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## Exemplary Others : Virtus, Roman Identity, and Hellenistic Kings in Republican and Augustan Historical Narratives

Lukkari, Jasmin

2023

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Lukkari, J 2023, 'Exemplary Others : Virtus, Roman Identity, and Hellenistic Kings in Republican and Augustan Historical Narratives', University of Helsinki, Universität zu Köln, Helsinki.

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<http://hdl.handle.net/10138/567057>

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Faculty of Arts  
University of Helsinki

## **EXEMPLARY OTHERS**

*VIRTUS*, ROMAN IDENTITY, AND HELLENISTIC KINGS  
IN REPUBLICAN AND AUGUSTAN HISTORICAL  
NARRATIVES

**Jasmin Lukkari**

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

To be presented for public discussion with the permission of the Faculty of Arts  
of the University of Helsinki, in Porthania, Auditorium PIII, on the 3rd of February,  
2023 at 15 o'clock.

Helsinki 2023

This dissertation was completed jointly in the Doctoral Programme in History and Cultural Heritage at the University of Helsinki and in the a.r.t.e.s. Graduate School for the Humanities Cologne, under co-tutelage agreement between the University of Helsinki and the University of Cologne.

ISBN 978-951-51-8865-6 (paperback)

ISBN 978-951-51-8866-3 (PDF)

University of Helsinki

Helsinki 2023

## ABSTRACT

In this work, I examine how and why certain kings of the Hellenistic East and Numidia were admired and even vindicated in several historical narratives of the republican and Augustan age – despite the circumstance that these kings had been enemies of Rome and, moreover, they represented monarchy, a system of government considered far inferior to that of the Roman Republic. I will also consider why and how these narratives likened certain Roman individuals to eastern kings and tyrants. My main sources are the works of Polybius (c. 200 – c. 118 BC), Sallust (86 – c. 35 BC), and Livy (64/59 BC – c. AD 17). I have particularly focused on Polybius’s and Livy’s later books, which only rarely have been studied from a narratological point of view. Pompeius Trogus, a contemporary of Livy, will be discussed to a limited extent through the later epitome written by Justin.

The authors in question wrote their works during a time when the Roman realm was rapidly expanding over the whole Mediterranean whilst the political system of the Roman Republic started to disintegrate and transform into an autocracy. In the wake of these developments, there had been increasing pressure to redefine Roman cultural identity, which had traditionally been based on republican moral values such as *virtus*; this pivotal virtue, “manliness”, entailed courage and self-discipline demonstrated on the battlefield. The general theoretical premise of the present study is that the understanding of the Self forms itself in relation to the Others and that cultural identities are dependent on historical narratives. Therefore, portrayals of foreign Others, such as Hellenistic kings, could be used to define the Self, namely Romanness, in the narratives.

Narrative portrayals of Hellenistic kings and Roman individuals were either negative or positive, and the Roman *virtus* could also be assigned to foreigners. However, scholars have been primarily concerned with the negative descriptions of Otherness. Therefore, in a bid to shed new light on the ideas of Roman identities, I have decided to focus on positive portrayals of foreign kings and on negative portrayals of Roman individuals. I argue that

these kinds of moral examples (*exempla*) were also an important part of the processes of identity construction in Roman literature. Moreover, I have employed methods of narratology that only rarely have been applied to the study of Roman historiography. In this study it will be shown that the historians used a great variety of narrative techniques, many of which are familiar to us from literary and audio-visual fiction, to create and convey moral examples: focalization, rhythm, narrative voices, speeches, and elements from the tragic genre.

In the analysis chapters of this study, I examine similar narratives and *exempla* of the above-mentioned historians systematically and comparatively. In chapter 2, I examine how and why both enemy kings and friendly kings were admired in the narratives. In chapter 3, I examine how and why certain Romans are represented in a negative light from the perspective of foreign kings. In chapter 4, I focus on Roman self-criticism in cases where Roman individuals are likened to stereotypical eastern kings and tyrants. The narratives promote the idea that those very same moral qualities (especially *virtus* and *pietas*) that made Hellenistic kings great leaders for their people and reliable allies for the Romans were also indispensable for Roman leaders. There was a strong notion among the Romans that they even needed valorous and virtuous enemies in order to maintain their own virtues. All the narratives that are examined in this study share the idea that, when the Romans ran out of strong enemies and brought excessive wealth to Rome after the conquest of the Mediterranean, the collective *virtus* of the Romans started to deteriorate and that this development also affected the Republic itself. The historical narratives illustrate this by gradually merging the Roman Self and the negative Other – in this case stereotypical eastern tyrants – until it is almost impossible to discern any moral difference between the two. This reflects the identity crisis of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC and the collective urge to rethink Romanness with the help of historical narratives.

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During the writing of this dissertation during the years 2016–2022, I have received the generous support from many individuals, institutions, and foundations. First and foremost, I sincerely thank my primary supervisor, Dr. Björn Forsén, for his constant patience and encouragement, and for always being available to help with any matters related to my studies.

I also wish to express my special thanks to my secondary supervisor, Professor Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp of the University of Cologne who, having accepted my request of co-tutelage, warmly welcomed me at his university and guided my first steps at the very beginning of my project. I am extremely grateful to Professor Werner Tietz for taking over the role of secondary supervisor upon Professor Hölkeskamp's retirement, even though my project was already nearing completion at that time.

I am deeply indebted to the preliminary examiners – Professor Giuseppe Zecchini and Associate Professor Gary D. Farney – for their insightful and encouraging comments that helped me improve my dissertation and consider possible future research subjects. I am also delighted that the latter has agreed to serve as my opponent in the public examination of this dissertation.

Dr. Kaj Sandberg deserves special thanks as well for acting as my de facto third supervisor – even if in an unofficial capacity – and for showing me the ropes in the world of Classical Studies.

I also thank Dr. Robert. M. Whiting for correcting the language of this dissertation.

All these people have put considerable effort into helping me improve my dissertation over the years, and for this I am grateful. Needless to say, I take full responsibility for any shortcomings still remaining in this text.

I passed the first two years of this project at the University of Cologne under a co-tutelage agreement, and I sincerely thank the staff of the a.r.t.e.s. Graduate School for the Humanities Cologne, the International Office, and the department of Ancient History for welcoming me into their wonderful, innovative, and international academic environment. Of course, I equally

thank the Doctoral Programme in History and Cultural Heritage at the University of Helsinki for their flexibility and continuous support throughout the years.

I conducted a large part of my doctoral studies and research at the Finnish Institutes in Rome and Athens. At the Finnish Institute in Rome, I specially thank Simo Örmä for always helping me with bureaucratic and library-related matters during my Roman sojourns. I thank Professor Tuomas Heikkilä, a former director of the institute, for inviting me into his research group in which I was given an opportunity to expand my skillset as a historian. I thank the Finnish Institute at Athens for hosting me during the of winter 2018–2019 as a doctoral fellow of the Society of Friends of the Finnish Institute at Athens (Suomen Ateenan-instituutin ystävät r.y.). I thank the former director Dr. Björn Forsén and the assistant director Dr. Antti Lampinen for inviting me to participate in the colloquium ‘Creating and Strengthening Identities: Greek and Roman Stereotypes of the East’, in February 2019.

I have had the privilege of working in many remarkable libraries of Classical Studies during this project. The libraries of the department of Classics at the University of Cologne, the American Academy in Rome, l'École française de Rome, l'École française d'Athènes, the Nordic Library in Athens, and the library of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan have been particularly important, and I thank them for welcoming me.

I have been lucky to receive funding from various sources. This endeavour would not have been possible without the scholarships granted to me by the Finnish Cultural Foundation, the Kone Foundation, the Ella and Georg Ehrnrooth Foundation, the University of Helsinki, and the Society of Friends of the Finnish Institute at Athens (Suomen Ateenan-instituutin ystävät r.y.).

The themes of my dissertation owe a lot to my basic education in the disciplines of History and Classical Philology, which I received at the University of Turku. I express my collective thanks to all the scholars who taught me there. Additionally, the courses in Classical Studies organized by the Finnish Institutes in Rome and Athens have been immensely important to me. Finally, I thank my teachers at the Sapienza University of Rome for a semester

there as an Erasmus student in 2013, learning about ancient Rome from Italian experts.

For moral and professional support, and for countless moments of joy, I extend my sincere thanks to friends and colleagues Dr. Holger Kaasik, Roosa Kallunki, Urpo Kantola, Saara Penttinen, Saku Pihko, and Anna-Maria Wilskman. Lastly, but definitely not least, I thank my family for always supporting me in everything – especially my husband Marcello and my sisters Mimosa and Viola, as well as my parents, my grandparents, my parents- and siblings-in-law, and my dog. I dedicate this work to all of you collectively, with the greatest gratitude.

Jasmin Lukkari

Helsinki, February 2023

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## ABBREVIATIONS

The abbreviations of names of ancient authors and of the titles of their works follow the guidelines of *Der neue Pauly*. Journals and periodicals are referred to by their complete names in the bibliography.

*CIL* = *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*

*HRR* = H. Peter, *Historicorum Romanorum reliquiae* (Vol. 1, 1914; Vol. 2, 1906, repr. 1967)

*ILS* = *Inscriptiones Latinae selectae*

*LTUR* = *Lexicon topographicum urbis Romae*

*OCD* = E. Eidinow, S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (eds.), *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (4<sup>th</sup> edition, 2012)

*OGIS* = W. Dittenberger, *Orientis Graeci inscriptiones selectae* (1903–1905, repr. 1960)

*ORF* = E. Malcovati, *Oratorum Romanorum fragmenta liberae rei publicae* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 1955)

*RRC* = M.H. Crawford, *Roman Republican Coinage* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Reprinted with corrections, 2001)

*Syll.* = F. Hiller von Gaertringen et al. (ed.), *Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum* (3<sup>rd</sup> edition, 1960)

*TLL* = *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae online*

# 1 INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

In this study, I examine how and why certain kings of the Hellenistic East and Numidia<sup>1</sup> were admired and even vindicated in several of the historical narratives of the Republican and Augustan<sup>2</sup> age – despite the circumstance that these kings had been enemies of Rome and, moreover, that they represented monarchy, a system of government considered inferior to that of the Roman *res publica*. I will also examine why and how, in the very same works, certain Roman individuals were likened to eastern kings and tyrants. My three main sources are the work of Polybius (c. 200 – c. 118 BC) with special emphasis on the later books, Sallust’s (86 – c. 35 BC) *De bello Iugurthino* (*The Jugurthine War*) along with the fragmentarily preserved *Historiae* (*Histories*), and Livy’s (64/59 BC – c. AD 17) *Ab urbe condita*. As for Livy, I will be primarily concerned with Books 31–45. I will also, to some lesser degree, discuss Pompeius Trogus. A lost work of this contemporary of Livy, partially surviving through Justin – a later writer – *Epitoma historiarum Pompei Trogi*, preserves evidence bearing on the questions I address. The methodological approach I have taken in this study is that of narratology combined with historical discourse analysis.

Roman identity was largely tied to the concept of *virtus* – i.e., “manliness” and courage – and the institutions and practices of the *res publica*.<sup>3</sup> One of the primary objectives of the historians discussed here was to

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<sup>1</sup> By the designation “Hellenistic East” I refer to the territories conquered by Alexander the Great in the period 334–323 BC, extending from Macedon to Egypt in the South and to the Indus Valley in the East. However, of relevance for my study are only those territories in which Roman military campaigns took place up to the beginning of the Mithridatic Wars in 89 BC. Though not part of the Hellenistic East, geographically, the Numidian Kingdom had taken on strong Hellenistic influences starting from the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC; see Kuttner 2013, 229–237. Numidian kings like Masinissa and Jugurtha are very prominent in the narratives. The Roman historians did not distinguish between different types of kingdoms on the conceptual level; see below pp. 66–68.

<sup>2</sup> In this thesis, the designation “Augustan” is used purely chronologically.

<sup>3</sup> *Virtus*, often simply translated “manliness”, is a complex concept evoking courage, self-discipline, and other war-like qualities. For a detailed definition, see below section 1.4. As for

provide historical *exempla* illustrating the republican *virtus*. These examples could be either negative or positive. Keeping this in mind, in this study I have been interested in examining what kind of similarities these historians saw between the concept of traditional Roman *virtus* and foreign kings. I attempt to demonstrate that positive portrayals of foreign kings and negative portrayals of Roman individuals could be used in various ways to define or redefine Roman identity in different eras and contexts. My premise is that negative descriptions of the Self and positive descriptions of the Other are two sides of the same coin and therefore inseparable – just like the much-studied positive descriptions of the Self and negative descriptions of the Other.<sup>4</sup> As a starting point for this study, I have used the well-known theories of Edward Said (*Orientalism*, 1978) and Stuart Hall (*Questions of Cultural Identity*, 1996) on Otherness and cultural identity. They both argue that a self-image is strengthened, or created in the first place, by being positioned against Others. With such discourses of Otherness, placing one’s own culture above other cultures, power relations with Others are created. Positive as well as negative characteristics can be examined separately and, moreover, safely removed from the Self, but at the same time they can also be polarized with respect to the Self.

The historians of the Late Republic in particular offer an excellent opportunity to examine how their narratives reflect the ideas of Roman cultural identity, as they lived and wrote during the transformation of the Republic into an autocracy which was a form of government that ever since the expulsion of the last king had been utterly alien to the Romans and strongly associated with the Hellenistic East.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, all forms of autocracy were so

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the English word “virtue”, I use it according to English usage, to designate any positive moral quality in a person, and not synonymously with the Latin word *virtus*.

<sup>4</sup> The Other can have various meanings, but in historical, cultural, and sociological studies this concept is usually used to designate an ethnic group that is external to, or a minority in, any given society.

<sup>5</sup> Obviously, the term “autocracy” has negative connotations for most modern readers, but it is an apt word to describe the sole rulership of Augustus, which was neither presented nor perceived as a monarchy. The Greeks commonly used the word “autocrat” (*αὐτοκράτωρ*) to denote an absolute ruler. Starting from Augustus’s reign, it was regularly used to denote the ruling emperor. “Sole rulership” is another concept I use in this study whenever an all-encompassing word for one man’s rule – whether monarchy, tyranny, autocracy, or kingship – is needed

strongly associated with non-Roman Others that merging it with Roman identity was not an easy or simple process, and Augustus's role in it was decisive. To this end, Augustus used pre-existing older discourses as an inspiration: history is, after all, indispensable for defining one's cultural identity. Furthermore, during the late Republic and Augustus's early reign, the relationship between the Roman citizenship and Roman identity was far from consolidated due to the extension of the Roman citizenship to all of the Apennine peninsula south of the Po Valley after the Social War.<sup>6</sup> Regarding Roman attitudes towards Greek culture, and regarding Roman cultural identities in the late republican and Augustan era, the works of Erich S. Gruen (*Culture and National Identity in Republican Rome*, 1992) and Andrew Wallace-Hadrill (*Rome's Cultural Revolution*, 2008) have been important inspirations. Defining Roman ideas of cultural identity is no trivial task because the notions in question were constantly transforming and evolving and because the Roman authors themselves are far from consistent about the subject. Moreover, there was not just one Roman identity but, rather, a multitude of different conceptions of it and even combinations where various facets of Romanness had been fused with other identities at the same time.<sup>7</sup>

We should also remember that various literary discourses of identity reflect the ideals of the time – not the reality – and that they were products of the elite – only a tiny fraction of the Roman population were privileged enough to receive an education. Yet, not even these discourses are completely detached from reality, as Paul J. Burton observes: “These representations of reality have not been created by ancient authors *ex nihilo*, but must be a reflection of the political and ideological mind-set of ancient diplomats and politicians – the main audiences for their historical works.”<sup>8</sup> And Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp has argued that the lower classes to some extent were able to share in this idealized image of Roman identity through the universal language of the

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<sup>6</sup> On these questions of Roman identity, see Dench 2005 and Farney 2007.

<sup>7</sup> For an important discussion on the co-existence of different identities within the same contexts, on the hybridity of identities, and on the concepts of Romanization and Hellenization, see Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 1–27. On the complexity of cultural and ethnic identities in ancient Rome, see Dench 2005, esp. 1–5, 26–35; Farney 2007. For the concept of multiple identities, in a discussion not limited to the ancient world, see Burke 2003, part IV; for the concept of cultural hybridity, see Werbner and Bhabha 2015.

<sup>8</sup> Burton 2011, 24–25.

historical moral examples that were presented not only in texts but also in public monuments, triumphs, and funerary processions.<sup>9</sup> Ayelet Haimson-Lushkov too observes that the historical *exempla* are “literary constructs meant to be read as an expression of cultural memory, articulated through narrative forms and rhetorical presentation”.<sup>10</sup> These literary constructs were of real relevance because they were important elements in the cultural discourse and political life in the Republic.<sup>11</sup>

In the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, research on Otherness in the realm of historical and classical studies became fashionable owing to the advances of postcolonial theory and the work of a number of influential scholars such as Arnaldo Momigliano (*Alien Wisdom*, 1975) and Edward Said (1978). According to the latter, Western Culture has created a certain discourse of the Middle East with a view to dominating and subordinating this part of the world. François Hartog (*Le miroir d'Herodote*, 1980) and Edith Hall (*Inventing the Barbarian*, 1989) were among the first to take this kind of approach in their study of the ancient Greek ideas of the East and the Others.<sup>12</sup> However, they have responded to Said's theory by focusing rather exclusively on the negative discourses of the Others in the Ancient World. In her important study, Edith Hall thoroughly examines the self-identity of the Greeks, along with their conceptions of other peoples, and also, albeit briefly, discusses their notion of “the noble barbarian”. For Hall, praise of the barbarian was merely a powerful literary device used to bring about an “inversion of the moral hierarchy” – further highlighting how the Greeks, almost invariably, thought of themselves as a superior people.<sup>13</sup> As for the negative ethnic stereotypes among the Romans, we must take note of Benjamin Isaac's comprehensive work *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity* (2004). In this study, Isaac deals solely with the many negative descriptions of foreign peoples and discusses how these expressions of

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<sup>9</sup> Hölkeskamp 2004, 172, 191–193. Also, the protagonists of many popular historical *exempla* were from the lower social classes. The funerary monuments of the people from lower social classes demonstrate concretely that they too participated in the exemplary discourse: Roller 2018, 9–10.

<sup>10</sup> Haimson Lushkov 2015, 18.

<sup>11</sup> Haimson Lushkov 2015, 25.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Hall 2002. For an early study on the Roman conceptions of “barbarians”, see Dauge 1981.

<sup>13</sup> Hall 1989, 211–223.

prejudice were used to justify Roman expansionism.<sup>14</sup> However, though significant and important as such, the exclusive study of negative representations of the Other yields a very incomplete picture of the various discourses of Otherness.

Moreover, just as the cultural perceptions of the Others are increasingly attracting scholarly attention in classical studies, so too are Greek and Roman assessments of foreign monarchs. Various questions pertaining to the co-existence of, and interconnections between, democratic and autocratic governments in the Ancient World are also receiving increasing attention.<sup>15</sup> Looking at the most recent studies on ancient monarchies, we also observe that the negative descriptions of Hellenistic kings have attracted the lion's share of scholarly attention. However, examining the literature of the Roman era we find many positive descriptions of foreign kings, even when these individuals in question had been enemies of Rome.<sup>16</sup> At the same time, especially in historiographical works, there are many examples of both direct and indirect criticism of Roman actions abroad and of the treatment, on the part of certain Romans, of some individual kings. While this observation is easily made, the many examples themselves clearly merit more attention on account of their exemplary and narrative nature, and with this study I attempt to help fill in what I consider a gap in previous research.

I have focused on portrayals of kings whom the Romans encountered personally, either in war or peace. It emerges from the sources, rather evidently, that among the most noteworthy of these kings were Pyrrhus (c. 319–272 BC), Masinissa (c. 238–148 BC), Antiochus III the Great (c. 241–187 BC), Philip V (238–179 BC), Perseus (c. 212–166 BC), Eumenes II (222–160

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<sup>14</sup> All these studies reflect this basic idea, put into words by E.S. Gruen (2011, p. 1): “A collective self-image, so it is commonly asserted, demands a contrast with other peoples and cultures. Or rather a contrast with the perceptions and representations of other peoples. They can serve as images and creations, indeed as stereotypes and caricatures. Denigration of the Other seems essential to shape the inner portrait, the marginalization that defines the center, the reverse mirror that distorts the reflection of the opposite and enhances that of the holder.”

<sup>15</sup> E.g., the publication series “Studies in Ancient Monarchies” of Franz Steiner Verlag starting from 2013: for this study especially relevant are Luraghi 2013b; Börm 2015a. Cf. Smith 1999. Interest in the Seleucid Empire seems to have spiked during the last two decades; see, e.g., Capdetrey 2007; Ehling 2008; Erickson and Ramsey 2011; Kosmin 2014; Engels 2017; Oetjen 2019; Coşkun and Engels 2019.

<sup>16</sup> Noted, e.g., by Ferrary 2014, 167–170.

BC), Jugurtha (c. 160–104 BC), and Mithridates VI Eupator (135/132–63 BC). At this point, I should explicitly state that I have decided not to include Hannibal (247–183 BC) in this study apart from brief mentions. Certainly, he could have easily been included in this study of Roman identity and portrayals of Others, even though he was not a king but a military commander. However, Hannibal is a very special character in the historical narratives – really in a category of his own. Scholars have recognized this, which has resulted in countless detailed studies of his characterization by Roman authors.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, I do not deal with Hannibal and the Second Punic War (218–201 BC) more profoundly in this study, but I will refer to previous studies whenever appropriate. In my own analysis, I focus on Polybius’s and Livy’s later books that have not been much studied from a narratological point of view.

There are many ways to study descriptions of foreign kings other than just analysing instances of explicit praise or vindication, which are fully covered in this thesis. An obvious approach is to examine all kinds of interactions between foreign rulers and various Roman individuals instead of solely the most violent or dramatic ones, because I believe that the exemplary discourse is constantly present in Roman historiography, even in descriptions of peaceful relations or seemingly unremarkable events.<sup>18</sup> Therefore, we should pay attention to the more subtle *exempla* as well and to the wider literary context and tradition of each particular *exemplum*. Plainly, one particular *exemplum* could serve different purposes for two different authors, and those purposes can be more easily discovered if all similar *exempla* are examined together.<sup>19</sup> Self-criticism, on the other hand, could appear in the form of vindication of Roman enemies, or it could manifest itself as descriptions of bad or immoral behaviour of individual Romans in various situations. Having decided to limit myself to examining more thoroughly Polybius, Sallust, Livy, and, to some extent, Pompeius Trogus, I will discuss

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<sup>17</sup> To mention some of the newest: Hoyos 2005; idem 2010; idem 2017; Levene 2010; Brizzi 2011; Stocks 2014.

<sup>18</sup> Similarly Chaplin 2000, 1–5; Haimson Lushkov 2015, 10, 16–18.

<sup>19</sup> A. Haimson Lushkov (2015, pp. 99–106) has analysed such an instance, Marius’s electoral campaign, in Sallust and Cicero.

only those Romans who are mentioned in the extant parts of my sources. This means that portrayals of men like Pompey or Antony are not directly analysed in this study, but that portrayals of men like Marius and Sulla will receive some attention.

In addition to the focus on the praise of the Other and criticism of the Self, in this study I have attempted to offer a novel approach to Roman historiography by applying the methods of narratology whenever opportune.<sup>20</sup> Studying historical narratives using the methods of narratology has become an increasingly popular trend in classics during the 21<sup>st</sup> century. What is still lacking, however, is a more focused attention to Roman historiography. As far as I know, there is no study that brings several different historical narratives of the republican and Augustan era together in order to systematically examine the narratorial choices and reasons behind each narrative. Many studies have focused on single authors from such viewpoints, but since this subject is tightly tied to the very complex concepts of *virtus* and cultural identity, it is useful to examine these narratives not only in their own contexts but also diachronically in relation to each other. Several accomplished and detailed studies on the literary techniques and styles of Polybius, Sallust, and Livy, and their mutual relationships already exist. In this study, I have not been interested in these much-studied technical aspects of their texts and styles but, rather, in the ideological and methodological aspects of their wider narrative schemes.

I believe that Roman historiography and other kinds of historical narratives<sup>21</sup> can be an extremely fruitful source group for the study of such a complex concept as cultural identity because history is and has always been commonly used to construct cultural identities. Frank Ankersmit has given a very comprehensive explanation of the importance of historical writing for understanding ideas of identity. He claims that much of the practice of historical writing can be fitted within the framework of “historical idea”.<sup>22</sup> According to Ankersmit, “a nation’s or an epoch’s historical idea expresses

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<sup>20</sup> There is more on narratology and historical narratives below in section 1.3.

<sup>21</sup> Other kinds of historical narratives include not only texts that are traditionally defined as historiography (e.g., Polybius, Sallust, and Livy) but also texts like epic, speeches, and letters (e.g., Ennius and Cicero) that had different literary goals and modes from historiography but still tell their own version of history.

<sup>22</sup> Ankersmit 2012.

what is unique about or characteristic of it [...] And what is unique or characteristic of it is its ‘essence,’ or its identity, which is best captured by its history, by an account of how it came into being” (p. 11). This idea or essence of Roman history is, I believe, what writers like Livy were pursuing. We should not locate the historical idea in the past but rather in the text of the historian. The historical idea gives shape to the historian’s narrative (or representation, as Ankersmit prefers to say) about the past. We should also remember that the past itself does not contain “some real counterpart to this structuring principle” of the historical idea (p. 13). Therefore, in this study I will attempt to elucidate this *idea* or *ideas* of Roman identity. I am accessing parts of it through historical narratives because that is the only place where it can be accessed.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, we can understand these historical narratives only in relation to other narratives. Their meaning is determined not so much by the author but by its context and by these other comparable narratives. That is why it is necessary to take as large a selection of all available sources as possible.<sup>24</sup>

## 1.2 SOURCES

### ***General notions of the sources and ancient historical narratives***

Even though I have focused on the works of Polybius, Sallust, and Livy in this thesis, I recognize “historical narratives” as a wider concept than just the works traditionally categorized as historiography. In my view, historical narratives can be found in any literary genre, such as letters, theatrical plays, poetry, speeches, or even non-literary works such as art. According to John Marincola, examining historical sources we should first ask ourselves whether

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<sup>23</sup> We can never understand the “whole” historical idea or the “reality” of anything in the past. We can only access some of its aspects through representations. For representations, see Ankersmit 2012, 64–86 and esp. 72–73; for meaning, see 126–156 and esp. 155–156.

<sup>24</sup> Ankersmit 2012, 147.

the source is narrative or non-narrative.<sup>25</sup> For him, the latter means a diachronic systematic explanation of something, such as chronologies or chronographies. A text can also mix narrative and non-narrative elements like those of Polybius do: Book 6 famously interrupts the main narrative in order to provide a presentation of the Roman *politeia*, whereas Book 34 deals with the structure of the known world. Marincola admits, however, that narrative movement can be latent and not obvious. Hayden White has demonstrated that even chronographies, which at first glance appear as detached lists of years and events, form a kind of a storyline that can be read as a narrative, even though the author did not mean to construct the text primarily as such.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, we could say that every text has narrative elements.

In his dialogue *On the Laws*, Cicero discusses the question of what constitutes historicity and what the readers expect from different genres.<sup>27</sup> He seems to say that in general historical writing should aim at telling the truth, but he admits that even the texts of Theopompus and of Herodotus are full of mythological fables. At the same time, poetry could also be history. The conclusion seems to be that whenever one writes about the distant past, it is only appropriate to repeat certain mythological stories known to everyone – in prose and poetry alike. Still, in his preface Livy felt the need to apologize for the fact that the beginning of his history is based on legends and advises his readers not to take these stories too literally.<sup>28</sup> For Cicero, the most important aspect that constituted history was the capacity to provide moral examples that could also be used in his time. The veracity or the genre of the text did not

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<sup>25</sup> Marincola 1999, 302–303.

<sup>26</sup> White 1987, 1–25. D. Carr claims that our lived experience itself already possesses a narrative structure: Carr 1986. For more on the theory of the historical narrative, see Roberts 2001; Ankersmit 2012, 34–36; Paul 2015, ch. 5. According to the “new historicist” theory, non-literary materials such as art can also be approached as narratives. One of the five key assumptions in new historicism is “that that literary and non-literary ‘texts’ circulate inseparably” (Veeser 1989, xi). Cf. Gallagher and Greenblatt 2000, 9–19; Veeser 1989, ix–xvi; Fox-Genovese 1989, 213–224.

<sup>27</sup> Cic. Leg. 1.5. Cf. Elliott 2013, 202–205.

<sup>28</sup> Liv. praef. Cf. Quint. Inst. 10.1.31. On the relationship of historiography, mythology, and legends, see Wiseman 1979, ch. 4.

matter to him.<sup>29</sup> Evidently, Cicero also thought that history and historical writing is the essential cornerstone for constructing cultural identity.<sup>30</sup>

Therefore, neither should we modern historians limit ourselves too much in terms of ancient literary genres when studying historical narratives and *exempla*.<sup>31</sup> For example, Ennius's historical epic *Annales* has not been considered as a serious attempt to write history because it overlaps the genres of historiography and epic and because it has Homeric and mythological content. However, Jackie Elliot rightly states that "Ennius' representation of Roman history was crucial to how Republican Romans understood their past and its relationship to their present identity."<sup>32</sup> Indeed, Livy and Cicero and other prose writers did not hesitate to use Ennius as their source of historical examples.<sup>33</sup> However, even though any text can be argued to contain historical narratives, differences between literary genres matter. I think that J.E. Lendon has a fair point in writing that we should not stop considering different ancient literary genres altogether, as some have suggested, because ancient historians themselves thought that they were writing history that had certain genre-specific models to follow.<sup>34</sup> Nevertheless, there was still ample room to experiment with different styles and narrative scopes within those genres. Marincola writes: "[I]nnovation constantly modified traditional forms, so that it is dangerous to assume uniformity of treatment by authors writing in the same genre".<sup>35</sup>

Even though Polybius, Sallust, and Livy lived during different periods of the Republic, they share an idea of moral decline, brought on by the expansion in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC. Moreover, they share a more or less critical view on

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<sup>29</sup> Elliott 2013, 210; Marincola 1999, 308. For Aristotle as well the form of the text was not as relevant as its content: Aristot. Poet. 1451a1–1451b7.

<sup>30</sup> F. Ankersmit claims that historical writing always precedes identity, and not the other way around: Ankersmit 2012, 2.

<sup>31</sup> E.g., Seeck 1983. On the possible impact of theatrical plays and public recitations on historical ideas during the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC, see Pausch 2011, ch. II.1.c.

<sup>32</sup> Elliott 2013, 198 and the introduction. Cf. Sandberg 2020, 217–218.

<sup>33</sup> Elliott 2013, 210ff.

<sup>34</sup> Lendon 2009. T.G. Rosenmeyer has even suggested that genres should be forgotten altogether, at least in Classics: Rosenmeyer 1985. Polybius, Sallust, and Livy were all very serious about their work as historians and described what historiography should be like; see the description of my main sources below. On earlier studies on the relationship of historiographical genre and literary fiction, see Pausch 2011, ch. I.1.

<sup>35</sup> Marincola 1999, 282.

Roman history and were not afraid of criticizing the Romans. Polybius, for example, openly admired the Romans, their government, and their military might, but was not afraid of criticizing their methods when criticism was due. Sallust was fiercely critical of the Roman society of his time, and Pompeius Trogus included such cutting anti-Roman speeches in his work that he has been called “anti-Roman” by some scholars. Livy treated the Romans most gently, at least in his extant books, but even for him the moral decline was evident from the mid-2<sup>nd</sup> century onwards. Neither self-criticism nor praise of an enemy were at all inappropriate in Roman historiography – it constituted a part of the historians’ mission to offer both inspiring and edifying as well as cautionary moral examples; both kinds of *exempla* always played important roles in the historical narratives of the Romans and in the construction of their cultural identity. Furthermore, even a Rome-centric work like Livy’s *Ab urbe condita* included descriptions of the deeds and thoughts of non-Roman agents in order to provide a complete and seemingly objective account of past events, as required by the conventions of ancient historiography.<sup>36</sup>

For all quotations and translations from ancient sources, I have used the newest available texts from the digital Loeb Classical Library, unless otherwise stated, with occasional minor modifications.<sup>37</sup> Of my main sources, Polybius has received revised translations between 2010 and 2012, and both Sallust’s monographs and the fragments of the *Histories* have been newly translated by J. C. Rolfe and J. C. Yardley in 2013 and 2015. For Livy, new Loeb translations by J. C. Yardley currently exist for books 21–40, published between 2017 and 2021. For Livy’s Books 41–45, I have opted for using J. D. Chaplin’s translations from *Rome’s Mediterranean Empire: Books 41–45 and the Periochae* (Oxford University Press, 2007), and for Justin’s *Epitoma historiarum Philippicarum Pompei Trogi* I have used J. C. Yardley’s translations from *Justin. Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus* (Scholars Press, 1994).

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<sup>36</sup> Pausch 2011, IV.1.a–b.

<sup>37</sup> This decision was influenced by the Covid-19 pandemic during the last two years (2020–2022) of my dissertation project, when physical access to libraries was restricted or impossible.

## ***Main authors and works in detail***

Polybius was probably born around the year 200 BC in Megalopolis, which was a part of the Achaean League that allied itself with the Romans against Philip V.<sup>38</sup> Polybius's father was Lycortas, an influential politician, and Polybius was destined to follow his father's example and become a politician himself. However, after the Romans defeated Perseus in 168 BC, Polybius was one of the thousand Achaeans who were taken to Italy as hostages because the Romans doubted their loyalty. The hostageship lasted for 17 years, during which time Polybius became a teacher and eventually a close friend of Scipio Aemilianus.<sup>39</sup> Polybius led quite a free life in Rome, and he became acquainted with several people of high rank: Roman nobles, scholars, foreign kings, princes, and ambassadors alike. Together with his personal experiences, and documents and literature available to him, his numerous personal relations were an important source for his *Histories*.<sup>40</sup> He started writing this work in Rome and completed it over several decades.<sup>41</sup> His readership consisted of educated Romans but also Greeks.<sup>42</sup>

Polybius had the opportunity to travel extensively during his life. He naturally knew the Greek world well, but he also visited Gaul, Africa, and Spain together with Scipio Aemilianus and other Romans. When the Achaean hostages were freed in 151/150 BC, Polybius chose to stay at Scipio's side for a while longer and witnessed the destruction of Carthage with his own eyes.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> For more detailed introductions to Polybius's life and the *Histories*, see Walbank 1957; idem 1972; Dreyer 2011; Thornton 2020. For a good compact introduction, see Champion 2004, 15–24.

<sup>39</sup> Scipio Aemilianus was 17 years old and Polybius in his thirties when they met. Polybius writes that Scipio Aemilianus was like family to him and their friendship was a universally known fact: Pol. 31.23–24, 31.25.1. For the friendship between Polybius and Scipio Aemilianus, see Diod. Sic. 31.26.5; Vell. Pat. 1.13.3; Plut. Mor. 659F; Burton 2011, 70–73; Thornton 2020, 97–99. For the effects of the hostageship on Polybius's attitudes, see Allen 2006, 201–223.

<sup>40</sup> Polybius also thought that a man who had no personal experience of war or politics could not be a good historian: Pol. 12.15.e and g. For personal acquaintances and letters as Polybius's sources, see Zecchini 2018a, ch. 2 and 3.

<sup>41</sup> It is difficult to determine when Polybius wrote or revised each book. I follow the example of C.B. Champion and examine the *Histories* as a whole, considering it in the general historical context: Champion 2004, 10–12.

<sup>42</sup> Pol. 6.11.3, 10.4.9, 31.22.8. C.B. Champion has argued that Polybius did not want to alienate either his Roman or his Greek audiences by favouring one side too clearly: Champion 2000; idem 2004.

<sup>43</sup> Liberation of the Achaean hostages: Pol. 30.13.1–12; Liv. 45.31.

Afterwards, in 146 BC, Polybius returned to Greece and stayed there to mediate between the Romans and the Achaeans after the destruction of Corinth.<sup>44</sup> Craige B. Champion has described Polybius's remarkably unique life well with a few words: "In roughly twenty years, Polybius had moved from leading Achaean statesman to political prisoner at Rome to mediator in the Roman resettlement of Greece, becoming in this process a uniquely qualified universal historian of the unification of the Mediterranean basin under Rome's aegis."<sup>45</sup> We do not know much of his later life besides this. He reached an old age and perhaps died soon after 120 BC: the last datable event mentioned in his *Histories* (3.39.8) is the construction of the Via Domitia.

Polybius obviously was a Greek and wrote in Greek, but this does not mean that he could not participate in the literary discourses of Roman identity and the Roman past, and therefore he can be categorized as a "Roman" historian.<sup>46</sup> Polybius certainly excelled in his task, and many Roman historians who wrote after him used his *Histories* as a source. In Polybius's time, the Roman and Hellenistic worlds had become so much intertwined that multicultural experts like Polybius were commonplace in Rome. Regardless of Polybius's personal experiences and respect for Rome, he does not blindly praise Rome in his *Histories*, even though he does argue that the Roman Republic during the Second Punic War (218–201 BC) had been superior to all other political systems. In accordance with his conviction that a historian should be as truthful as possible, he gave praise and criticism when either was due, to Romans and non-Romans alike.<sup>47</sup> Craige B. Champion has argued that

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<sup>44</sup> For these later phases of Polybius's life, see Baronowski 2011, 131–137; Thornton 2020, 113–136.

<sup>45</sup> Champion 2004, 18.

<sup>46</sup> A person could, for example, identify as a Roman and a Greek at the same time. Attaining Roman citizenship did not cancel or demote other earlier identities. None of the other authors so far mentioned were born in Rome either, even though they wrote in Latin. Cicero and Ennius, for example, said that they had several identities: Cic. Att. 2.2, 2.3, 2.5; Gell. NA 17.17.1; Farney 2007, 5–11; Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 3–7. We can also imagine that Pompeius Trogus, judging from his Roman-Gallic name, might have identified himself as a Roman and a Gaul at the same time, even though already his grandfather had received the Roman citizenship from Pompey. On Trogus's multiple identities, see Borgna 2018, 203–210. A. Wallace-Hadrill recognizes "intellectual life as a fundamental feature of the romanisation process, if by that we mean the spread to the cities of Italy and the provinces of a common language and culture in which all were active participants": Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 19. Cf. Pausch 2011, ch. II.1.b.

<sup>47</sup> He criticized those who blindly praised only one side of wars and conflicts: Pol. 1.14, 8.8. One clear example of Polybius's sometimes openly opposing the Romans is when he proudly

Polybius was often purposefully ambivalent in his description of the Roman culture because he was writing to both Roman and Greek audiences and wanted to assert his independent political agency.<sup>48</sup>

Polybius had a wide narrative scheme, the aim of which was to tell how the Romans became the undisputed masters of the Mediterranean between the end of the First Punic War (264–241 BC) and the Battle of Pydna in 168 BC.<sup>49</sup> He later decided to expand his *Histories* with ten more books up to the year 146 BC, when the Romans destroyed Carthage and Corinth. After narrating these last events, Polybius declared in the epilogue: “As I said, students by this treatment will attain the best and most salutary result, which is to know how and by what system of polity the whole world was subjected to the single rule of Rome — an event without any parallel in the past.”<sup>50</sup> Polybius’s work was a universal history and for this reason it was not structured in a traditional Roman annalistic manner but, rather, more thematically and geographically. Polybius was interested in causal connections in history.<sup>51</sup> Hence, he also analysed, sometimes boldly, psychological reasons for various political situations, as was the case with his description of Philip V and Perseus. Polybius thought that it was a historian’s duty to be as truthful as possible. He criticized those historians who invested in style at the expense of facts and clarity.<sup>52</sup> This does not mean, of course, that Polybius did not employ narrative

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writes how he helped the Seleucid prince Demetrius escape from Rome against the will of the senate: Pol. 31.11–15. It is of course possible that Polybius published these parts only after having been liberated himself: Allen 2006, 222–223. Polybian scholars have tried to determine if or how “pro-Roman” Polybius was (e.g., Walbank 1972, 166–183), but the matter is too complicated for a simple answer; see Champion 2000, Thornton 2020. For a summary of the previous scholarly discussion on Polybius’s opinions about the Romans, see Baronowski 2011, 5–11. Baronowski himself thinks that even though Polybius did not hesitate to criticize the Romans when it was due, he did think that Roman dominion was justified and well deserved: Baronowski 2011, esp. 164–175.

<sup>48</sup> Champion 2004, 8, 235–239, and *passim*. J. Thornton (2020) argues that Polybius was as much a historian as he was a politician.

<sup>49</sup> Morgan 1990, 37–53; Mittag 2006, 214–223. Polybius tells his readers about his narrative scheme: Pol. 3.1. Cf. Walbank 1972, 166–183.

<sup>50</sup> Pol. 39.8.7–8: ἐξ ὧν τὸ κάλλιστον ἔφαμεν, ἅμα δ’ ὠφελιμώτατον περιγενέσθαι τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσι· τοῦτο δ’ ἦν τὸ γινῶναι πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔπεισε τὴν Ῥωμαίων, ὃ πρότερον οὐχ εὐρίσκειται γεγονός. Cf. Pol. 1.1.2.

<sup>51</sup> Pol. 3.6.6, 3.32, 6.2.8, 9.19a.

<sup>52</sup> Pol. 16.17.9–11, 16.18.2–3, 16.20.1–4, 29.12, 38.4. Errors could be pardoned but deliberate distortion of the facts not: Pol. 12.12.4. About the usefulness of digressions: Pol. 38.5–6.

devices or was not biased in some of his analyses (for example regarding the Scipionic family).<sup>53</sup>

Polybius was greatly respected and cited in antiquity.<sup>54</sup> Despite this circumstance, out of altogether forty books only the first five are wholly extant today. Of the lost books, we have excerpts of varying length, except for the completely lost Books 17, 19, and 37. Many of these fragments have been further condensed by the scribes who copied them. This makes analysing Polybius's fragmentary books challenging, but with such a large number of fragments we may attempt to detect wider narrative schemes and recurring narrative elements that guided his original work.

We now turn to Sallust, chronologically my second main source. C. Sallustius Crispus was born in Amiternum, circa 130km north-east of Rome, in 86 BC, and he probably died in 35 BC.<sup>55</sup> This means that he belongs to the same generation as Catullus, M. Junius Brutus, and Mark Antony. Sallust aspired to a political career from an early age (Catil. 3.3.) and his first attested office is his tribunate in 52 BC. This was a politically tempestuous year in Rome as opposing factions were violently competing for power. Somehow Sallust survived the year unharmed despite the numerous cases of violence and expulsion. However, soon after, in 50 BC, the censor Appius Claudius exiled Sallust from the senate perhaps as part of a political purge.<sup>56</sup> Sallust became a supporter of Julius Caesar and commanded one of Caesar's legions in Illyricum late in 49 BC, however with bad results.<sup>57</sup> Again in 47 BC, Caesar trusted Sallust, then a praetor-elect, with a mission to suppress a mutiny in Caesar's legions in Campania, but Sallust failed once again.<sup>58</sup> He still continued to serve Caesar and regained his place in the senate through his

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<sup>53</sup> He himself admits that a certain amount of partiality should be allowed to a historian as long as it did not alter the facts: 16.14.6–10. C.B. Champion notes that even though Polybius appears to be a mostly objective narrator, there are several instances where Polybius uses his own authorial voice to comment on the events: Champion 2004, 24–28.

<sup>54</sup> Dionysius of Halicarnassus, however, complained that Polybius's style was very boring: Dion Hal. de comp. 4.30.

<sup>55</sup> For general introductions to Sallust, see Büchner 1960; Syme 1964; McGushin 1992; Ramsey 2013.

<sup>56</sup> Cass. Dio 40.63.4.

<sup>57</sup> Oros. 6.15.8.

<sup>58</sup> App. B Civ. 2.92; Cass. Dio 42.52.1f.

praetorship and by securing supplies for Caesar's troops during the dictator's African campaign.<sup>59</sup> He seemed to have gained Caesar's trust, for after the battle of Thapsus Sallust became governor of the new province Africa Nova until 45 BC, when he returned to Rome.<sup>60</sup>

After the murder of Caesar in 44 BC, Sallust retired from public life. He was wealthy enough to commission splendid gardens for himself in Rome and to dedicate his time to writing history, an activity that he considered to be as beneficial to the *res publica* as public service.<sup>61</sup> He seemed to enjoy sufficient favour with Caesar's successors Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus, for he survived the proscriptions of the triumvirs unharmed.<sup>62</sup> During the decade prior to his death, he wrote three works: the *Catiline conspiracy*, the *Jugurthine War*, and the *Histories*. Many scholars count the *Letters to Caesar* and the *Invective against Cicero* among Sallust's extant works as well, but it is not certain whether the authorship is his.<sup>63</sup> For the first two works, Sallust chose the format of a contemporary monograph in eloquent and sharp prose style instead of the traditional annalistic style. Before Sallust started writing, Cicero had complained that Roman historians before his time were just *narratores rerum*, uninteresting and lacking in style and deeper analysis.<sup>64</sup>

The common opinion is that Sallust's first text was the monograph *Catiline conspiracy*, an intense psychological narrative about the failed conspiracy of the senator Catiline to overthrow the consuls Cicero and C. Antonius Hybrida in 63 BC. Sallust himself had been a young man at that time. He published the *Catiline conspiracy* most probably at the end of 42 BC, after

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<sup>59</sup> Bell. Afr. 8.3, 34.1–3. Cassius Dio wrote that Sallust was an abusive and greedy governor: Cass. Dio 43.9.2, 43.47.4. Sallust himself admits that when he was young, he too fell victim to the typical vices of his era: Sall. Catil. 3.3–5.

<sup>60</sup> Bell. Afr. 97.1.

<sup>61</sup> On a historian's work according to Sallust: Sall. Catil. 3–4, Jug. 4. Cf. La Penna 1968, 25–32. For Sallust's prologues, see Büchner 1960, 91–130.

<sup>62</sup> There are no clear indications of Sallust's relationship with or opinion about Octavian in the extant parts of his works. For Sallust and Octavian, see Zecchini 2018b.

<sup>63</sup> F. Pina Polo (2021) argues that these could be Sallust's authentic works and lists scholars who have thought the same: Pina Polo 2021, 178 n. 4. Contra: Novokhatko 2009; Ramsey 2013, xxix–xxxi.

<sup>64</sup> Cic. De or. 2.51 ff, Leg. 1.5 ff, Brut. 228. Cicero in fact suggested that a monograph format could work well with historiography: Cic. Fam. 5.12. L. Coelius Antipater had already written a historical monograph before Sallust, but it did not achieve much popularity: Cic. De or. 2.54, Leg. 1.6. Cf. Ramsey 2007, 7–10. For the change in historiographical trends in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC, see Pausch 2011, ch. II.2.a.

all the involved persons, including Cicero, had died. After this he wrote his second monograph, the *Jugurthine War*, which concentrates on the character of King Jugurtha of Numidia and the Jugurthine war, waged from 112 to 106 BC. Sallust had served Caesar in his campaign against Pompey's ally Juba I, who was the grandson of Gauda, Jugurtha's half-brother, and after this war Sallust became the governor of Africa Nova, a new province founded in Eastern Numidia. Therefore, Sallust had extensive first-hand experience of this area, but he shows no interest in making this fact evident in his narrative. Rather, he concentrates on the moral and psychological aspects in his narrative, just as he did in the *Catiline conspiracy*. The character of Jugurtha plays a role very similar to Catiline as an immensely talented individual who succumbs to the corrupting influence of personal ambition and of the greed of the Roman nobility.<sup>65</sup>

Lastly, Sallust started writing the *Histories* in five books with an annalistic structure, covering the years 78–67 BC. Jennifer Gerrish has argued that even though Sallust wrote about the events of the 70s, he was indirectly telling about his time of writing in the triumviral period after Caesar's death.<sup>66</sup> Sallust might have wanted to start his *Histories* from the death of Sulla, since he wrote that the historian L. Cornelius Sisenna had already covered the age of Sulla quite adeptly and he himself did not want to write about Sulla.<sup>67</sup> It is possible that the *Histories* was intended to be a more substantial work, but Sallust's death at the age of 50 or 51 thwarted such plans. Unfortunately, it is hard to study the *Histories* as a whole, because the work has survived only in fragments.<sup>68</sup> Even from what survives, however, it is clear that he maintained the moralizing tone familiar from his monographs.

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<sup>65</sup> Ramsey 2013, xxxvii–xl.

<sup>66</sup> She calls this “analogical historiography”: Gerrish 2019, 1–5, and ch. 1 and 2. Gerrish (pp. 9–18) specifies that the “triumviral period” started with Caesar's death and lasted at least until the death of Sallust in 35 BC. She argues that not only Sallust's works but also other literature produced in this period was distinctive because of the certain pain of the civil war, identity crisis, and general pessimism that comes across from the works of Cicero, and the earliest texts of Virgil, Livy, and Horace – texts that do not sit well in the categories of “republican literature” or “Augustan literature”.

<sup>67</sup> Sall. *Iug.* 95.2.

<sup>68</sup> A. Feldherr has excluded the fragments of the *Histories* from his monograph on Sallust's narrative, because he deems analysing them too speculative: Feldherr 2021, 13–14. A. La Penna (1968) and recently J. Gerrish (2019) have nonetheless attempted to study the *Histories* as a whole and define its overall scope.

Sallust's reputation as a historian was great in antiquity. The later historian Tacitus called him *rerum Romanarum florentissimus auctor*, Quintilian even ranked him ahead of Livy, and Martial described him as the "first" among the Roman historians.<sup>69</sup> His works were used as a source, translated, commented, and imitated. In late antiquity and the Middle Ages, the high admiration for his stylish and moralizing texts continued, and they were often used in schools to teach Latin. Indeed, the *Catiline conspiracy* and the *Jugurthine War* have survived almost in their entirety to our time.<sup>70</sup> The fate of the *Histories* turned out to be quite different: we only have two letters, four speeches, and 500 other fragments of varying length.<sup>71</sup>

Livy's *Ab urbe condita* is the work that receives most of the attention in this study, obviously, on account of the sheer amount of extant text. Titus Livius was born in Patavium (nowadays Padova) in Northern Italy, in 64 or 59 BC, and he died sometime after AD 17.<sup>72</sup> Thus, he lived through the last decades of the republican era. Livy probably arrived in Rome for the first time towards the mid-30s BC and started writing *Ab urbe condita*, a detailed history of Rome from the founding to his own times. He had probably finished the first five books by 27 BC, at a time when Octavian (now Augustus) had recently defeated his last enemies, Antony and Cleopatra, and attained sole power.<sup>73</sup> Livy did not take part in public life: historians like Livy represented a new trend of "professionalization" of Roman historiography.<sup>74</sup>

Livy too took the historian's profession very seriously. In the preface, he says that the purpose of his history was to give as truthful a description of the

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<sup>69</sup> Tac. Ann. 3.30; Quint. Inst. 2.5.19; Mart. 14.191.

<sup>70</sup> They have been transmitted together in several extant manuscripts, of which the two oldest are from the 9<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>71</sup> A single manuscript from the 9<sup>th</sup> century contains only the speeches and letters of the *Histories*, and the monographs. It descended from a collection probably put together in antiquity for use in the schools of rhetoric. Sallust is the most quoted Latin prose author in extant ancient literature, hence the several fragments, even though we must keep in mind that authors often cited from memory. For a detailed explanation of the manuscript tradition, see Ramsey 2013, liii–lx.

<sup>72</sup> For general introductions to Livy, see Ogilvie 1965; Walsh 1974; Luce 1977; Heckel 2000; Chaplin and Kraus 2009; Mineo 2015a. There are various opinions about Livy's birthyear; see the summaries of the different arguments in Badian 1993, 10–11; Mineo 2015a, xxxiii.

<sup>73</sup> For detailed considerations of when Livy started writing and what the world around him was like at that time, see Syme 1959, 42–57; Vasaly 2015, 1–8. For the dating of Livy's first books, see Luce 1965.

<sup>74</sup> Pausch 2011, ch. II.1.b.

past as possible and show how and why Roman *virtus* had declined from the days of the old Republic before expansion.<sup>75</sup> However, Dennis Pausch has argued that Livy did not attempt to put forth just one “truth” for the readers, but he also strived to entertain the readers and he actively invited the readers to think for themselves about the complexities of historical trajectories.<sup>76</sup> Out of the 142 books of *Ab urbe condita*, 35 are mostly extant today, comprising the events before 293 BC (Books 1–10) and during the period 219–166 BC (Books 21–45). There is also an abridgement of Livy’s work, the *Periochae*, which was created in antiquity, listing the contents of each of Livy’s books (except for the lost summaries of Books 136 and 137).<sup>77</sup> However, the *Periochae* sometimes diverge from the extant books of Livy, and therefore we should not use them to reconstruct the precise contents and ideas of Livy’s lost books.

We do not know for sure if Livy knew Augustus personally. Livy’s last books that deal with his own era have not survived and there are no clear indications of his relationship with Augustus in the *Periochae* or other extant literature, even though certain famous passages seem to indicate that the two men had some direct interactions.<sup>78</sup> For example, Tacitus wrote that even though Livy praised Pompey so much that Augustus called him “Pompeian”, “*neque id amicitiae eorum offecit*”. Without entering too deep into this discussion, it suffices here to note that I think Ernst Badian is right in saying that 1) *amicitia* could mean anything from an actual friendship to an absence of hostility, and 2) it would have been very dangerous to *not* be Augustus’s *amicus* in this context.<sup>79</sup> This does not necessarily mean that Livy was “pro-Augustus” somehow. In fact, we should abstain from using binary terms such as “anti-Augustus” or “pro-Augustus” in this very complex historical context.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> On Livy’s preface and methods, see Vasaly 2015, ch. 2.

<sup>76</sup> Pausch 2011, ch. I.3, II.2.b, II.3. Livy might have had a possibly close relationship with some members of the Julio-Claudian family, though: reportedly, Livy had encouraged the young future emperor Claudius to write history: Suet. Claud. 41.

<sup>77</sup> Bringham 1978; Jal 1984, two volumes; Chaplin 2010; Bessone 2015.

<sup>78</sup> Liv. 4.20.5–11; Tac. Ann. 4.34; Suet. Claud. 41.1.

<sup>79</sup> Badian 1993, 11–12.

<sup>80</sup> Kennedy 1992; Albrecht 2016, 18–21. On this complex historical context, see Pausch 2011, ch. II.1.b.

Livy's work contains many different nuances and is based on a vast preceding literary tradition. His work is certainly adapted to the discourses of his own era, but when Livy, or anyone else for that matter, praised ancient republican morals, it did not necessarily mean that the author was doing it directly for Augustus. They simply were actual themes and happened to coincide with the interests of Augustus.<sup>81</sup> T.J. Luce writes that “[i]nstead of searching for Augustan allusions in Livian history, it might be more profitable to investigate to what extent Augustan policy was influenced by the Livian concept of the Roman past.”<sup>82</sup> Of course, authors could not be openly hostile towards Augustus lest they get into serious trouble. Based on the extant books, Livy certainly seemed to admire the Roman Republic and treated the general subject of sole rulership critically but carefully. According to Bernard Mineo, Livy's concept of history seems to be cyclical, which means that for him history repeated the same pattern of moral decline and renewal. Mineo argues that for Livy, Augustus might have represented a point of renewal, at least in the later books.<sup>83</sup> The end of the civil wars and the peace seemed to have impressed Livy, and after the first books his image of the future, which was based on the imagined glorious past, seemed to be more optimistic.<sup>84</sup>

Livy chose to structure his work annalistically according to consular years.<sup>85</sup> In addition to Polybius, Livy mentions Valerius Antias, Q. Claudius

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<sup>81</sup> Cf. Pianezzola 2018, 49–62; Galinsky 1996, 283. C. Balmaceda summarizes earlier discussions on the subject: Balmaceda 2017, 87–92.

<sup>82</sup> Luce 1965, 240. Cf. Mineo 2015c, 136: “What should be underlined is the fact that his education and intellectual output—and that he was initially drawn to philosophy—probably led him to adopt a very Ciceronian philosophical interpretation of these *virtutes* that Augustus had the intention of personifying, all the while remaining perfectly aware of their political exploitation at the time of the establishment of the principate.” Cf. Chaplin 2000, 192: “Nowadays it is more common to assume some complexity in the relationship between the two men. Perhaps Livy crafted a posture of uncertainty that allowed him room to write history beyond the reach of Augustus's authority; certainly the two men were almost exact contemporaries and no doubt capable of a mutual but independent participation in a post-civil-war *Zeitgeist*.” Cf. Feldherr 1997; Luce 1977, 296–297; Levene 1993, 243–248; Miles 1995, 47–54; Chaplin 2000, ch. 6; Pianezzola 2018, 49–62.

<sup>83</sup> Mineo 2015b.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. Mineo 2015c. For moral decline in Livy's work, see Balmaceda 2017, ch. 3. Strong signs of Trogius's congruence with this optimism (regarding a “golden age”) can also be found in Justin's *Epitoma*, see Levene 2007; Yarrow 2006, 203. An example of Livy's optimism: Liv. 9.16–19.

<sup>85</sup> For example, if we compare Livy's work to Polybius, who was Livy's most important source for events in the Hellenistic East, Livy's narrative transits chronologically from one event to another in a continuous fashion, whereas Polybius's narrative is ordered in separate thematic chapters that often overlap chronologically: Walsh 1954, 112–113. P.G. Walsh calls this a

Quadrigarius, P. Rutilius Rufus, and Cato's *Origines* as his sources.<sup>86</sup> Livy does not mention any other Greek-writing historians apart from Polybius. However, it seems that Livy also used Thucydides and Herodotus and some other Greek sources. Of all the sources, Polybius is undoubtedly his most important and preferred source for the Roman wars in the Hellenistic East – the focus of this study – in Books 31–45.<sup>87</sup> For example, all the speeches of this period present in Polybius can also be found in Livy. However, Livy's use of Polybius was sometimes awkward, for he had problems with geographical matters, the Greek language, and chronology. Indeed, there are no hints in his text or elsewhere that he had ever visited the Greek East personally. Also, Livy's mistakes in citing Polybius for battles and other events laden with military vocabulary betray his lack of personal experience in military matters.<sup>88</sup>

The strength of Livy might not lie in his technical accuracy but, rather, in his own personal style that highlighted the psychological, emotional, and moral aspects of historical events and characters. He did not just translate Polybius, but he often added something or changed the mood of the narrative into a style more suitable for his purposes and re-worked the speeches to adapt them to the Roman rhetorical style.<sup>89</sup> Jane D. Chaplin has encapsulated this well:

But, as far as we can tell from what survives of Livy's predecessors, his deployment of *exempla* represents something of a departure, either not coinciding in content with his sources or further developing ideas about

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“switch technique” and essentially he seems to mean that in order to create smooth narrative transitions Livy constantly switches between different viewpoints (or focalizations, but Walsh does not use these narratological concepts). Livy did not follow the annalistic form rigidly, however, but included for example many flashbacks, flashforwards, and digressions; see Pausch 2011, ch. II.2.a, III.

<sup>86</sup> All references: Heckel 2000, xxvi–xxix n. 38. On Livy's annalistic sources, see Petzold 1993. On the complex relationship between Livy, annalists, and historiography, see Wiseman 1979, ch. 4.

<sup>87</sup> Champion 2015. For detailed analyses on the relation between Livy and Polybius, see Tränkle 1977; Levene 2010, 126–163; Pianezzola 2018. Levene thinks, differently from Tränkle, that Livy used Polybius already from the beginning of the third decade and not just from the end.

<sup>88</sup> Champion 2015, 196.

<sup>89</sup> Chaplin 2000, 23–29; Eckstein 2015, 409. Older detailed studies of Livy's style and narrative adaptations: Witte 1910; Burck 1962; Walsh 1954; McDonald 1957; Tränkle 1972; Pianezzola 2018. For Sallust as a possible model for Livy, see Chaplin 2000, 25–29.

exemplary learning that are not fully exploited in previous historians. So although he was working in a moralizing tradition, and although historians of Rome before him had used historical examples, at the same time Livy finds *exempla* where others do not, adapts those in his sources, and generally goes beyond his predecessors in the depth and complexity of his interest.<sup>90</sup>

It is therefore obvious that Livy's narrative has to be analysed against that of Polybius when studying his moral *exempla*, as in this thesis. Such comparisons pose some specific challenges, however. Simply because the texts we have to work with are often very fragmentary and corrupt, we can never be sure of having the exact original wording of these authors. For example, parts of Polybius's text have clearly been compressed by a later scribe. Therefore, if there is something present in Livy's text but it is missing in the corresponding passage of Polybius, it can sometimes be nearly impossible to determine if Livy has added details to his text or if Polybius's text has been condensed.<sup>91</sup> Nonetheless, a large selection of examples from both authors can help us recognize possible recurring patterns. Also, a great number of detailed studies and commentaries exist about Livy's sources, and they are of great help when trying to analyse each individual passage.

In addition to these main sources, I discuss some parts – mostly those regarding the Mithridatic Wars – of Pompeius Trogus's/Justin's work in detail in this thesis. Therefore, a short presentation of this complex but interesting source is in order. Pompeius Trogus, a third generation Roman,<sup>92</sup> lived sometime during the late 1<sup>st</sup> century BC and the early 1<sup>st</sup> century AD and wrote

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<sup>90</sup> Chaplin 2000, 29.

<sup>91</sup> Moreover, there is a possibility that differences between Polybius's and Livy's versions are due to Livy's preference for an annalistic source; see Carawan 1988. Even in those cases, however, Livy had still deliberately decided to deviate from Polybius's version, just as when he changed details without an existing model.

<sup>92</sup> His family originated from the Vocontii people of the province of Gallia Narbolensis (a province of Rome since 118 BC). The grandfather of Trogus served in the army of Pompey in the Sertorian wars (77–72 BC). Pompey gave him citizenship, validated by the *Lex Gellia Cornelia* of the year 72 BC. His paternal uncle had even commanded a squadron of cavalry at the end of the Third Mithridatic war under Pompey's command (66–63 BC). His family then changed sides, for the father had been a secretary of Julius Caesar (Just. Epit. 43.5.11–12); see Alonso-Núñez 1987, 57; Develin 1994, 2–3; Ballesteros Pastor 2013, 1–4. For a detailed analysis of everything we know and can plausibly presume of the person and work of Pompeius Trogus, see Borgna 2018, 25–33, 131–202.

in Latin about the history of the eastern Mediterranean from the birth of the Persian empire until the age of Augustus in his voluminous work which was possibly titled *Historiae Philippicae*.<sup>93</sup> This was an unprecedented viewpoint for a Roman historian, for his predecessors Sallust and Livy and others who wrote in Latin had written from the Roman point of view.<sup>94</sup> Trogus probably ended his histories with AD 6 and wrote the last book after this. The *terminus ante quem* for his work is AD 9.<sup>95</sup>

Even though Trogus seemed to enjoy a great reputation as a historian in antiquity, Trogus's work has not been preserved.<sup>96</sup> However, hundreds of years later, in the imperial era, a man called Marcus Junianus<sup>97</sup> Justinus, usually referred to as Justin, made an abridgement of it, titled *Epitoma historiarum Pompei Trogi*.<sup>98</sup> Estimates on how long the original work by Trogus was vary between five and ten times longer than Justin's abbreviation. While Trogus's original work has been lost, Justin's epitome apparently

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<sup>93</sup> The title refers to king Philip II of Macedon, which in turn emphasizes Trogus's intention to focus on Greece and Macedon. It probably also refers to Trogus's source *Philippica* by the Greek rhetorician and historian Theopompus; see Alonso-Núñez 1987, 58. The longer title of *Historiae Philippicae* might have been *Liber historiarum philippicarum et totius mundi origines et terrae situ*: Bartlett 2014, 252–253; Yarrow 2006, 110–111; Heckel 1997, 4. The longer title can be read in the epitome's *Prologi* that briefly explain the original content of Trogus's work. However, the *Prologi* were not written by Trogus or Justin: Lucidi 1975.

<sup>94</sup> According to Justin, Trogus probably wanted to write a vast world history in Latin, because such a work did not yet exist: Just. Epit. praef. 1. He might also have wanted to complement Livy's work, which covered the whole of Roman history from the Roman point of view: Mehl 2011, 116–119; Borgna 2018, 211–214. Pompeius Trogus criticized Livy and Sallust for using *oratio recta* in speeches: Just. Epit. 38.3.11.

<sup>95</sup> The last event mentioned in the *Prologi* is the downfall of the tribe of the Sacauracae, and there is an inscription that dates this event to AD 6. Justin on the other hand ended his *Epitoma* with AD 1, when Augustus made peace with the Parthians; see Alonso-Núñez 1987, 60–61; Develin 1994, 3; Santi-Amantini 2017, 14–15. Otto Seel on the other hand thinks that Trogus wrote *Historiae Philippicae* between AD 14 and 30: Seel and Rühl 1972, 178–180.

<sup>96</sup> In *Historia Augusta* he is mentioned twice as one of the greatest Roman historians together with Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus: SHA Aurel. 2.1, Prob. 2.7. Tacitus used Trogus as a source; see Bartlett 2014, 260–263. Trogus also had some sort of reputation as a natural scientist, for another lost work, *De animalibus*, is ascribed to him, and Pliny the Elder mentions him several times: Charisius, Gramm. 130 [Barwick 1964]; Plin. HN 7.33, 10.101, 11.292, 11.274, 17.58, 31.131.

<sup>97</sup> It is not known if his *nomen gentilicium* was Junianus or Junianus. I use Junianus as in the Teubner edition: Seel and Rühl 1972, iii.

<sup>98</sup> The estimates of when Justin lived vary from the 2<sup>nd</sup> to the 4<sup>th</sup> century AD. Among some of the newest arguments we have M.T. Schettino's suggestion that Justin lived around the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> centuries: Schettino 2015, 69–73; A. Borgna argues that Justin wrote before AD 321: Borgna 2018, 123–127; G. Zecchini and D. Hofmann argue that he wrote at the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> century AD: Zecchini 2016; Hofmann 2018, 63–98.

became very popular at some point, possibly already in late antiquity.<sup>99</sup> Justin himself wrote about his motives at the beginning of the *Epitoma*:

During a period of free time which we had in the City [of Rome], I excerpted from his forty-four published volumes all the most noteworthy material. I omitted what did not make pleasurable reading or serve to provide a moral, and I produced a brief anthology to refresh the memory of those who had studied history in Greek, and to provide instruction for those who had not.<sup>100</sup>

It seems plausible that Justin might have been a rhetorician rather than a historian, and his *Epitoma* was intended to be a demonstration of Justin's rhetorical skills.<sup>101</sup> Indeed, Justin did not seem to be very interested in historical accuracy: the *Epitoma* is full of chronological errors and gaps, and Justin mixes up the names of several rulers. Justin seems to be more interested in events and persons that can evoke feelings or thoughts and can function as moral examples. Justin himself simply states that he has “selected” (*excerpsi*) the most interesting content, but he does not say if he had also modified this content somehow.<sup>102</sup> Quintilian wrote that a rhetorician had to know historical examples thoroughly.<sup>103</sup> Therefore, rhetoricians certainly read historiography, and we know that manuals and collections of *exempla* were made for them so

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<sup>99</sup> At the turn of the 5<sup>th</sup> century AD, Paulus Orosius used Justin's *Epitoma* as a source for his *Historiae adversus paganos*, which might mean that the epitome was more popular or easily accessible than the original *Historiae Philippicae* by Trogus at that time. On Orosius's work, see Merrills 2005, 35–97. The great popularity seemed to continue through the Middle Ages, for before the first edition in 1470 there were more than 200 manuscripts. For an up-to-date account of the ongoing manuscript research, see Petoletti 2014. Some scholars think that the great popularity of the epitome was a reason for the loss of the original work: Yardley 2003, 3; Seel and Rühl 1972, iv, xiii.

<sup>100</sup> Just. Epit. praef. 4–6: “Horum igitur quattuor et quadraginta voluminum (nam totidem edidit) per otium, quo in urbe versabamur, cognitione quaeque dignissima excerpsi et omissis his, quae nec cognoscendi voluptate iucunda nec exemplo erant necessaria, breve veluti florum corpusculum feci, ut haberent et qui Graece didicissent, quo admonerentur, et qui non didicissent, quo instruerentur.” The Latin quotations of Justin are from Otto Seel's Teubner edition from 1972.

<sup>101</sup> Jal 1987; Bartlett 2014, 266–269; Borgna 2018, 110–123. It is also remarkable that Justin uses the expression *florum corpusculum*, i.e., a “bunch of flowers”. The word “flower”, *flos*, was a common metaphor connected with rhetoric: Yardley 2003, 5; Heckel 1997, 16–19. For *floridus* and *flos* in rhetorical contexts, see *TLL* 6.1.925.72 ff and 6.1.936.45 ff.

<sup>102</sup> On Justin's technique and motives, see Borgna 2018, 47–105.

<sup>103</sup> Quint. Inst. 10.1.31–34.

that they would not need to read whole series of huge and rare historical opera just to find the best *exempla*.<sup>104</sup>

Furthermore, from Justin's *praefatio* we get the impression that he felt like he was creating his own work in his own style and not just a verbatim abbreviated copy of Trogus's work, because he asked for feedback on his work.<sup>105</sup> At one point of the *Epitoma*, Justin remarks that "I have considered this speech worthy of inclusion in my abridgement just as it was originally written."<sup>106</sup> From this we can also deduce that Justin's text as a norm does not follow Trogus in a verbatim manner. However, if Justin wrote his work in his own style, did he still preserve the ideologies and subtle discourses of Trogus's narrative? Brett Bartlett has attempted to use this speech to detect the original main arguments and rhetorical discourses of Trogus elsewhere in Justin's text, even though the language and form was Justin's.<sup>107</sup> Bartlett deduces that the indirect speeches contained in Justin's *Epitoma*, many of which are analysed in this thesis, are closest to Trogus's text in terms of main arguments and rhetorical discourse.<sup>108</sup>

For these reasons I have decided to occasionally give the *Epitoma*'s speeches considerable space in this study because I think that Justin's *Epitoma* can easily be connected to the historiographical context of the Augustan age of which many typical features and themes can be found in the *Epitoma*. For example, it is clear even from Justin's text that Trogus admired the republican virtues, *concordia*, and peace, which all had prominent roles in

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<sup>104</sup> For this purpose, Livy's work too was abridged by the rhetorician Florus. In late antiquity, historiography transformed into short abridgements and commentaries on earlier works, in addition to *exempla*-collections and biographies. Justin's *Epitoma* could be positioned in this context: Mehl 2011, 186–188, 197–198; Nicolai 2007, 19–23; Heckel 1997, 16–19; Browning 1982; Kenney 1982.

<sup>105</sup> Jal 1987; Ballesteros Pastor 2013, 13–15.

<sup>106</sup> Just. Epit. 38.3.11: "Quam orationem dignam duxi cuius exemplum brevitati huius operis insererem." This is the speech of Mithridates VI to his soldiers, analysed below on pp. 143–146.

<sup>107</sup> J.C. Yardley has examined Justin's use of language with the aim of discovering, if possible, which parts are closer to the original text by Trogus and which were created by Justin. Yardley, supported by similar conclusions by R. Develin, has concluded that the linguistic style of the *Epitoma* resembles much more that of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD than that of the age of Augustus: Yardley 2003, 5; Develin 1994, 4–6.

<sup>108</sup> Bartlett 2014, 269–274. Justin wrote that Trogus had only used indirect speech (Just. Epit. 38.3.11). If this is true, A. Borgna thinks that the only four (1.8.13, 2.12.3–7, 14.4.2–14, 18.7.10–14) direct speeches in the *Epitoma* could have been invented by Justin: Borgna 2018, 99–104.

Augustus's ideology.<sup>109</sup> Since it is precisely the moral *exempla* that interest me in this study, I think it will be worthwhile to examine parts of Justin's text side by side with my other sources and especially Livy. Not many have attempted this because of the problematic relationship between Trogus and Justin and because of the "anti-Roman" reputation suffered by Trogus in earlier scholarship.<sup>110</sup> There has been a sudden profusion of new detailed studies on Trogus and Justin during the last decade, and these have helped me include Justin's *Epitoma* in this study in a more audacious manner.<sup>111</sup> Lastly I should mention that I have felt like the two authors are so inseparably merged that I often write "Trogus/Justin" to pay respect to both.

### 1.3 METHODS

#### ***Studying historical narratives***

In this study, I have complemented conventional historical discourse analysis with the methods of narratology which is a school of literary theory that studies the narrative and narrative structure and the ways that these affect human perception. Discourse analysis regards narrative as one type of discourse among others. In this study I analyse how different narrative techniques and recurring discourses are used to construct certain images of history. Like Hayden White and Dominick LaCapra, I think that ancient historiography and literary fiction use similar narrative techniques, and language, text, and

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<sup>109</sup> Borgna 2018, 186–202, 211–214. For example, Augustus is openly praised as the bringer of peace and order: Just. Epit. 44.5.8. For Trogus's work's similarity to Livy, see Borgna 2018, 211–214.

<sup>110</sup> On Trogus's anti-Roman reputation, nowadays contested, see Borgna 2018, 157–202. See also below p. 144 n. 624.

<sup>111</sup> L.M. Yarrow too thinks that the *Epitoma* contains rhetorical discourses and themes typical of the age of Augustus: Yarrow 2006, 166 and *passim*. D. Levene analyses Trogus/Justin alongside Sallust and Livy: Levene 2007. Among the newest studies, there is a comprehensive three-volume article collection of different aspects of Trogus's and Justin's work titled *Studi sull'Epitome di Giustino* (Vita e pensiero, Milano 2014, 2015, and 2016), two monographs Borgna 2018 and Hofmann 2018, a philological study Yardley 2003, and new translations in Italian, German, and French.

narrative structures are means of constructing historical realities.<sup>112</sup> Therefore, some methods derived from literary theory such as narratology can be very useful in historical research when studying the ways of thinking and ideologies in the past.<sup>113</sup> This basically means that I approach the chosen historical narratives using similar methods as one would use when studying literary fiction.

Therefore, I study not only the narrative techniques but also both the obvious and subtle narrative intents and schemes of the authors in relation to their historical context and sources. This approach can help us study the ways in which the audience receives or was expected to receive the narrative. Moreover, I believe that narratology, together with other more traditional tools of historical study, can help us understand the intertextuality and meanings behind the narrative structures of ancient texts. Therefore, I have approached the texts through both synchronic and diachronic reading, i.e., by comparing recurring discourses within the works of each individual author but also between different authors.

For the usefulness of narratology in discovering intertextual connections, we may take a specific moral *exemplum*, such as the character of Scipio Africanus, as an example. His literary character has a real counterpart who existed in the past, but the literary representations of him vary from one author to another and do not directly mirror the past reality.<sup>114</sup> With narratology, we may examine how different versions of one *exemplum* vary in different levels of the narrative (text, story, and fabula). But every *exemplum*, like every historical representation/narrative, has to be interpreted in relation to other similar *exempla* or narratives. Indeed, according to Frank Ankersmit, the meaning of a historical narrative comes from its context and from its

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<sup>112</sup> White 1987; LaCapra 2013. Cf. Haimson Lushkov 2015, 21. R. Barthes already suggested that narratology could also be applied to historiography: Barthes 1966. The debate about the relationship between narrative and history is still ongoing. For a summary of this debate, see Carr 2001.

<sup>113</sup> White 1978. Cf. White 1987; Genette 1991; Cohn 1999; Iggers 2005, 149–160; Kramer 1989, 97–128.

<sup>114</sup> Using F. Ankersmit's terminology, we could say that every representation of Scipio Africanus offers different aspects of *not* the actual past reality but rather of the "representational/historical truth", which consists of all the different representations (or narratives). Cf. Ankersmit 2012. For the relationship between historical representation (or narrative) and identity, see above pp. 17–18.

relations to all other narratives. In my understanding, this is why narratology can be an excellent tool to study intertextuality and the deeper meanings of each different historical narrative.

Modern classical studies have been slow to adopt methods from literary theory, such as narratology, as tools to interpret ancient texts, however. From the '60s onwards, scholars started to pay attention to the narrative elements in the ancient texts, and especially from the '80s onwards there has been a surge of interest in narratological approaches. Useful recently published starting points regarding narratology applied to ancient literature are *Modern Literary Theory and Ancient Texts* (Schmitz 2007), *Narratology and Interpretation: The content of Narrative Form in Ancient Literature* (Grethlein and Rengakos 2009), and *Narratology and Classics: A Practical Guide* (Jong 2014).

During the recent decades, narratology has been enthusiastically applied to ancient poetry and epic. Among the early ground-breaking studies, we may name Massimo Fusillo's study on Apollonius of Rhodes (1985) and John J. Winkler's study on Apuleius (1985).<sup>115</sup> The first narratological commentaries have been published on Homer's *Odyssey* (Jong 2001) and Ovid's *Metamorphoses* (Tsitsiou-Chelidoni 2003). For the last two decades, Brill has been publishing a multi-volume series *Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative*, aiming to provide a comprehensive survey of the subject.<sup>116</sup> At the same time, more and more studies on various aspects of Greek literature from the narratological point of view are appearing with great frequency. Recently, there seems to be a constantly growing interest in the application of narratology to Roman literature in the wake of the active narratological research on Greek literature. Existing studies that use narratological methods extensively have, however, concentrated especially on poetry and epic, and historiography has attracted less attention.<sup>117</sup> Ancient historiography understandably might not be the most natural starting point for someone who

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<sup>115</sup> Fusillo 1985; Winkler 1985.

<sup>116</sup> As of now, there are five volumes: Jong, Nünlist, and Bowie 2004; Jong and Nünlist 2007; Jong 2012; Temmerman and Emde Boas 2018; Bakker and Jong 2021.

<sup>117</sup> For a brief history of narratology applied to ancient historiography, see chapter 7.1 in Jong 2014.

is looking for suitable ancient texts to apply narratology to: ancient historiography cannot be categorized as purely fictional literature nor it is exclusively meant to be a factual transfer of knowledge. Narratology was developed, after all, for the study of fictional literature.<sup>118</sup>

The plethora of narratological studies on ancient poetry and epic, however, have paved the way for similar studies on historiography because the genres have much in common.<sup>119</sup> The studies of Peter Wiseman (1979) and A.J. Woodman (1988) on the relationship between ancient historiography and rhetorical techniques were an important early influence in encouraging scholars towards the study of narrative aspects in Greek and Roman historical works.<sup>120</sup> Of the Greek historians, Herodotus and Thucydides in particular have received much attention from narratological perspectives.<sup>121</sup> The idea that historical writing and poetry have much in common was already expressed by Aristotle and other ancients after him.<sup>122</sup> Quintilian wrote in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century AD:

History also can nourish the orator with its rich, sweet sap. But we should read it too in the knowledge that many of its excellences are to be avoided by the orator. History is very close to the poets. In a sense it is a prose poem, and it is written to tell a story, not to prove a point. Moreover, it is wholly designed not for practical effect and present conflicts, but to preserve a memory for future generations and for the glory of its author's talents. It therefore avoids tedium in narrative by employing more out-of-the-way words and freer figures.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> On the problematics of this, see Pausch 2011, ch. I.2.

<sup>119</sup> For a recent demonstration, see T.A. Joseph's study of the relationship between the narratives of Tacitus, Virgil, and Lucan: Joseph 2012. E. Pyy has applied narratology to Roman war epic: Pyy 2014. C. Stocks studies several narratological concepts such as focalization and narrators in Silius Italicus's *Punica*: Stocks 2014.

<sup>120</sup> Wiseman 1979; Woodman 2014 (1988).

<sup>121</sup> Hornblower 1996; idem 2004; Rood 1998; Jong 1999; eadem 2014 ch. 7; Rengakos 2006a; idem 2006b; Baragwanath 2008; Grethlein 2010, 196–202, 240–254; Bowie 2018. For more references, see Pausch 2011, IV.2.a.

<sup>122</sup> Arist. Poet. 1451a1–1451b7; Cic. Leg. 1.5.

<sup>123</sup> Quint. Inst. 10.1.31: "Historia quoque alere oratorem quodam uberi iucundoque suco potest. Verum et ipsa sic est legenda ut sciamus plerasque eius virtutes oratori esse vitandas. Est enim proxima poetis, et quodam modo carmen solutum est, et scribitur ad narrandum, non ad probandum, totumque opus non ad actum rei pugnamque praesentem sed ad memoriam posteritatis et ingenii famam componitur: ideoque et verbis remotioribus et liberioribus figuris narrandi taedium evitat." Cf. 10.2.21–22.

My attempt to approach Roman republican historiography as narratives has been inspired in particular by Jackie Elliot's study of Ennius's *Annales* which overlaps the genres of historiography and poetry, and by Ayelet Haimson Lushkov's study on the relationship between historiography, *exempla*, and political thought.<sup>124</sup> Particularly in regard to Livy, throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, starting with Kurt Witte's *Über die Form der Darstellung in Livius' Geschichtswerk* (1910), several scholars have recognized the potential of studying Livy's narrative style, wider narrative scheme, and how it was different from Polybius – not just on a technical level but especially on the ideological and methodological levels.<sup>125</sup> These older studies constitute an important basis for the newer studies of Livy's narrative, even though they did not yet connect themselves methodologically with narratology and its several useful tools such as focalization.

During the last decades, the popularity of Livy in particular has increased among classical scholars partly because of contemporary tendencies to take an interest in the narrative aspects of ancient historiography.<sup>126</sup> Among recent monographs on Livy that take an explicitly narratological approach, Dennis Pausch's study *Livius und der Leser: Narrative Strukturen in ab urbe condita* (2011) should be emphasized.<sup>127</sup> In Sallust's case, Antonio La Penna (*Sallustio e la "rivoluzione" romana*, 1968) already noted the potential of studying Sallust's narrative techniques and schemes, but other scholars' interest has been piqued only recently.<sup>128</sup> A recent major contribution in studying Sallust's narrative is Andrew Feldherr's *After the Past: Sallust on History and Writing History* (2021).<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Elliott 2013; Haimson Lushkov 2015.

<sup>125</sup> Walsh 1954; McDonald 1957; Burck 1962; idem 1964; Tränkle 1972; Luce 1977; Pianezzola 2018. For studies on Livy's language and diction, see Murgia 1993.

<sup>126</sup> Scholars such as A. Feldherr, M. Jaeger, C.S. Kraus, and D. Levene represent the newer movement of scholars who have studied Livy's narrative. For a summary of earlier studies, see Pausch 2011, ch. I.1.

<sup>127</sup> There are other studies where narratology has been applied to Livy to a limited extent: J.D. Chaplin has used the narratological tool of focalization to analyse the internal audience of the *exempla* in Livy's earlier books: Chaplin 2000. For a short insightful study on internal focalization in Livy's work, see Tsitsiou-Chelidoni 2009. For narratological approaches to the battle of Cannae in Livy, see several articles in Gils, Jong, and Kroon 2019.

<sup>128</sup> La Penna 1968, 156–158, 312–365.

<sup>129</sup> For articles that focus on Sallust's narrative techniques, see Kraus 1999; Grethlein 2006; Egelhaaf-Gaiser 2010; Montgomery 2013.

As for Polybius, scholars have often seen his work as the most objective and truthful source for the events of his time and before – which was of course Polybius’s own goal – but the narratological aspects of his work have attracted less attention than in Livy’s case. An important contribution that approaches the *Histories* with the focus on its narrative and its wider ideological context, instead of just technical details, is Craig B. Champion’s *Cultural Politics in Polybius’s Histories* (2004). Champion has especially focused on the nature of the narrator in Polybius’s text, but he has recognized that there is more to be gained from studying, for example, Polybius’s use of focalization.<sup>130</sup> Another major contribution to the narratological analysis of Polybius’s *Histories* is Nikos Miltsios’s *The Shaping of Narrative in Polybius* (2013), with special focus on Polybius’s first three books and on Polybius’s use of temporal strategies, focalization, and narrator.

### ***Narratological tools***

The following explanations of various narratological concepts are based on Irene de Jong’s *Narratology and Classics: A Practical Guide* (2014) and Mieke Bal’s *Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative* (2017, 1<sup>st</sup> edition 1985), which in turn draw upon Gérard Genette’s *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method* (1980, original 1<sup>st</sup> edition in French 1972). These studies have provided the methodological framework for my own analysis.

Fictional narrative and historical narrative are clearly different styles, but they also have much in common.<sup>131</sup> Many narratological methods can indeed be applied to ancient historiography with special attention to some particularities of ancient historiography. Regarding the different narrative

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<sup>130</sup> Champion 2004, 24–28. Champion does not directly use the concept “focalization”, however. B. McGing has also recognized the potential of applying narratology to Polybius’s work: McGing 2013.

<sup>131</sup> Especially regarding Roman historiography, see Tsitsiou-Chelidoni 2009, 528; Miltsios 2013, 1–5; Haimson Lushkov 2015, 25. J.E. Lendon reminds us that we should not get so excited by this interesting new approach as to forget that the Roman historians themselves were striving to write history, not fiction: Lendon 2009.

levels (text and author – story and narrator – fabula and actor)<sup>132</sup> in ancient historiography, we should always keep in mind a fourth level that comes before the text, i.e., the sources, because ancient historians drew from multiple earlier sources to construct their own narrative. But for modern historians the importance of constant source criticism is obvious, and it is not something that needs to be further justified here. It is indeed sufficient here to emphasize that the conventional methods of source criticism and historical discourse analysis combined with narratological analysis can provide us with a deeper understanding of any ancient text. Chrysanthe Tsitsiou-Chelidoni describes the utility of narratological reading of ancient texts as follows:

But also the deciphering of the text's meaning, which we achieve through a narratological reading, makes other aspects (and therefore other meanings too) of the text appear, which were not visible before; for example, its relation to other texts or the transformation which its meaning is subject to, when looked at from the point of view of different audiences. Narratology appears then as an effective albeit partial method of literary criticism.<sup>133</sup>

Another narratological particularity of ancient historiography is that author (who wrote the text) and primary narrator (who tells the story), who does not change often, can be difficult to distinguish from one another. In a way, the historian seems to speak to the reader directly through the primary narrator.<sup>134</sup> This makes sense if we consider that ancient texts were usually read aloud.<sup>135</sup> Sometimes, the author himself becomes an internal narrator (i.e. a narrator who takes part in the events of the story, as opposed to an external narrator): this happens for example with Polybius when he at one point of the narrative (36.11–12) informs the reader that he will start referring to himself more often as “I” instead of “Polybius” because he had been closely

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<sup>132</sup> According to narratological theory, a narrative has three levels. The first level is that of the text, written by the author. The text in turn tells a story which is told by one or more narrators. The story contains *fabulae* which are series of chronologically related events that are caused and experienced by actors. *Fabulae* are presented through a focalizer which often is different from narrator. These different levels of the narrative can be studied separately but do not exist independently. This basic terminology is explained in detail in Bal 2017.

<sup>133</sup> Tsitsiou-Chelidoni 2009, 553–554.

<sup>134</sup> For narrators in different genres of ancient Greek literature, see Jong, Nünlist, and Bowie 2004. For the narrator in Sallust, see Pobežin 2020.

<sup>135</sup> On public recitations of historical narratives, see Pausch 2011, ch. II.1.c.

and personally involved in the events that he was about to describe.<sup>136</sup> Still, we must remember that there is a difference between Polybius the author and Polybius the narrator: the latter is always the creation of the former and is not necessarily more or less truthful than some other narrator.

The concept of focalization, invented by Gérard Genette, is very useful for the analysis of historical narratives.<sup>137</sup> Simply put, the focalizer in a narrative is the one “who experiences”, while the narrator is the one “who tells the story”. These are not always the same and for this reason the expression “point of view” is not accurate because it does not make a distinction between narrators and focalizers. In the case of external focalization, the narrator does not provide information about the thoughts or feelings of the described characters. When the focalization is internal, the narrator tells what the characters know or sense but limits the narration to that character’s perception of the story world. Through internal focalization, the narrator can provide the reader with information about the thoughts or feelings of a specific character or group. Such passages can be narrated in the third or first person (e.g., “Scipio thought that it was wiser to wait until the next day”, or “I thought that it was wiser to wait until the next day”). Focalization can also apply to a group of characters, such as the “people” or the “Achaeans”. This kind of group focalization is used to convey group mentalities, opinions, and feelings.

Arguably, another case of internal focalization is direct speech, *oratio recta* (e.g., “Scipio said: ‘I will lead us to victory’”). However, indirect speech, *oratio obliqua* (e.g., “Scipio said that he would lead them to victory”), is more common in Roman historiography and is a special case where we can sometimes speak of ambiguous or even double focalization: momentarily the voices of an external narrator and an internal focalizer seem to merge and the narrator speaks through a character, thereby communicating at the same time with the story world and with the external audience (the readers).<sup>138</sup> According

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<sup>136</sup> There are also several other points of the narrative, such as the introduction (1.3.7–9), where Polybius uses his own voice through the “I” pronoun. For Polybius’s direct narratorial interventions, see Miltsios 2013, 116–132; Longley 2013. For Polybius himself as a character in the narrative, see Miltsios 2013, 132–140.

<sup>137</sup> Genette 1980. The concept is summarized well by Miltsios 2013 (pp. 86–87) who provides examples from Polybius. Cf. Pausch 2011, IV.2.a, for more examples of how focalization can be applied to ancient historiography.

<sup>138</sup> For narratology applied to speeches in ancient Greek literature, see Bakker and Jong 2021.

to Gérard Genette, there is third kind of focalization called zero-focalization, or non-focalisation.<sup>139</sup> It means that a text is describing something while not having main characters and therefore not focalizing on anyone. Zero-focalization does not set any constraints on the information that the text can provide to the reader about the world of that narrative because zero-focalization is not tied to any character's perception or space in the story. The concept of "omniscient narrator" derives from this idea. The narrator is usually quite fixed, and it is easy to notice when it changes (e.g., when narration changes from third person to first person). Focalization however can change very quickly and repeatedly: the focalizer itself can change but the "distance" of the focalization can also vary, and it can sometimes be difficult to identify where the focalization is at each moment of the narrative. It often is a matter of interpretation.

From the analysis of Chrysanthe Tsitsiou-Chelidoni it is evident that Livy uses various kinds of focalizations and changes them quickly whenever necessary for the narrative.<sup>140</sup> Different kinds of focalizations can change the impact of a narrated event considerably. For example, when a speech by a historical character is indirect, it makes the speech seem more truthful and the narrator more objective. When the speech is direct, as is often the case in Livy, it changes the pacing of the narrative and makes a more stylistic impact, which in turn helps keep the readers engaged with the long narrative.<sup>141</sup> Livy was interested in both the entertainment value of his text and the trust of his

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<sup>139</sup> Genette 1980, 189–194. M. Bal, however, thinks that there is no such separate thing as zero-focalization: Bal 2017, 62. J. Stühling and T. Köppe do not reject zero-focalization but offer interesting corrections to Genette's original ideas of different types of focalization: Stühling and Köppe 2016.

<sup>140</sup> Tsitsiou-Chelidoni 2009. For other examples of this particular narratological aspect in ancient literature, see I. de Jong's important study on narrators and focalizers in the *Iliad* (Jong 2004) and N. Miltsios's narratological study on Polybius (Miltsios 2013, ch. 4 and 5).

<sup>141</sup> Some historians such as Pompeius Trogus avoided direct speech on purpose, as Justin comments in his epitome (Just. Epit. 38.3.11): "Pompeius Trogus presented it in indirect discourse, since he was critical of Livy and Sallust for having transgressed the proper bounds of history by inserting into their works speeches in direct discourse, but composed in their own style / quam orationem [...] obliquam Pompeius Trogus exposuit, quoniam in Livio et in Sallustio reprehendit, quod contiones directas pro sua oratione operi suo inserendo historiae modum excesserint." In Polybius's opinion, direct speech was most appropriate to tragic poets: Pol. 2.56.10–13. Nevertheless, Polybius too used it sparingly. For *oratio recta* and *obliqua* in Polybius, see Usher 2009. On Livy's use of *oratio obliqua* and *recta* compared to Polybius, see Walsh 1954, 107–109; Burck 1992, 68–86. Cf. Tsitsiou-Chelidoni 2009, 535–548. For indirect speech in Livy, see Lambert 1946. For recent works on speeches in ancient historiography, see Utard 2004; Pausch 2010b; Foster 2012; Bakker and Jong 2021, part 2.

readers.<sup>142</sup> Focalization was one of the best tools to affect the reception of his text in this manner.<sup>143</sup>

Another narrative device often used by ancient historians in conjunction with focalization is the creation of suspense and expectation in the story. Nikos Miltsios has demonstrated how Polybius makes use of this narrative device in his work by combining the aspects of time and focalization.<sup>144</sup> Basically, even though the readers knew how the major events such as wars had played out, Polybius made the story more exciting by focalizing on one character (e.g., King Perseus) and describing the events through this person, sometimes with external and sometimes with internal focalization. Polybius lets the reader learn the hopes and expectations of a character even though the reader knows the final outcome that might be completely opposite to what the character themselves expects. The reader has no choice but to follow the character's story up to the dramatic culmination, where the character's illusory expectations are shattered. This kind of situation creates suspense which in turn makes the readers feel sympathy for such characters in the story and even identify with them (Mieke Bal calls this "character effect"), even in the case of negative characters such as enemy kings.<sup>145</sup> Polybius himself explains this phenomenon, using as an example the popular reaction to the victory of Perseus against the Romans at Callicinus:

The phenomenon was very like what happens in boxing contests at the games. For there, when a humble and much inferior combatant is matched against a celebrated and seemingly invincible athlete, the sympathy of the crowd is at once given to the inferior man. They cheer him on, and back him up enthusiastically; and if he manages to touch his opponent's face, and gets in a blow that leaves any mark, there is at once again the greatest excitement among them all. They sometimes even try to make fun of the other man, not

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<sup>142</sup> Liv. praef., 3.47.5, 43.13.1.

<sup>143</sup> For Livy's use of narrative devices to engage the readers, see Pausch 2011.

<sup>144</sup> Miltsios 2009. D. Pausch has studied suspense in Livy's work arguing that even though suspense in Livy has already been studied extensively, it is worthwhile to re-examine the question by applying methods of literary, film, and theatre studies: Pausch 2011, V.

<sup>145</sup> Another excellent example of a situation where Polybius uses internal focalization to make the readers sympathize with a character is the long story of Achaeus (Pol. 7.15–18, 8.15–34). On characters and characterization in ancient Greek literature, see Temmerman and Emde Boas 2018.

out of any dislike for him or disapproval but from a curious sort of sympathy and a natural instinct to favour the weaker. If, however, one calls their attention at the right time to their error, they very soon change their minds and correct it.<sup>146</sup>

King Perseus indeed is such a character in Polybius's narrative, according to Miltsios, and it will be argued in this study that Livy also uses such narrative tools to occasionally evoke the readers' sympathy towards Perseus and to show the events from the imagined point of view of the last Macedonian king. Therefore, focalization with its many possible applications is one of the most important narratological aspects that I examine in my analysis of the chosen historical narratives.

Space is another narrative aspect that can be relevant in historiography.<sup>147</sup> In a historical narrative, there is always some concrete place where the story takes place, but we may also detect more abstract spaces such as symbolic or psychological spaces. One such relevant symbolic space in these historical narratives is "Asia": an ancient reader of the late Republic would automatically associate a certain set of stereotypical characteristics, such as corruption and opulence, with that place.<sup>148</sup> For example, when someone is said to be from Asia, an ancient reader might not need any other information to deduce what kind of person they might be in the narrative. Many places had such a symbolizing function. Psychological or mental space, on the other hand, reflects the thoughts and feelings of the story's focalizers. Examples of mental space are rarer in these historical narratives but there are a few excellent examples. Livy tells a story of King Philip V (40.21–22) who climbed to the top of Mount Haemus in order to see the surrounding seas and mountains and to better plan his war efforts against Rome. The ascent was very difficult and

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<sup>146</sup> Pol. 27.9.2–6: ἦν δὲ περὶ αὐτοὺς τοιαύτη τις, ἔμοι δοκεῖ, διάθεσις· παραπλήσιον ἦν τὸ γινόμενον τῷ συμβαίνοντι περὶ τοὺς γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας. καὶ γὰρ <έν> ἐκείνοις ὅταν πρὸς ἐπιφανῆ καὶ ἀήτητον ἀθλητὴν εἶναι δοκοῦντα συγκαταστῆ ταπεινὸς καὶ πολὺ καταδεστέρος ἀνταγωνιστῆς, εὐθέως ἀπομερίζει τὰ πλήθη τὴν εὐνοίαν τῷ καταδεστέρω καὶ θαρρεῖν παρακαλεῖ καὶ συνεξανίσταται τούτῳ ταῖς ὀρμαῖς· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ψαύσῃ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ ποιήσῃ τι σημεῖον τῆς πληγῆς, παραυτίκα πάλιν ἀπάντων ἀγῶν μικρὸς γίνεται· ποτὲ δὲ καὶ χλευάζειν ἐγχειροῦσι τὸν ἕτερον, οὐ μισοῦντες οὐδὲ καταγινώσκοντες, ἀλλὰ παραδόξως τε συμπαθεῖς γινόμενοι καὶ τῷ καταδεστέρω φύσει προσμερίζοντες τὴν ἑαυτῶν εὐνοίαν· οὗς ἐὰν ἐπιστήσῃ τις ἐν καιρῷ, ταχέως μετατίθενται καὶ παρὰ πόδας ἐπλαμβάνονται τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀγνοίας.

<sup>147</sup> For narrative space in different genres of Greek literature, see Jong 2012.

<sup>148</sup> There is more on this below on pp. 215–220.

ultimately futile because the mountaintop was too foggy to allow him to see anything. As analysed by Mary Jaeger, this scene at Mount Haemus mirrors the psychological state of Philip V: he was too blind and mad to see the truth and to see the conspiracy of his son Perseus despite his desperate efforts to do the right thing.<sup>149</sup>

Time is a narrative aspect highly relevant to ancient historiography: in particular, the chosen narrative order of events and the rhythm of the narrative.<sup>150</sup> For example Livy, who follows the annalistic style, mostly describes events in chronological order. Polybius instead uses a freer and more thematic format. It was possible to insert flashbacks (*analepsis*) or flashforwards (*prolepsis*) in historical narratives in order to provide important background (e.g., introducing a new character and briefly telling the reader about their youth) for some specific event or to create suspense in the story (e.g., “But they did not know what disaster would await them in the future”).<sup>151</sup>

The rhythm of the narrative determines, among other things, which aspects and events of the story get emphasized. When the story progresses more slowly, the description is also more detailed and takes more space in the book. This is why the narrative time seems to slow down during decisive moments of the story. Consequently, the narrative time speeds up and the description becomes less detailed when the author describes less important events. Such events can be summarized or even skipped (*ellipsis*). In the case of historiography, the authors could decide to differ from the narrative rhythm of their sources and to fill in or shorten the story in order to emphasize different things. Livy does this often with his sources. Ayelet Haimson Lushkov has analysed one such example in detail: Livy (39.39) described the electoral campaign of Q. Fulvius Flaccus (cos. 179 BC) for the praetorship and, according to Haimson-Lushkov, Livy extended this quite insignificant event, which could have been acknowledged with two lines of text, into a long moral *exemplum* that occupies two Teubner pages.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> For a thorough analysis, see Jaeger 2007. For more spatial aspects in Livy, see M. Jaeger’s monograph on Livy’s Roman history as “a story of space and memory” (p. 7): Jaeger 1997.

<sup>150</sup> For temporal aspects in different genres of ancient Greek literature, see Jong and Nünlist 2007.

<sup>151</sup> For narrative time and suspense in Livy, see Pausch 2011, III, V.

<sup>152</sup> Haimson Lushkov 2015, 141–151.

## 1.4 *EXEMPLA* AND *VIRTUS* IN ROMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY AND SOCIETY

Historical moral examples, *exempla*, are an essential part of ancient historiography and the key to understanding Roman ideas of identity.<sup>153</sup> History was supposed to entertain but also to teach about desired and undesired values and behaviour. Hence Livy states at the beginning of his work that he will provide moral guidelines together with positive and negative examples.<sup>154</sup> The general belief through antiquity was that there was continuity between the past and the future and that the past repeated itself.<sup>155</sup> Indeed, Livy's ideal moral values are similar throughout his work, even when he writes about very ancient times or foreign peoples.<sup>156</sup> Most authors wrote about historical periods that were far away from their own lifetime, but these different narratives still share striking similarities because they all shared the common idea of the ideal moral values of the Republic.<sup>157</sup> For this reason, *exempla* from the past were still applicable after hundreds of years. Jane D. Chaplin has encapsulated well the meaning of *exempla*:

Finally, on the conceptual level, the tension between new and old, the struggle between change and continuity, is the driving force of *Ab urbe condita*. It is hard to think of another ancient historian who chronicles as much change in an equally meaningful way. Book 1 is utterly different from book 31. To read Livy consecutively from the monarchy to the middle republic is indeed to see a city created, grow, face annihilation, and expand exponentially. However, the historical agents of that change, Livy's Romans, are constantly looking to the past as they create the future. *Exempla* are that process in a nutshell.<sup>158</sup>

Furthermore, according to Chaplin, the idea of history was not an unchanging monolith but, rather, it should be examined with a flexible mind:

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<sup>153</sup> For a comprehensive analysis of different uses of *exempla*, see Roller 2018.

<sup>154</sup> Liv. praef. For *exempla* in Livy, see Chaplin 2000, 2015.

<sup>155</sup> Hölkeskamp 2004, 180–195; Marincola 2007, 118–132; Mehl 2011, 243–151; Roller 2018, 17–23.

<sup>156</sup> Bernard 2015, 41.

<sup>157</sup> A. Haimson Lushkov calls this the “consensus rooted in the common culture”: Haimson Lushkov 2015, 24–25.

<sup>158</sup> Chaplin 2015, 112.

one should look at all kinds of historical *exempla* and “choose for yourself and for your own state what to imitate, from these mark for avoidance what is shameful in the conception and shameful in the result”, as Livy wrote.<sup>159</sup> Andrew Wallace-Hadrill also argues that historical *exempla* were adapted and re-interpreted continuously, and for this reason the writers of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC were “major players in the redefinition of identity”.<sup>160</sup>

We should keep in mind that *exempla* do not by any means correspond to how the Romans actually behaved.<sup>161</sup> What we are actually looking at is the *discourse* of exemplarity.<sup>162</sup> As Simon Goldhill writes, “examples themselves are narrativized – told as narrative – and as such are open to the plays and openness of the narrative form”.<sup>163</sup> In historical writing in general it is indeed quite common that current moral values are projected into the past.<sup>164</sup> They were not, on the other hand, just an empty symbol, as Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp reminds us. They had real relevance in the Roman society: *exempla* were constantly used, for example, in legal speeches. They were neutral historical examples of ideal behaviour and were not tied to any political party. Therefore, they could be freely used by anyone, especially towards the end of the Republic, when writers like Livy emerged from outside the senatorial class.<sup>165</sup> Furthermore, according to Hölkeskamp the lower classes could also to some extent participate in this shared exemplary discourse through public monuments, triumphs, and funerary processions.<sup>166</sup>

There were many ways to insert these moral examples into historical narratives. The most effective way to do so was to focalize on certain formidable characters and to shape the narrative around them.<sup>167</sup> Cicero wrote

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<sup>159</sup> Liv. praef. 10: “inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu, foedum exitu, quod vites”. Chaplin 2000, 132–136, 165–167. Livy’s contemporary Cornelius Nepos wrote (Hann. 13.4) in a similar vein that readers should compare the deeds of Romans and foreigners and decide “which should be favoured”. Unfortunately, the part of his magnum opus describing Roman commanders and foreign kings has not survived.

<sup>160</sup> Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 217. Cf. Luce 1977, 230–297.

<sup>161</sup> Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 54–55; Haimson Lushkov 2015, 12–13.

<sup>162</sup> Roller 2018, 9

<sup>163</sup> Goldhill 1994, 70.

<sup>164</sup> Ankersmit 2012, 222–223.

<sup>165</sup> Hölkeskamp 2004, 176–177, 185, 193–195. M.B. Roller explains the importance of *exempla* in legal speeches through Cicero’s speech *De domo sua*: Roller 2018, 233–264.

<sup>166</sup> Hölkeskamp 2004, 172, 191–193. In effect, the funerary monuments of the people from lower social classes concretely demonstrate this: Roller 2018, 9–10.

<sup>167</sup> For the relation of biography and history, see Stadter 2007.

that explaining history chronologically, following the events in order, was tedious, but what made history interesting was examining the historical characters closely.<sup>168</sup> Another effective way to provide *exempla* was to create speeches for these historical characters.<sup>169</sup> In fact, ancient historiography and rhetoric have much in common, as Peter Wiseman and A.J. Woodman have shown.<sup>170</sup> Both rhetoric and historical writing strived to entertain and affect the common opinion at the same time. Indeed, as discussed above, speeches were also effective narrative tools to affect the audience response. Rhetoric was an essential part of Roman public life, in which many Roman historians actively took part before their writing phase.<sup>171</sup> In turn, studying history was naturally a vital part of rhetorical education as well because of the endless moral examples that could be found in the past.<sup>172</sup>

My sources contain speeches and letters by foreign kings, Greeks, and Romans, addressed mostly to other kings, Greek assemblies, the Roman senate, soldiers, or family members. Not only because of historiographical conventions, but also for many practical reasons it is clear that the speeches and letters by foreign kings and assemblies in historical narratives cannot be authentic.<sup>173</sup> However, Polybius famously criticized Timaeus for fabricating speeches in his historical work, for Polybius thought that a historian should only relate what had actually been said.<sup>174</sup> This still does not mean that Polybius inserted only authentic speeches in his works because this was simply impossible. It could rather be that he relied more on whatever sources he had of real speeches and negotiations instead of just completely creating them

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<sup>168</sup> Cic. Fam. 5.12.5. Cf. Grant 1995, 80–85. F. Ankersmit and H. White remark that strictly chronological or annalistic histories were in general considered tedious and of lesser value because they do not provide any narratologically constructed meaning: White 1987, 7; Ankersmit 2012, 33–34, 46–47.

<sup>169</sup> Marincola 2007, 118–132.

<sup>170</sup> Cicero emphasized this in his work *De oratore*. On the connection of historiography and rhetoric, see Wiseman 1979, ch. 3; Woodman 2014 (1988); Cape 1997.

<sup>171</sup> Nicolai 2007.

<sup>172</sup> Cicero advised that a good orator should know all the historical examples by heart: Cic. De or. 1.18.

<sup>173</sup> Marincola 2007, 118–132; Grant 1995, 44–53. During antiquity, it was quite impossible that the speeches made by foreign kings could have been written down on the spot and that afterwards they could have ended up in the hands of Roman historians to be used as sources. Inserting speeches into a historical account was a narrative technique which served not only to enliven the story but also to give it a certain rhythm so that the readers could understand the importance of the following events and the motives of different sides more easily.

<sup>174</sup> Pol. 12.25b. Cf. Cic. Brut. 286; Diod. Sic. 20.1.1–3.

from his own imagination.<sup>175</sup> I think that Roberto Nicolai is right to emphasize that one of the most interesting aspects to look at in these speeches is their narrative function in the context of the whole historiographical work.<sup>176</sup>

The purpose of these historical moral examples was to define and strengthen the Roman concept of *virtus*.<sup>177</sup> *Virtus* itself originally signified a certain type of “manliness”, more precisely, positive moral qualities and courage demonstrated in battle.<sup>178</sup> According to Cicero, “*appellata est enim ex viro virtus*”.<sup>179</sup> Cicero seemed to think that it was military *virtus* that counted more than any other in making Rome so great.<sup>180</sup> Sallust wrote that in early republican times Roman men strove to demonstrate their *virtus* by learning the arts of war in military camps as early as possible. They did not fear any kind of physical hardship or enemy, and they wanted others to witness their valorous deeds. They thought that praise was much more valuable than riches.<sup>181</sup> Matthew B. Roller takes the funerary epitaph of L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus (cos. 298 BC) as a concrete example of the early concept of *virtus*:<sup>182</sup>

*Cornelius Lucius Scipio Barbatus*  
*Gnaivod Patre Prognatus, Fortis Vir Sapiensque*  
*Quoius Forma Virtutei Parisuma Fuit,*  
*Consol Censor Aidilis Quei Fuit Apud Vos*  
*Taurasia Cisauna Samnio Cepit,*  
*Subigit Omne Loucana Opsidesque Abdoucit.*<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>175</sup> On the speeches in Polybius’s work, see Walbank 1957, 13–14; Champion 2004, 193–195. On ancient opinions of speeches in historiography, see Pausch 2011, IV.3.a.

<sup>176</sup> Nicolai 2018.

<sup>177</sup> See esp. McDonnell 2006; see also Eisenhut 1973; Sarsila 1982; Edwards 1993; Rosen and Sluiter 2003; Py 2014, 33–50; Balmaceda 2017.

<sup>178</sup> For the specific aspect of “manliness” in Livy, see Albrecht 2016. For the connection of *virtus* and courage, see Balmaceda 2017, 15–17.

<sup>179</sup> “For it is from the word for ‘man’ that the word *virtus* is derived”: Cic. Tusc. 2.43.

<sup>180</sup> Cic. Mur. 22: “Ac nimirum—dicendum est enim quod sentio—rei militaris virtus praestat ceteris omnibus.” Cf. Cic. Leg. Man. 6. For Cicero’s use of the word *virtus*, see Eisenhut 1973, 57–76.

<sup>181</sup> Sall. Catil. 7.4–7.

<sup>182</sup> Roller 2001, 22–23. *CIL* I<sup>2</sup>.7 = *ILS* 1. According to recent studies, the epitaph should be dated to the middle of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC: Flower 1996, 171–175.

<sup>183</sup> “Lucius Cornelius Scipio Barbatus, sprung from his father Gnaeus, a man strong and wise, whose appearance was most in keeping with his virtue, who was consul, censor, and aedile among you. He captured Taurasia Cisauna in Samnium, he subdued all of Lucania and led off hostages.” Translation by M.B. Roller (2001, 22–23).

Therefore, the *virtus* of L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus consisted of his being *fortis* and *sapiens*, especially in connection with his mentioned military victories and magistracies.<sup>184</sup> According to Cicero, *sapientia* was important for any leader precisely because it drew men's attention away from trivial mundane matters such as wealth and power to the more important and eternal things such as wisdom and glory.<sup>185</sup> Scipio Barbatus's epitaph attests that his appearance corresponded to his great *virtus*. Therefore, *virtus* was not only the director of one's mind and behaviour but it also included physical qualities. Barbatus's military victories and magistracies benefitted the common good of the society. The epitaph of Barbatus's son is similar, as it emphasizes his offices and military victories but also adds *pietas* to the list for dedicating a temple.<sup>186</sup>

Roller remarks that the role of the judging audience, *apud vos*, was important and confirms these positive evaluations of his *virtus*. Once recognized as exemplary by the community, events and persons could be saved in the collective memory – or historical record – through several means including texts, monuments, art, oral tradition, triumphs, funerary processions or even places. In this way, history with its *exempla* was always present in the lives of the inhabitants of Rome.<sup>187</sup> It was indeed very common to raise monuments and to display objects and art to celebrate personal and family members' achievements publicly.<sup>188</sup> The tomb of the Scipiones itself was one such public monument after a major makeover in the mid-second century, probably by Scipio Aemilianus.<sup>189</sup>

Funerals themselves were important public events where the virtues and the achievements of the dead could be retold to the public. The ancestor masks

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<sup>184</sup> The combination of *virtus* and *fortis* is very common in Livy and other republican authors when describing the abilities of a magistrate in the military or domestic sphere; see Hellegouarc'h 1963, 244–248.

<sup>185</sup> Cic. Rep. 1.28, 3.28–33 (Ziegler 29–32, 34, 40). The *Dream of Scipio* addresses this at length: Cic. Rep. 6. On the importance of *fortitudo*: Cic. Rep. 5.7 (Ziegler 9).

<sup>186</sup> *CIL* I<sup>2</sup>.8–9 = *ILS* 2–3.

<sup>187</sup> Roller 2018, 1–23. Cf. Hölkeskamp 1996, idem 2004; Pausch 2011, ch. II.1.a; Rutledge 2012, *passim*, esp. 123–192.

<sup>188</sup> As in the case of the arches of the Fabii Maximi and of the Scipiones: *LTUR* 2 (1995), 264–167; Miller 2016; Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 219–220. For additional concrete examples, see Hölkeskamp 2004, 173–176.

<sup>189</sup> An impressive façade with the portrait statues of Scipio Africanus and his brother Lucius and the poet Ennius were added: Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 220–223. For pictures and explanations of the extant iconography and epigraphy regarding the Scipionic family, see the detailed appendices in Etcheto 2012.

of the dead family members were brought along and put on display. Polybius wrote that this was all part of how the Roman Republic worked – the Republic was based on the virtues of its citizens and these virtues had to be passed on to the younger generations who could thus admire the older men’s achievements – at funerals for example – and try to imitate them.<sup>190</sup> Sallust too remarks that Quintus Fabius Maximus, Scipio Africanus, and other illustrious Romans would often look at their ancestors’ portrait masks, and the memory of their ancestors’ deeds evoked in them a burning desire to imitate their virtues.<sup>191</sup> According to Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp and Andrew Gallia, identity and memory were closely connected – the former depends on the latter, much like identity and history.<sup>192</sup> Therefore, in Sallust’s example the Roman aristocrats, who looked at the ancestor masks, were expected to inherit their ancestors’ identities, which was possible through memory. Historical narratives, literary or not, and *exempla* were one way to give these memories a shape.<sup>193</sup>

*Virtus* could be attained through experience, but it could also be an innate quality.<sup>194</sup> This is attested by the epitaph of L. Cornelius Cn. f. Scipio.<sup>195</sup> He died at the age of 20, but nonetheless the epitaph records that he was never surpassed in *virtus* by anyone, even though he had never held any magistracies. Similarly, Sallust related how the young Julius Caesar hoped to have an occasion to lead an army in war in order to demonstrate his *virtus* publicly.<sup>196</sup> *Virtus* was, therefore, as much a pre-disposition or an attitude as actual deeds.<sup>197</sup> According to Cicero, however, having *virtus* was useless unless

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<sup>190</sup> Pol. 6.53–54.

<sup>191</sup> Sall. Iug. 4.5.

<sup>192</sup> Hölkeskamp 2004, 169–170; Gallia 2012, 5. For a short introduction to the concepts of cultural or social memory, see Gallia 2012, 3–7. Also, according to F. Ankersmit, in the purest epistemological sense, the identity of things originates in their past: Ankersmit 2012, 1–29.

<sup>193</sup> For these aspects in Livy, see Jaeger 1999; Balmaceda 2017, ch. 3. On the relationship between history and memory in Sallust, see Grethlein 2006.

<sup>194</sup> According to Cicero, *virtus* was not only hereditary but it could be achieved, as he had done: Cic. Rep. 1.10. Cf. Roller 2001, 24–25.

<sup>195</sup> *CIL* I<sup>2</sup> 11 = *ILS* 7.

<sup>196</sup> Sall. Catil. 54.4. Jugurtha also had a chance to demonstrate (*ostendere*) his *virtus* for the first time when he was sent on his first military mission under the command of Scipio Aemilianus: Sall. Iug. 7. For innate *virtus*, see Plin. HN 7.25.

<sup>197</sup> Roller 2001, 27–28.

you showed it.<sup>198</sup> In these ways, the exemplary discourse in Roman culture linked actions, audiences, values, and memory.<sup>199</sup>

In addition to *fortitudo* and *sapientia*, there were several other virtues important for leaders, mentioned often by the republican authors in several different combinations: *aequitas*, *temperantia*, *prudentia*, *fides*, *gravitas*, *dignitas*, *iustitia*, *moderatio*, *clementia*, *humanitas*, *pudor* and *pietas*.<sup>200</sup> According to the Roman view, the basis of a stable society was built on these virtues. Consequently, vices were the opposites of these and led to immorality and instability. Negative stereotypes of self-indulgent, dishonest, and cruel despots of the Hellenistic world represented everything that an exemplary Roman should not be.<sup>201</sup> By the end of the Republic, all these virtues were thought to be included under the main concept of *virtus*, through the influence of Greek philosophy, their concept of *ἀρετή*, and Cicero.<sup>202</sup> The Greek and Roman ideas of virtues were similar, but the Romans preferred to cite practical examples from their own past rather than Greek philosophers.<sup>203</sup> According to Myles McDonnell, at the same time with the ethical virtues that originated in Greece, the traditional Roman military *virtus*, i.e., courage demonstrated in battle, remained separate and important.<sup>204</sup> This kind of “courage” was, according to Polybius, “nearly the most essential virtue in all states and especially so in Rome”.<sup>205</sup>

*Virtus* is the key to understanding ideas of Roman cultural identity. Cicero saw *virtus* as the central building block of Roman cultural identity and as the basis of the Romans’ success and power:

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<sup>198</sup> Cic. Rep. 1.2. Cf. Cic. Mur. 18.

<sup>199</sup> Roller 2004, 4–7.

<sup>200</sup> Cic. Mur. 30, 60, 63–64, Rep. 1.19.32, 1.34, 2.32.56, 2.42.69. For virtues in Livy and their similarity to Cicero’s ideas, see Mineo 2015c, 131–135. For examples of how Livy illustrated various virtues with historical *exempla*, see Pianezzola 2018, 62–80.

<sup>201</sup> E.g., Dunkle 1967.

<sup>202</sup> Pl. Resp. 4.426–435; Roller 2001, 26. For the Greek concepts of virtues, see Smith 1999, 48–66; Balmaceda 2017, 19–34.

<sup>203</sup> Edwards 1993, 21–22. For the relationship between Greek and Roman thoughts on virtues, see Hedrick 2009.

<sup>204</sup> McDonnell 2006, 1–11, 128–129, 358–384. Otherwise “bad” men could also have this kind of military *virtus*.

<sup>205</sup> Pol. 31.29.1–2: Λοιποῦ δ’ ὄντος τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν μέρους καὶ κυριωτάτου σχεδὸν ἐν πάσῃ μὲν πολιτείᾳ μάλιστα δ’ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ.

Even though death is ordained by nature for all, a cruel and dishonourable death is generally warded off by *virtus*; and *virtus* is the badge of the Roman race and breed. Cling fast to it, I beg you, Men of Rome, as a heritage bequeathed to you by your ancestors. For whereas all else is false and uncertain, ephemeral and mutable, only *virtus* stands firmly fixed, its roots run deep, which no violence can ever shake, ever shift from its place. Thereby {with this *virtus*} your ancestors conquered all Italy first, then razed Carthage, overthrew Numantia, brought the most powerful kings and the most warlike nations under the sway of this empire.<sup>206</sup>

In this passage, the ancestors (*maiores*) are highlighted repeatedly. In Roman literature, this mode of thought can be traced back as far as Ennius, who wrote that “the Roman Republic stands upon ancient customs and men”.<sup>207</sup> For the Romans, their ancestors were the ultimate model of correct behaviour. <sup>208</sup> However, as Andrew Wallace-Hadrill notes, there were endless ways to readapt or interpret the ancestral tradition (*mos maiorum*) to elevate oneself above or to attack political competitors, or to generally praise one’s own culture.<sup>209</sup> They were universal tools for anybody to use, and it was often not even necessary to define which ancestors one was talking about. This kind of rhetorical use of ancestors forms an ever-changing and idealized idea of history.

One of the greatest examples of Roman *virtus* was the character of Scipio Africanus.<sup>210</sup> He was invoked repeatedly in historical narratives as an almost perfect *exemplum* of Republican *virtus*. Allegedly, Scipio did not desire power, glory, or political position – he took over public offices only to serve the

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<sup>206</sup> Cic. Phil. 4.13: “[...] crudelitatem mortis et dedecus **virtus** propulsare solet, quae propria est Romani generis et seminis. Hanc retinete, quaeso, quam vobis tamquam hereditatem maiores vestri reliquerunt. Nam cum alia omnia falsa, incerta sint, caduca, mobilia, **virtus** est una altissimis defixa radicibus; quae numquam vi ulla labefactari potest, numquam demoveri loco. Hac **virtute** maiores vestri primum universam Italiam devicerunt, deinde Karthaginem exciderunt, Numantiam everterunt, potentissimos reges, bellicosissimas gentes in dicionem huius imperii redegerunt.” Translated by G. Manuwald in *Cicero, Philippics 3–9* (2007), with minor modifications of my own. Cf. Cic. Tusc. 1.1.2.

<sup>207</sup> “Moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque”, cited by Cicero in Rep. 5.1 (Ziegler 1–2).

<sup>208</sup> Cf. Scipio Africanus’s desire to imitate his ancestors: Sall. Iug. 4.5.

<sup>209</sup> Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 217–231.

<sup>210</sup> For Scipio Africanus’s virtues and historical character in Polybius and Livy, see below pp. 206–215. For Scipio’s *virtus* in Livy, see Albrecht 2016, 317–327; Balmaceda 2017, 101–104.

Republic.<sup>211</sup> Wealth did not interest him either, despite several opportunities to become rich during his successful military campaigns.<sup>212</sup> Whatever bounty he won in Africa he used for the common good by funding the celebratory games and festivals after his triumph in 201 BC.<sup>213</sup> An exemplary story of Scipio's integrity, honesty, and general *magnitudo animi* was when his son was captured by King Antiochus III and the king tried to bribe Scipio into helping him by liberating the son and offering other gifts. Scipio stated that the king must have been utterly ignorant of the Roman ways and his personality to even suggest such a deal. Scipio said he would accept the liberation of his son as a personal gift, but in his official capacity he would accept nothing and give nothing in return.<sup>214</sup> The Republic always had to have precedence before personal gain.

Indeed, the concept of *virtus* was closely connected to the idea of the Roman Republic, because it was believed that the Republic was firmly held together by *virtus*. A proper Roman man had to dedicate himself to the Republic and to the common good. During the republican era this meant above all military service, but according to Cato the Elder – another model of the republican virtues – men could also serve the Republic by excelling as orators or senators.<sup>215</sup> Sallust for his part maintains that one could also serve the Republic through writing history, for it was a valuable effort of intellect to cultivate the memory of the past.<sup>216</sup> Myles McDonnell epitomizes that, essentially, the *only* way in which Roman men could call themselves Romans was to serve the Republic in some way.<sup>217</sup> I find that the following thought of Andrew Wallace-Hadrill exemplifies well why it was important for the Romans

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<sup>211</sup> Cic. Rep. 1.27.

<sup>212</sup> Pol. 18.35.9–12.

<sup>213</sup> Pol. 16.23. His triumph is also described by Livy: Liv. 30.45.

<sup>214</sup> Liv. 37.43–46.

<sup>215</sup> Plin. HN 7.27. Cf. Plut. Cor. 1.4. For examples of monuments raised for success in a public office during the early Republic and for other non-military monuments, see Rutledge 2012, 137, 159–192. On Cato the Elder as a model of *virtus*, see Sall. Catil. 53–54; Cic. Rep. 2.1; Liv. 39.40–43. For Cato's life and career in general, see Astin 1978; Gruen 1984, 251–260; Ferrary 2014, ch. 2.2; Gruen 1992, 52–170, 223–271. Curiously enough, the two models of Republican virtues, Cato the Elder and Scipio Africanus lived at the same time but did not get along well: Ruebel 1977; Champion 2004, 180–184, 204–208.

<sup>216</sup> Sall. Catil. 1–4, Iug. 1–4. Cf. La Penna 1968, 15–67.

<sup>217</sup> McDonnell 2006, 2–3, 11.

to associate their cultural identity and *virtus* with such a political concept as the *res publica*:

‘Greek’ and ‘Roman’ are not strictly parallel as types of cultural identity: while the ‘Greek’ is defined precisely by its Hellenic culture, the ‘Roman’ is defined by political structures. Everything under Roman control may be taken as ‘Roman’, whereas within that control, the ‘Greek’ may remain culturally distinctive.<sup>218</sup>

For this reason, I have taken an interest in examining the concept of Roman *virtus* in the context of portrayals of Hellenistic kings who represented a form of government that was considered by the Romans completely opposite to the Roman Republic.

For Polybius and especially during the last century of the Republic, the decline of the traditional Roman ways and *virtus* was already a recurrent theme in the Roman literature.<sup>219</sup> Roman authors expressed their worry about corrupting foreign cultural influences and how Romans were allegedly becoming like Greeks and Asians.<sup>220</sup> The historians of the late Republic perceived that the current state of Roman *virtus* was lower than ever and constructed their historical narratives around this idea. Indeed, the main theme in Sallust’s and Livy’s works is the moral decline caused by the excessive wealth brought by Roman conquests, which they relate in the beginning of their works.<sup>221</sup> They did not criticize the expansion itself but, rather, its consequences. The authors emphasized precise turning points in their narratives after which the Roman *virtus* begun to disintegrate.<sup>222</sup> According to Polybius, irreversibly fast moral

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<sup>218</sup> Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 27.

<sup>219</sup> McDonnell 2006, 1–2, 9–10; Mehl 2011, 243–251. The idea that *virtus* was declining is present already in the earliest extant fragments of Roman historians such as L. Calpurnius Piso: *HRR*, Piso fr. 38 (= Plin. *HN* 17.244), fr. 40 (= Cic. *Fam.* 9.22.2); Champion 2004, 173–185.

<sup>220</sup> For Greek cultural influences and philhellenism in Rome, see Ferrary 2014, ch. 1, 2.2, 2.3; Gruen 1992; Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 39–208.

<sup>221</sup> For moral decline in Sallust’s and Livy’s works, see Balmaceda 2017, ch. 2 and 3. For Sallust’s prologues, see Büchner 1960, 91–130.

<sup>222</sup> These historical turning points described in the sources are, however, misleading and exaggerated: Gruen 1992, 84–130.

decline had started after the battle of Pydna in 168 BC.<sup>223</sup> Even though Polybius did not blame the Eastern cultures per se, he too thought that excessive wealth – accumulated in Rome after the series of successful conquests of rich kings – was extremely dangerous to a society:

[...] wealth, a thing that when used with intelligence and daring is of real service in all enterprises but, when these virtues are absent, proves in most cases the cause of disaster and in fact of utter ruin. For it is the source of jealousy and plotting, and contributes more than anything else to the corruption of body and soul. Those souls indeed are few who can arrest these consequences by the mere power that riches give.<sup>224</sup>

For Livy, on the other hand, the downfall of the Roman *virtus* had begun a little before that, from the victory of Cn. Manlius Vulso against the Asiatic Gauls and his return to Rome with countless riches and undisciplined soldiers in 187 BC.<sup>225</sup> Sallust wrote that the downfall had begun with the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC, but the last crucial blow had been the undisciplined and licentious lifestyle of Sulla's soldiers in Asia after the first defeat of Mithridates VI in 85 BC.<sup>226</sup> For Cicero, too, the stability of the republican system depended on the Romans' moral integrity, and in his opinion this integrity along with the stability had already been lost a long time ago.<sup>227</sup> Efforts to re-define Roman identity and *virtus* played an important role in the political discourse at the end of the Republic. Many republican era authors thought that fast expansion, continuous intensive contact with Eastern cultures, or excessive wealth were to blame for the perceived decline of Roman *virtus* and therefore the crisis of

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<sup>223</sup> Pol. 3.4.1–8, 6.57.1–9, 31.25.4–5. However, Polybius seemed to think that Roman morals had started to gradually decline already during the Second Macedonian War: Pol. 18.35.1–2; Champion 2004, 198–202.

<sup>224</sup> Pol. 18.41.3–5: πλοῦτος [...], ὃς μετὰ νοῦ μὲν καὶ τόλμης χειριζόμενος ὡς ἀληθῶς μεγάλην παρέχεται χρεῖαν πρὸς πᾶσαν ἐπιβολήν, ἄνευ δὲ τῶν προειρημένων τοῖς πλείστοις κακῶν παραίτιος πέφυκε γίνεσθαι καὶ συλλήβδην ἀπωλείας. καὶ γὰρ φθόνους γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιβουλὰς καὶ πρὸς διαφθορὰν σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς μεγίστας ἔχει ῥοπὰς. ὀλίγοι δὲ τινές εἰσι ψυχαὶ παντάπασιν αἱ τὰτα δυνάμεναι διωθεῖσθαι τῆ τοῦ πλοῦτου δυνάμει. For the connection between luxury and moral decline in Roman thought, see Edwards 1993, 173–206.

<sup>225</sup> Liv. 39.6.7.

<sup>226</sup> Sall. Catil. 10; hist. 1.10 (11b M, 10 Mc). The view of Velleius Paterculus was similar to that of Sallust: Vell. Pat. 2.1.1.

<sup>227</sup> Cic. Rep. 1.51, 3.34 (Ziegler 41), 5.1 (Ziegler 1–2). For Cicero, excessive foreign cultural contacts were generally harmful: Cic. Rep. 2.7–8. H. Seng has examined the similarities between Cicero's *On the Republic* and Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline*: Seng 2017.

the republican system.<sup>228</sup> These ideas reflect a contemporary urgent need to redefine Roman identity and *virtus* that set them apart from these other cultures and held the Roman Republic together. The main question for them was, how the traditional moral values could be applied to the new situation.

Social scientist Clifford Geertz has argued that “ideology is a response to strain” which can be cultural as well as social or psychological. This strain is caused by sharp changes in an established political and social order: “It is a loss of orientation that most directly gives rise to ideological activity, an inability, for lack of usable models, to comprehend the universe of civic rights and responsibilities in which one finds oneself located.”<sup>229</sup> Matthew B. Roller sees that this theory of the connection between sociopolitical change and conceptual change can be applied to the study of the transformation of the Roman Republic into autocracy and to the study of the emperors’ image building. According to Roller, in social and political sciences there is a well-known theory that “a society’s moral values are linked in nonarbitrary ways with its sociopolitical arrangements, and that changes in sociopolitical arrangements are correlated to changes in values”.<sup>230</sup> Therefore, the attempts to redefine Roman *virtus* by the authors of the late Republic, and the so-called “restoration of the republic” by Augustus, are both reactions to the quickly changing social and cultural ambience. This is why historical *exempla* are the key to understanding *virtus* and consequently the Roman ideas of “Romanness” in this era.<sup>231</sup>

Defining Romanness at this time was important not only in relation to foreigners overseas but also in the Italian context, especially after the Social War (91–87 BC) when Roman citizenship was granted to all of the Apennine peninsula south of the Po Valley. According to Gary D. Farney, the Augustan

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<sup>228</sup> Edwards 1993, 173–206; McDonnell 2006, 259–262, 302, 356–384; Isaac 2004, 239–243, 304–323. Bernard 2015, 41–44. To name a few of the endless examples from the Roman era: Pol. 31.25.4–7; Liv. 33.20.1, 33.27.6, 33.33.5, 34.4.3, 42.47.1–9; Sall. Catil. 10–12; Cic. Rep. 2.6–7; Caes. B Gall. II 15.4; Diod. Sic. 30.7.1; Just. Epit. 36.4.12

<sup>229</sup> Geertz 1973, 219.

<sup>230</sup> Roller 2001, 17.

<sup>231</sup> There was no Latin word for “Romanness” in republican sources. In the 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD, Tertullian (De Pal. 4.1) used the word *romanitas*, but it is rare and not suitable in this context. I use the intentionally vague word “Romanness” to signify the ideas of what constitutes “being Roman” culturally. For definitions of “Romanness” in war-centred epic of the early principate, see Pyy 2014, 55–64.

era thus seems to be the beginning of the formation of some kind of common Italian identity. Farney argues that “this development appears already with Octavian’s *tota Italia* propaganda during the Actian War against Antony, and the growing primacy of Italy is recognized by Virgil in the *Aeneid*: ‘Here is Augustus Caesar driving the Italians into war, with senators and the people, with the Penates and the all-mighty gods.’”<sup>232</sup> According to Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, this is connected with the expansion of Roman citizenship. Therefore, the need to redefine Roman identity was linked to the change in the composition of the elite and the citizen body at the end of the republican era.<sup>233</sup>

After the difficult period of civil wars and proscriptions, Augustus needed to justify his rule and look for the right kind of profile that would appeal to the Romans. He needed to be careful to avoid the fate of his adoptive father Caesar: for the duration of the Roman Republic, *odium regni*, the fear of sole rulers emerging from within the Republic, had been one of the few sentiments that was shared by most of the Roman ruling class.<sup>234</sup> Augustus certainly had material to work with: during the late Republic, the Romans had actively and increasingly “rewritten” and used history to suit their own needs, thus creating many different versions of the past.<sup>235</sup> Augustus used the city of Rome as the basis, recomposing its history, culture, and identity around himself through institutions, arts, monuments, and literature.<sup>236</sup> He drew inspiration from the legends of Romulus and the city’s origins.<sup>237</sup> The Republic and its virtues were taken as an “ideological shield, behind whose protection the autocracy took its fledging steps”, as Ayelet Haimson Lushkov writes.<sup>238</sup>

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<sup>232</sup> Farney 2007, 233; Verg. Aen. 8.678–679. For Roman Italy, see Gabba 1994; Giardina 1997. For a deeper analysis of Augustus’s *tota Italia* propaganda, see Stephens 2016, 117–125; Segenni 2018. For the “Romanness” in Virgil, see Toll 1997. Roman identity in the West: Revell 2016. Roman identity in the war-centred epic of the early principate: Pyy 2014.

<sup>233</sup> Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 444–454.

<sup>234</sup> According to Cicero, Tarquinius Superbus had completely ruined the name of king (*rex*) in Rome: Cic. Rep. 1.62 and 64, 2.52. For *odium regni*, see Fritz 1954, 304–305; Russo 2015. For discussions of the concept of kingship in the republican discourse, see Classen 1965; Giua 1967; Grimal 1986; Martin 1992; Ferrary 2014, 167–170; Sigmund 2014, ch. 1 and 2.3.3.

<sup>235</sup> On the transformation of the *Geschichtskultur* from the late Republic to the Augustan era, see Pausch 2011, ch. II.1.b. Cicero lamented that Roman aristocrats “falsified” history on purpose: Cic. Brut. 62.

<sup>236</sup> For how publicly displayed collections of art and monuments “wove a narrative of empire” during Caesar’s and Augustus’s times, see Rutledge 2012, 228–262. For a list of positive representations of Roman commanders in art and coins, see Smith 1999, ch. 3.c.ii.

<sup>237</sup> For the connection of Augustus and Romulus, see Mineo 2015b, 139–141.

<sup>238</sup> Haimson Lushkov 2015, 20.

Augustus vouchsafed to restore the peace which technically meant that he would restore the Republican laws and rights, rather than actually re-establishing the old Republic.<sup>239</sup> Theodor Mommsen and some others have called the Augustan constitution “dyarchy”, where the power was shared between Augustus and the senate, but this was only a thin illusion. He was the sole ruler. Augustus justified his position by promising to bring universal peace, *pax romana*, to bring back the past golden age and traditional Roman morality, and to protect this renewed and even better Rome by becoming *pater patriae*.<sup>240</sup> Livy’s ideas of Roman *virtus* especially coincided with Augustus’s ideological program.<sup>241</sup> Historiography indeed was useful for commemorating the traditional republican ideals and for highlighting desired aspects in the broader cultural discourse. Bernard Mineo aptly observes:

The very Ciceronian moral values that form the basis of Livy’s concord appear in fact to largely corroborate the values underlined by Augustus, for which he was personally recognized through the attribution of the shield of valor (*Clipeus virtutis*) that proclaimed his *virtus*, clemency, good faith and justice, and his piety (*virtus, clementia, iustitia, pietas*: R. Gest. div. Aug. 34.2). Indeed, these qualities form the ideological core of a principate to which the countenance of the *moderator rei publicae* of the Ciceronian *princeps* acted as a republican guarantee.<sup>242</sup>

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<sup>239</sup> B. Mineo (2015c, p. 135) uses as an example the aureus struck by Augustus in 28 BC, with the inscription: “leges et iura p[opuli] R[omani] restituit”. Cf. Rich and Williams 1999. E.A. Judge has argued that the common conception that Augustus vouchsafed to literally “restore the Republic” (“res publica restituta”) is only a modern illusion and that Augustus himself or his contemporaries never claimed so: Judge 1974.

<sup>240</sup> R. Gest. div. Aug. 8.5, 35; Hor. Carm. 4.5.21–4, Carm. saec. 57–59. C. Edwards argues that the Augustan law against adultery (*Lex Iulia de adulteriis*) and other laws regulating marriage should be read as a part of the rhetorical incentive of the wider moral reform programme: Edwards 1993, 34–62. These ideas did not arise from nothing: Marius and Sulla had already alluded to themselves as *patres patriae* and these discourses became much more apparent in the legitimation of Caesar’s dictatorship; see Suet. Jul. 85; Zecchini 2001, 127–129.

<sup>241</sup> For the coinciding moral ideals of Livy and Augustus, see Pianezzola 2018, 49–62. Pompeius Trogus too wrote in this same Augustan context but we do not know if he already started writing before Augustus’s reign like Livy.

<sup>242</sup> Mineo 2015c, 134. However, according to Mineo, Augustus only made a cosmetic use of the Ciceronian moral values and it must have been clear to everyone that the principate was a big step toward autocracy. A. Wallace-Hadrill (2008, p. 258) instead thinks that “[i]t is the perfect revolution, which in changing everything changes also the perception of what is normal and traditional, and so erases its own revolutionary status.” For the memory of the Republic and its uses after Augustus, see Gallia 2012.

## 1.5 POLYBIUS AND CICERO ON THE CONCEPTS OF MONARCHY AND THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

The Romans' relationship with their own kings was complicated but it is safe to say that the general concept of kingship was seen in a more neutral manner.<sup>243</sup> Cicero, Livy, and Polybius all thought that the regal period had been a necessary growing experience for Rome in order to reach the more balanced and in every way better form of government – the Republic.<sup>244</sup> Indeed, they did not consider kingship to be a categorically bad form of government. Their ideas of different political constitutions were based on the Greek writings of the 5<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, but for my current purpose it will suffice to summarize Polybius's and Cicero's thoughts.<sup>245</sup>

Polybius's work includes the first surviving examination of the Roman constitution compared with other forms of government. Polybius applied the thoughts of Plato to his personal experiences of the Roman Republic.<sup>246</sup> Polybius starts by stating that the common opinion was that there were three types of constitutions: kingship, aristocracy, and democracy. In his opinion, there actually were six forms which evolved or devolved in a natural continuous cycle. The most primitive form was monarchy (*μοναρχία*). When it evolved, it became kingship (*βασιλεία*). When kingship became corrupt, it was called tyranny (*τυραννίς*). From this, aristocracy (*ἀριστοκρατία*) was born. When aristocracy became corrupt, it was called oligarchy (*ὀλιγαρχία*). From this, the most evolved single form democracy (*δημοκρατία*) was born.<sup>247</sup> The best possible constitution, however, was a mixed constitution: a combination of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy. All three elements were

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<sup>243</sup> A. Erskine has shown that the word *rex* is used in a completely neutral or even positive tone in republican literature: Erskine 1991, 111–113. Erskine has suggested that the anti-monarchic discourse towards foreign kings originated at the earliest in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century. Cf. Börm 2015b, 15–16; Russo 2015; *OCD*, s.v. *rex*.

<sup>244</sup> For Livy's political philosophy, see Livy: 2.1, 2.12.2. For a detailed study of Livy's view of the early Roman kingship, see Vasaly 2015, ch. 4, and *passim*.

<sup>245</sup> Herodotus wrote that monarchy could be a valid form of government: Hdt. 3.82.2. Plato and Aristotle too suggested that monarchy could work with a wise and educated king: Pl. *Plt.* 291c–293e; Aristot. *Pol.* 1284a4–b35. For Plato's opinion on bad tyrants, see Pl. *Resp.* 8.565d. For Xenophon or Socrates, a good king was a mirror image of a bad tyrant: Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.12. For Xenophon's ideas on leadership, see Gray 2010.

<sup>246</sup> For an in-depth analysis of Polybius's theory, see Fritz 1954. For political theories before Polybius, see Romilly 1959; Pelling 2002; Carlier 2011.

<sup>247</sup> *Pol.* 6.3–4. Cf. Pl. *Plt.* 291D and 302C.

needed to keep all social classes content. Polybius saw the Roman Republic or the Sparta of Lycurgus as examples of this.<sup>248</sup>

Even though the Roman Republic was a mixed constitution, it was not immune to the natural cycle of constitutions. Polybius explains this cycle in detail and concludes that the cycle ends with the dissolution of democracy and with a rollback to the most primitive form, monarchy. This happens because, after many generations under democracy, the people begin to take freedom for granted and start to crave power. This leads to corruption and violence and finally, when the dust settles, to monarchy.<sup>249</sup> This theory matches well with Polybius's wider discourse of the supposed moral decline of the Romans, caused by excessive wealth and the lack of *metus hostilis* – fear of strong external enemies – after the Hannibalic war and especially after the defeat of King Perseus.<sup>250</sup> He seems to be foretelling that because of this moral decline, monarchy might be the future of the Romans.<sup>251</sup> Polybius does not enter into this futuristic discussion, however: he settles for a static description of the Roman Republican constitution at its highest point.<sup>252</sup> We should further remember that for Polybius monarchy was the most primitive form of government, but it was not always a bad form of government. Monarchy could

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<sup>248</sup> Pol. 6.10–18 and 48–51. According to Polybius, the Roman Republic was better than Lycurgus's Sparta, however, because the Roman republican government could function outside the city itself, even with a vast empire. The first to present the theory of a mixed constitution was Plato, and others such as Aristotle also considered the theory. Polybius's version has had the greatest after-effect. Cicero's fragments of *On the Republic* were discovered only in 1819. Cf. Fritz 1954, v–vii; Walbank 1972, 130–156. In the sixth book, especially in the lost parts, Polybius also discussed cultural and military aspects that made the Roman Republic superior: Erskine 2013. For Polybius's views of different constitutions in the Hellenistic world, see Virgilio 2014.

<sup>249</sup> Pol. 6.5–9. According to Polybius, everything went well in Sparta as long as they had two kings, but the decline started when they transited into a system of only one king: Pol. 23.11.4–5. Polybius gives an example of what kind of behaviour brings a king closer to tyranny: Pol. 15.24.4–6.

<sup>250</sup> Pol. 3.4.1–8, 6.57.1–9, 18.35.1–2, 31.25.4–5; Champion 2004, 198–202. Polybius thought that moral decline was happening not only in Rome but also in the Greek world during his time: Champion 2004, ch. 5. The basic idea of *metus hostilis* comes from the Greeks; see Zecchini 2018a, 135–136.

<sup>251</sup> Pol. 6.11 and 57. The exact future was hard to predict, however, because the Roman constitution had three different elements: Walbank 1957, 743. D.W. Baronowski has analysed Polybius's vision of the future of the Roman empire in more detail: Baronowski 2011, 153–159. For Polybius's treatment of different political constitutions throughout his work, see Baronowski 2011, 137–142. F.W. Walbank however does not think that Polybius was trying to foretell anything or perceived that the decline of Roman society was already underway: Walbank 2002, 196–197, 200–208, 277–292.

<sup>252</sup> Fritz 1954, 153–154.

further evolve to kingship, when people began to follow someone not only for his great strength but also for his wisdom and justness.<sup>253</sup>

Around a hundred years later, Cicero applied Polybius's thoughts of mixed constitution to his own philosophical work, *De re publica (On the Republic)*.<sup>254</sup> Cicero's work is mostly concerned with moral values, a detailed definition of the *res publica*, and what types of leaders were the best. For Cicero, the three best single forms of governments were kingship, aristocracy, and a popular government. Any of these forms could function well with wise leaders. But for him, much like for Polybius, the constant change and cycle of these different constitutions was inevitable. For this reason, the most stable and the best possible form of government was a mix of these three. The goal should be to give the people as much freedom as possible without destabilizing the society. Excessive freedom would collapse into slavery and into tyranny.<sup>255</sup> "Nothing indeed can be sweeter than freedom", remarks Cicero.<sup>256</sup> For this reason, Cicero thinks that people living under a king were living in slavery.

However, Cicero saw the Roman regal period as a necessary growing experience in order to achieve the more perfect Republic. Every king had contributed somehow to improving the Roman government.<sup>257</sup> In his imaginary story, Cicero makes Scipio Aemilianus name the best of the three simple forms of government. Scipio says that if he cannot choose the mixed constitution, which is obviously the best, he would choose kingship. A detailed exaltation of kingship follows. Scipio says that if the king is the best available

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<sup>253</sup> Pol. 6.5–6. When the Iberians offered Scipio Africanus the title of king, which he obviously refused, Polybius notes quite directly that kingship was "the greatest blessing for which any man would dare to pray to the gods": Pol. 10.40.9.

<sup>254</sup> A comparison of Cicero's and Polybius's thoughts: Fritz 1954, 124–148. Cicero's *On the Republic* has survived in a very fragmentary form, which makes it difficult to analyse his thoughts profoundly. The story was set as happening in the house of Scipio Aemilianus in 129 BC. For a good introduction, see Zetzel 1999.

<sup>255</sup> Cic. Rep. 1.42–45, 1.47–48, 1.68–70, 2.2. Complete equality was not fair either because the natural talents of individual persons were not the same. For this, ranks of some kind were needed even in the *res publica*: Cic. Rep. 1.43, 1.49, 1.67. Fragments of Sallust's *Histories* give the impression that the Roman Republic had already collapsed into tyranny and slavery in the 70s BC: Sall. hist. 1.49 (48 Mc, 55 M), esp. lines 1–6, 9–10, and 25; *ibid.* 3.15 (34 Mc, 48M), esp. lines 1–3 and 9–13.

<sup>256</sup> Cic. Rep. 1.47.

<sup>257</sup> Cic. Rep. 2.23–37. For a more realistic general overview of the regal period, see Linke 2011. For Livy too, the Romans had had to go through the regal period because they were not yet "mature" enough for liberty and the republican government: Liv. 2.1, 2.12.2.

man and like a father to his subjects, kingship functions well.<sup>258</sup> Furthermore, he continues, people respect a charismatic king much more than they respect a group of aristocrats. For this reason, kingship is more stable than aristocracy. Even the gods had only one leader, Jupiter.<sup>259</sup> Scipio points out that not such a long time ago even Romans had had kings. He asks if this makes those Romans barbarians. The answer is that if they themselves rationally chose to be ruled by kings, they were no more uncivilized than some of the Greeks at that time. It was not a matter of race but of character.<sup>260</sup> Scipio reminds his audience that the people had loved Romulus, and it was only because of Tarquinius Superbus that the people started to hate kings and to idealize freedom in an exaggerated manner.<sup>261</sup>

These ideas can help us understand why foreign kings are sometimes praised in the historical narratives based on their moral qualities. However, we should not understand Cicero's thoughts as an encouragement to sole rulership in Rome. Rather, it is a critical and neutral examination of different government models. Kingship was one of many. It was better than most but still not the best. The traditional Roman Republic had been the best and the morally most superior form of government for Cicero. And it was the morals that dictated if nations deserved to survive or to dominate others. For Cicero, however, the traditional and ideal Roman Republic had already collapsed because of moral decline.<sup>262</sup>

To conclude, for both Polybius and Cicero the Roman Republic of the past had been the best form of government. Therefore, the Republic as they knew it in their own times was not flawless and perhaps not even better than the second-best option, kingship. Polybius's and Cicero's ideas of the natural cycle of constitutions partially correspond to what happened after their death: the disintegration of the Roman Republic was essentially a slow transition to

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<sup>258</sup> Cic. Rep. 1.54, 1.69. On Cicero's idea of a good king: Cic. Deiot. 45. Cf. Diodorus Siculus's ideas of kingship: Muntz 2017, 191–214.

<sup>259</sup> Cic. Rep. 1.55–56. Similarly, different aspects of mind such as fear and greed were controlled only by reason, and analogously a functioning household was controlled only by one person: Cic. Rep. 1.60–61.

<sup>260</sup> Cic. Rep. 1.58.

<sup>261</sup> Cic. Rep. 1.62, 1.64, 1.68. Livy remarks that it was generally difficult to find and maintain a balance between freedom and slavery Liv. 24.25.8.

<sup>262</sup> Zetzel 1999, xviii–xix.

another form of government. This transition, in turn, was a part of a very long process which started with the beginning of the Republic and did not end with Augustus and autocracy. The change was constant. For this reason, it is too simplistic to state that Rome “needed an emperor” because the empire had become too big for a republican constitution. It has been a common idea among earlier scholars that monarchies are automatically better at managing vast empires.<sup>263</sup> Keeping all this in mind we should not try to read Polybius, Cicero, or Sallust with the aspiration to forcibly find exhortations for sole rulership in Rome. It became necessary later, after the early reign of Augustus who established autocracy behind the name of the Republic and its traditional virtues. Augustus needed justifications for his autocratic position to avoid the fate of Caesar, and the republican moralists like the historians and Cicero offered him the basis for this discourse.<sup>264</sup>

A few last notions regarding the terminology are useful before proceeding further. Roman authors were not interested in recognizing any political differences between various forms of monarchy, from Numidia to Macedonia and from the Seleucids to the Pontic kingdom and many smaller ones. For Roman authors, every king represented more or less the same concept of Hellenistic monarchy.<sup>265</sup> This is the view of this study too, mostly but not solely because of how the sources treat the concept. Some modern studies on Hellenistic monarchies justly remark that different monarchies could vary greatly by geographical extent, mobility of the king, and resources.<sup>266</sup> Others, on the other hand, recognize many common denominators. Frank W. Walbank, for example, thinks that it is entirely possible to talk about Hellenistic monarchy as a specific political category. Indeed, Hans-Joachim Gehrke has listed important similarities between different Hellenistic monarchies: the lack of an effective succession system and resulting instability of government, frequent accession by usurpation, legitimation of rule by

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<sup>263</sup> K. von Fritz criticizes such statements and analyses the reasons for the transition to autocracy: Fritz 1954, 293–304.

<sup>264</sup> Erskine 1991, 107.

<sup>265</sup> The area of the Numidian kingdom was not part of Alexander the Great’s empire but assimilated clear Hellenistic influences starting from the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC: Kuttner 2013, 229–237.

<sup>266</sup> Bilde et al. 1996.

military victories, functionality of the king's court, ruler cult, public image of the king, and comparisons to Alexander the Great.<sup>267</sup> Gehrke further notes that these characteristics are present in Hellenistic monarchies from the beginning to the end of the Hellenistic era.<sup>268</sup> Therefore it is no wonder that Roman authors clearly had a more or less universal image of Hellenistic monarchies.

What about different names for sole rulers? The difference between monarchy, kingship, and tyranny was well defined in ancient political theories, even though it was not always so in other contexts.<sup>269</sup> In narrative portrayals, the same character – king or not – could have great virtues and serious vices at the same time.<sup>270</sup> If a sole ruler had only vices, however, he was a tyrant, not a king. Polybius wrote that everyone would like to be called king (*βασιλεύς*) but to earn this a ruler had to rule with reason and to be loved and accepted by his subjects.<sup>271</sup> True kingship was marked by companionship, justice, goodness, and almost fatherlike care for his subjects. However, Polybius's use of the word “king” or “monarch” (*μόναρχος*) is not consistent throughout the whole work: he seems to be using the word in several ways, often meaning a tyrant and other times more neutrally, not following his own definition from the sixth book.<sup>272</sup>

Cicero and other Latin writers for that matter seemed to prefer the word *rex* for “king”, *regnum* for “kingship/monarchy”, and *tyrannus* for “tyrant”.<sup>273</sup> The word *monarchia* exists but was not used in republican or Augustan era Latin texts. However, the English word “monarchy” is widely used in modern

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<sup>267</sup> Gehrke makes a distinction between Hellenistic and oriental monarchies, the latter of which rely much more on a magical-religious basis for royal legitimacy: Gehrke 2013, 91.

<sup>268</sup> For Gehrke's profound and fundamental discussion on legitimization of rule and the Weberian “charismatic ruler” theory applied to Hellenistic monarchy, see Gehrke 2013.

<sup>269</sup> Studies on the definitions of kings and tyrants in ancient thought: Hartog 1988, 310–339; Forsdyke 2009; Catenacci 2012, 13–37; Luraghi 2013a; idem 2015; Börm 2015b; Russo 2015. For Cicero's views on a typical tyrant, see Dunkle 1967.

<sup>270</sup> Sall. Iug. 64.1.

<sup>271</sup> In Livy's narrative, the Spartan tyrant Nabis, after having broken his treaty with the Romans, is offended when Flamininus starts calling him a “tyrant” instead of “king”: Liv. 34.31.13. Fear was something usually associated with tyrants. Livy (34.27.3) says that to control his subjects, Nabis “cowed people's spirits by intimidation and callous punishments as he could not expect them to wish a tyrant well / metu et acerbitate poenarum tenebat animos, quoniam ut saluum vellent tyrannum sperare non poterat.” The people of Argos were paralysed by fear because of Nabis: Liv. 34.26.4. Cf. Pol. 5.11.5–6; Nep. Milt. 8. For other leaders controlling their people with violence and fear, see Pol. 22.13.7, 38.8.13. For the famous expression “let them hate, so long as they fear”, see Cic. Off. 1.97, 2.23.

<sup>272</sup> Walbank 1972, 140–142.

<sup>273</sup> On Cicero's use of *rex*, *tyrannus*, and *dominus*, see Turchetti 2013, 147–151.

scholarship, and for the sake of clarity I do not wish to differ too much from this practice. I do not deem it necessary to differentiate between the two concepts (monarchy and kingship) because my sources do not either, regardless of philosophical considerations. What has been important in this study, however, is to remember the difference between kings and tyrants.

## 2 THE POSITIVE OTHER: ADMIRATION OF VIRTUOUS KINGS

In this chapter, I focus on the positive *exempla* of the Other, i.e., Hellenistic kings and how these *exempla* participate in the processes of literary construction of Roman identity. I examine which qualities made the kings admirable enemies or respectable allies according to the historical narratives. I show that the kings could earn the Romans' respect by demonstrating that they possessed moral qualities that concurred with the Roman idea of *virtus*.

In the case of enemy kings, military *virtus* was especially respected because strong enemies helped the Romans themselves stay strong. Thus, in the first subchapter, I show how historical characters of formidable enemy kings like Pyrrhus, Philip V, Antiochus III, Perseus, Jugurtha, and Mithridates VI were used as moral examples of Roman military *virtus* in the historical narratives. The common attribute of these admirable enemies was their military success that in turn was based on their ability to endure hardships and maintain self-discipline. These positive kingly attributes correlated with the Roman ideas of military *virtus* and, consequently, such praise of powerful enemies served to magnify Roman military victories and their own *virtus*. These enemy kings could function as positive models of Roman military *virtus* regardless of the fact that some of them possessed other bad moral qualities such as cruelty or impiety.

Other additional common moral values like *fides*, *pietas*, *modestia*, *clementia*, *continentia*, *temperantia*, and *iustitia*, often closely connected with concept of military *virtus* (cf. Augustus's *clipeus virtutis*: R. Gest. div. Aug. 34.2.), were important when making alliances with friendly kings. The same qualities that made kings worthy leaders made them worthy of Roman friendship. In the second subchapter, I study Polybius's and Livy's characterizations of the friendly kings Masinissa, Philip V, and Eumenes II from this position. I examine which moral qualities made these kings worthy of Roman *amicitia*, and which narrative tools the historians employ in these portrayals. Just like the enemy kings, these friendly kings served as models of

good leadership but, instead of concentrating only on military *virtus*, the historians also praise their other moral qualities.

Starting with this chapter, and continuing throughout the whole text, I strive to follow the idea (cf. Ankersmit 2012) that the meaning of historical *exempla* should be constructed through their context, e.g., with a diachronic reading of different narratives that use the same *exemplum*. In practice this means that I pay as much attention as possible to the differences between authors – mainly Polybius and Livy – and how they emphasize diverse aspects in their narrative portrayals of these kings because of their different narrative schemes and historical contexts. I will not mainly focus on the actual reasons for each historical event as such but, rather, I will focus on the narratives and whatever context is necessary for narratological analysis.

## 2.1 WORTHY ENEMIES OF ROME

### *The education of a virtuous king*

The portrayals of famous historical characters were often complete with their whole life story that typically consisted of a selection of the following components: their origin and birth, ancestors and family, childhood and education, personality and physical appearance, rise to power, remarkable deeds and wars, relationship with the gods, and death. Their exceptional *virtus* was evident in all aspects and phases of their lives. Already in Greek historiography, the childhoods of the most famous kings and leaders like Cyrus the Great were dotted with semi-mythical features and great hardships like abandonment, much as in the case of Romulus and Remus.<sup>274</sup> In the historical narratives discussed here, these aspects appear prominently in the childhood stories of, e.g., Pyrrhus, Mithridates VI, Philip V, and Jugurtha, who all encountered dangers, neglect, and the disdain of their closest relatives. They

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<sup>274</sup> Such childhood stories of famous kings and heroes were extremely common in antiquity; see Bettini and Borghini 1979. One such king was Cyrus the Great: Hdt. 1.107 ff; Just. Epit. 1.4–6, 44.4.12; Catenacci 2012, 53–55. For a similarly mythical childhood story of Hiero II of Syracuse, see Just. Epit. 23.4. For the similarities between Livy's descriptions of the Roman kings and the legendary eastern leaders, see Scapini 2015.

had to prove their worth already at a very early age in order to earn their place in the regal court. These elements, such as initial “disablement” and a series of tests to pass, are indeed common in many heroic stories and fables of all ages.<sup>275</sup>

The stories relate that Pyrrhus and Mithridates VI, for example, had to go into exile to evade assassination attempts during their childhood. To start with Pyrrhus, he is often praised in Roman sources beginning already with Ennius who had written that the Pyrrhic War (280–275 BC) had been a battle of *virtutes* between the Epirot king and the Romans.<sup>276</sup> According to Trogus/Justin, the father of Pyrrhus had been a hated king of Epirus who was exiled from his kingdom.<sup>277</sup> For this reason, Pyrrhus was also in danger of being killed as a baby. He was rescued and taken to Illyria, where the king and queen adopted him and protected him from the hatred of the Macedonians. Later, the Epirots started to pity young Pyrrhus and invited him back to his native land to become its king. Regardless of his young age, he possessed *virtus* and wanted to follow *exempla maiorum* – just as any young Roman nobleman would ideally strive to do. He was victorious in many wars, and quickly achieve considerable prestige.<sup>278</sup>

Justin tells a similar detailed story about Mithridates VI Eupator, the king of Pontus on the Black Sea during 120–63 BC.<sup>279</sup> When Mithridates was a young prince, his caretakers attempted to assassinate him by framing an accident: he was forced to ride a wild horse and throw javelins at the same time, but Mithridates proved to be an excellent rider, and he easily overcame the deadly challenge, despite his young age. Next, they attempted to poison him, but Mithridates was again prepared. He had trained his body by taking regular doses of antidote, thus becoming immune to all poisons. The story goes on to tell how he then spent seven years in the wilderness, hiding from more direct assassination attempts and training himself by roaming in nature and

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<sup>275</sup> Catenacci 2012, 55–56 and *passim*. G. Cipriani compares the story of Jugurtha’s youth to a fable. He calls it “fabula sallustiniana”. Cipriani 1988, 87–121.

<sup>276</sup> Cic. Off. 1.38 (= Enn. Ann. 183–190 in the 2018 Loeb edition, or 186–193 in Warmington’s 1935 edition). Ennius’s sixth book treated the Pyrrhic War. Cf. McDonnell 2006, 160–161.

<sup>277</sup> Just. Epit. 17.3.

<sup>278</sup> *Exempla maiorum*: Just. Epit. 18.1.2. Pyrrhus’s *virtus*: Just. Epit. 18.1.10. Pyrrhus was admired in Italy and Greece alike: Just. Epit. 23.3.2, 25.4.5.

<sup>279</sup> Just. Epit. 37.2–3.

hunting wild animals. This way, he was able to pass any “test of *virtus*”.<sup>280</sup> When he finally assumed the throne of his kingdom, he immediately began to expand it by waging successful wars with the neighbouring kingdoms.<sup>281</sup>

Exile and spending the formative years outside one’s native country was a common component of Persian legends of kings. Brian McGing remarks that Mithridates’ childhood story has to be analysed in relation to Persian traditions, according to which the youths of the Pontic upper class were also raised.<sup>282</sup> The upbringing consisted of combat training on horseback and hunting in the wilderness.<sup>283</sup> This was respectable from the Roman point of view as well. Cato the Elder was a famous advocate of military training for young Romans. In his opinion, a simple life without luxuries produced the best soldiers.<sup>284</sup> Sallust wrote that during the early Republic, young Romans started strictly disciplined military training early and preferred outdoor exercise over comfort and luxuries.<sup>285</sup> According to Cicero, Pompey, who was Mithridates’ final adversary, had started military training in his father’s army “straight out of school”.<sup>286</sup> Physical exercise and military training were indeed familiar activities to most Roman upper-class men, whose duty was to lead Roman soldiers in battles. Success in military affairs was an effective way to demonstrate one’s *virtus* publicly and advance one’s political career.

Trogus/Justin’s compliment of Mithridates, who spent his youth outdoors training instead of in leisure at the regal court, resembles Polybius’s story of how young Scipio Aemilianus liked to go hunting when other young men stayed at the Forum.<sup>287</sup> This kind of demonstration of *virtus* made Scipio Aemilianus earn the respect of his fellow Romans much more quickly than

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<sup>280</sup> Just. Epit. 37.2.9.

<sup>281</sup> For Mithridates’ expansion of his kingdom, see McGing 1986, 81–88.

<sup>282</sup> McGing 1986, 43–46.

<sup>283</sup> Pl. Alc. 1.121e.

<sup>284</sup> Plut. Cat. Mai. 4.3, 23.5; McDonnell 2006, 55–56, 259–262. Cf. Sall. Iug. 63.3. Consequently, inactivity and comfortable living in the military camps rendered the soldiers weak and undisciplined: Sall. Iug. 6.1, 45, 100.5; Liv. 23.18.12, 23.45.1–5, 28.24.6, per. 57; Cass. Dio 62.6.4–5. Cf. Phang 2008, 102–105.

<sup>285</sup> Sall. Catil. 7.4–6. Cicero too advocated for the importance of physical training and military education for the youth: Cic. Rep. 2.4, 4.1–2a. (Ziegler 3–4). A virtuous man did not fear death or pain: Cic. Rep. 5.7 (Ziegler 9). Cicero complimented King Deiotarus for his military training: Cic. Deiot. 28. Prusias II on the other hand was an opposite bad example: Pol. 36.15.

<sup>286</sup> Cic. Leg. Man. 28: “qui e ludo atque e pueritiae disciplinis bello maximo atque acerrimis hostibus ad patris exercitum atque in militiae disciplinam profectus est.”

<sup>287</sup> Pol. 31.29.

others, through deeds rather than words – the true Roman way that had reputedly already started to fall out of use.<sup>288</sup> According to Polybius, Scipio Aemilianus had acquired the passion for this sport in Macedonia, where his father, L. Aemilius Paullus, thought it was a suitable activity for him to spend free time hunting with the royal huntsmen – an activity equally respected and enjoyed by Hellenistic kings and princes.<sup>289</sup> Moreover, the story of Mithridates riding a wild horse immediately reminds one of the story of how Alexander the Great tamed a wild horse on his own.<sup>290</sup> In his kingly propaganda, Mithridates VI compared himself to Alexander the Great, and Trogus/Justin too claim that he was related to Alexander on his mother's side.<sup>291</sup> Comparing oneself to Alexander the Great was indeed very common among Hellenistic rulers.<sup>292</sup> The same story was told about Pyrrhus: he was related to Alexander and he reputedly wanted to be a conqueror comparable to him.<sup>293</sup>

But it was not only Alexander to whom the rulers compared themselves. Mithridates also claimed to be related to the Persian great kings Cyrus and Darius on his father's side, and Pyrrhus was said to be related even to Achilles and Hercules.<sup>294</sup> Macedonian kings for their part claimed descendancy from Zeus.<sup>295</sup> M.M. Austin has remarked that young kings who had not yet achieved any great military accomplishments of their own might want to legitimize their position by leaning on the achievements of their real or legendary ancestors and promising to imitate them.<sup>296</sup> This was something a Roman reader could

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<sup>288</sup> Just like Jugurtha who “performed numerous accomplishments, but spoke very little of his own exploits / plurimum facere et minimum ipse de se loqui”: Sall. Iug. 6.1. Cf. Sall. Iug. 85.14.

<sup>289</sup> On the importance of hunting and bodily exercise for Hellenistic royalty: Pol. 22.3.7–8, 25.3.6; Carney 2002. Polybius complimented King Masinissa for not being afraid of physical toil even in old age: Pol. 36.16. For Scipio Aemilianus's education, see Ferrary 2014, ch. 2.3.

<sup>290</sup> Plut. Alex. 6; McGing 1986, 44; Yarrow 2006, 318–319.

<sup>291</sup> McGing 1986, 44–46, 99, 101–102, 107, 109, 141–142; Just. Epit. 38.7.1. Plutarch wrote that Mithridates was struck by lightning when he was a baby just like Alexander the Great's mother when she was expecting Alexander: Plut. Mor. 624 B, Symp. 1.6.2, Alex. 2.2.

<sup>292</sup> Bohm 1989.

<sup>293</sup> Just. Epit. 17.3.14, 18.1.1–2. Cf. Fest. p. 412.13–23 L (= Enn. Ann. 166 in the 2018 Loeb edition, or 172 in Warmington's 1935 edition).

<sup>294</sup> For Mithridates being related to Cyrus and Darius, see Just. Epit. 38.7.1–5; Sall. hist. 2.59 (85 Mc, 73 M). The founder of the Epirot kingdom, also named Pyrrhus, was said to be a son of Achilles who married a granddaughter of Hercules. Pyrrhus's grandfather's sister Olympias was Alexander's mother: Just. Epit. 17.3.1–6; Vell. Pat. 1.1. Cf. Schettino 2015, 77–79.

<sup>295</sup> Bohec-Bouhet 2002.

<sup>296</sup> Austin 1986. Cf. Pol. 4.22.5, 5.16.2, 18.6, 26.4, 29.2, and 34.2 for Philip V, and 5.34.2 and 4.1 for Antiochus III.

relate to: one only needs to recall how Sallust wrote that illustrious Roman commanders, when they were young, would look at their ancestor's masks with a burning determination to imitate them and thus prove themselves to their community.<sup>297</sup> Austin quotes Polybius who describes the encounter of two young kings, Antiochus III and Ptolemy IV: "Neither king could cite any glorious and generally recognized achievement of his own, both of them having but recently come to the throne, so that it was by reminding the troops of the glorious deeds of their ancestors that they attempted to inspire them with spirit and courage."<sup>298</sup> A glorious ancestry was a promise to continue the ancestral tradition of conquest and expansion. Furthermore, young Antiochus III, Hannibal, and Philip V all not only passionately wanted to follow their ancestors' example but also showed "innate" *virtus* because of their special lineage.<sup>299</sup> This was in line with the Roman ideal that the ancestral tradition was very important and something to be imitated for collectively maintaining their *virtus*.

These *topoi* make even more sense if we examine them in the light of Hans-Joachim Gehrke's article, in which he examines the ways of the legitimization of rule in Hellenistic monarchies within their social context, based on Max Weber's concepts of the legitimacy of government.<sup>300</sup> According to Gehrke, the legitimacy of rule of a Hellenistic king is mostly, but not exclusively, based on charisma that is for its part based on situations that demonstrate the ruler's personal abilities and the favour of the gods. For a Hellenistic king, the most effective way to prove his competence to rule was military victory. Therefore, military victories or other demonstrations of personal virtues lead to the political and regal authority of the ruler. "Natural" legitimization, i.e., heredity of rule, was not sufficient alone in the context of Hellenistic monarchy – it often allowed a king to assume the rule, but the king still had to prove his abilities in order to legitimize the continuation of his rule. Gehrke discusses in detail different aspects of this kind of charismatic-natural

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<sup>297</sup> Sall. Iug. 4.5.

<sup>298</sup> Pol. 5.83; Austin 1986, 459.

<sup>299</sup> Just. Epit. 29.1.8: "His regibus pueris tametsi nulli senioris aetatis rectores erant, tamen in suorum quisque maiorum vestigia intentis magna indoles virtutis enituit." Cf. Pol. 4.2.4–11.

<sup>300</sup> Gehrke 2013.

legitimization with the conclusion that “royal legitimacy, therefore, is founded to an especially high degree, albeit not exclusively, on the individual ruler’s conduct and ability, on the power that is objectively and subjectively available to him, and on the exercise of that power in achievements that enhanced the ruler’s reputation in the eyes of the ruled.”<sup>301</sup>

Therefore, in the social context of Hellenistic monarchies, the legends of how Mithridates VI and Pyrrhus had earned their place on the throne with concrete demonstrations of strength reflect the real expectations that the subjects of these kings had. These legends were also appealing to the Roman ideal of military *virtus* – military success achieved by hard work and training was greatly valued in the Roman context. Henning Börm has noted that for Augustus too such meritocratic thinking was essential for legitimizing his rule and for ensuring the voluntary acceptance of his position as the sole ruler in Rome.<sup>302</sup> This is evident in his *Res gestae* that lists his achievements that justify his position as the *princeps* among his colleagues. Moreover, the Romans too respected the reputation of Alexander the Great. Livy and Trogus/Justin note that before the First Macedonian War (214–205 BC), the Romans admired and feared the long and valorous history of Macedonia and the enthusiasm of Philip V who compared himself to Alexander.<sup>303</sup> But also in Roman context, Alexander the Great was a very useful universal moral example and a model of conqueror, civilizer, and world consolidator.<sup>304</sup> Indeed, it is not surprising that Augustus compared himself to Alexander and maybe even to Seleucus I, the founder of the Seleucid empire, as David Engels has suggested.<sup>305</sup>

Such legends were useful in international relations: presenting oneself as a relative of some famous hero or god was a gesture that was easily accepted and understood in the Hellenistic East.<sup>306</sup> Indeed, Romans invented a glorious

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<sup>301</sup> Gehrke 2013, 85. For examples of good Hellenistic kings in ancient literature, see Smith 1999, ch. 2.b and c.

<sup>302</sup> Börm 2015b, 16.

<sup>303</sup> Just. Epit. 29.3.6–8, 30.3.1–2; Liv. 31.1.6–7.

<sup>304</sup> As a positive model for Hellenistic rulers: Strootman 2014. For Romans: Bernard 2000, 312–330; Peltonen 2019, ch. 4. For Pompey’s *imitatio Alexandri*, see Villani 2012.

<sup>305</sup> Comparisons to Alexander: Cic. Phil. 5.48; Suet. Aug. 18.1, 50, 94.4; Cass. Dio 45.1.2, 49.16.3–15, 51.3.5–7; Zanker 1988, 50–51 and fig. 39. Comparisons to Seleucus I: Engels 2010; idem 2017, ch. 13.

<sup>306</sup> Jones 1999.

Trojan ancestry for their whole race, which apparently impressed the Greeks.<sup>307</sup> Furthermore, Erich S. Gruen argues that the legend of the foundation of Rome being connected with the legend of Troy was an integral part of how the Roman cultural identity in the late Republic was constructed.<sup>308</sup> The legend was indeed immortalized by Virgil in the *Aeneid* and canonized by order of Augustus. Connecting the origin of Rome to the history of the Hellenistic East was a way to set Rome on the cultural world map of that time while still projecting a separate identity.

To return to the character of Mithridates VI, Trogus/Justin's portrayal of the king begins as follows:

The future greatness of this prince even signs from heaven had foretold; for in the year in which he was born, as well as in that in which he began to reign, a comet blazed forth with such splendour, for seventy successive days on each occasion, that the whole sky seemed to be on fire. It covered a fourth part of the firmament with its train, and obscured the light of the sun with its effulgence; and in rising and setting it took up the space of four hours.<sup>309</sup>

In this manner Mithridates VI makes an impressive and semi-divine entrance into the narrative.<sup>310</sup> In ancient Anatolia and the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as in the Roman and Greek worlds, comets were usually regarded as positive omens and signs from the gods. In the Hellenistic East, where ruler cults were common, rulers were expected to have glorious or even divine heritage, and it was indeed believed that divine portents such as comets foretold the birth of great kings.<sup>311</sup> One such omen was possibly seen

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<sup>307</sup> Erskine 2001.

<sup>308</sup> Gruen 1992, 6–51. The Greeks also used the Romans' connection to the Trojan myth in international diplomacy to their advantage: Russo 2014.

<sup>309</sup> Just. Epit. 37.2.1–3: "Huius futuram magnitudinem etiam caelestia ostenta praedixerant. Nam et eo quo genitus est anno et eo quo regnare primum coepit stella cometes per utrumque tempus LXX diebus ita luxit, ut caelum omne conflagrare videretur. Nam et magnitudine sui quartam partem caeli occupaverat et fulgore sui solis nitorem vicerat; et cum oreretur occumberetque, IV horarum spatium consumebat." The comets have usually been dated to 134 BC and 120 BC, but J.T. Ramsey argues, based on Chinese evidence, that they should be dated to 135 BC and 119 BC: Ramsey 1999.

<sup>310</sup> Such hyperbole for a comet is curious in the context of the *Epitoma*, however, because the supernaturalness of any natural phenomenon is treated sceptically elsewhere in the book, perhaps owing to Trogus's special interest in natural sciences. It might also be an exaggeration by Justin: Yarrow 2006, 317–318.

<sup>311</sup> For ruler cults, see Walbank 1987; Debord and Oulhen 2003; Wright 2005. Regal names and epithets insinuate divinity: e.g., Mithridates ("given by Mithra"), Demetrius, Perseus. For

during the lifetime of Trogus's father, who had been Caesar's secretary, in the year 44 BC, when, during Julius Caesar's funeral ceremony, a bright comet was seen burning in the sky for seven days. According to Suetonius, the Romans interpreted it as evidence of Caesar's newfound divinity.<sup>312</sup> The comets of Mithridates are described as having been even brighter than the sun, which reminds one of the Persian sun god Mithras. To highlight the connection between Mithridates and the comets could serve as an indication that the gods were already on Mithridates' side from his birth, and that there was something supernatural in his strength. It was his destiny to become a powerful ruler and to challenge the Romans. Romans believed that *felicitas*, i.e., good fortune, was also needed for a military victory. This was not just random luck but, more precisely, luck originating from the favour of the gods.<sup>313</sup> The comets of Mithridates indicate that he not only had military *virtus* but he also had good luck because of the favour of the gods.

Moreover, perhaps the comets were supposed to rhetorically highlight that Mithridates had been the last formidable enemy of the Roman Republic as it approached its end: Liv Mariah Yarrow states that Trogus/Justin's portrayal of Mithridates is constructed quite straightforwardly "as a worthy rival for the best of Rome's military commanders".<sup>314</sup> The same applies to Livy: in a speech of Cn. Manlius Vulso (cos. 189 BC), Livy reminds the readers that the stronger the enemy, the greater the victory.<sup>315</sup> This is indeed the reason for such positive portrayals of the enemy kings in the narratives: when the Roman historians emphasize the military *virtus* of the Other, it elevates the Roman achievement in defeating these enemies and thus in possessing even more military *virtus* than them. In this way, the descriptions of the dangerousness of Mithridates and other great enemies participated in the narrative processes of Roman self-definition.

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divine epithets, see Muccioli 2013, ch. 7. Alexander the Great's birth was marked by several divine portents: Just. Epit. 13.16. Divine portents at Seleucus I's birth: Engels 2010; idem 2017, ch. 13. Other examples of divine portents from tyrants' birth stories: Catenacci 2012, 38–98.

<sup>312</sup> Caesar's comet: Suet. Iul. 88; Pandey 2013. Trogus's father: Just. Epit. 43.5.12. On Caesar's deification post mortem, see Zecchini 2001, ch. 2.

<sup>313</sup> Cic. Leg. Man. 28, 47–48.

<sup>314</sup> Yarrow 2006, 317–318.

<sup>315</sup> Liv. 38.49.3–5.

On the other hand, comets could also be bad omens for the Romans, starting from the late Republic. A good example is Halley's comet in the year 87 BC. It was seen during the Roman Social War and the First Mithridatic war. It was common for the Roman authors to describe Halley's comet as an omen for the following period of civil wars.<sup>316</sup> Dennis Pausch has studied narrative foreshadowing in Livy's work and has generally shown that describing portents was one of the most effective ways to create suspense in the narrative before major events such as wars.<sup>317</sup> It is plausible that Trogus too had meant to foreshadow the following period of wars and thus use Mithridates' comets as a sort of stylish introduction for the next phase in the narrative. In fact, with this very intimidating and ominous picture of Mithridates VI, Trogus/Justin lets the readers understand that in order to defeat such a violent and ruthless enemy, as the portrayal of the king also shows, the Romans needed to send equally strong and ruthless commanders to defeat the king.<sup>318</sup> This perhaps foreshadows Sulla's and Pompey's roles as Mithridates' narrative counterparts in Trogus's non-extant text.

Stories of Mithridates VI's origins are laden with divine elements, but we have similar though more modest childhood stories of other famous kings. A good example from Polybius and Livy is Philip V, who experienced a challenging start as a king. When the only seventeen-year-old Philip V inherited the Macedonian throne in 221 BC, the neighbouring kings deemed him weak and immediately tried to conquer Macedonia. Polybius praises Philip V highly for blocking all attacks with ease and for inspiring awe and despair in his enemies.<sup>319</sup> Livy appraisingly mentions that the Macedonians were a warlike people.<sup>320</sup> This kind of praise not only highlighted the king's

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<sup>316</sup> Pandey 2013, 409–411; Verg. G. 1.488; Suet. Tib. 2.5.71, Claud. 46, Ner. 36, Vesp. 23.4; Manil. 1.866; Sen. Oct. 236; Luc. 1.529; Tac. Ann. 14.22, 15.47.

<sup>317</sup> For foreshadowing in Livy, see Pausch 2011, III.1.c, V.4.

<sup>318</sup> According to Justin, Mithridates VI murdered his nephew, King Ariarathes VI of Cappadocia, in the middle of negotiations: Just. Epit. 38.1, 38.7.9. He also murdered his wife: Just. Epit. 37.3.6–8. Cf. App. Mith. 64.

<sup>319</sup> Polybius's detailed description of Philip V's efficient management of the Social War is in the fourth book and the beginning of the fifth. For praise of young Philip V, see Pol. 4.22.5–6, 5.18.6–7, 5.29.1–2. Polybius admits that the young king's success probably was partly due to his capable advisors: Pol. 4.24.1–2. Cf. Just. Epit. 29.1.10–11. The young Philip V was not only capable in war but also confident, difficult to manipulate, and fair among his friends: Pol. 5.15–16.

<sup>320</sup> Warlike Macedonians: Liv. 36.17.5.

natural military *virtus*, but it also highlighted the Romans' *virtus* for defeating Philip V in war, just as in the case of Pyrrhus or Mithridates VI. Philip V, like any literary character, could be used to create contrast to other characters – either to Roman characters or other foreign kings. According to Livy, before a battle against the Seleucid king Antiochus III, M'. Acilius Glabrio (cos. 191 BC) told his soldiers that Philip V – their former enemy and current ally – was a true soldier because he had been hardened by war against the Thracians and Illyrians and all around already when young.<sup>321</sup> Here Livy uses Philip V as a positive contrast to the lazy Antiochus III, who is portrayed as a typical Asian despot consistent with the common Graeco-Roman stereotypes of the eastern cultures: Antiochus III was easily distracted by luxuries and women and did not pay attention to training and organizing his army.<sup>322</sup> The consul is basically saying that the Romans had recently defeated such a strong enemy as Philip V and made him an ally, and therefore a weak Asian king like Antiochus III would surely have no chance against them.

Sallust gives a similar but a more detailed narrative about Jugurtha, who did not have an easy childhood either.<sup>323</sup> He was the son of the brother of King Micipsa and his mother was a concubine. Even though Jugurtha received a regal education, he was treated as inferior to the king's two sons. However, he proved his inherent *virtus* during his formative years: he was strong, handsome, and intelligent, and, instead of enjoying leisure, he honed his military skills and physical strength by competing with his fellows and by hurling javelins. He also excelled at hunting and was always the first to kill the lion.<sup>324</sup> The description of his early training follows the same pattern as the stories about Mithridates VI and Scipio Aemilianus. Jugurtha became so popular and loved that the king decided to remove him in order to protect his younger sons. The king was afraid of assassinating Jugurtha openly, and for this reason he put him in command of an army and sent him to help their Roman allies in a war against the Numantians (143–133 BC), wanting to

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<sup>321</sup> Liv. 36.17.6.

<sup>322</sup> Liv. 36.15.1, 36.17.5 and 7. For the Asian stereotypes in Graeco-Roman literature, see below pp. 215–220.

<sup>323</sup> The whole story: Sall. Iug. 5.7–7.7. G. Cipriani compares Sallust's *Jugurthine War* to a heroic fable: Cipriani 1988, 87–121.

<sup>324</sup> *Virtus* mentioned at Sall. Iug. 6.2, 7.2, 9.2, 9.3, 10.2.

expose Jugurtha to danger and hoping that the dangerous mission would result in Jugurtha's death.

If we once again try to make sense of the story outside the narrative, in the Numidian context, it is possible that Jugurtha was actually sent to help the Romans as a normal part of his training as a member of the Numidian nobility. Joel Allen suggests that Jugurtha might have already been chosen as Micipsa's potential successor and was sent to help to Romans in order to create friendships and learn about the Roman culture.<sup>325</sup> In any case, Micipsa's plan according to the narrative did not work. Jugurtha proved to be an excellent and disciplined military leader, for which reason and because of his generousness and intelligence he quickly became very popular among the Romans too. Thus, Jugurtha's *virtus* was finally publicly recognized by the Romans, as G. Cipriani notes.<sup>326</sup> He served under the command of Scipio Aemilianus – a model of Roman *virtus* in the narratives – who taught the young Numidian the Roman virtues by his own example. Jugurtha became a friend of the Roman commander, who started to trust Jugurtha with the most difficult missions. After Jugurtha returned home, accompanied by a letter from Scipio Aemilianus in which Jugurtha was highly praised, the king decided to adopt Jugurtha as his heir.<sup>327</sup>

From a purely narrative point of view, the portrayal of young Jugurtha achieves the usual effect: the stronger Roman enemies were, the more admirable the eventual victory over them was. The story of the dangerous trials he had to overcome in his youth repeat the same *topoi* as, e.g., in the story of Mithridates VI: a positive portrayal of the Other, at least in regard to military *virtus*, is mirrored to the Self to magnify the Roman achievement of conquering these enemies. However, Sallust's portrait of Jugurtha is much more complex and cannot be reduced to this observation only. Sallust's Jugurtha is the protagonist of Sallust's monograph – as such a different historiographical format from Polybius's and Livy's monumental works – and he functions as a complex moral example that serves to illustrate the dangers

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<sup>325</sup> Allen 2006, 147–148, 156–157.

<sup>326</sup> Cipriani 1988, 95.

<sup>327</sup> Sall. Iug. 9–10. For Scipio's letter to Micipsa, see Büchner 1960, 183–185.

of ambition even in the most virtuous men, in Jugurtha and Roman society alike.<sup>328</sup> Thus, the more Sallust emphasizes Jugurtha's *virtus* in the beginning, the more impactful and dramatic his later succumbing to ambition feels to the readers. Furthermore, Jugurtha fought against men like Marius and Sulla, and his literary portrayal had to hold its own against the heaviness of these names.

Generally speaking, these stories of famous kings' difficult childhoods and rise to power serve to remind us that the greatest kings had to fight for their survival and to prove their worth in accordance with the theory of the legitimization of rule by Hans Joachim Gehrke. Briefly put, even though one was born to an illustrious family, this alone did not justify a position of command if one did not try to imitate one's ancestors' deeds and publicly demonstrate one's inherent talents. This thought is applicable to both Hellenistic and Roman contexts. We could here recall the youth and accession to power of Julius Caesar or, of course, Octavian/Augustus, who both had to struggle in order to gain authority in Rome in the face of other very resourceful and more experienced men. Even for them, the ultimate way to gain the highest power was to defeat their opponents by force. The historical *exempla* of young kings earning the respect of their subjects by surviving difficult trials could have had a certain appeal after Augustus's rise to power.

### ***Enemies' virtus in action***

The most powerful enemy kings not only had inherent military *virtus*, but they also strived to increase it throughout their life in order to expand their kingdom and to be able to challenge the Romans. According to Trogus/Justin, once having claimed the throne, Mithridates VI continued his disciplined military lifestyle learned during his youth and exercised himself together with his soldiers all year long instead of spending even the winter inside indulging in banquets and other comforts. To test and demonstrate his strength, Mithridates participated personally in sport contests, such as horse and foot

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<sup>328</sup> Sallust's portrayal of the Roman society through the character of Jugurtha is discussed below on pp. 239–248.

races.<sup>329</sup> Even Mithridates' eventual death was worthy of a valorous warrior, for he preferred to commit suicide before falling into the hands of the Romans as a prisoner.<sup>330</sup> From the Roman point of view, this was respectable.<sup>331</sup> The description of Mithridates' physical and mental discipline is a panegyric and an exaggeration, just like the story about his birth and the comet, and served to emphasize the danger that he posed for the Romans. Justin states: "invincible himself, he had also created an unbeatable force".<sup>332</sup>

In the fragments of the *Histories* of Sallust, there are indications that his description of Mithridates also emphasizes his great military power. Sallust had written that Mithridates was "a man to be spoken of with due regard" and described the king as a huge man who wielded equally huge weapons.<sup>333</sup> Allegedly, even as an over 70-year-old man he still was a strong and quick warrior.<sup>334</sup> Another fragment includes a speech by L. Marcius Philippus (cos. 91 BC) to the senate in which Mithridates is said to have had the power to make the Roman Republic crumble.<sup>335</sup> In another speech, C. Cotta (cos. 75 BC) mentions the king's "excessive power".<sup>336</sup> In his defence of the Manilian Law, Cicero emphasizes the dangerousness of this *potentissimus rex* heavily in order to reflect in him the moral and military excellence of Pompey and repeats how the whole Roman empire and the glory of their ancestors was at stake.<sup>337</sup> Similar descriptions from different authors suggest that such a portrayal of Mithridates quickly became a standard rhetorical tool to be used in political speeches and in republican historiography alike.<sup>338</sup>

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<sup>329</sup> Just. Epit. 37.4.1–2.

<sup>330</sup> Just. Epit. 37.1.6–9. For Mithridates VI's last years and death, see McGing 1986, 164–167.

<sup>331</sup> Often in Roman literature the way of dying reflected the character's personality: morally peccable characters died without honour, whereas morally exemplary characters died well. Dying well entailed self-restraint, courage, and a certain decorum. The best way to die for a Roman military commander was in battle: Rosenstein 1990, 120–124; Edwards 2007, 19–28; Hope 2009, 54–63.

<sup>332</sup> Just. Epit. 37.4.2: "Atque ita invictus ipse inexpugnabilem exercitum fecerat."

<sup>333</sup> Sall. hist. 2.58 (72 M, 84 Mc): "vir cum cura dicendus". The king's appearance: Sall. hist. 2.63 (89 Mc, 77 M).

<sup>334</sup> Sall. hist. 5.4–5 (4–5 Mc, 4–5 M).

<sup>335</sup> Sall. hist. 1.67.8 (67 Mc, 77 M).

<sup>336</sup> Sall. hist. 2.43.7 (44 Mc, 47 M): "[...] ob nimias opes Mithridatis [...]".

<sup>337</sup> Cic. Leg. Man. 4, 6, 9, 20, and *passim*.

<sup>338</sup> Livy might also have described Mithridates' great power, military skills, and popularity among the locals in his lost books, but the *Periochae* are too vague and unreliable to verify this. For the mentions of the Mithridatic Wars in Roman sources in general, see Zuchold 1979.

Therefore, Mithridates' strength and continuous military success seems to stem from an impeccable physical and military discipline. This reflects the Roman idea that a good military leader was expected to be disciplined, abstinent, and show an example to his soldiers.<sup>339</sup> Polybius praises another great king, Masinissa of Numidia, as follows: "He also excelled all his contemporaries in bodily strength, for when it was necessary to stand, he could stand in the same place for a whole day without shifting, and again, if he were seated, he never used to get up. And he could also continue to ride hard by night and day without feeling any the worse."<sup>340</sup> This kind of combination of strength of mind and body together constituted an important part of anyone's success as a military leader.<sup>341</sup> A good physical appearance was also very useful in diplomacy, as Polybius remarks: "Good looks are a better recommendation than any letter."<sup>342</sup> We should also remember that, as the above-mentioned epitaph of Scipio Barbatus shows, a strong or good physical appearance was believed to go hand in hand with innate military *virtus*.<sup>343</sup>

There are some examples of Roman commanders training or labouring with their soldiers. In reality it was probably not very common, and in literature it is described as exceptional and admirable.<sup>344</sup> During the Second Punic War (218–201 BC), Cato the Elder allegedly participated in every mundane task in the military camp with his soldiers and allowed himself no special privileges despite his rank and authority.<sup>345</sup> Scipio Africanus on his part was said to fight side by side with his soldiers, risking his life.<sup>346</sup> In the late Republic, at least Marius and Pompey were said to have been experts in

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<sup>339</sup> On Roman military training in general, see Phang 2008, 37–72.

<sup>340</sup> Pol. 36.16.3–4.

<sup>341</sup> Livy particularly mentions physical strength as an admirable quality in an enemy: Liv. 38.49.4.

<sup>342</sup> Pol. 31.16.3: "Ὅτι παντὸς ἐπιστολίου τὸ κάλλος ἐστὶ συστατικώτερον. Philip V's kingly physical appearance (*ἐπίφασις*): Pol. 4.77.3. Perseus's good looks: Pol. 25.3.5. The Thracian king Cotys of the Odrysae receives compliments for his "striking appearance" and superb military skills: Pol. 27.12. Philip V pardoned M. Aemilius Lepidus's (cos. 187 BC) rudeness because "he was the handsomest man of his time": Pol. 16.34.6. Scipio Africanus made a great first impression on Masinissa with his good and manly appearance: Liv. 28.35.5–6. If a Roman man had battle scars, it increased his political credibility and respectability: Sall. Iug. 85.30; Liv. 45.39.16–19, per. 70; Quint. Inst. 2.15.7; Plut. Mar. 9.2.

<sup>343</sup> See above pp. 51–52.

<sup>344</sup> Phang 2008, 239–241.

<sup>345</sup> Liv. 34.18. According to Lucan, Cato the Younger marched on foot with his soldiers in the desert: Luc. 9.588–589.

<sup>346</sup> Liv. 25.34.11, 28.19.17.

throwing the javelin from horseback, and to have trained and toiled with their own men, just like Mithridates VI.<sup>347</sup> In a similar manner, Caesar too is described in his own works and later narratives as a heroic soldier who fought in the front lines.<sup>348</sup> It is no wonder then that similar stories circulated about the greatest enemy kings: the only way to challenge the Romans was to be equally disciplined. Justly, Giuseppe Zecchini remarks that Mithridates VI's special relation with his soldiers must have reminded the Roman readers about men like Marius and Caesar.<sup>349</sup>

In Jugurtha's case, we have a chance to witness his military skills in action against the Romans through Sallust's *Jugurthine War*. As we have seen, Sallust praised the young Jugurtha highly for his military skills, and Scipio Aemilianus was said to respect him greatly.<sup>350</sup> Even later in the narrative, when Jugurtha became an enemy of the Romans, he was still described as very strong, warlike, and active – the qualities that allowed him to defeat his brother Adherbal, who was unwarlike, passive, and desperate.<sup>351</sup> Occasionally, Sallust focalizes more closely on Jugurtha and makes the readers witnesses of Jugurtha's bravery, for instance, in an intense battle scene, in which Jugurtha managed to escape alive through a storm of arrows even when others were dying around him.<sup>352</sup> Jugurtha also led surprise attacks personally, which Sallust describes in detail, slowing down the rhythm of the narrative to increase the impact of these closely focalized battle scenes that focus on Jugurtha's personal military abilities.<sup>353</sup>

With regard to tactical skills, Sallust compared him to Metellus, whom Sallust considered a brilliant military leader.<sup>354</sup> Furthermore, Velleius mentions that Jugurtha and Marius both used to serve under Scipio Aemilianus's command and to hone their military skills that they would later test against each other.<sup>355</sup> Intelligence also helped Jugurtha, for he was able to

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<sup>347</sup> McDonnell 2006, 296–297. Sall. hist. 2.20 (20 Mc, 19 M), Iug. 85.33, 100.4; Plut. Pomp. 64.2, 41.3, Mar. 7.3–6, 20.5; App. B Civ. 2.8.49.

<sup>348</sup> Zecchini 2001, 152–156.

<sup>349</sup> Mineo and Zecchini 2020, 221 n. 234.

<sup>350</sup> Sall. Iug. 7–9.

<sup>351</sup> Sall. Iug. 20.2.

<sup>352</sup> Sall. Iug. 101.9.

<sup>353</sup> Sall. Iug. 54.9–10, 58.1,

<sup>354</sup> Sall. Iug. 46.8, 51.5, 52.1, 61.3, 76.1.

<sup>355</sup> Vell. Pat. 2.9.4.

speak Latin so well that he successfully routed the Roman soldiers by shouting to them in Latin that their commander Marius had been killed.<sup>356</sup> Therefore, Jugurtha's dangerousness and ability to challenge the Romans derives from a combination of various qualities: courage, physical strength gained by hard work, intelligence, and continuous military activity. Through the foreign character of Jugurtha, Sallust showcases the qualities of an exemplary military commander in action. If the leader did not have these qualities, the result was a disorganized and disloyal army that performed poorly in battle. Sallust illustrates this by creating a stark contrast between the competent, active Jugurtha and corrupt, lazy Roman leaders: the Roman army had great trouble against Jugurtha before Metellus and Marius took the lead in the Roman war effort and were able to challenge Jugurtha's great *virtus*.<sup>357</sup>

King Philip V is admired for his military activity and courage in battle as well. According to Polybius, the king was extremely active, effective, and successful in his early campaigns – something that no one had expected from someone so young.<sup>358</sup> According to Livy, the Romans seemed to fear that if they themselves did not demonstrate similar activity, Philip might interpret it as a sign of weakness and attempt an expedition similar to the one Pyrrhus had tried almost a century before but with a much larger force.<sup>359</sup> In a speech of P. Sulpicius (cos. 211, 200 BC), Livy compares Philip admiringly and fearfully to Pyrrhus, saying that they were equally great.<sup>360</sup> L. Aemilius Paullus also considered Philip among the greatest kings and generals of his time.<sup>361</sup> Philip V indeed proved to be a strong enemy. According to Livy, Philip demonstrated “kingly spirit” and did not fear fighting in the most heated centre of the battle, in sight of his own soldiers and risking death.<sup>362</sup> Livy

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<sup>356</sup> Sall. Iug. 101.6.

<sup>357</sup> Sall. Iug. 32.1–3, 38.5–7, 44.1–2 and 5, 66.3.

<sup>358</sup> Most of Polybius's fourth book and the beginning of the fifth recount Philip V's efficient management of the Aetolian War (220–217 BC). At the beginning of these events Philip V was just over 17 years old. On the other hand, Polybius accuses the king of cruelty: Pol. 5.10–12.

<sup>359</sup> Liv. 31.3. Romans also feared that Philip V would ally himself with Antiochus III: Pol. 18.39.3–4. In Livy's narrative, this hypothetical possibility is brought up by Antiochus's envoy and by Hannibal, his military advisor: Liv. 35.18, 36.7. Cf. Just. Epit. 31.5.

<sup>360</sup> Liv. 31.7.

<sup>361</sup> Liv. 40.27.

<sup>362</sup> Liv. 31.9.10–11, 31.16.1, 31.24. Philip led a part of his army in the battle of Cynoscephalae: Pol. 18.18–27. For the “kingly spirit”, see Pol. 16.28.

criticizes this as arrogant behaviour, even though this was commonly expected from Hellenistic kings and repeated in the stories of other kings.<sup>363</sup> Philip was very good at leading battles, organizing military matters, and making surprise attacks.<sup>364</sup> Regardless of all the disdain that Livy often directs at the character of Philip, Livy follows Polybius's example in admitting that Philip was an exceptionally strong adversary for the Romans.<sup>365</sup> Polybius does not hesitate to openly praise Philip when he thought it was called for. For instance, after the disastrous defeat in the battle of Cynoscephalae (197 BC), Polybius admires how Philip faced the consequences calmly like a "true king".<sup>366</sup>

From the narrative point of view, both Polybius and Livy believed that Roman *virtus* had never been as strong as it was right after the victory over Hannibal.<sup>367</sup> Therefore, Philip V fought against the Romans almost in their prime, and we should examine Livy's literary characterization of him in relation to the imagined state of Roman *virtus* at that time. Daniel Albrecht has further noted that when looking at Livy's portrayals of enemy kings, we should consider their counterfigures, i.e., the Roman commanders.<sup>368</sup> Therefore, I think that even though Livy is not fond of Philip V, Livy still wanted to match Philip V with Flaminius – a particularly exemplary figure for Livy – at least in terms of military strength.<sup>369</sup> In other words, later authors saw the Romans of this era as morally exemplary, and thus also their counterfigures, the enemy kings, were an equally important part of the identity-building process in these historical narratives. Also, Philip V would later become an important Roman ally against Antiochus III, and we will see

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<sup>363</sup> Gehrke 2013, 78–79. Plutarch wrote that Macedonians respected strong warrior kings above all: Plut. Demet. 44. Many kings participated in battles personally, e.g., Antiochus III (Pol. 5.41.7–9, 5.45.6, 5.54.1, 5.84–85, 10.49.14), Pyrrhus (Plut. Pyrrh. 22.6), and Philip V (Pol. 18.18–27; Liv. 31.9.10–11, 31.16.1, 31.24). Livy criticized Perseus for not appearing personally on the battlefield once: Liv. 44.4.9. Kings also had to be ready to duel: Plut. Pyrrh. 7.4–5, 30.6.

<sup>364</sup> Liv. 31.28, 31.42–43, 32.5.9, 33.3.1–5.

<sup>365</sup> Philip V's later life became stained by family tragedy and, according to Livy, madness inflicted by the gods as punishment for his cruelty, see below pp. 177–181.

<sup>366</sup> Pol. 18.33.1–7. Cf. Pol. 5.12.1–4, 18.38.1–2.

<sup>367</sup> Pol. 18.35.1–2; Liv. 39.6.7.

<sup>368</sup> Albrecht 2016, 305.

<sup>369</sup> For the positive characterization of Flaminius in Livy, see below pp. 174–177, esp. n. 755.

Livy's characterization of Philip V shifting considerably towards a more positive tone after the war with the Romans.<sup>370</sup>

Polybius's text is fragmentary, but we can still see that Polybius's narrative goals were different. Polybius put less emphasis on presenting certain historical situations or characters as fairly simple moral *exempla*, as Livy does, and rather praises or blames kings and Romans alike in each situation individually according to their deeds. Polybius even felt the need to justify the way he portrayed different persons:

Therefore we should be right on this occasion in finding fault with the remissness of Attalus and the Rhodians and in approving Philip's truly kingly conduct, his magnanimity and fixity of purpose, not indeed praising his character as a whole, but noting with admiration his readiness to meet present circumstances. I make this express statement lest anyone should think I contradict myself, as but lately I praised Attalus and the Rhodians and blamed Philip, and now I do the reverse. For it was for this very reason that at the outset of this work I stated as a principle that it was necessary at times to praise and at times to blame the same person, since often the shifts and turns of circumstances for the worse or for the better change the resolves of men, and at times by their very nature men are impelled to act either as they should or as they should not.<sup>371</sup>

Perseus too is an example of changing characterization within one (Livy's) narrative. Perseus, the son and successor of Philip V, showed similar talents for military affairs as his father did and had reputedly spent his childhood in military camps, learning the arts of war as a part of his basic education.<sup>372</sup> The physical strength and moral qualities of young Perseus are

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<sup>370</sup> See below pp. 113–118.

<sup>371</sup> Pol. 16.28.3–7: διὸ καὶ τότε δικαίως ἂν τις τὴν μὲν Ἀττάλου καὶ Ῥοδίων ὀλιγοπονίαν καταμέμψαιτο, τὸ δὲ Φιλίππου βασιλικὸν καὶ μεγαλόψυχον καὶ τὸ τῆς προθέσεως ἐπίμονον ἀποδέξαιτο, οὐχ ὡς καθόλου τὸν τρόπον ἐπαιῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς τὴν πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ὀρμὴν ἐπισημαινόμενος. ποιῶμαι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην διαστολήν, ἵνα μὴ τις ἡμᾶς ὑπολάβῃ μαχόμενα λέγειν ἑαυτοῖς, ἄρτι μὲν ἐπαινοῦντας Ἄτταλον καὶ Ῥοδίους, Φίλιππον δὲ καταμεμφομένους, νῦν δὲ τούναντίον. τούτου γὰρ χάριν ἐν ἀρχαῖς τῆς πραγματείας διεστειλάμην, φήσας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ποτὲ μὲν εὐλογεῖν, ποτὲ δὲ ψέγειν τοὺς αὐτούς, ἐπειδὴ πολλάκις μὲν αἱ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον τῶν πραγμάτων ῥοπαὶ καὶ περιστάσεις ἀλλοιοῦσι τὰς προαιρέσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλάκις δ' αἱ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, ἔστι δ' ὅτε κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν ἀνθρώποι ποτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ δέον ὀρμῶσι, ποτὲ δ' ἐπὶ τούναντίον.

<sup>372</sup> Liv. 42.11.6–7.

praised by Polybius, Livy and Trogus/Justin.<sup>373</sup> According to Polybius, at the beginning of his reign Perseus was very much liked because of his clemency, good appearance, physical prowess, and moderate behaviour. Livy claims that it was a commonly accepted fact that the army of Perseus was the largest raised by the Macedonians since the days of Alexander the Great. During the 26 years of peace, a new generation of young men had grown and been trained in battles against the Thracians.<sup>374</sup> Perseus led attacks personally in the front line, like other kings, and was able to stay calm in the heat of battle despite feeling under great pressure, as Livy lets us know by focalizing on the king in several detailed battle scenes.<sup>375</sup> However, Livy describes Perseus in this manner only in the beginning, when the war went well for him. Later, when Perseus and his army started losing, Livy's Perseus becomes frightened, impatient, and capricious, to contrast him with the experienced Roman commander C. Popillius Laeneas (cos. 172, 158 BC) in book 44.<sup>376</sup>

For Livy too, as for Polybius, alternating between praise and blame of enemy kings could be a way to demonstrate what kind of actions and qualities resulted in military victory or defeat in each specific situation. An enemy could first possess great military strength and then lose it because of their own mistakes. Furthermore, the foreign characters that Livy constructs are not necessarily consistent throughout the narrative but, rather, adapted to other important characters they encountered. More precisely, Livy's portrayals do not always pair two equally powerful adversaries together as in the case of Jugurtha and Marius or Philip V and Flaminius but sometimes they rather emphasize a certain kind of inequality. In the case of Perseus, Livy characterizes him differently depending on whether he wanted to contrast him to different Roman commanders like Q. Marcius Philippus or L. Aemilius Paullus, or to the Attalid king Eumenes II who was allied with the Romans.<sup>377</sup>

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<sup>373</sup> Pol. 25.3; Liv. 42.33; Just. Epit. 33.1.3.

<sup>374</sup> Liv. 42.51–52.

<sup>375</sup> Liv. 42.57 and 59.

<sup>376</sup> For the miserable portrayal of Perseus in Livy at the end of the war, see below section 3.3. Polybius too reproves Perseus's management of the war and diplomatic relations: Pol. 28.9–10, 29.5–9, 29.15–18.

<sup>377</sup> Perseus's characterization in relation to Roman commanders is discussed below in section 3.3 and his characterization in contrast to Eumenes II is discussed below on pp. 125–135.

Therefore, in Livy's work, the Other could be contrasted with a different Other instead of just the Self, and each of these sides could be described in a positive manner, or just one of them. Also, the positive/negative portrayal of the Other/Self was not always fixed throughout the narrative but could change. Jane D. Chaplin writes that Livy preferred consistency of theme over consistency of character. This is true, I think, for most of Livy's characters but there are some exceptions like Flamininus.<sup>378</sup> Even though Livy seemed to make efforts to portray some characters more consistently than Polybius throughout the narrative, we should not presume that Livy had such a plan for every character or that, if he had, he could not have changed his plan during his long work.

We should also remember that even Livy's repeated narratorial choices could have been unintentional. Regarding the problem of authorial intention, Craig B. Champion cites Quentin Skinner who suggests that we cannot recover just authors' *conscious* intentions and *subjective* operations in writing because, at the same time, many of the narratorial choices are in fact *unconscious*, and it is impossible for us to discern the limit between their conscious and unconscious intentions.<sup>379</sup> This interesting theory is something to keep in mind when talking about Livy's or any other author's narratorial choices and preferences, even though it does not affect the results of this study whether the narrative techniques used by the authors were a result of calculated or intuitive choice.

To continue with the changing portrayals, describing an enemy as incredibly strong before the war was an effective way to create suspense in the narrative: only later in the narrative do the readers discover to what extent the character in question was able to live up to the hype. Livy's account of King Antiochus III follows this pattern even more clearly. Before the war, Livy gives the impression that Antiochus was extremely strong, had a great empire, was preparing for war actively, and that the Romans feared him.<sup>380</sup> He is described

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<sup>378</sup> Chaplin 2007, xix. For Flamininus in Livy, see below p. 175 n. 755.

<sup>379</sup> Champion 2004, 8–10.

<sup>380</sup> Liv. 33.19, 34.33, 35.13, 35.42. Also, the presence of Hannibal at Antiochus III's court scared the Romans greatly: Liv. 34.60.1–2. For Antiochus III's war with the Romans in general, see Badian 1964; Gruen 1984, 611–619; Grainger 2002; idem 2015, ch. 8–10; Eckstein

as a gentle ruler who promised freedom to the Greek cities and kept his temper politely in check around the Roman envoys.<sup>381</sup> His army was rumoured to hold so many elephants that they alone would win the war for him.<sup>382</sup> He was even believed to be so rich that he could “buy the Romans themselves”.<sup>383</sup> The Romans were apparently terrified especially because for a long period of time they did not know exactly where Antiochus III was and what he was planning to do.<sup>384</sup> By focalizing mainly on the Romans collectively, Livy is able to strengthen this impression of fear and mystery around Antiochus III’s character. Dennis Pausch has studied Livy’s use of delay and cliff-hangers to create suspense in his narrative of the Hannibalic war: Livy’s description of the beginning of the war with Antiochus III and the fearful anticipation of the Romans seem very similar, if less prolonged.<sup>385</sup>

At the first battle with Antiochus III, however, the illusion was shattered. Livy bluntly remarks that all the rumours were just exaggeration and states that Flaminius, who had been sent to the East to help ward off Antiochus III, also discarded all these as pretenses. When the Roman soldiers saw the army with their own eyes, they saw only a horde of famished slaves.<sup>386</sup> Therefore the early hype for Antiochus serves as a literary technique to build tension in the story. Creating such suspense in the story is an effective narratological tool to keep the readers interested in the story even though they certainly knew how the war with Antiochus III had ended. In any case, Antiochus III had some considerable successes and demonstrations of personal courage later in Livy’s

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2008, 306–341. For Antiochus III’s claim to Western Asia Minor and his campaign there, see Ferrary 2014, 133–158; Ma 2005, ch. 2.

<sup>381</sup> Liv. 33.20, 33.38, 33.39, 41.6. For Antiochus III’s other demonstrations of royal magnanimity and personal courage, see Pol. 5.41.7–9, 5.45.6, 5.54.1, 5.84–85, 8.23, 10.49.14. Livy openly omits any mention of various other conquests of Antiochus (Liv. 36.17.7: “ut aliam omnem vitam sileam”) despite the detailed description by Polybius: Pol. 5.31–107, 11.34. The limitless riches of Antiochus are later praised but only to underline how rich L. Scipio had become by defeating the king: Liv. 36.17.14, 38.59–60. For Antiochus’s empire and kingship, see Ma 2005; Grainger 2015.

<sup>382</sup> Liv. 35.35.7.

<sup>383</sup> Liv. 35.32.4: “tantum advehi auri, ut ipsos emere Romanos posset”. Cf. Sall. Iug. 35.10.

<sup>384</sup> Liv. 35.23.1–4, 35.41.1–5.

<sup>385</sup> Pausch 2011, V.2.b.

<sup>386</sup> Liv. 35.48. There were also other problems. According to Livy, during the war campaign Antiochus III had a serious lapse of concentration when he fell in love with his newest wife and as a consequence his army became undisciplined: Liv. 36.11. Polybius briefly mentions that Antiochus had achieved great things in his earlier life, referring to his eastern conquests, but then goes on to remark that later in life he became much more inferior and “disappointed general expectation”: Pol. 15.37.

story, in a manner similar to the other examples presented above, even though the historian himself was not impressed.<sup>387</sup> For Livy, Antiochus III was a stereotypical Asian king who was corrupted by eastern luxuries, much as the Persians had been for the Greek writers after the Persian wars.<sup>388</sup>

Daniel Albrecht has argued that Livy's portrayals of Philip V, Perseus, and Antiochus III were not at all "manly", at least when compared to Hannibal and Alexander the Great, the ultimate foreign examples of military *virtus*.<sup>389</sup> It is true that they all had weaknesses, and Livy sometimes ridicules them, but as we have seen, characters in these narratives could clearly have great virtues and great vices at the same time.<sup>390</sup> It must have been important for Livy to give an impression that the enemy kings of this era had been strong, even if morally flawed. Even after Antiochus III's defeat and after having criticized him in many ways, Livy reminds his readers that the king had been very resourceful at the beginning of the war.<sup>391</sup> Again, when Perseus had lost the war against the Romans, Livy returns one more time to praise the king and says that he was treated with respect, and Livy gives a short summary of the glorious history of Macedonia from its founding to the Roman conquest.<sup>392</sup> He would not want to leave the impression that Antiochus III or Perseus had been easy challenges.

This reasoning also seems to apply to Livy's earlier books of the Hannibalic war, not analysed in detail in this study: Dennis Pausch has argued that by focalizing alternately on Hannibal and Roman commanders, the readers get a clear idea of why Hannibal was so capable and successful, and why the Romans had trouble defeating him in battle.<sup>393</sup> This only heightens the ultimate Roman victory over the Carthaginians. Therefore, Livy's close

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<sup>387</sup> Antiochus started the war well: Liv. 35.51, 36.10. He personally commanded a part of his army: Liv. 37.41; Pol. 5.41.7–9, 5.45.6, 5.54.1. Antiochus invented a brilliant strategy in battle and almost routed the Romans in panic: Liv. 37.42; Just. Epit. 31.8.6. Judging from the prologues, Pompeius Trogus probably had given considerable space to the history of the Seleucid kingdom in his work, but Justin has preserved only some negative examples of Antiochus III: Just. Epit. 31.5–7. Cf. Bartlett 2014, 255; Muccioli 2015.

<sup>388</sup> For the Asian stereotypes in Graeco-Roman literature, see below pp. 215–220.

<sup>389</sup> Albrecht 2016, 304–316.

<sup>390</sup> Cf. Sall. Iug. 64.1, Catil. 5.

<sup>391</sup> Liv. 37.51.7–9.

<sup>392</sup> Liv. 45.7–9. Velleius Paterculus also praised Perseus and even more L. Aemilius Paullus who had conquered such a mighty king: Vell. Pat. 1.9.1–2 and 5–6.

<sup>393</sup> Pausch 2011, IV.2.b.

focalization on enemies like Perseus, or even Sallust's focalization on Jugurtha, serves the same purpose. Andreas Mehl in turn connects Livy's portrayals of strong enemies to the patriotic purpose of *Ab urbe condita*: by defeating the strongest and most morally commendable enemies the Romans could justify their conquests.<sup>394</sup> This discourse of justification of the Romans' emerging new identity as the rulers of the Mediterranean became particularly important towards the end of the Republic and Augustus used it to strengthen his *pax romana* propaganda. Virgil's *Aeneid* promotes this idea strongly: "you, Roman, be sure to rule the world (be these your arts), to crown peace with justice, to spare the vanquished and to crush the proud".<sup>395</sup>

So far, we have seen that military *virtus*, which had allowed the Romans to conquer the whole Mediterranean and their enemies to challenge them, consisted of military discipline, courage, luck, and intelligence. But qualities like clemency and generosity towards the enemy were respectable too. Cicero thought that such virtues were suitable for a military commander to supplement other more important virtues that together constituted military *virtus*.<sup>396</sup> In Polybius's work, Flaminius, after defeating Philip V, says: "Brave men should be hard on their foes and wroth with them in battle, when conquered they should be courageous and high-minded, but when they conquer, moderate, gentle and humane."<sup>397</sup>

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<sup>394</sup> Mehl 2011, 109.

<sup>395</sup> Ver. Aen. 6.851–53: "tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento / (hae tibi erunt artes), pacique imponere morem, / parcere subiectis et debellare superbos." It is possible that Pompeius Trogus too admired the *pax romana* ideology. Justin (44.5.8) writes: "Complete subjection of the country, however, and the Spaniards' acceptance of the Roman yoke could not be achieved until Caesar Augustus, having conquered the rest of the world, turned his victorious arms on them and, bringing a wild and barbarous people to a more civilized way of life under the rule of law, gave them a regular provincial administration / Nec prius perdomitae provinciae iugum Hispani accipere potuerunt, quam Caesar Augustus perdomito orbe victricia ad eos arma transtulit populumque barbarum ac ferum legibus ad cultiorem vitae usum traductum in formam provinciae redegit".

<sup>396</sup> Cic. Leg. Man. 36.

<sup>397</sup> Pol. 18.37.7: ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶ πάντων ἀγνωμονέστατον· πολεμοῦντας γὰρ δεῖ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας βαρεῖς εἶναι καὶ θυμικοὺς, ἠττωμένους δὲ γενναίους καὶ μεγαλόφρονας, νικῶντάς γε μὴν μετρίους καὶ πραεῖς καὶ φιλανθρώπους. Sallust praised his former patron Caesar for his clemency: Sall. Catil. 54. The Persian kings Cyrus the Great and Darius III were merciful: Just. Epit. 1.7–8, 1.10.

One such king who was believed to possess these additional virtues together with discipline, strength, courage and such was Pyrrhus.<sup>398</sup> Justin writes: “There is a general agreement amongst the sources that no monarch of the day, or previous times, could be compared with Pyrrhus, and that there had rarely appeared in history anyone of a purer life or a more transparent honesty – not merely among royalty but even among famous men of any station.”<sup>399</sup> Livy, citing Q. Claudius Quadrigarius, wrote that Hannibal said to Scipio Africanus that Pyrrhus, in his military skills, was second only to Alexander the Great and he had the charisma to make the Italian people love him so much that they started to prefer the rule of a foreign king instead of the long-standing Roman rule.<sup>400</sup> Pyrrhus seems like an example of a perfect king, as imagined by Polybius and Cicero in their constitutional theories. Stories about Pyrrhus’s nobility circulated throughout the republic era. The stories highlight the honesty of the Romans in warfare but also that of their adversary Pyrrhus. Cicero has preserved a passage where Ennius relates how Pyrrhus returned Roman prisoners of war for free, because all he cared about was testing his *virtus* against the Romans:

Indeed, the famous words of Pyrrhus concerning the return of prisoners are outstanding: ‘I do not ask for gold for myself, nor should you give me a ransom: not hawking war but waging war, with iron, not with gold let both sides resolve the vital question. Whether you or me Dame Fortune wants to rule, or whatever she brings, let us put to the test by *virtus*. And understand this saying, too: Those whose *virtus* the fortune of war has spared, their liberty it is certain that I spare. I offer them—take them—I give them up, as is the great gods’ will.’ It is a kingly sentiment and worthy of the race of Aeacus.<sup>401</sup>

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<sup>398</sup> Pyrrhus’s courage and strength: Just. Epit. 17.3.21–22, 18.1.5–7.

<sup>399</sup> Just. Epit. 25.5.3–6: “Satis constans inter omnes auctores fama est, nullum nec eius nec superioris aetatis regem comparandum Pyrrho fuisse, raroque non inter reges tantum, verum etiam inter inlustres viros aut vitae sanctioris aut iustitiae probatoris visum fuisse, scientiam certe rei militaris in illo viro tantam fuisse.”

<sup>400</sup> Liv. 35.14.5–9.

<sup>401</sup> Cic. Off. 1.38 (= Enn. Ann. 183–190 in the 2018 Loeb edition, or 186–193 in Warmington’s 1935 edition): “Pyrrhi quidem de captivis reddendis illa praeclara:/ nec mi aurum posco nec mi pretium dederitis:/ non cauponantes bellum sed belligerantes/ ferro, non auro vitam cernamus utrique./ vosne velit an me regnare era quidve ferat Fors/virtute experiamur, et hoc simul accipe dictum:/ quorum virtuti belli fortuna pepercit/ eorundem me libertati parcere certum est./ Dono—ducite—doque—volentibus cum magnis dis./ regalis sane et digna

The Romans too gave a demonstration of their nobility. The story comes from Gellius, who cites Valerius Antias and Claudius Quadrigarius as his sources.<sup>402</sup> According to Valerius Antias's version, when Pyrrhus was doing well in the war with the Romans, a friend of his went to speak with the consul C. Fabricius and offered to arrange the assassination of Pyrrhus for a reward. However, the consul related the offer to the senate which in turn warned Pyrrhus to be more cautious about those closest to him.

The version by Quadrigarius also includes a claim that the king thanked the Romans and clothed and released all Roman prisoners of war, linking the event to Ennius's story of the prisoners. Then, the consuls reputedly sent a letter to the king, in which they explained that because of reasons of honour they wished that Pyrrhus would not die before the Romans had a chance to vanquish him in battle. They had also written that the Romans would not resort to bribes or trickery in war, and they did not want other nations to think so.<sup>403</sup> Quadrigarius, just like Ennius, casts an image of two equally honourable opponents testing their *virtus* in honest combat.

In these historical narratives, Pyrrhus is pictured as the ultimate example of near perfect *virtus* in an enemy, with both military strength and a noble spirit, from a distant and more morally intact time. Cicero mentions that of the two enemies that had invaded Italy, because of his *probitas*, the Romans did not hate Pyrrhus like they hated the "cruel" Hannibal.<sup>404</sup> However, we have seen that even less-perfect men like Philip V or Mithridates VI – or Hannibal, who remains outside of the focus of this study – could still serve similar exemplary purposes in the narratives. Therefore, as in the other later Roman historical narratives discussed here, for Ennius, a non-Roman could also function as a positive moral example.<sup>405</sup> Jackie Elliott has studied Ennius's

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Aecidarum genere sententia." Cited from Ennius's 2018 Loeb edition. Pompeius Trogus too had used this *exemplum*: Just. Epit. 18.1.10.

<sup>402</sup> Gell. NA 3.8. Livy referred to this episode at least three times in his text: Liv. 24.45.3–4, 42.47.6–7, and with more detail in his lost Book 13. Cf. Briscoe 2012, 315–316. R. Roth notes that, for Livy, Ennius was a timeless source of *exempla* that could be freely used in a variety of different situations: Roth 2010, 180–181.

<sup>403</sup> Polybius confirms that Romans of old valued honest and direct ways of fighting, without ambushes: 36.9.9, 13.3. Cf. Diod. Sic. 30.7.1.

<sup>404</sup> Cic. Lael. 28.

<sup>405</sup> R. Roth (2010, p. 189) argues that Livy too found Ennius's Pyrrhus a particularly good *exemplum*: "Thus, a Greek king could provide *exempla* of good conduct to a Latin-reading

narrative and argues that the praise of the non-Roman enemies “tends to suggest that Ennius’ epic was capable of sympathetic representation regardless of national identity or personal politics”, contradicting “the popular view of the poem as partisan and nationalistic”.<sup>406</sup> In fact, Roman Roth has argued that Ennius might have presented Pyrrhus’s Greekness as a positive attribute, in contrast to the barbarous and cruel Hannibal, to emphasize his civilized manners in international relations.<sup>407</sup> Roth writes: “In this way, composing the Annals is a way of actively appropriating Greek culture for the purposes of writing about the glories of Rome’s conquest” and “[...] the conflict with Pyrrhus was a significant event in the cultural field, a prelude to the new wave of Hellenisation of Rome and Italy, in which the poet was himself an active participant.”<sup>408</sup>

It is indeed remarkable that such praise of the enemy was clearly present already in the earliest extant fragments of Latin literature, and the same *exempla* were readily embraced by authors of various different eras. Roman Roth suggests that “Ennius could be seen as an early example of an author who uses the Pyrrhic War as a vehicle to raise Rome’s glory to the heavens, as a precursor to the Annalists’ twisting of the tale to suit their idealized view of Roman history.”<sup>409</sup> Therefore, to apply Roth’s ideas to this study, Ennius’s portrayal of Pyrrhus could have been among the first of countless attempts to define “Romanness” in relation to the Greek culture and to the Other. Jackie Elliott reaches a similar conclusion: “promoting the skill and nobility of Rome’s most challenging enemies serves the later Roman prose historiographical tradition well”, and praising the enemy in general “served to

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audience: being portrayed as neither consistently good nor wholly evil, Pyrrhus represents a virtuous past (and thus an idealized future), which once belonged (and will belong again) to all civilized people, Roman and foreign alike.”

<sup>406</sup> Elliott 2013, 169.

<sup>407</sup> Pyrrhus’s Greekness is mentioned at Fest. p. 168.3–6 L (= Enn. Ann. 165 in the 2018 Loeb edition, or 178 in Warmington’s 1935 edition) and Cic. Div. 2.116 (= Enn. Ann. 167 in the 2018 Loeb edition, or 174 in Warmington’s 1935 edition). Livy uses Ennius’s Pyrrhus as an *exemplum* of civilized manners in international relations: Roth 2010, 185–186.

<sup>408</sup> Roth 2010, 178–179.

<sup>409</sup> Roth 2010, 179.

elevate the moral tone of Roman engagement as well as to dignify their eventual victories”.<sup>410</sup>

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To return to the main question of this subchapter, we can confidently conclude that enemy kings are praised for their military *virtus* quite openly in Roman historical narratives, starting with the earliest fragments of Republican historians. Praising enemies’ strength also served to define what the desirable qualities for Roman commanders were. Sometimes praise of military *virtus* was accompanied by reproach of other qualities: characterizations could be nuanced this way. Authors like Livy and Sallust liked to reflect on the different positive and negative moral qualities of foreign characters and examine them in comparison to Roman characters. In his introduction, Livy indeed encouraged the readers to consider by themselves which examples were to be imitated and which to be avoided.<sup>411</sup> We have also noted that Polybius’s narrative goals were different from those of Livy or Sallust and, instead of trying to create consistent characterizations for historical figures, he preferred to praise or blame the characters according to each situation separately. For this reason, for example, his characterization of Philip V appears more versatile than Livy’s. This narrative difference between Polybius and Livy will become more apparent with additional examples in the following chapters.

The enemies’ military strength gets much attention and praise in all narratives because it was the fundamental building block of the Roman idea of *virtus*, and because the authors believed that Roman *virtus* and military power stayed strong only when there were nearly equally strong opponents to fight with.<sup>412</sup> According to the logic of Roman *virtus*, the sheer military strength of the Romans justified their expansion and position as the rulers of the Mediterranean. Republican authors wanted to demonstrate that through hard

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<sup>410</sup> Elliot 2013, the first citation from p. 169, the second from p. 279. P. Lévêque already noted this about the portrayals of Pyrrhus in Roman sources: Lévêque 1957, 48–49.

<sup>411</sup> Liv. praef. 10. Cf. Nep. Hann. 13.4.

<sup>412</sup> Diod. Sic. 34/5.33.4–5, 32.4.5; Sall. Catil. 10.1; Val. Max. 7.2.3; Yarrow 2006, 205–206, 332–333, 344.

work and the military *virtus* inherent in their culture, the Romans had legitimized this new position of theirs in the eyes of other nations.

To sum up the discussion of the portrayals of praiseworthy enemy kings, several positive aspects recur in different stories. Often their childhood was marked by promises of future greatness such as divine signs, a difficult childhood, or exceptional inherent talent in military affairs. Often, they were said to be related to famous kings or heroes of the past such as Alexander the Great. They were self-disciplined, frugal, and physically strong. They had earned the respect of their subjects and made their armies strong because of their hard work, determination, and exemplary conduct. These traits constituted their military *virtus*. Other qualities that could complement their military *virtus* and make them even more respectable were clemency and generosity towards the enemy. All these qualities were desirable for Roman commanders too, and the greatest commanders who encountered these kings were indeed characterized in a similar fashion. Thus, the Other and the Self were equally valid channels for teaching positive and negative moral *exempla*.

These discourses were not just limited to historical texts, but they had real relevance in Roman political life. Victories over famous kings obviously became *exempla* of the ancestors' glorious deeds to be freely used in political speeches in later eras.<sup>413</sup> Furthermore, individual Romans commissioned public monuments to commemorate their own ancestors' victories over great enemies. According to Livy, L. Aemilius Regillus placed the following inscription in a temple of the Lares of the sea, vowed by him during the war, in the Campus Martius:

Above the temple doors a plaque was affixed bearing the following inscription: "To Lucius Aemilius, son of Marcus Aemilius ... this battle as he left ... for finishing a great war and subjugating kings ... the source of obtaining peace. Under his auspices and command, and through his good fortune and leadership, the erstwhile undefeated fleet of King Antiochus was scattered, smashed and routed between Ephesus and the islands of Samos and Chios, while Antiochus himself, and all his army, cavalry and elephants looked on. And there, on that day, forty-two war ships were captured with their entire

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<sup>413</sup> E.g., Cic. Phil. 4.13, Leg. Man. 55.

crews. When that battle had been fought King Antiochus and his realm <were completely crushed>. For that engagement he made a vow of a temple to the Lares of the sea.’ A plaque with the same text was placed above the doors in the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol.<sup>414</sup>

Another good example is the coin commissioned by L. Aemilius Lepidus Paullus in 62 BC. The coin depicts the triumph of his alleged ancestor L. Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus for the victory at Pydna in 168 BC. On the coin, the triumphator himself stands in front of the chained king Perseus, his two sons, and some spoils of war.<sup>415</sup> This is a prime example of the Otherness discourse as discussed above but in visual form. Moreover, in this way, even after a century, former victories over famous powerful kings could be used to glorify the identity and prestige of one’s family. In fact, as we have seen, there was no time limit for the use of these *exempla*. According to Velleius Paterculus, the ancestors of Sulla had fought against Pyrrhus. In this way, an enemy as distant in time as Pyrrhus is used to promote the experience of the Cornelian family in military affairs.<sup>416</sup> Of those Roman military commanders whose texts survive to us, at least Julius Caesar did not hesitate to praise his enemies openly. He praised the *virtus* of his Germanic enemies in order to make his own victory even greater.<sup>417</sup> Thus, the wars with foreign kings were seen as trials of *virtus* for the Romans, as Diodorus Siculus aptly wrote: “Rome’s strength should be judged, they thought, not by the weakness of others, but by showing herself greater than the great.”<sup>418</sup>

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<sup>414</sup> Liv. 40.52.5–7: “supra valvas templi tabula cum titulo hoc fixa est: ‘duello magno dirimendo, regibus subigendis, caput patrandae pacis haec pugna exeunti L. Aemilio M. Aemili filio auspicio imperio felicitate ductuque eius inter Ephesum Samum Chiumque, inspectante eopse Antiocho, exercitu omni, equitatu elephantisque, classis regis Antiochi antea invicta fusa contusa fugataque est, ibique eo die naves longae cum omnibus sociis captae quadraginta duae. ea pugna pugnata rex Antiochus regnumque eius . . . eius rei ergo aedem Laribus permarinis vovit.’ eodem exemplo tabula in aede Iovis in Capitolio supra valvas fixa est.”

<sup>415</sup> *RRC* 415/1. Cf. Lualdi 2019.

<sup>416</sup> Vell. Pat. 2.17.2.

<sup>417</sup> Caes. B Gall. 1.36.7. Caesar’s portrayal of himself did not lack heroism either; see Zecchini 2001, 153–155.

<sup>418</sup> Diod. Sic. 34/5.33.4: οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλων ἀσθενείας ἔκριναν δεῖν θεωρεῖσθαι τὴν τῆς Ῥώμης ἰσχύν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τῶν μεγάλων μείζονα.

## 2.2 FRIENDLY KINGS

### **Fides: *The basis of international friendships***

We have so far seen that our authors openly showed admiration for enemy kings who demonstrated that they possessed military *virtus* in line with the Roman ideals. In the Hellenistic context too, military success was equally respected and important for the legitimization of kings. But according to Hans-Joachim Gehrke, another important quality that was expected from an ideal “charismatic monarch” was wise and skilled management of domestic politics and international relations.<sup>419</sup> This was of course equally important for the Romans and, just as with military *virtus*, Roman authors used foreign kings as examples of these desirable qualities.

A direct indication of the expectation of moral qualities from the friendly kings can be found in Cicero’s speech *On Behalf of King Deiotarus*. Cicero commends the king for his sobriety but then remarks that it is pointless to praise a king for sobriety, for exuberant banquets were typical signs of power for kings. It was more important to recognize the king as “*fortem, iustum, severum, gravem, magnanimum, largum, beneficum, liberalem*”.<sup>420</sup> Cicero goes on to explain how these qualities had helped Deiotarus become a king with the help of the Romans and then to be an excellent ruler. Cicero remarks that “ever has the name of king been hallowed in our society; most hallowed that of kings who are our allies and friends”.<sup>421</sup> Livy on his part had a special expression, *regius animus*, for virtuous kings. The kings who possessed this “kingly spirit” were honest, courageous, self-restrained, active, generous, and they respected gods.<sup>422</sup> Augustus based his public image on such republican moral values, already promoted by Cicero and Livy and many others before: in

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<sup>419</sup> On the honourable conduct of kings and the concept of “δόξα”, see Gehrke 2013, 83–85.

<sup>420</sup> Cic. Deiot. 25–27, 37–38. Cf. Bell. Alex. 68.1.

<sup>421</sup> Cic. Deiot. 40: “Semper regium nomen in hac civitate sanctum fuit, sociorum vero regum et amicorum sanctissimum.”

<sup>422</sup> Liv. 31.16.1, 41.20.5, 42.18.1. Cf. Pol. 25.3.5; Bell. Alex. 24.3.1. Cf. Sallust, who wrote that Jugurtha gained the Romans’ friendship with his *virtus*: Sall. Iug. 10.2. The lack of such virtues made a king barbarous and uncivilized. Such a contrast is made in *The Alexandrian War* between the evil Pharnaces II and the virtuous Mithridates I of the Bosphorus, who helped Caesar in Egypt: Bell. Alex. 26–28 and 78.1–3.

27 or 26 BC, Augustus was honoured with a *clipeus virtutis* that commended his *virtus*, *clementia*, *iustitia*, and *pietas*.<sup>423</sup> These virtues included both military and domestic spheres, and in historical narratives, these same virtues were believed to be important in a king's interactions with his subjects and allies, and the same qualities allowed the king to become a friend of the Romans.

Paul J. Burton argues in detail that the language of morality was essential in the narratives of international friendship. Burton emphasizes that when Roman authors describe friendly relationships between Romans and foreigners, the essence of these friendships is based on moral qualities on each side of the relationship. Rather than formal agreements with binding obligations, international friendships were described as having been based on *fides* and the goodwill of each side and on the voluntary exchange of favours. The importance of *fides* is evident in the historical narratives. Livy makes the Spartan tyrant Nabis say: "As it is, when I look at you, I see that you are Romans, men who reportedly hold treaties as the most inviolable of things in the divine sphere, and good faith (*fidem*) with one's allies as the most inviolable in the human."<sup>424</sup> Burton further argues that "the moralizing discourse of the literary sources, moreover, is not merely rhetorical superstructure or an adjunct to the main business of practical diplomacy in the ancient world. Morality, it seems, was rather the essence of ancient diplomacy." Burton strengthens this claim by remarking that diplomatic inscriptions, which were "free" from the rhetorical artifice common in historical prose, contain equally moralizing language that emphasizes the concepts of honour, nobility, and goodwill in the context of international friendships.<sup>425</sup> My arguments are parallel to those of Burton – the same personal moral qualities that determined if a king was a worthy friend of the

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<sup>423</sup> R. Gest. div. Aug. 34.2. For the coinciding moral ideals of Livy and Augustus, see Pianezzola 2018, 49–62.

<sup>424</sup> Liv. 34.31.4–5: "Nunc cum vos intueor, Romanos esse video, qui rerum divinarum foedera, humanarum fidem socialem sanctissimam habeatis." On the importance of morality for both Livy's internal and external audiences, see Levene 2006, 104–106. For the importance of *fides* in international alliances, see also Rizzi 2011, 9–33.

<sup>425</sup> Burton 2011, 77–78.

Romans also determined if he was a worthy *exemplum* in the historical narratives.

In my opinion, it has been sufficiently demonstrated by David Braund and Paul J. Burton that using the concepts of “client king” and *clientelae* – a concept consolidated by Ernst Badian and still widely used by scholars – to denote any international friendship between the Romans and their allied kings is misleading during the middle Republic. This word implies some kind of unbalanced relationship in which one side is subordinate to the other. Even the Republican authors themselves rarely use the word *clientela* in the context of friendly kings. It is more accurate to speak of “friendly kings” and of *amicitia*. This concept is constantly used by the authors themselves and is much more compatible with the moral discourse connected with international friendships.<sup>426</sup>

How did a king become a friend of Rome? Livy emphasized that friendship with the Romans was not something easily gained. In his narrative, when Vermina, a Numidian leader who was an ally of Hannibal in the Second Punic War, sent envoys to ask for the friendship of the Romans after Hannibal’s defeat, the senate replied that the title of *rex sociusque et amicus* was reserved only for those kings who granted important services to the Romans.<sup>427</sup> Similarly, Sallust wrote that the Numidian prince Gauda “asked Q. Caecilius Metellus to be allowed the kingly privilege of sitting on an official chair next to him”, but Metellus refused him the honour because “by custom it belonged only to those who had been formally recognized as kings by the Romans”.<sup>428</sup> To get this recognition, a king could for example aid the Romans against their enemies. According to Ernst Badian, it was “the aim of every king

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<sup>426</sup> Badian 1958; Braund 1984; Burton 2011, esp. 2–6 for a short overview of the discussion. E.S. Gruen recognizes the frequency of the concept of *amicitia* but sees it as an excuse to promote Roman supremacy and imperialism: Gruen 1984, 54–95.

<sup>427</sup> Liv. 31.11.16–17. At this point of Roman history, the Romans had not yet had contact with many foreign kings. Livy is referring to a future point in his narrative, for the title of *rex sociusque et amicus* would not become common until later; see Briscoe 1973, 86. During the reign of Augustus and later, this official recognition was essential for any king who wanted to be successful in the sphere of influence of the Romans. For the meaning of *rex sociusque amicus*, see Braund 1984, 23–26.

<sup>428</sup> Sall. Iug. 65.2: “Quoi Metellus petenti more regum ut sellam iuxta poneret” and “quod eorum more foret quos populus Romanus reges appellavisset”. Gauda was the son of Mastanabal and a grandson of Masinissa. After the defeat of Jugurtha, the Romans made Gauda the king of Numidia.

within Rome's orbit to be 'called king' by her".<sup>429</sup> This "title" in question was a type of official recognition from the Roman senate. Individual Romans could not give this official recognition without the authorization of the senate.<sup>430</sup> Kings themselves usually asked the Romans for this recognition, as was the case with, e.g., Perseus, or they could sometimes even receive the recognition without asking, like Ariobarzanes III of Cappadocia.<sup>431</sup> Also those kings who had formerly been enemies, like Philip V or Masinissa, could later be recognized as kings and allies by the Romans. Once a king had acquired the recognition, the Romans would treat him with appropriate respect and friendliness.<sup>432</sup> Furthermore, friendly kings could also lose their favour among the Romans, as happened to Philip V and Eumenes II. According to the narratives, this too depended on their moral qualities.

### ***Masinissa: A king made by Rome***

King Masinissa of Numidia (c. 238–148 BC) is a prime narrative example of a king who – by his own decision – transformed from an enemy into a great ally of the Romans. In the Second Punic War (218–201 BC) he fought with Carthage against the Romans but later switched sides and allied with Scipio Africanus. With the help of the Romans he founded the kingdom of Numidia in 202 BC. His first presentation in Livy's work is very positive and already anticipates his exceptional friendship with the Romans: "Gala had a son Masinissa, seventeen years old, but a young man of such promise that even then it was evident that he would make the kingdom larger and richer than

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<sup>429</sup> Badian 1958, 106.

<sup>430</sup> There is at least one exception, when P. Clodius gave it to Brogitarius: Cic. Har. resp. 29, Sest. 56. When Scipio Africanus gave the recognition to Masinissa, he did it under the authority of the senate and it was later ratified by a formal decree of the senate: Liv. 30.15.11; 30.17.10; Rawson 1975, 155; Braund 1984, 31. There were cases when kings received recognition from a Roman individual but not from the senate, and the recognition was considered invalid. E.g., Demetrius I Soter was recognized by Ti. Gracchus but not by the senate (Pol. 31.33.3), and Antiochus XIII Philadelphus was recognized by L. Licinius Lucullus but not by the senate or by Lucullus's successor, Pompey, who deposed him (Just. Epit. 40.2.2–3; Diod. Sic. 40.1a–2).

<sup>431</sup> Perseus: Liv. 40.58.8. Ariobarzanes III: Cic. Fam. 2.17.7. The interpretation of the latter case is not certain, however; see Facella 2019.

<sup>432</sup> Cic. Verr. 2.4.67–68.

what he had received.”<sup>433</sup> Livy praises Masinissa for immediately winning a great victory without any help in his first battle against the Romans and their ally Syphax.<sup>434</sup> Later, Masinissa demonstrated his military skills by successfully fighting against P. Cornelius Scipio (cos. 218 BC) and his son of the same name (the future Scipio Africanus) and by giving the experienced Roman commander much trouble.<sup>435</sup> Mathilde Cazeaux has noted that Livy even emphasizes the feelings of *terror et periculum* that the older Roman commander had for Masinissa.<sup>436</sup> Thus, already before the alliance, Masinissa had proven his military *virtus* to the Romans.

When Masinissa finally decided to ally himself with the younger Scipio (the future Africanus), who was then in charge of the Roman army after the death of his father, Livy already emphasizes the Numidian’s *fides* in the future as if to justify his abrupt change of sides.<sup>437</sup> But it is the following description that attempts to convince the readers that the change of sides made sense. Livy slows down the narrative rhythm and describes in detail the meeting between the two commanders, focalizing internally on Masinissa. Livy makes the readers follow his arrival at the meeting, his great excitement about meeting the famous Roman in person, and finally Masinissa’s genuine first reaction: the Numidian was greatly impressed by Scipio’s dashing and soldierly looks. Dazed by admiration, Masinissa promised that “he was eager to give such services to Scipio and the Roman people that no individual foreigner would have aided the Roman state with more ardour”, as he had allegedly wished for

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<sup>433</sup> Liv. 24.49.1–2: “Filius Gala Masinissam habebat septem decem annos natum, ceterum iuvenem ea indole ut iam tum appareret maius regnum opulentiusque quam quod accepisset facturum.” Cf. Liv. 27.5.11. Actually, Masinissa was around 25 years old at this point. In general, the surviving fragments of Polybius do not contain many descriptions of Masinissa’s alliance with Rome, which is regrettable for Polybius wrote that he had met Masinissa in person: Pol. 9.25.4. In the fragments of Book 11, Masinissa is fighting for Carthage, but in those of Book 14, when he is mentioned again for the first time, Masinissa is already helping the Romans. In the fragments of Book 15 there are some brief mentions, and also at Pol. 31.31, and a death notice at 36.16.

<sup>434</sup> Liv. 24.49.2–6. Syphax later switched sides as well and allied with the Carthaginians. For an analysis of why this particular friendship with the Romans failed, see Burton 2011, 94–102.

<sup>435</sup> Liv. 25.34, 28.13. Masinissa is mentioned, fighting against the Romans under the Carthaginian general Mago, at Pol. 11.21.1.

<sup>436</sup> Cazeaux 2015, 303–304.

<sup>437</sup> Cazeaux 2015, 305.

a long time.<sup>438</sup> At the end of the meeting, the focalization switches briefly to Scipio and we learn Scipio's positive thoughts about the Numidian, and so started the long and fruitful friendship between Masinissa and Rome.<sup>439</sup> Earlier in the war, Scipio had already seen a proof of Masinissa's military talent and *virtus* as an enemy, and now he was convinced that he was trustworthy as well, as if Scipio could have seen his sincerity in the same way Livy's readers could. Scipio judged Masinissa worthy, and the readers are invited to do so as well.

Paul J. Burton has noted that Livy uses the same linguistic expression when describing the alliance between Aeneas and king Latinus and when writing that Masinissa wanted to shake hands with Scipio as a sign of mutual *fides*.<sup>440</sup> This symbolic comparison, the close focalization, and the amount of narrative detail in general highlight the importance of this particular alliance. Moreover, by focalizing internally on Masinissa, Livy attempts to show the readers that Masinissa's decision was genuine and without any hidden agenda.

After this introduction of Masinissa's character, Livy stops following the Romans and keeps the focalization on Masinissa by including a long digression that was most probably taken from Polybius's lost text. The digression describes in detail how Masinissa returned to Africa to fight against the Carthaginians and their new ally Syphax, the king of another Numidian tribe, who had also switched sides in the war. Together they were threatening to conquer the territories of Masinissa's late father and his tribe, the Massylii.<sup>441</sup> At this time the Romans were occupied with the Carthaginian invasion in Italy during 206–204 BC.

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<sup>438</sup> Liv. 28.35.9–10: "Cupere se illi populoque Romano operam navare ita ut nemo unus externus magis enixe adiuverit rem Romanam." Sallust too thought highly of Masinissa: Sall. Iug. 5.4–6.

<sup>439</sup> Scipio's thoughts: Liv. 28.35.12. Afterwards, Masinissa is mentioned helping the Romans against the Carthaginians on many occasions: Liv. 29.29.4–5, 30.5–17, 31.19; Pol. 14.4, 14.8, 15.5.12, 15.9.8, 15.12, 15.14.7. Justin mentions Masinissa in a similar context: Just. Epit. 38.6.4–5.

<sup>440</sup> Burton 2011, 1. Aeneas and Latinus: "dextra datam fidem futurae amicitiae sanxisset" (Liv. 1.1.8–9. Cf. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 1.59.1–2). Masinissa and Scipio: "eius dextra fidem sancire" (Liv. 28.35.1).

<sup>441</sup> Liv. 29.29–34. In what remains of Polybius we only have brief mentions of Masinissa's ambition and determination to become king: Pol. 15.3.6, 15.4.4. For the strife between the Numidian tribes and Carthage at this time, see Thompson 1981.

Livy even felt the need to justify the deviation from Roman matters because “he was far the greatest of all the kings of his time and gave the greatest aid to the Roman state”.<sup>442</sup> Dennis Pausch has shown that despite Livy’s general annalistic structure, which was intrinsically chronologically linear, Livy quite freely used digressions to enliven his narrative and to engage the readers.<sup>443</sup> In fact, Polybius states that digressions were useful precisely for that reason.<sup>444</sup>

This digression establishes Masinissa as a heroic character.<sup>445</sup> There are in fact many similar elements to the stories of the youth of the powerful kings, mainly having to survive various dangers and prove one’s worth as a leader. In this digression, Livy focalizes externally but closely on Masinissa and makes the readers follow his every heroic battle and every struggle in detail. Battle after battle Masinissa escapes death, dodging enemies’ weapons, hiding and surviving in the mountains, then fleeing wounded and finally throwing himself into a torrent after a long, desperate pursuit, never giving up.<sup>446</sup> This digression too serves to demonstrate to the readers that Masinissa had earned his position as a leader not only by birth-right but also by his military skill and resilience, demonstrated by his survival through countless hardships. Masinissa had therefore passed his “test of *virtus*” in this sense as well.

The digression ends with a description of Masinissa and Scipio’s coordinated battle strategy against the Carthaginians and Syphax. Livy makes the readers observe, as Scipio does, Masinissa’s flawless execution of the plan, which ensured the Roman victory.<sup>447</sup> Thus, a considerable part of the Second Punic War is actually narrated through the Other, a foreign hero Masinissa. The reader identifies with the hero and shares his hardships, failures and, finally, well-earned success. Through this literary technique, it becomes clear to the reader that this character will be an important moral example

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<sup>442</sup> Liv. 29.29.5: “Ceterum cum longe maximus omnium aetatis suae regum hic fuerit plurimumque rem Romanam iuverit, operae pretium videtur excedere paulum ad enarrandum quam varia fortuna usus sit in amittendo recuperandoque paterno regno.”

<sup>443</sup> Pausch 2011, III.1.c. Cf. Livy’s famous Alexander digression: Liv.9.17.1.

<sup>444</sup> Pol. 38.5–6. Cf. Pausch 2011, III.2.a.

<sup>445</sup> Cf. Cazeaux 2015, 304.

<sup>446</sup> Liv. 29.30–33.

<sup>447</sup> Liv. 29.34.10–17.

throughout the following narrative and be tightly connected with the character of Scipio Africanus, the exemplary republican hero.

At the end of the war, Masinissa had to endure one last test of *virtus* before earning formal recognition as a king from the Romans. When the Romans and Masinissa conquered Syphax's capital Cirta, Livy focalizes on Masinissa who entered Syphax's palace.<sup>448</sup> There he found Sophoniba, who was Syphax's wife and Hasdrubal's daughter. She begged, using direct speech, not to be surrendered to the Romans by appealing to the fact that they were both Africans whereas the Romans were foreigners. In her speech, Sophoniba inverts the role of the Other that from her point of view refers to the Romans. Masinissa immediately fell in love with the beautiful queen, as was "typical of the Numidian race".<sup>449</sup> Moved with pity and love, he promised not to give her to the Romans and married her the next day without informing the Romans.<sup>450</sup>

Here, Livy suddenly seems to characterize Masinissa through the negative ethnic stereotype according to which Numidians were untrustworthy and lustful by nature.<sup>451</sup> But to be a friend of the Romans, Masinissa could not act like a typical Numidian. Daniel Albrecht and Mathilde Cazeaux have indeed suggested that this story serves as a demonstration that Masinissa needed to overcome his natural "barbaric" instincts and prove that he was able to conform to the Roman standards of *virtus*, before earning the full acceptance of the Romans.<sup>452</sup> This means that while Masinissa had already proven his military prowess many times, he still had to prove that he had the other important qualities like *continentia* and *fides*. Livy narrates the following events in an intensive and stylistically masterful manner. In quick sequence, Livy focuses on different characters and uses different focalizations to offer a complete view of the situation. First, we read the words of the defeated and captive Syphax to Scipio in indirect speech.<sup>453</sup> The Numidian blamed Sophoniba for his grave mistake of defecting from the Romans and

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<sup>448</sup> Liv. 30.12.10–20.

<sup>449</sup> Liv. 30.12.18: "ut est genus Numidarum in Venerem praeceps".

<sup>450</sup> Masinissa's promise to Sophoniba also at Pol. 14.7.6.

<sup>451</sup> Numidian stereotype: Pol. 14.1.4, 14.7.6; Liv. 25.41.3, 29.23.4; Dauge 1981, 48, 64, 74, 80–81, 91, 620–622; Haley 1990. Sallust wrote that Numidians believed themselves to be descendants of Persians who had travelled to the West: Sall. Iug. 18.4–8 and 11–12.

<sup>452</sup> Cazeaux 2015; Albrecht 2016, 280–283.

<sup>453</sup> Liv. 30.13.8–14.

allying with the Carthaginians. He said that love had blinded him and the same would certainly happen to the even younger Masinissa.

Livy switches the focalization to Scipio and reveals his worried thoughts and how disgusted he was by Masinissa's impulsive marriage.<sup>454</sup> Not only did the marriage demonstrate a dangerous lack of self-discipline, it was also not acceptable to the Romans because the queen was supposed to adorn the triumph along with other important prisoners. Daniel Albrecht notes that this is an example of how Scipio is Masinissa's narrative foil: Scipio remembered how he was never tempted by any female prisoner in his own youth and how Masinissa still lacked self-discipline of this kind.<sup>455</sup> Chrysanthe Tsitsiou-Chelidoni on her part has observed that Scipio's internal monologue is an excellent example of Livy's skilful "psycho-narration", which means that the author-narrator remains external to the story while focalizing internally on a character and narrating their precise thoughts in the third person.<sup>456</sup>

Livy smoothly transits from this internal monologue to a fatherly direct speech of Scipio to Masinissa.<sup>457</sup> Scipio said that Masinissa already had every other virtue except, regrettably, continence and control of his passions (*temperantia et continentia libidinum*). Scipio, who obviously possessed these virtues, warned the younger man that the lack of self-control was far more dangerous than any external enemy and encouraged Masinissa to "conquer himself".<sup>458</sup> Therefore, if Masinissa wanted to earn the full respect of his Roman role model Scipio, he had to overcome the last of his Numidian vices. Livy continues the narrative, focalizing externally but closely on Masinissa.<sup>459</sup> We learn the Numidian's reaction in detail: he blushed, broke into tears, and gave a short apologetic reply to Scipio in indirect speech. Excruciated by emotions for Sophoniba, he went to contemplate the matter in his tent while everyone outside could hear his groaning.

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<sup>454</sup> Liv. 30.14.1–4.

<sup>455</sup> Albrecht 2016, 282–283.

<sup>456</sup> Tsitsiou-Chelidoni 2009, 538–539: "The authorial narrator chooses to maintain an apparently objective distance from the narrated story."

<sup>457</sup> Liv. 30.14.4–11.

<sup>458</sup> Liv. 30.14.11: "vince animum".

<sup>459</sup> Liv. 30.15.1–6.

Dennis Pausch has noted that even though Livy's readers would have known how the major historical events such as wars had played out, some more minor stories like the relationship between Masinissa and Sophoniba might not have been well known.<sup>460</sup> Therefore, Pausch continues, episodes like this were ideal for creating suspense in the narrative. This is precisely what Livy is doing, using delay and focalization as tools to achieve maximal suspense in a short time.

Livy does not delay the resolution of this episode for long: finally, Masinissa decided to renounce his love and offer poison to Sophoniba in order to keep the promise that she should not fall into Roman hands alive. Lastly, Livy gives us a scene where Sophoniba receives the message and fearlessly drinks the poison after pronouncing some brave last words in direct speech.<sup>461</sup> The whole sequence of Masinissa's and Sophoniba's reactions is dramatic and uses tragic elements in order to highlight the emotions of the characters.<sup>462</sup>

It is noteworthy that Livy does not use direct speech in the case of Masinissa. This is an example of a technique, as described by P.G. Walsh, in which Livy uses direct speech when he wants to emphasize certain characters or opinions.<sup>463</sup> In this instance, it could mean that Scipio and Sophoniba have a voice because they are the two active characters to whom Masinissa has to react. Scipio represents the Roman way of *virtus* and Sophoniba that of the Numidian vices. With the detailed narrative that emphasizes Masinissa's emotions, Livy attempts to show that even for the greatest of men it was not easy to resist vices. Masinissa, however, succeeds in "conquering himself" and this makes his alliance with Rome special because, following Paul J. Burton's model, Rome's most successful alliances were based on shared moral values.

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<sup>460</sup> Pausch 2011, V.1.b.

<sup>461</sup> Liv. 30.15.7–8 Cf. Diod. Sic. 27.7; App. Pun. 28. A. Kuttner has argued that the death of Sophoniba immediately became such an important *exemplum* that a painting of it was carried in the triumph of Scipio Africanus – a common habit in the triumphs. According to Kuttner, a certain two paintings from Pompeii (one from Casa di Giuseppe II, VIII.2.39, now in the Museo Archeologico di Napoli, inv. 8968, and another one still in situ in Casa del Fabbro, I.10.7) are replicas of this image: Kuttner 2013, 217–228.

<sup>462</sup> Livy and "tragic history" generally: Walsh 1961, 191; Pauw 1991. Cf. Tsitsiou-Chelidoni 2009, 545.

<sup>463</sup> Walsh 1954, 109–110. For Livy's use of direct speech from a narratological point of view, and for more references, see Tsitsiou-Chelidoni 2009. The story of Masinissa and Sophoniba has inspired a great number of tragedies, paintings, and operas from the 15<sup>th</sup> century onwards.

Livy's narrative of this event ends with Scipio's reaction. Scipio was somewhat upset that Masinissa had "atoned for one reckless act by another" but, curiously, instead of punishing Masinissa, Scipio decided to console him and reward him.<sup>464</sup> The following day Scipio called an assembly:

There he first addressed Masinissa as "king" and lavished extraordinary praise on him, and then he awarded him a crown of gold, a curule chair, and an ivory scepter, together with an embroidered toga and a tunic with a palm motif. He paid him further tribute in words: among the Romans, he said, there was nothing more splendid than the triumph, and those celebrating a triumph had no more splendid finery than that which the people of Rome thought Masinissa alone of foreigners now merited.<sup>465</sup>

Masinissa had thus become the first king created by the Romans, and he also was the first foreigner to achieve the honour of the symbols of a triumph and, according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the former insignia of the Roman kings.<sup>466</sup> Polybius wrote that these insignia were the most honourable gifts that could be given to kings.<sup>467</sup> To quote David Levene, "Masinissa, though a foreigner, is being received not merely into the Roman world, but into the highest status within that world."<sup>468</sup> He earned the legitimacy of his kingship through his demonstration of Roman virtues including loyalty, military prowess and self-control, which were all important for a leader.

Here we cannot compare Livy to his source Polybius, but it seems that at least Livy's story highlights that, even though Masinissa had proven his worth, he owed his kingship ultimately to the Romans. Later in Livy, the Roman

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<sup>464</sup> Liv. 30.15.9–10.

<sup>465</sup> Liv. 30.15.11–13: "Ibi Masinissam, primum regem appellatum eximiisque ornatum laudibus, aurea corona, aurea patera, sella curuli et scipione eburneo, toga picta et palmata tunica donat. Addit verbis honorem: neque magnificentius quicquam triumpho apud Romanos neque triumphantibus amplioem eo ornatum esse quo unum omnium externorum dignum Masinissam populus Romanus ducat." There is no extant account of this by Polybius.

<sup>466</sup> Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.35.1, 3.61.1. Dionysius of Halicarnassus is the only extant author who mentions these insignia in connection with the Roman regal era; see Braund 1984, 27. The toga was a symbol of "Romanness" for Cicero: Cic. Rep. 1.36. Before Masinissa, Syphax had received almost identical gifts: a purple toga and a tunic, an ivory chair, and a golden patera: Liv. 27.4.5–10. As seen above, however, Syphax turned against the Romans: Burton 2011, 94–102. For similar gifts in other contexts: Pol. 32.1.2; Liv. 27.4.8–10, 30.15.12, 31.11.11, 42.14.10; Caes. BG 1.43; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.61, 5.35; Briscoe 1973, 85–86.

<sup>467</sup> Pol. 32.1.3: τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτῇ νομιζομένων δῶρων ἀνταπέστειλε.

<sup>468</sup> Levene 2010, 258.

senate says that Masinissa was “a king who had completely fused his fortune and that of his kingdom with Roman concerns”.<sup>469</sup> The idea that the Romans created kings, who in turn were forever grateful and almost blindly loyal to the Romans, was a common sentiment during Livy’s time and in accord with the *pax romana* propaganda.<sup>470</sup> Livy might be retrojecting this sentiment to the distant past and to the character of Masinissa, the prototype of a great friendly king.

It is curious, however, that Masinissa did not suffer any negative consequences for having deceived Scipio by removing Sophoniba from the power of the Romans but, rather, he was immediately made a king and honoured by Scipio. In David Levene’s analysis, Scipio does not seem to notice that he has been manipulated but thinks that Masinissa acted out of recklessness caused by his youthful passion. Levene further remarks that Masinissa receives the honours “partly through behaviour that was distinctly un-Roman and indeed stereotypically Numidian, from the sexual passion that led to his entanglement with Sophoniba in the first place to his manipulation

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<sup>469</sup> Liv. 45.14.2–3: “aequatis iis postea trium regum bellis deinceps omnibus eum functum officiis. Victoria vero populi Romani laetari eum regem mirum non esse, qui sortem omnem fortunae regnique sui cum rebus Romanis miscuisset.” According to a number of sources, when Masinissa died in 148 BC at a very old age, he ordered that Scipio Aemilianus should decide how to divide the power among his three sons. It is remarkable that Masinissa in a way left his inheritance in the hands of a Roman. Scipio Aemilianus was not, of course, just any Roman. He was an adoptive grandson of Scipio Africanus. Scipio Aemilianus decided to make all three sons kings together: Pol.36.16.10; Cic. Rep. 6.9–10; Liv. per. 50; Val. Max. 5.2 ext. 4; App. Lib. 72, 94, 105–106; Zon. 9.27; Eutrop. 4.11; Oros. 4.22.8. Cf. Braund 1984, 138–139.

<sup>470</sup> During the republican and especially Augustan era, it was very common that foreign kings sent their children to Rome (either as a friendly diplomatic gesture or as hostages after a military defeat) to be raised and live among the Roman nobility. Some of them later became kings or queens in their homelands. From Augustus’s reign, a famous example is Tiridates III: R. Gest. div. Aug. 32.2; Tac. Ann. 6.32; Cass. Dio 58.26.2; Suet. Aug. 48. Another good example is Juba II of Mauretania and Cleopatra VIII Selene: Plut. Caes. 55.3; App. B Civ. 2.101; Cass. Dio 51.15.6, 53.26.1–2; Roller 2003; Allen 2006, 138–140, 170–176. The iconography of the Ara Pacis and the *Res Gestae* of Augustus explicitly emphasize the usefulness of such hostages in the peaceful cultural conquest inspired by the *pax romana* ideology: R. Gest. div. Aug. 4.3, 27.2, 32.2, 33; Braund 1984, 10–17; Allen 2006, 84–87, 132–134, 170. Livy’s attitude also seems to reflect this general idea elsewhere in his text. According to Livy, the Seleucid king Antiochus IV, also an ex-hostage, was so grateful for his pleasant years in Rome that he was fiercely loyal to Rome and “obeyed them like gods”: Liv. 42.6.6–12, 44.19.10–11, 45.13.2–3. A similar attitude comes through in the senate’s comment about Demetrius of Macedon after his liberation (Liv. 39.47.10): “Even if they returned him physically to his father, they explained, they still held his spirit hostage / Obsidem enim se animum eius habere, etsi corpus patri reddideri.” There are no similar sentiments in the extant parts of Polybius’s text. For Livy’s and Polybius’s very different attitudes towards royal hostages and especially Antiochus IV, see my forthcoming article ‘Stereotypes, Cultural Identities, and Code-Switching: Polybius’s and Livy’s Portrayals of Antiochus IV’.

and deception of Scipio”. Levene concludes that Livy’s Masinissa is at the same time very Numidian and very Roman, even after his successful test of Roman *virtus*: “He shows himself a ‘deceitful Numidian’ even as Livy celebrates his fidelity.”<sup>471</sup>

Jacques-Emmanuel Bernard has argued that “Livy emphasizes the constants of human behaviour, the universality of psychological spirit in all peoples. He does not take into consideration race, properly speaking, since he also accords virtues to other peoples.”<sup>472</sup> Generally, this seems to be true: Livy indeed uses non-Romans – the Others – as models of Roman virtues, as we have seen. But Livy’s portrayal of Masinissa suggests that sometimes the specific ethnicity of a character posed some special challenges: for Masinissa, “conquering himself”, i.e., suppressing his Numidian vices, was an important part of his journey. Still, Masinissa’s characterization in Livy is only partly based on the ethnic stereotype: already in the beginning of the story, Masinissa’s character appears different from a “typical Numidian”.<sup>473</sup> Masinissa is an example of someone who, in spite of being a foreigner, succeeds in conforming to the Roman idea of *virtus* and *fides*. At the same time, he does not lose his own identity and dignity but remains an equal of Scipio and of the Romans.<sup>474</sup> Daniel Albrecht has further concluded that Scipio too, for his part, adhered to Roman moral principles and did not turn a blind eye to the matter. The lesson seems to be that even when abroad, Romans should not forget their moral principles when dealing with foreigners.

Keeping to Paul J. Burton’s argument that the literary discourses of international relations were essentially moral, it was therefore due to the personal virtues of Scipio and Masinissa that Rome and Numidia became allies. Sallust also highlights the *honestas* and *bonitas* of Masinissa as the main

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<sup>471</sup> Levene 2010, 257–259, citations from p. 259.

<sup>472</sup> Bernard 2015, 41.

<sup>473</sup> Liv. 24.49.1–2. Cf. Cazeaux 2015, 303; Albrecht 2016, 280 n. 83. For the Numidian stereotype, see above p. 106 n. 451.

<sup>474</sup> Moreover, according to P.J. Burton, judging from Livy’s account, the relationship between Scipio and Masinissa is clearly *amicitia* between two equals and not *clientela* where Masinissa would be subordinate to the Romans. Scipio never demands anything from Masinissa but politely asks him to think which action would be morally right. Also, later in the narrative (Liv. 45.13.15) when the Numidian prince Masgaba came to Rome and said that the Numidian resources belonged to Rome, the Roman senate answered that the Romans only asked for help and never demanded it: Burton 2011, 111–114. Cf. Levene 2010, 257.

reasons for the lasting friendship with the Romans.<sup>475</sup> According to Burton, “the sources amply demonstrate the apparent conceptual and discursive slippage between interpersonal and international *amicitia* in the minds of the main actors”.<sup>476</sup> Still, the loyalty of Masinissa towards Rome also continued after the death of Scipio and was therefore not tied to his person.<sup>477</sup> Realistically speaking, Masinissa was a very useful ally for the Romans because he subverted the Carthaginian power, as P.G. Walsh reminds us.<sup>478</sup>

From this point forward in Livy’s narrative, Masinissa serves as an example of a great Roman ally and a friendly king who had voluntarily allied himself with the Romans.<sup>479</sup> The heroic character of Masinissa was part of Livy’s idealized description of the golden era of the Republic when the Roman *virtus* had been at its height and so had that of their allies. He was the model of a perfect ally, and other kings would strive to imitate him.<sup>480</sup> Masinissa helped the Romans for decades against Philip V, Antiochus III, and Perseus.<sup>481</sup>

To conclude with this prominent *exemplum* of Masinissa, portrayals of the greatest Roman allies were as important as the portrayals of their greatest enemies in the processes of literary construction of Roman identity. They all fell into the category of the Other but within this category there was extensive space for many different kinds of *exempla*. Also, these moralizing literary examples were not “mere language”, but they help us understand Livy’s view of the past international friendships and what had made some of them so

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<sup>475</sup> Sall. Iug. 5.5–6.

<sup>476</sup> Burton 2011, 110.

<sup>477</sup> Burton 2011, 109–111. In a fictive story, Cicero describes how Scipio Aemilianus and the old Masinissa met, and the king was overjoyed to see someone of the Scipionic family in his kingdom before his death. Scipio said that Masinissa was “familiae nostrae iustis de causis amicissimum”: Cic. Rep. 6.13–14 (Ziegler 9–10), citation from Rep. 6.13 (Ziegler 9), lines 6–7.

<sup>478</sup> Walsh 1965, 160.

<sup>479</sup> Sallust emphasized this too: he reminded the readers with the voice of Adherbal, a grandson of Masinissa, that since its founding the regal family of Numidia had willingly become an ally of the Romans unlike some other kings like Philip V, who had been defeated before being forced to become an ally: Sall. Iug. 14.5. Eumenes II reminded the Romans, however, that Masinissa had been an enemy first, even though briefly: Pol. 21.21.1–2; Liv. 37.53.21–23.

<sup>480</sup> In addition, Livy makes his other foreign characters use the loyalty of Masinissa as a rhetorical technique to persuade the Romans to take a friendlier stance towards them: Liv. 31.11, 37.53. Sallust did the same with the character of Adherbal, who frequently invoked the memory of Masinissa’s loyalty in order to gain the Romans’ trust: Sall. Iug. 5.4–5, 14.2, 14.6, 14.18, 24.10.

<sup>481</sup> Liv. 32.27.2, 36.4.8, 43.3, 43.6.13, 44.4.11–12, 45.14.2–3. Cf. Just. Epit. 33.1.2. The diplomatic relations between the Romans and Masinissa were extremely friendly: Liv. 31.11.

successful. The moralizing discourse and the description of the characters of individual kings also helps us understand why some of them drifted from friendship into disfavour, as in the cases of Philip V, Eumenes II, or Jugurtha.

### ***Philip V: A friend or a foe?***

The relationship of Philip V, who ruled Macedonia from 221 to 179 BC, with the Romans varied between hostility and friendship more than once. As we have seen above, until the end of the war with the Romans, Livy's description of Philip V is mostly negative: even though Livy admitted that Philip V was a strong and worthy enemy for the Romans, Livy also described him as an arrogant and aggressive initiator of the war.<sup>482</sup> This is in line with the image of a young, fierce, and powerful enemy king. Polybius's description is more varied: the historian explains that he sometimes praised and other times criticized the king, not because of his own incoherence as a writer but, rather, because any person – even kings – had their good and bad moments in life due to changing circumstances and fortunes.<sup>483</sup> Even though for Polybius Philip V was without doubt a capable military leader, he also showed disquieting signs of cruelty and madness early on – these were qualities of stereotypical tyrants.<sup>484</sup>

Livy's narrative goals were different, and some of his characterizations were adapted to each changing situation separately. For example, when Philip V's status changed from an enemy to a potential ally against the imminent

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<sup>482</sup> Liv. 30.26.2–4, 30.42.1–10, 31.1.9–10, 31.3.4–6, 31.7.2–13. Cf. Just. Epit. 30.3.2. According to Polybius, Philip V started to dream of conquering Italy already after the end of the Aetolian War (220–217 BC): Pol. 5.101.6–5.102.1, 5.105.5, 5.108.4–7. In 215 BC, Philip V allegedly made a treaty – never put into effect – with Hannibal against the Romans: Pol. 7.9; Liv. 23.33–34. For this treaty and its context, see Gruen 1984, 374–377.

<sup>483</sup> Pol. 16.28. See above p. 87.

<sup>484</sup> For Philip V's many good and bad qualities, see Pol. 7.11.1, 10.26, 15.14, 18.33. A little earlier in his narrative, Polybius accused Philip V of madness: Pol. 16.1, 16.10.1. A divine punishment such as madness or death or other great misfortunes often followed serious sacrileges: Pol. 31.9; Liv. 42.3, 42.28.12–13; Just. Epit. 32.3.9–12. Polybius also did not appreciate the pact that Philip V allegedly made with Antiochus III against the child king Ptolemy V Epiphanes, accusing both of immorality and impiety: Pol. 15.20. For Polybius, this pact may have even been one of the main reasons for the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War. On this subject, see Eckstein 2005. For stereotypical tyrants in republican literature, see Dunkle 1967, 165–171. For stereotypical tyrants in Greek literature, see Smith 1999, ch. 1.a.

threat of the Seleucid king Antiochus III in the East, Livy's description of the king also changed so that Philip V functions as a narrative foil to Antiochus III: Philip V is described as a strong Macedonian warrior king, whereas Antiochus III is a weak and spoiled Asian king who has no right to invade Europe.<sup>485</sup> Therefore, in Livy's narrative, immediately after making peace with the Romans, Philip V was transformed into a compliant and helpful friend of the Romans.<sup>486</sup> In several instances Philip provided valuable military help to the Romans in battles against the Spartan tyrant Nabis and Antiochus III.<sup>487</sup> Philip V coordinated his war efforts seamlessly with the Romans, and Livy relates that the Roman and Macedonian soldiers "were exerting themselves day and night on the siege works or in battle as if they were in competition".<sup>488</sup> Meanwhile the Aetolians were trying to acquire allies for Antiochus: Nicander, an Aetolian, went to Philip and attempted to persuade him to join Antiochus's side, but Philip ignored his plea.<sup>489</sup> Thus, Philip demonstrated his *fides* by giving practical help and staying loyal to the Romans.

Later, when the war between the Romans and Antiochus III was ongoing, Philip V's men captured Nicander, then an enemy.<sup>490</sup> However, Philip treated him gently and invited the prisoner to dinner as if he were a guest. For a moment, Livy takes the role of an omniscient narrator and focalizes internally on Nicander, following the example of Polybius closely. Philip told Nicander in a private conversation that the Aetolians were to be blamed for the Romans' arrival in Greece, and also the war with Antiochus was their fault. Philip nonetheless explained that he would be willing to forget the past if the Aetolians in exchange would stop causing trouble for him. He then let Nicander continue his journey safely. Polybius highlights that Nicander, who had expected the worst, was greatly relieved by his kind treatment and

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<sup>485</sup> M'. Acilius Glabrio (cos. 191 BC) explicitly makes this comparison in a speech to his soldiers: Liv. 36.17.6.

<sup>486</sup> Liv. 33.35. Cf. Pol. 18.48.3–5. Polybius's text is very fragmentary for these events.

<sup>487</sup> Liv. 34.26.10, 37.39.12. Later Philip V reminded the Romans of these services: Liv. 39.28.

<sup>488</sup> Liv. 36.25.

<sup>489</sup> Liv. 35.12, 39.28.

<sup>490</sup> Liv. 36.29. Cf. Pol. 20.11.7–8. Livy is following Polybius's similar version with the minor difference that Polybius's Philip asks the Aetolians to forget the past, whereas Livy's Philip promises to do this by himself. Briscoe 1981, 266. The description of the Aetolians in general is negative in Polybius. For him, they were, among other things, to blame for the war with Antiochus III: Pol. 18.39.1–2. Cf. Pol. 30.11.

remained grateful to the Macedonian royal family for the rest of his life. In this way, Polybius and Livy let their readers “witness” Philip’s virtues of nobility and clemency in practice. This serves to demonstrate that the Romans’ friendship with the former feared and dangerous enemy was indeed based on shared moral values and *fides*. It was also especially important to show this because earlier in both Polybius’s and Livy’s narratives Philip V had been accused of cruelty which was not becoming for an ideal king and ally of the Romans.

Livy seems to follow Polybius and has no reason to disdain Philip V at this point of the narrative when he was an ally of the Romans. This is a good example, I think, of Livy’s preference for consistency of theme over consistency of character, as Jane D. Chaplin writes referring to Livy’s work generally.<sup>491</sup> It is hard to say with certainty because of the fragmentary state of his text, but Polybius seems to be following his own advice, cited above: he preferred to describe each leader as realistically as possible, even if their luck or personality varied during their lifetime.<sup>492</sup> Polybius writes, referring to other historians’ descriptions of Philip V: “My own opinion is that we should neither revile nor extol kings falsely, as has so often been done, but always give an account of them consistent with our previous statements and in accord with the character of each.”<sup>493</sup>

Polybius, for example, commends Philip for the fact that at the moment of final defeat, after the war with the Romans, Philip V acted like a true king – something that he had not always done before – and adapted his actions and mind to the new situation.<sup>494</sup> Paul J. Burton has noted that Polybius is not commending Philip for being a good king for obeying the Romans and for doing as he was told to do by Flamininus but, rather, Polybius commends him for showing caution (*εὐλάβεια*), prudence (*εὐλογιστία*) and moderation

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<sup>491</sup> Chaplin 2007, xix.

<sup>492</sup> Pol. 16.28.3–7. For the whole citation, see above p. 87 n. 371.

<sup>493</sup> Pol. 8.8.7–8: ἐγὼ δ’ οὔτε λοιδορεῖν ψευδῶς φημι δεῖν τοὺς μονάρχους οὔτ’ ἐγκωμιάζειν, ὁ πολλοῖς ἤδη συμβέβηκε, τὸν ἀκόλουθον δὲ τοῖς προγεγραμμένοις ἀεὶ καὶ τὸν πρέποντα ταῖς ἐκάστων προαιρέσεσι λόγον ἐφαρμόζειν. In the following passage, however, Polybius admits that it is not always easy for various reasons, such as personal bias.

<sup>494</sup> Pol. 18.33, 25.3.9–10.

(μετριότης).<sup>495</sup> Realistically thinking, of course, Philip did not have much choice but to help the Romans in their wars; to protect his kingdom he needed to return to the Romans' good graces.<sup>496</sup> Therefore, Polybius highlights the moral virtues of the king as the main difference in his character after being defeated by the Romans. This is compatible with Burton's claims that in literature the moral character of the kings was presented as the basis of every successful relationship with the Romans. If we consider Polybius's and Livy's narratives in light of Burton's theory, it makes perfect sense why both historians constantly highlight these aspects in Philip's character during the friendship.<sup>497</sup>

After the battle of Thermopylae in 191 BC, Philip V sent a deputation to the Roman senate to congratulate the Romans for their victory. Livy says that the Macedonian envoys brought a heavy golden crown as a gift to the temple of Jupiter on the Capitolium – the very heart and soul of Rome. The gift was gladly accepted by the senate, and they decided to liberate the king's son Demetrius, who had been living as a hostage in Rome since the end of Philip's war with the Romans.<sup>498</sup> The exchange of these very special gifts was a mutual demonstration of great respect. In Polybius's fragment, the senate also promised that if Philip continued to demonstrate *fides* (πίστις) they would relieve him of some of his remaining war indemnities.

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<sup>495</sup> Sallust (Iug. 10) also reminds his readers that alliances should not be forced but should be built on *fides*, using the voice of the Numidian king Micipsa: "Non exercitus neque thesauri praesidia regni sunt, verum amici, quos neque armis cogere neque auro parare queas; officio et fide pariuntur." In Livy, Scipio Africanus is a prime example of a commander who successfully formed international alliances with the help of his personal virtues and generosity: Liv. 26.49–50; Burton 2011, 73–75. According to Cicero, the universal code of friendship recommended that friends offer help to each other even when the help is not directly requested: Cic. Lael. 44; Burton 2011, 174–175.

<sup>496</sup> Gruen 1984, 400.

<sup>497</sup> Burton 2011, 174–175.

<sup>498</sup> Pol. 21.1–3; Liv. 36.35.12–15. A little earlier in Livy's narrative, in 216 BC, King Hiero II of Syracuse arrived in Rome with a gift of troops, grain, and a heavy golden statue of Victory. The statue was placed in the temple of Jupiter: Liv. 22.38. According to the surviving sources, Hiero II was actually the first king to make a dedication, even though indirect, to the Capitoline Jupiter that would become central to the future relationships between the Romans and foreign kings. The willingness to undertake such a journey on the kings' part and allowing them to enter the temple on the Romans' part, was a sign of mutual acceptance. Cf. Braund 1984, 25, 131. According to Livy, foreign cities had been dedicating golden crowns and other similar gifts to the Capitoline Jupiter since the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC: Liv. 2.22.6. Later, at least Masinissa and Prusias II wanted to sacrifice personally at the temple of Jupiter: Liv. 45.13–14, 45.44.6.

We could say that from the Roman outward perspective, Philip seemed to be behaving as an exemplary friendly king. The narrative focalization has remained external to Philip, not letting us learn his thoughts or feelings. The Romans were still cautious, however. Before the final encounter against Antiochus III in Asia, the consul L. Cornelius Scipio (soon to be called “Asiagenes”) prepared to march with his army through Macedonia and Thrace. His older brother Scipio Africanus, who was helping Lucius in the campaign, suggested that before bringing the army into Philip’s territory someone should pay him a surprise visit to make sure that he was not plotting against the Romans at this crucial moment. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus was sent to the king’s court at Pella; as described by Livy:

The king was at dinner and was well into the wine, and his relaxed frame of mind allayed all suspicion that he intended any mischief. Furthermore, his visitor was then given a warm welcome, and the next day he saw the provisions that had been liberally stockpiled for the army, the bridges that had been built over rivers, and the roads constructed where passage was difficult. Taking back this news with the speed with which he had come, Gracchus met the consul at Thaumaci. From there the army, buoyed by more sanguine and positive hopes, came to Macedonia to find everything prepared for it. On their arrival the king welcomed and attended to the Scipios with regal liberality. He seemed possessed of great consideration and civility, qualities that won the approval of Africanus who, an outstanding man in all other respects, was not averse to a cordiality that shunned extravagance. From there the Romans reached the Hellespont, passing through Thrace as well as Macedonia, with Philip escorting them and making all necessary arrangements.<sup>499</sup>

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<sup>499</sup> Liv. 37.7.12–16: “in convivio rex erat et in multum uini processerat; ea ipsa remissio animi suspicionem dempsit novare eum quicquam velle. et tum quidem comiter acceptus hospes, postero die commeatus exercitui paratos benigne, pontes in fluminibus factos, vias, ubi transitus difficiles erant, munitas vidit. haec referens eadem qua ierat celeritate Thaumacis occurrit consuli. inde certiore et maiore spe laetus exercitus ad praeparata omnia in Macedoniam pervenit. venientes regio apparatu et accepit et prosecutus est rex. multa in eo et dexteritas et humanitas visa, quae commendabilia apud Africanum erant, virum sicut ad cetera egregium, ita a comitate, quae sine luxuria esset, non aversum. inde non per Macedoniam modo sed etiam Thraciam, prosequente et praeparante omnia Philippo, ad Hellespontum perventum est.”

Philip V is described with some typical markers of a great king: he is enjoying a life of banquets and luxury.<sup>500</sup> Tiberius Gracchus recognized this as normal behaviour for a king and took it as proof that nothing strange was going on. And, most importantly, the surprise visitor was given a warm welcome, and he saw that the king had not neglected his duties and had kept his promises to the Romans. When the Scipio brothers arrived with the army, Philip again showed great hospitality (*dexteritas* and *humanitas*), but not in an exaggerated manner (*sine luxuria*) from Scipio Africanus's point of view. By claiming that it was Scipio Africanus himself – the lauded model of Roman *virtus* – who thought like this about the king, Livy is giving a great compliment to Philip. In this manner he is bringing the Romans and Philip closer together than ever, which is opportune right before the decisive battle with Antiochus III. From the narrative perspective, Philip V truly was an exemplary ally.

After the Romans had won the war against Antiochus III and the matter was settled in the Treaty of Apamea in 188 BC, Philip V focused on ruling and strengthening his kingdom with his two sons Demetrius and Perseus. It was certainly logical that the king would try to rebuild his kingdom, gather resources, and regain riches during a long period of peace. But now that Antiochus III was no longer a threat, the suspicious attention of the Romans and Livy turned back to Philip V, who was again seen as a potential threat. At this point of the narrative, Livy suddenly uses internal focalization to reveal to the readers how Philip's anger at the Romans, even during the war against Antiochus, had been seething below the surface.<sup>501</sup> With timing and changing focalization Livy makes this revelation dramatic and surprising, even though the readers knew all along that the concord with the Macedonians would not last forever. Livy begins by explaining that instead of just rebuilding his kingdom, Philip was actually preparing for another war against the Romans after the defeat of Antiochus III.<sup>502</sup>

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<sup>500</sup> Also, Philip's son Demetrius later remarked that heavy drinking was only suitable for royalty: Liv. 40.14. Cicero says the same: Cic. Deiot. 26. Antiochus III was fond of wine as well: Pol. 20.8.2. The Roman moralists obviously frowned upon excessive drinking and eating: Phang 2008, 249–284.

<sup>501</sup> Liv. 39.23.5–13.

<sup>502</sup> Liv. 39.24.

Polybius's fragments of these events do not indicate that Philip V had been angry and secretly hostile to the Romans already during the war with Antiochus III. Instead, Polybius emphasizes the increasing conflict of interest between the Romans and Philip V. Eumenes II and the Thessalians, Perrhaebians, and Athamanians were sending envoys to Rome, complaining that Philip V had no right to hold certain cities and that he treated them cruelly.<sup>503</sup> Philip V instead was furious that the Romans were much more generous toward Eumenes II and were disregarding Philip even though he had also helped the Romans against Antiochus III.<sup>504</sup>

Livy's account of these events is more complete, and he uses internal focalization to convey Philip's frustration to the readers through his speech and thoughts. In his narrative, Livy shows that Philip's earlier virtues – *fides*, and self-restraint – started to disintegrate and be replaced by anger and untrustworthiness. These tyrannical vices had, of course, already been part of Philip V's characterization from the beginning, but now they seem to resurface after a short period of morally acceptable behaviour. Furthermore, Philip V allegedly vented his rage by massacring the Maronites.<sup>505</sup> The Romans went to investigate, and Philip unsuccessfully tried to hide the evidence. Polybius writes that this was what irreversibly damaged his friendship with Rome and convinced Philip V that peace with Rome was no longer possible so that he started to prepare for another war with the Romans.<sup>506</sup> Polybius wrote that Philip grudgingly obeyed the Romans only to gain more time for war preparations.<sup>507</sup>

From this point onward, Livy's description of the character of Philip V becomes increasingly negative and power-hungry, as it was before the alliance. The Romans no longer trusted Philip and he became more and more tyrannical: cruel, paranoid, and hated by his subjects.<sup>508</sup> Livy is already leading the narrative towards the Third Macedonian war against Perseus and uses

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<sup>503</sup> Pol. 21.25.1–2, 21.31–32, 22.6; Liv. 39.24–29.

<sup>504</sup> Liv. 39.28.

<sup>505</sup> Pol. 22.13–14; Liv. 39.34.

<sup>506</sup> Pol. 22.14.4–9; Liv. 39.23.5, 39.35.1.

<sup>507</sup> Pol. 23.8.1–2, 23.10.4; Liv. 39.53.11–16. In Macedonia, people expected the war to break out at any moment: Pol. 23.7.3.

<sup>508</sup> Liv. 40.3–4.

Philip V as an introduction: “The war with [future] King Perseus and the Macedonians which was threatening did not arise from the causes which most people assign to it, nor from Perseus himself: the beginnings had been made by Philip, and Philip himself, had he lived longer, would have waged that war.”<sup>509</sup> Polybius instead states that the war was fully Perseus’s fault.<sup>510</sup>

We can conclude that as long as Philip V *seemed* to behave even briefly according to the Roman principles of *fides* and *amicitia*, the alliance was possible. To make this clear, the narratives of both Polybius and Livy highlight Philip’s moral virtues during the alliance. By means of external focalization – always looking at Philip from someone else’s, usually the Romans’, point of view – Livy avoids revealing Philip’s true intent before it was time to move towards the Third Macedonian War in the narrative. Livy was more hostile than Polybius towards Philip because of his different narrative objective to provide clear moral *exempla* and because he blamed Philip for the war with Perseus. Livy modified Philip’s characterization accordingly and emphasized good or bad moral qualities and the temperament of the king as reasons for his actions. This is slightly different from Polybius, who put more emphasis on the general political situation – such as conflict of interests – as the reason behind the cooling alliance between Philip V and the Romans. Still, for both historians, moral compatibility between the Romans and the Hellenistic kings remained indispensable in international friendships, and with Philip V it was described as very fleeting.

### ***Eumenes II: The “greatest friend of the Romans”***

Eumenes II, the Attalid king of Pergamon from 197 to 158 BC, was one of the great Roman allies of the republican era, or even “the greatest”, as many said according to Polybius.<sup>511</sup> He also is a good narrative example of a king whose

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<sup>509</sup> Liv. 39.23.5–6: “Cum Perseo rege et Macedonibus bellum quod imminebat, non unde plerique opinantur, nec ab ipso Perseo causas cepit: inchoata initia a Philippo sunt; et is ipse, si diutius vixisset, id bellum gessisset.”

<sup>510</sup> Pol. 22.18. Cf. Briscoe 2008, 301–302. Therefore, Livy added this detail on his own or he took it from his annalist sources: Carawan 1988, 245–249.

<sup>511</sup> Pol. 30.19.3.

*amicitia* with the Romans weakened with time, even though it never ended completely. In the beginning, their *amicitia* was strong, however. Eumenes II gave invaluable aid to the Romans against Antiochus III and Perseus, thus continuing to cultivate the alliance started in 211 BC by his father Attalus I, who in turn had helped the Romans against Philip V.<sup>512</sup> Polybius and Livy use similar moral vocabulary to describe this earlier alliance. They make Eumenes II characterize the alliance between his father and the Romans by strong friendship (*φιλία*, *amicitia*), goodwill (*εὔνοια*, *benevolentia*), and loyalty (*fides*).<sup>513</sup> Consequently the alliance with Eumenes II was based on the same moral foundations. According to Paul J. Burton, the alliance between Rome and Pergamon was clearly a balanced *amicitia* in which each side was free to help the other as much as they wanted without any obligations.<sup>514</sup>

In the capacity of an omniscient narrator, Livy focalizes internally on Eumenes II and lets us know his thoughts regarding the alliance: Eumenes II had made a rational choice to stay allied with the Romans and to urge them against Antiochus III because, being a king of a very small kingdom in Asia, the help of the Romans would be useful for protecting and even expanding his domain if the Romans prevailed.<sup>515</sup> Also, “even if something went wrong, he reasoned, it was better to face whatever fortune had in store with the Romans as allies than to resign himself to Antiochus’s domination in isolation or be obliged to do so by armed force if he refused.”<sup>516</sup> With this, Livy reminds us that an alliance with Rome could be very beneficial to kings, as it had been to Masinissa. Internal focalization also serves to convince the readers that Eumenes II was indeed genuinely committed to staying loyal to the Romans

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<sup>512</sup> The alliance in 211 BC: Liv. 26.24.8–9, 27.30.2. Attalus I, the father of Eumenes II, had aided the Romans in “all their wars” in Greece: Pol. 21.20.4; Liv. 37.53.8–10. Cf. Just. Epit. 29.4.7.

<sup>513</sup> Pol. 21.20.1; Liv. 37.53.7–12. In the eulogy of King Attalus I, Polybius praises the king for being an excellent king, warrior, friend, husband, and father: Pol. 18.41.

<sup>514</sup> Burton 2011, 84–87. Cf. Liv. 32.8.8–16.

<sup>515</sup> Eumenes II’s thoughts: Liv. 35.13.7–10.

<sup>516</sup> Liv. 35.13.9–10: “etiam si quid adversi casurum foret, satius esse Romanis sociis quamcumque fortunam subire quam solum aut imperium pati Antiochi aut abnudentem vi atque armis cogi.” Cf. Liv. 35.17.1–2. J. Briscoe notes that there is no reason to doubt that the war between Antiochus III and the Romans was in Eumenes II’s interest and that Polybius had reported similarly: Briscoe 1981, 165; similarly: Gruen 1984, 543–545. For a summary of the Roman war with Antiochus III and its aftermath from the Attalid point of view, see Hansen 1971, 74–97.

not only because of the inherited *amicitia* but also because it was in his own interest.

Cooperation between the Romans and Eumenes II began well. The king provided military help wherever needed and used his brother Attalus<sup>517</sup> as an envoy to bring news to Rome.<sup>518</sup> In the course of the war, Eumenes II collaborated successfully and skilfully with the Roman commanders, and after the final battle at Magnesia (190/189 BC) he travelled to Rome to personally meet the senate. Livy presents the first conversation between Eumenes II and the senate using indirect speech: the king congratulated the Romans for their victory over Antiochus III but did not wish to talk too much about his own deeds, as the Romans would hear about them from their own commanders if they wished.<sup>519</sup> This demonstration of *modestia* earned applause from the senators, who then told the king to ask for anything at all and the Romans would grant it as far as possible. The king and the senators fell into a competition of generosity and modesty, and in the end Eumenes II refused to ask for any reward regardless of the repeated exhortations of the senators. This procrastination serves to create suspense in the story and to make the following second conversation more impactful. Livy's account is closely modelled on that of Polybius but repeatedly stresses the modesty of the king.<sup>520</sup>

Not much later, Eumenes II was called back to the senate and was persuaded to speak his mind. The speech is given in direct form, both by Polybius and Livy, to signal a pivotal moment and the climax of the speech.<sup>521</sup> Stephen Usher, who has studied direct speech in Polybius, has noted that switching from indirect to direct speech generally produces a natural “crescendo effect” but it also offers an opportunity to summarize less important topics before arriving at the crucial point of the conversation.<sup>522</sup> Eumenes II's speech to the senate is an example of this. First, the king warned

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<sup>517</sup> Later, as a successor of Eumenes II, he took the name Attalus II Philadelphus.

<sup>518</sup> Eumenes II and Attalus helping the Romans: Liv. 35.23.10–11, 37.33, 44.4.11–12, 44.10.12. Pompeius Trogus even made Mithridates VI claim that the Romans had relied more on Eumenes' troops than on their own troops against Antiochus III: Just. Epit. 38.6.3.

<sup>519</sup> The whole scene: Liv. 37.52.

<sup>520</sup> Pol. 21.18.

<sup>521</sup> Pol. 21.19–20; Liv. 37.53.

<sup>522</sup> Usher 2009, 512.

the senators about the Rhodians' hidden agenda that could harm him if naively supported by the senate.<sup>523</sup> Then, the king reminded the senators about the great services and loyalty of his late father, who had been the first king in Greece or Asia to ally himself with the Romans voluntarily. Eumenes II reminded them how he had successfully followed his father's example. In the king's opinion he had actually surpassed his father at least in practical matters, for he had given so much military aid and participated in every battle with the Romans, and he had not succumbed to the alluring offers of alliance from Antiochus III.<sup>524</sup> Eumenes II thus reminds the senate that he had proven his inherited *virtus* and *fides* in practice.

At this point of the narrative, while Polybius recapitulates with a few lines all the practical services of Eumenes II, Livy more than doubles them and adds details to emphasize the king's virtues. According to Livy, the king said that he had been the most active of all their allies, he had been present everywhere by the Romans' side, and "there was not a Roman soldier in your camp more devoted" than himself or his brothers.<sup>525</sup> Another effective narrative function of direct speech is that it characterizes the speaker, as observed by Stephen Usher and Suzanne Adema in Polybius's and Livy's other speeches.<sup>526</sup> Indeed, Livy seems to be taking full advantage of the opportunity to highlight Eumenes II's virtues and *fides* with this direct speech in order to construct an even more positive image of Eumenes II.

In the rest of the speech of Eumenes II, which again is similar in Livy and Polybius, the king goes further to remind his audience that Masinissa, another great friend of the Romans, had originally been their enemy, and still the Romans had rewarded Masinissa with a kingdom and great power.<sup>527</sup> Finally, Eumenes II sees fit to answer the original question: what would be a suitable reward for his Attalid royal family? He says that he would happily add to his kingdoms any parts of Asia that had sided with Antiochus III in the war if the Romans did not want to keep them. Both in Polybius's and Livy's versions,

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<sup>523</sup> Liv. 37.53.1–6.

<sup>524</sup> Liv. 37.53.7–13.

<sup>525</sup> Liv. 37.53.14–19.

<sup>526</sup> Usher 2009; Adema 2019.

<sup>527</sup> Pol. 21.21; Liv. 37.53.19–28.

Eumenes II ends his speech by stating that, to respect their *amicitia*, it was only just to grant him this wish.<sup>528</sup>

The expansion of his kingdom had indeed been what he had originally wished for, as revealed by Livy earlier.<sup>529</sup> This is, however, the first time that Polybius or Livy make Eumenes II voice his wish aloud in the story world, and they do this in a highly artful manner after having created extreme suspense with his calculated display of modesty. Then, when the king had every senator's complete attention, he highlighted his merits and *fides* and set his *amicitia* with the Romans above all other Roman alliances. According to Paul J. Burton, this indicates that the friendship between Eumenes II and the Romans was symmetrical, and in such a friendship straightforward and honest speech was allowed and appreciated.<sup>530</sup> Moreover, Eumenes II appears a highly rational and capable politician who knew exactly how to deal with the Romans in order to protect his own interests: to earn the Romans' respect, one needed to demonstrate his *virtus* and *fides*.

As expected, the senators were very pleased with this speech. Despite the Rhodians' attempt to remind the Romans of their role as protectors of freedom and to stop them from adding so many new areas to Eumenes II's kingdom, the Romans decided to favour the king and grant him any parts of Asia to the west of the Taurus range that had belonged to Antiochus III, except for Lycia and Caria that were given to Rhodes.<sup>531</sup> Livy later remarks that Eumenes II "ruled in such a way that the cities under his control did not wish to exchange their position for that of any free state" and that his subjects also liked him for his generous benefactions to them.<sup>532</sup> Therefore, for the people of Asia, freedom was not automatically better than living under a king, at least when

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<sup>528</sup> Pol. 21.21.8–11; Liv. 37.53.25.

<sup>529</sup> And probably by the non-extant text of Polybius.

<sup>530</sup> Burton 2011, 197–199.

<sup>531</sup> The Rhodians' speech: Liv. 37.54; Pol. 21.22–23; Usher 2009, 505. On the Roman freedom propaganda, see below pp. 149–150. The decision of the senate: Pol. 21.7–9; Liv. 37.55.5–6. For a detailed estimate of the areas that were added to Eumenes II's kingdom, see Thonemann 2013. The consul Cn. Manlius gave elephants, taken previously from Antiochus III, as a gift to Eumenes II: Liv. 38.39.5–6.

<sup>532</sup> Liv. 42.5.3–4: "ita se in regno suo gereret ut quae sub dicione eius urbes essent, nullius liberae civitatis fortunam secum mutatam vellent". The Rhodians too suggested that the freedom propaganda might not work as well in Asia as it had in Greece: Liv. 37.54.17–26. The corresponding parts of Polybius or of other authors are not extant. For Asian attitudes to freedom, see below p. 218 n. 928.

the king in question was capable and gentle. Eumenes II's excellent moral qualities shown in war, emphasized by Livy, seemed to translate well in his domestic government. This brings to mind Cicero's, Polybius's, and the Greek writers' thoughts about an ideal monarch who should be virtuous and wise.<sup>533</sup> However, the compliment for the good governance of Eumenes II serves to create a contrast to Perseus, the new emerging menace for the Romans:

Although Perseus was notorious for many assassinations, of both Macedonians and foreigners, and lacked any commendable quality, the cities generally favoured him over King Eumenes, who was pious to his relatives, just to his subjects, and generous to all. They may have been swayed by the reputation and grandeur of the Macedonian kings and scorned the newly created kingdom, or perhaps they desired a change of circumstances, or perhaps they did not wish to become subject to the Romans.<sup>534</sup>

According to Livy, it was the king's *pietas*, *iustitia*, and *munificentia* – virtues promoted by Augustus as well – that made his government so successful.<sup>535</sup> Cicero had written that a good king was someone who treated his subjects as a father would treat his children.<sup>536</sup> These were indeed the same qualities that were expected from an ideal Roman *paterfamilias*. Polybius's corresponding passage is not extant,<sup>537</sup> but according to another of Polybius's fragments, Eumenes II's reign was also famous for the concord between him and his brothers – of these especially Attalus was always said to support his older brother and never had any serious quarrel with him.<sup>538</sup> In contrast, Perseus allegedly had no good qualities and had even assassinated his brother, wife, and a friend. Therefore, in the narratives, the stark moral contrast

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<sup>533</sup> See above section 1.5.

<sup>534</sup> Liv. 42.5.5–7: “Intestinis externisque praeterea multis caedibus infamem nec ullo commendabilem merito praeferebant vulgo civitates tam pio erga propinquos, tam iusto in cives, tam munifico erga omnes homines regi, seu fama et maiestate Macedonum regum praecoccupati ad spernendam originem novi regni, seu mutationis rerum cupidi, seu quia non obiecti esse Romanis volebant.”

<sup>535</sup> The virtues listed in Augustus's *clipeus virtutis* were *virtus*, *clementia*, *iustitia*, and *pietas*: R. Gest. div. Aug. 34.2.

<sup>536</sup> On good kingship: Cic. Rep. 1.64. On the importance of *iustitia* and *pietas* towards the family: Cic. Rep. 6.20 (Ziegler 16).

<sup>537</sup> There is a similar comparison of the two kings in Diodorus Siculus, however: Diod. Sic. 31.14.

<sup>538</sup> Pol. 32.8.6–7.

between Perseus and Eumenes II served to denigrate Perseus and to highlight the shared moral values that made the friendship between Eumenes II and Rome so special.<sup>539</sup>

Livy continues the narrative in a similar manner: the Romans feared Perseus, and Eumenes II continued to be a great ally by collecting intelligence for the Romans about the military activities of Perseus. In 172 BC, Eumenes II decided to go to Rome and give his report personally.<sup>540</sup> Livy's account is certainly based on non-extant Polybius.<sup>541</sup> Eumenes II was received with great honour and he gave a long speech, in indirect form, in which he said that he had two reasons for coming to Rome.<sup>542</sup> Firstly, he said he had wanted to see the Roman gods and the Romans, whom he had to thank for his own fortune, thus re-demonstrating his *modestia* and *pietas*. Besides heavily highlighting the Augustan virtue of *pietas*, here we may see again a hint of Livy's habit of presenting certain friendly kings like Masinissa, Antiochus IV, and now Eumenes II as entirely loyal to Rome out of sheer gratitude, which was a common sentiment in the Augustan era.<sup>543</sup>

Secondly, Eumenes II said that he had wanted to warn the Romans about the accession of the anti-Roman Perseus and his war plans.<sup>544</sup> He goes on to relate at length how strong, resourceful, and bellicose Perseus was, and how

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<sup>539</sup> Later in the narrative, Livy reuses this technique: Liv. 44.1.

<sup>540</sup> Liv. 42.11.1–2. Livy wrote that even though Valerius Antias claimed that it was the king's brother Attalus who came to Rome, still most of the annalist historians "and especially those whom you would prefer to believe" wrote that Eumenes II himself came. Livy generally did not trust Valerius Antias very much: 26.49.3.

<sup>541</sup> Polybius mentions an embassy of Eumenes II's four brothers at Pol. 24.5. This must be a different embassy, however: Briscoe 2012, 186–187. Also, the date is different. In J. Briscoe's opinion, Eumenes did not arrive himself in 173 BC but only later, in 172 BC: Briscoe 2012, 172. The embassy of Eumenes II's brothers might have been mentioned somewhere in the lost parts of Livy's text. In fact, the fragments of Diodorus Siculus mention both; the embassy of his brothers (Diod. Sic. 29.22) and the return of Eumenes from Rome (Diod. Sic. 29.34). Polybius's fragment (Pol. 24.5) of the embassy of Eumenes' brothers includes a discussion about the strife between Eumenes II and Pharnaces I of Pontus. Polybius also mentions that the king's brothers were gladly received in the houses of their Roman friends whom they had met during the campaigns against Antiochus III in Asia. Attalus for example had helped Cn. Manlius Vulso in Asia and had made a great impression on the Romans: Pol. 21.33.2, 21.39.5 and 8 and 11, 21.40.9, 30.1.4; Liv. 38.12.7. Polybius reports that, compared to Pharnaces I, Eumenes II was moderate and cooperative in all matters whereas the Pontic king was rapacious and aggressive: Pol. 24.1.2, 24.14. Eumenes II later won the war: Pol. 25.2.

<sup>542</sup> The part in indirect form: Liv. 42.11–12.

<sup>543</sup> Unless this detail was taken from Polybius. For the gratitude towards Rome, see above p. 110 n. 470.

<sup>544</sup> For Eumenes II's and Perseus's mutual hostility before the war, see Hansen 1971, 106–112.

he was admired in Greece and Asia. Here, Livy is recapitulating, that is, briefly summarizing the current situation in the East and previous events that led to it, also mentioned before. As Dennis Pausch shows, using different examples, Livy often uses the techniques of recapitulation followed by anticipation in his speech sequences.<sup>545</sup> John Briscoe on the other hand points out that Eumenes II's words about Perseus's popularity in the East were purposefully exaggerated, which was common in such speeches.<sup>546</sup> Moreover, it seems to me that Livy uses the trusted ally Eumenes II to illustrate the Roman point of view of the situation: the speech reflects the supposed collective fears of the Romans while still outsourcing the incentive for the war. Moreover, this is an example of how the Other could be contrasted to a different Other: one of them represents the Roman interests in the East, while the other one is simply a negative Other.

Then Livy switches to direct speech, signalling the climax of the speech.<sup>547</sup> Livy is most probably following Polybius's example of starting the speech in indirect form and ending it with direct speech to create a "crescendo effect" which was commonly used by Polybius according to Stephen Usher.<sup>548</sup> Also, the content of this part of the speech anticipates (real or imagined) future events and creates suspense in the story, accordingly following the common speech pattern of recapitulation-anticipation as explained by Dennis Pausch.<sup>549</sup> Thus, in direct speech, Eumenes II affirms that this was the truth and he had seen all this with his own eyes, as if he had been personally sent there as a spy by the Romans. He would not have come to Rome in person if the matter was not serious and real. He said that Perseus would take over all of Greece before marching for Italy and it had been a matter of *fides* and friendship to warn the Romans. The use of direct speech, emphasizing the king's presence in Rome and the observations he made "with his own eyes", are effective narrative tools to make this part of the king's speech more convincing and urgent.

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<sup>545</sup> Pausch 2010a.

<sup>546</sup> Briscoe 2012, 189.

<sup>547</sup> Liv. 42.13.

<sup>548</sup> Usher 2009, 512. On Livy's use of *oratio obliqua* and *recta* compared to Polybius: Walsh 1954, 107–109.

<sup>549</sup> Pausch 2010a.

Livy continues by saying that after this the envoys of Perseus arrived, but the senate had already decided to believe Eumenes II's report of the situation after his masterful speech. The Macedonian envoy tried to defend Perseus before the senate in vain.<sup>550</sup> Also, the Rhodians' hostility towards Eumenes II was completely ignored.<sup>551</sup> Eumenes II apparently was greatly loved and trusted by the Romans because of his exceptional *virtus* and *fides*. Also, Eumenes II is presented as an extension of the Roman influence in the East, literally their eyes and ears.

According to Livy, Perseus was angry at Eumenes II and decided to assassinate the Attalid king, who was going to stop at Delphi on his way back to Pergamon to sacrifice to Apollo in accordance with his pious character.<sup>552</sup> Livy focalizes closely on the scene and slows down the rhythm, signalling the beginning of a pivotal scene. He then describes every moment of the assassination attempt: how the assassins hid above the road in the bushes, how Eumenes II slowly approached, and how the assassins threw heavy rocks down at the king and fled. The attempt failed, but the king remained gravely injured.<sup>553</sup>

Many sources report the assassination attempt, but it is unclear if Perseus was responsible.<sup>554</sup> But for Livy, there was no doubt: Perseus had already begun the war against the Romans with this deed, and there was no doubt that the incident had been his doing.<sup>555</sup> The details of the attack and Eumenes' struggle to stay alive afterwards are described in an equally detailed manner. This narrative technique brings the reader into the middle of the action and rouses fear for the "greatest friend" of the Romans; at the same time, it provokes hatred towards Perseus. This dramatic event strongly symbolizes a pivotal moment in the narrative: the beginning of the Third Macedonian War (171–168 BC). Even though the reasons for war were more

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<sup>550</sup> Liv. 42.14.2–4. Later, the Roman envoys went to Macedonia to see if the accusations were true and to confront Perseus directly, but the king recklessly insulted the envoys: Liv. 42.25.

<sup>551</sup> Liv. 42.14.5–10.

<sup>552</sup> Liv. 42.15.1–4.

<sup>553</sup> Liv. 42.15.5–10, 42.16.

<sup>554</sup> Other mentions of the assassination attempt: Pol. 22.18.5 and 8, 27.6.2; Diod Sic. 29.34.2. J. Briscoe suggests that it might even have been a natural accident caused by a rockfall: Briscoe 2012, 202–203.

<sup>555</sup> Liv. 42.15.3: "Eumeni ante omnes infestus erat; a cuius sanguine ordiens bellum."

complicated than this one incident, the assassination attempt comes to symbolize how the war had been instigated by Perseus in a cowardly fashion.<sup>556</sup> Soon after, the Third Macedonian War between Rome and Perseus began officially. Eumenes II, who had finally recovered, took active part in it with his brothers, sending troops and commanding them personally.<sup>557</sup>

Until this point, the characterization of Eumenes II had been nothing but positive, his virtues and *fides* emphasized on every possible occasion. However, Polybius and Livy report that their sources made some disturbing allegations about Eumenes II towards the end of the war against Perseus. According to Livy, during the siege of the city of Demetrias, “there was a story in circulation that terms for an alliance between Eumenes and Perseus were being discussed by a Cretan, Cydas, and Antimachus, the leading magistrate of Demetrias”.<sup>558</sup> The historian does not yet comment on this rumour any further but goes on to write that “historians tell completely different stories about king Eumenes”.<sup>559</sup> Livy, adding a warning “if you trust him”, chose to summarize the version by Valerius Antias, according to whom Eumenes II had been very uncooperative and irritable throughout the war, and instead of Eumenes II it had been his brother Attalus who remained helpful and friendly.<sup>560</sup> Later, Livy again repeats the sentiment of Valerius Antias in an envoy’s speech: “the king’s intentions clearly could not be relied upon, but

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<sup>556</sup> Polybius writes about the causes, including the assassination attempt: Pol. 22.18.5 and 8, 27.6. For a detailed discussion about the causes of the war, see Burton 2017, ch. 5. Cf. Gruen 1984, 408–419.

<sup>557</sup> Liv. 42.55–60, 44.11–13. Cf. Just. Epit. 33.1.2. Eumenes II, together with his brother Attalus and the Numidian prince Misacenes, proved to be invaluable to the Romans, even transforming situations of certain defeat into victories: Liv. 42.65–66.

<sup>558</sup> Liv. 44.13.9: “Fama fuit per Cydantem Cretensem et Antimachum, qui Demetriadi praeerat, tractatas inter Eumenen et Persea condiciones amicitiae.” This might have been based on Polybius, who also mentions conversations between Cydas and Antimachus at Pol. 29.6.1: Briscoe 2012, 505.

<sup>559</sup> Liv. 44.13.12: “De Eumene rege longe diversa tradunt.” Diodorus Siculus wrote that many envoys from Asia accused Eumenes II (of what is not specified) and this planted a seed of doubt in the Romans’ minds: Diod. Sic. 31.7.2. Cf. Gruen 1984, 562, 576, 561 n. 140.

<sup>560</sup> Liv. 44.13.12–14. “Si Valerio Antiati credas”. Livy generally did not trust Valerius Antias: 26.49.3. According to J. Briscoe, the veracity of Antias’s account “is questionable, though it was believed at Rome and led the senate to turn against Eumenes after the defeat of Perseus [...]; Antias’s more extreme accusations may also represent what was said in Rome at the time rather than be the product of his fertile imagination”: Briscoe 2012, 506. Cf. Vell. Pat. 1.9.2.

while everything having to do with Eumenes was uncertain, Attalus's resolute constancy was remarkable."<sup>561</sup>

Jane D. Chaplin has argued that to mention a variant version of the story in such a belittling manner is a way to influence how the audience perceives events.<sup>562</sup> In fact, before and after this in Livy's narrative, Eumenes II is consistently cooperative.<sup>563</sup> Chaplin concludes that "this alternative version probably reflects the fact that Eumenes eventually lost the Romans' favour while Attalus remained a loyal ally. By mentioning it, Livy maintains the favourable presentation of Eumenes which is central to the attack on Perseus's character, but also prefigures his loss of popularity." This becomes even clearer as Livy continues his effort to maintain a more positive characterization of Eumenes II in his following description of the intrigues between Perseus and Eumenes II, which we can compare to Polybius.

In Polybius's work there is a detailed analysis of the supposed intrigues of Perseus and Eumenes II, briefly mentioned by Livy during the siege of Demetrias.<sup>564</sup> Polybius laments that it was very uncertain what really happened, but he attempted to write about it as accurately as possible, considering that he lived at the time of these rumours and he claimed to have heard some leaked information from some former friends of Perseus.<sup>565</sup> Here we should note that for Polybius, who was contemporary with these events, hearing and writing about these rumours had a completely different significance than for the over a century younger Livy.<sup>566</sup>

According to Polybius, Perseus and Eumenes II had already been communicating about something secretly during the siege of Demetrias and before, which caused the Romans to become suspicious and to favour Attalus over Eumenes, even though nothing was ever proved.<sup>567</sup> It was clear to Polybius that Perseus and Eumenes II hated each other, as was supposedly

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<sup>561</sup> Liv. 44.20.7: "Sicut omnia de Eumene dubia, Attali egregie constantem fidem nuntiabant." According to J. Briscoe, the passage at 44.13.12–14 "makes it virtually certain that the present one [44.20.7] derives from Valerius Antias": Briscoe 2012, 529.

<sup>562</sup> Chaplin 2007, 340 n. 130.

<sup>563</sup> Liv. 44.10.12, 44.13.10, 44.28–29 and 32.

<sup>564</sup> Pol. 29.5–9.

<sup>565</sup> Pol. 29.7.3, 29.8.10. Probably they were Macedonian hostages held in Rome at the same time as Polybius.

<sup>566</sup> Schlei  ner 1973.

<sup>567</sup> Pol. 29.6. For Polybius, it was "not unfounded suspicion", however: Pol. 29.6.2.

natural between all kings, and especially because of the past hostility between their fathers. Therefore, Polybius believed that they were both trying to trick each other: Eumenes II, in exchange for a considerable sum of money, supposedly offered to retire from the war and stop supporting the Romans or, depending on the sum, even help Perseus achieve peace with the Romans. The historian continues, saying that no agreement was ever concluded possibly because of the avarice and mistrust of both parties.<sup>568</sup> In the following analysis, however, Polybius himself concludes that Eumenes II had very little or nothing to gain from this dangerous game with Perseus and very much to lose: but still the rumours turned the previously enthusiastic Romans cold and unresponsive towards Eumenes II. The whole story is highly unconvincing, but Polybius uses it to give a moral lesson about the dangers of avarice.<sup>569</sup> Erich S. Gruen argues that these accusations are not at all credible – not from a rational political point of view and especially not considering that Polybius’s reported source, i.e., “Perseus’s friends”, was clearly biased.<sup>570</sup>

Livy transmits the same story with some modifications.<sup>571</sup> According to Livy, first Perseus sent a message to both Eumenes II and Antiochus IV, trying to turn them against the Romans or at least to make them help bring peace between himself and the Romans. His arguments were that kings should not be enemies with each other but rather united against the Romans, who were determined to dethrone every king in the world.<sup>572</sup> He warned that the Romans had already started to disregard Eumenes II and had denied the successful conquest of Egypt to the current Seleucid king Antiochus IV.<sup>573</sup> According to Livy, this message was sent to Eumenes II “under the pretext of redeeming prisoners of war; in actuality, certain more covert matters were under way. These burdened Eumenes, already the object of hatred and suspicion among the Romans, with even more weighty and false accusations. For he was

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<sup>568</sup> Pol. 29.7–8.

<sup>569</sup> Pol. 29.9.

<sup>570</sup> Gruen 1984, 558–563.

<sup>571</sup> Liv. 44.24.1–44.26.1, 44.27.13.

<sup>572</sup> This is exactly what Antiochus III had said to Prusias I earlier: Pol. 21.11; Liv.37.25.

<sup>573</sup> Liv. 44.24.1–6.

considered a traitor and practically an enemy at the same time that the two kings were entrapped in a rivalry of trickery and greed.”<sup>574</sup>

For a moment, it seems that Livy is vindicating Eumenes II and discarding the rumours as false, but he then starts summarizing Polybius’s story of secret communications between Perseus and Eumenes II. Livy’s version follows Polybius but tones down Polybius’s heavy criticism of Eumenes II while highlighting Perseus’s failure in not accepting Eumenes’ help in mediating the peace – something that both the Romans and Perseus had wished for.<sup>575</sup> Where Polybius had thought that the senate’s later cold attitude towards Eumenes confirmed the rumours as truthful, Livy cautiously states: “there was no knowledge of what had been discussed or upon what the kings had agreed.”<sup>576</sup> As Jane D. Chaplin notes, Livy is not as interested as Polybius in analysing each king’s motives but wants to emphasize that Perseus’s greatest weakness was his moral character and greed.<sup>577</sup> John Briscoe on his part suggests that “Polybius seems to have exaggerated and L[ivy] may have been aware of this.”<sup>578</sup> Both seem sensible conclusions. Here too then, Livy seems to follow his usual pattern of softening Polybius’s most poignant tones.

Many have attempted to interpret these confusing stories about the intrigues between Perseus and Eumenes II.<sup>579</sup> True or not, it was actually quite common and logical that kings around the Roman empire would interact in both directions – with the Romans and with other kings.<sup>580</sup> As David Braund explains, these kingdoms at the Roman frontiers functioned not only as buffer zones against external threats but also as intermediaries between the Romans

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<sup>574</sup> Liv. 44.24.7–8: “Ad Antiochum aperta mandata erant; ad Eumenes per speciem captivorum redimendorum missus legatus erat; re vera occultiora quaedam agebantur, quae in praesentia invisum quidem et suspectum Romanis Eumenes falsis gravioribus <...>. Proditor enim ac prope hostis habitus, dum inter se duo reges captantes fraude et avaritia certant.”

<sup>575</sup> Perseus’s failure: Liv. 44.26.1.

<sup>576</sup> Pol. 29.9.3–5; Liv. 44.24.11: “sed quid actum esset quidve inter reges convenisset, ignorabatur”.

<sup>577</sup> Chaplin 2007, 343 n. 142.

<sup>578</sup> Briscoe 2012, 545–545.

<sup>579</sup> For detailed discussions about the veracity of the story, see Badian 1958, 102–105, 294–295; Gruen 1984, 559–563, 560 n. 132, 573–584; Sherwin-White 1984, 36–40; Levene 2010, 126–163.

<sup>580</sup> For example, the Attalids and the Seleucids had longstanding friendly relations with each other: Chrubasik 2013.

and other kings.<sup>581</sup> Also, Roman allies had freedom of action, interacted with other kings actively, and they even waged wars against other Roman allies.<sup>582</sup> The kings also had to protect themselves and to this end they formed connections with other kings, which might well have made the Romans nervous. This explains why the Romans continuously kept an eye on Philip V and Antiochus IV – two powerful allies who potentially could become equally powerful enemies.<sup>583</sup>

Erich S. Gruen has argued that after Pydna in 168 BC, Rome did not want to encourage any more power concentrations in the East – Eumenes II had already benefited immensely from his alliance with the Romans.<sup>584</sup> Indeed, Rhodes and Prusias were treated with similar coldness. Paul J. Burton however argues that such a *Realpolitik* type analysis ignores the moral aspect of international friendships.<sup>585</sup> Burton reminds us that even though the rumours of Eumenes’ secret dealings with Perseus might have been false, the only thing that matters from the moral point of view is that the rumours were believed by many in Rome, including Polybius for example. Therefore, according to Burton, the friendship between the Romans and Eumenes II dissolved because too many Romans felt that Eumenes’ moral character had become questionable.

The senate never openly accused Eumenes II of the lack of *fides* or of anything else for that matter, but for our historians, who obviously understood the importance of shared moral values in international relations, the sole suspicion of Eumenes’ greedy and dishonest conduct was enough to throw their *amicitia* out of balance. In the end, the Romans distrusted Eumenes II so much that, when he and Attalus came to Italy in winter 167/166 BC, Attalus was warmly welcomed but Eumenes was denied entry to Rome under the excuse that there was a general law that excluded any king from entering the city. He was even ordered not to stay in Brundisium but leave Italy in the

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<sup>581</sup> In the *Alexandrian War*, this is directly stated: Bell. Alex. 78.2. According to Cicero, Rome was also “*arcem regum at nationum exterarum*”: Cic. Sull. 33.

<sup>582</sup> Burton 2011, 205–227.

<sup>583</sup> Braund 1984, 91–98.

<sup>584</sup> Gruen 1984, 573–578.

<sup>585</sup> Burton 2011, 292–299.

middle of the winter.<sup>586</sup> Judging from the fragments of Polybius, the Romans remained suspicious of Eumenes II for the rest of his days.<sup>587</sup> Not even Attalus and his other brother Athenaeus succeeded in completely vindicating Eumenes when they visited Rome only for this purpose.<sup>588</sup>

What can we make of Livy's overall portrayal of Eumenes II then? Livy's description of Eumenes II is particularly flattering from the beginning, and he might not have wanted to stop praising Eumenes' virtues and *fides* in the narrative before the war with Perseus was over. Livy still wanted to use Eumenes II's character as a narrative foil to Perseus. It seems that Livy tried to maintain a more positive characterization of Eumenes II even when some of his sources accused him of perfidy: Livy disregarded Valerius Antias who wrote negatively about Eumenes.<sup>589</sup> Livy even openly dismissed some charges as false and softened Polybius's criticism.<sup>590</sup> In any case, Livy does not ignore the sources, including Polybius, according to whom for some reason the relationship between the Romans and Eumenes II cooled down towards the end of the war, while Attalus was becoming more and more favoured. As Jane D. Chaplin suggests, Livy probably wanted to set up the basis for his description of the tense relationship between Eumenes II and Attalus after the war for the purpose of a smoother narrative.<sup>591</sup> Furthermore, even though Dennis Pausch does not discuss this particular case in his study, I think that

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<sup>586</sup> Eumenes II is sent away from Italy: Pol. 29.6.3–4, 30.19; Liv. per 46; Just. Epit. 38.6.3–4. King Masinissa too asked to be allowed to come to the city and make sacrifices at the temple of Jupiter on the Capitolium at the same time when Eumenes II was trying to enter, but the senate told the king that it would not be necessary for him to come to Rome at this time: Liv. 45.14.4. Eumenes II is no longer *fidus socius*: Liv. 45.19.5. Cf. Braund 1984, 55–56. Justin, who claimed to be directly citing Pompeius Trogus at this point, wrote that Mithridates VI blamed the Romans for turning against Eumenes II after all the services that the king had rendered them, but this was of course a sensible argument for his anti-Roman speech: Just. Epit. 38.6.3–4.

<sup>587</sup> He had also become friendly with Antiochus IV, which the Romans did not like: Pol. 30.30. For the Romans' treatment of Eumenes II during this time, see Burton 2011, 296–298.

<sup>588</sup> Pol. 31.32.1–2; Diod. Sic. 31.7.2. Attalus however was always trusted by the Romans: Pol. 31.1.4–7, 33.12–13. Nevertheless, Eumenes II continued to be hugely popular in his kingdom and, to Polybius (31.6), his subjects seemed to become even more attached to him because of the maltreatment by the Romans. The popularity of Eumenes II is also attested by several inscriptions: Gruen 1984, 197–198 nn. 251–253.

<sup>589</sup> Livy disregarding Valerius Antias, see above p. 129 n. 560.

<sup>590</sup> Livy dismissing rumours as false: Liv. 44.24.7–8.

<sup>591</sup> Chaplin 2007, 340 n. 130. For Polybius and Diodorus Siculus, the fortune of Eumenes II started to crumble after the war with Perseus: Pol. 29.22; Diod. Sic. 31.12. The relationship between Attalus and Eumenes II is discussed below on pp. 159–168.

his thesis can be applied here: Livy presented certain historical situations from various different perspectives, using different focalizations and sources, without declaring clearly which opinion was the “correct” one. Livy left these considerations to the readers.<sup>592</sup>

### **Conclusion to chapter 2: Rome, “greater than the great”<sup>593</sup>**

We now have the basis for understanding the reasons for which foreign kings had been admired in the historical narratives ever since the earliest fragments of Roman annalists. In the case of enemy kings, the reasons were quite straightforward: the strongest enemies could be used as moral examples to show what constituted the Roman ideal of military *virtus*. Military strength and courage were seen as the basis of *virtus* and Roman cultural identity. From the Roman viewpoint, the Romans had conquered the whole Mediterranean because of their superior *virtus* but, on the other hand, their *virtus* would never have grown so strong without worthy challengers. The Roman *virtus* was what set them apart from other cultures.

During the late Republic, when Rome’s conquest of the Mediterranean was already in the distant past, it was still popular to recycle the same historical examples and recall the traditional Roman military *virtus* which legitimized Rome’s position as the ruler of its Mediterranean empire. By emphasizing the military *virtus* of Rome’s greatest enemies, the historians demonstrated that Rome had proved its worth. This kind of meritocratic reasoning is also evident in Augustus’s propaganda and emphasized, for instance, in his *Res gestae*, with which he attempted to legitimize his rule by listing his military deeds among other virtues.

Friendly kings on the other hand provided an opportunity to examine other moral qualities that were important for a leader in addition to military *virtus*. These qualities were *fides*, *pietas*, *continentia*, *clementia*, *moderatio*, *iustitia*, and many others that marked successful and legitimate leadership in

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<sup>592</sup> Pausch 2011, IV.

<sup>593</sup> Diod. Sic. 34/5.33.4: οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλων ἀσθενείας ἐκρίναν δεῖν θεωρεῖσθαι τὴν τῆς Ρώμης ἰσχύν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τῶν μεγάλων μείζονα.

monarchy and Republic alike. *Fides* in particular was important in international friendships and, generally, the most successful *amicitiae* between Rome and friendly kings were believed to be based on shared moral values and *fides*. The historians use the characters of Masinissa and Eumenes II as models of excellent allies and equally excellent leaders, who possessed every necessary virtue to make their kingdoms flourish. In these ways, the Other could be used as a positive *exemplum* of Roman virtues and not just of military *virtus*. In Livy's and Augustus's time, historical examples of friendly kings like Masinissa or Eumenes II, who "owed everything to the Romans", could serve to create a narrative of peaceful Mediterranean rulership by the Romans, in the spirit of the *pax romana* ideology, through relations with loyal pro-Roman kings. Then again, the narratives give the impression that even less than perfect kings like Philip V could be worthy of Roman friendship temporarily if they kept their vices in check.

In this chapter, we have seen various examples of different narrative devices, used by all our historians to convey the moral lessons to the readers. We have seen how Polybius, Sallust, and Livy use varying focalizations and rhythms to create suspense in the story. Moreover, internal or close external focalization served to create a "character effect", that is, to make the readers identify or sympathize with a character. Another narrative tool much used in historiography in general was the alternation between indirect and direct speech. By choosing one or the other or both, the historian could control the rhythm of their narrative or make it more dramatic at the right pivotal moment. We have seen that historians could add tragic elements into their narratives when writing about particularly dramatic events such as the forbidden love of Masinissa and Sophoniba. A particularity of Livy is that he seems to form pairs of characters on purpose in order to create contrast or to compare similar qualities. For example, Livy contrasts Eumenes II to Perseus, or he compares the military strength of Flaminius to that of Philip V. This is because Livy preferred consistency of theme over realistic characterizations. Livy attempted to provide simpler and more consistent moral examples than Polybius who in turn preferred to portray each event and character as

realistically as he believed possible even when the character in question appeared morally ambiguous.

Therefore, narrative portrayals of foreign kings could be and were used in a great number of different ways to showcase traditional Roman virtues, both on the battlefield and in more peaceful dealings. These virtues were considered to be the basis of the *res publica* itself and thus of the Roman identity and originality: during the late Republic and the Augustan era, authors of historical narratives constructed an image (or images) of the past, attempting to remind their contemporaries of how to restore Roman *virtus* and to redefine the meaning of Romanness, both of which were felt to be lost amidst the continuous political, social, and cultural upheavals.

### 3 MISTREATING THE KINGS: ROMANS THROUGH THE EYES OF THE OTHERS

In this part of the study, I turn my focus toward the self-critical aspects of the Roman historical narratives while still focusing on portrayals of the Others. I examine different examples of how kings were mistreated and deceived by the Romans and how the narratives seem to victimize or even vindicate some enemy kings. The historians focalize on various kings and provide a critical gaze of the Other at the Romans' behaviour abroad, thus presenting the Self in a morally questionable light. This was one of many narrative tools that enabled the historians to examine the ideal Roman virtues externally from the Self.

The discussion begins with the most obvious, that is, the anti-Roman enemy speeches and letters that directly accuse the Romans of hating and unjustly persecuting kings. I argue that these speeches could serve various narrative purposes such as enlivening the story and the enemy characters, or they could be useful for emphasizing the discourses of *odium regni*, justification of wars, and Roman freedom propaganda.

After this, I move on from speeches and letters, which are narratively speaking a category of their own, to the historians' descriptions of Roman dishonesty and deception in their dealings with kings, and how these were presented as symptoms of the Roman moral decline that had reportedly started in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC. At the same time, I examine how the historians use Hellenistic and Numidian royal families as examples of the importance of *pietas* and *concordia* in family relations and internal politics alike. In all these examples, Romans are presented as an external disruptive force that put the integrity of these royal families to a serious test.

Lastly, I examine Livy's detailed portrayal of Perseus: I argue that Perseus is presented as a victim of the devious and relentless Romans. Even though Perseus was an evil character in Livy's narrative, Livy uses specific narrative techniques such as internal focalization and tragic elements to momentarily rouse the readers' sympathy for Perseus and to draw attention to the moral lesson about the mutability of fortune. Again, the focus will be on

the narratives and on comparisons between authors whenever possible, with the hope that in this way I may contribute some new insights into these otherwise much-discussed texts.

### 3.1 THE REPUBLIC AGAINST KINGS

#### *Roman anti-monarchic discourse*

In the previous chapter I have shown that, according to the historical narratives, the Romans respected and befriended foreign kings when their moral qualities corresponded to the Roman ideals. Nonetheless, in republican literature it was common to come across the statement that the Romans hated kings because, regardless of several good kings, they were traumatized by their last, incompetent king, Tarquinius Superbus. According to Cicero, Tarquinius Superbus had completely ruined the name of king (*rex*) in Rome.<sup>594</sup> Because of this, Cicero continues, Romans feared kings even during his own days and had always watched very closely that no Roman would become a sole ruler again.<sup>595</sup> Livy, who wrote after the murder of Caesar, eagerly repeats the sentiment.<sup>596</sup> It is doubtful, however, whether this anti-monarchic discourse among the Roman nobles was as long-standing as Cicero or Livy attest.<sup>597</sup> But we do know that in the late Republic the fear of sole rulers, *odium regni*, was one of the few sentiments shared by most of the Roman ruling class. *Odium regni* was an important part of the identity building of the Roman aristocratic families and a powerful rhetorical weapon: political opponents who were

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<sup>594</sup> Cic. Rep. 1.62 and 64, 2.52. The characterizations of Tarquinius Superbus in Roman literature resemble Greek archetypes of bad tyrants: Scapini 2015.

<sup>595</sup> A famous and often cited example of a Roman who aspired to become a king was that of Spurius Cassius: Liv. 2.41; Cic. Rep. 2.49 and 60, Phil. 2.87 and 114, Lael. 28, Dom. 101; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 8.68–80.

<sup>596</sup> Liv. 1.46.3, 2.2.5, 2.8.2, 2.9.7, 2.15.3, 2.19. Cf. Erskine 1991, 106–107. Livy relates how during the Second Punic War the Iberians saluted P. Cornelius Scipio (the future Africanus) as a “king”. To this, Scipio replied that the name “king” was intolerable to the Romans – he would accept that the Iberians silently thought him to possess a noble kingly spirit (*regalem animum*), but they should not call him a “king”: Liv. 27.19.3–6. More on this below on pp. 206–215.

<sup>597</sup> Börm 2015b, 15–16; Russo 2015. On early anti- and pro-monarchic discourse in Rome, see Sigmund 2014, ch. 2.1 and 2.2.

especially popular among the people were frequently accused of aspiring to become sole rulers of Rome.<sup>598</sup>

Romans certainly did not like the idea of a king emerging from within the Republic, but in historical narratives we often encounter the assertion that the Romans also hated foreign kings in some innate and irrational way. In fact, these assertions are limited to a specific narrative context: anti-Roman speeches and letters by enemy kings. In these speeches and letters, the Roman Republic and Hellenistic monarchies are pictured as two opposite and utterly incompatible forms of government, destined to clash against one other. In Roman anti-monarchic discourse, the Republic is seen as the bringer of freedom, whereas living under monarchy was slavery, and the Roman wars against these aggressive kings had been almost automatically justified by this ideology. However, anti-Roman enemy speeches and letters make it appear that from the enemies' point of view it had been the other way around. These speeches and letters were exaggerated on purpose and served among other things to enliven the narrative and to provide the imagined perspective of an enemy in various situations, as generally argued by Dennis Pausch.<sup>599</sup> Here I analyse in detail the narrative functions of a few of the most pertinent examples: the letter of Mithridates VI by Sallust, the speech of Mithridates VI by Pompeius Trogus, a speech of Perseus by Livy, an exchange of thoughts between Prusias I and Antiochus III by Polybius and Livy, a letter of Perseus to Roman allies Antiochus IV and Eumenes II, and three anti-Roman speeches regarding the war with Philip V by Polybius.

### ***“Romans hate kings”***

In the so-called letter of King Mithridates VI of Pontus to King Phraates III of Parthia, in the narrative context of the Mithridatic Wars between 89 and 63 BC and written by Sallust, we have a fine example of an anti-Roman letter by

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<sup>598</sup> See below chapter 4. See examples from Cicero's speeches in Erskine 1991, 113–114. For *odium regni*, see Fritz 1954, 304–305; Russo 2015. For discussions of the concept of kingship in the Republican discourse, see Classen 1965; Giua 1967; Grimal 1986; Martin 1992; Ferrary 2014, 167–170; Sigmund 2014, ch. 1–2.3.3.

<sup>599</sup> Pausch 2011, IV.3.b.

an enemy king.<sup>600</sup> The letter was part of a longer narrative in Sallust's *Histories* which survives only in scattered fragments.<sup>601</sup> In the letter, Mithridates VI addresses Phraates III in the first person, as if in direct speech, trying to persuade the Parthian to join him in the war against the Romans.<sup>602</sup> The narrative technique of direct speech serves to present Mithridates VI's point of view in a more immersive way. The Pontic king does not waste time before stating the first accusations against the Romans: "In fact, the Romans have one inveterate motive for making war upon all peoples, nations, and kings: namely, a deep-seated desire for dominion and for riches."<sup>603</sup> Mithridates VI continues by accusing the Romans of having hunted down Philip V, Antiochus III, Perseus, and now of attempting the same with him. He claims that the Romans had even tortured the captive Perseus to death and betrayed their good friend Eumenes II.<sup>604</sup> Mithridates VI writes that the Romans had started the war against him by inciting Nicomedes IV of Bithynia to attack his territory.<sup>605</sup> Indeed, Mithridates VI had become their next target: "And the Romans, pursuing not me but rather their custom of overthrowing all monarchies [...]."<sup>606</sup> The uncontrolled imperialistic rage and the categorical hatred of kings had made the Romans unstoppable:

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<sup>600</sup> Sall. hist. 4.60 (67 Mc, 69 M). For a step-by-step analysis of all of the letter's arguments in historical context, see Büchner 1960, 229–235; Ahlheid 1988; Adler 2011, 18–35. For the first modern study of the letter of Mithridates, see Bickerman 1947. The letter certainly is the historian's own creation and not based on any actual Pontic letter, even though it clearly repeats the typical elements of the Mithridatic propaganda that was in circulation at that time; see McGing 1986, 154–160; Ahlheid 1988; Russo 2009; Adler 2011, 17–18. Contra: Raditsa 1969, 6–9 and *passim*.

<sup>601</sup> We should remember that speeches and letters like this were always a part of larger historical narratives, and they were not intended to be read separately without context. But in this case, we do not have a choice. G. Zecchini suggests that, when examined in the light of the prologue of Sallust's *Histories* (esp. 1.12 [12 M, 12 MC]), the letter of Mithridates could have served to emphasize the Parthians' position as the new great enemy of the Romans and challenge to their *virtus* after the definite elimination of *metus Punicus*: Zecchini 2001, 101–103. On the difficulties of analysing the *Histories* because of its fragmentary state, see Gerrish 2019, 6–9.

<sup>602</sup> For the historical context of the Mithridatic Wars, see Badian 1976, 47–50, 56–59; Sherwin-White 1977, 66–75; Gruen 1984, 249, 592–610; Rubinson 1993; Kallet-Marx 1995, 239–250; Mastrocinque 1999; McGing 2009.

<sup>603</sup> Sall. hist. 4.60.5 (67 Mc, 69 M): "Namque Romanis cum nationibus, populis, regibus cunctis una et ea vetus causa bellandi est, cupido profunda imperi et divitiarum."

<sup>604</sup> Sall. hist. 4.60.5–9 (67 Mc, 69 M).

<sup>605</sup> Sall. hist. 4.60.10–11 (67 Mc, 69 M).

<sup>606</sup> Sall. hist. 4.60.15 (67 Mc, 69 M): "secutique Romani non me, sed morem suum omnia regna subvertundi".

Or are you not aware that the Romans turned their arms in this direction only after Ocean put an end to their westward progress? That from the beginning they have possessed nothing except what they have stolen: their homes, wives, lands, and dominion? That having been once upon a time refugees without a native land or parents, they have been established to serve as a plague upon the whole world, being men who are prevented by nothing human or divine from plundering and destroying allies and friends—those situated far away or nearby, weak and powerful too—and from considering as their enemies all powers not subservient to them and especially monarchies.<sup>607</sup>

The letter ends with a warning: the Romans, *latrones gentium*, will never stop conquering and stealing away the rightful possessions of all kings.<sup>608</sup>

Focalizing on a character and letting them speak directly is an effective narrative device that provides the character's point of view of the situation and makes the reader sympathize with them. It is easy to agree with Antonio La Penna who thinks that the character of Mithridates VI appears feisty and powerful, and the letter's arguments seem persuasive, tenacious, and lucid.<sup>609</sup> However, I agree with La Penna that Sallust's intention is not to sympathize with the character of Mithridates VI but to use an enemy's words to criticize Roman society and foreign policies which was characteristic of Sallust's style. Jennifer Gerrish also thinks that the letter reflects Sallust's own thoughts about Roman society during his time, which were also prevalent themes in his other two works, the *Conspiracy of Catiline* and the *Jugurthine War*.<sup>610</sup> Indeed, a very similar but shorter passage from the *Jugurthine War* is the speech of Jugurtha to King Bocchus. In the speech, Jugurtha says that the Romans were unjust, greedy, and they automatically considered all the kings their enemies. Jugurtha continues that before himself the Romans' target had

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<sup>607</sup> Sall. hist. 4.60.17 (67 Mc, 69 M): "An ignoras Romanos, postquam ad occidentem pergentibus finem Oceanus fecit, arma huc convortisse? Neque quicquam a principio nisi raptum habere, domum, coniuges, agros, imperium? Convenas olim sine patria, parentibus, pesti conditos orbis terrarum, quibus non humana ulla neque divina obstant quin socios amicos, procul iuxta sitos, inopes potentisque trahant excindant, omniaque non serva et maxime regna hostilia ducant." For a similar harangue against the Romans, see Just. Epit. 28.2.1–7.

<sup>608</sup> Sall. hist. 4.60.19–22 (67 Mc, 69 M).

<sup>609</sup> La Penna 1968, 331.

<sup>610</sup> Gerrish 2019, 57–58. It is indeed hazardous to make any more extensive deductions about the letter's significance in the context of the wider narrative of the fragmentary *Histories*: La Penna 1963, 249–254; Ahlheid 1988, 91–92.

been Perseus and, after Jugurtha, Bocchus would be the next: no king would ever be safe from the Romans.<sup>611</sup> Still, Sallust's intention certainly is not to exculpate Jugurtha from starting the war, as we know from the wider context of the *Jugurthine War*. The same reasoning can be applied to the letter of Mithridates. Eric Adler further notes that Sallust skilfully bases Mithridates' arguments on just enough truth to make them convincing and exaggerated at the same time.<sup>612</sup> Sallust repeats the common sentiment that Romans were greedy and hated kings several times in the letter. As F. Ahlheid accurately argues, such repetition is an oratorical strategy to increase the letter's persuasive force.<sup>613</sup> Furthermore, it serves to intentionally polarize the Roman Republic and eastern kings on the most basic conceptual level.

Not long after Sallust, Pompeius Trogus inserted a speech of Mithridates VI in his narrative.<sup>614</sup> This speech is in part so similar to Sallust's letter of Mithridates that the latter probably was a major inspiration for Trogus.<sup>615</sup> This is the only instance where Trogus's epitomist Justin wrote that he had preserved Trogus's words *verbatim* because this particular speech was worthy of it (*dignus*).<sup>616</sup> Again, Mithridates starts by calling the Romans robbers (*latrones*) and by accusing them of starting the war.<sup>617</sup> Identically to Sallust, Trogus's Mithridates also accuses the Romans of preying on kings systematically: "For what the Romans struck out at was not the wrong-doing of kings but rather their strength and their majesty; nor was it against Mithridates alone that they had employed such violent tactics — they had done

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<sup>611</sup> Sall. Iug. 81.1. Cf. Adler 2011, 29–30. Before the first battle between Jugurtha and Q. Caecilius Metellus, the consul of 109 BC, the king spoke to his soldiers and accused the Romans of greed (Sall. Iug. 49.2). He said that Numidians should defend their country against these aggressors. In another passage (Sall. Iug. 102.12–15), King Bocchus tried to justify his hostility towards the Romans and said that he had attacked the Romans only to defend his kingdom and that he had previously offered friendship to the Romans, but his offer had been rejected.

<sup>612</sup> Adler 2011, 19–23, 32–35.

<sup>613</sup> Ahlheid 1988, 74, 79–80.

<sup>614</sup> Just. Epit. 38.4–7. For a step-by-step analysis of the speech's arguments, see Adler 2011, 41–51. Cf. Hofmann 2018, 171–174.

<sup>615</sup> Russo 2009, 391–395; Adler 2011, 38–39. G. Zecchini emphasizes Trogus's own ingenuity in writing the speech: Mineo and Zecchini 2020, 222 n. 240.

<sup>616</sup> Just. Epit. 38.3.11. L. Ballesteros Pastor however thinks that Justin is lying and composed the speech by himself using various parts of Trogus's work: Ballesteros Pastor 2016. Contra: Hofmann 2018, 171. For Trogus's criticism of Livy, see Tsitsiou-Chelidoni 2009, 544–545.

<sup>617</sup> Just. Epit. 38.4.2, 38.5.3–4 and 10.

so often against everybody else as well.”<sup>618</sup> The cruel treatment of Perseus, Eumenes II, and Jugurtha, who had been the grandson of Masinissa, the great friend of the Romans, are cited in the following passages.

Trogus has chosen more recent historical examples than Sallust. Beyond this, Trogus’s text differs stylistically from Sallust and becomes particularly provocative: “Such was the principle of hatred towards all monarchs that they had established, evidently because they themselves had had kings who were such that even their names made them blush.”<sup>619</sup> Trogus repeats the common late republican literary *topos* that Tarquinius Superbus had ruined the name of “king” in Rome and made all Romans generally phobic of kings.<sup>620</sup> Because the founders of Rome had been raised by a wolf, “their entire population had the temperament of wolves, with an insatiable thirst for blood and a ravenous hunger for power and riches”.<sup>621</sup> The end of the speech continues to differ from Sallust and consists of praise of Mithridates’ valorous ancestry and of promises of great war spoils to be won in the war against the Romans – both suitable additions to a speech addressed to soldiers. He promises that the campaign in Asia would be easy because the people there hated the rapacious Roman governors and tax farmers.<sup>622</sup>

Many scholars have noted that Mithridates’ speech by Trogus is particularly insulting towards the Romans, and some have even thought that Trogus’s own attitude towards Rome and Roman imperialism was negative because of his Gallic origins.<sup>623</sup> However, such self-criticism was very common in Roman literature and also strongly present in Sallust’s letter of Mithridates.<sup>624</sup> Only the fact that the speech and the letter of Mithridates have

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<sup>618</sup> Just. Epit. 38.6.1: “Quippe non delicta regum illos, sed vires ac maiestatem insequi, neque in uno se, sed in aliis quoque omnibus hac saepe arte grassatos.”

<sup>619</sup> Just. Epit. 38.6.7: “Hanc illos omnibus regibus legem odiorum dixisse, scilicet quia ipsi tales reges habuerint, quorum etiam nominibus erubescunt.”

<sup>620</sup> Cf. Cic. Rep. 1.62 and 64, 2.52.

<sup>621</sup> Just. Epit. 38.6.7–8: “[...] atque ut ipsi ferunt conditores suos lupae uberibus altos, sic omnem illum populum luporum animos inexplebiles sanguinis, atque imperii divitiarumque avidos ac ieiunos habere.” The expression greatly resembles Sall. hist. 4.60.5 (67 Mc, 69 M). Comparing Romans to ravenous wolves is quite a rare expression in ancient literature, found only in Vell. Pat. 2.27, in addition to Justin’s epitome: Russo 2009, 389–390.

<sup>622</sup> Just. Epit. 38.7.8.

<sup>623</sup> For a list of literature, see Adler 2011, 39 nn. 15–18.

<sup>624</sup> A. Borgna completely refutes claims of Trogus’s “anti-Romanness”: Borgna 2018, 157–202. Trogus/Justin did seem to have had a high regard for Augustus, who “[...] having conquered the rest of the world, turned his victorious arms on them [Spaniards] and, bringing a wild and

survived separately from their original contexts attests that such anti-Roman texts were eagerly read during their own time and also after.<sup>625</sup> Eric Adler has argued that Sallust's letter is rhetorically more convincing and Sallust's Mithridates presents the more believable criticism of Rome, whereas Trogus's Mithridates recycles "bookish" and somewhat generic examples also used in other orations of his work.<sup>626</sup> Adler thinks that Sallust's Mithridates appears humbler and more rational, whereas Trogus's Mithridates appears as a stereotypically arrogant eastern king who wants to boast of his own magnificence.

To complement this perceptive analysis, there are some additional stylistic choices to consider. Generally, Trogus's Mithridates is much more furious and his tone is scornful. This stylistic difference can be explained by the narrative context: Trogus's Mithridates is speaking to his soldiers and encouraging them, trying to convince them of his own military strength and superiority. Sallust's Mithridates is writing a letter to another king, and therefore he is arguing rationally, giving concrete examples and tactical advice, and trying to convince the other king to join him against the Romans. Moreover, Sallust's letter is written as direct speech, whereas Trogus's speech is indirect. According to Justin, Trogus had criticized Livy and Sallust precisely for this stylistic habit: Trogus had thought that stylish but deceptive *oratio recta* was not appropriate for historiography.<sup>627</sup> Indeed, indirect speech might seem more objective and truthful, whereas direct speech and a brief change of narrator from external to internal could benefit from a wider array of

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barbarous people to a more civilized way of life under the rule of law, gave them a regular provincial administration / Nec prius [...], quam Caesar Augustus perdomito orbe victricia ad eos arma transtulit populumque barbarum ac ferum legibus ad cultiorem vitae usum traductum in formam provinciae redegit" (Just. Epit. 44.5.8). Cf. Just. Epit. 42.5. Trogus had also dedicated a whole book to praising the history of the origins of the Romans: Just. Epit. 43. B. Mineo argues that Pompeius Trogus was "in perfect harmony with the Augustan moral system" just like Livy: Mineo 2016. A. Borgna thinks the same and also argues that Trogus was proud to be Roman: Borgna 2018, 196–214.

<sup>625</sup> Adler 2011, 57. E. Adler argues that Justin's *Epitoma* contains so many anti- and pro-Roman sentiments that it is useless to try to label Trogus with either of these categories: Adler 2011, 39–41.

<sup>626</sup> Adler 2011, 41–58. Along with these, Adler considers Appian's text. F. Russo too compares the three: Russo 2009.

<sup>627</sup> Just. Epit. 38.3.11.

rhetorical devices and thus be stylistically more impressive.<sup>628</sup> Besides, the closer the focalization is to a character, the easier it is for the reader to identify with them, whenever this should be the purpose of the author.

The allegation that Romans hated kings is repeated in both Sallust's letter and Trogus's speech. Whenever we come across such a statement in republican and Augustan literature, we should remember the importance of *odium regni* to the Roman aristocratic identity. The fear of sole rulership and the myth of the banishment of kings was one of the few unifying discourses in the Roman ruling class during the late Republic. Everybody knew the warning examples of past attempts to re-establish kingship.<sup>629</sup> I think that Eric Adler might be right in suggesting that Roman readers of this era might even have felt some pride when reading Mithridates' words according to which the Romans were hostile towards kings because of their own past.<sup>630</sup> The fear of sole rulership from *within* naturally also remained an important part of the identity of the Roman aristocracy during the age of Augustus, who started his rule behind the mask of the Republic. Therefore, it also makes perfect sense for Pompeius Trogus to maintain and even emphasize the same discourse as other authors did before him.

To strengthen these claims, we have similar examples from Polybius and Livy. Polybius wrote how Prusias I of Bithynia was afraid that the Romans would cross over to Asia and depose all kings, including himself, and that for this reason he was considering accepting the offer of alliance from the Seleucid king Antiochus III, who was at war with Rome.<sup>631</sup> Polybius brings to the foreground the emotions of the king who feared (*δειδω*) the Romans. At his point, Polybius inserts a letter from the Scipio brothers which is one of a kind in Polybius's extant text in terms of detail and ideological importance.<sup>632</sup> With the letter, the Scipio brothers, managed to calm him down by reasoning that

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<sup>628</sup> C. Tsitsiou-Chelidoni has analysed this in Livy's speeches: Tsitsiou-Chelidoni 2009, 538–539, 546–547.

<sup>629</sup> Cic. Rep. 1.62 and 64, 2.52.

<sup>630</sup> Adler 2011, 26, 32–33.

<sup>631</sup> Pol. 21.11.1–3.

<sup>632</sup> Cf. Zecchini 2018a, 36–38. Because of his personal connection to the Scipionic family, and because of his access to the family's archives, Polybius probably felt inspired to include such a special letter in his work.

in the recent past the Romans had rather created new kings, like Masinissa, than eliminated them – even Philip V still had his crown, although he had been defeated by the Romans.<sup>633</sup> Livy reports the same event but made some significant narrative changes.<sup>634</sup> In his version Antiochus III wrote a letter to Prusias I, complaining that Rome was going to eliminate all kings from the world until their empire was the only one left. The Romans were like a spreading fire that would spare no one. Philip V and the Spartan tyrant Nabis had already been defeated, Eumenes II had already subdued himself to Rome, and the next victim after Antiochus III would inevitably be Prusias I. This was followed by an even longer letter of the Scipio brothers, who successfully argued to the contrary, just as in Polybius's original version and thus effectively disproving the claim that Romans hated kings.

When we compare the two versions, in Livy's text it is Antiochus III – not Prusias I – who thinks that the Romans were hunting down all the kings. Livy expands the thought and converts it into a short anti-imperialistic discourse by using the voice of an enemy, in a very similar manner to those seen in Sallust and Trogus.<sup>635</sup> P.G. Walsh points out that Livy often put Polybius's criticizing sentiments concerning Rome in the speeches or letters of enemies: indeed, here Livy has taken Prusias I's worried thoughts and transformed them into a letter of Antiochus III.<sup>636</sup> Moreover, Livy took the opportunity to enliven the character of Antiochus III by strengthening his accusations against the Romans. The king's words are expectedly in line with Antiochus III's characterization throughout Livy's work. Antiochus III comes out as a warmonger who tried to defame the Romans. The list of previously defeated kings recalled the strength and military successes of the Romans. This was likely to evoke a feeling of pride in some Romans readers. A similar list is indeed present in Sallust's letter and Trogus's speech of Mithridates VI. Such purposefully anti-Roman speeches and letters were great narrative devices to make the enemy kings seem arrogant and the Romans formidable at the same time. Moreover, pairing the king's letter with a reply from the Scipio brothers

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<sup>633</sup> Pol. 21.11.3–13. Cf. App. Syr. 23.111.

<sup>634</sup> Liv. 37.25.4–7.

<sup>635</sup> Briscoe 1981, 327.

<sup>636</sup> Walsh 1954, 105–107.

allows the Romans to have the last word in the matter, effectively invalidating the whole anti-Roman sentiment.

Another example of an exchange of anti-Roman letters between kings in Livy's text is a letter of Perseus to Roman allies Antiochus IV and Eumenes II which repeats the same stock arguments as in the above cases but is not followed by an answer.<sup>637</sup> Polybius's fragment only mentions the sending of the envoys.<sup>638</sup> According to John Briscoe, it is unclear if Livy invented the longer letter by himself because Polybius's fragments sometimes are heavily compressed.<sup>639</sup> Briscoe thinks that Livy is probably following Polybius because he finds it hard to believe that Livy would invent such an anti-Roman attack even as a letter of an enemy king. It is true that Livy often softens Polybius's words regarding the criticism of the Romans in his own version.<sup>640</sup> Briscoe argues that unlike in other anti-Roman speeches in Livy's text, this letter is not followed by a redeeming speech or letter of the Romans.<sup>641</sup> However, the Romans could not always be present to vindicate themselves.<sup>642</sup> And for the Roman readers, they did not need to.

Moreover, from a narrative point of view, a private letter between kings did not require an answer from the Romans. Letters in fact were a good alternative to speeches. While speeches were much more impactful, they could only occur before battles or during various assemblies or senate audiences; letters on the other hand could easily be inserted into different points of the narrative without interrupting the logical flow of events. Moreover, Dennis Pausch has studied Rome-critical enemy speeches in Livy and argues with examples ranging from the early books to the last extant books that such speeches (or letters) are not consistently refuted with a pro-Roman comment or a later turn of events, as some influential scholars have suggested.<sup>643</sup> Since anti-Roman speeches and letters were quite common, different authors repeated the same standard arguments such as the claim that Romans hated

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<sup>637</sup> Liv. 44.24.1–2.

<sup>638</sup> Pol. 29.4.8–10.

<sup>639</sup> Briscoe 2012, 541–542.

<sup>640</sup> Examples of this in section 3.2. below.

<sup>641</sup> The other speeches mentioned by Briscoe are Liv. 31.29, 34.31, 35.16, and 37.25.

<sup>642</sup> As is the case in Liv. 42.52.6–16; see below p. 149 and p. 192.

<sup>643</sup> Pausch 2011, IV.3.b. Refutation of Rome-critical arguments: Burck 1982, 1170; Oakley 1998, 413.

all kings. Above we saw the anti-Roman letter of Mithridates VI, written by Sallust – perhaps Livy was inspired by this, just like his contemporary Trogus, and wanted to experiment with this narrative technique in his work. In any case, I do not think we should discard the possibility that Livy too had the courage and freedom to express such direct criticism of Roman expansion in the distant past through an enemy character.<sup>644</sup> This was, after all, one of the advantages of harnessing the Other as a tool in the narrative: to voice even heavy criticism of Rome externally and safely from the Self.

### ***Criticism of Roman expansion and freedom propaganda***

We have so far established that anti-Roman enemy speeches could provide the enemies' point of view to the readers, or they could remind the readers of the importance of *odium regni* within the Roman *res publica*. In addition, they address the theme of Roman expansion. Livy's work includes a speech by Perseus to his soldiers, in which the king accused the Romans of being bloodthirsty warmongers who wanted to eliminate all kings.<sup>645</sup> Perseus continues that the freedom propaganda of the past had only been a specious pretext, *speciosus titulus* – now the Romans were openly trying to enslave Macedonia. John Briscoe thinks that Livy might have invented this speech by himself because there is no known parallel from Polybius and it repeats the same arguments that Livy had already used earlier in the narrative.<sup>646</sup> The speech indeed is a typical anti-Roman speech of an enemy king. There is one particularity, however: Perseus directly criticizes the Roman freedom propaganda.

The core message of the Roman freedom propaganda in the Hellenistic East was that the Romans presented themselves as the liberators of the Greeks from the unjust slavery that kings and tyrants represented.<sup>647</sup> This was an effective way to justify the Roman military intervention in the eyes of the

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<sup>644</sup> H. Tränkle also thinks that Livy made the changes by himself: Tränkle 1977, 105.

<sup>645</sup> Liv. 42.52.6–16. For this speech, see also below on p. 192.

<sup>646</sup> Briscoe 2012, 336.

<sup>647</sup> Pol. 2.42.3–6, 2.70.1, 2.70.4, 4.22.4, 5.9.9, 9.36.4. For the proclamation of freedom in general, see Gruen 1984, 132–157; Ferrary 2014, 81–87.

locals. In this way the Romans could appear more as benefactors than conquerors. This idea could easily be aligned with the widespread Greek ideas according to which “the interests of democracies and kings are naturally opposed”.<sup>648</sup> In fact, in the Eastern Mediterranean, the promises of freedom and independence were used as a part of imperialistic propaganda already in the Hellenistic era after Alexander the Great.<sup>649</sup> The first Roman to use the freedom propaganda in the East was T. Quinctius Flamininus in 196 BC at the end of the Second Macedonian War against Philip V.<sup>650</sup> Livy and/or his annalistic sources greatly admired the Roman freedom propaganda of the past and, in fact, the speeches of kings who claimed that the Romans hated kings and were their natural adversaries promoted this propaganda and suggested that wars against these aggressive kings had been inevitable.<sup>651</sup> In this context, to claim that the Romans hated kings was to claim that the Romans loved freedom – the opposite of monarchy.

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<sup>648</sup> Pol. 22.8.6: τῶν δὲ πραγμάτων ἐναντίαν φύσιν ἔχόντων τοῖς βασιλεῦσι καὶ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις, said by an Achaean strategos Apollonidas of Sicyon. On some Greeks’ suspicion of sole-rulers, see Börm 2015b. The Achaeans valued their freedom greatly: Pol. 11.12.3, 11.13.5–8, 11.10.9; so did the Peloponnesians: Pol. 5.106.5. The Spartans found the discourse of freedom attractive owing to their past: Pol. 5.9.9, 6.48.2 and 5, 6.49.4, 9.31.4, 9.33.6, 9.38.4. After the Persian wars at the end of the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC, the authors of some Greek poleis, such as Athens, started writing negatively about both Persian people and kings as part of their own identity building: Hartog 1988, 330–339. On the impact of the Persian wars on the development of Greek identity, see Hall 2002. On the history and development of Greek ideas of tyranny and monarchy, see Luraghi 2013; Forsdyke 2009; Catenacci 2012. For Greek negative views of the Others, see Momigliano 1975, 129–137; Dauge 1981, 1–51; Hall 1989; Isaac 2004, ch. 4.

<sup>649</sup> Dmitriev 2011, part 1.

<sup>650</sup> Scholars have tried to determine when and from whom the Romans got the idea of promising freedom to the Greeks. It seems that the Greeks themselves suggested such a policy to the Romans during the course of the war: Seager 1981; Gruen 1984, 145–146; Ferrary 2014, 45–132; Walsh 1996; Dmitriev 2011, 145–199. A.M. Eckstein argues that the Achaeans convinced the Romans to adopt freedom propaganda in Greece: Eckstein 1990. The same propaganda was used against Nabis and Antiochus III right after the war with Philip V: Dmitriev 2011, 200–224. On the Roman freedom campaign against Antiochus III, see Seager 1981, 109–110; Gruen 1984, 147–157. After this, the discourse of freedom was put aside, as it had worked well only against the most formidable enemies, such as Philip V or Antiochus III, and only in those areas of the Greek world where freedom was valued the most – as Romans seemed to think. Obviously, the Romans were not the only ones using the propaganda of freedom – Philip V, Antiochus III, and later Mithridates VI presented themselves as liberators of the Greeks as well. Promises of freedom by Philip V: Pol. 4.25.6–8, 4.84.4–5, 18.14.6; Liv. 32.22.10; by Antiochus III: *OGIS* 234 I.19–22, 237 I.13 and 16; Liv. 33.38.5–7; Pol. 18.51.9. More examples of Antiochus III’s freedom propaganda: Walsh 1996, 359–361. Hannibal too had promised freedom to Tarentum: Pol. 8.25.1, 8.31.2, 8.34.4.

<sup>651</sup> On the admiration of the freedom propaganda by Livy or his annalist sources, see Carawan 1988. Livy’s work is laden with examples; see Livy’s description of the Isthmian declaration (Liv. 33.32–33. Cf. Pol. 18.46.1–14) and of the Roman settlement in Macedonia after the battle of Pydna (Liv. 45.16.2–3, 45.18. Cf. Diod. Sic. 31.8.1–9).

Another argument that the enemy kings keep using in these letters and speeches is that the Romans were aggressively looking to conquer the whole world. The enemy kings were basically suggesting that the Roman wars that had created their Mediterranean empire had been unjustified. From the Roman point of view, however, the Roman wars and subsequent dominion were justified. The narratives made it clear that the kings were the ones who did not care if their wars were justified or not: their excessive and innate ambition caused them to aggressively seek new conquests. Because of this insatiable desire for power, they were never content, even with constant new conquests and riches.<sup>652</sup> This was obviously connected with the nature of Hellenistic monarchies that required constant military success for legitimization of their rule, as discussed in section 2.1.

Cicero explained that in an ideal state a war should not be undertaken for reasons other than avenging or defending oneself or one's allies. A just war had to be declared to the enemy.<sup>653</sup> In the extant narratives, Romans seemed to have respected these requirements almost always in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC. In Livy, the Rhodians praised the Romans for never waging unjust wars and for never being motivated by conquest, even though it often was the result of their wars.<sup>654</sup> There was, however, the famous exception of Cn. Manlius Vulso's unauthorized attack on the Galatians in 189 BC.<sup>655</sup> For Livy, this was a decisive historical moment because before this all Roman wars had allegedly been waged for just reasons and declared in a correct manner. The accusers of Manlius Vulso stressed that it was not only an insult to the Republic and its laws but also to the Roman gods. This attack obviously happened long before

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<sup>652</sup> E.g., Pyrrhus: Just. Epit. 25.3, 25.4.1–2. Plutarch wrote about Pyrrhus's ambition and how the king wanted to conquer more and more lands until the whole world would be his. Even though Pyrrhus understood that he lost all the pleasures of life because of this ambition, he could not let go of his impossible goal: Plut. Pyrrh. 14.

<sup>653</sup> Cic. Rep. 3.24–26 (Ziegler 34–35). On the technical procedure for a declaration of war: Liv. 45.21.

<sup>654</sup> Liv. 37.54.14–16, 45.22.5–6.

<sup>655</sup> Liv. 38.45.4–10, 38.46.11–15. J.D. Grainger writes that we should not blindly accept Livy's opinion of Manlius Vulso's campaign and believe that the senate completely disapproved of it: Grainger 1995.

Livy or Cicero wrote, and we do not actually know precisely how or if the rule of the just war and the fetial law were followed in that era.<sup>656</sup>

At least this demonstrates that the rhetoric of just war in its moralistic sense was clearly important to Livy and therefore to his readers. Accusatory speeches of arrogant enemy kings were an excellent narrative device to draw the readers' attention to this subject: for Livy, the Romans of the past had nobly protected their allies against these aggressive kings. By justifying the past wars, Livy justified the current Roman dominion over the whole Mediterranean. This too was important within the wider attempt to redefine Roman cultural identity in their newfound position as the rulers of the multicultural Mediterranean. The fact that Cicero used the rhetoric of just war in his political speeches, as analysed by Alexander Yakobson, further illustrates its ideological relevance already in the mid-1<sup>st</sup> century BC.<sup>657</sup>

However, even these ideals left considerable space for manoeuvres. Yakobson has shown that "the Roman ideology of *iustum bellum*, 'the just war,' had to satisfy normative ethical and moral demands rather than strictly formalistic or technical-legal criteria, which implies the malleability of moral justifications and their susceptibility to being transformed into pretexts."<sup>658</sup> According to Ernst Badian, the rule of just war could indeed easily be bypassed: the Romans could ally themselves with some party under attack and make war with the attacker under the pretext of protecting their allies.<sup>659</sup> Polybius clearly states that during his lifetime the Romans were concerned about the justification of their wars in the eyes of foreign nations but does not mention any specific laws and rituals.<sup>660</sup>

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<sup>656</sup> For a detailed discussion on *iustum bellum* and *ius fetiale*, see Santangelo 2008. F. Santangelo argues (p. 77) that "[t]here are good reasons to believe that the *ius fetiale* – albeit duly revised to meet the demands of a different epoch – still played a significant role in Roman foreign policy during the early phase of Mediterranean expansion." W.V. Harris (2006, pp. 166–175) argues that these rituals were no longer followed after 171 BC. Cf. Frank 1912; Drexler 1959; Ogilvie 1965, 127–134; Dahlheim 1968, 171–180; Albert 1980; Wiedemann 1986; Petzold 1983; Watson 1993, 54–61; Ager 2009, 17–21; Burton 2011, 77. For more literature on the subject, see Ahlheid 1988, 84 n. 17.

<sup>657</sup> Yakobson 2009, 61–72. On Cicero's views, see Santangelo 2008, 81–83.

<sup>658</sup> Cited from Burton 2011, 77.

<sup>659</sup> Badian 1976, 11–12.

<sup>660</sup> Pol. 36.2. Cf. Diod. Sic. 32.5. Inscriptions also reveal the Romans' concern for their reputation in the eyes of other nations; see the letter of T. Quinctius Flaminius to Chyretiai, inscribed in stone between 197 and 194 BC: *Syll.* 593, lines 13–14, translated in Sherk 1984, 5.

According to Polybius, it was important not to confuse the causes of wars with pretexts for wars.<sup>661</sup> The war with the Dalmatians in 156 BC can be taken as an example of this: apparently, the real motivation for war was that there had been too long a peacetime after the war with Perseus because the senate feared that the Romans would become “effeminate” because of the prolonged peace.<sup>662</sup> Polybius proceeds to write that “these, then, were the reasons why the Romans went to war with the Dalmatians, but to the world at large they gave out that they had decided on war owing to the insult to their ambassadors”.<sup>663</sup> Therefore, for Polybius it had already seemed clear that for Romans it was more important to morally justify the wars to other nations rather than follow some actual Roman laws in that regard. Donald W. Baronowski has studied Polybius’s attitudes to Roman expansion in detail and further argues that almost all Roman wars had had an acceptable moral justification for Polybius, even though Polybius clearly admits that often Romans waged wars for economic reasons or otherwise acted with expansionist intent.<sup>664</sup> Polybius did not criticize the Romans for this, however, because for Polybius the Roman dominion was mostly beneficial to its subjects and it had been well earned with superior Roman *virtus*.<sup>665</sup>

This attitude of Polybius is noticeable in a series of speeches set before the Second Macedonian War (200–197 BC) against Philip V. The first is a speech of Demetrius, an Illyrian ruler of the island of Pharos, to Philip V. After having been defeated by the Romans in the Second Illyrian War (220–219 BC), Demetrius had fled to the court of Philip V to be his advisor. Polybius says that news of the Roman defeat by Hannibal at Lake Trasimene in 217 BC had reached Philip V, and Demetrius advised him to take over Illyria and attack

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<sup>661</sup> Pol. 22.18.6. Cf. Walbank 1979; Baronowski 1995; Baronowski 2011, 73–77.

<sup>662</sup> Pol. 32.13. According to Polybius, this had happened to the Carthaginians (31.21.3.) and to the Egyptian king Ptolemy VI Philometor (39.7.7).

<sup>663</sup> Pol. 32.13.9: αὐτὰι μὲν οὖν ἦσαν αἰτίαι δι’ ἃς ἐπολέμησαν Ῥωμαῖοι Δελματεῦσι· τοῖς γε μὴν ἔκτος τὸν πόλεμον ἀνεδείκνυσον, ὡς διὰ τὴν εἰς τοὺς πρεσβευτὰς ὕβριν κεκρικότες πολεμεῖν. Mistreatment of messengers was considered a valid reason for war: Pol. 33.9.

<sup>664</sup> Baronowski 2011, 11–13, 61–62, 65–86. Roman wars that did not have an acceptable pretext or a justifiable cause according to Polybius: Pol. 3.15.10, 3.28.1–2, 3.30.4.

<sup>665</sup> For the beneficence of the Roman dominion until 168 BC in Polybius’s view, see Baronowski 2011, 91–95. Still, Polybius was not afraid to criticize the Romans when criticism was due, for example for immoral methods used in wars and diplomacy: Baronowski 2011, 77–85. For Polybius’s general views on imperialism, see Thornton 2020, 155–218.

the Romans while they were still occupied with Hannibal.<sup>666</sup> Polybius stresses that Demetrius did not try to intimidate Philip V but, rather, he appealed to the young king's ambition. Indeed, Polybius remarks that Philip V dreamt of world dominion and that such ambitions were quite natural to a young king who had such a glorious ancestry.<sup>667</sup> This highlights the fact that for Polybius the war with Philip V had been inevitable and justified.

Soon after this, Polybius includes another speech in his narrative addressed to Philip V by an Aetolian leader named Agelaus of Naupactus.<sup>668</sup> The core message of this speech is that Philip V would be wise to make peace with the Aetolians and concentrate on the "looming clouds in the west" because whoever won the war in Italy would not stop there but the Greek East would be their next target. Still, Polybius again emphasizes that Philip V too planned to eventually dominate the whole world.<sup>669</sup> Polybius's fragment provides another later speech of a Greek ambassador, Thrasycrates, perhaps a Rhodian, to the Aetolians.<sup>670</sup> In this speech, the Aetolians are blamed for bringing the Romans into Greece. With the pretext of helping their allies, the Romans would step by step conquer everything, which was their "true and ultimate goal" (11.6.2). No one in Greece could yet know what kind of masters the Romans would be and if they would be any better than the Macedonians.

Thus, Polybius points out that the Romans did have a valid pretext for going to war against Philip V, who was not at all innocent: by focalizing internally on Philip V, Polybius reveals his personal desire for world dominion. We should remember that, in the context of Hellenistic monarchies, constant

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<sup>666</sup> Pol. 5.101.7–10. Trogus/Justin (29.2.1–7) have transformed this into a classic anti-Roman speech that repeats the usual arguments: Romans had the ambition to dominate the whole world, they were at war with every monarch, and Demetrius had been expelled "only because he seemed to be their neighbour – as though it were a crime for any king to be next to the borders of their empire".

<sup>667</sup> Pol. 5.102.1. Polybius criticizes Demetrius for often giving such audacious advice: Pol. 5.12.5, 7.13–14.

<sup>668</sup> Pol. 5.103.9–104.11. Trogus/Justin (29.2.8–9, 29.3.1–5) have transformed this into an apocalyptic speech of Philip V to the Aetolians: the speech includes metaphors not only of dark clouds from the west but also of thunder and a rain of blood.

<sup>669</sup> Polybius used the metaphor of "dark clouds coming from the west" several times: 5.104.10, 9.37.10, and 38.16.3. Philip V's desire for world dominion: Pol. 5.104.7.

<sup>670</sup> Pol. 11.4–6. For the identity of the speaker, see Walbank 1967, 247–248. The Aetolians and Philip V made peace in 217 BC, but the Aetolians allied with the Romans again in 211 BC. It is unclear if this speech is *also* related to the negotiations of 217 BC, as in Pol. 5.103.9–5.104.11 (see above n. 668), or if this is a later occasion.

military activity was important for legitimization of rule.<sup>671</sup> Military success confirmed the king's authority and earned him the peoples' respect. Kings who were not active and successful in wars were considered weak and risked losing their kingship.<sup>672</sup> However, these speeches – especially the last one – hint that the Romans too planned to conquer the world. Frank W. Walbank notes that, even though this statement (Pol. 11.6.2) does not comport with the Romans' actions before or after this time, it corresponds to Polybius's personal views.<sup>673</sup> This is precisely what Baronowski has argued in detail: for Polybius the Romans had intentionally set out to conquer the Mediterranean since the First Punic War (264–241 BC).<sup>674</sup>

In fact, it was not only foreigners but also the Romans themselves who seem to have this idea in Polybius's text. For example, Scipio Africanus had promised his soldiers a universal Roman empire during the Second Punic War (218–201 BC).<sup>675</sup> Another fragment from the later books reveals that, according to Polybius, Scipio Africanus knew that the ultimate goal of the war against Antiochus III was to “become masters of Asia”.<sup>676</sup> Moreover, Polybius uses his own authorial/narratorial voice to praise the Roman expansion:

The progress of the Romans was not due to chance and was not involuntary, as some among the Greeks choose to think, but that by schooling themselves in such vast and perilous enterprises it was perfectly natural that they not only gained the courage to aim at universal dominion, but executed their purpose.<sup>677</sup>

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<sup>671</sup> Gehrke 2013. On Hellenistic imperialism, see Strootman 2014. M.M. Austin notes that waging wars and conquering was also economically very important for the kingdom: Austin 1986, 455–466.

<sup>672</sup> Philip V and Antiochus III had to prove themselves as young new kings, and the best way to do this was war; for Philip V, see Pol. 4.22.5, 5.16.2, 18.6, 26.4, 29.2, 34.2; for Antiochus III, see Pol. 5.34.2, 41.1; Liv. 42.29.5–7. Even if a king was initially successful, too long a period of passivity could make a king lose the respect of his subjects: Just. Epit. 35.1.1, 36.1.1–2.

<sup>673</sup> Walbank 1967a, 277.

<sup>674</sup> Baronowski 2011.

<sup>675</sup> Pol. 15.10.2; Baronowski 2011, 71–72.

<sup>676</sup> Pol. 21.4.5.

<sup>677</sup> Pol. 1.63.9: [...] οὐ τύχη Ῥωμαῖοι, καθάπερ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐδ' αὐτομάτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν εἰκότως ἐν τοιοῦτοις καὶ τηλικούτοις πράγμασιν ἐνασκήσαντες οὐ μόνον ἐπεβάλλοντο τῇ τῶν ὀλων ἡγεμονίᾳ καὶ δυναστείᾳ τολμηρῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθίκοντο τῆς προθέσεως. Cf. a less explicit comment on the Romans protecting their own interests: Pol. 31.10; Baronowski 1995, 25 n. 26. The Romans' conscious drive for domination: Pol. 1.6, 1.10.5–9, 1.12.7, 1.20.1–2, 2.21.9, 2.31.8, 3.3.9, 3.32.7, 6.50.6. Deliberate expansion: Pol. 1.3.6–10,

It has been the prevailing opinion among the scholarship that the Romans had no interest in annexing and governing new areas in the Hellenistic East at the beginning of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC.<sup>678</sup> In these studies it is argued that we cannot speak of intentional Roman imperialism yet in this era, for the sources give the impression that the Romans were actively, if not always very successfully, avoiding interfering with eastern politics and conquering new areas. Scholars have called this “defensive imperialism”, as opposed to “aggressive imperialism”.<sup>679</sup> William V. Harris however has argued that, while the Romans justified their wars by claiming that they were protecting their allies and themselves, their ultimate goal was to conquer.<sup>680</sup> Therefore, for this reason even seemingly “defensive” imperialism would fundamentally be aggressive. The reason for this, as suggested by Harris, would be that success in wars was necessary for Roman individuals to advance their political careers and to demonstrate their *virtus*.<sup>681</sup> Therefore, military conquest would be as politically important to the Hellenistic kings as it was to Romans. Harris’s view seems radical compared to the previous scholarship. The debate is ongoing, however, because the narratives of Polybius, Livy, and others give a very mixed image: depending on the author’s narrative goals, the focalization, and the situation, the Romans appear as noble peacekeepers or aggressive conquerors.<sup>682</sup>

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1.63.4–9, 3.2.6, 8.1.3, 9.10.11, 15.9.2, 15.10.2. Cf. Walbank 1972, 160–163. Contra: Derow, Erskine, and Quinn 2015, 125–150.

<sup>678</sup> Badian 1976; Gruen 1984; Sherwin-White 1984; Kallet-Marx 1995; Eckstein 2008; several articles in Hoyos 2013. On the meaning of the word *imperium* in different eras, see Richardson 1991.

<sup>679</sup> For a detailed discussion on the use of these concepts in earlier scholarship, see Dmitriev 2009; Erskine 2010, ch. 3.

<sup>680</sup> Harris 2006, 163–165. This is precisely what the Rhodian ambassador says at Pol. 11.6.2.

<sup>681</sup> Harris 2006, 10–41. On the importance of military success in political career in Rome, see Badian 1976, 12–15; Rosenstein 1990, 1–5.

<sup>682</sup> For example, some scholars have seen the war with Nabis and the following war with Antiochus III as proof that freedom propaganda was only a convenient excuse to make war against whomever Romans wanted to and to control the political situation between various states and kingdoms in the Hellenistic East: Seager 1981, 111–112; Carawan 1988, 232, 237; Dmitriev 2011, 201–209. While Baronowski only studies Polybius’s personal ideas of Roman imperialism, his study is relevant to the theories of these other scholars: Baronowski 2011.

In this chapter, I have focused on the narrative purpose of Rome-critical speeches and letters in Polybius's, Sallust's, Livy's, and Pompeius Trogus's works. The speeches and letters often repeat the same accusation: the Romans were greedy for power and would never stop conquering. The enemy kings try to make themselves victims with these arguments. Evidently, for Polybius and other historians after him there was nothing wrong per se in conquering. Polybius even frankly admits that world conquest was the ultimate goal of the Romans. It was the natural right of the strongest nations. Success in wars was also very important for the Hellenistic kings who needed to legitimize their rule.<sup>683</sup> Besides, Polybius and Livy emphasize that the Romans had had an honourable pretext for every war, and this made their position as the rulers of an empire justified. The accusations of enemy kings are a rhetorical tool to recapitulate preceding events and to highlight the Roman military success. The lists of enemies that the Romans had previously defeated only reminded the readers of their past achievements and military *virtus*.

Another accusation that repeatedly appears in the speeches and letters is that the Romans hated all kings. They served to polarize republican and monarchic governments and to emphasize the importance of *odium regni* in Roman political discourse during the Republic and early Augustan reign. In Roman anti-monarchic discourse, the Republic represented freedom whereas monarchy represented slavery. This claim was useful for promoting the freedom propaganda, applied by the Romans in the Greek East. The enemies' accusations that Romans hated kings draw the readers' attention to these themes and place the Romans in the position of defenders of freedom.

Anti-Roman speeches and letters could have other additional narrative objectives, achieved by different stylistic choices. Speeches and letters gave the historians an opportunity to momentarily focalize closer to the enemy characters and reveal their arrogance and personal aspirations. They could choose direct or indirect speech, and they could choose between two formats – speech or letter. These choices affected the level of focalization, the tone and contents of the discourse, and the rhythm of the narrative. Using the enemies' voices gave the historians an opportunity to criticize the Roman society or its

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<sup>683</sup> Gehrke 2013; Austin 1986.

conduct abroad safely through a distant Other, should they choose to do so. Each historian had a different style in this, however. Sallust was the most disposed to criticizing the violence of the late republican Roman aristocracy with the enemies' voice, and he readily also did so with his own authorial/narratorial voice. Polybius's *Histories* and the extant parts of Livy's work focus on the time before 146 BC – the time period during which the gradual Roman moral decline had begun in their opinion.<sup>684</sup> For them, the successful conquests overseas and increased wealth had brought about irreversible moral decline.<sup>685</sup>

For our historians, enemy speeches and letters are not the primary way of expressing criticism of Roman moral decline, however. The enemies mostly question the justification of Roman expansion – a doubt that the authors themselves did not share. The enemy speeches and letters remain a category of their own, reserved for the enemies' empty slander against the Romans. Still, according to our historians, because of the gradual and slow moral decline that was creeping into the Roman society during the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC, several Romans *did* treat several kings dishonestly. But this treatment was not as flashy and systematic as the enemy speeches and letters accuse them of – it was subtle and devious, as the next two subchapters will show. In the rest of this study in general, I will explore the theme of moral decline in depth.

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<sup>684</sup> For Polybius (31.25), the battle of Pydna and the end of the Third Macedonian War in 168 BC had been the point of no return. For Livy (39.6.), it had started with Cn. Manlius Vulso and his return to Rome from his successful but unauthorized campaign against the Asian Gauls after 187 BC. For Sallust, the pivotal moment had been the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC: Sall. Catil. 10.1, Iug. 41.2, hist. 1.9 (11a M, 9 Mc), 1.10.1 (11b M, 10 Mc). The view of Velleius Paterculus was similar to that of Sallust: Vell. Pat. 2.1.1. For Pompeius Trogus, the turning point might have been the inheritance of the kingdom of Pergamon by the Romans in 133 BC: Just. Epit. 36.4.12.

<sup>685</sup> Pol. 18.41.3–5; Cic. Rep. 2.7–8; Isaac 2004, 304–312.

### 3.2 ROMANS AS INSTIGATORS OF DISCORD IN ROYAL COURTS

#### ***Concordia and pietas: The example of Attalus Philadelphus and Eumenes II***

In Roman thought, *concordia* and *pietas* were regarded as immensely important virtues for the integrity of both the family and the state. Lack of *concordia* and *pietas* could make the family and analogously the whole state – monarchy and the Republic alike – shatter from within. Emphasizing these virtues was an important part of Roman identity building in the republican historical narratives and during the consolidation of Augustus's rule after the period of civil wars. They were also important in the wider context of the Augustus's *pax romana* propaganda. In the following three examples, I illustrate the importance of these virtues from the perspective of friendly Hellenistic and Numidian royal families that became targets of certain Romans' dishonest attempts to shatter their internal concord. In Roman thought, *concordia* was linked to *metus hostilis*.<sup>686</sup> This means that fear of an external enemy was believed to help keep the state unified and away from internal disagreements. However, in these examples, the foreign kings and princes in question consider the Romans their allies and are thus blinded to the threat they pose. In this way, the narratives contrast the positive Other, the friendly kings, to the negative Self. By casting several Romans in a negative light, the narratives show the early symptoms of Roman moral decline.

The first example discussed here is the Romans' role in causing tension in the Attalid royal court. During their narratives of the Third Macedonian War (171–168 BC), Livy and Polybius draw more and more attention to King Eumenes II's younger brother Attalus and how some leading Romans were starting to prefer him over the king himself. Indeed, the falling into disfavour of Eumenes and, on the other hand, the newfound popularity of Attalus form an important

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<sup>686</sup> In fact, the thought derives already from the Greeks: Plat. Resp. 8.566c, Leg. 3.698b–c; Aristot. Pol. 2.1271b; Zecchini 2018a, 135–136.

background for the next part of their narratives: the growing tension and competing ambitions between the two brothers and how certain Romans tried to instigate it. This posed a serious test of *virtus* and *concordia* between the brothers.<sup>687</sup>

Even though the kingdom of Pergamon was a monarchy, Roman authors seemed to find many exemplary similarities between it and the Roman republican government. The kingdom of Eumenes II was seen as a rare example of a perfectly functioning monarchy, not only because of Eumenes II's several personal virtues in his dealings with his subjects and abroad, but also because of the harmonious internal family relations. Polybius commends Eumenes II: "having three brothers not far behind him in age and activity <very similar to him>, he kept them all in the position of his obedient satellites and guardians of the dignity of his throne, a thing for which one can find few parallels."<sup>688</sup>

Of all his brothers, Eumenes' bond with Attalus was especially strong. Polybius and Livy give us many examples of how Attalus had always supported Eumenes during war campaigns and in governing their kingdom.<sup>689</sup> Attalus actively promoted the fame and interests of Eumenes in Greece, and the love for his brother was an integral part of his public image. Indeed, he was commonly named "Philadelphus".<sup>690</sup> The concord between the two older brothers even endured some serious blows. After the infamous assassination

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<sup>687</sup> For the incident in general, see Ogden 1999, 199–212.

<sup>688</sup> Pol. 32.8.6–7: τρίτον ἀδελφούς ἔχων τρεῖς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν καὶ πράξιν <ὀμοιοτάτους αὐτῷ>, πάντας τούτους συνέσχε πειθαρχοῦντας αὐτῷ καὶ δορυφοροῦντας καὶ σφύζοντας τὸ τῆς βασιλείας ἀξίωμα. τοῦτο δὲ σπανίως εὖροι τις ἄν γεγονός. Polybius described their mother too, named Apollonis, as a praiseworthy woman who greatly loved her family. When she visited her hometown, Cyzicus, she walked around the city and visited temples hand in hand with all her sons, and the people applauded and respected the princes greatly because of this gesture of devotion to the family: Pol. 22.20.

<sup>689</sup> He had, for example, helped the Romans in Asia against the Gauls when Eumenes himself was busy elsewhere: Pol. 21.33.2, 21.39.5 and 8 and 11, 21.40.9, 30.1.4; Liv. 38.12–13 and 20–27. Eumenes trusted Attalus greatly and sometimes even left the kingdom under his care, when Eumenes himself was abroad: Liv. 38.12–13.

<sup>690</sup> Polybius reports that some Achaeans were displeased with Eumenes II and decided to remove all statues and inscriptions dedicated to the king. When Attalus saw how offended Eumenes II was for being deprived of recognition in Achaëa, Attalus sent a deputation to ask the Achaeans to repeal the decree. Polybius himself was present at that time and held a speech in which he stated that removing all the statues and inscriptions of Eumenes II was against their own laws. Attalus's request prevailed, to the great joy of his brother: Pol. 27.18, 28.7. On the Achaeans' decision and Polybius's speech, see Walbank 1979, 334–336; Usher 2009, 509–510. Attalus "Philadelphus": *OGIS* 308.

attempt of Eumenes by Perseus, everyone at Pergamon believed that the king had really died. In no time Attalus seduced the queen, Eumenes' wife, and took over the throne. When Eumenes returned alive, the king decided to suppress his anger and forgive Attalus, who had immediately stepped down and returned his wife.<sup>691</sup>

But the greatest test of *concordia* between the brothers was posed by their allies, the Romans, after Eumenes II had fallen into their disfavour. According to Polybius, in 167 BC Eumenes sent his brother Attalus to Rome to congratulate the Romans for the victory over Perseus and to ask for help against the Galatians, the Asiatic Gauls.<sup>692</sup> Polybius focalizes internally on Attalus:

He was very cordially received on all sides since they had become intimate with him in camp, and thought he was very well disposed to Rome, and, as the warmth of his reception even surpassed his expectations, he began to entertain extravagant hopes, not knowing the true reason of their kindness.<sup>693</sup>

Soon the real reason for the exaggerated enthusiasm was revealed to the Attalid prince.<sup>694</sup> Some of the “most distinguished Romans” told Attalus in a private conversation that the senate wished to create a separate kingdom for Attalus. This was supposed to be a countermeasure against Eumenes II, whom the senate suspected of planning something harmful behind their backs. Attalus found this suggestion interesting and, his ambition suddenly stimulated, agreed to talk about it with the senate. The Roman readers would have presumably known that Attalus did not betray Eumenes II, but Polybius, being a master of narrative suspense, creates this exciting brief scene to keep the readers engaged and to convey a memorable moral lesson. This was an obvious breach of *fides* on these Romans' part and went against the Roman

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<sup>691</sup> Liv. 42.16.9; Diod. Sic. 29.34.2. On the plausibility of the story, see Briscoe 2012, 208–209.

<sup>692</sup> Pol. 30.1.

<sup>693</sup> Pol. 30.1.4: πάντων δὲ φιλοφρόνως αὐτὸν ἀποδεχομένων διὰ τε τὴν ἐν τῇ στρατείᾳ γεγενημένην συνήθειαν καὶ διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν εὖνουν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καὶ γινομένης τῆς ἀπαντήσεως ὑπὲρ τὴν προσδοκίαν, μετέωρος ἐγενήθη ταῖς ἐλπίσιν, οὐκ εἰδὼς τὴν ἀληθινὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἀποδοχῆς.

<sup>694</sup> Pol 30.6–8.

ideal of *pietas* towards the family, but Attalus was briefly too blinded by ambition to consider this.

Here, we should remember the general importance of the narratives of honesty and *fides* in Roman international relations, as argued by Paul J. Burton and demonstrated with examples in section 2.2. Examples of such narratives in historiography are many, and probably among the most famous episodes is the story of how the Romans had warned their enemy Pyrrhus of an assassination plan. Historian Q. Claudius Quadrigarius had written that the Romans took pride in their custom of not resorting to bribes or trickery in war, and they did not want other nations to think they did.<sup>695</sup> Since the Romans ideally would not resort to trickery in war, they should do even less so in friendships. In Livy's text the Spartan tyrant Nabis had said "as it is, when I look at you, I see that you are Romans, men who reportedly hold treaties as the most inviolable of things in the divine sphere, and good faith (*fides*) with one's allies as the most inviolable in the human."<sup>696</sup> Now, while reading Polybius's account of the Romans' intrigue against Eumenes II, the question arises of whether for Polybius the Romans of the mid-2<sup>nd</sup> century BC had already forgotten or purposefully disregarded their famous moral principles.

Polybius continues the story and writes that Eumenes had predicted that the Romans would try to ruin his kingdom and had sent a trusted friend Stratius with Attalus to intervene if necessary.<sup>697</sup> Stratius argued in an extremely rational manner, in indirect speech, that Attalus already was the co-ruler with Eumenes, having identical power and lacking merely the crown and the title.<sup>698</sup> He was also the undisputed successor, since Eumenes did not have children.<sup>699</sup> Eumenes would probably not live much longer because of his poor health.<sup>700</sup> Therefore it made no sense to ruin such a balanced and

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<sup>695</sup> Gell. NA 3.8.

<sup>696</sup> Liv. 34.31.4–5: "Nunc cum vos intueor, Romanos esse video, qui rerum divinarum foedera, humanarum fidem socialem sanctissimam habeatis." On the importance of morality for both Livy's internal and external audiences, see Levene 2006, 104–106. For the importance of *fides* in international alliances, see also Rizzi 2011, 9–33, in addition to Burton 2011.

<sup>697</sup> Pol. 30.2.

<sup>698</sup> For evidence of Attalus as an effective co-ruler, see Walbank 1979, 416.

<sup>699</sup> Actually, he did have a son, the future king Attalus III, with a concubine but at this time he was just a baby and was not yet recognized as Eumenes' natural son, as Polybius remarks at 33.2.5.

<sup>700</sup> Eumenes II died nine years later, in 159 BC, at an age of at least sixty.

advantageous family situation, even more so in the face of the imminent Galatian threat. Attalus chose to stay loyal to his brother and to say nothing against him in front of the senate.

Generally speaking, the historians' portrayals of various illustrious individuals like Scipio Africanus, Flamininus, Eumenes II, Jugurtha and many others demonstrate that ambition was a natural quality that always came with great talent. Polybius has written, referring generally to anyone, that it was very common to lose one's moral focus temporarily, but if "one calls their attention at the right time to their error, they very soon change their minds and correct it".<sup>701</sup> In Attalus's case, this indeed worked and Attalus kept his ambition in check. Another example discussed above comes to mind from Livy's (and probably Polybius's) text: when Masinissa was temporarily blinded by love for the enemy queen Sophoniba, Scipio Africanus succeeded in convincing him to trust in the Roman virtues of continence and loyalty and renounce the queen.<sup>702</sup> In Attalus's example, however, it was the Romans who played the part of instigators, not the hostile Other, and the voice of reason comes from his brother.

To finish with Polybius's version of Attalus and Eumenes II, Polybius focalizes on the senate who gave Attalus lavish gifts and promised every help against the Galatians, hoping that Attalus would later speak against Eumenes II as agreed upon earlier. But when Attalus abruptly left Rome and it was apparent that he had not taken the bait, the senate was disappointed and disinterested in keeping the promises they had made a while before.<sup>703</sup> Polybius remarks: "In consequence he narrowly escaped damaging the interests of himself and his brother and their kingdom in general."<sup>704</sup> Thus Polybius draws an obvious parallel between concord in a family and in a state. According to Donald W. Baronowski, Polybius "did not criticize the Romans on this account, for the king had imprudently given them valid cause for

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<sup>701</sup> Pol. 27.9.6: οὓς ἐν ἐπιστήσῃ τις ἐν καιρῷ, ταχέως μετατίθενται καὶ παρὰ πόδας ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀγνοίας. For the whole citation, see above p. 46 n. 146.

<sup>702</sup> See above pp. 106–108.

<sup>703</sup> Pol. 30.3.

<sup>704</sup> Pol. 30.1.5: διὸ καὶ παρ' ὀλίγον ἦλθε τοῦ λυμῆνασθαι τὰ σφέτερα πράγματα καὶ τὴν ὅλην βασιλείαν.

retaliation, a grave error in the eyes of Polybius, as already noted”.<sup>705</sup> Baronowski also notes that when Eumenes II was later banned from Rome and refused help against the Galatians, Polybius explicitly states that the senate had secretly hoped to weaken Eumenes’ authority in his kingdom with this deed.<sup>706</sup> Either way, even without directly stating so, it is clear from Polybius’s blunt narrative that these Romans’ actions here went against their own moral ideals. Polybius believed that the Roman *virtus* had started rapidly weakening after the battle of Pydna in 168 BC because of excessive wealth and the end of *metus hostilis*.<sup>707</sup> The treatment of Attalus right after this moral turning point was one of the symptoms of this moral decline in Polybius’s narrative.

Livy did not seem to like this type of devious and revengeful portrayal of the Roman senate, however. Livy reports the same event but made some significant changes, added details of his own, and extended it into a longer moral lesson of family relations and good leadership.<sup>708</sup> Livy too starts by focalizing internally on Attalus, but, differently from Polybius, Livy reveals that Attalus secretly hoped that some like-minded Romans would help him in his ambitious designs against his brother.<sup>709</sup> As Emilio Pianezzola, Hermann Tränkle, and others note, it is obvious that Livy has transformed this scene by making it appear that it had been Attalus’s own idea to betray Eumenes II.<sup>710</sup> The “certain untrustworthy Romans” mentioned by Livy casts the senate in a better light than Polybius, who wrote that it was the whole senate’s idea to suggest the conspiracy to the unsuspecting Attalus.<sup>711</sup> This is another indication that Livy strived to soften Polybius’s tones regarding Roman immoral behaviour in certain cases. We have already seen examples of Livy’s tendency to modify some of Polybius’s anti-Roman speeches and letters, and

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<sup>705</sup> Baronowski 2011, 79.

<sup>706</sup> Pol. 30.19.11–13.

<sup>707</sup> Pol. 18.35.1–2, 31.25.4–5; Champion 2004, 198–202. F.W. Walbank, however, thinks that Roman moral decline was not a central theme in Polybius’s work and that Polybius does not apply the political analysis of the sixth book to Roman society in other parts of his work: Walbank 2002, 193–208.

<sup>708</sup> Liv. 45.19.1–45.20.3. For all the changes compared to Polybius in detail: Briscoe 2012, 662–668.

<sup>709</sup> Liv. 45.19.4.

<sup>710</sup> Pianezzola 2018, 57–59; Tränkle 1977, 155–157; Briscoe 2012, 662–663.

<sup>711</sup> Liv. 45.19.4: “quidam Romanorum quoque non boni auctores.” Cf. Walbank 1979, 416.

his attempts to portray the Roman ally Eumenes II in a more positive light, and we will continue to see similar tendencies in the following discussion regarding the portrayals of Flamininus and Scipio Africanus. This kind of comparison of Polybius's and Livy's different treatments of certain *exempla* – whenever we have both versions in a sufficiently preserved state – reveals how many different shades of grey one single *exemplum* can have in a longer literary tradition.

Another significant modification by Livy is Stratius's speech which Livy fills in with much more detail. The speech in indirect form starts with an emphasis on fraternal concord:

Different kingdoms had grown by different means. Their kingdom was young and not based on age-old resources; it depended on fraternal harmony; although one brother bore the title of king and wore the crown on his head, all the brothers governed the kingdom.<sup>712</sup>

Livy makes Stratius stress much more heavily the fact that if the brothers stay unified, they could ward off the Galatians, but if they start quarrelling for power, they would lose everything. Attalus should also consider what the most honourable thing to do was:

If both actions—preserving the kingdom for his brother and taking it away from him—could bring renown, still the praise for having saved the kingdom would be greater since it was linked to respect for family. But since in fact the alternative was despicable and practically parricide, was there any uncertainty left to be considered? [...] Stratius ended by saying that even the men who were goading Attalus on—and they were doing so as enemies of Eumenes rather than friends of his—even these would praise his piety and constancy if he remained loyal to his brother to the end.<sup>713</sup>

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<sup>712</sup> Liv. 45.19.9–11: “aliis alia regna crevisse rebus dicendo; regnum eorum novum, nullis vetustis fundatum opibus, fraterna stare concordia, quod unus nomen regium et praecipuum capitis insigne gerat, omnes fratres regnent.”

<sup>713</sup> Liv. 45.19.14–15 and 17: “Si utraque gloriosa res esset, et servasse fratri regnum et eripuisse, servati tamen regni, quae iuncta pietati sit, potioem laudem fuisse. Sed enimvero cum detestabilis altera res et proxima parricidio sit, quid ad deliberationem dubii superesse? [...] Eos ipsos qui non illi amici sed Eumeni infesti stimulent eum pietatem constantiamque laudaturos, si fidem ad ultimum fratri praestitisset.”

Livy narrates the rest of Attalus's visit in a more condensed manner than Polybius, leaving out the mention that Attalus left Rome unexpectedly before those few "untrustworthy Romans" had a chance to convince him, and that the senate was so disappointed that they did not keep all their promises. Livy's version makes the senate as a whole seem more honourable, as Jane D. Chaplin notes, but it is a small consolation after the intrigue against the Attalid brothers.<sup>714</sup> The *exemplum*, even though not as harsh as in Polybius, serves to draw attention to the changes in Roman *virtus* and other moral values over time which was one of the overall themes of Livy's work.<sup>715</sup> Indeed, according to Livy the decline of Roman virtues had begun circa two decades before with the victory of Cn. Manlius Vulso against the Asiatic Gauls and his return to Rome with countless riches and undisciplined soldiers in 187 BC.<sup>716</sup>

However, it is curious that in Livy's version Stratius tells Attalus that even the very same Romans who were trying to turn Attalus against his brother would appreciate Attalus's *pietas* and *constantia* if he remained loyal to Eumenes. The remark demonstrates that Livy believed that traditional family values were still remembered and respected among the leading Romans, even though some of them were acting like devious oriental diplomats, to cite a common Roman stereotype, trying to interfere with Eumenes' kingdom. Indeed, in another example (to be discussed in detail below) related to the war with Perseus not long before, Livy makes some older senators remind the younger ones that the Roman way, *Romanae artes*, was candour and honesty in all dealings, citing the ancient *exempla* of the Faliscan child hostages returned to their fathers or the time when the Romans warned Pyrrhus about an assassination plan.<sup>717</sup> In Attalus's *exemplum*, however, it is not a Roman but a foreign king, Eumenes II (through Stratius), who has to act as the voice of reason and to explain these virtues to Attalus.

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<sup>714</sup> Chaplin 2007, 350 n. 186.

<sup>715</sup> Liv. praef. 9.

<sup>716</sup> Liv. 39.6. Interestingly, C. Balmaceda has studied Livy's use of virtue-related vocabulary throughout *Ab urbe condita* and notes that starting with Book 39, Livy attributes *virtus* to the Romans considerably less than in the earlier books, whereas their vices seem to increase: Balmaceda 2017, 96, 104–105.

<sup>717</sup> Liv. 42.47.4–8. Cf. Diod. Sic. 30.7. Faliscan children: Liv. 5.26–27. For the *exemplum* with Pyrrhus: see above pp. 93–96.

Besides, Livy heavily stresses the importance of *concordia* and *pietas* in the context of the family and government at the same time.<sup>718</sup> *Pietas* was the key to *concordia* in a family and a state, and *concordia* was the basis for stability.<sup>719</sup> Indeed, a good state leader was expected to have the same virtues as a good *paterfamilias*. Not by chance, the members of the senate were called *patres*. Consequently, *pietas* was one of the four greatest virtues attributed to Augustus, the proclaimed *pater patriae* and the bringer of political concord and the *pax romana*.<sup>720</sup> He accentuated his *pietas* by honouring his adoptive father C. Julius Caesar and by avenging his murder. Moreover, the ideology of *pietas* was applied to Augustan legislation (e.g., the *Lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis*).<sup>721</sup> Thus, *pietas* became a core element in Augustus's moral propaganda that aimed to project a sense of unity and shared Romanness among the Romans who had experienced several identity-shaking events during the last few generations: the extension of Roman citizenship to the whole Italian peninsula and a series of civil wars.

These Roman moral concepts were often applied to kings, and not just in historiography. For example, when defending King Deiotarus, Cicero listed as one of his best qualities as a ruler that he was *optimus pater familias*.<sup>722</sup> As for Roman kings, already Ennius graced Romulus with the titles *patriae custos*, *pater*, and *genitor*.<sup>723</sup> Hellenistic kings themselves liked to stress their respect for the family with the common royal epithets Eupator, Philopator, and Philadelphus.<sup>724</sup> When Eumenes II died in 158 BC, Polybius's obituary note of

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<sup>718</sup> *Pietas* was not only the sense of duty towards one's family but also towards gods, society, and friends. On the importance of *iustitia* and *pietas* towards the family, see Cic. Rep. 6.20 (Ziegler 16). On the relation of *virtus*, family, and the *res publica*, see McDonnell 2006, 173–180.

<sup>719</sup> Cic. Rep. 2.69; Roller 2001, 26–27. For the power balance between *pater* and the *res publica*, see Gaughan 2010, ch. 2.

<sup>720</sup> His *clipeus virtutis* listed *virtus*, *clementia*, *iustitia*, and *pietas*: R. Gest. div. Aug. 34.2. Augustus as *pater patriae* and the bringer of peace: R. Gest. div. Aug. 8.5, 35.1; Hor. Carm. 4.5.21–24, Carm. saec. 57–59.

<sup>721</sup> For different applications of *pietas* during the reign of Augustus, see Gagliardi 2018.

<sup>722</sup> Cic. Deiot. 27.

<sup>723</sup> Cic. Rep. 1.64 (= Enn. Ann. 105–109 in the 2018 Loeb edition, or 117–121 in Warmington's 1935 edition).

<sup>724</sup> According to the legend, the first king of the Antigonid dynasty, Demetrius I, was famous for his harmonious relationship with his son: Plut. Demetr. 3. According to Xenophon, Cyrus the Great tried to teach his sons to live in harmony: Xen. Cyr. 8.7.6–28. V. Gabrielsen examines how the family metaphor was applied in the governments of the empires of the Achaemenids, Alexander the Great, and the Seleucids: Gabrielsen 2008, 33–39.

the king praises him especially for maintaining concord in his own family.<sup>725</sup> Attalus succeeded Eumenes II on the throne and took the name Attalus II, ruling for 21 more years.

To conclude with the *exemplum* of Attalus and Eumenes II, Polybius and Livy use them to give a moral lesson on the importance of *concordia* and *pietas* in family relations and in politics – a lesson that could be applied to the Pergamene monarchic and Roman republican systems both. Besides, both historians use the *exemplum* to show that Roman moral decline, as they imagined it, was already well underway in this historical period right after the end of the Third Macedonian War with the battle of Pydna in 168 BC. However, Livy has mitigated the extent to which the Romans were involved in the intrigue: perhaps for Livy it was too early in the narrative for blatant acts against Roman moral principles that involved the whole senate. In addition, Livy has greatly expanded Polybius’s moral lesson. Livy’s special attention to this aspect reflects his contemporary Roman society, governed and reformed by Augustus who in his public propaganda highlighted the importance of internal unity. Augustus also presented himself as the restorer of traditional republican moral values. During his lifetime, there was a dire need to promote a common system of moral values and to reconstruct Roman identity around them. The recent period of civil wars had dismantled these effectively. In this sense, Livy’s phrase “although one brother bore the title of king and wore the crown on his head, all the brothers governed the kingdom” might remind the readers of the position that Augustus took in the Roman senate at the beginning of his reign: he was, after all, “the first among equals”.<sup>726</sup>

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<sup>725</sup> Pol. 32.8. Cf. Gruen 1984, 584. When Ptolemy VI Philometor died, even in his case Polybius specially praised how gentle and forgiving he had been with his brother: Pol. 39.7.3–6.

<sup>726</sup> Liv. 45.19.9–11: “aliis alia regna crevisse rebus dicendo; regnum eorum novum, nullis vetustis fundatum opibus, fraterna stare concordia, quod unus nomen regium et praecipuum capitis insigne gerat, omnes fratres regnent.”

## ***Warning examples of family discord in Numidia and Macedonia***

The example of the harmonious co-rule of Eumenes II and Attalus is, however, unique among the examples offered by our authors. More often, brothers fought for power in monarchic royal courts because the succession in the Hellenistic monarchies was not a simple matter. There were no standard laws for succession and kings often had many wives of equal rank. Therefore, the sons had to compete for their father's attention and respect, and succession quarrels were common.<sup>727</sup> In Roman historical narratives this fact is woven into moral lessons of the danger of internal discord that could lead to destruction of entire kingdoms. Examples of this are the stories of Jugurtha and his brothers, and the consequent fall of the Numidian kingdom and, similarly, Demetrius and Perseus, and the fall of the Macedonian kingdom. These warning moral examples, illustrated through familiar Others like Jugurtha and Demetrius, symbolize the importance of *fides* and *concordia* within the Roman society and among the governing elite. Nevertheless, in these *exempla*, as in the case of Attalus and Eumenes II, the Romans also act as ruthless instigators of discord.

Sallust provides a very clear example of the dangers of uncontrolled ambition and lack of concord inside a family, set in the Numidian royal context, in his *Jugurthine War*. Reputedly, one of the greatest merits of King Masinissa, the founder of the Numidian kingdom, had been his ability to maintain harmony inside his family so well that no one ever schemed against him.<sup>728</sup> His successor Micipsa tried to teach the same lesson to his sons. Sallust narrates that old Micipsa, who was near death, spoke to his three ambitious sons, including adopted Jugurtha who was immensely popular among the Romans, about how to divide power and rule the Numidian kingdom in harmony after his death. Earlier in the narrative, certain influential Romans

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<sup>727</sup> For a good explanation of these dynamics, see Ogden 1999, ix–xix. It did not even have to be one of the sons to inherit the throne, but it could be any relative deemed worthy enough. For example Phraates I, the king of Parthia, decided to choose his brother as his heir rather than any of his sons: Just. Epit. 41.5.9–10. On the question of worthiness and legitimization of rule, see Gehrke 2013.

<sup>728</sup> Pol. 36.16.6.

had incited the ambitious Jugurtha against his brothers and father, promising to support him if he wanted to become king before his brothers.<sup>729</sup> Micipsa implored Jugurtha to love and respect his brothers and said:

Do not prefer forming connections with strangers to maintaining ties with those linked by blood. The bulwarks of a kingdom are neither armies nor treasuries but rather friends, whom you cannot collect by means of arms or obtain by means of cash; it is by devotion and loyalty that they are brought into being. Moreover, who is more bound by ties of friendship than brother to brother, or what stranger will you find loyal, if you become an enemy to your kindred? I deliver to you and my two sons a realm that will be strong if you three are virtuous, but if evil, then weak. For harmony makes small states great, while the mightiest are undone by discord.<sup>730</sup>

The Roman virtues of *concordia*, *fides*, and *officium* are once again cited as the secrets of successful family relations and stable government. Jugurtha had earned the admiration and friendship of the Romans by helping Scipio Aemilianus and Marius in the Numantine War (143–133 BC). However, both Micipsa and Scipio Aemilianus himself had warned Jugurtha not to trust the Romans.<sup>731</sup> This is reminiscent of the *exemplum* of Attalus and Eumenes II: the moral of that story was that if Attalus had listened to his own ambition and to the Roman perpetrators instead of his brother, he would have ruined the kingdom of Pergamon. This is exactly what happens to Jugurtha in Sallust's narrative, regardless of the warnings from his father and from the illustrious Roman commander. Jugurtha surrendered to his own ambition and started violently quarrelling with his brothers for power immediately after their father's death, setting the stage for Sallust's narrative of the destructive Jugurthine War.

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<sup>729</sup> Sall. Iug. 8.1.

<sup>730</sup> Sall. Iug. 10.3–6: “Nunc, quoniam mihi natura finem vitae facit, per hanc dexteram, per regni fidem moneo obtestorque te uti hos, qui tibi genere propinqui, beneficio meo fratres sunt, caros habeas neu malis alienos adiungere quam sanguine coniunctos retinere. Non exercitus neque thesauri praesidia regni sunt, verum amici, quos neque armis cogere neque auro parare queas; officio et fide pariuntur. Quis autem amicioi quam frater fratri, aut quem alienum fidum invenies, si tuis hostis fueris? Equidem ego vobis regnum trado firmum, si boni eritis, sin mali, inbecillum. Nam concordia parvae res crescunt, discordia maxumae dilabuntur.” G.M. Paul compares this speech to the speech of Cyrus the Great in Xenophon's work: Xen. Cyr. 8.7.6–28; Paul 1984, 45–46.

<sup>731</sup> Scipio Aemilianus's warning: Sall. Iug. 8.2.

A similar but more complex warning example of ambition and internal discord was the story of the strife between Philip V's two sons, Demetrius and Perseus. Polybius and Livy narrate this story in detail, constructing each character with great care and emphasizing dramatic elements. We have already seen the varying characterization of Philip V and how his oldest son and successor Perseus is used by Livy as an evil contrast to pro-Roman characters like Eumenes II. Demetrius instead was the younger son of Philip. In 197 BC, when Demetrius was 10 years old, he was taken hostage by the Romans in accordance with the peace treaty after T. Quinctius Flaminius had defeated Philip V in the Second Macedonian War.<sup>732</sup> Later, Philip V allied with the Romans in the war against Antiochus III. In 191 BC, the senate set the 16-year-old Demetrius free: this was a gift to Philip for helping the Romans.<sup>733</sup>

After the war with Antiochus III that had ended in 188 BC, the Romans again became suspicious of Philip V and feared that he might be planning another war against Rome. Eumenes II, who was the most trusted ally of the Romans at the time, was actively inciting the Romans against Philip. At the same time in Philip's court, his oldest son Perseus was becoming hostile towards Demetrius, fearing that the younger and more popular prince would inherit the Macedonian throne. In Polybius's and Livy's narratives, Demetrius represents Roman interests in the East, somewhat like Eumenes II had in the earlier example (in section 2.2), but to an even greater extent, whereas Perseus represents the anti-Roman movement.

The political aspects of the strife between Demetrius and Perseus have been thoroughly discussed by others.<sup>734</sup> Here, I focus on the moral and

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<sup>732</sup> Pol. 18.39.5; Liv. 33.13.14, 33.30.10, 34.52.9. Demetrius was born around 207 BC: Liv. 40.6.4. For a summary and analysis of Demetrius's hostageship and consequences, see Allen 2006, 1–9, 131–133.

<sup>733</sup> Pol. 21.3.3; Liv. 35.31.5; 36.35.13. According to Diodorus Siculus, the senate had promised this to Philip already before the war with Antiochus III: Diod. Sic. 28.15.1. In Polybius's and Livy's texts, Scipio Africanus tries to convince Prusias I that the Romans can be good friends of kings and uses this event as an example: Pol. 21.11.9–10; Liv. 37.25.12. Cf. Allen 2006, 57–61. After the war with Perseus, the Romans had taken the son of King Cotys of Epirus as a hostage. Later they gave his son back because, according to Polybius, they wanted to leave Cotys in the Romans' debt: Pol. 30.17.

<sup>734</sup> For a good overview, see Ogden 1999, 183–187. For a newer analysis, see Burton 2017, 47–55.

narratological aspects of different versions of the affair. Already Frank W. Walbank observed that Polybius's and consequently Livy's complicated and gradually intensifying narratives of Philip V's last years resemble a tragic play, and this aspect in particular could benefit from a closer look through a more narratological lens.<sup>735</sup> Recently, Andrew Feldherr, in his study of Sallust's monographs, has pointed out that the tragic format itself originated in the Greek East and told stories of foreigners: therefore, in ancient historiography too tragic elements were connected with stories of the Others.<sup>736</sup> It is, in fact, not only Philip who is a tragic character in these narratives, but pro-Roman Demetrius and anti-Roman Perseus also meet tragic ends.<sup>737</sup> The Romans act as deliberate catalysts of these fates.

Here we should briefly note that even though Polybius had written that historians should not write like tragic poets, this does not mean that for Polybius historiography could not include tragic elements without exaggeration when the actual historical events called for a more dramatic style.<sup>738</sup> Nikos Miltsios has shown that Polybius was actually very skilled at inserting subtle dramatic elements into his narrative in order to create suspense in the story.<sup>739</sup> Polybius achieved this by focalizing internally on characters, revealing their hopes and expectations, and thus making the readers feel sympathy and identify with the characters.<sup>740</sup> In this way, even when the readers know the result of major events, the narrative remains captivating. Dennis Pausch, on the other hand, has demonstrated with a different example that Livy too tried to evoke the readers' sympathy in order to generate narrative suspense.<sup>741</sup> Pausch also briefly mentions that the situation with Demetrius, Perseus, and Philip V contains tragic elements that

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<sup>735</sup> Walbank 1938.

<sup>736</sup> Feldherr 2021, 136–147.

<sup>737</sup> For the tragic Perseus, see below section 3.3.

<sup>738</sup> Pol. 2.56.10–13. For example, when writing about the Achaean war, Polybius wrote that a more dramatic style was appropriate: Pol. 38.4.1–2. On “tragic history” and Polybius's use of dramatic style generally, see Walbank 1972, 34–50; Marincola 2003, esp. 295–299; idem 2013; Wiater 2017. It is nowadays generally recognized that tragic elements were common in historiography in all eras; see Feldherr 1998, 4–19; Pausch 2011, V.3.a. On the “plausibility” of tragic elements in historiography, see Feldherr 2021, 103–109.

<sup>739</sup> Miltsios 2009.

<sup>740</sup> Cf. Pausch 2011, V.3.a.

<sup>741</sup> Pausch 2011, V.3.b.

Livy probably inherited from Polybius.<sup>742</sup> I think that this is indeed very evident in Livy's portrayal of the three Macedonians, and I have paid special attention to it in the following analysis.

Livy and Polybius write that Demetrius was sent to Rome as an envoy in 184/183 BC to exculpate his father from the various charges and suspicions. Philip V apparently had hoped that Demetrius would have some influence on the senators because, during Demetrius's years in Rome, the Romans had taken a liking to the Macedonian prince.<sup>743</sup> Before the senate, Demetrius was bombarded by infinite detailed complaints against his father by foreign envoys.<sup>744</sup> He was at a loss as to how to reply to them, and the senators, feeling sympathy for the young and inexperienced prince, made him simply read the notes that Philip had given to him. After having read his father's irritated letter, embarrassed Demetrius apologized on his father's behalf and promised that Philip would do as the senate wished in the future. The senate was pleased with the humble behaviour of Demetrius and commended Philip for sending him. Livy heavily stresses the extent to which the Romans liked Demetrius:

The senate, they said, could overlook and forget and simply put up with much of Philip's past behaviour, and they also had confidence in Demetrius. Even if they returned him physically to his father, they explained, they still held his spirit hostage [...] They also wanted Philip to be aware that it was thanks to the good offices of his son Demetrius that his entire relationship with the Roman people remained intact.<sup>745</sup>

The comment about Demetrius's soul still belonging to the Romans is not present in Polybius. This is a typical sentiment of the Augustan age when Livy wrote: it was believed that foreign royal hostages who had been reared in Rome would stay forever loyal to Rome even later when they returned to their kingdoms and became kings.<sup>746</sup> Moreover, in Livy's version Demetrius goes to

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<sup>742</sup> Pausch 2011, V.4.a.

<sup>743</sup> Pol. 22.14.9–11; Liv. 39.35.1–3.

<sup>744</sup> Demetrius before the senate: Pol. 23.1.8–13, 23.2; Liv. 39.47.

<sup>745</sup> Liv. 39.47.9–11: "Multa et dissimulare et oblivisci et pati praeterita senatum posse, et credere etiam Demetrio. Obsidem enim se animum eius habere, etsi corpus patri reddideri<n>t. [...] Velle etiam sentire Philippum integra omnia sibi cum populo Romano Demetrii filii beneficio esse." Cf. Pol. 23.3.4.

<sup>746</sup> See above p. 110 n. 470.

Rome alone, but in Polybius's version he goes with two friends of Philip. According to John Briscoe, Livy's purpose might be to highlight the tragic character of Demetrius and his loneliness against the difficulties that he would continue to face because of his Roman connection.<sup>747</sup> It indeed seems that the historians are paving the way for the coming tragedy: by emphasizing Demetrius's discomfort and embarrassment, and the senate's sympathy towards the prince, Polybius and especially Livy invite their readers to sympathize with Demetrius's character.

Immediately after Demetrius's visit to Rome, Polybius writes that Perseus and Philip felt offended by the special attention received by Demetrius, and Livy ominously remarks: "These things, which were done in order to enhance his distinction, were immediately turned into a cause of unpopularity and presently even of ruin to the young man."<sup>748</sup> A striking difference between Polybius and Livy is that Livy leaves out the conversation between T. Quinctius Flamininus and Demetrius, narrated by Polybius as follows:

Flamininus also, by inviting the young man's confidences and eliciting his secrets, contributed much to the same result, as he deluded him into cherishing the idea that the Romans were about to secure the throne for him at once, at the same time irritating Philip by writing to him to send Demetrius at once back to Rome with as many of his most serviceable friends as possible. For this was the pretext that Perseus soon after used to persuade his father to consent to the death of Demetrius.<sup>749</sup>

Elsewhere in his text Polybius wrote that the Romans were famous for honesty because the Romans of old would not deceive even their enemies in

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<sup>747</sup> Briscoe 2008, 374–375.

<sup>748</sup> Pol. 23.3.4–6; Liv. 39.48.1: "Haec, quae augendae amplitudinis eius causa facta erant, extemplo in invidiam, mox etiam in perniciem adulescenti verterunt." Narratologically speaking, this is an example of a subtle flashforward.

<sup>749</sup> Pol. 23.3.7–9: ὁ τε Τίτος ἐκκαλεσάμενος τὸ μεράκιον καὶ προβιβάσας εἰς λόγους ἀπορρήτους, οὐκ ὀλίγα συνεβάλετο πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν. τὸν τε γὰρ νεανίσκον ἐψυχαγωγῆσεν, ὡς αὐτίκα μάλα συγκατασκευασόντων αὐτῷ Ῥωμαίων τὴν βασιλείαν, τοὺς τε περὶ τὸν Φίλιππον ἠρέθισε, γράφας ἐξ αὐτῆς τὸν Δημήτριον ἀποστέλλειν πάλιν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην μετὰ τῶν φίλων ὡς πλείστον καὶ χρησιμωτάτων. ταύταις γὰρ ταῖς ἀφορμαῖς χρησάμενος ὁ Περσεὺς μετ' ὀλίγον ἔπεισε τὸν πατέρα συγκαταθέσθαι τῷ Δημητρίῳ θανάτῳ. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ὡς ἐχειρίσθη τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς δηλώσομεν. E. Gruen analyses the plausibility of Polybius's version: Gruen 1974, 235–236.

order to secure victory – thus deceiving one’s friends used to be an absurd concept.<sup>750</sup> However, Polybius also laments that double dealing and treachery were generally very common among the Romans during his own lifetime.<sup>751</sup> Does this mean that, for Polybius, the moral decline had already started at this point of Roman history, during the 180s BC as it had for Livy, and thus even earlier than the year 168 BC stated by Polybius later?<sup>752</sup>

However, Livy omits the suspicious conversation between Flamininus and Demetrius and mentions the letter much later, which changes the tone of the story completely: Livy wrote that in the letter Flamininus complimented Demetrius even more and invited him to return to Rome soon with other Macedonian envoys – a completely normal diplomatic interaction, as Erich S. Gruen reminds us.<sup>753</sup> Livy makes the jealous and paranoid Perseus accuse Demetrius of secretly plotting against him with the Romans based solely on this letter.<sup>754</sup> Livy’s purpose is clearly to vindicate the Romans and deny any deliberate Roman involvement in the following disaster at the Macedonian court. Moreover, Livy does not mention Flamininus’s and Demetrius’s conversation nor Demetrius’s excited reaction as reported by Polybius, because Livy is trying to construct a generally more flattering image of Flamininus throughout his work, as other scholars have sufficiently demonstrated.<sup>755</sup> For Livy, or for his annalist sources, Flamininus’s character functioned as a straightforward example of the old Roman *virtus* and therefore he was narratively an exceptional individual.<sup>756</sup>

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<sup>750</sup> Pol. 13.3, 36.9.9.

<sup>751</sup> Pol. 18.35.1–2.

<sup>752</sup> Pol. 31.25.6–7.

<sup>753</sup> Liv. 40.11; Gruen 1974, 243–246. For Polybius’s and Livy’s different descriptions of this particular episode, see Tränkle 1977, 81, 151–153; Carawan 1988, 245–249.

<sup>754</sup> Livy’s Perseus even said that Demetrius had replaced his real father with Flamininus: Liv. 41.11.2.

<sup>755</sup> Briscoe 1973, 11, 22–23 n.4; Gruen 1974, 223–224; Tränkle 1977, 144–154; Heckel 2000, xxv; Briscoe 2008, 381–382; Eckstein 2015, 410–412. On the possible influence of the annalist sources on the idealization of Flamininus, see Tränkle 1977, 162–164; Carawan 1988. For Flamininus in general, see Pfeilschifter 2005. When examined in the larger narrative context, Polybius’s description of Flamininus’s personal involvement in the matters of the Macedonian royal family fits Polybius’s overall portrait of Flamininus as an extremely intelligent, ambitious, and even ruthless man who had not been afraid to use dirty tactics in order to get the desired results and to advance his own career.

<sup>756</sup> Like Scipio Africanus, as we will see below on pp. 206–215.

Thus, there seems to be a pattern in Livy's modifications: the omission of Flamininus's guile resembles the way in which Livy later softens Polybius's story of how some senators tried to turn Attalus against Eumenes II. In my view, if we consider Livy's wider narrative scheme, Livy's purpose might be to create a coherent longer narrative about the moral decline of the Romans that, in his opinion, had started precisely after the war with Antiochus III only a few years before these events with Demetrius. Perhaps for Livy, at this point of the narrative, it was too soon to blame the Roman senate and illustrious Roman commanders like Flamininus for blatantly immoral behaviour and attempts to sow discord in foreign royal courts. There were other Roman individuals who functioned as negative examples of the moral decline during the 180s BC, but Flamininus was not one of them for Livy.<sup>757</sup>

To compare this to Polybius's version of this incident, he had a different scheme in mind regarding the moral decline and he was more flexible in his portrayals. Even though for Polybius the critical turning point in collective moral decline had been after these events – after the defeat of Perseus in 168 BC – this did not stop him from showing glimpses of immoral conduct among Romans already earlier in the actions of some particularly cunning individuals such as Flamininus.<sup>758</sup> Considering Polybius's general portrayal of Flamininus, I think that Flamininus's intrigue with Demetrius should also be seen as an exception and not as a sign of collective moral decline in Polybius's narrative.<sup>759</sup>

Another aspect that Livy seems to emphasize by not mentioning Flamininus's and Demetrius's conversation is the tragic characterization of Demetrius. In Polybius's version, Flamininus hints that certain Romans

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<sup>757</sup> For these negative examples, see below pp. 187–189 and 215–227.

<sup>758</sup> Cf. Pol. 18.34.7–18.35.2; Champion 2004, 198–202. G. Zecchini argues that Polybius did not impute any particular importance to Cn. Manlius Vulso's return from Asia, as Livy does, in terms of Roman moral decline. Zecchini argues that for Polybius, the moral decline started with Pydna in 168 BC, and the earlier books (1–29) do not contain considerations of moral decline (except for later additions like at Pol. 18.35; see Walbank 1967a, 594. For the dating of Polybius's books, see Ferrary 2014, 276–291) and thus Manlius Vulso's immoral conduct would have been an individual exception for Polybius: Zecchini 2018a, 132–133, 135–148.

<sup>759</sup> For example, Flamininus ensured with calculated actions that he alone would get all the glory for the war: Pol. 18.10–13, 18.39.4; Liv. 32.32.5–6, 32.36.3–10, 32.37, 33.13.15, 33.24.3–7, 33.25.4–11. Plutarch too wrote that Flamininus was very ambitious by nature: Plut. Flam. 2.1, 20.1.

wanted to help Demetrius secure the Macedonian throne for himself, and Demetrius was attracted by this idea. In Livy's version, the whole conspiracy was in Perseus's imagination. Irene de Jong has argued, using Herodotus as an example, that in historical narratives it was a typical sign of tragic heroes that bad things happen to them even though they have done nothing morally wrong.<sup>760</sup> Andrew Feldherr on his part argues that for the audience/readers to be able to feel pity, the character in question must seem undeserving of their suffering.<sup>761</sup> Indeed, in Livy's version Demetrius seems completely faultless, and in Polybius's version less so. These subtle changes in the narrative could thus effectively have an influence on the readers' emotional response to the story and to specific characters.

Polybius and Livy continue their narratives, describing the situation in Macedonia, first focalizing collectively on the Macedonian people and then on Perseus and Philip.<sup>762</sup> The Macedonians were terrified of the Romans and therefore very happy to hear that Demetrius had single-handedly saved the situation, at least for a while. Because of this, the Macedonians thought that Demetrius would inherit the throne instead of the older Perseus. It was also rumoured that Demetrius was the only legitimate son of Philip V, because Perseus did not look like Philip and his mother was a concubine. The ambitious Perseus was very nervous about this, and Philip V was irritated because everyone seemed to be interested only in Demetrius. Even the Roman commissioners who came to Pella preferred to spend time with Demetrius instead of the king himself. Demetrius is presented as a passive character who is observed by everyone but has no power to affect the events initiated by others around him.

Our historians are already actively leading the narrative towards the Third Macedonian War between Rome and Perseus. The rest of Polybius's text regarding these events is reduced to a few fragments, but we have Livy's detailed account. Dennis Pausch has argued that for Livy, this whole family drama served as a foreshadowing of the war in a very long suspense arc,

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<sup>760</sup> Jong 2014, 190–192.

<sup>761</sup> Feldherr 2021, 111–120. Cf. Aristot. Rh. 2.8.2; Cic. Tusc. 4.18.

<sup>762</sup> Pol. 23.7; Liv. 39.53.

together with numerous other episodes.<sup>763</sup> Livy goes on to explain how Philip's disdain for the Romans kept increasing and how the king became cruel, hated, and paranoid.<sup>764</sup> According to Livy, Philip inflicted the punishment of the gods upon his family because of his cruelty, and in consequence Perseus began to look for a way to get rid of Demetrius.<sup>765</sup> Frank W. Walbank has noted that in tragedies, a divine curse was often used as the cause of tragic events in the lives of tyrants, and Polybius emphasizes this when listing Philip V's cruelties.<sup>766</sup>

The two sons acquire two opposite roles in Livy's narrative: "Philip's hatred for the Romans increased daily, and Perseus nursed it and Demetrius tried with all his might to oppose it."<sup>767</sup> Demetrius is the innocent, virtuous, and pro-Roman prince, who has lived in Rome, knows the Roman ways, and promotes peace. Perseus is his narrative counterpart: he is evil, greedy, and a bellicose future enemy of the Romans. Philip is presented as easily malleable, undecided about his sons and the war, and half-mad. As we saw above, Philip's characterization has by this point been transformed far from a friendly Roman ally in order to meet different narrative goals.

Mary Jaeger has argued that Livy is casting Rome as the legitimate "heir" to Philip V. "By defeating the older, yet, according to Livy, illegitimate Perseus, who represents the old regime, the younger Rome both vindicates and stands in for the lost Demetrius. Making Rome once again a morally legitimate heir to empire, one which holds it respectfully and hands it down intact, is the goal of Livy's work. His achieving this goal depends on his successfully conveying a morally rejuvenating account of the past."<sup>768</sup> Therefore, Demetrius's character functions almost as a personification of Rome or the extension of Roman interests in Macedonia. With such narrative simplifications and symbolism, Livy certainly seems to be anticipating the approaching end of the mighty

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<sup>763</sup> Pausch 2011, V.4.a.

<sup>764</sup> Liv. 40.3–4. Of these events, only an incomplete fragment of Polybius remains: Pol. 23.10.12–16, 23.11. Paranoia was typical of stock tyrants: Cic. Off. 3.21.84, Rep. 2.45, Tusc. 5.62.

<sup>765</sup> Liv. 40.5.1–5. All of the following story is summarized briefly in the same tone by Justin: Just. Epit. 32.2.7–10.

<sup>766</sup> Walbank 1938; idem 1979, 229–234.

<sup>767</sup> Liv. 40.5.5: "crescente in dies Philippi odio in Romanos, cui Perseus indulgeret, Demetrius summa ope adversaretur."

<sup>768</sup> Jaeger 2007, 402.

Macedonian kingdom and justifying its annexation to the Roman empire retroactively, influenced by Augustus's *pax romana* propaganda.

Livy's narrative continues as follows. Perseus gathered supporters and spread malicious rumours against Demetrius who found himself alone and unprepared, just as he had earlier before the senate. The paranoid king started favouring Perseus and isolating Demetrius who desperately continued to defend the Romans.<sup>769</sup> Livy repeats the earlier figure of speech used by the senators but now said by Perseus: "after he was a hostage at Rome, the Romans gave him back to us but keep his soul themselves."<sup>770</sup> Rome continues to function as the unwitting cause for Demetrius's distress in Livy's narrative. It would have been interesting to know whether Polybius's fragmentary version had continued to present Roman involvement as intentional. To increase the suspense to the extreme and to give the readers time to sympathize with Demetrius even more, Livy uses many pages to portray Demetrius as completely ingenuous and ignorant of the imminent danger.<sup>771</sup>

At last, Perseus went to accuse Demetrius of attempted murder directly to Philip, who did not know if the accusation was false or just.<sup>772</sup> A fragment of Polybius survives, and Livy seems to be following him closely while expanding the dramatic elements already present and using the private setting of the Macedonian royal court as a stage for the brutally unfolding family drama.<sup>773</sup> Demetrius too was brought before the king, who started a long speech in direct form about brotherhood and the importance of concord within a family. Philip said that discord in royal families had destroyed whole kingdoms, mentioning as an example the Spartan dual kingship that apparently had worked well until its transformation into simple monarchy.<sup>774</sup> Philip provides another example of a functioning monarchy in which the power is harmoniously divided among brothers: the kingdom of Pergamon with its four brothers who had grown their originally tiny kingdom to match those of other great kings. Then Philip lists

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<sup>769</sup> Liv. 40.5.5–14.

<sup>770</sup> Liv. 40.5.12–13: "ex quo obses Romae fuit, corpus nobis reddiderunt Romani, animum ipsi habent."

<sup>771</sup> A detailed story of the purification ritual of the army and the subsequent quarrel between the two brothers during the after-party: Liv. 40.6–7.

<sup>772</sup> Liv. 40.8.

<sup>773</sup> Pol. 23.11.

<sup>774</sup> On the transformation of Spartan kingship, see Walthall 2013.

Roman brothers who had achieved great victories together: T. and L. Quinctius Flaminius, P. and L. Cornelius Scipio, and Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus and P. Cornelius Scipio. Philip furiously reproached his sons for their discord.

The speech of Philip to his sons immediately recalls those discussed above: the speech of Stratius on behalf of Eumenes II to Attalus and the speech of Micipsa to Jugurtha and his brothers. It recalls the same Roman themes of family, *fides*, and their importance for the stability of government. Jane D. Chaplin argues, comparing Polybius's fragment to Livy, that Livy has even increased the moral aspect of the speech, probably thinking about his contemporary readers: Livy's Philip praises the Spartan dual kingship and mentions several Roman brotherly *exempla* which make little sense in the Macedonian context.<sup>775</sup> But Livy's intention obviously was to speak to his Roman audience about Roman moral values through these Macedonian characters. In the stories of Attalus and Eumenes II and of Demetrius and Perseus, family and state are symbolically analogous: even the most powerful empire could fall if there was no internal concord. This was a common theme in republican literature. Sallust too, who lived through several civil wars, compared the family to the state in his *Jugurthine War*.<sup>776</sup> But Polybius felt like these traditional Roman family values had corroded badly already during the 160s BC. Polybius used his patron and best friend Scipio Aemilianus as a moral example of this and wrote that his generosity and love for his family, which was not at all usual at that time, made everyone in Rome respect and admire him.<sup>777</sup>

However, a few virtuous men who possessed *fides*, such as Scipio Aemilianus, or Demetrius for that matter, could not save the state if they were surrounded by men who could not keep their ambition in check and who did not follow the same moral ideals and work for the common good. Everyone's integrity was needed. It is easy to see why Livy found this *exemplum*, provided by Polybius, particularly attractive during his own lifetime after the civil wars

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<sup>775</sup> Chaplin 2000, 80–81. F.W. Walbank, however, sees no reason to exclude the possibility that Polybius's text also mentioned Roman examples. The corresponding fragment of Polybius does not contain the whole speech: Walbank 1979, 235.

<sup>776</sup> Sall. Iug. 3.2.

<sup>777</sup> Pol. 31.26–28.

and during Augustus's reign and therefore dedicated considerable space to it in his work. In fact, after Philip's speech, Livy continues the scene for seven whole chapters with the statements of Perseus and Demetrius in direct speech.<sup>778</sup> These speeches are rhetorically fascinating, but it suffices to say here that they continue to consolidate Perseus's and Demetrius's roles even further and to increase the suspense for the coming tragedy.<sup>779</sup> Finally, Perseus won, and the half-mad Philip decided to have Demetrius killed, severely regretting this later and dying from sorrow and madness like a true tragic tyrant.<sup>780</sup> Later, this would become a warning example used by various characters in Livy's narrative.<sup>781</sup>

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To conclude, what did the characters of Attalus, Jugurtha, and Demetrius have in common in these several narratives? They were all close friends of the Romans and full of virtues. However, their close Roman connection also posed serious danger for them: Polybius, Sallust, and Livy relate how some dishonest Romans tried to ruin their kingdoms by inciting the ambition that naturally resides in even the most virtuous men. Only Attalus and Eumenes II were able to maintain their mutual concord against the disruptive Roman influence. In all these examples, the Self, i.e., the Romans, takes the role of the more or less negative Other from the point of view of the foreign royal families on which the authors focalize.

Roman moral examples of the importance of *concordia* and *pietas* were common in the literature, but these three foreign characters address the theme externally, in other cultures and societies ruled by kings. The application of Roman republican moral discourse in the context of Hellenistic and Numidian royal families is quite straightforward and unproblematic in the narratives: these were the values that Hellenistic monarchs themselves promoted in their public image. This gives the authors an opportunity to examine how to

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<sup>778</sup> Perseus's accusation: Liv. 40.9–11. Demetrius's reply: Liv. 40.12–15. No fragments survive from Polybius. F.W. Walbank thinks that the "Polybian basis is probably elaborated" by Livy: Walbank 1979, 235.

<sup>779</sup> Liv. 40.16.1–3.

<sup>780</sup> Liv. 40.24 and 56. Cf. Just. Epit. 32.3.1–4.

<sup>781</sup> Eumenes II to Attalus: Liv. 45.19.16. The Achaeans: Liv.41.23.11.

theoretically keep the state internally stable against strong external pressures and influences. The state – republican or monarchic – is metaphorically compared to the family in these *exempla*. All these deliberations of concord, family, and *pietas* were of course very actual when Livy was writing because they were an integral part of Augustus’s ideological program. But these discourses and values were by no means inventions of the Augustan era, as Polybius’s fragments clearly demonstrate: they were only further highlighted by Livy.

Moreover, these examples of Romans acting against their own ideals and deviously trying to spread discord in friendly Hellenistic and Numidian monarchies provide the historians with an opportunity to show the symptoms of Roman moral decline during the Republic – a discourse shared by Polybius, Sallust, and Livy albeit with different temporal emphases. For Polybius, the moral decline had started after the Roman victory at Pydna in 168 BC, and in the example of Attalus, Polybius bluntly shows the whole senate scheming against the Attalids. Still, for Polybius there seemed to be some early exceptions involving blatant moral ambiguity, such as Flamininus’s unscrupulous behaviour with Demetrius.

For Livy, the moral decline had started in 187 BC with the return of Cn. Manlius Vulso from Asia. Therefore, the examples of the mistreatment of both Attalus and Demetrius date after the beginning of the moral decline for Livy. Nevertheless, Livy is clearly reluctant to provide such extreme examples of misconduct of the whole senate and Flamininus, whom Livy admired, during these early decades of the decline. Compared to Polybius, Livy mitigated the Romans’ role in these examples and preferred illustrating the moral decline through other characters, as we will see in sections 3.3 and 4.1. For Sallust, the moral decline was already in a very advanced state during the events of the *Jugurthine War*, and the example of how easily certain influential Romans destroyed the internal concord of the Numidian royal family is only a small part of the whole image that will be further discussed in section 4.2.

### 3.3 PERSEUS AS A VICTIM

Thus far, we have established that the Romans believed that honesty and *fides* were instrumental in all successful diplomatic relations. Moreover, these virtues were part of ideal wartime conduct. This meant that, even against enemies, cruelty and dishonest military tactics, such as bluffing, ambushes, or spying on the enemy were considered dishonourable. Livy wrote that such tactics were typical of Carthaginians and Greeks but not Romans.<sup>782</sup> Polybius too stated that according to Roman ideals, enemies were supposed to be defeated with pure moral and military superiority.<sup>783</sup> A famous example of this was the exemplary honesty on both sides in the Roman war against Pyrrhus, cited above.<sup>784</sup> In practice, the matter obviously was not this simple. It was often impossible to defeat the most formidable enemies, such as Hannibal, without any kind of tactical artifice – a factor that was indubitably one of the reasons for Hannibal’s great military success.<sup>785</sup> We can find many other examples of dirty military tactics and deceptive diplomacy by certain Romans in the works of Polybius, Sallust, and Livy and other authors.<sup>786</sup> In Polybius’s and Livy’s narratives, such sly behaviour in diplomacy increased as the Roman moral decline progressed. We have seen examples of this in the above analysis of some leading Romans’ malevolent treatment of their allied monarchies which showed a serious lack of *fides* on the Roman part. If even the friendly kings were not safe from the Romans’ deviousness, even less so were the enemy kings.

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<sup>782</sup> Liv. 42.47.4–9.

<sup>783</sup> Pol. 13.3, 36.9.9. Cf. Diod. Sic. 30.7.1; Liv. 1.53.4; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.16.1; Frontin. Str. 1.2.2; Sheldon 2005, 20–21; Baronowski 2011, 104–105.

<sup>784</sup> See above pp. 93–96.

<sup>785</sup> For the ambivalence of honesty in the Hannibalic War for Livy, see Levene 2010, 228–235. Scipio Africanus used his enemies’ own tactics against the Carthaginians, i.e., surprise attacks and spies: Pol. 10.6–15, 11.23–24, 14.1.7–8 and 13, 14.2.11; Liv. 26.45–47, 30.4–5. For Scipio Africanus’s “un-Roman” military tactics, see François 2006, 317–321.

<sup>786</sup> Sheldon 2005, 41–61. M. Porcius Cato attacked sleeping soldiers: Liv. 36.18. Later attempts at bribery and intimidation: Sall. hist. 4.45–46 (57–58 Mc, 56–57 M), Iug. 61.3–4. C. Marius and L. Cornelius Sulla defeated Jugurtha with deception: Sall. Iug. 109–113. The case of Marcus Philippus and Perseus (Liv. 42.47.4–9) is discussed in detail below in this section. Other examples of Roman tactical artifice: Pol. 29.15.3, 31.1.1; Liv. 7.14.6–7.15.8; Frontin. Str. *passim*. Not only military tactics, but also diplomatic behaviour could be morally questionable; see P. Villius Tappulus’s attempt to trick Hannibal and Antiochus III at Just. Epit. 31.4.4–9. Cf. Nep. Han. 2; Liv. 35.14.1–4. See also Cn. Manlius Vulso’s attempt to trick Antiochus III: Liv. 38.45.1–2.

As we have seen, Livy wanted to set forth the thesis that Roman *virtus* had started to decline irreversibly after the war with Antiochus III, when Cn. Manlius Vulso returned to Rome from Asia in 187 BC.<sup>787</sup> Livy uses his narrative of the Third Macedonian War (171–168 BC) against Perseus to demonstrate the obvious symptoms of this decline. The Romans of old had reputedly been morally exemplary, but Livy’s description of the Romans’ immoral treatment of Perseus at the beginning of the war suggests that something indeed had changed in the Romans’ behaviour after the war with Antiochus III. Livy’s narrative of the Third Macedonian War gives the general impression that even though Perseus is otherwise portrayed as an arrogant and aggressive king, he ultimately did not want to fight the Romans and attempted in vain to conclude peace with them on several occasions. This has not escaped the notice of modern scholars, and the debate on the causes of war has been lively.<sup>788</sup> Here, however, I focus on the narratological aspects. Dennis Pausch has already shown how the whole narrative of the Third Macedonian War is a prime example of Livy’s use of repeated foreshadowing that generates a slowly increasing suspense that extends over several books.<sup>789</sup> For my part, I argue that Livy attempts to portray Perseus as a victim and as a tragic *exemplum* of the mutability of fortune, and Livy succeeds in this endeavour by employing specific narrative devices such as focalization.<sup>790</sup>

Livy wrote that Perseus asserted early on that his intentions were peaceful, and he did not wish for a war.<sup>791</sup> However, Eumenes II, the great Roman ally and Perseus’s rival in the East, was actively trying to convince the

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<sup>787</sup> Cn. Manlius Vulso’s greed and indiscipline in Asia foreshadow the decadence that he would bring to Rome: Liv. 38.45.4–10, 38.46.11–15. For this moral turning point, see below pp. 215–228. M’. Acilius Glabrio’s speech before crossing over to Asia foreshadows this as well; see below p. 216 n. 920. D. Pausch too has noted that the frequency of Rome-critical voices in Livy’s text increases after the Second Macedonian War: Pausch 2011, IV.3.b. For foreshadowing in Livy, see Pausch 2011, III.1.c, V.4.

<sup>788</sup> For a very thorough discussion of the causes of the war, of all sources, and of the previous scholarship, see Burton 2017, 65–123. Cf. Gruen 1984, 408–419. For an equally detailed discussion of the war itself, see Burton 2017, ch. 6.

<sup>789</sup> Pausch 2011, V.4.a.

<sup>790</sup> For tragic style in Livy, see Levene 2006, 103–104. For “tragic history” in general, see Walbank 1972, 34–40; Marincola 2003, esp. 295–299. Polybius’s books about these events are far too fragmentary to make a complex evaluation of their narrative structure. For this reason, I will focus heavily on Livy here.

<sup>791</sup> Liv. 42.14.2–4 and 24.

Romans of the opposite.<sup>792</sup> Perseus's short temper did not help: when Roman envoys were sent to investigate why Perseus was mobilizing troops in Macedonia and harassing Roman allies even though the peace treaty made with his father Philip V forbade this, Perseus treated the envoys with contempt.<sup>793</sup> Here Livy slows down the rhythm of the narrative, anticipating a pivotal moment in the story, and describes the encounter in greater detail. The king, raising his voice and using foul language, accused the Romans of imperial greed and said that he did not need to ask for the Romans' permission for every action. If the Romans wanted to have an alliance with Perseus, the treaty should be remade, for the promises made by his father did not apply to him. Livy describes the crucial moment step by step:

At this point Perseus had started to sweep out, and there had been a move to clear everyone from the palace. So then the envoys had renounced the friendship and the alliance. Perseus, infuriated by this announcement, had stopped short and declared to them in ringing tones that they had three days to get themselves out of his kingdom.<sup>794</sup>

The Roman envoys left and deemed these words and the king's lack of hospitality a sufficient reason to declare war.<sup>795</sup> Livy draws the readers' attention to this moment in history – the pretext (as Polybius would say) for the war with Perseus – by slowing down the narrative until the events seem to be happening in real time and by describing the details of the situation such as gestures and the tones of Perseus. In this way, Livy makes us see what had been Perseus's decisive mistake that had started the war. Aristotle wrote that to make a tragedy successfully evoke the sympathy and even the pity of the audience, the main characters' dismay must be caused by some fatal mistake that in turn is caused by a serious character flaw (*ἀμαρτία*).<sup>796</sup> We could say that in Livy's narrative, Perseus's fit of anger, caused by his excessive

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<sup>792</sup> Liv. 42.11–13.

<sup>793</sup> Liv. 42.25.

<sup>794</sup> Liv. 42.25.12: "Atque ita se proripuisse, et summoveri e regia omnes coeptos. Tum se amicitiam et societatem renuntiassse. Qua voce eum accensum restitisse atque voce clara denuntiassse sibi, ut triduo regni sui decederent finibus."

<sup>795</sup> Mistreatment of messengers used as a pretext for a war: Pol. 32.13.9, 33.9.

<sup>796</sup> Aristot. Poet. 11 and 13. In distinction from, for example, some disaster that does not depend on the characters' actions.

arrogance and lack of self-control, is such a mistake and starts his tragic downfall. Perseus's characterization resembles kings and despots in the work of Herodotus or in Greek tragedies.<sup>797</sup>

It is, however, doubtful whether Livy's narrative managed or even strived to evoke pity in the readers at this point: as Andrew Feldherr has noted, the ancient literary theorists seemed to think that a character's suffering had to seem undeserved for it to evoke pity in the audience.<sup>798</sup> We should not forget Livy's detailed story of how Perseus had allegedly tried and failed to get Eumenes II assassinated, and how at least for Livy this alone would have been a sufficient justification to go to war with Perseus, even though the Roman envoys did not mention this directly to Perseus.<sup>799</sup> Earlier in his narrative Livy had claimed that the Third Macedonian War had been planned by Philip V, and Perseus was for some reason not able to avoid the war once he became king.<sup>800</sup> This is different from Polybius who gives a detailed explanation on how the war was caused by Perseus too and not just by his father.<sup>801</sup> For Polybius, there was no doubt that Perseus had planned the war by himself. Livy seems to be constructing a more ambiguous narrative in which Perseus indeed started the war, making it justified from the Roman perspective, but severely regretted it.

Later, when the Romans were mobilizing troops in Macedonia, a seemingly distressed Perseus sent several envoys and a letter in an attempt to conciliate the Romans.<sup>802</sup> He said that he had not wanted to anger the Romans and would like to negotiate with them in order to avoid the war.<sup>803</sup> Finally, the

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<sup>797</sup> Tragic characterization of kings, despots, and tyrants in Herodotus and Greek tragedies: Hartog, 1988, 335–337; Hall 1989, 69–70.

<sup>798</sup> Feldherr 2021, 111–120; Aristot. Rh. 2.8.2; Cic. Tusc. 4.18. Feldherr explains the difference between sympathy and pity: the former lacks the requirement of “deservedness”.

<sup>799</sup> For the assassination attempt, see Liv. 42.15–16 and above pp. 128–129. For the plausibility of the story, see Briscoe 2012, 202–203. Polybius's fragments only reveal that Perseus's envoys tried to defend the king against these accusations, but it was in vain because “the senate had already decided on war”: Pol. 27.6.2–3. Other mentions of the assassination attempt: Pol. 22.18.5; Liv. 44.1.10; Diod Sic. 29.34.2. Polybius tells about the causes of the war, including the assassination attempt: Pol. 22.18.5 and 8, 27.6. For modern studies on the causes of the war, see above n. 788.

<sup>800</sup> Liv. 39.23.5.

<sup>801</sup> Pol. 22.18. Cf. Briscoe 2008, 301–302, idem 2012, 13–15.

<sup>802</sup> Liv. 42.36, 42.37.5–6.

<sup>803</sup> Liv. 42.38.8–10.

Roman envoys A. Atilius and Q. Marcius Philippus agreed to meet Perseus.<sup>804</sup> The rhythm of the narrative again slows down expectantly, and the focalization shifts to Perseus internally. We learn that the king was hopeful upon hearing that one of the Roman envoys, Marcius Philippus, had known his father.<sup>805</sup> An exchange in direct speech between Marcius Philippus and Perseus follows. The Roman read the accusations aloud, and the king calmly defended his actions in a lengthy and detailed speech, without a trace of the rage and arrogance of earlier.<sup>806</sup> He promised to make an effort to resolve the situation in a way that satisfied the Romans. Perseus's speech is longer and gives a convincing impression. Indeed, without further questions Marcius Philippus made a truce with Perseus so that the greatly relieved king could send envoys to Rome to ratify the matter.

Up to this point of Livy's narrative, everything seems to go by the correct moral and diplomatic rules. It seems that the Romans gave Perseus a fair chance to defend himself. Through the means of internal focalization and a long direct speech, Livy lets the readers learn Perseus's anxiousness and his desire to make peace. Marcius Philippus had treated Perseus in a friendly and sympathetic manner, joking with the king and apologizing for having to read the charges against him. In the eyes of Perseus, everything seemed to proceed optimally. After this, however, Livy changes the internal focalization to Atilius and Marcius Philippus and reveals the real intent of the two Romans who reportedly had never had any intention of avoiding the war – they had only wanted to gain more time to better prepare against Perseus whose army was already completely ready.<sup>807</sup> The Roman envoys reported the result of the conference to the senate, taking pride in having tricked the king.

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<sup>804</sup> The whole conference: Liv. 42.39–43. Polybius's extant passages on the year 169 BC do not contain any mention of the conference.

<sup>805</sup> Liv. 42.39–40. Livy says that the homonymous father of Q. Marcius Philippus had known Philip V personally. To lighten the nervous mood at the beginning of the conference, the Roman envoy invited Perseus to come closer by saying "let the son come to the father", which amused Perseus. Cf. the exchange of witty remarks between T. Quinctius Flamininus and Philip V: Pol. 18.4.4, 18.6.1 and 5, 18.7.5–6; Briscoe 1973, 235; Tränkle 1977, 47–48; Carawan 1988, 216–221; Mineo 2015c, 132. Livy did not appreciate public displays of humourism in men in such high positions: Liv. 32.34.3–4. For all instances of laughter in Livy, see McClain 2006; for Philip V and Flamininus, see *ibidem*, 43–44.

<sup>806</sup> Liv. 42.41–42.

<sup>807</sup> Liv. 42.43.1–4, 42.47. Cf. Diod. Sic. 30.7.

Narratologically, this is an example of a situation where the author-narrator knows more than the focalizer and, in this way, temporarily withholds information from the readers to increase their sympathy towards Perseus and to create suspense in the narrative. Indeed, Livy briefly puts the readers in the position of Perseus by means of internal focalization during the conference: we know Perseus's intentions and hopes but we do not know those of Marcius Philippus any more than Perseus does. In Livy's work, Perseus is usually presented as an aggressive king who had tried to assassinate the Romans' ally Eumenes II, and who had angered the Romans with his arrogant behaviour, but now the roles are suddenly inverted: after this display of Roman cunning, Perseus seems to become the victim, whereas the Romans become the aggressors from Perseus's point of view. The principles of honourable warfare are called into question by Livy.

The striking difference from the accusations presented in enemy speeches and letters, analysed above, is that it is not just the enemy who accuses the Romans, but we get to read the thoughts and words of these Romans themselves, who clearly were not interested in peaceful solutions. Also, Perseus's envoys tried to vindicate the king in front of the senate, but their words were ignored and they were sent away.<sup>808</sup> Let us not forget that Livy had hinted before that Perseus could not prevent the war that had already been planned by Philip V.<sup>809</sup> In the scenario described by Livy, the incompetent Perseus seems like a victim trapped between Rome and Philip V by their hostility and schemes.<sup>810</sup>

Livy describes the senate's reactions to the conference and to the methods A. Atilius and Q. Marcius Philippus:

These actions a large part of the senate approved as having been done with great wisdom; the older men and those mindful of ancient custom said they did not recognize in this embassy the ways of Rome. 'Not by ambushes and battles by night,' they thought, 'nor by pretended flight and unexpected return to an enemy off his guard, nor in such a way as to boast of cunning rather than

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<sup>808</sup> Liv. 42.48.1-5.

<sup>809</sup> Liv. 39.23.5.

<sup>810</sup> D. Pausch also thinks that the whole suspense arc and detailed repeated foreshadowing of the Third Macedonian War shows that, for Livy, Perseus started the war: Pausch 2011, V.4.a.

real bravery, did our ancestors wage war; they were accustomed to declare war before they waged it, and even at times to announce a battle and specify the place in which they were going to fight. With the same straight-forwardness the information was given to King Pyrrhus that his physician was plotting against his life; in the same way the betrayer of their children was delivered bound to the Faliscans; these are the acts of Roman scrupulousness, not of Carthaginian artfulness nor of Greek slyness, since among these peoples it has been more praiseworthy to deceive an enemy than to conquer by force.’<sup>811</sup>

Even though it is doubtful that Marcius Philippus would have acted without discussing his plan with the senate in advance, Livy wants to make it appear that there was a huge generational gap in the senate.<sup>812</sup> Livy tries to remind the reader that honesty and straightforwardness in international relations was – or had been – typical of the Roman culture. Faliscans and Greeks are mentioned to highlight the specialty of the Roman customs, *Romanae artes*, and to define Roman cultural identity separately from others. Also, the timeless Ennian *exemplum* of Pyrrhus is mentioned to remind the reader of the distant and morally more intact time before the Romans’ overseas wars.<sup>813</sup> These attitudes reflect those of Polybius – the most probable source<sup>814</sup> of the episode described above – who reproached his contemporary Roman commanders for dishonest diplomatic conduct:

Philip [V] became addicted to that kind of treacherous dealings which no one indeed would say in any way became a king but which some maintain to be necessary in practical politics, owing to the present prevalence of treachery. The ancients, as we know, were far removed from such malpractices. For so

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<sup>811</sup> Liv. 42.47.4–8: “Haec ut summa ratione acta magna pars senatus approbabat; veteres et moris antiqui memores negabant se in ea legatione Romanas agnoscere artes. Non per insidias et nocturna proelia, nec simulatam fugam improvisosque ad incautum hostem reditus, nec ut astu magis quam vera virtute gloriarentur, bella maiores gessisse: indicere prius quam gerere solitos bella, denunciare etiam interdum pugnam et locum finire, in quo dimicaturi essent. Eadem fide indicatum Pyrrho regi medicum vitae eius insidiantem; eadem Faliscis vinctum traditum proditorem liberorum; religionis haec Romanae esse, non versutiarum Punicarum neque calliditatis Graecae, apud quos fallere hostem quam vi superare gloriosius fuerit.” Cf. Diod. Sic. 30.7. Ironically, Q. Marcius Philippus later spoke to his soldiers and accused Perseus of treacherous dealing and praised the Romans for their *pietas* and *fides*: Liv. 44.1.9–12.

<sup>812</sup> Zecchini 2018a, 141. Cf. Ferrary 2014, 534.

<sup>813</sup> For the Ennian *exemplum*, see above pp. 93–96. For Livy’s use of Ennian Pyrrhus, see Roth 2010, 180–189.

<sup>814</sup> Briscoe 2012, 313.

far were they from plotting mischief against their friends with the purpose of aggrandizing their own power, that they would not even consent to get the better of their enemies by fraud, regarding no success as brilliant or secure unless they crushed the spirit of their adversaries in open battle. [...] But at the present they say it is a sign of poor generalship to do anything openly in war. Some slight traces, however, of the ancient principles of warfare survive among the Romans. For they make a declaration of war, they very seldom use ambushes, and they fight hand-to-hand at close quarters. These reflections are occasioned by the excessive prevalence among our present leaders both in the conduct of public affairs and in that of war of a keenness for double dealing.<sup>815</sup>

Therefore, Polybius thought that already during his time of writing the collective Roman *virtus* had deteriorated so much that dishonesty was more common than not in both war and internal affairs. Livy repeats the sentiment and says that only the oldest members of the senate still remembered the ancient ways and rebuked Q. Marcius Philippus's duplicity with Perseus. Livy describes the older senators' thoughts so that they could serve as a reminder that the Roman *virtus* was already beyond redemption at this point of the narrative because, according to Livy, Roman *virtus* had started to decline irreversibly right after the war against Antiochus III. In the midst of the late Republican identity crisis, it was important for Livy to describe and imagine moments in the past where things had started to go awry. Already in the preface, Livy informs the readers that one of the goals of his work was to show this gradual decline:

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<sup>815</sup> Pol. 13.3.1–4 and 6–8: Ἐγένετο περὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κακοπραγμοσύνην, ἣν δὴ βασιλικὴν μὲν οὐδαμῶς οὐδεὶς ἂν εἶναι φήσειεν, ἀναγκαίαν δὲ βούλονται λέγειν ἔνιοι πρὸς τὸν πραγματικὸν τρόπον διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐπιπολάζουσαν κακοπραγμοσύνην. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι πολὺ τι τοῦ τοιοῦτου μέρους ἐκτὸς ἦσαν· τοσοῦτο γὰρ ἀπληλοτρίωντο τοῦ κακομηχανεῖν περὶ τοὺς φίλους χάριν τοῦ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ συναύξειν τὰς σφετέραις δυναστείας, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τοὺς πολεμίους ἤρουντο δι' ἀπάτης νικᾶν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες <οὐδὲν> οὔτε λαμπρὸν οὐδὲ μὴν βέβαιον εἶναι τῶν κατορθωμάτων, ἂν μὴ τις ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς μαχόμενος ἠττήσῃ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τοὺς ἀντιταττομένους. [...] νῦν δὲ καὶ φαύλου φασὶν εἶναι στρατηγοῦ τὸ προφανῶς τι πράττειν τῶν πολεμικῶν. βραχὺ δὲ τι λείπεται παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις ἴχνος ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχαίας αἰρέσεως περὶ τὰ πολεμικά· καὶ γὰρ προλέγουσι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ ταῖς ἐνέδραις σπανίως χρῶνται καὶ τὴν μάχην ἐκ χειρὸς ποιοῦνται καὶ <συ>στάδην. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω πρὸς τὸν ἐπιπολάζοντα νῦν ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον ἐν τῇ κακοπραγμοσύνῃ ζηλον περὶ τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἐν τε ταῖς πολιτικαῖς καὶ πολεμικαῖς οἰκονομίαις. Cf. Pol. 36.9.9. Polybius had not rebuked Scipio Africanus, however, when he used such tactics against the Carthaginians: Brizzi 2011, 15.

With the gradual relaxation of discipline, morals first gave way, as it were, then sank lower and lower, and finally began the downward plunge which has brought us to the present time, when we can endure neither our vices nor their cure.<sup>816</sup>

It seems that at this point of Livy's narrative, the Romans have reached the "downward plunge" phase in which "cure", i.e., the ancient *exempla*, is no longer possible, because only the older Romans and a very few younger ones still followed the moral *exempla* of the past. Jane D. Chaplin has argued that in Livy's narrative there is an evident increasing tension between the past and present, and this scene of the senate's reaction to Q. Marcius Philippus is an example of it.<sup>817</sup> In the above-discussed example of Attalus and the Roman senate as well, Livy differentiated from the senate "certain untrustworthy Romans" who no longer cared about honesty. Indeed, we could say that the connection between the past and the present had been severed: Romans were supposed to strive to be like their ancestors and follow their example, and this no longer occurred. Furthermore, this passage shows once again that Livy is very skilled in adapting the contents for his narrative from Polybius but at the same time expanding the moral aspect of it and weaving moral lessons into the narrative everywhere. The closely focalized narrative of Perseus's fall serves this overarching purpose.

For the rest of Book 42, Livy makes us follow Perseus's councils, plans, speeches to his soldiers, preparations, and movements. There are passages where focus briefly switches to the Romans, but the main focus seems to be on Perseus, and Livy frequently reveals the king's thoughts, hopes, and fears.<sup>818</sup> At first, when Perseus discovered that his peace embassy had failed, he held a council. Some thought that peace should be concluded with the Romans at any price, for the stakes were too high. The vast majority, however, encouraged the

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<sup>816</sup> Liv. praef. 9: "labente deinde paulatim disciplina velut desidentis primo mores sequatur animo, deinde ut magis magisque lapsi sint, tum ire coeperint praecipites, donec ad haec tempora quibus nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus perventum est."

<sup>817</sup> Chaplin 2000, ch. 4. For analysis of Q. Marcius Philippus's duplicity from this point of view, see *ibidem*, 106–108.

<sup>818</sup> Perseus's thoughts, fears, and hopes: Liv. 42.59.8, 42.62.14–15, 42.64.9, 42.65.5. For example, at 42.60.3 we also learn of the Romans' fears. Perseus speaks several times, whereas the Roman consul does not: Liv. 42.52.1, 42.52, 42.61.

king to fight the oppressor. They said that the Romans would never let him keep the crown and his kingdom. Perseus should become the new liberator of Greece and drive the Romans away, just like Hannibal had been driven out of Italy.<sup>819</sup> Needless to say, Perseus decided for war. The king lined up his soldiers to speak to them.<sup>820</sup> He accused the Romans of arrogance and aggression, reminding his army that the Romans had declined Perseus's requests to make peace; the Romans had lied to him now, and their freedom propaganda of the past had been a lie too; the time had come to defend Macedonia from the Roman conquerors. Livy's Perseus may not have wanted the war, but it did not matter because the Romans wanted it and – according to Livy (and Polybius) – they were justified in waging it.

The first battle at Callicinus in 171 BC was a great success for Perseus. The king was advised to use his victory to offer peace to the Romans with the same terms that his father had accepted after the Second Macedonian War.<sup>821</sup> However, the Roman consul P. Licinius said that the Romans would accept nothing short of unconditional surrender from Perseus. The king was surprised by the Roman stubbornness and arrogance, and their apparent self-confidence made him nervous. Perseus decided to offer even more money in a desperate attempt to buy peace, but the consul would not change his mind. Polybius's surviving description of the same event and Perseus's anxious counteroffers are almost identical. Polybius too praises "the typical Roman severity" but cautiously mentions that it still might not be the most suitable conduct in every possible situation.<sup>822</sup> The Romans were, of course, proud of their determination, and historical *exempla* told stories of how the Romans of the early Republic had preferred to win wars with pure *virtus* instead of money, for example.<sup>823</sup> However, in addition to *virtus*, *clementia* also was

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<sup>819</sup> Liv. 42.50. Sallust too wrote similar speeches, as we can see in his *Jugurthine War*. For example, Jugurtha tried to sway the Mauretanian king Bocchus, saying that the Romans were unjust, enormously greedy, and the enemies of mankind. Their goal was to dominate the world and to eliminate all kings, the most recent example being Perseus: Sall. Jug. 81.1.

<sup>820</sup> Liv. 42.52.6–16.

<sup>821</sup> Liv. 42.62.

<sup>822</sup> Pol. 27.8. Another famous example of "typical Roman severity" was the encounter of C. Popillius Laeneas and the Seleucid king Antiochus IV in 168 BC: Pol. 29.27; Liv. 45.12.4–6; Diod. Sic. 31.2.2.

<sup>823</sup> Liv. 5.49.3.

recommended in wars, especially in the Caesarean and Augustan narratives.<sup>824</sup> Clemency was the opposite of cruelty which was typical of tyrants and those who waged unjust wars.

What also catches attention from the narrative viewpoint is how Livy says that Perseus feared the Romans' determination.<sup>825</sup> Describing fear is, among other things, a literary tool to humanize characters and even make the reader sympathize with them by making them seem more vulnerable, even when the character in question is an antagonist.<sup>826</sup> Dennis Pausch has shown that Livy similarly used close focalization to describe the fears and suffering of the Carthaginians during his narrative of the Second Punic War: this served to humanize the enemy and to give a more complex view of the war.<sup>827</sup> Andrew Feldherr's thought regarding Livy's description of the Carthaginians who crossed the Alps and had to fight the local people is also relevant here: "[...] the entire account of the Alpine crossing is so strongly focalized through the experiences of the Carthaginians that a Roman reader may be in danger of forgetting who he is. In reading of the battles between Carthaginians and Gauls, who does a Livian reader root for – the civilized and skilful Carthaginians whose journey we have been following, or the barbaric Gauls, sackers of Rome, who here nevertheless are blocking the route of Rome's mortal enemy?"<sup>828</sup>

To return to Perseus, Polybius's account of the war is very fragmentary, but we have his long comment on the Greeks' reaction to Perseus's victory at Callicinus.<sup>829</sup> Polybius writes that many Greeks were enthusiastic and supported Perseus, momentarily forgetting that he was the weaker side of the war and generally a bad king. Polybius writes that the phenomenon is the same

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<sup>824</sup> Galinsky 1996, 84–88; Zecchini 2001, 29, 57–58, 70. Augustus's *clipeus virtutis* listed *virtus, clementia, iustitia, and pietas*: R. Gest. div. Aug. 34.2

<sup>825</sup> Liv. 42.62.14.

<sup>826</sup> Other earlier instances of enemies' fear: Philip V is struck by terror before the first decisive battle against the Romans: Liv. 31.34.5. Philip V is afraid and nervous: Pol. 16.24.1–4. Perseus acts too hastily out of fear: Liv. 45.5.9–11. Cf. Walsh 1954, 114. Sallust made fear a central aspect of his characterization of Jugurtha. For him, fear of the Romans conflicted with Jugurtha's natural ambition. For fear in the *Jugurthine War*, see Sall. Iug. 11.8, 13.5, 20.1, 25.6–7, 25.10, 32.5, 62.8, 72.2, 102.15, 108.3.

<sup>827</sup> Pausch 2011, IV.1.c, IV.2.b.

<sup>828</sup> Feldherr 2009, 317–318 n. 9.

<sup>829</sup> Pol. 27.9–10. See above p. 46 n. 146 for the whole citation.

as in a boxing match, where the audience suddenly starts cheering in support of the weaker fighter when he momentarily succeeds in getting the upper hand. Nikos Miltsios has studied this passage from the narratological point of view and argues that metaphorically Polybius means that by arousing pity and sympathy in the readers – by means of internal or close external focalization, suspense, and illusory expectations – even a completely evil character can momentarily become likeable.<sup>830</sup> Despite the fragmentary state of his work, it certainly seems that Polybius too was constructing a similar tragic and pathetic narrative arc for Perseus. Miltsios remarks appropriately: “We can see how the narrator creates an expectation in us that Perseus’s success augurs him no good, how his foreboding becomes all the more tragic as it is provided at a time of great elevation, and how this story too leaves us in a state of suspense in which fear and hope are intricately intertwined.”<sup>831</sup>

As the war went on, Q. Marcius Philippus took command in 169 BC, and Livy’s narrative starts to follow his movements.<sup>832</sup> To create contrast to the capable consul, Livy provides the readers with brief flashes of Perseus, who starts committing tactical errors and becomes sloppy in the management of the war.<sup>833</sup> Through these moments the readers learn that Perseus was panicking because of fear, not knowing what to do.<sup>834</sup> A particularly illustrative moment in Livy’s narrative is when Perseus learns of the approaching enemy during a bath: “Terrified at the news he leapt from the bathtub and rushed out, shouting that he had been beaten without a fight.”<sup>835</sup> This comical scene, together with Perseus’s constant fear, makes the king seem ever more vulnerable and even pathetic.

In her book on the theory of the narrative, Mieke Bal has written that character-bound focalization, generally speaking, “can vary, can shift from one character to another, even if the narrator remains constant. In such cases, we

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<sup>830</sup> Miltsios 2009, 504–506.

<sup>831</sup> Miltsios 2009, 505–506.

<sup>832</sup> Before this, there is a big lacuna in Livy’s 43<sup>rd</sup> book where he had continued to tell about the war. Hypotheses on the lost content: Chaplin 2007, 97–98. The narrative continues to follow Perseus from Liv. 43.18.

<sup>833</sup> Liv. 44.5–6.

<sup>834</sup> Pol. 28.10, 29.17.3–4, 29.18; Liv. 44.6.1–2, 44.7.8–9, 44.10.1 and 4.

<sup>835</sup> Liv. 44.6.1–2: “quo nuntio cum pavidus exluisset e solio, victum se sine proelio clamitans proripuit.”

may be given a good picture of a conflict. We are shown how differently the various characters view the same facts. This technique can result in neutrality towards all characters. Nevertheless, there usually is no doubt in our minds which character should receive most attention and sympathy.”<sup>836</sup> I think that with Livy’s portrayal of Perseus we should not forget that Perseus also was a morally flawed and evil character for Livy. The readers would not have forgotten, for example, the tragic story of what Perseus did to his brother Demetrius. It was indeed this severe moral weakness that made Perseus’s character such a good warning moral example, and his victimization through close focalization made the lesson more impactful and tragic.

Livy continues the narrative with the new consular year 168 BC, when L. Aemilius Paullus took command of the war.<sup>837</sup> The greatest part of the rest of Book 44 focuses on Aemilius Paullus’s movements and plans.<sup>838</sup> Livy’s portrayal of the consul is very positive, just as Polybius’s is: he is extremely capable and inspires everyone with his speeches and behaviour.<sup>839</sup> Livy writes that even Perseus could notice from a distance how the Roman soldiers were full of energy and motivation after one of the new consul’s speeches. Livy remarks that this sight scared the king even more.<sup>840</sup> King Prusias II of Bithynia and the Rhodians tried to mediate peace between the Romans and Perseus, but the senate did not regard these attempts positively.<sup>841</sup> Perseus sent a letter to both Eumenes II and Antiochus IV in which, among a list of insults against the Romans, he asked them to try to mediate peace between himself and the Romans, whose war against him was unjust, or join him against them.<sup>842</sup> Livy says that Eumenes II had known from the beginning that

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<sup>836</sup> Bal 2017, 136. Cf. Pausch 2011, IV.2.c.

<sup>837</sup> Livy describes the beginning of the new war season with the new consul: Liv. 44.17–22. Cf. Pol. 29.1.1.

<sup>838</sup> Starting from Liv. 44.33.

<sup>839</sup> The reason for this must be Polybius’s friendship with his son Scipio Aemilianus.

<sup>840</sup> L. Aemilius Paullus’s speech: Liv. 44.34. Perseus’s scared reaction: 44.35.1. At this point of the war, Perseus was in “great terror”: 44.32.5–6. Even Eumenes II knew that Perseus was scared: 44.25.5 and 8.

<sup>841</sup> Liv. 44.14–15.

<sup>842</sup> Liv. 44.24.6. Cf. Pol. 29.4.8–10. For Perseus and Eumenes II’s negotiations that allegedly ensued, see above pp. 130–134. Antiochus IV ignored the request.

Perseus had always only wanted peace with the Romans.<sup>843</sup> Neither king had any intention of helping Perseus, however.

Perseus had no choice but to desperately continue the war. Perseus had carelessly started the war and it seems that despite his best efforts – and even though neutral parties tried to mediate – it was impossible to stop the Romans and make peace. This is the impression that comes across from Livy's narrative that focalizes heavily on Perseus and emphasizes his fear and desperation. Such a portrayal victimizes Perseus and builds a basis for the tragic culmination of his story. Livy constructs the narrative of Perseus's fall from glory in a long and emotional arc that starts already with Perseus's conspiracy against his brother Demetrius.

It is probable that Polybius too used similar narrative devices for the portrayal of Perseus. The very few fragments of Polybius from this part of his work hint at that. Above, I have cited Polybius's narrative metaphor of the boxing match, and we have seen how Polybius too highlighted Perseus's nervousness and panic and ended the narrative of the Third Macedonian War with a deliberation on the unpredictability of fortune and Perseus's pitiful fall from glory. Nikos Miltsios has analysed other parts of Polybius's extant text and demonstrated that Polybius too was a master of psychological narrative: he used close focalization, suspense, and illusory expectations for arousing sympathy in the readers.<sup>844</sup> According to Miltsios, such interplay between a character's expectations and experiences also makes the narrative more exciting. Miltsios also mentions Perseus possibly as one of such characters in Polybius's narrative, citing the boxing match metaphor.<sup>845</sup>

The Romans ended the war with a decisive victory at the final battle of Pydna in 168 BC.<sup>846</sup> Towards the end of the battle, Livy's focus switches back to Perseus when he started to flee with a few friends.<sup>847</sup> Livy lets the readers follow Perseus's escape step by step, through the night, towards his capital

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<sup>843</sup> Liv. 44.25.3–4. Cf. Pol. 29.7.4. Eumenes II had, however, incited the Romans to go to war with Perseus; see Burton 2017, 65–123.

<sup>844</sup> Miltsios 2009. *Ibidem*, 504: "Indeed, independently of the means by which it is aroused, suspense almost universally entails the reader's identification or empathy with one or more of the characters of the story."

<sup>845</sup> Miltsios 2009, 504–506.

<sup>846</sup> Description of the battle: Liv. 44.40–42.

<sup>847</sup> Liv. 44.42.3–4. Cf. Pol. 29.17.3–4, 29.18, 29.19.1.

Pella and onwards to Amphipolis.<sup>848</sup> Dennis Pausch uses Perseus's escape and Aemilius Paullus's simultaneous pursuit as an example of an instance where Livy switches focalizations quickly back and forth to describe two synchronous events.<sup>849</sup> This almost movie-like technique increases the dramatic effect of the event. In Livy's narrative, when the king arrived at Amphipolis, he tried to speak to the people there, but failed to do so because of tears and emotion.<sup>850</sup> This moment highlights the king's desperation and impotence. The people of Amphipolis felt sympathy for the king – just as some of Livy's readers might have due to the historian's narrative that had consistently portrayed Perseus in a tragic light since the beginning of the war. Indeed, the reaction of the internal audience (the people of Amphipolis) upon observing the king guides the reaction of the external audience (the readers).

Earlier, Livy had stressed that for him Perseus was a despicable character and not worthy of the kingly title. He is depicted as someone who underestimated the menace and ruthlessness of the Romans out of his own incompetence and arrogance. Perseus is thus a victim of his own vices. Andrew Feldherr has written, in the context of the Hannibalic War, that because of the constant focalization on the enemy's hardships and suffering, the readers might momentarily wonder who Livy is rooting for – the Romans or the enemy.<sup>851</sup> However, just as in the case of Hannibal, if we look at the larger picture, there is no doubt that Livy thought that the Romans were justified in making war on Perseus. His end was tragic, but for Livy it was self-caused, in the manner of an Aristotelian tragic tyrant. However, even if the war was justified for the Romans, Livy's narrative of these Roman individuals' dishonest and even aggressive conduct seems morally questionable.

After Pydna, Livy says – again guiding the audience's reaction – that the consul L. Aemilius Paullus pitied the defeated king so much that he almost shed tears at the thought of the glory that Perseus had fallen from. The king had fled to Samothrace where he hid in a temple, having lost his army and his

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<sup>848</sup> Liv. 44.43, 44.44.4–8. There is a brief mention of Aemilius Paullus, who was worried about his momentarily missing son, the future Scipio Aemilianus, after the battle: Liv. 44.44.1–3.

<sup>849</sup> Pausch 2011, III.1.b. P.G. Walsh calls this "switch technique": Walsh 1954, 112–113.

<sup>850</sup> Liv. 44.45.9–11. After the battle, Aemilius Paullus started to follow Perseus's trail: Liv. 44.46.

<sup>851</sup> See above p. 193 n. 828.

kingdom.<sup>852</sup> The consul received a letter from Perseus who asked for mercy and protection. Despite his compassion, the consul maintained an unyielding attitude: he refused to help Perseus before he surrendered unconditionally and renounced his royal title.<sup>853</sup> Meanwhile the people of Samothrace turned against Perseus because he had his only remaining friend killed out of paranoia – a typical plight that troubled many kings and tyrants near the end of their lives.<sup>854</sup>

A description of the king's pathetic escape in the night follows: he sneaked out of his hiding place with nothing but his children and servants, had to scramble over a wall to get out, and went to the beach just to find out that the boat he had paid for had left without him. Eventually his servants left, and Livy tells how Perseus wandered on the dark shore aimlessly for some time and then gave up and hid himself in a dark corner of the temple. He had no choice but to surrender.<sup>855</sup> This scene is narratologically interesting for many reasons. Livy focalizes on Perseus and slows down the rhythm – methods that we have by now often seen in Livy's narrative – so that we may follow every desperate last step of the king's fall. The dark empty shore can be seen as a metaphor for Perseus's mental state: he is cornered, alone, and in the dark, without any place to go to and without any prospects for the future. Indeed, using narratological concepts, we could say that the shore functions as a psychological space in the narrative, just like Philip V's earlier climb to the foggy mountain.<sup>856</sup>

After this, Livy describes how the captive Perseus entered the Roman camp in mourning garb, accompanied only by his oldest son. Livy recapitulates how powerful the Macedonian empire had once been and how excited everyone was to see the famous Perseus arrive at the Roman camp in person.<sup>857</sup> His character comes to symbolize the end of the Macedonian kingdom.<sup>858</sup> This

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<sup>852</sup> Liv. 45.4.2–4.

<sup>853</sup> Liv. 45.4.5–7.

<sup>854</sup> Liv. 45.5–45.6.1.

<sup>855</sup> Liv. 45.6.2–10.

<sup>856</sup> Liv. 40.21–22. For Philip V's climb to Mount Haemus, see Jaeger 2007 and above pp. 46–47.

<sup>857</sup> Liv. 45.7.1–3. Cf. Liv. 45.9.

<sup>858</sup> Not much of Polybius is extant for Perseus's final moments except for Polybius's reflection on the end of the Macedonian kingdom and its comparison with the similar fate of the Persian kingdom: Pol. 29.21.

detailed and also very visually constructed story of Perseus's final moments as a king, from the dark shore to his following capture, forms the climax of the tragic "play". The arrival at the Roman camp is told from Aemilius Paullus's point of view. Perseus is now a passive character without any agency, and the slow rhythm of the scene anticipates an important moment, in this case a moral lesson. Livy writes that the consul received Perseus gently, not letting him prostrate himself.<sup>859</sup> Aemilius Paullus asked Perseus why he had started the war against the Romans when he had seen his father lose against them before. Perseus stared at the ground and wept silently.<sup>860</sup> When no reply was given, the Roman consul promised Perseus that he would be treated mercifully.<sup>861</sup> He also said to the other Romans present that they should see Perseus as a perfect example of the mutability of human fortune and how one should always stay humble, even at the moment of the greatest victory, because no one knew what the future would hold.<sup>862</sup>

David S. Levene has analysed some of the key moments of Livy's Book 45 from a narratological point of view, including Perseus's arrival at Aemilius Paullus's camp. Levene argues that the scene serves as a straightforward moral example, and the reactions of the internal audience (the people gathered at the camp to see Perseus's arrival) also encourage the external audience (us readers) to interpret the scene as such.<sup>863</sup> Levene also notes that Livy seems to want to present Perseus as a tragic character, even though Levene does not think that Perseus's character is meant to evoke pity in the readers because Perseus had caused his own ruin.<sup>864</sup> In the light of Perseus's whole tragic arc, however, starting in Aristotelian fashion with his fatal mistake, that is, the temper tantrum, and ending here with Aemilius Paullus, it seems to me that

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<sup>859</sup> Liv. 45.7.4–5.

<sup>860</sup> Liv. 45.8.1–4.

<sup>861</sup> Liv. 45.8.5. According to Livy, Perseus and his family were treated very gently and generously by the Romans. He wrote that after the triumph, Perseus lived a controlled but comfortable life in Alba with his family: 45.28.9–11, 45.42.4. However, other sources say that Aemilius Paullus could not prevent the bad treatment of Perseus and his children and they did not live for long, except for one of the three children: Pol. 36.10.3; Diod. Sic. 31.9; Plut. Aem. 37.2–4.

<sup>862</sup> Liv. 45.8.6–7. Similar thoughts of Polybius: Pol. 29.20–21.

<sup>863</sup> Levene 2006, 87–90.

<sup>864</sup> According to Aristotle, a good tragedy evoked sympathy, pity, or fear in the audience: Aristot. Poet. 11 and 13. Levene compares Livy's scene to Plutarch who directly wrote that Perseus did not deserve pity: Levene 2006, 90–92.

Livy definitely left the possibility open for the reader to sympathize temporarily with Perseus's character. Livy does this by means of typical narratological tools such as frequent internal focalization.

To continue with the narrative, Aemilius Paullus's words about the mutability of human fortune function as a foreshadowing of his own misfortune. Soon after in the narrative, Livy presents Aemilius Paullus as an explicit parallel to Perseus: at the time of the triumph, the moment of the greatest glory for any Roman commander, Aemilius Paullus had lost both his sons.<sup>865</sup> After the triumph he gave a speech (in *oratio recta*) in which he again reminded everyone of the mutability of fortune even at the most glorious moments.<sup>866</sup> This in turn can be seen as a further foreshadowing of the fall of the Roman *virtus* and the Republic. At this point of the narrative, Rome had conquered several great enemies and its power seemed unstoppable.

At the same time exceptionally virtuous Roman commanders like Aemilius Paullus were becoming a rarity, and the Romans were quickly beginning to forget their moral principles and the ways of their ancestors. This discord between the present and the past in Roman society is further highlighted by the foreign character of Perseus who functions as a tragic warning. When Aemilius Paullus asked Perseus why he had not learned from his father's mistakes, Perseus was at a loss for words: according to Jane D. Chaplin, "Livy depicts Perseus as characteristically incapable of benefitting from his father's experience."<sup>867</sup> For Livy, a similar discrepancy in Roman society was among the first signs of the beginning of the republican identity crisis that would reach its climax during his own time. Livy uses Perseus's dishonest and borderline predatory treatment at the hands of the Romans to illustrate this change in Roman *virtus*.

So ends Livy's narrative of the Third Macedonian War: on a gloomy and cautionary note. To sum up the narrative devices used by Livy: we can recognize a horizontal story structure with a clear beginning, middle, and

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<sup>865</sup> Similarly: Levene 2006, 97–101. Levene analyses the scene especially from the audience viewpoint.

<sup>866</sup> Liv. 45.40.6–9, 45.41. These are the sons from his second marriage. At this point his two eldest sons, P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus and Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, already legally belonged to other families via adoption.

<sup>867</sup> Chaplin 2000, 81.

end.<sup>868</sup> The beginning is marked by momentary suspense and Roman trickery, the middle shows us Perseus's gradual fall from a mighty king to the frightened and desperate prey of the Romans, and the finale is a detailed and closely focalized narrative of Perseus's desperation, paralleled by Aemilius Paullus's personal misfortune. It all shapes into a moral lesson on the dangers of arrogance and ambition. By introducing suspense into the narrative, creating illusory expectations, and focalizing often on Perseus, Livy has attempted to make Perseus a tragic character and to momentarily evoke the readers' sympathy even towards an enemy character.

### ***Conclusion to chapter 3: The beginnings of the moral decline through the eyes of the Others***

In this chapter, I have analysed narrative instances where Romans seem to mistreat or persecute kings or are accused of such behaviour. One such recurring instance are the enemy speeches and letters. These were exaggerated on purpose and were useful in showing the arrogance of these enemy characters. Moreover, Rome-critical speeches and letters obviously helped in making the narrative more engaging and less monotonous, and they invited the readers to consider the important concepts of *odium regni*, freedom, and the Republic. Such anti-Roman speeches and letters were very common in Roman historiography and were a safe way to express even harsh criticism of Roman society and foreign policies through the voice of the Other. After all, the criticism expressed in these examples mostly leans on events from the distant past. Some historians, such as Sallust, used heavier tones and more recent examples. The choice between direct or indirect speech, and between a speech or a letter, gave them the opportunity to regulate the tone of the accusations and the rhythm of the narrative. In these speeches and letters, kings accused Romans of aggressive imperialism and unjustified wars. It is clear, however, that for Polybius and Livy, the Roman wars of the early 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC had been just and the Roman dominion over the Mediterranean

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<sup>868</sup> K. Witte studied horizontal story structures in Livy already over a century ago: Witte 1910.

was well deserved. The narratives give the strong impression that morally acceptable pretexts for starting wars and for conduct in wars and diplomacy was very important for the Romans. They took pride, after all, in their honesty and straightforwardness compared to other peoples.

Polybius, Sallust, and Livy, however, provide examples of instances, outside enemy speeches, where such moral ideals were clearly not respected. Our historians indeed believed that the expansion of the Roman empire had been the cause of the gradual moral decline during the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC. In the narratives, more and more Romans started to show a blatant lack of *fides* in international relations as a symptom of this moral decline. Thus, we have examples of Romans who manipulated and deceived not only enemy kings but also friendly kings with the intent of compromising the internal stability of their governments. These are presented as warning examples of the dangers of ambition and internal discord. Moreover, these stories are told from the viewpoint of the Other who looked at the Romans as external threats. Similarly to the speeches and letters of the enemy kings, these examples too allow the historians to criticize the Romans “from outside”, using foreign characters. The difference is, however, that the criticism in the speeches and letters is very situational and exaggerated on purpose and always comes from an enemy. In the examples where Romans were involved in destabilizing their allied kings’ family concord, the historians consistently focalize internally on these foreign friendly characters and make the readers experience their suffering caused by the Romans. This kind of narrative gaze of the Other towards the Romans cuts much deeper than exaggerated enemy speeches and letters.

Lastly, the portrayal of Perseus shows a different type of example of Roman moral misconduct. This portrayal mainly functions as a moral warning example of the mutability of fortune and the dangers of arrogance and ambition. But it criticizes the Roman moral decline as well: in this portrayal, Livy focalizes on an enemy character who was tricked and ruthlessly crushed by certain Romans despite his repeated attempts to end the violence peacefully. Even though the war was justified from the Roman perspective, a stark contrast is drawn between ideal wartime conduct – as illustrated with

the Ennian example of the Pyrrhic War – and the Romans' dishonesty and aggressiveness during the time when moral decline was already well underway according to Livy. Moreover, Livy accentuates the generational gap that he envisioned in this historical era: the younger Romans no longer cared about the *mores maiorum* and did not listen to the warnings of the older Romans. For Livy, this was the beginning of the late republican identity crisis and of the separation of the Roman present from their history.

Focalization again emerges as an important tool for inviting the reader to sympathize with characters and to create suspense through illusory expectations. In a situation where the narrator knows more than the focalizer, such as when Q. Marcius Philippus deceived Perseus, the narrator attempts to create an effect of surprise and/or sympathy when the focalizer (Perseus) discovers the truth or meets their inevitable fate. These techniques, together with describing the feelings of the focalizer, give a tragic tone to the portrayals of such characters as well. Furthermore, we have seen examples of interesting metaphors, such as Polybius's comparison of the Third Macedonian War with a boxing match, or Livy's use of mental space when describing Perseus's desperate last escape to the dark shore of Samothrace. Lastly, Livy frequently uses the internal audience of the narrative to guide the emotional response of the external audience, i.e., the readers.

## 4 THE SELF-CRITICAL MIRROR: ROMANS PARALLELED TO KINGS AND TYRANTS

In this final part of the study, I focus on the aspect of Roman self-criticism in the narratives through cases where individual Romans seemed to behave or were accused of behaving like stereotypical eastern kings. The traditional Roman virtues were believed to ensure the stability of the Republic and its superiority over monarchies, which were considered an inferior form of government. However, the historians believed that the moral decline caused by rapid expansion had made the Romans forget these virtues so that, in the worst cases, there seemed to be no moral difference left between Roman commanders and eastern despots. Narratively speaking, it seemed that the Self and the negative Other were merging.

During and after the war with Antiochus III, the possibilities and, consequently, competition for magistracies and war booty in the East increased because of the quick expansion of Roman influence in Asia. Ambitious and talented Roman individuals were gaining more and more space to manoeuvre in the political arena. The common sentiment of *odium regni* became a powerful rhetorical tool to be used against political opponents. The vocabulary that was commonly used to describe degenerate eastern kings was as easily applied to undermine some of the most successful and powerful Romans who managed to distinguish themselves to the displeasure of their ambitious peers. They were accused of corruption, cruelty, general lack of self-discipline, and all the usual vices caused by moral decline.<sup>869</sup> The most successful men could even be directly accused of aspiring to sole rulership – an early example of this is the case of Scipio Africanus.

In this chapter, I examine different stages of this moral decline and excessively kingly behaviour, as it appears in different historical narratives. First, I study Polybius's and Livy's portrayals of Scipio Africanus who – according to these two historians – had lived during the Hannibalic Wars

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<sup>869</sup> Dunkle 1967, 151–171; McDonnell 2006, 195–197; Turchetti 2013, 151–160. See examples from Cicero's speeches in Erskine 1991, 113–114.

when the collective Roman *virtus* had still been intact. For them, Scipio Africanus was a model of this traditional Roman *virtus*, but, ironically, the qualities that made someone a great Roman commander were the same qualities that a great king should possess. In these portrayals, Scipio Africanus certainly had all the positive qualities, but he also was naturally ambitious and arrogant like all talented men. This was highly perturbing to the Roman republican aristocracy because of their shared *odium regni*, and in the end Scipio went into voluntary exile to evade the attacks of his paranoid peers.

Scipio's case creates a basis for and an interesting contrast to later portrayals in the narratives discussed here. After Scipio Africanus, I discuss other much more negative examples from different stages of the moral decline in the narratives of the late republican historians. First, I will examine portrayals of Roman individuals who were described as having adopted corrupting eastern habits during the early stages of the moral decline starting in the 180s BC according to Livy. His narrative shows how the increasing number of such individuals caused fierce competition and discord in Roman society, which he illustrates with a detailed description of the quarrelling between M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 189 BC), Cn. Manlius Vulso (cos. 187 BC), and M. Fulvius Nobilior (cos. 187 BC).

I continue the discussion with Sallust's and Trogus/Justin's fragmentary narratives of the Mithridatic Wars (89–85, 83–82, 73–63 BC) and of certain Romans' – especially Sulla's (cos. 88, 80 BC) – rapacious conduct in Asia during this time. The chapter ends with a narrative analysis of Sallust's acutely self-critical monograph of the Jugurthine War (112–105 BC) with portrayals of not only Jugurtha but also of Q. Caecilius Metellus (cos. 109 BC) and Marius (cos. 107, 104–100, 86 BC). Sallust's narratives strive to illustrate the advanced state of Roman moral decline: no Roman imitated or understood the *mos maiorum* anymore, and internal concord and *pietas* in the Republic was long gone.

## 4.1 ARISTOCRATIC AMBITIONS DURING THE EARLY WARS OF EXPANSION

### ***Scipio Africanus: The first republican “king”***

Since the Romans were extremely paranoid about anyone attempting to seize sole rulership in the Roman Republic, even the most successful and virtuous commanders such as Scipio Africanus could become targets of such accusations. Christoph R. Hatscher has applied Max Weber’s theories of charismatic leadership to the Roman military system and argues that, even though the Republic itself was not a purely charismatic institution (in the Weberian sense), the power of the consuls as commanders, *imperium militiae*, was charismatic in nature.<sup>870</sup> The commanders won their soldiers’ loyalty by demonstrating their personal abilities and *virtus* and by providing a part of the war booty or land to them. This was not far from how the Hellenistic kings acquired authority and legitimized their rule in the eyes of their subjects.<sup>871</sup>

According to Hatscher, P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus was the first republican military commander who had been “too charismatic” for the Republic.<sup>872</sup> Young Scipio already started earning great fame and popularity during his first military campaigns. Polybius and Livy tell the story of Scipio as a young commander who fought against the Carthaginians in Iberia and treated the locals so fairly that they allied themselves with Scipio and Rome. The Iberian chieftains Edeco and Andobales called Scipio a king (*βασιλεύς*) to honour his noble conduct in Iberia.<sup>873</sup> Focalizing on Scipio, Polybius tells us that the first two times Scipio did not pay much attention to this appellation and was merely happy about his good reception, but when, after a victorious battle against the Carthaginians in 209 BC, he was called a king for the third time by all the Iberians, it gave him pause. Scipio then addressed all the Iberians gathered around him and told them that “he wished to be called kingly by them and actually to be kingly, but that he did not wish to be king or

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<sup>870</sup> Hatscher 2000. Cf. Phang 2008, 22–24.

<sup>871</sup> Gehrke 2013.

<sup>872</sup> Hatscher 2000, 75–85.

<sup>873</sup> Pol. 10.38.2, 10.40.2–4.

to be called so by anyone. After saying this he ordered them to call him general.<sup>874</sup> Polybius goes on to praise the greatness of mind of Scipio who, despite his young age and great successes, did not accept the title of king.<sup>875</sup> This title was according to Polybius “the greatest blessing for which any man would dare to pray to the gods”.<sup>876</sup> Allegedly Scipio had several occasions to be called a king during his life, but Scipio had always chosen to stay loyal to the Republic.

Livy reports the same event but more briefly. In his version, Scipio immediately reacts to the Iberians who saluted him as a king by explaining that the title “king” was intolerable to the Romans and that he would accept that the Iberians silently thought of him as possessing a noble kingly spirit (*regalem animum*), but they should not use the word “king”.<sup>877</sup> The difference between the versions of Polybius and Livy might be an indication of the two authors’ different perceptions on kingship.<sup>878</sup> Polybius does not see the title of king as something immediately repulsive and neither does the character of Scipio.<sup>879</sup> On the contrary, Scipio is flattered, and Polybius thinks of it as the greatest possible honour and achievement. Only after a while does young Scipio realize that letting the Iberians think of him as their king conflicts with his duties to the Republic and, consequently, he forbids the use of the title. Livy’s Scipio on the other hand is immediately triggered by the appellation and forbids it right away, even though he recognizes that elsewhere the title is a great honour. Livy’s version is shorter, cleaner, and simpler – in line with the post-Caesarean paranoia of sole rulers in Rome.

Where did Scipio’s irresistible charisma come from, apart from his natural propensity to *virtus*? There were many stories of how Scipio Africanus had a very close personal relationship with Jupiter.<sup>880</sup> He consulted the god

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<sup>874</sup> Pol. 10.40.5–6: διὸ καὶ συναθροίσας τοὺς Ἴβηρας βασιλικὸς μὲν ἔφη βούλεσθαι καὶ λέγεσθαι παρὰ πᾶσι καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ὑπάρχειν, βασιλεὺς γε μὴν οὐτ’ <εἶναι> θέλειν οὐτὲ λέγεσθαι παρ’ οὐδενί. ταῦτα δ’ εἰπὼν παρήγγειλε στρατηγὸν αὐτὸν προσφωνεῖν.

<sup>875</sup> Pol. 10.40.7–10.

<sup>876</sup> Pol. 10.40.9: [---] ὡς οὗ μείζον ἀγαθὸν εὐξασθαι τις τοῖς θεοῖς <οὐ> τολμήσειε, λέγω δὲ βασιλείας, τοῦτ’ ἐκεῖνος πολλάκις ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης αὐτῷ δεδομένον [...].

<sup>877</sup> Liv. 27.19.3–6. Cicero too praised Scipio Africanus for putting the Republic before personal gain: Cic. Rep. 1.27.

<sup>878</sup> Erskine 1991, 107.

<sup>879</sup> For Polybius’s philosophical ideas on kingship, see above section 1.5.

<sup>880</sup> Pol. 10.5.4–7; Liv. 26.19.3–9, 38.58.7. For more sources, see Miller 2016.

before all important decisions and visited the temple of Jupiter on the Capitolium daily so that many thought he himself was of divine origin and had almost oracle-like abilities. A story started to circulate according to which a great snake had often been seen in his mother's bedroom. This obviously resembled the story about the divine origin of Alexander the Great and of many other Hellenistic kings.<sup>881</sup> In the late Republic, it became common that charismatic Roman commanders like Marius or Sulla promoted their divine favour to inspire trust.<sup>882</sup> However, Polybius's and Livy's narratives emphasize that during Scipio's lifetime it was something of an anomaly.

Livy thinks that this story was ridiculous, but Scipio did nothing to deny it or confirm it. Livy does not however directly deny or accept the stories of Scipio's special relationship with gods. Polybius on his part does not focus on these stories and simply writes that they were silly and undermined the fact that, in his opinion, Scipio Africanus achieved everything because of his own intelligence, prudence, and greatness of mind. Polybius admits, however, that Scipio was clever to use these common beliefs to his advantage and to gain the trust of his soldiers.<sup>883</sup> Nikos Miltsios has argued that if we also look at the later books of Polybius that describe Scipio's campaign in Africa and focalize partly on him, Scipio appears a very manipulative character.<sup>884</sup>

When compared closely to Polybius, Livy has highlighted this manipulative aspect of Scipio's character. In particular, Livy has made some significant changes and expanded the portrait by explaining how Scipio gained the admiration of the people and the command of the war when only 24 years old. Luca Beltramini and Marco Rocco have studied the narrative techniques of this passage (Liv. 26.19.3–9) closely and argue that even though Livy's

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<sup>881</sup> See Hatscher 2000, 84–85; Levene 2010, 119–122; Levene 2015, 209–215; Beltramini and Rocco 2020, 242–244. This story was very common and was associated with many other historical characters in addition to Scipio Africanus; see the list of sources and literature in Beltramini and Rocco 2020, 242 n. 64. On the so called “Scipionic legend”, see Walbank 1967b. For divine origins of the Hellenistic kings, see above pp. 73–77.

<sup>882</sup> Plut. Mar. 17.2–6, Sull. 6.7–13, 9.6–8, 19.9. Coins were an effective way to spread such narratives; see below p. 229 n. 979.

<sup>883</sup> Pol. 10.2, 10.9.2, 10.5.8–9, 10.11.7–9, 10.14.11–12; Liv. 26.45.9.

<sup>884</sup> Miltsios 2013, 106–114. Ibidem, 110: “Indeed, the image that is projected of Scipio at the battle of the Camps is in keeping with the way in which his personality is portrayed by the narrator in Book 10. The description of his exploits as a young man is intended precisely to highlight his clarity of thought and ability to manipulate others in order to achieve his aims [...]”

portrait of Scipio Africanus is clearly very positive in other parts of his work, this first presentation of the character of Scipio gives an ambiguous image.<sup>885</sup> Livy explains that Scipio had a special skill (*ars*) to showcase (*ostendere*) his virtues and even to pretend (*adsimulare*). Livy refers to Scipio's supposed religiousness with the word *superstitio*.<sup>886</sup> Beltramini and Rocco demonstrate with several examples that the words *ars* and *superstitio* had clear negative connotations.<sup>887</sup> Therefore, even though Livy does not directly state his own opinion, he clearly implies that a part of Scipio's popularity was due to calculated acting. Beltramini and Rocco conclude: "the young general, whose merits are beyond doubt, saved the *res publica* with his *verae virtutes* but also by means of his innate ability to trick people, however noble his motives."<sup>888</sup>

Indeed, I think that Beltramini and Rocco are correct in suggesting that this ambiguous portrayal of Scipio Africanus foreshadows the later accusations of striving for kingship directed towards him, and the comparisons to Alexander the Great just worsened the situation: "These coincidences demonstrate that the Alexander reference is anything but a straightforward eulogy; on the contrary, it clearly plays a role in distancing Scipio from the model of Roman hero praised by Livy throughout his work (and particularly in Book 9) pointing to criticism of him by his contemporaries."<sup>889</sup> Luca Beltramini has further noted that even though the external audience (i.e., the readers) of Livy's narrative is aware of Livy's scepticism, the internal audience of the narrative (e.g. the listeners to Scipio Nasica's speech at Liv. 38.58–59) completely believed in these stories.<sup>890</sup> Beltramini applies here the methodology of Jane D. Chaplin, who argues that for Livy *exempla* were very dynamic.<sup>891</sup> Indeed, in this example Livy

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<sup>885</sup> Beltramini and Rocco 2020.

<sup>886</sup> *Ars*: Liv. 26.19.4 and 8, *adsimulare*: 26.19.9, *superstitio*: 26.19.4. An example of Scipio's acting: Liv. 26.45.9.

<sup>887</sup> Noted also by D. Levene: Levene 1993, 18–19, 61–62.

<sup>888</sup> Beltramini and Rocco 2020, 246.

<sup>889</sup> Beltramini and Rocco 2020, 244–245. P. François argues that Scipio's *imitatio Alexandri* was not intentional, but the comparisons were made by his rivals (like the accusations of his excessive philhellenism) or later in literature as a part of his legend: François 2006, 314–315, 321–325.

<sup>890</sup> Beltramini 2017, 189–193.

<sup>891</sup> Chaplin 2000.

demonstrates directly how *exempla* could be used and abused for various purposes, including changing the people's perception of history.

Scipio's victory over Hannibal made him a great hero for the people of Rome. Polybius describes the overly enthusiastic reception of Scipio at his triumph in 201 BC.<sup>892</sup> The adoration of Scipio Africanus by the people of Rome took worryingly zealous forms, for they apparently would have wanted to make him a consul and a dictator for life. Scipio had to forbid this and the erecting of his statues on the Capitolium and in the Forum. He also tried to oppose a decree that authorized his effigy to be brought out from the temple of Jupiter as if in a triumphal procession.<sup>893</sup> This type of admiration verged on how kings of the Eastern Mediterranean, Egypt, and Mesopotamia were adored by the people. Scipio's nobility and immense success caused as much admiration as envy in Rome, according to Polybius.<sup>894</sup> The Iberians had offered him the title of king – would the Romans do the same?

Livy writes that in 190 BC, before going to war against Antiochus III with his brother Lucius, "Scipio Africanus set up an arch on the Capitolium facing the road that leads up to it, with seven gilded figures and two equestrian statues; and before the arch he placed two marble basins."<sup>895</sup> Don Miller argues that, despite its having often been ignored in scholarship because there is no physical trace of it, the arch of Scipio is an important clue to understanding his public image.<sup>896</sup> Livy said that Scipio had often had to forbid the enthusiastic Romans from erecting statues of him, but this one magnificent arch that stood right at the end of the triumphal path and near the temple of Jupiter had been erected by himself to advertise his earlier military success. Scipio Africanus had been eager to take part in the Asian campaign, Polybius says, and this triumphal arch could have served as some sort of monumental auspice for this campaign.<sup>897</sup>

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<sup>892</sup> Pol. 16.23.

<sup>893</sup> Liv. 38.56.12–13. Valerius Maximus and Appian both mention such a procession: Val. Max. 8.15.1; App. Hisp. 23.

<sup>894</sup> Pol. 10.40.10.

<sup>895</sup> Liv. 37.3.7: "P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, priusquam proficisceretur, fornicem in Capitolio adversus viam qua in Capitolium escenditur cum signis septem auratis et equis duobus et marmorea duo labra ante fornicem posuit." Cf. *LTUR* 2, 266–267.

<sup>896</sup> Miller 2016. Cf. Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 220–223.

<sup>897</sup> Pol. 21.5.12.

Kurt von Fritz might be right in suggesting that Scipio Africanus was not any less ambitious than Sulla – or Pompey who was also likened to Alexander the Great. Only the times were different.<sup>898</sup> We could indeed say, as Christoph R. Hatscher highlights, that Scipio Africanus was “ahead of his time” and prepared the way for the later charismatic leaders like Flamininus, Marius, Sulla, Caesar, and Pompey.<sup>899</sup> Cicero indeed once wrote, referring to Caesar, that “it is in the greatest souls and in the most brilliant geniuses that we usually find ambitions for civil and military authority, for power, and for glory”.<sup>900</sup> Scipio Africanus, however, had to tread very carefully in order to avoid suspicions from his peers. At that time, the Republic was much more effective in moderating single overly charismatic Romans who distinguished themselves in the eyes of the Roman people. Ironically, the better a commander someone was, the greater threat he became for the republican system.

We could compare Scipio Africanus to T. Quinctius Flamininus when naming extremely charismatic and ambitious young Roman commanders of the early overseas wars.<sup>901</sup> J.P.V.D. Baldson has written about Flamininus: “In Rome his career had not ended in tragedy, like that of Scipio. In Greece splendid gold coins circulated, carrying his portrait, as if he was more than a proconsul and scarcely less than a Hellenistic King.”<sup>902</sup> Polybius portrays Flamininus as a manipulative, ambitious, and even ruthless man, who had not been afraid to use dirty tactics in order to get the desired results and to advance

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<sup>898</sup> Fritz 1954, 300.

<sup>899</sup> Hatscher 2000, 83–85.

<sup>900</sup> Cic. Off. 1.26: “in maximis animis splendidissimisque ingeniis plerumque existunt honoris, imperii, potentiae, gloriae cupiditates.”

<sup>901</sup> Both were elected to the consulship regardless of their relatively young age (around thirty) and skipping the middle offices like the praetorship: Haimson Lushkov 2015, 151–159.

<sup>902</sup> Baldson 1967, 177. The Chalcidians later dedicated a building to Flamininus and other gods, as if the Roman general had been one of the gods himself. There was still in Plutarch’s time a priest for the cult of their saviour Flamininus who made sacrifices and sang hymns in his honour more than 200 years after his death: Plut. Flam. 16.3–4. According to Plutarch, at Delphi Flamininus had even dedicated a golden wreath to Apollo with an inscription in which he referred to himself as “god-like”, thus encouraging the Greeks’ adoration of him: Plut. Flam. 12.7. Also, a gold stater coin with Flamininus’s portrait was minted soon after the Roman victory. This is the oldest known Roman portrait on a coin: *RRC* 548; Gruen 1992, 161–162.

his own career.<sup>903</sup> However, he seemingly managed to avoid the attacks from his Roman competitors, unlike Scipio Africanus.

Livy remarks that Scipio's conduct had always been highly commendable, but still all those times when the people wanted to erect statues of him or make him a dictator for life could be and were used against him by his political opponents.<sup>904</sup> In 187 or 184 BC, the two plebeian tribunes, called Petellii, put Scipio Africanus on trial.<sup>905</sup> Livy describes this as outrageous and compares the treatment of Scipio to that of Hannibal who went to exile – both were heroes to an ungrateful nation.<sup>906</sup> On the other hand, some said that no one should be immune to legal investigation in a free state. Scipio was accused of behaviour that in Roman minds was seen as typical of degenerate sole rulers – he allegedly had lived luxuriously like a king (*externo et regio more*) in Syracuse and let his subordinate Q. Pleminius loot and terrorize the people of Locri.<sup>907</sup> At that time there had been malicious rumours not only about the indolent habits and Greek dress of the general himself but also of the lack of discipline among his soldiers in Syracuse.<sup>908</sup>

At the trial, even his earlier diplomatic encounter with Antiochus III was brought up. The accusers said that it was highly suspicious that Antiochus III

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<sup>903</sup> The sources tell us that Flaminius ensured, with calculated actions, that he alone would get all the glory for the war: Pol. 18.10–13, 18.39.4; Liv. 32.32.5–6, 32.36.3–10, 32.37, 33.13.15, 33.24.3–7, 33.25.4–11. Plutarch too wrote that Flaminius was very ambitious by nature: Plut. Flam. 2.1, 20.1. According to J. Briscoe, this kind of behaviour was smart in the competitive Roman society of that time: Briscoe 1972, 33–34. As we have seen, Livy attempted to cast a less ambitious and manipulative image of Flaminius. For the historical character of Flaminius, see above pp. 174–177.

<sup>904</sup> Liv. 38.57.1.

<sup>905</sup> For the whole trial, see Liv. 38.50–53. Cf. the very short fragments of Polybius and Diodorus Siculus: Pol. 23.14.1–4; Diod. Sic. 29.21. For the trial, see Scullard 1970, 216–223; Briscoe 2008, 170–179. Scipio Africanus's brother Lucius was put on trial too, probably before this, even though Livy has inverted the chronology. Lucius was accused of stealing money from the booty of Antiochus III or of taking bribes from the king. Livy thinks that these accusations were false as well: Liv. 38.54–60.

<sup>906</sup> Cf. Cic. Rep. 1.5–6.

<sup>907</sup> For Scipio's "indolent" Greek habits and lack of discipline: Liv. 29.19, 29.21.13; Briscoe 1981, 303–304; Champion 2004, 206–208; François 2006. H. Etcheto examines these accusations in the wider context of the history of the Scipionic family: Etcheto 2012, 121–136. For the whole case of Pleminius, see Liv. 29.16.4–29.22.10; Diod. Sic. 27.4. Scipio was not immune to occasional political errors either: Livy tells how, during his consulship in 194 BC, Scipio Africanus promoted the proposition that the senators should sit apart from the people during the *ludi Megalenses*. The proposition was accepted; however, it was widely regarded as a highly arrogant decision and not suitable for the free people of Rome. Scipio felt ashamed for having supported it: Liv. 38.57.1.

<sup>908</sup> Scipio did prove the last point wrong by giving an impressive military demonstration of his troops to the Roman investigators: Liv. 29.21.13, 29.22.1–6.

had liberated Scipio's son, who had been a prisoner of war, without ransom and that Scipio had behaved as if it was in his power alone to decide about the course of the war, regardless of the senate and the people of Rome.<sup>909</sup> In short, he had behaved more like a dictator than a legate. He had gone to Antiochus III only to show off his personal power to the world. Therefore, he was charged with extravagant living, cruelty, putting personal matters (his son) over state matters and posing himself as a Roman dictator. Livy makes it clear with his own author's/narrator's voice that he thought these charges were malicious and unjust.<sup>910</sup> For Livy, Scipio Africanus was a great republican hero and an almost perfect historical *exemplum* of Rome's past *virtus*.

On the day of the trial, Scipio was escorted to the court with a great number of people of all social stations. Scipio rose to the rostra (something not normally done by defendants) and stated that he did not wish to argue on the anniversary of the battle of Zama. Instead, that day should be celebrated by a visit to the temples of the Capitolium and Rome. In Livy's narrative, this is the only time during the trial that Scipio speaks, which marks the moment as crucial for the character's story. After the speech, the whole crowd followed him visiting all the temples of Rome, leaving the tribunes alone and humiliated in the Forum. His improvised tour of the temples escalated almost into another triumph for the battle of Zama.<sup>911</sup>

When another day of the trial arrived, Scipio again refused to present himself. He had retired to his villa in Liternum. Some said it was because of pride, whereas his brother Lucius said that it was because of illness. Scipio's character remains silent and even passive during the narrative of the trial. In the end, it was Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (cos. 177, 163 BC), one of the tribunes at that time, who succeeded in reminding everyone of the service that Scipio had rendered to the Republic. Thanks to his words everyone rebuked the Petellii for trying to debase Scipio's name, and Scipio was left alone in his voluntary isolation. Livy says that Scipio Africanus did not even want to be

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<sup>909</sup> For the encounter with Antiochus III, see Liv. 37.36.

<sup>910</sup> Liv. 38.50.1–38.51.5.

<sup>911</sup> Liv. 38.51.6–14. Scipio's triumph had been 14 years earlier; see Pol. 16.23; Liv. 30.45. Cf. Jaeger 1997 for a very detailed analysis of these spatial and temporal aspects of the trials.

buried in his family's tomb in Rome, because an ungrateful Rome did not deserve it.<sup>912</sup>

So, it seems that Scipio Africanus was above the law after all. In the very short fragment of Polybius describing the trials, Scipio asserts that no one had the right to utter accusing words against him because without him no one would have the right to speak anymore. With this he means that he had saved the Republic and the freedom that came with it.<sup>913</sup> In another fragment of Polybius, repeated by Livy and Diodorus Siculus, we learn that a senator once asked Scipio Africanus for a detailed account of how he had spent the money received from Antiochus III in the war. In Scipio's opinion, he did not have to give an account to anyone. The senator kept insisting, and Scipio had the account book brought to the senate where he ripped it into pieces in front of everyone. Scipio then reminded the senators that it was ridiculous to ask what had happened to his money, since it was thanks to him that a great amount of money had gone into the state's treasury and that the Romans had become the masters of Asia, Libya, and Iberia. This allegedly silenced everyone.<sup>914</sup>

Scipio's behaviour is admittedly very arrogant and confident in these examples. Ironically, the same qualities that made Scipio Africanus a perfect military commander and the hero of the Republic also made him a threat to the Republic. His immense *virtus* and charisma helped him save the Republic single-handedly, but at the same time they gained him the excessive admiration of the people. He risked becoming a king or a dictator several times without even trying. The qualities that made a great Roman military leader or a king were similar, and Scipio Africanus had them all.

Even though Livy's portrait of Scipio Africanus was somewhat ambiguous in certain respects, there is no doubt that for Livy – just as for the pro-Scipionic Polybius – Scipio Africanus was a historical *exemplum* of a hero who was unjustly mistreated by his own people. Whenever there was a similar case later in the narrative, a comparison could be made.<sup>915</sup> For both Polybius

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<sup>912</sup> Liv. 38.52–53.

<sup>913</sup> Pol. 23.14.1–4.

<sup>914</sup> Pol. 23.14.7–12. Cf. Liv. 38.55.8–13; Diod. Sic. 29.21.

<sup>915</sup> One such case was that of Aemilius Paullus, whose own soldiers tried to deny him the triumph over Perseus: Liv. 45.34–39.

and Livy, Scipio was an important symbol of the republican *virtus*. Stories of his virtues and the “Scipionic legend” were already circulating when Polybius started writing.<sup>916</sup> Polybius and Livy were sceptical of such stories, but both had reasons to admire the character of Scipio Africanus: Polybius was obviously personally connected with the family of the Scipiones, whereas Livy saw the past from the point of view of the Augustan regime, during which the distant republican history was idealized. Moreover, the character of Scipio Africanus is an important example of how even the most virtuous men were naturally ambitious and arrogant – only the Republic and the collective *virtus* of all Romans could contain such men.

### ***Moral decline and discord after Magnesia***

According to Polybius and Livy, the Second Punic War (218–201 BC) during the struggle between Scipio Africanus and Hannibal was the last high point of republican *virtus* and internal unity, after which the moral decline became more and more evident as Roman influence expanded farther away from the core. Polybius, Sallust, and Livy have shown the importance of integrity and concord inside royal families with their examples of Attalus and Eumenes II, Demetrius and Perseus, and Jugurtha. These examples showed that if members of a family or, similarly, a state did not keep their ambition under control and forgot the importance of *pietas*, it led to discord and eventually destabilization of the whole family/state in the face of external threats. In addition to *pietas*, it was indeed *metus hostilis* – the fear of external threats – that was equally important for keeping a state unified. During the Second Punic War, when *virtus* still was largely intact among the Roman aristocracy – at least according to the narratives discussed here – even exceptional men like Scipio Africanus or Flaminius could not destabilize the integrity of the state.

This changed quickly, however, with the advancement of moral decline, and Livy illustrates this inflamed situation with his description of the inner

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<sup>916</sup> Walbank 1967b.

political tensions in Rome and unruly Roman commanders abroad from the beginning of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC onwards.<sup>917</sup> Livy's account is clearly based on Polybius, but Polybius's work is too fragmentary to allow detailed comparisons for these events. With Livy, we must start by re-examining in detail his historical point of no-return with regard to declining *virtus*, that is, when Cn. Manlius Vulso returned to Rome in 187 BC with his army that had spent an extended period of time on Asian soil and brought with him an immensely rich war booty.<sup>918</sup> But before this, Livy foreshadows the nearing moral turning point: in 191 BC, M'. Acilius Glabrio brought his soldiers over to Asia after the battle of Thermopylae in which the Romans were victorious. Livy has included a speech of the consul to his soldiers before the battle.<sup>919</sup> The consul said:

You are fighting not simply for the independence of Greece, a fine enterprise though that would also be—to free now from the Aetolians and Antiochus a country that you earlier freed from Philip; and it is not only what can now be found in the king's camp that will fall to you as your prize—you will also have as your booty all the equipment that is expected any day now from Ephesus. After that you will open up to Roman rule Asia, Syria and all the wealthiest kingdoms stretching as far as the rising sun. How far shall we be then from having our empire, from Gades to the Red Sea, limited only by the Ocean that embraces the world? How far shall we be from having all humanity revere the Roman name next only to the gods?<sup>920</sup>

The speech itself is a very standard pre-battle speech, often found in historical narratives. What is most striking is that Glabrio holds the liberation of Greece – the official pretext for war – of secondary importance. He is

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<sup>917</sup> For an overview on how different historians treated the subject, see Bringmann 1977.

<sup>918</sup> Liv. 39.6. L. Calpurnius Piso might also have thought that this was a turning point in terms of the arrival of foreign luxuries in Rome: *HRR*, Piso fr. 34 (= Plin. HN 34.14. Cf. Plin. HN. 37.12).

<sup>919</sup> Liv. 36.17.2–16. We do not know if Polybius included such a speech – Livy is the only extant source to include it.

<sup>920</sup> Liv. 36.17.13–15 “*Illud proponere animo vestro debetis, non vos pro Graeciae libertate dimicare tantum, quamquam is quoque egregius titulus esset, liberatam a Philippo ante nunc ab Aetolis et ab Antiocho liberare, neque ea tantum in praemium vestrum cessura quae nunc in regiis castris sunt, sed illum quoque omnem apparatus qui in dies ab Epheso exspectatur praedae futurum, Asiam deinde Syriamque et omnia usque ad ortum solis ditissima regna Romano imperio aperturos. quid deinde aberit quin ab Gadibus ad mare rubrum Oceano fines terminemus, qui orbem terrarum amplexu finit, et omne humanum genus secundum deos nomen Romanum veneretur?*”

imagining a future Roman empire in the East, and he is painting a picture of endless eastern riches, which they would subsequently possess, in the minds of his soldiers. It is certainly credible that a commander would speak like this to his soldiers who would not care as much about the complex political or moral reasons for the wars as about their concrete personal rewards. The senate did not plan to conquer Asia at this point either. For Livy, this speech is a way to foreshadow the Roman world empire and the moral decline that would come later in his narrative.<sup>921</sup> At this time, the Roman army had not yet defeated Antiochus III nor crossed the sea, but Livy is already anticipating their future.

In Glabrio's speech, Asia is described not only as rich but also as a very pleasant place in terms of the climate. The thought that contacts with other cultures and especially foreign luxuries could make one's body and mind weaker was very common in Greek and Roman literature.<sup>922</sup> It was believed that such pleasant environments seemed to inevitably encourage laziness and a general lack of discipline.<sup>923</sup> These attitudes originate from the Greeks' negative stereotypes of the Persian people after the Persian wars. The Persian people were described as barbarians and as the opposite of the Greeks: Persians were weak, effeminate, and fond of excessive luxuries.<sup>924</sup> Greeks on the other hand were strong, independent, and free. For example, Xenophon

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<sup>921</sup> Also, before the war, the *haruspices* promise that the boundaries of Rome would grow: Liv. 36.1.3–4. For foreshadowing in Livy in general, see Pausch 2011, III.1.c, V.4.

<sup>922</sup> Lintott 1972; Levick 1982; Edwards 1993, 173–206; McDonnell 2006, 259–262, 302, 356–357; Isaac 2004, 239–243, 304–323. To name a few of the endless examples from the Roman era: Pol. 13.3.3, 31.25.4–5; Liv. 33.20.1, 33.27.6, 33.33.5, 34.4.3, 39.6.7, 42.47.1–9; Sall. Catil. 10–12; Cic. Rep. 2.6–7; Caes. B Gall. 2.15.4; Diod. Sic. 30.7.1; Just. Epit. 36.4.12: “Sic Asia Romanorum facta cum opibus suis vitia quoque Romam transmisit.” However, Trogus/Justin seemed to think that when the Romans had defeated Antiochus III in 190 BC, their *virtus* had still been uncorrupted and they had been immune to Asian riches: “The Romans then divided up the captured states among their allies, because they considered Asia more fitting to be given away as a gift of Rome than kept as a possession for the pursuit of pleasure; the glory of victory was to be claimed for the Roman name, and extravagant riches left to the allies / Captas civitates inter socios divisere, muneri Romano aptiorem Asiam quam possessioni voluptariae iudicantes; quippe victoriae gloriam Romano nomini vindicandam, opum luxuriam sociis relinquendam” (Just. Epit. 31.8.9).

<sup>923</sup> For examples, see Isaac 2006, 45, 56–74, 82–109. Cf. Just. Epit. 38.7.6–7, where Mithridates VI promises his soldiers that going on a military campaign in Asia would be like a holiday and they would not even have to fight for booty – it would be given to them without resistance.

<sup>924</sup> Hall 1989, 56–100; Smith 1999, 35–46. On the Greek views on “barbarians”, see Champion 2004, 30–47.

wrote that Persians used to be honorable enemies in the past, but during his own lifetime in the late 3<sup>rd</sup> – early 4<sup>th</sup> century BC they were plagued by moral decline, corruption, physical weakness, and lack of freedom.<sup>925</sup> According to Xenophon’s contemporary Hippocrates, the differences between Greek and Persian people originated from different climates: the mild and easy climate of Asia rendered the people weak and submissive, and therefore it was natural that they were ruled by kings.<sup>926</sup>

To take an example from Livy, he says that the fierce Gauls, who had moved to Asia, transformed into weak and bad soldiers just like the indigenous Asians. In Livy’s opinion, the combination of a new climate and cultural contacts had caused the Gauls to degenerate.<sup>927</sup> Romans were not immune to such transformations either, especially after the Romans ran out of strong enemies like the Carthaginians or Macedonians that had helped them maintain their *virtus* and military prowess. There was one obvious danger in these negative moral influences: the lazier and weaker the people were, the more susceptible they were to rejecting freedom and accepting “slavery”, as living under sole rulers is often called in the narratives that admired the Roman Republic.<sup>928</sup> Therefore, following this logic, as soon as the Romans started accepting Asian cultural influences and luxuries, their ability to defend

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<sup>925</sup> E.g., Xen. Cyr. 8.8; Ath. 5.210C–F, 12.527E–F; 12.540B–C. See also Isaac 2004, 290–293, 302–303, 335–351; Momigliano 1975, 129–137; Gruen 2011, ch. 1 and 2.

<sup>926</sup> Hippoc. 12 and 16; Pl. Leg. 693d, 697c–698a; Aristot. Pol. 3.1252b, 3.1327b; Isaac 2004, 61–63.

<sup>927</sup> Liv. 38.17.9–10.

<sup>928</sup> For example, the Rhodians had suggested in their speech that certain people of Asia had always had kings as their rulers, and they would not find the freedom propaganda as attractive as the Greeks did. They should be allowed to keep their kings, for they had never known or wanted freedom: Liv. 37.54.23–25. Cf. Pol. 21.22.7–9. The idea that the barbarians (= non-Greeks) were naturally servile already derives from Greek literature: Pl. Leg. 694a ff; Aristot. Pol. 1285a20; Hall 1989, 193–200. Livy later states that the subjects of Eumenes II were so happy with their king that they would not have wanted to change him for any kind of freedom or independence: Liv. 42.5.3–4. The Lycians said that their former servitude to Antiochus III seemed like “glorious freedom” compared to the oppression under the Rhodians: Liv. 41.6.8–9. Cf. Pol. 21.40.2–3. The Carthaginians thought that slavery under the Roman dominion was better than independence, because the Romans provided the weak city with protection against the Numidians: Liv. 42.23.9–10. In 95 BC, the Cappadocians “refused the gift of freedom and said that their nation could not survive without its king / Sed Cappadoces munus libertatis abnuentes negant vivere gentem sine rege posse”: Just. Epit. 38.2.8. Mithridates VI said (Sall. hist. 4.60.18 [67 Mc, 69 M]): “For in fact, while few men want freedom, a great many want fair-minded masters / Namque pauci libertatem, pars magna iustos dominos volunt.”

the Republic against any possible sole rulers emerging from within weakened at the same time.

Livy's description of Cn. Manlius Vulso's soldiers in Asia illustrates these attitudes well. The Romans defeated Antiochus III at the battle of Magnesia in the winter of 190/189 BC, and the Roman army stayed overseas with Manlius Vulso, the consul of 189 BC, who then infamously decided to wage an unauthorized war against the Galatian Gauls.<sup>929</sup> This was a turning point for Livy because Manlius Vulso had allegedly let his soldiers lead an undisciplined life in Asia.<sup>930</sup> According to Livy, such a lack of discipline had an immediate effect on the Roman soldiers, so that two years later in 187 BC they were in bad shape:

This [the Ligurians] was an enemy almost made for sustaining Roman military discipline in the breaks between major wars, and no other province did more to hone the soldiers' valor. Asia with its captivating towns, ample commodities from land and sea, a spineless enemy, and the wealth of its kings, enriched armies rather than tempered them. Discipline was particularly lax and slipshod under Gnaeus Manlius' command. This was why the slightly harder journey in Thrace and a better-trained foe proved a chastening experience with heavy casualties.<sup>931</sup>

Livy therefore confirms that fighting the weak Asian Gauls had not been sufficient for maintaining Roman military strength. If we think about this very commonplace description of Asia in narratological terms, we could say that for Livy and for any Roman reader, "Asia" as a place had a symbolizing function in narratives. This means that when a Roman read that someone was an Asian,

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<sup>929</sup> Liv. 38.45.4–10, 38.46.11–15. Apparently, Cn. Manlius Vulso had ignored the warning of the Sibylline books to not cross the Taurus range: Liv. 38.45.3–4. He was even accused of having "sold peace" to the kings in Asia: Pol. 21.34.12–13, 21.44; Liv. 38.42.11. J.D. Grainger writes that we should not blindly accept Livy's opinion of Manlius Vulso's campaign and believe that the senate completely disapproved of it: Grainger 1995. The whole Galatian campaign: Pol. 21.33–39; Liv. 38.12–25.

<sup>930</sup> Pol. 21.38; Liv. 38.24, 39.6.5–6.

<sup>931</sup> Liv. 39.1.2–4: "is hostis velut natus ad continendam inter magnorum intervalla bellorum Romanis militarem disciplinam erat; nec alia provincia militem magis ad virtutem acuebat. nam Asia et amoenitate urbium et copia terrestrium maritimarumque rerum et mollitia hostium regisque opibus ditiores quam fortiores exercitus faciebat. praecipue sub imperio Cn. Manli solute ac neglegenter habiti sunt. itaque asperius paulo iter in Thracia et exercitatio hostis magna clade eos castigavit." Earlier examples of Roman commanders who indulged their soldiers too much and performed poorly in battles: Liv. 22. 41–42, 25.20.6, 26.2.7.

they immediately recalled what a stereotypical Asian was supposed to be like: effeminate, lazy, irrational, and unreliable. Many places had such symbolizing functions in ancient narratives, and Livy's description of Asia is one of the most common examples.

In Roman thought, lack of discipline led to weakness of mind and body and was typical of eastern kings who were spoiled by luxuries. If a leader was like this, it resulted in bad military performance.<sup>932</sup> A good example of this is Antiochus III – in Livy's negative portrayal, the Seleucid king is lazy, erratic, and easily distracted by women and lavish banquets. Sloppy leadership made his soldiers poorly prepared for battle, even though he had Hannibal as his advisor and general.<sup>933</sup> Manlius Vulso, who waged an unjust war against the Galatians and won his soldiers' loyalty with money rather than with *virtus* and discipline, resembles a stereotypical weak eastern monarch more than any other Roman commander before him. While Scipio Africanus and Flamininus had defeated their dangerous enemies with sheer military *virtus* and intelligence, Manlius Vulso instead seemed to win the war only because his opponents had been weakened by their Asian environment as well.

Cn. Manlius Vulso was not the only Roman aristocrat to give rein to his personal ambitions and greed in Livy's narrative. Livy gives the following detailed account of the events in Rome during the crucial year 187 BC. M. Aemilius Lepidus, the consul of that year, lamented to the senate that the two consuls of 189 BC, i.e., Cn. Manlius Vulso and M. Fulvius Nobilior, had been conducting their military campaigns in Greece and Asia for two years, and that they had been behaving like kings, like successors of Philip V and Antiochus III, bullying the locals.<sup>934</sup> While Manlius Vulso had fought against the Galatians, Fulvius Nobilior had captured and plundered Ambracia during the Aetolian War, carrying away all the objects of art from the former royal seat of

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<sup>932</sup> Rosenstein 1990, 92–120; Edwards 1993, 173–206; Erskine 2013, 237–240. A classic example of a virtuous ruler corrupted by luxuries is Alexander the Great who gave in to the Persian kingly lifestyle and completely lost his honour and strength: Liv. 9.18.3; Just. Epit. 12.3.8–12, 12.4.1. For more references about Alexander, see Peltonen 2019, 38–46.

<sup>933</sup> Liv. 36.11, 36.17. Cf. Just. Epit. 31.2–3, 31.6.1–6.

<sup>934</sup> Liv. 38.42.8–13.

king Pyrrhus.<sup>935</sup> Both ex-consuls were called to withdraw their armies and return to Rome. Aemilius Lepidus had a personal feud with Fulvius Nobilior because the latter had allegedly managed to postpone Aemilius Lepidus's election to the consulship for two years.<sup>936</sup> Aemilius Lepidus bribed two Ambraciots to bring charges of excessive cruelty in the siege of Ambracia against Fulvius Nobilior. The other consul of 187 BC, C. Flaminius, saw through Aemilius Lepidus's malice and defended Fulvius Nobilior by saying that the capture of Ambracia and its treasures brought honour to Fulvius Nobilior.<sup>937</sup>

When Fulvius Nobilior returned to Rome, still in 187 BC, he asked the senate for a triumph.<sup>938</sup> Aemilius Lepidus was not present and had ordered the tribune of plebs, M. Aburius, to make everyone wait for his return before discussing the matter. The irritated Fulvius Nobilior told the senate that Aemilius Lepidus persecuted him unjustly with uncontrolled and almost tyrannical passion, and that delaying his triumph would be an insult to the gods and unfair just like Aemilius Lepidus's conduct. Another tribune Ti. Gracchus reproached M. Aburius and said that Aemilius Lepidus was not behaving as a consul should. The senate decided to grant a triumph to both Manlius Vulso and Fulvius Nobilior despite the heavy criticism.<sup>939</sup> These kinds of accusations of tyrannical cruelty, greed, and uncontrolled ambition – already seen in the portrayal of Scipio Africanus – would become commonplace in the political discourse of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC, but before this debate in 187 BC they were still a rarity in Livy's narrative.

Indeed, Dennis Pausch notes that the sheer amount of detail and the number of pages that Livy dedicates to this debate demonstrates how important and crucial this moment – especially Manlius Vulso's triumph – was for Livy in Roman history.<sup>940</sup> With the debate, Livy slows down the rhythm of the narrative and gives various different opinions and statements to make

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<sup>935</sup> M. Fulvius Nobilior in Ambracia: Pol. 21.27–30; Liv. 38.3–9. Plundering of art works: Pol. 21.30.9–10; Liv. 38.9.13–14. This constitutes one of the first art collections collected by a Roman that we know of: Rutledge 2012, 222–223.

<sup>936</sup> Liv. 38.43. Cf. Liv. 38.35.1, 38.47.7.

<sup>937</sup> Liv. 38.43.1–6.

<sup>938</sup> Liv. 39.4.

<sup>939</sup> Liv. 39.5.1–6. On the deeper exemplary aspect of this debate, see Chaplin 2000, 101–105.

<sup>940</sup> Pausch 2011, III.1.c. On the rhythm of Livy's narrative, see Pausch 2011, III.2.b.

the readers experience the historical turning point almost in real time. Furthermore, Pausch argues that by providing so many different conflicting perspectives, Livy invites the readers to participate in the process of interpreting history and shows that this task was not at all easy.<sup>941</sup> Related to this, it seems to me that Manlius Vulso's speech (Liv. 38.49.3–5) in defence of his triumph contains a metahistorical remark. Manlius Vulso insinuates that the senators in Rome could not truly know if the enemy that he had defeated in faraway Asia had been virtuous and worthy of triumph, or a typically weak and effeminate Asian: it was a matter of impressions and second-hand accounts. The same goes for historical narratives in general: they do not mirror historical reality but, in a way, *create* historical reality. This circles back to the mechanisms of late republican identity construction which was based on this literary construct of history and *exempla* of the past.

However, this debate is neither pure narrative either nor detached from reality. Giuseppe Zecchini accentuates that the debate on Manlius Vulso's triumph and contemporary accusations against Lucius and Publius Scipio are connected with the increasing worries about corruption in Roman leadership during this time. Both factions accused each other of having taken bribes from foreign kings, and laws against internal corruption, *ambitus*, in 181 BC and possibly 159 BC support the general impression given by Livy.<sup>942</sup> Polybius too had written that during his time in Rome starting from 168 BC, corruption had become common.<sup>943</sup> While both the Scipios and Manlius Vulso were accused of bribery and excessive luxury, Polybius and Livy did not want to defame their favoured Scipionic family.<sup>944</sup> Thus, only Manlius Vulso emerges as the culprit of oriental vices in Livy's narrative.<sup>945</sup>

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<sup>941</sup> Pausch 2011, IV.3.b–c, IV.4.

<sup>942</sup> Zecchini 2018a, 128–133. Cf. Zecchini 1982. Accusation of bribery against Lucius Scipio: Liv. 38.55.6; against Manlius Vulso: Pol. 21.34.12–13, 21.44; Liv. 38.42.11, 38.45.7–9. The *Lex Cornelia Baebia de ambitu* was passed in 181 BC and possibly another law *de ambitu* in 159 BC (Liv. per. 47).

<sup>943</sup> Pol. 6.56.1–12, 18.34.7–18.35.2, 31.25.3.

<sup>944</sup> Zecchini 2018a, 138–139.

<sup>945</sup> G. Zecchini argues that Polybius did not give any particular importance to Cn. Manlius Vulso's return from Asia, as Livy does, in terms of Roman moral decline. Zecchini argues that for Polybius, the widespread moral decline started with Pydna in 168 BC and thus Manlius Vulso's immoral conduct would have been an individual exception for Polybius; see Zecchini 2018a, 132–133, 135–148.

Livy gives a long list of different ostentatious Asian luxuries that Cn. Manlius Vulso's army brought back to Rome and displayed in the triumph of 187 BC and laments how these were merely the seeds of future decadence.<sup>946</sup> Manlius Vulso rewarded his soldiers generously in the triumph. Here too we can see worrying signs of the future downfall of the Republic: "And the songs sung by the soldiers to their general were such that it was readily apparent that they were addressed to an undemanding leader who courted popularity and that the triumph was more warmly welcomed by the troops than by civilians."<sup>947</sup> This foreshadows the later development when, after the transformation of a civilian army into a professional army, the soldiers were more loyal to their commanders than to the Republic.<sup>948</sup>

Still, Erich S. Gruen reminds us that Cn. Manlius Vulso's triumph was in no way exceptional in regard to war booty.<sup>949</sup> Already before him, many Roman commanders had brought abundant loot to Rome from the East, especially T. Quinctius Flamininus, M'. Acilius Glabrio, and L. Cornelius Scipio. The idea of Manlius Vulso's triumph as an extraordinary event with regard to eastern influences and loot seems to be Livy's or his annalist sources' invention.<sup>950</sup> Livy probably wanted to envision clear historical turning points in his long narrative of the distant past and moral decline, and Cn. Manlius Vulso's campaign and return to Rome functions as such.

Fulvius Nobilior also held his triumph in 187 BC but earlier than planned, before the return of the contentious Aemilius Lepidus, fearing otherwise to have "more strife in the triumph than in the war".<sup>951</sup> A great number of treasures and art works and other spoils of war were displayed in his triumph, and his soldiers received a gift of 25 denarii each.<sup>952</sup> Some of the most

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<sup>946</sup> Liv. 39.6.6–9.

<sup>947</sup> Liv. 39.7.3–4: "carminaque a militibus ea in imperatorem dicta ut facile appareret in ducem indulgentem ambitiosumque ea dici, triumphum esse militari magis favore quam populari celebrem."

<sup>948</sup> Liv. 39.6. See below p. 238.

<sup>949</sup> Gruen 1992, 103–107. Cf. Grainger 1995, appendix.

<sup>950</sup> L. Calpurnius Piso might also have thought that Manlius Vulso's triumph was a turning point in terms of the arrival of foreign luxuries in Rome: *HRR*, Piso fr. 34 (= Plin. *HN* 34.14. Cf. Plin. *HN*. 37.12).

<sup>951</sup> Liv. 39.5.12: "Ne plus in triumpho certaminum quam in bello haberet, praetulit triumphum diem."

<sup>952</sup> Liv. 39.5.13–17.

impressive pieces of art were displayed in the triumph and then placed in the temple of Hercules Musarum and also in Fulvius Nobilior's house.<sup>953</sup> Ennius had been present in Fulvius Nobilior's campaign and later wrote a *fabula praetexta* about it called *Ambracia*.

Steven H. Rutledge suggests that all this served to “weave together a narrative that expressed the aspirations and values of a fiercely aggressive elite”.<sup>954</sup> Indeed, this was not at all uncommon in this time period: in 181 BC, M'. Acilius Glabrio had a gilded equestrian statue mounted in the temple of Pietas in Rome to celebrate his victory over Antiochus III in the battle of Thermopylae in 191 BC.<sup>955</sup> Allegedly, the Forum and Capitolium were already so full of statues of private persons that it was occasionally necessary to relocate them to make space for new projects.<sup>956</sup> This anticipates the change in ways to communicate ideas of history during the late Republic: increasingly often, aristocratic families and individual Romans would create connections to legends and heroes of the past in visual media like public art and coins.<sup>957</sup>

These quarrels illustrate how the opportunities for military conquests stimulated the individual ambitions of Roman politicians and disturbed the inner concord of the Republic. Craige B. Champion accurately calls the Republic of this era a competitive oligarchy.<sup>958</sup> To counteract the intensifying competition among the leading Romans, the *lex Villia Annalis* was passed in 180 BC to set the age limits for each magistracy.<sup>959</sup> This law would be bypassed several times, but it nevertheless marks an early attempt to keep the ambition of individual young Romans in check.<sup>960</sup> In addition to this, several sumptuary laws were passed during the decades after the Seleucid War in an attempt to

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<sup>953</sup> Plin. HN 35.66; Ov. Fast. 6.797–812; Cic. Arch. 27; Gruen 1992, 109. Fulvius also deposited *fasti*, made by himself, and his *res gestae* in the temple of Hercules Musarum: Macrob. Sat. 1.12.16. See also Gruen 1992, 109–113.

<sup>954</sup> Rutledge 2012, 223.

<sup>955</sup> Liv. 40.34.4–5; Val. Max. 2.5.1. Ammianus Marcellinus claims that Glabrio was the first Roman to gild statues: Amm. Marc. 14.6.8.

<sup>956</sup> Liv. 40.51.3; Plin. HN 34.30. On art and private persons in Rome during this period, see Gruen 1992, 118–123.

<sup>957</sup> Pausch 2011, ch. II.1.b. For coins, see below p. 229 n. 979.

<sup>958</sup> Champion 2004, 212–224.

<sup>959</sup> Liv. 40.44.1–2.

<sup>960</sup> About bypassing legal age limits, see Meier 1980, 195–196.

curb private expenditure.<sup>961</sup> Thus the sumptuary laws, the laws against corruption, the Scipio trials and the debate over Manlius Vulso together reflect the actual historical reality that Livy is trying to illustrate while building his narrative of the moral decline around it.<sup>962</sup> As we have seen, Polybius dated the beginning of widespread moral decline later than Livy, to 168 BC: not long after this Polybius indeed laments that the Roman youth had already been completely spoiled by luxuries brought by recent conquests in the East and because of the long period of peace and lack of enemies.<sup>963</sup>

These narratives of inner turmoil should also be connected with the descriptions of Roman ruthlessness abroad during these decades. Polybius and Livy write about Roman commanders who behaved increasingly cruelly, arrogantly, and greedily towards Roman allies and enemies alike to get the upper hand in the competition against their peers.<sup>964</sup> Appius Claudius Pulcher (cos. 185 BC) threatened the Achaeans that they were to do as the Romans requested or they would be forced to do so.<sup>965</sup> C. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 177 BC) left Rome to fight the Histrians without performing the proper rituals.<sup>966</sup> M. Popillius Laeneas (cos. 173 BC) was especially notorious for his severity and overly harsh treatment of defeated foes, whom he sold into slavery even after their surrender.<sup>967</sup> In 171 BC the praetor C. Lucretius Gallus committed such cruelties during the war in Greece that he was later accused of tyrannical behaviour and sacrilegious plundering of temples, and he was consequently condemned to pay a heavy fine.<sup>968</sup> During the same war, C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 171 BC) left his allocated post at Aquileia to take his army to Macedonia,

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<sup>961</sup> The *Lex Orchia* of 181 BC, the *Lex Fannia* of 161 BC, the *Lex Didia* of 143 BC, and the *Lex Licinia* just after 143 BC. The banishment of the Epicurean philosophers who “had introduced the younger generation to many unnatural pleasures” (Ael. VH 9.12. Cf. Ath. 12.547A) in 173 or 154 BC is related to these.

<sup>962</sup> For the connection of the discourse of moral decline and historical events of this era, see Zecchini 2018a, ch. 11.

<sup>963</sup> Pol. 31.25.2–7, 32.13.5. Cf. Zecchini 2018a, 146–149.

<sup>964</sup> For more examples of Roman brutality abroad during this era, see Champion 2004, 52–57.

<sup>965</sup> Liv. 39.37.19–20.

<sup>966</sup> Liv. 41.10.

<sup>967</sup> Popillius’s treatment of Ligurians: Liv.42.8–9 and 21–22. Popillius’s severity: Liv. 45.10 and 12.

<sup>968</sup> Pol. 27.6; Liv. 42.63, 43.4 and 7–8.

against the wishes of the senate. On his return he ravaged the lands of allied Alpine tribes and sold them into slavery.<sup>969</sup>

And it was not just a few Roman individuals who applied brutally straightforward solutions abroad – the senate also authorized them. We should not forget about Livy’s narrative of Q. Marcius Philippus’s Machiavellian diplomacy with Perseus, and the fate of the losing side of the Third Macedonian War: after the Roman victory at Pydna in 168 BC, the Greeks who had sided with Perseus were severely punished by the Romans.<sup>970</sup> The senate ordered Aemilius Paullus to take vengeance on the Epirotes: Polybius writes that 70 Epirote towns were destroyed and 150 thousand people sold into slavery.<sup>971</sup> In Aetolia, an improvised massacre of political leaders was carried out by the Roman officers stationed there, which Aemilius Paullus later deemed just.<sup>972</sup> Elsewhere politicians were taken to Rome as hostages: all of the Macedonian royalty and leading men were sent to Italy, and more than a thousand Achaeans, including Polybius, and an unknown number of other Greeks met the same fate.<sup>973</sup> In Greek and Roman philosophical thought, what separated tyrants from just leaders was, among other things, the avoidance of unnecessary violence. The opposite of cruelty, i.e., *clementia* was especially important in the Caesarean and Augustan narratives, and the cruel behaviour of the Romans described above certainly did not match up with these ideals.<sup>974</sup>

Moreover, these moral preoccupations were not limited only to historical narratives. Giuseppe Zecchini connects these events to Cato the Elder’s 167 BC speech in which the orator defended the Rhodians who had angered the Romans to the extent that the senate even considered declaring war on Rhodes because of their friendly relations with Perseus during the Third Macedonian

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<sup>969</sup> Liv. 43.1 and 5.

<sup>970</sup> Cf. Tränkle 1977, 133–135; Zecchini 2018a, 141. For Greece after Pydna, see Gruen 1984, 514–517. For Macedonia after Pydna, see Daubner 2018. On straightforward Roman foreign policies in this period, see Sherwin-White 1984.

<sup>971</sup> Pol. 30.15; Liv. 45.34. A. Ziolkowski argues that the reason for this was purely economic: Ziolkowski 1986. Cf. Di Leo 2005

<sup>972</sup> Pol. 30.11.5; Liv. 45.28.6–8, 45.31.1–2.

<sup>973</sup> Macedonians: Liv. 45.32.1–7. Achaeans: Paus. 7.10.7–10; Just. Epit. 33.2.8 (Justin has confused Aetolians with Achaeans). Others: Pol. 30.7.5–7, 32.5.6; Liv. 45.31.9, 45.34.9, 45.35.1.

<sup>974</sup> Galinsky 1996, 84–88; Zecchini 2001, 29, 57–58, 70. Augustus’s *clipeus virtutis* listed *virtus*, *clementia*, *iustitia*, and *pietas*: R. Gest. div. Aug. 34.2

War.<sup>975</sup> Zecchini notes that this oration is the first known instance where a Roman intellectual deliberates on the right and wrong ways of imposing Roman hegemony abroad. Indeed, Cato stressed the importance of moderation and humility, even when there were no more strong enemies left to challenge them, lest the Roman dominion transform into despotic and arbitrary tyranny. No war was declared, to the great relief of the panic-ridden Rhodians, but several embassies, gifts, and pleas were required to restore the alliance with Rome.

Thus, Livy's particularly detailed narrative of the quarrelling among the Roman consuls serves to highlight Livy's moral turning point and the ensuing moral decline that was reflected in certain Romans' behaviour abroad, as discussed here and in sections 3.2 and 3.3. Livy further highlights the importance of these years in his narrative by dedicating considerable space and detail to the death of Hannibal: Livy styles the event into another historical turning point. Livy tells how in 183 BC, T. Quinctius Flamininus was sent to King Prusias I's court in Bithynia where the elderly Hannibal was staying as a guest after the defeat of Antiochus III.<sup>976</sup> Prusias agreed to hand Hannibal over to the Romans who were paranoid because their legendary enemy Hannibal was still alive.<sup>977</sup> Livy makes the readers follow Hannibal step by step as he tried to escape from the guards. In the end, surrounded by guards, Hannibal decided to kill himself with poison. Before his death, the greatest enemy of Rome gave a short speech in direct form in which he lamented how low the Roman *virtus* had fallen. He said that in days of old the Romans had warned their enemy Pyrrhus of an assassination attempt, and now they had forced Prusias to murder his guest, which was a sacrilege against the gods of hospitality. Livy compares Hannibal's death to the

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<sup>975</sup> ORF 8. XLII. *Pro Rhodiensibus*, p. 62–67; Zecchini 2018a, 142–144. The Rhodians' relations with Perseus and Rome: Pol. 25.4–5, 27.3–4, 27.7, 29.4.7, 29.10.2–3, 29.11, 30.5.12, 30.8–9; Liv. 41.6.8–12, 42.14.8, 42.45, 42.48.8, 44.15.1, 44.29.6. Romans angry with Rhodes: Pol. 29.19, 30.4–5, 30.21, 30.23, 30.31; Liv. 45.3.3. Cf. Dmitriev 2011, 283–312.

<sup>976</sup> Liv. 39.51. Livy does not accuse Flamininus of doing wrong, unlike Plutarch who wrote that Flamininus earned everyone's contempt for this deed: Plut. Flam. 20 and 21.1. Cf. Carawan 1988, 240–245.

<sup>977</sup> According to Justin, the Romans had already tried to assassinate Hannibal before: Just. Epit. 31.2.1–5.

contemporaneous death of Scipio Africanus, who was in exile because of the envy of his ungrateful peers.<sup>978</sup> Livy writes that both these brilliant men died an unworthy death. Livy's narrative message is clear: symbolically, with Hannibal and Scipio Africanus, the era of traditional Roman *virtus* that had grown to its height during the Second Punic War ended. That old Roman *virtus*, based on the *mos maiorum*, had been and should still be the basis of Roman identity and the Republic in Livy's opinion.

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In this chapter I have examined how Polybius and Livy represented the highest point of Roman *virtus*, that is, the period of the Second Punic War (218–201 BC) through the character of Scipio Africanus, and what the early symptoms of Roman moral decline in the early 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC were. These questions are related to portrayals of kings and tyrants because, as the moral decline advanced in Roman society, tyrannical portrayals and accusations of individual Romans in the historical narratives and political discourse also increased accordingly. Polybius's and Livy's portrayals of Scipio Africanus show that during the most stable time in terms of Roman *virtus* and internal concord, the Republic as an institution was able to contain ambitious and greatly talented individual Roman commanders like Scipio thanks to the *metus Punicus* and the shared *odium regni* of the ruling class and their integrity resulting from collective *virtus*. Regardless of his natural ambition and kinglike qualities, Scipio Africanus functions as a model of traditional Roman military *virtus* in Polybius's and Livy's narratives.

In a few decades, however, much had changed according to Livy: by the 180s BC, the lack of strong enemies and the abundance of eastern luxuries had rendered too many Roman leaders undisciplined and greedy. It did not help that Roman commanders had more and more liberty to act as they pleased abroad, far away from the eyes of the senate. This caused fierce competition among men like M. Aemilius Lepidus, Cn. Manlius Vulso, and M. Fulvius

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<sup>978</sup> Liv. 39.52.7–9. The great Greek general Philopoemen also died in this year. For these three parallel characters, see Pol. 23.12–15; Liv. 39.50.10–11; Diod. Sic. 29.18–21; Just. Epit. 32.4.8–9.

Nobilior, who were all accused of different kinds of tyrannical behaviour. Livy has constructed his narrative of the moral decline around an artificial historical turning point: he presents Manlius Vulso's return from Asia with eastern riches and his triumph in 187 BC as the moment when moral decline started to spread in the Roman society. For Polybius, the widespread moral decline started later, after Pydna in 168 BC. Different historians had slightly different emphases for the beginning of the moral decline, but the results of this decline were the same in every narrative and brought the Romans and stereotypical tyrants ever closer to one another.

## 4.2 SELF-CRITICAL NARRATIVES AFTER THE FOUNDATION OF THE PROVINCE OF ASIA IN 133 BC

### *Tyrannical Romans in the East*

Thus, the tension grew during the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC and finally escalated: the year 133 BC and the tribunate of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus is considered a decisive moment in Roman Republican history because from his tribunate onwards the last shreds of concord among the leaders of the Republic disintegrated and violence was introduced into politics.<sup>979</sup> With popular support, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus had succeeded in passing a new law, the *lex*

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<sup>979</sup> Sall. Iug. 42; Diod. Sic. 34/35.5-7; Vell. Pat. 2.3; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 8-21; Badian 1972. For the growing tensions in Roman internal politics between 151 and 150 BC in general, see Meier 1980, 129-151. Increasing political competition between individual Romans is also reflected in the imagery on coins: gradually, in the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC, Romans started minting coins with references to their own ancestors and thus highlighting their own family instead of more generic imagery of the *res publica* or gods; see Meadows and Williams 2001, 37-49. A. Meadows and J. Williams (p. 37) argue that a clear change happened in the 130s BC: "From this point on the designs of the denarii began to change on an annual basis, and ceased to act simply as identifiers of the state coinage of Rome. They began to carry designs of relevance to, and hence presumably chosen by, the moneyers responsible for them." They argue (pp. 46-47) that this was a way of monumentalizing the past just like the physical monuments and historiography eagerly produced in this era. J. Pollini (2012, pp. 72-74) argues that Marius's military reforms further impacted coin imagery: "This shift from state to commander ultimately led to living leaders being represented on coinage with divinities and/or appearing godlike." For a list of positive representations of Roman commanders in art and coins, see Smith 1999, ch. 3.c.ii.

*Sempronia Agraria*, to implement a radical land reform.<sup>980</sup> The senate, however, tried to hamper his efforts by not funding the reform sufficiently. In the same year 133 BC, the last king of Pergamon, named Attalus III, who was the successor of Attalus II, died and bequeathed his rich kingdom to the Roman Republic. Gracchus seized the opportunity and used these newfound funds to realize the land reform, disregarding the senate's precedence in supervising the state treasury and foreign matters.<sup>981</sup> This and his attempt to get re-elected caused rage and paranoia among the senators who feared that Gracchus was going to aspire to sole rulership and overthrow the Republic. This was the first time such accusations were directed at a tribune of the plebs. Some of the senators had him killed in a riot, justifying his murder by saying that according to the laws of the Republic it was their duty to kill a tyrant and save the Republic.<sup>982</sup>

Livy's work is not extant for these later events, but the inheritance of the kingdom of Pergamon by the Romans and the consequent founding of the province of Asia was an important turning point in the narrative of Trogus/Justin.<sup>983</sup> While the Romans were occupied with the tense situation with Ti. Sempronius Gracchus in Rome, a pretender to the throne of Pergamon called Aristonicus proclaimed himself king "Eumenes III", refusing to respect Attalus III's testament.<sup>984</sup> In 131 BC, the consul and *pontifex maximus* P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus went to fight Aristonicus but failed and died. Justin writes that the consul "had his mind more on the treasure of Attalus than on the conduct of the war. As the year closed, he joined battle with his army in

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<sup>980</sup> Meier 1980, 95–100.

<sup>981</sup> Meier 1980, 130–131. Justin claims that Attalus III's testament later caused even more fierce competition among Roman consuls: Just. Epit. 36.4.6–12.

<sup>982</sup> Sall. Iug. 31.7; Cic. Lael. 41, Rep. 2.49; Vell. Pat. 2.6.2; App. B Civ. 1.2; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 14. On tyrannicide in Roman thought, see Turchetti 2013, 155–160.

<sup>983</sup> Cf. Yarrow 2006, 205. Perhaps for Cicero too these had been the last moments of traditional Roman *virtus*: his treatise *On the Republic* is set to 129 BC, the year when the destroyer of Carthage Scipio Aemilianus – who also was a protagonist of the story – died. It may be that for Cicero choosing this year symbolized some kind of turning point for the Roman *virtus* and the Republic: Zetzel 1999, xxii. On the founding of the province, see Kallet–Marx 1995, 97–122.

<sup>984</sup> The Romans were initially reluctant to take possession of the province of Asia because they were preoccupied at home with the tension created by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. This hesitation gave Aristonicus time to lay claim to Pergamon: Badian 1976, 48–50; Gruen 1984, 605–609; Kallet–Marx 1995, 106–108, 122.

disorder, suffered defeat, and paid with his blood for his reckless greed.”<sup>985</sup> This is yet another *exemplum* of how eastern luxuries could corrupt Roman *virtus* and cause military weakness, just as in Livy’s example of Manlius Vulso’s army. Crassus’s conduct was also religiously objectionable: Livy’s *Periochae* mention that the *pontifex maximus* was not allowed to leave Italy, and this was the first time that such a thing had happened.<sup>986</sup> It was a blatant example of how greed and personal gain had superseded religious duties – even for the *pontifex maximus* himself. Such a lack of *pietas* was characteristic of arrogant eastern kings who considered themselves above the gods, whereas the Romans were seen as typically pious.<sup>987</sup> Polybius had written:

But the quality in which the Roman commonwealth is most distinctly superior is in my opinion the nature of their religious convictions. I believe that it is the very thing which among other peoples is an object of reproach, I mean superstition, which maintains the cohesion of the Roman State.<sup>988</sup>

Another consul, M. Perpenna (cos. 130 BC) succeeded where Crassus had failed and sent Attalus’s treasure to Rome. Justin comments, “so it was that Asia, made now the property of the Romans, transmitted to Rome its vices along with its riches”.<sup>989</sup> Again, we see the symbolizing narrative function of “Asia” in use. Even though the focus of this example is on P. Licinius Crassus and not on Cn. Manlius Vulso as for Livy, the immediate corrupting effect of Asia on the Roman army is the same: the Roman army that encountered Aristonicus was undisciplined and weak. Trogus/Justin’s text thus repeats the perennially popular *topos* of the corrupting influence of Asia. Even during

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<sup>985</sup> Just. Epit. 36.4.7–8: “Asia Licinio Crasso consuli decernitur, qui intentior Attalicae praedae quam bello, cum extremo anni tempore inordinata acie proelium conservisset, victus poenas inconsultae avaritiae sanguine dedit.”

<sup>986</sup> Liv. per. 59. Livy also laments that during his time Romans were no longer very religious and did not believe in godly portents like the Romans of old: Liv. 43.13.1–2. During Livy’s time, renewing and reviving the Roman religion was an important part of Augustus’s political program.

<sup>987</sup> Hartog 1988, 310–339. For more examples, see below p. 237 n. 1018.

<sup>988</sup> Pol. 6.56.6–7: Μεγίστην δέ μοι δοκεῖ διαφορὰν ἔχειν τὸ Ῥωμαίων πολίτευμα πρὸς βέλτιον ἐν τῇ περὶ θεῶν διαλήψει. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὸ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ὀνειδιζόμενον, τοῦτο συνέχειν τὰ Ῥωμαίων πράγματα, λέγω δὲ τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν.

<sup>989</sup> Just. Epit. 36.4.12: “Sic Asia Romanorum facta cum opibus suis vitia quoque Romam transmisit.”

Justin's lifetime, this topos held enough narrative significance to be included in his extremely compact epitome.

This description of the pivotal effect of the new province might have some actual basis on the political level: the province of Asia immediately became very important for the internal and foreign policies of Rome, as the case of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus shows. It became a particularly useful province for Roman governors and for the quickly emerging equestrian class to gain wealth and political power.<sup>990</sup> It offered individuals an opportunity to compete with their peers even more effectively than before. Several scholars have argued that before the Mithridatic Wars (89–85, 83–82, 73–63 BC), the Roman senate avoided interfering with matters in Asia and largely ignored the complaints that Asian embassies brought to Rome.<sup>991</sup> Thus, individual Romans operating in the province were quite free to act how they pleased. The loosely regulated Roman province of Asia certainly bothered nearby kings, and eventually in 89 BC the First Mithridatic War broke out. Ernst Badian has suggested that the province of Asia was indeed so lucrative that it disturbed the consistency, if there had ever been one, of Roman policy making (or the lack thereof) in the East: the Romans were forced to act.<sup>992</sup> Robert Kallet-Marx argues extensively that the Mithridatic Wars permanently changed the Roman policy-making processes in the East in a more aggressive and active direction.<sup>993</sup>

Pompeius Trogus and Sallust both used the lucrative province of Asia to emphasize their ideas about the Roman moral decline. In the above-discussed speech of Mithridates VI, Pompeius Trogus made the Pontic king provocatively claim that the people of Asia had learned to hate their abusive Roman governors so much that they begged Mithridates to come and liberate

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<sup>990</sup> For the rise of the equestrian class in general, see Nicolet 1966; Meier 1980, 64–95. For the economic interests of different Roman groups abroad, see Shatzman 1975; Sandberg and Lukkari 2018.

<sup>991</sup> For the background of the Mithridatic Wars, see Badian 1976, 47–50, 56–59; Sherwin-White 1977, 66–75; Gruen 1984, 249, 592–610; Kallet-Marx 1995, 239–250; Mastrocinque 1999.

<sup>992</sup> Badian 1976, 31–33, 37–38.

<sup>993</sup> Kallet-Marx 1995, 289–342.

them from the “greedy Roman wolves”.<sup>994</sup> Therefore, the king claims that Asia had corrupted the Romans so deeply that their Republic had become even worse than the stereotypically bad Asian despots themselves. Sallust, who had lived during the last two Mithridatic Wars, also made Mithridates VI say that the greedy Romans were robbers of entire nations, *latrones gentium*.<sup>995</sup> The Pontic king indeed had received extensive support in Asia and this must have surprised the Romans, as Kallet-Marx mentions in his analysis.<sup>996</sup> Allegedly, Mithridates VI excused the debts of the conquered cities and granted them exemption from taxes for five years.<sup>997</sup> Statues and inscriptions dedicated to Mithridates VI in Athens, Delos, and Rhodes attest his successful annexation of the Asian cities on the governmental level.<sup>998</sup> According to Trogus/Justin, the king claimed to be generous and just to the extent that any of his soldiers could prove it.<sup>999</sup>

David Braund argues that during the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC in particular there did not seem to be much practical difference between Roman governors of the provinces and kings from the local inhabitants’ point of view.<sup>1000</sup> The Spaniards and the Hellenistic world had long regarded the leading Romans as akin to kings: one only needs to recall the examples of Scipio Africanus or T. Quinctius Flamininus. To take an example from the late Republican narratives, in 49 BC, when Caesar rode into Alexandria, the locals “threw down their arms, abandoned their fortifications, assumed that garb in which suppliants are used to placate tyrants with earnest prayers, and brought forth all the sacred emblems by the sanctity of which they had been wont to conjure the embittered and wrathful hearts of their kings”.<sup>1001</sup> Roman conquerors were

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<sup>994</sup> Just. Epit. 38.6.8, 38.7.6–8. This is the speech of Mithridates VI (analysed above on pp. 143–145) – reportedly the only part of Pompeius Trogus’s original text that Justin claimed to have preserved *verbatim*. On abusive Romans in Asia, see Diod. Sic. 37.5.

<sup>995</sup> Sall. hist. 4.60.22 (67 Mc, 69 M). Cf. App. Mith. 70. On the justification of the Mithridatic Wars from the point of view of Sallust’s letter of Mithridates, see Ahlheid 1988, 84–88.

<sup>996</sup> Kallet-Marx 1995, 289–342.

<sup>997</sup> Just. Epit. 38.3.8–9.

<sup>998</sup> Mastrocinque 1999, 24–25; McGing 1986, 89–99. For several articles on Mithridates VI’s rule, especially from the archaeological perspective, see Højte 2009.

<sup>999</sup> Just. Epit. 38.7.10. For Mithridates’ propaganda in Asia, see Glew 1977. For Mithridates’ popularity in Asia during the First Mithridatic War, see McGing 1986, 113–121, 127–131.

<sup>1000</sup> Braund 1984, 83–85. Cf. Sigmund 2014, ch. 2.4.3. Sometimes Roman governors even lived in the former king’s palace: Cic. Verr. 2.4.118.

<sup>1001</sup> Bell. Alex. 32: “omnis enim multitudo oppidanorum armis proiectis munitionibusque suis relictis, veste ea sumpta qua supplices dominantis deprecari consuerunt, sacrisque omnibus

always likened to kings, and in a provincial context, Roman governors naturally had frequent communications and equal social standing with nearby kings.

From the narrative point of view, however, Trogus's and Sallust's provocative accusations might have made the Roman readers contemplate whether there was anything left that differentiated the Romans from their eastern enemies in this historical era. In the past it had been their *virtus* that set Romans above other cultures. If there was no *virtus* left, what did it mean to be Roman any longer? Sallust too blamed Asia for a great part of this perceived moral decline, even though Sallust admitted that it had been a long gradual process. Sallust had written that rapid moral decline had started already with the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC and the end of *metus Punicus*, but the corrupting influence of Asia during the period of the Mithridatic Wars starting from 89 BC had been the final blow to the already crumbling Roman *virtus*. Sallust wrote that in days of old, the Romans had not feared any kind of labour or battle. There had been no place too hard for them and no enemy too terrifying. They had only cared for the shared glory of the Roman Republic and not for riches and entertainment. They had been fearless and strong in war but gentle and fair in peace.<sup>1002</sup> This had all started to change for the worse after the destruction of Carthage because of the lack of formidable enemies. First came the ever-present ambition, now uncontrolled. Then came greed, cruelty, discord, and military weakness.<sup>1003</sup>

For Sallust, the one man to expressly blame for letting this moral decline spread among Romans had been L. Cornelius Sulla (cos. 88, 80 BC), who had let his soldiers enjoy the luxuries, wine, and women of Asia without any restrictions after the end of the First Mithridatic War (89–85 BC).<sup>1004</sup> Sulla

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prolatis quorum religione precari offensos iratosque animos regum erant soliti, advenienti Caesari occurrerunt seque ei dederunt." For conquering Romans likened to kings, see Gruen 1984, 247–249.

<sup>1002</sup> Sall. Catil. 7, 9–10.

<sup>1003</sup> Sall. Catil. 10.1, Iug. 41.2; hist. 1.9 (11a M, 9 Mc), 1.10.1 (11b M, 10 Mc). For moral decline in Sallust's works, see Balmaceda 2017, ch. 2.

<sup>1004</sup> Sall. Catil. 11–13. In the *Jugurthine War*, Sallust had introduced Sulla, admitting his several good qualities and his great ambition but ending the introduction with a statement that Sulla's later career was a matter of great disgust and shame: Sall. Iug. 95. Cf. Diod. Sic. 37.25; Vell. Pat. 2.17.1, 2.25, 2.28. Also, judging from Sallust's fragments, L. Licinius Lucullus (cos. 74 BC) and his soldiers too fell victim to the eastern riches during the Third Mithridatic

himself was allegedly fond of a similar unrestrained lifestyle, especially regarding women.<sup>1005</sup> Sexual unrestrainedness was a typical attribute of tyrants and kings in Graeco-Roman literature.<sup>1006</sup> One of the most famous warning examples of this was the story of Alexander the Great who adopted the excessive habits of Persian kings, forgot his origins, and lost his strength.<sup>1007</sup> On the other hand, it also was a sign of power: for example, Hellenistic and African kings often held lavish banquets and took several wives and concubines.<sup>1008</sup> During the late Republic, sexual unrestrainedness was at the same time a sign of power and potential danger: it was commonly connected with powerful charismatic men like Pompey, Mark Antony, and Caesar, who were all accused of an unlimited sexual appetite.<sup>1009</sup> According to Catherine Edwards, later during the Principate some emperors deliberately used the association between sexual appetite, charisma, and power: some emperors may have even spread such stories about themselves.<sup>1010</sup>

Fragments of Sallust's *Histories* claim that Sulla was later criticized for his "tyrannical" rule in Rome by M. Lepidus (cos. 78 BC). Sulla is compared to Pyrrhus, Hannibal, and Philip V in his endeavour to deprive the Romans of their freedom: he is in fact called *scaevos iste Romulus*.<sup>1011</sup> Even though

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War (73–63 BC): Sall. hist. 4.8–10 (8–10 Mc, 10–12 M). Cf. App. Mith. 82. Allegedly, Lucullus was even called a Roman Xerxes: Vell. Pat. 33.4; Plut. Luc. 39.3. Similar rebukes of Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (cos. 80 BC): Sall. hist. 3.10 (2.59 Mc, 2.70 M). For more scattered examples of misbehaving Romans, see Sall. hist. 1.67 (67 Mc, 77 M); Liv. per 69–90; Vell. Pat. 2.20–22, 2.24.5. For imported luxuries and moral decline in Sallust's works, see Earl 1961, 42–45.

<sup>1005</sup> Sall. Iug. 95.3, hist. 1.50–53 (50–53 Mc, 58–61 M).

<sup>1006</sup> Cf. Acc. Atreus 169–177, Brutus 39, Tereus 639–642; Liv. 1.57–59; Ov. Met. 6.453–675. Herodotus too connected sexual unrestrainedness with autocracy: Hartog 1988, 330–331. Cf. Catenacci 2012, 121–141. Similar rebukes of Prusias II: Pol. 36.15.3. Cicero accused his political opponents of sexual unrestrainedness: Cic. Sest. 16–18, Mil. 76, Phil. 2.3, 3.11.

<sup>1007</sup> Liv. 9.18.3; Cic. Att. 8.28.2–3; Just. Epit. 12.3.8–12, 12.4.1. For more references, see Peltonen 2019, 38–46.

<sup>1008</sup> Sallust did not appreciate this habit: Sall. Iug. 80.6–7. When Hannibal was not interested in female captives, Justin comments that "you wouldn't believe he was born in Africa": Just. Epit. 32.4.10–12. For Antiochus III, "every day was occupied with some new marriage" even during the war with the Romans: Just. Epit. 31.6.3. Cf. Pol. 20.8; Liv. 36.1. On polygamy in Hellenistic dynasties, see Ogden 1999.

<sup>1009</sup> Dunkle 1967; Edwards 1993, 42, 81–92.

<sup>1010</sup> Edwards 1993, 28, 47–48. Such stories may have already circulated of Caesar and Augustus: Suet. Iul. 52.1 and 3, Aug. 69. S. Rutledge argues that the decorations of the Forum of Caesar attempted to construct a material narrative of Caesar's sexual and therefore political power: Rutledge 2012, 228–230.

<sup>1011</sup> Sall. hist. 1.49 (48 Mc, 55 M), esp. lines 1–6 and 25. According to A. La Penna, it was hypocritical of M. Lepidus to make such accusations: La Penna 1968, 330. For a detailed bibliography and analysis of its philological aspects and authenticity, see La Penna and Funari

Romulus was usually seen as a positive figure in Roman literature, in the late republican political discourse Romulus could be used as an insult – at least Cicero, Pompey, and Caesar received the dubious nickname as well.<sup>1012</sup> By this time it had indeed become extremely common to accuse political opponents of aspirations to sole rulership and tyrannical behaviour which comprised cruelty, violence, sexual unrestrainedness, and a generally decadent lifestyle. It did not matter how truthful such accusations were: they were part of the political discourse of that time.<sup>1013</sup> Everyone in Rome would have recognized this stock character type of a tyrant from Greek tragedies that were well known among Romans.

To add to Sulla's unrestrainedness during military campaigns, he had let his soldiers plunder their allies and commit various sacrileges in order to win their loyalty. Sallust and Diodorus Siculus wrote that Sulla even plundered the temple of Apollo in Delphi, "without any fear".<sup>1014</sup> This again connects Sulla's character to typical tragic tyrants who could do whatever they pleased without consequences.<sup>1015</sup> François Hartog has shown that, already in Herodotus's work, to disrespect the gods was typical of kings and tyrants who were so arrogant that they considered themselves equal to gods. Such arrogance led to all kinds of transgressions of religious and social boundaries.<sup>1016</sup> This made a tyrant's subjects constantly afraid that the king would vent his anger on them or raise the wrath of the gods.<sup>1017</sup> An example of this was Prusias II who,

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2015, 170–223. For the remark "scaevos iste Romulus" and the use of Romulus by Sallust, see Gerrish 2019, 56. Another speech by the tribune C. Licinius Macer presents similar complaints of tyranny: Sall. hist. 3.15. (34 Mc, 48 M), esp. lines 1–3 and 9–13. For an analysis of Lepidus's and Macer's speeches in historical context, see Seidl Steed 2017, 414–418.

<sup>1012</sup> Ps.-Sall. In Tull. 7; Plut. Pomp. 25.4; Catull. 29. For example, Augustus instead promoted a positive connection with Romulus: Varro, Rust. 3.1.2–3 (= Enn. Ann. 154 in the 2018 Loeb edition, or 468–469 in Warmington's 1935 edition); Suet. Aug. 7.

<sup>1013</sup> Dunkle 1967, 165–171. E.g., L. Sergius Catilina had all the stereotypical qualities of a tyrant: Sall. Catil. 5, 14.7–15.1, 51.9. Another example of these kinds of discourses in politics is how Cicero accused C. Verres, a propraetor of Sicily, of ruling like a bad licentious king, listing every possible tyrannical vice: Dunkle 1967, 160–162. For Cicero, Antony was the worst tyrant of them all: Cic. Phil. 3.4.9, 3.11.28, 11.1.1.

<sup>1014</sup> Sall. Catil. 11.4–7; Diod. Sic. 38.7. Cf. Plut. Sull. 12; Paus. 1.20.4, 9.7.4, 9.33.6.

<sup>1015</sup> Soph. Ant. 550–552.

<sup>1016</sup> Hartog 1988, 310–339. Cf. Cic. Inv. 1.102. Impious tragic tyrants: Eur. Bacch. 345–350, Heracl. 243–246; Soph. Aj. 1047–1050, Ant. 21–38.

<sup>1017</sup> Examples from tragedy: Eur. Bacch. 668–671; Soph. Ant. 744–745. According to Livy, the tyrant Nabis controlled his subjects with cruelty and fear: Liv. 34.26.4, 34.27.3. Cf. Pol. 5.11.5–6; Nep. Milt. 8. A divine punishment such as madness or death or other great misfortune often followed serious sacrileges: Pol. 31.9; Liv. 42.3, 42.28.12–13; Just. epit. 32.3.9–12.

according to Polybius, was so delirious that he shamelessly plundered the sanctuaries and did not wage war “only on men but on gods”.<sup>1018</sup> Sulla’s actions in Delphi are no different. Sulla’s conduct according to Sallust sounds much like what Mithridates VI had promised to his soldiers in the speech written by Pompeius Trogus: the Pontic king too had tried to encourage his soldiers by saying that the war in Asia would be more like a pleasant feast than a tedious war.<sup>1019</sup> In this sense, the narratives suggest that Mithridates VI would not have differed much from Sulla as a victor – the moral baseness and lack of discipline among the soldiers was the same, and they were motivated by greed instead of honour and loyalty to one’s country.

These accusations seem to reflect the political discourses of the time. Cicero, Sallust’s contemporary, made similar rebukes of the treatment of provinces and Roman allies. He wrote that in the past the Roman Republic “could be called more accurately a protectorate of the world than a dominion”.<sup>1020</sup> However, “This policy and practice we had begun gradually to modify even before Sulla’s time; but since his victory we have departed from it altogether. For the time had gone by when any oppression of the allies could appear wrong, seeing that atrocities so outrageous were committed against Roman citizens.”<sup>1021</sup>

Different characterizations of Mithridates VI and Sulla appear to form a pair of two equally vicious and violent eastern tyrants. As we have seen, Mithridates VI was characterized as a formidable and even supernaturally strong enemy in the extant narratives. However, he was also cruel, ruthless, and dangerously cunning: according to different narratives, the Pontic king had murdered his wife and nephew.<sup>1022</sup> We should also recall the infamous “Asiatic vespers” of 88 BC when Mithridates VI allegedly had all Roman

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<sup>1018</sup> Pol. 32.15.12. There are many other examples of kings who were believed to have suffered from a god-complex due to excessive arrogance; for Philip V, see Pol. 15.24.6, 16.1.2, 16.10.1, 18.3.8; Liv. 40.5.1–5, 40.56.8–10; for Xerxes, see Hdt. 7.31, 7.35, 7.233, 8.109.3; Aesch. Pers. 744–752; Plu. Mor. 455e; Ael. VH 2.14, 9.39; Bridges 2015, 45–51.

<sup>1019</sup> Just. Epit. 38.7.6–8.

<sup>1020</sup> Cic. Off. 27: “illud patrociniū orbis terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari.”

<sup>1021</sup> Cic. Off. 27: “Sensim hanc consuetudinem et disciplinam iam antea minuebamur, post vero Sullae victoriam penitus amisimus; desitum est enim videri quicquam in socios iniquum, cum exstitisset in cives tanta crudelitas.”

<sup>1022</sup> Just. Epit. 37.3.6–8, 38.1, 38.7.9. Cf. App. Mith. 64. Cicero characterizes Mithridates VI as a tragic tyrant: Cic. Leg. Man. 22.

*publicani* in Asia murdered in a cunning plot.<sup>1023</sup> Such a brutal enemy provides a narrative mirror image for Sulla, his opponent in the ensuing war.

Moreover, with these examples Sallust illustrates not only the moral decline but also the changes in the Roman military during that time. In the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC, the Roman army was slowly transforming from a civilian army into a professional army to provide more willing soldiers for constant faraway wars. The Roman army started to recruit soldiers among non-Roman citizens and members of lower social classes. This meant that the Roman nobility too took less and less part in the actual fighting.<sup>1024</sup> These new kinds of professional soldiers were more loyal to their commanders than to the Republic. John Pollini notes that this development is reflected even on coins since it became common to represent living Roman commanders with divinities and/or appearing godlike in coin imagery.<sup>1025</sup> Men like Marius and Caesar were presented in Sallust's and Caesar's works as practical military men who toiled with their men and fought by their side in the front lines like exemplary men of the earlier Republic such as Cato the Elder.<sup>1026</sup> This served to increase their favour among the people by setting them apart from the Roman nobility: in Sallust's *Jugurthine War*, in his speech for the consulship Marius accuses the Roman nobility of weakness and incompetence in military matters and even shows his battle scars to prove his own experience.<sup>1027</sup>

Another way to gain the soldiers' loyalty was money. Caesar, Sulla, and Pompey, who was the one to vanquish Mithridates VI in the last war, had bought their men's' unwavering loyalty.<sup>1028</sup> In this situation, if a Roman commander did not indulge his soldiers enough, the soldiers might become unreliable and unmanageable. On the other hand, if the soldiers liked their commander, this could transform into political leverage especially during the

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<sup>1023</sup> Cic. Leg. Man. 7; App. Mith. 22–23. Cf. Meier 1980, 215–216. Curiously, Justin does not mention the Asiatic Vespers in his epitome despite having otherwise included a relatively detailed portrayal of Mithridates VI.

<sup>1024</sup> McDonnell 2006, 242–273; Brizzi 2008, ch. 6. About Roman veterans after Marius, see Meier 1980, 100–107. For the Roman army generally in different eras, see Nicolet 1979, ch. 8.

<sup>1025</sup> Pollini 2012, 72–74.

<sup>1026</sup> Zecchini 2001, 117–120, 148–158.

<sup>1027</sup> Sall. Iug. 85.10–25, 30. For Marius's speech, see Büchner 1960, 196–201.

<sup>1028</sup> Plut. Caes. 17.1–2, Sull. 27.5–6; Suet. Iul. 68.1; Badian 1976, 77–81.

last century of the disintegrating Republic.<sup>1029</sup> These possibilities were foreshadowed quite overtly in Livy's description of L. Aemilius Paullus's soldiers who had been so unhappy with the lack of additional gifts and with the traditional military discipline practised by the consul that they had tried to vote against his triumph.<sup>1030</sup> With these individual charismatic Roman commanders and their personal armies, the situation was slowly reaching the point where the most successful Romans could no longer coexist in harmony. Polybius had suggested in his theory of the cycle of constitutions that, after democracy disintegrated, monarchy naturally followed because of uncontrolled ambition and corruption: according to him, monarchy was the most primitive form of government, in which the strongest individual would take leadership.<sup>1031</sup> Polybius could not have known that his theory was eerily close to what happened in Rome after his death.

### ***Sallust's Jugurthine War: A republican tragedy***

Sulla had been an aggravating influence, but for Sallust the negative effects of moral decline were very much discernible even before the Mithridatic Wars. In the *Jugurthine War*, which narrates the said war during 112–105 BC, right from the beginning Sallust switches the moral roles between the Roman leaders and Jugurtha, a foreign king: in the early Republic, the Romans had been incorruptible. Now, it is virtuous young Jugurtha who becomes the target of the ruthless and greedy Roman nobles. In section 2.1, we saw the countless natural virtues that Jugurtha possessed, and how his father King Micipsa had allegedly sent him to help the Romans in the war, hoping that Jugurtha would

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<sup>1029</sup> On the civil wars and the crises of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC up to Caesar and Pompey, see Meier 1980, 207–301.

<sup>1030</sup> Similar but lighter foreshadowing in the description of Cn. Manlius Vulso's triumph (Liv. 39.7.3–4): "And the songs sung by the soldiers to their general were such that it was readily apparent that they were addressed to an undemanding leader who courted popularity and that the triumph was more warmly welcomed by the troops than by civilians / carminaque a militibus ea in imperatorem dicta ut facile appareret in ducem indulgentem ambitiosumque ea dici, triumphum esse militari magis favore quam populari celebrem." For the narrative technique of foreshadowing in Livy, see Pausch 2011, III.1.c, V.4.

<sup>1031</sup> Cf. Zecchini 2018a, 123–127.

never come back alive to cause trouble for his legal sons.<sup>1032</sup> Thus, young Jugurtha had served under the command of Scipio Aemilianus in the Numantine War (143–133 BC) and became acquainted with some of the most influential Roman nobles and *homines novi* at that time. P. Andrew Montgomery notes that Sallust lets us see the character of Scipio through Jugurtha’s observation: by following Scipio’s example, the Numidian learns everything about Roman virtues and earns the trust and admiration of Scipio and his Roman peers.<sup>1033</sup> Scipio was so impressed that he sent a letter in which Scipio praised Jugurtha to King Micipsa, and the king had no choice but to adopt Jugurtha as his heir as well.<sup>1034</sup>

By praising Jugurtha’s virtues so much in the beginning, Sallust’s narrative indeed seems to attempt to make the readers momentarily forget or underestimate the level of danger of the natural ambition that resides in all virtuous men. I think that Christina S. Kraus’s analysis supports these claims. According to Kraus, initially we get two versions of Jugurtha: one feared by Micipsa and the other admired by the Romans.<sup>1035</sup> Jugurtha himself hardly ever speaks. Sallust seems to be intent on making the readers believe that Micipsa was wrong about Jugurtha. Indeed, it seems that Micipsa changed his mind when he officially adopted Jugurtha. However, soon after in the narrative, when the dying Micipsa spoke to Jugurtha, praising his valour and wisdom, we get the first hint of Jugurtha’s dangerousness: Sallust, exercising the role of an omniscient narrator who knows the inner feelings and thoughts of each character, focalizes internally on Jugurtha and reveals that Jugurtha knew that Micipsa was not saying what he really thought about Jugurtha.<sup>1036</sup>

Therefore, up to this point in the narrative, the Romans (and possibly Sallust’s) readers had been so deeply impressed by the military prowess and intelligence of Jugurtha that they had completely underestimated his ambition, foreseen by Micipsa. According to Kraus, the chaotic portrait of Jugurtha, torn in two directions by great virtue and ambition, is the foundation

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<sup>1032</sup> On Jugurtha’s virtues, see Sall. Iug. 6–7, 9.1–3; above on pp. 79–81, 84–85.

<sup>1033</sup> Montgomery 2013, 23–27.

<sup>1034</sup> Sall. Iug. 9–10. For Scipio’s letter to Micipsa, see Büchner 1960, 183–185.

<sup>1035</sup> Kraus 1999.

<sup>1036</sup> Sall. Iug. 11.1: “Ficta locutum intellegebat”, that is, as if Micipsa “was playing a part”; see Kraus 1999, 226–227, 237–238.

of Sallust's narrative about the similarly chaotic state of the Roman republic in his time – the Republic that had succumbed to *ambitio* and had forgotten its *virtus* and compromised the basis of its whole identity.<sup>1037</sup>

Indeed, instead of following Scipio Aemilianus's example and direct warning, and the warning of his father Micipsa, Jugurtha let himself be influenced by the other less honourable Romans who had recognized the natural ambition in Jugurtha and tried to abuse this ambition by promising that if King Micipsa died, he would gain the sole power in Numidia. For this reason, Jugurtha thought that "he possessed the greatest prowess, while at Rome everything was for sale".<sup>1038</sup> This led to the Jugurthine War and to the eventual fall of Jugurtha.<sup>1039</sup> The *exemplum* is clear: for Sallust, the moral decline was already beyond the point of no return since the majority of the younger Romans no longer followed *mores maiorum*. For this reason, a single virtuous Roman like Scipio Aemilianus could not stop the inevitable process.

Jonas Grethlein argues that Jugurtha's fall is an example of the disconnect between the present and the past in Sallust's narrative. In other words, examples of the past were no longer respected and imitated.<sup>1040</sup> This is precisely what Livy also highlights on several occasions in his narrative, as argued by Jane D. Chaplin.<sup>1041</sup> For example, the above-discussed passage of the senate's divided reaction to how Q. Marcius Philippus had tricked Perseus illustrates this disconnect between the present and the past well: the older senators said that trickery was not the way of their ancestors and thus Marcius Philippus's behaviour was condemnable, whereas the younger senators praised Marcius Philippus for his intelligence.<sup>1042</sup> If these were the first symptoms of such a disconnect for Livy, Sallust's *Jugurthine War*, placed over 50 years later in the narratives, shows it in full swing.

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<sup>1037</sup> Kraus 1999, 220–221. Cf. La Penna 1968, 331, 349–357.

<sup>1038</sup> Sall. Iug. 8.1: "si Micipsa rex occidisset, fore uti solus imperi Numidiae potiretur: in ipso maxumam virtutem, Romae omnia venalia esse." See above pp. 188–189 n. 811. Micipsa warns Jugurtha: Sall. Iug. 10.3–6. Scipio warns Jugurtha: Sall. Iug. 8.2. Here P.A. Montgomery (2013, pp. 28–30) interestingly notes that before this point in the narrative, we have seen Scipio only as an object of Jugurtha's observation. Only now does he become an active subject and try to persuade Jugurtha.

<sup>1039</sup> Morstein-Marx 2000.

<sup>1040</sup> Grethlein 2006.

<sup>1041</sup> Chaplin 2000.

<sup>1042</sup> Liv. 42.47.4–8.

Andrew Feldherr writes that, when Sallust makes the eventual defeater of Jugurtha, C. Marius (cos. 107, 104–100, 86 BC), deride the Roman nobles for citing the deeds of their famous ancestors and for reading about military tactics instead of getting their hands dirty, Marius was actually rejecting the *mos maiorum* and the lessons of the past.<sup>1043</sup> Instead, he thought that he knew how to demonstrate his *virtus* in practice, without the help of the moral *exempla* of the ancestors. Grethlein calls this a separation between signs and their meanings.<sup>1044</sup> For Sallust, Marius was just one in the series of many would-be-kings and failing imitators of ancestral images, starting with Catiline and continuing with the likes of Jugurtha and Sulla: Feldherr even compares them to tragic actors wearing false faces.<sup>1045</sup> All the characters in the *Jugurthine War* have great virtues and great vices at the same time. As soon as one character is introduced and his virtues are praised, the virtues make room for serious vices and for a new similarly conflicted opposing character.<sup>1046</sup>

Sallust's *Jugurthine War* gives a clear idea of the increasingly fierce and violent competition among the leading Romans, especially between Marius and Metellus and afterwards between Marius and Sulla. Indeed, the whole narrative of the *Jugurthine War* seems to be but a prelude to the disastrous 1<sup>st</sup> century BC – the events that the readers could have read about in Sallust's *Histories*.<sup>1047</sup> Sallust describes Marius as a young and ambitious *homo novus* who was “driven by a mighty longing for the consulship, for achieving which he had in abundance every asset except an ancient lineage: namely, diligence, honesty, great military skill, and a spirit that was mighty in war, restrained in civilian life, immune to passion and the lure of riches, and greedy only for glory”.<sup>1048</sup> Sallust goes on to tell how Marius was immune to corruption and to

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<sup>1043</sup> Feldherr 2021, 153–154. Cf. Büchner 1960, 196–201; Egelhaaf-Gaiser 2010. Marius's speech: Sall. Iug. 85.4, 85.10–12, 85.23–25.

<sup>1044</sup> Grethlein 2006.

<sup>1045</sup> Feldherr 2021, 162.

<sup>1046</sup> Balmaceda 2017, 61–73.

<sup>1047</sup> For the beginning of the tension between Marius and Sulla during the Jugurthine War, see Feldherr 2021, 160.

<sup>1048</sup> Sall. Iug. 62.2: “At illum iam antea consulatus ingens cupido exagitabat, ad quem capiundum praeter vetustatem familiae alia omnia abunde erant: industria, probitas, militiae magna scientia, animus belli ingens, domi.” Judging from Livy's *Periochae*, his portrayal of Marius's career after his success in the Jugurthine War might have been very negative. Marius

the effect of eastern luxuries and quickly obtained one magistracy after another. However, he was “ruined by ambition” which alone was enough to corrupt even the best of men according to Sallust.<sup>1049</sup>

Q. Caecilius Metellus (cos. 109 BC), a talented but arrogant nobleman who had command in the war before Marius, did not take Marius’s desire for the consulship seriously, which angered Marius.<sup>1050</sup> “So, he pressed on under the influence of desire and anger, the worst counsellors, and he refrained from no act or word provided it furthered his interests. He was less strict than before in maintaining discipline among soldiers under his command in winter quarters.”<sup>1051</sup> Immediately then, Marius’s several virtues and self-discipline make room for vices, born from ambition and from his hatred of Metellus, and this affects the army negatively.<sup>1052</sup> He took Metellus’s disdain as a personal challenge and even complained publicly that Metellus was arrogant like a king and addicted to power.<sup>1053</sup> When Marius managed to obtain the consulship in 107 BC and therefore also the command of the continuing Jugurthine War, Metellus was so disappointed and personally envious of Marius that he had a tyrant-esque tantrum upon hearing the news.<sup>1054</sup>

Furthermore, Montgomery has argued that Scipio Aemilianus’s character was not morally perfect either and he violated his own moral principles by trying to privately persuade Jugurtha.<sup>1055</sup> For Sallust, as for Polybius, *metus hostilis* was needed to maintain *concordia* in Roman society because all talented men were naturally ambitious and arrogant.<sup>1056</sup>

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comes across as arrogant, fiercely ambitious, and a corrupt opportunist, who committed countless crimes and cruelties during the Social War: Liv. per. 67, 69, 71–80. Cf. Diod. Sic. 34.38, 37.2.12, 37.29.1–2, 38.6; Vell. Pat. 2.11.1., 2.18.6, 2.22–23.

<sup>1049</sup> Sall. Iug. 63.3–6. On Sallust’s portrayal of Marius, see Santangelo 2013, 181–191.

<sup>1050</sup> Sall. Iug. 64.1–5.

<sup>1051</sup> Sall. Iug. 64.5: “Ita cupidine atque ira, pessumis consultoribus, grassari neque facto ullo neque dicto abstinere; quod modo ambitiosum foret: milites quibus in hibernis praeerat laxiore imperio quam antea habere.”

<sup>1052</sup> Marius hates Metellus: Sall. Iug. 64.4.

<sup>1053</sup> Sall. Iug. 64.5. Marius trying to outshine Metellus: 89.6.

<sup>1054</sup> Sall. Iug. 82.2–3.

<sup>1055</sup> Sall. Iug. 8.2; Montgomery 2013, 30–34. Ibidem, 34: “By making Scipio’s actions contradict his words, Sallust makes Scipio Aemilianus the model of the aristocrat who undermines the state, the model of a nobleman who thwarts the traditional values of the *mos maiorum* even as he demands that a barbarian learn to adhere to them.”

<sup>1056</sup> G. Zecchini (2018a, p. 153) compares the *metus hostilis* of Sallust and Polybius but does not think that Sallust used Polybius as the model for this thought: Sallust dates the end of *metus hostilis* to the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC.

Undeniably, as we have seen, even the “best” of them like Scipio Africanus have received ambiguous characterizations in the historical narratives. Sallust seemed to think that after the destruction of Carthage and with it the common enemy of all Romans, the last thing that could generate enough *metus hostilis* to restrain ambitious Roman politicians was gone.<sup>1057</sup>

Aislinn Melchior has studied the use of the word *hostis*, an “enemy” or a “foreigner” by Sallust.<sup>1058</sup> She notes the word was more frequently used to signify a foreigner or a foreign enemy, but during the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC more and more Roman individuals were called *hostes* in the literary sources. Sallust’s *Conspiracy of Catiline* is a good example of this: Melchior shows how, in the course of the narrative, *hostis* comes to signify not only foreign enemies but also Roman enemies.<sup>1059</sup> Therefore, for Sallust, when Romans had worked together against common external enemies, unified by *metus hostilis*, their *virtus* and *res publica* had thrived. But when each Roman started to think only about themselves and look for enemies in other Romans, the *res publica* started losing its firm basis. A situation like this could easily be compared to Hellenistic courts where strife and violence between family members were common because there was no clear system of inheritance and members of royal families had to compete for the throne.<sup>1060</sup> As discussed above, Polybius’s and Livy’s examples of the narrowly avoided strife between Eumenes II and Attalus, and the violent conflict between Perseus and Demetrius – and not to forget Sallust’s own example of Jugurtha and his brothers – were warning examples of this in foreign contexts.

The disappearance of *metus hostilis* and with it the concord in Roman society is indeed painfully visible in the *Jugurthine War*. According to Andrew Feldherr, Sallust’s Jugurtha is not an external foreign object of fear – i.e., a predictable negative Other – as one would expect in a historical narrative of a Roman war against a foreign enemy – because Sallust focalizes so closely on

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<sup>1057</sup> Montgomery 2013, 34–38. *Superbia* as the “common vice of Roman nobles”: Sall. Iug. 64.1.

<sup>1058</sup> Melchior 2010.

<sup>1059</sup> On the moral decline in Sallust’s *Conspiracy of Catiline*, see Balmaceda 2017, 57–61.

<sup>1060</sup> Ogden 1999. Mithridates VI (Just. Epit. 37.2.6) and Antiochus III (Plin. HN 20.254) allegedly took frequent doses of antidote to avoid death from likely poisoning attempts. Livy accuses Antiochus III of poisoning his own son: Liv. 35.15. For more examples of murders inside regal families, see Pol. 29.13; Just. Epit. 38.1.1–10, 38.8.

Jugurtha and makes the readers live the story through his eyes for a great part.<sup>1061</sup> Jugurtha feared the Romans as much as they feared him. There is no discernible difference in who was *civis* and who was *hostis* – or who was the Self and who was the Other among these ambitious and ruthless characters.

As the narrative proceeds, Roman and foreign characters keep merging into the same morally grey homogeneous group of people governed by uncontrolled ambition. Sallust changes internal focalization quickly from one character to another, and, as an omniscient narrator, he reveals their thoughts and feelings. While the focalization changes, the same chaotic energy swirls around every character: Sallust constantly emphasizes the negative feelings such as hate, fear, or ambition that completely controlled all the main characters.<sup>1062</sup> There seems to be no real moral difference between Jugurtha and the Roman commanders.<sup>1063</sup> As Feldherr observes, “the Romans have traded places with tragically inclined foreign tyrants”.<sup>1064</sup> In fact, Christina S. Kraus has noted that, from a narrative point of view, Metellus and Marius could match Jugurtha’s military cunning and courage only because they themselves were so similar to the ambitious king.<sup>1065</sup> They give the impression that, in this era, modest and honest men could not survive amongst all these ruthless men.<sup>1066</sup>

Moreover, Sallust uses the Jugurthine War to illustrate the advanced state of corruption in Roman society. Polybius had already written that during his own time bribery and corruption had already started to become common among the Romans. According to Polybius, to practise bribery had been a punishable and highly shameful act during the early Republic, unlike in

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<sup>1061</sup> Feldherr 2021, 148–150.

<sup>1062</sup> For fear in the *Jugurthine War*, see Sall. Iug. 11.8, 13.5, 20.1, 25.6–7, 25.10, 32.5, 62.8, 72.2, 102.15, 108.3.

<sup>1063</sup> Cf. Dix 2006.

<sup>1064</sup> Feldherr 2021, 153.

<sup>1065</sup> Kraus 1999, 220–221, 241–242.

<sup>1066</sup> Jugurtha’s brother Adherbal is such a character who, despite his virtues and friendship with the Romans, becomes completely overwhelmed by Jugurtha. A. La Penna (1968, p. 329) has suggested that this stark contrast between the personalities of Adherbal and Jugurtha serves to create a very dramatic and even tragic effect in the narrative. The characters themselves are also filled with contrasting emotions in the works of Sallust. For these “psychological portraits”, see La Penna 1968, 349–357. For the tragic characterization of Adherbal, see Feldherr 2021, 141–145.

Carthage and Greece.<sup>1067</sup> Related to this, in a speech from 123 BC, C. Sempronius Gracchus as well seems to take it for granted that foreign kings bribed the Romans all the time.<sup>1068</sup> Indeed, in Sallust's narrative Jugurtha was easily able to bribe most Romans into helping him again and again.<sup>1069</sup> Jugurtha's ambition and the Romans' unrestrained greed quickly escalate into a nightmarish vicious circle of corruption.<sup>1070</sup> Everyone from senators to consuls, and from tribunes to soldiers took bribes. This led to complete disorder and disloyalty in the Roman army which performed pathetically in the first battles after the outbreak of the war between Rome and Jugurtha.<sup>1071</sup> Only when the command of the war was entrusted to Metellus and then to Marius, were the Romans able to regain some of their discipline and to prevail.

After Jugurtha's last visit to Rome before his eventual defeat, Sallust makes Jugurtha speak the famous prophetic words: "After he had gone forth from Rome, it is said that he often looked back at it in silence and finally said, 'A city for sale and soon to perish, if it finds a buyer!'"<sup>1072</sup> This scene resembles the scene from Polybius where Scipio Aemilianus predicted the fall of the Roman Republic while watching the burning Carthage from a distance.<sup>1073</sup> Sallust has made the scene impactful by focalizing it on Jugurtha and making him say the words in direct form. Christina S. Kraus has noted that this is the only moment in the extant parts of the *Jugurthine War* where Jugurtha speaks in direct form, whereas there are many others like Sulla, Marius, and the Mauretanian king Bocchus who do so often.<sup>1074</sup> This almost makes Jugurtha look like a passive silent character in a story where many other characters have a voice. He seems like someone who has no control of his ambition and his

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<sup>1067</sup> Pol. 6.56.1–12, 18.34.7–18.35.2, 31.25.3. Cf. Zecchini 2018a, 123–127.

<sup>1068</sup> *ORF* 48.XII *Dissuasio legis Aufēīae*, p. 187–188 (= Gell. NA 11.10.1–6).

<sup>1069</sup> Sall. Iug. 13.5–8, 15.2, 16.1, 16.4, 28.1, 28.5, 29.1–3, 31.18–19, 31.25–26, 32, 33.2, 34.1, 38.6. Cf. Sall. Catil. 10.4. Livy gives the impression that the senate did not wish to intervene in African affairs at this time: Liv. 34.62.

<sup>1070</sup> According to C.S. Kraus, the characterization of Jugurtha symbolizes the chaos the Roman society was in at that time: Kraus 1999, 220–221.

<sup>1071</sup> Sall. Iug. 32.1–3, 38.5–7, 44.1–2 and 5, 66.3.

<sup>1072</sup> Sall. Iug. 35.10: "Sed postquam Roma egressus est, fertur saepe eo tacitus respiciens postremo dixisse, 'Urbem venalem et mature perituram, si emptorem invenerit!'" Repeated in Liv. per. 64.

<sup>1073</sup> Pol. 38.22 (= App. Pun. 132).

<sup>1074</sup> Kraus 1999, 221–222. One of Jugurtha's virtues was that he spoke very little of himself: Sall. Iug. 6.1.

future. Antonio La Penna has also noted Jugurtha's lack of direct speech but thinks that it is simply a matter of narrative rhythm.<sup>1075</sup> Kraus suggests, however, that such narrative choices were meant to be significant in a highly dramatic and character-driven work like the *Jugurthine War*. La Penna too (p. 352) writes that the character of Jugurtha is very tragic and torn by conflicting uncontrollable emotions. In fact, Jugurtha's narrative silence seems to comport with this tragic characterization. François Hartog has noted that already in Herodotus's work, kings, despots, and tyrants alike were presented as tragic characters who were victims of their hubris and could not stop the downfall it would inevitably cause – just as in Greek tragic plays.<sup>1076</sup>

In his recent study on Sallust's monographs, Andrew Feldherr has no doubt that the whole *Jugurthine War* is constructed with tragic plays at mind.<sup>1077</sup> Feldherr reminds us that the tragic format in general originated in the Greek East and depicted stories of foreigners, i.e., Others.<sup>1078</sup> Therefore, tragic narrative elements and tragic character arcs were useful tools when a historian wanted to provide a point of view of the Other because that was what the audience expected from a tragedy. According to Feldherr (p. 147), this special eastern connotation of the tragic format made it particularly useful for thinking “through the relationship between representation and identity” in historical narratives that examined Romans and foreigners side by side, as in the *Jugurthine War*. This interesting thought could be applied to other tragic foreign *exempla* discussed in this study: Masinissa and Sophoniba's love and the characters of Philip V, Demetrius, and Perseus. In these examples, Polybius and Livy used tragic elements to intensify the moral lessons and their idea of Romanness through these Others.

Feldherr sees the ending sequence of the *Jugurthine War* as purposefully theatrical: Sallust has constructed the story so that the readers are not able to know until the last moment who will betray whom between Bocchus, Jugurtha, and Sulla, who was Marius's quaestor at this time.<sup>1079</sup> There was no room for

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<sup>1075</sup> La Penna 1968, 329–330. For all the speeches in the *Jugurthine War*, see Büchner 1960, 182–203.

<sup>1076</sup> Hartog, 1988, 335–337. Cf. Hall 1989, 69–70.

<sup>1077</sup> Feldherr 2021, ch. 4.

<sup>1078</sup> Feldherr 2021, 136–147.

<sup>1079</sup> Feldherr 2021, 159–166.

Roman virtues or *fides* in this ending sequence – the result of the war was left to these fickle characters who were all similar to each other. The last glimpse of Jugurtha is when Sulla hands him over to Marius (Jug. 114.3) – Jugurtha’s story ends with this very visual spectacle worthy of a tragic character, when he is being brought to Rome in chains. Indeed, this resembles Livy’s equally visual narrative representation of tragic Perseus’s end when the deposed and captive Macedonian king arrived in the Roman camp in mourning garb.<sup>1080</sup>

These intensive scenes of the *Jugurthine War*, told from various characters’ points of view in quick sequence, illustrate well how Sallust saw the Roman society at this time. No one was working for the common good of the Republic any longer, but everyone was thinking about themselves first and competing for power.<sup>1081</sup> This was not the traditional Roman way which emphasized integrity and *pietas* towards the *res publica* above any personal feelings or desires: the prime example of this had been when Antiochus III had offered to liberate a hostage, Scipio Africanus’s son, in exchange for more favourable peace terms, and Scipio had declined.<sup>1082</sup> But in Sallust’s story, as in Sallust’s time of writing, Scipio Africanus was long gone and so were all the other illustrious advocates of traditional Roman *mores*.

### ***Conclusion to chapter 4: The merging of the Self and the negative Other***

In this chapter, I have analysed the ways in which individual Romans are likened to stereotypical eastern kings and tyrants in the narratives. The Romans had always taken pride in how *virtus* and their Republic set them apart from other cultures and made them superior in every way. However, our historians believed that the Roman moral decline quickly destroyed the basis of their cultural identity and constitution. When the Romans forgot their

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<sup>1080</sup> See above pp. 198–199.

<sup>1081</sup> Cf. Sall. Jug. 31.12, 85.45–46. Similar complaints referred to the year 47 BC: Bell. Alex. 65.1. On the civil wars and crises of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC up to Caesar and Pompey, see Meier 1980, 207–301. For an analysis of the excessive charisma (applying the theories of Max Weber) of these military leaders of the late Republic and how they contributed to the transformation of the Republic into a monarchy, see Hatscher 2000.

<sup>1082</sup> Pol. 21.15; Liv. 37.36–37; Diod. Sic. 29.8; Just. Epit. 31.7.4–9; App. Syr. 29.

virtues and *mores maiorum*, there was no real difference left between Romans and eastern kings or tyrants. The narratives suggest that for some people, for example some Asians, it made no difference if they were under the dominion of Rome or some king. In fact, sometimes the Roman dominion could be even worse.

All talented men – Romans and kings alike – were naturally ambitious, but the historians believed that during its prime, during the Second Punic War (218–201 BC), the Roman Republic and collective respect for *mores maiorum* could contain these ambitions extremely effectively – even too much so. Polybius’s and Livy’s portrayals of Scipio Africanus, who had every positive quality of a good Roman commander and of a good king, are examples of this. Moreover, Scipio’s death served as a symbolic ending point of the golden age of Roman *virtus* for Livy. All our historians – Polybius, Livy, Sallust, and Trogus/Justin – perceived a similar decline of Roman *virtus*, of military discipline and power, and of internal concord, albeit with different temporal emphases. First, the Romans ran out of formidable enemies that had helped them maintain their military power and *virtus*. It was believed that without *metus hostilis*, Romans had grown arrogant and discordant. Especially after the contact with Asia increased, the historians believed that the Romans had started to become weaker as a result of the sudden high exposure to eastern riches and excessive wealth.

As *virtus* became compromised, the Roman leaders and consequently their soldiers became undisciplined and greedy and ever more like eastern despots. Even though the highest point of Roman *virtus* was believed to have been the Second Punic War (218–201 BC), according to Polybius the widespread moral decline in Rome had started after the battle of Pydna in 168 BC. For Livy, the point of no return had been Cn. Manlius Vulso’s return from Asia in 187 BC, and for Sallust it had been the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC with Sulla’s aggravating influence later. The result was that at their worst the Romans did not behave any differently from stereotypical eastern tyrants since it was no longer possible to contain individual ambitions. The late republican historians especially liken Roman commanders to their foreign enemies: for example, the characters of Jugurtha and Marius, or Mithridates

VI and Sulla were not much different from each other. These kinds of parallels effectively illustrate how far the Roman *virtus* had fallen from its old glory, and how difficult it had become to define Roman identity and differentiate it from others. Sallust's *Jugurthine War* emphasizes how the difference between *civis* and *hostis* – the Self and the Other – had disappeared.

From the narratological point of view, one of the most obvious narrative devices for explaining the moral decline in the distant past was using the common age-old literary *topos* of the corrupting influence of Asia. This is also an example of the symbolizing function of a place in a narrative. Furthermore, the historians created clear historical turning points in their narratives and emphasized these by dedicating considerable space and detail to them, i.e., slowing down the rhythm of the narrative. These passages often include comments or entire speeches in *oratio recta* which offer our historians the opportunity to recapitulate or emphasize the moral lessons of the narrative. Moreover, even though our historians remain external author-narrators, they often use their authorial/narratorial voice to express their personal opinions and even direct criticisms at opportune moments. The historians may have seen the distant past of the Republic as more or less morally exemplary, but none of the extant narratives about the post-Gracchan era shy away from sharp self-criticism of the Roman society at that time.

Lastly, I have attempted to show how tragic elements can be used to intensify moral lessons and ideas of identity in historical narratives. Sallust's *Jugurthine War* is a very distinct example of this, and we have also seen the same in previous chapters, for instance, with the narrative of the fall of the Macedonian royal family. Also in this regard, I have continued to find that focalization is an extremely versatile narrative tool in historiography. It is used by each historian to convey the thoughts and feelings of individual characters and groups. Quickly shifting and intensive internal focalizations that describe strong negative feelings emphasize the tragic tone of the narratives. With Sallust's *Jugurthine War*, it can even be argued that the tragedy did not concern just deposed foreign kings like Jugurtha – it concerned the Republic itself.

## 5 CONCLUSIONS : EXEMPLARY OTHERS AS AN ELEMENT OF LITERARY CONSTRUCTIONS OF ROMAN IDENTITY

In this study, I have studied “exemplary Others”, that is, portrayals of Hellenistic kings in Roman historical narratives. I have limited my sources to those historians who lived during the last two centuries of the Republic and focused their narratives on the expansion of Roman dominion over the Mediterranean. I have mostly discussed Polybius’s, Sallust’s, and Livy’s works, because they are the best-preserved historical narratives that focus on these themes written during the said era. I have approached the portrayals from the perspective of Roman identity and *virtus* which were closely connected to each other and primarily defined with the help of historical moral examples (*exempla*). I have considered this era especially worthwhile for the study of Roman ideas of their own cultural identity and their relationship to their Republican past: during the lifetimes of Polybius, Sallust, and Livy, Roman society was quickly transforming to accommodate the new role of Rome as the master of the multi-cultural Mediterranean. I have drawn inspiration from Erich S. Gruen’s (1992) studies on the complexity of the Romans’ relationship with the Hellenistic East and from Andrew Wallace-Hadrill’s (2008) theories of Roman identity during the late republican crisis and during the transition from the Republic to the Augustan autocracy. They have emphasized that Roman ideas of other cultures and of their own cultural identity were very multi-faceted and constantly transforming. They have inspired me to look at unconventional places such as positive portrayals of foreign kings to deepen our understanding on the subject.

In the Roman Republic, the concepts of Roman identity and the *res publica* itself were inseparably intertwined with the concept of *virtus* that entailed first and foremost military courage and self-discipline and was closely connected to honesty, piety, justice, and other desired moral qualities for an ideal leader. Myles McDonnell’s (2006) comprehensive study on the concept of *virtus* and Roman ideas of manliness has served as the basis for my

understanding of the subject. There were many ways to promote these virtues in Roman society, such as literature, public art, funeral processions, and triumphs. Of these, in this study I have focused on the *exempla* in historiography, the purpose of which was to provide examples of both desired and undesired moral conduct through portrayals of Roman and foreign historical figures.

As Edward Said (1978) and Stuart Hall (1996) have shown in wider historical contexts, along with Arnaldo Momigliano (1975), François Hartog (1980), and Edith Hall (1989) in the context of ancient Greece, that the portrayals of the Other were essential in the construction of one's self-identity. However, these pioneering studies, and most studies after them, have put more emphasis on *negative* portrayals of the Other: with this study, I have sought to complement these earlier studies by focusing on how positive portrayals of the Other and, conversely, negative portrayals of the Self could function in the same way, as components of self-identity construction in historical narratives. As the category of the Other, I have chosen Hellenistic and Numidian kings who appear in the extant parts of the chosen historical narratives.

In addition to this, I have attempted to contribute something new to the study of Roman historical *exempla* and portrayals of kings by adopting narratology, until recently rarely used to study Roman historiography, as a methodological tool. Following Frank Ankersmit's (2012) and Hayden White's (1987) theories, I believe that identities are built on *ideas* of history, and these ideas of history are constructed with historical narratives. This is why I have deemed it useful to study these historiographical works as narratives, with the methods of narratology. I have used Gérard Genette's (1980), Mieke Bal's (2017), and Irene de Jong's (2014) studies as methodological models. The few existing narratological studies on Roman historiography focus on case studies or single authors. These have helped me in my endeavour to study similar narrative techniques used by various historians comparatively. I have paid special attention to focalization, narrators, speeches, suspense, narrative rhythm, and tragic elements. By comparing these narrative techniques in the texts of Polybius, Sallust, Livy, and to some extent Pompeius Trogus, I have

been able to detect many similarities and differences not only in their use of these techniques but also in their overall narrative schemes.

Even though earlier narratological studies are few, they have provided a solid basis for this study. Craige B. Champion (2004) has studied narrators in Polybius's *Histories* and noted that it would be worthwhile to study focalization as well in Polybius's work. Nikos Miltsios (2013) has taken on the task by studying Polybius's use of temporal strategies, focalization, and narrators in the first three books of Polybius. In this study, I have greatly benefited from these earlier works while focusing on Polybius's later fragmentary books that have received less attention from narratological perspectives. Polybius was in a unique position as a historian: he lived in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC during the period of rapid Roman expansion while he was an ex-politician of the Achaean league and a hostage and Scipio Aemilianus's friend in Rome. He wrote in Greek, to both Roman and Greek audiences, and while he greatly admired the Roman Republic and its military success, he did not want to favour any side too much in order not to alienate any part of this vast audience. This has been argued by Craige B. Champion (2004) and my observations presented in this study support this. Indeed, Polybius's portrayals of different characters and groups, Roman and foreign alike, are multi-faceted and complex. Polybius himself stated that he wanted to be as objective as possible. However, this did not exclude the possibility of using more critical or dramatic tones when the author himself deemed it necessary.

Sallust's works have been narratologically examined mainly through case studies. Already Antonio La Penna (1968) lightly drew attention to Sallust's narrative techniques such as tragic portrayals of historical characters, and very recently Andrew Feldherr (2021) has made a major contribution to this area of study with a monograph on Sallust's use of, among other narrative aspects, focalization and tragic elements. In this study I have strived to compare Sallust's narrative techniques to those used by Polybius, Livy, and Pompeius Trogus. Sallust lived in a very different era from Polybius or Livy, and as an ex-politician he had seen the state of affairs during the last decades of the Republic first-hand. Jennifer Gerrish (2019) has argued that the pain of the civil war, identity crisis, and general pessimism that comes across from the

works of Sallust is distinctive in his period and does not sit well in the categories of “republican literature” or “Augustan literature”, commonly associated with Polybius and Livy. Indeed, narratological analysis of Sallust’s writings supports Gerrish’s observation. In his two short historical monographs, Sallust’s approach was exceptionally psychological and severely critical, and he made full use of various narrative tools to convey as intensive and tragic image as possible of these events. His more extensive historical work is very fragmentary, but it seems he maintained his typical critical tone in it.

Livy has perhaps been the relatively most studied Roman historian from narratological perspectives. Jane D. Chaplin (2000) has studied focalization and internal audience in Livy’s earlier books. Dennis Pausch (2011) has published a methodologically detailed study on temporal aspects, focalization, and suspense in Livy’s narrative and on how these are used to communicate with the reader. Pausch’s focus is on the books that cover the Punic Wars. There are several shorter studies of single narratological aspects of Livy’s work as well, with a focus on earlier books. As with Polybius, I have deliberately focused on Livy’s less studied later books to complement these earlier studies. Livy wrote during the last civil war between Octavian and Antony and during the decades of Augustus’s early rule. The historical era in which Livy found himself clearly influenced his narrative choices and overall narrative scheme. When he wrote about the distant history of the Republic, he wanted to transmit clear moral examples and cast an image of the Republic that had been morally intact and also something to imitate in his own times. For this reason, his tones towards the Romans in the distant past were gentler and more idealized than in Polybius’s work that Livy used as a source. To help create a coherent but engaging long narrative, Livy used the same narrative tools as Sallust in his monographs, albeit with less intensity to match his annalistic structure and the long extent of his work. If compared with Polybius, on the other hand, Livy highlighted some tragic and dramatic aspects and used internal focalization and direct speech more generously.

I have also included Pompeius Trogus, a contemporary of Livy, in some of my comparisons. Due to Trogus’s work surviving only to a very limited

extent through Justin's later epitome, I deemed it useful to compare this work to Polybius, Sallust, and Livy only in a few specific cases. Still, it has been a very interesting exercise in an almost uncharted territory. Trogus's speech of Mithridates has attracted relatively much scholarly attention, but very few scholars have attempted to compare Trogus/Justin's overall narrative to other republican historians: the examples of Liv Mariah Yarrow (2006) and David Levene (2007) have encouraged me to try.

This study started with the questions of how and why certain kings of the Hellenistic East and Numidia were admired and even vindicated in historical narratives written in the Republican and Augustan eras, and how and why these narratives likened certain Romans to eastern kings and tyrants. The analysis part of this study has been divided into three chapters. Each one treats, respectively, the subjects of praising the kings, vindicating the kings, and emulating the kings on the narrative level.

In the first of these, titled "The positive Other – Admiration of virtuous kings", I showed different ways in which enemy kings and friendly kings were admired in the narratives because of their *virtus* demonstrated in battles and because of their other positive moral qualities. Myles McDonnell (2006) separates military *virtus* from other more ethical virtues such as honesty, piety, and justice. This is reflected in the portrayals of kings: they could have many virtues and flaws at the same time, but to pose a worthy challenge for the Romans, they needed to possess at the very least military *virtus*. It was important to emphasize the enemies' *virtus* in the narratives because it was believed that strong enemies helped the Romans strengthen and maintain their own *virtus*. From the narratological point of view, close focalization has proved to be an effective way to convey these portrayals in the most memorable way to the readers: the authors make the readers follow every endeavour and struggle of these kings by closely focalizing on them. By modifying the rhythm of the narrative, and thus the amount of detail, the authors increase the suspense of the most important scenes and emphasize the dangerousness of these enemy kings.

Hans-Joachim Gehrke's (2013) model of charismatic leadership in Hellenistic monarchies has been very useful for understanding the praise of kings in Hellenistic contexts but also in Roman contexts: in fact, the Roman leadership during the Republic was also charismatic in nature because, to advance in his political career, a Roman man had to achieve military success and his *virtus* had to be recognized by his peers. For Hellenistic kings as well, military prowess legitimized their rule in the eyes of their subjects, according to Gehrke. Because of this, it is no wonder that we can find many parallels between the portrayals of virtuous kings such as Alexander the Great, Philip V, Masinissa, and Mithridates VI, and Roman leaders such as Scipio Africanus, Marius, Pompey, Caesar, and Augustus – they were all described as disciplined and fearless warriors who tirelessly maintained their own and their soldiers' military prowess and who often were said to have divine origins. Parallels could also be drawn with narrative portrayals of Hannibal, who has not been the focus of this study. The studies, of e.g., Dexter Hoyos (2005, 2010, 2017), Giovanni Brizzi (2011), David Levene (2010), and Claire Stocks (2014) have shown that Hannibal was a special character who was at the same time hated and greatly admired in Roman literature. The stories of Hannibal were immensely important for the literary constructions of Roman identity, as was his Roman counterpart Scipio Africanus. Admiration of various enemy kings constitutes a part of this same phenomenon, even if they were presented with less extensive examples by Roman authors and thus are less studied by modern historians.

If a king wished to be an ally of the Romans, military *virtus* was not enough: he needed to possess additional virtues. Paul J. Burton (2011) has argued that the Romans' friendships with foreign kings were based on shared moral values, especially *fides*, i.e., mutual trust. This is heavily reflected in the narrative portrayals of friendly kings. The portrayals repeatedly demonstrate their military *virtus* but also their honesty, trustworthiness, and generosity. Foreign kings could thus be used as positive *exempla* of any Roman virtue in addition to basic military *virtus*. Essentially then, an exemplary Roman commander and an exemplary friendly king were expected to have similar moral qualities. In Polybius's and Livy's portrayals of Masinissa, for example,

in order to be recognized as a king by the Romans, Masinissa had to overcome his Numidian vices with Roman virtues that he had learned from Scipio Africanus. This story is strengthened by frequent focalization on Masinissa to make the readers identify with the friendly character, and by adding tragic elements to Masinissa's last great test of *virtus*, i.e., letting go of his forbidden love for Queen Sophoniba. Philip V and Eumenes II on the other hand function as examples of how friendship could deteriorate when a king's moral character became questionable. From the narratological point of view, these portrayals show that Livy preferred consistency of theme over realistic characterizations. Because of this, Livy's moral examples are simpler and more consistent, whereas Polybius portrayed each event and character as realistically as he believed possible. For this reason, Polybius's portrayals are more ambiguous and variable.

The second analysis chapter, titled "Mistreating the kings – Romans through the eyes of the Others", turned the focus towards the negative portrayals of the Self, i.e., narrative instances where the Romans themselves seemed to act against their own moral ideals in their diplomatic dealings with kings. One such striking category of examples was the anti-Roman enemy speeches and letters that seemed to vindicate the enemies and paint them as victims of the Romans. These speeches are common in all my sources, and they have attracted the attention of scholars who have studied them as case studies or focused on one author at a time. Yet, there have not been systematic studies that would compare such speeches with each other in a detailed manner, also comparing the narrative techniques used across many different historical works. Hermann Tränkle (1977) and John Briscoe (1973, 1981, 1993, 2008, 2012) have compared Polybius's and Livy's corresponding speeches, and Eric Adler (2011) has perhaps been the first to compare six anti-Roman enemy speeches and letters of different authors from different eras. I have attempted to complement these and other shorter studies by examining Polybius's, Sallust's, Livy's, and Pompeius Trogus's anti-Roman enemy speeches and letters with respect to each other while applying narratological methods.

These anti-Roman speeches and letters were written using the voice of the Romans' enemies. To use the voice of the Other in this manner was a useful narrative tool not only to provide enemies' perspectives but also to "safely" insert heavier than usual Rome-critical sentiments in the narrative. The typical accusation of the anti-Roman speeches and letters was that the Romans categorically hated all kings because of their own traumatic experience with their last king, Tarquinius Superbus. As the preceding chapters have shown, it was clear that, even on the narrative level, the Romans had no irrational phobias towards foreign kings whom they very often befriended and collaborated with. The fear of sole rulers emerging from within the Republic, *odium regni*, was first and foremost important for the identity building and the internal concord of the Roman aristocracy during the Republic. Reminders of the expulsion of the Roman kings, and of the foundation of the Republic, were likely to evoke pride in Roman readers, who looked admiringly to the distant Roman Republican past.

Another common accusation voiced by the enemy kings against the Romans was that the Romans did not wage wars for just reasons and only wished to subdue all kings with violence. The true nature of Roman imperialism has been a subject of lively debate for a long time but, in this study, I have been focused on the enemy speeches and letters which are a category of their own and allowed the historians to insert critical opinions that they themselves did not necessarily share. For example, Donald W. Baronowski (2011) has shown that Polybius himself believed and clearly stated in his work that the Roman wars of expansion had not only been justified, but also desired and often intentional. For Livy as well, the Roman dominion of the Mediterranean was well deserved owing to their superior *virtus* that set the Romans apart from and above other cultures. Therefore, the enemies' empty accusations effectively show the excessive arrogance of these kingly characters. In addition to providing the enemies' perspective, the anti-Roman speeches and letters are an effective narrative tool to enliven the long historical narratives. Historians had a choice of choosing between speech or letter format, and between direct or indirect speech in order to regulate the tone of the accusations and the rhythm of the narrative as they pleased.

In addition to the speeches and letters, I have examined narrative instances where the historians describe Roman behaviour that was blatantly immoral according to their own moral ideals. The Romans expected certain moral qualities and especially *fides* from their allied kings, and this relationship of mutual trust was obviously supposed to work in both directions. Our historians provide three particularly striking examples of situations where certain Romans intentionally deceived or manipulated the brothers or sons of their allied kings with the purpose of destabilizing the internal concord in their royal courts: the Macedonian royal court during Philip V's rule, the Attalid court during Eumenes II's rule, and the Numidian court during Micipsa's rule. More often than not, these Romans succeeded. These function as warning examples of the importance of *pietas* and *concordia* inside a family and, analogously, inside a state. These moral teachings could easily be applied to both monarchic and republican constitutions in the Roman historians' mindset. Furthermore, *pietas* and *concordia* were central elements of Augustus's propaganda during the early consolidation of his reign.

There were certain moral principles to respect even in dealings with the enemies. Polybius and Roman authors after him believed that the Romans of old, before the Hannibalic Wars, had waged their wars honestly, without deceit and trickery. Ennius's famous examples of Pyrrhus already praise the honesty and *virtus* on both sides of the war. Dishonest war tactics were imagined to be typical of the Others, such as Asians and Carthaginians. However, Roman commanders sometimes resorted to sly tactics against particularly strong enemies. David Levene has shown that, for example, Scipio Africanus, the model of Roman *virtus*, used morally ambiguous tactics against Hannibal in Livy's narrative. In this study, I have specifically examined Livy's – and Polybius's very fragmentary – portrayal of Perseus, who, in a part of their narratives, appears a victim of Roman trickery and aggression due to the choice of narrative techniques. In this chapter as well, it has become evident how effectively and variably Polybius and Livy use focalization. In these examples in particular, their goal seems to be to invite the readers to sympathize with the characters who find themselves in trouble because of the Romans. Repeated and close focalization on these characters and their feelings

and expectations creates suspense and gives the narratives a tragic tone, intended to entertain the readers and to provide memorable moral lessons.

Polybius and Livy had presented Scipio Africanus's tactical cunning against Hannibal as necessary against the formidable enemy, but the examples that I have discussed in this study relate to later historical eras, after the Hannibalic war, when our historians believed that the Roman moral decline caused by the eastward expansion was well underway. Malignant manipulation of friendly kings and diplomatic trickery with Perseus were but the first symptoms of this decline that would corrupt the very base of the Roman Republic and identity in the course of time. All historians discussed here shared a similar idea of the symptoms and causes of moral decline, even though each one of them had slightly different temporal emphases. By comparing Polybius's and Livy's narratives of the early 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC in chapter 3, I have noticed that Livy tended to mitigate or erase the earliest signs of Roman moral decline, present in Polybius's text, when they did not match his own model of the moral decline. At the same time, Livy has intensified the moral lessons that emphasize *concordia* and *pietas* in the spirit of the post-civil war era during which he wrote.

In these first two analysis chapters I have thus answered the questions of how and why certain kings of the Hellenistic East and Numidia were admired and even vindicated in Republican and Augustan era historical narratives, thus covering both positive representations of the Other and negative representations of the Self from the kings' point of view. The last analysis chapter, titled "The self-critical mirror – Romans paralleled to kings and tyrants", further explored the negative representations of the Self in relation to the concept of moral decline and to the internal crisis of the late Republic. The premise of this chapter was that, according to the narratives, the moral decline blurred the moral difference between the Romans and stereotypical eastern kings. This merging of the Self with the Other caused internal discord in Roman society when the leading Romans started seeing their peers as enemies.

*Odium regni*, the fear of Roman sole rulers during the Republic, could be and was actively used in political discourse. Political opponents were commonly accused of aspiring to sole rulership in Rome especially in the late Republic. An early example of this is the portrayal of Scipio Africanus in Polybius's and Livy's narratives: he had all the positive kingly qualities which also coincided with the ideal qualities of a Roman republican leader, but he hardly had any negative qualities. His popularity among the people triggered the hostility and fear of his peers who drove him into exile. Scipio's portrayals served as an example of morally more solid times when even exceptionally talented individuals like Scipio could not and did not want to rise above others in power inside the Republic.

Scipio Africanus was a very virtuous character for Polybius and Livy, but as their narratives advanced and generations changed, the moral decline also worsened, and undisciplined and ruthless Roman characters begin to emerge in the narratives. The reason for this was believed to have been the lack of strong enemies and the excessive wealth in Rome after many successful conquests. The historians of the late Republic especially highlighted the corrupting influence of Asia as the catalyst of moral decline in Rome. Already in Greek imagination, eastern cultures were seen as the source of corrupting luxuries and vices, and the Romans largely adopted this idea. The concepts of moral decline and eastern stereotypes have been comprehensively discussed by scholars like Erich S. Gruen (1984, 1992, 2011), Benjamin H. Isaac (2004), Andrew Dalby (2000), and Catherine Edwards (1993). Also, we know very well what typical tyrants and bad kings were like in ancient Greek and Roman narratives, thanks to numerous studies on the subject, e.g., François Hartog's (1980) and Edith Hall's (1989) studies on Greek literature or the new series *Studies in Ancient Monarchies* by Franz Steiner Verlag. Based on these, I have attempted to focus on how these different historical narratives liken individual Romans to stereotypical tyrants, corrupted by eastern vices. Roman political history of the last century of the Republic has obviously attracted extensive scholarly attention. Here too, I have wanted to focus on narratological aspects as much as possible in hopes of offering some new insights into the subject of moral decline and the late republican identity crisis.

The corrupting influence of Asia after the war with Antiochus III, and in particular Cn. Manlius Vulso's return to Rome with immense war booty in 187 BC, appears as the crucial moral turning point in Livy's narrative. For Polybius, it was the Roman victory at Pydna in 168 BC. Such historical turning points were exaggerated narrative devices aimed at making long and abstract historical developments, like moral decline, easier to understand for the readers. These turning points are easy to recognize in the narratives, because the historians used their authorial/narratorial voice to directly state the significance of such turning points. Moreover, they emphasized them by dedicating considerable narrative detail to them, for example, by slowing down the rhythm of the narrative and by inserting speeches at such points. In addition to this, the narratives of moral decline use the common *topos* and the symbolizing function of Asia in Graeco-Roman literature – every Roman or Greek reader in the historians' target audiences would have known what the negative Asian stereotypes were like. For the time after the Second Punic War, Polybius's work is increasingly fragmentary, but the better preserved parts of Livy's work provide a detailed narrative of fierce aristocratic competition in Rome, which illustrates the disintegration of internal concord, the importance of which Livy heavily emphasized, for instance, through the *exempla* of the Macedonian and Attalid royal courts, discussed in section 3.2. Despite the exemplary figure of Scipio Africanus, in the 180s BC it seemed that it had already become almost impossible to contain the ambitions of younger talented Romans like M. Aemilius Lepidus, Cn. Manlius Vulso, and M. Fulvius Nobilior, who accused each other of tyrannical behaviour.

For Sallust, the acquisition of the province of Asia in 133 BC in particular had been an especially devastating blow to the collective Roman *virtus*. Soon after, during the Jugurthine War and the Mithridatic Wars, there seemed to be no effective difference left between ruthless Roman commanders and governors and their kingly counterparts. Sallust's use of quickly shifting internal focalization in the *Jugurthine War* adds a clear tragic tone to the portrayal of Jugurtha but also to the portrayal of the general state of the Roman Republic at that time. Sallust is very direct in his use of authorial/narratorial voice to openly criticize Roman society in both his extant

monographs. Sallust's description of Roman society during these times is so negative and intense that Polybius's and Cicero's theories of the inevitable cycle of constitutions seemed to be realizing themselves step by step in his narrative. According to these theories, after a democratic constitution disintegrated, monarchy would always follow. Sallust's two historical monographs indeed revolve around power-hungry characters like Catiline, Marius, and Sulla. Republican and Augustan authors believed that *virtus* had been the basis of the Roman Republic and had made the Romans morally and militarily superior to all other cultures: as *virtus* begun to deteriorate, so did the Roman identity and the Republic itself. According to the narratives, this had caused the long period of civil wars during the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC. Augustus used these earlier discourses to justify his moral reform aimed at constructing a new collective idea of Romanness with him as the thinly veiled sole ruler of the "restored" Republic.

My premise in this study has been that historical narratives are necessary for constructing cultural identities. Thus, historians create their ideas of history with the help of several narrative means. Within the narrative realm of Roman historiography, I have specifically chosen to examine descriptions of *virtus* and moral *exempla* in relation to Hellenistic and Numidian kings that constitute the category of the Other for the purposes of this study. With this dissertation, I have shown how positive descriptions of the Other and negative descriptions of the Self could be used to define Roman self-identity in historical narratives during the time of expansion, during the late republican crisis, and during Augustus's early solidification of his rule. This is the other but equally important side of the model suggested by Stuart Hall (1996) and others, who have shown how negative descriptions of the Other and consequently positive descriptions of the Self could be used to create literary constructions of cultural identities. Furthermore, I have offered a systematic narratological comparison of portrayals of kings across Polybius's, Sallust's, Livy's, and to some extent Pompeius Trogus's works.

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