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## NORDISM AS A REMAKE OF THE NORDIC-SCANDINAVIAN PAN-NATIONALISM

*Peter Stadius*

The transformation from Scandinavianism to Nordism, and the replacement of the varying nineteenth-century interpretations of what the pan-Scandinavian idea stood for, has its established chronology. The final point of Scandinavianism is usually dated to the Danish defeat in 1864, and finally to the dissolution of the union between Sweden and Norway in 1905. The final “Indian summer” around 1900 was replaced by a “Nordic winter,” a state of affairs that would last one decade.<sup>1</sup> The first sign of a re-emerging pan-Scandinavian or pan-Nordic initiative is in this chronology occupied by what was to be called the Three Kings Meeting in Malmö in December 1914. What actually was a meeting between three foreign ministers was also the first time the kings of Sweden and Norway met in an official event, giving this political meeting an added symbolical value.<sup>2</sup>

The result of the meeting was a joint declaration of neutrality in the Great War that had started some months earlier. The foreign ministers would meet again in 1917 when deciding upon mutual assistance in exchange of goods to relieve home market shortages. By the end of the war, the idea of keeping up with this cooperation found supporters among several leading politicians and industrialists. Even if the most far-fetched visions of a tariff-free inner market were not made reality, the seeds for Nordic cooperation and for what would be labelled as “Nordist” ideas had been sown. Only after the Second World War did the official Nordic cooperation become reality with the establishment of the parliamentary cooperation body, the Nordic Council, in 1952.

The concepts “Nordism” and “Nordist” first appear in the 1920s,<sup>3</sup> but it took a while before that term rooted itself in common speech, and it was only after the Second World War that these terms apparently became widely used, a practice that has persisted until this day. However, in the early 1920s the idea of Scandinavianism was gradually replaced by the practice of pan-Nordic cooperation, and the principles guiding Nordic cooperation and a pan-Nordic idea were

formed during these decades. If we look at the various expressions and actions in favour of Nordic cooperation, it is evident that concepts and discourses vary during these years. We find both seemingly tradition-bound reuse of Scandinavianist rhetoric, as well as a very cautious Nordic cooperation discourse in accepting only a cooperation culture where all “neo-Scandinavianist” tendencies would be declined in favour of a total respect for each nation’s independence.<sup>4</sup>

The interplay between internal and external factors, as defined by Iver B. Neumann, both changed in context. When Neumann refers to inside-out and outside-in dynamics of pan-regional movements, he sees the former as the culture-based identity formation process, working out of the premises of a common cultural heritage. The latter refers in his typology to the fact that regional cooperation often stems from a detected need to find viable geopolitical solutions when facing outside threats.<sup>5</sup> Here lies the core and the essence of Nordism, i.e. a combination of the nineteenth-century Scandinavianist idea of belonging to a common transnational region on the one hand, and the logics of small state cooperation in order to muster strength when facing outside threats. Eventually this latter would also develop into a mutual self-identification of the Nordics as a humanitarian power of considerable size and importance in the international community.<sup>6</sup> Also, the internally felt sense of belonging, or the benchmarking of national identity with a Nordic element,<sup>7</sup> one of the backbones in Nordic pan-nationalism, underwent a process of modernisation. It would gradually embrace the idea of Nordic people and societies as an avant-garde in modern social engineering, as well as it developed a sharper ideological positioning as an anti-fascist pan-nationalism.

In this chapter the emerging Nordic cooperation practice and culture will be studied mainly through one central civil society organisation, the Norden Association (*Foreningen Norden*), which was funded as three distinctive national branches in 1919 and consolidated as an all-Nordic network of national associations with the addition of an Icelandic and Finnish branch in 1922 and 1924 respectively. As recent scholarship has concluded, one fruitful way of studying pan-nationalisms is to rather look at the persons, actions and articulations, in short “categories of practice,” rather than aiming at fitting various movements into theoretical models of success/failure criterion.<sup>8</sup> The dominating feature in the re-emerged Nordic cooperation in the inter-war years was the emergence of NGOs that have proven long-lasting. Their role in the period under study is crucial, albeit also the political turn of events go hand in hand with this development. Consequently, the actors of Nordic cooperation and the promoters of a Nordist idea need to be studied.

## From Scandinavianism to Nordic cooperation

When the concept of “Norden” replaced “Skandinavien” as the mainly used name for the region and the practice of pan-national building efforts, it also signified a redefinition of the nature of the region’s pan-nationalist self-articulations.

There were several reasons for this conceptual shift. Both concepts as geographical and political concepts have a longer history, although Norden is more used than Scandinavia in the early modern period, and a rough assessment is that while Scandinavia transformed from a geographical concept into a political concept during the nineteenth century and the Scandinavianist movement, Norden remained a vague but still culturally value-laden geographical concept during that century.<sup>9</sup> Norden was a pan-national symbol in many patriotic songs, and “Norden” and “nord,” literary “the north” in Scandinavian (and German) languages, both appear in the later canonised Swedish (Richard Dybäck 1844) and Finnish (J.L. Runeberg 1848) national anthems which are still sung today.

However, it remains clear that there was never a completely fixed norm for using Scandinavia and Norden, and nor is there any such still today if we look at it from a broader international perspective. Both terms are still used interchangeably in the public sphere. The diversity of content and definitions is typical of any nationalist or pan-nationalist movement, but the Scandinavian-Nordic case stands out with its self-naming confusion. Most other European pan-nationalisms do not have this ambiguity. To some extent the inter-changeability of pan-Turanism and pan-Turkism has a matching character.<sup>10</sup> But perhaps the only real point of comparison would be the development of the pan-Illyrian movement as a southern section of pan-Slavism. Also, the overlapping but distinct conceptual pair Latin/Mediterranean could be included in such a category.<sup>11</sup> However, in neither case there is such a persisting confusion of naming that partially has lasted until this day.

If we still wish to create order in the self-naming confusion, some particular developments can be found. When Scandinavia gradually ceded as the geographical denomination for the pan-national efforts, it was partly because of the failure of its political programme. Since no Scandinavian United Kingdom or union would see the light of the day, political Scandinavianism had failed in the light of the most ambitious plans, and thus also Scandinavia as a political concept became contaminated and burdened with negative associations from the recent past. In addition, the break-up of the union between Sweden and Norway added further shadows on the notion since the union geographically had covered the Scandinavian Peninsula. A further aspect that motivated the replacement of Scandinavia with Norden was the emergence of Finland and Iceland as sovereign states. The two Scandinavian realms had become five Nordic nation-states, as Finland retook a Nordic orientation after a century as an autonomous Grand Duchy (1809–1917) in the Russian Empire, and Iceland had become a sovereign state in 1918 in a personal union with the Danish king.

The rebirth of the Nordic/Scandinavian pan-national idea and project was not just a matter of changing one name with another. Even if many of the established forums for cooperation persisted, such as the Nordic Lawyers' Meetings (running since 1872), the main principles for cooperation would change. The new Nordic cooperation that replaced Scandinavianism was built upon a restrictive attitude towards deeper integration efforts, which had been an explicit demand

from the Norwegian side in the 1920s.<sup>12</sup> In the aftermath of the union break-up, and with Finland's independence in 1917 and Iceland practically becoming independent in 1918 (formally in 1944), there was a common understanding for and respect towards the sovereignty of each Nordic partner.

The primacy of the nation-state also was a sign of the times in the inter-war period, and these two factors solidified the subordination of Nordic pan-nationalism in relation to the nation-state nationalisms.<sup>13</sup> What later would be referred to as Nordism built upon the "Olympic principle" of each participant representing his or her nation under its flag, and thus firmly framed in a national identity.<sup>14</sup> Nordism in the 1920s and 1930s was never a serious threat and competitor to nation-states, and as such there is no element of what has been referred to as othering, i.e. the phenomenon of a competing pan-nationalism in outright conflict with the nation-state.<sup>15</sup>

The inter-war period is also a specific period in the development of pan-nationalisms. The shift from a *Völker* idea of cultural-linguistic pairing with liberal ideas towards a Darwinist struggle and geopolitics context emerged already in the late nineteenth century. What has been referred to as a biologisation of nationalism and pan-nationalism was obviously a factor also in the Nordic case.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, it was also logical that the age of Nordism developed a different relation to the concept of race. In comparison to other pan-national movements, Nordism did not make race a main point, but rather a more implicitly present dimension in the framing of Nordic essence.<sup>17</sup> Pan-Germanism and pan-Latinism had different developments, where the entanglements with scientific racism as part of fascist ideology are more present.

In the German case this meant that the challenge to the Pan-German League presented after the Great War by the German Worker's Party (1919–20), and its successor NSDAP (1920–45) became a hegemonic overtaking culminating in the 1933 electoral victory and the following political path chosen. As Roger Chickering has noted:

The turmoil of war, revolution, and civil war expanded and altered radically the character of the German-national public realm. The older patriotic societies (or their successors) and other "national organizations" of the imperial period found themselves in the early 1920s amidst a network of new groups – paramilitary formations, political parties, and radical antisemitic societies – all of which claimed to speak or act in the name of the nation.<sup>18</sup>

Even if the Pan-German League developed strategies to maintain its influence, it soon became clear that German nationalism under an Austrian-born dictator had adopted an aggressive, biologised and expansive pan-German doctrine with a clear aim to convert it into political action. In many ways this example is illustrative of the longer development of pan-nationalisms, from cultural to power politics.

Even if Nordism in theory had many common historical, cultural and mythological components to share, the interpretation of modernity, politics and social order was to be very different. There was never a serious far right wing and fascist challenge to the central actors and discourses on Nordic cooperation. The reason for this is manifold. In Germany the combination of a very firmly rooted scholarly and political doctrine of German border-colonial expansion in combination with a sense of humiliation connected to the Versailles Peace 1918 created a very tense atmosphere that can be compared to the state of a cold war. The idea of expanding and clashing civilisational spheres seems to have created some kind of basic necessity for expansion essential to pan-Germanism in the inter-war years. Already in 1913, the German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg had in a speech anticipated a violent and apocalyptic clash between Germans and Slavs.<sup>19</sup>

The Nordic situation was very different, with no immediate war experience nor trauma, except for the Finnish Civil War of 1918, where Swedish volunteers had fought on the white side as an act of anti-Bolshevism. Otherwise, having stayed neutral during the war was a logical outcome of realist small state policy, where securing status quo and peace was the major aim. After the war Denmark regained a considerable part of southern Jutland, as a consequence of Germany's war loss. The regaining in 1920 of the sites for the Dybbøl battle of 1864 gave Denmark the chance to re-nationalise the battlefield as a Danish memory site.<sup>20</sup> As part of this plan a memorial for the Nordic volunteers was erected in 1936. The central obelisk is surrounded by four cornerstones for each Nordic neighbour country. On the obelisk's plinth an inscription reads:

Finnish, Icelandic, Norwegian and Swedish men fought as volunteers in the battles 1848–50 and 1864 for the Danishness of Southern Jutland. Danes erected this memorial.<sup>21</sup>

A poem accompanies the text, reading: "The hand you gave/ the blood that was shed/ the sacrifice you made/ tied us together." The text represents standard nationalistic war memorial rhetoric but is also a symbol of how Nordic cooperation and togetherness became part of the Danish anti-German memory culture. The fact that only very few Icelandic, Finnish and Norwegian volunteers actually fought in these wars on the Danish side is over-shadowed by the need to portray Nordic unity in the latter half of the 1930s, when Germany again posed an aggressive and expansionist attitude. By this time Nordic cooperation, as a consequence of the changed geopolitical situation, had become more instrumental, and plans for a permanent parliamentary cooperative body as well as for security cooperation were already sketched.<sup>22</sup>

Simultaneously a shared vision of how to approach the challenges posed by "mass society" was in the making connecting the emerging social democratic-driven welfare state policies to both practical Nordic cooperation and to the forging of a new element in the Nordic self-narrative.

## The Norden Associations

The main conducting forces of Nordic cooperation in the inter-war years were civil society organisations. Among the various NGOs funded just after the Great War in order to promote the retaken Nordic pan-nationalist initiatives, the most important was the Norden Association. The Norden Association actually consisted of five separate national organisations, which perfectly embodies the principle of nation-state primacy. The original idea presented in 1919 to fund *one* Norden association was altered, in order to meet Norwegian expectations.<sup>23</sup> Fear of being redrawn into an asymmetrical power relation with its two former dominant Scandinavian counterparts was the leading idea among Norwegians. The cooperation during the world war had broken the ice-cold relationship between Norway and Sweden, but still utter caution was employed.

During the entire inter-war period the Norwegian partners in this form of Nordic cooperation maintained a stand which clearly wanted to limit the cooperation to low key enlightenment activities promoting knowledge about each other among the Nordic countries. “Knowledge gives friendship” was the slogan proposed by the Norwegian board member Johan Ludwig Mowinkel, illustrating the Norwegian stand.<sup>24</sup> Any proposals hinting at a deeper integration were rejected as “amalgamism,” a term that had been coined during the Swedish-Norwegian union, or as “neo-Scandinavianism,” which was understood as an anachronistic strategy to revive an already failed political Scandinavianist project.<sup>25</sup> The newly established principles of Nordic cooperation, against any kind of excessive Danish and/or Swedish supremacy, were further consolidated by the founding of the Norden Associations in Iceland in 1922 and in Finland in 1924. The Icelandic association came to see the light after a heavy campaign by the three founding partners since there was a strong feeling that the Nordic family would not be completed without an Icelandic participation.<sup>26</sup> The activities within the Icelandic branch remained very modest during the first decade; by 1930 the association had 90 members, but eventually the Icelandic Norden association would become an active and integrated part of this NGO group.<sup>27</sup>

The Finnish case was a bit different since it took until 1924 before a Norden Association was established. Earlier attempts and initiatives around 1919–20 had failed due to two main reasons. Firstly, the Swedish Norden Associations’ leading members were hesitant about the status of the newly independent Finland, which had been part of the Russian Empire for over hundred years, and just gone through a brutal civil war in 1918. The dispute over the Åland Islands, ruled in Finland’s favour by the League of Nations in 1921, also affected Swedish sentiments towards Finland at that very moment. Secondly, there was a concern that the Finnish branch would become dominated by Swedish speakers of Finland. Some circles within this group had presented a plan that the Finnish branch would only be for Swedish speakers, and that other Scandinavians living in Finland could become members.<sup>28</sup> Here, there was a concern for the influence of the Greater Sweden ideology through the National Association for the

Preservation of Swedishness Abroad (*Riksföreningen för svenskhetens bevarande i utlandet*), who had actively established contacts and branches in Finland.<sup>29</sup> Since this organisation was openly hostile towards Nordic cooperation, it had to be assured that the Finnish Norden Association would have a wider national base. On the Finnish nationalist side, the agrarian party and organisations like the Academic Karelia Society were also strongly opposed to a Nordic orientation. The former had been the political backbone for the Fennoman movement, and the latter was an activist society founded on the bases of a Greater Finland ideology. Finally, in 1924 a consensus among Finnish- and Swedish-speaking political forces, both in favour of what was seen as a Scandinavian political culture based on the rule of law, managed to give birth to a bilingual association officially named “Norden, an association in Finland for Nordic cooperation,” in concordance with the official name of the other chapters.<sup>30</sup>

One of the leading proponents of the Norden Association was the Danish industrialist Aleksander Foss, chairman of the Danish Industrial Council (*Industrirådet*) and parliamentarian, who personally was driven both by commercial interests and by security concerns. The first board of all three national associations was occupied by the representatives of the highest circles in society, including politicians, civil servants and university professors. The Norwegian board was chaired by Edvard Hagerup-Bull, leader of the right-wing party *Høyre*'s parliamentary group in the Norwegian parliament *Stortinget*, experienced through various stints as cabinet member as well as judge of the Supreme Court. Besides Anders Buen, the speaker of *Stortinget* and leader of the social democratic parliament group, and the university professors Halfdan Koht and Fredrik Stang, the board also counted with some heavyweight representation from corporate business. Johan Throne Holst was the owner and CEO of Norway's leading chocolate factory Freia, and in 1916 he had started a similar company Marabou in Sweden. He was a lifelong Nordist, who saw a connection between business and culture.<sup>31</sup> Johan Ludwig Mowinckel was a prominent figure in the shipping business, but also politically active within the liberal party *Venstre*. He had served as member of parliament and later during the inter-war period he was appointed cabinet member several times, including three different periods as Prime Minister. Mowinckel was an active proponent of free trade, and his involvement in the Norden Association was motivated by the lobbying for developing the wartime exchange of goods into a Nordic free trade agreement.

The fact that the Norden Association boards were stacked with the utmost political, academic and business elite needs further consideration. In the Norwegian case there was certainly a strategic national interest to monitor the development of the association, thus the broad parliamentary base, but that is just a side story. One may also notice the consensual representation of all main right-centre-left parties on the Norwegian Norden Association board, a phenomenon that was matched in the Swedish and Danish boards as well. However, no radical parties, be it communists or fascist parties, were part of the association's recruitment base. What is striking is that while similar associations in the nineteenth

century had been short-lived and not seldom met with distrust for political and reliability reasons, the new Nordic associations would both become long-lived and form an accepted part of the interplay between official authorities and civil society actors.<sup>32</sup> Not seldom did important persons sit on many chairs, and the Nordic associations became forums for testing ideas that were still too bold to be implemented politically. Thus, an NGO like the Norden Association would at times serve a lobbying platform for Nordic cooperation in high politics. In the beginning the results were not that prominent, but eventually these organisations pushed forward Nordic cooperation making a clear impact towards the official parliamentary cooperation established in 1952.

The commitment and engagement of the elite had many reasons and further implications. Firstly, the commercial interests for lowered trade barriers were a political question connected to the active promotion of Nordic cooperation. Secondly, the recent war, albeit the three Nordic kingdoms had remained neutral, still was a crude reminder of the still prevailing geopolitical threats in the south and in the east. The rapprochement labelled Nordic made by the governments 1914–18 came from the highest political level, and the initiative to create lobbying NGOs was in tight connection to certain sectors of that elite. The executive circles of the associations were part of the establishment. Their political competition came mainly from stricter nationalism and to some extent from communism and fascism.

### **The elite in search of a demos**

The Norden Associations were essentially top-down elitist organisations in the beginning, whose main goal was to foster pro-Nordic policies and eventually to create a popular base for these. This early elitism has often been brought up as a revelation and honest observation of the fact that these organisations originally were not popular movements, implicitly indicating this as a negative feature.<sup>33</sup> This criticism goes back to the 1930s and 1940s as part of an internal self-criticism within the movement. Nils Herlitz, who had been part of the Swedish board since the beginning reflected over this in 1944 stating, “that those who were part of the Nordic movement from the beginning cannot escape the question if the association would have done more and according to other principles.”<sup>34</sup> This was opportunistic hindsight and fitted an anti-elitist and egalitarian Nordic self-image that has been part of a teleological narrative on the evolution of Nordic cooperation in the twentieth century.

This is to a high degree tied to the inter-connection between the rising power position of the Nordic social democratic parties and the intensified Nordic cooperation in the 1930s. It also ties back to an egalitarian self-narrative of nineteenth-century nation-building in the Nordic region. However, it is also worth pointing out that the transnational “elitist” position must be understood in the context of competing nationalism, and also in the context of which groups in society had the capacity to think and act in transnational terms. A transnationally

competent and orientated sector of society has generally been a precondition in a successful pan-nationalist agency in comparison with nationalisms.<sup>35</sup> The dominating critical narrative of 1920s Nordism as elitist has seldom been contested through this argument, with perhaps the only exception of Danish historian Lorenz Rerup, who has pointed out that the Norden Associations and other similar organisations probably would never have seen the light of day without the transnational perspectives provided by certain key actors familiar to international surroundings. He sees no capacity within the emerging middle class at this point to be able to concretely bridge national borders in order to shape a Nordic community.<sup>36</sup>

This being said, there was a constant concern among the board members to reach a more popular member base. The challenge posed by an emerging mass society was urgently sensed and many strategies articulated from a patronising but enthusiastic perspective. Valfrid Palmgren Munch-Petersen, one of the more active board member contributors in the annual Norden yearbook, expressed this need to create a popular base, “so that the peoples of Norden eventually would learn to think and feel not only in national but in in Nordic terms.” She also added that the association, representing “the smartest among our people,” should work for awakening, “the free will to follow the call of nature who invites the Nordic peoples to live together as brothers of the same tribe.”<sup>37</sup> These ideas were already very close to neo-Scandinavianist ideas and the earlier Swedish Royal Library clerk Palmgren Munch-Petersen working as Swedish language lecturer at the University of Copenhagen had constant clashes about the association’s strategy with her Norwegian antagonist Edvard Hagerup-Bull. The Swedish board member and historian Eli Hekscher supported a deeper integration vision. He asked for more ambitious action in the form of ambulating university courses, and generally deploring how the World War had “numbed the senses for both righteousness and common sense” among “the civilized mankind.”<sup>38</sup> A similar patronising discourse was presented by the bishop and professor of theology Edvard Rodhe, when speaking to the participants of a Danish-Swedish summer meeting in Kullen on the Swedish west coast in 1924. He thanked the Norden Associations for arranging “meetings like these which make a difference in the education of the people,” and he added that “we want a united Norden” since he felt that the unity between Nordic peoples was something unique. Finally, he asked God, “who steers the faith of nations, to protect Norden.”<sup>39</sup>

This top-down constellation did not bring great results for membership numbers until the late 1930s, but already during the first decade a myriad of activities made the association an important actor. The number of various professional group summer courses and meetings is to be counted in hundreds. School teachers, journalists, merchants, farmers, dairy producers, gardeners and school children count among some of the groups that were specifically targeted for all-Nordic activities.<sup>40</sup> All in all, the Norden associations were estimated to have arranged 99 courses and meetings for a total of 13 171 participants during the first 20 years, 1919–39.<sup>41</sup> The meetings were often facilitated by efforts to

conceive lower fares from the respective national railroad companies, and often chartered trains would bring the participants to the meeting venue.

The strategy to battle what was seen as harmful animosity between the Nordic nations also resulted in a school history book committee that undertook various initiatives to harmonise the content concerning how past history was presented with regard to past wars and animosities between the Scandinavian kingdoms. The subject had been constantly on the agenda since the start of 1919, and many were the lobbying efforts of the national school authorities. Finally, in 1933 the Norden Associations decided on a major revision of school history books in all Nordic countries.<sup>42</sup> The aim was to erase what was referred to as chauvinism, and to make place for a more sensible patriotism that also acknowledged the close kinship between all Nordic nations. These activities were conducted by a quite small group of people, all active in the Norden Associations. The success of their activity is difficult to measure, and there were various forms of national contesting of the committee's proposals. The most visible result of the committee, which officially functioned until 1972, was a report published in 1937 with the title "Nordic school books in history: a mutual review conducted by the expert councils of the Norden Associations."<sup>43</sup>

It was not, however, until the labour movement organisations joined the Nordic cause during the 1930s that the true broadening of the member base took place. During the heydays of Scandinavianism, the university students as representing the future of the nation had performed the role of an active member base for the cause. In the inter-war era of democratisation and modernisation, the popular support would be mobilised from a combination of civic citizenship of the educated bourgeoisie and the active support of workers, in what was to be labelled as "Workers Scandinavianism."<sup>44</sup> The Nordic social democratic labour unions had in 1932 intensified its cooperation dating back to 1886, and as a result a cooperation committee SAMAK was founded. The obvious converging interest in the aspirations for worker's rights was coupled with the advancements of what was later to be known as a Nordic welfare state model.<sup>45</sup>

This made Nordic cooperation a relevant forum for the revisionist Nordic political left. The pressure to reform the Norden Associations grew stronger, and the criticism towards the elitist and patronising elements was voiced. One expression used to criticise earlier practices was "banquet Nordism," a critical reference to what was seen as a cooperation practice where fancy gala banquets and bombastic speeches dominated over grassroots popular mobilisation.<sup>46</sup> As a marking point for the new direction Sweden's social democratic Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson published an article in the Norden Associations common Yearbook in 1937 under the title "Workers Scandinavianism."<sup>47</sup> Besides the obvious conceptual lingering between nineteenth- and twentieth-century pan-nationalistic language, within the labour movement the use of Scandinavianism was explicit, as it might have seemed more in line with the internationalism so central. The political leader of Sweden explicitly stated that the Nordic social democratic parties were now ready to take a major role in the Nordic cooperation movement: "The

labour Scandinavianism in its enlarged Nordic form is now completely merging into the general aspirations for a Nordic concord.”<sup>48</sup> Further the Swedish leader pointed to SAMAK as a vital organisation for Nordic cooperation, and he also reminded the readers of the importance of unity, “when it concerns the acting of the Nordic states towards the exterior in international politics.”<sup>49</sup>

The chairman of the Swedish chapter of the Norden Association, the social democrat Torsten Nothin, was also in line with the interest shown by P.M. Hansson. He urged for making special efforts to attract new members to the association in order to make it into a proper popular movement. By early 1929 the total number of members in all five chapters had risen to 5000 persons, indicating a steady increase during the first ten years of existence.<sup>50</sup> In Denmark the membership count amounted to 3000 persons by 1939. Despite all efforts it would take an external shock to alter the picture drastically. It was the outbreak of the Second World War that made the membership numbers reach until then unimaginable heights. The outbreak of the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union was the spark that made all previous efforts and preparations become reality. Between 1939 and 1945 the membership total rose drastically, and by the end of the war the Norden associations had almost 70 000 members.<sup>51</sup> The main reason was the general public outcry in support for Finland, which made people join the Norden Association as an act of solidarity. The labour unions effectively promoted membership and also employer’s organisations did the same in Sweden. The most striking case was Denmark where basically all union members joined a massive support for Nordic solidarity during the war. By 1945 the Danish Norden Association had over 50 000 members. This phenomenon has been called the Nordic awakening or the Nordic revival,<sup>52</sup> and as such it constituted a popular support and mandate for government-driven Nordic cooperation after the war.

### **Nordic self-constructing discourses in the inter-war period**

A value-based Nordic self-image as defenders of rule of law, democracy and egalitarianism both internationally and in their own societies grew into a self-understanding where the Nordic countries perceived themselves as defending something precious and morally higher against the evils imposed by two powerful neighbours. The geopolitical David and Goliath constellation was conceptualised as a fight for a common set of Nordic values that were seen as universal. The higher quest for the Nordic pan-nationalism was to secure the survival and freedom of this region, and as such the idea of forming a democratic and progressive ante-murale against totalitarianism and aggressive expansionism set the tone for Nordist self-understanding. The idea of a specific form of “Nordic democracy” became the intellectual basis for Nordic cooperation.<sup>53</sup> The idea of a specific form of Nordic democracy was launched in 1930 mainly from the left, partly as an act of contesting domestic conservative politics. This compares to the liberal political agenda of the mid-nineteenth Scandinavianism.

As the reformist left made a quest for occupying a leadership role in Nordic cooperation, one emblematic moment was the celebration of the “Day of Nordic Democracy,” in Malmö, in August 1935. A strong sense of democracy being in crisis on the European continent was made into a counter-image of what was conceptualised as Nordic democracy. The event was arranged by the Swedish Social Democratic Youth organisation, and strategically it coincided with the Socialist Youth International congress held in Copenhagen. In total some 20 000 people had gathered for the two events, and in Malmö four Nordic social democratic leaders, Per Albin Hansson, Väinö Tanner (Finland), H.P. Hansen (Denmark) and Johan Nygaardsvold (Norway), all gave speeches.<sup>54</sup> They all stressed how their movement was future oriented and represented a new form of modernity. The Norwegian Nygaardsvold also added that, “if we want to achieve a strong and secure bulwark against the European dictatorship infection, it has to be created by and with the working class.”<sup>55</sup> This conceptual border-drawing practice included “a duty towards all mankind” to take up the battle for democracy.

The Norden Associations were attentive to follow up the public mass manifestations by the labour movement, and the very next year “Norden’s Day” was arranged on 27 October 1936 in all five Nordic capitals. The explicit aim was to reach all citizens and promote a broader popular support for the associations and for the Nordic cause in general. The event was broadcasted over national radio, as all four heads of state gave a speech on the occasion. The event is also known for presenting for the first time the allegory of five swans symbolising Nordic cooperation. Based on a poem by Dane Hans Hartvig Seedorff Pedersen this motive was recurring in the extensive advertisement in mass media and also on the cover of a song book printed in a 200 000 copies edition.<sup>56</sup> That symbol has later established itself as the flag of official Nordic cooperation.

The political development towards increased totalitarian regimes in the vicinity made the Nordic discourse easier to grasp as a pan-regionalist self-identification. And as seen, it was not only the Social Democratic party that conceived a pan-Nordic value-based vision. The explicit statement against totalitarianism in all its forms, born in a world of tensions and geopolitical threats, was widely embraced. In domestic politics, it was also connected to a specific political consensual bargaining between the left and the agrarians and between employer’s organisations and labour unions. The form of Nordism practised and endorsed by the generally more conservative and paternalistic Norden Association inner circles thus far did not stand that far from the ideas social democratic leadership was articulating. Much of this tradition was tied to older structures such as the Nordic Lawyers’ Meetings, started in 1872 and retaking its practice of regular meetings every third or fourth year. When the 13th meeting was held in Helsinki 1925, the chair of the Finnish organising committee Julius Grotenfelt welcomed his 400 Nordic fellow lawyers with the following words:

Therefore, we the Finnish lawyers who have endured past decades of ardent fight for the preservation of lawful order and principles in our

country against heavy attacks, now with outmost satisfaction greet this day, when the guardians of western law and legal culture in Norden have gathered here in large numbers for this general assembly in our independent country.<sup>57</sup>

This forum representing the establishment cultivated a strong discourse of the Nordic countries standing as beacons for a western legal tradition. In the Finnish case this had been part of the national constitutional struggle during the last 20 years as part of the Russian Empire. This in combination with the emerging totalitarian tendencies and increased geopolitical threats provided a context for a Nordist self-celebratory discourse. Unlike pan-Germanism, the Nordist discourse was not expansive in geographical terms, since that was not a feasible future outlook, but rather defensive. An era that saw a logic of expansion and evolution towards bigger units as a sign of civilisational strength also saw pan-nationalist movements adhere to claims for so-called life space.<sup>58</sup> The “biologisation” of nationalism, the steady shift from a *Völker* ideology towards a more social-Darwinist view meant that international law constantly was under pressure from a major power imposed expansionism.<sup>59</sup> The bulwark idea sprung from a figure of thought where the Nordic people had to protect the lawful and democratic values essential to their societies. It also contained an intrinsic reference to possessing reason in a world of turmoil, thus hinting at a moral supremacy of the northernmost nations of Europe.

A brief look at developments within the pan-Latinist sphere during the same decades also offers an interesting contrast to the Nordic case. From the Franco-Prussian War 1870–71 up until the First World War pan-Latinist thinking and practice had evolved much around a counter-narrative to Anglo-Saxon and other northern hegemony imposed by the process of biologisation of nationalism. A sense of being marginalised and meridionalised was acute among the Latin nations.<sup>60</sup> When the British prime minister Lord Salisbury in a speech in 1898 referred to how there were only two categories of nations, the living and the dying, he referred to Europe’s Latin nations concerning the latter category. Otto von Bismarck at one point referred to Latin nations as the feminine race of Europe.<sup>61</sup> In this sense pan-Latinism was also much evolved around the idea of a defensive battle that had to capitalise on immaterial capital in its self-empowering discourse.<sup>62</sup> In the Latin case it would be the superiority of culture and civilisation that became the cornerstone for a common struggle, while the Nordic self-image evolved around the idea of representing true democracy and standing as morally superior common sense representatives and defenders of law and order in international relations.

During the First World War, however, a new strategic constellation emerged as a Franco-Italian approach became one way of countering the German threat in France. Italy as a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary did not participate in the war, and in 1915 the alliance expired. After the

war a considerable number of public intellectuals saw this scenario in a positive light alluding to a common Latin identity. This also in many cases included an approval to Mussolini's fascist ideology.<sup>63</sup> Even if the diversity of ideological stands was considerable, still the fact that fascism figured as one of the important forums for pan-nationalist Latin action during the inter-war years makes it different from the Nordic case.<sup>64</sup> Another slight difference was the centrality of "race" in the Latin case in comparison with a more implicit, but nonetheless relevant, discourse in the Nordic region. Especially the Italian debate paid attention to the race question, since it was also seen as part of a national north-south question, the *questione meridionale*.<sup>65</sup> A division appeared between those who disqualified scientific racism and the theories of Aryan supremacy, and those who contemplated over the future of the Latin nations from a perspective that accepted the idea of Latin backwardness and lagging behind in modern progress. This was very much also the situation in Spain, while the French saw themselves (as did others in the Latin world) as the leaders of a trans-Atlantic pan-region. The term "raza" also always contained a less racist connotation in the Hispanic world, as it in many Latin American countries also alludes to the mestizaje of European and indigenous elements in the nation, but in a more cultural sense than in an anthropological sense.

In the Nordic case there is no such understanding of mixing Nordic with indigenous elements, and the classic German-based *Volk/folk* definition of each Nordic nation persisted through the first half of the twentieth century. The Nordic-Aryan racist discourse was, however, generally much stronger in Germany and in the USA, even if it was not absent in the Nordic region.<sup>66</sup> Internally the Sámi and Inuit communities in Norden served as contrasting population groups where racism discourse was the order of the day, and mainstream racist discourse was not uncommon even within the labour movements at least until 1933 and the change of power in Germany.

## Conclusion

The re-emergence of a pan-nationalist idea in the Nordic countries under the label of Nordism and Nordic cooperation was both a continuation and a break from nineteenth-century Scandinavianism. Utter caution was employed just after the First World War to point out the novelty and changed principles of this idea. If we compare Nordism and its content and practices, the high level of institutionalisation, continuity and especially the evident support Nordism had in the highest political and social spheres stand out. Nordic cooperation of the inter-war period has more in common with top-down state-driven integration projects, such as the European integration process after the Second World War, than it has with nineteenth-century pan-nationalist practices. Instead of striving for uniting a pan-nation as one based on a national-romantic ideology, Nordic cooperation strove towards a governmental cooperation as an act of rationality and sensible politics.

A vital part of Nordism was a culture of cooperation practices that in many ways had survived from the nineteenth century and which was reinforced vigorously during the inter-war period. The cooperation became in many ways the achieved goal of Nordic cooperation, and during the inter-war periods no serious proposals for a federal Nordic state were presented. During the dramatic years of the Second World War this would change for a short moment when some pamphlets urging for a future federal state saw the light of day. However, after the war it was precisely the base of civil society cooperation practice in combination with a common will to institutionalise official Nordic cooperation that paved the way for a comparatively highly institutionalised, both unofficial and official, Nordic cooperation. By then also to identify oneself as a Nordist slowly became a self-imposed identity. The bases for a high popular acceptance of Nordic cooperation became a fact during the Cold War due both to external pressures and to internally edified sense of Nordic solidarity which had broad popular support.

In Norden pan-nationalism did not emerge as a response to multi-ethnicity since the nation-state primacy in combination with the incapacity to recognise linguistic and ethnic minorities meant that Nordism was firstly an idea of protecting the region against outside threats. Rather the emerging Nordism was based on what Tim van Gerven in his typology refers to as brothering, by which is meant a state when national and pan-national identities are subsidiary. Also, the concept of benchmarking applies to the Nordic case, alluding to a situation where an Old Norse legacy but also a set of moral attributes create the substance of how to define the “we.”<sup>67</sup> Since the inclusion of Finland after 1918 in Nordic cooperation, the Old Norse legacy ceased to be all-embracing, and the moral values connected to shared legal, Lutheran and social democratic-driven modernisation processes became more and more important. This shift happened exactly during the inter-war period, when the remake of nineteenth-century Scandinavianism into Nordism and Nordic cooperation took shape.

## Notes

- 1 Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter*, 358; Sejerstedt, *Socialdemokratins tidsålder*, 176–77.
- 2 Stadius, *Trekungamötet i Malmö*, 370–71.
- 3 See Hemstad’s contribution to this volume.
- 4 See Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter*, 99–102.
- 5 Neumann, *A Region-Building Approach*, 53.
- 6 Götz & Haggrén, *Introduction*, 9–11.
- 7 Gerven, *Scandinavism*, 387.
- 8 Brubaker and Cooper, *Beyond “Identity,”* 4; Maxwell, *Pan-Nationalism as a Category*, 3.
- 9 See Hemstad, *Scandinavian Sympathies and Nordic Unity*, 35–38.
- 10 See Elmgren’s contribution to this volume.
- 11 Guedj and Meazzi, *Pour une lecture latine*,
- 12 Hansen, *Drømmen om Norden*, 82.
- 13 Janfelt, *Att leva i det bästa av världar*, 97.

- 14 Haggrén and Stenius, *Det nordiska samarbetets vardagspraktiker*, 81.
- 15 van Gerven, *Scandinavism*, 387.
- 16 Danielsson, "Pan-Nationalism Reframed," 50.
- 17 See WeBel, *The Nordic in the Scientific Racial Discourses*, 59–62.
- 18 Chickering, *We Men Who Feel*, 229.
- 19 Kohn, *Pan-Slavism*, 198.
- 20 Sørensen and Adriansen, *Dybbøl: The Construction and Reconstruction*, 18.
- 21 <https://smvu.se/registreringskort-nr-dk07/>
- 22 Wendt, *Cooperation in the Nordic Countries*, 25.
- 23 Andersson, *Idé och verklighet*, 19.
- 24 Hansen, *Drømmen om Norden*, 81.
- 25 Hemstad, *Scandinavianism, Nordic Co-operation*, 183.
- 26 Janfelt, *Att leva i det bästa av världar*, 132.
- 27 Andersson, *Idé och verklighet*, 24.
- 28 Stadius, *Hundra år av nordism*, 20.
- 29 See Hemstad's contribution to this volume.
- 30 Swe. Norden, en förening i Finland för nordiskt samarbete; Fin. Norden, Suomessa toimiva yhdistys pohjoismaista yhteistyötä varten.
- 31 Sejerstedt, *Socialdemokratins tidsålder*, 190.
- 32 See Hemstad's contribution to this volume.
- 33 Wilén, *Föreningarna Norden*, 279.
- 34 Andersson, *Idé och verklighet*, 55.
- 35 Maxwell, *Pan-nationalism as a Category*, 4.
- 36 Rerup, *Nationalisme og skandinavisme*, 79–87.
- 37 Palmgren Munch-Petersen, *Tankar i nordiska frågor*, 109.
- 38 Hekscher, *Det nordiska samarbetets innebörd*, 52.
- 39 Rodhe, *Ett enigt Norden*, 115.
- 40 Wendt, *Cooperation in the Nordic Countries*, 89.
- 41 Hansen, *Drømmen om Norden*, 86.
- 42 Åström Elmersjö, *Norden, nationen och historien*, 92.
- 43 Åström Elmersjö, *Norden, nationen och historien*, 115.
- 44 Hemstad, *Scandinavianism, Nordic co-operation*, 187.
- 45 Kurunmäki and Strang, *Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy*, 10.
- 46 Stadius, *Hundra år av Nordism*, 28.
- 47 See also Hemstad, *Scandinavianism, Nordic co-operation*, 189.
- 48 Hansson, *Drømmen om Norden*, 92.
- 49 Ibid.
- 50 Wilén, *Föreningarna Norden*, 279.
- 51 Andersson, *Idé och verklighet*, 111.
- 52 Andersson, *Idé och verklighet*, 43–44; Stadius, *Kristid och väckelse*, 212.
- 53 Kurunmäki and Strang, *Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy*, 10.
- 54 Kurunmäki, "'Nordic Democracy' in 1935," 37–38.
- 55 *Fyra tal om nordisk demokrati*, 33.
- 56 Hemstad, *Promoting Norden*, 43.
- 57 Tamm, *De nordiske juristmøder*, 74–75.
- 58 Kohn, *Pan-Slavism*, 198.
- 59 Danielsson, *Pan-Nationalism Reframed*, 42, 50.
- 60 Giladi, *Origins and Characteristics of Macro-nationalism*, 255.
- 61 Stadius, *Resan till norr*, 91–92.
- 62 Litvak, *Latinos y anglosajones*, 13.
- 63 Shor, *Identité fasciste, identité latine*, 4.
- 64 Gudej and Meazzi, *Introduction. Pour une lecture latine*, 2.
- 65 Moe, *The View from Vesuvius*, 224–30.
- 66 See WeBel, *The Nordic in the Scientific Racial Discourses*.
- 67 Gerven, *Scandinavism*, 387.

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