Russell's Discussion of Judgment in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism : Did Russell have a Theory of Judgment in 1918?

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dc.contributor.author Korhonen, Anssi
dc.contributor.editor Elkind, Landon D. C.
dc.contributor.editor Landini, Gregory
dc.date.accessioned 2020-12-12T05:12:17Z
dc.date.available 2021-12-17T18:49:24Z
dc.date.issued 2018-12
dc.identifier.citation Korhonen , A 2018 , Russell's Discussion of Judgment in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism : Did Russell have a Theory of Judgment in 1918? in L D C Elkind & G Landini (eds) , The Philosophy of Logical Atomism : A Centenary Reappraisal . History of Analytic Philosophy , Palgrave Macmillan , pp. 221-244 . https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94364-0_10
dc.identifier.other PURE: 100589692
dc.identifier.other PURE UUID: 1c6259fd-695b-44d4-b422-da85e355bcd3
dc.identifier.other ORCID: /0000-0002-7399-7281/work/53513181
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10138/322836
dc.description.abstract Russell’s discussion of belief in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism is brief, tentative and mostly negative. The standard view has been that in the Lectures, Russell no longer believed in the multiple relation theory of judgment but was not yet in a position to articulate an alternative conception of belief; that came only a little later, with the psychological account of belief that is found in such works as On Propositions (1919) and The Analysis of Mind (1921). In this paper, I challenge the standard view. First, I present evidence to support the claim that the views that Russell held in 1918 at least leave room for a version of the multiple relation theory, albeit one that would be rather different from the view he held before. Second, I consider some key developments in Russell’s thinking about judgment during 1913–1918. These developments indicate the direction in which he may have been moving. Third, I present some speculation – partly relying on a recent work by Fraser MacBride – regarding a positive account of judgment in Russell’s Lectures; an important connection that emerges from this speculation is one between the multiple relation theory of judgment and the distinction between positive and negative facts en
dc.format.extent 24
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Palgrave Macmillan
dc.relation.ispartof The Philosophy of Logical Atomism
dc.relation.ispartofseries History of Analytic Philosophy
dc.relation.isversionof 978-3-319-94363-3
dc.relation.isversionof 978-3-319-94364-0
dc.rights.uri info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject 611 Philosophy
dc.title Russell's Discussion of Judgment in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism : Did Russell have a Theory of Judgment in 1918? en
dc.type Chapter
dc.contributor.organization Department of Philosophy, History and Art Studies
dc.contributor.organization Staff Services
dc.description.reviewstatus Peer reviewed
dc.relation.doi https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94364-0_10
dc.rights.accesslevel openAccess
dc.type.version acceptedVersion

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