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Somali State Failure: Players, Incentives and Institutions

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dc.contributor Svenska handelshögskolan, institutionen för nationalekonomi, nationalekonomi sv
dc.contributor Hanken School of Economics, Department of Economics, Economics en
dc.contributor.author Ismail, Abdirashid A.
dc.date.accessioned 2010-06-02T13:52:59Z fi
dc.date.accessioned 2011-03-02T13:20:35Z
dc.date.available 2010-06-02T13:52:59Z fi
dc.date.available 2011-03-02T13:20:35Z
dc.date.issued 2010-06-02
dc.identifier.isbn 978-952-232-081-0
dc.identifier.issn 0424-7256
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10227/607
dc.identifier.uri URN:ISBN:978-952-232-081-0
dc.description.abstract In Somalia the central government collapsed in 1991 and since then state failure became a widespread phenomenon and one of the greatest political and humanitarian problems facing the world in this century. Thus, the main objective of this research is to answer the following question: What went wrong? Most of the existing literature on the political economy of conflict starts from the assumption that state in Africa is predatory by nature. Unlike these studies, the present research, although it uses predation theory, starts from the social contract approach of state definition. Therefore, rather than contemplating actions and policies of the rulers alone, this approach allows us to deliberately bring the role of the society – as citizens – and other players into the analyses. In Chapter 1, after introducing the study, a simple principal-agent model will be developed to check the logical consistence of the argument and to make the identification of causal mechanism easier. I also identify three main actors in the process of state failure in Somalia: the Somali state, Somali society and the superpowers. In Chapter 2, so as to understand the incentives, preferences and constraints of each player in the state failure game, I in some depth analyse the evolution and structure of three central informal institutions: identity based patronage system of leadership, political tribalism, and the Cold War. These three institutions are considered as the rules of the game in the Somali state failure. Chapter 3 summarises the successive civilian governments’ achievements and failures (1960-69) concerning the main national goals, national unification and socio-economic development. Chapter 4 shows that the military regime, although it assumed power through extralegal means, served to some extent the developmental interest of the citizens in the first five years of its rule. Chapter 5 shows the process, and the factors involved, of the military regime’s self-transformation from being an agent for the developmental interests of the society to a predatory state that not only undermines the interests of the society but that also destroys the state itself. Chapter 6 addresses the process of disintegration of the post-colonial state of Somalia. The chapter shows how the regime’s merciless reactions to political ventures by power-seeking opposition leaders shattered the entire country and wrecked the state institutions. Chapter 7 concludes the study by summarising the main findings: due to the incentive structures generated by the informal institutions, the formal state institutions fell apart. fi
dc.language.iso en
dc.publisher Svenska handelshögskolan sv
dc.publisher Hanken School of Economics en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Society
dc.relation.ispartofseries 212
dc.rights Publikationen är skyddad av upphovsrätten. Den får läsas och skrivas ut för personligt bruk. Användning i kommersiellt syfte är förbjuden. sv
dc.rights This publication is copyrighted. You may download, display and print it for Your own personal use. Commercial use is prohibited. en
dc.rights Julkaisu on tekijänoikeussäännösten alainen. Teosta voi lukea ja tulostaa henkilökohtaista käyttöä varten. Käyttö kaupallisiin tarkoituksiin on kielletty. fi
dc.subject state failure fi
dc.subject state collapse fi
dc.subject social contract fi
dc.subject principal-agent theory fi
dc.subject institutions fi
dc.subject tribalism fi
dc.subject patrimonial leadership fi
dc.subject cold war fi
dc.subject Somalia fi
dc.subject Barre fi
dc.subject military regime fi
dc.subject civilian regime fi
dc.subject.other Economics fi
dc.title Somali State Failure: Players, Incentives and Institutions fi
dc.type.ontasot Doctoral thesis en
dc.type.ontasot Väitöskirja fi
dc.type.ontasot Doktorsavhandling sv
dc.type.dcmitype Text
dc.date.accepted 2010-06-10

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