Frege, Carnap, and the Limits of Asserting

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Haaparanta , L 2019 , Frege, Carnap, and the Limits of Asserting . in H Appelqvist (ed.) , Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language . Routledge , Abingdon, Oxon , pp. 115-132 . https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351202671-6

Title: Frege, Carnap, and the Limits of Asserting
Author: Haaparanta, Leila
Other contributor: Appelqvist, Hanne
Contributor organization: Department of Philosophy, History and Art Studies
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 2019
Language: eng
Number of pages: 18
Belongs to series: Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language
ISBN: 978-0-8153-8501-1
978-1-351-20267-1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351202671-6
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/330499
Abstract: This paper applies the contemporary idea of the constitutive features of assertions to the texts of Gottlob Frege, Rudolf Carnap, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The focus is in Frege and Carnap, but a connection to Wittgenstein’s remarks on philosophy is indicated at the end of the paper. I intend to study and compare the three philosophers’ views on philosophical asserting and philosophical assertions. The question about the limits of language is thus posed in pragmatic terms, because it is formulated as a question about the limits set to linguistic acts labelled as assertings. I focus on Frege’s Begriffschrift (1879) and his Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884), and on Carnap’s article titled “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” (1950/1956); I then make a few remarks on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty. I argue that there are important connections between Frege’s and Carnap’s views on the limits of asserting. Their otherwise diverging positions are connected in that, as they show, it is not easy for philosophers themselves to comply with the norms they give for judging and asserting. I argue that while Frege does not make his attitude towards philosophical assertions explicit, the common core in Carnap’s and Wittgenstein’s texts is that the epistemic norms they give to assertions lead both to deny the possibility of philosophical assertions.
Subject: 611 Philosophy
judgment
assertion
knowledge
justification
Frege
Carnap
Wittgenstein
Peer reviewed: Yes
Rights: unspecified
Usage restriction: openAccess
Self-archived version: acceptedVersion


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