Why is Behavioral Game a Game for Economists? : The concept of beliefs in equilibrium

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dc.contributor University of Helsinki, Practical Philosophy en
dc.contributor.author Nagatsu, Michiru
dc.contributor.author Lisciandra, Chiara
dc.contributor.editor Egashira, Susumu
dc.contributor.editor Taishido, Masanobu
dc.contributor.editor Hands, Wade
dc.contributor.editor Mäki, Uskali
dc.date.accessioned 2021-05-07T09:07:01Z
dc.date.available 2021-05-07T09:07:01Z
dc.date.issued 2021
dc.identifier.citation Nagatsu , M & Lisciandra , C 2021 , Why is Behavioral Game a Game for Economists? The concept of beliefs in equilibrium . in S Egashira , M Taishido , W Hands & U Mäki (eds) , The genealogy of self-interest in economics . Springer , Singapore , pp. 289-308 . https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9395-6_17 en
dc.identifier.isbn 978-981-15-9394-9
dc.identifier.isbn 978-981-15-9397-0
dc.identifier.isbn 978-981-15-9395-6
dc.identifier.other PURE: 121750798
dc.identifier.other PURE UUID: 198cfaaa-4eab-4d5d-b34a-d17f4107854f
dc.identifier.other ORCID: /0000-0001-6566-0307/work/94752754
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10138/329695
dc.description.abstract The interdisciplinary exchange between economists and psychologists has so far been more active and fruitful in the modifications of Expected Utility Theory than in those of Game Theory. We argue that this asymmetry may be explained by economists' specific way of doing equilibrium analysis of aggregate-level outcomes in their practice, and by psychologists' reluctance to fully engage with such practice. We focus on the notion of belief that is embedded in economists' practice of equilibrium analysis, more specifically Nash equilibrium, and argue that its difference from the psychological counterpart is one of the factors that makes interdisciplinary exchange in behavioral game theory more difficult. en
dc.format.extent 20
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.relation.ispartof The genealogy of self-interest in economics
dc.rights en
dc.subject 511 Economics en
dc.subject History of economic thought en
dc.subject History of Economics en
dc.subject 611 Philosophy en
dc.subject philosophy of science en
dc.subject philosophy of economics en
dc.title Why is Behavioral Game a Game for Economists? : The concept of beliefs in equilibrium en
dc.type Chapter
dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9395-6_17
dc.type.uri info:eu-repo/semantics/other

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