

Finland and Operation Cyprus

The Finnish UN battalion in Cyprus in 1964 and 1974.

Christian Vuorenvirta
Maisterintutkielma
Historian maisteriohjelma
Humanistinen tiedekunta
Helsingin yliopisto
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Tekijä: Christian Vuorenvirta

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Tiivistelmä: After World War II the Greek-Cypriot community living in Cyprus started demanding independence from the United Kingdom. And so during the heights of the cold war an organization called EOKA was formed the purpose of which was to achieve this independence and enable a union with Greece. And so followed the Cyprus war of independence (26.11.1955 – 19.3.1959). During this conflict the Turkish-Cypriot community that formed a 18% minority on the island had sided with the British since they did not want a union with Greece. The war ended with all interested parties i.e. the UK, Greece, Turkey and both communities living on the island (and with the backing of the USA and the Soviet Union) agreeing to an independent Republic of Cyprus being formed that was to be run jointly by the two communities. This did not sit well with many members of the Greek-Cypriot community. The government created was also not able to function properly. Civil unrest ensued and after a prolonged period of strife between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus the United Nations (UN) had to intervene to prevent a possible escalation of the situation.

In 1964 a force called UNFICYP (the United Nations Peacekeeping Force In Cyprus) was then formed and sent to the island to maintain the peace between the two communities whilst in the meantime UN-led peace negotiations moderated by Sakari Tuomioja from Finland tried to find a permanent solution to the Cyprus problem. Part of the UNFICYP force sent to the island was a battalion of Finnish soldiers. Opinions in Finland, when looking through press releases at the time, were divided. Some were proud that Finland was breaking free from political shackles and taking a larger role in international matters and for some it was a bad idea to antagonize the Soviet Union and send young Finnish servicemen to possibly die in a foreign country. This division also had a political nature with the right-wing supporting and the left-wing opposing. In Cyprus opinions expressed through the press also followed political ideologies. The left-wing was neutral and hoped that the UNFICYP forces would bring stability whilst the right-wing were negative and wanted all foreign forces to leave the island to decide for itself. In the meantime, the Finnish forces themselves were getting on with their tasks which they had started to find increasingly hard and frustrating as civil unrest continued. After the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 opinions changed. All newspapers and political parties of the Greek-Cypriot community openly welcomed and supported the UNFICYP forces and were even open to letting these forces have a larger role on the island. In this paper we go through the events in Cyprus during the cold war period. We look at how the UN was involved and how the UNFICYP forces were formed. We see how Sakari Tuomioja from Finland was part of the initial peace-talks process. We examine what servicemen from the Finnish UNFICYP battalion thought about their mission in Cyprus and we analyze what the press thought of the UNFICYP's involvement in 1964 and 1974.

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1. Introduction

From 1964-77 a Finnish battalion served in Cyprus as part of a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force sent to the island during the cold war period. Over the course of 14 years a total of over 8 000 Finnish soldiers served in this battalion¹. In my research paper, I will be examining Cyprus's situation during the cold war, the formation of the UN's peacekeeping force in Cyprus, Finland's role in the Cyprus situation, the Finnish UN battalion and the attitudes of the general press in 1964 and 1974 towards the involvement of the Finnish peacekeeping forces in Cyprus. I have chosen the two above-mentioned periods, not only due to the importance of these two periods in the island's recent history, but also because I believe that general opinions and attitudes in 1964 were different to the opinions in 1974, due to the change in the island's situation.

Being half-Finnish and half-Greek Cypriot and having served in the Cypriot National Guard for 27 months, I have always been interested in this topic that connects both the countries I am from. Over the years, I have read a lot about the Finnish "peacekeeping years", and I have talked to both Finnish men that had served on the island in the peacekeeping forces and Cypriot people that lived during those years about the topic. Therefore, I decided to finally explore this chapter in Finnish and Cypriot history.

1.1 Research questions, research method and terms

There has been a lot of research on the reasons that led to UN-troops being sent to Cyprus² and a lot of this research has focused on how cold war political power struggles between major powers (e.g. Britain, USA and Russia), international organizations (e.g. NATO and the UN) and countries directly involved in the conflict (e.g. Greece and Turkey) shaped the events that took place in Cyprus³. There has also been research conducted on how history

¹ Immonen, 2016, p.1.

² Stegenga 1968 and Boyd 1966.

³ Kaloudis 1991, p.21-25.

is used as a political tool by opposing sides in a conflict in order to justify their claims⁴. In addition to this, many books have been written about how the Finnish servicemen involved felt and thought about their mission.

In my research paper, however, I want to explore the events of the cold war period that led to the Finnish battalion being deployed to Cyprus and what the general press, and the servicemen, thought of the involvement of UNFICYP in general and Finland in particular in Cyprus's internal affairs. I will do this by examining related literature and research and also newspaper articles of the two periods in question. I will attempt to avoid straightforward repetition of newspaper headlines and rather try to mirror feelings and thoughts through the reporting of actual incidents that I believe better bring to the surface the general attitudes and opinions towards UNFICYP and the Finnish battalion during those times.

Press opinions in Finland were conflicting in their views and varied according to the newspapers' political affiliation and over time. The opinions of the Greek-Cypriot general press also varied according to political affiliation and changed over the time-period examined. With regards to the servicemen, many of them probably did not fully understand what they were getting themselves involved in.

In this paper, I will thus attempt to answer four main questions: Why did the Finnish battalion end up being deployed to Cyprus? What were the opinions on the matter of the press when the Finnish servicemen arrived in 1964? What did the servicemen think of the situation and why did a large number of servicemen hand in letters of resignation after only a few months of service on the island? How did these opinions change in 1974 when Turkey invaded the island?

My research will focus on the periods between March – June 1964 and June – August 1974. The first period includes the acceptance by the Finnish government to send a battalion of soldiers to Cyprus, the deployment of this Finnish UN peacekeeping force and the first 2 months of this battalion's service-time in Cyprus. The second period covers the immediate period before the invasion, the months during which the invasion occurred and the immediate period following the invasion.

⁴ Kangasniemi 2016.

For reasons of brevity some of the terms appearing multiple times in this paper will have to be written in short-form: United Nations (UN), United Nations Peacekeeping Force In Cyprus (UNFICYP), Greek-Cypriot (=GC) and Turkish-Cypriot (=TC).

1.2 Source materials and research literature

During the periods under observation, newspapers were more important as a source of news than they are presently. Not all people owned TV's and the scope of news on the TV and radio was limited. Newspapers were the general source of news-provision and people read them actively. Politics also played a much bigger role in what was reported and in what way. All major political parties had their own newspapers through which they portrayed their viewpoint on events that had occurred. Readers would generally choose a newspaper according to their political affiliation and their opinions would, to a certain extent, be affected by what they read.

In order to get a more rounded view on how UNFICYP was seen by the press (and subsequently by the general public) I researched digitalized newspaper archives in both Finland and Cyprus. For this study I decided to choose newspapers affiliated with the three general political movements of the time and namely liberal, right wing and left wing. Public opinion writings in newspapers were a rare thing during the periods examined, so I chose to concentrate on editorial pieces and lead columns, since these pieces represented the general position each newspaper (and political party) took on a specific subject. Due to the extensive coverage of UNFICYP in Cyprus, I had to restrict my choice of articles to those that most strongly brought out the viewpoint of the newspaper (and party) in question.

Therefore, for the purpose of this research paper, I chose eight of the main Cypriot newspapers that were in publication between 1964 and 1974 and which were of differing political affiliation in order to get a more rounded view. These eight newspapers are liberal/neutral Fileleftheros (FIL – “Liberal”) and Teleftaia Ora (TOR – “The last hour”); right-wing Eleftheria (FYO – “Freedom”), Mahi (MAX – “The Battle”), Kypros (KYP – “Cyprus”), Alithia (ALI – “The truth”) and O Agon (AGO – “The struggle”) and left-wing

Haravgi (HAR "The Dawn"). All published articles examined are from the periods March – June 1964 and August 1974.

In the case of the Finnish press I chose three newspapers that were in publication in 1964 and which were of differing political affiliation. These three newspapers are Helsingin Sanomat (liberal-neutral), Uusi Suomi (right-wing) and Kansan Uutiset (left-wing). All published articles examined are from the period 1.3.-30.6.1964. I must note here that I found Karita Immonen's Master's thesis "Lojumaan tai kuolemaan Välimeren auringonpaisteeseen" very useful whilst gathering relevant newspaper articles on the matters researched in this paper.

With regards to the deployment of the Finnish battalion to Cyprus, I examined documents archived by the Finnish ministry of foreign affairs and the UN. I also examined literature, research literature and unpublished research literature regarding the topics, people and incidents I describe and research in this paper.

With regards to the thoughts and feelings of the servicemen themselves I concentrated on letters and memoirs written by men who had served in Cyprus. In particular, I used letters published in the books "Suezilta Afganistaniin" by Rauli Virtanen (a correspondent reporting on UNFICYP activities in Cyprus in 1974) and "YK-miehet kertovat", a book written by ex-UN serviceman Esko Heikkinen. I also used material written by Roope Alftan in his memoir book "Sopeutumaton sotilas".

Since many people in Finland are not so familiar with the historical background of Cyprus and are also not fully aware of the events that led to the deployment of these servicemen, I will now present an extensive background passage describing the situation that led to the deployment of the Finnish UN troops to Cyprus. This is done not only in order to help readers form a proper understanding of events, but also as background research on future papers I will be writing on this topic.

1.3 General historical background

The Turkish ruled Cyprus from 1573-1878 during which time a large Turkish-Cypriot community was formed on the island. In 1878 Britain and the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire signed the Convention of Constantinople (a.k.a. the Cyprus Convention) under which agreement the possession and administration of Cyprus was given to Great Britain. In 1914, after the Ottoman Empire joined World War I on the side of the Central Powers, the island was annexed by the United Kingdom. The Greek Cypriots believed it was their natural and historic right to unite the island with Greece, as many of the Greek islands had done following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This demand was to resurface at constant intervals from the 1920's onwards⁵.

After WWII the small island of Cyprus was to be the scene of intense political rivalry between many different nations which extended well beyond the actual problems facing the island⁶. The chess pieces on the Cyprus chess board included (in addition to the GC- and TC-communities) Turkey, Greece, the UK, the USA, Russia and organizations such as NATO and the UN. Depending on how far back you decide to go, Turkey and Greece have been neighbors and rivals at least since Greece's liberation from the Ottoman rule in 1821.

Both sides (in addition to their own vested interests) wanted to protect their "own" communities on the island and the intense political rivalry between these two countries made it extremely difficult to find a solution to the island's problems. After Cypriot liberation (to be discussed further later on) the UK wanted to maintain its strategic military bases on the island. On the one hand stability was to the benefit of the British, but on the other hand they did not look favorably on either Greece, or Turkey taking complete control over the island and so were in favor of Cyprus becoming an independent country with a constitution that protected both communities on the island. The USA on its behalf was interested in supporting its ally (UK), keeping Russian influence out of Cyprus and having access to the British military bases on the island. Russia was also a player in this game. The Russians were not only playing their part in the cold-war in the sense that all countries were

⁵ Kangasniemi 2016, p.20.

⁶ Kaloudis 1991

part of the “join us not them”-setting but had both religious ties (Orthodox just like the GC-community) and political ties (the large GC left-wing party on the island) with the GC-side. Their rivalry with Turkey and their distrust of NATO also made it difficult to find a solution to the Cyprus problem.

In 1955, a Cypriot General in the Greek army called Georgios Grivas Dighenis formed the paramilitary nationalist group called EOKA, the ultimate goal of which was the liberation of Cyprus from the British and a union (*Enosis*) with Greece. Although initially EOKA had not sought to start hostilities against the Turkish-Cypriot community, the British “divide and conquer” tactic of conscripting Turkish-Cypriots into the forces that patrolled Cyprus to fight EOKA, led to the start of hostilities between the two communities and the Turkish-Cypriots’ demands for a partition (*Taksim*) from the Greek Cypriots.

In 1959, representatives of all countries involved in the situation (Great Britain, Greece, Turkey and the GC- and TC-communities)⁷ met in London to resolve the situation. Rather than risk a UK – Greece - Turkey sovereignty rule and possible partition⁸ Archbishop Makarios (the Greek community leader at the time) accepted independence in 1960. One of the conditions to independence was a constitution forced upon the Cypriots by the “big” powers⁹. This constitution stated that all positions of power (political, defense, police etc.) were to be allocated according to a 7:3 split (GC: TC) despite the fact that the Turkish minority constituted only 18% of the population. In addition, the constitution stated that the president would always be a GC, the vice-president would always be a TC and both would have veto rights to any decision made by the other person. This constitution brought the island to a political deadlock¹⁰ and was not accepted by either side. This in turn led to civil unrest.

⁷ Stegenga 1968, p.23.

⁸ Ibid, p.21

⁹ Ibid, p.24.

¹⁰ Sambanis 1999, p.86.

In 1963, Archbishop Makarios (who had become the first president of independent Cyprus)¹¹ attempted to change the constitution in an attempt to break the deadlock¹². The TC-community saw this move as a GC step towards enosis. Hostilities broke out.

The right of the Makarios' government to resolve the problems was recognized by the UN mandate.¹³ This further entrenched the TC-community and worsened the situation. NATO couldn't be used to resolve the matter due to Russia and its opposition to the organization¹⁴. The British also refused to fully intervene. Meanwhile Turkey threatened to invade the island in order to protect the TC-community (as it possibly was entitled to according to what was agreed upon at the UN)¹⁵ and Greece threatened to retaliate if this occurred. As the situation appeared to be escalating towards a larger conflict in the area, a quick solution had to be found.

The only viable option left was the UN. The UN general secretary U Thant (not supported, but also not vetoed by Russia)¹⁶ quickly tried to organize a peacekeeping task-force (UNFICYP) to be sent to the island on an initial mandate of three months¹⁷.

2. The Cold War, the UN and UNFICYP

This study-paper will not focus on the success (or not) of the UN mission¹⁸, or on the effect the UNFICYP mission could have on future UN missions¹⁹. Rather, this paper will analyze the events leading up to the Finnish troops being sent to Cyprus²⁰ and also research how the UNFICYP mission was viewed by the general press (and servicemen themselves) in Finland and Cyprus during the two different time periods under examination. We begin by

¹¹ Mayes 1989, p.144.

¹² Ibid, p.164.

¹³ Sambanis 1999, p.91.

¹⁴ Kaloudis 1991, p.25 and Welin 2004, p.12.

¹⁵ Coufoudakis 1976, p.462.

¹⁶ United Nations Security Council, S/PV.1102, 4.3.1964

¹⁷ Welin 2004, p.12.

¹⁸ Boyd 1966, p.11-13 and Sambanis 1999, p.80.

¹⁹ Stegenga 1970, p.12.

²⁰ Vuorensola 2007, p.46-59.

examining Cyprus's situation during the cold war. Then we will focus on the UN and how the UNFICYP task-force came to be created before moving on to study what Finland's role was in the events researched.

2.1 Cyprus in the cold war

In an ongoing situation that started a long time ago, it is many times hard to pinpoint a starting and ending point to an issue that is to be researched. Let's, however, start with the definition of the period that is to be examined in this paper. The Cold War was a period of geopolitical tension between the USA and the Soviet Union (and their respective allies) which began following World War II. The period is generally considered to have started in 1947 (with the Truman Doctrine) and ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The term cold war is used because there was no large-scale fighting between the two superpowers, but during the course of the cold war they each supported major regional conflicts.

However, the tensions between the opposing sides in the cold war started long before the actual cold war itself. This also applies to Cyprus - the subject of this research paper. Cyprus' involvement in the forthcoming cold war chess game started as far back as 1878²¹. The British wanting to preserve British interests and hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean and seeing that the Ottoman Empire was no match for the Russians anymore leased Cyprus from the Ottomans (under the guise of "protecting Asiatic Turkey against Russian attack") in an agreement accepted by Congress of Berlin in 1878.

And who were the players in this ongoing Cypriot chess game? In the foreground the pawns: the Greek-Cypriot (GC) community of Cyprus, the Turkish-Cypriot (TC) community of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. And in the background the players -> the USA, the UK and the USSR.

How do communities become pawns? How do the players get to move these pieces? Apart from the obvious military and financial power that moves all pieces in this world – there

²¹ Mallinson, 2005

also has to be an echo from the pieces they are moving. Narratives and constructions of the past are used by all sides to prove the legitimacy of their own claims²². Each side's narrative establishes a historic continuity and in these narratives the events seem to tell themselves. In the divided capital of Cyprus Nicosia (Lefkosia for the GC and Lefkoşa for the TC), there are two museums. Both are called Museum of National Struggle and both tell the story of each community from their own perspective. The GC-story talks of how the island has always been Greek and the TC-story talks of how history on the island began with the Ottoman conquest of the island.

But how do stories of a nation (or should we call it "Nationalism") achieve credibility? Papadakis (2006) suggests that it is an interactive process of a narrative being imposed from "above" and supported from "below". What recent events have shown to the author of this paper personally, is that if there is a flicker of an idea "below" that is constantly imposed from "above" and depicted on all media channels then - together with the force of societal pressure (whether it be forced by law, or an unwritten law of the community) – the idea of a nation does not take long to set roots in the community.

But these are not simple issues. Consideration also has to be placed on political views and at what point during history did these views arise. The contest in Cyprus has had a lot to do with the conflicting ideas of the left-and right-wing parties. Right-wing parties striving for unification with the motherland (be it Greece, or Turkey) and left-wing parties leaning towards Cyprus-centered solutions. This all also took place during an era when the world was very strictly divided between the left-right conflict of the cold war and areas of national interest for either side. Possibly the fact that Cyprus did not form such an important area of interest to the USSR meant that right-wing ideologies gained more support and led to a situation which in hindsight only had one end result. A result which stands till this day.

But how did the game of Cyprus play out during the cold war? What were the roles and ambitions of the various parties involved? Once again a situation the starting point of which is hard to pinpoint. Who did Cyprus "belong" to? Greek language, religion and customs are believed to have been brought to the island as far back as 1200bc. The GC had compromised

²² Papadakis, 2006

77% of the population on average throughout the years. On the other hand Cyprus was under the Ottoman rule from 1571 to 1878 during which a large TC community (17% on average) grew and lived alongside the GC community. So both communities could claim to have valid reasons to be entitled to self-determination as to the future of themselves and the island, or at least part of it.

It is worth pointing out that during Turkish occupation the Ottomans applied the millet system to Cyprus, which allowed religious authorities to govern their own non-Muslim communities. This system reinforced the position of the Orthodox Church and the cohesion of the ethnic Greek population. The Church of Cyprus was liberated because the Turks were afraid of the presence of the Catholic Church as it might instigate an attack of Western Europe against them. Gradually the Archbishop of Cyprus became not only a religious, but an ethnic leader as well, something the Turks promoted wanting to have somebody responsible for the loyalty of the Greek flock. In this way the Church undertook the task of the guardian of the Greek cultural legacy. This is why in the formative years of the current republic the church played a role in the events that occurred.

As early as 1828 and after Greece's war of independence against Turkey, Greece's first president Count Kapodistria called for the union of Cyprus with Greece²³. In 1878, Cyprus became a British "protectorate" (after having been under the Ottoman rule since 1571) and upon arrival on the island of General Wolsely (appointed high-commissioner of Cyprus) the Archbishop of Kition welcomed him with a request that Britain hand Cyprus over to Greece. Britain offered to cede Cyprus to Greece if Greece joined WWI on Britain's side (Turkey having joined the war on the opposing side). Greece joined in 1917, but the British did not give up the island after the war at the treaty of Versailles. However the (pre 1974 invasion) GC population never gave up on their almost hope for "enosis".

Needless to say, the TC also had its own important word "Taksim", or the partition of the island of Cyprus into Turkish and Greek portions. Turkish nationalism in Cyprus grew in response to the growth of Greek nationalism and the desire for enosis. Initially, the TC favored the continuation of British rule. However, the GC calls for enosis alarmed the TC,

²³ Mallinson, 2005

as they saw that the union of Crete with Greece had led to the exodus of Cretan Turks. The TC also viewed themselves as a distinct ethnic group of the island and believed in their having a separate right to self-determination. The TC only made up 17% of the islanders and so joining Turkey was unfeasible. This meant the TC favored partition. The slogan "Partition or Death" was used in TC protests in the late 1950's and throughout the 1960's.

One of the most controversial wartime documents is the so-called percentage agreement between Stalin and Churchill in Moscow made on the 9th of October 1944²⁴. According to Winston Churchill he had told Stalin "Let us settle about our affair in the Balkans. Your armies are in Romania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions and agents there. Don't let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety per cent predominance in Romania, for us to have ninety per cent of the say in Greece and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?". Churchill had then wrote out on a half-sheet of paper he handed out to Stalin: - Romania: Russia 90%, the others 10% - Greece: UK 90% (in accord with USA) Russia 10% - Yugoslavia 50-50% - Hungary 50-50% - Bulgaria: Russia 75% the others 25%. And so the chess-board was set out and the game was about to start.

After WWII and the Greeks fighting on the side of the allies - hopes of Enosis rised again – however paradoxically the threat of communism was to be used as both a British reasoning against, or for Enosis²⁵. On the one hand, it was thought that ceding Cyprus to Greece would help make Greece a strong ally. On the other hand the Greek civil war immediately after the end of WWII fought between the extreme right and extreme left and the rise of the left in Cyprus led others to reason that Cyprus is the only important strategic base left in the area and should be held onto. As Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden stated in July 1954 "No Cyprus, no certain facilities to protect our supply of oil. No oil, unemployment and hunger in Britain. It is as simple as this".

America on the other hand was caught in-between its post-war commitment to the self-determination of peoples whilst safeguarding its own interests during the cold war period. Turkey's role as an ally against the Soviets was growing and a 17% TC minority is still a

²⁴ Hanhimäki, 2003

²⁵ Mallinson, 2005

large percentage of the population. So despite public opinion swaying towards enosis – the role of Turkey as an ally and the large TC minority also had to be considered. The USA also, of course, had a special bond with Britain. And Cyprus was becoming increasingly important to the British. After the Suez events in 1956, the British became even more determined to keep on to one of their last remaining strategically important assets in an increasingly important sector.

On 18 September 1950, Makarios, only 37 years old, was elected Archbishop of Cyprus. In this role he was not only the official head of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus but became the Ethnarch and de facto national leader of the GC. This highly influential position put Makarios at the center of Cypriot politics.

During the 1950s, Makarios embraced his dual role as Archbishop and Ethnarch with enthusiasm and became a very popular figure among GC. He soon became a leading advocate for enosis (the unification of Cyprus with Greece), and during the early part of the decade he maintained close links with the Greek government. In August 1954, partly at Makarios' instigation, Greece began to raise the question of Cyprus at the United Nations, arguing for the principle of self-determination to be applied to Cyprus. This was viewed by advocates of enosis as likely to result in the voluntary union of Cyprus with Greece following a public referendum.

However, the British government was reluctant to decolonize the island which had become their new headquarters for the Middle East. In 1955, a GC pro-enosis organization was formed under the banner of Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), or EOKA. On the 1st of April 1955 the Cypriot war of independence started. It was fought between the EOKA organization led by extreme-right nationalist Georgios Grivas (a GC that was a high-ranking officer in the Greek army) and the British who, some might say using a divide-and-conquer tactic, fought back hard with the help of TC-recruits.

Britain turned to secretly supporting the TC position in an effort to bring a halt to any enosis plans²⁶. As a means to turn the situation into one where enosis would not be possible the British managed to engineer a conference between Turkey, Greece and Britain in 1955 to talk about the Cyprus situation. This ensured the matter started shifting away from a possible UN issue and towards one that (by undermining Greco-Turkish relations) would most likely end up with Britain keeping at least a presence on the island as they still do to this day. However, the GC did not do itself any favors by not taking around 18% of the population (at that time) into consideration during its strive for Enosis.

Turkish nationalist sentiment, angered by the mistreatment (by parts of the GC) of the TC on the island, became inflamed at the idea that Cyprus might be ceded to Greece. This led to the Greek community of Istanbul becoming the target in the Istanbul Pogrom of 1955 (6-7.9.55). In response, Greece withdrew from all co-operations with Turkey, which caused the Balkan Pact to collapse. For a while conflict between Greece and Turkey was imminent.

In June 1958, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan proposed a seven-year partnership scheme of separate communal legislative bodies and separate municipalities, which became known as the Macmillan Plan. Greece and the GC rejected it, calling it tantamount to partition. The Greek side also pointed out that the US was also pushing towards an unacceptable (to the Greeks) partition solution and had consistently sought to discourage the raising of the Cyprus question at the UN²⁷.

In 1960, a compromise solution to the Cyprus issue was agreed on: Britain granted independence to Cyprus, and a constitution was forged. Greek and Turkish troops were stationed on the island to protect their respective communities. Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis was the main architect of this plan, which led to an immediate improvement in relations with Turkey, particularly once Adnan Menderes was removed from power in Turkey.

²⁶ Mallinson, 2005

²⁷ Stefanidis, 2007

This new situation did not however satisfy the GC as not only did enosis not happen, the new constitution had been built to give equal powers to the TC – which the GC saw as unfair seeing that 77% of the island's population at that time was GC. So on 30 November 1963, Makarios declared his proposal for a constitutional amendment that included 13 articles. These would have given more power to the GC community. This led to intercommunal violence in Cyprus that started in December 1963.

Turkey, however, restated that she was against these amendments and threatened war if Cyprus continued its actions against the TC community, or tried to achieve unity with Greece. In August 1964, Turkish aircraft bombed Greek troops that surrounded a Turkish village (Erenkoy) and war seemed imminent. Once again, the Greek minority in Turkey suffered from the crisis, causing many Greeks to flee the country, and there were even threats to expel the Ecumenical Patriarch. Eventually, intervention by the United Nations led to another compromise solution. In Cyprus matters flared up and gave rise to even more conflict between the GC- and the TC-communities.

During the period of intercommunal strife in 1963 and 1964 (that could even be called a period of civil war), many were massacred on both sides. In all honesty – the GC was the far larger community and so the TC did endure more hardship than the GC community. This was the period during which the UN taskforce UNFICYP was sent to Cyprus.

2.2 The United Nations

The United Nations (UN) is an intergovernmental organization whose purpose is to maintain international peace and security. The UN's Department of Peace Operations in turn, is responsible for UN peacekeeping operations that are defined as an "instrument developed by the organization as a way to help countries torn by conflict to create the conditions for lasting peace". These operations are seen as a tool for maintaining international peace and security. There are three basic principles that are considered integral to all UN peacekeeping operations²⁸. These three principles are:

²⁸ www.un.org

1) Consent of the parties

UN peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict. This requires a commitment by the parties to a political process. Their acceptance of a peacekeeping operation provides the UN with the necessary freedom of action, both political and physical, to carry out its mandated tasks.

2) Impartiality

Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but should not be confused with neutrality, or inactivity. United Nations peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate.

3) Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate:

UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool. However, they may use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defense and defense of the mandate.

As a conflict develops and starts to get worse the UN is quite often involved in a number of consultations to determine the best response by the international community. If deemed to be necessary, the UN's Security Council (SC) then has to decide whether the deployment of a new UN peace operation is necessary. The UN Charter gives the UN's SC primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Council can thus establish a UN peace operation.

So, UN peace operations are deployed based on mandates from the SC. After decided upon, there will follow the necessary strategic, technical, and political assessments of the situation at hand. If a peacekeeping force is determined to be necessary, the SC must formally sanction and authorize this by adopting a resolution. The resolution sets out the operation's mandate and size and details the tasks it will be responsible for performing. The budget and

resources are then subject to the UN's General Assembly approval. This assembly will also play a key role in the peace operation's financing.

The Secretary-General of the UN will then appoint a Head of Mission (and a force commander) who in turn must report to the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations at the UN Headquarters. The Security Council can vote to extend, amend, or end mission mandates as it deems appropriate.

These types of peace-keeping operations have to be properly planned (politically, militarily and logistically) – deployment of an operation will then proceed as quickly as possible, taking into account the security and political conditions on the ground. The UN has no standing army, or police force of its own, and Member States are asked to contribute the military and police personnel required for each operation. Peacekeepers wear their countries' uniform and are identified as UN peacekeepers only by a UN blue helmet, or beret and a badge. The Secretary-General will then provide regular reports to the Security Council on the implementation of the mission mandate as it progresses.

After WWII the UN was formed as a means of preventing the eruption of another world war. The idea was that great powers would have a vested interest to be in a forum through which issues could be resolved and which had a system designed to collectively punish a wrongdoer and set it on the right path²⁹. Direct peacekeeping operations as a tool for addressing conflicts was not something that the UN founders had originally had in mind and is why peacekeeping is not directly mentioned in the UN Charter of 1945.

During the cold war however³⁰, the SC became gridlocked on many issues and many times the only measures that could be adopted (or that the SC was willing to take) were in areas of secondary significance to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States (US). This mostly included (de)colonialization-related conflicts. Of course, the SC also had to get involved in certain conflicts that might have ended up escalating into much larger issues. But even in these conflicts, enforcement measures were off the table mostly because great powers did not want to sanction something they could not entirely control

²⁹ De Coning, 2019

³⁰ Weiss, 2010

(the UN) to use force. The core characteristics and principles of UN peacekeeping developed as a direct result of this Cold War schism.

The first two UN peacekeeping missions signaled what kind of conflicts the UN would be preoccupied with in its first decades and in which way. Both involved declarations of independence, colonialization issues, were not clear-cut (as to which side was to blame) and could have escalated into direct combat between the US and the USSR.

In 1948 and after the conclusion of the first Arab Israeli war the SC sent a small force of unarmed military observers to monitor the cease-fire. The same happened after the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947-1948 (on a slightly larger scale though). In 1949 UN peacekeeping troops were sent to the area to monitor whether all sides were complying with the ceasefire and created a buffer zone between the two sides. Peacekeepers had clear instructions not to get involved in internal affairs of the states and not to attempt to resolve conflicts. They were sent to manage these conflicts, not resolve them.

The first UN peacekeeping operation (UNEF 1) which included armed military personnel, was sent to Egypt in 1956 following the Suez Crisis. Two years after the deployment of UNEF I, the Secretary-General published an extensive report summarizing lessons learned from this first proper experience with UN peacekeeping, recommending a set of basic principles (talked about above in the introduction) that should guide any future deployments.

But what was Finland's role in the UN? During WWII Finland fought against the Soviet Union. The Moscow armistice was signed by Finland and the Soviet Union in 1944 ending the war, though the final peace treaty was not signed until 1947 in Paris. Following that and in 1948 the two countries signed the "Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance", also known as the YYA-Treaty, which was the basis for Finnish - Soviet Union relations from 1948 - 1992, that is until after the end of the cold war and the dissolution of the USSR.

Under the treaty, the Soviets wanted to deter Western Powers from attacking the USSR through Finnish territory, and the Finns sought to increase its political independence from the Soviet Union thus ensuring Finland's survival as a liberal democracy close to the USSR.

Under the pact, Finland was obliged to resist armed attacks against the Soviet Union through Finland. If necessary, Finland was to ask for Soviet military aid to do so. However, the pact did not place any requirements on Finland to act should the Soviet Union be attacked from elsewhere. The agreement also recognized Finland's desire to remain outside great-power conflicts, allowing the country to adopt a policy of neutrality in the Cold War.

This YYA treaty was thus the main instrument used in implementing the Finnish policy known as the Paasikivi–Kekkonen doctrine. The Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine was a foreign policy of neutrality (and as mentioned above of a “co-operative” relationship with the USSR – without however, excluding warm ties with the West) established by Finnish President Juho Paasikivi (in office 1946-1956) and continued (and further developed) by his successor Urho Kekkonen (in office 1956-1982). During his term as President Kekkonen had stressed, however, that Finland should be an active rather than a passive neutral.

So, it is logical that Finland found the UN and its peacekeeping forces as the perfect forum through which to ensure its own neutrality and independence, uphold relationships with the West (without deteriorating its relationship with the USSR) and actively work on helping to upkeep the general world peace – so as never to have to suffer through what it did in WWII again – and hopefully prevent others from suffering the same.

Finland was willing to join the United Nations right after the Peace Treaty in 1947 but was refused entry for several years due to the Cold War gridlock and did not attain membership until the end of 1955. After Finland's membership was confirmed the Soviet Union was quick to remind the Finnish government that (in their opinion) it was they who had helped Finland gain membership in the world organization and it was with them with whom Finland should cooperate whilst in it.

Finland on its own behalf wanted to tighten the ties between itself and the West and develop tight bonds of co-operation (including in matters of military defense) with the other Nordic countries. Finland's position from the very beginning was thus very precarious as it had to maintain a balance between both Eastern pressure and Western inclinations.

After entering the UN Finland made it clear that it wished to remain neutral and outlined the two basic features of its foreign policy: caution and constructivism. Caution in its voting and constructive support when considered feasible. A strict line of neutrality was followed

by Finland's delegation in any conflict situation which according to Finland's point of view was related to great power conflicts. The thinking was that when applied in conflict situations, neutrality sets up a solid basis for conflict resolution and peaceful settlement.

Another common feature in Finland's positions has always been strong support for the UN Charter, the Secretary-General and the Security Council. This of course means a strong leaning on international law, international organization and multilateral cooperation. And so, Finland has consistently emphasized the central principles of international law in the context of every crisis. A negative attitude towards the use of force and the threat of force has been regularly expressed and the necessity for peaceful solutions stressed. Depending on the character of the conflicts concerned, other legal principles have been referred to, such as the territorial integrity of states, the inviolability of frontiers, the right of national self-determination, and respect for human rights.

This strong emphasis on legal principles rather than moral judgments in the Finnish approach is said to be typical of small states and for Finland the small state perspective has been a continuous theme ever since the beginning of the country's UN membership. Small states have to put their efforts into law and cooperation, while great powers can rely on their might.

No special group of neutral countries was born in the UN; however, neutrality did become an important foreign policy tool in countries like Finland, Sweden, Austria and Ireland during the Cold War and these countries also played a large role in UN peacekeeping efforts.

Finland's above-mentioned positions in the UN illustrate the balancing acts Finland's delegation had to perform. Every global conflict seemed to bring forward a new political tight rope that the Finnish government had to balance itself on. With a host of global crises mounting towards the end of 1956, Kekkonen was to write in his private correspondence in November of 1956 that he feared Finland had joined the UN "too soon".

For example, during the Hungarian revolution of 1956 sympathy in Finland for the Hungarian people was at a high as was condemnation in the UN. The Finnish government naturally wanted to express its support for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and for Hungarian independence as well as humanitarian support, but also wanted to avoid measures that would damage its relations with the Soviet Union.

When the General Assembly dealt with the crisis, Finland, together with other Nordic countries, abstained in some controversial votes, but were in favor of concrete measures to resolve this crisis. Some of these measures concerned the idea of UN peacekeeping forces.

Even though the UN did not find a way to help Hungary, Finland did find its opportunity to “prove it’s worth” while maintaining its neutrality during a crisis that for once seemed to have both the US and the USSR in agreement. This crisis was the Suez Canal crisis of 1956.

The Suez Crisis (also called the Second Arab – Israeli war) was an invasion of Egypt in late 1956 by Israel, followed by the United Kingdom and France. The aim was to regain control of the Suez Canal for the Western powers and to remove Egyptian president Nasser, who had just nationalized the foreign-owned Suez Canal Company, which administered the canal. After the fighting had started, political pressure from the US, the USSR and the UN led to a withdrawal by the three invaders and to a UN peacekeeping force being sent to ensure the ceasefire and secure the agreed upon borders.

Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld had introduced the idea of peacekeeping troops. However, he knew that Nasser would not accept any large powers sending personnel into Egypt and so he had sent a preliminary inquiry to several small and medium-sized countries about their readiness to provide troops if requested. Finland was the first country to respond, and the Finnish government had sent a positive response the very next day. It was a quick and brave response taking into consideration the world’s political situation, the dangers involved, the fact that peacekeeping was a new idea (not even mentioned in the UN Charter) and of course, there was no domestic legislation on peacekeeping yet.

After holding further talks with Nasser, Hammarskjöld knew that Egypt would only accept Finnish and Swedish troops at the time (due to their policy of neutrality, their size and also due to the closeness of Finland to the USSR – Egypt’s new friend). But Finland’s participation was not a certainty.

On top of the political risk there was also the cost of the operation. Finland was still suffering from the cost of WWII and the UN had not yet set up (due to this being the first time) it’s current method of budgeting these types of operations. Hammarskjöld feared the mission would not succeed if Finland did not get its troops to Egypt. Under the guise of Finland and Sweden, Hammarskjöld hoped Nasser would also accept personnel from Norway and

Denmark marking a large step forward in Nordic relations and setting the first stones in the foundations of what was hoped to become a potential future strong Nordic alliance.

Finland, however, recognized that this was an important mission politically for them³¹. Finland would finally be seen as it wanted to be seen – as a neutral, democratic society and not as part of the Eastern European bloc. In the end, the funding was agreed upon by all parties and the Finnish government decided to participate. Finland was subsequently one of ten countries that ended up providing troops to the operation named UNEF I (United Nations Emergency Force), together with Sweden, Norway and Denmark.

The activities of the UN forces in Egypt ranged from patrolling to combat forces ensuring the ceasefire in so called territorial “hot-spots”. Upon arrival, however, the actual fighting had almost died down and the heavy military equipment the UN brought with them proved to be unnecessary. All of a sudden a new reality emerged - instead of fighting, one had to know how to build peace. However, apart from a few isolated incidents (mainly related to alcohol), the Finns performed well in their given tasks and were quick to understand the new role of the UN forces and what it required from them.

During this first mission Finnish forces had been stationed in the less dangerous sections of the operational area. According to Uolevi Koskenpalo (the Finnish liaison officer) “the fishing, swimming and sauna facilities, as well as the peaceful and barren (desert) environment,” reminded him of Finland to some extent. This “out of sight out of mind” situation was politically very suitable for Finland and of course meant less risk to the personnel. The situation in the area also calmed down meaning the operation could be considered to be a success and ensure further similar types of operation in the future. All in all, this first mission was politically exactly what Finland had needed.

The original principles of UN peacekeeping suited Finland’s foreign policy well from the very beginning: through them it was possible to express concrete support for the UN, for the Secretary-General, for the promotion of peaceful means in conflict resolution, for international law and for multilateralism in general³². Moreover, participation in peacekeeping was considered to strengthen Finland’s neutrality and its status in the Nordic

³¹ Pesu, 2020

³² Hytönen, 2020

group. No wonder then that Finland's participation in peacekeeping – and later under the title crisis management – has continued to this day.

However, as has been already mentioned, another reason behind Finland's involvement in the UN peacekeeping forces was the “secret” goal of one day establishing a strong Nordic defense alliance that would be able to stand up to any potential (Soviet) threat.

The “Nordic initiative” was an initiative to set up a Nordic contingency force in the UN. This would mean the backbone of future political and military operations between the Nordic countries would be set in place. Perhaps the deepest phase of Nordic co-operation in the early 1960s was linked to the establishment of the Nordic Standby Force.

These plans to establish a contingency force were well under way when the flammable situation in Cyprus was in danger of exploding in early 1964. As a result of this international political crisis, the eventual establishment of the Finnish contingency was delayed until 1969.

At the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964, the clashes between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities on the island were escalating and there was a great danger of direct conflict between Greece and Turkey over the issue. The geopolitical position of Cyprus was so significant to NATO, and especially to Britain and the United States, that they could not leave its fate to their own devices.

Seeing that the USSR would not accept direct involvement by any of the other great powers and not wanting to risk any of the sides involved aligning with the Soviets the only remaining viable option left was the UN. The UN General-Secretary at the time U Thant (not supported, but also not vetoed by Russia) quickly tried to organize a peacekeeping taskforce (UNFICYP) to be sent to the island on an initial mandate of three months. And so, Finland was requested to take part in the mission.

The role of the UN, the SC and the peacekeeping forces has changed over the years and especially after the end of the cold war. Finland's foreign policy has slowly over time moved on from one of conflict response to one of conflict prevention. The change is the result of the change of the political landscape, a shift in the nature of conflict and the diversification of the parties involved.

As a result of these changes, the way the international community operates has also begun to change. The importance of peace mediation as part of conflict prevention and resolution has become better recognized and its basis has also been strengthened in recent years, for example at the United Nations (UN). Peace mediation has been presented as a solution to the problems that conflict diversification has brought with it.

And so, Finland now emphasizes the view that sustainable peace development – a concept to which Finland has lent its support since it was launched – calls for proper attention to be paid to three major elements of sustainable peace - namely economic, social and environmental sustainability.

This type of thinking and policy is completely different to what it was in the 1950's when Finland was taking its first steps in the UN peacekeeping forces and facing a whole different situation to what it is facing nowadays. The whole mindset and guiding principles behind the tasks performed by the peacekeeping forces have (hopefully) irrevocably changed form.

One can argue that of the two elements found in the crucial decisions made by Finland back in 1956, caution and constructivism, the first prevailed in clear Cold War issues until the end of the Cold War, whereas the other, the constructive approach through pragmatic and concrete measures, has continued ever since and characterizes Finland's foreign policy in the UN even till today³³.

Finland's then President Urho Kekkonen when addressing the General Assembly of the UN for the first time in 1961, expressed Finland's position in a metaphor that has thereafter often been used to describe Finland's approach: "We see ourselves as physicians rather than judges; it is not for us to pass judgement nor to condemn. It is rather to diagnose and to try to cure".

But now let's return to the matter of the UNFICYP-taskforce – how it was created and Finland's involvement in it, both through the sending of a battalion to the island and through the mediating efforts of Sakari Tuomioja.

³³ Vesa, 2012

2.3 Creation of the UNFICYP-taskforce

From the beginning, the task at hand was hard. UNFICYP was assembled ad-hoc³⁴ and was to be undermanned (only around 6 500 servicemen to patrol the whole island)³⁵, finances for the taskforce were not yet ensured³⁶ and due to cold-war politics U Thant (the Secretary-General of the UN) had to make sure to have nonaligned countries (such as Finland) involved in the force³⁷.

The UN mandate voted on (on the 4.3.1964) was very broad³⁸, with the main goals of UNFICYP stated simply as being to try to help to prevent fighting, reinstate and maintain law and order and help ensure a return to normal conditions.³⁹ UNFICYP was also limited by the fact that it could only use force to defend itself and could not be used to prevent weapons imports⁴⁰. However, it must be mentioned, that these limitations were in line with the UN policy of being peacekeepers (and not peacemakers) and the general secretary U Thant's belief that a political solution had to be found by the two sides themselves.

So the UN had a two-fold mission. On the one hand it was to send a peace-keeping force to the island and on the other hand it was to send a designated UN mediator to help the two sides find a peaceful political solution to the problem⁴¹.

And so Finland was requested to take part in the mission.⁴² After WWII and during the cold-war Finland had (as mentioned previously partly due to its own wish and partly due to political circumstances) decided to be politically neutral and non-aligned. In order to emphasize this political position and to try to ensure a future where the country would not have to sacrifice so much in another major war, Finland decided to actively participate in

³⁴ Stegenga 1968, p.7.

³⁵ Ibid, p.81.

³⁶ Kronlund-Valla 1996, p.61-67.

³⁷ Stegenga 1968, p.11 and 73.

³⁸ United Nations Security Council, Resolution, 8/5575, 4.3.1964

³⁹ Welin 2004, p.13.

⁴⁰ Ulkoministeriön Arkisto (UM), Pol.os., 40/37, YKD 3/663-63, 11.3.1964

⁴¹ Coufoudakis 1976, p.465.

⁴² Vuorensola 2007, p.44.

UN-mandated peacekeeping efforts⁴³. And so at the request of the UN (or rather after a second request by the UN)⁴⁴ Finland assembled a battalion of around 1000 soldiers that was to be part of the UNFICYP force to be sent to Cyprus.

The UN in 1964 did not yet have a lot of experience in peacekeeping missions and thus did not yet have fixed operational (and cost) models in place.⁴⁵ This in turn meant it was not yet sure just how much these operations would cost Finland and asked for Finland to contribute towards the mission⁴⁶, which practically meant Finland was to pay for a large part of the costs of its participation.

In addition to this, Finland did not have in place any legislation regarding the sending of troops to a foreign country in times of peace. Each U.N. mission Finland took part in had to be voted for separately by the parliament. In order to avoid similar situations in the future, in the spring of 1964 the Finnish government brought forward to the parliament its suggestion for a permanent law that would cover not only the Cyprus-mission (i.e. the government's authority to send servicemen, to prepare for operational readiness, to fund the mission etc.), but also all future Finnish UN-missions.

If voted through by the parliament, this law would strengthen Finland's commitment to UN peacekeeping-missions and solidify Finland new foreign policy direction⁴⁷. The bill was finally voted through on 26.5.1964 (Laki suomalaisesta valvontajoukosta 276/1964), which made it easier from then on for Finland to continue supporting UN missions in the future.

However, in the case of the Cyprus mission, this legislation was not yet in place. After the initial details of the operation were brought forward,⁴⁸ there were intensive discussions within the government, the ministry of defense, the parliament and even the media on both the necessity of involvement, the cost of the operation and the tight timetable set forward by the U.N.⁴⁹

⁴³ Kronlund-Valla 1996, p.117.

⁴⁴ Vuorensola 2007, p.44.

⁴⁵ United Nations Press Services, Press Release, SG/SM/27, 7.3.1964

⁴⁶ United Nations, FI 323/18(18), 7.3.1964

⁴⁷ Kronlund-Valla 1996, p.268-270.

⁴⁸ Ulkoministeriön Arkisto (UM), Pol.os.2, 43/42, 12.3.1964

⁴⁹ Vuorensola 2007, p.43-46.

All of these issues though were eventually resolved and the Finnish soldiers left for Cyprus on the 25.4.1964.

2.4 Finland's mediator – Sakari Tuomioja

In addition to being asked to participate in the Cyprus-operation, Finland was also given a second UN-task. Sakari Tuomioja was named by U Thant to be the first UN mediator in Cyprus⁵⁰.

Sakari Tuomioja (1911-1964) had a lengthy career as a politician and diplomat in Finland and served as Finland's Prime Minister between 1953-1954. However, further details of his political career are not pertinent to this study. What is important to bring forward is the fact that Tuomioja was the first Finnish person to be appointed to a high-level position in the United Nations. He served as Secretary General of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe between 1957-1960 and also acted as chairman of the committee responsible for investigating the economic affairs of Laos in 1959 and 1961.

After his three years at the European Economic Commission, he returned to Finland where he started work as a negotiating officer for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 1 November 1960. He was then appointed Finland's Ambassador to Stockholm where he started work on 1 July 1961.

In the U.N.'s resolution 8/5575 voted for on the 4.3.1964 (and already mentioned previously in this study), it was decided upon that in addition to the peacekeeping troops to be sent to the island, the Secretary-General of the U.N. would also designate a mediator to the island. The task of this mediator would be to work with the Government of Cyprus, the leaders of the TC-community, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom and try to find a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. The mediator would have to be one accepted by all interested parties.

⁵⁰ Tuomioja 2007, p.399.

Initially U Thant had decided upon a close associate and U.N. under-Secretary José Rolz-Bennett. This associate was, for reasons of their own, not approved by the Turkish government. U Thant's next candidate was Sakari Tuomioja. Even though the Secretary-General did not know him personally, he came highly recommended by other members of the staff at the U.N. that had worked with him.

Finland's president at the time U.K.Kekkonen agreed to the request and Tuomioja did not decline. And so, Sakari Tuomioja was appointed mediator to Cyprus by the U.N. on the 25.3.1964. All interested parties had accepted his nomination and the international press were satisfied that the right man had been appointed. The Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung, for example, introduced him as a man of compromise and stated that you could not find a more suitable and neutral person in the whole world.

True to his reputation and nature, Tuomioja kept a very low-profile and was very careful in all his moves and statements. His task was not to choose sides, but to find a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem that all parties could accept and live with.

The task facing Tuomioja was enormous and difficult. Both GC- and TC-communities were deeply entrenched in their own positions, as were the Greek and Turkish governments. Deadly hostilities between the two communities were an everyday event and it seemed as if it would be very difficult to find a solution that would suit all parties.

During the spring of 1964 Tuomioja spent time meeting with and listening to the views of all parties. In the beginning, it seemed as if Tuomioja's (and the U.N.s) goal was to try to ensure that the island remained as an independent nation consisting of two communities. The course of action was to try to find a constitution and measures that would enable this to happen. "Radical" options, such as "enosis", or the division of the island, were not yet placed on the table of negotiations.

Then on the 27.5.1964 Cyprus's government led by president Archbishop Makarios announced that it was to strengthen its air defense capability (in fear of a Turkish invasion) and introduce mandatory army subscriptions. The Turkish government saw this as a provocation and let the USA know that it intended to invade Cyprus and annex part of it, in

order to protect the interests of the TC-community. The USA. strongly advised Turkey against this course of action.

The situation calmed down and the negotiations led by Tuomioja continued, but it was clear that a new player, the USA., had entered the game. The cold war was ongoing (and the Cuba missile crisis still in fresh memory) and since the U.N. did not (and could not) seem to be able to solve the problem, the United States decided to take a more active role in order to protect its interests in the region and avoid a possible Greece-Turkey conflict.

And so a new phase in the negotiations began. The USA. wanted to take charge and suggested that Tuomioja continues with his tasks, but that ex-foreign minister Dean Acheson (USA's ex-foreign minister) would be placed in charge of the negotiations as a whole. U Thant refused, believing that this would not be accepted by all interested parties and might also provoke a reaction from the U.S.S.R. A compromise was found, whereby both Acheson and Tuomioja would simultaneously, but separately, negotiate with all parties.

In the midst of this at times confusing set-up, intense negotiations continued from July to mid-August. A preliminary peace plan was also introduced that was called the "Acheson plan", even though it was a joint effort between the USA and the U.N and between Acheson and Tuomioja.

Over time, the negotiational position had shifted from the idea of one independent nation to a suggestion of "Enosis". Most of Cyprus would be given to Greece with Turkey keeping a small area as a military base. Turkey would also be given the small Greek island of Kastellorizo off the shore of Turkey. In the area given to Greece, there would exist one, or two, small Turkish cantons and the rights of the Turkish citizens would be guaranteed all over the island. Any Turkish person wishing to move out of the island would be assisted in moving out and given compensation. All sides eventually rejected this plan. The GC-community was not willing to give up parts of the island to Turkey and Turkey in turn, wanted a larger area than what had been promised to it.

It has to be pointed out here, that even though Tuomioja had taken part in the drafting of the "Acheson" plan, he had all along opposed the idea of splitting the island. He had wanted the island to stay joint and independent and was also willing to discuss an "Enosis" with

Greece that ensured protection of Turkish citizen's rights and compensation to Turkey. He however did not at all agree with a plan that would lead to an actual split of the island.

Alas, Tuomioja was not going to be able to continue with his work as he was to suffer a brain hemorrhage on the 16.8.1964. He passed away on the 9.9.1964 whilst at Kivelä Hospital in Finland. Maybe he was not able to solve the Cyprus problem, but he was admired by all parties involved and he knew very well that peaceful solutions are not possible if none of the parties are interested in compromising. The Cyprus problem still remains unsolved up until today.

But returning to the Finnish battalion sent to Cyprus. next we will examine how this battalion was viewed in the Cypriot and Finnish press in 1964.

3. The view of the press in Cyprus in 1964

The press has a strong influence on public opinion. Newspapers choose what and how to report and many times are the channel through which people and societies form an opinion on an issue. In many ways, newspapers could be called instruments of power and control.⁵¹

3.1 "Enosis..."

From the beginning the right-wing was very nationalistic⁵² and demanded Enosis (i.e. union with Greece) and non-intervention and was openly opposed to UNFICYP.

On the 12.5.1964, FYO writes about how Turkish Foreign Minister Mr. Erkin threatened Cyprus with a Turkish invasion. The paper expresses its opinion that the Turkish side does not respect the UN and how it is worried that UN involvement might lead to Turkey

⁵¹ Immonen 2016, p.2 & 6.

⁵² Kangasniemi 2016, p.21.

invading.⁵³ On the 16.5.1964, FYO reports on Turkish Airforce planes flying over GC areas and complains how UNFICYP is doing nothing to stop them.⁵⁴

In May of 1964, MAX reported on 32 TC-citizens that had gone missing. The GC-side had been accused of kidnapping these people, but the paper strongly states how it believed that the TC-side had killed TC-citizens that did not agree with TC-policy and were now trying to fool the UN (it is implied that the UN would believe the TC-side) into believing it was the GC-side's fault.⁵⁵ Although not directly stated, the tone of this article is one of contempt for the UN and the TC-side. Roope Alftan (a Finnish serviceman on the island at the time) states in his book "Sopeutumaton sotilas" that it was his belief that the GC-side murdered these TC's together with the British Major Macey (and his driver) that were sent to investigate the affair⁵⁶.

On the 14.6.1964, MAX reports on how the TC-side are reporting, via the Reuters news agency, false allegations on atrocities committed by the GC-side. MAX also states that they have proof that Reuters is publishing all negative (towards the GC-side) statements issued by the UN and leaves out positive statements. MAX directly accuses Reuters of taking sides in the conflict.⁵⁷ This article is in-line with the extreme right-wing's doubt and opposition towards all foreign intervention, in any mode, in the Cyprus problem.

In an article in KYP on the 1.6.1964, the paper strongly demands that British troops should not be included in the UN peacekeeping force, since Britain has always supported the TC community and that the British Intelligence Service is taking actions to further escalate the hostilities and tip the scale towards the TC side.⁵⁸ This opinion was backed up by FYO, which on the 10.6.1964 published an article which stated that the GC community is against the presence of British troops in UNFICYP, since Britain's goal is the splitting up of Cyprus.⁵⁹ The articles in both newspapers imply that although they don't agree with the

⁵³ O Erkin, FYO 12.5.1964.

⁵⁴ I Kypriaki, FYO 16.5.1964.

⁵⁵ 32 dithen omiroi, MAX 29.5.1964.

⁵⁶ Alftan 2014, p.109-110.

⁵⁷ To reouter, MAX 14.6.1964.

⁵⁸ N'afypnisthomen, KYP 01.6.1964.

⁵⁹ Ta Inomena Ethni, FYO 10.6.1964.

presence of UNFICYP, if there is to be a UN force on the island it should include servicemen of other nations (i.e. Scandinavian forces).

Finally, FYO stated on the 26.6.1964 that the UN and Britain would not be of help and that Enosis is the only practical solution to the Cyprus problem.⁶⁰

3.2 “...or peace”

Both the liberal and the left-wing affiliated newspapers adopted a more neutral stance, as compared to the right-wing, and expressed their hope that UNFICYP would help stop the violence and form a peaceful solution that possibly would involve Cyprus becoming an independent country.

An article published by FIL on the 18.4.1964 describes how the Cypriot government will not try to use the UN to further the GC community's own interests, but rather believes that the only way to achieve a permanent solution between the two communities is through discussion (with the help of the UN) and without the interference of foreign powers.⁶¹

On 12.5.1964, TOR reports on what the British press had written about the situation in Cyprus.⁶² The British press in general did not believe that the UN would be able to resolve the island's problems. Even though not directly stated, the tone of the article indicates that TOR did not fully agree with the British opinion.

HAR on the 20.5.1964 is worried that any NATO involvement will undercut the efforts of the UN and its mediator Mr. Tuomioja to successfully solve Cyprus's problems.⁶³ On the 13.6.1964, HAR expresses its hope that the UN will strive to find a righteous solution to the Cyprus problem, in accordance with its principles and without any political agenda, and not betray the trust placed upon it by the people of this small and troubled country.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Enosis, FYO 26.6.1964.

⁶¹ Epytyhis ekprosopisis, FIL 18.4.1964.

⁶² Ti grafei, TOR, 12.5.1964.

⁶³ I mesolavisi, HAR 20.5.1964.

⁶⁴ O syndesmos Inomenon Ethnon, HAR 13.6.1964.

TOR states on the 30.6.1964 that the Cyprus problem will only be solved through UN involvement which includes mediator Mr. Tuomioja and the UNFICYP force. The paper believes that both communities on the island trust the UN and believes that only the UN can provide a realistic solution to the island's problems.⁶⁵

It has to be mentioned here, that both the left-wing and the right-wing press in Cyprus extensively covered the death of Finnish serviceman Juhani Matikainen (this death will be examined in detail later on in this research paper) in their articles and it was apparent that this situation had changed the tone of reporting on the U.N. soldiers.

Both FIL and MAX reported on the 23.5.1964 how Cyprus President Archbishop Makarios had expressed his sadness about the event and his condolences to the General Secretary of the UN Mr. U Thant⁶⁶.

4. The view of the press in Finland in 1964

4.1 Lying or dying in the Mediterranean sun

All three chosen newspapers had (to various degrees) different initial views on the Finnish UN-mission. These views also (to varying degrees) changed as time went on. As is the case with most news events, as time went by coverage lessened (= the story did not sell anymore) and articles were only published if there was an important change in events⁶⁷.

What is worth noting is how articles in the chosen newspapers were also contradictory at times.⁶⁸ On the one hand the mission was talked about seriously (with the Finnish servicemen portrayed as bold soldiers representing the Finnish nation) and on the other hand the servicemen were depicted as sun-seeking tourists interested in adventure and a good salary. This contradiction still applies today as can be seen in an article written by Katriina Pajari about Finnish peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan published on the

⁶⁵ To arthron, TOR 30.6.1964.

⁶⁶ Dia ton fonon, FIL 23.5.1964 and O Arhiepiskopos, MAX 23.5.1964.

⁶⁷ Malmström 2013, p.35.

⁶⁸ Pesola 2013, p.38 and Immonen 2016, p.2-3.

28.12.2014 in Helsingin Sanomat⁶⁹. Even though Afghanistan was (and is) a dangerous conflict-area the servicemen were many times portrayed as being interested in getting a tan and a new car. This contradiction was picked up by the readers of the chosen newspapers at the time and in a public opinion piece written on the 7.4.1964, pseudonym “Kypros ensin” commented that apparently Finland was sending over servicemen to either lie, or die, in the Mediterranean sun⁷⁰.

4.2 The reluctant view of Helsingin Sanomat

Helsingin Sanomat (HS) took a reluctant view towards the participation of Finnish servicemen in UNFICYP, especially in March-April 1964 when the Finnish battalion was being formed and was first deployed. Cyprus was presented as a country in the midst of an open war and the paper advised that careful consideration should be taken before sending servicemen over. In its editorial of 6.3.1964, the paper expressed its opinion that there is no reason to make hasty decisions and that there is a possibility of Finnish fatalities if Finland is involved⁷¹. In its editorial of 15.3.1964, the paper commented that it would be extremely optimistic to expect the UNFICYP-mission to turn out to be an easy tourist-trip⁷² and in a leading article on the 25.4.1964 it was expressed that this mission would turn out to be much harder than Finland’s previous UN-involvement in the Suez-mission⁷³. HS also, on several occasions, expressed its concern about the USSR’s negative stance towards UN peacekeeping missions and its effect on Finland’s policy of impartiality.

The opinion of HS towards the involvement of Finnish servicemen in UNFICYP changed the least over the course of the period covered as compared to the other newspapers examined. In June of 1964, as the initial three-month UN mandate was coming to an end, HS was still carefully reluctant towards Finland’s participation. The situation in Cyprus had

⁶⁹ Pajari, HS 28.12.2014.

⁷⁰ Pseudonym “Kypros ensin”, Kypros ja YK, HS 7.4.1964.

⁷¹ Suomalaisia Kyprokseen? HS 6.3.1964.

⁷² Kyprokseen, HS 15.3.1964.

⁷³ Lähtö, HS 25.4.1964.

not changed and the paper recommended that Finland reconsider whether or not its servicemen should remain on the island⁷⁴.

4.3 Uusi Suomi supports the cause

Out of the three newspapers examined the right-wing Uusi-Suomi (US) was the only one that openly supported the sending of servicemen to Cyprus⁷⁵. The paper was worried about the general global political situation and the effect the Cyprus crisis would have on it, but unlike HS, the paper agreed with Finnish involvement. Like HS however, US was concerned about the challenges facing the Finnish mission and warned that the Cyprus mission might turn out to be harder than previous UN missions⁷⁶.

US's opinion became more careful and wary towards the end of the period examined. US still supported the mission though and in 25.6.1964 assessed that without the UN servicemen the situation on the island would be worse and that their presence on the island was justified⁷⁷.

4.4 Kansan Uutiset: Openly against the mission

Kansan Uutiset (KU) was the only newspaper (of those examined) that was against the UNFICYP-mission. This was in part due to its political affiliation. Being a left-wing affiliated newspaper it along general lines agreed with many USSR-opinions. USSR itself had adopted a negative stance towards UN peacekeeping missions and KU followed suit⁷⁸. KU, generally speaking, was wary of the risk that Finland would get too involved in cold-war politics and did not agree with Finland's growing commitment to UN-peacekeeping missions. This is why KU so strongly opposed the new law that was to be voted for in parliament in May of 1964.

⁷⁴ Kypros ja USA, HS 19.6.1964.

⁷⁵ Suomi ja Kypros, US 15.3.1964.

⁷⁶ Ibid, US 15.3.1964.

⁷⁷ YK-pataljoonamme, US, 25.6.1964.

⁷⁸ Lisäselvityksiä tarvitaan, KU 10.3.1964.

In the spring of 1964, the Finnish government brought forward to the parliament its suggestion for a permanent law that would cover not only the Cyprus-mission (i.e. the government's authority to send servicemen, to prepare for operational readiness, to fund the mission etc.), but also all future Finnish UN-missions. If voted through by the parliament, this law would strengthen Finland's commitment to UN peacekeeping-missions and solidify Finland new foreign policy direction⁷⁹. KU preferred that each mission be voted on separately, because there was a risk that a permanent peacekeeping force might lead to servicemen being sent to missions that clashed with Finland's impartiality policy.⁸⁰

In addition to its political opposition, KU also pointed out the costs of the mission⁸¹. The UN in 1964 did not yet have a lot of experience in peacekeeping missions and thus did not yet have fixed operational (and cost) models in place.⁸² This in turn meant it was not yet sure just how much these operations would cost Finland. As in the case of HS and US, the paper also pointed out how this mission would be difficult⁸³. Unlike the other newspapers though, KU regularly expressed its opinion that peacekeeping missions are not vacations, but military operations.

KU's opposition to Finland's involvement in UNFICYP only hardened over time as did their opposition to what they saw as right-wing "militarism". On the 22.5.1964, KU's editorial article was very critical of the fact that the new UN-law had been voted for in parliament⁸⁴ and on 30.6.1964 the paper was critical of Finland's involvement in what it saw as open war⁸⁵. Throughout the period examined, KU was in strong opposition to what it saw as Finland's involvement in "major-power politics".

In the next part of this paper we will look more into the Cyprus mission and how the servicemen themselves thought and felt about it.

⁷⁹ Kronlund-Valla 1996, p.268-270.

⁸⁰ Kypros-pataljoona vai pysyvä joukko-osasto, KU 12.4.1964 and Pysyvä valvontajoukkoa? KU 26.4.1964.

⁸¹ Kypros-joukkojen määräraha, KU 21.3.1964.

⁸² Kronlund-Valla 1996, p.61-67.

⁸³ YK: n joukot Kyprokseen, KU 17.3.1964.

⁸⁴ Päätös suomalaisesta YK-joukko-osastosta, KU 22.5.1964.

⁸⁵ Ulkopuolisten peliä Kyproksessa, KU 30.6.1964.

5. Mission: Cyprus

5.1 The mission begins: recruitment

HS reported on the recruitment of soldiers to the Finnish battalion extensively. On the 21.3.1964, the paper wrote about how application forms had run out and went on to guess that the prospect of a well-paid job was what had attracted so many young men⁸⁶. These men formed a real cross-section of the Finnish population with applicants ranging from people with University degrees to unemployed port-workers.⁸⁷ When the servicemen had been chosen HS published all of their pictures, names and areas of residency. The paper did worry that some applicants might be in search of adventure⁸⁸ and that some might not last long due to home-sickness⁸⁹. HS also did sometimes imply that the servicemen were going on a holiday tour.⁹⁰ However, the general tone was one of confidence in the men (and their fighting abilities) being sent there and in the belief that they would get the job done⁹¹.

For US, the Finnish battalion to be sent to Cyprus was a matter of pride. The paper mentioned how successful applicants are demanded to be of excellent physical and mental condition in order to be able to represent Finland with honor in Cyprus⁹². The paper also mentions how many people remember Finland's efforts during WWII and know about the quality of the Finnish servicemen.⁹³ On the 20.3.1964, the paper published five interviews it had conducted with applicants to the battalion. In this article it can be seen that the main reason for application was the prospect of a good salary.⁹⁴ The paper on many occasions expressed its hope that applicants were not going there to seek adventure. Like HS, the paper also published articles implying how the mission might turn out to be a holiday for the servicemen.⁹⁵

⁸⁶ Kypros-anomuksia haettiin Helsingissä toistatuhatta, HS 21.3.1964.

⁸⁷ Yli 2000 miestä hakenut jo Kyproksen pataljoonan, HS 26.3.1964.

⁸⁸ Kyproksen lähtijöitä yli 250 Lappeenrannassa, HS 27.3.1964.

⁸⁹ Suomen ensiapu Kyproksen vaivoihin, HS 26.3.1964.

⁹⁰ Näkemiin vaan, täällä onkin turhan kylmä, HS 26.4.1964.

⁹¹ Suomalaisten valvonta-alueella on rauhallista, HS 7.5.1964.

⁹² Näin valitaan miehet Kyprokseen, US 18.3.1964.

⁹³ Suomalaisten YK-joukkojen tuloa odotetaan innolla Kyproksessa, US 19.3.1964.

⁹⁴ Palkat houkuttelevat sotureita Kyprokseen, US 20.3.1964.

⁹⁵ Sotilasmuotia Kyprokseen, US 7.4.1964.

KU on the other hand, was against Finnish soldiers being sent to Cyprus and portrayed those going there as a group of right-wing militarists.⁹⁶ These soldiers were going to Cyprus looking for adventure and could end up blindly following orders that were against their own better judgement⁹⁷.

5.2 The death of Corporal Juhani Matikainen

There was a lot of reporting on events in Cyprus between April and May of 1964. Many of these were opinion pieces: about the situation in Cyprus, about worldwide political events affecting the Cyprus situation (or being affected by the Cyprus situation) etc. Many of the news articles were about the servicemen's everyday-life on the island. In this paper, I have already discussed about many of these articles. But there is an event that stands out which I would like to further examine in this paper, since reporting on events in Cyprus changed after this event and since it sheds light on what kind of affect a war-zone mission can have on servicemen.

On the evening of the 20.5.1964, Corporal Juhani Matikainen died in action in Cyprus. This was the first death of a Finnish serviceman in Cyprus and was a big news event at the time⁹⁸, not only because of the unfortunate death, but also because of the circumstances surrounding it. According to the UN and the Finnish battalion's official statement a Finnish patrol's vehicle had broken down. Another vehicle had been sent to assist (Matikainen was in this vehicle) and this vehicle was shot at from a nearby Turkish village. Both sides commenced shooting at each other. The servicemen had then asked for help and a large number of vehicles had been sent to assist (the commander of the Finnish battalion Uolevi Kettinen was part of this operation). These vehicles approached the scene (from the direction of a nearby GC village) from two different directions and some of the vehicles had (for security reasons) switched their lights off. The fire-fight had continued and one group of soldiers had camouflaged themselves and tried to approach the Turkish positions. At this point Matikainen was fatally hit by three bullets and died. The incident ended when

⁹⁶ YK:lla ei ole päätöstä pysyvistä joukoista, KU 16.5.1964.

⁹⁷ Onko hyötyä Suomelle? KU 20.3.1964.

⁹⁸ Kansainvälisen vastuun ensimmäinen uhri Kyproksessa nuori suomalainen, US 22.5.1964.

a Finnish armored vehicle drove into the line of fire and managed to contact the TC-side. The TC-side on its behalf gave a similar story with the difference being that they claimed that the Finnish side had shot first and that they had no idea that it was UN-soldiers. They had thought that the GC-side was attacking and had requested help from the UN headquarters.

Many of the details of this incident raise questions. It was standard procedure that UN-patrol vehicles would drive with lights on and UN-flags clearly visible in order to avoid such unfortunate events. It was also standard procedure to try to be in touch with the locals if any incidents arose. Why did some of the vehicles drive without lights? Why wasn't the TC-side contacted immediately? Why did Finnish servicemen engage in a fire-fight? Why was the Finnish battalion commander involved in the incident? Roope Alftan directly accuses the Finnish commanders of trying to cover up what was a clear and bad mistake that they were largely responsible for⁹⁹. He also believes that the servicemen wanted to play war and (breaking all UN principles and authority given to the UN via the Cyprus mandate on the way¹⁰⁰) go on the offensive themselves (instead of just using force as a means of defense)¹⁰¹. I am inclined to believe this and also believe that this whole incident was partly due to a form of army mass psychosis that I will attempt to explain in chapter 5 of this paper.

This incident was covered extensively by the newspapers examined. HS reported on the 22.5.1964 that losses were to be expected on a mission like this¹⁰². The paper also stated clearly on the 22.5.1964 in another article that this incident was a mistake and due to a misunderstanding.¹⁰³ However, the paper did express its sorrow and paid its respects to the deceased, for example, when it covered his funeral on the 27.5.1964¹⁰⁴. Even though US also saw the death as being a mistake, they did however treat Matikainen as a hero and described how a very large crowd was present at the deceased hero's funeral¹⁰⁵. KU on its behalf, wrote that this was an unfortunate incident, but not unexpected¹⁰⁶. Even though the

⁹⁹ Alftan 2014, p.82-94.

¹⁰⁰ Sambanis 1999, p.88.

¹⁰¹ Virtanen 2011, p.68.

¹⁰² Vihan hedelmät, HS 22.5.1964.

¹⁰³ Varapresidentti valittaa ja puolustaa omiensa toiminta, HS 22.5.1964.

¹⁰⁴ Uhrillaan hän lunasti meille toivon paremmasta huomisesta, HS 27.5.1964.

¹⁰⁵ Kyproksen jääkäriin viimeinen matka, US 27.5.1964.

¹⁰⁶ Ei ole aurinkomatka, KU 22.5.1964.

paper continued to disapprove of the mission (as explained previously in this paper), its attitude towards the servicemen softened¹⁰⁷.

In my view, after this incident the coverage of the Cyprus mission changed. Views became softer and there was no more talk about this being a holiday mission, or how superior Finnish servicemen were. Coverage also lessened. The reporters HS and US had on the island left and the papers reported mainly news items provided to them by the battalion, or news agencies. It is not certain whether this was due to a drop in interest on the mission, a realization that the mission would not end very soon, or an agreement with the Finnish forces on what is to be reported and how. The only event to receive major coverage after the death of Matikainen was that of the large amount of resignation papers handed in by Finnish servicemen in June of 1964.

5.3 The mission stalls: Resignation requests handed in

In June of 1964, it became apparent that a large amount of Finnish servicemen were handing in their resignations and that this was due to growing dissatisfaction among the Finnish servicemen. The Finnish high command was reluctant to reveal final figures and the resignation process itself involved resignation applications having to be approved by command. Also a certain amount of resignation applications were withdrawn over time. The final figure of resignations, therefore, was anything between 62 and 165¹⁰⁸. Alftan describes how command tried to hide the true amount of resignations and also reduce them, either through talks with servicemen who wanted to resign, or by not accepting resignation notes handed in.¹⁰⁹

For HS, Cyprus became no longer a holiday retreat, but a place from which servicemen wanted to escape. The paper reported on these resignations on the 16.6.1964¹¹⁰. The paper also wrote that the servicemen were claiming that they were handing in their resignations

¹⁰⁷ Iitalomia YK-pojille, KU 12.6.1964.

¹⁰⁸ 165 miestä haluaisi erota suomalaisesta YK-pataljoonasta, US 24.6.1964.

¹⁰⁹ Alftan 2014, p.136.

¹¹⁰ Erohakemusten määrä kasvanut Kyproksessa, HS 19.6.1964.

due to personal reasons (such as family, work, studies or financial reasons)¹¹¹, or because they had thought that their mission was to last three months and not six¹¹².

The original UN mandate had been for three months, but a new three-month mandate had been given and so the servicemen had to stay for three more months according to their contract. Probably the servicemen had believed the situation would have been resolved during the first mandate and some appeared to be genuinely confused as to how long they were supposed to be on the island.

HS believed that the battalion included a lot of servicemen that were just not fit for such a mission and quoted the battalion's commander Uolevi Kettinen, who had said that most of the reasons given for resignation were not proper grounds for breaking these contracts.¹¹³ HS's opinion was that all reasons given were just excuses and that the real reasons behind the resignations were, for example, a lack of personal freedom and the heat in Cyprus.¹¹⁴ All in all, HS clearly expressed its disappointment at the resignations. On the 25.6.1964 HS published an opinion piece¹¹⁵ that seems to have been written by a Finnish person who had served in the UN's Suez mission. In this opinion piece, the writer claims that the people trying to resign were cowards. They had gone to Cyprus in search of money, adventure and a holiday, but the mission turned out to be harder than they thought.

US was also disappointed and strongly disapproved of these resignations. The paper quoted an article published by left-wing newspaper Päivän Sanomat that saw these resignations as being a stain on the country's reputation and the resignees' as being weak (thus indirectly letting its own opinion be known)¹¹⁶. KU on its behalf did not openly express its opinion and settled on simply publishing fact-based pieces on these resignations that simply stated that a number of servicemen wanted to resign¹¹⁷.

Whilst researching Finnish newspaper articles, I realized that two issues that stuck out were how the general press got frustrated with the, in their view, lack of progress towards the

¹¹¹ Eroanomuksia peruutettu Kyproksessa, HS 24.6.1964.

¹¹² Henkilökohtainen vapauden vähyys syynä eroanomuksiin Kyproksella, HS 23.6.1964.

¹¹³ Eroanomuksia peruutettu Kyproksessa, HS 24.6.1964.

¹¹⁴ Henkilökohtainen vapauden vähyys syynä eroanomuksiin Kyproksella, HS 23.6.1964.

¹¹⁵ Käpykaartia Kyproksella, HS 25.6.1964.

¹¹⁶ Muut lehdet, US 19.6.1964.

¹¹⁷ Kuusi Kyproksessa olevaa suomalaista tahtoo kotiin, KU 16.6.1964.

mission's objectives and how the press also viewed the servicemen's resignations as a failure.

US reported on the 9.5.1964, that you would have to have a vivid imagination to be able to think of anything exciting about the battalion's first days in Nicosia.¹¹⁸ This frustration grew as time went on. Tuomioja's mediation was not bearing any fruit and the USA was taking a larger role in trying to solve the crisis¹¹⁹. The UN appeared to be being pushed aside (as mediator) and having to be content with their role as a peacekeeping force. It appears that the general press got stuck on the success of the UN mission in Suez and expected that the brave Finnish servicemen would waltz in, solve the problem instantly and come home heroes. This is one of the reasons, in my opinion, why the press got so frustrated with the lack of progress and also one of the reasons they came down so hard on the servicemen that had put in their resignations.

Another reason the newspapers disapproved of the resignations was due to the picture many people had built of the Finnish servicemen in their minds. According to Pesola, the Finnish servicemen in Cyprus were seen by many as being the successors to the Finnish soldiers who had fought in WWII¹²⁰. As such, these resignations were not in-line with this picture and thus unacceptable and a disappointment. Personally I do not understand how one can compare a situation where you had to defend your own country, family, freedom and life to one where you have voluntarily gone to try and help another country solve its problems. The "motive" to carry on "fighting" is simply not the same.

I also believe that the press is at fault here for building up false expectations and never really understanding what a mission like this is really about, how hard it is on normal human beings and how long it can take to solve. You cannot expect to solve a fight that has gone on for centuries in the matter of three months just as you cannot expect normal human beings to always act "heroically" under very difficult situations. I hope this paper's final chapter will shed some light on why some servicemen decided to resign and what life was like serving in Cyprus.

¹¹⁸ Suomalaisilla rauhallinen viikko vihreällä linjalla, US 9.5.1964.

¹¹⁹ Kronlund-Valla 1996, p.147-149 and Tuomioja 2007, p.404.

¹²⁰ Pesola 2013, p.37.

6. Attitudes of the Finnish servicemen towards the mission

I have above described how and why coverage of the mission in Cyprus changed and tried to portray what the newspapers thought about the Finnish Battalion and the reasons why the servicemen went to Cyprus. I have also described what they thought of those servicemen that handed in their resignations. In his book, Alftan describes how the picture of the mission painted by the UN and the Finnish High Command was false¹²¹ and how the servicemen would many times laugh at what the newspapers had to say about them¹²². So, what did the soldiers themselves have to say? And also, what were some of the reasons behind the resignations?

6.1 What the soldiers thought

In the book “Suezilta Afganistaniin”¹²³, the author Rauli Virtanen has published a series of letters and cards serviceman Harri Nygren (father of a 4-month old daughter when he was sent to Cyprus) wrote to his wife whilst serving in Cyprus. These letters represent many of the feelings and thoughts many of the servicemen in Cyprus had. In these letters he talks about everyday life on the island, how he got to know GC’s and TC’s better, difficult situations he got into, his thoughts on war and love, the boredom he felt at times with everyday military tasks, his internal torment on leaving his young family behind (“Should I try to bring peace to the world, or to my home”) and the home-sickness he was experiencing. Nygren decided to apply to the mission because he was interested in the salary provided, he wanted to see the world and he believed this mission would give him a chance at a new career (as a professional soldier). For the purpose of this paper, I have chosen to quote a few of his letters (freely translated from Finnish), since I believe they give a good picture of the Finnish servicemen’s everyday life, thoughts and feelings:

¹²¹ Alftan 2014, p.209.

¹²² Ibid, p.259.

¹²³ Virtanen 2011.

20.5.1964: “Don’t people in Finland know that our job is to prevent war...It’s the politicians and Tuomioja’s job to stop it”¹²⁴. From here we can see the frustration felt towards criticism that the mission was a “failure” and also how the servicemen were not immune towards the general political situation.

22.5.1964: “First they kill one of ours (i.e. Matikainen) and then we carry on protecting them”¹²⁵. From here we can see how deeply Matikainen’s death had affected the morale of the servicemen and how feelings of injustice and resentment were born.

7.6.1964: “All kinds of men (GC’s and TC’s) are walking around with guns here and we can’t take those guns away from them”¹²⁶. From here we once again see how the servicemen were frustrated that they did not have the power to try to resolve the situation.

18.6.1964: “In the afternoon I gave our boys machine guns...they drove to the Greek positions and asked them if we should go ahead and have a firefight...they (the GC’s) didn’t want to”¹²⁷. From here we see how occasionally the servicemen vented their frustrations in questionable ways.

24.6.1964:”They (the servicemen) pay a pound (Cypriot currency) and get rid of their needs (for sex)”¹²⁸ and 7.7.1964: “One boy from Jyväskylä...fell asleep drunk at his guard-post and will probably face a court-marshal and be sent back to Finland”¹²⁹. These two letters show how extended periods of strict military regulations led to servicemen “releasing steam” through sex and drinking.

2.8.1964: “The people here...have started protesting against us...They don’t realize at all how we have managed to bring peace to our area...We aren’t given any more authority to take action and I’m losing faith in the UN”¹³⁰. This letter yet again shows how many times the servicemen felt a sense of injustice that their work was not being appreciated and frustration towards their lack of means to help solve the Cyprus situation.

¹²⁴ Virtanen 2011, p.66.

¹²⁵ Ibid, p.69.

¹²⁶ Ibid, p.71.

¹²⁷ Ibid, p.72.

¹²⁸ Ibid, p.73.

¹²⁹ Ibid, p.74.

¹³⁰ Ibid, p.76.

This frustration in not being able to use all means necessary to solve the problem can also be seen in an article published by HS on the 27.4.1964, in which the newspaper explains how many of the servicemen wondered why the UN doesn't use harder measures to resolve the situation and believed that all could be solved just by flattening a couple of villages¹³¹.

In 1996 and after a difficult operation ex-serviceman Harri Nygren was told by his doctor that writing about his experiences might help his recovery and so Nygren wrote (freely translated from Finnish): "Without UNFICYP Cyprus would have experienced a lot more fighting and bloodshed. The UN has secured and continues to secure peace in Cyprus".¹³²

In a recent interview in a local paper called Vihdin Uutiset on the 17.4.2014, Uolevi Sandell talked about his experiences in Cyprus. He commented on how the servicemen involved had always been highly regarded, how they realized when they got to the island that it won't end up being a "fun-trip" and how some had gone for adventure, or to get away from problems at home, but Cyprus was not to be the promised land for them. However, for him and many more it was a great once-in-a-lifetime experience.¹³³

Olavi Alkio on his behalf, in an interview in the local newspaper Perniönseudun Lehti on the 30.4.2014 commented that there was no student-loan system back then and he thought this would be a good way to earn money for his studies.¹³⁴

In the book "Rauhanturvaajat"¹³⁵, a number of Finnish servicemen who had served in Cyprus (in subsequent battalions sent to the island) wrote about their experiences. I decided to quote a few of these writings in this paper (freely translated from Finnish), since I believe that in these short-writings readers can find thoughts and feelings common to many servicemen who had been to Cyprus:

First Lieutenant Jarmo Virmavirta who served between fall '64 - spring '65 wrote: "Missions like Cyprus were very important for Finland and its army...they helped the army

¹³¹ Kyproksen aurinko poikiemme vaarallisin tuttavuus saarella, HS 27.4.1964.

¹³² Virtanen 2011, p.80.

¹³³ Koski, 2014.

¹³⁴ Perniönseudun Lehti 2014.

¹³⁵ Heikkinen 2006.

gain experience, be prepared and able to handle peacekeeping and civilian crisis' and defend Finland... "better-off countries (i.e. Finland) should help out other countries in trouble"¹³⁶.

Infantryman and driver Heikki Luoma who served between winter '66 - fall '67 wrote: "...it is embarrassing to remember, but in the beginning the locals were looked down upon as dirty thieves and cowards...the training officers later spent a lot of time teaching the servicemen how to think differently...but I do believe the Finnish servicemen were good UN-soldiers"¹³⁷.

Sergeant Pekka Hytönen who served between fall '67 - spring '68 wrote: "I was a young man looking for a good job...there were cases of disorder like the bar-riot (see below)...not all were ready for such a mission...but for me it helped me expand my world and prepare me for my future life"¹³⁸.

6.2 A nightmare for a few

In the spring of 1964, Finland had started preparations for involvement in UNFICYP, but the battalion to be sent had yet to be formed.¹³⁹ This led to the battalion having to be built-up at a pace faster than is usually the case. This in turn led to the recruitment of young and inexperienced (and in some cases unsuitable) servicemen. Many of the Finnish servicemen involved had never travelled abroad and did not fully understand what they were getting themselves involved in. Many were going to Cyprus for the wrong reasons (i.e. seeking adventure or a quick and easy paycheck). Alftan mentions how the soldiers were not properly briefed on the situation in Cyprus before they were sent there¹⁴⁰ and the battalion was many times not properly equipped¹⁴¹. For some of the servicemen initial feelings of excitement changed into a more cynical view of the situation they were in.

Out of experience, I can say that life in the military (especially during times of war, or unrest) is different to what anyone can imagine. You are young, away from loved ones,

¹³⁶ Ibid, p.29-34.

¹³⁷ Ibid, p.53-62.

¹³⁸ Heikkinen 2006, p.69-75.

¹³⁹ Kronlund-Valla 1996, p.158-176.

¹⁴⁰ Alftan 2014, p.19.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, p.164.

forced to obey orders that you many times find illogical, your freedom is restricted, you might be teased by fellow servicemen (or the people you are supposed to be protecting), you may not be allowed to use all means possible to solve a situation and the situation you are trying to solve just carries on and on. The mission is a constant day after day repetition of tedious and hard manual work (like building barricades) and exercises. You are forced to undergo hour after hour of guard duty in extreme heat (or cold) and mostly in the dark. Life is a stream of endless days of boredom followed by brief moments of life-threatening danger. You have nothing to do but are always afraid of what might happen next and you always have to be ready for war and death. You forget all about the surrounding world and become one with your battalion. There is no logic apart from the army logic and the war logic. And war is completely absurd. And sometimes you crack. This might come in the form of mass psychosis (where a group of people all end up doing or saying things they never would under normal circumstances e.g. see the paragraph further down this page concerning the bar-riot in 1967), or using substances to make you forget, or doing harm to yourself (or others). Communications officer Erkki Pihkala talks about how one Finnish serviceman shot himself after guard-duty just to get out of Cyprus¹⁴².

In his book, Alftan talks about the alcohol problem servicemen faced and about how many servicemen relieved “pressures” and tackled loneliness by visiting prostitutes. He also mentions how hopeless the mission was (he believed there could never be peace on the island).¹⁴³ Alftan carries on to talk about how the battalion’s leadership was at times not very good.¹⁴⁴

Pihkala also talks about how alcohol became a big problem to many Finnish servicemen. Some were sent to difficult guard-posts as punishment for alcohol-related offenses (i.e. causing trouble or falling asleep at their guard-post). Many servicemen were sent home if the offence were big enough. Many careers were destroyed as a result of over-abuse of alcohol.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴² Virtanen 2011, p.74.

¹⁴³ Alftan 2014, p.53-54.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, p.79 and 122.

¹⁴⁵ Virtanen 2011, p.66.

On the 17.12.1967, there was a riot in the bars of Nicosia.¹⁴⁶ A large number of Finnish servicemen, who believed that local bar-owners had mistreated them, destroyed a large amount of property as revenge. First Lieutenant Lauri Lehtimaja who served between fall '67 - spring 68 and was legal assistant in the defense of those charged after the bar-riot wrote (freely translated from Finnish)¹⁴⁷: “this mission includes lots of factors that slowly and unnoticeably warp the men’s views on what is right or wrong and what is acceptable behavior and what is not...the situation in Cyprus after November 1967 got bad...the servicemen’s freedom of movement was restricted...there were limited places for them (i.e. the cabaret area in Nicosia) to go and let some steam out...after being mistreated by locals they were encouraged by officers to react...rank (and situation and alcohol) prevailed over sense...the officers should be held responsible for the servicemen’s action...”.

7. The view of the press in Cyprus in 1974

7.1 The Turkish Invasion

After the events of 1963-1964 there followed a series of unsuccessful attempts at mediation (between the parties involved), first by the British government and then by the (then US President Lyndon Johnson) Johnson administration which sent Under Secretary of State George W. Ball to the region¹⁴⁸. In order to bring the crisis under control and pre-empt its internationalization which might open the way to Soviet interference, London and Washington proposed a peace keeping force under NATO command. Makarios rejected this proposal.

Former U.S Secretary of State and advisor on foreign policy to the U.S government Dean Acheson (asked by President Johnson to help find a solution to the Cyprus problem) then tried to persuade Greece and Turkey to accept partition – double-enosis, confederation, or

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, p82-85.

¹⁴⁷ Heikkinen 2006, p.83-91

¹⁴⁸ Stefanidis, 2007

federation. The events in Cyprus and the Acheson plan (that was rejected) brought about a fresh bout of anti-American, anti-NATO and pro-Soviet feelings in Greece¹⁴⁹.

At the same time Makarios was approaching the Soviet Union with the hope that he would receive backing and push the matter towards a UN solution, or at least help to maintain independency. In the end, he was able to help in the setting up of the decision made by the UN to send troops to Cyprus and the UN General Assembly resolution of 1965 that recognized the Republic of Cyprus and its right to enjoy full sovereignty and complete independence without any foreign intervention, or interference.

However EOKA leader Georgios Grivas, as commander of the Cypriot National Guard, who took his orders from the military junta in Athens (that run Greece at the time), had other plans. He worked with covert sections of the US government and his extreme-right views and actions endangered the relationship of Makarios with the Soviet Union and the independence of the island itself with Turkey looming large. To him the enemy was the left and Turkey and the goal was enosis – independence was not enough.

The Soviet Union had previously supported the Papandreou government in Greece and Makarios in Cyprus. After the right-wing led military junta in Greece in 1967 this support waned and the Soviets started to believe that whether it was the Greeks, or the Turks that won a potential direct confrontation, the result would have been the same - it would probably result in Cyprus becoming an official NATO base either as a result of double-union with Greece and Turkey, or of outright conquest by Turkey - and so they did not take sides but maintained their support of independence on the island. However, the Soviet stance was enough to ensure that caution was to be put before any political or military move.

The US on the other hand followed a policy of ensuring its self-interests. Turkey was a stronger ally against the Russians – but public opinion leaned towards the Greek position and the US did not want to see Greece “fall” to the Russians. And so independence, or some sort of partition, seemed to be the best solution. The British government’s main concern was to maintain the control of its sovereign bases in Cyprus.

¹⁴⁹ Stefanidis, 2007

The Turkish side wanted to ensure its interests in Cyprus are served and that under no circumstances will the whole island be joined to Greece. Greece and its military junta (and public opinion) was in favor of enosis – the whole island joining Greece.

The TC favored partition, but not joining Turkey. In the GC public opinion had always favored enosis – though the left-side was also content with independence. Makarios himself tried to balance between public opinion and political realities – but he did have a change in opinion and heart when it came to the possibility of a NATO-led solution. He did not want Cyprus to join NATO – because he was afraid that this would have split the island up and end any hopes of a unitary Cyprus – enosis, or no enosis. In the end his dreams and aspirations always included the island remaining intact and not splitting up into pieces. He would have wanted enosis – but not if it meant partition. He preferred independence to that. However, as leader of the GC, he did aim to strengthen his own community's position no matter what the outcome.

As the situation carried on, the US started weighing up 3 different options: a unitary state protected against Turkish intervention and with freedom to opt later for enosis, full autonomy for the TC under the protection of Turkey, or a compromise between these extreme views. For the time being though, they believed the best policy was to preserve the status quo and slowly attempt to work towards a permanent solution.

But no solution was to be found and the conflict between the two communities continued. And so in 1971 Grivas formed EOKA-B – in his opinion the successor to EOKA that had fought against the British for independence. EOKA-B followed an ultra-right-wing nationalistic ideology and had the ultimate goal of achieving union (enosis) with Greece.

EOKA-B not only ruthlessly targeted the TC community, but also people of the left-wing it deemed to be “traitors to the cause”, since the left-wing had adopted a more careful approach and was inclined towards keeping the island as an independent nation made up of two communities, as opposed to openly supporting an enosis that might lead to eventual partition, or even worse, Turkish occupation. My own grandfather had to hide in a hole he had dug in the ground in the yard of his house (and covered with branches and leaves) in order to avoid being caught and shot by EOKA-B – just because he was a member of the left-wing party.

And so after years of intercommunal strife and failed attempts at political resolution the (US-backed) Turkish invasion of Cyprus was launched on the 20th of July 1974, following the Cypriot coup d'état on 15 July 1974.

The coup mentioned above had been ordered by the military Junta in Greece and staged by the Cypriot National Guard in conjunction with EOKA-B and Grivas. It deposed the Cypriot president Archbishop Makarios III and installed Nikos Sampson.

The Turkish forces landed in Cyprus on 20 July and captured 3% of the island before a ceasefire was declared. The Greek military junta collapsed and was replaced by a civilian government. Following the breakdown of peace talks, another Turkish invasion in August 1974 resulted in the capture of approximately 36% of the island. The ceasefire line from August 1974 became the United Nations Buffer Zone in Cyprus and is commonly referred to as the Green Line. This line continues to exist to this day as does the reality of an island still separated – a recognized independent Republic of Cyprus to the south where the GC community lives and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus - a de facto state recognized officially only by Turkey.

7.2 Changing situations

But how did the press in Cyprus view the UN forces in the period just before the invasion and immediately after the invasion? Had opinions changed since the previous period in 1964 examined earlier in this paper?

Turkey invaded Cyprus on Saturday, 20th July 1974. Troops landed shortly before dawn at the town of Kyrenia on the northern coast meeting resistance from Greek and Greek Cypriot forces. Ankara said that it was invoking its right under the Treaty of Guarantee to protect the Turkish Cypriots and guarantee the independence of Cyprus. This treaty is part of the Treaty of Nicosia signed on 16th of August 1960 concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus¹⁵⁰. The parties signing the treaty undertook to guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and not to promote the union of Cyprus

¹⁵⁰ www.peacemaker.un.org

with other states, or the partition of the island. By the time the UN Security Council was able to obtain a ceasefire on the 22nd of July the Turkish forces were in command of a narrow path between Kyrenia and Nicosia, about 3% of the territory of Cyprus.

On 01.08.1974 HAR reports how the Turkish side were willing to accept the establishment of a neutral UN zone but were not ready to accept any attempt by the UN to monitor its troops (and make sure the ceasefire was being followed). Also the Turkish side were refusing to allow UNFICYP forces to enter the occupied area in order to help those Cypriots in need there¹⁵¹.

Also on 01.08.1974 AGO reports how UNFICYP is patrolling the borders established during the cease-fire and providing supplies to those in need together with the Red Cross movement. During the tragic events 1 member of the UNFICYP force was killed and 22 injured – 2 of which were Finnish soldiers¹⁵².

On 02.08.1974 HAR reports in a positive tone how the Soviet Union is attempting to convince other nations to increase the role of the UN in Cyprus and looking into the possibility of including troops from socialist countries in the UNFICYP force¹⁵³. HAR on the same day also in a positive tone reports how the UNFICYP are monitoring all movements and actions made by Turkish troops that are in violation with the agreed-upon ceasefire. These movements and related shooting incidents were reported by the GC side to the US secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger¹⁵⁴.

On 02.08.1974 FIL reports how the foreign ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom met and agreed upon a set of measures. These included the stabilization of the current situation, the adherence to the agreed-upon ceasefire, the importance of a permanent solution to the situation and the continuing further involvement of the SC, UN and UNFICYP in the situation¹⁵⁵.

On 03.08.1974 MAX reports that the Secretary-General (SG) of the UN Kurt Waldheim has instructed the leader of the UNFICYP forces Major General Chand to carry out its

¹⁵¹ To chroniko tis tragodias, HAR, 01.08.1974.

¹⁵² O er.stavros, AGO, 01.08.1974

¹⁵³ Megalytero rolo, HAR, 02.08.1974

¹⁵⁴ Synehizoun, HAR, 02.08.1974

¹⁵⁵ Tis Genevis, FIL, 02.08.1974

duties according to the new SC resolution 355. On his behalf Major General Chand told both sides to not allow further shooting incidents between the two sides to occur¹⁵⁶.

ALI reports on the 05.08.1974 that the Turkish forces are making it very difficult for the UNFICYP troops to carry out their tasks. The UNFICYP troops are being pushed out of agreed upon positions, are not being allowed to patrol, are not being allowed to take supplies to those in need and are not being given information on prisoners of war (or “hostages” as the GC side classifies them) and missing people¹⁵⁷.

HAR on the 06.08.1974 in a thankful but very worried tone writes about how the UNFICYP is trying its best to help people, ensure the cease-fire conditions are upheld and find out about prisoners and hostages in the Keryneia area. Investigations are also being made into allegations of widespread looting by the Turkish forces in the occupied areas¹⁵⁸.

HAR on 10.08.1974 reports on how a further 278 officers and men from Finland joined the existing Finnish UNFICYP troops bringing the total to 600 personnel¹⁵⁹.

On the 14th of August 1974 Turkey launched its "Second Peace Operation", which resulted in the Turkish occupation of 37% of Cyprus. In the process, many Greek Cypriots became refugees. The number of refugees is estimated to have been between 140 000-160 000 (the GC population of Cyprus in 1974 was estimated to have been about 500 000). About 40 000 emigrated from Cyprus between 1974-1976¹⁶⁰. GC casualties of the war have been estimated to have been 6 000 dead, 12 000 wounded and over 2 000 missing that are presumed dead. The UNFICYP forces suffered 9 deaths and injuries to 65 people. HAR reports on the 22.08.1974 that the situation is tragic. On the occupied side Turkish troops and members of the TC community are looting, destroying, raping and killing. HAR states that the United Kingdom (UK) is very critical of the Turkish side and are demanding that things are resolved before the situation worsens¹⁶¹.

¹⁵⁶ H UNFICYP, MAX, 03.08.1974

¹⁵⁷ Katalogos, ALI, 05.08.1974

¹⁵⁸ Anisyhia, HAR, 06.08.1974

¹⁵⁹ Oi Finlandoi eirineytes, HAR, 10.08.1974

¹⁶⁰ www.kypros.org

¹⁶¹ Simainei to teos ton Inomenon Ethnon, HAR, 22.08.1974

FIL on the 23.08.1974 states that the SG of the UN Kurt Waldheim and the GC side are frustrated since the Turkish forces are not allowing the free movement throughout the occupied areas of UNFICYP and Red Cross personnel despite Turkey having agreed to these measures¹⁶². On the same day AGO reports very enthusiastically that Waldheim stated that the UNFICYP forces will not be leaving despite this being Turkey's desire¹⁶³.

On the 27.08.1974 FIL reports how the Turkish side claim that Swedish members of the UNFICYP have been looting occupied areas. FIL is strongly of the opinion that this is nothing else than an attempt by the Turkish side to undermine the UNFICYP and the work it is trying to do¹⁶⁴.

In an article published on the 28.08.1974 in FIL, then president of the GC side of Cyprus Mr. Glafcos Klerides states how it is the wish of the GC side that not only should UNFICYP remain on the island, but its forces and scope should be largened and he stated his wish was that hopefully they could also be used to throw out all Turkish troops from the island¹⁶⁵.

On the 30.08.1974 FIL reports that the GC refugees of war are asking for the UN Security Council to send representatives to Cyprus to see the tragic situation of the island, help those left stranded (and find those missing) on the TC side and help avoid a possible genocide of the GC community¹⁶⁶.

As can be seen in the researched newspaper articles above, there was a large shift in public opinion and sentiment between 1964 and 1974. One could cynically be of the opinion that of course opinions change when you are faced with a disaster and need help. However, that should not overshadow the fact that over the years UNFICYP had performed a good job and helped both communities (GC and TC) through an extremely difficult (and yet resolved) period of its history. In 1974 not only did the GC community want the UNFICYP to remain – they also openly secretly wanted to extend the scope of their mission.

¹⁶² O Baldhaim, FIL, 23.08.1974

¹⁶³ Den apohoroun oi OHedes, AGO, 23.08.1974

¹⁶⁴ Tourkikon ishirismon kata Souidon ths OUNFIKYP, FIL, 27.08.1974

¹⁶⁵ Allagi tw n orwn entolis tis OUNFIKYP zhte i Kypros, FIL, 28.08.1974

¹⁶⁶ Zhtoun thn apostolin klimakiou tou OHE eis thn Kypron, FIL, 30.08.1974

8. Conclusions and further research

In Finland, the general press had conflicting views on the involvement of the Finnish troops in Cyprus in 1964. Although proud that Finland is involved in helping to bring peace to the world (despite at times not fully agreeing with endangering Finnish lives in “far-away and dangerous” places, especially after the first Finnish casualty occurred), the general press at times portrayed the soldiers as nothing more than young men in search of a holiday in the sun and a good wage. The general press was also highly critical of the high rate of resignation applications put in by Finnish soldiers after the first few months of their deployment. In general, press opinions in Finland in 1964 varied according to the newspapers’ political affiliation and over time. Liberal HS was conservative and had a somewhat reluctant view of the mission. The paper’s approach and outlook remained fairly similar throughout the period examined. Right-wing US was in favor of the mission and proud of the soldiers involved. Over time and as the situation in Cyprus remained the same the paper became frustrated at the mission’s lack of progress. US also disapproved of the large amount of resignations handed in and expressed its disappointment. KU was against the whole mission, but its position softened after the death of the first Finnish serviceman. What was obvious though, was how these newspapers did not fully understand the difficulties of the mission and how these difficulties could understandably lead to a certain amount of servicemen handing in their resignations.

As to the servicemen, many of them did not fully understand the situation they were getting themselves into. Some believed it would be an easy task, some were interested in a good pay-check and some went seeking adventure. During the course of their stay (and as the reality of the mission’s difficulties set in) some servicemen became disappointed, some turned out to be unsuitable for a mission of this kind, some turned to alcohol, some missed home and family too much, some made mistakes and some became cynical and disheartened with the whole assignment. This in turn led to a number of resignation requests. I personally understand how the mission itself, serving in a battalion under war-conditions and the difficulties faced in Cyprus can have a negative effect on many normal human beings and understand why many wanted to leave. On the whole though, the Finnish peacekeeping

force (taking into consideration the situation) performed well over the years, helped keep peace on the island and this mission was to become an invaluable experience and fond memory for most of the servicemen involved and a matter of pride, experience and source of good reputation for the Finnish army itself.

In Cyprus, the right-wing became more adamant in its demand for non-intervention and Enosis (i.e. union with Greece) and the liberals and left-wing (even though they too originally had supported Enosis) adopted a more neutral stance and expressed their hope that the UN force would help stop the violence and help form a solution that possibly would involve Cyprus becoming an independent country. This deep schism in opinions was one of the main reasons behind the eventual coup d'état in 1974 by right-wing forces, which in turn led to the invasion and occupation of around 37% of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974.

The Turkish invasion changed opinions on the presence of the UN in Cyprus. After the Turkish invasion UNFICYP played a vital role in ensuring peaceful and stable conditions, ensuring that agreed upon matters (UN resolutions and peace-talks) were upheld and ensuring that innocent lives were helped and protected. And so the GC community embraced the UNFICYP forces and appreciated the work they were doing. Over the years and despite the difficulties the Cold War-era brought along with it, the UN (in addition to implementing resolutions and being part of peace-talks) managed to develop its resources and troops into an effective, highly-respected and appreciated peace-keeping force.

Before concluding this paper it must be mentioned that there were areas that I did not research. I was not able to include the Turkish-Cypriot community's views on the matter, due to limited access to relevant material and language barriers. Furthermore, I would have liked to examine the political issues involved in more depth and conduct interviews of people from all sides of this situation in order to get a better picture of the whole situation. Finally, as regards to the servicemen themselves, I did not go too deeply into the issue of soldier-& war-psychology and how this affects individuals, groups and their decisions and actions. All of these issues are subjects that I intend to examine further in future research papers I write on this topic.

Throughout this paper there is probably one thought that readers might have had. Was there at any point a chance that the two communities could have, left alone, found a way to live

together in harmony – or to together decide the fate of the island. Without having lived during those times it is hard to say what people really felt. It would also turn into a game of “what-ifs”? Maybe the historical bonds between the two communities might not have been enough. According to Papadakis (2006) some measure of responsibility should be placed on the Western powers for this. Had the West not required the Greeks to see themselves as the heroic defenders of Europe against the evils of the Ottoman Empire the Greeks might have preserved parts of their traditional culture instead of banishing it as “Turkish”, or “Slavic”.

Perhaps left alone things would have been different. Perhaps Cyprus fell victim to the notorious British divide-and-rule strategy. Perhaps the outcome would have followed different routes but ended up the same. Perhaps.

For the purpose of emphasizing how Cyprus and its two communities were nothing but chess pawns on the great power chessboard, I would like to end this paper with an excerpt (Hanhimäki 2003) from a conversation between then US president Gerald Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President of Indonesia Suharto in 1975 deciding on the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in order to prevent a leftist takeover. SUHARTO – “...We want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid, or drastic action”. FORD – “We will understand and not press you on the issue. We understand the problem you have and the intentions you have”. KISSINGER – “We appreciate that the use of US-made arms could create problems (this was a response to Suharto asking for permission that the arms used be of US design but produced in Indonesia)”. FORD – “We could have technical and legal problems. You are familiar, Mr. President, with the problems we had in Cyprus although this situation is different”. KISSINGER – “It depends on how we construe it; whether it is self-defense or a foreign operation. It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly. We would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens after we return...”.

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