Robot Responsibility and Moral Community

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http://hdl.handle.net/10138/336585

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Gogoshin , D L 2021 , ' Robot Responsibility and Moral Community ' , Frontiers in robotics and AI . https://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2021.768092

Title: Robot Responsibility and Moral Community
Author: Gogoshin, Dane Leigh
Contributor: University of Helsinki, Academic Disciplines of the Faculty of Social Sciences
Date: 2021-11-22
Language: eng
Belongs to series: Frontiers in robotics and AI
ISSN: 2296-9144
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/336585
Abstract: It is almost a foregone conclusion that robots cannot be morally responsible agents, both because they lack traditional features of moral agency like consciousness, intentionality, or empathy, and because of the apparent senselessness of holding them accountable. Moreover, although some theorists include them in the moral community as moral patients, on the Strawsonian picture of moral community as requiring moral responsibility, robots are typically excluded from membership. By looking closely at our actual moral responsibility practices, however, I determine that the agency reflected and cultivated by them is limited to the kind of moral agency of which some robots are capable, not the philosophically demanding sort behind the traditional view. Hence, moral rule-abiding robots (if feasible) can be sufficiently morally responsible and thus moral community members, despite certain deficits. Alternative accountability structures could address these deficits, which I argue ought to be in place for those existing moral community members who share these deficits.
Subject: 611 Philosophy
moral responsibility
moral agency
robot moral agency
artificial moral responsibility
accountability structures
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