“Us” and “Them” in National Collective Memory

Encounters with Images of Russian Empire and Soviet Russia in Czech, Finnish and Polish Upper Secondary School History Textbooks

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Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract

In the last twenty years, European identities have been in turmoil. The old borders of the Cold War era have crumbled and the EU has expanded towards the east. As a result, it has become important for Europeans to re-evaluate what "us" and "them" mean in a world of multiple identities. As our relationship to the world has changed we have been driven to reconsider the past from new perspectives. How are collective memories constructed? How has history defined our social evolution? These question forms the backdrop for this study. The study seeks to illuminate the issue by promoting a comparative approach on contemporary European memory and identities.

The purpose of the study is to compare contemporary Czech, Finnish and Polish textbook understanding of Russian history over between 1815 and 1922. The question of how the Russian image is perceived is connected more widely to nation-specific historic discourses and collective memory. Ultimately, this means examining the dialogue between the nexus of "us" and "them". Revealing textbook images that legitimize national victimhood or hostility is the first step to mutual understanding that can be used as the basis of friendly relations.

The theoretical framework of this material-based study is connected to discussions of nationalism and memory studies: discussions concerning national identity and collective memory will offer the conceptual tools for my study. The comparative approach enables to reconstruct how Czech, Finnish or Polish historical consciousness and identity are engaged in representations of Russian history. The methodology of this study consists of the guidelines of textbook analysis suggested by Falk Pingel and qualitative content analysis.

The Czech, Finnish and Polish textbook memories of nineteenth and early twentieth century Russia contain many images of the country. The comparative analysis demonstrates that national perspective dominates Finnish and Polish textbooks references to Russia. On the contrary, Czech textbooks perceive Russian history most often from the perspective of general world events or from the Russian perspective. The Finnish textbooks convey an ambivalent image of the Russian Empire: opportunities for Finns and multicultural tolerance are accompanied by backwardness and fierce Russification. Hence, the portrayals suggest that Finns are also willing to make compromises whereas Poles express primarily their enthusiasm to revolt.

Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords
Collective memory, Czech Republic, Finland, history culture, history education, image of Russia, textbooks, national identity, Poland, Russian Empire, Soviet Russia

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"Me" ja "he" kansallisessa kollektiivisessa muistissa: Venäjä-kuva tšekkiläisissä, suomalaisissa ja puolalaisissa historian lukion oppikirjoissa

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Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract

Euroopassa ovat puhaltaneet muutoksen tuulet 1990- ja 2000-luvulla kylmän sodan raja-aitojen kaaduttua ja Euroopan unionin laajennettua itään. Entiset etupiirit ja viholliskuvat ovat tuulettuneet käynnissä olevan murroksen kyllästämässä moninaisten identiteettien Euroopassa. Tarkastelen pro gradu -tutkielmassani tätä taustaa vastaan, miten suhdetta Venäjään jäsennetään 2000-luvun historian lukion oppikirjoissa kolmessa valtiossa: Tšekin tasavallassa, Suomessa ja Puolassa. Keskityn Venäjän historiassa ajanjaksoon 1815 – 1922 Wienin kongressista Neuvostoliiton perustamiseen.

Vertailen tutkimuksessani tšekkiläisten, suomalaisten ja puolalaisten historian oppikirjojen Venäjä-kuvan suhdetta kansalliseen muistiin ja identiteettiin. Kysyn, millä tavoin historian oppikirjoissa tehdään eroa "meidän" ja Venäjän välille. Tutkimus valottaa kollektiivisen muistin ja identiteetin suhdetta vertailevan tutkimuksen lähtökohdista. Tutkimuksen teoreettinen viitekehys rakentuu nationalismintutkimuksen ja oppikirjatutkimuksen parissa käydystä teoriakeskustelusta: sovellan ennen kaikkea kollektiivisen muistin ja kansallisen identiteetin käsitteitä. Lähestyn oppikirjoja laadullisen sisällönanalyysin tarjoamilla metodologisilla välineillä.

Analyysini osoittaa, että tšekkiläisissä, suomalaisissa ja puolalaisissa historian lukion oppikirjoissa esiintyy monenlaisia Venäjä-kuvia. Suomalaisia ja puolalaisia oppikirjakuvauksia Venäjästä hallitsee vahvasti kansallinen näkökulma. Tšekkiläiset oppikirjat ovat tässä suhteessa erilaisia, koska ne tarkastelevat Venäjän historiaa ensisijaisesti maailmanhistoriallisesta, yleiseurooppalaisesta tai venäläisestä näkökulmasta. Suomalaisissa oppikirjoissa Venäjä-kuva on jossain määrin ristiriitainen, koska Venäjän keisarikunta nähtiin yhtäältä monikulttuurisen suvaitsevaisuuden ja laajojen mahdollisuuksien tyyssijana, mutta toisaalta takapajuisena ankaran venäläistämispolitiikan lietsojana. Oppikirjakuvausten perusteella suomalaiset ovat taipuvaisempia kompromisseihin, kun taas puolalaiset nousevat mieluummin avoimeen kapinaan venäläisiä vastaan.

Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords
Historiakulttuuri, historianopetus, kansallinen identiteetti, kollektiivinen muisti, oppikirjat, neuvosto-Venäjä, Puola, Suomi, Tšekki, Venäjä-kuva, Venäjän kaisarikunta

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Lists of Abbreviations

CZ: Czech

FI: Finnish

FRCE: Fundacja Rozwoju Systemu Edukacji / the Polish Foundation for the Development of the Education System

ISCED: The International Standard Classification of Education

MEN: Ministerstwo Edukacji Narodowej / the Polish Ministry of National Education

MŠMT: Ministerstvo školství, mládeže a tělovýchovy České republiky / the Czech Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports

OKM: Opetus- ja kulttuuriministeriö / the Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture

PL: Polish

RVP G: Rámcový vzdělávací program pro gymnasia / the Czech National Core Curriculum for Upper Secondary Schools

WsiP: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne / a Name of Polish School and Pedagogical Book publishing house

WSOY: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö / a Name of Finnish Book publishing house

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

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1. Introduction

1.1 Identities from Mitteleuropa to Norden

In the last twenty years, European identities have been in turmoil. The old borders of the Cold War era have crumbled and the EU has expanded towards the east. As a result, it has become important for Europeans to re-evaluate what "us" and "them" mean in a world of multiple identities. As our relationship to the world has changed we have been driven to reconsider the past from new perspectives. How are collective memories constructed? How has history defined our social evolution? These question forms the backdrop for this study. The study seeks to illuminate the issue by promoting a comparative approach on contemporary European memory and identities.

This research examines how the image of Russia from 1815–1922 is presented in upper secondary school textbooks published in the Czech Republic, Finland and Poland between 1993 and 2013[1] and how this image reflects on and constructs Czech, Finnish and Polish collective memory. I have chosen to study textbook portrayals in these countries because Czech, Finnish and Polish historical experiences are similar, but yet different in a way which fits into the bigger picture of European history. While these countries display some similar features, there are many differences which distinguish them.

The Czech Republic and Finland are relatively new as independent nation-states among the European nations: Finland gained its independence from the Russian Empire in 1917.[2] Czechoslovakia gained its independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918. Poland gained its independence in the same wave, becoming independent in 1918; however, this does not make Poland new. On the contrary, Poland had gradually ceased to exist since being first being partitioned in

[1] Most of the textbooks were published between the years 2000 – 2013, but one Czech textbook was published in 1993. However, it is still considered relevant and is used in history education in the country. This textbook can therefore be interpreted to represent 21st century collective memory as well.

[2] Finland had been a part of Sweden until 1809.

the late 18th century. During the course of the 19th century, Czechs, Finns and Poles were a part of a larger empire, yet they developed strong national movements.

The Second World War left its scars on all the three countries: Czechoslovakia and Poland were occupied by Germany. The Holocaust destroyed their pre-War ethnic plurality, and was painful for both. Finland, on the other hand, suffered greatly in its war with the Soviet Union. After the Second World War, Czechoslovakia and Poland became socialist republics and fell under the Soviet sphere of influence. Finland was officially a neutral country in the Cold War order. However, the political history talks about *Finlandization*, (Finnish: *suomettuminen*) which refers to the Soviet influence on the Finnish affairs.

The collapse of the Soviet system affected all the three countries. The Velvet Revolution began in 1989 in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (Československá socialistická republika, ČSSR), which in 1990 became the Czechoslovak Federal Republic[3]. Correspondingly, in Poland, fierce years of the Solidarity Movement culminated in the declaration of Martial Law from 1981 to 1983. The Polish People's Republic (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, PRL) ceased to exist in 1989, and the country became the Republic of Poland (Rzeczpospolita Polska). In Finland, the collapse of the Soviet Union had profound political and economic consequences. Finland had to, for example, re-arrange its exports because the Soviet Union had been its largest trading partner. Mentally, all the three countries had to reconstruct their identity. Politically, it opened up the possibility to integrate with the West.

Finland's accession to the EU took place in 1995. The Czech Republic and Poland joined NATO in 1999. The Czech Republic and Poland joined EU on the 1st of May 2004 together with 8 other countries, in the so-called Eastern Enlargement. All three countries are relatively new members of the European Union. After the 2004 enlargement, the Czech Republic, Finland and Poland have all sat at the same table of EU cooperation as major western European countries.

However, this does mean their collective understanding of themselves is complete. It merely marks a new beginning. Collective memory – the relationship between "us and them" is in constant flux. All these countries carry memories of

[3] And then peacefully in 1993 dissolved into separate Czech and Slovak Federal Republics.

unstable times in their past prior to becoming independent nation states. Deep down lurks the experience of being governed by others accompanied by the fear of losing a distinct nature and becoming the other. All three countries have had periods of difficult relations with Russia. Finland and Poland during the Russian Empire and following independence; in the post-war period relations have been ambiguous if not hostile. The Czech Republic (or Czechoslovakia) had problematic relations with the Soviet Union particularly after the Second World War.

The first reason I have chosen to study representations of Russian history between 1815 and 1922 is because the symbolic importance of this period relates strongly to how the three countries see themselves and their relations to others – and ultimately to Russia (or the Soviet Union). The second reason is historical distance. There are not so many individuals who can recall even the latest years of this period as a part their personal memories. The collective constructing of these images is therefore increasingly filtered through secondary sources like history textbooks. These events have become more and more imagined and less experienced.

There are many reasons to compare the relationship between collective memories of Russia and national identities in the Czech Republic, Finland and Poland. First, Czechs and Finns and Poles have had a similar path to independence: independence movements in all three countries were comprised of non-dominant ethnic groups which took steps to free themselves from larger empires. While Poland became independent in the same period, its experience differed slightly from the Czech Republic and Finland, in as much as Poles were the dominant ethnic group before the country was partitioned. Second, the Czech Republic was never a part of the Russian empire, while Finns and Poles were and fought for their freedom against Russian rule. Third, the Soviet Union has a strong legacy in all three countries. While Czechs and Poles were a part of the Eastern Bloc, Finland was not. However, Finland was closely connected to the Soviet Union in many ways[4]. The fourth and most recent reason is the "Europeanization" that took place in all three countries after the collapse of the Soviet system.

In terms of identity politics, Czechs have participated in the Central European project and proclaimed their place as a part of *Mitteleuropa* (from the 20th

[4] Finland had for example signed the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. The agreement was in effect from 1948 to 1992.

century until today). Finns have similarly participated in the Northern European project *Norden* (especially after the Second World War). Interestingly enough, Poles have aspired to belong to both Central and Northern Europe, while still standing on their own.[5] In addition, Poland identifies with the Catholic world, which connects them to southern Europe as well. Czechs, Finns and Poles have during different periods experienced being European through the filters of German and Russian culture[6]. This is also reflected in their collective memory of the process of national identity formulation.

The image of Russia and the Soviet Union during the late modern period in the Czech Republic, Finland and Poland is problematized and ambiguous.[7] While Russia's contribution to today's international politics is undisputed, it is important to study the image of former enemies who have participated in "Europeanizing" themselves from a comparative perspective. The message of the Russian Federation has been that it wants to be recognized as a "Eurasian power" whose influence is equivalent to that of the EU. However, the crisis in Ukraine which broke out in 2013 –2014 has indicated that the old "spheres of influence" thinking and the distrust connected to all parties continues to impact international relations. It is for this reason that examining collective memories and textbook images of former enemies is important.

Many history textbooks, in both authoritarian and democratic countries, contain specific self-images and images of the alleged "others" which trace back to the distant past. In specific cases they even legitimize national superiority, collective victimhood or hostility – revealing this kind of mechanism is the first step to mutual understanding and can be used as the basis for friendly relations between these countries.[8]

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[5] Neumann 1999.

[6] Finns perhaps more or less between Sweden and Russia.

[7] The late modern period is in this context a flexible concept which refers to the period starting in the late eighteenth century as a result of political revolutions and industrialization. Together with these developments the worldviews of modernism emerged. The late modern period includes also events which took place in the nineteenth century. It is a period which has changed western societies in many ways. For these reason the consequences of the late modern period have lasted until the contemporary era. See for example Bauman 1989.

[8] Lässig 2013, 1.

School education serves an important role when it is comes to learning citizenship skills at both local and global levels. History education is a useful tool to understand how different identities are located in the world. As Philips and Reyes note, "the very notion of a national identity can be said to been largely constituted through practises of public remembrance that serve to forge a common origin as well as a sense of collective destiny."[9] National identities can therefore be established via history education through the use of core national curricula and textbooks. Peter Carrier points out that nations refer to universal rules in order to justify their authority (domestically) and their autonomy (internationally), and schools administer learning citizenship (domestically). The challenge is how schools can educate enlightened citizens who see themselves and operate as both citizens of their nations and citizens of the world.[10]

In this study, the question of national identity establishes the primary impulse and background motive to study the perceptions of Russia reflected in Czech, Finnish and Polish history textbooks. The presumption is that identity is not fixed; its meanings are a result of constant negotiations which take place in the everyday individual communication. The question of national identity is also present in history education and the development of history textbooks. The overall context of national identity affects how history is constructed in textbooks – this is how it has been historically and continues to be in the 21th century.[11] The Czech Republic, Finland and Poland are examples of the close relationship between historical memory and national identity. This study examines how the national framework of memory impacts upon textbook representations of Russia.

[9] Philips and Reyes 2011.

[10] Carrier 2013, 7.

[11] The nation state is not the only framework in which historical memory operates but it nevertheless is an influencing one.

1.2 Overview of Historiography: Czech, Finnish and Polish Perceptions of Past

Czech, Finnish and Polish history textbooks do not represent Russian history in a vacuum. The image of Russia has been developed and will develop within the sphere of national histories, culture and traditions of producing historical knowledge. There are connotations associated with certain events, periods and persons of Russian history. In this chapter, I will observe how elements of national identity have affected relations to Russia (or Soviet Russia/Soviet Union) based on a short review of historiographical traditions in these countries.

The Czech Republic, Finland and Poland have in common in their collective memory the fear of being governed by others and the bitterness that important national decisions have been made by others. The process of becoming independent nations had many phases which differ in pace, timing and consistency. Poland, divided among three empires, became a nation without a state in the late eighteenth century. In the nineteenth century, Czechs lived in Czech territories (Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia) in the Austro-Hungarian Empire under Habsburg rule. However, the Habsburgs were newcomers in these territories: the Czechs had lived there for many centuries under the Kingdom of Bohemia. The Russian Empire gained Finland, which was previously a Swedish province, in the Finnish War of 1809.

In the Polish case, the memory of common past has identified with the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth; one of the largest countries in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe. Poland has cherished the memory of its Commonwealth past. The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth is considered the predecessor state of modern Poland. Stone describes the Commonwealth as an elective monarchy where the Polish nobility (szlachta) formed a relatively large amount of population – up to 7–10 per cent of the total population. Religion played a vital role in defining national culture. Roman Catholicism brought the Polish majority together, but had a centrifugal effect on the Commonwealth as a whole and alienated other members of this multi-ethnic society.[12]

[12] Stone 2001, 211–212.

In the 18th century, the Polish–Lithuanian state underwent a period of decline. Poland was partitioned in 1772, 1793 and 1795. The territory of the Commonwealth was divided between the Russian Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia and Habsburg Austria. Interestingly enough, the first modern constitution in Europe (the May 3rd Constitution) was instituted in Poland in 1791 – just four years before the Commonwealth ceased to exist. The legacy of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth has affected Polish historical memory, and endorsed the idea of Poland as buffer zone in Europe. In this view, Poland is seen to represent Christendom defending Europe from the "barbarians".

The idea of Poland as the buffer zone is associated with the ideology of Sarmatism. Stone explains that "Sarmatia" refers to a historical myth created by Polish Renaissance scholars who claimed that Polish-Lithuanian nobles descended from a third-century warrior people who lived on the steppes north of the Black Sea. According to this myth, Sarmatian noble practices evolved into the political system of Polish-Lithuanian noble democracy, which established civil liberties for nobles, elected kingship, with the primacy of parliament protected by the liberum veto.[13] After the partitions, Sarmatism became intertwined with Messianism, the idea of Poland suffering in a way that Christ among the European nations. During the 19th century, uprisings in Polish against the new ruler intensified this Messianic feeling. Polish national identity has developed strongly on the basis of Roman-Catholicism and cultural tendencies (or ideologies), such as Sarmatism and Messianism. These also established practices of "othering" for those who do not fit the national type.

Like the Poles, Czechs also have a memory of a glorious national past. When describing the history of the Czech lands, Czech historians emphasize the importance of its geopolitical location in "the heart of Europe"[14]. In the Czech national consciousness, the golden age of the Czech state took place in the High and Late Middle Ages. Zdeněk Měřínský and Jaroslav Mezník describe how in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Medieval Czech State reached the apogee of its power: its core remained in Bohemia and Moravia, but under the last Přemyslides and the first Luxemburg rulers there began a process of territorial expansion. The

[13] Stone 2001, 211–212.

[14] See Pánek & Tůma et al. 2009, 25; Měřínský & Mezník 1998, 39.

authors argue that the influence of the Medieval Czech State extended beyond Central Europe.[15]

In terms of the national identity, the Hussite Movement (1419–1471) has an important role in Czech historiography. Czech historian František Šmahel calls the Hussite Movement "a Reformation before the Reformations," "revolution before revolution" and "an anomaly of European history"[16]. A series of religious reforms led by Jan Hus between 1370 –1415, the Hussites criticized the role of the church in Czech society. This led to the Hussite Wars from 1420 –1434. In the beginning of the Early Modern Era the Czech state was incorporated into the Central European Habsburg Empire.[17] It was in the Battle of the White Mountain (1620) where the Hussite tradition was finally defeated (in a form that identified partly with the new currents of European Reformation). This battle stands out in Czech historiography as a symbol of defeat, a memory of the lost Protestant tradition and being overpowered by Habsburg rule.[18]

According to a 2010 empirical study on historical consciousness in the Czech Republic by Šubrt and Pfeiferová, the reign of Charles the IV, the Hussite movement and the First Czechoslovak Republic (1918 –1938) are considered the most important periods in Czech history. This demonstrates the importance of the medieval history for the Czechs. In a similar vein, their studies also confirm that the idea of belonging to the "heart of Europe" is reflected in Czech understandings of their national identity. Indeed, the informants in discussion with Šubrt and Pfeiferová have emphasized that the Czech Republic belongs to Central Europe, just like Austria, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary.[19]

The Middle Ages and Hussite Movement have a similar importance for Czech national identity and state formation as the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth has for Poland. They represent for the Czech and Polish national consciousness the "golden age" of their nations For them it is a flourishing era when they had more

[15] Měřínský & Mezník 1998, 49.

[16] Šmahel 1998, 79.

[17] The Habsburgs, who ruled the Czech state since 1526, adhered to the Catholic faith.

[18] Petráň & Petráňová 1998, 142–144.

[19] Šubrt & Pfeiferová 2010.

influence: their nation culture was more "desirable" for others. The Finnish memory differs from the Polish and Czech experience of identity construction. Finns have not had a historical predecessor state as symbolic role model such as the Bohemian Kingdom and Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Instead, Finnish identity has been based on its distance from the "ancient regime."

A strong element, also visible with the Czechs, is that Finns have been historically governed from outside the territories of modern-day Finland. Under Swedish Rule (c. 1150–1809) Finland was considered an eastern province of the Swedish Kingdom. During this era, wars between Sweden and Russia very much determined the position of Finland. Russia gained the area of "Old Finland", the lands to the east of the river Kymi, in the Great Northern War and in the Russo-Swedish War (1741–1743). Finally, after the Finnish War between Sweden and Russia in 1809, Finland became a part of the Russian Empire as the Grand Duchy of Finland.

A common denominator between the historical experiences of Finns and Poles is that they both lived in the Russian Empire during the nineteenth century until their independence in 1917 and 1918. Similarly, both faced acts of Russification. Unlike the Czech and Polish experience, Finnish identity and nation building did not incorporate a "golden age" of the Finnish past. Yet the Finnish national consciousness has been able to invent traditions which have been incorporated into the national identity. For example, in the nineteenth century the publication of national epic Kalevala introduced to the wider public "the mythological past" of the Finnish culture and people.

In terms of Finnish identity, Finnish historiography has emphasized events and processes which created a link between Finns and the West. Eino Jutikkala and Kauko Pirinen write how during the twelfth century the Eastern and Western Neighbours, Novgorod and Sweden, became attracted to the lands that forming present-day Finland due to their sources of raw materials. The competition turned in favour of Sweden and Finland was "drawn into the Western Cultural Sphere". [20] One canonised event is the first crusade to Finland in the late twelfth

[20] Jutikkala & Pirinen 2003, 40–74.

century despite the fact that Christianity did not have strong roots in the country at the time.

Few contemporary sources refer to the crusade conducted by Eric IX of Sweden and Bishop Henry[21]. One is the legend of Bishop Henry, written possibly in the late thirteenth century. The oldest known manuscript is the Registrum Upsalense, which dates back to the year 1344. According to this legend, a peasant called Lalli killed the Bishop Henry during the Bishop's trip[22]. This legend conveys the paradoxical duality of the Finnish national identity: on the one hand the influence of Western culture over the Finnish but on the other the primitive nature of the Finnish people, who were reluctant adapt to Western civilization.

The experience of being under the rule of others is rooted deeply in the core of Czech, Finnish and Polish historical consciousness. The Polish experience of history is rooted in bitterness at Poland being partitioned in the late eighteenth century. Finnish and Polish memories have in common the memory of changing borders. The Poles have their *Kresy Wschodnie* (Eastern Borderlands) which evoke the borders of the ancient Commonwealth. In the Finnish case, the Eastern border has moved back and forth. Treaty of Nöteborg in 1323 (Finnish: Pähkinäsaaren rauha) was the first settlement between Sweden and Novgorod regulating their border. The border has changed frequently over the centuries. The most recent changes took place after the Second World War when Finland had to surrender some of its territories to the Soviet Union.[23]

The twentieth century brought many turbulent changes for Czechs, Finns and Poles. A civil war broke out in Finland in 1918 just one year after its independence. Soviet Russia assisted the Finnish "Reds" in the war which was won by the "Whites." This did not help to decrease the Russophobia emerging in Finland at the time. In Czech case, the Munich Agreement of 1938 between Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy, which ratified Nazi Germany's annexation of the Sudetenland, resonates strongly in their collective memory. Poles had a similar experience with the 1945 Yalta Congress, where USA and Soviet leaders met and

[21] See Katajala 2002.

[22] See Katajala 2002.

[23] The memory of these lost territories is connected especially to the memory of lost Karelia.

legitimized Soviet influence over Poland. Finnish historical memory includes similar bitter elements stemming from the 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947. The Holocaust is also traumatizing for Czech and Polish collective memories and identities. In Finnish collective memory, the Winter War and Continuation War against the Soviet Union continue to resonate strongly with the public.

After the Second World War, the Cold War and Iron Curtain brought the Czechoslovak Federal Republic and Polish People's Republic under the influence of the Soviet Union. Finland was "Finlandized" and followed the Soviet activities very closely. This was a period of Marxist historiography in both the Czechoslovak Federal Republic and Polish People's Republic. The Czechs and Poles re-wrote their history according to historical materialism. National heroes were reinvented and decorated according the Socialist worldview. For example, the national hero of Czechs, Jan Hus, was seen in a new light. According to Marxist historian Josef Macek, the Hussite revolutionary movement was a peasants' war and a prelude of bourgeois revolutions.[24] These two countries, like many other Communist countries, reinterpreted history according to historical materialism. In this worldview, it was the Soviet Union that served as an example for the other countries of the world. In this sense the history of the Soviet Union was held high.

Finns, Czechs and Poles have had ambiguous relations with Russians in terms of historical memory during the 20th century. During 1930s, 1940s and the latter half of the 20th century, Czechoslovakia, Finland and Poland were all confronted with situations where their sovereignty was under a threat. Warsaw Pact troops occupying Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the Finnish-Soviet Winter War and Continuation War and the Red Army presence in Poland during and after the Second World War are key events which have complicated relations with the Soviet Union.

Historical questions continue to colour the way these three countries perceive their relations with Russia even after the fall of the Soviet Union. Memories of the Second World War, Cold War and the fall of the Eastern Bloc contribute their drama to these relations. In general, the Czech and Polish post-Soviet collective

[24] Macek 1954.

memory has developed a strong negative bias towards their ideological past; however, not completely without nostalgic impulses towards the former way of life. The questions of history create tensions even today – for example between Poland and Russia in the case of on-going discussion about the Katyn Massacre and its 21st century sequel, the Smolensk accident. Historic wars of diverging memories still continue their battles. Overall, the extremes of the Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union during the twentieth century have a strong presence in the collective memories of the Czech Republic, Finland and Poland. Talking about Russian history between 1815 and 1922 may therefore raise similar emotions and traumas.

1.3 Russian History from Empire to Extremes

By analysing how Russian history is represented in textbooks, I will ask to what extent and how they lay their "national gaze" on Russian history. The period between 1815 and 1922 was turbulent in Russia, with many conflicts, revolts and eventually a revolution occurring.[25] This period evokes the prosperities and monstrosities of the Russian Empire, social reformations and modernization processes as well as international and domestic crises. During the period, as today, Russia was country of a great size which encompassed many structures, ideas and peoples. It begins at the end of the Napoleonic wars and 1815 Congress of Vienna and culminates in the fall of the Russian Empire, Russian revolution, first years of the Soviet Russia and establishment of the Soviet Union 1922.[26]

The first major event in the beginning of this period 1815 –1917 is the Vienna Congress and the establishment a coalition called the Holy Alliance created

[25] In Russian history it has always been problematic to draw a line where this period ends. For example Zhiromskaia (2005) reflects on the problem of periodization of Russian history in writing textbooks. According to Zhiromskaia, the end of the 1920's marks the dividing line in Russian history. I have decided to draw the line in the year 1922 - the establishment of the Soviet Union, because in 20th century history I want to rather concentrate on fin-de-siècle, the First World War, the Russian Revolution and its aftermath owing to their symbolic importance for Czech, Finnish and Polish national identities.

[26] The period covers most of it what British historian Eric Hobsbawm calls the long nineteenth century (1789 –1914), the "Age of Empire". The chosen period extends itself to the beginning of what Hobsbawm calls the short twentieth century (1914 –1989), "the Age of Extremes". See Hobsbawm 1989 & 1996.

by Russian, Prussian and Austrian. Russia was ruled by Alexander I during the years from 1801-1825, Nicholas I from 1825-1855, Alexander II from 1855-1881, Alexander III from 1881-1894 and Nicholas II from 1894-1917. A revolutionist group which became later known as the Decembrists sought to exploit the dynastic crisis of December 1825, but were not successful. The Polish November Uprising took place from 1830-1831. After the European revolutions in 1848, the Tsar adopted a strongly reactionary posture.[27]

The interest to strengthen its positions in the Black Sea and obtain markets in the Near East together with aim of fostering the spirit of Russian nationalism to "protect" Orthodoxy lead to Russian Empire's involvement in the Crimean War (1853–1856), in which Russia was defeated. The Peasant Reform in 1861 abolished serfdom in all areas of Russian Empire. The Polish January Uprising took place in 1863. Russia was defeated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, which lead to social unrest and revolts around the empire. On Bloody Sunday, the 9th of January 1905, armed soldiers opened fire on demonstrators in St. Petersburg.[28]

The news of these events caused protests across the country. In response, the Tsar announced the October Manifesto, in which he pledged to grant basic rights to the Russian people. Although the Manifesto managed to halt protests temporarily it was not enough to satisfy those shocked by the events of 1905. Russia participated in the First World War but withdrew when the revolution broke out in 1917. The year 1917 marked the beginning of a new era. The Tsar was overthrown, the empire was thrust into a state of anarchy and the Bolsheviks took over.[29]

In June 1918, radical measures known as "War Communism" were implemented resulting in state monopoly of grain and later in November in nationalizing trade and establishing a network of state cooperative stores to distribute goods. By the spring 1921, it became clear that the anti-Communist White Army was unsuccessful against the Red Army in an effort to restore the old order. The Red Army's victory paved the way for the emergence of Soviet Russia. Finally, in 1922,

[27] Riasanovsky 1993.

[28] Oxley 2001 & Riasanovsky 1993.

[29] Oxley 2001 & Riasanovsky 1993.

the Soviet Union was established when the nominally independent republics signed a Union treaty that pooled their sovereignty in one federation.[30]

One reason for choosing this period from the point of view of Russian history is the dialectic between liberal reform and reactionary conservatism. Russian society went through many changes during the period, both attempts at modernizing society and contradictory drawbacks scripted by autocracy and monarchism. At the same time the Russian Empire expanded its borders and acquired new lands. The Russian Empire became a major player in the European theatre of power and influence. The nineteenth century also witnessed the march of European nationalism, both in Russia and abroad. To a certain extent, ethnic conflicts within the multicultural empire contributed to pressures to reform. The year 1917 is the turning point in of these developments. In the aftermath of the First World War large, European empires – the Russian Empire, the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire – dissolved. Many smaller nation-states, Czechoslovakia, Finland and Poland among them, appeared on the European map. It is interesting to examine comparatively how these nations, which have strong historical linkages to Russia, interpret this period of Russian history in their textbooks.

1.4 Upper Secondary School Textbooks as Research Material

Research material consists of textbooks published in the Czech Republic, Finland and Poland from 1993–2013. In order to justify the comparison, I have selected textbooks for upper secondary schools focusing on general education, which are classified by the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)[31] as level 3. Typically, ISCED 3 programmes have more diverse, specialised and in-depth instructions than previous levels. ISCED 3 programmes are also more differentiated, with an increased range of options and streams available. Teachers are often highly qualified in their subjects or fields of specialisation, especially in the higher grades.

[30] Ascher 2009 & Hosking 2011.

[31] ISCED was developed by UNESCO as a framework to compare statistics across national education systems. It was revised in 2011 by UNESCO Member States to include 9 levels of education (International Standard Classification of Education ISCED 2011, 2012).

Programmes classified at ISCED level 3 can be referred to in numerous ways: secondary school (stage two/upper grades), senior secondary school, or (senior) high school. [32] For clarity, I will use the term 'upper secondary school' because it is more comparable within the international framework of education.

I will concentrate on textbooks which are used in institutions of education at level ISCED 3 in the Czech Republic, Finland and Poland. In the Czech system of education this means textbooks used in *gymnázium* (or more generally in *střední školy*) for students aged 15–19. In Finland the equivalent is *lukio* and the age group is 16–19. In Poland, the similar institutions of education are called *szkoły ponadgimnazjalne*, the equivalent being more specifically *lyceum ogólnokształcące*.[33] These textbooks target teenagers (or in some cases adult learners) who already have undergone a significant amount of history education at the comprehensive level. The books are produced and consumed within the national context: they are written in Czech, Finnish and Polish and addressed to a national audience.

The textbooks therefore offer an intriguing insight into the national memory of Russian history. It is necessary to conduct a systematic study on their content because the materials of history education are under pressure to discuss and reflect the historiographical debates of their time. Despite fact the historiographical intention of being objective, already the topics chosen in the textbooks adjust the perspective. Interpretations of history may vary according to a specific author, publishing house or series, but national tendencies still exist. Textbooks are not the only arenas where images and representations of Russian history are produced. This also occurs in popular culture. Memorial institutions and media contribute to this. Miroslav Hroch distinguishes some of the categories which are considered significant for the formation of historical consciousness:

1. Results of the academic historical research and its popularizations in the media

[32] International Standard Classification of Education ISCE 2011, 2012.

[33]The structure of the European education systems 2013/14, 2013. http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/facts_and_figures/education_structures_EN.pdf See the Czech, Finnish and Polish School Systems according to ISCE in appendix 1.

2. History as a school subject and similar subjects, such as literary history, civics, geography and religion.
3. Publications and journalism (as a wide concept)
4. History in artistic works, for example its literal forms (historical fiction, drama, poetry) and visual and musical forms
5. Mobility – targeted visits to historic sites or changing the place of residence
6. Informal transmission of information about the past in the framework on family or other community.

The examples pinpointed by Hroch[34] demonstrate the variety of arenas which participate in social memory practices. Nonetheless, school history education and representations in textbooks can have nationwide effects on the way the historical memory of Russia develops in the three countries under consideration. Textbooks are in direct contact with history education practices and can have a generation-wide influence on historical memory: they are a link between public and private history.

1.5 Defining the Research Question

The purpose of the study is to compare contemporary Czech, Finnish and Polish textbook understanding of Russian history and Russia's change over the period 1815–1922. The period has symbolic value for identity formation in the Czech Republic, Finland and Poland. Between 1815 and 1922 the three nations examined here were parts of larger empires: Czechs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Finns in the Russian Empire, with the Poles being parts of not one but *three* empires in Prussia, Russia and Austro-Hungary. However, they nevertheless developed strong national movements within the framework of these empires. The selected period has symbolic importance in terms of Czech, Finnish and Polish understandings of the past and how their identities have been constructed and located relative to other European nations.

The age of empire cast its shadow over the three nations. The Russian Empire had a very strong impact on Finns and Poles, as they lived inside the empire

[34] Hroch 2010, 33.

until the end of the First World War. Equivalently, Czechs lived in the neighbouring Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the beginning of the twentieth century European empires started to crumble, which meant new possibilities for European nationalism. Various non-dominant ethnic groups articulated their desire for self-determination. Eventually, this lead to the establishment of new independent states in Europe: Czechoslovakia became independent in 1918, Finland 1917 and Poland 1918. The establishment of Soviet Union in 1922 brought about new divides.

The question of how the Russian image is perceived in the Czech, Finnish and Polish textbooks is connected more widely to nation-specific historic discourses and collective memory. In my research, I compare the Czech, Finnish and Polish representations of Russian history and how it reflects the contemporary national identity.

My main research question is how the textbook image of Russia relates to Czech, Finnish and Polish collective memory. This enables me to benchmark Russia's connotations from a comparative perspective within the historical narratives regarding Russian history. Ultimately, this means examining the dialogue between the nexus of "us" and them".

The theoretical framework of this material-based study is connected to discussions of nationalism and memory studies. Discussions concerning national identity and collective memory will offer the conceptual tools for my study. The comparative approach to this question will reconstruct how Czech, Finnish or Polish historical consciousness and identity are engaged in representations of Russian history. The methodology of this study consists of qualitative content analysis and the guidelines of textbook analysis suggested by Falk Pingel[35]. Textbook research and nationalism studies have a common ground when it comes to the question how different national and ethnic groups are represented in schoolbooks. However, textbook research alone does not constitute an independent discipline.

I will conduct qualitative content analysis of the textbooks in question in order to organize the research material. The first step is to arrange a typology of perspectives in order to see how Russian history is narrated regarding the scale of locality, global/European perspectives, the national perspective and the Russian

[35] Pingel 2010.

perspective. The frequency of the national perspective already emphasizes the national viewpoint's interconnections to Russia. Together with this typology of perspectives I will analyse whether these narratives include biased perceptions. Is Russia seen as enemy that threatens the Czech, Finnish or Polish national agenda? In what kind of roles does Russia appear? Are there any echoes of national traumas or fears? Do the textbooks convey a detailed information or are their descriptions more vague (is the distance to Russian history long or is Russia observed more closely)? Is Russia portrayed as "them", as a close other or as a distant other?

By comparison, I try to delineate the differences and similarities between the Czech, Finnish and Polish textbooks. According to the contextual factors, there are three basic pre-assumptions that may inform the results of the comparative qualitative analysis:

1. The Czech Republic and Finland contain parallel elements in their collective memory because they are significantly smaller nations than Poland. The population of the Czech Republic was approximately 10.5 million in 2012 (the population of Czechoslovakia in 1993 was estimated at 15.6 million), the population of Finland is approximately 5.4 million in 2014 while the population of Poland was approximately 38.5 million in 2012. Poland has almost eight times more inhabitants than Finland and almost four times more inhabitants than the Czech Republic. In addition, from the viewpoint of nationalism Czechs and Finns fall more or less in the category of ethnic type of nationalism while Poles are between an ethnic and civic nationalism type[36] (see discussion on nationalism and national identity in chapter 2.2). Therefore, the Czech Republic and Finland may constitute a cohort whereas Poland stands out as different.

[36] However, there can be seen a civic element in the Finnish nationalism due to the special status of the Swedish minority in Finland and an ethnic tendency in Polish nationalism after the Second World War and the disappearance of Poland's multiculturalism, for example the destruction of the Jewish community.

2. Finns and Poles lived under the rule of the Russian Empire. Therefore their collective memories of Russia should share some common features.
3. Czechs and Poles have in common their Communist past and their status as satellites of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. They perhaps want forget some of the events of their recent history. Memories of Czechoslovak-USSR and Polish-USSR relations also have a potential impact on the way earlier periods in Russian history are perceived.

The comparison will show whether Czech, Finnish or Polish collective memory inform images of Russia as an enemy in school textbooks. I am interested to find out whether the relation between "us" and "them" is hostile or friendly in these countries.

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 Collective Memory

Collective memory deals with the question how a certain group or community perceives the past. Wulf Kansteiner describes it as collective phenomenon which can take hold of historically and socially remote events and often privilege the interests of the contemporary. Kansteiner suggests it is a result of conscious manipulation and unconscious absorption and is always mediated.[37] Memory at the level of national identity requires negotiation; history textbooks participate in this. This type of memory is synchronous in nature: it is synchronized with the present time which looks the past eras under the contemporary influence.

The objective of this thesis is connected with the project Pierre Nora calls the "history of second degree" – history less interested in "what really happened" than its influence on successive presents; and less interested in traditions than in the way traditions are constituted and transmitted. It refers to a history interested in memory not as remembrance but as an overall structure of the past within the present.[38] For Nora, these sites of memory lead to the unveiling of the French nation.[39] In this study the image of Russia will function in similar way, constructing understandings of the past within the present-day horizon of definitions of the nation.

At the centre lies the question: What is a collective memory? In recent decades, the concept of memory has raised wide discussions in diverse fields of study from humanities to the social sciences. Having observed the situation, Kerwin Lee Klein considered it the rise of the "memory industry." Similarly, Wulf Kansteiner writes about the "memory wave" and Allan Megill describes it as the "memory craze."[40] Memory has long been an object of scholarly fascination,

[37] Kansteiner 2002, 180

[38] Nora 1996a, xxiii–xxiv.

[39] Nora 1996b, 1 – 2.

[40] Klein 2000; Kansteiner 2002; Megill 1998.

especially in the United States. Kansteiner explains the popularity of memory by its rare combination of social relevance and intellectual challenge. However, as Kansteiner points out, it is unclear to what extent this convergence reflects actual common intellectual and methodological interests.[41] The concept has taken over complex interdisciplinary research. Despite its popularity the terminology continues to be contested.

The term 'collective memory' traces back to French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, who first introduced the concept and remains a key influence in memory studies. Halbwachs holds the view that collective memory is constructed socially, arguing that no memory is possible outside frameworks used by people living in society to determine and retrieve their recollections. Collective frameworks are instruments used by the collective memory to reconstruct an image of the past, which is in accord with the predominant thoughts of society in a given historical period. According to Halbwachs, society obligates people from time to time not to simply reproduce previous events but also to shorten or complete them. He argues that regardless of how convinced we are that our memories are exact, we give them a prestige that reality did not possess in the first place.[42]

Halbwachs supports his ideas by arguing that a series of images in our dreams do not contain true memories. Dreams are fragmented and incompressible because in order to remember we must be capable of reasoning, comparing and feeling in contact with a society which can guarantee the integrity of memory. [43] Although this might be not entirely the case when it comes to memory, a memory which is produced without any reflection on the society is not likely to be a memory which has much social meaning. Memory, in order to be collective, has to interact with what Halbwachs calls the social frameworks of memory, such as religious collective memory and social classes[44]. Otherwise they are just memory images which float in the experiences of individuals and do not constitute social value outside the individual realm. They remain as a dog's dreams, not memories of

[41] Kansteiner 2002.

[42] Halbwachs 1992, 37 – 52.

[43] Halbwachs 1992.

[44] Halbwachs 1992.

society. In this study, the national project in its different compositions serves as a social framework of memory in a Halbwachsian sense.

Collective (or social) memory is not the only concept introduced to the debate. Jan Assmann offers the term 'cultural memory' which he describes as a collective concept for all knowledge and experience in the interactive framework of society. Cultural memory, he argues, is obtained over generations through repeated societal practice and initiation. He defines cultural memory through a delimitation which distinguishes it from "communicative" or "everyday" memory and from science[45] (or as Halbwachs has argued a distinction between memory and history[46]). Cultural memory is characterized by its distance from the everyday, with fateful events of the past being fixed cultural reference points. Their memory is maintained through cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments) and institutional communication (recitation, practice, observance). Assmann calls them "figures of memory" which are formed by flow of everyday communication such as festivals, rites, images and so on. [47]

Assmann argues that cultural memory attempts to reconcile memory (the contemporized past), culture and the group (society). According to him, cultural memory consists of three characteristics. First is the concretion of identity or the relation to the group**.** The objective manifestations of cultural memory are defined through an identificatory determination in a positive ("We are this") or negative ("That is our opposite") sense. In this sphere distinctions are made between what pertains to oneself and what is foreign**.** Second is the capacity to reconstruct; cultural memory always relates its knowledge to an actual and contemporary situation. Cultural memory exists both in the potentiality of the archive whose accumulated texts, images and rules of conduct act as total horizon and in the actuality where each contemporary context puts meaning in its own perspective and relevance. The

[45] The English translation is in some places inaccurate: to my understanding Assmann refers to academic scholarly work such as historical research, not to science as to natural sciences but in the meaning of the German word *Wissenschaft*.

[46] Halbwachs 1992.

[47] Assmann 1995, 125 –126.

characteristics of cultural memory include formation, organization, obligation and reflexivity.[48]

Despite the fact that most historians dealing with the concept of collective memory treat Halbwachs as their primary theoretical reference point, they do not take his theories on memory as given. As Kansteiner points out, many historians remain uncomfortable with Halbwachs's determined anti-individualism. The objection derives from the Halbwachsian notion that individual memory is entirely socially determined. Halbwachs may be extensively cited but historians also tend to take distance and return to the actions and objectives of individuals in history.[49] Philips and Reyes note that Halbwachs perceived the nation only as a distant framework which had less influence on the practices of individual recollections than frames such as religion, class or the family. However, the nation-state has proved to be a fundamental concept for followers such as Pierre Nora, who sought to trace the transformations of French national memory in *Realms of Memory.*[50]

Nonetheless, Halbwachs's emphasis on the function of everyday communication in the development of collective memories and together with his interest in imaginary social discourses resonate well with recent historiographical debates, especially regarding questions of historical representation[51]. Correspondingly, Halbwachs's writings on memory are relevant here as well since history textbooks can be seen as an imaginary social discourse. The formation of national identity is connected with the social frameworks of memory because of the very nature of the history textbooks that are nation-specific as a medium.

Assmann's contribution to this thesis is his description of how cultural memory functions creating a sphere where identificatory determination takes place in manifestations of oneself and manifestations of the foreign. I use the term collective memory because it highlights the social characteristics of a nation. When combined, these theoretical tools are more than sufficient to understand the complex

[48] Assmann 1995, 129 –133.

[49] Kansteiner 2002.

[50] Philips & Reyes 2011, 7.

[51] Kansteiner 2002.

relationship between memory and national identity. In this thesis, the term collective memory is understood primarily as representations of history in textbooks which participate in the imagining of the nation.

2.2 Foundations of National Identity: Nation and Nationalism

In this study, the scholarly interest in memory is connected to its relation to national identities. How national identity is defined relates to the question of what makes a nation. Miroslav Hroch, a scholar whose name is associated with the modernist school of nationalism studies[52], implies that a 'nation' is not an eternal category but a result of a long and complicated process of historical development. Hroch defines the nation as a large social group integrated by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical and historical) and their subjective reflection on their collective consciousness. [53] A particular nation might contain one or two of these relationships or a combination of many.

Based on empirical studies, Hroch creates a classic comparative model regarding the behaviour of national movements of non-dominant ethnic groups in nineteenth century Europe[54]. Even for scholars focusing on twenty-first century national identities, this model offers valuable insights into the way, in which nationalism works within a community. According to Hroch, three ties stand out in the nation-building process. He notes that some may play a particularly important role in one nation-building process, and a subsidiary one in others. The first is a 'memory' of some common past, treated as a 'destiny' of the group. The second is a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the group than beyond it. The third one is a conception of equality within the group and organized as a civil society. [55] Notice that memory is one of the ties Hroch

[52] The different paradigms of nationalism studies will be discussed later in this chapter.

[53] Hroch 1996, 78 –79.

[54] Hroch 1985.

[55] Hroch 1996, 78 –79.

associates with the process of nation building. Even though Hroch's model derives mainly from nineteenth century national movements of non-dominant ethnic groups, it also describes the journeys taken by small nations such as the Czech Republic, Finland and Poland.

Among the various scholars studying nationalism there is a disagreement whether it is a modern phenomenon or whether pre-modern forms of nationalism have influenced the birth of modern nationalism. The modernist theory of nationalism claims we can only talk about nationalism in a modern sense in the context of the modern age. The Perennialists argue that nations, if not ancient, are at minimum older than modern nations founded, for example, on the basis of ethnicity.[56]

For example Anthony D. Smith claims that we cannot discharge the earlier nationalist phenomena because they might for example have symbolic value for the development of the modern nationalism.[57] Yet most are willing to admit that nationalism as we know it today was born only during the modernization processes of industrialization.[58] In this view, modern nationalism emerged in the late 18th century, developed alongside civil society and intensified during the course of the 19th century.

Smith distinguishes the Western or 'civic' model of the nation and the non-Western model an 'ethnic' conception of the nation.[59] According to Smith, the components of the standard, Western model of the nation are historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology. He argues that in the Western model of national identity, nations were seen as culture communities whose members were united, if not made homogeneous, by common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions. However, the non-Western model of the nation emphasized a community of birth and native culture. [60]

[56] Compare for example the views presented by Smith 1998 and Gellner 1983.

[57] See Smith 1991.

[58] Hobsbawm 1994, Smith 1998, Gellner 1983.

[59] This typology stems from Hans Kohn's dichotomy of Western and non-Western (Eastern) nationalism. See Kohn 1951.

[60] Smith 1991, 9 –13.

Smith claims that whereas the Western concept laid down that an individual had to belong to some nation, but could choose to which he or she belonged, the non-Western or ethnic concept allowed no such latitude. He explains that the elements of the ethnic conception of the nation are genealogy and ties by presumed descent, popular mobilization, vernacular languages, customs and traditions. This model is mirrored on a very different route of 'nation-formation' travelled by many communities in Eastern Europe and Asia, and one that constituted a dynamic political challenge. Smith identifies two models of national identity: the Western model and non-Western model. In the Western model nations were seen as culture communities, whose members were united, if not made homogeneous, by common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions. The non-Western model represents an 'ethnic' conception of the nation.[61]

In Smith's view the difference between the two models is the emphasis on the place of law in the Western civic model, whereas the ethnic model is defined by vernacular culture, languages and customs. However, these arguments are not plausible enough to describe these models even though from the historical perspective these tendencies would be noticeable. In the Western model Smith highlights individual choice, in which one chooses the nation to which he or she belongs. However, attachment to and identification with a particular nation is not a matter of voluntarism, as the difference between the two models suggest. Smith highlights in the Western model the role of the "homeland" where "terrain and people have exerted mutual and beneficial influence over several generations."[62] This idea is at the very core of the collective memory of national conscious-making meaning and understanding one's own nation.

These two models stem from different historical circumstances but do not necessary result in the conclusion that nationalism would be always either civic or ethnic. The development of national identity can be affected unpredictably by political, social and historical changes and is therefore not straightforward. Poland is an example of nationalism in the Western civic model which transforms into a more ethnic type after "losing its territory". Smith acknowledges that Poland went through

[61] Smith 1991, 9 –13.

[62] Smith 1991, 19.

this kind of transformation.[63] Furthermore, in the Western model the status of the nation is more established. There are favourable circumstances to concentrate on the building of laws and institutions rather than appeal to the ethnic origin and cause of the "people" because the national culture has a solid basis already.

Otto Bauer promotes the view that the national character in the national consciousness is changeable over time. Supporting the direction of the modernist view on nationalism, Bauer emphasizes that in no way is the nation of our time linked with its ancestors of two or three millennia ago. It is the character of the community that links the members of the nation in a certain era.[64] However, nationalist ideas are eager to make us believe it is much older. It is coded into the idea of nationalism that nations want to be portrayed as an eternal category. Searching for common history and destiny is one way to build a national consciousness and a sense of community. Anthony D. Smith talks about an organic nation that is closely connected with a form of nationalism, Primordialism, in which a nation has a special place in the past because it has existed for a long time and is therefore a natural world order.[65]

The modern theory of nationalism emphasizes that pre-modern forms of nationalism do not link to modern nationalism in any way other than a reconstruction.[66] One of the most influential voices in the modernist school of nationalism, Eric Hobsbawm, talks in this context about invented traditions. He emphasizes that the link between pre-modern and modern nationalism is reconstructed or even invented.[67] The idea behind this is that tradition helps to create a reference point to the past. Finding traditions takes place through the process of selecting different elements from the past. However, Hobsbawm has been criticized for his usage of the term 'invented traditions'. Scholars against the modern theory of nationalism have argued that traditions are not purely invented, and that there has to be something which gives traditions credibility. Anthony D. Smith does not agree

[63] Smith 1998, 130 –131.

[64] Bauer 1996, 40.

[65] Smith 2000.

[66] For example Gellner 1983.

[67] Hobsbawm 1992, 1–10.

with Hobsbawm's view of nationalism as artificial. According to Smith, modern nationalism cannot be understood without prior ethnic ties and remembrances. [68]

The debate between pre-modern and modern leads us to the question how the national identity is established through language. Benedict Anderson offers one model when describing the nation as an imagined community. According to Anderson, the nation is imagined because members construct a sense of belonging though all of its members will never meet each other. Anderson considers nationalism to be born alongside print-capitalism, when newspapers and books became available to the masses, thus highlighting the role of a particular scrip-language. When people started reading daily newspaper their lives were bound together. This crystallizes the mind of the nation when readers experience and feel the same events simultaneously. [69]

According to Anderson, the nation is imagined as limited because it has finite and elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.[70] These boundaries are defined in the sphere of the imagination. This coincides with what Smith argues about how nationalism makes its way: "The task is to ensure the common public and that is why mass culture has been handed over to the agencies of popular socialization, notably the public system of education and the mass media."[71] It is the image of one particular nation and the socialization arenas of history textbooks being examined in this study which have a bearing on how nationalism needs to invent itself and imagines its heroes and nemeses.

2.3 Collective Memory in Relation to National Identity

There are surprisingly few studies examining the relationship between memory and identity in the field of historical research and others. Allan Megill expresses his disappointment that the extensive historical literature on memory has failed so far to explore the relation between historical understanding and identity: identity itself is

[68] Smith 1998, 130–142.

[69] Anderson 1991, 9–36.

[70] Anderson 1991, 7.

[71] Smith 1991, 21.

taken as an unproblematic category. Megill criticizes Halbwachs's argument that memory is determined by an identity which is already well established.[72] For Halbwachs, identity precedes memory because social identities have already determined existence before the collective memories that they construct.

According to cultural theoretician Stuart Hall, an identity – whether collective or concerning a particular individual – has to be produced and constructed culturally.[73] Hall's views support what Megill has pointed out regarding the study of memory and identities. Hall emphasizes that we are not born with ready-equipped national identities. According to Hall, we should consider national cultures as discursive tools which represent differences as sameness and thus construct a seemingly unified identity. [74] The mechanism of defining sameness strives to portray a group with sporadic connections and dispersed as the same. On the other hand, it might present otherness as a contrast in order to define the borders of sameness. This mechanism is connected to the way cultural and national identities develop. Hall's thinking on identity highlights that there exists no such thing as a genuine cultural self. Identity is instead created as a part of representation systems producing cultural meanings.

Megill distinguished the history–memory–identity dialectic by stating that memory is not history's raw material, nor is history constructed as the sum of memories. According to him, memory is an image of the past constructed by subjectivity in the present. Memory is itself subjective and therefore might be irrational, inconsistent, deceptive and self-serving. Therefore, memory represents the domain of obscurity. Similarly, most identity statements are not true or false: they are self-designations born by the way how 'we' choose to name ourselves, how 'we' designate ourselves in language. In contrast, history as a discipline has an obligation to be objective although it cannot always live up to this ideal.[75]

Megill argues that there is an element of arbitrariness or contingency in identity. This is due to the fact that identity is constrained in some ways but in some

[72] Megill 1998.

[73] Hall 1999.

[74] Hall 1999, 54–56.

[75] Megill 1998, 41 –56

ways it is not. He argues that in the contemporary world in a relatively prosperous, media-saturated social context people have available to them multiple models of self-designation and images of the past. Therefore they are able, and even invited, to consider these models as possibilities of self-designation for themselves.[76]

Megill has argued the relation of memory in the formation of identity is more complex than Halbwachs's writings on collective memory suggests. Wulf Kasteiner points out that we are always a part of several mnemonic communities: collective memories exist on the level of families, professions, political generations, ethnic and regional groups, social classes and nations.[77] The self-designations which determine how individuals identify with different groups are in constant flux. This presents certain challenges regarding how to study the relation between memory and identity.

2.4 Textbooks as History Culture and Representations

History school education is a major arena where perceptions of history in the form of this narrative reach a large number of the population.[78] Textbooks in each country represent the national traditions of nation-specific historical research. Despite attempts to break away from the national pattern[79] the viewpoints of the national understanding do not always translate well into other countries. Within the framework of national education systems, history textbooks have an analogous impact on the type of nation formation described by Benedict Anderson in terms of the role of print press in the formation of nation consciousness. According to Anderson, communities are distinguished not by their falsity or genuineness but by the style in which they are imagined. The imagined nature of nation involves the

[76] Megill 1998.

[77] Kansteiner 2002, 188 –189.

[78] This study is inspired by the linguistic turn and post-modern theories. The idea behind this is the arbitrary nature of language, which leads to the recognition of the importance of studying history as a narrative. See Saussure 1960.

[79] See for example Defrance & Pfeil 2013 on the Franco-German textbook; Lässig & Strobel 2013 on the Polish-German textbook.

simultaneous experience of nation crystallizing through language.[80] Theoretically, this might happen with history school textbooks if the individuals of same generation are conditioned with history according to same narratives.

History textbooks have their background in academic historiography but they tend to popularize the results of academics than develop the findings of professional historians. History textbooks used in schools are part of a 'history culture' where the images of history are conveyed to the wider public. The term history culture, *Geschichtskultur*, emerged in the 1980's West Germany. It referred to ways of producing and using images of the past and how the past is "preserved" with a help of teaching in schools, museums, archives and exhibitions.[81] Jorma Kalela defines history culture as the forums where history is used.[82] Other items of history culture can be historical novels, BBC costume dramas or films about the Second World War. They have an impact how the wider audience perceives history.

According to Jörn Rüsen, the starting point of history culture is when history is put on the horizon, in which previously more separately operated areas and strategies of historical memory merge to form complex joint structures. Academic disciplines relating to specific subject areas, school teaching, the preservation of historical monuments, museums and other institutions are linked by mutual boundaries and manifestations of overarching common terms with the past to be examined and discussed. 'Historical culture' describes this collaborative and comprehensive project.[83]

Kalela distinguishes two representations of history: the official and the plebeian. Official interpretations are connected to the "national culture heritage" and can be found in the speeches of presidents and take can the form of public monuments. This official "channel" shapes our awareness of history. The plebeian forms of history is told and discussed by common people in their homes and on the

[80] Anderson 1991, 6. Anderson's concept of imagined communities and the Modernist school of nationalist represented by him and others have been much criticised. However, Anderson's claim is not, as sometimes mistakenly understood, that nations do not exist but that the focus should be on how they are imagined.

[81] Salmi 2001, 134.

[82] Kalela 2001, 21.

[83] Rüsen 1994.

streets; it is the living history among the local communities. These two sources of history influence each other constantly.[84] School history textbooks are related to the official level of history because history education of the young is a national question. However, textbooks also have a connection with the plebeian level because they affect the historical interpretations of the anonymous masses.

If we emphasize the importance of print culture and national languages, in a similar way school history textbooks function as an important arena where the national consciousness constructs its roots, triumphs and defeats. School history textbooks form a sphere of history culture, written in a national language which works as an institution of collective memory of that particular generation of pupils who are exposed to these particular textbooks. History has a special place in the formation of a national consciousness. History contributes to our understanding of ourselves as a group, defines our identity, and creates stories of ancestors, roots, triumphs and failures and explains where we come from – it identifies us with the past. There is a vast area of history culture where the notions shared by the public evolve and spread. One of these areas is the history taught in schools.

The academic interest in collective memory and textbooks as a form of history, expressed throughout this study, is connected with the study of history culture as well. According to Salmi, the study of history culture does not aim to fight against popular representations of history nor criticize the validity of historical interpretations which have been stated aloud in public. On the contrary, Salmi suggests that the interest in history culture could be the study of a wider history consciousness, which at the same time could help to reflect also the image research has about the past. [85]

2.5 Textbook Research and Analysis

The academic project connected to textbook research is by its nature multidisciplinary and conducted by scholars in several fields. In my study, I will follow the general guidelines for textbook analysis articulated by Falk Pingel's

[84] Kalela 2001, 18.

[85] Salmi 2001, 135.

UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook Research and Textbook Revision (2010). Pingel divides textbook analysis into didactic analysis and content analysis: the former explores the pedagogy behind the text, whereas the latter that examines the text itself.[86] As a historian, I am more interested in the text itself as representations of history more than the pedagogical aspect of the textbooks.[87]

Pingel describes textbook research as an academic discipline which aims to provide better insights into the interrelationships between the teaching of history, geography and civics and the prejudices and misconceptions in the everyday experiences of pupils as conveyed by the general political culture, to which mass media make an increasing contribution.[88] As we can see, the motivations behind various studies connected to textbook research are diverse. It is therefore difficult to speak about textbook research as a homogeneous academic discipline. As a symptom of this tendency, Eckhardt Fuchs acknowledges it would be more correct to speak of textbook-related research instead of textbook research because it exists in a wealth of diverse forms and lacks a common denominator for individual research projects[89].

Traditional textbook revision emerged after the Second World War by UNESCO's initiative which sought to "disarm" the portrayals of other countries and people as enemies. This initial phase lasted until the 1950's and was followed by the "classical" phase, which lasted until the 1970's. From the late 1970's onward textbook development went from "textbook revision" to "textbook "research."[90] In the world of trans-lateral and bilateral textbook revisions are the responsibility of supra-national institutions such as the United Nations, UNESCO and the Council of Europe.[91] Since the 1990's text-book research has sought to address textbook-related

[86] Pingel 2010, 31.

[87] There exist a number of studies that explores the history consciousness and didactics. See for example Ahonen 1998, Torsti 2003 and Šubrt & Pfeiferová 2010. They often use history textbooks and/or interviews of (former) pupils as their primary sources.

[88] Pingel 2010, 28.

[89] Fuchs 2011, 17.

[90] Stöber 2013, 26 –28.

[91] Lässig 2013, 2.

conflicts and the connection between history instruction and the hindering of understanding between (former) enemy groups or states.[92]

There have been a few initiatives to create joint textbook projects. The Franco-German joint textbook *Histoire/Geschichte: Europa und die Welt seit 1947/L'Europe et le monde depuis* 1945 was published in 2006. Its first volume was intended not only for German pupils learning French and French pupils learning German but also for pupils learning history in Germany at gymnasium or in France at a lyceé. The Franco-German textbook project sought to overcome national approaches and to pave a way for a hypothetical European textbook combining the perspectives of all EU member states.[93] Even though the Franco-German textbook was not a commercial success it established a model for similar projects. One of them is the German-Polish joint textbook, of which the first volume is due to be released in 2015 by the Polish publishing house Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne (WsiP) and the German publishing partner Universum Kommunikation + Medien AG[94].

Despite the few joint textbook projects, textbooks used in schools have sustained their nation-specific quality: textbooks are written and read primarily in their national context. The process of choosing and omitting, condensing, structuring, reducing and generalizing information for a textbook in most countries is authorized by the state. Ever since the emergence of the modern school system and the implementation of compulsory education, textbooks have been considered ideal instruments of forming collective identities.[95] History textbooks do not depict random events of world history but instead focus on elements which have been discussed and selected through discourse on national history culture and the educational requirements considered valuable within the framework of a nation-specific kaleidoscope.

Simone Lässig argues that textbooks do not only transport and convey pure data or neutral-value information but also contain clues as to what is considered

[92] Lässig 2013, 3–4.

[93] Defrance & Pfeil 2013, 52 –62.

[94] Lässig & Strobel 2013, 90 –91.

[95] Lässig 2013, 1.

"worth knowing" by societies or ruling elites. Lässig writes about textbooks as emitters of "canonized knowledge". Textbooks in subjects such as history do not only convey representations of specific regions, nations or groups; they also offer authoritative interpretations of the past, the present and the future in the given society and serves as both product and provider of a specific memory culture. In addition, they serve as central resources of identity construction via knowledge which is still primarily structured by the nation-state despite globalization tendencies.[96] Textbooks are not simply "delivery systems of facts" but the result of political, economic, social and cultural activities, battles and compromises. They are published within the political and economic constraints of markets. What they mean and how they are used are fought over by communities with distinctly different commitments and by teachers and students as well.[97]

Studying history textbooks enables one to unfold intertwined stereotypical images regarding how one's own nations as well as others are perceived. Pingel argues that history textbooks contain a self-image, which may be no less stereotyped than the perceptions they contain of countries other than they own. He suggests that this self-image may be identifiable directly but may also be discovered through the images and portrayals of others.[98] Consequently, textbook research and nationalism studies share a common ground when it comes to the question of how different national and ethnic groups are represented in schoolbooks. Pingel writes that we are exposed to an inextricable interrelation between two poles: "us" and "the other". Therefore the basic questions for textbook analysis with a view of international understanding are: How do we assess our own group? How do we assess other groups?[99]

Pingel suggests concepts of collective identity are often anchored in history and linked to a territory "owned" by the collective. [100] This is no wonder. With few exceptions, countries typically prepare the curriculum and textbooks in

[96] Lässig 2009, 3–4.

[97] Apple & Christian-Smith 1991, 1–2.

[98] Pingel 2010, 26.

[99] Pingel 2010, 37–39.

[100] Pingel 2010, 37 –39.

their national solemnity. Lässig points out that the textbooks and curricula in particular, which are not only state-approved but also of a highly condensed and selective nature, are obliged to reduce the complexities of the past, present, and future onto a limited number of pages.[101] Therefore, in the realm of textbook-related research, it is easy to see why the relationship between national identity and the other is an important research question to ask.

Pingel suggests a list of criteria for textbook analysis, which according to him, represents a minimum standard for textbook analysis.[102] However, Pingel's approach only gives general guidelines and does not form a specific method as such. I have selected from Pingel's list what he calls the "analysis of content" and "perspective of presentation". However, it is necessary to note that textbook analysis is too broad a field to be the foundation of any method. Therefore I will contemplate Pingel's general guidelines with the methodological support of content analysis in order to make sense of the vastness of the data formed by the textbooks analysed in this study.

[101] Lässig 2009.

[102] Pingel 2010, 71.

3. Methodology and Research Material

3.1 The Role of Method and Historical Research

In terms of methodology, the most basic "method" of historical research is critical reading, of which intention is to contextualise the source. Subsequently, historians have the tendency to dive into their sources without specifying their method. This does not necessarily affect the value and prominence of their study. On the contrary, it merely demonstrates the role of methodological discussions within historical research. The importance of sources cannot be underestimated. The importance of discussion regarding methodology comes somewhere behind this. Yet methodological questions and problems exist in historical research as well. These questions are intertwined with paradigmatic shifts in historiography. It is therefore difficult to separate methods in historical research from the achievements of historical theories.

John R. Hall expresses the view of the situation of methodology in historical research that historians have avoided a sterile formalization when it comes to methodology. Hall argues that constructing the overall domain of socio-historical research suggests a theoretical formalization of methodology. He writes that an overview of general historiography reveals distinct phases and shifts in style of historical inquiry, from Leopold von Ranke's early nineteenth century prospectus for a "scientific" history which would tell "what really happened," through Annales macrohistory, social history, the study of everyday life or microhistory; and with the linguistic turn in the late 20th century, to the flowering of cultural history.[103]

Historiographically speaking, my study relates to historiography after the linguistic turn and postmodern theories of history. I am not interested in "what really happened" but the way reality (history) is constructed. For this reason, I owe much of the historiographical and theoretical background to poststructuralist and postmodern theories.[104] However, method-wise they can only function as a perspective to approach the topic rather than a step-by-step method.

[103] Hall 2007, 93.

[104] See Iggers & Wang & Mukherjee, 2008, 301 –306; White 1973.

Borrowing from neighbouring disciplines has been warmly welcomed in historical research. Hall groups various inter-disciplinary academic projects or disciplines which have contributed to the convergence between history and social sciences (for example, historical-comparative sociology, social-science history economic history, historical social science, social history and world-systems analysis, historical anthropology) under the umbrella of "socio-historical inquiry"[105]. The interest of this thesis is the interconnection between national identity, collective memory and historical representation, which creates an orientation towards social science history. Hence, this thesis could be labelled what Hall terms socio-historical inquiry.

The methods of social research must fit in when regarding the bigger methodological picture of the thesis. However, the marriage between social sciences and historical research does not come without its fundamental disputes. Peter Burke distinguishes the difference between historical research and social science research as follows: Social science scholars such as sociologists are trained to notice or formulate general rules and often screen out the exceptions, whereas historians learn to attend to concrete detail at the expense of general patterns. [106]

In other words, historians study the particular and sociologists the general. According to Burke, history studies societies in the plural, placing emphasis on the difference between them and the changes which occurred within them over time, whereas sociology emphasizes generalisation on the structure and development of society.[107] The methodology of social research can serve as a methodological complement for my study, bearing in mind that the two disciplines (historical and social science research) differ from each other in terms of their epistemological intention. However, as the methodological framework of this thesis demonstrates, they may in fact be to a certain extend intertwined within one study.

[105] Hall 2007, 82.

[106] Burke 1992.

[107] Burke 1992.

3.2 On Comparative Approach

This thesis includes a qualitative content analysis where a comparative approach is used as the methodological basis. In other words, I am not simply analysing content x of the textbooks but content a, b, and c within the comparative framework: what are differences and similarities between a, b and c. The purpose is to break through the nation - or region-specific - gaze upon history by exposing the three different historiographical traditions – how Russian history is represented in schoolbooks in three European countries – symmetrically as objects of comparison. Therefore, one could make such a claim that the comparisons in this study function as a "method" of contextualising the sources (the sources being the textbooks).

Jürgen Kocka distinguishes four main purposes and function of comparison in historical research: heuristic, descriptive, analytical and paradigmatic. Firstly, Kocka argues the comparative approach allows one to heuristically identify questions and problems one might otherwise neglect. Secondly, the descriptive purpose is that historical comparison can help to clarify the profiles of single cases by contrasting them (or it) with others. [108]

In my study, comparisons provide heuristic and descriptive motivations for how to study representations of Russian history. I am interested in delineating nation-specific features and establishing whether there are any features which can be found in all of the cases. Kocka points out the ubiquitous nature of comparison in historical research. He argues that comparison pays a role even in the historical works which cannot be classified as comparative in the full sense of the word. Further, comparison both supports the notions of particularity and helps to challenge and modify these notions. [109]

Thirdly, Kocka identifies the analytical purpose of the comparative approach. Comparativeness can be indispensable for asking and answering causal questions. However, as Kocka notices, this involves a warning, because historians rarely "test hypotheses." There should always be a certain element of criticism when it comes to general causal explanations in historical research. Finally, there is the

[108] Kocka 2003, 39–44.

[109] Kocka 2003, 39–44.

paradigmatic function of the comparison. Kocka explains that comparisons help distance oneself slightly from the case that one knows the best, from "one's own history." [110]

In this study, for example, studying images of Russia in Finnish textbooks from the Finnish perspective would not necessarily answer the same questions when comparing textbooks alongside the Czech and Polish cases even if the research questions were similar. Comparison as a method arranges the constellation, possibly resulting in interesting outcomes which would not be otherwise accessible.

3.3 Choosing the Research Material: Role of Textbooks and Curriculum

My research material consists of 18 history textbooks published in the Czech Republic, Finland and Poland between the years 1993 and 2013 (six from each country). They are in use in upper secondary schools focusing on general education.[111] Some of the Czech textbooks may be used in vocational schools as well[112]. The Czech books are written in Czech, the Finnish books in Finnish and Polish books in Polish.[113] The chosen textbooks are widely available and distributed in all three countries. In Finland and Poland particularly, there is a relatively large amount of choice and competition between different textbook series and publishers in these countries.

In the Czech Republic the current curriculum has been in effect since the September 2007.[114] From the Czech Republic I have chosen six history textbooks

[110] Kocka 2003, 39–44.

[111] See the definition of ISCED 3 in the chapter 1.4.

[112] The reason for this is the scarcity of selection in terms of Czech textbook series. Most Czech textbooks are used for both general education and vocational upper secondary schools. In the Czech education context the difference regarding history education is quite large.

[113] I left out textbooks and history education conducted in other national languages (eg. Swedish in Finland) and minority languages. I also left out textbooks where other languages were used as the language of instruction (for example in bilingual schools).

[114] *Rámcový vzdělávací program pro gymnasia*, from this point forward *RVP G 2007*. In the Czech Republic I found that the oldest editions of history textbooks are still available and used widely. Textbook editions published in early 1990's have maintained their validity.

which are widely available for upper secondary institutions. [115] The emphasis is on textbooks published in the 2000s. I have also chosen one textbook published in the 1990s because it is widely available and still in use even though it is much older than those of Finland and Poland.[116]

Table I. Basic Information of the Czech Textbooks.

Author(s) Surname, name	Title of the book/Series in Original Language	Title of the book/Series Translated into English	Publisher	Publi-cation Year	Edi-tion	Abbre-viation [117]
Čapek, Vratislav	Světové dějiny II: Dějiny lidských civilizací od poloviny 17. století po současnost	World History II: History of Human Civilization from the mid-17. Century until Today	Fortuna	1993	1st	CZ1
Hlavačka, Milan & Čornej, Petr	Dějepis 3: Novověk	History 3. Modern Age	SPN – pedagogické nakladatelství	2001	1st	CZ2
Hroch, Miroslav	Dějiny novověku	History of the Modern Age	SPL – Práce / ALBRA	2002	4th	CZ3
Kuklík Jan & Kuklík, Jan & Čornej, Petr	Dějepis 4: Nejnovější dějiny.	History 4. The Newest History	SPN – pedagogické nakladatelství	2005	3rd	CZ4
Kuklík Jan & Kuklík, Jan	Dějiny 20. století	History of the 20th Century	SPL – Práce / ALBRA.	2000	3rd	CZ5
Kvaček, Robert	České dějiny II	Czech History II	SPL – Práce / ALBRA	2002	1st	CZ6

According to *RVP G 2007*, history as a school subject in the Czech Republic is part of the educational area labelled 'Man and society' ("Člověk a společnost"). This area has many objectives, such as developing and cultivating the awareness of personal, local, national, European and global identities ("rozvíjení a kultivaci vědomí osobní, lokální, národní, evropské i globální identity").[118] Within the timeframe of 1815–

[115] For example the writer of the Czech textbook *Dějiny novověku* is Miroslav Hroch an emeritus professor of history at the Charles University in Prague.

[116] During my inquiries – discussions with Czech pedagogical professionals and visits to bookstores – I did not find upper secondary school textbooks published in the 2010's.

[117] In the analysis chapters, I will use these abbreviations in the footnotes instead of the book titles.

[118] RVP G 2007.

1922 Russia is mentioned only briefly. The text examines the emergence of Russia as a European great power ("nástup Ruska jako evropské velmoci") and the establishment of Bolshevik power in Russia ("nastolením bolševické moci v Rusku").

In the Czech Republic, the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports publishes the list of textbooks and teaching texts. These are approved on the basis of an assessment as to whether they comply with educational objectives stipulated in the Education Ac, in the framework of education programmes and legal regulations. Schools may also use other textbooks and teaching texts unless they do not conform to educational objectives. A school head decides on the use of textbooks and teaching texts and pupils cover the cost themselves.[119]

In Finland the current core curriculum has been in effect since 2003.[120] The ministry of education is preparing a reform which will be implemented in 2016.[121] In Finnish textbooks, the main difference (compared to their Czech and Polish counterparts) is that they are not constructed by periodization or division between national and general history. Instead they employ the course-structured curriculum of Finnish general education in upper secondary schools.[122] Courses are divided thematically. One deals, for example, with international history and one with the cultural history of Europe. I have chosen books from two publishing houses, WSOY and Tammi. The series by WSOY is titled Muutosten maailma. The Tammi series is titled Corpus.

I have only chosen textbooks which are used in compulsory courses[123] – I Man, Environment and Culture (Ihminen, ympäristö ja kulttuuri), II The European (Eurooppalainen ihminen), III International Relations (Kansainväliset

[119] Eurydice: Czech Republic: Teaching Methods and Materials (2014). https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/eurydice/index.php/Czech-Republic:Teaching_and_Learning_in_Upper_Secondary_Education (Accessed 20.04.2014.)

[120] *Lukion opetussuunnitelman perusteet* 2003.

[121] OKM (The Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture) Lukiokoulutuksen kehittäminen. http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Koulutus/koulutuspolitiikka/Hankkeet/lukiokoulutus/ (Accessed 21.01.2014.)

[122] *Lukion opetussuunnitelman perusteet 2003:* Opintojen rakenne.

[123] *Lukion opetussuunnitelman perusteet 2003:* Historian pakolliset kurssit.

suhteet) and IV The Turning Points of Finnish History (Suomen historian käännekohtia).[124] The Tammi textbooks analysed are *Corpus I* (2008), *Corpus II* (2007), *Corpus III* (2008), *Corpus IV* (2009) and from WSOY, *Muutosten maailma 3* (2011) and *Muutosten maailma 4* (2012).[125]

Table II. Basic Information of Finnish Textbooks.

Author(s) Surname, name	Title of the book/Series in Original Language (the appreviation of the series title)	Title of the book/Series Translated into English	Pub-lisher	Publi-cation Year	Edi-tion	Ab-brevi-ation
Asiainen, Mikko & Marjomaa, Risto & Nurmiainen, Jouko & Väntänen, Niina & West, Pirjo	Corpus IV: Suomen historian käännekohtia	Corpus IV: Turning Points of Finnish History	Tammi	2009	1st	FI1
Hietaniemi, Tapani & Jussila, Matti & Marjomaa, Risto & Nurmiainen, Jouko & Väntänen, Niina & West, Pirjo	Corpus I: Ihminen, ympäristö ja kulttuuri	Corpus I: Man, Environment and Culture.	Tammi	2008	2nd	FI2
Heikkonen, Esko & Ojakoski, Matti & Väisänen, Jaakko.	Muutosten maailma 3: Kansainväliset suhteet	The World of Changes 3: International Relations	WSOYpro	2011	9. – 11.	FI3
Heikkonen, Esko & Ojakoski, Matti & Väisänen, Jaakko.	Muutosten maailma 4: Suomen historian käännekohtia	The World of Changes 4: Turning Points of Finnish History	Sanoma Pro	2012	12. – 14.	FI4
Jussila, Matti & Risto, Marjomaa & Nurmiainen, Jouko & Väntänen, Niina & West, Pirjo.	Corpus II: Euroop-palainen ihminen	Corpus II: European Man	Tammi	2007	1st	FI5
Jussila, Matti & Risto, Marjomaa & Nurmiainen, Jouko & Väntänen, Niina & West, Pirjo.	Corpus III: Kansainväliset suhteet	Corpus III: International Relations	Tammi	2008	1st	FI6

The Finnish curriculum, *Lukion opetussuunnitelman perusteet 2003*, sets similar ambitious objectives to its Czech equivalent. One of them is the goal that students

[124] Supplementary courses do not deal with themes connected to Russia within the specified timeframe.

[125] I decided not to involve *Muutosten maailma 1–2* in my study because they do not contain much material related to Russian history, and *Corpus 1&2* already cover courses 1 and 2.

understand the present is a result of historical development and the starting point of the future. The student is also encouraged to understand various cultures and their differences. Within the timeframe 1815 –1922 Russia is mentioned explicitly only in connection with the annexation of Finland to Russia and the emergence of Finnish autonomy. [126]

In Finland, teachers have the autonomy to decide teaching methods and materials such as books. However, their methods must be in accordance with school guidelines, and thus with the National Core Curriculum and relevant legislation. Teachers and education providers may utilise a national website, updated by the Finnish National Board of Education, which contains information and support for teaching, such as online learning material.[127]

In Poland, a new core curriculum took effect in secondary schools in September 2012. One purpose of the reform was to increase the amount of history classes in the curriculum.[128] Polish upper secondary school textbooks are divided into two levels: the basic level ("zakres podstawowy") and the extended level ("zakres rozszerzony"). I have chosen books from these both categories.

Poznać przeszłość. Ojczysty Panteon i ojczyste spory (2013) from Nowa Era is a textbook designed for supplementary course of history and society. It is included in my study because it both follows a historical narrative and constructs the past of Polish nation. In terms of analysis it is one of the most interesting textbooks in this study.[129] In the Polish National Curriculum historical and civic education forms one entity [130] ("Edukacja historyczna i obywatelska").[131]

[126] *Lukion opetussuunnitelman perusteet* 2003.

[127] Eurydice: Finland: Teaching methods and materials (2014). https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/eurydice/index.php/Finland:Teaching_and_Learning_in_General_Upper_Secondary_Education (Accessed 20.04.2014.)

[128] MEN (The Polish Ministry of Education) 2012. *Informacja Ministerstwa Edukacji Narodowej dotycząca nauczania historii w liceach ogólnokształcących.* (Accessed: 4.8.2013.)

[129] It was also the newest textbook I was able to acquire.

[130] There are similar aims of history and civic education in all three countries. For example, in the Czech national curriculum the school subjects of History and Basics of Civics and Social Sciences belong to the same educational area "Man and Society." In Finland, history and civic education (yhteiskuntaoppi) are separate subjects but were taught together until 2002. Valtioneuvoston asetus lukiolaissa tarkoitetun koulutuksen yleisistä valtakunnallisista tavoitteista ja tuntijaosta, 14.11.2002/955.

Table III. Basic Information of Polish Textbooks.

Author(s) Surname, name	Title of the book/Series in Original Language	Title of the book/Series Translated into English	Pub-lisher	Publi-cation Year	Edi-tion	Level	Abbrevi-ation
Burda, Bogumila & Halczak, Bohdan & Jósefiak, Roman Maciej	Historia 3. Historia najnowsza.	History 3: The Newest History	Operon	2005/ 2012	5th	Extended	PL1
Dolecki, Rafał & Gutowski, Krzysztof, & Smoleński, Jędrzej	Po prostu historia.	Simply History	WSiP	2012	1st	Basic	PL2
Maćkowski, Tomasz	Poznać przeszłość: Ojczysty Panteon i ojczyste spory	Know the Past: Native Pantheon and Native Disputes	Nowa Era	2013	1st	Extended	PL3
Roszak, Stanisław & Kłaczkow, Jarosław	Poznać przeszłość: Wiek XX.	Know the Past: The 20th Century	Nowa Era	2012	1st	Basic	PL4
Śniegocki, Robert. Kaminski, Marek	Historia od kongresu wiedeńskiego do I wojny światowej	History from the Vienna Congress to the First World War	Nowa era	2010	8th	Extended	PL5
Ustrzycki, Janusz	Ciekawi świata historia	The Remarkable World of History	Operon	2012	1st	Basic	PL6

The Polish national curriculum does not explicitly refer to Russia until the beginning of the First World War. Students are instead expected to be familiar with the main principles of the Congress of Vienna and, most importantly, its decision regarding the Polish question. The curriculum emphasizes the importance of Polish history after the Congress of Vienna. Students are expected to know the new borders of the partitioned territories, to be able to characterize the structure of the Polish Kingdom and evaluate the accomplishments of the Polish Kingdom in the spheres of economy,

[131] *Podstawa programowa z komentarzami. Tom 4. Edukacja historyczna i obywatelska w szkole podstawowej, gimnazjum i liceum historia i społeczeństwo* (2012).

culture and education. Furthermore, students are expected to be familiar with the Polish national uprisings, to situate when and where the November Uprising and January Uprising took place, give reasons and compare the course and character of the uprisings, distinguish between direct and long-term consequences of rebellious movements, characterize the main currents and forms of the Great Emigration.[132]

Russia is present in the curriculum only implicitly in the role of "państwa zaborcze", the possessive countries. This term in Polish historiography refers to Prussia, Austro-Hungary and Russia; the countries responsible for the partitioning of Poland and taking over the Polish territory. Students are expected to know about life under occupation, to explain the objectives and describe the methods of action against the aggressors, characterize and evaluate the diverse attitudes of society towards possessive countries, compare living conditions during the three partitions in the second half of the nineteenth century, take into account opportunities for social activities and the development of national training and show the main currents of political life under occupation at the end nineteenth century. [133]

The national curriculum emphasizes the Polish national agenda in breath-taking quantity. Only in the beginning of the 20th century does the curriculum refer to Russia; again after the rise of the conflict between "the great powers" and the outbreak out of the First World War and the Russian Revolution in 1917.[134]

In Poland, teachers can choose textbooks from a list approved by the ministry. They are free to decide what teaching and assessment methods to use, to introduce new teaching methods and to choose curricula which are approved by the school head. They can also develop their own curricula – based on core curricula – and submit them to the school head for approval.[135]

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[132] *Podstawa programowa z komentarzami. Tom 4. Edukacja historyczna i obywatelska w szkole podstawowej, gimnazjum i liceum historia i społeczeństwo* (2012).

[133] *Podstawa programowa z komentarzami. Tom 4. Edukacja historyczna i obywatelska w szkole podstawowej, gimnazjum i liceum historia i społeczeństwo* (2012).

[134] *Podstawa programowa z komentarzami. Tom 4. Edukacja historyczna i obywatelska w szkole podstawowej, gimnazjum i liceum historia i społeczeństwo* (2012).

[135] FRCE & Eurydice (2014). The System of Education in Poland in Brief. March 2014. http://www.eurydice.org.pl/sites/eurydice.org.pl/files/Sheet_EN_2014final.pdf (Accessed 20.04.2014.)

3.4 Qualitative Content Analysis

According to Bruce L. Berg, content analysis consists of applying an objective coding scheme to the data. In order to conduct an analysis of the content, a criterion of selection has to be set before an actual analysis of the data. [136] I will use content analysis in my study as a technique to identify and organize my research material as the basis of qualitative analysis. I do not treat content analysis as quantitative method[137] but what Berg calls "a passport to listening to the words of the text and understanding better the perspective(s) of the producer of these texts." For Berg, data analysis should be organized according to certain content elements. It should also consider the literal words in the text being analysed, including the manner in which these text are presented.[138] In my study, content analysis will provide a strategy to assess the textbooks.

Berg implies the categories that researchers use in content analysis can be determined inductively or deductively. In the deductive approach, documents offer a means for assessing a hypothesis deriving the categorical scheme of the analysis from the theoretical perspective.[139] However, this will not entirely be the case in my study; the role of methodology in historical research and historians' unwillingness to jump into testing hypotheses was mentioned earlier.

Conducting a material-based study where questions emerge in the materials themselves will require the kind of emphasis an inductive methodological approach can provide. Berg writes that a great reliance on induction is necessary if we want to present in a most forthright manner the perceptions pronounced in the texts. However, as Berg point out, in many circumstances, the relationship between a theoretical perspective and certain messages involves both inductive and deductive approaches.[140] Therefore I cannot neglect the deductive approach completely.

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[136] Berg 2001, 238 –267.

[137] For views supporting the quantitative nature of content analysis see Silverman 1993.

[138] Berg 2001, 242.

[139] Berg 2001, 245 –246.

[140] Berg 2001, 245 –246.

Berg distinguishes in content analysis two processes which interact with each other: specification of the basic content elements being examined and application of explicit rules for identifying and recording these elements. The categories into which the researcher codes content items vary according to the research and data. The smallest element of content analysis and other elements may be themes, paragraphs, concepts and such. [141] In my study, the aim is to construct a typological scheme containing the different categories found in the textbooks. As Berg points out, the categories which emerge in the course of developing the criteria of analysis should reflect all aspects of the messages and retain, as much as possible, the exact wording used in the statements.[142]

3.5 Coding Scheme

In order to make a qualitative analysis of the content of these textbooks, I will conduct a systematic content analysis. My basic content elements are sections (or sub-chapters) with a reference to Russia. These sections either narrate Russian history or contain at least a passing reference to Russia as a country or its people who might be actors represented as Russians; for example the Tsar, government officials, the army, politicians, or people of science and culture. References to Russia indicate the location of the main content elements – the sections being analyzed. Textbook sections are usually sub-chapters of a larger chapter and are companied by a title.[143] Sections containing one or several mentions of Russia are the objects of my analysis. This is because one section often forms a thematic entity. It would therefore be difficult to differentiate single sentence-level references because the text constitutes a single entity.

I organize sections referring to Russia according to the perspective it follows. I found in the material three alternative perspectives: the general perspective (often Eurocentric), the national perspective and a Russian-related perspective. In

[141] Berg 2001, 246–248.

[142] Berg 2001, 241.

[143] Or other visual elements marking the beginning of a new section. For example, the first words of a section could be in capital letters.

most cases I interpret the perspective based on the section as whole without taking into consideration what the perspective of the whole chapter possible would be. Only in rare cases where the perspective is ambiguous do I examine the context of the main section. In this case the perspective of the main chapter decides the perspective for the section as well.[144]

The content analysis seeks to examine qualitatively whether images of Russia contain biased perceptions. The question is whether representations of Russian history are connected with confrontations with national narratives or any kind of manifestations of self-image. Ultimately, I will analyse whether there are nationalistic ideologies behind these textbook representations. Van Dijk notes that ideologies are the basis of social representations shared by members of a group. According to him, ideologies allow people as group members to organise the multitude of social beliefs about what is good or bad, right or wrong, for them, and to act accordingly.[145] Van Dijk distinguishes four means in the strategy of ideological communication:

1. expressing/emphasizing positive information about "us",
2. expressing/emphasizing negative information about "them",
3. suppressing/deemphasizing positive information about "them",
4. suppressing/deemphasizing negative information about "us"[146]

In terms of communication strategy, the biased image of Russia is connected to Van Dijk's definition of numbers 2 & 3 i.e., expressing / emphasizing negative information about "them" and suppressing / deemphasizing positive information about "them". However, if references to Russia relate to communications strategies 1 & 4 as well; i.e., expressing / emphasizing positive information about "us" and suppressing/deemphasizing negative information about "us" I will take these into

[144] This occurred in some sections covering the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. If the main chapter was about international relations I interpret the perspective of the section dealing with the Russo-Japanese War rather than Russia in general. However, if the main chapter was about Russia from a Russian perspective and the Russo-Japanese seems to form only a sub-plot, I interpret the perspective as Russian.

[145] Van Dijk, 1998.

[146] Van Dijk, 1998

account as well. This is only the case where sections containing reference to Russia have an interconnection with the construction of national identity.

By looking at communication strategies in each section I will determine whether they contain positive or negative biases. If I do not find any bias I will classify the section as neutral. In order to be neutral, the section had to be written using language lacking in judgmental assessments containing expressions which explicitly or implicitly show Russia in a positive or negative light. These sections meet the ideal of objectivity instead of promoting a specific view. Neutral sections express their views in a manner which leads to a balanced interpretation: no single opinion is raised above others.

I will categorize the bias as negative when the section creates explicitly or implicitly a negative image of Russia or actors represented as Russians. Negative bias uses nouns, adjectives, verbs that imply negative behaviour and actions of Russia and Russians. It is important to note that it is possible to describe bad things in a neutral way. Therefore a negative bias requires an emphasis of the narrative and language supporting this view.

Conversely, I will categorize the bias as positive if explicit or implicit words of praise that pronounce positive perceptions about or use Russia as a positive example are found. Nevertheless, positive images in the textbooks seem rare. Usually, positive images are encountered in connection to the cultural sphere: Textbooks often refer to canonized classics using positive superlatives (the greatest, the most famous, the most original, a founder of something valuable and so one) are in this connection is very typical for art discourse. The bias also defines whether the image of Russia is hostile or friendly or whether Russia seen as an enemy or as a friend.

It is possible for good or bad things to be narrated without bias. If textbooks report there was a war between Poland and Russia, a negative bias is not necessary. However, if a textbook expresses the views of Poles who are afraid of Russia or Poles showing hatred towards Russia, the situation changes: the perspective is from a Polish point of view. The narration guides the reader to interpret Russia in a negative light through identification with Poland in opposition to Russia. In other words, negative images require an explicit articulation that Russia is considered dangerous or harmful. The focus is in the identificatory enunciations of

the image. For example, it is not negative to describe conflicts between Finns and Russian nationalists during Tsar Alexander III's reign. An example of a negative image is: "Finland was driven into the hands of Russian nationalists." The literal translation refers to 'teeth' instead of 'hands,' which has a connotation that Finland was tormented by Russian nationalists. "Suomi joutui venäläisten nationalistien hampaisiin Aleksanteri III: n noustua valtaan 1881."[147]

If historical evidence is used to support views which uphold the grudge between the nation in question and Russia, the issue is interpreted as portraying Russia in a negative light. Once again, reporting that relations have been bad is not enough. There needs to be more elements which orient the reader towards the identification of negative sentiments between "us" as Finns, Poles and Czechs and Russia as "them." The line between neutral, negative and positive images is not always easy to determine. One such example is a description of a Bolshevik propaganda poster from 1920. While ambiguous, it nevertheless implies a more negative than neutral point of view. The poster depicts a Polish soldier as a drooling inbred Bulldog. The texts on the posters are in Russian. The description follows below:

> Bolshevik poster "The Honourable [Jaśnie wielmożna] Poland – the last dog of Entente" was supposed to convince workers and peasants that the intentions of the Polish state were hostile. Noble clothes symbolized Polish imperial plans in the East. The slogan was: "Polish masters [panowie] want to supress the Russian workers and peasants. Death to the Honourable masters!"[148]

Despite being a historical source this poster is not neutral because of its strong negative bias towards the newly founded Polish state. The poster itself has a powerful visual message which reinforces the negativity it conveys.[149] This negative message can also be oriented towards Polishness as such beyond the reference point of specific historical events. In the realm of collective memory this poster is enough

[147] FI4* 2012, 57. From here on, information about the perspective (N=National, G=General, R=Russian) and theme of the chapter in question will be available in the parenthesis: (N: the Autonomy is Questioned, the Autonomy under a Threat). *For the abbreviations see chapter 3.3.

[148] PL4 2012, 77 (N: the Battle of Warsaw)

[149] More about the visual side of the textbooks in LaSpina 1998.

to turn this particular image of (Soviet) Russia into a negative one. At the end of the day, the final interpretation whether the section is neutral or biased is subjective. The interpreter of these biases is connected to the shared perceptions of good and bad in one's time and culture.

Findings are presented in two tables which detail each book (see tables IV–V). The tables demonstrate the frequency of biased references and perspectives. According to these tables, it is possible to see which perspective is more prominent overall. In addition, I present in the appendices 3–5, which themes contextualize the image of Russia in Czech, Finnish and Polish historical memory. In some sections Russia is only mentioned in passing, while others are devoted to talking about Russia exclusively. The actual amount of explicitly pronounced signifiers relating to Russia is less important than the biases, perspectives and themes, which tell more about the overall emphasis of the sections.

The purpose of categorizing these sections as neutral or biased is to find equivalent indicators across the various textbooks which can be examined comparatively. The coding scheme offers just the starting point for the qualitative analysis of the different images of Russia found in history textbooks and the realm of collective memory.

4 Images of Empire

4.1 Frequency of Perspectives and Enemy/Friend Biases

Having analysed whether the textbooks contain neutral or biased notions of Russia, the results were predictable. Giving Finland's (the Grand Duchy of Finland) and Poland's (Congress Poland or the Kingdom of Poland) controversial status in the Russian Empire, contemporary Finnish and Polish textbooks contain notable amounts of negative bias; however, in their defence, the majority of the analysed material can be classified as neutral.

Around 28% of the analysed Finnish content contained negative bias, while around 20% of the Polish content contained negative bias. On the contrast, the analysed material in Czech textbooks contained hardly at all negative bias; only 3%. Czech textbooks were also the most neutral, at 91%. Finnish textbooks were 68% neutral and Polish textbooks were 77% neutral. Czech also textbooks contained more positive bias (6%) than Finnish textbooks (4%) and Polish textbooks (3%).

Finnish and Polish textbooks were also more inclined to see Russian history from the perspective of their own nation. In these cases Russian appearances in the text were most often motivated by national developments, with the nation positioned against Russia. In Finnish textbooks 61% of the sections mentioning Russia were narrated from the Finnish perspective. In the Polish textbooks the number is similar, at 59%. In Czech textbooks this scenario was very rare; only 9%. In Czech textbooks Russia appeared most often (63%) in the context of international relations and development. This general perspective was present in 25% of the Polish texts and 27% in the Finnish texts. The Czech textbooks were most willing to use Russia's own perspective as the narrative emphasis, this perspective occurred in 28% of the sections. In Polish and Finnish textbooks this perspective was less frequent: Polish textbooks used it 16% and Finnish 12%.

Table IV. Perspective in Czech, Finnish and Polish Textbooks Altogether[150]



Table V. Bias in Czech, Finnish and Polish Textbooks Altogether[151]



The Polish and Finnish textbooks were prone to view Russia in a negative light when coming to their own nation. In Polish textbooks 26 out of 34 negative mentions were from the perspective of their own nation. In Finnish textbooks the number is even

[150] Percentage of all Czech, Finnish or Polish textbooks. See appendix 2 for absolute numbers.

[151] Percentage of all Czech, Finnish or Polish textbooks. See appendix 2 for absolute numbers.

higher, with 40 out of 50 negative references. However, on cannot necessarily conclude that Finnish textbooks are more negatively biased in terms of the national perspective because Polish textbooks lacked the positive bias related to their own nation. Finnish textbooks, on the other hand, had 3 out of 7 positive references. Altogether there were clear patterns, of which the most visible were that Finnish and Polish textbooks emphasized the national perspective whereas Czech textbooks emphasized the general perspective. In addition, Czech textbooks saw Russia from the most neutral perspective. Finnish and Polish textbooks were frequently neutral even though they also contained a remarkable amount of negative bias.

4.2 Image of Great Power between Traditions and Reforms 1815 –1917

The image of Tsarist Russia as a great European power (Czech: velmoc; Finnish: suurvalta, Polish: mocarstwo) is shared by Czech, Finnish and Polish textbooks. This image is connected to the descriptions of the Russian Empire as one of the participants in the Vienna Congress in 1815 and a member of the Holy Alliance. In the analysed textbooks, the Vienna Congress and its consequences are narrated from a general perspective. Generally speaking, there is no contradiction between the national perspective and the role of the Russian Empire in the international arena.

The following example in a Czech textbook represents a typically neutral style of writing regarding the Vienna Congress:

> The countries that were victorious over Napoleon, most importantly Russia, Prussia, Austria and Great Britain, tried to return the pre-1792 borders of France and strengthen their own power by gaining new territory. [152]

Significantly, in the one of the Finnish textbooks the narrative does not stay neutral when describing territorial changes in post-Napoleonic Wars Europe. In the following example, territorial changes regarding Finland are seen as unjust whereas the territorial changes affecting the Polish Kingdom are reported in a neutral manner:

> Russia retained Finland, which it had seized from the Swedes regardless of the fact that Sweden was also on the winning side of the war. [...] In addition,

[152] CZ2 2001, 58 (G: Vienna Congress); for coding see footnote 145.

> the Polish Kingdom was to be ruled by the Russian Tsar. Poland lost thus its independence. [153]

As we can notice, the tone in these two descriptions of territorial changes is quite different event though they occur in the same section. Finland was not *given* to Russia but Russia *seized* Finland from Sweden. The section implies also that this action was unjust ("regardless of the fact"). Naturally, the territorial change regarding Finland contains much more emotional meaning from the viewpoint of the Finnish nation and therefore the tone is different. When it comes to representation of historical events these kinds of shifts in narrative tone are inevitable if closer attention is paid

Despite this one example, the narration of Russia's role in the Vienna Congress is otherwise very similar in all textbooks. In the Czech textbooks, Russia appears in the 19th century most often in the context of general Eurocentric developments and international relations. In this sense, the image of Russia is not far from the image of other great European powers such as France and Great Britain. However, the image of Russia is portrayed as more backward, especially in sections narrated from Russia's point of view, owing to the regime's occasional unwillingness to implement reforms. In the following Czech example we see how the ambiguity is narrated between traditional values and voices calling for reform:

> After the Napoleonic Wars, it was obvious that Russia had become a great European power. Likewise, strong tsarist absolutism reigned in Russia. However, young aristocratic officers, who during the war with Napoleon had gone to France and then returned home, did not agree with the tsarist government. After returning home, they compared the domestic political situation to the situation in Europe. In their opinion, establishing secret societies with violent efforts to overthrow the Tsar was the way to change the country.[154]

The textbooks convey an image of a nineteenth century Russia ruled by stern Tsarist absolutism. However, strict measures produce resistance among certain strata of the Russian society. As a consequence, secret societies emerge. Czech, Finnish and Polish textbooks all mention the Decembrist revolt in 1825 as an event connected to

[153] FI6 2008, 10–11 (G: Vienna Congress)

[154] CZ2 2001, 73 (R: Tsarist Power in Russia)

this development. Finnish and Polish national movements found anti-Tsarist attitudes coincided with the aims of Finnish and Polish national movements[155].

What the Czech, Finnish and Polish textbooks have in common is the recognition of Russia's status as a great European (sometimes Eurasian) power, which is to a certain extent comparable to Western Europe. As Czech textbook states: "Russia was a great European and Asian power."[156] However, this image portrays Russia as an empire between two poles: at the same time there is elite keeping up with the latest fashion of Paris while the rural population lives in primitive conditions. Above all of this is the Tsar who rules with an iron fist. In Finnish textbooks the image of the Tsars shifts between a fair and just reformer and a despotic ruler, depending on his attitude toward Finnish privileges. Tsar Alexander I is seen in more positive light because he gave Finland its autonomy. The image of Nicholas I and Nicholas II is more hostile due to their Russification policies. In Polish textbooks, Tsarist governance in general is seen in a negative light.

Another nineteenth century event narrated similarly (equivalent of the descriptions of the Vienna Congress) is the Crimean war. The following Polish example is a typical narration of these events:

> Military action was carried out from the Baltic Sea to the Far East, but the most severe battles took place on the Crimean Peninsula, and therefore the war is called the Crimean War. The British, French, Turkish and Piedmontese were present in the Crimea and took part in the siege of the Sevastopol fortress. [157]

One Czech example presents the results of the Crimean war for Russia in the following manner:

> Russia lost the war and lost a decisive influence on the Balkan Peninsula and control of the Black Sea.[158]

This interpretation of the causes of the Crimean War and the actual events are very similar in Czech, Finnish and Polish textbooks. Let us, for the sake of drawing an

[155] I will deal with this question more closely in the chapter 5.1.

[156] CZ2 2001, 132 (R: Russian Multiethnic Empire)

[157] PL5 2010, 102 (G: Crimean War)

[158] CZ2 2001, 104 (G: Crimean War)

interesting comparison, quote an example appearing in a Finnish textbook:

> The Crimean War revealed that even though Russia had been considered one of the strongest military powers in Europe it was far less developed than the other great powers. Russia's infantry and artillery weapons were a lot worse compared to the Western countries. Also, the Russian fleet turned out to be old-fashioned. Russia was able to perform against the Ottomans but the French and British steamships were far more superior to the Russian. [159]

As we can see, this textbook seems to be very keen to observe Russia's weaknesses in detail. However, this does not necessarily imply an enjoyment of describing Russia as weak. A more plausible explanation is that this topic is more close to Finnish interests. Therefore, the Russian military power is scrutinized in a more detailed manner.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 is also treated in a similar manner in textbooks from all three countries. Again a result of this war is Russia losing its influence. However, in a Finnish textbook there is one surprisingly positive image of Russia in the form of a description of the Russo-Japanese War written by the Finnish magazine *Kyläkirjaston Kuvalehti*.

> [Stepan] Makarov was a frequently seen visitor in Helsinki, Hanko and Mariehamn. He was well educated, lovable and respectable, which brought him friends among the Finns. He sailed to East Asia with the highest hopes but these hopes crashed soon dreadfully. The Japanese managed to blow up the Makarov's gallant battleship Petropavlovsk in the harbour of Port Arthur and in a few minutes the ship sank with its crew under the waves of the ocean. [160]

In this case, the sympathy conveyed by this text, published originally during the war in 1904, is on the side of the Russian troops. Russian Navy Commander Stepan Makarov is portrayed as a sympathetic hero, his battleship Petropavlovsk as magnificent.

Once again the differences are not significant in textbooks dealing with Russia's role in the Great War (the First World War). The textbooks see the causes of the war and its results very similarly. However, this is just an international and general perspective. The differences emerge in the sphere of national perspectives. In

[159] FI6 2008, 19 (G: Crimean War)

[160] FI3 2011, 32 (R: Russo-Japanese War)

the next chapter I will analyse how Finnish and Polish textbook convey images of nineteenth century Russia where Russia is portrayed as a brutal and oppressive ruler. This kind of negative image appears only in the Finnish and Polish textbooks. In the Czech textbooks this type of image does not appear.[161]

4.3 Finnish and Polish Images of Repression and Russification 1815 –1917

An overview of Finnish and Polish textbooks suggests the period starting in the beginning of the 19th century and ending with the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922 is full of contradictions from the national perspective. Images of confrontation stem from the clash between images of Russia as ruler and the perspective of nations struggling to be free of rule by the other. This constructs a negative image which can be connected to fears and suspicion arising among various strata of Finnish and Polish society. Finns and Poles beings subjects of the Russian Empire, and the Finnish and Polish national agenda being confronted by Russian authorities.

In Finland this translates into a question of whether to acquiesce or fight against Russian authorities.[162] At the core of this conflict is the question of the interpretation of the autonomy. Correspondingly, with Poles the litmus test is the status of the constitution:

> It quickly turned out for Alexander I that the constitution had a different meaning than for the Poles.[163]

In both cases opposition legal and illegal movements emerged. Finnish efforts in this regard were less intensive due a political hesitation between consent and opposition. With Poles, the opposition to Russia manifested itself more concretely.

In the Polish case, the opposition was both illegal and legal and culminates in an armed struggle in the form of uprisings. Similarly, various excerpts in Finnish textbooks describe the clashes between the Finnish national agenda and

[161] See the frequency and distribution of positive and negative images in the chapter 4.1 and in the appendix 2.

[162] For example FI1 2009, 69 (N: Conciliation or Resistance)

[163] PL5 2010, 45 (N: the Constitution in the Kingdom of Poland)

authorities, which was a concern among the Finnish population. The following Finnish example describes how the hopeful antipathy of the first years of Autonomy turns into suspicion, even hatred:

> The amount of [Finnish] people who were interested in maintaining autonomy grew larger. Trust in the Tsar began to transform into hostility toward the "Ruskie's tsar" ["ryssäntsaari"].[164]

The above image of Russia is negative from the viewpoint of the national polity because it evolves into seeing Russia as a threat. However, the confrontation is described as reciprocal because the Russians are also described as critical of the privileges enjoyed by Finns. Here is one example that of tightening attitudes in Russia towards Finnish nationality: "There was a growing concern in Finland because of the increasingly stricter attitudes among Russians."[165] Yet another example of the attitudes among Russians toward Finns: "Many Russians held an opinion that Finns had gained too many privileges."[166]

Both Finnish and Polish textbooks use 'repression' as synonymous (Finnish: sorto, Polish: repsesja) with Russification policies. The following example demonstrates how Polish textbooks present the word 'repression' in the context of Russification:

> In the late nineteenth century, the Russian authorities conducted a policy of repression and Russification against Poles. From the time of the January uprising, governments and the police force censored and prohibited any political activities and finally liquidated the political separateness of the Polish Kingdom, as evidenced by the renaming of Polish territories – Kraj Przywiślański [or in Polish Kraj Nadwiślański, in English the Vistula Land, in Russian Привислинский край, Privislinsky krai]. [167]

And another example in a Polish textbook where repression and Russification are associated with each other:

> After the collapse of the January Uprising, Russians renamed the Kingdom of Poland as Kraj Przywiślański and significantly reduced the autonomy of its inhabitants within the framework of the repression. That was followed by a

[164] FI1 2009, 67(R: the Empire in Crisis)

[165] FI1 2009, 69 (N: Conciliation or Resistance)

[166] FI1 2009, 65 (N: Criticism Against the Finnish Privileges)

[167] PL5 2010, 117 –118 (N: Russification Policy)

> period of intense Russification in the field of administration and education. In this way, the tsarist authorities planned to blend the Polish lands into the Russian Empire as soon as possible.[168]

In Finnish textbooks, periodization is defined by oppression. Periods of time are broken down into "the first period of oppression" and "the second period of oppression". In the following example, Finland is portrayed as victim of the repressive forces of Russification: "Finland was driven into the second period of oppression."[169]

As the previous examples indicate, Finnish history textbooks periodize Finnish history according to "periods of repression" (Finnish: ensimmäinen sortokausi; toinen sortokausi) while Polish textbooks periodize Polish history according to Polish uprisings. The most significant Polish revolts which took place against the Russian Empire are considered the November Uprising 1830-1831 (Polish: Powstanie listopadowe) and the January Uprising 1863 (Polish: Powstanie styczniowe).

In this Polish example, the contradiction between Russian authorities and Polish national resistance is apparent:

> For the Russians, the most dangerous were the conspiracies of opposition groups such as the National Freemasonry founded in 1819 on the initiative of Major Valerian Łukasiński. The aim of these activities was to deepen the Łukasiński organization's feelings of defending the principles of the constitution, and forcing the tsar to realize the promises to extended areas of the Kingdom.[170]

Finnish and Polish textbooks portray life under the rule of tsarist Russia as ominous, intimidating and threatening – vulnerable to hostile Russian intentions. Life was hard for Finns and Poles under Russification, especially when they had aspirations of national sovereignty.

In the Finnish textbooks, the illegal opposition is not emphasized as strongly as in the Polish textbooks. However, the assassination of the Governor-General of Finland, Nikolay Bobrikov, holds a similar meaning. In one Finnish

[168] PL4 2012, 8 (N: Russification and Germanization)

[169] FI4 2012, 69 (N: the Second Period of Oppression)

[170] PL5 2010, 47 (N: Illegal Opposition)

textbook, Bobrikov is even referred to as "the dictator of Finland."[171] However, by the same token, Finnish activists perpetrating anarchist acts are referred to as "terrorists."[172]

In the Polish case, Russification and repression resulted in a wave of emigration. In Polish historiography, emigration from the Polish Kingdom after the January Uprising is known as the Great Emigration:

> Participants in the uprising who escaped captivity had to emigrate from the country, for their participation meant repression under the Russian authorities. Approximately 50 thousand soldiers and civilians went to Prussia and Austria, of which only some returned to the Polish Kingdom. Another 7-10, 000 refugees went to Western Europe. Most of them went to France; much less to the UK, Belgium and Switzerland. Outstanding people of politics, culture and science as well as the military left the country. This has been called as the Great Emigration.[173]

In Polish collective memory, images of Russia as oppressor are very powerful. According to the national narrative, Poles stood up, fought for their freedom but failed, forcing some to flee the country. This confrontation has a huge effect on the Polish image of 19th century Russia. However, Russia is not the only oppressor from the Polish point of view. Prussian policies of Germanization are also presented as threatening. In the following example a Polish textbook describes both Germanization in Prussian and Austrian Poland and Russification in Russian Poland:

> Germanization swept through Prussian Poland [the Prussian side of the partitioned Poland] and Austrian Poland during the first half of the 19th century, with Russification occurring in Russian Poland. In addition, the governments of the partitioning powers attempted to weaken Polish initiatives in the economy. The Poles not only had to resist the actions imposed on them by the authorities of the occupying powers, but also to build a strong national identity in order to defend Poland's traditions and common interests. [174]

Polish collective memory therefore sees both German (most importantly Prussian but also to a certain extent Austrian) and Russian rule is a threat to the Polish nation.

[171] FI1 2009, 70 (N: Bobrikov)

[172] FI1 2009, 82 (N: Finnish Terrorists)

[173] PL3 2013, 107 (N: Great Emigration)

[174] PL3 2013, 117 (N: Polish National Consciousness, Germanization and Russification policy)

Correspondingly, it is only Russia that is seen as a threat in Finnish collective memory.

The perspective of Russian as a threat does not appear in Czech textbooks because the Russian Empire was not connected to the every-day life of the Czech people. Russia is perceived positively to a certain extent because of an emerging Slavonic consciousness in Czech lands against the influence of German culture within the Habsburg Empire. Czech textbooks do not root Russia's image in the grand narrative of their nation. This is not surprising because Czechs were not part of the Russian Empire. Rather, they were part of the Habsburg Empire. Czech textbooks differ from Finnish and Polish textbooks in this regard, where Russia is seen as a part of the story of ”us” as a nation and the enemy image of ”them” who threaten the existence of the nation.

These textbook examples demonstrate that Finns and Poles have collectively constructed Russian history through identificatory determination contrasted with national struggles against the outside other. The image of Russia in Finnish and Polish textbooks is negotiated under the pressure of Russification. As a reaction to Russification, Russia becomes to a certain extent hostilized. In national narratives where own national existence is under a threat and being thrust "between a rock and Russification" the image of Russia becomes negative. However, this enemy image is not the only image of Russia appearing in Finnish and Polish textbooks, as the previous chapter of Russia as a Great Power has shown and as the following will argue.

4.4 Between Oppression and Civilization: Expansionist and Multicultural Empire

Another image appearing in the textbooks of all three countries is the image of Russia as an expansionist power. On the other side of this is the image of Russia as a multicultural empire. However, the co-existence of various ethnic and national groups is not always portrayed as unproblematic. Finnish and Polish textbooks specifically pinpoint these problems because their connection to images of repression in their national narratives. In the following Finnish example, it is suggested that the existence of the Russian Empire was only possible through the use of repressive acts:

"Russia had grown into a Eurasian imperium that could be sustained only by coercion"[175].

As we notice, the textbook takes a critical stance on the imperial character of the Russian Empire. Indeed, Finnish textbooks often point out the conditions and treatment of minority groups in Russia. The expressions are at times rather colourful. In the following Finnish example, Russian and Austrian Empires are referred to as "prisons of nations" from the viewpoint of those who defend the right of nations to be sovereign: "The typical empires for the era, for example the Russian Empire and the Austrian Empire, were the prisons of nations in the eyes of the nationalists."[176]

One of the historical debates problematized in the textbooks of all three countries is the expansionist nature of the Russian empire and the question of whether Russian expansion during 19th century should be seen as equivalent to the imperialism of Western Europe, the United States and Japan. Both Czech and the Finnish textbooks deal with Russia's expansions in the East in an imperialist context. However, both usually avoid explicitly calling Russia an imperialistic power. Here is one example appearing in a Czech textbook with a title "A new view on colonies."

> The years 1880 -1914 were a period when European powers and the USA, Japan and Russia focused their efforts on Africa, Asia and Oceania. During this period, these countries conquered and occupied vast areas with indigenous peoples and created large colonial empires, which they used to obtain natural riches and cheap labour as strategic focal points, while also assisted in solving social issues.[177]

The example acknowledges that Russia was indeed able to "create a large colonial empire" but avoids making a reference to imperialism. In one Finnish textbook the historiographical debate behind this question is openly presented for the readers:

> There is a disagreement among scholars over nature of Russia's 19th century expansion. The conquests in the Far East and Central Asia are not usually considered as imperialistic conquests. However, some scholars have seen Russia's actions as imperialist because the Russians suppressed other ethnic

[175] FI6 2008, 13. (G: Holy Alliance)

[176] FI5 2007, 132 (G: Nationalism)

[177] CZ2 2001, 122 (G: Imperialism and Colonialism)

> groups under their rule. One of Russia's motives was indeed a creation of a unified Slavonic state.[178]

The Finnish textbooks pinpoint the ambiguous character of Russian imperialism, connecting the question to Russian nationalism. Here is one example appearing in a Polish textbook. While referring to Russia's expansion, it is also avoiding the term 'imperialism'. This example suggests that Russia's conquests did not take place oversees and therefore could not be considered imperialist:

> Russia, in contrast to other major powers did not make conquests overseas. Its territory was enlarged by the conquest of mainland Asia. According to statistics, Russia expanded its area by 80km^2 every day during the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. Russia occupied infinite Siberian lands, conquered the Caucasus and pacified independence movements, took vast areas of Central Asia and a part of China. [179]

One Czech example emphasizes that Russia took part in territorial expansion but its expansion took place in "a specific form" compared to countries such Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy:

> The last third of the 19th century was marked by rivalries between great powers in acquiring colonies. England and France, as well as new nation-states: Germany, Italy and also Russia, in a specific form, participated in this.[180]

This implies that Russia can be mentioned in the context of imperialism but only under specific conditions which are different from countries such as England and France. Here is one Czech example of Russia's expansionist efforts in the South Caucasus and Central Asia:

> Other areas where the interests of the powers clashed were the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia under the rule of Alexander I in 1801 took Georgia and soon annexed the territory of the other Caucasian lands. Russia had to fight for this territory with Persia and Turkey for a long time. In the first half of the century, Russia penetrated the Caucasian steppes and shortly

[178] FI3 2011, 27 (R: Russia's expansions to the East)

[179] PL5 2010, 158 (R: Russian Colonialism)

[180] CZ3 2002, 152 (G: Colonial Aspirations)

> thereafter began a new entrance to the Central Asian region. Persia passed Armenia to Russia and thus opened the way to Afghanistan.[181]

This Czech example gives a more detailed overlook of Russian expansions in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The style is neutral compared to some descriptions in Finnish and Czech books which explicitly portray the violent nature of Russia's conquests. Here is one Polish example where the collective memory pinpoints the violence associated with Russia's conquest: "Nicholas I suppressed bloodily all the uprisings – in the Caucasus, Ukraine and Polish lands"[182]. Interestingly, this Polish textbook locates Russia's repressive rule also in the Caucasus, which in the previous Finnish and Czech examples is mentioned only in the context of the territorial expansions of other imperialistic powers, such us Great Britain and France.

One Finnish textbook approaches this topic by using historical visual sources containing a strong message regarding Russia's expansions in Siberia and Asia. One painting (of which the origin and year are not mentioned) portrays the actions of Tsar's troops in Siberia:

> [Caption:] Tsar's Cossack troops suppressing [alistamassa] the East Siberian Tungus people under Russian rule. The Siberians lived their lives peacefully until the Trans-Siberian railway was completed. After that Russian interest in the natural resources of the area grew bigger. Siberia became familiar also to the opponents of Tsar: for them Siberia meant a place of deportation or a penal colony. [183]

Another picture appearing in Finnish textbooks is a British caricature from the year 1903.

> [Caption:] Russia as a greedy glutton [Venäjä ahneena rohmuajana] in China. This is how the English humour magazine Puck portrayed Russia's actions in a caricature published in 1903. The caption "First come, first served" suggests that France and Germany arrived too late. [184]

These pictures are grotesque interpretations of Russia's expansionist behaviour. The image of Russia is ruthless, power-hungry and seeking to expand its influence and territories at any price. This image is partly associated with the image of repression

[181] CZ1 1993, 71 (G: New View on Colonialism)

[182] PL5 2010, 39 (R: Tsarist Government in the Russian Empire)

[183] FI3 2011, 26 (N: Russia's conquests in the Asia)

[184] FI3 2011, 26 (N: Russia's conquests in the Asia)

and Russification dealt with in chapter 4.3. Furthermore, in the context of the Russian Empire as whole this image expands beyond the national narrative to represent a threat to all non-Russians.

However, in Finnish textbooks the memory of Russia in terms of its imperial character is layered with a twofold tension between the oppression of ethnic groups and tolerant multiculturalism. Therefore, images of the imperial character of Russia are not as hopeless as the image of an oppressor would suggest. Belonging to the Russian empire is also described in Finnish textbooks as a means to expand Finland's cultural environment thanks to an increase of multiculturalism. The Russian Empire helped the Finns to be exposed to "worldly influences." In the following Finnish example for example religious plurality and booming businesses are mentioned:

> During the 19th century, Helsinki had grown into an international city. It was a window to the West for many Russians. Judaism as well as Islam came to Finland. Under Russian rule, many entrepreneurs moved to Finland, e.g. Fazer, Stockmann and Paulig.[185]

The Russian Empire brought new influences to Finland, such as Judaism and Islam. In addition, many companies now considered important parts of Finnish culture started their operations during Russian rule. From this viewpoint Finnish textbooks see a positive side to Russian rule – new influences. One Finnish textbook describes the situation in the following manner:

> Becoming a part of the Russian Empire ended the isolation of Finland. In the era of the multi-national empire lived a wide spectrum of peoples, cultures and religions. The imperial administration reluctantly adapted to the fact that religious groups other than Orthodox Christians lived in their empire. Jewish and Muslim livelihoods and migration rights were closely monitored but their presence was tolerated.[186]

Religious and cultural tolerance under the Russian Empire was regulated. This was something unheard of in relatively homogenous Finland.

All these examples demonstrate that images of Russia as an expansionist and multicultural empire are diverse. The same empire is presented as

[185] FI4 2012, 56 (N: Russian Influence in Finland)

[186] FI1 2009, 60 (N: Industrialization)

both a glutton which hoards more territories with a greedy appetite, becoming "a prison of nations" for the various nationalities that lived under its rule as well as a (somewhat) tolerant multicultural empire that served as a gateway to the world for Finnish people living on the periphery of Europe.

As the image of worldly influences in Finnish textbooks demonstrates, the Finnish and Polish image of Russia is not as bad as the wide range of the negative images might suggest. Besides multiculturalism, there are also images connected to development and civilization, some of which are quite positive. Most of these positive images belong in the sphere of culture. However, examples of technical development, science and even the status of women are found.

The most common theme containing positive images is culture – most often Russian literature. In the one Czech textbook, an entire section is dedicated to Russian literature:

> The most famous Russian writers of this era of realism were Ivan Sergeyevich Turgenev, Leo Nikolayevich Tolstoy, Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky; considered a pioneer of the psychological novel; writer and playwright Anton Pavlovich Chekhov, whose works are among the highlights of Russian critical realism.[187]

Russian Romanticism and Alexander Pushkin feature prominently in Czech, Finnish and Polish textbooks. One example of similar type appears in a Finnish textbook:

> Alexander Pushkin started the golden age of Russian literature. His poem Eugene Onegin inspired an opera which was to be composed later. Pushkin's poem "The Bronze Horseman" that speaks about Peter the Great's statue and the miserable fate of a peasant is considered to be the culmination of Russian Romanticism.[188]

Positive attributes such as "golden age" and "culmination of Russian Romanticism" appear in the textbooks mostly on a cultural context.

As many of the textbooks, also *Historia 3: Historia najnowsza* (PL1) includes the classics of Russian literature into its narrative:

[187] CZ2 2001, 133 –134 (R: Flourishing of Russian Literature)

[188] FI5 2007, 133 (G: Romanticism)

> The Russian writers, Leo Tolstoy (*War and Peace*), Fyodor Dostoyevsky (*Crime and Punishment*), Anton Chekhov (*Three Sisters*) and others criticized cultural values in their works.[189]

However, the Polish textbook emphasises that the authors were critical towards the current regime. This seems to be important for the Polish textbooks when mentioning the achievements of the Russian nineteenth century literature. The following example appears in a Polish textbook: "In Russian literature anti-tsarist views pronounced by poet Alexander Pushkin (1799 -1873), author of the poem Eugene Onegin."[190] This excerpt in a Polish textbook emphasizes that Pushkin was *anti-tsarist*, which shows how strongly the battle against the Russian authorities penetrates the narration.

The images conveying the message that Russia has a more progressive side compared to other images are somewhat scarce and scattered. These progressive images can be found when searched for but there are still not many of them. One striking feature is that Czech textbooks refer to Russia most often when narrating general developments such as social change and industrialization whereas Polish textbooks often bypass Russia and only look at developments in Western Europe.

The Czech textbook *Dějiny novověku* (CZ3) takes a more profound view on Russian society and its political, social and economic development in the 19th century. The text examines various perspectives on the Russian Empire in a chapter titled "The slow way of reform in Russia" ("Pomalá cesta reforem v Rusku").[191] Russia is considered an important great power even though its development drags behind Western Europe, Central Europe and the United States. These developments in Russian history receive more often a superficial treatment.

In Finnish textbooks the closeness of Russia is evident in the form of the different possibilities that the Russian Empire had to offer to Finns (see the chapter 5.1). Polish textbooks acknowledge Russia's importance in terms of general world events and European history. However, in their national narrative Russia does not have anything other than a hostile role, which is reinforced though images of

[189] PL1 2005/2012, 33 (G: Literature)

[190] PL5 2010, 12 (G: Romanticism)

[191] CZ3 2002, 128 –132 (R: Nikolai I's governance, R: Alexander II's Reforms x2, R: Narosnik Movement x2, R: Russia's Foreign Policy x2, R: Political Parties in Russia, R: Fiodor Dostojevsky, R: Russian Workers, R: Revolution of the 1905, G: Alternatives of Russia's Development)

repression and Russification. Russia might be looked from Poland's point of view from different angles but the way Tsarist Russia reacted to the Polish uprisings has strongly affected collective memory. The intensity of the Polish national narrative leaves almost no room for other voices which would offer alternative perspectives on the image of the Russian Empire.

5. Towards 1917: Friends and Enemies in Era of Uncertainty

5.1 Czech and Finnish Images of Partnership and Possibilities

Czech textbooks described Russia as a kind of model Slavic country in the eyes of the Czech national movement in the 19th century. Pan-Slavism emerged in the Austro-Hungarian Empire: in the spirit of Slavonic brotherhood Russia was seen as a member of the Slavonic community. The following example demonstrates that Russia influence was seen as an alternative to German cultural supremacy:

> However, most crucial was the determination towards nationality, it was necessary to be more developed, as were the Germans or the Slavs, as is the case of Russians.[192]

The Pan-Slavic image is presented in Czech textbooks three times but in two cases it is accompanied with a criticism by contemporary Czech figures. This image of Russia as a "Slavic brother" is not very strong. In addition, the textbooks emphasize that it was short-lived. The sentiment soon vanished owing to the Tsar's reaction to the Polish uprising:

> The main support of this solidarity was Russia, regarded as strong and powerful as well due to a notable contribution to the victory over Napoleon. However, it was Russia that caused the crisis of this Slavonic concept. Suppressing the Polish uprising in 1831, using total power politics against one of the "Slav brothers" hit Czech Pan-Slavism in the face with significant consequences. It confirmed the recognition of the unattractive reality of Tsarist Russia, which was critically assessed primarily by young journalist Karel Havlíček.[193]

Here is another Czech example of criticism of the Tsarist rule in Russia connected to Pan-Slavism:

> Disagreement was also noticeable in the Czech politicians leading the national party. The cleavage in terms of opinions was also beneficial, and the national unit that had been established survived. The initiative for the apparent division came from outside: the Polish uprising against Russia in 1863. Radical journalism supporting Poles accused [František] Palacký of pro-tsarist thinking. He defended his moderate position on the Polish- Russian

[192] CZ6 2002, 18 (N: Czechs and Germans)

[193] CZ6 2002, 23 (N: the Crisis of Pan-Slavism)

> fight taking into account domestic and foreign policy of Russia. However, pro-Polish sympathies became stronger in the Národní listy newspaper. [194]

The image of Slavonic cooperation remains a small glimpse into Russia's reaction to the Polish uprisings and shatters any dreams that Russia might support Czech aspirations for independence. The emerging Pan-Slavism transforms into Austroslavism, zoning Russia out of the Slavonic family into the category of otherness and separate to the Austro-Hungarian Slavic nations.

Another context in Czech textbooks in which Russia appears is in discussions by Czech historical figures. In the following example, the first president of Czechoslovakia Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, one of the most important Czech political thinkers of the 19th century, criticizes the Tsarist rule in Russia:

> For that reasons some thinkers associate the First World War with the fight for democracy "against monarchist and theocratic regimes", as did for example T. G. Masaryk. Tsarist Russia does not fit into this definition because democratic principles did not represent Russia in its internal organization. On the contrary, in Austria-Hungary we find undisputable features of liberal constitutional monarchy with a parliament and a constitution guaranteeing civil rights.[195]

According to this Czech example, the respect of democratic principles is held precious in terms their interpretation of the First World War. The comparison made between the Habsburg monarchy and Tsarist Russia concludes that Austro-Hungary already had some democratic characteristics which were missing in the Russian Empire. For Czech collective memory, this emphasis is important because it pinpoints that the Austrian monarchy was already guided by some democratic principles. The image of the Austro-Hungarian Empire is not as negative as the image of the Russian Empire in Finland and Poland, even though concerns regarding the influence of German culture might arise occasionally.

In most of cases where Russia appears in the context of Czech historical figures, Russia is connected to the international networks of Czech emigrates. The underlying sentiment is a feeling of solidarity, which in any case

[194] CZ6 2002, 44 (N: Czech idea of the Austrian State)

[195] CZ5 2000, 11 (N: Conflict Between Democracy and Theocratic Monarchy)

remains small. Russia is not really a *de facto* partner of cooperation but it is seen in the light of becoming one, however scarce the possibility might be:

> Masaryk found for his vision of Czechoslovakia financial and moral support in the expatriate associations in France, Great Britain, Russia, and especially in the USA. Approximately two million Czech and Slovak emigrants lived abroad.[196]

The image of cooperation appears also in Finnish and Polish textbooks in connection to their respective resistance movements: how the Finns and Poles belonging to these movements were in contact with Russian underground anarchists. In Polish textbooks this is the only sign of cooperation. Even in this setting it is presented as Poles and Russian resistance fighting against Russia.

The image of cooperation is more present in Finnish textbooks in the form of economic interdependence and career possibilities. In this sense, Russia is seen as a gateway to the world, with vast possibilities. They describe how Finns were able to make a career in Russia or able to benefit from the Russian Empire. This clearly illustrated by the following excerpt:

> Unforeseen opportunities were offered to Finns to create careers as subjects of a vast empire. Thousands found their way into the service of the great power outside the borders of the Grand Duchy of Finland. There were for example soldiers, businessmen, adventurers, artisans and as well as ordinary workers among them.[197]

Especially the Russian city of St. Petersburg attracted Finns. Russia was also a transmitter of influences:

> Artists had close relations with both Central Europe and Russia. The key influences were sought in Paris. On the other hand, the metropolis of St. Petersburg and its court offered employment opportunities and an international atmosphere.[198]

These examples convey an image of Russia which offered a glimpse of the kind of imperial glory and glamour that was unfamiliar to Finns. Individual stories of people

[196] CZ2 2001, 166 (Masaryk's Foreign Campaign)

[197] FI1 2009, 66 (N: Finns in the Russian Empire)

[198] FI4 2012, 51 (N: Finnish Artists Abroad)

who made successful careers in that world emphasize this image. One example of this is the Finnish Fabergé designer Alma Pihl:

> Finnish Alma Pihl became one of Fabergé's top-designers in St. Petersburg regardless the fact that she had never studied design. Her uncle Albert Holmström owned a workshop, which produced jewellery for Fabergé. It was the place where Alma learned to combine small diamonds, gold and platinum into various ensembles. The two Fabergé eggs that Alma produced in the years 1913 –1914, which Czar Nicholas II ordered as gifts to his mother and his wife, are considered the apex of her career. After the Russian Revolution, Alma returned to Finland to work as an arts teacher. [199]

The following excerpt about the famed socialite Aurora Karamzin (former Stjernvall) functions in a similar way:

> Aurora Stjernvall was born into a noble family during the Finnish War in 1808. When she was two years old she was sent to St. Petersburg to live with her aunt. In St. Petersburg she learnt to speak French and Russian. When she was 16 years old she started to take part in the social scene in Helsinki and mesmerized high society with her beauty. [200]

The stories of Alma Pihl and Aurora Karamzin illuminate the imperial and luxurious St. Petersburg lifestyle, with its court and high society from the inside. These examples lack scorn and criticism because they show it was possible for Finns to participate in that society as well. Such examples are very rare but demonstrate that Finnish textbooks offer a multifaceted picture of Russia in the 19th century, which goes beyond the portrayal of court luxuries by describing both the high and low-brow.

Images of possible cooperation and partnership appear more frequently in Czech and Finnish textbooks than their Polish counterparts. In Polish textbooks they are nearly non-existent, which implies the Polish view of 19th century Russia is primarily that of a threat. Finnish textbooks are more willing to compromise than Polish textbooks. For example, in the economic sphere, Russia is referred as a trade partner, which is a tangible form of cooperation. The image of Russia portrayed in Polish textbooks is primarily that of an enemy. However, Russia is not the only enemy. Prussia is portrayed with similar traits. The images of cooperation and

[199] FI4 2012, 49 (N: Finnish female artists)

[200] FI1 2009, 35 (N: Aurora Karamzin)

partnership which appear in Czech and Finnish textbooks are nevertheless complementary to the images of otherness because they convey a message that Russia does not represent a mere dead end when it comes to peaceful intensions to be an active citizen of society: there are also for example economic prospects to it.

5.2 Red and Revolutionary Russia 1917–1922

The Russian perspective appears most often in the context of Russian revolutions. In the Finnish textbook series, Muutosten maailma (FI3–FI4, FI5–FI6) and Corpus (FI1–FI2), these revolutions get a twofold treatment: first from Russia's viewpoint in the textbooks for course III and from the national viewpoint in the textbook for course IV. This is because the events leading to Finland's independence are so tightly interwoven with the events which took place in Russia at the same time.

Many of the textbooks dealing with revolutionary events dedicate multiple sections to them. This is the case in *Czech Dějepis 3 pro gymnázia a střední škol* (CZ2) and *Dějiny 20. století* (CZ5), Polish *Historia od kongresu wiedeńskiego do I wojny światowej* (PL5) and Finnish *Corpus III –IV* (FI6, FI1) and *Muutosten maailma 3–4* (FI3–FI4). However, other approaches to this subject also exist. In the Czech text *Světové dějiny II* (CZ1) events in Russia are closely connected to general world events. In the Polish text *Poznać przeszłość: Ojczysty Panteon i ojczyste spory* (PL3) events in Russia are briefly mentioned in a box containing extra information on world events. The overall narrative of the textbook is substantially national.

Světové dějiny II (CZ1) and *Poznać przeszłość: Ojczysty Panteon i ojczyste spory* (PL3) emphasize how revolutionary events in Russia are perceived in Czech and Polish collective memory: the Czech approach acknowledges the global importance of these events, while the Polish approach focuses their relation to the Polish national struggle. Finnish memory is located somewhere in between these two.

In Czech textbooks one striking element is the emphasis on the democratic origins of the revolutions of 1917:

> On November 7, 1917 the Bolsheviks removed the interim government and seized power in the country. In the Democratic Revolution of March [according to the Julian calendar, the Revolution of February] 1917 changed

> into a socialist revolution. In spring 1918, the Bolsheviks renamed their party the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).[201]

In the similar vein, the next Czech example also pinpoints the democratic nature of the revolution:

> They wished a fundamental change for virtually all the major components of Russian society, with the exception of those closely tied to the Tsarist system of government. It is no wonder that in March 1917 (under the old czarist calendar in February) broke out in Russia's democratic revolution, which overthrew the Tsar and his regime. The democratically oriented liberal interim government as well as the Workers' Soviets and military delegates became the representatives of the new power, in their whole still democratically minded representatives of the social revolutionary parties (SRs) and the Mensheviks.[202]

Along this line, one Czech textbook highlights Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's moral message:

> [Lenin] embodied the path of social rebellion, civil war, violent revolution and a break from the traditional democratic values of the West. [...]Vladimir Ilyich Lenin also talked about peace. His revolutionary concepts were closely tied to war. He pronounced the slogan "transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war" that should pave the way for the violent takeover of political power. [203]

Though the Czech textbook refers to Lenin's moral and peaceful message it still emphasizes the negative consequences of Communism. However, this slight moral reminder differs from the manner in which the other textbooks deal with the turbulent early years of Soviet world order.

Czech and Finnish textbooks emphasize the social character of the revolution, which is much weaker in Polish textbooks. Here is an explanation for the outbreak of the revolution in a Czech textbook:

> Poverty, hunger and death demoralized society. Humanity experienced the greatest crisis of values in history. Due to the increasing suffering of the

[201] CZ1 1993, 134 (G: the First World War)

[202] CZ5 2000, 21 (R: Russian Revolution)

[203] CZ4 2005, 8 (G: the Moral Consequences of the IWW)

> masses, the population began to radicalize. The first social revolution broke out in Russia in early 1917.[204]

In Czech textbooks the treatment of the revolution is more connected to social matters. In Polish textbooks the line between Russian Bolsheviks and Russian "Whites" is made clear, inasmuch as the attitude towards both of them is negative from the point of view of Polish national aspirations.

Taking into account the overall negativity of images in Polish textbooks, one Polish textbook, *Historia 3: Historia najnowsza* (PL1), stands out with a surprising number of positive images. However, the periodization of this textbook starts at the beginning of the 20th century and does not deal, for example, with the 19th century uprisings. The amount of positive images can also be explained by the emphasis on cultural matters[205].

Historia 3: Historia najnowsza (PL1) examines for example Russian visual arts in the beginning of the 20th century:

> A precursor of abstract art is considered to be Wassily Kandinsky, a Russian painter associated with the Blaue Reiter group. The painter expressed – by using colour – the specific roles that symbolize not only the state of the soul but also the painter's vision that colours correspond with sounds of music.[206]

The text also refers to Russian advancements in science at the beginning of the century:

> Russian scientist Ivan Pavlov received the Nobel Prize in 1904 for his work on distinction between conditioned and unconditioned reflexes. During his experiments with dogs, Pavlov discovered that animals could learn different reactions. His research became the basis for the doctrine of reflexes in psychology. [207]

Interestingly, *Historia 3: Historia najnowsza* (PL1) is also the only textbook which connects the newly organized Soviet Russia to female suffrage:

[204] CZ2 2001, 162 (G: Threat of Social Revolution)

[205] I already mentioned in the chapter 4.4 some positive images connected to the sphere of culture.

[206] PL1 2005/2012, 34 (G: Fine Arts)

[207] PL1 2005/2012, 28 (R: Ivan Pavlov)

> Women gradually obtained the right to vote - from 1902 in Australia, from 1906 in Finland, 1913 in Norway and in subsequent years in Denmark, the Netherlands, Canada and Soviet Russia.[208]

Although Polish textbooks do not contain any positive images of Russia in terms of their national narratives at least *Historia 3: Historia najnowsza* (PL1) acknowledges that Russian society had some progressive elements in the beginning of the 20th century when the country was able to produce for example many successful artists.

5.3 Finnish and Polish Battles for Borders: New States with Old Fears

When Finland became independent in 1917 and Poland 1918 they were very far from stable. This also lends a shared experience to Finnish and Polish history. Instability led to a civil war in Finland in 1918. In Poland this instability is apparent in the way Poland became an independent state without clearly defined borders. In this sense, both countries were still defining the boundaries of their identity, in terms of the questions of which social system to adopt or where to draw the actual borders of the state. In addition, both of these countries had to take the newly formed Soviet into account. The Bolshevik vision of the revolution spreading to the West seemed at that time a real threat.

Polish and Soviet interests collided over the rule of areas of modern day Ukraine and parts of modern-day Belarus. From 1918–19 there was a westward Soviet offensive. Polish troops and the Red Army fought against each other. These battles were followed by the Polish–Soviet War between 1919 and 1921, in which Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine fought against the Second Polish Republic and the Ukrainian People's Republic. However, in Polish textbooks, it is clear that the Bolsheviks were not the only ones considered a threat:

> In autumn 1919, Josef Piłsudski ordered a halt to the offensive in the east. This enabled the Bolshevik authorities to direct all forces against the forces of "White" General Anton Denikin, who threatened Moscow. According to the Head of State and a large number of Polish politicians, the Whites were more dangerous for Polish than the Bolsheviks, because they could count on the support of the countries of the Entente, and both Denikin and other

[208] PL1 2005/2012, 40 (G: Status of Women during the Interwar Period)

> White generals sought to rebuild the Russian empire according to pre- World War I borders.[209]

This example demonstrates how important it was for Polish leaders to expand Poland's borders as much as possible. However, it was also in the interest of Soviet Russia to expand its influence westward as much as possible. The clash of powers was inevitable. Soviet Russia became an enemy for Poland because of this border dispute. The following example appears in the Polish textbook. Józef Piłsudski describes his strategic vision of Russia during this period:

> The aim was also the weakening of Russia - by tearing Ukraine away from it - so it could not threaten Poland in the future, regardless of the system it would be governed by.[210]

According to Piłsudski, Poland had to seize Ukraine, at least parts of it, so Russia would not be a threat in the future regardless of its political system. In other words, Russia would pose a threat to Poland whether the country was ruled by the "Whites" or the "Reds."

In the Finnish national narrative, the threat of Russia was associated more with the fear of Communism. In Finnish textbooks the line between the Bolsheviks and Russians is blurred. Poland did not go through a Civil War like Finland. In Poland, national aspirations were monopolized by "White" generals and politicians. The following example appearing in a Finnish textbook describes how Russian Bolsheviks supported the aspirations of Finnish Communists:

> Strong Red Guards was established in industrial centres, such as Helsinki, Tampere and Turku. There was a Finnish Red Guard of workers in St. Petersburg. Many in rural areas, especially farm workers, joined the Red Guard. The duties of the Red Guards were maintaining order and keeping an eye on local White Guards. Many were preparing for a revolution that they eagerly expected to take place in Finland. Occasionally, there was also cooperation between the Finnish Red Guards and the Russian soldiers who strived for world revolution.[211]

The Finnish Civil War was a very traumatic event for Finnish collective memory. The trauma of the Finnish Civil War divided the country even in following

[209] PL1 2005/2012, 75 (N: War Against the Red Army and Lithuania)

[210] PL6 2012, 27 (N: Conceptions of State Building)

[211] FI1 2009, 101 (N: Finnish Civil War)

generations. After the war, hatred against Russians reached boiling point. Finnish textbooks maintain the memory of those who were injured and killed during these turbulent times. Both the fear of Russia and the terror oriented towards Russians is a part of the historical memory conveyed by Finnish textbooks. In the following example this memory is described:

> The racial hatred toward "Ruskies" extended also to the civilian population. A few thousand civilians who came from Russia to Finland were murdered, and thousands others were forced to flee the country. Thus Finland lost a large part of the Russian minority which had formed in the previous century. Those who stayed in Finland were treated with hostility, and they were forced to hide their background as much as possible.[212]

One of the textbooks even refers to the violence against Russians as 'ethnic cleansing:' "The 'Whites' used violence against the Russians in a manner very close to ethnic cleansing."[213]

Finnish fears that Finland's autonomy would be taken away under Russian rule (or the fear of not maintaining Finland's independency) exploded in the aftermath of the Civil War into full-blown ethnic hatred. It is difficult to distinguish to what extent the object of fear and hate is communism and to which extend it is Russians themselves. To a certain extent the term 'Russian' became synonymous with 'Communist'. It also became synonymous with unpatriotism.

The victory in the Civil War did not satisfy the aspirations of the Finnish "Whites". Parallel to Polish efforts to expand in the East, in Finland this question culminated in the nationalist idea of Greater Finland. In Poland, the parallel ideology stemmed from the glorious memory of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth (see the chapter 1.2). In the following example appearing in a Polish textbook Józef Piłsudski expresses in his letter "to the inhabitants of the former Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth" the idea of Poland protecting the peoples of the former "Polish empire":

> For more than a hundred years, your country has not known freedom; it has been oppressed by the Russian, German, Bolshevik violence, which did not ask the people but imposed its foreign patterns of conduct, telling you what to do, not listening to what you want, often destroying lives. I want to give

[212] FI1 2009, 105 (N: Outcome of the War)

[213] FI1 2009, 104 (N: Political and Ethnic Cleansing)

> you the opportunity to solve domestic national affairs, as that's what you wish for you yourselves, without any violence or oppression on the behalf of Poland.[214]

The idea of Greater Finland did not lead to as large a conflict as between Poland and Soviet Russia. Yet there were those in Finland who could not keep their hands off the territories inhabited by Finno-Ugric peoples, located in Soviet Russia or close to the borders of Soviet Russia. Between 1918 and 1922 Finnish volunteers participated in conflicts which took place in Estonia and in Russian Karelia. Finnish textbooks mention these campaigns briefly. Finally, the Treaty of Tartu in 1920 establishes the Finnish border. Similarly, Poland's borders are established in the Treaty of Riga in 1921. Collective Finnish and Polish memories of the 1910's and 1920's are of border confrontations with Soviet Russia. It was not only a battle of actual borders but a battle of geographical identity where the end the territories marked by Finnishness and Polishness. In this sense, Russia, as the enemy force, draws the line between the Poles and the Ukrainians and between the Finns and other Finno-Ugric peoples.

The new nations had to establish their national symbols and fortify the basis for their national identities. One Finnish textbook suggests, by referring to postcards printed in Finland in the 1920's, that part of these actions were not only to define the borders of identity for one's nation but to define its enemy:

> After the civil war in 1918, the Finnish parliament ratified the white-and-blue flag as the official flag of the country. In the 1920's, the Finnish Independence association printed a series of postcards in order to make the flag more known. The card also wanted to tell from which direction the enemy of the new state was to be found: a fluttering war flag is threatened by a red glow that comes from the East. [215]

This image of Russia of the red glow coming from the East reminds Finns that the fight for their national sovereignty continues even after independence. Similarly, for Poles it is Ukraine which symbolizes their separation from Russia.

[214] PL4 2012, 72 (N: Conception of Federation)

[215] FI4 2012, 77 (N: Great Finland and Eastern Threat)

6 Conclusions: We and Russia

6.1 Multiple Images of Russia

There are multiple images of Russia in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in Czech, Finnish and Polish textbooks. According to my analysis (see the chapters 4 and 5), there are at least six different images of Russia (or Soviet Russia). They are partly intertwined with each other although not necessarily inseparable. (Table VI.)

Most of these images were connected to the Russian Empire in the period 1815 –1917. Two of the images – "Red and Revolutionary Russia" (see the chapter 5.2) and "Battles for Borders" (see the chapter 5.3) – were connected to the period 1917–1922. Only one image – the Czech and Finnish image of "Partnership and Possibilities" (see the chapter 5.1) – was connected to the period of 1815–1922 as a whole.

Table VI. Different Images of Russia

Image of Russia	Whose image?	Period of Russian history
Tsarist Russia as a Great European Power	Czech, Finnish, Polish	1815 – 1917
Confrontation, Russification and Repression	Finnish, Polish	1815 – 1917
Russia as an Expansionist Power / Multicultural Empire	Czech, Finnish, Polish	1815 – 1917
Partnership and Possibilities	Czech, Finnish	1815 – 1922
Red and Revolutionary Russia	Czech, Finnish, Polish	1917 – 1922
Battle for the Borders	Finnish, Polish	1917 – 1922

The images all three countries have in common are "Tsarist Russia as a Great European Power" (see the chapter 4.2), "Russia as an Expansionist Power / Multicultural Empire" (see the chapter 4.4), and "Red and Revolutionary Russia". In terms of the first two of these images, the textbooks narrate Russia's development

into a European great power and its expansion into a multicultural empire in similar fashion. In terms of the third image, Czech, Finnish and Polish textbooks portray similarly how revolutions broke out and how Russian society transformed into Soviet Russia. Textbooks from all three countries acknowledge that either the Russian Empire or Soviet Russia (or both of them) contained some more-or-less developed and civilized attributes.

The comparison shows that national perspectives dominate Finnish and Polish textbooks in their references to Russia. As a result, Russia appears as the opposing "enemy" during the nineteenth century and in the beginning of the twentieth century – relations are often depicted as hostile on both sides. Finnish and Polish history textbooks have in common images of "Confrontation, Russification and Repression" (see the chapter 4.3), where Russia is seen as an oppressor. The negative bias is slightly more common in the Finnish textbooks: 28% of Finnish material contained negative bias whereas 20% of the Polish material contained negative bias. Consequently, both Finnish and Polish textbooks have in common the tendency to perceive Russia negatively from their respective national perspectives (see the chapter 4.1).

The frequency of the national perspective of Russian history demonstrates the importance of the national framework in terms of contemporary Finnish and Polish collective memories of Russia. When it comes to the expansionist character of the Russia Empire, Finnish and Polish textbooks portray Russia as a cruel oppressor of ethnic minorities. One Polish textbook calls the Tsarist rule "bloody" and one Finnish textbooks calls Russian empire "the prison of nations". Finnish and Polish national history is narrated from the viewpoint of confrontation with Russia. Finnish history is periodized according to "periods of oppression" and Polish history according to Polish uprisings. However, Finnish memory holds the image of Russia being enemy number one whereas Polish memory considers both Russia and Prussia (German culture) an enemy.

On the contrary, the Czech textbooks contained hardly at all negative bias; only 3%, of the images were negative. The analysis indicates that Czech memory does not see Russia as a threat when referring to the period 1815 –1922. In terms of the nineteenth century history, Czech memory seeks support for its national aspirations in Slavonic culture. It is the superiority of German culture that worries

Czechs the most. The Czechs might be concerned of the influence of German culture but this does not mean that they would not cooperate in the Austro-Hungarian context.

For Czechs, the Russian Empire is seen as a model Slavonic country. Czech textbooks perceive twentieth century Russia most often from a general and Russian perspective. One exception, the Polish Uprising, provokes a different view of Russia. References to this event in Czech textbooks marginally portray Russia as an "other." Therefore, Russia defines the borders of Austro-Hungarian Slavonic project – Russia is pushed aside because Russia does not belong to the family of Austro-Hungarian Slavs. However, relations stay on good terms despite the fact that Czechs break this symbolic connection, the result of which is that Russia is left outside the Austro-Slavic project.

One of the most dominant images of Russia in Finnish and Polish collective memory is the image of confrontation. The analyses show that Finland and Poland have defined their national identity and borders in response to Russia. In the nineteenth century, Finns and Poles were a part of the Russian Empire but yet construct their national culture as separate from the country. As the analysis indicates, many of the images of Russia in Finnish and Polish textbooks are in a contradiction with Finnish and Polish national narratives.

Czech textbooks do not contain enemy images of Russia. Czech collective memory – as this analysis of the Czech textbooks suggest – may hold a grudge against the Soviets rather than the Russians. It would require further research to establish whether Czech memory holds biased perceptions of the Soviet Union for example in terms of the Cold War history of the latter half of the nineteenth century (do events such as the Prague Spring in 1968 followed by the Soviet occupation and the years of "normalization" in the 1970's have an impact on the relations?). Perhaps the only reconciliation of Czechoslovakia's Communist past in Czech textbooks is the emphasis on Lenin's peaceful message and the democratic nature of the March (February) Revolution of 1917.

I have summarized my findings on the relation between "us" and "them" in Czech, Finnish and Polish textbooks in the following table:

Table VII. The Relation between "Us" and "Them"

"Us"	Opposed "Them"	Perspective on Russia	(Russia=) Friend/ Enemy	Relation to the Other = Fight/ Negotiate
Czechs	Germans	General	Friend	Negotiate
Finns	Russians	National	Enemy (and Friend)	Fight and Negotiate
Poles	Germans and Russians	National	Enemy	Fight

Polish collective memory emphasizes how Poles were striving for Poland's freedom at any cost. The Czech collective memory is more conciliatory, conversational and ready to negotiate in terms of a superior "other" (German culture), of which opposition is not as strong compared to the "enemies" in Polish and Finnish memories. Finnish collective memory has a lot in common with Polish memory because they both consider Russia a threat. Finns and Poles share images of Russia as an oppressor. However, Finnish memory turns a bit to the direction of the Czech tendency for reconciliation: Finnish textbooks also contain images of Russia as a land of possibility for Finns. They often refer to contradictions inherent in the Russian Empire, which is seen as a place of opportunity and backwardness, or a place of multicultural tolerance and fierce Russification. In Finnish portrayals, Finns are more willing to make compromises whereas Polish textbooks portray the willingness to fight.

Portrayals of Russia from the Czech national perspective hint that Russia might be seen as a possible partner. Surprisingly, this image of cooperation and partnership is visible in Finnish textbooks as well. This more optimistic portrayal of Russia refers to career opportunities for Finns. From a Finnish perspective, being a part of the Russian Empire opened up many possibilities. For this reason, the relation to Russia is twofold: Russia is both a hostile oppressor and a provider of opportunities. Hence, Finns differ from Poles because from the Finnish perspective Russia is not always an enemy even though Tsarist rule is occasionally seen as oppressive. According to textbook portrayals, Czechs and Finns have this element of

democratic dialogue in common, whereas Poles are portrayed as eager to revolt in order to gain their freedom.

Czech and Finnish portrayals of Russia are slightly more detailed than Polish portrayals. In Czech textbooks there is a richness of detail which occurs most often in terms of the Russian perspective: the image of Russia is not close in terms of how Czech identity and Russianness meet, but close in the way Czech readership is informed about Russianness by using detailed descriptions from the Russian perspective. In Finnish textbooks both Russian and Finnish perspectives are equally detailed. In Polish textbooks the level of detail afforded to the Russian perspective is low relative to that of the national perspective. Instead they concentrate on developments in the Polish part of the Russian Empire; Russia stays somewhere in the background.

6.2 Rethinking Assumptions

As the analysis demonstrates, Russia has many faces in the eyes of Czechs, Finns and Poles. Furthermore, the images are often ambiguous and in contradiction with each other. This can be demonstrated for example by the result that Finns see Russia both as a friend and an enemy.

In terms of my original assumptions, *assumption number one* (see the chapter 1.5) could be confirmed only partially. It seems that Czechs and Finns have in common the orientation towards negotiation and richly detailed images of Russia from the Russian perspective. Perhaps the tendency to negotiate is a more typical strategy for smaller nations. However, this does not explain the Finnish orientation towards fighting *and* negotiating. Therefore, this does not necessary lead to any conclusions because Finns have the orientation to fight as well. Finnish textbooks also have a richly detailed national perspective, so this closeness is not comparable.

These similarities perhaps only communicate the fact that giving detailed information about Russian history is seen as important in these countries rather than communicating about their size or their type of nationalism. Overall, the first assumption could not be proven in any significant capacity.

The second assumption (see the chapter 1.5) turned out to be more important. Finns and Poles have in common the enemy image of Russia and

willingness to fight, which can be explained by the situation of Finns and Poles in the context of Russian Empire. This conflict is clearly visible also after these countries declared their independency, which only reinforce past patterns of hostile relations. Finns and Poles have much in common when it comes to the image of Russia in their collective memory because they both have seen Russia as a threat to their nation in different periods.

The third assumption (see the chapter 1.5) does not seem to play any role in collective memory from this perspective. First of all, the Czechs and Poles do not have much in common in terms of their collective memory of Russian Empire and Soviet Russia besides the general perspective of history and shared views of Russia as a great European power and internationally meaningful canonized historical events.

Plausibly, Czechs and Poles might have more things in common regarding the collective memory of the Soviet Union and the Cold War era, which would of course require further study of the memory of that specific period of time. Certainly, the picture would be clearer if studies were conducted diachronically on textbooks of various decades.

6.3 National Collective Memory

The comparative analysis of the collective memory of these European countries – the Czech Republic, Finland and Poland – demonstrates that they, from a certain perspective, have something in common in terms of their historical experiences. However, they also differ in certain views. Finns and Poles see Russia in the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century as the enemy. For the Czech Republic, Russia is an object of interest instead of an enemy. Finns and Poles see Russia as an oppressor which implemented a harsh policy of Russification that threatened the existence of their nations. For the Poles, Russia represents an absolute power conflict as equally fatal as the conflict with Prussia. For the Czechs, Russia is a model a Slavonic nation that in no sense threatens the existence of the Czech nation. Czechs and Finns see Russia as a partner of cooperation. Finns see Russia as a partner of cooperation in the form of concrete possibilities, whereas Czechs see Russia as spiritual support.

The analysis suggests that even in 21st century Europe, the nation-state remains a fundamental unit of analysis in the history presented in school textbooks. Czech, Finnish and Polish textbooks are constructed on a national basis and the national perspective is emphasized in their narratives. Even though identities would not be perceived as ready-made, as Maurice Halbwachs to some degree suggested, in the context of school history textbooks the nation seems to be a major framework of memory. The importance of Halbwachs's contribution to discussions of collective memory is his recognition of social frameworks in the practices of how we remember the past. Textbooks seem to be an arena where the nation determines what is held valuable enough to be remembered. History not seen as important is pushed out of the collective memory into the sphere of amnesia.

Benedict Anderson suggests that the emergence of print capitalism and the use of vernacular languages set the stage for the modern nation. Anderson emphasizes the importance of newspapers which made possible the creation of imagined communities, and new types of social organisms which experienced certain events simultaneously by simply reading about them at the same time.[216] Likewise, since the establishment of the modern school system textbooks have been efficient arenas for nations to educate. Whole generations of citizens have learned to see the position of their nation in relation to the past in uniformity.

In this sense, textbooks speak in the voice of the nation and they remember what ideas society at a given moment thinks must be transmitted to the new generations, which participate in the national project by becoming citizens of the state. However, 'identity' is a somewhat ambiguous term. It is not given, but mediated. In addition, as Megill suggests, memory is also somewhat subjective and therefore contains elements of obscurity. For this reason, the relation between identity and memory can be incoherent. That is why Finns see Russia simultaneously as an enemy and as a great possibility to achieve something larger than Finns could achieve by themselves. Russia does not have just one image in relation to the national identity: "we" in relation to "them" is not just one but many. Russia is occasionally the "other" that defines who we are but on the other hand there are many images of Russia.

[216] Anderson 1991.

Fernand Braudel has described European civilizations as "overlapping each other as the seeds of a pomegranate fruit"[217]. This is also visible in the way Czechs, Finns and Poles construct their national identities and their nation's memory of Russia. The effect of different periods of time affects memory as in a layer of fruit. European historical memory overlaps when comparing different periods and different areas: identities are both spatial and temporal. Czech, Finnish and Polish identity are a product of their time, but are also subject to change over time. This research has been one synchronous snapshot of the national identity and its relation to Russia. It would require a diachronic analysis of textbooks from different periods of time if we wish to see how the identity-memory–relation has evolved alongside the nation.

[217] Braudel 1992.

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[218] In the analysis chapters, I will use these abbreviations in the footnotes instead of the book titles.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: ISCED Education systems

Table 1.1 ISCED Key



Table 1.2 The Education System in the Czech Republic (Source: Eurydice)



Table 1.3 The Education System in Finland (Source: Eurydice)



Table 1.4 The Education System in Poland (Source: Eurydice)



Appendix 2: References to Russia in Absolute Numbers

Table 2.1 Sections in Czech Textbooks with Reference to Russia in Absolute Numbers

Bias / Perspective on Russia	Positive Bias	Negative Bias	Neutral Bias
General	3	2	75
Russian	3	1	32
National	2	1	8

Table 2.2 Sections in Finnish Textbooks with Reference to Russia in Absolute Numbers

Bias / Perspective on Russia	Positive Bias	Negative Bias	Neutral Bias
General	3	6	39
Russian	1	4	17
National	3	40	65

Table 2.3 Sections in Polish Textbooks with Reference to Russia in Absolute Numbers

Bias / Perspective on Russia	Positive Bias	Negative Bias	Neutral Bias
General	4	1	36
Russian	1	7	19
National	-	26	72

Appendix 3: Czech Textbooks

Table 3.1 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in CZ1[219]

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia[220]	Bias[221]	Themes
General	15	Positive 1 Negative - Neutral 14	Industrialization, Social Structures in Change, New View on Colonialism, Ideology and Revolution, Romanticism, Outbreak of Revolutions, Rise of Nationalism and Development of Democracy, the Post-Revolution events in Europe after 1848 and 1849, Crimean War, Great Empires Rule the World, the Economic Development, Civilization and Culture, Imperialism, the Confrontation Between the Rich and the Poor and Between the Workers and Employers, the IWW
Russia	2	Positive 1 Negative - Neutral 1	Reforms in the Russian Empire, the Establishment of the Soviet Union
National	-	-	-

Table 3.2 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in CZ2

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia	Bias	Themes
General	22	Positive 1 Negative 1 Neutral 20	Vienna Congress, the New European Map, the Holy Alliance x2, Romanticism, the Greek Revolt, the Polish Revolt, the Crimean War, the Second Republic in France, Imperialism and Colonialism, Japan Opens to the World, Japan's Great Power Endeavours, Battle for Universal Suffrage, Russo-German Dispute over the Balkan, International Agreements,

[219] For the complete titles and bibliographical information, see tables I–III.

[220] The numbers refer to the number of sections.

[221] The numbers refer to the number of sections.

			IWWx4, the Threat of Social Revolution, the End of the IWW, Consequences of the First World War
Russia	13	Positive 2 Negative 1 Neutral 10	Tsarist Power in Russia, the Decembrist Revolt, Land Reform in Russia, Russian Society, Secret Revolutionary Organizations, Multi-ethnic Russian Empire, the 1905 Revolution, the Massacre of the Bloody Sunday, the Flourishing of Russian literature, Pyotr Stolypin, Russian Revolutionx2, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin
National	3	Positive 1 Negative - Neutral 2	Masaryk's Foreign Campaign, Czech Foreign Resistance, the Year 1918 in the Czech Lands

Table 3.3 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in CZ3

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia	Bias	Themes
General	24	Positive 1 Negative- Neutral 23	The New Division of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars, the Holy Alliance x2, Revolution in Greece, the November Uprising in Poland, the Balkan and the Ottoman Empire, Conflict Between the Great Powers, the Consequences of the 1848 Revolutions, Bismarck's Foreign Policy, Wilhelm II's Germany, Colonial Invasions, Literature, Modernization of Society, Nationalism, National Movements, Colonial Aspirations, Imperialism, Reforms in Japan, International Relations on the Eve of the IWW, German Foreign Politics, the Balkan Question, the Berlin Congress, Triple and Dual Alliance, Russo-French Alliance
Russia	17	Positive - Negative - Neutral 17	Decembrist Revolt, Mikhail Bakunin, the Governance of Nikolai I, Slavophiles and Zapadniks, Reforms to Overcome Backwardness, Crimean War, Alexander II's Reforms x 2, Narodnik Movement x2, Russia's Foreign Policy x2, Political Parties in Russia, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Worker's Class, Revolution of the Year 1905, Alternatives to Russia's Development
National	-	-	-

Table 3.4 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in CZ4

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia	Bias	Themes
General	3	Positive - Negative - Neutral 3	World Order after the IWW, New Order in Europe after the IWW, the Moral Consequences of the IWW
Russia	-	-	-
National	-	-	-

Table 3.5 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in CZ5

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia	Bias	Themes
General	16	Positive - Negative 1 Neutral 15	Rivalry Between Countries Before the I WW, the Sarajevo Assassination, IWW x6, the Eastern Front 1916, Final Phase of the War, German-Russia Relations During the War x2, Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, the Changes in the European Map after the War, the Versailles Conference, the International Community's Possibility to Intervene in Bolshevik Revolution
Russia	4	Positive - Negative - Neutral 4	Russian Revolution x4
National	1	Positive - Negative - Neutral 1	Conflict Between Democracy and Theocratic Monarchy

Table 3.6 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in CZ6

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia	Bias	Themes
General	-	-	
Russia	-	-	
National	7	Positive 1 Negative 1 Neutral 5	Czechs and Germans, the Crisis of Panslavism, Czech Idea of the Austrian State, Czech Opposition against Dualism, Political, Activism against Austro Hungary Abroad, Czechoslovak Army in Russia, the Establishment of the Czechoslovak state

Appendix 4: Finnish Textbooks

Table 4.1 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in FI1

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia	Bias	Themes
General	1	Positive - Negative - Neutral 1	Nationalism and Language in Europe
Russia	5	Positive - Negative 1 Neutral 4	The Empire in Crisis, Revolution of 1905 and the Beginning of the War, Russian-Japanese War, Russia on the Merge of Revolution, Revolution Overthrows the Tsar
National	49	Positive 1 Negative 19 Neutral 30	The Formation of Finnish Autonomy x4, the Finnish Representation in Russia, Developing National Culture, Aurora Karamzin, Economy in the Grand Duchy of Finland, Canals and Railroads, Steamboats and Timber Rafting. the Diet Gathers x2, the Question of Military Service, the Finnish Currency, the Years of Starvation, James Finlayson, Living Conditions and Search for Work, the Minorities in the Grand Duchy of Finland, Internationalization, the Autonomy Falls into Crisis, Criticism Against the Finnish Privileges, Finns in the Russian Empire, the February Manifest, Conciliation or Resistance, Bobrikov, Finnish Female Artists, Finnish Artists Abroad, National Romanticism in Art, Finnish Terrorists, the Parliamentary Reform and Universal Suffrage, the Second Period of Oppression, IWW and Revolution x2, the Jäger Movement, the Grand Duchy Adrift, the Finnish Declaration of Independence, the Reds and the Whites, the Finnish Civil Warx3, Revolution Fails, Political and Ethnic Cleansing, the Outcome of the Civil War, Republic or Monarchy, the Young Republic, Against the Communists and Russians, Xenophobia in Right-Wing Finland, Soviet Russia as the Neighbour, the Boarder Question, the Direction of Foreign Policy, the New Direction of Economy

Table 4.2 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in FI2

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia	Bias	Themes
General	4	Positive - Negative 1 Neutral 3	Economic Liberalism, Abolishment of Slavery, Superiors and Underdogs of Imperialism, IWW
Russia	1	Positive - Negative - Neutral 1	Rise of Soviet Union
National	-	-	-

Table 4.3 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in FI3

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia	Bias	Themes
General	13	Positive - Negative - Neutral 13	The Vienna Congress x 2, Unification of Germany, the Many Nations within the Habsburg Austria, the British Colonial Power, Nationalism before the IWW, Alliances and Rearmament, Imperial Problems, the Balkan Conflict, the Illusion of the Short Warfare, Trench Warfare, Central Powers in Trouble, New States in Europe
Russia	13	Positive 1 Negative 3 Neutral 9	Russia's Conquests in Asia x 2, Russian Serfdom and the Social Freedom, Russia's expansion to the East, Lenin on Tsarist Russia, Tolstoy on Russian Peasants, Alexei Filippov's perception on Rasputin, Noble Life in St. Petersburg, Russia-Japanese War x 2, the October Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution x 2
National	-	-	-

Table 4.4 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in FI4

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia	Bias	Themes
General	-	-	-
Russia	-	-	-
National	58	Positive 2 Negative 21 Neutral 35	The Formation of Finnish Autonomy, Imperial Admiration and Finland, Diet of Porvoo, Pasifying the Finnish People, Finnish Administration, Changes in Finland Under the Russian Rule, the Reasons for Autonomy, Governmental Reforms, Diet Gathers Regularly, municipality and state gets separated, Agricultural Crisis, the Great Starvation, Mark as the Finnish Currency, the Birth of Paper Industry, Agricultural Development, Excessive Growth of Population, Emigration, the National Awakening, the National Philosopher Johan Vilhem Snellman, Fennoman movement, Compulsory Education, Designer Alma Pihl, European Influences in Art, the Period of Oppression in Finland, Russian Influence in Helsinki, the Autonomy is Questioned, the Autonomy Under a threat, Governor-General Nikolai Bobrikov, February Manifesto of 1899, the Great Petition and Rebellious Postcards, Eugen Schaumann, the Finnish Parties, the Finnish Worker's Movement, the Active Opposition, Revolution of 190, Nikolai II's Visits in Helsinki, the Parliament Act in 1906, Jäger Movement, the Second Period of Oppression, the First World War, the Jäger Movement (2nd) Pehr the first senate of Independent Finland, the Question of the Highest Representative of Power, Independence of Finland in the Turbulence of Revolution, Finland's Declaration of Independence x 2, Recognizing the Independence, the Civil War of 1918 x 2, the Proletariat in Need, the Beginning of the War, Red Against White, the White side Wins, Monarchy or Republic, Great Finland and Eastern Threat, the Direction of Foreign Policy, the Question about Finland's Borders

Table 4.5 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in FI5

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia	Bias	Themes
General	8	Positive 3 Negative 3 Neutral 2	Nationalism, Romanticism, Parliamentary Democracy, Socialists, Literature, Art Movements, National Extremist Movements, Europe Divides into Two
Russia	-	-	-
National	-	-	-

Table 4.6 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in FI6

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia	Bias	Themes
General	21	Positive - Negative 1 Neutral 20	The Vienna Congress, the Holy Alliance x2, Revolutionary years, Nationalism, Anarchism and Nationalism, the Crimean War x 2, Bismark's Foreign Policy, the Balkan Question, International Conferences and Treaties, Japan Strengthens, Europe Before the IWW, the Balkan Crisis, the Sarajevo Assassination and Outbreak of the War, IWWx5, Europe after the Great War
Russia	3	Positive - Negative - Neutral 3	Revolution in Russia, the Bolsheviks aspirations, Komintern
National	-	-	-

Appendix 5: Polish Textbooks

Table 5.1 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in PL1

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia	Bias	Themes
General	4	Positive 2 Negative - Neutral 2	Literature, Fine Arts, Culture, Culture and Art in the Totalitarian Regimes, the status of Women during the Inter-War Period
Russia	2	Positive 1 Negative 1 Neutral -	Soviet State, Ivan Pavlov
National	6	Positive - Negative 1 Neutral 5	Polish-Ukrainian War, War against the Red Army, Polish-Ukrainian Union / Battle of Kiev, Attitude in the Polish Society Towards the Threat, Polish Counter-Offensive, Peace Treaty of Riga

Table 5.2 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in PL2

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia	Bias	Themes
General	5	Positive - Negative - Neutral 5	Paris Peace Conference, the League of Nations, the Washington Naval Conference, the Political and Economic Balance of the Great War, the Versailles-Washington System,
Russia	7	Positive - Negative 3 Neutral 4	Russia after the Bolshevik coup, the Brest Peace Treaty, Emergency Commission Cheka, the Constitution of 1918, Gulag, the Russian Civil War, War Communism
National	9	Positive - Negative 2 Neutral 7	Rise of the Independent Poland, The Regency Council of the Kingdom of Poland, the Question of Poland in the Paris Conference , the Polish Eastern Agenda, the Battle of Lvov, the Polish Bolshevik War, the Battle of Warsaw and the Battle of Niemen, the Peace Treaty of Riga , the Question of Eastern Pomerania and Warmia-Masuria

Table 5.3 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in PL3

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia	Bias	Themes
General	2	Positive - Negative - Neutral 2	The Holy Alliance, the IWW
Russia	-	-	-
National	21	Positive - Negative 10 Neutral 11	Polish Question and Napoleonic Wars, Józef Poniatowski, Russian influence on Poland in the 18th and 19th century, Polish independence conspiracies, November Uprising x2, the Great Emigration, Poles under Russian Empire, Romuald Tragutt, Polish National Consciousness, Germanization and Russification policy, Marie Skłodowska-Curie, Poles and the aftermath of Napoleonic Wars, January Uprising, the Polish Question rises again, Polish Leagues in the IWW, Józef Pilsudski, Roman Dmowski, Polish lands during the IWW, Polish Independence, Fighting for the Eastern Borders, Battle of Warsaw

Table 5.4 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in PL4

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia	Bias	Themes
General	5	Positive 1 Negative - Neutral 4	Entente Cordiale, Causes of the outbreak of the Great War, Eastern front in the IWW, Literature and Press in the Second Half of the 19th Century, New States in Europa after the IWW
Russia	1	Positive - Negative - Neutral 1	Russian Revolution
National	15	Positive - Negative 4 Neutral 11	Russification and Germanization in the Kigdom of Poland , the pro-Russian side, Polish Lands after the IWW, War for Polish Boarders in the East, the

			Concept of Federation, the Polish-Ukrainian War, the Question of Kiev, the Bolshevik Offensive, International Communists, the Battle of Warsaw x2, the Miracle of the River Vistula, the Bolshevik Propaganda, Peace of Riga , International Relations of the Newly Independent Poland

Table 5.5 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in PL5

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia	Bias	Themes
General	25	Positive 1 Negative 1 Neutral 23	Industrial development in the beginning of the 19th Century, Romanticism, The Vienna Congress x2, The Holy Alliance, the Independence War in Greece, Revolutions of 1848, the Ottoman Empire, the Crimean War, Bismarck's policy objectives, Bismarck's diplomacy, Prussia's War with Austria, Bismarck's Foreign Policy, Industrial Development of the Second Half of the 19th century, spread of Democracy, Socialist Movement in the late 19th century, Communism and Social Democrats, Education in the 19th and 20th Century, Literature in the 19th and 20th Century, the Balkan Melting Pot, the Political and Military Alliances in the Late 19th Century, Assassination in Sarajevo, First World War, the Year 1917, War Propaganda
Russia	14	Positive - Negative 1 Neutral 13	Tsarist Government in Russian Empire, the Peasant Reform in Russia, Russian Colonialism, Russo-Japanese War, Russian Revolution x 3, Russia before 1914, Russian Revolution x6
National	42	Positive - Negative 7 Neutral 35	The Polish Question in the Vienna Congress, The Kingdom of Poland, Development of Culture and Education in the Kingdom of Poland, Partitioned Poland, the Constitution in the Kingdom of Poland, Legal (Polish) Opposition, Illegal (Polish) Opposition, November Uprising x7, Polish Emigration, Repression after the November Uprising

			in the Kingdom of Poland, Situation of Poles in the Partitioned Lands, Wielkopolska Uprising 1848, the Peasant Reform in the Kingdom of Poland, Patriotic sentiment in the Kingdom of Poland, Wielkopolska Uprising, Conspiracy Groups for Independence, Wielkopolska Politics, January Uprising x4, Economic and social situation in the Russian part of Poland, Russification Policy against Poles, Polish Political Thought in the Russian part of Poland, Polish Political Parties in the Second Half of the 19th Century x2, Polish Question during the Crisis in Russia, Outbreak of Revolution in the Polish lands, policy of the tsarist authorities against Poles, Polish Uprising in the Final Phase of the Revolution, Polish Lands before the IWW, Poles in the Austro-Hungarian, German and Russian Army in the IWW, Józef Piłsudski in the beginning of the War, Act of November 1916, The Oath crisis between the Imperial German Army command and the Polish Legions during the IWW, the Polish Question and the Final Phase of the War, the Entente Powers and the Polish Question

Table 5.6 Perspectives and Themes of Sections with References to Russia in PL6

Perspective on Russia	References to Russia	Bias	Themes
General	-	-	-
Russia	3	Positive - Negative 2 Neutral 1	Russian Civil War and War Communism, the Starvation in Ukraine, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin
National	5	Positive - Negative 2 Neutral 3	Conceptions of Polish State Building, Polish-Ukrainian Conflict in the Eastern Galicia, the Development of Situation in the East, Polish-Bolshevik War, the Miracle of the Vistula River