Russell's Discussion of Judgment in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism : Did Russell have a Theory of Judgment in 1918?

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Korhonen , A 2018 , Russell's Discussion of Judgment in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism : Did Russell have a Theory of Judgment in 1918? in L D C Elkind & G Landini (eds) , The Philosophy of Logical Atomism : A Centenary Reappraisal . History of Analytic Philosophy , Palgrave Macmillan , pp. 221-244 . https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94364-0_10

Title: Russell's Discussion of Judgment in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism : Did Russell have a Theory of Judgment in 1918?
Author: Korhonen, Anssi
Other contributor: University of Helsinki, Department of Philosophy, History and Art Studies
Elkind, Landon D. C.
Landini, Gregory

Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Date: 2018-12
Language: eng
Number of pages: 24
Belongs to series: The Philosophy of Logical Atomism A Centenary Reappraisal
Belongs to series: History of Analytic Philosophy
ISBN: 978-3-319-94363-3
978-3-319-94364-0
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94364-0_10
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/322836
Abstract: Russell’s discussion of belief in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism is brief, tentative and mostly negative. The standard view has been that in the Lectures, Russell no longer believed in the multiple relation theory of judgment but was not yet in a position to articulate an alternative conception of belief; that came only a little later, with the psychological account of belief that is found in such works as On Propositions (1919) and The Analysis of Mind (1921). In this paper, I challenge the standard view. First, I present evidence to support the claim that the views that Russell held in 1918 at least leave room for a version of the multiple relation theory, albeit one that would be rather different from the view he held before. Second, I consider some key developments in Russell’s thinking about judgment during 1913–1918. These developments indicate the direction in which he may have been moving. Third, I present some speculation – partly relying on a recent work by Fraser MacBride – regarding a positive account of judgment in Russell’s Lectures; an important connection that emerges from this speculation is one between the multiple relation theory of judgment and the distinction between positive and negative facts
Subject: 611 Philosophy
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