Information Sharing in Banking: A Collusive Device?

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http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:951-555-648-1
Titel: Information Sharing in Banking: A Collusive Device?
Author: Gehrig, Thomas; Stenbacka, Rune
Medarbetare: Svenska handelshögskolan, Institutionen för nationalekonomi, nationalekonomi
Tillhör serie: Working Papers - 429
ISSN: 0357-4598
ISBN: 951-555-648-1
Abstrakt: We show that information sharing among banks may serve as a collusive device. An informational sharing agreement is an a-priori commitment to reduce informational asymmetries between banks in future lending. Hence, information sharing tends to increase the intensity of competition in future periods and, thus, reduces the value of informational rents in current competition. We contribute to the existing literature by emphasizing that a reduction in informational rents will also reduce the intensity of competition in the current period, thereby reducing competitive pressure in current credit markets. We provide a large class of economic environments, where a ban on information sharing would be strictly welfare-enhancing.
Permanenta länken (URI): http://hdl.handle.net/10227/134
URN:ISBN:951-555-648-1
Datum: 2000
Subject: information sharing
collusion
imperfectly competitive credit markets
Rights: Publikationen är skyddad av upphovsrätten. Den får läsas och skrivas ut för personligt bruk. Användning i kommersiellt syfte är förbjuden.


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