Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?

Show simple item record Korpela, Ville Lombardi, Michele Vartiainen, Hannu 2021-10-21T22:10:48Z 2022-08-04T02:45:13Z 2020-01
dc.identifier.citation Korpela , V , Lombardi , M & Vartiainen , H 2020 , ' Do coalitions matter in designing institutions? ' , Journal of Economic Theory , vol. 185 , 104953 .
dc.identifier.other PURE: 127638563
dc.identifier.other PURE UUID: d53930b8-2a06-47bb-a65c-893c1930ef89
dc.identifier.other RIS: urn:0D27778E3F32B0A3474880905628CB2F
dc.identifier.other WOS: 000509612200001
dc.description.abstract In this paper, we re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting where coalitions are fundamental behavioral units, and the outcomes of their interactions are predicted by applying the solution concept of the core. The planner's exercise includes designing a code of rights that specifies the collection of coalitions having the right to block one outcome by moving to another. A code of individual rights is a code of rights in which only unit coalitions may have blocking powers. We provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation (under core equilibria) by codes of rights, as well as by codes of individual rights. We also show that these two modes of implementation are not equivalent. The results are robust and extend to alternative notions of core, such as an externally stable core. Therefore, coalitions are shown to bring value added to institutional design. The characterization results address the limitations that restrict the relevance of the existing implementation theory. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. en
dc.format.extent 19
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartof Journal of Economic Theory
dc.rights cc_by_nc_nd
dc.rights.uri info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject Core
dc.subject EQUILIBRIUM
dc.subject GAMES
dc.subject Implementation theory
dc.subject Rights structure
dc.subject 511 Economics
dc.title Do coalitions matter in designing institutions? en
dc.type Article
dc.contributor.organization Economics
dc.contributor.organization Helsinki Centre of Economic Research (HECER), alayksikkö 2013-2021
dc.description.reviewstatus Peer reviewed
dc.relation.issn 0022-0531
dc.rights.accesslevel openAccess
dc.type.version acceptedVersion

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