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#### **4. The cohesive and dividing power of anti-fascism: Language and class among Finland-Swedes in the 1920s–1940s**

**Anders Ahlbäck, Kasper Braskén, Matias Kaihovirta and Ylva Perera**

In late 1929, the Finnish extreme right was gathering its forces. The Finnish revolutionary socialists, who had been thoroughly beaten in the brutal civil war of 1918, were again more or less openly canvassing support and stirring strikes among the workers. This was an unbearable affront to those on the winning, non-socialist “white” side of the civil war. Rallies were organized, where the government and parliament were cried down for their passivity and calls were made for a complete ban on any communist activities. In a manner familiar from contemporary fascist rallies all over Europe, speakers claimed that “righteous” citizens had to take the law into their own hands if the authorities did not take strong measures against the communist threat.<sup>1</sup>

On the rural west coast of Finland, which was divided between Swedish-speaking and Finnish-speaking municipalities, the local Swedish-language newspaper *Wasa-Posten* noted with concern the rancour at such a meeting held in the nearby Finnish-speaking municipality of Lapua:

We Swedes have no reason to applaud and cheer those Finnish hotheads, who are now on the move. The movement that these citizens’ meetings are trying to bring about, can easily direct itself against the Swedish population. On the meeting in Lapua, many hateful words were uttered about the [Finland-]Swedes. (...) A

fascism in this country can only be ultra-nationalistic, and the country's Swedish population would also suffer from a change of the constitution, achieved through extra-parliamentary pressure.<sup>2</sup>

Lapua was indeed becoming the epicentre and designation for the ongoing mobilization of the Finnish far right movement of 1929–1932. The editors of the centre-leftist *Wasa-Posten* had critically reported on the rise and spread of European fascism throughout the 1920s. From the very outset, they associated the so called “Lapua movement” with fascism, although the movement did not use that term of itself. As organized fascism now seemed to be landing in Finland, the newspaper strongly advised its readers against supporting the movement. The political violence and the breakdown of legality that followed in the wake of fascism, the editors warned, would threaten not least the political rights and very existence of the Swedish speaking population of Finland.<sup>3</sup>

Having for centuries been an integral part of the Swedish realm and from 1809 an autonomous part of the Russian empire, Finland had after its independence in 1917 been declared an officially bilingual country. Around 12 percent of the population was still Swedish-speaking. Swedish speakers, however, were a quite heterogenous group, consisting partly of the old land-owning nobility and educated urban classes, partly of peasants, fishermen and proletarian workers scattered mainly along the Southern and Western coastal regions. There were no clear markers of difference from the Finnish-speaking population that would have united the Swedish-speaking minority in terms of religion, culture or lifestyle – only the language difference, which had been politicized among both Finnish- and Swedish-speaking intellectuals since the mid-nineteenth century.<sup>4</sup>

In the 1920s and 1930s, the notion of a Swedish-speaking minority in Finland, bound together by a common cultural and ethnic identity, was still very much a nationalist construction in progress, rather than any evident social reality. Many Swedish-speakers nonetheless felt that their language group was under increasing pressure from the Finnish-speaking majority. Democratization, independence, and intense nationalist mobilization among Finnish-speakers had eradicated the privileges once enjoyed by the Swedish-speaking nobility and burghers. The most zealous Finnish nationalists were eager to push for further diminishing the share of Swedish speakers within leading positions in public service, higher education, and business.<sup>5</sup>

Fascism was mainly understood as a militant form of anti-communism and anti-parliamentarism in Finland during the 1920s. In the post-civil war atmosphere of bitterness and mistrust on both sides, it found many sympathizers among both Finnish- and Swedish-speaking conservatives and right-wing circles. Yet there were different views on how this new political “third way” might weigh in on the ongoing language struggle. Some Swedish-speaking politicians and intellectuals hoped fascism would reconcile the language conflict through a common front against socialism, while others feared that fascism would only work as a catalyst for the Finnish ultra-nationalist campaign against the Swedish language in public life.

In this chapter, we focus on three groups of Swedish-speakers in Finland: non-socialist politicians, leaders of the workers’ movement, as well as writers of poetry and fiction. Our main question concerns how and to what extent those among these groups who chose to resist fascism related their anti-fascism to the language question in Finland. The chapter’s focus remains on the Swedish-speaking minority’s relation to anti-fascism and fascism in Finland, while more internationally oriented

anti-fascism falls beyond the scope of the analysis. Highlighting the heterogeneous and partly incoherent nature of the Swedish-speaking minority, we problematize anti-fascism as both a cohesive and divisive force within the language group. This means that we study how certain Swedish-speaking collectives and individuals – mainly conservative and liberal urban elites – represented anti-fascism as a common cause to rally around for the language group, uniting the Swedish-speaking Finns and consolidating their ethnic community; whereas other collectives and individuals – mainly Swedish-speaking socialists – denied language any supremacy over class as the common denominator in the struggle against fascism.

The term “anti-fascism” was in the period mainly used in communist campaigns. Here, we are rather using it as an analytical category, for the purpose of capturing a broader, more complex and more comprehensive image of how different societal groups resisted fascism and related forms of anti-democratic ultra-nationalism. We investigate how contemporaries themselves used fascism as a label for politics and attitudes they claimed had to be resisted; but also how certain practices, in their contemporary context, can be understood as resistance to fascism even when the historical agents did not explicitly use that term themselves. One might object that other concepts, such as humanism or parliamentarism, might be better suited and adapted to the self-understandings of liberal and conservative actors. The point of bringing in these under the same conceptual umbrella as socialist anti-fascists – a form of historical intervention – is explorative; to investigate what connections, relationships and differences this might render visible and accessible for comparison and analysis.

The complexity of anti-fascism even within a relatively small ethnic groups such as the Swedish-speaking Finns, numbering circa 400.000 in the period, cannot

be fully covered in a book chapter. Different social layers and political groupings could resist fascism in different ways and for different reasons. Nonetheless, a comprehensive look at one ethnic minority group, even if sketchy, makes it possible to compare different political and social functions of anti-fascism in a minority setting and how different social classes and political parties used anti-fascism to form group identities.

### **The non-socialist public sphere: Anti-fascism as a source of unity?**

Representatives of the largest political party of the Finland-Swedish minority, the Swedish People's Party, had been heavily involved on the 'white' side in the Finnish Civil War of 1918. Hence, they perceived communism as the most urgent threat to civilisation and were inclined to sympathise with other anti-communist forces in Finland and the rest of Europe. In the early 1920s, initial reports on fascism in the Swedish-language non-socialist press in Finland reflected this position. Italian fascism was described as a movement carried by "patriotic youth" which "fought heroically against the terrorists", meaning Italian communists or anarchists.<sup>6</sup> If the Italian non-socialists did not push back the hostile red agitation, and answered violence with violence, the papers explained, they risked losing everything.<sup>7</sup> The Swedish-language non-socialist press hoped that fascist violence in Italy would soon ebb away and a fruitful co-operation between the bourgeoisie and the pacified fascists be established. These visions were, however, recurrently shaken by the unremitting fascist brutalities.

One can identify distinct shifts in the reactions to fascism. Initially, the Finland-Swedish bourgeoisie rather enjoyed reading about Italian fascists striking down communists and socialists. Yet soon became more concerned as they noticed that

the fascists eventually targeted all who dared to criticise them, their non-socialist partners included.<sup>8</sup> These sentiments did not notably differ from the (majority) Finnish-speaking bourgeoisie, or even from the European bourgeoisie in general.<sup>9</sup> In which ways, then, did a distinct anti-fascist *minority* position develop among the Swedish-speaking bourgeoisie in Finland?

Over the course of the 1920s, a consistent line of criticism was established in the Swedish-language press against fascist Italy's handling of the German-speaking population in South Tyrol (Alto Adige), which until the First World War had been part of the Habsburg Empire. The plight of the German speakers in the area did not cause a fundamental re-assessment of conservative sympathies for fascist Italy. When viewed from a minority perspective, however, the cultural and political terror directed against the German speaking minority in Italy was repugnant, and raised questions about whether this would be the model for other fascist movements' and regimes' treatment of ethnic minorities. Would Finnish fascism take on a similar ultra-nationalist position and direct its attacks against the Swedish-speakers in Finland? Such questions were openly posed in the Finland-Swedish media.<sup>10</sup>

The Swedish People's Party, a coalition of non-socialist social strata, viewed itself as the main bulwark of the Swedish speakers and defended every inch of the language rights and liberties that had been inscribed into the constitution, laws, and regulations after Finland's independence. The party leadership – mainly industrialists, bankers, clergymen, noblemen and professionals – was staunchly positioned at the political right. However, as radical language nationalism, or so-called “true Finnishness”, gained influence among the Finnish-language conservative and agrarian parties from the mid-1920s onward, the basis for a united, bilingual non-

socialist front against communism was increasingly undermined. This forced the leadership of the Swedish People's Party to re-consider its political alliances.<sup>11</sup>

The ethno-nationalist radicalization among the Finnish right-wing block during the 1920s had led Swedish-speaking politicians to believe that if a Finnish fascist movement emerged, it would have a corresponding agenda of unconditional Finnish-language nationalism. However, when fascism eventually materialised in Finland in 1929–1930, it initially declared a neutral stance with regard to the conflicts between the language groups. Instead of national and linguistic homogeneity, the Lapua movement stressed the primacy and urgency of anti-communist action as the foundational value of the Finnish nation, irrespective of language questions.<sup>12</sup> This was an unexpected development, which threw the Swedish People's Party into its deepest crisis in its history. If Finnish fascism against all expectations appeared to be neutral towards the Swedish-speaking minority, then what stance should the Swedish People's Party take towards it? The anti-communist or even anti-socialist traditions within the Swedish-speaking middle and upper classes remained robust and the right-wing within the party had for many years advocated a stronger policy against communist agitation in Finland. Why should they oppose this new and forceful anti-communist movement, which early on attracted Swedish-speaking as well as Finnish-speaking rank and file supporters ?

The inner divisions of the Swedish People's Party were exposed in the polarised interpretations of the Lapua movement in 1930. The centre-right fraction within the party perceived Lapua to be a genuine people's movement and an expression of a deeply felt popular resentment against the provocations of the 'unpatriotic' communists. The centre-left fraction, on the other hand, perceived Lapua

to be an expression of Finnish fascism, or at least a movement with significant fascist tendencies that formed a major threat to democracy and legality.<sup>13</sup>

Arguably, many people in the countryside thought the movement's mission was to make the elites and political leaders in the capital listen to marginalised 'ordinary people'.<sup>14</sup> The "peasants' march" to Helsinki, organized by the Lapua movement in July 1930, was part and parcel of a political strategy to put extra-parliamentary pressure on the country's political leaders. Its objective was to enforce strict legislation that would once and for all ban communism from public life in Finland. Political violence, arranged kidnappings of members of the left-wing and liberal elites, as well as attacks against the workers' movement and its institutions all over the country were all parts of the Lapua movement's radical playbook.<sup>15</sup>

The Lapua movement did not only lay open the traditional left-right division within the Swedish People's Party, but also the split between representatives of the urban centres and the countryside. Local leaders from the rural periphery argued that its urban liberal leaders had shifted the party too far towards the left. They referred especially to the actions of the party's parliamentary group, which on several occasions had voted together with the Social Democrats and even the communists in parliament. Members of the party's liberal leadership such as Ernst von Born and Ragnar Furuholm explained that such 'unholy' alliances had been necessary and justified, due to the radical Finnish language nationalism pursued by the conservative National Coalition Party and Agrarian Party. The parties most strongly opposed to the oppression of national minorities had been the Social Democrats and Communists. This had led to the establishment of an uneasy affinity between the bourgeois Swedish People's Party and the political left in parliamentary politics.<sup>16</sup>

For many right-wing members of the Swedish People's Party, such an association with the left was fundamentally mistaken. The emergence of the Lapua movement, with its neutral language position, energized this latent critique within the party and emboldened the inner opposition to a full-blown attack against the liberal party leadership. In both Finnish- and Swedish-speaking right-wing nationalist circles it was argued that the incessant compromises of parliamentary politics had sacrificed too much of the values that should have been secured through the white victory in the Civil War of 1918. From such a perspective, it was the parliamentarians and the political elite that had squandered 'the spirit of 1918'. This notion was eventually transformed into the myth of a 'mutilated victory', which was at the core of the Lapua movement as well.<sup>17</sup>

Due to the official language neutrality of the Lapua movement, the Swedish People's Party became sharply divided into pro- and anti-Lapua fractions in the early 1930s – in other terms, a pro-fascist and an anti-fascist side. In heated public exchanges, the outcomes of the Lapua movement were related to the very survival of the Finland-Swedes as a group. For example, the right-wing Finland-Swedish poet Bertel Gripenberg insisted in 1930 that it would be in the best interest of the Swedish-speakers to join the ranks of Lapua. Gripenberg was himself involved in organizing its Swedish-speaking supporters. If the anti-Lapua leaders in the Swedish People's Party insisted on resisting and opposing Lapua, he argued, what would be the fate of the Finland-Swedish minority once the movement was victorious and installed fascism in Finland?<sup>18</sup> Those who opposed Lapua, and perceived it to be a fascist or fascistoid movement, argued to the contrary, that Finland-Swedes who supported it were gullible and naïve concerning its true intentions. Even in case the Swedish People's Party gave its full support to Lapua, the anti-Lapua fraction argued, there

was nothing to guarantee that the Swedish-speakers would not be the movement's next target. Similar to Italy, it was argued, Finnish fascism was initially directed against the communists and socialists, but as soon as these were defeated it would turn on the national minorities, just like the Italian fascists had done in South Tyrol. The Swedish-speaking, non-socialist anti-fascists thus did not oppose the Lapua movement because of its anti-communism, but because of what they anticipated would follow next.

The Lapua movement had a huge momentum in 1930–1931. It successfully put pressure on the right-wing block to quickly pass strict legislation prohibiting communist activities on all levels of society. Moreover, once the communists were excluded, the right-wing parties for the first time in many years managed to secure a non-socialist majority in parliament, even without the support of the Swedish People's Party. Ironically, the radical elements within the Lapua movement were still not content. As Finnish parliamentary politics continued to be seen as an arena of political compromise, the Lapua radicals staged an attempted coup in early 1932 – which failed miserably. The Lapua movement was soon thereafter dispersed, but its remnants were immediately used to build a new extreme-right political party with even more evident fascist characteristics, the Patriotic People's Movement. Contrary to Lapua, the Patriotic People's Movement did not even feign neutrality in the language question, but picked up the torch of the radical language nationalism of the 1920s.

The old fears within the Swedish People's Party were thus realised after 1932. The right-wing block was enhanced by the new, fascist Patriotic People's Movement, which used its position in parliament to push for anti-Swedish policies.<sup>19</sup> Its rhetoric polarized public debate even further and inspired heated verbal attacks against the

Swedish People's Party. However, the fact that Finnish fascism now openly assumed radical language nationalism as its principal value brought about a major turn for the potential of anti-fascism as a cohesive force among the Swedish-speaking minority. The scope for fascist sympathies within the Swedish People's Party became narrower and was soon marginalised. As a result, the cohesion within the Swedish People's Party became stronger than ever, once it embraced an anti-fascist line against the Patriotic People's Movement. The case of the Swedish People's Party shows that as long as Finnish fascism demonstrated indifference to language issues, resisting fascism threatened to become major divisive issue within the minority. However, once fascism openly attacked the minority, anti-fascism was transformed into a binder that united the heterogenous party base of the Swedish People's Party around its principal cause, the protection of the interests of the Swedish-speaking minority.

### **The Swedish-speaking labour movement: Language and class as divisive forces**

Towards the end of the 1930s, the Swedish People's Party increasingly appealed to Swedish-speakers in Finland to come together and unite in the face of verbal and physical attacks from True Finns. In late 1938, the party even sent a letter to their main opponents on the left, the Swedish-speaking Social Democrats, inviting them to collaborate and unite forces against the threatening Finnish nationalism by means of summoning *Folktinget*, the representative assembly of the Swedish-speaking minority. The response from the Swedish-speaking Social Democrats was however a clear and simple no.<sup>20</sup>

Why did the Swedish-speaking Social Democrats reject the proposition to join forces with their Swedish-speaking kinsfolk, fighting side by side against the fascist threat? Collaborating with the Swedish People's Party and crossing the class lines was by no means unthinkable from the left's perspective in the late 1930s. Social Democrats in neighbouring Scandinavian countries as well as Finland already participated in coalition governments with centrist non-socialist parties, staking out what was to become known as the middle way (between communism and fascism), in order to safeguard democracy and market economy against the threats of authoritarian dictatorship. Even the communists were at this point in time eager to collaborate with former class enemies, both social democrats and non-socialists, in order to build a pro-Soviet "people's front" against fascism.

However, for most Swedish-speaking Social Democrats in Finland in the late 1930s, class was still a dividing force within the language group. When the question of collaboration was raised, Anna Bondestam, one of the younger Social Democrats, reminded readers of the Swedish-language social democratic newspaper *Arbetarbladet* of the open scars from the tragic Civil War twenty years earlier. Neither in 1918 nor during the post-war years, Bondestam pointed out, had supporters of the Swedish People's Party voiced any thoughts about solidarity within the language group.<sup>21</sup>

This same point had repeatedly been made during the 1920s by the senior Social Democratic politician and former party secretary K. H. Wiik, also a Swedish-speaker. With reference to the past class conflicts that had divided the Swedish-speaking minority, Wiik had during his whole political career stressed how little interest the Swedish-speaking upper classes had shown in advancing social and democratic progress. In a party publication in 1924, celebrating the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary

of the founding of Finland's Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1899, Wiik claimed that the "reign of terror" in connection with the Civil War of 1918 had been most brutal in Swedish-speaking areas, with executions and killings of red Swedish-speakers by white Swedish-speakers. The "destruction" exercised by the Swedish-speaking "slavers" had in many places, according to Wiik, been more thorough among the Swedish-speaking working-class minority than among the Finnish-speaking majority. In Wiik's words the Swedish-speaking upper-class blamed the Swedish-speaking Reds for an act of double treachery by their rebellion in 1918: they had betrayed the White fatherland by collaborating with the Russian Bolsheviks during the Civil War, and they had betrayed the Swedish minority nation by joining forces with Finnish-speaking socialists and revolutionaries.<sup>22</sup>

The notion of double treachery was fundamental for the Swedish-speaking workers' movement's class identification in the interwar era. It also gave rise to negative attitudes among Swedish-speaking socialists towards the new, "White" nation-state in the interwar era. The politics that were implemented in the wake of the Civil War were perceived as reactionary among socialists and soon compared to the politics of fascist movements in Southern and Eastern Europe. For example, upon his election as party secretary in 1926, K. H. Wiik warned of the threat of rising fascism in Finland to the labour movement and the working class. He claimed that especially the Finnish ethno-nationalist right-wing block, represented by the conservative National Coalition Party and the Agrarian party, exercised aggressive and discriminatory policies not only towards the working class, but also the Swedish minority. Here, Wiik pointed to the possibility of a pro-democracy bloc in Finnish politics, a cross-class-alliance between the Left and the Swedish People's Party, since both the working class and the Swedish-speaking minority could only have their

primary interests secured by a democratic government. However, Wiik was still sceptical of the intentions of the Swedish People's Party. As a true Marxist he argued that class interests were always at stake, and the Swedish-speaking non-socialists would rather support a bourgeois-capitalist dictatorship than a democratic labour government.<sup>23</sup>

Furthermore, the Swedish-speaking left was internally divided, as Swedish-speaking communists made political attacks on their main rivals, the Social Democrats, whom they labelled "Social Fascists" – a term adopted from the anti-Social Democratic rhetoric of the Communist International in the 1920s. While the Swedish-speaking Social Democrats believed in bi-lingual cooperation and wanted to turn down the inflamed language issue in the interwar era, the Swedish-speaking communists moved in the opposite direction. They unequivocally equated True Finns with fascism, accusing both the Swedish People's Party and the Swedish-speaking Social Democrats of passivity in the necessary fight against these extreme right forces.<sup>24</sup>

The Swedish-speaking communists were aware of the language nationalism among Swedish-speaking smallholders, fishermen and rural workers, especially in the province of Ostrobothnia on the West coast of Finland. In this region, there was strong popular support for irredentism or self-government for the Swedish-speaking population, similar to the arrangement that the Åland Islands had obtained in the early 1920s.<sup>25</sup> Swedish communist minority nationalism in Finland was not perceived to be in any conflict with Leninist class struggle, since it was understood to be in line with Marxist-Leninist and Stalinist theories on the national question. Stalin's view that national identity was connected to the possession of land appealed to communist

Swedish-speaking smallholders, who found the True Finns' "imperialist" and fascist in their policies targeted against the interests of the Swedish-speaking minority.<sup>26</sup>

In a 1933 pamphlet, Comintern agent Allan Wallenius, a Swedish-speaking Finn who was at the time head principal of the Scandinavian section of the Communist University of Western Minorities in Moscow, appealed to the Swedish-speaking farmers and workers of Finland. He urged them to join the Communist Party and take up the struggle against the Lapua movement in order to protect themselves against the fascist threat. Interestingly, Wallenius in his pamphlet singled out the language oppression as a problem on par with the global economic crisis and the threat of war for the Swedish-speaking working class in Finland. He also referred to the Stalinist multi-nationalism that was practiced in the Soviet Union when addressing these problems of language oppression under the "Fascist rule" in Finland. The Swedes in Finland "had every reason to envy the nationalities in the Soviet Union and the liberties they enjoyed", while they were being granted full national autonomy in the union.<sup>27</sup>

Wallenius markedly addressed the Swedish-speaking "working peasants" in his pamphlet, a strategic manoeuvre to embrace the broad and somewhat vague social and political group who called themselves peasants and thus targeting a core constituency of the Swedish People's Party.<sup>28</sup> Clearly by the time of the global economic crisis in the early 1930s, that struck hard on Finnish agriculture, communists were aware of the importance of mobilizing farmers. However, it seemed that Finnish fascism had been more successful in that respect, organizing peasant protests and the peasant march to Helsinki in the summer of 1930.<sup>29</sup>

Similar to Wallenius, many of the most militant Finnish communists had used the Soviet Union as their basis of operations, since the Lapua movement had

managed to bring about a total ban on all communist activities in 1930. The Social Democrats at first adopted a cautious policy towards the Lapua movement, yet soon demands were raised for putting an end to not only communism but Social Democracy in Finland as well. Violent assaults targeting Social Democratic activists and club rooms escalated. This caused the social Democrats to launch an offensive against fascism. When the Lapua movement managed to bring about the dissolution of parliament in July 1930 and a new general election in October '31, the Social Democrats made it their objective to split the "patriotic" anti-socialist party alliance. In this task, the Swedish-speaking social Democrats played a significant role. With their close connections to Scandinavian social democrats as well as influential anti-fascist social liberals, they organized joint protest meetings in Stockholm against the allegedly undemocratic and fascist Lapua movement in Finland.<sup>30</sup> Scandinavian concerns over a fascist takeover in Finland most likely had an impact on the Swedish People's Party and the Finnish-speaking liberal party. Both chose to distance themselves from the Lapua movement, partly in order to retain good relations with neighbouring Nordic countries.

The Scandinavian connection became even more important after the fascist and Nazi takeovers in Austria and Germany, which basically ruined the Socialist Labour International (SLI). When the Scandinavian Social Democratic organization was reformed in 1931, one of its lead motives was to "confront the Fascist plague".<sup>31</sup> The Finland-Swedish Social Democrat Karl-August Fagerholm came to personify the Scandinavian-style reformism within the bi-lingual Finnish labour movement in the 1930s. A "Nordic" coalition government with social Democrats, the Agrarian party and the Liberals was formed in Finland in 1937.<sup>32</sup>

Although the Scandinavian Social Democrats declared that their social-political reform project had an anti-fascist dimension, their foreign policy towards Nazi-Germany in the 1930s was compliant.<sup>33</sup> The Nordic turn in Finnish politics nonetheless disarmed fascist politics at home. In the late 1930s, with rising international tensions due to the threat of war in Europe, it seems that Swedish-speaking Social Democrats took on key political roles. In that sense, the Swedish-speaking working-class and labour movement actually surpassed the Swedish People's Party in terms of underlining the importance of a vivid Swedish minority culture for connecting Finland to Western civilization.

The Nordic dimension of Social Democracy in the late 1930s did not, however, lead to cohesion within the labour movement itself. After communism was banned in Finland in 1930, communists together with left socialists and social Democratic Marxists built a strong left-wing opposition within the SDP. When the Comintern in 1935 approved a new direction in its anti-fascist strategy, encouraging Western communists to collaborate with social democrats and liberals to form a "people's front" against fascism, this decision had an impact on the Swedish-speaking labour movement as well. Former Swedish-speaking communists, now fully accepted members of SDP, started a "people's front"-styled newspaper, *Folkviljan* ("The People's will") in 1937. It promoted anti-fascist activism and a positive attitude towards the Soviet Union. The leadership of the Swedish-speaking Social Democrats, however, remained guarded towards the leftist "people's front"-activities.<sup>34</sup>

Class was thus a significant factor in the unwillingness of the Swedish-language labour movement in Finland to fully collaborate with non-socialist and bourgeois Swedish-speakers. Whenever the Swedish-speaking socialists were

criticized for their lack of solidarity with their language group, they counterattacked with the argument that the Swedish-speaking ruling elite had never shown any solidarity with Swedish-speaking common people. They connected the fascist threat to the White victors of 1918 and the bourgeois oppression of the working class. A fascist takeover or right-wing dictatorship would deal a further deathblow to the Swedish-speaking working-class. They would therefore rely on international solidarity and transnational connections in their anti-fascist resistance. As this section has shown, crossing linguistic and national borders and promoting socialism in different variations, with the outspoken intent of preserving and even strengthening ethno-linguistic identity among Swedish-speakers, served as an anti-fascist strategy for the Swedish-speaking labour movement.

### **The field of literature: Looking inward and outward from a minority position**

In order to further grasp the varieties of anti-fascism within the Finland-Swedish minority during the interwar era, an important key is to examine the literature produced by this minority.<sup>35</sup> Many writers of the period were through reading, travels and correspondence well informed about the political situation both domestically and internationally, and expressed their reactions to this in their literature. Literature is however interesting to study from an anti-fascist perspective not only because of its mimetic portrayal of society. Rather, it is important as a sphere where it was possible to imagine alternatives to the present politics.<sup>36</sup> For Finland-Swedish writers who experienced fascism as a threat, novels, plays, poems and essays became sites for expressing opinions and envisioning what an anti-fascist resistance might look like. This inevitably intertwined with the shaping of a Finland-Swedish minority-identity.

As literary historian Clas Zilliacus writes, with reference to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Finland-Swedish literature can be regarded as a “minor literature”.<sup>37</sup> This means a literature written by a minority within a major language – like Franz Kafka’s use of Prague German – for which “everything is political, since the community is too small to allow for a distance between the individual and the social”.<sup>38</sup> This also means that everything created within a minor literature takes on a collective value and nothing can be perceived to be only the expression of an individual master.<sup>39</sup> According to this view, the minority position makes it easier for writers to imagine another world than the current hegemony, which makes it a fruitful ground for anti-fascism.<sup>40</sup> With the proto-fascist movements in Finland predominantly advocating an ethnically homogeneous and monolingual Finland, one could argue that writing in Swedish in Finland itself became an anti-fascist act. That would however mean ignoring the numerous Swedish-speaking writers who expressed sympathy with the fascist ideologies and movements. In fact, the Finland-Swedish identity motivated anti-fascist as well as fascist attitudes.

The poets Arvid Mörne (1876–1946) and Bertel Gripenberg (1878–1947) serve as illuminating examples of opposing positions in this respect, even though they both built their idea of Finnish-Swedishness on defending Western heritage and values.<sup>41</sup> Politically, Mörne’s ideals were socialist, but he was also a nationalist who cared deeply for the Swedish-speaking minority’s right to exist on its own terms within the newly founded Finnish nation-state. Mörne saw the Finland-Swedish culture as rooted in the farming communities of the countryside along the coast of Finland, and regarded all anti-democratic ideologies as contradictory to the Swedish heritage. Hence, he deemed the proto-fascist Lapua movement (which also had a number of Swedish speaking supporters) a great threat to the so-called “Swedish soil”, i.e. the

notion of Swedish-speaking communities having a traditional right of possession to certain coastal regions.<sup>42</sup> During the 1930s, this resulted in a poetry that could be described as “mobilization poetry” (*beredskapsdiktning*), a term mainly used for patriotic tendency writing in Sweden before and during the Second World War, defending national and democratic values.<sup>43</sup>

Literary historian Johan Wrede has pointed out that Mörne saw the Finnish monolingual, authoritarian movements and European fascist movements as explicitly linked, to the extent that Mörne sometimes even used the same poem to express his resistance to all of them. The poem “Till den fria sången” (“To the free song”) was originally written in 1930 to rally protests against Lapua, but Mörne chose to include it – with only minor revisions – in a collection of poetry published in 1939, this time to protest the rise of the fascist European regimes.<sup>44</sup> During the Second World War, he was also critical of Finland’s ambition to expand its territory in Eastern Karelia, since he believed that all minorities, like the Finland-Swedes, should have the right to self-determination.<sup>45</sup> In short: legality and parliamentarism, rather than fascist authoritarian violence, was a better way for minorities to secure their survival, according to Mörne.

Gripenberg, on the other hand, belonged to the aristocracy and saw the fascist movements in Finland as a somewhat plebeian but necessary ally in the fight against communism. He simply did not believe that a democratic state would be strong enough to withstand the Soviet threat, and hence, fascism was a better alternative.<sup>46</sup> In his poetry, Gripenberg aspired to portray war and violence in a heroic and positive light, as a necessary means to defend the noble West from the barbaric east.<sup>47</sup> He was himself active in the Lapua movement, as were a number of other prominent Finland-Swedes, e.g. the poet Örnulf Tigerstedt (1900–1962). The latter was an

aristocrat as well, who identified with a small elite within the Swedish-speaking, but ethnically heterogeneous, upper classes. Tigerstedt thought it was the responsibility of this elite to defend itself from being engulfed by the masses – whether it be the masses of communism or of liberal democracy.<sup>48</sup> The right to love Finland in the Swedish language was essential to Tigerstedt, yet he did not withdraw his support for the fascist movements in Finland when most of them turned monolingual after the failure of the Lapua movement – he merely chose to focus his own energy on collaborating with fascist and Nazi groupings in Sweden instead.<sup>49</sup>

While Mörne and Gripenberg both chose to express their opposing opinions in a traditional poetic style with strong patriotic tendencies, several writers of the Finland-Swedish literary modernism combined an anti-authoritarian worldview with an anti-authoritarian poetic style.<sup>50</sup> For modernists who adopted an anti-fascist stance, internationalism was key early on – the Finland-Swedes had to “open the windows towards Europe”, as the Swedish-speaking poet Elmer Diktonius (1896–1961) wrote in 1922.<sup>51</sup> The critic, playwright and novelist Hagar Olsson (1893–1978) proclaimed in 1928 that she saw no other way forward for the Finland-Swedish minority literature than to regard itself as part of the literature of the world – without having to seek the approval of Finland or Sweden.<sup>52</sup> Olsson, much in line with Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of minor literature, saw the minority position not only for its limitations (“you are alone on an island”), but also for its possibilities (“from the island you can see the whole ocean”).<sup>53</sup> She did not make the same overt connection between being an anti-fascist and a Finland-Swedish minority writer as Mörne. Rather, she found Mörne’s idea of Finland-Sweden to be reactionary.<sup>54</sup> To Olsson, writing as a Finland-Swedish author was not about creating a sanctuary where the minority could be conserved,

but rather to use one's unique position to engage actively with the world, and change it for the better.

This utopian view is essential in Olsson's literature and intrinsically linked to how she expressed her anti-fascism, by using narrative techniques that break up the realism and challenge the reader or spectator to actively think for themselves, as Judith Meurer-Bongardt has shown. Although Olsson early on reacted against the dangers of fascism, especially its ultranationalist, militarist and anti-democratic tendencies, she was very critical of the older liberal and conservative generation of the bourgeoisie as well. She understood the younger generations' interest in fascism as a result of society's failure to provide them with sufficient hope for the future.<sup>55</sup> Hence, when Olsson portrayed political struggles in her plays, the setup was often a conflict between generations as well as between opposing political views.<sup>56</sup> Her worldview was permeated by her faith in humanity; she believed a world in unity to be possible if everyone would recognize that the human in me is connected to the human in you – in spite of all differences.<sup>57</sup> Art and literature can awaken this sense in people, therefore they play important roles, but this requires an art that is free and does not function merely as propaganda for a political party.<sup>58</sup>

Olsson's insistence on a politically engaged literature advocating anti-fascism had less to do with being a Finland-Swede than with being a writer in a time of political turbulence, with a responsibility to engage people to create a better world.<sup>59</sup> In her essay "Författarskapets dekadens" (1944, "The Decadence of Authorship", my transl.) she clearly positioned herself as a European writer among other European writers who she thought should have done more to try to mobilize resistance against fascism and the war.<sup>60</sup> Many Finland-Swedish writers did not, however, share Olsson's internationalist ambitions. Compared to other Scandinavian countries,

writers in Finland showed a remarkably low interest in the Spanish civil war, and many of those who did, sided with Franco since they identified his struggle with that of the white side in the Finnish civil war of 1918.<sup>61</sup> The attempts to establish a Finnish division of the internationalist, pacifist and anti-fascist Clarté movement (founded in France by Henri Barbusse in 1919) also failed, even though Olsson worked hard for it in collaboration with her Scandinavian contacts.<sup>62</sup>

As these examples have shown, Finland-Swedish writers differed in how their anti-fascism related to their identity as minority writers. Where the fascist threat made it even more important for Arvid Mörne to emphasize democracy as something inherently Swedish, Hagar Olsson appealed to a European community of writers to use their art to engage people to oppose totalitarianism. For writers such as Bertel Gripenberg and Örnulf Tigerstedt, the Finland-Swedish identity did not lead to an anti-fascist stance at all, since they identified more strongly with belonging to the upper-class than with being a member of a language minority. It is, however, worth noting that regardless of their political differences, the Finland-Swedish writers still socialized and joined forces in establishing and defending the space for literature in Swedish in Finland, which was in their common interest. Here it seems that the awareness of belonging to a minority whose culture could not be taken for granted triumphed the will to distance oneself from political enemies within that minority.<sup>63</sup>

## **Conclusions**

There were thus many different kinds of anti-fascism within the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland; people resisted fascism in different ways and for different reasons, depending on their class position and political outlooks, and they related their anti-fascism to the language question in different ways. This also translated into

different attitudes to the notion of Swedish-speakers rallying around their language and minority rights in a common opposition to ultra-nationalist fascist notions of ethnic homogenization.

The liberal and conservative politicians of the Swedish People's Party largely shared the anti-communist sentiment that carried a fascist movement in Finland around 1930, yet they ended up in an anti-fascist position because of both their aversion for the anti-democratic and unlawful nature of fascist activities and their concerns over the apparent connections between fascism and radical, anti-Swedish Finnish nationalism. The fact that legalistic conservatives and liberals such as Ernst von Born or Ragnar Furuhielm opposed the Lapua movement even when it seemed to be offering a truce in the language conflict, at the risk of splintering their own party, might seem to demonstrate that not minority rights but more general democratic principles were fundamental to their anti-fascism. These different motives cannot, however, be told apart, since these ethno-nationalist politicians argued that legality and parliamentary democracy were not only the cornerstones of a stable social order, but ultimately the best safeguards of minority rights.

The Swedish-speaking social democrats and communists, on the other hand, were unequivocal in their anti-fascism from the very start, yet primarily from a class perspective rather than a language minority position. They (rightly) perceived fascism to be an existential threat directed against the self-organization and interests of the working class. Politicians like the social democrat K.H. Wiik or the communist Allan Wallenius certainly also thought fascism threatened the language rights of Swedish-speaking workers and peasants in Finland, but saw little ground for a united anti-fascist front with the bourgeois leadership of the Swedish People's Party. The memories of the atrocities committed against the rebellious Reds in the wake of the

civil war were still too raw for the socialists to enter a co-operation, even in the name of anti-fascism, with the perceived perpetrators of 1918. In the spirit of international working-class solidarity, they rather looked beyond Finland's borders for much stronger allies; the Social Democrats looked to their Scandinavian brother parties, and the communists to the Soviet Union.

These political divisions were mirrored and further complicated in the field of literature. Nationalistically minded authors such as Arvid Mörne or Bertel Gripenberg came to opposite conclusions regarding fascism, due to the differences between their ideals of grassroots democracy versus aristocratic rule. Mörne used tropes well-known from the political arenas of Swedish language-nationalism in his poetry, such as the Swedish cultural heritage of democracy, freedom and rule of law, in order to construct an image of Swedishness as inherently opposed to fascism. Yet his modernist contemporaries such as Hagar Olsson would not agree to letting their humanism be curtailed by in-group ethnic solidarity with the Swedish minority. Although internationalist in outlook, Olsson's anti-fascism was not like that of Wiik or Wallenius founded in class solidarity and class struggle, but rather in a sense of the artists' and intellectuals' task to open people's minds to the larger world.

What does it ultimately bring to designate all these widely divergent forms of critique and opposition towards fascism with the same label of "anti-fascism"? In the case of the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland, it brings into view how fascism was resisted in many different ways and different quarters, but also the weaknesses of this resistance, in that it struggled to unite its forces across ideological and class boundaries. Some liberal and conservative politicians and intellectuals envisioned all Swedish-speakers rallying around the defence of language rights, understood as equal to defending democracy and lawfulness against the onslaught of Finnish

ultranationalism and fascism. In their vision, resisting fascism could thus have become a cohesive force, bringing the Swedish-speakers closer together in terms of both ethnic and political identity. Yet in a society marked by stark class conflicts, neither working-class leaders nor progressive artists were attracted by cohesion on these socially conservative terms. It could nonetheless be argued that finding a common enemy in fascism eventually paved the way for decreasing class tensions around a common project of securing a Swedish-language dimension to the emerging welfare state – yet this would mainly take place only after the Second World War.

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<sup>1</sup> Oula Silvennoinen, ‘Home, Religion, Fatherland’. Movements of the Radical Right in Finland,’ *Fascism*, no. 4 (2015) pp. 134–154.

<sup>2</sup> ‘Kampen mot kommunismen’, *Wasa-Posten*, 5 December 1929.

<sup>3</sup> ‘Lappo-Larmet’, *Wasa-Posten* 12 December 1929; ‘Fascismen är farlig’, *Wasa-Posten*, 22 December 1929.

<sup>4</sup> Max Engman, *Språkfrågan: Finlandssvenskhetens uppkomst 1812–1922* (Helsingfors & Stockholm: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland & Atlantis, 2016).

<sup>5</sup> Henrik Meinander, *Nationalstaten: Finlands svenskhet 1922–2015* (Helsingfors & Stockholm: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland & Atlantis, 2016); Pekka Kalevi Hämäläinen, *Kielitaistelu Suomessa 1917–1939* (Porvoo & Helsinki: WSOY, 1968).

<sup>6</sup> See e.g. *Åbo Underrättelser* 4.4.1921; *Hufvudstadsbladet* 5.4.1921; *Wiborgs Nyheter*, 6.4.1921.

<sup>7</sup> See e.g. *Hufvudstadsbladet* 18.4.1922; *Svenska Tidningen*, 7.5.1921.

<sup>8</sup> *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 20.8.1921.

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<sup>9</sup> Cf Jenni Karimäki, 'Finnish Liberals and anti-fascism, 1922–1932,' *Anti-Fascism in the Nordic Countries. New Perspectives, Comparisons and Transnational Connections* (eds.) Kasper Braskén, Nigel Copsey and Johan Lundin (London: Routledge, 2019) pp. 39–54.

<sup>10</sup> See Kasper Braskén, 'A Dire Warning to All Ethnic Minorities of Europe? Fascist Repression in South Tyrol and the Formation of Swedish-Speaking Anti-Fascism in Finland,' in *Anti-Fascism in European History: From the 1920s to Today* (eds.) Egon Pelikan, Jože Pirjevec and Sabrina P. Ramet (Vienna: Central European University Press, 2023).

<sup>11</sup> On the Swedish People's Party's development, see Göran von Bonsdorff and Frank Jernström, *Från självständighet till Lappo: Svenska folkpartiet II, 1917–1929* (Ekenäs: Svenska folkpartiet, 1984).

<sup>12</sup> On the role of Finnish language nationalism, see Ari Uino, 'Kielitaistelu ja "uusi suomalaisuusliike" 1918–1939,' in *Herää Suomi: Suomalaisuusliikkeen historia* (ed.) Päiviö Tommila (Kuopio: Kustannuskiila Oy, 1989).

<sup>13</sup> Georg G. Rosenqvist, *Lappo-Rörelsen: mål motiv medel* (Helsingfors: Söderström & Co. Förlagsaktiebolag, 1930); Matias Kaihovirta and Mats Wickström, 'An Anti-Fascist Minority? Swedish-Speaking Finnish Responses to Fascism,' in *Anti-Fascism in the Nordic Countries. New Perspectives, Comparisons and Transnational Connections* (eds.) Kasper Braskén, Nigel Copsey and Johan Lundin (London: Routledge, 2019) pp. 55–71.

<sup>14</sup> Johanna Bonäs, *Kommunistkräck, konservativ reaktion eller medveten bondepolitik? Svenskösterbottniska bönder inför Lapporörelsen sommaren 1930* (Åbo: Åbo Akademis Förlag, 2012).

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<sup>15</sup> On the violent actions, see Juha Siltala, *Lapuan liike ja kyyditykset 1930* (Helsinki: Otava, 1985).

<sup>16</sup> Rosenqvist, *Lappo-Rörelsen*; Ragnar Furuhjelm, 'Det politiska lägets utveckling och de svenska frågornas behandling sedan senaste partidag, Åbo, 1930. Tidningsurklipp, SLS, Sarvlaks arkiv, Ernst von Born, 9.1.7.

<sup>17</sup> Tuomas Tepora and Aapo Roselius (eds.) *The Finnish Civil War 1918: History, Memory, Legacy* (Leiden: Brill, 2014).

<sup>18</sup> Bertel Gripenberg, 'Kring Lapporörelsen. Svar till friherre Ernst von Born', *Borgåbladet*, 3 July 1930; Lauri Hyvämäki, *Sinistä ja mustaa: Tutkielmia Suomen oikeistoradikalismista* (Helsinki: Otava, 1971) pp. 15–173.

<sup>19</sup> Vesa Vares, 'From Allies to Opponents. Conservatives Facing Fascism in Finland in the 1930s,' *Scandinavian Journal of History* 46, 2 (2021) pp. 224–247.

<sup>20</sup> 'Svenska folkpartiet har satt igång förarbeten för folkting', *Arbetarbladet*, 14 December 1938.

<sup>21</sup> Chroniquer [Anna Bondestam], 'Brokota världen', *Arbetarbladet*, 9 December 1938.

<sup>22</sup> Matias Kaihovirta, 'Minority nationalism and socialism: K. H. Wiik and the national question in Finnish Social Democracy from 1900's to 1940's', *The Finnish Labour Studies Yearbook* (2020) pp. 77–80.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, pp. 80–81.

<sup>24</sup> *Nya Folkbladet*, 11 October 1929, 7 March 1930; 'Socialfascisterna förnyar anfallen mot Folkets hus i Vasa', *Nya Folkbladet*, 11 April 1930.

<sup>25</sup> Johan A. Isaksson, *Ett diskussionsinlägg i nationalitetsfrågan* (Vasa: Ny tids förlag, 1927) pp. 23–24.

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- <sup>26</sup> Mats Wickström and Jonas Ahlskog, 'Stalin och det svenska i Finland: Kommunistisk nationalitetsteori och den tidiga finlandssvenska folkdemokratin', *Historiska och Litteraturhistoriska Studier* 93 (2018) pp. 135–159.
- <sup>27</sup> Allan Wallenius, *Svenskarna i Finland och nästa krig: Några revolutionära synpunkter* (1933) pp. 7–10, 14–15.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, p. 4.
- <sup>29</sup> For the contested use of the political concept of 'peasants' in interwar era Finland, see Pauli Kettunen, *Suojelu, suoritus, subjekti: Työsuojelu teollistuvan Suomen yhteiskunnallisissa ajattelu- ja toimintatavoissa* (Helsinki: SHS, 1994) pp. 170–172 and Tauno Saarela, *Suomalainen kommunismi ja vallankumous 1923–1930* (Helsinki: SKS, 2008) pp. 309–314; Bonäs, *Kommunistkräck, konservativ reaktion eller medveten bondepolitik*.
- <sup>30</sup> 'En svensk resolution mot Lappo', *Arbetarbladet*, 19 September 1930; 'Lappo och vänstern i Sverige', *Åbo Underrättelser*, 21 September 1930.
- <sup>31</sup> Dörte Putensen, 'SAI och SAMAK – växlande storlekar i den internationella och den nordiska dimensionen (1914–1945)', in *Lokalt och internationellt: Dimensioner i den nordiska arbetarrörelsen och arbetarkulturen* (ed.) Pauli Kettunen (Tammerfors: THPTS, 2002) pp. 132–140.
- <sup>32</sup> Mirja Österberg, 'Karl August Fagerholm. "Pohjoismaisten kokemusten esittelijä ja länsimaisten peruskäsitysten innokas puoltaja"', in *Työväki lähtee – mihin suuntaa tutkimus?* (eds.) Matti Hannikainen and Pia Lohikoski (Helsinki: THPTS, 2008).
- <sup>33</sup> Klas Åmark, *Att bo granne med ondskan: Sveriges förhållande till nazismen, Nazityskland och Förintelsen* (Stockholm: Bonniers, 2011).
- <sup>34</sup> Anna Bondestam and Alf-Erik Helsing, *Som en stubbe i en stubbåker: Finlands svenska arbetarförbund 1899–1974* (Vasa: Fram, 1978) pp. 267–270.

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- <sup>35</sup> Kasper Braskén and Johan A. Lundin, 'Introduction', in *Anti-fascism in the Nordic Countries: Comparisons and Transnational Connections* (eds.) Kasper Braskén, Nigel Copsey and Johan A. Lundin (London: Routledge, 2019) p. 6.
- <sup>36</sup> Elisabeth Hjorth, *Förtvivlade läsningar: Litteratur som motstånd och läsning som etik* (Göteborg: Glänta produktion, 2015) p. 7.
- <sup>37</sup> Clas Zilliacus, 'Mellan finskt och svenskt: Den finlandssvenska litteraturen 1900-2012', in *Finlands svenska litteratur 1900–2012* (ed.) Michel Ekman (Helsinki/Stockholm: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland/Atlantis, 2014) p. 364.
- <sup>38</sup> Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1986) p. 17.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid, p. 17.
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>41</sup> Johan Wrede, 'Om politiska ideologier och litteratur i Finland 1917–1948', in *Från dagdrivare till feminister: Studier i finlandssvensk 1900-talslitteratur* (ed.) Sven Linnér (Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet, 1986) p. 180.
- <sup>42</sup> Johan Wrede, *Arvid Mörnes lyric: Från och med den poetiska förnyelsen omkring 1920* (Helsingfors: Holger Schildts förlag, 1968) p. 77.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid, p. 214; Bengt Landgren, *Hjalmar Gullberg och beredskapslitteraturen: Studier i svensk dikt och politisk debatt 1933–1942* (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 1975) p. 11.
- <sup>44</sup> Wrede, *Arvid Mörnes lyric*, p. 228; Arvid Mörne, *Över havet brann Mars* (Stockholm: Albert Bonniers förlag, 1939) p. 12–13.
- <sup>45</sup> Wrede, *Arvid Mörnes lyric*, pp. 98–99.
- <sup>46</sup> Anna Möller-Sibelius, *Roll, retorik och modernitet i Bertel Gripenbergs lyrik* (Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2015) p. 212.

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<sup>47</sup> Möller-Sibeliuss, *Roll, retorik och modernitet i Bertel Gripenbergs lyrik*, p. 190.

<sup>48</sup> Göran O:son Waltå, *Poet Under Black Banners* (Uppsala: Skrifter utgivna av litteraturvetenskapliga institutionen vid Uppsala universitet, 1993) p. 253.

<sup>49</sup> O:son Waltå, *Poet Under Black Banners*, pp. 255–256.

<sup>50</sup> Helen Svensson, 'Hagar Olsson och 30-talets idévärld', in *Ideas and ideologies Ideologies in Scandinavian Literature since the First World War: Proceedings of the 10th Study Conference of the International Association for Scandinavian Studies, held in Reykjavik, July 22–25, 1974* (ed.) Sveinn Skorri Höskuldsson (Reykjavik: University of Iceland, 1975) p. 301; Michel Ekman (ed.) *Finlands svenska litteratur 1900–2012*, p. 99.

<sup>51</sup> Diktonius, 'Muualla ja meillä', *Ultra* 1922:1, p. 24–25.

<sup>52</sup> Olsson, 'Finländsk robinsonad', *Quosego*, 1928:3, p. 128.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, p. 129. See also Judith Meurer-Bongardt 'Att hitta vägen i ideologiernas djungel: Hagar Olsson som antifascistisk kritiker och dramatiker', forth.

<sup>54</sup> Olsson, 'Finländsk robinsonad', p. 130.

<sup>55</sup> Meurer-Bongardt, 'Att hitta vägen i ideologiernas djungel'; Judith Meurer-Bongardt, *Wo Atlantis am Horizont leuchtet oder eine Reise zum Mittelpunkt des Menschen: utopisches Denken in den Schriften Hagar Olssons* (Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 2011); Svensson, 'Hagar Olsson och 30-talets idévärld', p. 306.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, p. 305.

<sup>57</sup> Meurer-Bongardt, *Wo Atlantis am Horizont*, p. 271.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, p. 268.

<sup>59</sup> Svensson, 'Hagar Olsson och 30-talets idévärld', p. 311; Roger Holmström, 'Tiga eller tala? Om Hagar Olssons författarroll under fyrtioåret', in *Literature as Resistance and Counter-Culture: Papers of the 19th Study Conference of the*

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*International Association for Scandinavian Studies* (ed.) Péter Mádl (Budapest: Hungarian Association for Scaninavian Studies 1993) p. 155.

<sup>60</sup> Hagar Olsson, 'Författarskapets dekadens' [1944], *Jag lever. En studie i det mänskliga* (Helsingfors: Schildts, 1948) pp. 143–172.

<sup>61</sup> Göran O:sån Waltå , 'Krisen och litteraturen på trettioalet', in *Finlands svenska litteraturhistoria: Andra delen, 1900-talet* (ed.) Clas Zilliacus (Helsingfors/Stockholm: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland/Atlantis, 2000) p. 134; Wrede, 'Om politiska ideologier och litteratur i Finland 1917–1948', p. 184.

<sup>62</sup> Helen Svensson, 'Clarté i Finland', *Historiska och litteraturhistoriska studier* 54 (1979) pp. 157–177.

<sup>63</sup> Stefan Nygård and Henrika Tandefelt, *Skrivandets villkor och gemenskap: Finlands svenska författareförening 1919–2019* (Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2019) p. 130.