Information Sharing in Banking: A Collusive Device?

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dc.contributor Svenska handelshögskolan, Institutionen för nationalekonomi, nationalekonomi sv
dc.contributor Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration, Department of Economics, Economics en
dc.contributor.author Gehrig, Thomas
dc.contributor.author Stenbacka, Rune
dc.date.accessioned 2011-03-02T13:56:15Z
dc.date.available 2011-03-02T13:56:15Z
dc.date.issued 2000
dc.identifier.isbn 951-555-648-1
dc.identifier.issn 0357-4598
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10227/134
dc.identifier.uri URN:ISBN:951-555-648-1
dc.description.abstract We show that information sharing among banks may serve as a collusive device. An informational sharing agreement is an a-priori commitment to reduce informational asymmetries between banks in future lending. Hence, information sharing tends to increase the intensity of competition in future periods and, thus, reduces the value of informational rents in current competition. We contribute to the existing literature by emphasizing that a reduction in informational rents will also reduce the intensity of competition in the current period, thereby reducing competitive pressure in current credit markets. We provide a large class of economic environments, where a ban on information sharing would be strictly welfare-enhancing. fi
dc.format.extent 1837 bytes
dc.format.extent 93731 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.format.mimetype text/plain
dc.language.iso en
dc.publisher Svenska handelshögskolan sv
dc.publisher Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working Papers
dc.relation.ispartofseries 429
dc.rights Publikationen är skyddad av upphovsrätten. Den får läsas och skrivas ut för personligt bruk. Användning i kommersiellt syfte är förbjuden. sv
dc.rights This publication is copyrighted. You may download, display and print it for Your own personal use. Commercial use is prohibited. en
dc.rights Julkaisu on tekijänoikeussäännösten alainen. Teosta voi lukea ja tulostaa henkilökohtaista käyttöä varten. Käyttö kaupallisiin tarkoituksiin on kielletty. fi
dc.subject information sharing fi
dc.subject collusion fi
dc.subject imperfectly competitive credit markets fi
dc.subject.other Economics fi
dc.title Information Sharing in Banking: A Collusive Device? fi
dc.type.dcmitype Text

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