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# Periphery of a Genocide: Finland and the Holocaust

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By scrutinizing Finland's complex position as an Axis ally during the Second World War, this article explores the degree to which the country contributed to the destruction of European Jews. Though historians within Finland continue to debate these issues, the author argues that neither exculpation, nor exclusion from the general framework of Holocaust history are tenable historical approaches. While the extent to which Finland willingly participated in the mass murder of the Jews and other perceived enemies remains an unresolved question, this article reveals how key individuals and lower-level authorities nevertheless knowingly contributed to lethal practices and outcomes. Thus, this article challenges current interpretations of Finland's involvement in the Holocaust.

In Helsinki, a bespectacled man in civilian clothes stepped out from the Stockmann department store into the bright warmth of a late July 1942 afternoon. He was accompanied by a coterie of assistants and companions, some in uniform, who opened the door for him and carried his numerous purchases.<sup>1</sup> The man was Heinrich Himmler, the chief of the extensive police apparatus of Nazi Germany, the head of the *Schutzstaffeln* (SS, protection squadrons)—which functioned virtually as a state within a state, incorporating agencies from an institute for archaeological and ethnological studies to armored divisions—and the main architect and chief supervisor of the destruction of European Jews. As he toured the North European capital, his victims were being forced into ghettos, and concentration and extermination camps throughout Nazi-occupied Europe, where they were beaten, shot, gassed, and executed *en masse*.

While in Helsinki, Himmler did more than shop.<sup>2</sup> He met privately with the president of Finland, Risto Ryti, appears to have discussed the “Jewish Question” with Prime Minister Johan “Jukka” Rangell, and dined with the commander-in-chief of the Finnish armed forces, Marshal Gustaf Mannerheim, at his headquarters in Mikkeli. Thus, there were plenty of opportunities for frank conversation with Finland's top leadership. Himmler also would have had ample time to pressure the Finnish government into playing a role in the Final Solution. A crucial question for historians, however, concerns the true intentions of Himmler and the broader Nazi leadership, and the *exact* role they intended for Finland with respect to the *Endlösung*.<sup>3</sup>

Scholars still debate this question, and their assessments vary. Wolfgang Benz's answer, which he includes in the introduction to *Dimension des Völkermords*, is characteristic of international scholarship up to the end of the Cold War. He consciously excluded Finland from an otherwise comprehensive analysis of the Holocaust, and depicted it as having played a “special role” (*Sonderrolle*) among the other Axis allies and satellites. Based on Raul Hilberg's assessment, compared to these other allies,

Finland had not faced “comparable pressure” to hand over its Jews. Consequently, roughly two thousand Finnish Jews were spared altogether. While there had been, according to Benz, some fifty (mainly Austrian) Jewish refugees in Finland under threat of deportation, only one deportation ever occurred.<sup>4</sup>

In November 1942, eight Jewish refugees were deported from Finland and delivered into the hands of the German security police in occupied Estonia. Part of a larger group of deported foreigners, the group of eight Jewish refugees also included one child less than two years of age. From Tallinn they were sent to Berlin, and from there onto Auschwitz with the twenty-ninth *Osttransport* in February 1943. Only one of them survived.<sup>5</sup>

The November 1942 deportation became public knowledge soon after it occurred. In years since it has become the most infamous example of Finnish complicity in the Holocaust. Even until the 2000s, researchers remained fixated on this incident, as if it were a singularly defining event that would outline both Finland’s complicity and resistance. Although Benz and other scholars argue that the low number of deportees should exclude Finland from studies related to Holocaust victims, researchers, particularly in the last few decades, have continued to question the limits and nature of Finland’s participation in the genocide.<sup>6</sup>

Research in Finland on the country’s Holocaust history emerged slowly from the shadow of the war generation, whose members held positions of academic authority. A shift occurred in the late 1970s onwards, when Elina Sana laid the basis for Finnish Holocaust research through her work as a journalist. As an outsider to the academic community, which for decades showed no interest in the subject, she nevertheless pioneered Finnish Holocaust research and uncovered new facts to suggest a markedly bleaker assessment of wartime Finnish participation.<sup>7</sup>

Sana soon gained a relentless opponent in the historian Hannu Rautkallio, who, since the 1980s, has proposed a diametrically opposed interpretation, arguing that Finland should be credited as an unsung protector of not just its own Jewish minority, but also non-Finnish Jews, who resided in Finland relatively unmolested throughout the war years. According to Rautkallio’s account, the November 1942 deportation was an unfortunate accident that was the result of Jewish refugees’ inability to respect local laws and their combative attitudes toward authority figures. It was not, in his estimation, a symptom of Finland’s deeper systemic participation, but rather Finland had consistently maintained “the ethical norms of a state governed by the rule of law.”<sup>8</sup> One conclusion Rautkallio proposes is that Finland should be recognized for resisting Nazi pressure and for its resolute, consistent practice of protecting all Jews within its borders. Undoubtedly, Rautkallio’s most influential work in this regard was his 1987 monograph *Finland and the Holocaust*. The softcover edition’s back cover tells readers that Finland is a country in which there was no antisemitism.<sup>9</sup>

It was not until the 1990s that notable non-Finnish scholarly works on Finland and the Holocaust began to emerge. Rautkallio’s exceptionalist reading drew a weighty response in the form of William B. Cohen’s and Jörgen Svensson’s 1995 article in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*. Cohen and Svensson thoroughly questioned Rautkallio’s conclusions, and arrived at a blunt conclusion, categorizing Finland in starkly Hilbergian terms as just another perpetrator-state, writing, “the Finnish authorities deported Jews because of local antisemitism and their own willingness to carry out policies parallel or complementary to those of Nazi Germany.”<sup>10</sup>

The matter would not rest there for long, as Finnish academic research finally took up the subject at the turn of the twenty-first century. Elina Sana again played a decisive role with her 2003 book *Luovutetut* (The Deported), which caused a major sensation in Finland. Her work reassessed the wartime political leadership, security and military authorities, and the nature of Finnish collaboration with the Germans. Research was no longer focused on a single deportation, but the armed forces’ administrative machinery regarding prisoners of war, as well as the thousands of prisoners sent to Germany during the war. Sana reveals that a considerable number of Soviet Jews had been handed over directly to the German security police. She subsequently suggests expanding the historical understanding of Finland’s contribution to the Holocaust from “those eight” in November 1942, to several thousand.<sup>11</sup>

As a result of domestic and international attention to Sana's claims, the Finnish government from 2004 to 2008 funded a research project to investigate the wartime treatment of Jews and other threatened minorities, as well as Soviet POWs in Finnish hands. The project produced three important outcomes: Antti Kujala's study on Finnish extralegal executions of POWs, Oula Silvennoinen's work on Finnish-German security police cooperation, and Lars Westerlund's studies on the mortality of POWs. Together, they refuted some of Sana's assumptions, while confirming and expanding upon others. The purpose of this article is to situate these findings in relation to scholarly interpretations of Finland's role in the Holocaust.<sup>12</sup>

It is this sharpening picture, increasingly based on primary source research, that also led Antero Holmila in 2009 to challenge the earlier interpretation of Cohen and Svensson in his own article in *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*. In Holmila's reading, the Finnish case was too complex to interpret along straightforward intentionalist lines. According to Holmila, while Cohen and Svensson raise important points, their interpretation is too simplistic, as one must consider "both structural and intentional factors" and also take into account "concepts such as bureaucratic boundaries" in order to properly understand Finland's role in the genocide. Holmila ended up rejecting Cohen's and Svensson's assessment that Finland was another perpetrator state, and stressed the need for renewed critical study on the subject.<sup>13</sup>

In this article, I thus try to put forth a more nuanced interpretation of Finland's position as an ally of Nazi Germany, and explore how Finland became entangled in the genocide while fighting a common war with Germany. I will argue that neither exculpation, nor exclusion from the general picture are tenable historical interpretations; however, a straightforward interpretation of Finland as a common perpetrator state would be equally misleading. At all times, just as Holmila stressed, there were contradictory impulses at work, and the final outcome was an ambiguous one. Finland therefore needs to be included in discussions on the Holocaust—but how? To present a cogent answer we need to take a closer look at the particulars of Finland's position as a German ally.

### ROAD TO THE DANGER ZONE

Finland's long formative period into nationhood, first as a part of Sweden, then Russia, ended in 1917 with the declaration of Finnish independence. Almost immediately in 1918, the country was plunged into civil war between the Reds—the radicalized wing of the Finnish social democratic party—and the Whites, a loose confederation of non-socialists. The Whites defeated the Reds quickly with the help of imperial Germany, and in summer 1919, Finland was declared a republic. Many of the Reds fled to Soviet Russia and in August 1918 set up the Finnish Communist Party (*Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue*, SKP) in Moscow. While the country remained starkly divided internally throughout the interwar period, the liberal republic slowly gained ground and legitimacy from its adversaries both on the left and right.

Over the course of the 1920's, it became increasingly clear that the communists harbored no real chance for a renewed armed uprising and revolution in Finland. Domestic communism nevertheless was enough of a threat that it became a cultural bugaboo that the sharply anticommunist right used to mobilize. In the early 1930s the Lapua movement briefly attracted mass support by appealing to a near-universal readiness to see in communism an existential cultural, spiritual, and moral threat. At its core, Lapua was a fascist movement of the type common to interwar Europe, with its sharply anticommunist rhetoric underlaid by antisemitism and conspiratorial beliefs typical of the far-right.<sup>14</sup>

The Lapua movement rose and disintegrated in rapid succession, driven by its internal rifts and an increasing tendency for violence, which alienated less-radicalized supporters. Any danger of a right-wing coup in Finland waned almost as quickly as it had manifested. A sense that the country remained under the threat of communist subversion nevertheless remained acute among large segments of the political right, particularly those who identified themselves as bearers of the legacy of the civil war Whites. It was especially prominent among the personnel of the Finnish security police (*Valtiollinen poliisi*) and the military security and counterintelligence organizations, all of which had been created

to fight the menace of communism and the Soviet Union. They had grown accustomed to justifying their own existence by appealing to the need for relentless vigilance.<sup>15</sup>

Among key authority figures, ties to National Socialist colleagues in Germany had been natural to form and maintain. Soon after Hitler's accession to power, in December 1933, the Finnish security police sent a young official to take stock of the newly established *Geheimes Staatspolizeiamt*, then led by Rudolf Diels. There were good reasons to do so. Finland had maintained relationships also with the Weimar security authorities mainly in an effort to strengthen its own ability to control the movement and operations of communist agents within the Baltic region. The new Nazi authorities were ready to continue cooperating, and thus a basis for a mutual understanding between the Finnish security police and the emerging SS-security apparatus quickly formed. It would be based on the shared view that the Finnish security police and the *Gestapo* were both fighting a common enemy, international communism, and that this made Hitler's Germany in the words of one Finnish official "in the political sense a closely aligned major power."<sup>16</sup>

Finland was also home to a small Jewish community, which could trace its history to the mid-nineteenth century, when Jews were first allowed to settle and practice their religion in what was then a grand duchy of the Russian Empire. For Jews, citizenship had been more difficult to achieve. It took until 1918 before the necessary changes in legislation finally overcame the traditional antisemitism of the now-independent country. By the eve of the Second World War, the Finnish Jewish community numbered roughly two thousand, with synagogues in the largest towns of Helsinki, Turku, and Viipuri. In addition to the Finnish Jews, by the outbreak of the war in Europe, there were a few hundred Jews from elsewhere in Europe, most of whom began entering Finland in 1938 as refugees. They either resided in the country with residence permits, or as paperless residents—without permission to stay, but without the ability to leave.<sup>17</sup>

The palpable, long term security problem for Finland remained the Soviet Union, which displayed signs of increasing aggression during the 1930's. Political options for Finland remained limited to what protection interwar international cooperation could offer. Hitler's ascension to power in Germany brought no change to Finland's basic dilemma: it was without credible allies. Germany would not take up the role of a military counterweight to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and the United States were too far, and would not commit themselves, and even Sweden remained disinterested in forging a joint security arrangement. By the terms of the secret protocol attached to the deceptively named German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, signed in August 1939, Finland became part of the Soviet Union's sphere of interest. Germany agreed not to object to any changes, political or territorial, the Soviet leadership might implement. In November 1939, the Red Army poured over the Finnish-Soviet border.<sup>18</sup>

Consequently, the resulting Winter War seemed to confirm two staples of Finnish interwar security political thinking: the Soviets could never be trusted and were bent on conquering Finland one way or another. The Red Army's invasion of Poland and the soon-to-be-realized occupation of Estonia and Latvia fit the pattern only too well. Post-Winter War security assessments thus seemed unequivocal: Finland could never have peace and security as long as the Soviet Union remained a potent force.<sup>19</sup>

The fateful mechanism outlined in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact first encouraged the Soviets into a military conflict with Finland, and later pushed the Finns into renewed war with the Soviet Union. By the end of 1940, after Hitler had decided to invade the Soviet Union, Germany began to hint at a possible policy reversal regarding the German-Soviet alliance. By that time, many in Finland were willing to listen. Those who had, ever since 1918, harbored designs to one day defeat and destroy the Soviet Union (and in the process push Finland's borders further east), were joined by a much more numerous cadres of moderates, who saw no other way out than a preemptive war against the Soviet Union, but this time with a powerful ally.<sup>20</sup>

## MARCHING EAST

By spring 1940, German's eastern policy began to shift. Immediately following the conclusion of hostilities between Finland and the Soviet Union, Germany approached Finland to sign a trade agreement.

Later that year in November, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, while on a diplomatic visit to Berlin, demanded that Germany honor the German-Soviet non-aggression pact and leave Finland in the hands of the Soviet Union. Hitler flatly refused, as Finland had become a factor in his plans.<sup>21</sup> When Germany launched its assault on the Soviet Union in June 1941, Finnish territory and military bases were at the disposal of the German armed forces. The Finnish army mobilized, deployed, and prepared for its own advance. By July, hostilities began along the roughly 1,300 kilometers of the Finnish-Soviet border, from the Gulf of Finland to the Barents Sea.<sup>22</sup>

The operational plan was straightforward: German troops stationed in Norway and Finnish Lapland were to move on Murmansk, occupy the Kola peninsula, and then roll south along the Murmansk-Leningrad railway. Finnish troops were to advance from their deployment zone in the southern part of the country towards the east, sever the railway connection between Leningrad and Murmansk, and then push on to occupy preplanned positions in Soviet Karelia.

As the campaign unfolded, the German army failed to take Leningrad in 1941. Finnish troops were part of the forces encircling the city, and amassed to its north. By late 1941, the Finnish army had nevertheless occupied considerable stretches of Soviet Karelia, reaching Lake Onega (Ääninen) and the town of Petrozavodsk. With their operational targets thus reached, Finnish soldiers in Soviet Karelia became occupiers, and the Finnish army created an occupation administration.<sup>23</sup>

In the nineteenth century, Finnish nationalism had already created a vision of an ideal nation-state of Greater Finland, encompassing the closest linguistic relatives of the Finns: Estonia, most of Soviet Karelia, the Kola peninsula, the Finnmark region of Norway and the Västerbotten region of Sweden. As long as the war proceeded favorably for Germany and its allies, Finland could speculate widely as to its future borders; however, Finnish schemes for territorial expansion, annexation, and resettlement were inevitably tied to a German victory over the Soviet Union, and Germany's plans to dismantle and divide up the former Soviet territories.<sup>24</sup> A case in point is the Kola Peninsula east of the Murmansk oblast. With its ample forests and potential for hydroelectric power, the area was sometimes included in schemes for Greater Finland, and the war seemed to offer the possibility of making this dream into a reality. The Germans, perhaps deliberately, gave conflicting and vague statements about the future of Kola—in some cases the Reich was to directly annex the territory, in others it was to be gifted to Finland, in yet others it was promised to Vidkun Quisling's Norway. Regardless, Germany was cavalier in its grandiose plans for territorial expansion and demographic reorganization, despite the very real, and partially realized, consequences for the affected people.<sup>25</sup>

In summer 1941, well before the end of the war, Germany was already making plans to resettle inhabitants of its captured territories, and nowhere was this more apparent than Leningrad. The area around the city, the region of Ingria (*Ingermanland*), was mainly inhabited by Finnic peoples, including the native Ingrians, Votes, and the descendants of seventeenth-century Finnish settlers known as Ingrian Finns. Stalin's purges in the 1930s had targeted the minority nationalities in the Soviet Union, and Ingrian Finns were no exception. Nevertheless, by the German invasion there were still more than one hundred thousand Ingrian Finns living around Leningrad.<sup>26</sup>

As the Germans approached the city, *Einsatzgruppe* A began to systematically collect and transfer Ingrian Finns from the area southwest of Leningrad into Estonia, to await further deportation and resettlement. These people were moved from Ingria, because the Germans planned to turn it into the province of *Peipusland*, an area reserved for Germanic settlement. In November 1941, Finnish government circles proposed resettling the Ingrian Finns, who were languishing in SS-run camps in Estonia, to territories that Finland planned to annex at the end of the war in order to ease the country's acute agricultural labor shortage. Consequently, by the breakup of the Finnish-German alliance in 1944, Germany had transferred over sixty thousand Ingrian Finns to Finland.<sup>27</sup>

The notion of "repopulating" a territory begs the question: What will become of the existing inhabitants? In the eyes of the Finnish planners, the Soviet authorities had largely resolved this question by evacuating the territories they relinquished as their forces retreated. Men of military age were conspicuously absent from Finnish-occupied parts of Soviet Karelia. The Finnish occupiers grouped the remaining civilian population by their "nationality" (e. g. people of Finnic origin and "non-nationals"). All non-Finnic Soviet nationalities comprised the latter group, and were considered a security risk.

Finnish forces rounded them up in concentration camps to await forcible deportation to either German or Soviet-controlled territory after the successful conclusion of the war. In other words, the Finnish authorities were preparing to ethnically cleanse the area.<sup>28</sup>

## DEPORTING JEWS

The implementation of the “Final Solution,” the planned mass genocide of the Jews, began in winter 1941/1942. Previously, the Jews had been customarily and indiscriminately murdered throughout the occupied Soviet territory, but the creation of an express policy of systematic destruction also put Jewish minorities outside of Germany’s immediate control at risk, specifically Finnish Jews and those residing in Finland as refugees.<sup>29</sup> The architects of the Final Solution were aware of the existence of Finland’s Jewish community. The Wannsee Conference protocol of the January 1942 meeting, for example, appear to lay out plans for the Jews in Finland. It included a prewar assessment of the Jewish population’s size, and the figure cited in the protocol (2,300), is remarkably accurate. That number would also have contained an estimated number of Jews residing in Finland temporarily as refugees.<sup>30</sup>

Martin Luther, the influential head of the *Deutschland* section of the German Foreign Ministry, attended the conference. His comments, recorded in the minutes, imply that the Nordic Jewish communities could be temporarily exempted from the general plan for the Final Solution. He argued that the small sizes of Nordic Jewish communities made them (including Finland) less of a priority. In addition, he anticipated resistance from Nordic governments (occupied or not), who would likely be unwilling to quickly deport their Jews. Given that Luther was officially responsible for ensuring that dependent foreign governments implemented aspects of the Final Solution, his statement carries weight. The Finnish Jews had been granted a temporary reprieve, but how long would it last?<sup>31</sup>

Even if the Finnish Jewish community was initially safe, the non-Finnish Jewish refugees residing in Finland were in a much more precarious situation. As Jews they faced antisemitism, which portrayed them as a morally and politically unreliable group. Such prejudices could be found amongst the Finnish security authorities, who believed that “Jewishness” and communism were two sides of the same coin. From the early 1920s onwards, the security police personnel had widely accepted the belief that Jews were instigators of communism and that they enjoyed a sinister prominence in the Soviet Union. Openly antisemitic remarks appear in the internal correspondence of the top security police officials. In a memorandum from May 1943, the chief of the security police, Arno Anthoni laid out his own policy: every Jew should be regarded as an enemy of Germany, and thus, by extension, an enemy of Finland. In short, in the eyes of the security police, Jews were by nature suspect.<sup>32</sup>

As such, Jews without Finnish citizenship were prime targets for policing and deportation. The security police would often closely watch individual Jewish refugees they suspected of petty criminality, vagrancy, or activities harmful to Finland’s security, such as espionage and political agitation. Given the wide range of potential misdemeanors they could be charged with, Jewish refugees could easily be singled out for deportation.

With the Finnish security police and the army counterintelligence organ (*Päämajan valvontaosasto*), we come to two lower-level authorities, who were involved in practical measures that tied Finland to the Final Solution. Unsurprisingly, there were also Finnish authorities with close prewar and wartime ties to the SS. While the army counterintelligence destroyed its archive at the end of the war, the security police left a relatively intact archive, which documents the latter’s relationship to the burgeoning Nazi security apparatus under the SS.

Between May 1941 and December 1942, the security police delivered a total of twelve Jewish refugees into the hands of the German security police (*Sicherheitspolizei*, SiPo). In all cases, the security police referred to either the criminal or “immoral” activities of the deportee, or to an apparent political or security risk, as grounds for each individual deportation. Some cases were discussed with Heinrich Müller, chief of the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt Amt IV*. He was the Finnish security police’s most important direct contact within the Nazi security apparatus, who oversaw the transport of deportees once they entered German-controlled territory.<sup>33</sup>

There is no evidence of a plan by either the Finnish security police or higher government circles to deport either the non-Finnish or Finnish Jews *en masse*. Nevertheless, rumor and anxiety among the Finnish and refugee Jewish communities hung in the air as a result of the deportation of individual Jewish refugees, the Finnish policy of subjecting Jewish refugees to compulsory labor service, and Himmler's visits to the country. Finnish and German security authorities found common ground over their shared anticommunist and antisemitic outlooks. Over time the two organizations continued to work closely together, as was clear from the Finnish-German security authorities' joint operations within Finnish territory.<sup>34</sup>

### EINSATZKOMMANDO FINNLAND

Though perpetuating an atmosphere of dread amongst the Jews, their deportation required the cooperation of the Finnish government and authorities, or Germany's occupation of Finland. Finnish authorities could, however, directly participate in the Holocaust through their connections to the SS, particularly the SiPo. The *Sicherheitspolizei* formed the nucleus of the *Einsatz*-units sent to carry out the planned racial and ideological war of extermination against the Jews in the Soviet Union.

The *Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des Sicherheitsdienstes* for the coming campaign against the Soviet Union formed in spring 1941, many of them in the *Grenzpolizeischule Pretzsch* (Border Police School) near Leipzig. They would further break down into smaller *Einsatz*- and *Sonderkommandos*. It seems to have been an afterthought within the SS-leadership, that Germany was also about to open a front against the Soviet Union in the far north, as the formation of an *Einsatz*-unit for the German Army of Norway (*Armeeoberkommando Norwegen*) did not take place before June 1941. Eventually, SS-*Sturmbannführer* Gustav vom Felde was transferred from his intended posting in the *Sonderkommando 1b* of *Einsatzgruppe A*, to head a unit with a cumbersome official name, *Einsatzkommando der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD beim Armeeoberkommando Norwegen, Befehlsstelle Finnland* (Special detachment of the Security Police and the SD with the Army of Norway Headquarters, Command Post Finland).<sup>35</sup>

In the final days of June 1941, as the hostilities elsewhere on the eastern front were already in full swing, vom Felde arrived in Helsinki. He promptly met with Chief of the Finnish Security Police, Arno Anthoni at Hotel Kämp, one of the finest establishments in the capital. There they discussed vom Felde's *Einsatzkommando*. The Finnish security police agreed to provide vom Felde with some of its officials, as well as interpreters fluent in Finnish, German, and Russian.<sup>36</sup>

From the internal correspondence of the security police, it becomes clear that the Finns knew what work the Finnish security police officials were to undertake under vom Felde's command. An early July report to the main office in Helsinki makes it clear that the Finns expected to help confiscate Soviet documentation, carry out interrogations, and participate in executions. The written *Einsatzbefehle* issued by the Chief of the *Sicherheitspolizei*, Reinhard Heydrich in June and July 1941 provided detailed information on those considered the mainstays of the Soviet state and society, including Soviet officials, active communists, and any and all Jews, regardless of occupation, sex, or age.<sup>37</sup>

Late 1941/early 1942 was a period of frequent communication between the Finnish security police, the *Einsatzkommando Finnland*, and *Einsatzgruppe A*. In late September, the chief of *Einsatzgruppe A*, Walter Stahlecker, visited Helsinki for the first time. Anthoni had received and acknowledged a detailed report by one official, who had visited *Einsatzgruppe A* in October. It detailed what he had seen in Estonia, and clearly stated that the Germans were rounding up and executing large groups of Jews, along with suspected communists and saboteurs. The report caused no discernible reaction among the security police leadership. Everything continued as before.<sup>38</sup>

In early November 1941, Anthoni was in Tallinn to meet with Stahlecker and vom Felde. Stahlecker, who by now was elevated to the status of *Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD Ostland* (Commandant of the Security Police and the SD Ostland), reported the activities of his unit. Over the past three and a half months they had killed 135,000 Jews, communists, partisans, and the physically and mentally disabled. Soon, in January 1942, Stahlecker would boast that Estonia was officially "free of Jews."<sup>39</sup>

Throughout late 1941, the fall of Leningrad seemed imminent. Finnish government and administrative bodies began to prepare for this momentous event. They made plans to essentially "loot" the

city—different branches of government prepared to seize machinery, archival material and artwork from the besieged metropolis. Additionally, in cooperation with the *Einsatzgruppe A*, the Finnish army security organ and the Finnish security police prepared to act once the city had been occupied.<sup>40</sup> In a later, unguarded interrogation statement given in preparation for his postwar trial, Anthoni said that the Finnish security police had “together with the Gestapo already beforehand in detail prepared that, once St. Petersburg would have been occupied, quickly round up all known Finnish communists [in the city].” This would have meant a joint Finnish-German security police operation similar to the one planned for Murmansk.<sup>41</sup>

The existing archival sources provide a broad outline of the *Einsatzkommando Finnland*'s activities in Norway, Finland, and the Soviet Union. Beginning its operations on July 1, 1941, the unit was expected to reach the Soviet arctic center of Murmansk within a few days. The *Einsatzkommando* would then round up suspects, gather official archival material, conduct interrogations, capture valuable intelligence targets, and execute targeted groups.<sup>42</sup> As it turned out, operations to take Murmansk had to be halted in October due to the onset of winter. Throughout early 1942 the group anticipated the advance of the German troops. When this did not occur, the *Einsatzkommando* instead focused on finding notable Soviets, communists and Jews amongst their prisoners of war. By mid-1942, the activities of pro-Soviet and Soviet partisans in Norwegian and Finnish Lapland also increasingly occupied the unit.<sup>43</sup>

Alongside Finnish Jews and Jewish refugees, a third group of Jews came under Finnish control after the invasion of the Soviet Union. From 1941 to 1944, Finnish authorities registered a total of 470 Soviet prisoners as Jews. The Jews were but one group out of a much larger mass of POWs. By August 1942, Finnish armed forces had captured 63,000 POWs. Throughout the war the Finnish authorities registered a total of 65,000.<sup>44</sup> This was more than they had initially anticipated, and consequently, POWs lacked sufficient food rations, accommodation, clothing, sanitation, or medication. Famine and disease soon ravaged the prisoner population in the overcrowded camps, resulting in mass starvation, disease, and death. By late 1941, mortality rates among the prisoners topped 30 percent.<sup>45</sup>

In the north, the German army could neither advance nor take prisoners in great numbers. The Finnish army counterintelligence organ from 1941 to 1942 nevertheless transported a total of 520 Soviet POWs from Finnish camps into the hands of the *Einsatzkommando Finnland*. These prisoners were a select group, as they were all suspected of being communist agents, political commissars and low-level political instructors of the Red Army, or troublemakers the Finnish authorities had no wish to keep in their custody.<sup>46</sup>

The majority of those handed over were ethnic Russians, but the group also contained forty-eight registered Jews. Overall, the Finns appeared to select prisoners for transfer to the *Einsatzkommando* based on their perceived connection to communism. Security Police and army counterintelligence officials chose Jews because of their antisemitic belief that Jews were likely communists as well. From the extant documentation it is clear that registered Jewish ethnicity was an aggravating circumstance, but in no case the sole precondition for a prisoner to be sent to the *Einsatzkommando*. There is also no evidence to suggest that large numbers of Jewish POWs were ever handed over.<sup>47</sup>

It is likely that those sent to the *Einsatzkommando Finnland* would have been summarily executed, though we cannot know if the prisoners were re-interrogated once in German hands. There are, however, several cases of prisoners who were reportedly killed on the same day they arrived. The total number of *Einsatzkommando Finnland* victims is arguably around one thousand people. If accurate, about half were Soviet POWs handed over by Finnish authorities, among them a disproportionate number were Jews.<sup>48</sup>

The *Einsatzkommando Finnland* was officially disbanded in November 1942, as the frontline in the North remained static. Those Finnish officials and interpreters still serving with the unit either returned to their regular posts or were absorbed by the army. One of the interpreters moved to Tallinn, Estonia, to continue work under the *Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD Estland* (Commander of the Sicherheitspolizei and the SD Estonia), Martin Sandberger. On that note, the paper trail regarding the existence and activities of the *Einsatzkommando* ends.<sup>49</sup>

From what can be gleaned from extant Finnish and German archival sources, it is evident that there was a verbal agreement within the Finnish security police to refrain from referring to the *Einsatzkommando* by its official name, or referencing activities they knew violated existing international law. Thus, even after the leadership of the Finnish security police was forced to resign from office by late 1944, they knew that it was unlikely that the archive of the security police would reveal anything damaging.<sup>50</sup>

Following the partial lifting of the siege of Leningrad in January 1943 and the end of the battle for Stalingrad in February, the Finnish political and military leadership began by March 1943 to surmise that Germany would lose the war. The army intelligence's confidential assessment was presented to the political leadership and parliament in February. A new government formed in March 1943 thus began to base its policies on an understanding that the country must pull out of the war.<sup>51</sup> This reorientation reflected a change of policy for both the Finnish security police and the army security apparatus. Soviet prisoners were no longer handed over to the German security authorities. The *Einsatzkommando Finnland* had already been disbanded. Its first commander, Gustav vom Felde, died in November 1943 in an Allied air raid on Berlin. Traces of the unit and its crimes were rapidly being erased.<sup>52</sup>

### PARALLEL WARS

By the end of the war, the details of the collaboration between German authorities, the Finnish security police, and the military counterintelligence organ had either been burned or were safely tucked into almost impenetrable masses of seemingly innocuous archival documents. More importantly, Minister of the Interior Toivo Horelli and the military high command under Marshal Gustaf Mannerheim could safely shield themselves behind a wall of plausible deniability. No written orders to cooperate with the *Sicherheitspolizei* were ever issued, either to the military counterintelligence or the security police. In their dealings with the German authorities, they seem to have acted independently, within the broad authorization granted by their superiors.<sup>53</sup> This autonomous activity is reflected in the reports to the Foreign Ministry by Bruno Kivikoski, the head of the Office of the President of the Republic of Finland, and former Finnish ambassador to Poland and Romania. Kivikoski was sent in summer 1941 to Rovaniemi in Finnish Lapland to observe the activities of the Finnish and German authorities on Finnish territory. His reports were sent to the highest leadership of the Finnish state and military.

Kivikoski quickly grasped that some of the local Finnish representatives were all too accommodating towards their German counterparts. On one occasion, he had to prevent the handing over of an apprehended British consular agent to the *Gestapo* in Norway. He also learned of the agreement between the Finnish security police and the *Einsatzkommando Finnland*, including details about Finnish officials "investigating and sentencing prisoners expected to be taken in Murmansk." The activities were clearly outside the bounds of the police's authority according to the law, but Kivikoski passed this information on to Helsinki without further comment. It also elicited no comment from those who read his report.<sup>54</sup>

Such documentation became a potential embarrassment for the Finns as soon as the war was over. Postwar Finland was dominated by the absolute necessity of maintaining relations with the Soviet Union. Many of the country's choices from its recent past quickly turned into political liabilities. Among them were Finland's decision to participate in a war that intended to destroy the Soviet Union, as well as its unofficial but publicly floated schemes to annex Soviet territory and effect radical population policies via deportation and resettlement.<sup>55</sup>

Postwar, the Soviet Union showed only intermittent interest in prosecuting Finland for war crimes. For its part, the Finnish leadership chose to avoid these topics wherever possible, and instead focus on themes that were not useful to either the Soviet or Finnish communists, bent on gaining political influence. Thus, Finland did investigate crimes committed against POWs, as it was obliged to do under the terms of the Finnish-Soviet armistice agreement. Overall, these investigations resulted in some seven hundred convictions; however, the more shadowy details, such as the activities of the security police and the army counterintelligence apparatus within the *Einsatzkommando Finnland*, never surfaced.<sup>56</sup>

The only court case related to the Holocaust was the postwar trial of Arno Anthoni, the aforementioned wartime chief of the security police. He was brought to trial to answer for his conduct during

the deportation of a group of Jewish refugees in November 1942. Eventually, he was cautioned for “carelessness in office,” but was acquitted, as the prosecutor failed to utilize the security police archival material in an effective manner. No other security police or army counterintelligence officials were prosecuted. In the German Federal Republic, the existence of the *Einsatzkommando Finnland* surfaced briefly during a criminal investigation that began in the 1970s; however, the case petered out with no results, in part because, the authorities could neither ascertain the identity of the accused nor trace anyone mentioned in the witness statements.<sup>57</sup>

Postwar Finnish historians were keen to develop a narrative of the recent past that would distance Finland from any implications drawn from their common war with Germany from 1941 to 1944. Perhaps the most influential thesis to appear during the Cold War was the 1961 study “Plan Barbarossa and Finland” by historian Arvi Korhonen. In it he puts forth an interpretation that seemingly exonerates Finland by portraying it as a helpless victim of the major power politics. Exposed to the relentless threat of Soviet aggression, Finland had waged war alongside Germany as an unwilling partner because there had been no other alternatives. Therefore, he implicitly argues, Finland bears no moral responsibility for their actions during the War. Korhonen did not even deign to mention the Holocaust.<sup>58</sup>

Throughout the postwar period, Finland continued to contest any suggestion of a Finnish-German “alliance.” The Finnish political and military leadership never accepted this term, and instead purposefully downplayed any joint war aims, joint political and/or military planning and leadership, and, most importantly, the level to which Finland was dependent on its mighty co-belligerent in vital necessities, such as basic foodstuffs, fuels, and oil. Indeed, the term favored by the Finns from fall 1941 onwards (and acceptable to the Germans) was the conveniently vague concept of *Waffenbrüderschaft* (comradeship-in-arms) or co-belligerents. Such euphemisms were necessary, primarily to manage the country’s delicate wartime relations with Great Britain and the United States, neither of which Finland wished to turn into outright enemies.<sup>59</sup>

Throughout the Cold War, Finnish politicians and historians alike continued to describe Finland’s wartime history in guarded terms. There were some undeniable facts, of course. Finland had not signed an alliance with Germany and had never joined the Axis powers as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact. It had maintained independent command of its own troops throughout the war, was never occupied by Germany, and, despite a significant German military presence and the zoning off of the Finnish Lapland as a German-controlled theater of war, Finland remained an independent country with an independent political and military leadership. Most crucially, Finland had remained a democracy, and never entirely abandoned the principle of the rule of law, upon which the republic was founded—not even when the country became the only democracy to fight for Hitler.<sup>60</sup>

Even early on in the war, the Finnish political and military leadership chose to distance itself from its war with Germany. The country might be fighting the Soviet Union alongside Germany, yes, but it was waging a *separate war* for its own aims. Thus, according to this interpretation, Finnish war aims and methods could not be discussed in the same breath as their German counterparts. Such self-deception further discouraged Finland from reflecting on its reckless treatment of POWs, plans to forcibly resettle whole civilian populations, schemes to break up the Soviet Union and divide the spoils among the victors, and willingness to participation in the Holocaust.

During the Cold War, the separate war thesis became a widely accepted interpretation of Finland’s role in the Second World War. It essentially absolved Finland of responsibility for its actions during the war while simultaneously suppressing any questions. According to this theory, Finland had not wanted war, but had been driven into it; Finland had not sought the destruction of the Soviet Union, but had pursued a set of limited war aims; and Finland had occupied Soviet territory, but had not committed atrocities or sought to annex any land.<sup>61</sup>

Questions regarding the Holocaust pointed to the fact that arguably, no Finnish Jews had become victims of the Holocaust. Instead, they had served in the armed forces throughout the war, just like other Finnish citizens. The best-known instance of direct Finnish involvement with the Holocaust, the November 1942 deportation, was portrayed as exceptional, or merely an administrative misstep.<sup>62</sup>

Given the scholarly consensus among Finnish historians regarding the separate war thesis, it is unsurprising that international scholarship did not challenge this narrative for some time. Even in recent

international depictions of the German Eastern front, as well as the Holocaust, it is common for Finland to be simply omitted, as if nothing worth mentioning happened along the northernmost third of the initial Barbarossa front.<sup>63</sup>

### IN THE PERIPHERY OF A GENOCIDE

During his visit to Finland in July/August 1942, Heinrich Himmler indeed seems to have spent the majority of his time on vacation. There is little evidence to suggest that he pressured the Finnish government into participating in the genocide of the Jews and Roma. Himmler's visits, however, continue to be the subject of copious speculation. Even during his visit, Finnish Jews and Jewish refugees were alerted to his presence. Rumors began circulating then and continue to do so even today.

As an often-retold postwar story recounted, Himmler had indeed come to Finland to force it to hand over its Jewish population for destruction. Supposedly, Finnish military intelligence had surreptitiously managed to photograph the contents of Himmler's briefcase in an unguarded moment. Inside had been a list of Finnish Jews, complete with their home addresses. Alerted to Nazi designs by this intelligence coup, Himmler's proposals were politely declined by the Finnish authorities. So goes the apocryphal story in some of its later iterations, underlining at least one thing—ever since the war Finland's position in the Holocaust has remained ambiguous.<sup>64</sup>

Some statistics help to better define Finland's involvement in the Holocaust. Throughout the postwar era, the November 1942 deportation of eight Jewish refugees from Finland has remained prominent in the memory of ordinary Finns as the only example of Finland's participation in the Holocaust. Research during the last few decades has revealed that Finnish security police handed over a total of twelve Jewish refugees into German custody. In addition, the military counterintelligence organ sent at least forty-eight Soviet Jews to the *Einsatzkommando Finnland* among a total of 520 Soviet POWs. This gives us the figure of sixty people as an absolute minimum. Compared to the general scale of the Holocaust, this figure is still low, but it is far more than the November 1942 incident would suggest.<sup>65</sup>

Research also needs to explore how impersonal entities like states, authorities, and organizations were drawn into cooperating in mass violence and genocide. The Finnish case is a particularly illustrative example of this process, as there is little prewar evidence to suggest that the Finnish officials would have eagerly participated in the Nazi genocide. Decades of international research on the Holocaust, however, has shown that the Nazi state and its authorities could not have achieved their murderous goals so efficiently without the participation of local actors. Such collaborators ranged from individuals and communities to whole governments. Guy B. Adams and Danny L. Balfour describe the convoluted way individuals participate in impersonal processes, through their description of "administrative evil." They argue, "the common characteristic of administrative evil is that ordinary people within their normal professional and administrative roles can engage in acts of evil without being aware that they are doing anything wrong."<sup>66</sup>

In the Finnish case, the key authorities allied themselves with the Germans to combat communism and dismantle the Soviet Union. Antisemitism does not appear to have been the primary impulse prompting the actions of the Finnish authorities, but it was ingrained in their world view and professional culture. As a result, the Finns disproportionately handed over Jews in vulnerable positions—refugees and POWs—to the Germans without concern for their safety or life. These fatal actions occurred within lower-level administrative bodies, where many small decisions coalesced into criminal complexity.<sup>67</sup>

The figures suggest that Finland in fact did not play a *Sonderrolle* role in the Holocaust. With respect to the number of victims, Finland is comparable to Denmark, another "special case" that nevertheless is regularly discussed. In more than one sense, Finland belongs to a genocidal periphery. Geographically, it is situated in a remote corner of the European continent, and remained outside of direct Nazi control. Though the genocidal aims of the Nazis did not waver from one location to another, the implementation of the Holocaust did vary. In the peripheral areas, the genocidal process was typically limited, modified, delayed, restricted or frustrated due to the structures and forces limiting their genocidal aims.<sup>68</sup> With respect to international historiography on both the war and the Holocaust, Finland

remains understudied, and historians only began to scrutinize its own bystander or victim status in the 1990s.<sup>69</sup> There is little to suggest that Finland openly chose to participate in the destruction of the European Jews, but there are many paths to perdition.

Debates on the degree of Finland's willing participation, however, should make way for discussions as to why a Nordic parliamentary democracy proved unable to prevent injustice and murder from being perpetrated in its name by its own trusted agents. As Michael Jonas has pointed out, the rapidity with which the Finnish political and military leadership accepted Hitler's overtures in 1940–1941, points to the “government's general preparedness to compromise the basic institutions of the country's parliamentary system in a situation of self-perceived existential crisis.”<sup>70</sup>

Finland's case is arguably an example of “cumulative radicalization,” as suggested by Hans Mommensen. Yet Finland was able—once its political and military leadership recognized that Germany was losing the war by early 1943—to draw back from the brink. From September 1944 to March 1945, Finland was able to extricate itself from the war without decisive German interference.<sup>71</sup> Finnish Jews indeed were entirely spared from destruction. Even after a few decades of rigorous academic scrutiny, the total count of those who died due to the actions of Finnish authorities remains small if one compares it to the enormity of the Holocaust. But it cannot, and should not, be relativized away, or ignored.

In their 1995 article, William B. Cohen and Jörgen Svensson take a very skeptical view of the Finnish refusal to participate in the Holocaust: “It was not Finnish ‘resoluteness’ that prevented more deaths; it was rather the direction the war took and Finland's geographic position—far from easy German access—that saved Finnish Jews.”<sup>72</sup> As a state, Finland did not eagerly participate in the Holocaust on its own initiative. Throughout the critical period of 1941–1942, the country was led by a broad coalition government, including liberals and social democrats with a history of consistent suspicion towards Hitler's regime. The government did at least the minimum to maintain an unpleasant, but for the moment indispensable military alliance with Germany. As a state, however, Finland was not an altogether unwilling partner either. Arguably it simply was never tested. There was never an official German request to hand over the Jews, nor is there evidence of a less formal proposal by Himmler or any other member of German leadership.

Yet among the Finnish administrative machinery, both civil and military, there was considerable readiness to go along with the *Sicherheitspolizei* and the SS. At the very least this was they were engaged in a common war against a common enemy, world communism. Had the war proceeded more favorably for Germany, it is entirely probable that a more sinister collaboration may have occurred. There is little to suggest a victorious Germany would have allowed Finland to remain a “special case” or exception to the Final Solution forever. Eventually, Nazi Germany would have asked them to hand over their Jews. Arguably, the mechanisms and human propensities that produced the Holocaust elsewhere in Europe were no different in Finland. As we now can see with more clarity—neither were the outcomes.

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## NOTES

1. “Ilmoitus koskee SS-Reichsführer Heinrich Himmlerin vierailua Suomessa,” Helsinki, August 8, 1942, Kansallisarkisto (National Archives of Finland, KA), Valpo II, XXV F3–XXV G1a. The exact date would have been July 30, 1942; Rolf Werning to Veikko Sippola, March 10, 1946, KA, EK-Valpo I, personal dossier 11459 Rolf Werning.
2. Himmler visited Finland twice in 1942, first in March to inspect the Waffen-SS troops based in Finnish Lapland, and later again in July/August 1942. Both visits were unofficial; Antero Holmila, “Finland and the Holocaust: A Reassessment,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 23, no. 3 (2009): 422.

3. Rolf Werning to Veikko Sippola, March 10, 1946, KA, EK-Valpo I, personal dossier 11459, Rolf Werning; Markku Jokisipilä and Janne Könönen, *Kolmannen valtakunnan vieraat* (Helsinki: Otava, 2013), 430–32. Rangell later claimed that Himmler had tried to initiate a discussion regarding the Jews during a car ride, but he rebuffed him with the words “Wir haben keine Judenfrage” (“We don’t have a Jewish Question”). As there are no other corroborative sources, and Rangell’s account dates well into the postwar era, his story cannot be verified. During an earlier visit to Finland, however, Himmler is known to have spoken of Jews in the presence of Finnish officials “in a most cold tone,” and alluded “to some kind of an *Aktion* going on against them in Germany,” as reported at the time by the county governor of Lapland, Kaarlo Hillilä. Felix Kersten, Himmler’s personal masseur, who accompanied him on the July/August 1942 trip to Finland, also claims to have played a role in thwarting a direct attempt to make Finland deport its Jewish citizens. His account is clearly problematic and self-serving as it casts him as a rescuer of Finland’s Jews.
4. Wolfgang Benz, *Dimension des Völkermords: Die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus* (Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 1991), 14.
5. Osttransport in das KL Auschwitz, Berlin, February 19, 1943, Arolsen Archives, ITS Digital Archive, Welle 43, p. 29; Oula Silvennoinen, “Beyond ‘Those Eight’: Deportations of Jews from Finland 1941–1942” in *Finland’s Holocaust: Silences of History*, ed. Simo Muir and Hanna Worthen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 194–95.
6. Of the tendency to only deal with November 1942, see, for example, Yrjö Blomstedt, “Juutalaispakolaisten luovuttaminen 1942,” *Historiallinen Aikakauskirja* 2 (1980): 142–46.
7. Elina Suominen (née Sana), *Kuolemanlaiva S/S Hohenhorn: Juutalaispakolaisten kohtalo Suomessa* (Porvoo, Finland: Söderström, 1979); Elina Sana, *Luovutetut: Suomen ihmislouvatukset Gestapolle* (Helsinki: W. Söderström, 2003). This later 2003 work can be regarded as the opening shot of modern Holocaust studies in Finland. In it, Sana laid out a far more extensive picture of Finnish cooperation with German authorities, documenting the handover of several groups including civilian deportees and prisoners of war to the German authorities from 1941 to 1944.
8. “Kokonainen kansakunta oli kyennyt pitämään tiukasti kiinni oikeusvaltion eettisistä normeista,” Hannu Rautkallio, *Suomen juutalaisten aseveljeys* (Helsinki: Tammi, 1989), 196–97.
9. Hannu Rautkallio, *Finland and the Holocaust: The Rescue of Finland’s Jews* (New York: Holocaust Library, 1987). See as well Hannu Rautkallio, *Holokaustilta pelastetut* (Helsinki: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 2004), 356–401. On the continuous influence of Rautkallio’s thesis see, for instance, Jeremy Black, *The Holocaust: History and Memory* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 140. This work, based on Rautkallio’s *Finland and the Holocaust*, also describes Finland’s participation in the November 1942 deportation against “opposition in both the government and among the public” (p. 140).
10. William B. Cohen and Jörgen Svensson, “Finland and the Holocaust,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 9, no. 1 (1995): 84.
11. Sana, *Luovutetut*; Ida Suolahti, “Yhteinen vihollinen, yhteinen etu: Sotavankien luovutukset ja vaihdot Suomen ja Saksan välillä jatkosodan aikana” (PhD diss., University of Helsinki, 2016), 60, 129–30. Until 1944, Finland and Germany regularly exchanged groups of prisoners both considered interesting for different reasons. Thus, for instance, Finland received from Germany Finnic prisoners from the Soviet Union, in exchange for prisoners from the Caucasus. The total number of prisoners thus handed over by Finland is, according to Ida Suolahti’s most recent calculation, just under three thousand. Finland received almost the same number of prisoners in the exchange.
12. Antti Kujala, *Vankisurmat: Neuvostotavankien laittomat ampumiset jatkosodassa* (Helsinki: W. Soöderström, 2008); Oula Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft: Die sicherheitspolizeiliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen Finnland und Deutschland 1933–1944* (Darmstadt: WGB, 2010); Lars Westerlund, *Sotavankien ja siviili-internoitujen sodanaikainen kuolleisuus: Muonahuolto, tautisuus ja Punaisen Ristin toimettomuus 1939–44* (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2009).
13. Holmila, “Finland and the Holocaust,” 413; Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 264–65.
14. Tauno Saarela, *Suomalainen kommunismi ja vallankumous 1923–1930* (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2008), 304–305; Kimmo Rentola, *Kenen joukoissa seisot? Suomalainen kommunismi ja sota 1937–1945* (Porvoo, Finland: W. Soöderström, 1994), 77–79; Oula Silvennoinen, “‘Home, Religion, Fatherland’: Movements of the Radical Right in Finland,” *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies* 4, no. 2 (2015): 134–54.
15. Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 40–43.
16. Senior detective Arvid Ojasti’s travel account of a trip to Stockholm, April 20–May 25, 1938: “Meille poliittisessa mielessä läheinen suurvalta,” KA, Valpo II, case dossier XXIII C; Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 74–75.
17. Silvennoinen, “Beyond ‘Those Eight,’” 195–96.
18. Henrik Meinander, “Finland and the Great Powers in World War II: Ideologies, Geopolitics, Diplomacy,” in *Finland in World War II: History, Memory, Interpretations*, ed. Tiina Kinnunen and Ville Kivimäki (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 57.

19. Meinander, "Finland and the Great Powers," 57–59; Baryshnikov, "Leningradin turvallisuuden haasteesta," in *Historian Kosto: Suomen talvisota kehyksissään*, ed. Henrik Meinander (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Siltala, 2015), 158–59; Martti Turtola, *Tornionjoelta Rajajoelle: Suomen ja Ruotsin salainen yhteistoiminta Neuvostoliiton hyökkäyksen varalle vuosina 1923–1940* (Helsinki: Werner Soderstrom Osakeyhtio, 1984), 16.
20. Mauno Jokipii, *Jatkosodan synty: Tutkimuksia Saksan ja Suomen sotilaallisesta yhteistyöstä 1940–1941* (Helsinki: Otava, 1987), 56–57; Michael Jonas, "The Politics of an Alliance: Finland in Nazi Foreign Policy and War Strategy," in *Finland in World War II*, 96–97.
21. Jokipii, *Jatkosodan synty*, 143–44.
22. Jonas, "The Politics of an Alliance," 96–98.
23. Antti Laine, *Suur-Suomen kahdet kasvot—Itä-Karjalan siviiliväestön asema suomalaisessa miehityshallinnossa 1941–1944* (Helsinki: Otava, 1982), 99–104.
24. Toivo Nygård, *Suur-Suomi vai läähiheimolaisten auttaminen: Aatteellinen heimotyö itsenäisessä Suomessa* (Helsinki: Otava, 1978), 47–50.
25. Oula Silvennoinen, "Kumpujen yöhön: Eli kuinka historiallinen muisti vääristyi," in *Luvattu maa: Suur-Suomen unelma ja unohdus*, ed. Sari Hannele Näre and Jenni Kirves (Helsinki: Johnny Kniga, 2014), 35–36.
26. Pekka Nevalainen, *Inkeriläinen siirtoväki Suomessa 1940-luvulla* (Helsinki: Otava, 1989), 18; Pekka Nevalainen and Hannes Sihvo, *Inkeri—Historia, Kansa, Kulttuuri* (Helsinki: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura, 1991), 410.
27. KA/SArk, T 9729/15, Eastern Karelia Military Administration Staff (ItäKarSE), PM, December 1, 1941; Nevalainen, *Inkeriläinen siirtoväki Suomessa*, 37–41, 59; Nevalainen and Sihvo, *Inkeri*, 274.
28. Laine, *Suur-Suomen kahdet kasvot*, 121.
29. Christopher R. Browning and Jürgen Matthäus, *The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939–March 1942* (Lincoln and Jerusalem: University of Nebraska Press and Yad Vashem, 2004), 311–14; Klaus-Michael Mallmann, Andrej Angrick, Jürgen Matthäus, Martin Cüppers, eds., *Die "Ereignismeldungen aus der UdSSR" 1941: Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion I* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2011), 29–30.
30. Hans-Jürgen Döscher, *Das Auswärtige Amt im Dritten Reich: Diplomatie im Schatten der "Endlösung"*, (Berlin: Siedler, 1987), 235–36.
31. Döscher, *Das Auswärtige Amt*, 224. For Luther's comments about the Wannsee Conference, see the reproduction of the protocol (pp. 235–36); Ernst Klee, *Das Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich: Wer war was vor und nach 1945* (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch, 2005), 384–85.
32. KA, Valpo II, personal dossier 4374b Anthoni, Arno, Sa, PM Helsinki 16.3; Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 64–65.
33. Silvennoinen, "Beyond 'Those Eight,'" 213.
34. See Gerd von Seefeld to Finnish security police, Tallinn September 4, 1943, KA, Valpo II, case dossier XXIX 41c. While the chief of the security police, Arno Anthoni, appeared personally disposed to treating any and all Jews as security risks and therefore targets for wholesale deportation, the realization of such schemes would have needed broader political backing. Up until the cooling of the Finnish-German security authorities' relations and Anthoni's resignation in early 1944, the Finnish security police would deport only non-Finnish Jews in small, select groups.
35. Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD to all subordinate commanders and units, Berlin March 10, 1942, BArch, R 58/400; BDC, SSO 200, Gustav vom Felde; Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 164–65, 177.
36. KA, Valpo II, personal dossier A 4367, Bruno Aaltonen; Heinrich Müller to Bruno Aaltonen, Berlin June 19, 1941, Turku University Library (TUY), K. N. Rantakari collection 10.1.(3); Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 167–68. See vom Felde's description of his orders in "Ereignismeldung 27," July 19, 1941, printed in Mallmann et al, *Die "Ereignismeldungen aus der UdSSR"*, 144, 146n1–147n2.
37. "Richtlinien für die in die Stalags abzustellenden Kommandos des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD," Berlin June 28, 1941, BArch, R 58/272, RSHA Amt IV; Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 166–69.
38. "Matkakertomus virkamatkasta Tallinnaan 1.-12.10.1941," Helsinki, October 21, 1941, KA, Valpo II, case dossier XXV G 5; Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 192–94.
39. Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, *Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges: Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938–1942* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981), 606–607; Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 196.
40. Arno Anthoni, conversation notes, Helsinki, October 24, 1944, KA, Valpo II, personal dossier 4374b.
41. *Ibid.*; Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 162–63.
42. "Sallan vankileirin sotavankien lukumäärää koskeva tilannekatsaus," September 20, 1941, KA, EK-Valpo I, KD 412/963 1941.
43. Risto Linna to Armas Thomenius, Rovaniemi, June 27, 1942, KA, EK-Valpo I, personal dossier 14011, Veikko Urho Ilmari Piha. See Kriegstagebuch AOK Norwegen Qu 2, Befehlsstelle Finnland, Anlagen, Anlage 310, BA—MA, RH 20–20/205. This extant document is a rare glimpse into the EK Finland at work in November 1941, filtering politically and racially undesired persons from among a group of eighty Ukrainian German POWs handed over by Finnish authorities from Finnish POW camps.

44. Oula Silvennoinen, "Limits of Intentionality: Soviet Prisoners-of-War and Civilian Internees in Finnish Custody" in *Finland in World War II*, 368; Ida Suolahti, "Yhteinen vihollinen, yhteinen etu: Sotavankien luovutukset ja vaihdot Suomen ja Saksan välillä jatkosodan aikana" (PhD diss., University of Helsinki, 2016), 289.
45. Lars Westerlund, ed., *POW Deaths and People Handed over to Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939–55: A Research Report by the Finnish National Archives* (Helsinki: Kansallisarkisto, 2008), 48.
46. Päämajan valvontaosaston sotavankiluovutukset kotialueen sotavankileireiltä, October 29, 1941–September 22, 1942, KA, T19659/B18; Suolahti, "Yhteinen vihollinen," 231.
47. Suolahti, "Yhteinen vihollinen," 303. Ida Suolahti correctly stresses that the exact motivation for the handing over of any single Jewish prisoner is impossible to generalize. Each decision was ultimately subjective and case dependent.
48. Päämajan valvontaosaston sotavankiluovutukset kotialueen sotavankileireiltä, October 29, 1941–September 22, 1942, KA, T19659/B18; Suolahti, "Yhteinen vihollinen," 230–31; Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 177–82.
49. Norman Rieks to Finnish Foreign Ministry, Helsinki, July 18, 1943, KA, EK-Valpo I, KD 201/178 1943; Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 225–27.
50. Salla, September 21, 1941, KA, EK-Valpo I, KD 412/963, 1941. Ironically, a note in the margin of this report alludes to a policy of not writing down any sensitive information. Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 179, 288.
51. Markku Jokisipilä, "Hitlerin avulla idän barbaareja vastaan": Tulkintoja suomalais-saksalaisesta aseveljeydestä (Turku: Turun yliopisto, 1998), 81–82; Jukka Tarkka, *Ei Stalin eikä Hitler: Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikka toisen maailmansodan aikana* (Helsinki: Otava, 1987), 68–69; Michael Jonas, *Kolmannen valtakunnan läohettiläis: Wipert von Blücher ja Suomi* (Helsinki: Ajatus kirjat, 2010), 280–83, 289–90. The German envoy in Helsinki, Wipert von Blücher, began to note a shift in the attitudes of leading politicians from late autumn 1942 onwards.
52. BArch, BDC, SSO 200, Gustav vom Felde; Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 227; Mallmann et al., *Die "Ereignismeldungen aus der UdSSR,"* 146n1; Suolahti, *Yhteinen vihollinen*, 129–30.
53. Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 270–72.
54. Ministeri Kivikosken ja maaherra Hillilän tiedotukset Rovaniemeltä vv. 1941–42, PM Rovaniemi, July 10, 1941, Finnish Foreign Ministry (UM), Fb 110 A 6; and Bruno Kivikoski to Foreign Ministry, Rovaniemi September 2, 1941, UM, Fb 110 A 6 8.
55. Silvennoinen, "Still Under Examination—Coming to Terms with Finland's Alliance with Nazi Germany," *Yad Vashem Studies* 37, no. 2 (2009): 76.
56. Kujala, *Vankisurmat*, 11–12.
57. Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 260–64.
58. Arvi Heikki Korhonen, *Barbarossa-suunnitelma ja Suomi: Jatkosodan synty* (Porvoo, Finland: W. Soöderstroöm Osakeyhtiö, 1961).
59. See Jokipii, *Jatkosodan synty*, 625–28, for an illustrative discussion on the uses of political terminology. Great Britain finally declared war on Finland in December 1941, but the US maintained diplomatic relations until the summer of 1944.
60. Jokipii, *Jatkosodan synty*, 345–50.
61. For an apt summary of this interpretation, see State Secretary Pertti Torstila's speech before the Swedish War Academy, Stockholm, November 13, 2006, Ulkoministeriö Utrikesministeriet, [https://um.fi/tal/-/asset\\_publisher/up7ecZeXFRAS/content/tal-av-statssekreterare-pertti-torstila-vid-kungliga-krigsvetenskapsakademien](https://um.fi/tal/-/asset_publisher/up7ecZeXFRAS/content/tal-av-statssekreterare-pertti-torstila-vid-kungliga-krigsvetenskapsakademien) (accessed May 3, 2023).
62. Rautkallio, *Finland and the Holocaust*, 195–96; Cohen and Svensson, "Finland and the Holocaust," 70–71; Holmila, "Finland and the Holocaust," 413–14; Silvennoinen, *Beyond "Those Eight,"* 208–209.
63. See, for instance, such relatively recent works as David Cesarani, *Final Solution: The Fate of the Jews 1933–1949* (London: Macmillan, 2016); and Stephen G. Fritz, *Ostkrieg: Hitler's War of Extermination in the East* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011) are examples of the propensity of both Holocaust and military historiography to ignore the war in northern Norway and Finland.
64. One of the earliest versions of the story emerged in 1954 in a magazine article (*Uusi Kuva-lehti*, November 12, 1954) written by the wartime head of Finnish censorship, Kustaa Vilkkuna. As Vilkkuna offered no evidence beyond hearsay, and none has ever surfaced, there is little reason to take the story seriously.
65. Silvennoinen, *Beyond "Those Eight,"* 194; Suolahti, *Yhteinen vihollinen*, 230–35. The figures presented here are to be considered absolute minimums, as they exclude individuals not officially registered by contemporary Finnish authorities as Jews. It is likely that particularly among the Soviet POWs many prisoners would have successfully sought to hide their Jewish background.
66. Danny L. Balfour, Guy B. Adams, Ashley E. Nickels, *Unmasking Administrative Evil* (New York and London: Routledge, 2020), 15.
67. Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 267–70; Dan Michman, "Bureaucratic Gehorsamkeit, Peer Pressure, Bottom-up Initiatives: Ordinary People and the Successful Implementation of Nazi Anti-Jewish Policies," kick-off lecture, conference in honor of Chris Browning, Villa ten Hompel, Münster, October 29–31, 2019, 7.

68. Sofie Lene Bak, "From Rescue to Escape in 1943: On a Path to De-victimizing the Danish Jews" in *The Holocaust as Active Memory: The Past in the Present*, ed. Marie Louise Seeberg, Irene Levin, and Claudia Lenz (London: Routledge, 2013), 139–40.
69. Michael Marrus, *The Holocaust in History* (New York: New American Library, 1987), 66, 75; Michman, "Bureaucratic Gehorsamkeit," 7; Oula Silvennoinen, "On the Brink: Finland and the Holocaust Era," in *Civil Society and the Holocaust: International Perspectives on Resistance and Rescue*, ed. Cecilie Felicia Stokholm Banke and Anders Jerichow (New York: Humanity in Action Press, 2013), 148–49.
70. Blomstedt, "Juutalaispakolaisten luovuttaminen," 142–46; Silvennoinen, "Beyond 'Those Eight,'" 210–211; Jonas, "The Politics of an Alliance," 102.
71. Hans Mommsen, "Changing Historical Perspectives on the Nazi Dictatorship," *European Review* 17, no. 1 (2009): 75–76.
72. Cohen and Svensson, "Finland and the Holocaust," 84.