THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AESTHETICS AND MORALITY

014489934

Aleksi Tapani Vuorela

University of Helsinki
Faculty of Social Sciences
Philosophy
Master's Degree
January 2020

Sisällys

1. Introduction

The connection between the traditional aesthetic values and morality is not something that is often discussed. There are many reasons for this, but one of them is the fact that the concept of beauty, the most important traditional aesthetic value, is not considered to be as important as it used to be. The word beauty is apt to bring to mind shallow concern with appearances and in general everything sensual. This is very much in contrast to morality, which is supposed to concern the deepest and most serious aspects of life. Because of this, drawing any connection between beauty and morality seems fruitless. However, this was not always so. For a long time, arguably until the end of the nineteenth century, beauty was commonly thought of as a crucial and important concept, one that we could hardly be without. Not only was there thought to be a connection between beauty and morality, but they were often considered to be nearly inseparable, expressing similarly important matters from different perspectives. Not only was beauty not thought to ultimately signify shallow and sensual matters, but there have been many who have denied that such things can in any way be beautiful. There is much of this that seems to be correct. For, as degraded as the concept of beauty has become, we are all familiar with the experience of beauty. And said experience does not seem in any way shallow or frivolous; to the contrary, it is among the most powerful experiences in existence. Here is Roger Scruton's apt description of such an experience:

> Suppose you are walking home in the rain, your thoughts occupied with your work. The streets and the houses pass by unnoticed; the people, too, pass you by; nothing invades your thinking save your interests and anxieties. Then suddenly the sun emerges from the clouds, and a ray of sunlight alights on an old stone wall beside the road and trembles there. You glance up at the sky where the clouds are parting, and a bird bursts

> into song in a garden behind the wall. Your heart fills with joy, and your selfish thoughts are scattered. The world stands before you, and you are content simply to look at it and let it be. (Scruton, 2009).

This example illustrates problems associated with the idea that beauty is ultimately something shallow. It is implausible to suggest that such a profound experience can happen for frivolous reasons. Such an experience seems to rather suggest the fact that beauty is not at all frivolous, and indeed touches something deep within our natures. And while experiences like the one described by Scruton are not every day occurrences, there are various smaller scale experiences of beauty that permeate everyday life. Scruton writes an example of such an experience as well:

> It is a special occasion, when the family unites for a ceremonial dinner. You set the table with a clean embroidered cloth, arranging plates, glasses, bread in a basket, and some carafes of water and wine. You do this lovingly, delighting in the appearance, striving for an effect of cleanliness, simplicity, symmetry, and warmth. The table has become a symbol of homecoming, of the extended arms of the universal mother, inviting her children in. And all this abundance of meaning and good cheer is somehow contained in the appearance of the table. This, too, is an experience of beauty, one that we encounter, in some version or other, every day. We are needy creatures, and our greatest need is for home—the place where we are, where we find protection and love. We achieve this home through representations of our own belonging, not alone but in conjunction with others. All our attempts to make our surroundings look right—through decorating, arranging, creating—are attempts to extend a welcome to ourselves and to those whom we love (Scruton, 2009).

Based on such examples, the idea of beauty touching something deep in human nature (as was believed by the philosophers of old) does not seem implausible. And because of

this, the question of beauty´s connection with morality becomes all the more interesting. It is thus a good idea to examine what kinds of answers have been given to this question historically; this way we can also come to a better understanding of why there used to be a tight consensus that beauty and morality are intertwined. Yet it is also reasonable to assume that their accounts were left wanting in some way or another; otherwise the idea of their connection would probably not have faded into obscurity. While examining the previous accounts is important, then, it is also probably likely that something more needs to be said.

Aside from the fact that these previously proposed views must be examined, we should also examine the more basic question of the nature of beauty itself. For this question in itself is hardly settled, and it has a big effect on the way in which we understand its connection to morality. This is not to say, of course, that there are no unsettled questions concerning the nature of morality. However, the basic ideas concerning normative ethics – that morality is altruistic by nature, concerns the way in which we ought to live, and involves concepts like virtues, duties and values – seem to be relatively noncontroversial. This is in contrast to the concept of beauty, of which there is little agreement even in regards to its very basics. This paper will thus proceed by examining the various conceptions of beauty (and sublimity) and their connections with morality. We will start by extrapolating the ancient views on beauty, both in terms of what might be referred to as the classical conception of beauty in a generic sense, but also the thoughts of individual thinkers Like Plato and the stoics. Afterwards, we shall examine the views of Immanuel Kant, who is probably the most influential modern philosopher regarding this topic. Next we shall discuss beauty as a value. Relating to this, we shall evaluate the views that try to base morality itself on beauty and other similar aesthetic notions. Finally, we shall examine the views of Thomas Reid, who I consider to be the most interesting theorist of beauty and its relationship with morality. I shall finish this paper by explicating Reid's theory of aesthetics through Linda Zagzebski's moral theory. I argue that because

beauty and sublimity are defined in moral terms, aesthetics becomes a part of ethics; thus ethics is conceptually and metaphysically more fundamental than aesthetics.

Now we can move onto the subject itself. We shall start by exploring the classical conception of beauty in a general manner.

2. Classical conception of beauty

2.1. Unmodified classical conception of beauty

There have been many different theories of beauty throughout history, but none has had a more prominent position in aesthetics than the classical conception. Its prominence lasted for over two thousand years, starting from ancient Greece and ending only as late as the eighteenth century. According to the classical conception of beauty, beauty results from an arrangement of parts into a coherent whole, based on notions such as symmetry, harmony and proportion. One can see the influence of the classical conception of beauty in, for example, classical and neo-classical architecture, sculpture and literature. And even in the eighteenth century, when the classical conception started to come under attack, there were still many who subscribed to it. Francis Hutcheson is a notable example. According to him, beauty consists of uniformity amongst variety. The more complex something is, the more beautiful it is as well, if it still forms a coherent whole. (Sartwell 2017).

The classical conception of beauty was often accompanied with the idea that beauty and moral goodness are closely related (Sartwell 2017). This might sound like a strange idea to us moderns, but perhaps the fact that it used to be so prevalent should serve as a reason for us to treat it more sympathetically. In this context, it is also worth mentioning that,

according to Tatarkiewich, unlike nowadays, the classical view emphasized spiritual beauty over sensual beauty. For the classically minded, things like the beauty of character and beauty of thoughts were more central to beauty than sensual beauty (Tatarkiewich, 1970, 25). They thought that sensual beauty was beauty only in a thin sense, and beauty was considered to be primarily an attribute of spiritual things, like the afore mentioned character and thoughts. It might very well be the case that it was the classically minded who were correct about this, and that our modern notion of beauty is impoverished. In any case, when one takes this view into account, the idea of beauty and moral goodness being connected ceases to be so strange. But even if we accept the idea that beauty and moral goodness are connected, it might still seem to be a strange idea that that notions like symmetry, proportion and harmony (the main features of the classical conception) could have anything to do with morality. However, after examining the idea in more depth, it starts to seem more compelling. We ought to start our discussion by examining the classical conception in more detail. This can be accomplished by surveying the views of the earliest proponents of the classical conception.

Tatarkiewich notes that the classical conception of beauty seems to have originated among the Pythagoreans. According to him, Pythagoreans themselves did not employ the term beauty, talking instead about harmony (a term which they seem to have invented themselves). As the Pythagoreans conceived it, harmony meant unity, order and concord, based on proportion and measure. As such, harmony was not a property of individual objects, but was rather based on a proper arrangement of many objects. Pythagoreans thought of the entire world as being based on mathematics, and as such they likewise considered harmony to be a mathematical relation. For the Pythagoreans, harmony was a property of the whole cosmos, and they studied it as a part of cosmology. These ideas of the Pythagoreans had a large influence on ancient aesthetics and society in general; Pythagoreanism influenced Greek art, music, architecture, and many other fields (Tatarkiewich, 1970, 80-81).

Previously it was mentioned that the Pythagoreans thought that the cosmos itself was harmonious. According to Tatarkiewich, the term cosmos, like harmony, was in fact invented by the Pythagoreans. The literal meaning of the word cosmos is "order" which signifies its connection to the idea of harmony. Among other things, Pythagoreans based their belief of the sphericity of the earth on the idea that cosmos is harmonious; they consider sphericity to be a paradigm example of a harmonious property. The principle of harmony also forms the basis of Pythagorean psychology. A perfect soul is one whose parts are arranged properly, i.e. harmoniously (Tatarkiewich, 1970, 81).

The idea that harmony and proportion are the basis of beauty became dominant in philosophy after the Pythagoreans. After they introduced it, the classical conception came to be endorsed by almost every major philosopher for the next two thousand years. One of the earliest major philosophers who endorsed it was Plato (Tatarkiewich, 1970, 116). Echoing the Pythagoreans, Plato held that not only beauty, but goodness itself, is based on proportion and harmony (Plato, 1925, 389). As related by Tatarkiewich, Plato thought that there are in total five regular three dimensional figures, and it is these figures that form the basis of perfect proportions. The entire world, he believed, was founded on them. Two of these five figures are squares and triangles; as a result of Plato's influence, both squares and triangles came to be emphasized in arts and architecture for centuries, or even for millennia (Tatarkiewich, 1970, 117).

Another example of an early advocate of the classical conception was Aristotle. Aristotle, like the Pythagoreans, believed that order and proportion are the basis of beauty. In addition to these features, Aristotle also added size. According to Aristotle, something that is either too large or too small cannot be beautiful. A small object is too easily perceptible, whereas something that is too large is incomprehensible (Aristotle, 1995, 55-56). But while this idea was a novelty on Aristotle's part, it can be accommodated quite easily to the basic framework of the classical conception; after all, size is a relevant property when one considers harmony and proportion.

These were just a few examples of philosophers who upheld the classical conception. As was previously mentioned, the classical conception held sway for over two millennia, both among philosophers and the artists. However, while it seems clear that concepts like proportion and harmony are connected to beauty, the classical conception is ultimately insufficient as a comprehensive theory of beauty. Already back in antiquity Plotinus raised some concerns about the classical conception. Plotinus criticizes the classical conception of beauty for the fact that, according to it, only complex objects can be beautiful. However, there are things such as certain colors and light which are beautiful, despite the fact that they are simple and thus lack any complexity. In addition, things like gold, lightning and stars are beautiful even though they are not complex (Plotinus, 2016, 46-47). Tatarkiewich argues that, according to Plotinus, beauty is based on unity, not proportion (Tatarkiewich, 1970, 319). As such, his theory is more of a modification of the classical conception than an outright refutal of it: for harmony and unity are, as concepts, ultimately similar, difference between them being merely the fact that harmony requires parts, whereas unity does not.

Plotinus' criticism of the classical conception seems to be sound, but later on, additional problems with the classical conception were pointed out. The classical conception of beauty started to be heavily criticized in the eighteenth century. While there were many philosophers who criticized the classical conception of beauty during the eighteenth century, it was Edmund Burke who offered arguments against the classical conception that seem decisive. For example, Burke noted that, although everyone agrees that flowers are the most beautiful plants in existence, there does not seem to be any single proportion that is responsible for their beauty. A rose and an apple flower, for example, are both beautiful flowers. However, whereas rose is a large flower that grows from a small shrub, an apple flower is, to the contrary, a small flower that grows from a large shrub. And when it comes to animals, swans have a long neck, but a short tail. One might think that this is a beautiful proportion, but a peacock has, to the contrary, a short neck and a huge tail. Yet despite this, peacock is a beautiful bird, just like a swan. And while the idea that beautiful

humans share certain proportions in common is widespread, in truth said proportions are not sufficient for beauty, according to Burke (Burke, 1757, 85-88).

Burke has shown that the classical conception of beauty as it stands has some severe issues. (although Plotinus' version of the theory is arguably not refuted by his arguments). Starting from the late eighteenth century most philosophers have agreed that the meaning of the word "beauty" is not exhausted by notions like harmony and proportion (Stolnitz, 1992). However, it would be too quick to say that Burkes criticism shows that no version of the classical conception is adequate. For while there were many who subscribed to the version of classical conception that we have sketched above, there exists a modified version of the classical conception which is supplied by another notion of beauty. We should examine it first before dismissing the classical conception wholesale. Before we do that, however, we should first discuss the ways in which notions like harmony have been applied to ethics. After all, the fact that the unmodified version of the classical conception is inadequate does not change the fact that notions like harmony and proportion are clearly connected to beauty; the appeal of the arts based on the classical conception are enough to show that. As such, we should still stop to examine the ways in which the unmodified classical conception has been thought to be related to morality.

We previously mentioned that for Plato, harmony was the basis of both goodness and beauty. This can be seen in the way Plato defines certain virtues. For example, according to Plato, in order for one to be prudent, the different parts of one's soul need to be in harmony, and each of the different parts must be connected to the whole in an appropriate manner. Justice, on the other hand, is based on all of the different parts of the soul knowing their places. This entails that they should only do what they are supposed to do, in order to avoid bringing disharmony to the soul (Plato, 370 bc, 143-150). For Plato, beauty and goodness do not seem to be ultimately distinct. According to Marciano, Pythagoreans seem to have also held that harmony is the basis of morality. For example, the Pythagoreans believed that friendship is the power which holds society together, and friendship itself is

based on harmonious equality. Harmonious equality means that people in different positions are capable of maintaining harmony together, in spite of their differences. All groups ought to recognize their proper relation to the whole and act accordingly. Teacher, for example, should serve his students kindly, while students ought to be respectful towards their teachers (Marciano 2014, 146-147).

In this regard, Pythagorean views on the effects of music are particularly interesting. According to Tatarkiewich, Pythagoreans believed that music had an impact on the listener's character. Music can either cause one's soul to become harmonious, or alternatively it can corrupt it. One could say that the harmony of music echoes in the listeners soul, whereas disharmony likewise causes one's soul to become disharmonious. The Pythagorean view, in fact, went even deeper than this. For Pythagoreans believed that soul is imprisoned in a body for its sins, and it can only be liberated by purifying it. And according to Pythagoreans, a soul can only be purified by music. As such music, and thus harmony, had an ethical, even religious significance for the Pythagoreans. This idea of the power of music was, like Pythagorean aesthetics in general, very influential in the ancient world (Tatarkiewich, 1970, 82-83).

The idea of harmony was thus very influential in the ancient world. And the previous examples do indeed show that the unmodified classical conception of beauty does have a kind of connection to morality. It is doubtful, however, that harmony could form the basis of morality by itself. One can of course talk about harmony in the context of morality, but only in a limited sense. That is, it is easy to agree that harmony is good, morally speaking; For example, Plato's view that prudence can be defined as harmony between different parts of the soul (or mind) is quite plausible. But what makes something harmonious – that is to say, proportioned and orderly – depends on other criteria. Regarding the previous example concerning prudence, what counts as a part of the soul having a proper relation to the whole is not something that the principle of harmony itself can tell us. The idea that there are universal proportions which are good as such and form the basis of ethics, as

Plato for example seems to have believed, seems far fetched. The idea that, say, the goodness of pleasure is based on the fact that it conforms to some universal proportion is implausible. But in any case, harmony is a concept that belongs both to beauty and ethics and makes the ancient idea that beauty and moral goodness are tightly related to each other more comprehensible.

2.2. Beauty as fittingness

The classical conception of beauty was often augmented by the notion of beauty as fittingness. According to this notion, fittingness is partly what beauty is based on. Tatarkiewich elaborates that the Stoics, among others, meant by fittingness that all the different parts of a thing form a whole in a way that is fitting and proper. The difference with the classical conception as such emerges from the fact that fittingness depends on what kind of object or creature is in question – that is to say, on their nature. This is unlike, say, harmony, which is meant to be a universal criterion of beauty. Fittingness in this sense is surely also connected to ethics. In fact, fittingness was originally an ethical concept, and it was only later when it started to be used as an aesthetic concept (Tatarkiewich 1970, p. 189-190).

One can already see the notion of beauty as fittingness in Socrates. Socrates argued that a beautiful wrestler is unlike a beautiful runner, and a beautiful javelin is unlike a beautiful shield. A golden shield would be ugly, since it would be not fit for what a shield is supposed to do (that is to say, defend). A dung basket can on the other hand be beautiful, in so far as it is fit for its purpose. Anything can be beautiful as long as they are well suited for their purpose (Xenophon, 233). But, as a result, an objects beauty is dependent on what it is

supposed to be. What makes a knife beautiful is different from what makes a spoon beautiful.

The notion of beauty as fittingness helps to enhance the classical conception by providing criteria for what counts as harmony or a good proportion. An animal, for example, is harmonious if all of its different parts are fit for its purposes, and the criteria for good proportions can be provided by similar means. And the notion of fittingness does seem to be connected to beauty. It helps us to explain why the criteria for beauty seem so different in different kinds of objects and creatures; their purposes are different. But this raises the question of what counts as a purpose or an end in an object that is not an artifact. The most common way to define a purpose for non-artefactual beings has been to appeal to nature. By examining what some creature is like, we can find out what end nature has provided for it. A common example of this is to appeal to the fact that much of the different properties that animals possess seem to exist in order to propagate their survival. This view is not without its problems, but we unfortunately cannot discuss them here in depth. We shall rather move onto evaluating the notion of beauty as fittingness in general, and its connection to morality.

In addition to criticizing the unmodified classical conception, Burke also offered arguments against the notion of beauty as fittingness. Burke notes, for example, that if fittingness would be the ultimate criterion of beauty, one would think that a monkey is a particularly beautiful animal. After all, the humanlike hands of a monkey combined with its flexible limbs are very fitting for climbing, running, jumping and gripping; yet few would say that monkey is a beautiful animal. And in the same way, a pelican's throat pouch fits pelicans purposes very well, but this does not make said throat pouch beautiful (Burke 1757, 95-96). While Burkes criticisms have some truth to them, it can be argued that he himself conceived beauty in too shallow of a manner. The afore mentioned arguments of Burke seem to focus only on sensual beauty, whereas the notion of fittingness goes deeper than that. Larger problem for the notion of beauty as fittingness is the fact that it is relative to

any given object's nature. As such, it does not allow us to compare the beauty of two things with different natures to each other. But we are clearly capable of comparing beauty in such a way; this shows that the classical conception, even when supplied with the principle of fittingness is still lacking as a theory of beauty. As such, despite its long lasting prominence in aesthetics, it is no wonder that it ultimately came to be supplanted by other theories. But still, as fittingness is connected to beauty at least in part, we should stop to analyze it as an ethical concept (all the more so as fittingness, as was previously mentioned, originated as an ethical concept).

We shall use two different ethical theories that are based on fittingness (or nature) as examples, one of them being ancient, one of them modern. We shall use the Stoic theory of ethics as an example of an ancient naturalistic theory. For starters, Sellars explains that the Stoics believed that an action is fitting if it accords with the agent's nature. Simple examples of this are eating and drinking, but in many cases more attention is required before one can figure out which action is fitting in a given situation. Concerning us humans, acting according to our nature means most of all to act based on our rational nature. To act according to one's rational nature on the other hand is the same thing as acting virtuously. This includes, among other things, the avoidance of dangerous and irrational emotions. Another aspect of acting according nature is self-preservation, something that irrational animals are also capable of doing; the previously mentioned eating and drinking are part of what it means to act in order to survive (Sellars 2006, 125-128).

In modern philosophy it is common to highlight the fact that one cannot draw an ought from is; because of this, talking about acting according to nature might sound old fashioned. But although the logical separation of ought from is surely sound, this does not mean that acting according to nature does not have any normative significance. Our constitution certainly determines partly what is good for us. The fact that food is necessary for our survival determines the fact that food is good for us – as long as we add a further premise that our survival is a good thing. In the same way, from the fact that human beings

are capable of making autonomous choices one can infer that slavery is not fitting for humans. It is easy to come up with other such examples, which shows the fact that fittingness is an important normative concept. It is another question entirely, however, whether ethics can be based only on nature. Before answering this question, we should first examine a modern form of naturalistic ethics. We shall use Rosalind Hursthouse's naturalistic theory as an example.

Hursthouse starts expounding her theory by talking about natural goodness in animals and plants. The kind of goodness in question is goodness qua them being specimens of their natural kind (This kind of goodness is referred to as "attributive" goodness. When using the word "good" attributively, saying that, say, "that is a good tree" means that it is good *as* a tree; it means to evaluate the tree by the standard of treeness). For example, an individual plant is a good plant of its kind in so far as its parts and operations are good, according to her. Said parts and operations on the other hand are good if they are conducive of individual survival of the specimen through its natural lifespan, and the continuance of its species. A tree, for example, should have roots that enable it to survive, and the roots are good qua being roots only to the extent that they manage this. The goodness of plants, therefore, consists of their capacity to further the two ends of individual survival and species survival. One can further divide plants into their parts and operations, which serve as the plants two aspects of evaluation (Hursthouse, 1999, 197-198).

When we move onto animals, things become more complicated. In addition to the afore mentioned two ends and aspects of evaluation, there are two more of each. The third aspect of evaluation concerns actions. Actions are good, according to Hursthouse, in so far as they further the accomplishment of the two previously mentioned ends. An owl, for example, needs to be able to hunt well, and in so far it is not able to, it is defective. The third end is the combination of characteristic freedom from pain and characteristic pleasure. The reason Hursthouse stresses the word "characteristic" is that the function of pain and pleasure in any given animal depends on what kind of animal it is. A dog that feels

pain when the pad of its foot is cut is better qua being a dog than a dog which does not, because its capacity to feel such pain is crucial for its survival. The fourth aspect of evaluation concerns emotions and desires. A good member of a given species, for example, is afraid of anything that its species characteristically fears. In so far as it is not afraid of them, it is defective. Finally, the fourth end concerns appropriate social behavior. For example, wolves hunt in packs, and as such, a wolf that hunts alone is defective. The appropriateness of any social behavior is based on its capacity to serve the three previously mentioned ends (Hursthouse, 1999, 198-201).

Hursthouse believes that when we talk about goodness in humans, it should be done in the same manner as when we talk about goodness in animals and plants. In other words, to be a good human being is to be good qua being a human. However, according to Hursthouse, being a good human being in regards to physical characteristics is not relevant to ethics. It is only when we talk about nonphysical aspects, such as pleasure, pain and emotions (in the case of humans, also rationality) that we move onto the territory of ethics. As it happens, it is precisely these three features which form the basis of virtues. Virtues, according to Hursthouse, are compounds of rational and emotional aspects. Virtues like courage help us to achieve the four natural ends and are therefore essential when considering what it is to be a good human being. And thus ethics are based on similar naturalistic considerations as those which are used to evaluate the goodness of animals and plants (Hursthouse, 1999, 206-209).

Such is Hursthouse's modern theory of naturalistic ethics. As we previously noted, the point of bringing it up was not to judge its overall plausibility, but rather to have it serve as an example of a modern naturalistic theory of ethics. Examining it can help us to answer the more general question of whether ethics can be based solely on nature. On the face of it, the problem with such naturalistic ethics is that it does not enable us to make comparisons between the goodness of different kinds of species. Our ethical theory should be capable of explaining why animals have more moral value than plants, for example. But the

naturalistic criteria of the sort that Hursthouse uses do not enable us to do this. As we already mentioned, the four ends that Hursthouse characterizes are all relative to any given specimen's natural kind. On this account, the pleasure that an animal feels is not good as such, but only to the extent that it is characteristic of its species. Likewise, the value of individual survival is qualified by taking into consideration the natural lifespan of an organism. Such relativity makes ethical decision making concerning members of different species difficult.

Of course, there does exist a way out of this problem. One can always subscribe to the Eudaimonic perspective according to which the moral value of different things can be judged based on the way they contribute to eudaimonia, i.e. flourishing of the subject. This would give us the kind of standard that we need for decision making. It is not, however, a perspective that I find persuasive. Constricting morality to the subject's perspective does not do justice to the fact that ethics is driven by altruistic considerations. Of course, proponents of Eudaimonism do not usually deny this, citing virtues like justice as being other regarding (Hursthouse, Pettigrove, 2016). But if this is so, it no longer makes sense to claim that the end of ethics is happiness. If some virtues are other regarding, they cannot be subsumed under the umbrella of happiness. And with this being the case, the Eudaimonic perspective is no longer sufficient for ethics. While the notion of flourishing is obviously important for ethics, it does not exhaust it.

Overall, fittingness does not seem capable of grounding ethics any more than it can ground beauty. But it is nonetheless a concept that is relevant both to beauty and ethics and given the emphasis that ancient theories of beauty and ethics tended to give it, it helps us to understand why the ancients (and those influenced by them) saw them as being strongly interconnected. But we shall not stop our examination here, for there is still one ancient view on beauty that is worth considering. It does not concern beauty as such, but rather the experience of beauty. We shall discuss this theory next.

2.3. Plato Symposium

We have already previously discussed Plato's classical view on beauty. However, in his dialogue Symposium he additionally discusses the effects of beauty, and the way we develop in our capacity to appreciate beauty. It is this aspect of Plato's philosophy of beauty that has arguably proven to be more influential (his views on beauty per se, after all, are mostly borrowed from Pythagoreans). Plato's theory on the experience of beauty and its effects manages, ironically, to further exacerbate the problems with the classical view, yet at the same time, gives a hint to the way in which we should proceed when we contemplate the nature of beauty.

For Plato, love is intimately connected to beauty. In Symposium, he characterizes love as a longing for beauty. As such, beauty, for Plato, is obviously connected to ethics. For example, as argued by Phaedrus in Symposium, beauty inspires love, and it is love that causes us to act nobly. Love is the prerequisite of altruism and it inspires people to accomplish their greatest deeds. It is love that enables us to be courageous, and likewise we would never abandon or refuse to help someone who we truly love. In addition, only love can cause someone to be willing to sacrifice his life for the sake of others. There is nothing else in the world that contributes more to happiness and virtuousness, according to Phaedrus (Plato, 2000, 6-7). Agathon adds that loving commits us to justice and temperance (the latter because, being the strongest of all emotions, it can temper all others) and in addition, protectiveness, orderliness and good will (Plato, 2000, 17-18).

Plato also described the way in which he believes we develop in our ability appreciate beauty. In the dialogue, Socrates relates the teaching of a wise woman named Diotima. According to her, one needs to start by focusing on the beauty of an individual body. After one has fallen in love with the beauty of an individual body, one must relate that love to other bodies, since all bodies are ultimately similar. Afterwards, one must realize

that beautiful bodies are ultimately trifling in comparison to beautiful souls. When we manage this, we are able to love a beautiful soul even in an ugly body. This in turn compels us to love discourse that enables us to grow a noble nature. As a result, we start to admire the beauties of laws and institutions. At this point we start to realize that all beauties are similar to each other. The next and final step is to be able to contemplate the beauty as it is in itself, I.e. the form of beauty. If our life is ever worth living, says Diotima, it is when we have attained this vision of beauty as it is in itself (Plato, 2000, 26-27).

What should we think of these views? While certain details of Plato's account do not seem plausible (can we really love a body or an abstract form?), the idea that love is a longing for beauty seems quite plausible. An experience of beauty and love are, after all, very similar experiences. While the idea that sensuous beauty could inspire love is dubious, the idea that beautiful souls – to use Plato's term – could inspire love sounds believable. And the idea that love inspires altruism and virtuous behavior also seems obviously true. Plato's views are, in general, a good example of the fact that the ancients took beauty seriously. After all, if love is a desire for beauty, and love is what inspires us to act virtuously, then this renders beauty to be of utmost importance. In this regard it is also noticeable that Plato treats beauty of bodies, and material things in general, as ultimately trivial forms of beauty. This also accords with the traditional notion. Plato's theory of love being about longing for beauty does justice to all of these views.

But all of this seems to raise even more problems for the classical conception of beauty. By focusing on the experience of beauty, it opens a wide gulf between the experience of beauty and its supposed cause. For it does not seem plausible to suggest that either harmony or fittingness as such could inspire an emotion as strong as love. Such notions seem too shallow in order to inspire such an emotion. This should be the most important criterion when we try to define beauty: whatever beauty is, it must be something that is

worthy of the strong emotions it can cause in us. And this is a standard that the classical conception is unable to meet.

We shall next divert our attention to the subject of sublimity and its relationship with morality. I shall start with surveying Kant's views on the subject. While he was not the first philosopher to discuss sublimity, his views on it have been highly influential, and it is thus a good way to approach the subject.

3. Immanuel Kant

3.1. Kant on sublimity

As a term, sublime is somewhat more problematic than beauty. This is because different writers employ the term in different ways, rendering it ambiguous. All its different uses seem to share the idea that sublime is something that is great, in one way or another, but in other respects the uses differ. Perhaps it is better, then, to think of the sublime as a family of concepts rather than as a single, determinate one. In any case, much has been said about the sublime and its relation to ethics, and few have been as influential in this regard as Kant.

According to Kant, we call things sublime when they are "truly great". Kant divides the sublime into two different categories, that of the mathematical sublime and dynamic sublime. Something is mathematically sublime when it is so large that our imagination is

unable to comprehend it. Our imaginations inability to grasp it causes us to realize the greatness of our intellect, since our intellect does not have the same limitations that the imagination has and is capable of grasping even infinity (Kant 1790, 250-256).

On the other hand, something is dynamically sublime when the thing in question has great power but is nonetheless incapable of ruling over us. It causes us to feel fear next to the greatness of nature, yet at the same time makes us feel superior compared to nature, since our humanity is not harmed by the fact that nature is physically more powerful than us. As one can see from Kant's description, the experience of the sublime focuses ultimately on ourselves. Kant's view is that we cannot refer to the object itself as sublime (Kant 1790, 245).

Even though both forms of sublimity involve pleasure, neither are entirely pleasant experiences. Mathematical sublime involves an unpleasant feeling caused by the realization of the limits of our imagination, whereas the dynamical sublime involves an unpleasant feeling caused by us feeling ourselves inferior to nature physically. However, the pleasure involved in the experience of the sublime is not possible without these unpleasant feelings. The pleasant feelings are built upon the unpleasant ones (Kant 1790, 258-260).

While it is probably true that the experience of sublime as Kant understands it can be likened to moral respect, his description of how we realize the greatness of our intellect and humanity through the sublime is implausible. The experience of sublimity is directed outwards, phenomenally speaking and it is thus untenable to suppose that the sublime concerns our own qualities. It is true that the experience of sublime involves pleasure, but the cause of this pleasure is not ourselves. We need some other way to explain our emotional reaction to the sublime.

When we think about the sense of the sublime that we experience when we come across say, a large mountain or a magnificent building, the expression "feeling small" is probably the best way to describe the experience. Kant is probably right that such an experience

involves us feeling ourselves inferior to nature. But if this is the case, what is the cause of the pleasure belonging to the experience? The answer to this question can be found, perhaps surprisingly, from theology.

We can better understand sublimity when we compare it to another, similar, concept. This concept is the numinous, which was made known by Rudolf Otto. As defined by him, numinous is a religious concept, which refers to the feeling that something is far above us, to the point that we cannot even comprehend it. The experience of the numinous is, at the same time, both terrifying and interesting, and makes us feel humble next to something or someone that is far greater than ourselves.

The sublime can be understood as a lesser, more secular version of the numinous. Seeing a large mountain causes us to feel small and humble. Feeling humble, on the other hand, can be a pleasant experience. Humility is commonly held to be a virtue, and a sense of humility and smallness causes us to feel that we are not responsible for everything, and thus relieves our sense of burden. The feeling of humility is an emotion that is directed outwards, and it involves admiration and interest towards something greater than ourselves. This sort of emotion can preempt us from becoming arrogant and holding ourselves in too high regard. By serving as an analogue for moral humility, the experience of sublime can help us to be more alert morally.

Along with sublimity, Kant had also much to say about beauty, particularly the disinterestedness that it involves. This is something that belongs to the experience of sublime as well, but as it involves them both, we should withhold discussing it until the next section, since it is mainly in the context of beauty that Kant discusses it.

3.2. Kant on beauty

Like his theory of sublimity, Kant's theory of beauty has been very influential. We shall not discuss Kant's own theory, but only his views on beauty's relationship with morality; Kant's theory of beauty, due to its subjective character, does not by itself fit into the context of our discussion.

Beauty and sublimity have a similar relationship with morality, according to Kant. Both of them are connected to moral emotions. Beauty guides us to love something disinterestedly, regardless of our own interests, whereas the sublime helps us to appreciate something even if that something is contrary to our interests (Kant 1790, 267).

In addition to the fact that the disinterestedness belonging to beauty and sublimity makes them connected to morality, beauty is also analogous to morality in the sense that, just like moral judgements, judgements of beauty are also universally valid, applying to all human beings, and not just subjective assessments (It is worth noting, though, that for Kant, the universal validity of moral judgements is more unconditional than in the case of beauty; his theory of beauty is ultimately subjective) (Kant 1790, 354). This view leads us to metaethical questions which we do not have time to go over here. Nonetheless, Kant's view brings forth the fact that the question about the objectivity of beauty is important when considering the relationship between beauty and morality.

According to Kant, beauty is capable of expressing moral ideas in a sensuous form. The experience of beauty helps us to understand moral ideas better and to cultivate our moral feelings. Kant does not believe that the capacity to appreciate beautiful art is connected to good character. However, the capacity to value and to be interested in natural beauty is always a mark of a good soul. And if such appreciation is common for someone, said person is likely also temperamentally well suited for moral emotions. Such capacity shows that one is capable of appreciating nature regardless of one's own interests and to simply rejoice about its existence. As an example of how beauty is capable of bringing forth moral ideas, Kant mentions colors. According to him, colors work as symbols for all kinds of moral concepts. White serves as a symbol of innocence, red of sublimity, blue of courage and

green of pleasantness, for example (Kant 1790, 299-302). This is an interesting idea, and we shall discuss such symbolism later as well.

We previously mentioned Kant's view that beauty and sublimity are disinterested. This is a complex topic, and before examining Kant's own views on the matter, we should take a brief detour and go over the history of the concept.

3.3. Disinterestedness

According to Stolnitz, the concept of disinterestedness appeared slowly throughout the seventeenth century. The first philosopher to call attention to the idea of disinterested perception was, Stolnitz believes, Lord Shaftesbury. He brought attention to the term as a contrary of the notions of interest and interestedness. Both of the latter terms were in common use at the time. When it comes to ethics, the term was essential for Hobbes' theory of ethics as being based on self-interest, and similar views were expressed at the time in religious matters as well. Shaftesbury thought that this idea of egoism as a basis for religion and ethics to be not only wrong, but wicked. Interest was, then, supposed to refer to our private good, not to any common good. Interest in this sense is, in other words, equivalent to self-interestedness. Shaftesbury does not, however, imply that disinterested actions are those that are benevolent and altruistic. Early on, Shaftesbury did not make clear what he precisely had in mind when talking about disinterestedness; he only used it in a negative sense, as the opposite of interestedness. Later, he comes to define disinterestedness as caring about something for its own sake. Virtuous person is someone who cares about moral goodness for its own sake, not as a means to any other end (Stolnitz, 1961, 132-134).

Indeed, Shaftesbury gives up the notion that ethics should focus on the idea of wrong or right actions, but rather holds that morality ultimately concerns the love of virtue. Given

this, Shaftesbury's ethical theory is hard to distinguish from an aesthetic theory. Stolnitz also notes that Shaftesbury thinks that an art lover and a virtuous man are very much alike, except for the fact that they apprehend different objects. Unlike previously, when Shaftesbury used the term "disinterest" merely in a negative way, in his later thought it no longer refers to a kind of action, but rather to a kind of concern towards something that involves no thinking or caring about the consequences. While it might seem that Shaftesbury arrived at the ultimately aesthetic concept of disinterest from the starting point of ethics, in actuality Shaftesbury's thought was focused on the aesthetic from the very beginning. He used his aesthetic insights in different domains, both ethical and non-ethical (such as mathematics). He does discuss the notion of disinterest in a way that is strictly aesthetic as well. He describes, for example, how the appreciation of the beauty of an ocean must not involve any ideas concerning the oceans possible purposes, ones that, at any rate, go beyond the act of perception itself. The enjoyment we get from the idea of possessing an ocean, for example, is very different from the enjoyment which accompanies the observation of its beauty (Stolnitz, 1961. 132-134).

Shaftesbury's impact in this regard was large, and the notion of disinterest was used by many different philosophers during the late eighteenth century. However, according to Shelley, it was with Kant that the decisive turn in the usage of the concept of disinterestedness appeared. For according to James Shelley, Kant was the first philosopher who reoriented the concept of disinterestedness to be the opposite of morality, very much unlike the way Shaftesbury had understood it. For Kant, the pleasure involved with morality still counts as interested, because it brings forth a desire for action. The pleasure one receives from attending a beautiful object, however, is disinterested, for it does not involve a desire to do anything. It was through Kant that the notion of the aesthetic became its own, irreducible category, distinct from morality. What started as a concept that brought morality and beauty together ended up becoming something that separated them (Shelley, 2017).

Should we conclude from this that the concept of disinterestedness has nothing to do with morality after all? Not necessarily. While this has been a popular notion and has bolstered the idea of autonomy of the arts, this Kantian notion of disinterest also has several flaws. The notion of disinterestedness, and the whole idea of a specific aesthetic attitude has come under attack. George Dickie is often thought to have given said notions a decisive blow in his essay "The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude" in 1964. He argued that all the purported cases of interested attention are merely cases of inattention. For example, a father who takes pride in his daughter's performance in a play is not observing the play in an interested manner, but is rather being unobservant, because his focus is fixed solely on his daughter's part in the play (Shelley, 2017).

It is also worth mentioning that while many have interpreted Kant as having separated disinterestedness from morality, this is not necessarily true. Roger Scruton, for example, argues that Kant's understanding of disinterestedness did not differ much from Shaftesbury's account. According to Scruton, for Kant, interest means that, when we have an interest to something, we only care about it to the extent that it helps us to fulfill some of our desires. But along with such instrumentally valuable things, there are also things that have intrinsic worth. The kind of interest we have in them is such that it is only directed to the things themselves. A paradigm example of such an interest is moral interest, which is directed to morality itself, not in any other interest which morality could help to fulfill. We can still talk about an interest of a kind in cases like this, but according to Scruton the interest in question is a ''disinterested interest'', which does not involve any instrumental motives (Scruton 2008, 23).

One might argue that the idea of beauty being associated with disinterestedness contradicts the fact that beauty involves pleasure. Scruton answers this charge by dividing pleasure into two different categories, nonintentional and intentional. The first kind of pleasure is not dependent on our thoughts (for example, the kind of pleasure we get from eating) whereas the second kind has a cognitive basis. The disinterested pleasure that

arises from beauty belongs into this category. The pleasure involved with beauty arises only after we have disinterestedly judged something to be beautiful, not vice versa. We can of course wish to see something beautiful only because we are interested in pleasure; however, this kind of pleasure is not possible unless we are capable of appreciating beauty in itself, disinterestedly (Scruton 2008, 24-25).

Apart from whether this is the correct interpretation of Kant's view on the matter, Scruton's description seems like a plausible way to understand disinterestedness. Both beauty and ethics do indeed seem disinterested in this sense, and as such it marks a similarity between them. The notion of disinterestedness also has some interesting implications for what beauty is like as a value; we shall discuss these implications in the next chapter.

In conclusion, Kant's view about the relationship between beauty and morality is that they are not connected directly, but beauty can work as a symbol for morality, and is capable of cultivating our moral emotions. Kant's views are not without their problems, but many of his insights, such as the ones concerning disinterestedness, are surely true. We shall come back to them later during our discussion.

4. Value theory

4.1. Beauty as a value

Ethics naturally involves values, and beauty is a value in its own right (In this chapter, we shall use "beauty" in a more general sense to denote both beauty proper and the sublime; "beauty" has often been used to denote both of the traditional aesthetic values in general, and we shall now do the same for the sake of convenience). Value theory, therefore, is highly relevant to our subject. According to Mark Schroeder, the term is used in various ways, but it can most usefully be defined as a field of philosophy that examines theoretical questions about values. One of the traditional questions of value theory concerns the question of intrinsic values (Schroeder, 2016). This is the question we shall address first.

Schroeder argues that intrinsic value can simply be defined as the contrary of instrumental value. For something to be instrumentally valuable, it must be something that we take to be valuable, but not in itself. Its value is based on its capability to fulfill some other end: it is in this sense that such a value is instrumental. Money is a good example of an instrumental value, as it is valued because it leads to other things, but not in itself. Something intrinsically valuable is, to the contrary, valued in itself; we want it for its own sake (Schroeder, 2016).

It is self explanatory that there must be some things that are intrinsically valuable; there can be no instrumental values if there is no end to which they serve as instruments for. Given this, we should try to examine whether beauty counts as an intrinsic value. This is not a trivial question, as there are probably many who would claim that beauty itself is not intrinsically valuable, but that its value is rather instrumental; it gives us pleasure. However, based on our examination of the concept of disinterestedness, this does not seem to be so. For the pleasure involved in an experience of beauty can only rise when one appreciates the target of the experience in itself without any further motives. And

given that the beautiful object is appreciated in such a way, it means that beauty as a value must be intrinsic – to be an intrinsic value simply means, after all, that something is valued in itself. As such, being an intrinsic value is something that beauty shares with fundamental moral values. But there still remains other questions relating to it such as, for example, the question of how many different intrinsically valuable things exist.

This question can be expressed by asking whether value pluralism or value monism is true (Schroeder, 2016). The question is significant for our subject, as based on the above analysis, beauty seems to be an intrinsic value, alongside other intrinsic values like pleasure. However, if there is something wrong with the idea of value pluralism, beauty's intrinsic value will be threatened. For if there can only be one fundamental value, beauty is not a likely candidate. No matter how much it may seem that beauty is an intrinsic value based on the previous considerations, the view has to be abandoned if value pluralism cannot be defended.

However, based on such considerations – and many other such concerns besides – value pluralism does seem like an intuitive and attractive option. For it seems that there are many different values. Things like pleasure, knowledge and virtue all seem to be intrinsically valuable. A life filled with pleasure but lacking in knowledge and virtue seems inferior to a life that is equally pleasurable, but also features knowledge and living virtuously. This gives value pluralism a strong starting point in the debate. However, there are other considerations, some of which may render value monism more plausible.

One such additional consideration concerns the capacity to explain, according to Mason. Value pluralism, some have argued, has the problem that it is explanatorily unsatisfying. This is because it has to resort to explain values based on multiple considerations. The alleged problem with this is that if one holds, for example, that both pleasure and knowledge are values one can still ask why they are valuable. And the only way to answer to this is to invoke some other value, of which their value is derived from. This argument would seem to bring us to value monism, because it does not have such a problem: value

monists can explain value by saying that value simply equals pleasure, or some other single value. However, this argument relies on a controversial principle concerning the way explanations of value are supposed to work. This principle is not necessarily true: one can, for example, explain the fact of both knowledge and pleasure being values by reductively explaining what it means to value something. This way, their position as values can be explained, without having to invoke any other, supposedly more fundamental values (Mason, 2018).

Mason also notes that another problem plaguing value pluralism is that of incommensurability. The idea being that, since there is no single value by which to judge them, you cannot compare different fundamental values to each other and measure which one is best. One common answer to this objection is to rely on the notion of practical wisdom. Going back to Aristotle, practical wisdom is thought of as a faculty that a virtuous person possesses and allows him to make correct practical judgements. Someone who possesses practical wisdom is simply able to see which action is the right one to do. The problem with this answer is that the concept of practical wisdom is too vague. How does the faculty associated with it work, and how does it enable us to judge that one action is to be preferred to another? At the face of it, the idea of such a faculty seems mysterious, almost magical in character. More would need to be said in order to make the idea of practical wisdom compelling (Mason, 2018).

Another approach to the problem is to rely on basic preferences to make the decision (again, according to Mason). When there are cases where reason itself does not explain what choice we ought to make, such preferences are the only basis to make a choice. When choosing between a banana and a pear, for example, reason does not necessarily provide any reason to choose one over another. In such a case, we can simply make the choice based on our own desires. However, while this account makes sense in such a nonmoral case, problems appear when it is applied to moral dilemmas. Choosing without any reasons does not seem to do justice to the notion of a moral choice. It is not very

plausible to suggest that moral dilemmas could be justifiably resolved based on such arbitrary considerations (Mason, 2018).

Finally, there is also the simple choice to accept incommensurability. Perhaps there are conflicts between some values which are simply irresolvable. Perhaps the world is such a complex place that it would be naive to suggest that all moral conflicts can be resolved. It might be that ethics does not even need to always be action guiding (Mason, 2018). But accepting incommensurability does not seem to me as easy as this argument makes it out to be. For it is not simply the case that it would render some moral dilemmas featuring different values unsolvable, but all of them. However, it does not seem plausible that none of these value dilemmas can ever be solved. Take, for example, a case where we have to choose between hurting someone by telling them the truth or lying to them. It does seem that these sort of dilemmas can be solved, often enough. If the suffering caused by truth telling is large, without the truth in question being in itself all that important, lying seems justifiable. But this presupposes that we are able to weigh two different values – truth and pleasure/pain – against each other. So simply accepting incommensurability does not seem to be an option.

The issues concerning the debate are complex, as we have seen. Given this, for our purposes it might be the best to try to find a way to secure the status of beauty, even in the case that monism turns out to be true. At first glance, as we already mentioned, the idea of securing beauty as an independent value seems hopeless if we are chosen to accept monism. However, this is ultimately only so if we take monism in a very strict sense. But it is also possible to have a looser type of monism. This kind of monism can incorporate beauty.

What would this loose monism be like? One example of it is eudaimonia, a concept which we discussed in the previous chapter. Eudaimonia can be translated as happiness, but it is not quite the same thing as what we nowadays mean by happiness. Eudaimonia is not concerned only with hedonistic happiness but includes all of the things that can be

considered good for a human being to possess. This includes things like being virtuous, knowledgeable and healthy. In other words, eudaimonia contains within itself a large variety of components, and it cannot be simply reduced into a simple property. However, it is still ultimately a unified property, one that consists of various others.

One thing noticeable from the above description is that while eudaimonia seems like a singular value, due to the fact that it consists of many things which we hold to be independently valuable, it gives a lot of ground to pluralism. For as things like pleasure and virtue are not thought to be, on this account, means to eudaimonia but rather it constituents, we can still say that such things are intrinsically valuable, while at the same time subsuming them under the notion of eudaimonia. This kind of loose monism would also allow us to say that beauty is an independent value, and thus secure its status. This type of monism does not necessarily have to be eudaimonia - as we already argued, it does not seem ultimately plausible – but it can be any kind of monism of the same, loose type. I am not going to propose what such monistic value could be. It is enough for our purposes to make clear that it is possible that there can be such a value, for it suffices to protect beauty from being reduced into some other value, like pleasure.

While we have established that beauty is an intrinsic value, there are still many questions that remain concerning beauty as a value. For one thing, as it seems to be a fundamental value, can it also considered to be a moral value? We shall delve into this topic by discussing two philosophers who have thought this to be the case.

4.2. G.E.Moore

G.E. Moore's normative theory of ethics is significant in terms of it treating beauty as a moral value. This makes it connected to our question at hand and is thus worth

examining. Moore's theory is one of the few systematic theories of normative ethics to give beauty a significant role.

Baldwin defines Moore's normative theory as consequentialist: according to him, right action is the one that produces more goodness than any other possible action. This is standard consequentialism, but what makes Moore's theory stand out are the things he counts as good. Unlike the hedonistic value theories that dominated traditional utilitarianism, Moore is a value pluralist, and does not hold pleasure to be the only thing that is valuable. Moore holds that one of these additional values is beauty. At first, Moore did not agree that all that is good must be a conscious state. He countered this view with a thought experiment. A world that is beautiful is better than an ugly world, even if neither contain anything that is conscious, and therefore any conscious states. This was Moore's early view; however, his views on the matter changed. Later Moore agreed with the idea that something needs to be a conscious state in order to be a possible candidate for goodness. He still held the experience and contemplation of beauty as valuable, but not beauty in itself (Baldwin, 2004).

It is perhaps ultimately no wonder that Moore abandoned his earlier view. For the idea that beauty is intrinsically significant in a moral sense has some strange consequences. It would imply, for example, that beauty makes a difference when it comes to the worth of different human beings, and that the moral worth of different animal species is partly dependent on their beauty. One would have to hold that a hyena, for example, is at least slightly less valuable than a kangaroo because of the latter being more beautiful. This seems like a repugnant conclusion. There is something very crass about claiming that someone's worth is dependent on their beauty. But still, there is something to be said for the thought experiment that Moore used to show that beauty has intrinsic moral value. A beautiful world seems like a better world than an ugly world (assuming that this is the only difference between them). And given the fact that beauty and goodness have traditionally been held to be so closely connected, the idea of beauty having moral value

is not completely absurd. However, due to the strange consequences that seem to arise from holding beauty as a moral value, the matter needs to be investigated further. We shall return to this topic later in this examination.

4.3. Richard Shusterman's postmodernist ethics

A significant aspect of Shusterman postmodernist ethics is the elevation of aesthetics as the primary basis of ethics. Shusterman believes that aesthetic considerations are paramount when it comes to deciding how to live. He believes that this idea should extend not only to the private realm but to the public as well; that is to say, he believes that the model of a good society should also be based on aesthetics. In regards to the latter, he believes it is tempting to characterize a good society as one that has an optimal balance between unity and variety, i.e. as one that complies with Hutchenson's criterion of beauty. Shusterman thinks that this sort of aestheticization of ethics is already prevalent among common people, and that this can be seen in the fact that our culture is so heavily focused on glamour and personal appearances, to the point that lives of glamorous celebrities have replaced saints as the people whom we think of as role models (Shusterman, 2000, 236-238).

Shusterman explains this rise of aestheticization by noting the downfall of traditional forms of ethics. He thinks this to be the result of the prevalence of anti-essentialism concerning human nature and the limitations of morality as a basis for ethics. Shusterman notes that traditionally ethics have often been based on some notion of human nature. Typical examples of essential features of human nature have been thought to be universal desire for happiness and pleasure and the human capacity for rational thinking and acting. The problem for such a basis for ethics is the strong suspicion that there is no such thing as human nature. He thinks that notions like happiness and rationality, for

example, are too culturally varied in terms of the way they are conceived in order for them to serve as a basis for ethics. He also says that because of our suspicion of metanarratives (which was first pointed out by Lyotard) we cannot explain the different ideas of good human lives within the same cultures by claiming them to be the result of people progressively coming closer in their ideas of perfection. In addition, because we all embody so many different roles, it is not possible for us to really define who we fundamentally are (Shusterman, 2000, 239-243).

When it comes to the limitation of morality as a base for ethics, Shusterman believes that there has been a widespread recognition that ethics goes beyond morality. Morality concerns itself with obligations and universalization, yet there are many ethical considerations that are not universalizable (special concern for our own family for example) nor obligations (like acts of kindness that go beyond duty). Furthermore, obligations often do not override these sorts of ethical concerns, so the role of morality within ethics is limited. And limiting morality's role in such a way makes ethical thinking more akin to aesthetic judgement. In these ways ethics has become aestheticized, instead of being an autonomous domain (Shusterman, 2000, 243-246).

As an example of a life based on aesthetics, Shusterman mentions life based around beauty. Such a life involves enjoyment of beauty, such as objects of nature, art and beautiful people. Shusterman believes that this sort of life built around beauty, as articulated by the proponents of aestheticist decadence such as Wilde and Pater, remains captivating and might be among the few forms of ethics that are plausible in our postmodern world. However, Shusterman also notes another kind of life as a possibility; that of a life which is not based on enjoyment of beauty, but rather in living a life that is in itself aesthetically appealing, one that is assessed as an organic whole (Shusterman, 2000, 250-254).

Shusterman's theory is interesting, but his attempt to combine ethics and aesthetics ultimately falls flat. I will not discuss Shusterman's postmodern presuppositions, as we do

not have time to do that here, but I will note that even if those suppositions were correct, they would still not make the idea of aesthetics serving as a base for a good life appealing. Life based on nothing but the appreciation of beauty is ultimately empty. A fulfilling life requires the sense that we are doing something important, something that goes beyond our own desires and projects. Whether it is a career that benefits other, having a family, or helping others through other means, we need something that goes beyond ourselves. Appreciation of beauty can, and I would argue ought, to be a part of life, but it cannot form its basis. The problem with Shusterman's other example of an aesthetic life, the one based on creating a life that is aesthetically appealing, is the fact that it is ultimately self-defeating. To see the problem with it, think of someone who dedicates his or her entire to helping other people. This sort of life is certainly a beautiful one; however, now imagine that the person in question does not act the way he or she does for altruistic reasons, but rather because of a desire to make his or her life as beautiful as possible. We would no longer appreciate said person, and indeed would become repulsed by such a life. The lesson to take from this example is that we cannot live a beautiful life by deliberately trying to do so; we need to strive for other objectives in order for our lives to be beautiful. Because of this, the aesthetic life of this sort defeats itself. In conclusion, no matter what kind of metaphysics one supports, an ethics based on aesthetics does not seem to be a viable option.

We have now explored various different ways in which beauty could serve as a moral value and found them all wanting. But even so, the feeling persists that the value of beauty is partly moral in one way or another; Moore's thought experiment remains compelling, despite everything that goes against the idea of beauty being a moral value. Thus, the results of our discussion remain inconclusive. Perhaps it is better to try to define beauty before we try to offer a final answer to this question. It is to this task that we shall turn to in the next chapter.

5. Thomas Reid

5.1. The decline of beauty

One reason that the question of the relationship of beauty to morality has receded is that the prestige of beauty as an aesthetic concept has in itself declined, especially among aestheticians. There are many reasons for this, but one reason is the fact that many have thought that beauty is too indeterminate of a concept. As Stolnitz explains it, starting from the eighteenth century, the traditional theories of beauty lost their status and the ones that replaced them were thought not to be determinate enough. It started to seem that the only criterion for something to count as beautiful was that it brought its perceiver pleasure or caused some other subjective experience. Such characterization of beauty makes it seem unimportant, or at any rate not important enough for it to deserve much scrutiny (Stolnitz 1992, 196-204). Tolstoy is a good example of this modern devaluation of beauty. Tolstoy believed that even artists should not pay attention to beauty but should rather focus on the moral cultivation of mankind (Beardsley 1966, 308-313). It is interesting to note that Kant for example did not think of the afore mentioned goals to be contrary to each other, but rather complementary; this goes to show how beauty's status has declined.

But is it really true that beauty is an indeterminate concept? It is certainly true that we refer to many different kinds of objects as being beautiful, ranging from landscapes to mathematical formulas. However, the same applies to the concept of goodness; yet few would say that goodness is a fruitless concept. The fact that beauty can apply to many things, then, does not make it a useless concept. And as long as beauty has at least some determinacy to it, it is also possible to suppose that beauty is not only a luxury, but something of greater importance. In fact, I believe that there was one philosopher who managed to come up with plausible criteria for beauty already in the eighteenth century,

during the same time that beauty started to lose its status as an aesthetic concept. His notion of beauty can be applied to a wide variety of things, without it coming across as too indeterminate. We shall discuss this in the next chapter.

5.2. Thomas Reid´s aesthetics

Thomas Reid's aesthetics are not widely known, even though there has been a resurge of interest to his philosophy in general. However, my belief is that Reid's theory is capable of making sense of beauty better than any other theory that has been offered on the subject. His theory is wide ranging, yet determinate at the same time and is also capable of absorbing the insights from other theories of beauty, such as the notion that harmony and proportion are connected to beauty. Reid's theory also brings beauty close to ethics, which is all the more of a reason for us to address his theory. I shall discuss Reid's views on sublimity and beauty proper at the same time, because he characterizes them in a similar manner.

Reid examines beauty and sublimity in a similar spirit. Even though they are two different qualities, they are very similar. In neither case does Reid think it to be a good idea to try to find some common principle among the objects we refer to as being either beautiful or sublime. Rather, he approaches the subject by analyzing the experiences of beauty and sublimity and based on his analysis he comes up with a theory about their basis (Reid 1785, 448-449).

According to Reid, the easiest way to approach the experience of beauty is to focus on the emotion that beautiful objects arouse in us. The emotion is easy to recognize, unlike the beautiful things themselves, of which there are so many different kinds that it is hard to come up with some common denominator. Reid notes that there are, among others, beautiful sounds, colors, forms and motions, in top of beauty in thoughts, arts, sciences,

actions and characters. He cannot think of any quality that all of these things share in common. It is hard to conceive any similarity between a beautiful theorem and a beautiful piece of music, for example. However, as the emotion aroused by different beautiful objects is similar and the word "beauty" is nonetheless ascribed to all these objects, there must be something that they share. It is thus prudent to try to find out what this something is by analyzing beauty as an experience. As Reid noted, everyone is aware of the emotion associated with beauty. Reid thinks that we can refer to the emotion in question as love. He defends his view by pointing out what the experience of beauty is like. The experience of beauty tenders and calms our minds, awakens benevolent feelings and makes us appreciate the target of the experience disinterestedly, without caring about its utility. It also tends to change our mood so that we are prone to feel other positive emotions, such as hope and joy. All of these factors apply also to love, which is why Reid thinks it is justified to identify the emotion of beauty with love (Reid 1785, 450).

Reid divides different beautiful objects into living and nonliving. He does not think that this sort of division is unproblematic, however. For while we think that both living and nonliving things can be beautiful, we do not seem to be capable of loving nonliving things, at least in the same sense that we love living things (Reid 1785, 451). When he comes back to the problem later, he answers it by dividing beauty into derivative and original beauty. Original beauty is something that belongs only to some qualities of mind, namely virtues, such as benevolence and tenderness. As one can see from these examples, Reid has in mind specifically the so called soft virtues, not virtues such as bravery and self-discipline. Virtues and some other amiable qualities of mind are the only things that can inspire love. According to Reid, all other beauty is derivative, being based on all kinds of analogues and associations (both innate and learned ones). Because we are incapable of detecting other people’s qualities of mind directly, there exists different kinds of signs, based on which we are capable of recognizing them (to use my own example, a smile serves as a sign of benevolence and happiness, which is why we tend to infer that smiling people are, ceteris paribus, happy or benevolent). These signs of course do not always prove that we are

dealing with some quality of mind or a virtue (it would be absurd to think that, based on someone's ugliness, we could infer that the person in question is morally lacking). Along with these signs we also regard as beautiful things which remind us of some quality of mind or another, causing us to appreciate them through an analogue (Reid 1785, 459-469).

Reid gives many examples of the ways in which material objects manifest beauty. By doing so he also manages to explain the elements belonging to the classical conception of beauty, such as proportion and harmony in addition to the idea of beauty as fittingness. For example, Reid believes that the beauty of harmony and symmetry are based on the fact that they evoke the idea of design, for the more harmonious and symmetrical some object is, the more unlikely it is that it has come to existence randomly; the more complex and varied something is, the more beautiful it is, assuming that said object is also harmonious and beautiful, for harmony in a complex object evokes the idea of design in a stronger way. All these things apply also to fittingness: if something manages to be naturally fit, it evokes the feeling that it has been designed in some way. The beauty of all these things, then, can be reduced to the fact that they either remind us or directly reflect the capacity to design or to be systematic, and these skills belong to the category of mental qualities that are beautiful in themselves (Reid 1785, 470-471) In this way, Reid is capable of including the traditional criteria of beauty into his theory, without claiming that they serve as the basis of beauty. They are not even necessary for something to be beautiful, let alone forming the basis of beauty, but Reid's theory is still capable of explaining why we hold such qualities to be beautiful.

Reid also gives an explanation for the basis of beauty in different arts. The beauty of poetry is based on its capability to create new associations. Reid uses as examples expressions like the wind whispers, the sea rages and the streams murmur. In addition, poetry has many beautiful qualities peculiar to itself such as line symmetry and its own way of expressing things, both of which can be reduced to the qualities of the mind (Reid 2004, 282-283).

As for music, even simple sounds have their own individual expressive qualities, according to Reid. Some sounds come across as gloomy, some as joyful and some as tranquil. Reid thinks that this way of describing even simple sounds is a good argument for the conclusion that their main purpose is to express something outside of themselves. More complex sounds in music are similarly expressive. By being complex, they are capable of express more complicated virtues and other qualities of the mind. (Reid 2004, 287-288). Through more complex and longer sounds it is possible to express, for example, how one emotion slowly recedes and another one grows. In this way, music is capable of telling stories of a sort, whose plots differ based on the emotions that are expressed in them (Reid, 2004, 474-475).

Painting, on the other hand can describe various qualities of the mind quite directly by showing people acting and gesturing in different ways. One can also describe different qualities of the mind through painting in a more symbolical way, through different kinds of color arrangements, for example. Different colors symbolize different qualities of the mind, and by taking advantage of this one can present them symbolically in the visual arts as well; Reid agrees with Kant on this issue (Reid 2004, 285).

In contrast to material objects, Reid believes that animals possess original beauty in the same way that humans do. Animals have emotions, tendencies and abilities which count as being good qualities of the mind. They are not capable of reaching the same level of beauty as humans, because their capacity to think, and in general their mental capabilities are not as advanced as that of humans (as such, animals do not possess virtues, since they are not capable of making moral choices. But their beauty is still superior to nonliving objects, which possess only derivative beauty (Reid 1785, 472-473).

The beauty of animals is additionally based on how well they fit to their way of life. In a racing horse, agility, eagerness and a strive for success are among the most important things that make it beautiful, whereas a pointing dogs beauty is based in large part on its sense of scent and its capacity to adapt (regarding wild animals, Reid simply notes that

much of their beauty is based on signs of their perfections qua the kind of animal they are). In addition, as with inanimate objects, animals beauty is based partly on the fact that all their great qualities, such as their sensing capabilities and all other things that make them adapted to life reflect the wisdom of God who created them (Reid 1785, 472-473).

When it comes to humans, Reid observes that human bodies need to express kind and gentle emotions in order to be beautiful. Reid thinks that, as a contrary to this, cruel and harsh emotions are apt to make a human look ugly. The expression of soft emotions is at least as important in regards to beauty as simply looking pretty. No matter how good looking someone is otherwise, if he or she does not express any qualities of mind on his or her face, he or she inspires no feelings in the observer. As such, this kind of beauty, based on the emotions and states of mind that people express, is more important than being merely good looking in a shallow sense. There is, in addition to these two forms of beauty in human bodies, a third form of beauty which Reid refers to as grace. Grace is based on moving in an appropriate manner, one which expresses those soft qualities of the mind which form the basis of beauty. The way one ought to move in order to be graceful is dependent, of course, on the emotions one happens to be feeling, and on one's character in general. Just as in the case of animals, the beauty of a human body is based either on generally good features (whose beauty is based on the beauty of their Creator, that is, God) or on the fact that it expresses beautiful qualities of the mind (Reid 1785, 474-477).

Reids theory of sublimity approaches its subject in the same way in which his theory of beauty does. He begins by identifying the emotion caused by sublime objects as respect and admiration. And, just as in the case of beauty, based on this Reid deduces what the things we refer to as sublime are really like. According to him, true sublimity cannot be based on something like an artful arrangement, any more than beauty. The strong feeling of admiration and respect one feels in response to sublimity cannot be caused by something that does not fit the emotion. If an orator, for example, speaks passionately about something that is not actually very important, this evokes nothing but amusement

in the listeners. Ultimately, the only things that can be called sublime are certain qualities of the mind, just as in the case of beauty. Among things that can be called sublime Reid includes virtues and great talents such as those of poets, philosophers and lawgivers. Isaac Newton, as a great discoverer of laws of nature, is one example of such a genius, according to Reid. Regarding virtues, Reid mentions Cato with his determination, fortitude, and passion for maintaining liberty in the face of Caesar. Unlike in the case of beauty, the sublime virtues are not what one might call soft virtues, but rather the sturdy ones. As examples of sublime virtues, Reid mentions fortitude, self-discipline and indirectly courage, among others (Reid 1785, 435-441)

Reid further describes the emotion associated with sublimity as solemn and serious. At its highest level (when contemplating God), it inspires devotion, which Reid defines as a state of mind characterized by magnanimity and which makes us disposed to perform heroic deeds. The lesser kind of sublimity is similar in nature, but Reid does not refer to it as devotion. Reid repudiates the notion that sublimity is concerned with fear in any sense. He believes that the mistake of associating fear with sublimity is caused by admiration and fear being similar in certain ways. Both are serious and leave a strong impression, for instance. But unlike admiration, fear does not presuppose any kind of excellence in its object. Fear also does not cause enthusiasm, which is a key characteristic of sublimity. In addition, Reid believes that sublimity is clearly an objective matter: fortitude is greater than pusillanimity, wisdom is greater than folly and so forth. Someone who would admire qualities like cowardice and folly would be suffering from madness, in a similar way in which someone who believed that two plus three equals fifteen would be considered to be out of his or her mind (Reid 1785, 435-441).

As for matter, Reid is convinced that it cannot be sublime in itself. This is because matter is by its nature nothing more than a substance that is movable, divisible and extended; and none of the afore mentioned properties are great enough to be considered sublime. However, they may still serve as analogues or signs of sublimity, and as such they can evoke

the same experience (and presumably to be considered sublime in a derivative sense) (Reid 1785, 442-447).

Reid does not discuss the way in which material objects express sublimity as much as he did in the case of beauty, but he did have something to say about the subject. As a one example Reid uses Iliad. The sublimity of Iliad is based both on the sublimity of its creator, Homer (because a great work of art like Iliad can only be born from a mind that is sublime in itself) and on its characters, like Hector and Achilles, whose sublime deeds and personalities are described in Iliad. Nonliving things can only cause a kind of mixture of fear and respect, because sublimity belongs only to those things that possess some extraordinary quality that is capable of inspiring admiration in others. And the only things that are capable of inspiring such admiration are virtues and other mental qualities (Reid 1785, 442-447). Reid's view on sublimity differs so much from Kant's that it may be better to treat them as two entirely separate concepts. For it seems that Kant is talking just about the kind of mixture of fear and respect that Reid depreciates, whereas in a Reidian sense sublimity is something akin to nobility or valor.

In conclusion, Reid holds that beauty and sublimity are based on virtues and other qualities of the mind (Soft ones in the case of beauty, sturdy ones in the case of sublimity). His theory seems plausible in many ways. I am not sure about all the ways in which Reid describes material objects manifesting beauty, but the subject is complex, and there is no reason to think that we could find a complete answer to it any time soon. It may take hundreds of years to finally answer a question of such complexity. However, Reid's views on this score are plausible enough, so they will suffice for his theory. There is no reason to say that the project to explain all the different ways in which material objects manifest beauty must be doomed from the start, especially when we take into account all the other strengths of Reid's theory.

Reid's views concerning the connection between beauty and virtues are very plausible. We already previously argued that love and beauty are connected. Reid provides additional

considerations in favor of the view that they are connected, citing their many similarities. There is additionally the simple fact that what we feel when we contemplate beauty *feels* very similar to love. They are phenomenally very much alike; and when two emotions are similar phenomenally, that in itself is a reason to believe that they are tightly connected. And based on our previous discussion, virtues seem like the most credible candidates for something that can inspire love. Virtues are certainly the best qualities that there are; all other things, be it power, pleasure or anything else, seem trifling by comparison (even for a hedonistic utilitarianist, virtues at least possess an enormous instrumental value). And in general love is such a powerful feeling that it is not plausible to suggest that a mere material object as such would be capable of causing it. Neither does there seem to exist any other plausible candidate that could be the cause of love except the virtues. For example, while qualities such as fittingness and harmony are certainly likeable qualities, they are not important enough to cause an emotion as powerful as love. It is certainly pleasant when something is well proportioned or fit to serve it's ends. But could they (i.e. things that are harmonious or fitting) inspire us to sacrifice our lives, better ourselves morally or any other things which love can cause us to do, as Plato pointed out? That does not seem plausible. As such, virtues seem to be the causes of love. And all of these considerations also apply to the feeling of admiration belonging to sublimity. Because we commonly talk of beauty only as it pertains to material objects, it is understandable that the nature of beauty has been tried to determine by using qualities such as harmony and proportion. Reid's arguments show, however, that such a project is bound to fail.

Despite all the merits of Reid's theory, it does have some problems. First, Reid's view that the experience of beauty equals love is questionable. While Reid's over all argument concerning the nature of the experience of beauty appears to be sound, it seems more reasonable to define love as a desire for beauty as Plato did instead of equating love and beauty. Reid is correct when he stresses the similarities between love and beauty, and it does indeed seem that they are hard to separate. However, there does exist a difference between them, which is the fact that whereas an experience of beauty as such does not

involve desire – we can observe a beautiful landscape, for example, without it arousing any desire to possess it – love involves a desire to possess the beloved, in one way or another. When we are in love with someone, there exists not just the desire to contemplate the beloved, but also to "possess" them, in the sense that we want them to commit to us, in a similar manner in which we want to commit to them. As such, similar as though they are, it seems that an experience of beauty and love are separate; love can be defined as an experience of beauty + desire. This does not hamper Reid's overall argumentative strategy: his view that beautiful objects must be worthy of the emotion involved with beauty is still correct. And as the emotion belonging to beauty is a very powerful one, its target must be important indeed.

Second, while Reid's account of the beauty possessed by qualities of the mind is convincing, his theory does not explain in detail what it is that makes these qualities so uniquely valuable. He does note that qualities of the mind are worthy of our love and admiration, but prima facie none of these qualities of the mind seem to have a single attribute that makes them admirable and loveable. Thus, more needs to be said concerning why these qualities are of such high value and concerning the common quality that they share. But overall, Reid's theory is highly plausible, and for the rest of this examination we shall take Reid's theory as a base when moving forward in our inquiry. The fact that more could be said about the value of virtues is not very damaging to Reid's theory; it only means that this is one part of his theory that should be explored further.

As I noted before, Reid's theory of aesthetics is not as well known as the rest of his philosophy. And of those who are familiar with his aesthetic theory, there are many who reject it. Yet at the same time, it has also received some powerful support. Perhaps surprisingly, Reid's theory was very influential in France; we shall discuss Reid's French disciples in the next chapter.

5.3. Reids followers in France

Reid's aesthetical theory does not seem to have received a large following in Britain; however, his theory proved to be very influential in France. In the nineteenth century, French aesthetics was heavily indebted to Reid. The two philosophers in particular who deserve a closer look in our discussion are Victor Cousin and Theodore Jouffroy. Their works have unfortunately not been translated into English: however, we can use secondhand accounts of their philosophy in order to discuss them. We shall start by discussing the views of Victor cousin.

Victor Cousin was arguably the most important French philosopher in the nineteenth century. Cousin founded a school of philosophy called Eclectisism. As such, he was influenced by many sources, but his aesthetics in particular were heavily influenced by that of Reid's. However, he did not simply mimic Reid's theory, but rather made original contributions to it. One important concept that Cousin employed was ideal beauty. It does not have a direct counterpart in Reid's philosophy, although it can still be traced to it. Ideal beauty shares the function of Reid's original beauty as being the form of original, nonderivative beauty, but it also functions by securing the universality of beauty. Cousin argues that there must be something absolute about beauty in order for it to be even possible to theorize about the fine arts. We cannot find such an element, however, simply through empirical means, because it is not possible to extract something perfect from something that is imperfect, or something absolute from what is contingent. Of course, we do regard material things (i.e. imperfect and contingent things) as being beautiful. However, these material objects serve only to manifest ideal beauty (which is the absolute, perfect element of beauty that Cousin spoke of) (Manns, 1988, 638-641). All of this is quite similar to Reid's view that material objects only serve to express original beauty, which one can only find in qualities of the mind. However, Cousin takes Reid's theory in a much more metaphysical direction. His talk of the absolute beauty seems to

reflect Hegel's absolute idealism, which was quite foreign to Reid's own thinking. Cousin claims, for example, that ideal beauty is not something that we can ever fully apprehend, and that the only kind of beauty that we can apprehend is so called real beauty, which is derived from ideal beauty (Manns, 1988, 641). It would be hard to imagine Reid himself talking in such a quasi-mystical way. However, it can be argued that the lack of metaphysical theorizing on Reid's part is a weakness in his theory that needs to be remedied. Cousins theory can be seen as an attempt to synthesize Reid's aesthetics with Hegelian metaphysics. Whether it succeeds is something that we are unable to judge here.

Theodore Jouffroy likewise took Reid's theory in a more metaphysical direction. He was a student of Cousin, and as such this should not come across as a surprise. However, Jouffroy also indulged in some psychological speculations. On the metaphysical side, Jouffroy held that all things in the world can be divided into two categories: matter and spirit. For Jouffroy, matter was inert and passive, whereas spirit (he also used the term power) is active and productive. Matter cannot, then, causally interact with anything by itself; it needs to be activated by the spirit. As the sensible portion of the world, matter provides us with signs which we can use to interpret the spirit, which lies behind its material manifestation. We can grasp these symbols, according to Jouffroy, in a priori fashion. Like Cousin and Reid, he locates beauty in the metaphysical interior of things, the ones that matter symbolize. This corresponds to Reid's idea that original beauty lies in unobservable qualities of the mind, which material things are capable of symbolizing. Jouffroy, however, provides an original argument for this view. Jouffroy argues this conclusion based on the nature of ugliness. He believes that, because many things that are proportionate, ordered and unified are beautiful, it causes us to mistake these qualities for beauty itself. However, when you compare these objectives to the ones that are ugly yet still possess these properties, it becomes easy to see that beauty is not ultimately based on such qualities (Manns, 1988, 644-647).

According to Joffroy, a scene that lacks unity is not ugly but chaotic, while a scene that lacks variety is likewise not ugly, but dull. The same applies to imitative qualities, which are also often thought to be the source of beauty. For a bad imitation is not necessarily ugly; a portrait of Ingrid Bergman that ens up resembling Humphrey Bogart would not be an ugly portrait of Bergman, but rather not a portrait or imitation at all. Neither is something ugly if it is inexpressive; in such a case, it wont be even noticed. But if none of these things cause ugliness, then what does? Jouffroy uses a decaying corpse as an example. A decaying corpse looks revolting because it is a representation of lifelessness. Likewise, a hypocritical and malevolent face is ugly because it signifies a corrupted soul. And these things – life and soul- are invisible, spiritual things. On the contrary, a benevolent smile and an extraordinary athlete look beautiful (Manns, 1988, 647-648).

Jouffroy's argument from ugliness appears to be sound: however, the same cannot be said for his theory of natural signs. As James Mann notes, even if we accept the metaphysics behind Jouffroy's theory of natural signs, it still falls short. For example, Mann notes that while a smiling cat may seem to express hypocrisy, it cannot literally be hypocritical. Joyffroy's view to the effect that we grasp these naturals signs through a priori methods fall flat if nature can deceive us this way. As such, it is better to talk of seeming expressiveness instead of natural signs in this sense. Jouffroy himself seems to accept that sometimes expressiveness can be merely apparent expressiveness. But if this is so, according to Mann, the idea of there being real natural signs is no longer necessary. And if this is so, Jouffroy's theory is in a need of revision (Manns, 1988, 648-649).

Manns criticism seems to be correct. Jouffroy's theory of natural signs does not seem plausible. It is better to simply hold, as Reid appears to have done, that the natural signs are natural only in the sense that we instinctively associate them with certain qualities of the mind, not in any deeper metaphysical sense. Overall, Cousin and Jouffroy develop Reid's aesthetics in interesting ways. While Jouffroy's theory of natural signs, as we have seen, is left wanting, his argument from ugliness for the Reidian theory is interesting and

provides additional way to defend it. The metaphysical direction in which Cousin takes Reid's theory is likewise interesting, although much of it concern matters that we are not capable of discussing here. Their contributions show that there are still ways to develop Reid's theory further.

Next, we shall examine the views of a modern defender of Reid's theory, Colin McGinn. Exploring McGinn's views is important, for he is arguably the most significant modern ''Reidian'' aesthetician and philosopher.

5.4. Colin McGinn´s Reidian theory

While Reid clearly brings beauty close to morality in his theory, he did not discuss their ultimate relation to each other. Is beauty a moral value, does it help us connect to morality or does it perhaps merely supervene on morality without having anything deeper to do with it? While Reid never discussed questions of this sort, McGinn tries to supply Reid's theory with answers to these kinds of questions, in addition to providing further arguments in its favor. McGinn starts defending Reid's theory by drawing attention to the commonly used moral terms that have an aesthetic ring to them. For example, we tend to refer to a good person as pure, delightful, sweet or wonderful, whereas we tend to describe bad people as rotten, disgusting, filthy, monstrous and so forth. This sort of language is a good enough reason by itself to take Reid's theory seriously, according to McGinn. It is not likely that throughout the ages all the masses of people who have talked in such a way have merely succumbed to silly category errors. Similarly, it is hard to describe someone's character as beautiful or sublime without having to use terms that are connected to morality – McGinn does not believe that this is possible at all (McGinn 1997, 99).

This kind of aesthetic tone applies both to virtues and deeds. In so far as a person is good, he or she thinks that violence is disgusting, for example. In the same way virtuous people think that exploiting the weak is contemptible, hurting the innocent is horrifying and (to use my own example) being impolite is crude. This sort of language is of course partly metaphorical in nature; when we, for example, talk of a dirty play in sports when someone breaks the rules, we do not mean that the play in question is dirty literally. But the same thing applies to arts as well, because when we describe, say, a novel as rough, we do not mean that the novel is rough literally, that is to say, that its surface is rough and is thus unpleasant to touch. This sort of metaphorical language belongs to aesthetics in all of its forms, but even though many aesthetic terms are metaphorical, the aesthetic qualities which they refer to are not (McGinn, 1997, 103-104). We can assume that the purpose of this kind of metaphorical language is only to render comprehensible such aesthetic qualities which are otherwise hard to grasp.

According to McGinn we do not only value moral goodness and disapprove of evil, but we also love the virtues and hate the vices. From moral philosophy one might easily draw the conclusion that morality is only about making moral judgements, but in truth morality is strongly connected to our emotions. One does not need to be an emotivist (which McGinn himself is not) to highlight the fact that morality is imbued with emotions. Loving virtues and hating vices are a central part of morality. McGinn thinks that this can be explained by the fact that virtues are beautiful and vices are ugly, and beauty and ugliness tend to evoke such feelings in us. Aesthetics and morality are connected in the sense that the aesthetic qualities of virtues and vices explain the fact that morality arouses powerful emotions in us (McGinn 1997, 115-116). In other words, he proposes in a semi-Kantian way that beauty is connected to our moral emotions, but not to morality itself.

In his discussion of the relationship between ethics and aesthetics McGinn refers to the views of the Russian writer Vladimir Nabokov. By drawing on Nabokov's views, McGinn argues that an essential part of the experience of beauty is that it causes us to enter a

state which McGinn refers to as aesthetic bliss. In this state we are capable of imagining a world in which beauty and the sublime are universal. In other words, it makes us to come in contact with a certain kind of ideal. And because beauty and the sublime are connected to morality, the ideal in question is a moral ideal, a world in which morality reigns supreme. This explains the fact that an experience of beauty makes us feel morally elevated. This feeling of moral elevation is caused by the fact that an experience of beauty inspires us to imagine and to hope for a morally ideal world, and thus helps us to experience morality on an intimate level, which may further inspire us to demand more from ourselves when it comes to morality (McGinn, 1997, 110-113).

McGinn defends Reid's theory of aesthetics well. However, while Reid certainly does not try to reduce morality into aesthetics, he nonetheless falls guilty of aestheticism with his view that aesthetic qualities are responsible for the emotions associated with morality. First, it is questionable to suggest that beauty and the sublime are responsible for all, or even most, of the emotions associated with morality. Emotions like guilt, indignation and pity have at least as large of a role to play. None of these emotions can be called aesthetic in any normal sense and enlarging the term ''aesthetic'' to cover terms such as these would serve to make the concept empty. In addition, while McGinn is correct when he refuses to reduce morality into aesthetics, this causes him problems, for as he strictly separates morality and aesthetics, yet still espouses the view that aesthetics has a large role to play with the emotional aspect of morality, he ends up with the view that at the very least a large part of morality's emotional aspect – and therefore its motivating aspect – is based on something else than morality itself. This is problematic, as it is hard not to think that it would be hypocritical (in the old meaning of the term) to act morally for reasons that aren't moral themselves. If McGinn were right, most of our supposedly moral acts would not be moral after all, since we would not act based on the right kinds of reasons. This view does not do justice to the way in which people actually relate themselves to morality, and as such it has to be rejected (Kant's view about beauty as the cultivator of moral feelings is unacceptable for similar reasons). McGinn's mistake is that

he separates ethics and aesthetics too strictly. The fact that one does not accept such a reduction does not mean, of course, that one has to reduce morality into aesthetics. For there yet remains the option that we take beauty to be something of a moral quality, one that belongs to morality but does not exhaust it. We shall return to this notion later, but first we ought to go over some of the criticism that Reid's theory has received.

5.5. Schellekens' criticism of Reid

When it comes to modern aestheticians, Schellekens has been particularly critical of Reid's theory of beauty. By answering Schellekens' criticism we can address the criticism of Reid's theory in a more generally as well, because Reid has received similar criticism from others.

Schellekens criticizes McGinn, and indirectly Reid as well for the fact that, according to her, their theory renders beauty of material objects to be nothing more than an illusion. If only virtues can be beautiful, then all the material objects that we hold to be beautiful are not beautiful in any real sense, but only because they refer to the beauty of virtues. Material objects end up becoming platonic steps of a ladder towards true beauty, steps which are to be abandoned after we have used them to climb up higher (Schellekens 2007).

Even though Plato may have thought that the beauty of material objects is ultimately an illusion, Schellekens is wrong when she claims that Reid and McGinn subscribe to this view. In this context it is good to be reminded of Reid's talk of original and derived beauty. A good way to illustrate this differentiation is to think of the difference between moonlight and sunlight. The sun is filled with light on its own, whereas the moon, in so far as it is alight, is illuminated by the sun, instead of being illuminated by itself. But even though this is so, we have no reason to claim that moonlight is merely an illusion. It is more natural to say that the moon can have light, but it receives its light from elsewhere.

In the same way we can say that, for example, some work of art is beautiful, even though it has received its beauty from elsewhere, in this case from the artist who made it. The artwork is beautiful, but it is not originally beautiful, as it receives its beauty from its creator. There is no reason, therefore, to be worried that Reid's theory makes material beauty into an illusion.

In addition, as Nauckhoff pointed out, Reid did not think that material objects are beautiful only to the extent that they express beautiful mental qualities, but they can additionally be beautiful if they express beauty in a certain way (Nauckhoff 1994, 184). The way some material objects express beauty can be beautiful in itself. While they still ultimately refer to qualities of the mind, in this way the material beauty can be more independent. For example, while the beauty of Beethoven's ninth symphony is, according to Reid's theory, based on the fact that it expresses beautiful emotions and virtues, it is also additionally based on the beautiful way in which the ninth symphony expresses them. This bolsters the view that Reid's theory does not give a short shift to material beauty.

Schellekens is also critical towards the way in which Reid connects love and moral goodness. According to her, while it is true that moral goodness is apt to evoke love and admiration, part of what it is to love is to tolerate imperfection. When we love someone, we do not love them in spite of them not being wholly virtuous, but partly because of it. Vices, just as much as virtues, are parts of a person. This is why love involves the acceptance of such imperfections (Schellekens 2007, 136-138).

I do not believe that Schellekens is correct when she claims that Reid connects love to moral goodness in its entirety. Schellekens forgets that Reid gives a large part to sublimity in his theory. Beautiful virtues are only the ones that are considered to be ''soft'' virtues. These kinds of soft virtues are the ones which are apt to evoke love. Schellekens is correct when she says that a morally perfect human being is not lovable in this sense. This does not contradict Reid's theory, however, for a morally perfect being would also possess the

sublime virtues. As Reid explained, the emotion that is caused by sublimity is admiration and respect, not love. A requirement for loving someone is that the loved one is not too far above us. If someone is too perfect, he or she is certainly admirable and respectable, but not loveable. Because of this, and because we are imperfect ourselves, in order for us to love others they must also be imperfect, so that our relationship with them is sufficiently equal. Reid's theory has no trouble explaining this fact concerning love.

Schellekens also criticizes Reid based on the fact that large portion of love and caring are born out of simply spending a lot of time with the person we love, or in other words merely being accustomed to them. Virtues are not the only things that cause love. It is not true, then, that love is only based on the good qualities someone happens to have (Schellekens 2007). But on the other hand, cannot we interpret this sort of love born out of custom to be the result of the fact that one has more time to spot the other persons good qualities? It is hard to imagine love to be such a shallow emotion that it can be the result of mere conditioning, without any deeper cause. But if such habitual love simply means that one has had more time to detect the other persons virtues, then it is not contrary to Reid's theory.

Schellekens criticizes McGinn's moral philosophy. If McGinn would be right, Schellekens argues, people with bad character could not act in a manner that is morally right. This idea is absurd, according to Schellekens, because in reality even people with extremely bad characters can still do good deeds (Schellekens 2007, 139). This threatens to lead us off track from our subject, but Schelleken's view is good to mention due to the fact that it reminds us that our normative ethical views also have bearing on the way in which we conceptualize the relationship between ethics and aesthetics. In this case in particular the question is whether the morality of an act is based on the virtuousness of the one who performs it or whether the morality of an act is independent from the agent's character and motives. In so far as I see it, an act can be independently good in the sense that an act can serve to produce states of affairs which are morally good, even if the act in

question is based on bad intentions or tendencies. But there is a difference between an act being good in this instrumental sense and it possessing moral dignity. The latter requires that an act results from the virtuousness of the agent who performs it. If an act has not been done from good motives it has no moral dignity. McGinn does not state it directly, but I believe that he holds this view as well. Probably there is no real disagreement here, then: Schellekens likely does not deny that virtuousness is required in order for an act to possess moral dignity. On the other hand, at times Schellekens seems to imply that someone with a thoroughly vicious character is capable of doing good deeds regularly (Schellekens 2007, 139). I find this view to be hard to defend, but we should not focus on refuting it, because it threatens to bring us away from our main subject.

It seems that Reid's theory can be successfully defended from criticism. But although the theory itself seems sound, its implications for the relationship between beauty and morality have not become entirely clear. Therefore we should follow in the footsteps of McGinn and try to determine the consequences of Reid's views.

6. Understanding Reid through Linda Zagzebski

In this chapter, I shall try to explicate Reid's theory by arguing that it can be understood to be analogous to Linda Zagzebski's theory of virtue ethics. This helps us to understand what kind of relationship beauty (once again used to designate both the sublime and beauty proper) has with morality, and to follow on the speculation that beauty can be reduced to ethics (as we postulated when discussing McGinn's theory). We shall additionally discuss Zagzebski's notion of identifying virtues through admiration, and how it relates to Reid's theory.

Zagzebski's theory derives the rightness of an act from virtues: that is to say, according to her, a right act in a given situation is what a virtuous person would (or might) do in that situation. By contrast, a wrong act in a given situation is what a virtuous person would not do in that situation (Zagzebski, 1996, 235). The important thing to note about Zagzebski's theory is that she does not claim that one must be virtuous in order to perform good acts; as long as the act is something that a virtuous person *would* do it counts as a good act, even if the person in question is not actually virtuous (Zagzebski, 1996, 234).

One argument she provides for her theory is that people are more fundamental than acts, i.e. acts are defined in terms of persons. Based on this, she argues that it is reasonable to believe that the moral properties of persons are ontologically more fundamental than the moral properties of acts. Following this the moral properties of acts should be defined based on moral properties of persons. And as a result, virtues come before acts, i.e. the rightness of acts is derived from virtues (Zagzebski, 1996, 79-80).

It should be noted that the theory Zagzebski proposes is not a virtue theory centered around eudaimonia, but rather motivation. Instead of virtues being seen as good because they are constituents of eudaimonia, in Zagzebski's motivation based theory the goodness of virtues is fundamental; characteristics like courage and justice are good in themselves, not because they constitute something else (Zagzebski, 1996, 82).

Zagzebskis theory is of interest for us, for Reid's theory can be explicated through analogous means. In the same way that Zagzebski claims that a right act is based on what a virtuous person would do, a large part of Reid's derivative beauty is based on what a virtuous (i.e. originally beautiful) person would do. An artwork is beautiful, if it is something that a virtuous person would create (It is worth mentioning that in Reid's theory, intellectual virtues are counted among the moral virtues). But, like in the case of Zagzebskis theory, something does not need to actually be created by a virtuous person in order for it to be beautiful: as long as it is something that a virtuous person *would* create, it counts as beautiful. That way it is possible to account for natural beauty even without

invoking God (though there is of course nothing wrong with theists accounting for natural beauty in that way). We could say, for example, that the Niagara falls are beautiful because they are something that a virtuous person would create, even though they were not actually created by a virtuous person.

We should additionally discuss Zagzebski's theory about moral exemplarism. She proposes her theory as an analogue of Putnam-Kripke theory of direct reference as it pertains to natural kinds. For example, according to Putnam-Kripke theory, gold refers to the same kind of thing as some paradigmatic example of gold. While rarely as simple as this, you could point to some paradigmatic instance and say that gold refers to the same element as that. The advantage of this theory is that we do not need to know the nature of gold in order to refer to it. After all, for millennia people did not know the deep structure of gold, I.e. it's nature, but were still surely able to refer to and in a sense define it (Zagzebski, 2010).

Zagzebski's theory of moral exemplarism is built on a similar idea. By picking out someone who is morally exemplary and saying " a good person is someone like that" we fix the reference of the term "good person" without giving a descriptive definition of a good person. Zagzebski believes that this practice of picking out exemplars is prior to us knowing any fundamental moral concepts. Moral learning, she believes, is done by imitation. The way we pick out the moral exemplars and decide to imitate them is through the emotion of admiration. The emotion of admiration is subject to education, but is generally trustworthy. Zagzebski notes that, just like in the case of gold, empirical investigation can help us find out about the nature of a good person. That is to say, we first come to realize an example of a good person, but afterwards, through empirical investigation, we can find out what it is that makes the person in question morally exemplary (Zagzebski, 2010).

The exemplarist theory that Zagzebski proposes is a version of virtue ethics, but it does not have to be: in addition to exemplary people, there may be exemplary acts or state of

affairs, for example. As such, the basic exemplarist framework is not limited to only to virtue ethics, but can also be incorporated by consequentialism and deontology, at least in principle (Zagzebski, 2010).

Interestingly, Zagzebski's notion that we can identify virtuous persons (i.e. exemplars) through admiration is similar to Reid's view that the emotion belonging to the sublime is admiration, while the sublime is based on (sturdy) virtues. It is also not difficult to incorporate Reid's view that love and beauty are connected to virtues into Zagzebski's theory (the idea that some virtues I.e. the soft ones can be identified as the ones which are loveable sounds plausible enough). If Zagzebski is correct – and it seems very much possible that she might be – then her theory provides another way to help us to understand Reid's theory. Based on this, love and admiration would be fundamental to morality. This would further incorporate Reid's theory of aesthetics into the moral realm and would make aesthetics – if indeed it can anymore be referred to as being simply about aesthetics, rather than a facet of morality – crucial. For if Zagzebski's theory is correct (along with Reid's) the seemingly aesthetic concepts of beauty and the sublime (and at the same time admiration and love), would have a great deal of moral importance. They would be the way in which we come to learn about morality, all down to the basic moral concepts like right and wrong. This further cements the idea that the seemingly distant realms of ethics and aesthetics have a great deal to do with each other, and that the classical aesthetic concepts of beauty and sublime are, in a sense, moral concepts.

To sum it up, on this understanding, Reid's theory of aesthetics comes very close to a kind of virtue ethics; indeed, so close that aesthetics and ethics end up becoming one. Beauty comes to be based on the virtues. Even if one does not subscribe to virtue ethics wholesale, it is still possible to grant that rightness of an act derives at least partly from what a virtuous person would do. When all this is granted, we might say that aesthetics becomes absorbed into ethics, thus answering the question of their relationship.

On a final note, we should address the dilemma concerning beauty as a moral value: that, on the other hand, beauty being a moral value makes sense, since it's origin lies in virtues and Moore's thought experiment seems to show that beauty has value in itself, but at the same time there being something strange about treating beauty this way. I believe the answer to the dilemma ultimately lies in the fact that, due to the marginalization of beauty throughout the modern era (and treating it as something that is ultimately subjective) the word "beauty" has a connotation of something frivolous and shallow. However, as we discussed previously, this was not the case throughout much of history; the ancients, for example, would probably have no problem with the idea of treating beauty as a moral concept. As such, I believe the reason that treating beauty in such a serious way feels so strange to us is not due to there being any problems with the idea of beauty being a moral concept as such, but simply because we are so used to treating it as something shallow and unimportant.

7. Conclusion

We have come to the conclusion that Thomas Reid's theory of aesthetics is the most plausible theory about beauty. His arguments for the view that beauty proper and sublimity are based on virtues are convincing, and he manages to explain the reason that we view material things as beautiful without coming across as counterintuitive. Reid's theory also survives from the various counterarguments that have been raised against it. We also went through various ways Reid's followers have attempted to further defend and extrapolate his theory and found merit in them while at the same time doubting some of their conclusions. Finally, we explicated Reid's theory through Linda Zagzebski's theory of virtue ethics and came to see how aesthetics and ethics end up becoming one in Reid's theory; beauty and sublimity are defined in moral terms, and thus aesthetics

becomes a part of ethics. Ethics turns out to be conceptually and metaphysically more fundamental than aesthetics.

Throughout our discussion, we have discussed various other theories of beauty and their relationships to morality. Most of them proved to contain at least something in them that appears to be correct: for example, the classical conception is correct in claiming that harmony and fittingness are relevant to beauty, and that both of them are also moral concepts. Kant´s notion of the sublime has its place in aesthetics as long as it is modified, and it also possesses moral significance. The concept of disinterestedness, as articulated by Kant and others, is also correct, and it applies both to beauty and to morality. In addition to all the things we have argued, the notion that the capacity to appreciate beauty and to be moral go hand in hand at least to a degree, as Kant argued, is surely correct. Thomas Reid managed, I think, to synthesize many of these observations into his theory, on which we built upon in the last chapter.

With all that said, there are still specific questions regarding our subject that remain unanswered. For example, there is the question of whether experiencing beauty has a beneficial effect to our moral characters, not just in the sense that beauty is directly concerned with morality, but also that appreciating things like art and the beauty of nature contribute to our moral cultivation. Many thinkers, like the Pythagoreans and Kant, have expressed this view, but giving a definite answer to it seems difficult; I for sure do not feel that I can answer it. More work needs to be done when it comes to answering this question, then; in addition to philosophical theorizing, it would be good to have some psychological experiments done on the subject. This is an important question, for the answer to it might have serious implications for moral education.

I shall end this examination on the note that the question of beauty's relationship to morality is a lot more interesting and significant than is often supposed. I can only hope that this examination has convinced the reader of this, at least to some degree. For, as I

have argued, beauty's moral significance is deep, and it ought to be taken into account when discussing morality.

References:

Aristotle (1995): *Poetics.* Translated by Stephen Halliwell. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Beardsley, Monroe C. (1991): *Aesthetics From Classical Greece To The Present.* The University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa.

Baldwin, Tom, "George Edward Moore", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/moore/>.

Burke, Edmund (1990[1757]): *A Philosophical Enquiry Into the Origin of Our ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful.* Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Hursthouse, Rosalind (1999): *On Virtue Ethics.* Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Hursthouse, Rosalind and Pettigrove, Glen, "Virtue Ethics", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/ethics-virtue/>.

Kant, Immanuel (2007[1790]): *Critique of Judgement.* Translated by Nicholas Walker. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Nauckhoff, Josephine C. (1994): "Objectivity and Expression in Thomas Reid's Aesthetics", *The journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 52, 183-191.

Manns, James (1988): "The Scottish Influence on French Aesthetic Thought", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 49, 633-651.

Marciano, Laura Gemelli M. (2014): "Pythagorean Way of Life and Pythagorean ethics". In Huffman Carl A. (ed.) (2014): *A History of Pythagoreanism.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Mason, Elinor, "Value Pluralism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/value-pluralism/>.

McGinn, Colin (1997): *Ethics, Evil, and Fiction.* Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Plato (2012[370 bc]): *Valtio*. Translated by Marja Itkonen Kaila. Otava, Helsinki.

Plato (2000): *Symposium.* Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Infomotions, Inc. ProQuest Ebook Central.

Plato (1925): *Philebus*. Translated by Harold. N Fowler. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Plotinus (2016): *Ennead I.6: On Beauty.* Translated by Andrew Smith. Parmenides Publishing, Las Vegas.

Reid, Thomas (1969[1785]): *Essays on Intellectual Powers of Man.* L. White, Dublin.

Reid, Thomas (2004[N/A]): *On Logic, Rhetoric and The Fine Arts.* A. Broadie (ed.), Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park.

Sartwell, Crispin, "Beauty", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/beauty/>.

Schellekens, Elisabeth (2007): *Aesthetics and Morality.* Continuum International Publishing Group, London.

Schroeder, Mark, "Value Theory", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/value-theory/>.

Scruton, Roger (2008): *Beauty: A Very Short Introduction.* Oxford University Press. Oxford.

Scruton, Roger, "Beauty and Desecration", *The City Journal* (Spring 2009 edition), https://www.city-journal.org/html/beauty-and-desecration-13172.html

Sellars, John (2006): *Stoicism.* Routledge, New York.

Shusterman, Richard (2000): *Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art.* Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham.

Stolnitz, Jeremy (1992): "Beauty: Some Stages in the History of an Idea". In Kivy, Peter (ed.) (1992): *Essays On The History of Aesthetics.* University of Rochester Press, New York, 185-205.

Stolnitz, Jeremy (1961): "On The Origins of Aesthetic Disinterestedness" *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 20, 131-143.

Tatarkiewich, Wladyslaw (1970): *History of Aesthetics I: Ancient Aesthetics.* Polish Scientific Publishers, Warsaw.

Wynn, Mark, "Phenomenology of Religion", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (edit.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/phenomenology-religion/>.Beardsley,

Xenophon (2013): *Memorabilia.* Translated by E. C. Marchant. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Zagzebski, Linda (1996): *Virtues of the mind: an inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Zagzebski, Linda (2010): "Exemplarist Virtue Theory" *Metaphilosophy* 41, 41-57.