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On the Legacy of Lutheranism in Finland

Societal Perspectives

Edited by
Kaius Sinnemäki, Anneli Portman, Jouni Tilli and Robert H. Nelson

Studia Fennica
Historica

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Historica 25

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Preface

This volume is a collection of chapters written by members of the research network Protestant Roots of Finnish National Identities (or ProFini2017 for short). The network consisted of roughly 50 scholars from many different disciplines within the social sciences and humanities, who were interested in gauging the societal effects of the Reformation on Finnish society as a way of honouring in 2017 the first centennial of Finland's independence and the fifth centennial since the beginning of the Reformation. Most of the chapters in the volume have been presented at the network's meetings and events since August 2014, most notably the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies symposium 'Legacy of the Reformation: Law, Economy, Education' in February 2016. The network's main work period was 2014–2017, but some aspects, such as the completion of this volume, have continued until 2019.

The idea for ProFini2017 was born in the spring of 2014 in discussions between Kaius Sinnemäki and Anneli Portman, when we realized that 2017 marks 500 years since the beginning of the Reformation and 100 years since the independence of Finland. Robert H. Nelson joined this core group at an early stage and Jouni Tilli later that year. At the time, Sinnemäki and Nelson were fellows at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies. The support for the project by the director of the Collegium, Professor Sami Pihlström, was crucial at the initial stages. Encouragement from Professors Henrik Meinander, Pirjo Markkola, and Risto Saarinen was also very important at this point. The first meeting of the network, where we presented our initial plans, was organized in August. We organized several seminars and symposia during 2014–2017 in collaboration with the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, the Department of History and Ethnology at the University of Jyväskylä, the Finnish Institute in Rome, the Church Research Institute of Finland, Think Corner at the University of Helsinki, Turku Centre for Medieval and Early Modern Studies, Reformation 500, Finland 100, the Westermarck Society, the Finnish Psychological Society, the Finnish Society of Church History, and the CoPassion and CoCare projects of the Faculty of Theology at the University of Helsinki. We are grateful for the collaboration at various levels, the discussions and comments from the participants of the meetings we arranged, and the encouragement and criticism given along the way from too many persons for us to thank separately. For financial

and institutional support, we would like to thank the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, the Department of Languages at the University of Helsinki, the Department of History and Ethnology at the University of Jyväskylä, the Church Research Institute of Finland, the Federation of Finnish Learned Societies, and the CoPassion and CoCare projects of the Faculty of Theology at the University of Helsinki.

This book has been in the making for almost five years. We are grateful to the authors for their contributions, persistent and smooth work, and collaboration along the way. Anonymous referees provided constructive criticism, which helped to improve the manuscript considerably. We would also like to thank the roughly two dozen colleagues who acted as referees for individual chapters during the editing process. Special thanks also to Alina Laine for help in editing the bibliographies.

We would also like to mention two more technical issues. First, since this volume brings together authors from many different disciplines, we have allowed some already established terminological diversity to remain. As an example, the terms 'priest' and 'pastor' are used as synonyms in this volume. The term 'priest' is often used in some countries, such as Finland and Sweden, while elsewhere the normal term is 'pastor.' Because of such already existing diversity we have not aimed at unifying this terminology here. Second, we have given the authors freedom to use different versions of the Bible in their chapters. To the best of our knowledge, two versions of the Bible are referred to, namely, the King James Version and the New Revised Standard Version. The version referred to is specified upon quotation.

We received the sad news on December 15, 2018 that one of the editors, Robert H. Nelson, had passed away. Bob, as everyone called him, was on one of many research visits made to the University of Helsinki over the past five years. Tragically he passed away on his last day of his visit, a day after many of us met to celebrate the work we had done and to officially wrap up the network. We were fortunate to have Bob collaborate with us over the years and to know him not only as a colleague but also as a friend. His contribution in this book is obvious in the articles he authored but also in the editing he did for many of the chapters. His friendship and humour will be sorely missed.

Helsinki September 18, 2019
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The Legacy of Lutheranism in a Secular Nordic Society: An Introduction

The religious turn in the social sciences and the humanities

The enlightenment and its legacy

The history of human societies is a complex web of continuations, radical changes, and aborted paths. Societies at any moment of time are to some extent reflections of their historical legacies, sometimes with surprisingly deep historical dependencies as culture and values are passed on from one generation to the next.[1] In the West, Christianity was the dominant religious influence on civilization for almost 1,500 years, from Constantine to the Enlightenment. The traditional and self-understanding scientific narrative has stressed that the Enlightenment is the crucial juncture in the development of modern societies, as societies abandoned overtly religious beliefs and traditions. But while such junctures point to future paths of change, they may exhibit greater continuities than scholars tend to realize.

Since the Enlightenment the influence of Christianity has thus been widely contested by new systems of thinking, such as rationalism and individualism, which have often regarded Christianity as the legacy of an ignorant past. Instead, for increasing numbers since the 18th century, the Enlightenment meant the dawn of a new era grounded in the truths of Science. By the 20th century, such views were triumphant over much of the Western world, including Finland and other Nordic countries. Unlike some nations where traditional religion was condemned outright, the Nordic countries, however, never abolished their historic Lutheran inheritance altogether. Large majority of the populations of these countries continued as members of the Lutheran church up to the present time as Lutheranism found ways to adapt to numerous societal changes.[2] Lutheranism has retained its importance as a national historical and cultural symbol of the

1 Norris & Inglehart (2011).
2 See especially the chapters by Huttunen; Ihalainen (this volume).

origins of the Nordic nations, even as it was not considered a practical guide to most major private and public decisions and actions.

In matters of private cultural practice and public governance, the Nordic nations instead looked to economics, psychology, sociology, and other social sciences for their new forms of guidance and direction. Such developments in the Nordic countries and elsewhere since the Enlightenment were commonly described as expressing a growing secularization of Western society that went hand in hand with increasing modernization. Central changes leading to modern societies, such as civil society, equality, mass education, and freedom of religion, were explained via economic development, urbanization, industrialization, the formation of non-governmental organizations, or secular rationalism. But not religion, which has generally remained outside the mainstream of academic research. Yet the separation of religious and secular domains in modern societies does not entail that they become irreligious; quite the contrary: as argued by the historian Pasi Ihalainen, such societies 'may still remain deeply religious in character.'[3]

At the heart of the Enlightenment vision had been a transcendent vision of the assured rapid scientific and economic progress of the modern world. The Nordic countries themselves in the 20th century became leading world symbols of the remarkable social transformations that were occurring as a result of the applications of modern science and economics. Rising from a poverty-stricken Nordic past as recently as the 19th century, the Nordic countries in the 20th century achieved some of the highest standards of living in the world. Partly for this reason, the Enlightenment vision of transcendent human social and economic progress had probably a greater influence in the Nordic countries than in any other nations of the world.

But a turning point in this process began to take place beginning in the 1960s. The supposed triumph of secularism began to seem less assured and indeed many people would turn away from it in the following decades. It was probably the result in part of an increasing recognition that modern science and economics was a double-edged sword; it could lead towards heaven on earth by way of decreasing poverty and evils that go with it, but it could conceivably also lead to hell on earth: the wars, mass killings, and many terrible things that happened in the first half of the 20th century were a profound shock to progressive belief. It was difficult at best to reconcile progressive optimism with an event such as the holocaust – the mass extermination using 'modern' scientific and economic methods of many millions of Jews and Romani and other minorities. Indeed, secular rationality could not begin to comprehend how such a thing as the holocaust had occurred in a historically leading Western nation in the 20th century. In the ensuing discussion the idea of 'original sin' in its Christian statements was not revived but it was impossible to ignore the fact that human beings had seemed to include, besides a large capacity for doing good in the world, also surprisingly strong tendencies towards mass depravity within themselves.

3 Ihalainen (this volume).

Twentieth century secularism was also challenged on other fronts. The social sciences proved less scientific than had been expected in the positivist tradition.[4] Apparently there were no clear discoverable scientific laws of economics, for instance, that could be capable of guiding national economies on a continuously rising rapid upward path of growth – an awkward doubt reemphasized by the major and largely unpredicted sharp economic downturn of 2008 and 2009. One reflection of a growing challenge to this progressive confidence in science and economics was the more recent displacement of the social democratic parties – the leading Nordic spokesmen for Nordic progressive modern values – from a position of almost complete political dominance that they had held from the end of World War II into the 1970s. Since then the Nordic welfare state has been in successive crises and welfare services have been increasingly provided by the private sector and civil society.[5]

At the height of secular ascendency, it was assumed that religion was a relic of the past that would fade and indeed disappear altogether in the not so distant future. It has not. Although church attendance has steadily decreased in general, religion is obviously back on the agenda. In public discussion religion has entered the scene more visibly especially after 2001 both in Finland and elsewhere.[6] Fundamentalist religion has also been on the rise in many parts of the world further jarring secular progressive optimism. For instance, in the United States attendance at the mainline progressive Protestant churches has declined precipitously from the 1960s but attendance at evangelical and fundamentalist churches has surged. The spread of terrorism motivated by fundamentalist Islam has been a particularly stark reminder that religion does not seem to be going away.

The recent influx of asylum seekers also to Nordic countries has further accelerated the need to understand religion. However, in Finland the discussion has still focused mostly on the religiosity of the others, the newcomers, and how to address it in a secular society. There has been much less discussion on the continuing religiosity of our own societies. The media occasionally raises issues related to Lutheranism and its role in Finnish national identity,[7] but generally it has not reflected or problematized what Lutheranism means and what its societal influences are. Some new reflections on these issues, however, have begun to emerge in 2017 as a response to the 500th anniversary of the Reformation.[8]

4 Nelson (2001).

5 See Grönlund (this volume). It is true, as one reviewer points out, that other factors are also involved in the crisis of the welfare state, such as the development of the medical sciences and the ensuing huge increase in the cost of medication for welfare services. Our aim here is not to evaluate the relative strengths of the different factors involved in the crisis of welfare, but to argue that secularism and the progressive confidence in economics have been challenged on multiple fronts – the crisis in welfare services is just one reflection of those challenges.

6 See e.g., Fish (2005); Habermas (2006); Helander & Räsänen (2007); de Hart, Dekker & Halman (2013); Huttunen (2015).

7 E.g., *Helsingin Sanomat*, September 13, 2015.

8 E.g., *Helsingin Sanomat*, October 29, 2017, its main editorial October 31, 2017, and the *Helsingin Sanomat* Theme magazine 2/2017.

When the societal influences of religion have been researched in social sciences, they have tended to be framed critically. For instance, Michel Foucault argued that modern biopolitics, that is, the political power over life, has been developed on the basis of Christianity and rooted in pastoral power.[9] This idea has been used to show how, for example, Lutheran theology (e.g., Table of Duties) was an integral part of the Danish colonialization of Greenland and the ensuing transformation of the identity of the indigenous Inuit population.[10] Yet while there is much social injustice to blame for Christianity, not all evils – and not all good societal things for that matter – can be attributed to it. For one, the roots of modern biopolitics, as recently demonstrated by the political scientist Mika Ojakangas, are in ancient Greece and Christians have mostly objected to it in any form. Lutheranism, on the other hand, removed some of the obstacles to it when subjugated by the state, although it also mostly continued to object to biopolitics.[11]

The loss since the 1960s of full progressive confidence in the future has left an intellectual vacuum also in Finnish life. It is no longer clear that faith in science and economics will be capable of providing the value foundations that the Nordic countries will depend upon for a sustainable and happy future. On the contrary, populism has been on the rise across Europe and including the Nordic countries. Faith in scientific expertise is decreasing, and recently Nordic governments have also tended to cut funding of science – more so in Finland than in the other Nordic countries, possibly because of the neoliberal policies driven by the current Finnish government. New intellectual responses and directions are thus being explored across the Nordic academic world and in other places, if showing few signs of any emerging consensus in these countries.

Academic revival of interest in religion

One sign of the new directions is a revival of interest in the role of religion in the historical development of the Nordic countries, including Finland. For much of the 20th century, this role was largely overlooked in social sciences and humanities research in Finland,[12] much more so than for instance in Britain, the Netherlands, and recently in Sweden. Research on the possible societal effects of religion has been mostly limited to writers in the area of theology, while other disciplines have not typically dealt with this issue in their working paradigms.

In theology the religious dimensions of society have naturally been addressed, such as religious education, values, civil society, and social work done by the church. Especially since the recession of the 1990s in Finland, theologians and the leadership of the Church have argued for the Lutheran value basis of a welfare society (e.g., the 1999 statement by the bishops of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland)[13]. However, there has not been

9 Foucault (2007).
10 Petterson (2014).
11 See Ojakangas (2015, 2016). See also Hagman (this volume).
12 See e.g., Hjelm (2008); Poulter (2013).
13 Suomen evankelis-luterilaisen kirkon piispat (1999).

any systematic scholarly research on the wider impact of Lutheranism on Finnish society, although isolated contributions do exist.[14]

As a result, Nordic scholars in general do not have a clear understanding of what role religion has played in the formation of modern Nordic societies. Religion has been epistemologically a blind spot, as claimed by the comparatist Daniel Weidner about religion in humanities research.[15] As for Finland, an educated Finn might readily affirm that of course Lutheranism has had an influence on Finnish society. When pressed and asked how so and in what ways, the first – and typically the only answer – may refer to the historically prominent role of the church and the traditionally close bond between the church and the state. But deeper influences on contemporary society are not usually recognized.

As a sign of changing times, however, over the past 15 years there has been a growing scholarly attention to the Lutheran past itself and to the direct historic role of the Lutheran Church in earlier centuries in shaping private and public practices that often continue in Finland today. Even more recently, there has been a new recognition that Lutheranism may have continued to strongly influence – implicitly more often than explicitly – the basic thinking and institutional forms of modern Finland and other Nordic countries.

This new trend in Nordic research is part of a wider ongoing change in social sciences and humanities research across the world. The American literary theorist Stanley Fish commented in a famous 2005 piece that in academia it is now religion 'where the action is.'[16] This growing recognition has accelerated since then. For instance, leading European philosophers, such as Jürgen Habermas, have acknowledged the positive role of religion in society.[17] Recent historical and social science research has increasingly argued in particular that the Reformation and its legacy have influenced modern democratic societies more than they have thus far realized – especially areas such as the welfare state, systems of law, mass education, and gender equality in the Nordic countries as well as other parts of the world.[18] These large influences are quite unexpected from the point of view of the previously dominant secularization thesis and, therefore, require more detailed attention.

Research on religion has actually become one of the most current themes across different disciplines, such as political philosophy[19] and human rights.[20] This shift in research agenda concerning society and culture has

14 Hallamaa (1999); Saarinen (2005); Kirkon tutkimuskeskus (2015); Markkola & Naumann (2014).
15 Weidner (2012).
16 Fish (2005).
17 Habermas (2006).
18 E.g., Van Kersbergen & Manow (2009); Norris & Inglehart (2011); Tröhler (2011); Nelson (2012); Woodberry (2012); Arneson & Wittrock, eds, (2012); Christoffersen et al. (2010); Ojakangas (2015).
19 Taylor (2007).
20 Banchoff & Wuthnow (2011).

been branded a 'theological turn,' 'sociotheological turn,' or 'religious turn,'[21] and it has given birth to new and interesting research paradigms, such as economic theology.[22] There are, of course, differences in the developments in different disciplines and countries but despite these differences there seems to be a general trend of bringing religion in a new way from the periphery to the core of humanities and social sciences research.[23]

In Finland and other Nordic countries there is also an increasing number of publications that focus on the social impact of some aspect of religion – and much of this research is done by non-theologians. Some of these publications include the discussions on the welfare state and Lutheranism by Pirjo Markkola and her colleagues,[24] the evaluation of values in the speeches of Finland's rulers by Anneli Portman,[25] the critical evaluation of the Lutheran clergymen's role in the Continuation War by Jouni Tilli,[26] the application of the Weberian thesis to contemporary national differences in Europe by Robert Nelson,[27] and the recent Nordic discussion on the secularity of law.[28] However, this renewed focus on the history of religion in Finland and the Nordic countries is still relatively meagre compared to other Western countries, such as the Netherlands and Great Britain, and there is thus much room for advancing this discussion.[29]

This book is an outgrowth of these recent trends. It explores in various specific areas, such as contemporary education, law, and national values, the continuing powerful influence – both direct and indirect – of the Lutheran heritage of Finland. Some of the most important ways in which Lutheranism continues to influence events in Finland today are no longer communicated explicitly through the historic Lutheran messages and institutions. The most powerful form of Lutheranism, as one might say, is an unconscious Lutheranism. This could be regarded religiously in one of two ways; 1. as the birth of a brand new secular religion out of the old Lutheranism or 2. as a transformation within mainstream Lutheranism itself from a 'traditional Lutheranism' to a new form of 'secular Lutheranism' with similar societal outcomes.

Our assumption is that for researching societal effects of religion, the most productive starting point is to approach religion as a sociocultural institution. Typically, religion has been understood as traditional organized religion that is marked by participation in religious activities and by the usage of overtly religious linguistic tags, such as Creator, sin, congregation, etc. Such understanding of religion, however, may mask beliefs, behaviour, and principles that are equally religious but that cannot be so easily recognized

21 E.g., Gane (2008); Juergensmeyer (2013); Weidner (2012).
22 E.g., Dean (2019).
23 Nelson (2017a).
24 E.g., Markkola (2002); Markkola & Naumann (2014).
25 Portman (2014).
26 Tilli (2012, 2014).
27 Nelson (2012).
28 Christoffersen et al. (2010).
29 E.g., Woodhead & Catto (2012).

using easy catch-words or surface-level analysis of people's behaviour.[30] The religion scholar Sophie Gilliat-Ray's observation captures this idea well: 'some of the richest insights into contemporary religious life are to be found outside formal congregations, away from religious buildings, and in perhaps the most "unlikely" secular institutions.'[31] Our approach to religion reflects this line of thinking and is thus reminiscent of anthropological research, which has criticized more traditional definitions of religion.[32]

Two Protestant ethics?

Weber's focus on Calvinism

In 1904 and 1905 Max Weber published a two-part article in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* that would become the seminal book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.[33] That book continues to influence contemporary economics and social science.[34] Recent trends towards a greater interest in the role of religion in forming modern Nordic societies can be seen as turning back – at least for inspiration – to Weber's original efforts in this area. The great influence of *The Protestant Ethic* has been a source of confusion in one important respect, however: Weber was not actually writing about a general 'Protestant ethic.' Rather, the great majority of Weber's analyses and case examples were taken from the history of Calvinism and other Reformed denominations. The American theologian Max Stackhouse wrote that in *The Protestant Ethic* Weber focused on the social and economic impact of 'Puritan attitudes as well as the later (Baptist and Methodist) traditions influenced by them.'[35] To Lutheranism he paid little attention.

Despite many similarities Luther's writings were less supportive than Calvin's for the development of capitalism. Indeed, Luther was often fiercely critical of a market economy driven by the self-interested drive for profit.[36] Luther in his own time, moreover, instructed the Lutheran faithful that they must be completely obedient to the German Princes – and later Lutherans would be similarly obedient to other state authorities.[37] A devout Lutheran might validly raise objections by the written and spoken word but must not rebel violently against his Prince. In those countries where Lutheranism later

30 Cf. Tröhler (2011: 3–4).
31 Gilliat-Ray (2005: 368).
32 See e.g., Geertz (1973); Asad (1983, 1993); Smith (1998); Beyer (2003); Cavanaugh (2011).
33 This section is largely based on Nelson (2017: 15–21, 33–42).
34 E.g., Gane (2012).
35 Stackhouse (2014).
36 Note, however, that Luther professed some ideas of self-regulated market order (Schwarzkopf 2016). But the general tone in his writings is very negative against the self-interested pursuit of profit. Although Luther was a complex figure, his distaste of the self-interested pursuit of profit is well in line with his sharply negative criticism of the sale of indulgences.
37 See Huttunen (this volume).

became the dominant religion (such as Finland, then part of Sweden), a state religion existed in which a Prince, King, or other state authority typically combined both the role of head of the church and head of the state.[38] Calvinists, by contrast, typically aimed to maintain a separation from state power – in matters of religion in particular.

The greater attention to the consequences of Calvinism partly reflected that the people living in nations significantly influenced by Calvinism (and its Reformed denominational followers), such as England and the United States, were much higher in total numbers than the populations of countries where Lutheranism had the greatest historical influence, such as the Nordic countries, Germany, and Estonia. Another explanation for the relative international neglect of Lutheranism is the less prominent place of the Nordic countries geographically and economically in Europe until recently. Before the late 19th and early 20th century, the Nordic countries were economically backward, leading large parts of their populations to emigrate elsewhere, principally to the United States. The economic outcomes in the Nordic world thus were long a side show as compared with the remarkable economic developments taking place in England, Germany, the Netherlands, France, and other parts of continental Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries that would transform the world.

But in the 20th century the Nordic countries themselves would come to be seen as leading the advance of modern trends. Recently, in the 2019 *World Happiness Report* covering the period 2016 to 2018, and prepared under the auspices of the United Nations, the Nordic countries held the four highest positions and five of the top ten positions for overall national happiness, including Finland (1st), Denmark (2nd), Norway (3rd), Iceland (4th), Sweden (7th).[39] This suggests that perhaps we should be searching for new Max Webers of our time to address a different and more contemporary concern: Is the historic presence of Lutheranism somehow responsible for making people happier today, does it somehow work to spread a powerful 'Spirit of National Happiness?'

As the Nordic countries in the 20th century became the objects of much greater world attention, leading scholars in and outside of these countries, nevertheless, still devoted little study to religion. If they did say anything about religion, they were more likely to argue that 20th century Nordic modernization resulted from the abandonment of the antiquated Lutheran religious heritage. Throughout the 20th century, leading historians, economists, and other scholars instead characteristically interpreted past events in the light of a strict economic determinism.

But one cannot really escape the fact that the Lutheran religion is one of the big factors still shared by all Nordic countries and potentially influencing their similarities. All five, for example, have almost the same national flags that differ by colours but otherwise embed the cross in a solid

38 See more in Knuutila (this volume).

39 Helliwell et al. (2019). Interestingly, all the other top ten countries were historically Protestant – Netherlands (5th), Switzerland (6th), New Zealand (8th), Canada (9th), and Austria (10th).

background. Many nations that are grouped together by social scientists and historians have a common language, but this is not the case for the Nordic world: Finnish belongs to the Finno-Ugric language family and is thus linguistically completely unrelated to the other Nordic languages which belong to the Indo-European language family. Similar histories are another factor often giving nations a shared sense of group identity[40] and here there are already more affinities between the Nordic countries, especially the cultural, economic, and politic ties during the long Hanseatic period in the late Middle Ages. Having the same geographical location in North Europe and roughly similar climates are also shared factors, but differences are clear again at the level of political status: Sweden and Denmark were major European powers for centuries, while Finland and Norway were very poor and became independent nations only in the 20th century. When trying to explain similarities between the Nordic countries, it should thus be apparent that cultural factors (including religion) must be taken as seriously as shared history, geography, climate, or economy.

In this book, the authors of the various chapters will show how, in the 20th century, and now in the 21st century, Lutheranism provided a value foundation that was essential to the political, educational, and economic successes of Nordic societies. This 'Lutheran ethic' and value foundation – centred around education, egalitarianism, the work-ethic, and honesty[41] – originated in the writings and actions of Martin Luther himself and then were further interpreted by Lutheran theologians and clergy in the following decades and centuries. For the next 300 years the Lutheran ethic evolved within the Lutheran state churches of the Nordic world, culminating perhaps in the Swedish Empire in the 17th and 18th centuries. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the pace of Nordic religious change amplified as orthodox Lutheranism was increasingly challenged by Pietistic and other new revivalist influences, partly reflecting a growing Calvinist presence.[42] Up until then the centuries-long alliance between the Nordic states and the Lutheran Church had resulted in forms of social control that may have been even stronger than in European Catholic Churches.[43] As a result, and despite close censorship, religion's influence could no longer be tightly controlled by the Lutheran state clergy, but other agents began to have an increasing religious impact on society.

In the 20th century, reflecting worldwide secularizing trends, the traditional religious character and institutional forms of traditional Lutheranism eroded rapidly. But the change for Finland and other Nordic countries was greater in the outward appearances and overt forms of religion than in the ways of thinking and behaving than what most people in the Nordic world recognized at the time.

40 See Finell et al. (this volume).
41 See the chapters by Helkama & Portman; Salonen; Niemi & Sinnemäki; Mangeloja.
42 See Mangeloja (this volume).
43 Anttonen (2018).

Social democracy, the welfare state, and Lutheranism

Indeed, as Nordic scholars themselves have begun to argue more frequently in recent years, there is one particular perspective on the Nordic world in which it is appropriately understood as grounded in a Lutheran ethic, now mostly taking a newly secularized and thus implicit form, namely, social democracy.[44] The sociologist Risto Alapuro, for example, wrote in 1999 that 'after the Reformation [...] there was no rivalry between the state and the church and no protest movement from below,' as all the Nordic nations had top-down, Lutheran state churches. Although facing greater resistance in the 19th century, this Lutheran orthodoxy continued into the early 20th century but then 'the role of the Lutheran tradition in the development of the welfare state' took new forms. As Alapuro writes, the Nordic countries saw the rise of 'a new "secularized Lutheranism" in the form of the social democratic parties [that] continued the Lutheran tradition in the construction of the [Nordic] welfare state.'[45]

As recently as 2008, however, the German sociologist of religion Michael Opielka could observe that 'little research exists reflecting the religious foundations of welfare states' in Europe and elsewhere.[46] But there had been some signs of change since the 1990s, although remaining a minority position. The publication in 1997 of *The Cultural Construction of Norden* was such an early breakthrough in the study of Nordic history.[47] Culture, the book argued, is not a by-product of more fundamental economic and other material forces, as Marxist and many other economic determinists had long proclaimed. Addressing matters of culture, moreover, inevitably meant getting into matters of fundamental belief, also of religion.

The book included a chapter by the Finnish historian Henrik Stenius titled 'The Good Life is a Life of Conformity: The Impact of Lutheran Tradition on Nordic Political Culture.'[48] Opening up new possibilities for social science study, the editors Øystein Sørensen and Bo Stråth state that 'it is not particularly difficult to imagine the social democrats as a secularized Lutheran movement;' indeed, in the 20th century Nordic 'social democracy [is] a continuation/transformation of Lutheranism.'[49]

Finnish historian Pirjo Markkola has been another pioneer in studying the impact of Lutheranism on modern Finland and other Nordic countries, examining in a 2002 book how women's rights and responsibilities were redefined in Finland from 1860 to 1920 by urban middle-class women in a Lutheran context.[50] In another indication of the growing importance assigned to religion in shaping the welfare state, two volumes were published presenting the summary and research results of a large scale study of 'Welfare and Religion in a European Perspective: A Comparative Study of the Role of Churches as Agents of Welfare within the Social Economy (WREP),'

44 See Nelson (2017a) for a recent detailed analysis.
45 Alapuro (1998: 377).
46 Opielka (2008: 98).
47 Sørensen & Stråth (eds) (1997).
48 Stenius (1997: 162).
49 Sørensen & Stråth (1997: 13, 5).
50 Markkola (2002).

organized by the Center for the Study of Religion and Society at Uppsala University in Sweden.[51] In presenting the WREP project, Anders Bäckström and Grace Davie explain that 'an important starting point' is a recognition that 'the majority churches of Europe – as theologically motivated carriers of values – are related to the different welfare models that have emerged across the continent.'[52]

Based on a large body of research, the WREP conclusion was that religion is an important factor in the development of welfare in Europe.[53] More broadly, WREP researchers explain that

> our results confirm the view that modernity does not necessarily entail the displacement of religion, but is more likely to mean a change in its form, function and content. "Religious change" is therefore a more helpful label than "secularization" when describing the position and role of religion and religious organizations in late modern European societies.[54]

A yet more recent contribution to this trend appeared in 2012, *Nordic Paths to Modernity*. Based on the growing body of recent religious research and reflection, a still stronger statement could be made with respect to the large role of Lutheranism in shaping the culture and the political and economic institutions of Finland and the other Nordic countries. According to the editors, Jóhann Páll Árnason and Björn Wittrock, Lutheranism has had a dominant importance for cultural developments in the Nordic countries:

> The Nordic world is not the only part of Europe where Lutheran influences have counted for something in modern history, but it seems to be the region where this version of the Reformation played the most decisive and durable role.[55]

Modern Nordic history, in short, shows a continuing powerful connection between the social movements of the past two centuries and a contemporary Lutheran religious culture.

Danish historian Uffe Østergård explains how in the early to mid-19th century the young Danish Lutheran priest Nikolaj Frederik Severin Grundtvig 'took it upon himself to re-establish what he took to be the original "Nordic" or "Danish" "mind."' His critical thinking, including attacks on Lutheran orthodoxy, led him to be 'banned from all public appearances and publishing,' resulting in the 1830s in an 'inner exile' during which he 'formulated a program for the revival of the critical stagnant religion' of orthodox Lutheranism. When he was free to publish again in 1839, he soon delivered a 'massive production of sermons, psalms, and songs, a literary legacy which until at least a few years ago formed the core of the socialization of most Danes.'[56]

51 See Bäckström et al. (eds) (2009a, 2009b).
52 Bäckström & Davie (2009: 5, 6).
53 Bäckström & Davie (2009: 6).
54 Pettersson (2009: 15).
55 Árnason & Wittrock (2012: 11).
56 Østergård (2012: 63).

The new research on the Lutheran foundations of social democracy is just one example of the kind of influences that Lutheranism seems to have had on modern Nordic societies. More research, however, is needed to form a more detailed and solid picture of the societal legacy of Lutheranism in Finland and other Nordic countries. That is the purpose of this book.

What is Lutheranism?

Before embarking on the discussion of the aims and contents of this volume it is appropriate first to say a few words about the notion of Lutheranism.[57] Every religion is linguistically special and has its own set of creeds.[58] The Lutheran confession, the *Book of Concord*, was written in 1580 as the doctrinal standard for Lutheran Churches, containing for instance the Augsburg confession as well as the small and large catechisms written by Luther. The 'creeds,' or the central doctrine, typically associated with Lutheranism have revolved around different *sola*: *sola scriptura*, *sola fide*, *sola gratia*, etc. The *sola* have expressed in a nutshell its main claims and identified it especially against the historic teachings of the Catholic Church. Luther taught instead that salvation comes on the basis of Scripture alone, through faith alone and by grace alone, independent of any institutional church's traditions.

Luther had an immense impact not only on future Christian theology but also on the institutional structures and practices of Lutheran and other Protestant churches. In 2013 the German historian Heinz Schilling published what is likely to be the definitive biography of Luther for many years to come. Translated from German into English in 2017, Schilling summarizes the many radical changes in Lutheran religious practice that followed in the wake of the Reformation.

> Luther's evangelical church ordinances, which emerged from his theology of grace were [...] no less radical, as was evident for all to see in monks and nuns who left their monasteries; priests who married; the cessation of Masses said without a congregation present; preaching in German; abandonment of relics, of the veneration of the saints, and of the promises of indulgence; redirection of pious endowments; secularization of church property for the care of the poor, sick, and orphans; evangelical education within the family and in schools and universities; and, not least, regular salaries for those who served the church.[59]

These all remain features of the Lutheran Church today in Finland and other Nordic countries. The current state of Finnish Lutheranism is illustrated by the latest Quadrennial report of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland

57 The 500th anniversary of the Protestant Reformation in 2017 yielded an outpouring of new books about Martin Luther and Lutheranism. See, for example. Schilling (2017); Gregory (2017); Roper (2016), Hendrix (2015); Lull & Nelson (2015); and Malysz & Nelson (2015); Massing (2018).

58 Ostler (2016).

59 Schilling (2017: 359).

(2012–2015).[60] The report surveyed the relationship between the Church and the Finnish people; one of the central survey-points was how much the Lutheran ethic correlates with many other features of Finnish life. Sixteen sub-elements of the Lutheran ethic were surveyed, including elements related to theology (two of them related to the aforementioned *sola*), work ethic, religious education, etc. The statistical analyses showed that many of these sub-elements correlate among Finns, reflecting current aspects of Lutheranism in Finland. Those sharing a Lutheran ethic were, among other things, more likely to be tolerant of the presence of Islam than non-religious people were, whose identity was more likely associated with national pride.

When talking about Lutheranism in the Finnish setting, one thing that strikes many people as somewhat odd is the name of the Lutheran Church. While the Lutheran state church in Sweden, for instance, is simply called The Church of Sweden without any reference to it being Lutheran, in Finland the church is officially called the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland.[61] But why evangelical? And why Evangelical Lutheran? Why not The Church of Finland?

The explanation for the name 'Evangelical' is historical and related directly to the Reformation. In Reformation terminology evangelical is largely synonymous with 'Protestant' – referring to those that hold to the doctrine of justification by faith and to the authority of the Biblical texts (especially gospel texts) instead of a church's tradition. The term 'Lutheran,' on the other hand, was originally a derogatory term used by Luther's adversaries to refer to the new heretical movement. Luther did not want to use the term, but over the course of time it became apparent that there was a need for his followers to distinguish themselves from other Protestant movements. A 'Lutheran Church' was explicitly named as such for the first time in 1586 in Germany.[62] In Finland, the churches were part of the Church of Sweden until Finland was annexed by the Russian empire and became a Grand Duchy. As a result, since the churches in Finland were no longer part of the 'Church of Sweden,' they identified themselves instead as the 'Lutheran Church.' After Finland became independent in 1917, it was natural for this to become the 'Lutheran Church of Finland.' The policy for naming the church was discussed last time in 2016 when the Institute for the Languages of Finland gave a recommendation for how to write the name of the church.[63]

In Finland, the current Lutheran Church is 'Lutheran' in relatively less formal ways. It is often characterized as a folk church which allows and may incorporate a diversity of different theological interpretations and practices. In addition, the revival movements that were born within the Lutheran Church in the 19th and 20th centuries were influenced by evangelical movements from other countries such as Britain. As a consequence, these Finnish revival movements are in their theology and practices closer to

60 Ketola et al. (2016).

61 Sometimes the name Lutheran Evangelical has also been discussed. We are grateful for an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

62 Gassmann et al. (2011: 2–3). See also Johnston (2000: 219).

63 Suomen kielen lautakunnan suositus, May 13, 2016.

Calvinism, and modern evangelicalism, than the mainstream theology of the Finnish Lutheran church.

As a folk church, the Lutheran Church has also been cautious about evangelism and proselytism. In general it has not been particularly interested in expanding its reach – in this respect unlike Calvinism – except in the form of modestly investing in missionary efforts. Lutheranism has rather historically associated more closely with nationalism and committed itself to creating a homogeneous society.[64]

One interesting reflection of this close relationship between religion and nationalism is offered by the immigrant Lutheran Churches in the United States. The Lutheran Churches in the US are heritage churches, but they nevertheless have more than five million members in total, mostly descendants of emigrants from German-speaking areas and the Nordic countries. According to a recent *Pew Research Center* analysis of the ethnic diversity of 30 religious groups, the two Lutheran denominations in the United States are among the three ethnically least diverse groups.[65] They are ethnically less diverse compared to even Judaism and Hinduism. This high American association of Lutheranism with a narrow ethnicity stems from the close original connections between Lutheranism and national identity in the Nordic countries.

During the preparations for this volume, a German theologian asked us whether it was not already passé to research national identity and its relationship to religion. While this comment may reflect a particular (even individual) stance among theologians, from the perspective of social sciences and humanities research the question is of definite importance, as suggested by several chapters in this book. Our goal is also not just to describe how religion, national identity, and nationalism are intertwined, but also to unravel and reanalyse these notions in the current societal context. Two issues are particularly relevant to mention in this regard.

First, the current relationship of ethnicity, nationalism, and religion continue to interest social scientists, as is obvious, for instance, by the contents of the journal *Nations and Nationalism* published by the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN). Despite the strong efforts of ASEN the relations of ethnicity, religion, and nationalism have often been researched without observing their broader societal consequences. Or alternatively, the study of ethnicity and nationalism and the study of religion have been isolated from one another with little interaction, as recently suggested by the sociologist Rogers Brubaker.[66] Our volume suggests that there is much to be researched and reanalysed in such areas that may benefit these disciplines.

64 See especially Ihalainen (2005).

65 *Pew Research Center*, July 27, 2015. We are grateful to Risto Saarinen for pointing this survey report to us. See also Hagman (this volume) for similar ideas about religion and identity.

66 Brubaker (2015: 6).

Second, Christianity is a universal religion, whereas national identity is, by definition, a local phenomenon and not universal.[67] Sometimes religion can be associated with national identity, but it need not be. It can be rather a resource to be used, especially at times of national crises or threats.[68] One such time seems to be at moments of intense nation building and in many parts of Europe religion has, consequently, been associated with national identity.[69] However, as a religion, Christianity is focused on the salvation of souls and not on nations, their existence, and policies. But such beliefs can become part of the make-up of the culture and values of a country and it is this cultural and local Christianity, or in the case of Finland and other Nordic countries, cultural Lutheranism, that can be – and has been – strongly associated with their national identities. Many centuries ago, the Christianization of the Nordic world in the Middle Ages was foundational to future national identities.[70]

These two aspects of Christianity – salvation and culture – may of course become entangled. Such entanglement is reflected in many chapters of this book, such as in Robert Nelson's chapter on the gender equality, in Katja Valaskivi's chapter which touches on the church in mediatized society, and in the chapter by Klaus Helkama and Anneli Portman, which analyses honesty and other cultural values of Finns. The Lutheranism which is most associated with national identity and different societal institutions in contemporary Finland, however, is largely a matter of cultural Lutheranism, or secular Lutheranism. Cultural Lutheranism is the product of a centuries-long process whereby the originally religious values and practices have adapted to remain part of the people's culture. In twentieth century Finnish society they took largely secular forms. Cultural Lutheranism, therefore, is less a matter of traditional religion and more a matter of a new modern form of religious culture – or as some call it an 'implicit religion.'[71] From this perspective, it has even be claimed that the religion of Finland from the 1930s to the 1980s was social democracy.[72]

The current volume

Aim and questions

The purpose of this book is to explore the influence that the Reformation and its aftermaths (e.g., Pietism) as religious-societal events have had on Finnish society, on the formation of Finnish national identity, on cultural values – and on the ways in which these influences might still be visible in contemporary society. The societal effects of Lutheranism may have been explicit and overt or implicit and covert, coming about through the secularization of traditional

67 Villads Jensen (2017).
68 Barker (2008).
69 E.g., Hroch (1996).
70 Villads Jensen (2017).
71 Bailey (2009, 2010).
72 Nelson (2017a).

religious values and ideas and their transformation into new societal forms, sometimes in quite disguised ways.

The research questions in this volume relate to the following:

(1) In what ways may the effects of Lutheranism be visible in modern Finnish society?
(2) What kinds of societal-political consequences have Lutheran theology and thinking had – and may still be having – in Finland?
(3) What are the main mechanisms, social factors, and individuals by which traditional Lutheran values have assumed new secular forms in modern Finnish society?
(4) In what ways and to what extent, are Lutheranism and national identity still intertwined today in Finland, given especially that the concept of national identity needs to be reanalysed in a pluralistic society?

The focus on Finland is interesting and justified on several grounds. Many societal changes in Finland are not home-grown but have come through contacts with neighbouring countries from which religious beliefs, ideologies and other influences have spread. As a small region situated between Norway, Sweden, and Russia and at the northern end of the Baltic Sea, Finland is a border zone where it has been on the receiving end of cultural and political influences from the east, west, and south. These influences are reflected, for example, in the fact that Finland has two official languages (Finnish and Swedish) as well as two churches (Lutheran and Orthodox) that have a special status regarding their relationship with the state. Until 1870 the Lutheran church was the state church. After the independence of Finland, the Lutheran and the Orthodox churches still have a special status in that they are governed by their own law (ratified by the Parliament), are institutions under public law, and have taxation rights.

Finland has also been shaped by the historically rapid economic and democratic developments since the 19th century Pietistic and nation-building movements.[73] Some of the implications of our findings can be easily extended to the entire Baltic region. Nevertheless, the geo-political situation of Finland is fairly different from the other Nordic countries and this position has triggered some developments unique to Finland – especially the complications of a long border with neighbouring Russia (and the Soviet Union for much of the 20th century). In this context, Lutheranism may also have contributed to nation building in ways that have not been seen in other Nordic countries.

This volume provides a multidisciplinary approach to examining the Finnish societal legacy of Lutheranism. It offers no unified methodology, but the chapters represent different approaches stemming from the authors' respective disciplines. Most chapters take a historical approach, the time-windows varying from more than two millennia (Sinnemäki & Saarikivi) to roughly a decade (Tilli), thus providing both macro- and microhistorical

73 E.g., Mangeloja (this volume).

interpretations. A few chapters narrowly focus on current issues, such as school pupils, philanthropy, and digitalization.[74] Many of the chapters also have a comparative aspect because of the importance of seeing Finland in its wider geo-political and cultural context.[75] In order to do so, we need to understand broader religious and political developments in Northern Europe and elsewhere.

On factors of change

In research on the Reformation's societal impact, it is often emphasized how important the development of the vernacular Bible was. However, the Bible was expensive and only a very few people could afford to buy it. The print sizes were small up until the early 19th century when the Bible Society began to distribute inexpensive copies to laymen.[76] Sweden (including Finland until 1809) was the first country to make reading skills a compulsory requirement for each citizen and these skills were examined on the basis of reading the catechism. For this reason, it is likely that the catechism has had a more significant effect on people's thinking and values than Bible reading has, at least before the 19th century.[77] This is why we dedicate a full chapter to the catechism but none specifically to the Finnish Bible.

But there may have been even more influential factors in Lutheran values and thinking that affected people in their everyday lives. First, Lutheranism is known for its love of hymns and it has been characterized as a singing religious movement.[78] Luther himself wrote many vernacular hymns to the tunes of well-known German folksongs. Hymns help create an emotional attachment to the contents of faith and they can be easily memorized by illiterate people as well. Hymnbooks were also much more affordable to laymen than the Bible. Yet in social history vernacular hymns are an almost forgotten source of how the Lutheran faith may have influenced people's thinking, culture, and values.[79] Occasional exceptions do exist, such as the work by the historian Christopher Brown, who presents a strong case for vernacular hymns and their role in spreading and solidifying the Lutheran

74 See the chapters by Finell et al., Grönlund, and Valaskivi, respectively.

75 E.g., the chapters by Sinnemäki & Saarikivi, Ihalainen, Nelson, and Helkama & Portman.

76 See Laine (this volume).

77 Laine (this volume).

78 Hagman (this volume).

79 The Estonians created spiritual folksongs in the 19th and early 20th centuries that blend Lutheran hymns and traditional Estonian folksongs. These songs were strictly forbidden during the Soviet era, but they nevertheless became popular during that time. They were also sung during the so-called singing revolution between 1987 and 1991 when Estonians gathered in non-violent singing protest against the Soviet Union. On September 11, 1988, as many as 300 000 people gathered to sing in Tallinn, more than a quarter of the population. The protest culminated in Estonia regaining its independence in 1991. While Lutheranism has lost its religious and social influence in Estonia, the singing revolution is a good illustration of the potentially strong cultural influence of Lutheranism in the form of spiritual folksongs (Armstrong 2013).

Reformation.[80] In Finland, even recently written Lutheran hymns overtly uphold the central aspects of Lutheran ethos. For instance, the hymn *Kiitos Jumalamme* (hymn number 581 in the Lutheran hymn book; in English 'Thanks be to God') reflects such themes as calling, work, respect for authority, and patriotism. It was written in the 1980s and designed especially for the youth, but it soon became a kind of patriotic hymn that united people of different backgrounds.[81] Although in this volume no single chapter is dedicated to hymns, several chapters discuss their importance.

Second, all protestant denominations are known for their love of the sermon. The Reformers elevated preaching to a key position in worship services and especially catethetic preaching became an important aspect of expounding the Christian message, but also a crucial form of public control. As the societal importance of the church institution has decreased, the impact of the sermon has also decreased. Yet there are ways in which the sermon continues to have an important public position in the Nordic societies; this comes out clearly in the chapter by Pasi Ihalainen, which analyses contemporary sermons in Finland and Sweden.

One emphasis in Reformation research is the changing relationship between the church and the state. The church was long a part of the state in the post-Reformation era, but the specifics of that relationship have been re-negotiated over and over again in the history of the Nordic countries.[82] Especially at particular times of national crisis, the Lutheran Church in Finland has engaged in heated debates about its relationship to the state.[83] While the Lutheran Church as an institution has arguably had the largest role in providing the foundations for modern Finnish society, not all important societal influences of Lutheranism have come directly through the institutional church. One aspect that needs greater recognition is the role of deeply devout individual Christians who played key parts in building national state institutions and also institutions at the level of Finnish provinces and municipalities, even as they were not mouthpieces of the church. In this volume the chapters by Nelson, Laine, and Mangeloja, in particular, discuss some such individuals in the Finnish context.

One prominent example of such a person was Johan Vilhelm Snellman, a Finnish philosopher and statesman. Historians have tended to focus on the importance of his Hegelian philosophy, but much less attention has been given to his Christian values and the ways in which those values formed a crucial part of his nation building program.[84] In general, the impact of religious thinkers has been underestimated by students of the history of ideas in Finland,[85] thus calling for more effort to be invested in future research.

80 Brown (2005).
81 Väinölä (2009: 597).
82 Knuutila (this volume).
83 Tilli (this volume).
84 See Savolainen (2006). Also Rantala (2013) discusses the Christian motivations and beliefs of Snellman at length.
85 Poulter (2013).

One further major historic influence often attributed to Lutheranism, or Protestantism more generally, is the widespread use of the printed media.[86] The Reformers' message quickly spread to the masses via the printed media, contributing to a growth in newspapers and the development of an early public sphere in various parts of Europe.[87] The spread of vernacular printed media and newspapers was also closely connected to nation building in Finland. While the Reformers were able to take advantage of the new technology of their day, the contemporary Lutheran Church has not been in the forefront of using social media and the news-sphere. On the contrary, in the face of a rapidly changing society and its increasingly pluralist values, the church has slipped into a spiral of negative media attention in Finland. It is only now slowly learning ways to handle this new information age. One means of addressing these challenges is branding, as discussed by Valaskivi in her chapter. The discussion on branding highlights the struggles of established churches today in making use of the latest technology and media possibilities for promoting their messages.

From medieval uniform culture to modern pluralism

A starting point for this book is the observation that there was a sense of cultural uniformity in the pre-Reformation society and that the influence of Catholic religion penetrated every sphere of life.[88] The Reformation brought many radical changes to this cultural uniformity, but there were also long-lasting continuities which will be highlighted in many chapters of this volume.[89] In the Catholic narrative, the Reformation can be blamed for shattering the unity of the Western Church because of its fomenting of internal doctrinal differences and disputes.

The American historian Brad Gregory has emphasized how the Protestant principle of *sola scriptura* did not lead in practice to a common accepted understanding of the Scriptures but rather to insurmountable disagreements in understanding them. In the real world, the intended biblical meaning just did not emerge from the study of the text; rather, it could vary greatly from theologian to theologian and individual believer to individual believer. This inability to find shared understandings, or even criteria for how to arrive at shared understandings, forced theologians and others to search for criteria from the secular sphere, thus paving the way for the secularization of knowledge.[90]

However, doctrinal differences were not the only reason for the new plurality of Protestant denominations, such as Lutheranism and Calvinism.[91]

86 Edwards (2005); Pettegree (2015).
87 Woodberry (2012: 249–251).
88 Gregory (2012). The Catholic Church was no monolith, however, and there was diversity in local customs, in the veneration of saints, and even in theological opinions. Variation was tolerated when it did not disturb the peace of the church or pose a threat to its unity, which was ultimately upheld by the Pope and the canon law.
89 E.g., chapters by Salonen; Knuutila; Sinnemäki & Saarikivi.
90 Gregory (2012).
91 Eire (2016).

Two further reasons are that, first, Luther was one of the first persons to stand against the Pope's absolute authority and to survive. In time it became clear that the Protestant movement needed to separate itself from the Catholic Church. This shift meant that there was no longer the unifying function of the papacy and the canon law over the new Protestant regions.[92] National laws and cultures, instead, began to have their impact on the specific versions of Protestantism that arose in different parts of Europe, in Germany, Switzerland, France, Netherlands, and England, as well as in the Nordic world.[93] Differences at all levels emerged – political, social, cultural, and economic.

Thus, once the Protestant movement left the Catholic Church, it was set, in our interpretation practically inevitably, on a path that led to different expressions of the Protestant faith. These separate movements would have strong national flavours, including in the Lutheran world that was subject to the kings, and national identity was strongly tied with the local religious expressions. These national developments would further pave the way to the political religion of modern nationalism and would connect it no longer with traditional religion but with the vernacular language.[94]

Second, linguistic differences have not been given much attention in the development of this plurality of Protestant denominations. Recently the linguist Nicholas Ostler has made the point that the linguistic differences among local vernaculars have influenced the ways in which different Christian traditions have developed their particular characteristics.[95] The linguistic differences do not seem to cause fundamental differences, but it is still notable that major Christian traditions have evolved around different linguistic settings such as the Syriac, Ethiopian, and Coptic churches, all of which take different linguistic forms.

Because of the unique historical, linguistic, geo-political, and ethno-cultural make-up of Finland, it was probably inevitable that Finnish Lutheranism would also have special emphases over its long history. One of those is the great importance of Lutheranism to Finnish nation building, probably much more so than in Sweden, for instance. Lutheranism was the only nation-wide institution when Finland was annexed by the Russian empire in 1809, and so it became an important stabilizing factor, encouraged also by the Russians who wanted to keep the population's trust.[96] While traditional Lutheranism is no longer so closely connected to national identity, many of the chapters of this book argue that Lutheranism as secular Lutheranism is still closely bound up with contemporary Finnish national identity, values, and society more generally.

The central motivating concept behind this volume thus is the idea of historical continuities. Research on the Reformation has often emphasized the radical changes it brought about, but especially among the current

92 Howard & Noll (2016).
93 Knuutila (this volume).
94 Sinnemäki & Saarikivi (this volume).
95 Ostler (2016).
96 Ihalainen (2005).

younger generation of historians there is now a greater emphasis and interest in continuities, which is also reflected in the wave of new books published around the fifth centennial of the Reformation.[97] In this volume, the idea of continuations relates first to ideas and practices that stayed roughly the same or were only changed in some outward forms from medieval Catholicism to Protestantism. The chapters by Sinnemäki & Saarikivi, Salonen, and Knuutila, in particular, examine these continuities relating to language, education, and law and legislation in Finland but also more widely in the Nordic world. Second, the idea of researching the societal legacy of Lutheranism in the first place is grounded in an assumption that there are national continuities in the transition from the traditional Lutheran faith to modern secular societies, some in more explicit and easily perceived forms, others are in more implicit forms that are less easy to perceive. Earlier research has begun to research these more implicit influences of Lutheranism and our aim has been to open up new cases that deal with different areas of Finnish society in one volume.

Structure and overview of the volume

In addition to this general introduction by the editors, the volume contains fifteen chapters organized into four parts. These chapters have various research perspectives, and roughly follow the path to nationhood described by the Czech political theorist Miroslav Hroch, who writes:

> To form a nation, you need a "memory" of some common past, treated as a "destiny" of the group – or at least of its core constituents; a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the group than beyond it; a conception of the equality of all members of the group organized as a civil society.[98]

The four parts of the book address: The development of national identity in Finland (Part 1), the Lutheran roots of Finnish education (Part 2), the influence of Lutheranism on Finnish social practices (Part 3), and the adaptability of the Lutheran Church to recent large changes occurring in Finnish society (Part 4). Cumulatively, these chapters paint a picture of how Lutheranism has managed to introduce thoroughly religious concepts at the core of Finnish society at the same time that it has been adapting itself to modern challenges. The entwining of the church and the state has also made inroads into the political arena, contributing to the maintenance of societal structures as an example of pious living. As Robert Nelson has recently argued, the transition in Finland might be described as one in significant part from 'Lutheran State Church to Social Democratic State Church.'[99]

In Part 1 (Building Lutheranism and National Identity), three chapters discuss the basis of Finnish national identity, namely language, values, and religion, showing how closely intertwined they are in Finland. In the first chapter Sinnemäki & Saarikivi argue that there are many parallels in the

97 E.g., Pettegree (2015); Lull & Nelson (2015); Eire (2016); Gregory (2017); Roper (2017); Schilling (2017).
98 Hroch (1996: 73).
99 Nelson (2017b).

development of standardized languages under nationalism, as compared to sacred languages in traditional world religions, thus giving a general longue durée perspective. They show how traditional religion and nationalism both use language, a 'sacred language,' as a building block for unity and purity. In both spheres pluralism presents a challenge, is dealt with in much the same ways, and the pious react in similar ways. The following two chapters narrow the scope. Hagman focuses on Lutheranism and its developments as a distinct nationalistic project. He argues that the understanding of the three *sola* (*sola scriptura*, *sola fide*, *sola gratia*) as the heart of Lutheran theology was not the product of the Reformation era but of late 19th and early 20th century Luther renaissance in Nordic theology. Helkama & Portman examine the Protestant roots of four Finnish values: egalitarianism, a work-related ethic, education-related values, and honesty. They show that it has been necessary for Finnish value researchers to develop a different approach to work-related values compared to originally American psychological value measures which have combined hard work with ambition. That combination is much more suitable to Calvinism but much less so to Lutheranism – a point that emphasizes the need for considering the two as distinct Protestant ethics.[100]

Part 2 (Education and Culture) discusses education in Finland and its religious roots. Key concepts promoted by the Reformation, and which still form the bedrock of Finnish education – such as respect for learning and teaching, personal responsibility, persistency, and high morals – also informed the nationalistic movements of the 19th century. The four chapters peruse the ways in which Lutheranism has influenced Finnish educational systems but also how this legacy is increasingly becoming thinner. The chapter by Salonen traces the history of Finnish education and shows that the process of developing education in Finland was a lengthy process starting as early as the medieval period, much before the Reformation. In their chapter Niemi & Sinnemäki take a closer look at the changes the Reformation brought about. The chapter analyses the impact Lutheran values have had on the development of education in Finland and contends that the remarkable successes of the current Finnish education system can be traced, at least in part, to the values emphasized by the Reformation. In the next chapter Laine looks more closely at the development of literacy, one of the key aspects of Finnish education. The chapter argues that the egalitarian principle of the Reformation, that it was everybody's right and duty to get to know the Word of God, paved the way for the rise in literacy in general. The emphasis on good skills in reading also led to the establishment of the library system, a continuing cornerstone of Finnish cultural socialization. Finell, Portman & Silfver-Kuhalampi bring the focus closer to the present day and examine how national identity and religion intersect in school students' thinking.

The chapters in Part 3 (Lutheranism and Social Practice) focus on some key aspects of how Lutheranism influenced the development of social democracy and the welfare state. The chapters show how many of the most praised features of the social democratic Nordic societies can be

100 See also Ketola et al. (2016: 57).

seen as products of a 'secularized Lutheranism.' The chapter by Knuutila provides an overview of the relationship between the church and the state in Finland from the medieval Catholic period to the present day. Using the development of law and legislation as a basis for his analysis, he identifies four phases in this long history. In the next chapter, Mangeloja examines the political and economic impact of major new religious developments that began in Finland in the mid-18th century and continued into the early 20th century. He proposes that they had a decisive influence in the establishment of what would become Finnish social democracy in the 20th century. Nelson's chapter surveys a recent body of scholarship that finds that Luther and later Lutheran followers had an important influence in advancing a key feature of social democracy, namely, gender equality, which is among the highest in the world in Finland and other Nordic countries. In the last chapter of Part 3, using Finland as the case in point, Grönlund tackles the recent difficulties of all Nordic welfare states. As rapid economic growth has slowed, there is an increased strain on the ability of Nordic governments to fulfil their traditional welfare responsibilities. Grönlund explores how the roles of the state, market, and philanthropy for the provision of social welfare have been changing recently, including in Finland a greater reliance on voluntary private activities.

The theme that unifies the chapters in Part 4 (Church in Adaptation), spanning over 100 years, is transformation. The authors illustrate how the Lutheran Church of Finland has adapted to societal changes in the context of civil war, post-WWII new demands, and contemporary 21st-century society. The chapters reveal a common trajectory: while in the early and mid-20th century the key issues were related to secular authority, that is, the state, nowadays the most pressing questions pertain to social values and the economy. Importantly, as all the chapters find, adaptation has never been a straightforward or a uniform process, nor has the church been merely a passive recipient. In his chapter Huttunen takes a closer look at the moral roots of Finnish society, especially as they relate to authority and the concept of obedience to authority. He examines the impact of the Apostle Paul's teaching on secular authorities (*esivalta* in Finnish) in the context of the Finnish Civil War of 1918 and shows that the concept of *esivalta* is an especially useful notion for demonstrating the mutual influences between the institutional church and the state. Moving the focus to the Lutheran Church, the discussion of secular authority continues in Tilli's chapter, in which the context is the immediate years after WWII, 1944–1948. Tilli examines how Lutheran priests constructed publicly the church's relationship to the state, evolving from mild optimism towards criticism and separation of the church and the state, and even 'martyrdom.' Ihalainen in his chapter, in turn, analyses the relation between the state and the church in terms of sermons given at occasions of national worship in 2009 and 2010, in Sweden and in Finland, respectively. Ihalainen argues that it is the political control of public religion that has been a characteristic of Lutheran establishments since the Reformation and that facilitates the flexibility and even resilience of Finnish and Swedish Lutheranism in reconciling its political teachings with those of the current rulers and the opinions prevailing among the political elites.

Part 4 is concluded by Valaskivi who examines another crucial aspect of the church's adaptability, the ways in which it has responded to the demands posed by the media and the digital era by directing more and more of its activities towards branding, promotion, and communication.

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I Building Lutheranism and National Identity

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Sacred Language: Reformation, Nationalism, and Linguistic Culture

Abstract

In this chapter we discuss religion and linguistic culture with reference to changes that took place as a result of the Reformation. We focus on religiously motivated beliefs about language and their effects on linguistic ideologies and the cultural myths that guide the linguistic behaviour of individuals and societies. In particular, we follow the path of the idea of a sacred language that emerged in early Middle Eastern monotheism and ultimately became the normative, prescriptive language of a nation state. We see a continuum in the linguistic ideologies related to the language of the divine revelation, which evolved into the idea of the universal language of the Church and learning, the sacred language of a national church acting as the patron of the king, and finally the standard language of a modern nation under nationalist ideologies. The common factor behind this development is the notion that language, as the bearer of the common good, lasts over a single generation and maintains a community that has a sacred character. This sense of holiness is reflected in the importance of safeguarding the norm of the language. Thus, the ideological concept of a standard language derives to a significant degree from the concept of language as holy, representing one of the most important substitutions of traditional religion in the Western hemisphere, nationalism and its universal mythology. In the context of this volume, we exemplify these developments especially with respect to Finnish language but also take the wider European context into consideration.

Basic concepts and outline

Every human community has ideas and beliefs about language that guide their linguistic behaviour.[1] In sociolinguistics, the beliefs, values, prejudices,

1 This paper has benefited greatly from the comments by the series editor of *Studia Fennica Historica* and the reviewers and also from discussions with several people. Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the seminar 'Finland 100, Finland 1000 – Shaping the Finnish Society,' at The Finnish Institute in Rome (Villa

and myths that a speech community attaches to language(s) and that guide the linguistic behaviour of the community members are labelled as language ideologies or, in a broader sense, linguistic culture.[2] The linguistic culture of a country, region, or social group has effects on language policy, types of literacy, and national identity, among other things.[3]

Self-evidently, one fundamental set of beliefs that people attach to their language may be related to religion.[4] While the contribution of linguistics to understanding religion has been discussed to some extent,[5] the importance of religion within a linguistic culture has been investigated less, and the authors of this chapter are not aware of any unified approach to this topic.

The defining of religious culture is a complicated task. Religion represents both oral and written, mythological and sacral, and ritual and magical beliefs and activities, but also a particular ethos of a human group with norms of ethical behaviour. Features of religion overlap with those of governing, as well as habits, knowledge, learning, and other societal activities that may be hard to understand from an outsider's perspective.

The notions of sacred or religion are very different in different languages and cultural contexts. It can be noted that in many languages, the concept of sacred is related to wholeness and healthiness (as the English *holy*, from a word stem meaning 'whole,' 'healthy'), or, on the contrary, setting apart or marking off (as the English *sacred* < Lat. *sacer*[6] and, ultimately, the Indo-European root **sek-* 'separate').[7] In yet other cases, it is related to large size or brightness (such as Russian *святой* 'sacred' from **swentu-*, originally likely just 'big').[8]

Lante), January 20, 2017, at the annual winter seminar of the Association for Religious Education Teachers in Finland, February 4, 2017 at Helsinki, at the public seminar 'Reformation Shaping Culture and Society in the Past and in the Present,' March 15–16, 2017 at the University of Turku, at the annual Church Days of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, May 19, 2017 at Turku, at the conference 'Protestantism and Negotiating Identities,' August 24–25, 2017 at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, and at the 'Work in Progress' seminar of the Department of Linguistics, Stockholm University, November 23, 2017. We would like to thank the audiences of these events for many helpful comments. We are also grateful to Sonja Dahlgren, Maria Khachaturyan, Ulla Vanhatalo, and Max Wahlström for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper. Both authors have received funding for this research from the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, and Sinnemäki also from the Church Research Institute of Finland, which we gratefully acknowledge.

2 Schiffman (1996).

3 We prefer Schiffman's notion 'linguistic culture' over the related and widely used notion 'linguistic ideology' because of its broader scope and more down-to-earth nature.

4 Schiffman (1996: 55–74).

5 See Mooney (2010) and references.

6 Anttonen (2000: 41).

7 de Vaan (2008: 532).

8 See Saarikivi (2007: 327–331) whose etymology for the word *pyhä* differs from earlier explanations by Koivulehto (1973, 1989). See also Saarikivi (2017).

The concept of religion, in turn, is not present in many (old) language forms or linguistic cultures at all. The field it covers are considered as 'knowledge,' 'habits,' 'taboo,' 'worship' or 'governing.' The concept is extremely difficult to identify in a cross-cultural comparison, and many of the definitions of religion would cover phenomena such as sports and celebrity fan clubs, nationalism, or arts and entertainment.

Here we adopt the assumption that while a universal definition of sacred or religion is problematic, most – if not all – of human communities make a distinction between everyday matters and the matters of utmost importance that are to be approached with caution, endure over generations, hold society together, have relevance beyond the life of an individual, and may be connected with deities, the origins of the community, and the afterworld, as well as with mythology and ethics.

Obviously, many of these features are reflected in language use and the ideologies related to it. In the following, we demonstrate that a characteristic religious genre can be found in many of the world's languages. In the world's major religions, this idea of religious language use emerges in the form of collections of old texts written in a sacred, typically old-fashioned language used in rituals and spiritual teaching.

It is often noted that the Reformation altered the role of many vernacular language forms in Europe. Finnish, for instance, had no written language prior to the Reformation. Some vernacular languages were written before the Reformation, such as Italian, Catalan, German, and French, but even for many of these, especially German, the Reformation played a major part in bringing written language to the masses. It also significantly changed the position of English language in Britain.

The Reformers' incentive that every Christian should be able to read the Bible in their native language served as a motivation to translate it and other religious literature (such as catechisms, prayer books, and hymns) into the vernacular from the 16th century on. These texts and practices served as the basis for developing vernacular language in the fields of education, government, and science, especially in the framework of modern nationalism beginning in the 19th century.

Another viewpoint regarding this development is that over the course of time the Reformation transformed ideas about the church as sacred to an idea of sacred calling in everyday life, thus paving the way for one of the influential substitution today of nationalism for traditional religion. Although nationalism is a complex phenomenon, one of its main features is that it replaces the sacred universal church with a sacred state under a divine destiny. From the perspective of language, this meant that the national languages were not only considered important media for learning and communication, but also semiotic systems that held the nation together.

In this chapter, we seek to understand these developments from a comparative and historical perspective. First, we discuss the importance of religion to beliefs about language. We note that the conceptual system of large world religions is often safeguarded in the old languages in

which the canons of their sacred texts were written.[9] Second, we discuss the relationship between language and national identity. We claim that while Latin was replaced by vernaculars in European countries during the Reformation, the idea of understanding language as a divine instrument of unity and sacred semiotics did not disappear. The holy language of the Church was replaced by national languages that became sacred for a state church and subsequently for modern nationalism, which in turn replaced many functions of traditional religion. Third, we briefly provide examples of these changes in the context of linguistic cultures in different languages, focusing especially on Finland.

Sacred languages: The rise of a sacred code

Language may be considered sacred for different reasons. Typically, any act of religion or magic involves both a gesture or deed and a verbal action.[10] For instance, when sorcery is practiced, a deed is always followed by incantation.[11] In more organized forms of religion, acts of offering are combined with spoken formulae. In rites of passage, acts and words together form the fabric of a religious event. Religious actions are thus created by performative speech acts.[12]

Many oral cultures have specialized men or women who know the sacred texts (for instance, prayers and incantations) and recite them. A religious specialist can, among other things, master the language and wordings used for healing, praying, offering, etc. Often these texts are in a language form which is treated with particular care, strictly reserved for special contexts, and not revealed to outsiders. They may also contain taboo words that should only be uttered in a limited religious context.

For instance, while in the traditional Mari (Cheremis, in the Volga region) culture the transmission of religious knowledge is oral, there is a group of societal ceremony specialists (*kart*, plural *kart-wlak*) who can memorize and recite lengthy prayers to various gods rightly. These rite-specialists represent particular esteemed families, and also provide teaching on religious matters.[13] Some hunter-gatherer or nomadic societies also have genres of mythological songs or poetry performed on special religious occasions, such as the bear rites among the Ob-Ugric people (Khanty, Mansi), which represent a clearly marked type of language use both lexically and structurally.[14]

The emergence of a genre of ritual language would seem to be almost a cultural universal that can be observed in a variety of contexts.[15] This is reflected in the fact that religious specialists are among the first professions to

9 Schiffman (1996).
10 Ostler (2016: xv–xvi).
11 Malinowski (1948).
12 Austin (1962).
13 Toidybekova (1997).
14 See Karjalainen (1918); Bartens (1986).
15 See Sawyer (1999: 23–43).

emerge in any society. Typically, the only specialized profession in a hunter-gatherer society is that of a shaman, and it is a part of their profession to know the relevant ritualist practices of language use. In the case of Finnish (or Uralic), the only professional denomination that can be reconstructed in early protolanguages of the Uralic family is the word *noita* 'shaman' (< **nojta*, with cognates in Saami and Ob-Ugrian languages).[16]

In organized religions, a central reason for defining a language as sacred is based on the assumed divine origins of the sacred texts. This otherworldly character may be fostered by their linguistic form, which is either peculiar or outright unintelligible and understood only by trained specialists, the 'priest-philologists' (to use the term advanced by V. Voloshinov).[17] Their task is to read, study, and explain the holy text and thus guard the purity of the belief system and, ultimately, the unity of the whole religious community. Often such sacred language is used solely by the religious specialists. Some examples include Sanskrit in Hinduism, Classical Arabic in Islam, and Biblical Hebrew in Judaism. Another reason for treating a language as sacred is for societal reasons, such as for safeguarding the continuity and unity of the group. Latin in the pre-1960s Catholic Church is a good example of this, being the liturgical language of the Church until that point. It was also widely used among the learned classes and not only by religious specialists. It remained as the language of science in Protestant Europe far beyond the Reformation: in Finland, for instance, university teaching was given partly in Latin until the early 19th century. However, the functions of Latin that lasted so long in science, administration, and governing were related to and largely emerged from its position as the sacred language of the Catholic Church and from its well-established role in medieval Europe. Those functions were slowly replaced by vernaculars in different parts of the continent, as their position grew stronger especially after the Reformation.

These different aspects of sacred language may naturally be intertwined. If a language is believed to have an otherworldly character, this belief is likely to have social and psychological consequences, such as enforcing unity in the religious community that employs the texts written in it. In the following, we briefly discuss beliefs about language in Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, and Islam and then focus more on developments in Christianity.

Holy languages in world religions

Both Hinduism and Buddhism developed in Southeast Asia, but the linguistic cultures they have fostered differ from one another. Whereas Hinduism retains many features of an ethnically associated religion using Sanskrit and the languages derived from it, Buddhism has developed into a variety of regional traditions with different linguistic bases.

In the sacred Vedic hymns of Hinduism, language was personified as a goddess, and one later commentator even suggested that the 'universe is ultimately of linguistic nature.'[18] It is thus understandable why Hinduism

16 Itkonen & Kulonen (1992–2000, vol. II: xx).
17 Voloshinov (1973: 74).
18 See references in Itkonen (1992: 6).

has been preoccupied with language and why Sanskrit, the language of the Vedas, came to be considered divine.[19] The Vedas were originally oral, but because the everyday language changed from that used in the sacred texts it became important to preserve their correct pronunciation.[20] This motivation to safeguard the correct, old-fashioned pronunciation of the texts boosted the rich linguistic tradition of Hinduism, culminating in the grammar of Pāṇini (roughly 400 BCE), which was quite likely the first grammatical treatise in history. This heightened interest in linguistics manifested in the emergence of grammatical description, in the learning of Sanskrit, and in its preservation as a spoken language among the religious upper class. On the other hand, translating the Hindu texts was practiced only in modern emigrant contexts.[21]

While Sanskrit was used to also write sacred Buddhist texts, the tradition of preserving texts in that language alone was rejected. Alongside it, Prakrit, Middle Aryan, and Pali were also used early on.[22] This textual multilingualism encouraged the translation and usage of other languages in Buddhism.[23] The relative openness of Buddhism toward multilingualism is reflected in multiple independent traditions that emerged in different linguistic contexts: for example, Tibetan Buddhism (Vajrayāna), Southeast Asian Buddhism (Theravāda), and East Asian Buddhism (Mahāyāna).[24]

In the monotheistic tradition of the Middle East, the idea of a sacred scripture and language originated in Judaism. The Bible was largely written in Biblical Hebrew,[25] and the idea of Hebrew as a sacred language of Judaism and its use in religious contexts preserved the skills in Hebrew during the centuries when it was not spoken as a mother tongue. In the 20th century, the Hebrew language was again turned into a state language and a mother tongue for more than six million people. This recreation of Modern Hebrew as a spoken language illustrates well the main thesis of this chapter, namely, that sacred language in religious and nationalist terms represents an ideological continuum.

While Biblical Hebrew was sacred for the Jews, the Jews were open to using other languages in religious contexts as well.[26] The Hebrew Bible was translated into Koine Greek already in the 3rd century BCE (the Septuagint) and later into Aramaic as well (the Targum). In line with the tradition regarding the divine inspiration of holy scripture, the Greek Old Testament came to be thought of as inspired scripture as well. One myth on the origin of the translation stipulates that 70 translators (70 = *septuaginta* in Latin) independently of each other made a translation that was alike, even to the

19 Aklujkar (1996: 72).
20 Itkonen (1992: 10).
21 See Pandharipande (2013).
22 Spolsky (2003: 83).
23 Nattier (1990).
24 See, e.g., Ostler (2016).
25 Sawyer (1999: 26–30). Some parts of the Hebrew Bible, such as half of the book of Daniel, were written in Old Aramaic.
26 Sawyer (1999: 30–31).

smallest detail.[27] Such histories regarding Bible translations would later emerge in various Christian contexts as well.

The idea of sacred scripture was adopted from Judaism by both Islam and Christianity. In Islam, the Qur'an was passed to Mohammed in the Arabic language.[28] Dogma stipulates that only the Arabic Qur'an possesses the real sacred script, which existed with God already before the creation of the world. The dogma that the Qur'an is the only thing that was not created by God only extends to the Arabic Qur'an, as all translations are human work. For this reason, Classical Arabic is highly sacred for Muslims. Although the Qur'an has been translated into many languages, there is fierce opposition against accepting any translations as sacred; they are typically considered mere commentaries.[29]Arabic also plays a central role in Islamic rituals: reciting the Qur'an in Arabic is held to generate religious merit, while reciting it in other languages is not considered proper prayer[30] or may be even prohibited altogether.[31] This is reflected also in the spread of Arabic language and literacy to the Muslim world. Across vast areas, such as northern Africa, Mesopotamia, and Syria, speakers of other languages shifted to Arabic and still others became bilingual. Countries like Iran and Pakistan adopted the Arabic script together with large amounts of Arabic vocabulary of predominantly religious content. Up to the present day, most Muslims around the world learn Arabic to some extent in order to be able to recite their prayers properly.

Language of scripture in Christianity until the Reformation

In Christianity, the situation regarding language is the most complex among the world's major religions. Language manifests in the creation story of the Church at Pentecost: in Acts 2, the disciples receive the Holy Spirit and begin to speak in languages that they did not understand, and they are understood by outside observers. In addition, in the Great Commission[32] Jesus specifically commands the disciples to take the Gospel to all the nations.[33] Both stories thus deal closely with language.[34]

For Christians, God's Word was manifest in the person of Christ, not in a divine text, as in Judaism or Islam. Though called Holy Scripture, the New Testament is generally not understood to be the word of God as such, but testimony of the Word of God, in the person of Jesus Christ. It is interesting to note in this context that the words of Christ were originally preserved in

27 See Dimont (2004).
28 Morrow (2014: 253).
29 See also Schiffman (1996: 68–71); Ruthven (2006: 90).
30 Afnan (2006: 657); Sawyer (1999: 24).
31 Sawyer (1999: 24).
32 Matthew 28: 16–20.
33 To be precise the Great Commission does not directly state that the message should be translated into other languages. While a universal faith will necessarily be translated and culturally interpreted (Ostler 2016: xvi), it then depends on the religious culture and dogma whether those translations will be treated as sacred.
34 Hastings (1997: 194–195).

a Greek translation, not in Aramaic, the original mother tongue of Jesus. However, Christian theologians argued early on that Christ is a word (λόγος in Greek) that existed before creation (cf. John 1).

This abstract character of God's word meant also that Christianity was not confined to any particular language community. From early on, Christianity was a multicultural (Jewish and Greek) movement. In the words of St. Paul: 'There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus.'[35] There is thus indifference to characteristics such as ethnicity, language, social status, gender, etc., but not rejection of them.[36] Instead, regarding ethnicity and language, there is at the core of Christianity a sense of destigmatizing vernacular cultures and a radical cultural pluralism.[37]

Nevertheless, the idea of holy scripture and a holy book was transferred from Judaic tradition to Christianity in a similar manner to Islam, creating an array of sacred translations. The translation movement within Christianity began right away. Many parts of the New Testament emerged on the basis of the Aramaic tradition in Greek. Most notably, the Gospels of Mark and Matthew bear witness to Aramaic origins, and according to Christian tradition the Gospel of Matthew was first written in Aramaic but then translated into Greek[38] (although the mainstream view in research now is that the texts were written originally in Greek).[39] Many Jews in first-century CE Palestine used Koine Greek instead of Aramaic.[40]

Further translations soon followed, Latin by Jerome and Gothic by Wulfila in the 4th century. These and many subsequent translations would be characterized as inspired or sacred. Yet, they would be incomprehensible for generations to come, who nevertheless long considered them as the unalterable norm of religious mythology and terminology. Thus, the Catholic Church worldwide has reserved a special place for the Latin Bible from the 5th century onwards up to the present day, regardless of the fact that Latin disappeared as a spoken language long ago. The Orthodox Churches still widely use the Old Greek New Testament, which is largely incomprehensible for Modern Greek speakers; in a similar manner, the Old Church Slavonic translation of the New Testament (in the 9th century) is used in church services in Russia, Bulgaria, and Serbia, even though it is now mostly incomprehensible to the speakers of the modern languages.

Many Protestant revival movements also prefer older translations. Some branches of the Laestadian revival movement in Finland, for instance, use the old Church Bible from 1776. There is also a Protestant movement to support the use of the King James Bible (published in 1611) in the English-speaking world instead of newer translations.

The early budding of linguistic pluralism in the Christian Church did not last very long, especially in the West. After the Vulgate, there was almost

35 Gal 3:28. Translation according to the New Revised Standard Version.
36 See Huttunen (2015: 101–102).
37 Sanneh (1989: 1).
38 Sawyer (1999: 83).
39 We are grateful to Niko Huttunen for pointing this out to us.
40 Porter (1998).

a thousand-year gap before the next full Bible was translated into another language for the Western Church. Portions of the Bible, however, were translated into many European languages. In 880, Pope John III decreed that both scripture and liturgy may be conducted in any language, including Slavic, which Methodius and Cyril had worked in at that time.[41] But Pope Stephen V, immediately following, turned against the use of the vernacular in liturgy and translations; this happened largely as a side-effect of demands for conformity in church practice toward the Western tradition and for authority to be given to the educated church elite.[42]

In the 11th century, Pope Gregory VII emphasized conformity to Roman practice even more by arguing that 'sacred scripture in certain places should be hidden, lest, if it should appear open to all, by chance it might be [...] so misunderstood by those of little intelligence that it might lead them into error.'[43] Thus, if God's will was to conceal scripture, it was only sensible to conduct liturgies in a language that was unintelligible to the masses. The difficult and more obscure parts of scripture were considered open only to the learned. This paved the way for the strengthening of the elitist power structures by giving a unique status to those who were educated to understand the scriptures in Latin.[44] Because education at that time was dependent on private tutors, it was only accessible by wealthy people. Latin thus increasingly changed from being a medium used for understanding religious matters into an expert language that kept dogma and church power out of the reach of laymen. Authority in the Church and religion remained in the hands of the clergy, enforcing a greater degree of unity in a geographically expanding Christian community.[45]

After the 12th century, the major concerns of the Western Church shifted to fighting against heresies, but the central role of Latin prevailed in both liturgy and theology. Self-produced translations were allowed for personal use, but their public reading was usually prohibited.[46] Public reading of translations was a common part of sermons in medieval Catholic masses, however; the passage was first read in Latin and then from the translation.[47] But not just any translation was allowed. The Waldensians, for instance, who translated portions of the Bible into many European languages and aimed at teaching the laypeople, were considered heretics. Sometimes even possessing a copy or an extract of the Bible in a vernacular language was considered a sign of heresy and a reason for being burned at the stake.[48] Translators like

41 The translation and the process of creating the new Slavic alphabet were accompanied by the oldest and most important non-translated Old Church Slavonic text by Chernorizets Hrabar, who defended the alphabet and its further development (Vlasto 1970: 177). We are grateful to Max Wahlström for bringing this issue to our attention.

42 Geary (2013: 50–55).

43 Gregory VII (1923: 474). Quoted in Geary (2013: 53).

44 Sawyer (1999: 24, 77).

45 Geary (2013).

46 Deanesly (1920: 18–19).

47 We are grateful for an anonymous reviewer for contributing this information.

48 Deanesly (1920).

William Tyndale (1494–1536) were sentenced to death for having translated the Bible into the vernacular for laypeople outside the official Church.[49] It seems that a categorical ban on vernacular translations did not exist, but many specific translations were nonetheless prohibited, and many were approached with suspicion.[50]

There is no doubt that Latin gradually became a sacred language for the Catholic Church in terms of policy.[51] However, its sacredness did not stem from a belief in its divine inspiration but was rather a consequence of protecting the purity of the dogma by requiring prolonged education of the clergy and by enforcing greater unity in the Church. The Catholic Church was not a monolingual community, of course. Vernaculars were already used well before the Reformation – even in Finland[52] – but they never replaced Latin, which remained the language of the liturgy of the Catholic Church and the Bible until the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s. Catholic missions also differed from the later Protestant missions in that they placed emphasis on translating the Catechism into vernaculars but not the Bible, except after the 1960s.

The situation was somewhat different in the East.[53] The Bible was translated into several languages during the first millennium CE: for instance, Syriac (an Aramaic dialect spoken in Edessa), Coptic (in Egypt), Ge'ez (Ethiopia), Arabic, Persian, Chinese, Old Armenian, Old Georgian, and Caucasian Albanian.[54] Since the split of the Roman Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church in the 11th century, the Eastern Churches have never been linguistically uniform, and they have allowed vernaculars to be used in liturgy as well as in translations of scriptures.[55] While the Eastern Churches have not been particularly active in producing new translations of the Bible, their less centralized structures, with several independent churches, has nevertheless resulted in a less strict relationship between language and religion than that prevailing in the Roman Catholic Church.

The Reformation and the vernacular

There are two competing processes in many religious communities: the preservation of doctrinal purity and the unity of the community, on the one hand, and the need to understand the sacred texts and doctrine, on the other (Figure 1). Translations that alter the understanding and expression of a religion may prove harmful for unity and continuity, because languages never have identical semantics and the metaphors typical of each language are culturally bound.[56] But as language evolves, the more unintelligible

49 McGrath (2001: 87–88).
50 Kienzle (1998: 265).
51 Geary (2013).
52 See Salonen (this volume).
53 Sawyer (1999: 55).
54 Beerle-Moor (2015: 188); see also Sawyer (1999: 86–89).
55 Spolsky (2003: 84).
56 Ostler (2016: 116–118); see also Idström & Piirainen (2012).



Figure 1. Tug-of-war between doctrinal purity and vernacular understanding.

sacred texts eventually become, and this creates a pressure to express the religion in a modern vernacular.[57] This conflict is basically unsolvable, and the world religions, at different periods in history, differ from each other in the amount of willingness vis-à-vis cultural evolution and assimilation, or in the degree of cultural assimilation required of converts.

In the Reformation, this tug-of-war tilted strongly toward vernacularisation but with a strong tendency toward greater doctrinal purity as well. Two important changes paved the way for this somewhat paradoxical process. First, vernacular languages slowly began to be used in secular contexts in the Late Middle Ages. They gradually became adopted for regular media in law courts, aristocratic institutions, and chancelleries. This happened for the purpose of record-keeping by the government,[58] but also because the secular powers wanted to limit the Church's power. Latin was increasingly identified as the language of the Church and considered 'complicated, hidden, and susceptible to manipulation and deception.'[59] Language choices were, therefore, a political issue, and undoubtedly they paved the way for religious reforms.[60]

Second, as a result of the fall of Constantinople in 1453, many Byzantine scholars fled to the West, bringing with them numerous Greek manuscripts, including those of the New Testament, which scholars in the West had previously had no access to. This accelerated the revival of learning classical Greek.[61] Based on New Testament manuscripts, Erasmus prepared an edition of the Greek New Testament that antedated the texts that had been available to Jerome when he translated the Vulgate. The Reformers thought that the original Gospels had been obscured in the later manuscripts and translations, necessitating a return to ancient Greek manuscripts. They even saw the fall

57 Ostler (2016: xvi).
58 Safran (2008).
59 Geary (2013: 59).
60 Geary (2013: 56–59).
61 Eire (2016: 70).

of Constantinople as providential for the purpose of renewing the Western Church.[62] Moreover, there was a shift in reconstructing the scriptures based on historical evidence from Greek and Hebrew manuscripts, rather than solely on the Church's authority.[63] This shift meant a continuing need for a priest-philologist elite, who could understand those manuscripts.

A key change provoked by the Reformation was emphasis on the authority of scriptures (*sola scriptura*) instead of the Church's tradition. This was coupled with the idea of the priesthood of all believers, which naturally was related to translating the Bible into vernacular languages. The turn toward vernaculars broke the link between Latin and religion and strongly affected the development of national cultures and languages in the West, as the break from a transnational Church strengthened national sovereignty in relation to linguistic, political, and religious issues.

For many European languages, the vernacular Bible was among the first books published, paving the way for vernacular written cultures. In many cases these publications had predecessors in vernacular manuscripts, even if these were not generally available to the masses. Luther published a New Testament in German in 1522 and poured out short publications in the early 1520s, both for the clergy and for the common people. Soon thereafter, the New Testament was published in Danish in 1524, in Swedish in 1526, in French in 1530, in Finnish in 1548, etc.[64] These translations, used in preaching and private study, were widely accepted as Holy Scripture. The Reformers thus produced 'a variety of "vulgates"' to be used not just by the highly educated but also by the common people.[65]

These publications also served as a base for a novel emphasis on lay education with the aim to enable people to read the Bible themselves.[66] Since God now spoke in the laymen's language, the Bible was no longer the property of the papacy but belonged to the people, as Luther had hoped.[67] The German peasant revolts in 1524–1526, however, made the Reformers worried that untutored Bible reading could cause social unrest. So, only a few years after his translation of the German Bible, Luther made a conceptual reversal: reading of the Bible was not so recommended anymore. Instead, Luther began to write catechisms that he declared the people's Bible. Catechism thus became a tool for enforcing doctrinal purity in the emerging Protestant tradition, on the one hand, and imposing congregational unity in the new Protestant churches, on the other hand, in much the same spirit as the medieval Catholic Church.[68]

62 Thompson (1996: 31).
63 Ostler (2016: 241–251); see also Eire (2016: 70).
64 See the chapters by Salonen; Laine (this volume).
65 Safran (2008: 174).
66 See the chapters by Salonen; Laine (this volume).
67 Safran (2008: 174).
68 Baron (2015: 25–26).

The rise of vernacular standards and making the foundations of nationalism

On national identity and the rise of vernacular standard language

It has long been agreed in the social sciences that language is a central factor that contributes to national identity, along with shared history, religion, and ethnicity.[69] The Reformation, along with changing ideas related to languages, arguably had important consequences to national identities as well. The Reformation quickly spread to vast numbers of people through the new technology of the printing press. The Reformers' activities resulted in the growth of newspapers and an early public sphere in Europe.[70] These developments led to the further need to standardize the vernacular written languages. This movement largely began in the 16th century and culminated in 19th-century nationalism. Standardization, on the other hand, created what Benedict Anderson coined as the 'unified fields of communication,' which were below Latin but above the spoken vernaculars.[71]

By its very nature, standardization levels down personal, regional, and class variation, and thus it paves the way for modern society, which allows social mobility and individual choice of identities. Speakers of different dialects could now understand each other through the standardized written medium. Over the course of time, the standardized vernaculars completely replaced Latin and came to be the fundament of many evolving European nations.

Raising the status of the vernacular democratized linguistic cultures in Europe and marked a drastic change in myths and beliefs related to languages. English, for one, had been considered barbarous, a language of the peasants and 'incapable of expressing anything other than the crudest and most basic of matters,' 'incapable of conveying the subtle undertones of diplomacy, the fine distinctions of philosophy,' and 'incapable of expressing the deep and the nuanced truths of the Bible in particular.'[72] But beginning in the mid-15th century and culminating in the 17th century, it transformed into a language of governing, nobility, and high culture. Simultaneously, Britain turned from a combination of papal and king power towards a modern sovereign state, and subsequently, took the course to become an international empire with a British vernacular as the sole official language. In Finland, as in most of Eastern Europe, a similar process of making the language of peasants into a language fitting all social domains took place only in the 19th century in connection with nationalism and folk education.[73]

The American colonies of Britain would follow the liberal and nationalist ideologies by creating a country that was neutral from the point of view of traditional religion but dependent on a shared ethos of nationalism. This

69 See, e.g., Flora et al. (1999); Hroch (2012); Finell et al. (this volume).
70 Woodberry (2012: 249–251).
71 Anderson (2006: 46).
72 McGrath (2001: 24, 27, 33).
73 Huumo (2005).

was manifested in semiotics of the pledge of allegiance to the American flag, military cemeteries for the sacrificial victim for the country, memorials erected for past presidents, etc. Albeit being multicultural from early on, the U.S. would experience a period where the unifying role of the English language was stressed as fundamental for the nation, while the use of other languages would be considered a threat or suspicious activity.[74]

In the German-speaking countries, the period between Luther's activities (in the early 16th century) and the Westphalian peace treaty (in 1648) meant a shift from papal and principal power to an increasingly sovereign state power that functioned in the German language. Although divided into various states, the German lands turned to a common literary standard of German, beginning from the mid-17th century in the northern states. Up to the mid-18th century, this standard, based on Luther's translation of the Bible, would be used even in the Catholic regions and replace the earlier *Oberdeutsche Schreibsprache*. From this emerged the nationalist ideologies that would sacralise the German nation and seek its unity over state boundaries. This movement would be connected especially with the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, the founding of the Rheinbund by Napoleon, and accentuating Prussian efficiency and progress as opposed to Austrian backwardness and Catholicism. Particular interest turned to German vernaculars and folklore, which were considered to represent the divinely inspired *Volksseele* and *Naturpoesie*, as opposed to artificial *Kunstpoesie*. In this movement, German thinkers, such as Herder and Fichte, strongly emphasized the ultimate importance of language to the nation.[75]

In France, the French language was made an official language, ousting Latin in state governance in 1539. In 1634, the French Academy was founded, with the main task of protecting and cultivating the French language. The seal of the Academy depicted the text 'À l'immortalité,' pointing to the immortality of the French language that the Academy should guard. France, unlike Germany, was a unitary state with a single king and central administration. It should be noted, though, that by this time French was not widely spoken by the rural population outside Île-de-France and the northern regions, thus indicating that the role of language was also a policy oriented toward unifying the nation.

In the French Revolution, a new type of a state emerged that substituted religious worship with the cult of the human and the state. The newly erected Madeleine Church was refurbished into the Pantheon, where French national heroes would be buried and honoured. Although the subsequent rulers of France, including Napoleon, would have a considerably more tolerant attitude toward the Church, the secular nature of the French state prevails up to the present day. On that basis, forms of national worship would emerge, including honouring of the flag, the constitution, the national anthem, the Unknown Soldier, etc. A specific place in the system of nationalist concepts would be reserved for the French language, which, in

74 Zolberg & Long (1999).
75 See, e.g., Smith (2000).

the linguistic mythology of the following generations, would be praised for its logical structure, beauty, and clarity.[76]

In Eastern Europe, similar developments took place that, during the 19th century, created new full-fledged literary languages and countries with nationalist ideologies.[77] Typically, the development of literary language and the widening of its functions preceded the emergence of local nationalist ideologies, and national independence then confirmed these trajectories by establishing a nationalist cult in arts, symbols (flags, anthems, national heroes), holidays, and cemeteries and other sanctuaries. The three main institutions involved in establishing national identity were schools, newspaper media, and the army, all organized by means of a national language. Through these institutions, the nationalist identity was transferred to the masses, and the earlier predominantly local and religious identities receded into the background. A special role in this development was played by the literary standard of the language taught in schools and used in media at the expense of local spoken vernaculars, which in turn were often ridiculed or considered to be subject to foreign influences to be avoided.

In Finland, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the basis for the use of vernacular as a literary language had also developed already in the 16th century at the time of the Reformation, even though its full-fledged use began only later. The New Testament was translated into Finnish in 1548, accompanied by the Catechism and basic learning tools. At that time, the territory of Finland formed the eastern part of the Swedish kingdom, and a similar translation had been made into Swedish just shortly before.

During the 17th century, it was customary for the Swedish state to provide teaching in the basics of reading and Christianity at confirmation school.[78] Thus, Sweden was probably the first country in the world to require elementary reading skills of the whole population. However, writing skills were not required; this was a peculiar characteristic of Nordic countries. Even as late as the 1890s in Finland, then an autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire, only about 20% of the Lutheran population could both read and write, while nearly everyone was able to read.[79] Overall, the Orthodox Finns were better at writing than Lutheran Finns.

The Lutheran emphasis on reading skills and catechism had distinct societal effects in the Finnish population. While the Lutheran Church encouraged reading, it also emulated the Catholic practice of controlling the degree to which the people understood the Bible themselves or could spread their own interpretations through writing. Significant changes to these practices started to take place only during the 19th century as a result of the nationalist awakening, when Finnish national identity began to be constructed consciously, and in connection with the Pietist movement, which encouraged laypeople to read the Bible.

76 See, e.g., Schiffman (1996: 75–123); Oakes (2001).
77 See Hroch (1996, 2012).
78 See chapters by Salonen; Laine; Niemi & Sinnemäki (this volume).
79 Lehmuskallio (1983: 44).

The creation and standardization of the vernaculars all over Europe paved the way for a 'national awakening,' but it was also fuelled by the availability of vernacular Bible translations and other subsequent vernacular literature.[80] The emerging 'print languages' functioned as the foundation for national consciousness. As famously put by Benedict Anderson, it is written language that helps people create an 'imagined community' of those who can communicate by means of it; this community crosses the boundaries of local dialects, enabling greater social mobility and identity-building that is not confined to the local community.[81]

Modern nationalism and its sacred languages

Many social scientists agree that modern nationalism inherited features formerly associated with religion. In a similar manner to traditional religions, nationalism has myths and sacred symbols and it provides a transcendental meaning of life for an individual, albeit not in the immortality of a soul but in the immortality of the people (and their language), which also represents a mythological genealogy of the individual.[82] Carlton Hayes, the pioneering specialist on the research of nationalism, considered it a powerful modern religion that inherited many of the central symbols of Christianity, such as anthems and sacred cloths (the flag). He noted that European nationalism first emerged in Christian communities and that many of the practices related to it imitated Christian habits. In 19th-century nationalism, a new type of nationalist worship emerged that displayed the features of religion but was centred on concepts related to nation rather than concepts related to deities. In Hayes' words, nationalism has 'the patron or the personification of [the] fatherland;' 'speculative theology or mythology' describing the 'eternal past [...] and everlasting future' of the nation; canon of holy scripture; feasts, fasts, processions, pilgrimages, and holy days; and supreme sacrifice. Related to this, Hayes had a negative idea of nationalism, which he saw as representing tribal selfishness and vainglory.[83]

This analogy between religion and nationalism can be extended to discuss the role of language in nationalism. While early national identities were based on a religious understanding of the nation as God's chosen people, over the course of time language effectually replaced religion's role as the bedrock for nationhood.[84] As suggested by the sociologist Rogers Brubaker, in the era of modern nationalism, language came to be seen as the 'chief criterion and main cultural substrate of nationhood.'[85] Where traditional religions have their sacred languages, the centrality of language to nationalism makes it plausible to see a vernacular language, especially the standard official vernacular, as sacred to a nation state.

80 Hastings (1997).
81 Anderson (2006: 46).
82 Safran (2008).
83 Hayes (2016[1960]: 164–168).
84 Safran (2008).
85 Brubaker (2013: 13).

In addition, it has often been traditional religion that has legitimized the sacred status of language for nationalism. Variants of modern Christianity often represent a mixture of universal Christian and local nationalistic values, including language-related myths. In the 19th century, for instance, Bulgarian, Macedonian, and Serbian all claimed to represent an unbroken continuity with Old Church Slavonic,[86] considered to be of great value for national identity. In Protestant countries, the bond between the state, Church, and language became very intimate, and the origin of all of these were considered sacred. For instance, in Sweden, the leading Protestant nation of the 17th century, many theories were developed by Olaus Rudbeck, the most important historian of the time, to prove the biblical origins of the Swedish people and their languages.

The role of language for national identity may vary, depending on the degree of multilingualism and the degree of perceived or imagined threat from other languages. One of the more serious threats to national identity and national integrity seems to be peril of the common language. Threats to language are felt to be especially strong when language has a unifying function in the community. In Finland, this idea was expressed succinctly by Mathias Castrèn, the first professor of Finnish language, who stated in his inaugural public lecture in 1851 – at a time of early waves of national awakening – that it was not only the national culture that would stand or fall with language but the whole existence as a nation.[87]

We could assume that such threats were especially felt in monolingual nation states. However, 'monolingual' states seem to be historically a product of nationalism or large empires.[88] Even Western states are not completely monolingual, despite centuries of striving for unification. Linguistic diversity is often concealed by the promotion of the official language and through linguistic purism.

Linguistic purism is closely related to the standardization of languages,[89] and it can be viewed as a secular analogue to doctrinal purism in traditional religions. In the United States, for instance, possible threats to the status of English are often referred to in similar contexts as the cultural threats posed by a foreign religion, such as Islam.[90] France, while being a markedly non-committal state regarding religion and conviction, is simultaneously the country with probably the worst reputation regarding minority language protection in Europe. In a country without a common religious identity, the schooling, media, and administration functioning exclusively in French have provided a powerful tool for the unifying of the people and bringing their identities closer to each other. It is perhaps no surprise that France, a pivotal example of modern secularism, is also well known for its exceptionally purist attitude and guarding of the French language against foreign influence.[91]

86 Safran (2008: 174–176).
87 Paunonen (1976: 314).
88 Evans (2010).
89 See Brunstad (2003) and references there.
90 Zolberg & Long (1999).
91 Oakes (2001).

Finnish standard language and nationalist heritage

In the following, we discuss the relationship between language and ethnonational identity in Finland. We argue that although the state functions bilingually in Finnish and Swedish in Finland, there is a close linkage between language and national identity and that in the construction of the Finnish language standard there are signs of the same kind of sacred character of language as in officially monolingual nation states with a much longer tradition of standard language. Although there is no space in this chapter to deal with other officially bi- or multilingual countries like Belgium, Switzerland, or Canada, we may assume on a general level that they may share some common features with the history of Finland as regards language nationalism.[92]

Standard Finnish and national identity

When Finland became a Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire in 1809, Swedish remained the language of administration and prestige, while Finnish was stigmatized, especially in the eyes of the elite.[93] The common people spoke local dialects of Finnish and there was neither a standard spoken Finnish that was developed nor shared Finnish identity, as far as it is possible to reconstruct the situation of that period.

In the first half of the 19th century, European nationalist-romantic currents also reached Finland and began to stir national awakening in the Swedish-speaking upper classes, especially among university students and teachers. The intelligentsia began to promote a distinct Finnish national identity. In this nationalist movement, language became a crucial aspect of political debate and organization, notwithstanding the fact that the country did not really have a Finnish-speaking learned class. The differences between the first political parties in Finland were related to different opinions about Finnish language and culture: the Fennoman party promoted Finnish and the Svecoman party Swedish. The ideas of the Fennoman movement were formulated by J. W. Snellman, according to whom 'the only way Finland could make its own contribution to the history of the world was by the creation of a Finnish-speaking civilization expressed through a national literature in Finnish.'[94]

The nationalist movement escalated in so-called language strife, which lasted from roughly the second half of the 19th century well beyond the declaration of independence in 1917. A crucial role in the battle was the support of the Russian crown for the Fennoman movement. Of the four estates (nobility, burghers, clergy, and peasants), the clergy and the peasants supported Finnish language, but since three out of four were needed

92 A recent report by the *Pew Research Center*, February 1, 2017, suggests that this could be the case at least in Canada, where language is seen as more critical to national identity than birthplace, culture, or other relevant criteria. See also Finell et al. (this volume).

93 Hult & Pietikäinen (2014: 2–3).

94 Lindgren et al. (2011: 22).

to resolve the issue, tensions continued. The resolution was to have both Finnish and Swedish as official languages of the state.[95] The co-official status was first declared in 1863 with a twenty-year transition period, and again in a carefully prepared and detailed way in the 1922 language law, which had many concrete formulations to protect Swedish-speakers who were in the minority. However, the situation was resolved only in the Second World War, when speakers of both languages fought together against a common enemy. The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland did not seem to have a strong official opinion about the language strife, but most of the clergy and especially the Pietist Awakened faction (*heränäisyys* in Finnish) supported the Fennoman movement.[96]

In principle, nationalist ideology emphasizes language and vernacular literature as cornerstones of national identity and nation-building but simultaneously tends to create new normative contexts, which, deviating from vernacular language use, are labelled as 'national' and therefore important.

These circumstances are clearly visible in the creation of the Finnish national epic *Kalevala* in the 1830s and 1840s. The epic was compiled by Elias Lönnrot, who collected oral poetry especially from Northern Karelia. The collection had a great impact on the emerging Finnish literary standard while not actually being Finnish from the point of view of language. The epic was instead based on Northern Karelian (a Finnic language closely related to Finnish) folk poems, which were largely unintelligible for the admittedly tiny audience that was able to read Finnish literature in the 1840s.

Notwithstanding this state of affairs, the *Kalevala* soon became a kind of holy book for Finnish nationalism. A large amount of vocabulary entered the literary language from its poems, and Kalevalaic themes became extremely popular in the arts. Painting related to the themes of the *Kalevala* and also its runes were used to illustrate the premises of such official buildings as the Students' Union House (*Ylioppilastalo* in Finnish) or the National Museum (*Kansallismuseo* in Finnish). It was no problem in this connection that much of the *Kalevala* was in fact hardly intelligible for a lay Finn (this is reflected, for instance, in the fact that special dictionaries of the *Kalevala* have been published to facilitate its reading).[97] Even at present, the themes related to Kalevalaic mythology occupy an important position in Finnish nationalism.

When schools with Finnish as the language of instruction were established in the latter half of the 19th century, quite a few Swedish-speaking aristocratic and other well-off families also started to shift their home language and often also surnames into Finnish. As a result, by the early 20th century there was also a Finnish-speaking elite in Finland, alongside the old Swedish-speaking cadre.[98]

Because the new Finnish-speaking elite had shifted language, they had little connection with regional Finnish dialects, which meant that their

95 Lavery (2006: 58–61).
96 Huhta (2007); Juva (1950).
97 See Turunen (1949); Jussila (2009).
98 Lindgren et al. (2011).

speech included many features that were alien to traditional forms of Finnish. From then on, however, these features would define the standard. As a curious example, consider the development that took place in the representation of the dental fricative sound *ð* (the sound in the English article *the*). Through the influence of Swedish, it first began to be represented in writing by the letter *d*, and later the sound itself began to be pronounced as *d* in standard Finnish. This pronunciation was non-existent in all dialects that, in addition to *ð*, had *r*, *l*, or loss that was also represented as *h* and *j* in some positions. The new pronunciation was due to the Swedish superstrate, as the Swedish represented *d* but did not possess *ð*.[99] In addition, even the sounds *b* and *g* were now taken into standard language even though only a handful of Finnish dialects actually employed them and for most speakers they were (and partly still remain) hard to pronounce. Presently, the inability to pronounce these phonemes is often ridiculed as a sign of backwardness and the rural origins of a person.

The changes were evident also in morphology. Finnish is rich in declensional and conjugational types, and there is a lot of variation in declension, conjugation, and derivation between the dialects. Now, a particular form would be considered correct in writing and learned language, whereas the use of other forms would be discouraged. Especially conservative forms were chosen as the basis of the morphology of the literary language. As the end product, the literary language came to have many morphological rules *ad hoc*.

Moreover, the late 19th-century influx of Eastern Finnish words from the *Kalevala* and folk poetry meant that the lexicon of the literary language did not correspond to any spoken variety of Finnish. It represented a mixture of inherited Western and newly added Eastern vocabulary, mainly from dialects heavily deviating from the old literary language on every level. Furthermore, many Swedish loanwords and internationalisms that were commonplace in all of the Finnish dialects were now replaced with artificially created neologisms on the basis of dialectal vocabulary and derivative suffixes. The knowledge of previously non-existent words for concepts such as fork, hospital, jail, circle, person, assume, develop, etc. became a sign of 'good language use,' and as such it was required in all schools. At the same time, schoolchildren were told that the local words used for these and other concepts were not 'good Finnish,' and they were discouraged from using them.

The emerging literary language thus increasingly diverged from all spoken varieties of Finnish. The standard spoken and written Finnish is, on the one hand, a construct and, on the other hand, a compromise between the dialects.[100] It is practically no one's native language, being quite different from spoken everyday varieties of Finnish, and as such it is to some extent incomprehensible to everyone without a formal education.[101] The existence

99 Pulkkinen (1994).

100 Piippo et al. (2016: 157–158).

101 Similar ideas have been expressed, for instance, by Leino (2002). Note that some people apparently learned standard Finnish as a first language during the Fennoman movement and even until the mid-20th century (Paunonen 2017).

of two rather different types of Finnish, literary and spoken, is also a problem for the instruction of Finnish as a second language. Special learning books on spoken Finnish are needed to familiarize students with the way it is used in oral interaction.[102] Such a state of affairs is typically characteristic only of literary languages with a very old tradition (for instance, Arabic).

For the purpose of establishing and controlling the norms of Finnish language, active language planning has been practiced since the 19th century. A linguistic committee was established by the Finnish Literature Society already in the 1860s. Beginning in the 1940s, the responsibility for language planning and the governing of the norms of the standard language have been the responsibility of a state-run organization. In the 1970s, this fell under the aegis of the newly established Institute for the Languages of Finland.[103] The norms regarding the formal and conceptual systems of the standard language are governed to ensure that the standard language serves the communicative needs of the whole population, but this also ensures that the standard language provides the grounds for national unity.

From the perspective of language ideologies and linguistic culture, it is interesting to investigate the arguments used when a particular morphological or lexical form is preferred in the literary standard. In these cases, the argument of 'original Finnishness' often surfaces in a similar manner as the aspiration to avert 'foreign' influences (although, from a historical perspective, it is quite hard to say what original Finnish would be in terms of syntax, for example). The argument of the older age of the form is often put forward, and structures deviating from Swedish have clearly been given priority.[104] It needs to be noted, though, that analysis of the critical argumentation of the values behind language planning in Finland still remains to be carried out in future research.

Quite interestingly, the Language Board (or *Kielilautakunta*, the official body governing the norms of the standard language) is often criticized for being too tolerant toward dialectal and substandard features. For instance, the Institute for the Languages of Finland decided in 2014 to accept the colloquial construction *alkaa tekemään* ('to start doing') as part of the standard language. For about 100 years, the sole accepted construction in the standard language for the corresponding meaning had been *alkaa tehdä*. Although this change only introduced a common variety to the standard language and did not replace the construction that had been in use up until then, there was an unprecedented uproar in public discussion and in the media commenting on this change, both for and against.[105]

The discussion that followed suggests that Finns are quite conscious of the normativity of the standard language but also that many language users are keen to protect that normativity. As an example, the main editor of the leading newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat* was quick to declare that they would

102 Lauranto (2007).
103 Kolehmainen (2014).
104 See Kolehmainen (2014: 159–164), who presents other arguments often used in the Finnish language planning discussion.
105 Piippo et al. (2016: 147–149).

continue using only the old standard, that is, *alkaa tehdä*.[106] Such reactions reflect conservative ideas about language planning. It is felt that if the norms are loosened, it will weaken the authority of language planning, lead to uncertainty among language users, and potentially create an appearance that the community is unstable.[107]

Standard language and linguistic minorities

Under nationalism especially, territorially clustered linguistic minorities have often been considered as a threat to national identity and the unity of the state.[108] As a result, they have tended to be repressed on linguistic grounds. While many Finns quite probably felt themselves as representative of a small minority increasingly threatened and oppressed by Russification toward the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this did not translate into compassion toward even smaller minorities once Finnish independence was achieved. As a dominant culture, Finnishness began – and has been – largely assimilating Karelian-speakers, the Saami, the Romani and other linguistic minorities.[109] This has been in sharp contrast to treatment of Swedish-speakers, the old majority population, guaranteed far-reaching linguistic rights already in the first language law (1922) of independent Finland, which is considered as one of the fundamentals of Finnish statehood.

The case of the Karelian-language speakers is especially interesting because of the important role of Karelian culture in the Finnish national romantic self-identity. Despite the small number of Karelian-speakers in Finland proper – they constitute 1% of the pre-war Finnish population and even less in modern Finland – Karelian culture was actively appropriated in constructing the Finnish national identity. This was most obvious in the case of the *Kalevala*, which transformed Karelian folk poetry into a European nationalist epic. The same nationalistic interest regarding Karelian culture was also apparent in 19th- and early 20th-century arts and architecture, which used many elements of Karelian origin, such as ornaments, scenery, and mythology.[110]

Karelian culture was, however, strongly evaluated in terms of the amount of Russian influences vis-á-vis its 'original' and 'Finnish' character. This evaluation was carried out even though many of the 'Finnish' features of Karelian culture were absent in the Finnish-speaking area. In many early writings about life in Karelia – which, for the most part, was never a part of Finland proper – the local people were condemned for using Russian clothing, and where they appeared to know Karelian folk poetry, this was considered a notable value in the otherwise heavily Russified environment.[111]

In the independent Finland of the 1920s and 1930s, the Orthodox Karelian population was under suspicion of being oriented toward Russia.

106 *Helsingin Sanomat*, February 5, 2014.
107 Piippo et al. (2016: 161, 164).
108 Brubaker (2013: 13).
109 Tunkelo (1902: 56); Onikki-Rantajääskö (2013: 83).
110 See Sihvo (1969).
111 Ervasti (1880).

Their language, which was practically unintelligible for a layman Finn from western regions, was labelled the 'Finnish dialect of Eastern Karelia,'[112] and the population was subjected to severe Fennicization, especially in the schools that spread the Finnish literary language and 'mainstream' Western Finnish culture. These practices were also carried out in the Karelian-speaking areas occupied by the Finnish army in the Second World War (1941–1944).

In the national narrative, Karelia needed to be 'freed' from Russian political and cultural influence, even though in many respects the Karelian culture can be characterized as Orthodox Northern Russian village culture. Finnish activists took part in two military interventions in the Karelian-speaking areas of Russia in the early 1920s, and during the Second World War the freedom of the Karelian people was set as a chief goal of state politics. However, ensuring that Karelian speech habits were free of Russian influences actually meant getting rid of much of the everyday vocabulary and replacing it with Swedish borrowings and Finnish neologisms. The politics of Fennicization were also supported by some Lutheran chaplains, who tended to justify the war on biblical grounds, even applying to Karelia the prophetic rhetoric of a promised and holy land.[113] Similar rhetoric was reflected in the orders of Finland's commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Carl Mannerheim, who referred to the invasion of Russia as 'the holy war' and a 'crusade.'[114]

Thus, despite the undeniable importance of Karelia in the creation of Finnish national identity, at the same time the elements of Karelian culture were actively depicted as the Eastern 'other' in school teaching, local histories, and tourism-related materials.[115] This kind of Karelianness had meaning as an exotic element of regional Finnish culture but not so much for its own sake.

As for the Saami people, a major areal linguistic majority in northern Finland, they were brought under the national education of Sweden in the 17th and the 18th centuries. Since the beginning of the nationalistic period in Finland, Finnish language and culture were promoted in the education of the Saami. Both the state and the Church showed clear assimilative tendencies toward the Saami, but the character and strength of the policy measures varied, often according to the teachers and priests who were in charge. During the 20th century, Saami speakers were often prohibited from using their language in boarding schools, which resulted in major language shift in the next generation. Analogous developments took place in Sweden and Norway.[116]

Despite the ethos of Reformation that the holy texts should be available in different languages, the first New Testament in a Saami language spoken in Finland only appeared as late as 1840, three hundred years after the Swedish and Finnish translations. What is more, the Finnish Lutheran Church did

112 Hakulinen et al. (1942).
113 Tilli (2012).
114 Supreme Commander's (Mannerheim) Order of the Day No. 1, June 1941.
115 Lähteenmäki (2009).
116 Oakes (2001); Keskitalo et al. (2016); Rasmus (2008).

not support this translation, which was initiated by the Norwegian Bible Society.[117] The full Bible in Northern Saami was published in 1895. Portions of the New Testament have been published in other Saami languages but not earlier than the 1970s. While writing this chapter, a new Bible translation in Northern Saami is underway, and it is expected to see the light of day in a few years. The full New Testament will also be translated to Inari Saami in the near future.

Given Luther's impetus to translate the Bible into vernaculars and the fact that hundreds of missionaries have been sent from Finland to foreign countries since the 1870s (also to engage in Bible translation), it is striking that the translation and production of religious literature in the languages of linguistic minorities in Finland began in many cases much later.

In independent Finland, the elements of Saami culture have been widely appropriated in a similar manner to Karelian culture. Saami dress, music, mythology, and shaman drums all appear in numerous art works – such as paintings, songs, and novels – as exoticized elements of the far north, and subsequently they have been used by the tourism industry to create an image of Finland. The fact that the Finnish-speaking population of Lapland is actually of recent origin and emerged mainly in the 19th and 20th centuries is not seen as a problem here, nor is the fact that the Saami culture was aggressively assimilated. Industrial forestry and the building of artificial lakes in Lapland destroyed much of the reindeer pastures and Saami livelihood, yet the tourism industry continues to view the Saami as an important part of the brand of Northern Finland. In the 21st century, discussions regarding these practices of cultural appropriation have become commonplace; for instance, the use of Saami dress by Finnish beauty queens and sportsmen, the use of Saami elements in art works with no apparent Saami context, etc. have all been criticized in both traditional and social media.

The process of more demonstrably improving the status of minorities in Finland began only in the 1970s, when foreign minorities started immigrating to the country.[118] Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the assumption of stronger orientation toward the rest of Europe, the Nordic countries have taken reconciliatory measures to improve the status of minorities, especially in the framework of European integration, most notably the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. In Finland, the updated constitution (1995) acknowledges the Saami as an indigenous people possessing cultural autonomy (the Saami parliament). In addition, the state of Norway issued an apology to the Saami people in 1997; this was followed by the state of Sweden in 1998. In Finland, the Bishop of Oulu issued an apology to the Saami in 2012 for the repressive actions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. However, the Finnish government has not issued an apology and, unlike Norway recently, it has not ratified the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention.

117 Tunkelo (1902).
118 Räsänen (2009: 2, 4).

Against the perceived egalitarianism of Finnish society and the status of the biggest minority linguistic group (Swedish), the state has been surprisingly uneasy about emancipating its linguistic minorities.

As a conclusion, there are several signs that Finnish became – and still is – sacred for nation-building and national identity in Finland. Language also seems to be the strongest criterion of national identity, even for the younger generations of Finns.[119] A distinct Swedish-speaking identity for Finns, representing the long tradition of Swedish language in statehood, was consciously constructed during the 19th century,[120] and it resulted in Finland becoming officially a bilingual state. But Finland-Swedish identity construction is still controversial: ethnically the Finland-Swedes have a kind of affinity to Sweden but their national identity is linked to Finland and has regionally distinct characteristics.[121] National identity has a complex nature, and it allows different ethnolinguistic groups multiple nested sub-national and regionally distinct identities.[122] It remains to be seen how Finland will manage to support the construction of such sub-national identities in the future, particularly as the society becomes increasingly pluralist at all levels.

Conclusion

In many world religions, a specific language can acquire sacred status. However, the relationship between language and religion is especially complex in the history of Christianity. Latin became a sacred language for the Catholic Church, but the Reformation replaced Latin as the sole sacred language of the Church and elevated vernaculars as the new 'vulgates.' The use of vernaculars is by no means unique to Christianity or Protestantism, although the extent to which they are promoted is perhaps unique. The Reformers' endorsement of vernaculars was not new in the Christian tradition. It was rather a return to the roots of early Christianity. However, the Reformation also paved the way for replacing religion with nationalism. The vernaculars shifted from rural languages to languages of religion and then to the core of nationhood in the modern era of nationalism. We argue that in this process the ideology of sacred language has secularized and continued to influence, for instance, language policies, attitudes toward the standard language, and attitudes toward linguistic minorities.

We further argue that the creation and maintenance of standard vernacular languages are analogous to the emergence and safeguarding of the conceptual systems, dogma, and sacred languages of religions. The core ideology in this regard is to maintain the purity of the linguistic form in order to safeguard the unity of the people. Critically, our analysis does not hang on the belief that nationalism is considered a religion or not, because the

119 See Finell et al. (this volume).
120 Gardner (2014).
121 Hedberg & Kepsu (2008).
122 Kaplan (1999).

concept of sacred can be applied to nationalism even if it is not considered a religion.

Nordic countries have a strong Lutheran heritage, and the development of the vernaculars into official written languages due to the Reformation is a uniting theme in the ways in which the historical narratives of the national identities in these countries have been framed.[123] This emancipation of the majority vernaculars, however, was not applied to the same degree to linguistic minorities in their spheres. While the status of the dominant vernaculars improved, the dominant culture tended to discriminate against linguistic minorities, especially in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. In doing so, the dominant culture has in effect repeated the linguistically discriminatory policies that the Nordic majority vernaculars themselves were largely subjected to in the pre-Reformation era – and, in the case of Finnish language, up until the 19th century.

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123 See Salonen (this volume).

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Patrik Hagman

What Is This Thing Called Lutheranism Anyway? A Critical Perspective on the Construction of Lutheran Christianity in Sweden and Finland

Abstract

It is difficult to establish a theological continuity regarding the content of the term Lutheranism from the 16th century to the present. The construction of what we today understand to be Lutheran theology began in the late 19th century and became central to academic theology in the early part of the 20th century. By looking at the various 'Luther renaissances' and their motivations, this chapter argues that the construction of Lutheran faith as pure, clear and uncompromising is to a significant degree motivated by nationalistic tendencies in the Nordic societies. This 'Lutheranisation' of the Nordic countries was an attempt to counter the secularization of these societies, by distinguishing Lutheran faith from other types of Christianity, such as Roman Catholicism and various Free Church movements.

Introduction

In this chapter I want to complicate the conventional image of the Nordic countries as 'Lutheran' using a two-part argument. Firstly, by looking at the way Luther and Lutheranism have been received in Sweden in particular (and Finland after it was separated from Sweden), I will argue that there is little continuity in this notion of Lutheranism in the Nordic Countries, and that the kind of Lutheranism we today take more or less for granted is a rather late construct. Secondly, I will argue that what is often considered to be a Lutheran influence seldom differs much from other types of Christianity in practice, but is seen as such because of the polemical use that is made of Luther against various perceived 'enemies.'

In particular, I want to look at the way Lutheranism has been constructed as a very particular form of Christianity in contrast to both Catholicism and the various Free Church movements (Pentecostals, Baptists, Methodists etc.). I am not questioning the impact of Christianity on Finnish society, but I want to raise the question of whether the fact that Christianity in Finland has been predominantly of a Lutheran flavour has had the importance that is often imputed to it.

The late reformation

So, what is Lutheran Christianity? There is a tradition of summing up reformation teaching under three principles, the so-called three *solae*: *sola scriptura*, *sola fide*, *sola gratia*; or by scripture alone, by faith alone and by grace alone. The implication of the three is of course an emphasis on Scripture over tradition, faith over works and grace over merit.

However, this list of *solae* is merely one hundred years old. Lutheran theologian Theodore Engelder, in a book commemorating the four hundred years that had passed since the reformation, formulated it – though each of the *solae* had been used now and then going back to the reformers themselves. Engelder, however, is the first to describe these *solae* as the core principles of the Lutheran reformation. This is an important point, and it underlies what I am trying to say here: Much of what we believe to be authentic 16th century Lutheranism is in fact 20th century interpretation.

So why frame the Lutheran teaching in these three *solae*? Engelder writes:

> That uncompromising *sola* – "nothing else than" – is there for a purpose. Rome was ready with a compromise. She was willing to acknowledge the authority of Scripture and did not hesitate to extol the sanctity of the Bible. But it must be Scripture as interpreted by the Church, or the councils, or tradition, or the teachings of the fathers, meaning in every case the pope. So also Zwingli and the other dreamers of dreams: [...] But Luther would have none of it. He knew that, if it were not Scripture solely, it would not be Scripture at all.[1]

This notion of Lutheran faith as pure, clear, complete, while all other versions of Christianity are compromises is a strong feature in much Lutheran theology of the 20th century. But let me give you some background.

People often imagine that there is a tradition of Lutheran teaching in the Nordic countries going back to the reformation itself. This is not the case. People studied theology in Nordic universities during these centuries and, yes, they understood themselves to be Lutherans. But from the 16th century to the 19th, people did not read Luther very much. To be Lutheran meant to adhere to the Lutheran confession, which was centred on the Book of Concord rather than Luther himself. Theology textbooks from the first part of the 19th century do not even quote Luther.[2] Each generation of theologians would primarily read the books written by the generation before them.

In Finland, during the 17th century only the two Catechisms were available in Finnish translation, and it was only in the 1840s that the amount of texts translated started growing slowly.[3] Not even the Small Catechism was widely read in unmodified form. The situation in Sweden was much the same. Besides the Catechisms, it was only a few psalms by Luther that were available before 1754 when Luther's *Church Postil* was published, followed by the *Galatians Commentary* in 1775.[4]

1 Engelder (1916: 99).
2 Anderson (2006: 7).
3 Laine (2012: 109–110).
4 Aurelius (1994: 156).

The importance of Luther started to increase, not because people were reading his writings but because various groups needed to appeal to his authority. During the 18th century pietism arrived in Sweden (including what today is Finland). In this development Luther gained significant importance, though not so much in the sense that these movements were tightly focused on being Lutheran in their theologies – in fact the reading material of these groups were surprisingly ecumenical in scope, ranging from medieval mystics to puritans to German pietists.[5] Luther became significant when these groups came under heavy criticism from the established church. This started a chain reaction: first the pietist groups would try to find support in Luther for their views, arguing that they were the true Lutherans, whereas the established church resembled the papists. The representatives of the State Church then responded using the same argument, but claiming that the pietists resembled the 'Schwärmer,' the enthusiasts of the left wing of the reformation. Very different theologies would thus be described as Lutheran, and none of these 'lutheranisms' was based on very comprehensive or deep understandings of Luther's writings and his theology. Rather it was Luther's biography that inspired these various groups in their self-understanding as Lutherans.[6]

It is only from the 19th century onwards that there was a significant interest in Luther's actual writings, and this interest is again closely related to the various revival movements. Some of these groups indeed read thoroughly the few texts by Luther that were available, like the so-called *Lutherläsarna* ('Luther readers') in Northern Sweden in the early 19th century. Because of long distances to churches, people in this part of Sweden were allowed to have services at home instead of going to church each Sunday. This was probably the context of the first serious engagement with Luther in Sweden since the 16th century, in small poor villages in the countryside.

Towards the end of the 19th century, this growing interest in Luther resulted in a turn to Luther in academic research, both in Germany and in the Nordic countries. This is where the actual work of constructing a distinct Lutheran Christianity begins, that is, a Christianity that is based on the theology of Luther as expressed in his writings.

Luther as polemical tool

James Stayer describes the awakening of interest in Luther in Germany in his important book *Martin Luther German Saviour*. Like the pietists, the great liberal theologians of the 19th century treated Luther as a 'Great man in history,' although they were not impressed by his theology. They saw him as a brave figure who broke with oppressive structures in his day, but there was little alignment between Luther's theology and the concerns of theologians like Ritschl and von Harnack. Still, even here we can see the tendency that will dominate all Lutheran theology for decades to come, a strong anti-

5 Karimies (2018).
6 Aurelius (1994: 59–80).

Catholicism. In von Harnack it takes the surprising form of erasing probably the only Church Father who Luther talks approvingly of, Augustine, from Luther's theology, because Augustine was deemed too Catholic.[7]

The real start of the so-called Luther Renaissance in Germany came with the First World War. Karl Holl, the most important Luther scholar of his generation in Germany wrote to a friend that he considered his Luther research a contribution to the German war effort.[8] For Holl, the recovery of Luther's theology was part and parcel of building a strong German nation. This poignant example tells us something important – the renewed interest in Luther and reformation thinking at the start of the 20th century was heavily politicized. That was true not only of (political) conservatives like Holl, but also of liberals like Ernst Troeltsch and socialists like Karl Barth, though different kinds of politics led to different kinds of theologies.

Now, in Sweden we do not have such a clear example as Holl, at least not to my knowledge. Swedish theology, and Nordic theology in general, tends to hide its politics quite well. But in many ways the development in Swedish Luther research mirrors its development in Germany, and of course Swedish and German theologians were in very close contact with each other.

The first brilliant Luther scholar in Sweden was Einar Billing. Billing's first work on Luther *Luthers lära om staten* [Luther's teaching on the state] was published in 1900, but has a surprisingly modern feel to it – compared to much of the subsequent theology in Sweden. In particular, Billing clearly acknowledges Luther's lack of systematic thinking and the fact that he seems to change his mind according to situation quite a lot. He can also be rather critical towards the reformer.[9] But two themes are underlined by Billing that will have tremendous influence on later Luther scholarship. The first one is the notion of a 'kernel' in Luther's thinking, the 'justification by faith alone' – the *sola fide* referred to above. Billing interprets all of Luther's writing as emanating from this core.

This paradox – that Luther does not write in a systematic fashion, but still would have a clear centre of thinking, remains a paradox in Billing, but is largely lost on his followers, who fiercely try to harmonize the disparate strands of Luther's thinking into a seamless whole.[10]

Another thought that has become a staple of 'Lutheran' teaching is the notion that Luther has a strong and original doctrine of vocation that suggests a very particular view of work in Lutheranism. This idea also originates in Billing, although it has become part of the canon because of Wingren's well-known study.[11] Since this doctrine still has such a strong influence on the general perception of the way Luther has influenced the Nordic countries, it is worthwhile to dwell a bit on the subject here. Now, according to Billing, Luther's view of vocation had three benefits – in the words of Mary Elizabeth Anderson:

7 Stayer (2000: 11).
8 Stayer (2000: 24).
9 Billing & Wrede (1971: 115–116).
10 Frostin (1994).
11 Wingren (1957).

> First, it provides education for the self, disciplining the body through its "cross." Such discipline was what the Roman Catholic monastic system failed to bring about through its "child's play" (*lekverk* in Swedish). Next, calling provides a means to serve one's neighbor. Again, this was more useful than the Roman Catholic method of almsgiving. The third benefit was that it contributes to society's order, peace and calm. He argued that the emphasis of each benefit was that God orders all things. In this way, Luther's view of calling was a synthesis between faith in providence and faith in the atonement.[12]

It is not difficult to work out the object towards which this rhetoric is aimed. Roman Catholicism, again, is clearly the 'other' against which a Lutheran identity defines itself. However, there is more going on here than meets the eye. Firstly: There were very few Roman Catholics around in Billing's Sweden. Thus, unlike his German counterparts, Billing's theology was not about doing battle for the hearts of the nation between 'German' Luther and the Roman Catholics. Of course, in part, this is just a combination of an attempt at placing Luther in his 16th century context and an influence from German theologians. However, I do think there is a polemic going on here.

Billing developed his own theology like a battle with two fronts.[13] On the one hand there were strong secularizing tendencies in Sweden at this time, and in particular a strong workers movement with atheistic leanings.[14] The Church of Sweden was bleeding a lot of people and influence because of this. But there was another threat from the opposing side, from revival movements and free churches such as the Methodists and Baptists. And we can easily substitute Roman Catholic for these movements in the above statement. Luther was summoned in a struggle with the present day 'monastics' of Billing's day, small, enthusiastic groups of believers that were setting themselves clearly apart from the mainstream of Swedish society.

Considering that Luther singlehandedly confronted the greatest power of his time, it is a bit counterintuitive that in 20th century Swedish theology Luther becomes the great champion for a middle-of-the-road type of Christianity. This theme reoccurs in Swedish theology up to this day, though the perceived enemies vary slightly.[15]

So Billing had his motives – like all of us – and if anything this tendency to recruit Luther in ecclesial battles increases throughout the 20th century. But there is more to say about this notion of a 'Lutheran' doctrine of vocation and work. And we can see how strong this polemical strain is in Swedish 20th century Luther scholarship when we see that it did not seem to occur to anyone to check if this description of 'Roman Catholic monasticism' actually corresponds to anything that actually has existed.

Because there is little evidence that it did. Of course Luther is describing something, probably his own experiences of monastic life. Everyone acknowledges that Luther is a polemical writer who does not shy away from generalizations and exaggerations. There is nothing that suggests that

12 Anderson (2006: 40).
13 Eckerdal (2012).
14 Lange (2014: 320–326).
15 Kristensson Uggla (2010: 62).

Luther's descriptions of monasteries in the 16th century describes what was generally the case.[16] Sure, there was, as there has always been, monasteries in bad shape, with bad teaching and where helping the poor and sick was not a high priority. But the most striking thing about all of this is that what Billing describes as Luther's new doctrine is not so different from the teaching about work and vocation that had been taking place in monasteries since the third century.[17] And of course, this teaching was radical when it was new – in a society where manual work is something only slaves do, the notion that the development of the inner human being involves manual labour is radical indeed.

But the whole concept of monasteries was founded on the concept of bringing a person to a closer likeness with Jesus Christ through work and prayer or 'ora et labora' as the classical monastic dictum has it. And of that work, the most important was taking care of the poor, the sick, travellers and others in need. Any monastic rule, from the third century up until today will give ample evidence of the centrality of this.[18]

'Almsgiving' understood as in the above quote, as an ineffective non-systematic giving of food or cash to the needy was never seen as the ideal. Rather, it was throughout the Middle Ages considered to be a kind of minimal way of showing one's 'love for the poor,' perhaps suitable for the spiritually weak – like the rich.[19] This view remained more or less the same after the reformation in the Nordic countries up to the rise of the modern welfare state.

So there is not anything particularly new or different in Luther's teaching about work, but isn't it new when he talks about 'ordinary people's' work as opposed to the work of the spiritual elite in the monasteries? This is another beloved piece of the construction of a Lutheran identity in opposition to other types of Christianity, in particular Catholicism.

It rests on the idea that the medieval world was divided in two, between spirituals – priests, monks, nuns – and the laity that practiced a very minimalistic version of Christian faith. But this image of the Middle Ages misses at least two important points. One is that more or less everyone in the later Middle Ages was part of some kind of 'monastery'-like community. A guild, a fraternity, some kind of order, or at least a village. Not all of these were monastic, but all of them were connected to the church in some way. So the tanners in a town, for example, would have their own chapel in the cathedral, they would take part as a guild in the liturgical life of the church, for example, on feast days. Their 'work' was intimately connected to a complete vision of a society directed towards God, in much the same way as the Benedictines, the Franciscans and so on. It was merely the content of the work that differed. It is false to claim that only the work of clerics was 'religious' in this sense.

16 Hagman (2013); Lawrence (1989: 274–288).
17 Agamben (2013: 23–24).
18 Lawrence (1989).
19 Brodman (2009); Shuler (2010).

The second point is that the monastic orders were not a homogenous spiritual class. Rather different orders lived very different lives. Some were very well off, some were very poor. Some were stationary, some moved around. Some were devoted to learning, others to providing health and education. The difference in way of life, social standing and occupation differed much more between a mendicant friar at the University of Paris and a Carthusian recluse, than, for example, a modern day lawyer and a factory worker. And the secular clergy, ranging from village priests, that may have had very weak literacy, to cardinals and bishops, some of the most powerful people in the world at the time, could hardly be considered part of the same class.

What all this amounts to is that Luther's doctrine of vocation, and his criticism of monasticism of which it is a part, should not be read as a radically new criticism of how medieval society worked, or of 'Roman Catholic' doctrine or practice. Rather, it was yet another example of the kind of criticism of monastic decline that we have seen throughout the history of the church in every kind of reform movement. The theme of the sanctity of the work of ordinary people was a common theme in the preaching of the mendicant orders, for example.[20]

There is, however, one important difference. In Luther's vision of reform, the monasteries were closed. But what this indicates is that a better description of what actually took place is that, rather than abolishing monasteries, what Luther actually accomplished was the abolishing of a separate religious 'world.' That is, in the post-reformation era the entire world was supposed to live as monastics, though not as celibates.[21]

In the generation after Billing similar tendencies continued. Theologians like Anders Nygren, probably the most internationally influential Scandinavian theologian of the 20th century, were captivated by the notion of creating a scientific method for theology. Thus it could be considered slightly surprising that in his great work on the Christian notion of love, *Agape and Eros,* published in the 1930s, he would reach the conclusion that nowhere outside the New testament was the true Christian view of love established better than in Luther. Nygren tried to distinguish the pure Christian Agape-motif from the Greek Eros-motif – a distinction that few serious thinkers today would try to uphold.[22] In Nygren's narrative these always tend to get mixed up, with one astonishing exception: Martin Luther. Nygren writes:

> His view of love is throughout determined by the Christian Agape motif. We look in vain here for a single feature of Eros. And we try in vain to think of any possible expression of the idea of Agape, which Luther has not found and used.[23]

So, in Nygren, and in the other writers in the so-called 'Lund school of theology,' we see the full force of the authority of the scientific method

20 Lawrence (1989: 257).
21 Hagman & Halldorf (2017: 79–100).
22 Coakley (2015: 45–48).
23 Nygren (1953: 739).

brought in to prove the superiority of the Lutheran version of Christianity. Where Luther is, there is light, everywhere else darkness rules.

The Lutheranisation of the Nordic churches

Today, few theologians or Luther scholars would uphold this construct – the major trend seems to be to underline the continuity between Luther and medieval theology, and thus between Luther's theology and other versions of Christianity. Nonetheless the notion of a pure Lutheran faith still has a great influence in the Lutheran churches, especially in Finland, Denmark and Norway, while less so in Sweden.

What this small overview of the so-called Luther Renaissance in Germany and Sweden shows is that the notion of a Lutheranism that has had a strong influence on the Nordic societies is of a comparably late date – it is a feature of 20th century northern Europe. It is also intimately connected to the secularization of these countries – that is, this 'lutheranisation' of the churches in the Nordic countries was a strategy to counter the gradual loss of influence in society.

In his study of the use of Luther in the Swedish church throughout the centuries, Carl Axel Aurelius wants to argue against a standpoint similar to my own – the notion that Luther, in the words of Danish church historian P. G. Lindhardt, was 'a name and a symbol.'[24] Aurelius thus proceeds to study how the reformation was commemorated once every century – what themes were brought forward, how Luther was referred to. Aurelius argues that there is a continuity, but not in the sense of any typically 'Lutheran' doctrine, like the justification by faith alone, two kingdom doctrine or the division of law and gospel. Rather the strongest and most persistent theme in various speeches on the reformation over the course of the post-reformation era is 'God's providence.'[25] This is rather ironic given Aurelius' own intentions, because the notion of providence is common not only to most types of Christianity, but indeed, most kinds of monotheistic religion.

It does seem that, not only is there little continuity in the way Luther is viewed and read in the Nordic countries, but where this continuity exists, it is of a more general Christian kind. The same kind of argument could be made for 'Lutheran' features, like the emphasis on man's relation to God, the importance of the Bible, or more sociological features like ideas about learning and critical thinking. None of these are exclusively Lutheran. But this fact has been obscured by centuries of making use of Luther for various polemical purposes.

By emphasizing Lutheran Christianity as clear and pure, the authors sought to distance themselves from those features of Christianity that were deemed to be at odds with modern secular society. These features – hierarchy, 'religious life,' etc. – were now construed as 'catholic' features that were not at home in the Lutheran churches anyway. In this sense this Lutheranisation

24 Aurelius (1994: 7).
25 Aurelius (1994: 165).

shared a great deal with the liberal protestant theology that spawned it, even though it in many ways distanced itself from the 19th century type of liberal theology.

It should also be emphasized that this Lutheranisation takes place at a time when nationalism was very strong in the Nordic countries in general and in the Lutheran churches in particular. The leading example of this is of course the Finnish civil war where the Church almost without exception took the side of the 'whites.'[26] But the same tendency is strong in the other Nordic countries as well, although in less violent ways. In Sweden the so-called 'ungkyrkorörelsen' (Young Church Movement) had strong nationalist leanings, and similar movements took place in the other Scandinavian countries as well.[27]

So in order to state my thesis as clearly as possible: My point is that I would be hesitant to make very strong connections between a 'Lutheran' theology and particular aspects of today's society, unless there is a strong mediator between the two. This, in my opinion, is what for example Max Weber's famous thesis about the connection between a 'protestant ethic' and capitalism lacks. Put differently: The strong Lutheran identity that arose during the first half of the 20th century was mostly an intellectual affair – it would primarily affect theologians and priests.

This does of course not mean that we cannot find aspects of Finnish society that have a Christian origin. But in most cases these would not be unique to Lutheranism in any way. For example Christianity has started schools and hospitals all over the world. This is equally true of Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Lutheranism, Reformed churches and so on. It is true also in the Nordic countries.

If we want to identify clearly Lutheran influences, they can really only be of one kind: Where Lutheran tradition has made the church act in a specific way that in turn has affected society.

I will end with two examples, where I think the reformation actually did have an effect on the culture of the Nordic countries, precisely because here the effects have been mediated via material and institutional changes, rather than as abstract doctrines.

Firstly, there are the hymn books. Because of the changes in worship that were promoted by Luther and the other reformers, the use of popular melodies with spiritual texts created an entirely new popular culture in the form of the hymn books. Not every Lutheran home by far had a Bible. But all but the poorest of the poor had a hymn book. It would be hard to overemphasize the impact of this shared body of text in these countries. Of course, because its use was so universal, its impact is therefore hard to detect, but the language of these hymns, and the worldview contained in them, would have done more to shape the lives of the people living in this part of the world than all the efforts of the intellectual elite combined.

Of course, the influence is complex, so even though the hymn books were a distinct Lutheran feature before they spread to almost all other churches,

26 See more in Huttunen (this volume); Tilli (this volume).
27 Harding (2016).

it would be hard to pinpoint distinctly Lutheran features in their theologies. And of course there is a circular set of developments going on here – hymns that reflected the mood of society would be chosen for inclusion in the hymnbooks.

The other example is very different. It has to do with a theme I have already touched upon, that is Luther's criticisms of the monasteries. As is well known, the Protestant state was all too willing to use this aspect of reformation teaching in order to close down the monasteries and seize their wealth for the crown.

I will not go into the actual content of Luther's critique of monasteries – suffice to say he had little against the notion of ascetic techniques as a part of Christian life.[28] The result was that in those areas of Europe that became Lutheran, monasteries were closed. Now what did this do to these societies?

This is speculative, but I would suggest a connection between this development and the exceptionally strong convergence between state and civil society that we see especially in the Nordic countries. This could perhaps be seen as counter-intuitive to those who perceive the medieval church as this hegemonic monolete. But in reality the monasteries acted as diverse and decentralized centres of power, economy and learning, with great variation in intellectual traditions and approaches to interaction with the local society. With the monasteries gone, only the crown remained, taking over the organization and legitimacy of the Church, in its transforming influence that led to the modern nation state.

I suggest that this is an important factor in creating the fairly homogenous societies that have had great difficulty in dealing with groups of people that somehow did not fit the norm. We can pick and choose from examples here, but they include the various dissenting religious groups in the 19th century, state sponsored programs of racial 'hygiene,' oppression of minority groups such as the Romani and the Saami, up to the growing racism of today's Nordic societies.

Obviously, this was not an intended consequence of the reformation, Luther's notorious writings on the Jews notwithstanding.[29] I would still see the connection as plausible, because it is a theological difference with a strong institutional basis, and thus almost by definition something that would have a large effect on society.

Conclusions

In 2017, providence saw it fit to have the 100-year anniversary of Finnish independence coincide with commemoration of the 500 years that have passed since the reformation. This chapter can be understood as a plea that we should take this coincidence as the occasion to once and for all decouple the memory of the reformation from all kinds of nationalistic projects.

28 Hagman (2013).
29 Gritch (2012).

Whatever consequences the reformation might or might not have had for present day Finnish society, we will not resolve the very real challenges for those of us that live here by continuing to define some shared national identity against some perceived construction of 'the other.'

Let us rather use the hymnbook as a guide – it includes today hymns from all strands of Christian Faith, from all parts of the world, from all periods of the churches history. It is this kind of 'symphonic' identity we need today, rather than some continued dream of a pure superiority.

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Protestant Roots of Honesty and Other Finnish Values

Abstract

In this chapter, we examine the Protestant roots of four Finnish values: egalitarianism, work-related (or Protestant ethic) values, education-related values (*Bildung* in German, *sivistys* in Finnish), and honesty. We distinguish three levels: cultural, individual, and behavioural. In terms of these three levels, equality seems to be part of the cultural (behavioural) programming of the Finns as a nation, even though it does not figure prominently in the social representation of national identity or rank high in individual value hierarchies. Work-related values seem to be quite central to Finnish national identity, as well as empirically linked to honesty, also a central Finnish value. Education as a value seems to be more on a cultural level, and thus unites a more general Protestant approach, rather than being more specifically Finnish. Honesty is a value for which all three levels – national, individual, and behavioural – are in an agreement in Finland. This chapter advances evidence of a social psychological mechanism through which egalitarianism, Protestant work ethic, and education values jointly produce honesty and other ingredients of a functioning democracy. However, it should be noted that those associations are statistical and not deterministic or straightforward. The Finnish (and Nordic) honesty norm could be seen as a result of a joint influence of several values, not just attributable to the impact of one or two values.

Introduction

Some years ago, schoolboys in Helsinki loved to tell one other the following joke:

> Hitler, Stalin, and Mannerheim found themselves on board of an aircraft and wanted to know whose soldiers were bravest. Hitler called a German soldier with a parachute and told him: Jump! The German soldier jumped. Stalin called a Russian soldier without a parachute and ordered: Jump! The soldier jumped. Mannerheim, in turn, told a Finnish soldier to jump. The Finnish soldier said: Go and jump yourself!

The anecdote illustrates Finnish values in several ways. The response of the Finnish soldier to the order of Mannerheim, the Finnish World War II commander and war hero, suggests that Finns are proud of the low power distance or egalitarianism of their culture.[1] In low power distance cultures, unlike high power distance ones, employees are not too afraid to protest against authorities' irrational commands. Protestantism, in fact, was born as a protest against the Papal authority of the Catholic Church, 'which was not fulfilling its mission on earth,' as the famous Harvard historian of ideas, Crane Brinton (1898–1968) said in his *History of Western Morals*.[2] Also the military context of the joke reminds us of the salience of national defence and military bravery as a valued aspect of national identity.

In this chapter, we examine the Protestant roots of four Finnish values: egalitarianism, work-related (or Protestant ethic) values, education-related values (called *Bildung* in German and *sivistys* in Finnish), and honesty. We follow Schwartz's current value theory in which values refer to broad desirable goals that also serve as standards for evaluating actions, events and people. Schwartz distinguishes individual and cultural values. The latter are part of the cultural system of societies and derive from the functional imperatives with which societies have to cope in order to survive. Of course, a basic question in the study of values is to what extent people behave according to their values.[3] Here, we speak of three levels of values, cultural, individual and behavioural.

Max Weber famously argued that religion influences the social and economic system.[4] Weber's ideas have received strong support from the recent study by the political scientist Robert Woodberry.[5] Focusing on presence and frequency of Protestant missionary activities, he showed beyond any reasonable doubt that the intensity of such Protestant conversionary attempts is statistically strongly associated with indicators of functioning democracy that are customarily used in political science. By examining a variety of contexts where the missionaries have been active, Woodberry was able to exclude virtually all plausible third factor explanations.

Protestants are different from supporters of other religions, both Christian and non-Christian, in many societal respects.[6] In his theoretical model of the mechanisms through which Protestant missionary activities have influenced democracy, Woodberry singled out mass education, mass printing, and civil society, among other things.[7] We attempt here to look for the values that are associated with such sociological phenomena.

1 Hofstede (2001).
2 Brinton (1959: 214).
3 See, e.g., Schwartz (2011).
4 Weber (1969[1905]).
5 Woodberry (2012).
6 See the review by Nelson (2012).
7 Woodberry (2012: 256).

Egalitarianism

Mass education and mass printing conceptually imply equality in the sense that education and printed word are available to a great number of people and not restricted to elite. Protestantism, however, is not a necessary condition of egalitarianism. While all the Protestant countries are among the lowest power distance countries, there are also several non-Protestant ones among them (Austria, Israel, Ireland).[8] Protestantism thus seems to be a sufficient condition of egalitarianism but there are other causal factors at work as well.

Unlike work and education values or honesty, egalitarianism or equality do not figure in the national stereotypes or social representations of Finns and Finnish identity. However, in a study 'The Finns and history,' a large representative sample of adult Finns was asked to select five most important events from a list of 21 events. The third most frequently chosen event was the establishment of universal suffrage in 1906 (51% of the respondents), which reflects the significance of political and gender equality in the national consciousness.[9] Otherwise, equality mainly manifests itself on the behavioural level, so to speak, as 'cultural programming' of the Finns, to use Hofstede's term.[10]

If we look at the contents of national classic narratives, Aleksis Kivi's *Seven Brothers* from 1870, the first Finnish-language novel, belonged among the spontaneously most frequently mentioned works 'that had made a deep impression' on the respondents in Pilvi Torsti's study from 2012.[11] *Seven Brothers* is pervaded by a spirit of egalitarianism, best epitomized in the famous lines by Juhani, the eldest brother, addressed to the master of Viertola, a nobleman:

> We are under one law and are equal in its eyes. You came into this world as naked as I did, and you're not an inch better a man. And what of your rank? Let our bleary-eyed old rooster do his trick on it! There is one law for every man![12]

Similar egalitarian spirit can be perceived in the books on top of the Finns' list in Torsti's study, Mika Waltari's *Sinuhe* or Väinö Linna's *The Unknown Soldier*, whose villain is the authoritarian lieutenant Lammio. *Sinuhe*, for instance, says in an oft-quoted passage:

> There is no difference between one man and another, for all are born naked into the world. A man cannot be measured by the color of his skin, or by his speech, or by his clothes or jewels, but only by his heart. A good man is better than a bad man, and justice is better than injustice – and that is all I know.[13]

8 See e.g., Hofstede (2001: 113–115).
9 Torsti (2012: 100).
10 Hofstede (2001).
11 Torsti (2012: 108).
12 Kivi (1991[1870]: 195).
13 Waltari (2005[1945]: 487–488).

Schwartz's typology of values

The most widely used approach to values in cross-cultural psychology is Schwartz's theory of universal content and structure of values.[14] It defines values as motivational constructs, cognitive representations of abstract goals which serve to define situations, elicit more specific goals, and guide action. Individual values are organized into 10 universal types that serve different interests or motivational goals. Values, their contents, and (exemplary) items are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. The ten universal motivationally pure value types.

Power:	societal prestige and controlling others (social power, authority, wealth).
Achievement:	personal success and competence according to social standards (successful, capable, ambitious).
Hedonism:	pleasure and satisfaction of sensual needs (pleasure, enjoying life).
Stimulation:	excitement, novelty and challenge in life (daring, varied life, exciting life).
Self-direction:	independent action and thought, making one's own choices (freedom, creativity, curious).
Universalism:	understanding, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature (broadminded, social justice, equality, protecting environment).
Benevolence:	protecting the welfare of close others in everyday interaction (helpful, honest, forgiving, responsible).
Tradition:	respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's culture or religion imposes on the individual (humble, devout, accepting my portion in life).
Conformity:	restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to upset or harm others, or violate social expectations or norms (polite, obedient, honouring parent and elders).
Security:	safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships and of self (national security, family security, social order, clean).

In Schwartz's model, the goals and interests that values serve can be either compatible or conflicting with each other. The values form a two-dimensional continuum, organized along a circular structure consisting of two main dimensions, self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement and openness to change vs. conservation (Figure 2). Self-transcendence refers to motivation to transcend selfish concerns and promote the welfare of others (including the values of benevolence and universalism). Self-enhancement comprises values which motivate people to further their own personal interests even at the expense of others (power and achievement values). Openness to change values refer to motivation to follow one's own intellectual and emotional interests (self-direction, stimulation and hedonism value types), whereas conservation values refer to preferring the status quo and the certainty provided by relationships with close others, institutions and traditions (tradition, conformity and security value types).

14 Schwartz (1992).



Figure 2. A two-dimensional diagram of the relationships between different values in Schwartz's model.

One may wonder about the absence of religious values in the model. In fact, when Schwartz started developing his model, he had religious values among the values, but together with many other values, such as courage or lightheartedness, they were dropped from the model, as they turned out not to be motivationally pure – in contrast to the forty or so value items retained in the model as a result of empirical tests in 20 countries.[15] In Finland, for instance, religious values belong to (= correlate highly with) tradition values in the general population[16] but to universalism and benevolence values among university students.[17] Finland, along with the other traditionally Protestant countries, has been fairly secular for a number of years now. Values have been measured since 1975 using the precursor of the value survey (the Rokeach value survey)[18] in a representative municipality, Pyhtää. Salvation (eternal life), was ranked 16/18 both in 1975 and 2007 as well among what Rokeach calls terminal values. Terminal values refer to 'desirable end-states of existence,' which people would like to reach during their lifetime (e.g., salvation, freedom).[19]

While probably most values are not motivationally 'pure,' the Schwartz model could be used to determine their meanings, both within one culture and across cultures. Pohjanheimo added the item, sense of humour, to the

15 Schwartz (1992).
16 Puohiniemi (1995: 79).
17 Verkasalo (1996).
18 Rokeach (1973).
19 Helkama (2015: 83).

value measure, and found, first, that it was among the most important ones for the Pyhtää people, and second, that motivationally, it was a mixture of three Schwartz values, universalism, self-direction, and stimulation.[20] As these three values are adjacent in the model, this finding was consistent with Schwartz's assumption that adjacent values are compatible with one another. Likewise, Klaus Helkama and colleagues examined the meaning of honour in Finland and four other countries and found that in Finland and Estonia, it was an achievement value but in Italy and Russia a tradition/conformity value.[21] Thus, the Schwartz model is a useful tool for assessing also the meaning of other values than those in the model.

Equality is one the values in the Universalism value type. As the Schwartz Value Survey has been used in Finland since 1990s in national representative samples, we know a great deal of its variation, both temporally and across the different categories of Finns. In Puohiniemi's five value measurements between 1991 and 2005, the mean rank of equality showed the second largest variation, from 27/57 to 18/57.[22] There is also clear disagreement along the right – left political ideology regarding the individual importance attached to equality, even if the extent of disagreement has varied over the years.[23] In any case, on the individual level, that is, in the value hierarchies of individuals, equality is not among the top values of Finns, who also disagree with regard to its importance. To summarize the findings in terms of the three levels, equality seems to part of the cultural (behavioural) programming of the Finns as a nation, even though it does not figure prominently in the social representation of national identity or rank high in individual value hierarchies, let alone be shared.

Protestant ethic and education values

For Weber, the essential characteristic of Protestant ethic was a new attitude toward work.[24] A person had to work as if work were an end in itself ('absoluter Selbstzweck;' 'Beruf' (calling)).[25] The originally American psychological value measures, including Schwartz Value Survey, combine hard work and ambition into one item. This item has provoked protest from Finnish respondents, who would often say that ambition and hard work are, for them, so separate things that they do not know how to rate the item. 'Hard work, ambition,' is the only item that is associated with Protestant ethic in the Schwartz Value Survey. Those Finnish comments inspired us to divorce ambition from hard work and add a number of Protestant ethic items to accompany hard work in the value measure. For more than fifteen years now, we have used a version of the Schwartz Value Survey that involves a six-item

20 Pohjanheimo (1996).
21 Helkama et al. (2013).
22 Puohiniemi (2006: 334).
23 Helkama (2012).
24 Weber (1969[1905]).
25 Weber (1969[1905]: 52).

measure of Protestant values (hard work, conscientiousness, orderliness, long-term planning, punctuality, thrift). These Protestant ethic values form a type of their own, psychometrically as good as the motivationally pure Schwartz value types. The few published studies show that the importance of work values varies a great deal.[26] Unpublished studies show that those working or studying in the field of agriculture and health care place the Protestant ethic values on the top of their value hierarchy, whereas for many other groups, including a representative sample of a population of a representative Finnish municipality, Pyhtää, they rank near bottom. As to their meaning, Protestant ethic values are usually not motivationally pure. In terms of Schwartz's model they typically combine achievement and conformity, two non-adjacent value types in the model, and are thus an exception that confirms the rule.

By contrast, on the level of national culture, data from at least four independent sources of information attest to the salience of work in national identity. First, in studies of national stereotypes, hard work has consistently figured as a central trait attributed by the Finns to themselves[27] and by Russians, Estonians and Japanese to the Finns.[28] Second, on a word association test designed to study national identity,[29] Finns associate work far more frequently with their nationality than do Hungarians, Norwegians, or US citizens.[30] Third, in the just cited study of Finns' historical consciousness, as many as 86% of the respondents agreed with the statement 'Throughout their history, Finns have been hard working and industrious,' and hardly any differences were found between age groups, supporters of different political parties, or people with different educational levels.[31] Fourth, when interviews of celebrities were analysed, using the Schwartz value model as a tool, in Finnish and comparable international news magazines in the year 2000, the proportion of work values mentioned in the interviews published in the Finnish magazines *Suomen Kuvalehti* and *Apu* was much higher than the proportion of work values in *Newsweek* or the German *Der Spiegel*.[32]

A recent study also showed that in the public recurrent speeches, Finnish heads of state appeal to work values as a tool to foster cohesion especially in times of national crises.[33] The speeches unite both the individual and the cultural level, and can be seen as an expression of what is considered important/desirable for the entire nation from the head of state's point of view.[34]

The coupling of perceived 'Finnishness' with Protestant ethic values is especially evident in presidential New Year's Speeches. New Year's Speeches have traditionally been given as way to point the nation to the right direction

26 See Helkama et al. (2012); also Myyry & Helkama (2001).
27 Liebkind et al. (2007).
28 Helkama (2015); Lehtonen (1993); Varamäki (2005).
29 Larsen et al. (1995).
30 Anttila (2007: 195).
31 Torsti (2012: 207–213).
32 Helkama et al. (2012).
33 Portman (2014).
34 Schuh (2006); Renshon (2009).

for the coming year, and they have the highest percentage of mentioning of the Protestant ethic values (9–18%) in comparison with other types of recurring public speeches. Clearly the nation is meant to work, not only to solve crises, but also to be kept out of mischief, in accordance with the moral inhibition function work values also carry,[35] coupling the moral obligation to fight sloth with being productive. In addition, work requires coordination, so Protestant ethic values also act as an additional vehicle for fostering cohesion and a sense of national identity: 'we' work together for the nation, so to work is to be part of the 'we.' It would seem that in the Finnish context work and appealing to the importance of working together forms the bedrock of Finnish societal coping with difficulties, thus making Protestant ethic values quite central to Finnish identity.

Interestingly, the coupling of work with the production of wealth and poverty seem to have different paths in Catholic and Protestant thinking[36] with a further distinction between Reformed and Lutheran Protestant thought. In the Catholic world view, in which salvation and good works are closely related, the poor allow the rich to exercise benevolence and generosity, that is, virtues which help offset some of the misdeeds and sins. Therefore, even the poor are necessary, and being poor is not a sin. With the rise of Protestantism, giving alms ceases to be a way to salvation, and even the poor lose their standing as helpers of the rich. Being poor becomes a synonym with being lazy, which merits punishment, usually in the form of forced labour.[37] These discourses are still part of the present day political Finnish discussions on the welfare state and its viability, including the Finnish government's recent 'active model' for addressing unemployment which has been heavily criticized for punishing the unemployed.

A second aspect of work values' popularity in the heads of states' speeches is that Protestant ethic values echo the values of a deeply agrarian society, in which hard work (often hard physical work) was the reality many grew up with. Therefore, even in the late 20th century, when most work is done in offices, the appeal to topple financial crises and other evils by working harder and longer hours and being satisfied with less pay, clearly taps into the ideas the previous generations had passed on as realities of life, and is therefore hailed as expressing something essentially Finnish.

The pursuit of knowledge and education as a Finnish cultural value can be seen in the rulers' speeches, along with the previously mentioned Protestant ethic values. The creation of the Finnish 'knowledge society' has long roots, and education was seen as central to Finnish success even before independence. The importance given to education as a particularly Finnish value has its origins in the nationalistic thrust of the 19th century, which saw a renewed interest in the quest for national roots and identities in general, of which the establishing of Finnish as a fully-fledged language for education and for governance was a local example.[38]

35 Myyry & Helkama (2001); Helkama & Seppälä (2006).
36 Kahl (2005: 118–120).
37 Ojakangas (2016).
38 Also Sinnemäki & Saarikivi (this volume).

The political advantage of this (from the point of view of Finland's then rulers, the Russian Czars) was that it moved Finland even further from its previous close links with Sweden, and therefore it was strongly publicly encouraged. By separating the municipal and ecclesiastical spheres from one another, the law of 1866 established a primary school system modelled on Swiss examples, resulting in education being separated from the domain of the Lutheran Church. Still, the role of the Church was seen as crucial for the maintenance of education, and more specifically literacy, as a central Finnish value even as late as 1942.[39] From 1970s onwards there has been a national curriculum for all the primary schools in Finland, making sure education is equally accessible for all aged 7–15. This was a development strongly supported and pushed for by President Kekkonen, who in his speeches framed it as a question of equality. Thus education, while being a central cultural value on its own, is also deeply engrained with another core element of Finnishness: equality.

The pursuit of knowledge and higher education requires a steady source of public funding. The nature of education's status as a national value can also be seen in the ways it has been encouraged and funded (up to now)[40] even in times of national financial duress. The following short excerpt from President Koivisto in the midst of the severe recession of 1990s sums up the view of many of the heads of state,

> Even during economically trying times we need to remember that we are building the future on the basis of the level of education of the citizens, and on their know-how. We have to spend the resources of our society on research and education, regardless of the economic situation.[41]

Much like what Daniel Tröhler sustains, in Finland and in other Nordic countries, education is another means to gain control over difficulties the society or the individual face, and therefore various pursuits of new skills or knowledge are societally approved ways of overcoming them both on an individual as well as on a societal level.[42] Education thus serves not only as a means to personal growth, but it also serves as a stabilizing factor in the face of uncertainty. 'When in doubt, educate!' For example, in Sweden the recent substantial influx of migrants is met with the rhetorical stance by which education of those who have arrived is seen as the primary means of creating stability and fostering their integration into society.[43]

Conceptually education values are closely related to openness to change, and thus to self-direction values. In the recurring public speeches education (as pursuit of knowledge) is also mentioned as a way to maintain national independence and to make sure that Finland maintains its internationally cutting edge of innovation, thus enhancing its economic competitiveness.[44]

39 Portman (2014: 147).
40 See Lundahl (2016).
41 Koivisto, Parliament Opening Speech 1992. From Portman (2014: 148).
42 Tröhler (2011).
43 Portman (2016).
44 Antikainen (2010); Schienstock (2004).

Finland has been hailed as a knowledge society, made possible by the level of education of the population permitting a rapid transition to the kind of flexible technological mind-set needed for a rapid thrust forward (cf. Nokia).[45]

Honesty

Honesty is a value for which all three levels – national, individual, and behavioural – are in agreement in Finland. Social psychological studies of national stereotypes show that honesty is part of the Finnish autostereotype, or social representation of national identity.[46] In a study of autostereotypes of nine nations (Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and UK),[47] Finns were the only ones whose autostereotype involved the trait trustworthy. On the other hand, Finns and Swedes share the trait, trustworthy, in their autostereotype.[48] Thus, Finns and Swedes, historically Protestant nations, stand out by thinking that they are honest and trustworthy.

Finns also have high regard for honesty in their individual value hierarchies. Among the values that Rokeach called instrumental values,[49] in everyday language virtues, honesty has invariably been the top value since 1975, when we started measuring individual values by means of the Rokeach Value Survey.[50] Also among Swedes, honesty belongs to the most important values.[51] In the value systems of US citizens, too, honesty is ranked first.[52] Thus, other traditionally Protestant nations seem to share the high regard for honesty on an individual level.

Behavioural indicators of honesty suggest that Protestants, and Finns along with them, distinguish themselves from inhabitants of the rest of the world's countries. A standard question in the World Value Survey has been whether other people can be trusted. Using the affirmative response to this question as the indicator of the perception that other people (respondents' countrymen) tend to behave honestly, we can conclude that in 1991 for instance, the five Protestant countries, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, were the only countries in the world where the majority of citizens thought that people are honest.[53] In the Transparency International Corruption perception index 2011, the same five Protestant countries score the lowest, that is, least corrupt.[54]

45 Ahokas & Kaivo-oja (2004/2012); Välimaa & Hoffman (2008).
46 Helkama (2015); Kivilahti (1996); Lehtonen (1993); Liebkind et al. (2007); Smith et al. (2005).
47 Smith et al. (2005).
48 Henning-Lindblom (2012).
49 Rokeach (1973).
50 Helkama (2015); Puohiniemi (2006).
51 Verkasalo, Daun & Niit (1994).
52 Rokeach (1973: 166).
53 Inglehart & Welzel (2005: 72).
54 See e.g., Nelson (2012: 436).

On the Reader's Digest Lost wallet test in 2013, Helsinki turned out to be the most honest city among the 16 in which the test was carried out.[55] A total of twelve wallets were dropped down in the city centre, in parks, near shopping malls, and on sidewalks, with the name and cell phone number of the owner, as well as an amount of 50 US dollars in local currency. The return rate in Helsinki was 92% (11/12). The other historically Protestant city, Amsterdam, did not attain the top ranks but was left on the fifth place, together with Moscow, and after Mumbai, India, Budapest, and New York City. In similar earlier tests arranged by Finnish newspapers and magazines, the honesty percentage has been between 80 and 90.[56]

Honesty, then, is in Finland a (behavioural) norm that is followed, an individually important value, and part of national identity. This consistency between the three levels of scrutiny is, we shall argue here, a social psychological product of Protestantism's three values, examined above. That this is not a mere correlation but a cause – effect relation is suggested by a number of social psychological experiments that have focused on honesty.

In these experiments, participants are exposed to a strong temptation to cheat. In a typical experiment, participants are given extremely difficult or impossible tasks (e.g., mathematical or geometrical puzzles) to be solved, and they are told for instance that '90% of your fellow students' have correctly solved such tasks. By chance, the experimenter has 'forgot' a booklet that contains the correct answers in the room. In the early experiments Eisenberger and Shank found that those who endorsed Protestant Work Ethic were less likely to cheat than those who got lower scores on the PWE test.[57] They also found that in the condition in which participants had to work hard (solve many difficult problems) they cheated less than participants in the condition in which they worked less hard, that is, were asked to solve a couple of easy problems only. Hard work and the belief in hard work and other Protestant virtues thus lead to honesty.

Even more interesting are the recent findings by Francesca Gino and Cassie Mogilner, who in a series of experiments had participants think of either money or time.[58] Thinking of money led to more cheating and thinking of time to less cheating than in the control condition. When analysed further, it turned out that the factor behind the differences in the time and money conditions was self-reflection – thinking of time reduced cheating by increasing self-reflection, and thinking of money increased cheating by lowering self-reflection.

Self-reflection, in turn, is clearly related to those sociological factors that Woodberry sees influencing democracy, viz. mass education and mass printing.[59] They both are essentially linked to literacy. And literacy is essentially linked to self-reflection. In a classic study in the early 1930s, inspired by the Russian cultural-historical school, Aleksander Luria

55 Reader's Digest (2013).
56 See Helkama (2015: 160).
57 Eisenberger & Shank (1985).
58 Gino & Mogilner (2014).
59 Woodberry (2012).

compared three groups of Uzbeks and Kirgiz living in remote villages. Of the three groups of basically similar background, one was illiterate, the second semiliterate, and the third had acquired literacy. Whereas in the illiterate group, only five per cent showed self-reflection when asked about their mental characteristics and differences from other people, in the literate group a majority (65%) did analyse their inner world.[60] The early Protestants mainly used their literacy to reading the Bible, but a look at the Protestant best-seller that mass printing made available to the new large reading public, John Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress from 1687, suffices to convince one of the self-reflection-promoting effects of this book. On almost every page, the reader is struck by the Pilgrim's concern for the purity of his motives and by his fear of being guilty of hypocrisy. Pilgrim's Progress has been, after the Bible, the most widely printed book in the world, translated into more than 200 languages. In Finnish it appeared for the first time in 1809, and the latest translation was published 2009.

Thus, the experimental evidence suggests that Protestant ethic values and their activation lead to honesty, as does increase in self-reflection, produced by schooling and education. It does not seem plausible to argue that citizens in present-day Protestant countries would be more self-reflective than citizens elsewhere. Rather, they probably follow more or less automatically the honesty norm that was formed several hundred years ago under the influence of those factors, by their ancestors whose main independent readings were Bible and Pilgrim's Progress. And that equality is one of the value factors that contribute to the maintenance of the honesty norm is in turn suggested by the social psychological experiments by Morton Deutsch.[61] He had groups of similar individuals perform different tasks and varied the principle according to which the reward would be divided among the members. It turned out that groups that were told that the reward would be divided equally among the members developed cooperative, positive, trusting interindividual relationships, whereas those groups in which the reward was to be divided according to individual performance displayed competitive, negative, and mistrustful ones. Hence, egalitarian relations have reinforced the trust that is an integral part of civil society, an essential component in the Protestant syndrome that leads to functioning democracy.[62] And observations from the United States 1960–1998 show that trust in other people declined *pari passu* with increasing economic inequality.[63]

Discussion and conclusions

To summarize our analysis, we examined first how four Protestant values, equality, work, education, and honesty, manifest themselves in Finnish culture and in the social scientific measures of individual and cultural

60 Luria (1976/1974: 160).
61 Deutsch (1985).
62 Woodberry (2012).
63 Uslaner (2002).

(national) values and the behavioural equivalents of those values. Two of those values, equality and honesty, are included in the Schwartz measure,[64] which consists of values that are motivationally pure and have cross-culturally stable meaning. If we compare the cultural level and the individual level, equality and honesty behave differently. Equality is part of the Finnish system of cultural values in the sense that Finland belongs to egalitarian countries, but equality is not very high in the individual value hierarchies of Finns, unlike honesty, which is one of the top individual values. Hard work and education vary in meaning across cultures and are motivationally not pure. Hard work and other work-related values are like equality – part of the social representation of Finnish national identity but typically not very important individually. Of education values we do not have individual-level data, but the data from rulers' public addresses, word association tests, and Finns' conceptions of history concur in confirming their salience in the national self-image. Second, we advanced evidence of a social psychological mechanism through which egalitarianism, Protestant work ethic and education values jointly produce honesty, which is an essential ingredient of a functioning democracy.

Let us add a few historical and social psychological considerations of the dynamics of values. Protestant egalitarianism is historically relative. Take, for instance, the Protestant missions, the target of Woodberry's scrutiny.[65] Finnish missions were in no way havens of egalitarianism, at least for the female missionaries. In her study of Finnish missionary women in Japan, Seija Jalagin documents the strong patriarchal hierarchy that prevailed in the organization of the mission of the Lutheran Evangelical Association of Finland during the early 1900s (when Finnish women already had full political rights), and the strategies that woman missionaries used to gain autonomy in their work.[66]

Protestantism, egalitarianism and education values do regularly go together. In 1850, in the world there were ten countries where illiteracy among adults was less than 30%. They included all Nordic countries and the Netherlands (all Protestant), Scotland, Germany and Switzerland (partly Protestant), and the United States whites.[67] Still, in Finland, egalitarianism and education values may be even more tightly intertwined than in the other Nordic countries. For instance, in Norway, school and schooling were in a word association test less salient than in Finland[68]. This was most likely due to the popular education ideology of the nationalistic movement, supported by the Russian rulers, as we have seen. As an example, of the students in the University of Helsinki in 1935, 23% were from working class and 19% from peasant families, far higher percentages than in the other Nordic countries.[69] But in terms of social mobility, all of the Protestant Nordic countries usually

64 Schwartz (1992).
65 Woodberry (2012).
66 Jalagin (2003).
67 Hobsbawm (1987: 345).
68 Anttila (2007: 194).
69 Jutikkala 1978: 183).

get the top rankings, whatever the measure of mobility. The reason for this is that education is the main avenue of getting ahead.

Of the Protestant social innovations, to use the fashionable term, probably the crucial one was the book, its mass printing, and the ensuing emphasis on education. According to Egon Friedell's beautiful analysis in his *Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit* from 1927:

> In der [...] Tatsache, dass im Mittelpunkt des Glaubens nicht mehr das Leben und Leiden des Erlösers steht, sondern der Bericht darűber, das "B u c h," erfűllt sich der Sieg des schreibenden, druckenden, lesenden, szientifischen Menschen, der die Neuzeit regiert, kűndigt sich der Anbruch eines literarischen Zeitalters an. [...] Kurz: der Gutenbergmensch triumphiert űber den gotischen Mensch.[70]

Friedell expressed with eloquence the fact which Woodberry discovered by means of statistical analyses: books, mass printing and mass education lead directly to the enlightenment and democracy, even though Luther did not foresee those consequences of his doctrine.[71] The present-day Finn is, in many ways, Luther's exemplary pupil, writing, printing, reading, scientific *homo Gutenbergensis*. The Finnish national novel is the humorous story about the seven brothers' slow and tortuous acquisition of literacy, which eventually takes place by what in social psychology is called cooperative learning: the youngest brother, Eero, teaches others, who did not profit from the authoritarian clerical method. Eero, the author's alter ego, also epitomizes enlightenment values and, as a person who on Sundays and holidays 'read the newspaper or himself wrote about the parish news and affairs for some newspaper,' ends up being literally a real *homo Gutenbergensis*.

Literacy and self-reflection go together, as we saw, but books and civic society in the sense of participation in civic activities also seem to be linked. The Polish social psychologist Maria Lewicka examined social participation in a large representative sample of Poles.[72] She used the number of books as a measure of cultural capital and found that it was associated with participation in civic affairs (e.g., local government, voluntary associations, political parties) even when plausible third factors such as education and income were taken into account. Thus, against the stereotypical view, bookworms are not socially isolated and withdrawn individuals but active citizens.

Among the behavioural manifestations of education values, performance indicators of the national school systems, higher education and science figure prominently. Protestant countries are high scorers in all those rankings. But a closer look at the statistics shows that it is not Protestantism

70 Friedell (1927: 281). English translation by the authors is provided here:
The fact that the focus of faith is no longer on the life and suffering of the Redeemer but on the narrative of them, on the 'b o o k,' means the victory of a writing, printing, reading, scientific man, who dominates the modern age, and this announces the dawn of a literary era. [...] In brief: the Gutenberg man triumphs over the Gothic man.

71 Woodberry (2012).

72 Lewicka (2005).

with its emphasis on education per se, but also equality that is responsible for high achievements. For instance, when the indicators of the quality of scientific research are related to population size, the top countries are Israel, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Denmark – Finland, Norway and Sweden are also near the top.[73] Israel and Switzerland are egalitarian but not Protestant – Israel not at all, and Switzerland not exclusively. In the same vein, in the PISA (Programme for International Students Assessment) top countries, Finland, Canada, and South Korea, the differences between schools are the smallest.[74] In the field of education, egalitarianism and high performance do not exclude one another but on the contrary, there is solid evidence of a positive correlation between the two, whatever the think tanks funded by the economic elite want to argue. In the Nordic countries, there is a top university per 8 million inhabitants, the highest density in the world. With regard to the performance rankings of the basic school system, Finland differs from the other Nordic Protestant countries with regard to the PISA scores. Thus, the Finnish success must be attributed to factors that are not at work elsewhere. Hannu Simola invokes one factor that seems to be lacking in other Nordic countries.[75] Based on empirical comparative evidence, he calls this traditional paternalistic progressivism, which guides the classroom behaviour of teachers and pupils. It is the remnant of the agricultural society. In terms of the Schwartz model, this paternalism could be associated with conformity values on which Finland is the highest in Western Europe. Thus, the combination of the Protestant education values with relatively high conformity, admittedly somewhat paradoxical from the viewpoint of Schwartz's model, has guaranteed the smooth functioning of the Finnish basic school system.

To conclude, we explored some of the social psychological value mechanisms that may underlie the associations of Protestantism and functioning democracy, both from a historical perspective and relying on experimental studies. The Finnish (and Nordic) honesty norm as well as the performance of the Finnish basic school system could be seen as a result of a joint influence of several values, not just attributable to the impact of one or two values.

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II Education and Culture

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Reformation and the Medieval Roots of the Finnish Education

Abstract

In the Finnish context, the effects of the Reformation on education and spreading of literacy have always been considered crucial. In the history of Finnish education, a special emphasis has been given to Luther's idea about how everyone should be able to read and understand Sacred Scripture in their own language and, thereby, to the creation of the Finnish literary language. The Finnish history writing attributes to Luther's idea two closely intertwined processes: The development of the Finnish literary language and the spread of reading and writing skills among Finns.

The Reformation and Luther's idea of reading have without doubt contributed significantly to the development of the Finnish literary language. It is, however, wrong to claim that the Reformation has been the starting point for education in Finland in general or that it would have created a sudden change in the educational system. The education in Finland has, in fact, solid medieval roots, and the development of the educational system was a slow process, which ended with the spread of reading and writing skills to the whole Finnish population as late as around the turn of the 20th century. This chapter aims at illustrating this development. The analysis begins with the Catholic Middle Ages but pays a special attention to the changes during the Reformation period, that is, the 16th and 17th centuries.

The impact of the Reformation upon education and literacy in Finland

The Finnish scholarship discussing the Reformation has always stressed the crucial role of Reformation for education and literacy in the country. The literature regarding the Reformation in Finland has laid a special emphasis to how Luther's idea that everyone should be able to read and understand the Sacred Scripture in their own language has contributed – through translating the central ecclesiastical texts into Finnish – to the birth of the Finnish literary language. The Finnish history writing therefore attributes to the Reformation two intertwined processes: The development of the Finnish literary language and the spread of reading and writing skills among Finns.

During the Catholic Middle Ages, the written languages in Finland were Latin (in ecclesiastical contexts), Swedish (in administrative and judicial contexts) and Middle Low German (in commerce as the lingua franca of the Hanseatic League), while Finnish was the spoken language of the (often uneducated) common people. The Reformation changed this old tradition, when ecclesiastical texts for the first time were translated into Finnish and published in a printed form. The main personage in this development was the later bishop of Turku, Mikael Agricola, who because of his extensive translation and publication activities has received the epithet of 'the father of the Finnish literary language.'[1]

The above sketched effect of the Reformation on the spread of reading skills of Finns is, however, somewhat debatable. It is 'common knowledge' among Finns that Agricola's publications, in particular his primer called *ABC-kiria* (1543) and his translation of the New Testament (1548), resulted in the ground-breaking effect that the previously illiterate Finns finally learned to read. But this is not the whole truth. It is beyond doubt that the first Finnish publications by Agricola had an immense impact upon the development of the Finnish literary language. However, the publication of the first texts in Finnish did not mean that the whole Finnish population suddenly learned to read. That was a long process, and in certain more remote territories it took centuries before the majority of inhabitants were able to read, and even longer before the majority of the Finnish population could express themselves in writing.[2]

Despite these reservations, it is certainly correct to say that the Reformation had strong and long-lasting effects on Finnish education and literacy. In this chapter I will discuss in detail the most significant events in the development of the Finnish educational system from the Catholic Middle Ages until the mid-19th century, when the whole basis for education in Finland – which until then had been based on the medieval model of Latin schools – was renewed, and even girls were allowed to attend the schools.

Education in the medieval diocese of Turku

The first signs of literate culture appeared in Finland together with the arrival of the Catholic Church in the mid-12th century. The first preserved written documents, dating to the 13th century, were composed in Latin and concern the early church structure in the diocese of Turku, which in the Middle Ages covered more or less the territory of present-day Finland. Along with the new faith, various liturgical manuscripts arrived in the territory of the diocese of

1 On Mikael Agricola, his life and production, see Heininen (2007: *passim*).

2 The investigation of development of reading and writing skills in Finland have shown that in 1880, 98.7% of Lutheran Finns could read but only 12.4% were able to write. The situation changed slowly in the course of the following 50 years, since in 1930 99.3% could read and 84.1% of Finns had also writing skills. Latomaa & Nuolijärvi (2002: 114–116, especially p. 115) with a table referring to Lehmuskallio (1983).

Turku: Mass books, handbooks for priests and liturgical manuals alongside with copies of the Holy Bible and ecclesiastical law began to be used in the country. For a long time, various types of manuscripts were imported from abroad and used by a small number of priests, who had learned to read and write during their priestly education.[3] In the following century, the written culture of the Catholic Church was adopted to the civil administration and the ability to read and write was no more reserved to men serving God. In the Middle Ages, education was a privilege of only a very few persons belonging to the upper social strata: noblemen, clerics and burghers. In the last century of the Middle Ages and especially during the early modern period, the offspring of wealthy peasants – like Mikael Agricola, who chose his family name according to his father's profession – could also receive education and so could women with an upper-class background.

Since the norms of the Catholic Church, the so-called Canon Law, stipulated that men who received priestly orders had to be able to read, write and understand Latin, the Church expected the local bishops to take care of the education of future clerics.[4] For this purpose, there should be a school in each cathedral, where young talented boys could learn the necessary skills so that they could become priests and serve in their parishes.[5] The earliest surviving source referring to the existence of a cathedral school in the diocese of Turku is from the year 1355, when the retired school master of Turku, Henrik Tempil, made his last will.[6] The will does not date the founding of the cathedral school in Turku but it gives a date prior to which the first Finnish school must have been functioning. The cathedral school in Turku followed the same general curriculum as all other cathedral schools, where the pupils were taught the subjects of *trivium* (Latin grammar, rhetoric and dialectic) and *quadrivium* (arithmetic, geometry, music and astrology).[7]

Alongside the cathedral school in Turku, which educated future priests, there were other means of receiving education as well. At the local level, parish priests taught to their young parishioners the basics of the Christian faith as well as trained skilled young boys to help them in carrying out the priestly duties in the local church. Alongside with the liturgy, the boys could learn to sing, to read and to write, and perhaps the priest could even teach them the basics of Latin grammar. The existing medieval sources, unfortunately, do not give us any details about these voluntary local schools but just refer to the existence of such a practice.[8] When the boys had learned enough and aimed at an ecclesiastical career, they could continue their education in the cathedral school of Turku or attend the schools in one of the Dominican (Turku and Vyborg) or Franciscan (Vyborg or Rauma) convents, which educated young men who intended to join the order. In certain medieval towns there were also parish schools, which offered higher

3 Heikkilä (2012: 22–24); Heikkilä (2010: *passim*).
4 Salonen & Hanska (2013: 9–18).
5 Hanska & Salonen (2004: 59–61).
6 REA 160 (6.7.1355).
7 Hanska & Lahtinen (2010: 49–50, 53–57).
8 Hanska & Lahtinen (2010: 45); Salonen (2009: 271).

education than only the basics, but we do not know much of them and sometimes the research has mixed them with the schools of Dominicans or Franciscans.[9] The latest research on the 'famous Franciscan school in Rauma' has, for example, shown that the school in Rauma was not connected to the Franciscans but was most probably a school of the local parish.[10] If a boy did not want to pursue ecclesiastical career, he could be educated in town schools, sponsored by the local town councils, where he would learn all skills necessary for burghers: to read, to write and to count. As in the case with ecclesiastical schools, the medieval sources do not offer any details about these schools or their curricula, but their existence is known through small references in sources to them or their students.[11]

The elite of the cathedral school of Turku could continue studies at universities abroad. Since not all bright young men could afford expensive studies, the Turku diocese would offer them scholarships (in Latin, *bursa*) in the form of income from certain parishes. The first source references to Finns studying in foreign universities are already from the 13th century, but the number of Finnish university students began to increase only in the following century. The late 15th-century as well as early 16th-century sources, instead, contain information about numerous Finnish students in foreign universities. Jussi Nuorteva, who has studied the Finnish students abroad, has counted that over 160 Finns received a degree at a foreign university in the Middle Ages. Since his studies have later been completed and updated by others, it is perhaps not wrong to talk about almost 200 Finnish medieval university students.[12]

Alongside with the education of promising priest candidates, the medieval church provided education for parishioners in the basics of catechism. In practice, this education took place through preaching and the act of yearly confession. According to the decision of the Fourth Lateran Council celebrated in Rome in 1215, parish priests were in charge of the cure of souls of their parishioners and every Christian was obliged to confess his or her sins to the local father confessor at least once a year.[13] The yearly act of confession was an occasion for the confessor to ensure that all his parishioners possessed the minimum understanding of the basics of the Christian dogma and sufficient knowledge on what kinds of deeds were sin and what were not. Additionally, the act of confession allowed the priest to test, whether his parishioners knew the Ten Commandments and Creed and could recite the most important prayers, Our Lord and Hail Mary. It was the task of the priest to recite these prayers every Sunday during the Mass so that all could memorize them, but the medieval Church was not interested in teaching Christians to read or to write.[14]

9 Hanska & Lahtinen (2010: 64–68).
10 Keskiaho (2015: 124–126).
11 Hanska & Lahtinen (2010: 68–69).
12 Nuorteva (1997: *passim*).
13 The constitution no. 21 known as the canon *Omnis utriusque sexus*, of the Fourth Lateran Council is edited in COD, 245.
14 Hanska & Lahtinen (2010: 88–91).

The Reformation and the declining financing of education

Even though Finnish history writing often links the Reformation with higher education and spread of literacy, the Reformation has also had a negative impact upon the level of education, although not for a very long time. The reason for this was purely economic. When the Swedish King Gustav Vasa carried through his Reformation in the realm, the ecclesiastical administration and life in the diocese of Turku changed too. Historians have defined the Reformation in Sweden as 'a royal reformation' meaning that it was not a popular movement but a top-down event dictated by the Swedish King, or, as the Finnish church historian Kauko Pirinen has put it, 'a change in ecclesiastical conditions, dictated by secular authorities, the content of which was formulated by national reformers.'[15]

In practice, the Reformation of Gustav Vasa meant huge economic losses for the church and parishes because the King confiscated all 'extra' property of cathedrals, parishes and monasteries and diminished radically the income of not only the bishops but also other ecclesiastics in order to save the finances of his deeply indebted realm.[16] The loss of property and income meant a great distress for the church, which earlier had had an important role in taking care of the poor and sick as well as in supporting young talented men in their studies. After the confiscations, the church was no longer able to take care of these functions as it had done earlier.[17]

With the closing of the monasteries in Sweden, including the diocese of Turku, the Reformation meant an end to the monastic schools. The Reformation and the diminished income of the church complicated also the activity of the local ecclesiastical schools since the income of parishes diminished radically. But the effect of the Reformation upon these local and rather unorganized activities was not as significant as it was to the cathedral school. With the rundown of the Turku cathedral chapter, the Reformation caused financial problems for the cathedral school too.[18]

Since the reformed church needed competent priests and the new Swedish realm needed learned civil servants for its increasing bureaucracy, the cathedral school in Turku maintained its important function in educating literate men for the service of the Swedish crown – despite the financial cuts. Because of this need, the office of the schoolmaster was not in danger of being abolished, even though many of the canonries in Turku cathedral, and the prebends connected to them, were closed down during the Reformation period. The impoverishment of the Finnish church had also another very concrete consequence, the cathedral chapter or bishop could no longer support young men in their academic studies. This meant a break for Finnish students visiting foreign universities from the year 1518 until 1530.[19]

15 Pirinen (1991: 276–277).
16 Hiekkanen (2003: 170–172).
17 Salonen (2016: 88–89).
18 Salonen (2016: 84–85).
19 Nuorteva (1997: 150–153).

There is thus a strong continuum between the Catholic Middle Ages and the Reformation period: The medieval school system survived the waves of the Reformation firstly in the sense that the cathedral school in Turku continued as the highest educational institution in the country and secondly in the sense that parish schools and town schools, especially those in Rauma and Vyborg, continued their activities – although we do not have any written evidence of them. However, the level and the frequency of education in the ecclesiastical schools became more fluctuating because of the economic distress caused by the Reformation. The only clear change between the Catholic Middle Ages and the Reformation period was the abolition of monastic schools alongside the closing of monasteries and the break in studies abroad.

Another, but less evident, change in the educational system in Finland was the disinterest of noblemen towards education. In the Middle Ages, the sons of noble families often pursued ecclesiastical career, which required at least an education in the cathedral school of Turku and, for those who aimed at the highest ecclesiastical positions in the diocese, it was necessary to study at foreign universities. The interest of the nobility towards higher education declined with the Reformation and the consequent impoverishment of the church, when they realized that a career within the church no longer guaranteed comfortable income. Additionally, the policy of the Swedish King Gustav Vasa to rather promote talented sons of lower nobility or even peasantry, of which Bishop Mikael Agricola of Turku is a good example, made the nobility to lose interest in higher education and to leave that for others.[20]

New faith, new education

Despite economic distress, the church continued also after the Reformation to be the leading educational institution in Finland. In the beginning, the schools run by the clergy followed the good old medieval curriculum and intellectual heritage, but the Reformation also brought novelties to the teaching. For example, Hebrew and Greek were added to the curriculum alongside Latin, and little by little other kinds of text, such as authorities from the Antiquities, joined ecclesiastical texts in the reading list of the schools. Also the various publications of the German reformers found their ways to the curriculum of Finnish schools, some in original version, some in translations.

The Reformation caused also concrete changes in the education. Reformed priests had to be able to do different things than Catholic priests, and therefore the medieval school order had to be updated. For this purpose, the German reformer and professor in Wittenberg Philipp Melanchthon formulated a new school order in 1528. Since many Swedish learned men visited the University of Wittenberg from the 1530s onwards, the ideas of Melanchthon quickly reached the Swedish realm and were soon adapted to

20 Hanska & Lahtinen (2010: 81); Lahtinen (2016: 32–33).

local purposes, also in Finland. In 1571, the new school system got an official form as part of the new Church order compiled by the Swedish reformer Olaus Petri.[21] The Church meeting in Uppsala in 1595 even defined the books which should be included in the teaching. The teaching methods in the 'new' schools did not differ from the medieval ideas. The most important didactic method was learning by heart and special emphasis was put on the reading skills. Writing, instead, was not included in the curriculum before the new school order of 1611.[22]

Even though the orders and instructions regarding the development of education in Finland came from Sweden, there were also some local novelties. The most important new local educational tool was the *ABC-kiria* published by Mikael Agricola while he acted as the school master of the Turku cathedral school. The *ABC-kiria* was a combination of an ABC-book and catechism. It began with the alphabets and proceeded with the basics of Christianity (the Ten Commandments, the Creed, the two most important prayers, Our Lord and Hail Mary, explanations about the sacraments of Baptism, Confession and Eucharist, various prayers for dining, morning, evening and ringing the bells) and ended with the numerals.[23]

Struggle for a new school order

In the course of the 16th century, the level of education was a subject of constant complaints. It is claimed that the economic distress of the church, which was the main educational actor in Finland, resulted in the collapse of the educational system. Studies of the school system in the 16th-century Finland mention too that there were only seven schools in Finland (the Turku cathedral school and town schools in Vyborg, Rauma, Pori, Naantali, Helsinki and Porvoo) and that the schools (apart from those in Pori and Helsinki) have medieval roots indicating that they had not been suppressed during the Reformation. According to the Church Order of 1571, these schools had to teach three subjects: Latin, theology and singing. The state of distress in the educational system was considered as a serious problem and the church and state were eager to renew and improve it.[24]

The Swedish church had – already in the 16th century – actively tried to improve the school system because it needed well-educated priests, who were familiar with the new ideas of the period of orthodoxy according to which the Christian faith should be based solely on the Holy Bible and the Confession of Augsburg. With this emphasis, the Swedish church tried to keep distance not only to the Catholic Church but also to the Calvinists and other protestant movements.[25]

21 See also Knuutila (this volume).
22 Nikula & Nikula (1987: 694–695); Hanska & Lahtinen (2010: 82–84).
23 Heininen (2007: 164–188).
24 Joutsivuo (2010: 112).
25 Joutsivuo (2010: 113).

The struggle of power in Sweden between the sons of Gustav Vasa was strictly connected to different ecclesiastical trends – the oldest son, King Erik XIV nurtured Calvinistic ideas, the second son, King John III, was filo Catholic and his son, King Sigismund (of Poland), was Catholic, while the youngest son of Gustav Vasa, King Charles IX, had Calvinistic sympathies and strived for a protestant country. Owing to this, the Swedish rulers and the state were eager to stress the Lutheran ideology after Charles had defeated King Sigismund and was crowned King of Sweden in 1604.[26] By King Charles' initiative, emphasis was put also on lay education in order to extirpate Catholic and non-Christian habits among the population and to teach the people the pure Christian faith – and this could best be done by improving the level of priests through proper education.

In order to reach these goals, the Swedish clergy presented a new school order in the diet of 1611. According to this plan, 'Latin schools' should be founded all over the country. In the countryside, the education should take two years, during which the students learned Latin and theology according to Luther's catechism, while education in the cathedral schools would last longer and include also rhetoric and logic but the focus of the education was in theology. The new school order was never ratified by the diet because the new King Gustav II Adolf preferred a school system, which would include more practical skills and produce able servants for state administration, not only priests. However the King did not succeed in creating a new kind of educational system due to the strong resistance of powerful churchmen, and therefore the educational system in the Swedish realm remained under the control of the church. Nevertheless, the needs of civil servants were better taken into account in the education, and the curriculum changed slightly towards that direction.[27]

In the course of the 17th century a tripartite school system began to develop under the guidance of the church. The old cathedral schools in episcopal cities were replaced by gymnasiums, other old schools were reorganized as trivial schools, and pedagogiums were founded in other towns. This development arrived also in Finland, when Isaacus Rothovius was appointed bishop of Turku. He founded a gymnasium in Turku, which functioned until the founding of the Academy of Turku in 1640. Another gymnasium was founded in Vyborg a few years earlier. According to the plans, the schools in Helsinki, Pori and Vyborg were updated to trivial schools and a trivial school was (re)founded in Turku too. In addition to these actions, pedagogiums were also erected in the countryside. The curriculum of the lower schools included reading, writing and counting skills as well as catechism and classical languages (Latin and Greek). Teaching was done mainly in Swedish but occasionally also in Finnish.[28]

These actions considerably broadened education in Finland. They also changed the focus from ecclesiastical matters towards practical issues but the religious foundation was still very strong. This division formed the basis of

26 Lahtinen (2016: 35–37).
27 Joutsivuo (2010: 113–114, 116).
28 Joutsivuo (2010: 116–118); Nuorteva (1997: 353–355).

educational system in the country for a long time. New school orders of 1649, 1693 and 1724 did not make any fundamental changes to this principle. In fact, the school system of the 17th century remained in use until the mid-19th century, when new school orders of 1843, 1856 and 1872 were stipulated for Finland during the Grand Duchy. It was only in 1868, that the school system was separated from the church and became a state institution.[29] It has been claimed that the new school system covered relatively well the whole country but this is not true, since most schools were placed in towns or densely inhabited regions in the west and the south. The inhabitants of eastern and northern parts of Finland were still outside the possibility for education.

The church controls the spreading of literacy in Finland

The Lutheran church has always stressed the importance of the ability to read because, as Luther himself put it, it made it possible for people to read the Holy Bible and understand God's Word. This principle was the leading idea in the ecclesiastical folk education and the subsequent spread of literacy. But, unlike it sometimes is said, this development did not take place immediately after the Reformation but slowly in the course of the following centuries as a consequence of teaching in parishes. The ecclesiastical teaching focused only on reading skills while ignoring writing, which was not necessary for being able to understand the Sacred Scripture.

Since it soon had been realized that individual reading easily led to heresies, the Lutheran church had to find an answer to how to train Christians the 'right' reading. The answer was catechism in vernacular language. The first catechism in Finnish was printed in 1543, and it spread over the country during the following century. The role of catechism in the education of Finns has been crucial and all Lutheran generations have had it in their hands.[30]

There remained only the practical question, how to convince the Finnish population to learn to read and to adopt the teachings of the catechism? The answer to this question was through teaching in parishes and the requirement that all Christians who wanted to attend Eucharist had to pass an exam on catechism. And, since attending Eucharist was obligatory, nobody could avoid this obligation. A special incentive for the spread of literacy was that nobody could get married without attending Eucharist and hence reading skills became a prerequisite for marriage. Additionally, the Swedish state started to emphasize literacy and obliged in 1723, under pain of penalty fees, all parents to teach their children how to read.[31]

Teaching methods in the 17th and 18th centuries were elementary. In principle, parish priests were responsible for the spread of literacy in their parishes and they taught catechism in churches before or after the Mass or in special schools. The interrogation took also place in the church, which decreased the enthusiasm to attend ecclesiastical services. From the second

29 Joutsivuo (2010: 121–122, 136–137, 158–159, 164–170).
30 Heininen (2007: 166–168); Laine & Laine (2010: 271–277).
31 Laine & Laine (2010: 259–263).

half of the 17th century onwards, priests followed the reading skills of their parishioners by compiling so-called confirmation books (*rippikirja* in Finnish), which included information about the participation of each parishioner in interrogations as well as their abilities. When a person could read sufficiently – whatever that meant – they received a mark in the *rippikirja*. The notes in *rippikirja* were checked carefully when couples came before the priest to get married.[32] Through this folk education system, it is possible to say that the Lutheran church really contributed to the spread of literacy among the Finnish population, even though the writing skills of Finns were far behind the reading skills.[33]

Conclusions

The Lutheran Church in Finland contributed to the spread of literacy but this did not happen during the Reformation period, even though this development has often been connected to the explicit wish of Martin Luther that all Christians should be able to read and thereby to study the Sacred Scripture. In Finland, literacy spread over the country from the second half of the 17th century onwards but it did not reach the most remote areas before the second half of the 19th century – or even the early 20th century. Thus we cannot conclude that Finnish literacy would have direct roots in the Reformation. Instead we can say that the Reformation gave – through the birth of the Finnish literary language with the translation of Bible and other religious texts into Finnish – the basis for later development of reading and writing skills.

Another common assumption which has been connected to the Reformation and education is that the Reformation period marked a clear change in education. This is also partly a myth. It is true that the confiscations made by Gustav Vasa impoverished the church, which in the Middle Ages had been responsible for education in the diocese of Turku. But the distress did not last for a too long time. Students could afford returning to European universities after some decades' break and cathedral schools as well as town and parish schools continued their activities throughout the Reformation period, although in a reduced form.

However, there is also some truth in the assumption about a change, if we compare the curriculum of the schools in the Catholic Middle Ages to the curriculum of the Lutheran early modern period. After the Reformation, the schools stressed the spread of pure Lutheran faith and theology was an integral part of the curriculum, but at the same time the needs of the civil administration changed the curriculum towards more practical skills too.

32 Laine & Laine (2010: 265–271, 280–282).
33 See also footnote 2.

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The Role of Lutheran Values in the Success of the Finnish Educational System

Abstract

This chapter analyses how the roots of recent Finnish educational success are found in the original principles and practices of the Lutheran religion, which set reading as a basic requirement for both men and women.

Our aim is to reflect on how the Lutheran religion and the Finnish educational system have been interwoven. We use path dependence as a paradigm for understanding the course of history of Finnish education and identify three processes as key junctures in the long path of Finnish history from the Reformation to the current Finnish educational system. The first was the influence of Mikael Agricola, the father of Finnish literary language. The second was the establishment of The Royal Academy of Turku, which became fertile breeding ground for the Finnish national awakening. The third was the establishment of the public education system, which was built on strongly religious foundation. A combination of religious values, national identity formation, and respect for education and teachers created the value basis on which the Finnish educational system was established in the 1900s. As Finland has moved towards multicultural education, it remains true that many of its basic educational values, such as equal learning opportunities, derive from its Lutheran history.

A brief history of Finnish educational successes

The Finnish educational system has received wide international attention because of the high learning outcomes of its 15-year-old students. Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) measurements have placed Finland among the top international rankings since 2000.[1] The differences in achievement among its schools have also been the smallest in the world. Even though its ranking dropped in 2012, in 2015 Finland still had one of the highest performing educational systems in the world.[2]

1 See e.g., OECD (2003, 2006b, 2009, 2010, 2014).
2 OECD (2016); Välijärvi & Sulkunen (2016).

The Finnish educational system has also succeeded with older-aged groups. The mean proficiency scores of Finnish people aged 16 to 65 in both literacy and numeracy are significantly above the average of OECD countries participating in the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC), with Finnish adults in second place with Japan.[3]

The reasons for this success have been discussed in hundreds of international forums, and the most common question has been how it can be possible that – with only an average monetary investment by the Finnish government, a very small amount of homework and number of school lesson hours, and an extremely light educational evaluation system that does not use inspections – the Finnish education system can achieve such consistently high quality and equality results in international comparisons.[4] Many reasons have been suggested for Finland's success: high quality teachers and their commitment to their profession, equity as a leading educational principle, national support systems to keep all students on the educational path, and a strong sense of the importance of life-long learning.[5] In this chapter we focus on how these possible explanatory factors may be connected with Finland's long-term historical Lutheran foundations.

Education and religion from a path dependence viewpoint

Why are some countries outstanding in education? This question has no simple answer. Educational systems are connected with each country's political and cultural context and are rooted in societal, political, and cultural factors. Often these factors have deep historical backgrounds.

In this chapter we approach these factors from a path dependence viewpoint, which can make historical sequences more understandable. Path dependence has been used in economics, social sciences, and even physics.[6] The path dependence approach to historical events suggests that crucial choices may establish certain directions of change and foreclose others, shaping long-term development trajectories.[7] Path dependence refers to a specific type of explanation that unfolds through logically sequential stages. The essential concept of the path dependence approach is that there are critical junctures characterized by the selection of a particular option, for example, a specific policy, coalition, or government. The selection made during such a critical juncture is consequential because it leads to the creation of an institutional structural pattern that endures over time. For instance, the political scientists Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart have investigated how some political movements have been interwoven with

3 OECD (2013).
4 Reinikainen (2012); Morgan (2014); Välijärvi & Sulkunen (2016).
5 Niemi (2011, 2012); Niemi & Isopahkala-Bouret (2012); Sahlberg (2007, 2011); Darling-Hammond (2010: 164–172).
6 Koch & Eisend (2009).
7 Mahoney (2001: x, 6).

religion at critical points of societal change which has led to surprisingly lasting religious influences even in secular societies.[8]

When analysing the relationship between the Finnish educational system and Lutheranism, we can see critical junctures of this kind: decisions made at a certain time have led to long run consequences. These decisions have been connected to the Lutheran religion at different levels. Here we will describe three such critical junctures and reflect on how they have led to the current educational system in Finland.

Our primary question is how the Protestant faith, manifested as Lutheran tradition, has been involved in education in Finland, both in the nations' early phase as part of Sweden and later when it became an independent nation after 1917. Only a very rough picture can be drawn here given the long time since the Reformation itself, but we argue that the main contours can still be seen.

During the chapter's time-window (from the 16th and to the 21st centuries) Finnish education has been influenced by many political, societal, philosophical, pedagogical, cultural, and religious changes that took place in Europe and elsewhere. The Lutheran Church has not been a monolithic unit either, but has existed in the middle of and interacted with various contextual surroundings. Given this two-way influence between society and religion, we present neither a causal nor a direct relationship between Lutheranism and education in Finland. Instead, we want to understand certain deep cultural features in both Lutheranism and in Finnish educational history and to show how Finland's Lutheran religion and educational approaches have been interwoven.

Reformation from an educational perspective

Martin Luther did not have an educational program or plan in the sense that we view education systems in societal contexts today. Rather, Luther's reflections and writings focused purely on the theological fundamentals of the Christian faith. His educational plans were focused only on living as a Christian. Singing hymns was an important way for illiterate people to learn the truths of faith and salvation.[9] In those days, literacy was very rare among the common people,[10] while, for instance, bourgeoisie in the cities were often literate. However, Luther had a revolutionary vision that Christians had both a right and an obligation to become personally aware of the foundations of the Christian faith in their native languages.[11] The idea for the use of the vernacular was no novelty in the early modern period. Before Luther vernacular reading of the Bible had been emphasized by, for example, the Waldensians in France and by the early Church.[12] Translating

8 Norris & Inglehart (2011).
9 Arffman (2003: 197).
10 See e.g., the review and references in Woodberry (2012: 251).
11 See also Sinnemäki & Saarikivi (this volume).
12 Sanneh (1989).

the catechism and the New Testament to the language of the ordinary people opened doors for the belief that everyone should learn to read. In 1523, Luther published the *Formula Missae* that was the order of mass and communion for the church at Wittenberg and proposed a catechism examination for Holy Communion and confession.

Luther's Reformation ideas also changed the role and tasks of the priesthood and clergy. While the priests' education was important also in the Catholic Church, the Lutheran clergy's ability to participate in theological and dogmatic discussion became even more important as a result of the Reformation.[13] This further raised the importance of theology and academic studies for the clergy. Lutheran pastors were required to be able to teach parishioners in such a way that every listener could understand the basis of the Christian faith. As a consequence, the Lutheran sermon became an important space for teaching. In addition, work in secular life became important. Everyone could hear 'the call' and have a vocation to work in God's world.[14] Having a calling was no longer the privilege of a priesthood and thus, the concept of calling strongly worked to advance social equality. In many Protestant countries, including Finland, teachers, for instance, were also seen as having a special vocation.

As a result of the Reformation, Catechisms and their explanations of the Ten Commandments became guidelines for living a correct Lutheran life. Although no-one was able to earn salvation by their actions, actions were important for living as a Christian. The Ten Commandments were also important in the Catholic Church and taught to parishioners; however, Luther made parents especially responsible for the upbringing of their children. Parents had pedagogical duties toward the younger generation, and they were called to teach the children the Ten Commandments from a young age.[15]

Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560) was a professor at the University of Wittenberg and Luther's closest collaborator. Melanchthon's impact on education was more direct: he integrated both Protestant theology and the humanist tradition into his educational plans. Melanchthon's outlines for education were expressed in his work *Instructions for the Visitors of Parish Pastors in Electoral Saxony* (1528) and enacted into law in Saxony, thus establishing the first public school system. Melanchthon's educational plan was widely copied throughout Germany in the next decades, and at least 56 cities sought his advice in founding schools.[16] His educational plans were also adopted to Trivial schools (secondary level education) in Sweden in the 17th century.[17] Numerous publications on pedagogy brought great public recognition to Melanchthon, and he was awarded the honorary title of *Praeceptor Germaniae* (Teacher of Germany) during his lifetime.

13 Arffman (2003: 163); Androne (2014: 81).
14 Arffman (2003: 232); Witte (2013).
15 Androne (2014: 82).
16 Manschreck (2016).
17 Tarkiainen & Tarkiainen (1985: 77).

Melanchthon was an organizer and he provided schools, universities, and churches with durable organizational structures and clear educational purposes. This was as one of the more significant societal outcomes of the Reformation movement and had wide effects on Scandinavian and many other European countries' educational systems.[18] Schools had a strong connection to religious values as well as to their ties to the traditional humanist heritage. These aims were also introduced to the Finnish educational system particularly through Mikael Agricola's work.

Mikael Agricola, the Finnish Reformer

In Finland, the diocese in Turku had a cathedral school for Catholic priests' education. Owing to the Reformation in Sweden, these were given a new mission in which Mikael Agricola (1510–1557) played a key role. He worked as a secretary to the bishop in Turku and gained notice for his great talents, particularly for his linguistic skills. As a result, he was sent to study in Wittenberg (1536–1539) as a disciple of Luther and Melanchthon.[19] Through Agricola, their Reformation ideas came to have a strong influence in Finland. We argue that from the viewpoint of path dependencies, Agricola's influence in Finland can be viewed as a remarkable juncture on the path by which Lutheranism has influenced the Finnish educational system.

Agricola studied in the middle of the spread of the Reformation at the University of Wittenberg under Luther and Melanchthon. The translation of the major religious texts into parishioners' native languages in accordance with Lutheran theology became his life's work. After returning from Germany he was a teacher in the cathedral school and thereafter a bishop of Turku (Åbo) during 1554–1557. Agricola's relationship with the king was not always without conflict, but he nevertheless managed to keep his position as a bishop.[20]

Agricola's life work can be analysed from various viewpoints. He was a theologian, a humanist who admired ancient languages, a linguist, and a teacher. These different roles were highly integrated in his life and his multi-dimensional outlook continued to be typical of the Finnish Lutheran tradition. His diverse skill-set became a model to follow.

As a teacher, Agricola had a strong influence on how and what languages were used in Finland. He emphasized the importance of Latin to priests as the language of civilization. However, in line with Lutheran theology, he also started to translate the New Testament into Finnish and to produce other books, for example, the first Finnish ABC book. He also produced a prayer book and hymns for the new Lutheran Church. This work set the early rules of orthography that are the basis of modern Finnish spelling. Agricola has been called the 'Father of literary Finnish.'[21]

18 Woodberry (2012); Witte (2013).
19 Tarkiainen & Tarkiainen (1985: 52–92). See also Salonen (this volume).
20 Heininen (2012); Tarkiainen & Tarkiainen (1985).
21 Heininen (2012); Tarkiainen & Tarkiainen (1985).

Even though Agricola's lifework was devoted to the Lutheran religion and the Lutheran Church, he had also a wide impact on education. With his publications in Finnish he established a basis for education and written culture in Finnish. The written Finnish language later became a key issue in the Finnish national movement that struggled for Finland's independence. From the viewpoint of path dependence, therefore, Agricola's influence can be viewed as one critical juncture which later irrevocably influenced Finnish culture, education, and society.

The Lutheran basis for universal education

The Lutheran Church in Sweden and Finland had many impacts on education in people's everyday lives.[22] It made parents responsible for their children's Christian education. Church law in the 17th century even proposed fining parents if they neglected their duties in this area. There was also a recommendation that, if guardians could not fulfil their educational responsibilities, they should send their children to the Parish clerk's school.[23] This school became the first form of compulsory education in Finland. The aim was for all children to learn the foundations of the Lutheran faith and how to live as Christians. This required, first that all teachers (who originally were parish clerks) themselves must learn to read the catechism, and then teach all children to read. As early as 1569, a Church order directed that parish clerks must take care of all children whose parents were not capable of teaching them. Parish clerks had also the requirement to determine whether all youngsters, both boys and girls, had learned at least the catechism before having their first Holy Communion. In 1562, a Church order stipulated that all children should know the Ten Commandments, the Apostles' Creed, and the Lord's Prayer. Knowing all these things was a precondition for having one's first Communion. In 1571, this requirement was extended to all communicants, including the older population.[24]

In many places, parish clerks also travelled from village to village and organized so-called 'moving' or 'travelling' schools. In these classes, often held in someone's home, they taught the catechism and carried out examinations. The purpose of teaching was so that all people could learn to read the foundations of their faith. Simultaneously, in these schools many every-day life issues were taught. Catechism was the guidebook for one's whole life.[25] At this time, teaching children how to write had a much lower priority.

In the 17th century the quality of learning started to become a pressing issue. In many places, examinations could be passed just by memorization.

22 See Salonen (this volume) and Laine (this volume) for more details about the church's involvement in education. Here we only summarize the most important themes, focusing especially on teaching methods and educational aspects.

23 Tähtinen & Hovi (2007).

24 Tähtinen & Hovi (2007).

25 Välimäki (1998: 91); Tähtinen & Hovi (2007).

The goal, however, was for learners to understand what they were learning. As a result, teaching methods began to come under greater scrutiny. For instance, Bishop Rothovius (bishop 1627–1652) advised and guided pastors and parish clerks that they should pay more attention to teaching methodology. Their aim was to tailor the teaching to children's and youngsters' actual levels of comprehension and not make the instruction too abstract.[26] The most important Finnish proponent of the quality of catechism instruction in the 17th century was Bishop Johannes Gezelius the elder (bishop from 1664–1690).[27] His main effort was for learning to lead to real understanding and reading, not merely the repetition of some sentences by heart during examinations. In 1673 he wrote guidelines that consisted of detailed instructions on how to organize teaching for catechism learning.[28] The guidelines consisted, for example, of the following recommendations:

- General principles
  The teaching of children should be started in their early years, children's progress should be written down and followed-up in the Confirmation book, and at 10–11 years old they should know the foundations of the Christian faith according to Lutheran understanding. Children should be taken along with their parents to Confirmation examinations.

- Teaching reading
  Students should be hard working and they should understand what they learn; teachers' instruction should be correct and clear. In every parish, there should be at least one parish clerk who has good literacy. In each village, they should also find at least one smart boy who can teach other children in the village.

- Confirmation examinations
  Examinations should be organized, preferably in churches, collecting for each examination 20–30 families. Examinations were compulsory. Individual examinations should consist of questions that show an examiner that students actually understood what they read. Standards could be higher for children than for elderly people. For old people, it was enough that they could understand others' readings.

There was also advice on how to handle those children who could not learn successfully. These guidelines included giving them extra instruction and making a plan for unsuccessful learners showing their next learning targets. Those children who neglected learning were to appear in front of a parish board. If after receiving orders and advice they still did not apply themselves to their learning tasks, then the matter was transferred to the church council.[29]

26 Tähtinen & Hovi (2007: 19).
27 Laasonen (2012); Leinonen (2007).
28 Leinonen (2007); Tähtinen & Hovi (2007: 21); Gezelius (1673).
29 Tähtinen & Hovi (2007: 21).

Overall these recommendations dealt with educational aspects such as how to organize teaching, learning goals and how to monitor them, learning difficulties and problems, teaching methods, and examinations and evaluation criteria as well as their adjustment to the learner's age. Although from the perspective of modern school system the instructions were rudimentary, they nevertheless already encapsulated many of the same elements and principles that are part of modern Finnish educational system as well.

Based on Parish clerks' schools, confirmation schools and classes started in Finland in 1730. In 1740, they became mandatory in all parishes. During the 18th century, classes emphasized the Christian faith and life, and passing the examination also determined who had the right to marry or to become godparents. Moreover, confirmation schools ensured that all boys and girls had reading skills.

The Swedish Kingdom also made decisions about promoting educational instruction for the whole nation in areas other than religion. In the 17th century, there was an educational expansion due to new economic and other demands from society. For example, 16 pedagogios (elementary schools) for children and new trivial schools were established. Also new Gymnasiums started in Turku and Viipuri. These schools followed the Melanchthonian guidance and humanist spirit.[30] However, in many places, the Lutheran Church remained the main educational provider to the common people. In general, pastors and bishops continued to have a strong influence on all educational issues throughout the 17th and 18th centuries and well into the 19th century.

The university becomes a cornerstone of Finnish identity and education

We argue that another critical juncture in the path of how Lutheranism has influenced Finnish education was the establishment of the university in Turku. This section gives an overview of how the university became a centre of Finnish cultural life and a cradle of Finnish national identity. It will also explain how Lutheranism was critical to this cultural development. The next section will deal with the repercussions for Finnish public education.

In the 17th century, Sweden became increasingly aware of the importance of universities for society. Influences from other European countries appeared in Sweden, and the importance of education grew beyond religion to other areas of life. The University of Uppsala had been established in 1477. But the Swedish Kingdom was large and additional universities were needed. Establishing a new university in Turku had a cultural as well as a political function. It strengthened the hold of the Swedish empire in its eastern territories.[31]

30 Tähtinen & Hovi (2007).
31 Klinge et al. (1987: 13–80).

The Royal Academy of Turku (1640–1809) was established by Swedish Queen Christina in 1640 in Turku. When Finland became a Grand Duchy of the Russian empire in 1809, the Academy's name was changed to the Imperial Alexander University in Finland. After the great fire in Turku in 1827 in which most of the city, including the university, was destroyed, the university was transferred to the new capital city, Helsinki, in 1828. The transfer had also a political function: Helsinki was closer to the Russian territories and Saint Petersburg. After the independence of Finland, the name of the university was changed to the University of Helsinki (in 1919).

At its beginning the Royal Academy of Turku had four faculties: theology, law, medicine, and philosophy. Following the example of Uppsala University, the academy had a wide autonomy, but it also had strong connections with the Lutheran Church in Sweden. Its main function was to train clergy and civil servants. Teaching materials were in Latin, though the Swedish language gained ground beginning in the late 18th century. Its highest administrative position was that of a Chancellor, who came from Swedish nobility; the Bishop of Turku was vice-chancellor.[32]

The university had a strong influence on the formation of Finnish national identity as many university professors emphasized the importance of Finnish culture and language. Already as early as the 18th century ideas of Finnish national history started to circulate among the university scholars, and there were even attempts at establishing a Finnish language newspaper. One later example was Elias Lönnrot, the collector of the poems that formed Finland's national epic, the *Kalevala* (1835). He was an expert in the Finnish language, a poet, and also a hymn writer.[33]

From the late 19th century onward, a strong Finnish nationalist movement grew, known as the Fennoman movement. A leading figure, J. V. Snellman (1806–1881) – philosopher, statesman, and later head of the Bank of Finland – stressed the value of education for the nation. He saw signs of secularization and wanted to transfer educational responsibilities from the Church to the experts with a more secular education. Nevertheless, he still considered religion to be a cornerstone of the nation.[34] In Snellman's thinking, the core concept was civilization as originally described by the German and Lutheran concept of *Bildung*, which has a strong connection to education and civilization. For Snellman, religion was part of *Bildung*, and Christianity in its Protestant form was the highest form of religion.[35]

A focus on national identity, national culture, and civilization with a moral emphasis was typical of the Fennoman movement even more generally. Johan Ludvig Runeberg (1804–1877), a docent and professor of Latin and ancient Roman literature saw a strong moral ideal as the core of national identity. It included a high commitment to the Fatherland, altruism, and human care in times of distress. He wrote the Finnish national anthem, which remains a leading national symbol, and he also wrote 62 hymns,

32 Klinge (1987: 60).
33 Majamaa (1997).
34 Klinge (2015); Murtorinne (2006).
35 Savolainen (2006); Rantala (2013); Tröhler (2012).

many of which are still in the Finnish and Swedish psalm books.[36] Likewise, Topelius, a writer, journalist, and professor, as well as rector of the university 1875–1878, made a strong contribution to the formation of the Finnish national identity through his book *Maamme* or *Our Fatherland*. He also wrote more than 30 hymns for the Lutheran hymnal and was a member and chair of the hymnal book committee in the 1860s and 1870s.[37]

Regarding the Finnish language, it is notable that Runeberg, Snellman, and Topelius (among others) wrote in Swedish, and their texts were later translated into Finnish. Thus, from its beginning, Finnish national identity was not tied to language as much as to moral ideals and cultural factors, including Lutheran religion, which transcended linguistic divides. As a result, Finnish national identity grew, not only from respect for Finnish as a language, but also from respect for Finnish culture, civilization, education, and the Lutheran religion.

A milestone of university education was the first professorship in education established in 1852 at the Imperial Alexander University in Finland. Its tasks were closely related to religious instruction but included also education of teachers for public schools. In the early years, the chair of this professorship was established in the Faculty of Theology, but it has been located in the Faculty of Philosophy since 1859. It was the first professorship of education in Scandinavia.[38]

As this brief historical review suggests religion was intimately tied with the development of higher education and national awakening in Finland. Based on these factors, the establishment of the university in Turku in 1640 was another critical juncture on the path through which Lutheranism has influenced the Finnish higher education and through it the public education system.

Public education and teacher education start in Finland

In this section we provide a brief chronological overview of how public education was formed in Finland and the influence of Lutheran religion on its formation. Although many Lutheran countries such as Germany and Sweden influenced the Finnish system, it had its own characteristics in which the Finnish language and the national conception of civilization played an increasingly important role, and in which the teachers' role was remarkably large.[39]

The Swedish Kingdom had plans for secular public education as early as the 1600s and 1700s, but in practice, the church had the primary responsibility for organizing education for the wider population. A system of secular public education was established in Finland only in the 1860s when Finland was a Grand Duchy of the Russian empire. The basic education

36 Klinge (1997a).
37 Klinge (1997b).
38 Uljens (2002).
39 Saari et al. (2017).

statutes made local municipalities responsible for the education of the population. The Lutheran Church opposed these arrangements, as it was afraid of losing its traditional power over education, especially on religious issues. The public system started slowly and did not function effectively for many years. At the beginning of the 20th century roughly half of children still received church-organized basic education. In 1918 a new school law was enacted that finally transferred public education fully to the municipalities.[40]

The 1860s beginning of secular public education was initiated by Tsar Alexander II who had promised a complete reorganization of Finland's primary schools. He visited the Grand Duchy in 1856 and ordered a large developmental plan for Finland in the Senate. The need for educated teachers was urgent and thus the first teacher training seminar was started in Jyväskylä in 1863. Thereafter, more training institutions were established, including those in Tammisaari (Ekenäs in Swedish), Uusikaarlepyy (Nykarleby in Swedish), Sortavala, Raahe, Rauma, Heinola, and Kajaani.[41]

Uno Cygnaeus became the most influential promoter of basic education for all Finnish children and developed the first teacher-education models in Finland. He was invited to become the first rector of the Jyväskylä teacher training seminar in 1863. Cygnaeus had become *Filosofie Magister* there in 1836 and then spent two years as an assistant pastor and prison chaplain at Viipuri, simultaneously teaching in a private school. In 1840, Cygnaeus became chaplain to a trading colony at New Archangel, Russian America (now Sitka, Alaska, U.S.). He returned to Europe in 1845 and spent the next 12 years as a superintendent of a Finnish school in St. Petersburg, Russia. This experience, along with his study of the educational philosophers Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi and Friedrich Froebel as well as his educational travels in Europe, encouraged him to write his own proposal to the Senate when it called for proposals for how public education should be organized in Finland. Cygnaeus' proposal won favour with the Senate which made him the chief inspector of the country's school system. For this reason, he has been titled 'the Father of the Finnish elementary education.'[42] His influence on the current public education system in Finland is still visible in many ways.[43]

Educational ideas linked to Lutheranism were closely integrated to the Finnish public school system. Entrance requirements for elementary school teacher seminars were not only academic but also moral. The aspiring teachers had to have performed well in their elementary education but the requirements for their moral behaviour were also high: each teacher student was obliged to 'follow the order of the school, treat their teachers respectfully and obediently, and practice all that belong to Christian and moral life.'[44] Most teacher education programs were four years long and provided the qualification to become an elementary school teacher. What reflects the

40 Kannisto (2011); Välimäki (1998: 149–153); Tamminen (1967: 22–29, 54–61).
41 Nurmi (1995).
42 Luukkanen (2012); Rautakilpi (2007).
43 See Harjunen (2010) and references there.
44 Nurmi (1995: 32).

depth of religion's influence on the whole public school system was the leading idea of Cygnaeus: that the public school was a manifestation of God's kingdom on earth and it was through this system that the child would grow into her calling as God's image on earth.[45]

As for the grammar schools, their teachers were first educated in trivial schools and universities, and then had a special year in the seminars and teacher-training schools. Their selection criteria did not stress moral and personal qualities to the same extent as the criteria for elementary school teachers did. However, the Finnish educational system was overall strongly influenced by Hegelian philosophy, humanism, and the concept of *Bildung*, which is essentially a Lutheran idea of how to build up a person to be civilized from the inside out.[46] Moreover, explicit instruction into Lutheran religion was an important part of teacher education and school curriculum. All in all, moral and Christian values were integrated into public schools, even though they were no longer run by the Church.

From a historical perspective, teacher education can be seen as necessary for the education of the whole nation. Teachers were considered important persons in local communities: when in 1921 a six-year basic education became compulsory for all children, teachers were often responsible for cultural activities in villages. Teachers were called 'candles of the nation,' and very often they educated the whole village and the people in local regions by organizing choirs, theatre performances, and parental education in addition to their normal school work.

Education and plans for schools in Finland were not without tensions and disagreements. The pedagogical, philosophical, and political movements that emerged in Europe also came to Finland. The Industrial Revolution, urbanization, philanthropism, and new pedagogical trends also arrived at Finland. Tensions occurred between the key promoters of education. For instance, Snellman openly criticized Cygnaeus' teacher education programs.[47] He would have liked to have more freedom in teacher education studies and to focus more on thinking skills. He also warned about courses becoming too overloaded if Cygnaeus' plans were followed. Cygnaeus, on the other hand, emphasized practical skills so as not to overburden pupils with head knowledge. However, generally speaking, the key people in Finnish educational development had common aims connected to national identity and civilizing the people. International connections have also been active since the Reformation, as new pedagogical trends were absorbed into the Finnish national framework.

The establishment of the public education system in the mid 19th century involved many choices (e.g., practical, philosophical and pedagogical choices) and the building of institutions that had long lasting consequences to Finnish education. Although run by a secular government and municipalities, religion was intimately tied with and built into the system. Based on these issues, we argue that the establishment of the public education system was

45 See Jalava (2010: 62).
46 Tröhler (2012).
47 Nurmi (1995: 17–18).

an important critical juncture on the path through which Lutheranism has influenced Finnish education.

Evolving values in Finnish schools

The great drive for education in Finland started by the Lutheran church was based on values and principles directly grounded in the Lutheran understanding of the Christian faith. However, Finnish education was also connected with natural law and the ideal of living as a good citizen. Connections with traditional humanist sources came also through Protestant thinkers, especially Melanchthon and later professors at the Royal Academy of Turku/University of Helsinki.

When the public educational system started in the 19th century, the value basis of education gradually detached from its direct connection with religion. Leevi Launonen has analysed the change:

> [A] great change had taken place in the deep structure of the philosophy of ethical educational thinking. In the old elementary school (1863–1920), ethical education was based on Christian humanism and ethical objectivism, in which the unifying basic concept was the moral system of the world.[48]

Launonen has noted also: 'Between the two World Wars (in the 1920s and 1930s) teleological, metaphysical and religious thinking in education decreased, but belief in objective values continued to dominate still educational thinking.'[49] Two important turning points were the 1940s and the elementary school curriculum (1946/1952), when explicit religious and metaphysical expressions were detached decisively from basic ethical conceptions.

After the 1940s, the language of moral virtue thus changed. Earlier ideals connected with self-discipline, the simple life, unselfishness, and altruism gradually disappeared and were replaced by more psychological learning concepts and more Anglo-American educational terminology.[50] Simultaneously, the focus of school education shifted from refining students' moral character to social interaction skills and ethical questions in society. With the establishment of the comprehensive school (since the 1970s) principles of global ethics and sustainable development have become increasingly important. These values were attached to the nation's newly secular culture and to the United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights.[51] However, it has to be equally stressed that over the course of time also the modes of expressions of ethical issues and values have changed in the Finnish Lutheran Church itself. Partly these changes have been related to the common development of the Finnish language but also because the Church has been influenced by the rest of the society which has changed drastically

48 Launonen (2000: 6).
49 Launonen (2000: 6).
50 Launonen (2000: 239–252).
51 Launonen (2000: 307).

politically and socially. This can be seen for example in the changes in reading materials for confirmation school teachers and students.[52] As a result, differences between values in the recent secular schools and the Lutheran Church are not as large as might be concluded from the detachment of religious concepts in school curricula.

Although some ideals changed with time, a set of permanent moral ideals remained in Finnish school education into the 19th and 20th centuries. These ideals were mainly connected with honesty, diligence, work, fairness, and courtesy, as expressed in social interactions. The objectives of the school curriculum painted the picture of a fair Finn who is honest, enterprising, and a diligent worker, and who possesses the most important basic skills needed for living together in society. Overall the Finnish curriculum has been a fusion of the Lutheran *Bildung*-based thinking and the North American curriculum tradition.[53]

When Finland adopted the comprehensive school system, a common school for all students from 7–15 years, the value basis of the school curriculum was seen as relative and changeable.[54] The individual's importance in choosing his or her own values grew strongly in the 1970s and was further emphasized in the school-specific curricula of the 1990s.

While the 20th and 21st century school system is detached from value expressions connected explicitly to traditional Lutheran religion, we can still see a strong emphasis on responsibility, civilization, and connection to national development. The latest school law (628/1998) states:[55]

> The purpose of education referred to in this Act is to support pupils' growth into humanity and into ethically responsible membership in society and to provide students with knowledge and skills needed in life. Furthermore, the aim of pre-primary education, as part of early childhood education, is to improve children's capacity for learning.
>
> Education shall promote civilization and equality in society and pupils' prerequisites for participating in education and otherwise developing themselves during their lives.
>
> The aim of education shall further be to secure adequate equity in education throughout the country.

The recent value basis of education can be summarized: there must be respect for all students' uniqueness and everyone's right to have quality instruction.[56] The values stress humanism, civilization (*Bildung*), equity, and democracy, and cultural diversity is seen as adding richness. The aim is a sustainable lifestyle. While the school system is detached from the church, teaching religion as a subject matter has remained and is stipulated in the Constitution.

52 Kilpeläinen & Seppälä (1972).
53 Autio (2006); Saari et al. (2017).
54 Launonen (2000: 215–227).
55 Finlex.
56 Finnish National Board of Education (2014).

Is Lutheranism visible in recent education?

As is generally agreed among Finnish historians, the Reformation, in its Lutheran tradition, indirectly triggered the development of the Finnish written language. In conjunction with the Reformation idea of priesthood of all believers there was a general obligation for everyone to receive education so that everybody would be able to read the catechism in the vernacular. This also furthered equal rights for everyone, as there was no distinction by social class or gender in this obligation for vernacular literacy. Later these ideas were fuelled by the rise of humanism and later still by the formation of a national identity of the newly formed independent Finland.

The political scientist Robert Woodberry has both historically and statistically analysed how Protestantism has influenced the rise and spread of stable democracy around the world.[57] He argues that Protestantism was a crucial catalyst for the development and spread of religious liberty, mass education, mass printing, newspapers, voluntary organizations, and colonial reforms, thereby creating the conditions that made stable democracy more likely. Education has especially reconceived the elite's status and transferred more power to poor people as well as to women.

The legal scholar John Witte, Jr. has also concluded that the Reformation has had a strong impact on mass education.[58] In the Finnish case, we can see that the Lutheran tradition with its requirement of universal literacy has been decisive for education: when people can read, it leads to ever wider demands for education, thus creating self-reinforcing processes which lead to a wider educational system.

According to Witte, Luther's two-kingdoms theory was a rejection of traditional hierarchical theories of being, authority, and society. He argues that Luther's idea about 'two kingdoms' (the earthly and heavenly kingdoms) was an early and innovative theory of secularization that lies at the heart of historical Scandinavian culture.[59] It was this idea that 'helped to trigger a massive shift in power and property from the church to the state, and ultimately introduced enduring systems of state-established churches, schools, and social welfare institutions.'[60] Rather than mere secularization per se, the two kingdoms idea promoted the all-pervasiveness of 'the hidden sacrality of the secular.'[61] Stemming from this, the Lutheran tradition in school education has some core values as to what was needed to be a good citizen. They were values such as respect for learning, personal responsibility, diligence, and the sense of calling (or vocation) for everyone to serve as a Christian in God's world.

57 Woodberry (2012).
58 Witte (2013).
59 See also Knuutila (this volume) for more about Luther's doctrine of two kingdoms.
60 Witte (2013: 22).
61 Witte (2013: 57).

As Witte concludes:

> Lutheran reformers replaced the traditional understanding of education as a teaching office of the church with a new understanding of the public school as a "civic seminary" for all persons to prepare for their distinctive vocations. Literacy and learning are still considered a prerequisite for individual flourishing and communal participation.[62]

As has been said earlier, this historical process happened also in Finland. The path to full-blown state-run churches was a long one, entailing the conjunction of several critical events and decisions the Lutheran Church made in the Finnish territory around 500 years ago. Then, during the transfer to the secular educational system the structure and content of the present educational system was developed. It had a close relationship with the Church and its Lutheran teachings. During the 20th and 21st centuries this continued through secular and multi-cultural schools.

The following summary aims to describe more concisely how the Lutheran ideology gave roots to Finnish education, and how it has also transformed into new forms and phenomena.

Equity

Equity became a practical consequence of the Reformation principle that everyone has a duty and the right to be taught to read so that they can read the catechism and the Bible in their native language. Teaching had to be organized in every village, and learners had to be helped to achieve these objectives.

From the 16th century onwards the systematic work for education has gradually expanded from teaching reading to much wider educational objectives.[63] In the 1950s, the 'Baby boom' after the second World War increased the number of pupils. At the same time also the concept of a welfare society emerged. Education was seen as a basic force for equity in society.[64] Since the late 1960s, Finnish basic education has steadily developed towards the comprehensive model, which guarantees everyone equal opportunities in education, irrespective of sex, social status, ethnic group, etc., as outlined in the constitution. The Finnish educational policy has purposefully aimed for equity in education, and this has been seen by many as a main reason for its high learning outcomes. Especially in terms of monetary principles, Finland has built an education system of uniformity in public funding: all have access to free education, free school meals, and free special needs education. The current educational system pays a great deal of attention to helping students who have learning difficulties.[65]

62 Witte (2013: 23); see also Smith (2017).
63 Nurmi (1995): Tähtinen (2007).
64 Simola (2005); Antikainen (2006).
65 Niemi (2012); OECD (2006a); Simola (2005); Välijärvi (2003/2004); Välijärvi & Sulkunen (2016); Kumpulainen & Lankinen (2016).

Teaching

The Lutheran Church is very much a teaching church. From its onset the Church has believed that priests should learn to teach people through sermons and that teaching should fit learners' capacities. Historically the parish clerks were required to teach learners in such a way that they understood what they had read: learning by heart was not enough, and weak learners were to be helped.

Likewise, recent Finnish education has placed a strong emphasis on high-level thinking skills and a high quality of learning as its national aims.[66] According to an analysis of governmental educational policy documents, lifelong learning is included in all education in Finland.[67] The lifelong-learning perspective is systematically integrated into educational policy and other policy sectors related to education and training. According to this holistic approach, lifelong learning is a program that starts from people's early years and continues throughout the full course of their lives. It emphasizes a readiness to continue studying at the next level, learning to learn, and learners' personal growth.

Structures

As was previously mentioned, each village had an obligation to have someone who was capable of teaching reading skills to its inhabitants. This required new and systematic structures to be developed. Usually the parish clerks who acted as teachers, but peer learning was also used. The innovative Finnish special arrangement was to create travelling schools to reach all people throughout the country. This can be seen as an earlier form of distance learning that is today in wide use, providing online learning opportunities to all citizens in situations where education is otherwise not available.[68] Recent educational structures aim for all people to have the chance to have an education, even if they have failed at earlier phases of their studies. This again calls for innovative structures to be in place, such as the reform of vocational training from the beginning of 2018, which emphasizes individualized paths to help also students with previous negative experiences to obtain a suitable level of education.

Native language

The Reformation and its aftermath and the 19th century nationalistic promotion of Finnish culture and civilization made language a special issue. After considerable efforts, Finnish (in addition to Swedish) finally attained the status of an official language of Finland in 1863. After independence both languages remained official languages, which means that all education has to be provided in these languages. In the current Finnish educational system, mastering one's mother tongue is considered the basis for learning. This principle is also integrated in the Finnish educational system for

66 Finnish National Board of Education (2014).
67 Niemi & Isopahkala-Bouret (2012); Antikainen (2006).
68 Distance learning portal (2019).

immigrants, who are provided with their own native language teachers and are thus provided with opportunities to create their own national identities.[69]

Value basis

Responsibility for ones' own life and being a good citizen are deeply rooted values in Protestantism and its Lutheran tradition. Also, the concept of having a calling and vocation to work in God's world provided the moral background for professionals. Values (called virtues by Luther) applicable in life were also part of educational values.[70]

In the current Finnish educational system, values are detached from their religious origins and concepts. However, the aim of education continues to be to provide a sustainable value basis for all learners (including students in schools) to learn to be responsible citizens in their own country as well as in the wider, global world.[71] In newly secular forms, the old Lutheran influence thus remains powerful.

Teachers

In the 19th century, during the formative years of the national Finnish education system, the teachers' commitment and their role were explicitly linked to many values originating from the Christian faith. Currently, teachers' work in public schools is linked to seemingly secular values, such as everyone's right to have a good education, equality, democracy, and sustainable living, but they are no longer explicitly linked to any religion. Nevertheless, teaching as a moral profession in Finland demands that teachers have internalized a deep understanding of the consequences of their work for pupils' lives and for society as a whole. This is still well in line with the Lutheran *Bildung*-tradition with its emphasis on civilizing the nation. Nowadays the morals taught in teacher education are not based on explicit Christian teaching but on deontological ethics that stresses duty, the rightness of action, and the universality of the ethical principles. But deontological ethics is dominant in Christian ethics as well, having grown increasingly strong since the Middle Ages, through the Reformation, and into the modern times: the parallels between secular and religious values are thus obvious here.

Since its beginning in the 19th century, the secular teaching profession has been a very desirable career in Finland. Teachers in Finland are members of a respected academic and ethical profession.[72] Finnish teacher education for both primary and secondary school teachers is a five-year MA university program. These programs attract a large number of young people: the teaching programs for grade levels 1 to 6 are some of the most popular academic programs in Finnish universities. Very talented, highly motivated applicants seek entrance to these programs each year. Secondary school teachers also face very strict entrance requirements: academic ability,

69 Finnish National Board of Education (2014).
70 Witte (2013).
71 Finnish National Board of Education (2014).
72 Sahlberg (2007, 2011); Toom & Husu (2016).

especially thinking skills, career choice motivation, and social skills are all tested. Successful applicants are thus well trained for and deeply committed to the teaching profession.[73]

Recent Finnish teacher education has committed itself to a strong research-based approach.[74] This academic career is also seen as moral profession, the ethical grounds of which have been embedded in teachers' pre-service education. The National Ethical Committee of the Teaching Profession was established by the teachers' trade union in 2000.[75] It sets a high moral code for the teaching profession, including teachers' relationship with pupils, colleagues, and other partners in education, and teachers' work in society. Overall, given the strong emphasis on (deontological) ethics and the relatively high autonomy of teachers – an idea that stems from the Lutheran *Bildung*-tradition[76] – it is not difficult to see traces of Lutheran, or more broadly Christian values in the current education system of Finland.

Conclusion

The Finnish educational system has been highly successful in recent international assessments. However, there are yet many other well-performing countries, such as Singapore, Shanghai-China, Korea, and Japan. These countries have totally different driving forces that characterize their educational systems, such as high-stake testing, tight control of teachers, and student competition. Can we then find any connection between the Finnish educational system and the culture's alleged Protestant roots?

The aim of this chapter was to reflect on how the Lutheran religion and the Finnish educational system have been interwoven. We used path dependence as a paradigm for understanding the course of history of Finnish education, seeking to explain how certain decisions or choices have long run consequences in the processes following these choices even under changed circumstances. No exact causal relationships can be provided because of changing contextual factors and because many processes are self-reinforcing.

We identified three processes as key junctures in the long path of Finnish history from the Reformation to the current Finnish educational system. The first was the influence of Mikael Agricola, the father of Finnish literary language who became a model to follow. The second was the establishment of university in Turku, which became fertile breeding ground for the Finnish national awakening. The third was the establishment of the public education system, which was built on strongly religious foundation. While religion is no longer an explicit driving force, it provided the basis for the development of Finland's educational system, the most important qualities of which are equity and respect for civilization (the Lutheran concept of *Bildung*).

73 Toom & Husu (2016).
74 Niemi & Jakku-Sihvonen (2006).
75 Niemi (2002).
76 Saari et al. (2017).

The international success of this system has been a side effect, although a significant one.

The promotors of the national independence and the nationalistic Fennoman movement pushed the struggle for Finnish language, culture and civilization to the forefront. Many of the people involved had a strong Lutheran background, and the nationalistic endeavours had a Lutheran flavour. The pursuit of independence included the building of a Finnish identity, which included respect for learning and education. Teachers and the teaching profession have been valued as 'candles of the nation,' and thus they have been highly respected. Also on the political level, teachers' work has been (and still is) considered vitally important to national welfare,[77] and therefore teaching is a respected profession with highly trusted and well-trained experts as its practitioners. Some key events and processes of Finland's history and independence have thus set it apart from the other Nordic countries. Historically, we can see that there is a strong connection between education and the Lutheran religion as well as between education and independent Finland; all these phenomena are interwoven.

As we saw, it has been a long road for the Finnish educational system to get to point of the last decades of the 20th century, when it gradually proceeded toward a more comprehensive system, in which the basic value became equal opportunities for all learners throughout their lives. This ideology and progress can be seen in other Nordic countries as well.[78] However, why has Finland then been more successful in educating its citizens compared to other (Nordic) Lutheran countries? One special conjunction in the path of history has been the Finnish journey toward its independence as a nation, as some events and processes linked to it have set it apart from other Nordic countries.

After its independence Finland developed a unique educational system, including extensive and high-quality academic teacher education, and a specific enhancement-led evaluation system that puts more emphasis on the learners' support system than on ranking and competition.[79] Finland also has a curriculum system, as described earlier, in which the main objective is for all learners from early ages through adulthood to have equal opportunities for a high-quality education. This then entails the creation of a strong support system for those with special needs, so that they too have this equal opportunity.

Lutheran tradition has given way to the more current secular school, which yet shares many of the values related to good and responsible citizen working for the benefit of all, which were the core aims also in Luther's secular regiment. Finnish social solidarity is in significant part derived from its history in which for centuries all Finns shared a common Lutheran religious heritage. However, during the course of history also many other forces have had an impact on the Finnish educational system but delving deeper into those lies outside of the limits of this chapter.

77 Antikainen (2007); Kumpulainen & Lankinen (2016); Sahlberg (2007, 2011).
78 Antikainen (2007).
79 Sahlberg (2007, 2011); OECD (2016).

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From Learning the Catechism by Heart towards Independent Reading

Abstract

Finland is known as a country of good literacy and education as well as a country of many libraries. Literacy, reading and education are marks of a highly civilized society. In this chapter I shall look backwards to uncover the roots of Finland's education and literacy. What role did the Lutheran church play in this development and how did it improve literacy following one of the main principles of the Reformation, namely that it was everybody's right and duty to get to know the Word of God? I am comparing the role of the Catechism and the Bible in this process. Although literacy at first served religious aims, it was soon used in other, more secular fields of human life. Good skills in reading also led to the establishment of the library system as well. This happened through the libraries of the dioceses and parishes, which encouraged the development of public lending libraries at the end of the nineteenth century.

The Bible or the Catechism?

Finnish national literature has its roots in the Reformation. One of the main principles of the Reformation was to gain access to God's Word, that is, the Bible, in everyone's own language. This can be seen, for example, in the rapidly increasing number of translations and editions of the Bible in different countries. The Finnish reformer Michael Agricola, who studied at the University of Wittenberg, and became Bishop of Turku after returning to Finland, translated the basic religious books into Finnish and published them in Stockholm in the 1540s and at the beginning of the 1550s. This included a primer (The ABC book/*Abc-kiria* 1543), a prayer book (*Rucouskiria Bibliasta* 1544), the New Testament (*Se Wsi testamenti* 1548) and some translations of Old Testament books (1551, 1552). He also translated and prepared some liturgical books in order to help priests in their work.[1]

1 Heininen (2007: 156–157); Johansson (2009: 33); Wallace (2012: 81).

Luther's Catechisms, which were used and kept as a model for other Catechisms also in the Swedish realm, included explanations, but until the beginning of the 18th century primers or ABC books were composed of texts of the Catechism in a shorter form and without explanations. It is very probable that Agricola's primer, which was published in three editions (1543, 1549–1551, 1559), was mostly used by priests and helped them to teach the principles of Christian doctrine in the same Finnish form. This was very important for absorbing the principles of Christianity, which for a long time meant learning by heart. Literacy among the common people was still very poor in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and it seems unlikely they bought or read even ABC books.[2]

Although literacy in its original meaning includes both reading and writing, by literacy I refer in this chapter only to the ability to read. After the Reformation, the Lutheran church took care of teaching people to read but not to write. By reading one could deepen one's knowledge of Christianity even by oneself. Writing did not have this advantage. Most people in Finland lived in the countryside and got their living from agriculture. Rural people did not need writing skills and concentrating on writing would have taken time away from 'real work.' Being able to write might encourage children to raise their class status, they might become much interested in studying, leading them to forget their roots and deny their peasant heritage. Not even the Lutheran church encouraged people to learn to write, because writing was considered a worldly skill. Similar attitudes concerning reading and writing could also be found not only in the Swedish realm, but in Denmark and Norway as well.[3]

In Germany, which later became the heartland of the Reformation, the teaching of the Catechism began as early as in 1215 in the 21st Constitution of the IV Lateran Council. It stipulated that every Christian was obliged to have communion at least once a year at Eastertide and that the parish priest's duty was to instruct them on the basics of faith that they were required to know before being admitted to the communion. This constitution was binding in the whole of the Catholic Church and was reflected in local synodal statutes and practises, also in German lands. Catechetic teaching can be found also in thirteenth-century German sermon, for example in those by Franciscan brothers Berthold von Regensburg and Konrad Holtnicker. At first The Lord's Prayer, Ave Maria and the Apostles' Creed had to be learned by heart, but afterwards the Ten Commandments were added to the list. Catechetical literature for the common people was also born, the oldest Catechism of this kind being *Der Grosse Seelentrost* (1350–1360). When Luther wrote his Catechisms, he could follow this older tradition. However, even in the early decades of the 16th century, there was no clear genre of 'catechism' in its modern meaning. Both shorter or longer works could be titled Catechisms. Teaching Christian doctrine before the invention of the printing press had

2 Laine & Nyqvist (1996: numbers 159–161); Johansson (2009: 29); T. Laine (2012: 63).

3 Appel & Fink-Jensen (2011: 1, 8–9); Kotilainen (2016: 15–16); Mäkinen (2016: 25–39).

usually meant learning by heart, and in this process texts were not important. Luther's first Catechism was published in 1529, and learning it meant learning to read (at least reading aloud). In other words a Christian was a literate person who knew the most important doctrines of Christianity. This was a new development. Luther's example became an inspiration for Lutheran churches, and many Catechisms, translations of Luther's Catechisms as well as other Catechisms based on Luther, were published in the Swedish realm.[4]

If the Reformation underlined the Word of God, why did the Catechism and not the Bible become so important in Lutheranism? Luther emphasized the meaning of the Catechism, calling it the Bible of lay people.[5] It included everything which one needed to know about Christianity. Many could not afford to buy the Bible and in any case their skills in reading were often too rudimentary to understand it. In these circumstances the Catechism was a very suitable book for such people. The Catechism also had other advantages. All chapters in the Catechism were accompanied by Luther's explanations, and individual interpretations were not required. The Peasant Revolt had shown how dangerous wrong interpretations made by unlearned people might be. Later on, especially in the Radical Pietism movement, not only in Germany, but also in the Swedish realm, problems arose when lay people read and interpreted the Bible by themselves.[6]

The Swedish church law of 1686 ordered that only those who knew their Christian faith, that is, knew the Catechism at least by heart, could attend Holy Communion, were allowed to marry, and could become a godfather or godmother. The knowledge of the basic teachings of the Catechism were regularly examined by priests. This also raised the importance of the Catechism in early modern times in the Swedish realm. In order to instruct people more properly, psalm-books contained besides psalms, the Biblical texts of the ecclesiastical year, the Catechism with Luther's explanations, the Table of Duties, and prayers for home and church.[7]

The difference between the Catechism and the Bible was not so great as far as basic church education was concerned, because both contained partly the same texts, for example the Lord's Prayer, the Apostles' Creed and the Ten Commandments, which people had to learn even in Catholic times. In addition, they should also know the institutional words of the sacraments: Baptism, Holy Communion and Confession, though in the Lutheran church the Confession was not strictly speaking considered a sacrament. There were also ABC books, which contained the letters of the alphabet and some prayers.[8] In other words, with the exception of the letters of the alphabet, all the texts of primers were Biblical texts which were crucial for practicing the faith.

4 Bast (1997: 36, 58); Hanska & Lahtinen (2010: 91–92); T. Laine (2012: 63); Wandel (2015: 7–9, 22, 27–28); Eire (2016: 591–593); Kaufmann (2016: 512–515); Libris: katekeser.

5 See also Sinnemäki & Saarikivi (this volume).

6 Gilmont (2003: 220, 226); Eire (2016: 593); T. Laine (2017).

7 Laasonen (1977: 280); Johansson (1988: 6); Johansson (2009: 28–30, 39–40); Brilkman (2013).

8 T. Laine (1997: 83), T. Laine (2012: 63).

Even though the most important part of the Catholic mass was the Eucharist, the Catechism was also central in religious education in the Catholic world. For example, between 1500 and 1700, thirty-eight English Catholic and several hundred Protestant catechisms were printed in England. The first English Catholic Catechism was Edmund Bonner's *An Honest Godly Instruction*, which was published to replace Protestant catechisms.[9]

In the Anglican Church and especially in the Puritan tradition, the Bible was the most important book, although many Catechisms were also written and published. The Bible is mentioned among the things that the Puritans took with them when they left England for America on the *Mayflower* and later on other ships. For the Puritans the Bible was not only a holy text, it was also an object of reverence which protected one's whole house and its inhabitants from evil.[10]

In Finland in the eighteenth century the Bible was still quite rare and even then was expensive for the common people to purchase. Sometimes several families bought a Bible together and passed it from family to family.[11] Biblical texts were not unknown, however, and there were many opportunities to hear or read at least some texts from the Bible. Every Sunday chapters of the Bible were read out loud in church and priests explained them in their sermons, but this was not the only way to become acquainted with the Bible.

The connection between the Catechism and the Bible is seen even in the Swedish 1695 hymnal. This was translated into Finnish as a so-called 'Old hymnal' from the year 1701. It was in use in Finland until 1886. The first 21 psalms were 'catechetical psalms' and psalms 22–112 from the Book of Psalms had biblical motifs. There were also 21 psalms written on such evangelical texts as John 2 (the marriage in Cana) and the parables of Jesus.[12] Sermons, the Catechism, the Table of Duties and the Psalm-book with their Biblical texts and citations did not of course make up the Bible in its entirety. But they did offer prepared, interpreted images of the Bible, suitable for common folk, without inconsistencies or texts which were hard to interpret.

As mentioned earlier, the basic texts of the Catechism were taken directly from the Bible. Only the explanations were written by Luther or other Catechism authors. In Lutheranism it was recommended that devotional literature and the Bible should be read after the Catechism had been absorbed. All religious education was based on the Catechism and other books widened the knowledge of Christianity. Apart from the Catechism and the Bible, the reading of other books improved reading skills, though it was important that people read 'good books,' namely those recommended by the church.[13]

Reading of the Bible emerged only during the nineteenth century, when the Finnish Bible Society (established after the model of English Bible Societies) was founded (1812) and started to publish inexpensive versions

9 Underwood (2014: 51–52); O'Malley (2016: 25).
10 Cambers (2011: 4–5).
11 T. Laine (2003: 28–30); Johansson (2009: 41).
12 Uusi Suomenkielinen Wirsi-Kirja (1785: hymns 119–219); Johansson (2009: 40).
13 Gezelius (1683: A3v., A4r.).

of the Bible. By that time, as a result of increased literacy, people were eager to read the Bible.[14]

The role of the Catechism in the campaign for literacy

In addition to Agricola's work there were some other basic religious books published mostly by bishops in the late 16th century and early 17th century for the common people. But the real literacy campaign in the whole Swedish realm only took place in the second half of the 17th century. The 17th century was characterized by confessionalization. The realm was to be united both politically and religiously. Popular education could not be built on oral transmission, but demanded more effective teaching techniques. The Swedish bishop Olaus Svebilius was asked to write a Catechism for the whole realm. His *Enfaldig Förklaring öfwer Lutheri lilla Catechismum* (*A Simple Explanation of Luther's Small Catechism*) was published in 1689 and came into common use after its publication. Also in other European countries, especially in Protestant Northern and Central Europe, there was a dramatic increase in literacy during the seventeenth century. As a result of this the majority of the Nordic population, men as well as women, had reached a basic level of literacy by the end of the eighteenth century, and even before that.[15]

In Finland, two Turku bishops, Ericus Erici Sorolainen at the beginning of the 17th century and Johannes Gezelius the Elder from the 1660s were eager to write and publish books for the common people. Like Luther himself, Ericus Erici wrote both a smaller and a larger Catechism, the latter being directed towards priests. He also wrote the first collection of sermons for the whole liturgical year in order to help priests prepare their sermons. Like some of his predecessors he published a manual with all the formulas of the Christian rites and services.[16]

A few decades after Ericus Erici Sorolainen, Bishop Johannes Gezelius the Elder remarkably extended the selection of Finnish religious books and literary culture. He not only wrote and printed books, but also sold them, which was the privilege of bookbinders. He hired his own bookbinder to sell bound books and even produced some paper for his own printing press. Books for the common people and school children as well as educating

14 Kakkuri (2015).

15 Pleijel (1965: 16); Johansson (2009: 31–32); Lindmark (2011: 192). Despite quite exhaustive Church examination registers in Sweden and Finland it is very difficult to give exact information about readers. There were large differences between registers in parishes, and every priest had his own system. The information is not comparable between different areas or different priests, and every parish has to be compared separately and a general conclusion reached only later. Furthermore, even in the secondary literature different meanings were given for the word 'literate.'

16 Laine & Nyqvist (1996: numbers 1050, 1052–1067); T. Laine (2010: 64); Appel & Fink-Jensen (2011: 1). Catechisms written for priests was a common feature also in the Catholic world in the 16th century. Eire (2016: 596); O'Malley (2016: 26).

priests were the main interests of Bishop Gezelius. This was a part of the larger literary campaign in the whole Swedish realm, and though Gezelius sold the books he produced, making a profit was not of major importance. Indeed, printing and selling these books was mostly an unprofitable business for him. When Bishop Johannes Gezelius the Elder died in 1690, all the storage areas were full of unsold books, because the bishop had taken so large editions of them. His son, Johannes Gezelius the Younger, bishop of the Turku diocese after his father, wrote that these books could not be sold even in a hundred years.

In 1666 Johannes Gezelius the Elder published a Catechism both in Finnish and Swedish. The Catechism included the ABC book, the Catechism, questions on Christianity and a collection of biblical quotations. Pedagogical ideas were much in mind. One started with the easiest text and progressed step by step towards the most demanding parts. Gezelius' Catechism became very popular, running to over sixty Finnish and over ten Swedish editions up until 1809. It was used in many parishes with the understanding that Bishop Olaus Svebilius' Catechism (first translated into Finnish only in 1745) was also used. This practice was ordered by the King of Sweden and was a part of the unification politics in the Swedish realm in the Age of Greatness. Even after that older people were allowed to use Gezelius' Catechism and it was also used in Old Finland (the parts of Finland annexed to Russia by the peace treaties of 1721 and 1743) even at the beginning of the 19th century.[17]

Before Gezelius the common people were taught to read by rote. The role of priests was not to teach but to examine. Teaching children was the task of parents, but if parents were for some reason unable to teach their children to read, they got help from the parish. Examinations were held in the cities on Saturday evenings and in the countryside on Sunday mornings just before the Sunday service. Knowing the Catechism was required in order to attend Eucharist, to get permission to marry and to become a godfather or godmother. Not only the basic texts of the Catechism were to be known, but also the explanations and the Table of Duty as well.[18]

In the seventeenth century and in the first half of the eighteenth century children had to read the same primers and catechisms as adults: at first the Catechism in its short form and then with explanations. The first and only picture in these books was a picture of a teaching cockerel. Young children and teenagers who had the possibility of attending schools might also have read *Orbis pictus*, a multilingual book with pictures written by the Czech educationalist Johannes Amos Comenius.[19]

During the literacy campaign, bookreading was emphasized. Gezelius gave advice and orders considering schools and the education of children and the common people in his circulars (*Catechismi appendix* 1666, *Perbreves commonitiones* 1673) and school programme (*Methodus informandi* 1683), all of which were published in his own printing press. Although he

17 Gezelius (1666b); Laasonen (1977); T. Laine (1993); Tiimonen (2001: 147).

18 Hellemaa et al. (1986: Chapter II § IX pp. 14–15, II § X p. 15, Chapter XXIV § 22 p. 121, Chapter XXIV § 32 p. 125); Lindmark (2011: 193), Brilkman (2013).

19 Hanho (1947: 43, 47); T. Laine (2017: 65-66).

still wrote these works from the point of view of reading by rote, he also underlined bookreading, in which he saw many advantages. Reading from a book was more fluent than remembering the texts by heart. If one forgot something, which was usual, it was easy to check it from the book. This was a very important point, because otherwise people might understand something wrongly at the very beginning and in that way acquire an inaccurate knowledge of the Christian faith. According to Gezelius, the most important thing about reading from the book itself was understanding. People who simply tried to remember the text by heart had greater difficulty in understanding what they read, and understanding was crucial for reading. Books were, of course, essential to improve reading skills. That is why Gezelius also published devotional literature and suggested that people buy it wherever possible.[20]

During the 1700s book reading became more common and in some cases it replaced learning by heart. Many adults were already literate and they could teach their children better than before. Children's first reading was still reading by rote, but when they got a little older they could start to read books. In the last decades of the 18th century discussion on reading focused on rote learning. The smallest children read by rote, but after that rote learning was taught only when one had to read from a book. Reading by rote was seen as useful for many reasons. Children had a good memory and learning to read by rote was easy for them. It supported children's memory, and one could memorize psalms and prayers during one's daily work. Knowing and memorizing religious texts was seen as a mark of piety. After learning how to read books, reading by rote was the generally used pedagogic method in the 19th century. In some ABC books there were also excerpts from the Bible and the Psalms to learn by heart.[21]

At the end of the eighteenth century some catechisms, mostly originating in Sweden but published in Finland, were designed for children. These texts were, at least according to their authors, simple to understand compared with adult catechisms. The first real children's books were published in the 1790s by the Bishop of Turku, Jacob Tengström. They contained short stories and fables, albeit without pictures, and even the Christian texts were easy for children to understand.[22]

Reading by rote was still considered an important pedagogic method in the early 20th century for a variety of subjects. It was very common in schools to use this method to learn, for example, the names of Finnish rivers. Even today some important items in the grammar of foreign languages, such as prepositions which require the accusative, are still learned in this way. In the 1930s young people had to learn the Catechism with all its explanations by heart at confirmation school. Nowadays, they only have to know some things by heart, such as the Ten Commandments, John 3:16, the Blessing, the Confession of Faith and the Lord's Prayer.[23] Thus, learning by heart

20 Gezelius (1666a); Gezelius (1673); Gezelius (1683).
21 Sadelin (1851: 49–58); T. Laine (2017); Nivalan kansanopetuksen varhaisvaiheet.
22 Laine & Laine (2010: 277); T. Laine (2017: 97).
23 Minä seurakunnassa (2016).

and reading by rote have not totally disappeared, not even among today's younger generation.

Because until the 19th century ABC books were composed of the Catechism in short form, the connection between ABC books and the Catechism on the one hand and between literacy and Christianity on the other was clear from the beginning. The position of the Catechism in ABC books was strong throughout the 19th century. Even as late as 1900 ABC book *Uusi Aapinen* included the Catechism.[24]

The Table of Duties (*Hustavla* in Swedish or *Huoneentaulu* in Finnish), a collection of quotations from the Scriptures, was a supplement to Luther's Small Catechism. It consisted of specific Bible verses arranged according to the traditional, Lutheran doctrine of a three-stage, social hierarchy: *ecclesia* (the church), *politia* (the state) and *oeconomia* (the home). Quotations from the Scriptures outlined the Christian duties in which each stage in this hierarchy was dependent on the others. Such categories were, for example, priests/parishioners, rulers/subjects, heads of families/children and household servants. Reading the Table of Duties already required very good literacy and priests used the last part of the Catechism to examine the common people.[25]

There are some common features between the Table of Duties and the Ten Commandments, the first part of the Catechism, but there are also some differences. The first three Commandments set out man's relationship with God and declare that God is above all other creatures. Seven other Commandments proclaim the relationship which should exist between people. In the Ten Commandments the relationship between humans is not seen as hierarchic as it is in the Table of Duties. In the Ten Commandments all people are seen as equal; there are no differences between priests and parishioners or rulers and subjects, for the Commandments and their explanations are the same for all. There is only one exception: in both the Ten Commandments and the Table of Duties children were taught to obey their parents.[26]

Studies have shown that the Catechism was taught everywhere in Finland, but the Table of Duties was taught only in Western Finland. Literacy was higher in Western than in Eastern Finland at an earlier stage, making it possible for them to deal with more advanced texts. By contrast, people in Eastern Finland were more liberal. They were not, for example, interested in sitting in the pews ordered for them in the church and the idea of class-hierarchy was strange to them. In some Eastern parishes, such as in Kuopio, the system of everybody having their own hierarchic place in the church, which was ordered for the whole Swedish realm by the King in 1732, did not work at all. This liberal attitude has been explained by pointing to the poverty of the area – there were no large mansions or landlords in the East as there were in Western Finland.[27] Another explanation, however, might

24 *Uusi Kuva-Aapinen* (1883); Tuhkanen (1894); *Uusi Aapinen* (1900).
25 Po-Chia Hsia (1992: 144–151); E. M. Laine (2002: 62–63); Johansson (2009: 57).
26 Luther (1785: 241–244, 258–264).
27 E. M. Laine (2002: 74–75).

be that hierarchic thinking had not been inculcated into them. Because of their poor literacy skills their basic knowledge emphasized equality, a notion derived from the Ten Commandments, not the hierarchic system of the Table of Duties, which they never learnt. In this way the teachings of the church in fact strengthened their support for equality, a notion which had already been relevant to them on account of their poor social standing. In Western Finland, however, where the Table of Duties was learnt, class hierarchies were more established.

Religious reading turns to secular reading

During the eighteenth century reading habits changed a great deal. Literacy improved even among the common people. In Ii in Northern Ostrobothnia¸ for example, before 1750 only 6.6% of households owned a book, whereas in 1750–1769 this rose to 20%. In 1780–1789 60% of households owned books, a figure which rose to 73% by the end of the century. The Enlightenment touched even the peasants. Many scholars wrote special guidebooks for them in order to improve their knowledge of animal husbandry, agriculture, health and even child care. These works were published as books, booklets or texts attached to almanacs.[28] Readership broadened from the Catechism and devotional literature to embrace secular books of a practical nature.

Peasants were not, of course, the only social class who got to know secular literature. In practice, their access to such texts was very limited, because it was mostly initially written in Swedish or in another European language. Secular literature spread especially among the upper social classes, and particularly among the bourgeoisie. In Europe the eighteenth century is known not only as the century of the Enlightenment, but also as the century of the bourgeoisie, a rising class that was both literate and had language skills. They also had the opportunity to travel, and many in fact were professional merchants. The bourgeoisie became the new target group for the publishing industry. The publication of travel literature and *belles lettres* emerged, as did new kinds of reading habits. Even women and children found new kinds of reading material. People devoured novels so eagerly that reading was even seen as harmful and a symptom of illness.[29] The most striking and important difference comparing reading in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the turn from religious reading to secular reading. Almost all the new genres in the book market were secular.

The emergence of secular material is visible even in the ABC books. These books no longer contained simply short catechisms, but also included fables, stories and pictures. One reason for this was that children were now being taken into consideration as readers, even as consumers. The production of children's literature rose throughout Europe. What is interesting is the role

28 Mäkinen (1999: 169); T. Laine (2001: 200–203); T. Laine (2013: 31–36); Kotilainen (2016: 16–17).

29 Mäkinen (1999); Knapas (2002); Laine (2006).

of the Catechism in this new situation. Although the number of secular stories increased during the nineteenth century, and it stole space from the Catechism, the Catechism as such did not disappear. Even during the last decades of the nineteenth century it was still printed at the end of the ABC books.[30]

In the first half of the twentieth century some people, mostly from different revival movements, expressed their disquiet over secularization in school education. In the 1860s education was transferred from the church to the state and the whole schooling system was totally reformed.[31] Religion no longer played such a marked role in school. The special Christian ABC books published during the first decades of the twentieth century offered basic knowledge on Christianity and resembled the Catechism, but they were not official school textbooks and were mostly used at home or in Sunday schools.[32] Christianity was losing its role in society, but the literacy which it had produced even strengthened its position.

Libraries and literacy

One way to use the skill of literacy came true through libraries, especially in cases where it was not possible to acquire or get needed books otherwise. Libraries have traditionally played a significant role in Finnish society, and have also had a remarkable influence on improving literacy and literate culture. Cathedral libraries are the oldest church libraries in many countries. Also in pre-Lutheran Catholic times, many Finnish churches had libraries. The best known was the Turku Cathedral library, which lost its most valuable books to Danish robbers in 1509. In his circular *Perbreves commonitiones* of 1673, Bishop Johannes Gezelius the Elder wrote about the theological and liturgical books which every church must purchase. Books were kept under lock and key in the church when not being used in the church and not even priests were allowed to borrow them.[33]

Not only the education of the common people but also the education of priests was important for Gezelius, and he published many books to this purpose. The same principle reigned throughout the Swedish realm during the seventeenth century. In Swedish dioceses libraries were founded for priests in connection with churches. Even in Finland, churches were expected to buy the books which the King of Sweden ordered them to acquire. In most cases churches had to order books which were useful for them, but they were so expensive that money needed to be raised for their printing. Christian Scriver's postilla, *Siäle-skatt* in five parts from the 1720s is one example of this kind of book. The King also ordered parishes to acquire

30 *Uusi Kuva-Aapinen* (1883); Tuhkanen (1894); T. Laine (2002); Weinkauff & v. Glasenapp (2010: 26); Grenby (2012: 2).

31 See also Niemi & Sinnemäki (this volume).

32 Saraste (1908); Havas (1930).

33 Gezelius (1673: A3); Grönroos (1946: 4–5); Schmalor (2010: 41).

legal and liturgical books (church law, service books, etc.) which were in use throughout the realm in all parishes.[34]

During the Great Wrath (the Russian occupation of Finland, 1714–1721), many private and public book collections were destroyed. New books needed to be purchased and the state supported the parishes financially in this task. When the most vital books had been bought, parishes were regularly informed about other useful books they might purchase. This literature was targeted not only at priests but at parishioners as well. Books were needed in homes both to educate children but also for devotional purposes as well, the last one being ordered by the King of Sweden in 1726. Not all could acquire their own books, however. It is known that in the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nineteenth century Swedish parishes lent books to their parishioners. This probably also occurred in Finland, although there is little documented information about this. At least in the middle of the nineteenth century, when the first public libraries appeared in Finland, they were mostly founded by priests and maintained by parishes. Parish libraries lent out not only religious literature, but secular literature as well. They, as well as reading societies, school libraries and people's libraries, can be seen as the forerunners of public libraries in Finland.[35]

At the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century there were also several reading societies especially among the clergy and other gentry. These societies lent books to their members, and they too can be considered early libraries. Some societies charged a small sum for lending. Books of different genre were provided, but novels were the most popular items. This reading and lending tradition among the upper classes is still alive in Eastern Uusimaa in the so-called 'Herrgårdsbokringen,' a society comprised of twelve aristocratic families, which was founded a hundred years ago.[36]

Public libraries were enthusiastically founded in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century, and were established in all the Nordic countries at about the same time. They were modelled (first in Norway) on the public libraries in North America, which had had Britain as its prototype. When in 1865 the ecclesiastical and the communal sector of the administration were separated in Finland, teachers rather than priests took care of public libraries. After founding libraries in civil parishes, many schools acquired their own libraries. In 1914 more than half of the public libraries were located in schools. At the end of the nineteenth century there were 400 public libraries. Not only did parishes, reading societies and civil authorities found lending libraries, other societies did the same. For example, in 1905 youth associations had 390 libraries and worker's associations had 509 libraries in 1906.[37]

At first people's libraries could be seen as a project of the elite to civilize and educate the lower classes and so exert a form of social control. Popular

34 Grönroos (1946: 10–16); Laasonen (1977); T. Laine (2006).

35 Grönroos (1946: 19–20, 23–33); Lempiäinen (1967); Grönroos (1983: 46–47); Hietala (1999: 18); Takala (2015); Kotilainen (2016: 10–11).

36 Mäkinen (1999: 169–172); Herrgårdsbokringen 100 år.

37 Hietala (1999: 19); Mäkinen (2003: 310, 319); Kotilainen (2016: 9).

libraries provided a useful service for the lower ranks of society and ordinary country folk were sometimes very active in establishing libraries.[38]

Common literacy and reading, which earlier was the responsibility of the Lutheran church, had now in many ways become detached from the church and its targets. It is clear, however, that without its roots in Lutheran literacy programmes, interest in reading and the founding of libraries would not have spread so effectively among the Finnish people as a whole. The role of the church in this project was ground-breaking.

After the elementary school act of 1866 the state rather than the church was now responsible for general education. Those children who could not attend an elementary school pursued their studies at home, in church and in so-called ambulatory schools, which were kept open for a few weeks in the wintertime in the countryside. Only in 1921 was a compulsory education law passed, which guaranteed that every child could attend school.[39]

According to the elementary school act it was necessary to institute a library for pupils. One of the most eager spokesman in this matter was Kaarle Werkko (1850–1926), leader in the development of primary schooling in Helsinki. According to Werkko, school libraries were necessary for children, because public libraries did not contain books suitable for children. However, school libraries were not established everywhere. Some public libraries were not enthusiastic about setting up special sections for children, especially where schools already had their own libraries. Moreover, where public libraries did exist they might well be rarely open. Many public libraries refused to lend books to children and some only did so during the summer, when school libraries were closed. One of the oldest, still operating publishers in Finland, Otava, published school books from the beginning. Otava also provided a model for reference libraries in schools. Elementary schools should have some encyclopaedias and 22 non-fiction books. Libraries for smaller children should have 35 picture books, fairy tales and poetry collections, and for older children 23 non-fiction books and 50 juvenile books.[40] In this, the number of school children played no role, and of course the profit motive was inevitably in the background. Following this model for school libraries would have produced a tidy sum of money for a publisher which published this kind of literature for children. But financial issues aside, Otava's recommendation might well have been useful for those who wondered what kind of literature there should be on the shelves of the school library.

In Finland as well as in other Nordic countries libraries were seen as part of the civilizing process. Finnish public libraries received state aid from 1921 onwards, and Finland was among the first countries in Europe to have special legislation concerning libraries, the first law being enacted in 1928. It guaranteed the position of libraries as an institution in Finnish civil life and has subsequently helped Finnish libraries become among the best in the world.[41]

38 Kotilainen (2016: 19).
39 Leino-Kaukiainen & Heikkinen (2011: 16, 22–24).
40 Werkko (1879: 273–274); Koskimies (1946: 337–340); Eskola (1999: 137, 139).
41 Eskola (1999: 121–122); Haavisto (1999: 219); Haasio & Vakkari (2016).

Conclusion

The roots of literacy in Finland lay in the Reformation. The possibility and even the requirement to read and understand Bible texts was one of the main principles in the Reformation, and the Lutheran church took upon itself to realize these aims. Bishops and later on clergy wrote catechisms following Luther's model, and parish priests examined their parishioners regularly. According to the Church Law of 1686 it was not possible to attend Eucharist, marry or become a godparent without skills in literacy and this motivated people's desire to achieve literacy. At first reading only meant reading by heart, but quite soon comprehension was emphasized and book reading became more common. During the eighteenth century, Finnish people in general learned to read quite well. Especially in Western Finland the rate of literacy increased, people mostly reading religious texts.

When literacy improved in the nineteenth century, people became interested in both religious and secular books. Bible reading increased when the price of Bibles sank after the Finnish Bible Society was established. The new schooling system also increased literacy. At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century readers discovered a wider range of books in libraries, many being founded at the turn of the twentieth century. Gradually secular literature became more and more common, and the interest in reading grew.

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Christianity as a Criterion of Nation in Finland among Upper Secondary School Students in 2002, 2008, and 2014

Abstract

This chapter explores whether Christianity is regarded as a criterion of nation among adolescents in contemporary Finland. We focus on adolescents living in the Helsinki metropolitan area. The data was collected in upper secondary schools in 2002, 2008, and 2014. Using quantitative methods, we examined whether being a Christian is an important criterion for being a Finn, and whether Christian items (e.g., church buildings or rituals) are perceived as Finnish national symbols. Using qualitative methods, we analysed the kinds of argument individuals use when explaining why they consider these Christian objects and rituals as characterizing Finland. We found that Christianity is not an important criterion of being a Finn. Furthermore, we found that only Helsinki Cathedral is perceived as a relatively important national symbol, and only because it is perceived as a tourist attraction and landmark. These results may reflect prevalent norms associated with Christianity in Finland.

Introduction

Definitions associated with the concept 'nation' (i.e., the criteria of nation) can dictate whom we perceive as a member of a national group.[1] Religion is one such criterion. Although 74% of Finns still belong to a Christian Church (Lutheran 73%, Orthodox 1%, other Christian denominations under 1%),[2] the religious diversity of Finnish citizens is likely to grow, for example due to

1 The authors would like to thank Kimmo Ketola and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. This study was funded by the Academy of Finland (grant no. 117363) and the Jenny and Antti Wihuri Foundation.

2 Statistics Finland (2015).

increasing migration. Therefore, it is important to study whether Christianity is a criterion of nation in contemporary Finland.[3]

In this chapter, we reflect on these issues from three perspectives, using mixed methods. Firstly, we examine whether being a Christian is an important criterion for being a Finn. Secondly, we examine whether Christian objects and rituals, such as Lutheran church buildings or church services, are perceived as Finnish national symbols. Finally, we analyse the kinds of argument individuals use when explaining why they consider these Christian objects and rituals as characterizing Finland. We study these issues among Finnish adolescents through data collected in upper secondary schools in 2002, 2008, and 2014 in the Helsinki metropolitan area. We start by briefly grounding our research questions, and explaining what the relationship between Christianity and nationality is like in Finland. We then present our data and the results from two studies, one quantitative and one qualitative. Finally, we discuss our findings in light of previous research.

Christianity as a criterion of nation

There are multiple ways to define the term 'nation,'[4] which is also true of the term 'religion.' Demerath defines 'cultural religion' as a form of religion that provides a sense of social identity and continuity, even when there is no active participation in religious rituals and beliefs.[5] In the case of national groups, this means that religion can be perceived as an important part of national culture and heritage, and can be a criterion of nation, regardless of personal involvement in religious practices or beliefs. Previous research has supported this notion. Storm, for example, shows that ethnic national identity is positively associated with the notion that Christianity is an important criterion of being British.[6] Kunovich showed that respondents considered religion on a par with other ethnic criteria of nation in data collected by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) from 31 countries in 2003.[7] Thus, shared religion, like many other shared cultural resources and objects (e.g., language, history, habits), can serve as a basis for national membership.[8]

Nevertheless, there is only a limited number of studies concerning the degree to which individuals in different countries use religion as such a criterion. In one of these rare studies, Jones and Smith showed that religion was on average the least important criterion of nationality among seven alternatives (e.g., citizenship, language) in 23 countries in ISSP 1995.[9]

3 In this chapter we usually use the umbrella term 'Christianity' rather than the narrower term 'Lutheranism,' for reasons of internal consistency. We take the term 'Christian' from an item measuring the degree to which shared religion is perceived as an important characteristic of being a Finn. Given that Lutheranism is the majority religion in Finland, the term 'Christian' is most likely to mean Lutheran.

4 See e.g., Finell (2012); Reicher & Hopkins (2001).

5 Demerath (2000).

6 Storm (2011b).

7 Kunovich (2009).

8 See also Jones & Smith (2001a); Saroglou & Cohen (2013).

9 Jones & Smith (2001b). See also Kunovich (2006).

While 60% of respondents considered language to be a very important criterion (the second most important after 'feeling' or sentiment), only 20% considered religion to be so. Furthermore, there were wide variations among countries. Among the European nations, the Bulgarians and the Irish were the most likely to emphasize religion as a criterion of their nation (46% and 32% respectively), whereas in the Netherlands only 3%, in Sweden 8%, and in Norway 10% fully agreed with the statement.[10] Finland did not participate in the ISSP in 1995.

However, shared religion does not only function as an attribute of national membership. Shared religion is also rich in cultural symbols (e.g., paintings, architecture, music, artefacts), which in turn can become national symbols. These symbols help to distinguish one's own nation from other nations, and through them individuals can express their loyalty, love, and devotion.[11] In other words, a shared religion, among other cultural objects and resources, makes the abstract term 'nation' a concrete part of social reality.[12] This close tie between religion and national culture is evident when material religious symbols are studied. Historically Christianity has been tied to nation-building in various ways in the West,[13] and therefore Christian symbols can convey connotations of political power. Furthermore, the Christian symbols of ethnic majorities are often understood as representations of the national culture in those countries.[14] Hence the meanings of religious symbols and practices can, at least partly, be separated from the religion itself, and transformed into national symbols of continuity, power, virtue, and cultural heritage. There are various examples: the menorah, the ancient Jewish religious symbol, is the state emblem of Israel;[15] some religious celebrations have been turned into important national commemoration days in various countries, for example, in the Balkans and Ireland;[16] and the cross is represented in the national flags of Nordic countries.[17]

Finally, it has been shown that the ways we perceive or define our nation have various consequences.[18] For instance, they influence patriotic, nationalist, and intergroup attitudes.[19] In addition, the above-mentioned perceptions and definitions also have an impact on how national identification and patriotism are associated with intergroup attitudes.[20] In line with this reasoning, Smeekes, Verkuyten, and Poppe's experimental study showed that emphasizing the Christian background of the Netherlands influenced the association between national identification and opposition to Muslims'

10 Jones & Smith (2001b).
11 E.g., Finell (2012); Firth (1973).
12 E.g., Anderson (1991); Poole (1999); Syrjämaa (2003).
13 See Mitchell (2011).
14 Beaman (2013).
15 Mayer (2005).
16 Roudometof (2005).
17 See e.g., Tepora (2011).
18 For a review see Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta (2014).
19 E.g., Rothì, Lyons & Chryssochoou (2005).
20 E.g., Finell et al. (2013); Finell & Zogmaister (2015); Meeus et al. (2010); Smeekes et al. (2011).

expressive rights.[21] According to their findings, when the Christian background of the Netherlands was emphasized, not only did individuals with strong national identifications express intolerance, but those with a weak sense of identification did so too. This study demonstrates how Christianity as a criterion of the nation not only serves as a basis for national membership, but also provides tools by which individuals can imagine their nation now, in the past, and in the future, creating a sense of continuity.[22] Furthermore, it can be used to separate groups with different religious backgrounds from one another.

Christianity as a criterion of nation in Finland

The ties between Church and state have historically been quite strong in Finland.[23] As part of Sweden, Finland was automatically included in the territories where Swedish King Gustav Vasa's politically motivated Reformation took place in the 16th century. This meant that the centuries-old allegiance to a remote Pope was exchanged for a stronger local allegiance, as the 'new' religion made the Church beholden to the monarch. Gustav Vasa was the head of state and the head of the Church, and he made full use of the opportunity to impose his religion on his subjects, a regional practice later captured in the phrase *Cuius regio, eius religio*.

The new Lutheran ideas spread very rapidly across Europe,[24] and with them a new understanding of how to relate to one's ruler.[25] Luther's conception of the state and its role was positive from the outset: he saw the powers-that-be as temporal servants of God, and thus to obey them was to obey God. Rulers served God by ruling; society served God by taking care of the poor; and individuals served God by relating correctly to their surroundings.

The concept of religion as intertwined with the nation-state, especially in the form of obedience to the authorities, was already part and parcel of Finnish culture before the nationalistic endeavours of the 19th century.[26] The Lutheran Church occupied this uncontested position in religious matters while Finland was under the rule of Russian Orthodox monarchs (1809–1917). During this period, being a Lutheran was an important criterion for being a Finn and a good citizen,[27] and opposition to the official Lutheran Church was interpreted as a challenge to both political power and the religious/national identity associated with that power.[28] The strong links between the Church and the state can also be seen in the fact that prior to the 1922 Freedom of Religion Act, in order to be a citizen one also had to be

21 Smeekes et al. (2011).
22 Anderson (1991); Hobsbawm & Ranger (2012); Poole (1999).
23 Sihvo (1991).
24 Pettegree (2015).
25 See Huttunen (this volume).
26 See e.g., Hjelm (2014); Juva (1960); Koskenvesa (1969).
27 Portman (2014).
28 For a 19th-century example of the political and judicial consequences, see Ylikangas (1979); also Mangeloja (this volume).

a member of the Lutheran Church (even though other forms of Protestantism had been accepted under the Nonconformity Act of 1889).

In contemporary Finland, private belief in God and other religious tenets is declining. The Lutheran Church conducts a state-of-affairs survey every four years, and has published the results since the 1960s. In a study conducted in 2011, only 10% of participants said they were very religious.[29] In terms of religious identity, about 60% described themselves as Lutheran and/or Christian. More women (68%) than men (57%) did so.[30] Despite this development, the tie between shared religion and the nation is still strong in contemporary Finland. According to the 2012 survey report *Haastettu kirkko*, most Finns in 2011 were still in favour of the presence of the Lutheran Church (e.g., its symbols and practices) in public organizations such as schools.[31] The Lutheran religion is taught in schools, including the Lord's Prayer; for example, the school year ends with Lutheran hymns being sung by the pupils, and there can also be special school-related religious services (e.g., around Christmas and Easter).[32] The same was true of political life: the majority of Finns approved of the presence of the Lutheran Church in the political arena, for instance in the form of religious services for Members of Parliament and other state officials at the beginning of the parliamentary year (only 15% of Finns reported negative attitudes to this). Studies explicitly analysing the association between the Lutheran religion and Finnish national identity further support this notion.[33] For example, when asked why they belonged to the Lutheran Church in 1999, 67% of the members of the Lutheran Church agreed with the statement 'the Church is part of the Finnish lifestyle,' whereas only 45% agreed with the statement 'the Church supports my belief in God.'[34]

Although previous research supports the notion that Christianity is understood as an essential part of Finnish culture, it is less clear whether Christianity is considered a defining characteristic of Finland or of being a Finn in contemporary Finland. We have analysed this issue in two studies, using mixed methods. Study 1 uses analysis of variance to examine whether being a Christian is an important criterion of being a Finn (Research Question 1), and to what degree Christian symbols (Helsinki Cathedral) and rituals (Lutheran worship) are regarded as Finnish national symbols (Research Question 2). Study 2 uses rhetorical analysis[35] to find out what kinds of arguments respondents use to justify why these two Christian symbols are regarded as characterizing Finland (Research Question 3). To our knowledge, no previous studies have addressed these research questions yet.

29 Haastettu kirkko [Challenged church] (2012).
30 Haastettu kirkko (2012).
31 Haastettu kirkko (2012).
32 See also Poulter (2013).
33 See e.g., Korhonen (1993); Niemelä (2011).
34 Niemelä (2003); see also Niemelä (2011) for similar results.
35 Billig (1987).

Finland was one of the most liberal countries among the participants in the 2008 ISSP survey in terms of acceptance of individuals with different religious backgrounds as a family member or a political candidate for one's own party.[36] Furthermore, it has been shown that age has a great impact on religiosity in Finland (only 22% of 15–24-year-olds report that they believe in God, whereas among 65–74-year-olds the figure is 57%).[37] In addition, there are territorial differences in levels of religiosity in Finland: it is lower in the metropolitan area than in the rest of the country.[38] Thus, it is likely that among adolescents living in the metropolitan area of Finland, religious background will be of minor importance in defining who is a Finn (Research Question 1: Hypothesis 1). Given that there is no previous research measuring the degree to which respondents perceive Christian symbols as characterizing Finland, no hypothesis was formulated regarding Research Question 2. Finally, because Research Question 3 is answered using qualitative methods, no hypothesis was formulated.

Methods

Respondents in Studies 1 and 2

In total, 788 (2002 N=140, 2008 N=211, 2014 N=437) Finnish upper secondary school students[39] were recruited during 2002, 2008, and 2014 from the same five schools in the Helsinki metropolitan area.[40] The age and gender distribution for each year is presented in Table 2 (Appendix).

Procedures and materials in Studies 1 and 2

The data collection included three phases.[41]

A. The respondents were shown 50 pictures related to Finland in 2002, 51 in 2008, and 48 in 2014. The pictures were projected onto the wall for 10 seconds each, and were presented in the same order each year. The respondents were then asked to evaluate each picture on a four-point scale in terms of how well it symbolized Finland (1=well, 2=somewhat, 3=a little, 4=not at all). If the student did not recognize the person/event/thing represented in the picture, they were advised to choose the option 'I do not know.' This option was recoded as a missing value in further analysis. In this context, we focus on five pictures: the Winter War; lake scenery; the sauna; Helsinki Cathedral;[42]

36 Ketola (2011).
37 Niemelä (2011).
38 Mikkola, Niemelä & Petterson (2006); Salomäki (2014).
39 Those who reported that both parents were not originally Finns were excluded from the data. In this study, we focus only on members of the Finnish majority.
40 In 2008 only four schools participated in the data collection.
41 See Finell (2005); Finell (2012).
42 Helsinki Cathedral is an Evangelical Lutheran church located in the centre of Helsinki. It was built in 1830–1852 and is an integral part of the neoclassical city centre. It is one of the best-known Finnish churches today. It is also one of Helsinki's best-known tourist attractions. The square in front of it, Senate Square, is the setting for many political and cultural national activities.

and the cross on the top of Helsinki Cathedral (2002), or a Lutheran religious service[43] (2008 and 2014). The picture representing the cross on the top of Helsinki Cathedral was included in the material in 2002 only. It was replaced by a picture representing a Lutheran religious service in 2008 and 2014. The replacement was made because the few essays written on the cross discussed Helsinki Cathedral (see below).

B. After having evaluated the pictures, the respondents received small black-and-white copies of them, with written instructions to identify those they had judged as best symbolizing Finland (i.e., 'symbolizes well'). From these pictures, the respondents were asked to choose between one and three that evoked mental images, memories, and emotions, and to write an essay about each chosen picture answering a set of questions (e.g., 'How does the thing/person/event in the picture you have chosen relate to Finland?,' 'What kinds of feelings and thoughts does the thing/person/event in the picture evoke in you?').

C. Finally, after writing the essays, respondents filled in a questionnaire. The degree to which individuals perceived Christianity to be a criterion of nation was measured by a question adapted from ISSP 1995. The questions were in the form:

> When we think somebody is a Finn, we expect them to have certain skills or traits. When you think of what a Finn is like, how important is it to you that the person you consider a Finn is a Christian?

The item was measured on a four-point scale (1=very important, 2=fairly important, 3=not very important, 4=not important at all).[44] The option 'I do not know' was coded as a missing value in further analysis.

Study 1: Quantitative study

Study 1 had two aims. First, it analysed the degree to which Finnish upper secondary school students regarded being a Christian as an important criterion of being a Finn. In order to help the reader to understand the results better, we compare this criterion with three other criteria of being a Finn. Second, it analysed the degree to which two Christian symbols (Helsinki Cathedral and a Lutheran religious service/Cross on top of the Cathedral) functioned as Finnish national symbols. Similarly, we also report the means and standard deviations for the lake scenery, Winter War, and sauna pictures, so that it is possible to compare the importance of these established Finnish national symbols with pictures representing Christian symbols.

43 The picture of a Lutheran religious service depicted a typical view of the interior of a Lutheran church during a confirmation ceremony.

44 The original scale was 1=not important at all, 2=not very important, 3=fairly important, 4=very important. It was reversed so that the direction of the scale would be the same in all the analyses.

First, we tested whether being a Christian was an important criterion of being a Finn. The means and standard deviations are reported in Table 3 (see Appendix). They show that in all yearly samples, respondents on average considered being a Christian to be a fairly unimportant criterion of nation. We also found that in each year it was considered significantly less important than being a citizen of Finland, being able to speak Finnish, or respecting Finnish laws and institutions.[45] There were no significant differences in evaluations between 2002, 2008, and 2014.[46] Thus these analyses show that being a Christian has minor importance as a criterion of nation among our respondents.

Second, we tested the degree to which the pictures representing Helsinki Cathedral, the cross on top of it, and the Lutheran religious service were perceived as Finnish national symbols. The means and standard deviations are reported in Table 5 (see Appendix). They show that the respondents on average considered Helsinki Cathedral fairly important and the cross and Lutheran service fairly unimportant national symbols of Finland. Furthermore, we found that the respondents evaluated Helsinki Cathedral as a more important national symbol in 2014 than in 2002,[47] and that the girls perceived both Helsinki Cathedral and the Lutheran service as more important national symbols than the boys did.[48] There were no significant differences between years in evaluations of the Lutheran service.

Finally, we tested whether the evaluations of Christian symbols significantly differed from the evaluations of the pictures of the sauna, lake scenery, and Winter War.[49] The cross (in 2002) and the Lutheran service (in 2008 and 2014) were rated as significantly less important symbols of Finland

45 We tested the differences by paired sample t-tests. The means and standard deviations for each criterion are presented in Table 3, and the estimates and p-values in Table 4 (see Appendix).

46 We used two-way ANOVA for testing whether there was a difference in evaluations between years. Given that previous research has shown that there is a significant gender difference in levels of religiosity (Haastettu kirkko 2012), we used gender as a covariate in the analysis. No significant main effect for gender was found. However, an additional analysis revealed a significant interaction between years and gender ($F(2, 756)=4.15$, $p=0.016$, partial $\eta 2=.01$). Partial eta-squared is the variance in outcome variable that is explained by the predictor excluding the variance explained by other predictors (Richardson 2011). Our results indicate a small effect (Richardson 2011). Boys considered being a Christian a more important criterion than girls did in 2002 ($F(1, 134)=9.84$, $p=0.002$, partial $\eta 2=.07$; boys: $M=3.20$, $SD=.86$; girls: $M=3.60$, $SD=.60$). There was no significant difference between genders in 2008 and 2014.

47 We used two-way ANOVA for testing whether the evaluations of Helsinki Cathedral and the Lutheran religious service differed significantly between years. As in the previous analysis, we used gender as a covariate. With Helsinki Cathedral there was a significant main effect for the year ($F(2, 749)=4.66$, $p=0.010$, partial $\eta^2=.01$). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 5 (see Appendix).

48 Helsinki Cathedral: $F(1, 749)=33.11$, $p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.04$; girls: $M=1.67$, $SD=0.75$; boys: $M=2.02$, $SD=0.88$. Lutheran service: $F(1, 597)=33.32$, $p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.05$; girls: $M=2.53$, $SD=0.86$; boys: $M=2.93$, $SD=0.82$.

49 We tested the differences by paired sample t-tests.

than the established national symbols: the sauna, lake scenery, and Winter War. However, Helsinki Cathedral was rated rather highly, and did not differ significantly from the Winter War in 2008.[50]

To conclude, Study 1 provided partly contradictory findings. In line with previous results from Western Europe, it showed that being a Christian is not an important criterion of nation.[51] Furthermore, the cross and the Lutheran service were not perceived as important symbols of Finland. Nevertheless, Helsinki Cathedral was perceived as a fairly important national symbol. In 2008 there were no significant difference between Helsinki Cathedral and the Winter War, which plays an important role in Finnish collective memory and national iconography.[52] In order to better understand this finding, further analysis was needed: what kinds of meanings are associated with these Christian icons?

Study 2: Qualitative study

According to Michael Billig's rhetorical approach,[53] people use various arguments derived from the discursive realm when they justify their choices and attitudes. In this context, they had to justify why certain pictures represented Finland well. While doing so, they simultaneously constructed the meanings of those pictures in relation to the nation. Thus, the rhetorical approach[54] provided a fruitful analytical perspective for answering our third research question: what kinds of arguments do respondents use when they explain why Helsinki Cathedral and the Lutheran religious service are symbols of Finland?

Analysis strategy

In the first phase, the handwritten essays were transcribed, and all the paragraphs in which respondents explained why the chosen picture represented Finland well were chosen for the final data. Then all the sentences in which the respondents justified why the chosen picture represented Finland well were analysed using the following questions: (a) how and whether religion was used as an argument in order to convince the reader that the picture represented Finland well; (b) what other kinds of argument individuals used when justifying their choices.[55] At this point, the passages were categorized into two types of argument based on the role religion played in the argument: that is, 'religious' versus 'national arguments.' The numbers of essays are reported in Table 7 (Appendix). Given that the few essays written about the cross on top of the Cathedral discussed Helsinki

50 The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 5, and the test statistics and p-values in Table 6.
51 See Jones & Smith (2001b).
52 Smart (1985).
53 Billig (1987).
54 Billig (1987).
55 See Billig (1987).

Cathedral, the essays written on those two pictures (the cross on top of the Cathedral and Helsinki Cathedral) were analysed together.

Analysis

In the 'religious arguments,' respondents used shared religion as a justification for why they regarded the pictures as characterizing Finland well. Such arguments were used in the context of pictures representing both Helsinki Cathedral and the Lutheran ceremony. Respondents used shared religion as an argument in two intertwined ways. First, the rhetoric of quantity was used: 'The picture of the church has to do with Finland, because so many people belong to the Lutheran Church ...' Extract 1 below is an example of the second way, which is a logical extension of the first.[56]

Extract 1
1 In addition, the picture tells about state religion in
2 Finland. Religion is not generally speaking a very
3 important thing to the Finns, but practising Christianity
4 here is so common that it can be regarded as being part
5 and parcel of our culture. (Helena, 2002)

Here Helena explains why she felt that the picture of Helsinki Cathedral symbolized Finland well. She separates the practice of religion ('practising Christianity,' line 3) from its importance.[57] Her main argument is that because Christianity is so widely practised, it is part of Finnish culture. This is in line with the notion discussed by Beaman that the religious symbols of ethnic majorities are often understood as representations of national culture.[58] Although these kinds of argument reflect the theoretical link between religion and nation, it is nonetheless important to note that only a very small minority of the respondents used them (N=7 essays, 23%; see Table 7).

The respondents used 'national arguments' only in the context of the picture representing Helsinki Cathedral. Unlike religious arguments, here religion played no role in justifying why the picture was an important symbol of Finland. Instead, phrases such as 'the most beautiful building in Finland,' 'the most important tourist attraction,' or 'the most beautiful place' were used. Helsinki Cathedral was defined as a sight that greets visitors arriving by sea, a space where different festivals and events are organized, and a source of national pride. Rather than creating boundaries between groups, Helsinki Cathedral is a symbol through which Finland is acknowledged and recognized by others,[59] as one respondent wrote: 'Happiness that in my home town there is something so beautiful, which you can present to foreigners with pride.'[60] This group of arguments comprises the large majority of the accounts. Anna and Laura explain their choices as follows:

56 All translations by the authors.
57 See e.g., Demerath (2000); Storm (2011b).
58 Beaman (2012).
59 See Finell & Liebkind (2010).
60 It is typical in the essays that Helsinki Cathedral is also understood as a symbol of Helsinki (e.g., 'my home town'), the capital of Finland.

Extract 2
1 Picture number 39 also represents Finland well, because
2 the picture of Helsinki Cathedral is always in all
3 publicity about Finland/Helsinki. It evokes in me the
4 feeling of Finnishness when I see the picture of
5 Helsinki Cathedral somewhere, for example in a magazine for
6 tourists. The Cathedral brings to my mind an image
7 of when I walk past the Cathedral and I see how tourists
8 and foreigners admire it. It makes me feel proud. (Anna, 2014)

Extract 3
1 Picture 39, in my opinion, has to do with Finland,
2 because it shows the Cathedral of Helsinki. Many tourists
3 when they have come to Finland want to see the church
4 and take pictures of it. If the weather is good, the white colour of
5 the Cathedral and the blue sky together create the colours of
6 the Finnish flag. (Laura, 2014)

Anna justifies her choice with two arguments (Extract 2). First, by using the word 'always' (line 2), she emphasizes that Helsinki Cathedral represents the official face of Finland and Helsinki; it thus becomes the preferred means of representing Finland to others. Anna's second argument relates to the notion that people from abroad admire this building, which evokes national pride in her. This argument is similar to Laura's, who states that 'many tourists [...] want to see the church and take pictures' of the Cathedral (Extract 3, lines 2–4). This style of argument is also typical of the other essays. It is important to note that although Helsinki Cathedral is understood as a tourist attraction in many accounts, it is not perceived as a tourist attraction just like any other museum or church in Finland. It has a special value. This becomes evident in Laura's argument when she compares the Cathedral to the Finnish Flag: 'the white colour of the Cathedral and the blue sky together create the colours of the Finnish flag' (Extract 3, lines 4–6). A national flag is a symbol in which both universal and particular aspects of nationalism become apparent: nations seek to be similar to and different from other nations at the same time.[61] Like the national flag, Helsinki Cathedral too seems to be such a symbol. The architectural masterpiece of a respectable capital city is devoted to God, and is admired by others. As one respondent wrote: 'The picture shows well the outside splendour and the toil needed to have been able to build such a noble Cathedral here too.' Thus, Helsinki Cathedral places Finland in the group of respectable nations.

To conclude, the respondents used two types of argumentation when they explained why they had chosen Helsinki Cathedral or Lutheran worship as symbols of Finland: religious and national arguments. These two groups of argument make visible the contested nature of national symbols.[62] They also reveal how different criteria of the nation can vary in their levels of exclusiveness. This difference exists not only between symbols;

61 E.g., Billig (1995); Giddens (1985).
62 Reicher & Hopkins (2001).

even the same symbol (depending on the definition used) can be taken as expressing different levels of exclusiveness, as is the case with Helsinki Cathedral. Individuals use these cultural resources for different purposes. This possibility to choose is evident in Extract 4 below.

Extract 4
1 The Cathedral is a Lutheran church, but I don't think of it
2 as a particularly religious symbol, but more as a
3 landmark. That's why it can represent Finland also to those of
4 other religions and to atheists. The Cathedral does not
5 breathe out the pressure of obeying religious
6 commandments. (Kaisa, 2014.)

In Kaisa's account, the fact that Helsinki Cathedral is 'a Lutheran church' (line 1) is stated explicitly. Nevertheless, her account differs from those that justify their choice by the prevalence of the Lutheran religion in Finland (i.e., the religious argument). She states that she prefers to define Helsinki Cathedral more as a landmark than as a religious symbol, because in this way Helsinki Cathedral can also be perceived as a national symbol among those who do not belong to the Lutheran Church. For her it is an explicit choice as to which form of argument she prefers to use.

Discussion

This chapter presents two studies that analyse three research questions: (a) whether being a Christian is an important criterion of being a Finn, (b) whether Helsinki Cathedral and Lutheran service are perceived as Finnish national symbols, and (c) what kinds of argument are used when individuals explain the reasons why they perceive these Christian symbols as characterizing Finland. To our knowledge, no previous studies have addressed these research questions yet.

First, we found that Christianity was not an important criterion of being a Finn among respondents in any of the studied years. This finding is in line with previous research on ISSP data (1995), which showed that religion was on average the least important criterion of nation among seven alternatives (e.g., citizenship, language) in Western Europe.[63] It is also in line with the previous finding from ISSP data (2008) that Finns are one of the most liberal ISSP countries in accepting individuals from different religious backgrounds into their in-groups.[64]

Second, the notion that Christianity does not play a major role as a criterion of nation received further support from our finding that only a very small minority of respondents mentioned Christian symbols as characterizing the nation. In addition, the pictures representing the cross on top of the Cathedral (2002) and a Lutheran religious service (2008 and 2014) were evaluated as significantly less important national symbols

63 See Kunovich (2006); Jones & Smith (2001b).
64 Ketola (2011).

than established national symbols such as the sauna, lake scenery, and the Winter War. Nevertheless, there was one exception: Helsinki Cathedral was perceived as a fairly important national symbol. Furthermore, its importance as a national symbol increased significantly from 2002 to 2014. These results should not, however, be interpreted to indicate that Helsinki Cathedral is an important national symbol because of its religious connotations. Only seven respondents used religion as an argument when they explained why Helsinki Cathedral was an important national symbol. Instead, Helsinki Cathedral was perceived as a national symbol because it was a source of national pride, a tourist attraction, and a landmark in the capital. In other words, Helsinki Cathedral was perceived as a non-polarized national symbol,[65] reflecting the interplay between the universal and particular aspects of nationalism.[66]

To conclude, these two studies tell the same story by different methods. Christianity was not perceived as an important criterion of nationality among our young respondents in any studied year. Nevertheless, previous research has shown that both in the past and in the present, the Lutheran religion and the nation have strong ties in Finland, and the Lutheran religion is an important part of Finnish national identity.[67] How then is it possible to explain the divergence between our findings and this notion? One possible explanation is provided by Kimmo Ketola.[68] He shows that Finns are especially suspicious of fundamentalism and strong religiosity. This norm may be even stronger among younger generations, whose religiosity is lower than older generations, at least when 'religiosity' is understood in the latter's terms.[69] Thus, it is possible that respondents avoid emphasizing Christianity as a criterion of a nation because they do not want to break this prevalent norm. This finding may also reflect the division between 'cultural religion' and active participation in religious rituals and beliefs in Finland.[70] These suppositions need further research, of course. Another reason for our finding may lie in the territorial differences in religiosity in Finland. In the metropolitan area, fewer people are members of the Lutheran Church or baptize their babies than in the rest of the country, for example.[71] Our sample was from the metropolitan area.

This study also opens up many other avenues for future research. One important question is how much our findings reflect the general perception among adolescents and adults in Finland. Although our findings are in line with previous studies,[72] additional research is needed with different age groups and in different parts of Finland. However, the fact that our results were repeated among three different groups provides strong evidence that these findings are valid for certain age groups and certain areas of Finland. In addition, given that the meaning of symbols is related to time and

65 Finell (2012); Finell et al. (2013).
66 E.g., Giddens (1985).
67 Hjelm (2014); Juva (1960); Koskenvesa (1969); Portman (2014); Sihvo (1991).
68 Ketola (2011).
69 Niemelä (2011).
70 See Demerath (2000); Haastettu kirkko (2012).
71 Salomäki (2014).
72 Ketola (2011); Kunovich (2006); Jones & Smith (2001b).

place, it would be interesting to study whether the importance of religion has increased since 2014. It is possible that religiosity has become a more important criterion of nation than it was in 2014 because of the European immigration crisis, for example. The third issue would be to analyse the impact of individual characteristics, such as level of religiosity, on the evaluations. Finally, we used only pictures relating to churches. However, there are many kinds of Christian symbol that we did not study. It is possible that adolescents identify with other kinds of Christian symbol than those representing the 'official' Church. Thus, much more research is needed in order to better understand the kind of role religion plays as a criterion of nation, and its causes and consequences in Finland.

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Appendix

Table 2. Means and standard deviations (SD) of age and frequency distributions of gender of each year.

	2002	2008	2014
Age	17.24 (0.51)	17.00 (0.54)	17.26 (0.54)
Gender			
Female (%)	74 (53)	121 (57)	248 (57)
Male (%)	66 (47)	89 (42)	187 (43)[b]
Unknown (%)[a]		1 (1)	2(1)[c]
Total	140	211	437

[a] Respondents who did not report their gender.
[b] One respondent is deleted because they did not insert their code number into the questionnaire.
[c] 56.8% + 42.8% + 0.5% ≈ 100%

Table 3. Means and standard deviations (SD) of four criteria of nation.

How important is it to you that the person you consider a Finn...:	2002	2008	2014
...is a citizen of Finland?[a]	1.64 (0.77)	1.65 (0.82)	1.65 (0.79)
...is able to speak Finnish?	1.28 (0.58)	1.31 (0.57)	1.39 (0.63)
...respects Finnish laws and institutions?	1.67 (0.81)	1.44 (0.69)	1.53 (0.72)
...is a Christian?	3.41 (0.75)	3.49. (0.74)	3.47 (0.82)

N (2002)=136–137; N (2008)=198–2001; N (2014)=428–432.
[a] 1=very important, 2=fairly important, 3=not very important, 4=not important at all.

Table 4. Paired sample t-tests for each year (to be a Christian versus to be a citizen of Finland, to be able to speak Finnish, or to respect Finnish laws and institutions; *** means $p < .001$).

How important is it to you that the person you consider a Finn...:	2002 ...is a Christian?	2008 ...is a Christian?	2014 ...is a Christian?
...is a citizen of Finland?	t (134) = 21.06***	t (195) = 27.24***	t (422) = 36.01***
...is able to speak Finnish?	t (134) = 29.36***	t (193) = 36.09***	t (425) = 44.97***
...respects Finnish laws and institutions?	t (133) = 20.73***	t (192) = 31.44***	t (420) = 40.27***

Table 5. Means and standard deviations (SD) of the evaluations of symbols.

	2002	2008	2014[a]
Lake scenery	1.26 (0.53)[b]	1.27 (0.57)	1.26 (0.53)
Sauna	1.24 (0.54)	1.53 (0.84)	1.31 (0.55)
Winter War	1.57 (0.84)	1.77 (0.83)	1.65 (0.75)
Helsinki Cathedral	2.01 (0.87)	1.85 (0.84)	1.76 (0.81)
Lutheran religious service	–	2.79 (0.85)	2.67 (0.88)
Cross on top of the Cathedral	2.61 (0.90)	–	–

N (2002)=137–140; N (2008)=199–209; N (2014)=404–414.

[a] In 2014, 21 respondents had to be excluded from this analysis because of technical errors in data collection.

[b] 1=well, 2=somewhat, 3=a little, 4=not at all.

Table 6. Paired sample t-tests for each year (Christian emblems versus the sauna, lake scenery, and the Winter War. Note that * means $p < 0.05$, ** means $p < 0.01$, and ***means $p < 0.001$).

	2002		2008		2014	
	Helsinki Cathedral	Cross	Helsinki Cathedral	Lutheran religious service	Helsinki Cathedral	Lutheran religious service
Sauna	t (137) = 10.04***	t (135) = 16.95***	t (205) = 4.04***	t (197) = 16.36***	t (401) = 10.16***	t (397) = 30.25***
Lake scenery	t (138) = 9.27***	t (136) = 16.54***	t (205) = 8.94***	t (197) = 23.09***	t (407) = 11.76***	t (402) = 30.31***
Winter war	t (137) = 4.41***	t (135) = 10.94***	t (203) = 1.04	t (196) = 13.80***	t (404) = 2.11*	t (400) = 19.57***
Cross/ Lutheran religious service	t (135)= -9.22***	–	t (195) = -14.61***	–	t (397) = -18.22***	–

Table 7. Numbers of essays written about each picture.

	2002	2008	2014	Total
Lutheran religious service	–	1	4	5
Helsinki Cathedral	3	5	15	23
Cross on top of the Cathedral	2	–	–	2

III Lutheranism and Social Practice

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Lutheran Culture as an Ideological Revolution in Finland from the 16th Century up to the Beginning of the 21st Century: A Perspective from Ecclesiastical Legislation

Abstract

In this chapter, Lutheran culture in Finland will be discussed.[1] This will be viewed as an integrated whole from the 16th century up to the beginning of the 21st century. Because the time period under focus is very long, the chapter will focus on Lutheran culture from the perspective of the doctrine of two kingdoms or governments.[2] It will be argued that the intersection point of the two governments, law and legislation, is one of the essential elements of the relations between the church and the state as well as the wider society.[3]

The relations between the church and the society in Finland can be divided into four phases. The first was the medieval phase, when the church enjoyed autonomy. The second phase was when the state[4] started to control the church in the 16th century. The third phase was from the 17th century up to the first half of the 20th century, when the state controlled the church. The fourth phase began in the second half of the 20th century, when the

1 In this study, the term Lutheran will be used to express one of the five main branches of the Reformation launched by Martin Luther to reform the theology and practice of the Church. In the Scandinavian countries, this branch can be called Lutheran, because all Scandinavian Churches have called themselves Evangelical Lutherans. I will use the term Lutheran culture to describe certain aspects of culture in Finland from the 16th century up to the beginning of the 21st century despite the fact that the concept of Lutheran culture is difficult to define as such. However, the use of the concept of Lutheran culture is justified because I focus specifically on the relations between the church and society or state from the perspective of a Lutheran religious and cultural belief, namely the doctrine of two kingdoms or governments.

2 The term of the doctrine of two kingdoms or two governments, worldly and spiritual, is the English translation of the German concept 'zwei-Regimenten-Lehre' coined by Martin Luther.

3 The concept of society will be used here to mean a large group of people and their communities who live and interact in a particular geographical area with different institutions, political practices or power structures, infrastructures and culture.

4 The concept of state will be used here to mean a centralized and institutionalized society with solid administrative structures, for instance, the autocracy of the king and his government.

society and the institutionally somewhat weakened state started to become increasingly secular and was no longer overtly based on a Lutheran way of interpreting Christianity.

Introduction

The doctrine of two kingdoms

The aim of this chapter is to observe a common development in European history over the past 500 years. From the 16th century up to the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries the development and formation of the nation-state led by a monarch and nobility can be seen throughout Europe with only a few exceptions. In addition, in Northern Europe Protestantism can be argued to be another common factor during those 500 years. Furthermore, during the past century a continuous social and religious transition has taken place in Northern Europe.[5]

In fact, it can be argued that in Northern Europe the nation-state and Protestantism, or perhaps more specifically Lutheranism, go hand in hand. This argument can at least be partly explained by the Lutheran doctrine of two governments, that is, the regiments [rule or government] of political and ecclesiastical authorities, namely the king and the church. The doctrine was formulated by Martin Luther in his 1523 booklet 'Temporal authority: To what extent it should be obeyed:'

> God has ordained the two governments: the spiritual, which by the Holy Spirit under Christ makes Christians and pious people; and the secular, which restrains the unchristian and wicked so that they are obliged to keep the peace outwardly [...] The laws of worldly government extend no farther than to life and property and what is external upon earth. For over the soul God can and will let no one rule but himself. Therefore, where temporal power presumes to prescribe laws for the soul, it encroaches upon God's government and only misleads and destroys souls. We desire to make this so clear that everyone shall grasp it, and that the princes and bishops may see what fools they are when they seek to coerce the people with their laws and commandments into believing one thing or another.[6]

According to Luther's doctrine, God had created two regimes to rule: the *regnum civil* and the *regnum Christi*. The *regnum civil* consisted of the organized political elite that included the political, juridical and military executive authorities, while the *regnum Christi* referred to the spiritual domain, the kingdom of Christ, that was governed by the Word of God and the Gospel. Furthermore, because humans also have an evil side, they should be subjected to legislation and the sanctions of the *regnum civil* in

5 See e.g., Wright (2010: 79–112).

6 Luther (1523: 4). This doctrine of two regiments was developed by Martin Luther on the basis of the medieval ecclesiastical doctrine of two swords. However, the most recent research on Luther is surprisingly silent about this doctrine (e.g., Eire 2016; Roper 2016; Schilling 2017). See, for instance, Oakley (2006: 121) and Witte (2013) for more information about this doctrine and its origins.

order to ensure external order and harmony in the country. The *regnum Christi* in turn, is dominated by the Word of God and the Gospel, that is, the truth of salvation given by Christ. An essential feature of the *regnum Christi* is freedom from all evil. Luther explained that the regiments were different and separate but not isolated from each other; the relationships between the political and ecclesiastical authorities were thus justified by this dual doctrine. The regiments were taught to have different duties and responsibilities as a part of the order of God's created world; it was understood that both regiments were employed by God in his supervision of the world. Furthermore, the authority of the *regnum civil* was justified by God himself and its activities were intended to ensure and guarantee that the gospel of Christian freedom could be declared freely. In the words of the theologian Kenneth Hagen, the *regnum civil* could be considered the left hand of God and the *regnum Christi* his right hand.[7]

Based on earlier research on the ecclesiastical history after the Reformation, the main claim in this chapter is that the doctrine of two kingdoms contributed in many ways to the ethical manners and behaviour of the people in those regions of Northern Europe where the Lutheran doctrine had spread.

Up until the 16th century, two significant, centrally-controlled institutions, the state and the church, had co-existed in these regions for several centuries.[8] I argue that the doctrine of two governments had both a positive and a negative impact on relations between the state and the church. The positive effect can be presumed to stabilize these institutions, while the negative effect in turn can be expected to cause conflicts between them. In the case of either type of effect, relations between the state and the church should be regulated by collective agreements. The presence of conflicts suggests that disagreements have existed in the relation between the church and the state that need to be solved. I presume that laws and legislation have played a significant role in both agreements and disagreements between these institutions. Thus, laws and legislation can be argued to be an intersection point in the relations between the church and the state as well as the wider society. This argument can be justified because legislation played a significant role in the society or state and both the civil and ecclesiastical regimes were involved in defining and controlling it.[9] In fact, the most important content of the legislation in the form of laws and regulations given by the ruler or king emphasized the unity of the king and the church.

The formation of the new Lutheran Church and Lutheran culture

Based on the new Protestant theological doctrine and belief, the Christian faith was understood and interpreted in a new way in the 16th century. This new interpretation brought a significant change to the understanding of the church with its dogma, office, sacraments, ecclesial legislation and activities

7 See e.g., Hagen (1998: 103–127).
8 See e.g., Spalding (2010: *passim*).
9 Cameron (2012: *passim*).

as well as the ethical manners and behaviour of lay people. In England, a new Protestant church began to take shape and develop from the second half of the 16th century onwards. This church was independent of the Roman Catholic Church as well as a local one comprising the geographical region of the Kingdom of England in those days.[10] As for Germany, apparently the word 'Lutheran' was used for the first time in 1586 as an attribute of a church.[11]

With Sweden – of which Finland was a part – it is a matter of debate when the Lutheran Church can be considered to exist as an independent local institution without ties to Papal Rome. When we apply the same elements of defining an independent local church, such as dogma, office, sacraments, ecclesial legislation and activities as well as the ethical manners and behaviour of lay people, it is certain that the Lutheran Church did not exist in Sweden earlier than in other regions in Europe.[12]

Because of the doctrine of two governments, the Lutheran Church developed close relations and ties to political and ecclesiastical authorities. I presume that these close relations and ties were manifested especially in legislation.[13] It is possible to detect several different but also common elements of ecclesiastical and social life in the Nordic nation-states that were influenced by Lutheran doctrine and policy. This situation can be taken as an essential part of the political culture of those days in Northern Europe, especially in Scandinavia.

In this chapter I call those common elements Lutheran culture. During the 500 years since the Reformation several major social and ecclesiastical changes took place in the Nordic countries. Some of these changes were significant enough to be called turning points or even ideological revolutions and they will be particularly focused on in this chapter.[14]

The aim of the chapter

This chapter discusses Lutheran culture in Finland from the 16th century up to the beginning of the 21st century. The concept of culture will be understood here as an integrated whole which is formed by several intertwined aspects of ecclesiastical and social life which religious doctrine and policy influenced in a significant way. Within the limits of the chapter I will only focus on one perspective. It has been selected on the basis of the doctrine of two kingdoms and the intersection point of both regiments, law and legislation, which can be expected to be one of the essential elements of the culture to be studied in Finland.

My aim is not to present an overall view to the developments during the era under study but rather to concentrate on the periods when significant changes took place and explain the reasons behind these changes. In order

10 See e.g., MacCulloch (1990: *passim*).
11 Gassmann et al. (2011: 2–3).
12 See e.g., Lavery (2018: 133–166).
13 See e.g., Heininen & Heikkilä (2016: *passim*).
14 See e.g., Heininen & Heikkilä (2016: *passim*).

to give an idea of the kinds of changes that the Reformation brought to legislation, the analysis starts from Catholic medieval times.

This chapter will discuss the following questions:

- What kind of laws and regulations existed in Finland as a part of Lutheran culture during the era to be studied?
- How were they related to the doctrine of two governments?
- What kind of impact did the laws have in order to stress the dogma of two kingdoms and by whom were they ordered and given, the king or the church?
- What kind of content did the legislation have concerning the relations between the church and society or state?
- Have those relations remained the same all the time or have they changed?

In addition, I examine signs of ideological turning points or ideological revolutions. The development and formation of the Swedish Church will also be discussed from the perspective of laws and legislation.

Social and ecclesiastical legislation in Finland

Harmony between the church and the society in Catholic medieval times from the perspective of ecclesiastical legislation

Christianity was brought to Finland at the turn of the first and second millennium by the Catholic Church.[15] During the 13th century the church was organized in such a way that the Diocese of Turku (in Swedish *Åbo*) was formed by means of ecclesiastical administration, the territorial partition of parishes, and by liturgy. In the process, ecclesiastical legislation, that is, canon law, was used in the diocese. This meant that the diocese followed two legislations: 1. the universal, that is, general ecclesiastical orders and regulations, and 2. the local, that is, particular directives and provisions. The particular directives and provisions were regulated both in the ecclesiastical province of Uppsala and in its suffragan diocese, Turku. Canon law with its universal and particular orders and regulations was followed in the territory of Finland up to the end of the first half of the 16th century. All orders and regulations of canon law were regulated by the church itself, that is, the office of the church and the synods. The office of the church consisted of the pope, archbishops, bishops, and the synods of the general ecclesiastical synods as

15 Also at the turn of the first and second millennium, the first impacts of Christianity arrived in South-western Finland along the eastern route, that is from Constantinople along the network of Russian rivers to Lake Ladoga and from there to the Gulf of Finland. Both material and linguistic evidence demonstrate this. However, Christianity in the Western tradition became dominant in Finland in the 11th Century. See e.g., Jutikkala & Pirinen (1989: 24–31).

well as the synods of Uppsala ecclesiastical province and the Turku diocese. In addition, canon law was enforced by the office of the church.[16]

At the end of the 11th century, the geographical area of Finland at that time was a very sparsely populated country with no unified administrative system. From the first half of the 12th century up to the first half of the 14th century, immigrants from Sweden settled in Finnish coastal areas in several stages. Although they only lived in some areas in South-western Finland, political, economic and military dominance was nevertheless totally in their hands. As a result, society and social life in Finland were organized and formed on the basis of Swedish secular legislation, which the emigrants brought to Finland. Secular legislation consisted of provincial laws or codes (in Swedish *landskapslagar*) from the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th century as well as the land laws (in Swedish *landslagar*), the law of Magnus Eriksson circa from 1350, and the law of Christopher of Bavaria from 1442 (The Country Law of Christopher from 1442). Especially, the provincial laws of the Hälsingland (in Swedish *Hälsingelagen*) and Uppland (in Swedish *Upplandslagen*) provinces as well as the land laws of Magnus Eriksson and Christopher of Bavaria were followed in Finland. The laws were compiled and written down by Christian priests and monks according to oral legislation tradition and were memorized by lawspeakers. The provincial laws thus contained regulations and rules from pre-Christian times, but they were interpreted and supplemented by the doctrine of the Christian faith. As an example, provisions concerning matrimony in all provincial and land laws can be mentioned.[17]

Both the provincial and the land laws were divided into sections called balks (in Swedish *balkar*). The balks consisted of regulations and rules for different legal problems and issues concerning people's everyday lives. The balks were named after different juridical contexts concerning individual persons and their life situations, crimes, different activities, and relationships with the community. As examples may be mentioned the balks concerning marriage, parenthood and inheritance, crimes and trials as well as land ownership, trade and building issues. One of the balks was called the Church Balk (in Swedish *kyrkobalken*), which consisted of orders regarding the church, ecclesiastical issues, and Christian everyday life. The land laws (of Magnus Eriksson and Christopher of Bavaria) did not contain the Church Balk. Instead, the last-mentioned balk of the law of the Province of Uppsala was used in this context of the land laws because the archbishop's seat was situated in Uppsala.[18]

The state-of-affairs in the Turku Diocese was such that the medieval legislation concerning the church was regulated by both ecclesiastical and secular laws. However, it is worth stressing the impact of canon law, that is, the legislation of the Holy Church, on secular legislation. The spiritual power of the church can be understood as a reason why it had influence on

16 See e.g., Knuutila (2009: 170–172). See especially the sources and literature in the footnotes.

17 See e.g., Korpiola (2009: 205–208).

18 See e.g., Knuutila (1990: 19–23); Korpiola (2009: 205–209).

society in general and reciprocally the church voiced support for the political elite and its authority. Hence, the society and the church lived in harmony in Finland. It can be summarized that in the Middle Ages the church in the Turku Diocese had ecclesiastical statutes of its own.[19]

The harmony in the relations between the church and society is understandable because Christianity played a significant role in the medieval Scandinavian social system especially in the 15th century. One indication of this harmony were the family ties between members of families with dominant position. Bishops could be close relatives of the ruling elite. However, they were elected and nominated by the church herself. Therefore, it is not particularly surprising that the church owned a lot of land and had many privileges guaranteed by laws and agreements, such as the right to collect taxes in the form of tithes.[20]

It is possible to claim that the church had more influence on the medieval social system than the political elite had. This fitted into the medieval doctrine of two swords. According to the doctrine, the Church had two swords based on the words of the Gospel, the spiritual sword and the temporal sword, which were both under the control of the Church. The spiritual sword was wielded by priests, the temporal by kings and their soldiers, but only at the request and by the permission of the Church. Temporal authority should be a subject to the Church.[21]

The end period of harmony between the church and society: The rise of political influence on ecclesiastical legislation

In the 1530s and 1540s the Reformation begun in practice in the Diocese of Turku. During that time the conditions for ecclesiastical administration and the liturgical life were formed according to the principles of the Reformation. However, in those days no other ecclesiastical laws existed besides the orders and regulations of canon law despite a critical attitude towards canon law among the reformers in some regions of Germany, England, Denmark and Sweden. Hence, canon law and medieval Swedish secular legislation with provisions of canon law were used in the Turku Diocese. The reason for this policy was practical because the provisions were regarded as fair justice due to their clear and proven formation. No 'Lutheran' or more generally 'Protestant' legislation existed in those days in the Turku Diocese either.[22]

In the 1530s King Gustav Vasa (reigned 1521–1560) and the Swedish reformers broke the relations with the pope. Subsequently the king attempted to replace the canon law by new ecclesiastical and social secular provisions according to the principles of the Reformation. From the end of the 1530s several different Swedish reformers started to prepare a new Evangelical

19 E.g., Knuutila (2009: 172); Knuutila (2010); Knuutila (2012). The last mentioned two studies by Jyrki Knuutila (in Edilex, from 2010 and 2012) have been used in this chapter. They will not, however, be mentioned in the footnotes.

20 See. e.g., Pernler (1999: 164–194).

21 See e.g., Oakley (2006: 121).

22 See e.g., Parvio (1986: 95); Korpiola (2009: 205–209).

Church ecclesiastical legislation on the king's authority. The king further approved a proposal for a church ordinance for the Church in Sweden, *Articuli Ordinantiae* from 1540 written by Georg Norman († 1552/1553). In addition, the Archbishop of Uppsala, Laurentius Petri (archbishop 1531–1573), was required to prescribe several directives of the archbishop in order to provide a normative base for practical solutions concerning ecclesiastical issues in everyday life. He also completed a new proposal for a church ordinance in 1561–1562, but it was not approved by King Eric XIV (reigned 1560–1568). A new church ordinance was approved years later in 1571 by King John III (reigned 1568–1592) and printed as *the Swedish Church ordinance* (in Swedish *Then Swenska Kyrkeordningen*).[23]

Without going into details, the content of *Articuli Ordinantiae*, the Articles of Vadstena, and *the Swedish Church Ordinance* of 1571 can be summarized as consisting of the office of ministry, the different duties of this office, and the everyday ecclesiastical life and education. The theological thinking of King John III can be described as intermediate between Catholicism and Protestantism. His purpose was to restore the hierarchy of ministry and enrich liturgical life. Thus, he was not satisfied with *the Swedish Church Ordinance* of 1571. An ecclesiastical compilation of provisions called the *Nova Ordinantia* was presented to the king and was introduced to the synod of ministers in 1575. Comparing *the Swedish Church Ordinance* of 1571 and the *Nova Ordinantia*, regulations concerning the position of the king were included in the latter legislative source but not in the first source of law mentioned. Because the synod of ministers did not approve the *Nova Ordinantia*, it was not printed. For that reason, the *Nova Ordinantia* did not threaten to replace the status of *the Swedish Church Ordinance* of 1571 as an ecclesiastical act, and this was further accented in the synod of Uppsala in 1593. *The Swedish Church Ordinance* of 1571 was mentioned as a confession book by the final act of this synod.[24]

During the 16th century, the relations between the church and society underwent changes compared with the state of affairs in the Middle Ages, the secular government slowly beginning to dominate the church. In this period, the medieval land laws were followed in general. Concerning the church, their regulations and the Church Balk of Uppsala provincial law were still in use. The church was not controlled by new social legislation but by the orders and regulation of the Diet that was led by the king. In the social system of the first half of the 16th century, the structure of medieval society remained relatively unchanged, but the role and importance of the monarch increased.[25]

From the perspective of the doctrine of two kingdoms this shift in the relations between the church and the society can be interpreted as an ideological revolution. The relationships between the political and ecclesiastical authorities were very different than before. The duties, responsibilities and rights of the monarch and the church were justified

23 See e.g., Kjöllerström (1971: 201–209); Parvio (1986: 95–96).
24 See e.g., Kjöllerström (1971: 209–223); Parvio (1986: 97–98).
25 See e.g., Lavery (2018: 67–75).

by this doctrine, accepted by the Swedish political elite, and submitted to by ecclesiastical leaders. In practice, the leadership of the church could not be argued to be totally in the hands of bishops. Instead, the church as an administrative institution was more and more governed by monarchs although the spiritual supervision was in the hands of bishops and pastors. In other words, the monarchy and bishops had an equal leadership status over the church. On the other hand, monarchs had the leading role because the election of bishops was accepted by them.[26] Thus, the doctrine of two governments deviates completely from the medieval doctrine of two swords according to which temporal authority was subject to the Church and not vice versa. This shift was in essence revolutionary.

Furthermore, in the first half of the 16th century there was no new official 'Lutheran' ecclesial legislation formulated in Sweden despite the new interpretation of the Christian doctrine, office, sacraments and other ecclesiastical activities. Indeed, in this period, there was no autonomous local Lutheran Church in Sweden. This can be clearly seen in the nomination of bishops. Bishops were elected by the members of chapters and were ultimately nominated by the monarch, no longer by the pope in Rome. In addition, the role and status of the archbishop of Uppsala were reduced by the monarchy so that new bishops, for instance, were no longer necessarily ordinated by the archbishop of Uppsala. In addition, during the 1540s the archbishop was subject to the king's official, the superintendent Georg Norman.[27]

The absolute authority of the monarch on ecclesiastical legislation

The Swedish Church Ordinance of 1571 was used as an ecclesiastical act up to the end of the 17th century, though the provisions of the act were outmoded in substance during the 17th century. The reason for this were the ongoing social changes which resulted in a new form of regime in which there was uniformity between the monarch and the church essentially based on the Lutheran confession. This was part of the transformation in which society began to turn from a medieval social system dominated by a number of mighty families into the authority of a single dominant family system with administrative institutions, that is, the state. In this context, a multiphase and eight-decade long legislative process was initiated to complete *the Swedish Church Ordinance* of 1571 as an act and as a single provision.[28]

During this process the first proposal for a new Church ordinance was completed in 1608. In practice, it was a complementary and updated version of the Church Ordinance of 1571 intended to abolish the Church Balk of the Uppsala Provincial law and replace it with a new Church Balk based on Mosaic law, according to the policy of King Charles IX (reigned 1604–1611). However, this replacement was unsuccessful, as the old Church Balk was still used in Sweden and Finland because of the constitutional status which was

26 See e.g., Lavery (2018: 97–100).
27 See e.g., Lavery (2018: 126–130).
28 See e.g., Kjöllerström (1971: 223); Parvio (1986: 98).

prescribed in the ruler declaration of King Gustavus Adolphus the Great (reigned 1611–1632). In 1626, a supplement to *the Swedish Church Ordinance* was compiled by the bishops in order to have a new church ordinance, but it was not approved by the king because of disagreement between the king and the bishops concerning the supreme ecclesiastical administration. During the next 40 years this disagreement inhibited the renewal of the ecclesiastical law. Therefore, *the Swedish Church Ordinance* of 1571 was applied as a fair act in Sweden and Finland. Nevertheless, it was not applied in the same way in all dioceses according to the directives and provisions of several dioceses from 1627 to 1632.[29]

In the territory of Finland, directives of these kinds and provisions were published in several versions during the 1640s under the title of 'constitutions' by Bishop Isaacus Rothovius (bishop 1627–1652). In addition, he compiled a shortened version of *the Swedish Church Ordinance* of 1571 with the title 'Canon Ecclesiasticus' probably at the turn of the 1630s and 1640s to be used by the ministry.[30]

During the last half of the 17th century the disagreement over supreme ecclesiastical administration still continued. Furthermore, it was understood that ecclesiastical legislation was included in the constitution. Proof for this comes from the assurance of Queen Christina (reigned 1632–1689) in 1644, which promised that a new Church ordinance would be compiled. In addition, the ministry was granted juridical status in 1647 and 1650. During the reigns of Queen Christina and King Charles X Gustav (reigned 1654–1660) there were several attempts to compile a new church ordinance or a church law. None of them, however, were approved by the queen or the king. For this reason, there was an attempt to complete diocesan provisions on the basis of the old Swedish Church Ordinance of 1571. In Finland, such an ecclesiastical juridical provision for the Diocese of Turku was compiled by Bishop Johannes Gezelius Senior (bishop 1664–1690) in 1673 under the title 'Perbreves commonitiones.'[31]

In 1675 King Charles XI (reigned 1660–1697) decided that a new church ordinance based on the old Swedish Church Ordinance of 1571 should be compiled. There were several proposals which were revised and edited by the king and his officials in order to eliminate all such issues which could be interpreted to be in conflict with the absolute authority of the king. For this reason, the jurisdiction of the ministry was limited in relation to the king's political magistrates. In 1686, the new law for the Church of Sweden, the Church Law (The Church Act of 1686), was approved and confirmed a social and ecclesiastical provision by King Charles XI. The ecclesiastical act was, therefore, enacted by the king and not by the church. The status of the Church Law 1686 as a social act was emphasized in the form of government in 1772, in which the Church Law received constitutional protection. Hence, the Church Law can be seen as an act of the integrated church, that is, the

29 See e.g., Parvio (1984: 247–249).
30 See e.g., Parvio (1966: 8–18); Parvio (1984: 250–252).
31 See e.g., Kjöllerström (1971: 224–248); Parvio (1986: 98–99).

State or national Church of Sweden, to which all inhabitants in the country belonged.[32]

During the 17th century the relations between the church and state continued to undergo major changes with regard to the state of affairs in the 16th century. The secular government began to have absolute authority over the church. However, in social legislation, for example in the Civil Code of 1734, there were several provisions that had an impact on ecclesiastical legislation. From the perspective of the doctrine of two kingdoms an ideological revolution was deepening. The church was submitted totally to the king and bishops were nominated by him, thus essentially becoming members of the political system. The absolute political authority of the king can be argued to receive a new nuance because he was thought to receive the divine mandate being the lawgiver of the ecclesiastical law. As a result, he can be argued to be the head of the church as well.

On the other hand, we can see the new local and autonomous church beginning to organize in Sweden during the 17th century. This church compiled its own doctrine including a new understanding of office, sacraments and other ecclesiastical activities as well as ethical manners and behaviour concerning lay people. In addition, ecclesiastical legislation was organized in this century, though the church was subject to civil and political administration, not to ecclesiastical administration. Thus, the monarch was considered the supreme ruler of the church and, therefore, it can be called the Church of Sweden.

Russian secular government as the highest authority of the ecclesiastical legislation

In 1809, Finland was separated from the Kingdom of Sweden and annexed to the Russian Empire as a result of the Napoleonic Wars 1803–1815. From 1808 to 1809, there was a war between the Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Sweden called the Finnish War. In this war, Finland was taken over by the Russians, who required the contribution of the church and the ministry in order to establish their administration in Finland and to appease the opinions of the Finnish people. For this reason, the Russians allowed the Swedish polity, constitution, and religion to be retained in Finland. Therefore, the Church Law 1686, the Privileges for Ministers 1723, and the provision of the form of government concerning the church continued in effect in Finland. I interpret these processes to mean that regarding the Church Law 1686 the Russians recognized the law as a part of constitutional legislation, and therefore the Swedish constitution continued to be in effect in Finland. Hence, it is justified to say that at the beginning of the time of the Grand Duchy in Finland there were no changes in the relations between the church and the government or in the status of the ministry as a spiritual estate.[33]

However, the relations between the church and the government were criticized at the beginning of the 19th century. During this period theological and church juridical opinions based on natural juridical ideas were followed

32 See e.g., Kansanaho (1976: 19–22); Parvio (1986: 101–104).
33 See e.g., Kansanaho (1976: 23–28); Björkstrand (2007: 174–199).

on the European continent and Sweden and these ideas also spread to Finland. According to these ideas, the church formed a community that consisted of its members. Furthermore, the church was understood to have an independent status in its own issues, but the church could not be functional without precisely defined relations to the government. Based on these ideas it was thought that the Church Law 1686 was outdated. For this reason, in turn, a process of reform began in 1817, the 300th anniversary of the Reformation, to pass a new ecclesiastical act. During the process two proposals for a new church law were compiled in 1825 by Archbishop Jacob Tengström (archbishop 1803–1832) and in 1845 by Professor Johan Jacob Nordström (1801–1874). Neither proposal was approved, because they were considered obsolete. The third proposal, compiled in 1862 by Frans Ludvig Schauman (1810–1878), Professor of Practical Theology at the University of Helsinki, and Archbishop Edvard Bergenheim (archbishop 1850–1884), was approved in 1867 after many phases. In the following year, it was confirmed by the Emperor of Russia and published under the title 'The Church Law for the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland.'[34] This act can be argued to be the basis for the autonomous Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, which was no longer part of the Swedish Church.

During the 18th and 19th centuries we can see that the relations between the church and state were stable compared to the state of affairs in the preceding centuries. The secular government continued to have absolute authority over the church. Thus, from the perspective of the relations between the church and the government things remained the same as during the Swedish rule, when the government had absolute supremacy of the church since the end of the 1600s. The doctrine of two kingdoms also stayed intact in the Finnish society governed by the Russians. Social peace and Russian authority were guaranteed by ecclesiastical legislation, teaching, and activities. In return, the church was allowed to act independently by the secular government. Thus, the church and the state could be considered to live in harmony with each other. One example of this close relationship can be illustrated from social legislation, and there were several provisions which had an impact on ecclesiastical legislation.

On the other hand, the church was required to submit totally to the Russian political authorities. Bishops were members of the political system because they were nominated by the Emperor of Russia and the absolute political authority had the status of lawgiver of the ecclesiastical law because it was approved by the Emperor. Thus, he could be argued to be the head of the church.

The Finnish government as the highest authority in ecclesiastical legislation

During the last decades of the 19th century significant changes took place in Finnish society. At that time, the draft of the Church Law 1869 (The Church Act of 1869) was in preparation. However, there were no changes

34 See e.g., Kansanaho (1976: 28–41); Pirinen (1985: 47–51); Björkstrand (2007: 41–170, 198–207).

to the relations between the church and the government, that is, the state, and for this reason the role of the general or church synod was emphasized. The synod consisted of both ministers and lay people and could, therefore, be seen as an administrative structure with some similarities to the Diet of Four Estates. According to this administrative ideology, the synod took the initiative and began to prepare a new ecclesiastical act. The proposal was then introduced to the government, that is, the Emperor and the Diet. The proposal could only be accepted or rejected by the government, but the government was not allowed to make changes to the proposal. These principles of preparing the ecclesiastical legislation were not changed until Finnish independence was achieved at the beginning of the 20th century.

After Finland's independence in 1917 some reforms were introduced into church law on account of the Form of Government 1919 and the Freedom of Religion Act 1922 as well as due to the development of the Finnish language.[35] Furthermore, from the 1920s to the 1950s, certain additions and clarifications were necessarily introduced into the Church Law 1869 owing to revisions to Finnish social legislation. In the 1950s, a committee was set by the church synod to compile a codification for the Church Law 1869. A proposal for this step was given to the synod in 1958 and reviewed as well as approved by it in 1964. The proposal was ratified by the Finnish Parliament and confirmed by the President in the same year. Hence, the Church Law 1964 was legislated by the government.[36]

In this period the church can be understood to be totally under the control of Finnish political authorities. Bishops were members of the political system, because they were nominated by the President of Finland, and Finnish political authorities can be argued to have the status of lawgiver in ecclesiastical law because it was approved by the President. Thus, the President can be claimed to have been the real head of the church.

The last decades of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century marked the beginning of a change in the relations between the church and the state. Regardless of this change, the secular government can still be understood to have authority over the church according to the doctrine of two governments. On the other hand, the church continued to play a significant role in several sectors of Finnish society. For instance, Lutheran pastors served in the army, in hospitals, and in prisons, all of which were social institutions. In addition, a Lutheran service was held on Finnish Independence Day as well as at the opening and closing of Parliamentary sessions.

From the perspective of the doctrine of two kingdoms there were no revolutionary changes in the relations between the church and the state in the last half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. There was, instead, continuity in this relationship, because the legal principles concerning the relations between the church and state remained unchanged. However, the role of the church as a social actor began to decline when the

35 See e.g., Kansanaho (1976: 56–62).

36 See e.g., Pirinen (1985: 77–85); Kansanaho (1976: 361–367); Leino (2002: 168–173).

church's societal responsibilities, for example education, were transferred to municipalities.[37] Thus, the impact of ecclesiastical legislation on secular legislation was not as significant as before.

The church and the state are separated but still together from the perspective of ecclesiastical legislation

After the Second World War, social thinking was influenced by new ideas concerning ideology and cultural spread in Finland. Due to these processes there was criticism of the close relations between the church and the state and of the juridical and theological principles of ecclesiastical legislation. Therefore, in the 1960s, the church synod arranged several committees to achieve reform concerning ecclesiastical legislation, administration, and the relation between the church and the state. After a thorough debate ecclesiastical administration was renewed at the level of the church as well as at the level of parishes in the period from the 1970s to the beginning of the 1990s.[38]

One of the decisions was to divide the ecclesiastical act into two parts, church law legislated by the government and the church ordinance constituted by the church synod. However, the process of adjusting church law continued in the same way as before. Thus, in 1993, the proposal for a new Church Law was approved by the church synod, ratified by parliament and confirmed by the President. In the very same year, the Church Ordinance was constituted by the church synod, that is, solely by the church and not at all by the government. As an act, the church law had the status of a social law and the church ordinance was assimilated to the status of the ecclesiastical regulation and not to the status of social regulation.[39]

Thus, the church was not totally subject to the Finnish political authorities as before. The political authorities only had the status of lawgiver of ecclesiastical law and legislation concerning relations between the church and the state, that is, the institutionally somewhat weakened state. Because ecclesiastical law was approved by the President of Finland, the office of the President had the status of the lawgiver of church law as a part of social legislation. However, the President cannot be argued to be the head of the Church, because the total ecclesiastical legislation, the church ordinance, was no longer the duty of the President to accepted. In addition, bishops were not members of the political system, because they were no longer nominated by the President.[40]

In the second half of the 20th century, the relations between the church and the state experienced other radical changes when compared with the ideological issues in the preceding centuries. Ideas about human rights and equality of rights began to spread to Finnish society based on the ideologies of the United Nations and the European Union. Thus, there were demands

37 See e.g., Heininen & Heikkilä (1996: 188–189).
38 See e.g., Kansanaho (1976: 63–65).
39 See e.g., Leino (2002: 168–173).
40 See e.g., Heininen & Heikkilä (2016: 230–232).

from society that ecclesiastical legislation should be changed according to these ideologies. Several changes of this nature were made to ecclesiastical legislature, for example, concerning the ordination of women.[41]

In addition, Finnish society received influences from Western Europe, especially from the other Nordic countries. In these countries, the social system was becoming increasingly secular and religion-neutral. For this reason, the secular government begun to withdraw from ecclesiastical legislation and the impact of ecclesiastical legislation on the secular legislature diminished significantly. One example is that the number of ecclesiastical holidays was reduced. In addition, a new and lively debate on the status of church law was opened. The main point in this debate was whether a new law should be prepared concerning the relations between the state and the church.

From the perspective of the doctrine of two governments these changes signified an ideological revolution compared to the tradition since the 1500s. Co-existence between the church and the state (or the rest of society) was no longer as close as before. Finnish society was becoming more secular and religion-neutral, and no longer a society with only a Lutheran way of interpreting Christianity.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have discussed Lutheran culture in Finland from the 16th century up to the beginning of the 21st century. Because I view the concept of culture as an integrated whole, but also because the time-period is very long, the chapter has focused on Lutheran culture from the perspective of the Lutheran doctrine of two kingdoms. In this chapter the intersection point of the two governments, namely, law and legislation, has been regarded as one of the essential elements of Lutheran culture in Finland.

To sum up, the relations between church and society in Finland can be divided into four phases. The first was the medieval phase, when the church enjoyed autonomy. Before the Reformation, the medieval legislation concerning the church was regulated by both ecclesiastical and secular laws, and the church in the Turku Diocese, like other sees, had ecclesiastical statutes of its own and it elected and nominated bishops itself. Canon law had an impact on the secular legislature, for example, on the Church Balk of Uppsala Provincial law and provisions concerning matrimony in provincial and land laws. In addition, the spiritual power of the church had an influence on society in general and, reciprocally, the church voiced support for the political elite and its authority. Society and the church lived in harmony in Finland. Overall, the church had greater influence on medieval society than the political elite did, as the church owned land and had the right to collect taxes in the form of tithes.

41 See e.g., Heininen & Heikkilä (2016: 230–232).

The second phase was when the state started to control the church in the 16th century. During the 16th century the secular government began to slowly dominate the church as well. In this period, the medieval land laws were followed, and the Church Balk of Uppsala provincial law was still in use. The church, however, was not controlled by any new social legislation but rather by the orders and regulations of the political elite's meetings that were overseen by the monarch. The role and importance of the monarch increased and, at the same time, the ideology of the doctrine of two kingdoms spread to Sweden. The relationships between political and ecclesiastical authorities was justified by this doctrine, accepted by the Swedish political elite, and submitted to by ecclesiastical leaders. The leadership of the church was in the hands of the bishops, but the church was also governed by monarchs. Spiritual authority, however, was in the hands of bishops and pastors. Overall, monarchs and bishops had an equal leadership status over the church. On the other hand, monarchs had a leading role because the election of the bishops was subject to their acceptance. In the first half of the 16th century, there was thus no autonomous local Lutheran Church in Sweden. Hence, for instance, a bishop would be elected by the members of the chapter and would be nominated by the monarch, and no longer by the pope in Rome. Moreover, a new bishop would no longer be necessarily ordained by the archbishop of Uppsala.

The third phase was from the 17th century up to the first half of the 20th century – the period when the state controlled the church. During the 17th century the secular government had absolute authority over the church: the monarch was the head of the church and he or she nominated bishops who were also official members of the political system. In addition, the monarch was the lawgiver of ecclesiastical law. In the social legislation, there were several provisions that had an impact on ecclesiastical legislation. From the perspective of the doctrine of two governments, an ideological revolution was deepening. On the other hand, the new local and autonomous church, called the Church of Sweden was taking shape during the 17th century.

In Finland, the relations between church and state were stable in the beginning of this phase and they co-existed in close union with each other. In social legislation, several provisions had an impact on ecclesiastical legislation. But since the early 19th century the church, 'the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland,' was totally under the control of the Russian political authorities. The Emperor of Russia, the head of the church, nominated bishops who were members of the political system. Furthermore, he was the lawgiver of ecclesiastical law because the Emperor ultimately approved the law.

The last decades of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century marked the beginning of a change in the relations between the church and the state. After Finland's independence, the church was under the auspices of the Finnish political authorities. The President of Finland nominated bishops who were themselves members of the political system. Furthermore, the political authorities can be argued to have the status of lawgiver with ecclesiastical laws because they were ultimately approved by the President. He was, in effect, the head of the church. In general, the secular government

had authority over the church according to the doctrine of two kingdoms. On the other hand, the church continued to play a significant role in several sectors of Finnish society.

The fourth phase began in the second half of the 20th century, when society and the institutionally somewhat weakened state started to become increasingly secular and no longer overtly based on a Lutheran way of interpreting Christianity. During this time the relations between church and state experienced other radical changes compared to the ideological issues of previous centuries. The secular government begun to withdraw from ecclesiastical legislation and the impact of ecclesiastical legislation on the secular legislature diminished significantly.

All in all, during the post-Reformation period from the 16th century up to early 21st century, ecclesiastical legislation provides an excellent way to approach the relations between the church and society from the perspective of the doctrine of two governments.

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Lutheranism and the Equality of Women in the Nordic Countries

Abstract

Finland, along with the other Nordic countries, ranks at the top among the nations in the world in terms of gender equality. The usual explanation is that gender equality is a product of the rapid Nordic pace of modernization – including a corresponding decline of traditional religion and the restrictive roles it assigned to women. This chapter argues, however, that their shared historic Lutheranism has also been a major contributing factor to the exceptionally high equality of women throughout in the Nordic world. This goes back to Luther himself whose theology and personal actions contained important elements that worked in his own time – and then among his later followers – to increase the role and status of women in society. The chapter surveys a recent growing body of Nordic and other scholarly literature that examines the influence of Luther and Lutheranism on the position of women in society and finds a significant overall positive influence.

Introduction

In the 2014 Global Gender Gap Report from the World Economic Forum, Iceland ranked first in the world in gender equality, followed by Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark to fill out the top five.[1] A woman, Tarja Halonen, was the President of Finland from 2000 to 2012; in 2014, half of the cabinet ministers in Finland were women. Following the 2014 elections, 44 per cent of the 349 seats in the Swedish Parliament were held by women. The highest decision-making body of the Church of Sweden, the General Synod, in 2015 had 125 women and 126 men on its board. Similarly large roles for women have characterized government and other top leadership positions across the Nordic world.[2]

1 World Economic Forum, *The Global Gender Gap* (Geneva, Switzerland: 2014).

2 There is admittedly one significant exception, the numbers of women in the Nordic countries occupying senior level executive positions in business. In this respect, the World Economic Forum ranks Denmark as 72nd in the world. Only 6 percent

The explanations offered for the exceptionally high degree of equality of men and women in the Nordic countries have not traditionally looked to religion. Indeed, it has more often been the opposite; the increasing equality of women in Nordic society has been seen as the product of a general secularization of Nordic societies, as has been accompanied by and reflected in the twentieth century by the declining role of the Lutheran Church in Nordic public life. The role of women in Nordic society increased most rapidly during the period of Nordic social democratic political dominance from the 1930s to the 1980s. Nordic social democrats advocated the secular cause of the economic progress of society based on a foundation of knowledge grounded in the physical and social sciences. The institutions of traditional religion might survive as a form of national historic preservation but otherwise religion was widely seen by social democrats as destined to lose out in the long run to the secular progressive advance of Nordic societies. In the twentieth century, the processes of modernization did in fact advance more rapidly in the Nordic countries than anywhere else in the world – thus explaining the unusually prominent role for women in these countries.

In the past two decades, however, a number of Nordic scholars have offered a revisionist account in which religion is seen as having played a larger role in the history of Nordic social democracy.[3] This reflects in part a growing scholarly recognition that so-called 'secular' belief systems may be more religious than had been conventionally assumed.[4] Indeed, according to such more recent thinking, the messages of secularism in the Nordic countries may actually represent new implicit restatements of values and beliefs of the historic Lutheranism of these countries. The sociologist Risto Alapuro thus writes of a 'Nordic pattern of social democracy as a continuation or a transformation of Lutheranism and parish political culture.'[5] In the Nordic world, as another Finnish historian Henrik Stenius finds, one must look back to 'the Post-Reformation centuries' and the Lutheran state churches of those days as having created a religious heritage whose influence remains powerful even today.[6] Two other leading Nordic historians, Øystein Sørensen and Bo Stråth, write that 'it is not particularly difficult to imagine the social democrats as a secularized Lutheran movement;' indeed, in the Nordic world of the twentieth century 'social democracy [is] a continuation/transformation of Lutheranism.'[7]

Given the close ties between the advance of women's equality and the rise of social democracy in the Nordic countries, one might well then

of Norwegian corporations had a female chief executive in 2013, as compared, for example, with 5 percent of the CEO's among the largest 500 companies in the United States as listed by *Fortune* magazine.

3 Nelson (2017). This book helped to set the stage for this chapter. It includes a chapter on 'Lutheranism and the Equality of Women' which develops many related themes. This current chapter differs in many details from the book chapter, building on that earlier effort.

4 Nelson (1991, 2001, 2010).

5 Alapuro (2012: 193).

6 Stenius (2012: 214).

7 Sørensen & Stråth (1997: 13, 5).

hypothesize that much the same Lutheran influences were also working in the nineteenth and twentieth century to promote the rapidly growing role of women in Nordic societies. The recent Nordic revisionist historians have not written much on that subject. A leading American religious historian Mark Noll, however, observed in 2011 that 'for Protestantism as a whole, Luther's example' in his own writings and in his portrayals of his marriage 'exalted the status of wives, mothers, and the domestic round.' Indeed, this

> contributed greatly to establishing a general Protestant conviction: the belief that any calling – whether in the home or in public, sacred or secular, taken up by men or by women – could be pursued honorably and for the glory of God.[8]

Luther transferred the central point of religious life from the Catholic Church to the individual Lutheran community and family, a momentous historical development whose full gender implications are still being worked out theologically and practically today.

In his recent magisterial biography of Luther, the German historian Heinz Schilling thus writes that 'with Luther's eschatological theology uniting faith and world and identifying the world as the place where salvation unfolded, that which was of the world became part of salvation.' This had profound consequences for 'marriage, sexuality, work, and politics [which] were all re-evaluated and given a new legitimacy.' As a consequence, 'to believe without acting was now just as sinful and far from God as was acting in the world without believing.' Following after Luther's message, 'religion would help shape the modern world for centuries, culturally, and politically' – including a new role of women in society.[9]

Theologically, Luther gave a new emphasis to the fundamental Christian message that all people, men and women alike, are made 'in the image of God' – and thus in their core essence they are fully equal. He wrote that 'all Christian men are priests, all women priestesses, be they young or old, master or servant, mistress or maid, learned or lay. Here there is no difference, unless faith be unequal,' regardless of gender.[10] Timothy F. Lull and Derek R. Nelson comment that in Luther's 'Sermon on Marriage,' written while he was still a monk and six years before his own marriage in 1525, Luther offered 'one of the more positive interpretations of marriage – as opposed to celibacy – that had appeared in many centuries' in the Christian world.[11] The elevation of marriage to a higher religious status in society than monasticism did much to raise the social position of women.

Luther is commonly rated among the top five individuals in terms of historic impact on Western civilization over the past thousand years.[12] In the United States alone in 2016 there were three museum shows in New York, Atlanta and Minneapolis celebrating his life and great historic impact. Reviewing these shows, Peter Schjeldahl commented that one important

8 Noll (2011: 18–19).
9 Schilling (2017: 543).
10 Martin Luther, *A Sermon on the New Testament*, quoted in Edwards (2005: 67).
11 Lull & Nelson (2015: 92).
12 See *Globe and Mail*, April 20, 2007, *Life Magazine*, 1997.

theme was that Luther was 'unusually supportive of women.' If a woman had 'an impotent or unwilling husband [she] should seek a divorce,' or as Luther said, at the least find another local sexual partner. But 'failing that, she might leave and start fresh in another town' in search of such a person.[13] Luther from the beginning was anything but puritanical. His favourable attitudes about sex between men and women stood in large contrast to the Roman Catholic Church that had taught for many centuries that its one legitimate purpose was procreation, creating another force for gender equality.[14]

While many scholarly studies in the twentieth century and still continuing have explored the importance of the Reformation for a wide range of modern outcomes such as capitalism, democracy, science, law, the nation state, education, and others, much less has traditionally been said about its impacts on the role of women in society. This partly reflects the emphasis, dating to Max Weber, on Calvinism as the preeminent statement of Protestantism.[15] With the 500th anniversary of the Protestant Reformation in 2017, there was an outpouring of new books and articles on the historic significance of Luther and the Reformation. This chapter draws on such recent literature and also on older writings to survey the role of Luther and Lutheranism more generally in advancing women's equality in the Nordic world (and elsewhere). My hope is that this review of current and past writings will help to inspire further detailed study of this important influence of Lutheran Protestantism.

Religion and women's rights

In 1990 the Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Anderson published *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, a pioneering analysis arguing that the welfare states of the economically developed nations of the Western world fit into three broad types: (1) the welfare states of the mostly Catholic nations in continental Europe with strong corporatist/statist traditions; (2) the nations mostly with an Anglo-Saxon heritage with strong liberal (in the European sense) traditions, and (3) the Nordic nations with strong social democratic traditions.[16] With respect to this last group, Esping-Anderson saw the Nordic welfare state as the triumph of revolutionary socialist ideals through democratic parliamentary means as social democrats typically worked in cooperation with farmer groups and other Nordic political allies.

Esping-Anderson's book opened a new era in welfare-state analysis with its shift from longstanding economic explanations to a new greater acknowledgement of its cultural roots. A number of subsequent studies addressed more specifically the importance of religion to welfare-state developments, an explanatory factor to which Esping-Anderson himself had given limited attention (mainly with respect to historically Catholic

13 *New Yorker*, November 14, 2016.
14 Eire (2016: 711).
15 Howard & Noll (2016).
16 Esping-Anderson (1990).

countries).[17] A historic Protestant religion, however, was now also increasingly recognized as having been an important factor in national welfare state outcomes, differing, moreover, in its impacts between the Lutheran and the Calvinist Reformed traditions within Protestantism.[18] By 2011, a fellow Dane, Uffe Østergård would write that 'the Danish welfare state is a result of secularized Lutheranism in national garment, rather than international socialism,' as Esping-Anderson and many other researchers of the welfare state had previously claimed was the decisive early factor.[19]

Among the major events of the twentieth century, the large new role of women in Western societies perhaps exceeds in historic importance even the development of the national welfare state. Marxism failed in its objective to find a 'new man' in the workings of economic history but one might say that the history of the twentieth century opened the way to a 'new woman.' Like the welfare state itself, the leading explanations for this extraordinary social change have tended to see it as a consequence of industrialization, urbanization, the rise of the working class as a powerful political and economic force, the general spread of democracy, and other secularizing political and economic developments. Indeed, as noted above, the creation of the welfare state and the establishment of women's rights have been commonly seen as related parts of the same overall processes of modernization – and in the Nordic countries this was closely associated with the rise of social democracy in the mid twentieth century that was the leading vehicle of Nordic modernization.

Yet, offering a challenge to this timing of events, in the Nordic world the changing status of women historically began several decades before the main period of most active modernization and social democratic governance that did not take off until the 1930s. As early as 1906, Finland (then a Grand Dutchy within Russia, but with a large degree of regional political autonomy) adopted universal women's suffrage, the first country in Europe to do so. The next two nations in Europe were Norway in 1913 and Denmark in 1915, and then among the Nordic countries Sweden followed in 1921. Indeed, the timelines for the adoption of women's suffrage can be roughly grouped in national categories to match the 'three world' welfare-state model proposed by Esping-Anderson. The Nordic nations again represent one distinct European 'world' where women's suffrage overall advanced more rapidly than in Calvinist and Catholic countries of Europe (Calvinist and Catholic Switzerland was the last nation in Europe in 1971 to adopt universal women's suffrage). The adoption of women's suffrage so early in the twentieth century in Nordic countries suggests that the preconditions for this development must have arisen in significant part in the nineteenth century, a time when Lutheranism still exerted a powerful influence throughout almost every area of Nordic societies.

Thus, as the political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, two leading researchers of social value trends around the world, write in

17 See Bäckström et al. (2009a, 2009b).
18 See Van Kersbergen & Manow (2009).
19 Østergård (2011: 93).

2005, the 'Scandinavian social-democratic welfare states show the highest level of gender equality' in Europe. As they comment, 'a trend towards gender equality becomes a central aspect of modernization' and is 'crucial to the quality of democracy,' areas in which the Lutheran countries of the Nordic world advanced especially rapidly in Europe in the twentieth century.[20]

It is thus natural to ask: how might Lutheranism – the historic state religion of each of the Nordic nations from the sixteenth century onward – contributed to such rapid modernizing trends and the associated unusually high levels of women's equality as found in the Nordic countries in the second half of the twentieth century and continuing now in the twenty-first century?

Martin Luther as advocate for women

In considering this question, it is well to begin with the figure of Martin Luther himself and the Reformation which he launched. While Luther's immense historic impact cannot be doubted, it must be recognized that Luther was a complicated individual. Both his theology and his actions were often filled with tensions and even outright contradictions. Most of his writings were written in response to issues and controversies of the moment; unlike Calvin, he never sought to create a systematic theology. Diarmaid MacCulloch, a contemporary professor of the History of the Church at Oxford University, thus writes that 'Luther was a passionate, impulsive man, who felt his theology rather than beginning with logical questions and answers about God, resulting in a theology full of paradoxes or downright contradictions.'[21]

This extended to his writings about the role of women in society where Luther frequently offered a traditional patriarchal understanding including the necessary subservience of a wife to her husband. Oxford historian Lyndal Roper thus comments in a recent book that 'it is easy to plunder his works for sexist aphorisms.'[22] In exploring the full body of Luther's writings about sex and marriage, Finnish theologian Sammeli Juntunen considers that the implications for the role of women in society can often be negative. Luther frequently portrays the sex act itself as a sinful outcome of the fall in the Garden which reduces human beings to animal-like motives and behaviour – acceptable only because God has given his specific approval within the institution of marriage. For Luther in his writings, as Juntunen finds, without this divine approval, 'sex in itself is something dirty and shameful.' At one point Luther justifies marriage because it works as 'a medicine and remedy for whoring' – a better outlet at least for the implacably sinful and lustful nature of human beings.[23]

Typical of his tendencies towards contradiction, however, Juntunen also sees significant positive sides for women in other areas of his writings.

20 Inglehart & Welzel (2005: 279–280, 272).
21 MacCulloch (2004: 115).
22 Roper (2016: 282).
23 Juntunen (2010: 200, 197).

Luther could take the position that 'marriage is still a godly institution, one that God has blessed with his word.' Moreover, it is 'the family [that] forms the basis of a society,' where women have the central role. Juntunen finds that 'in a certain sense Luther's theological thinking allows a much more positive attitude toward sex than the thinking of Augustine or Thomas Aquinas.'[24]

Given the immense body of his writings, and their frequent improvised character to suit the specific circumstances of the moment, Luther's overall body of works can often lend itself to many interpretations. The distinguished American legal philosopher and historian John Witte Jr. sees Luther's views about sex and marriage in a much more positive light. He notes that Luther once wrote:

> God's word is actually inscribed on one's spouse. When a man looks at his wife as if she were the only woman on earth, and when a woman looks at her husband as if he were the only man on earth; yes, [...] right there you are face to face with God speaking. [...] Luther [...] did not betray these warm sentiments to the point of becoming the grim prophet of patriarchy, paternalism and procreation *uber alles* that some modern critics make him out to be. For Luther, love was a necessary and sufficient good of marriage.[25]

Luther's overall theology and his actions in practice had large indirect implications for the status of women in Lutheran societies. Theologically, his central message of the priesthood of all believers made men and women fully equal members in principle of the priesthoods of Protestant countries. German Luther scholar Bernhard Lohse thus writes that Luther rejected 'the then commonly accepted principle that there were two sets of ethics: one for secular Christians and the other for monastics.' Luther advanced instead the revolutionary idea that instead of 'the medieval assertion of the spiritual over the secular estate, [...] all baptized are priests,' including ordinary women along with ordinary men.[26] Women admittedly did not become Lutheran pastors until the twentieth century but a Lutheran male pastor was just another ordinary human being, more church administrator and discussion leader than the holder of special religious authority. To this day, a female Catholic priest remains an impossibility, reflecting persisting differences going back 500 years in the Lutheran and Catholic ways of thinking about the place of women in society.

Beyond his theology, the two most important of Luther's actions were his role in undermining celibacy for the Christian clergy and the example of his own marriage. As Protestants abolished the Catholic monastic orders in the 1520s, Luther rejected celibacy in part because he saw it as another false form of 'good works.' When droves of monks and nuns left their orders, it was often because they wanted to marry, and many did so. Indeed, the issue of their freedom to leave was initially framed in terms of their right to reject monastic vows of celibacy. This freedom extended equally to men and women.

24 Juntunen (2010: 199, 189, 202).
25 Witte (2012: 124); see also Witte (2006).
26 Lohse (1986: 151, 128).

Luther historian Scott Hendrix explains that in 1521 it was Luther's fellow reformer Andrew Karlstadt 'who took the first steps toward religious change. When three priests in the vicinity violated their vows of celibacy and took wives, Karlstadt supported them by declaring that vows taken by priests and monks were null and void.' Philip Melanchthon readily agreed but Luther was initially hesitant. By the end of the year, however, 'he was certain everyone could leave, and he started an attack on monastic vows in order to "free the young people from that hell of celibacy."'[27] The wives of Lutheran clergymen achieved a higher social status, and all women benefited from the elevated religious significance of the family where Luther now taught that a healthy equality in sexual pleasures was a feature to be praised.

The professor of church history Carter Lindberg explains that 'Luther rejected every form of flight from the world with its suspicion of creation including the human body. Humankind is not called to flee the world but rather to engage the world.' In abandoning clerical celibacy, 'this was not just a matter of breaking church law; rather, the public rejection of mandatory clerical celibacy encompassed the new evangelical [Protestant] understanding of the relationship to God and the world.' For its time, as Lindberg writes, 'the thought that persons could serve God in marriage was revolutionary.' Reflecting his broader thinking, Luther further intended as part of the new worldliness of Reformation religion that 'with marriage and the household estate came multiple responsibilities to the larger community and vice versa.'[28]

The American professor of Reformation history and theology Jane Strohl similarly explains that for the Lutheran faithful – including its women – the pursuit of a calling would involve a religious act of 'serving and praising God in and through their routine activities' in this world.[29] For Luther himself, having a 'particularity of vocation was a great comfort' to him. Luther felt not surprisingly that 'he was called to be a doctor of Scripture in the service of the church.' Less well known, he regarded his second great calling in his life 'to be the husband of one particular woman and the father of her children,' seeing his actions in this capacity as also serving God's purposes.[30] In this role, Luther himself 'did not consider it unmanly for fathers' such as himself 'to wash diapers and make beds' (ideas that admittedly have yet to be universally adopted by the fathers of the twenty-first century). [31] Typical of Luther's frequently bombastic style, he once wrote:

> a maid who wraps a child with swaddling clothes and cooks porridge for it – even if it is the child of a prostitute – has a much higher calling from God himself than all the monks and nuns on this earth, who can't claim that their self-appointed holiness is from God.[32]

27 Hendrix (2015: 120–121).
28 Lindberg (2003: 167, 168, 169).
29 Strohl (2003: 161).
30 Ibid.
31 Treu (2013b: 279, 277).
32 Quoted in Treu (2013a: 27).

It is sometimes said that Luther acted against women's interests by abolishing the orders of nuns and other special women's roles of the Catholic Church, one of the few potential avenues at the time for women to gain a higher level of education and to advance to higher leadership positions in society, outside the home. While there is some truth to this, such advances involved a small minority of women, whereas Luther gave a new religious significance to the household activities of the great majority of Lutheran women. Martin Treu writes of Luther's views of relations between the sexes that even 'in their time they developed revolutionary explosive power' that worked to raise the religious status of women in society.[33]

For Luther and his later followers, it was necessary, for example, that girls must also learn to read the Bible in order to discuss among themselves (and with men) the true meaning of the Scriptures, giving the education of women in this respect an equal degree of importance with men. Luther scholar Andrew Pettegree writes that 'Luther was [...] a notable pioneer in the field of female education. If the goal of an informed Christian people was to be realized, then for Luther this applied equally to girls as to boys.' He therefore called for 'the best possible schools both for boys and girls in every locality.'[34]

Until the Reformation, almost all serious writings about religion were in Latin. In his early writings, Luther also normally wrote in Latin but he soon turned increasingly to colloquial German; over his lifetime, 17 percent of his publications were in Latin and 83 percent in German – and thus comprehensible to ordinary people who were literate (still a small but nevertheless an influential minority).[35] Luther famously translated the New Testament into German while hidden in 1522 in Wartburg Castle, thus facilitating the efforts of many lay Germans to reach their own conclusions as to the true meaning of 'scripture alone.' The invention of the printing press made Luther's voluminous writings in German – often in many editions – widely and inexpensively available, commonly seen as a central explanation for the success of the Reformation. As in other areas, it was not Luther's specific goal in this case but his use of German in his writings again worked to advance the equality of women. In Luther's time, the proportion of men who could read Latin, and thus follow intellectual debates in Latin, was larger than the proportion of women.[36]

Luther's marriage

Luther's rejection of clerical celibacy and other traditional Roman Catholic practices and attitudes concerning the role of women in society was powerfully symbolized by his own decision to marry in 1525. German Luther scholar Martin Treu explains that in the medieval Catholic world

33 Ibid.
34 Pettegree (2015: 265).
35 Edwards (2005: 20).
36 Roper (2016: 36).

'everyone considered it a certainty that life in an order and celibacy were a more meritorious way of life in the eyes of God.'[37] But fairly early in the Reformation, Luther 'reversed the traditional order [...] since [marriage as he saw it] was expressly governed by God's sacred will to create,' as seen in human sexual desires readily visible in nature, 'while the former [celibacy] was not commanded by God,' but was an artificial requirement asserted by the Roman Catholic Church.[38] In the earliest years of Christianity, women had played a significant role in its spread across the Mediterranean. But with the development of the Roman Catholic Church centred in Rome and its bureaucratic religious bodies the role of women declined. As he saw matters, Luther's fundamental objective in the Reformation was a restoration of an older and truer Christianity as it had existed before the many centuries of corruption in Rome, the (always male) Pope in the end having become for Luther the Anti-Christ.

In the common view of the Roman Catholic Church in Europe before the Reformation, as Heiko Oberman writes, the 'sexual drives are confused with man's "primeval sin" [in the Garden]. What nature wants is "unholy," something only for the dark hours of the night.' But in rejecting this way of thinking, Luther showed a willingness 'to speak plainly about the healthy elemental force of desire,' even including an occasional 'erotic passage' in his correspondence. Indeed, Luther was for his day sometimes remarkably frank about the strong sexual attraction and mutual pleasures he and his wife Katherine von Bora enjoyed. He wrote to a friend about to be married:

> when you sleep with your Catharine and embrace her, you should think: "This child of man, this wonderful creature of God has been given to me by my Christ. May He be praised and glorified" by our acts of love. "I shall make love to my Katherine while you make love to yours, and thus we will be united in love."[39]

In their biography of Luther, Lull and Nelson observe that with his marriage Luther began 'to explore the path he had recommended to so many others – serving God not in a set-apart religious life but in the ordinary structures of family and work.'[40] Luther endorsed other earthly pleasures as well, as when on one occasion he expressed his happiness that 'the local wine is good, and the Naumberg beer is very good,' further examples of how 'Luther's Reformation found God-given space for love and good living' of men and women alike (attitudes that admittedly would not always be embraced by later Lutheran pastors and other followers who could be more fearful of human pleasures).[41]

Lyndal Roper distinguishes between Luther's evolved religious understanding of marriage and that of Calvinist and other Reformed faiths – another aspect of the different impacts on European societies of a Lutheran versus a Calvinist national religious heritage. As she explains, Luther's

37 Treu (2013a: 24).
38 Treu (2013a: 27).
39 Oberman (1992: 275, 276).
40 Lull & Nelson (2015: 222).
41 Oberman (1992: 283).

> married life had transformed his theology. He had shed asceticism for a remarkably positive conception of human physicality. [...] This vision would separate him not only from the old [Roman Catholic] Church but also from the rule-bound communitarian moralism of those influenced by the Swiss reformers and their heirs, the Calvinists.[42]

Luther as social radical

Given the lack of consistency in his writings, Luther's actions could be as important as his words themselves – or even more important. Luther in his lifetime on three occasions in particular took actions that were critical to the ultimate success and impact of the Protestant Reformation, also showing his great personal resolve and strength of willpower. The first occasion was his decision to become a monk in 1505, thus defying his father (who had invested heavily in Luther's education) and which resulted in an estrangement that lasted for many years. The most momentous of Luther's actions was in 1521 when he defied the Holy Roman Emperor in refusing to recant at Worms – thus literally changing the history of Europe and indeed the world.

Luther's third great act of defiance was to marry in 1525. Luther scholar Martin Treu reports that 'for Luther's enemies his marriage was a scandal,' some even suggesting that Luther had launched a crusade against the Roman Catholic Church in order to gain the freedom to satisfy his private lusts.[43] His new wife was by many accounts a beautiful woman, descended from a noble – if now impoverished – family. Treu writes that 'even his friends were critical,' including his theological collaborator Philipp Melanchthon who was not invited to the wedding. Melanchthon was particularly unhappy that Luther had acted in the midst of the Peasants War when death and destruction for others were so prevalent throughout Germany. He wrote harshly in 1525 how surprised he was that

> in such serious times, when good people everywhere suffer so much, that he [Luther] does not share others' suffering, but even more, so it seems, indulges himself and compromises his good reputation, at a time when Germany right now especially needs his spirit and his authority. [...] the man can be terribly easily misled, and the nuns who in every way lay in wait for him, have ensnared him, [...] and caused the fires of passion to blaze up in him.[44]

It was particularly provocative in that a former monk was marrying a former nun. Characteristically, Luther ignored all such innuendo, snide remarks and other harsh criticisms for this latest violation of the social expectations of the times, again with large historical consequences. Luther once declared in a 1517 sermon that 'where Christ is, there he always goes against the flow,' a message heeded by Luther once again in his 1525 decision to marry.

42 Roper (2016: 305).
43 Treu (2013b: 76).
44 Quoted in Treu (2012a: 32).

As far as we know, Luther had had little if any sexual experiences with women as of 1525. He had been an Augustinian monk and fully absorbed by his struggles to reform the Catholic Church. Indeed, before his marriage he was concerned about his future ability to perform his husbandly duties. The possibility of marrying at the age of 42 was a low priority for him but Luther now found himself driven by circumstances. He had assumed the responsibilities of a match maker for nine former nuns who had fled their monastic life to come to Wittenberg with his assistance. He was successful in finding husbands or other suitable arrangements for all but one, Katherine von Bora, already 26 years old, well past the usual age of marriage. Luther made a suggestion or two for possible husbands but she rejected them – thus acting on the Christian principle that a woman entering into marriage is free to decide as a matter of individual choice (a right not recognized at the time for women over much of the world and still not accepted in some places today).

Katherine did suggest, however, that Luther would be acceptable to her, and Luther somewhat reluctantly agreed to resolve the problem by marrying her himself. As Luther historian Roland Bainton writes, he offered 'three reasons for his marriage: to please his father, to spite the pope and the Devil, and to seal his witness before martyrdom' (which he was then expecting to come soon).[45] Luther, however, did not in fact die until 1546, and by all accounts his new marriage proved a great success. Luther fathered six children (two dying in childhood), as his new partner 'Katie' provided a happy and supportive home environment. Pettegree observes that his marriage put him 'at the center of a growing, happy family.' Although little of Katharine's correspondence has survived, Luther's own correspondence indicates 'how much Luther had come to respect and love his wife' with whom he shared a 'partnership of real depth and touching devotion.' The feelings were reciprocated as 'Katharina was, within a very few years, his trusted soul mate, with whom he shared his hopes and fears.'[46] In his own marriage Luther would have been expected to fulfil the role of patriarch but the actual reality was that he and his wife shared a close partnership encompassing most areas of family responsibility, an historic example that would become a lasting part of the lore of Lutheranism to this day.

Katherine also managed the household business affairs, maintaining the household revenue and cost accounts and supervising the acquisition of land, livestock and other management decisions. She proved talented in this regard – as Luther had not – and by the 1540s Luther had become 'one of Wittenberg's wealthiest citizens.'[47] Oberman comments that 'she ruled an extended family judiciously,' including a 'never-ending stream of visitors – friends, people curious to meet the great man, or people with theological queries.'[48] Lull and Nelson comment that she also assisted Luther in matters extending well beyond family affairs; she was present 'not only in the kitchen and the bedchamber,' but was sometimes even a 'theological

45 Bainton (2012: 294).
46 Pettegree (2015: 255, 256, 257).
47 Treu (2013b: 82).
48 Oberman (1992: 279).

advisor' to Luther. Shilling similarly comments that 'over the course of the years, Katharina formed a reliable prop for the work of the Reformation, and was even in certain respects Luther's collaborator' in advancing the Reformation agenda.[49] Luther was a moody person who was prone to times of deep depression and despair. By his own testimony there were only three people who could effectively 'minister to his discouragement,' his pastor and confessor John Bugenhagen, his wife Katharine, and his close friend and long-time theological collaborator, Philip Melanchthon.[50]

Luther's powerful example

Luther by his actions in his marriage thereby offered a future model for Lutheran Europe; by his example he showed that even a great religious leader might enter into marriage, treat his wife with great respect, both enjoy their sexual relationship for its pleasures as well as progeny, and indeed generally conduct the marriage as a partnership of mutually equal and freely choosing individual adults. Later members of the Lutheran Church did not necessarily follow this example in every respect (or sometimes even most respects) but Luther in his relationship with his wife had acted in what we might say today was a remarkably 'modern' way. This side of Luther's legacy would become especially important in the Nordic world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as more and more men and women followed Luther's lasting example (whether they knew it or not).[51]

The importance of Luther for the rights of women was a neglected subject in the twentieth century but this has been changing recently. In *Resilient Reformer: The Life and Thought of Martin Luther*, Lull and Nelson write in 2015 that 'in the main, he [Luther] held the same views as others in the sixteenth century. He thought that women were weaker, more prone to emotional outburst, and less reasoned.'[52] In his relationship with his wife, however, there was little sign of this. As in many areas, Luther can be a bundle of contradictions, and his actions are often more important than his words. Indeed, in the broader view, Lull and Nelson conclude:

> In the ways in which Luther departed from his culture – which ought to signal something deeper about his thought than the defaults of his [societal] context – Luther often viewed women more favorably than one might expect. His many writings on marriage consistently took seriously the claims of women. And his defense of marriage as a noble Christian institution was generally good news for women. [...] His strong endorsement of a healthy sexuality extended to women and men, loudly condemning earlier views that "marriages fill the earth, virginity fills heaven." He went against the norms of German law and made his

49 Schilling (2017: 288).
50 Lull & Nelson (2015: 217).
51 In this context it is important to note that according to Hagman (this volume), Luther was not widely read between the 16th and the 19th centuries but his writings began to draw more attention during the revivals of the 19th century.
52 Lull & Nelson (2015: 327–328).

> wife the executor of his will. [...] He strongly encouraged Argula von Grumback, a noblewoman in Bavaria who wrote and published Reformation pamphlets, including a letter to the faculty of the University of Ingolstadt who had arrested a student for Lutheran views. Women ordinarily would never do such a thing, yet Luther did not think twice about urging her on.[53]

Given Luther's renown across Europe, as Pettegree explains, Luther thus made large contributions to asserting a new role for women in Protestant societies. Pettegree writes that in his 'home life, lived in a very public way, [Luther] provided the new church with the archetype of the new Protestant family.' Many Catholic priests in Luther's time, by contrast, had had female partners but their relationships had necessarily been 'furtive and clandestine. The priest's woman was often the subject of public mockery and faced a dismal prospect of dispossession and penury in the event that the priest died.' With Luther as a towering example, 'now the Protestant churches not only regularized these unions; they provided the potential for a stable family life at the heart of each local community' with its Lutheran Church and pastor, educating the children 'in the new faith and suited for a profession of their own.' Pettegree writes that 'the power of Luther and Katharina as a model and exemplar is demonstrated in the proliferation of copies of [Lucas] Cranach's double marriage portrait.' It presented to the owners of these famous portrait copies an image of 'sober Protestant homes, presiding over households where the Christian life was both lived and taught: the holy household as church.'[54]

Assessing the overall impact, the Harvard historian Steven Ozment considers that

> No institutional change brought about by the Reformation was more visible, responsive to late medieval pleas for [Church] reform, and conducive to new social attitudes than the marriage of Protestant clergy. Nor was there another point in the Protestant program where theology and practice corresponded more successfully.[55]

Luther radically rejected the traditional Catholic view that encouraged the 'self-chosen religious callings of clericalism.' Instead, in properly serving God 'Luther focused on "the ordinary."' It meant 'that we are not called to self-chosen extraordinary tasks, but rather to service in the world' of daily marriage, family, and immediate community. This means also that 'the center of Luther's ethic of vocation is not self-sanctification, but the neighbors' needs' – and the needs of a person's spouse as the closest 'neighbour' of all.[56] With the reach of religion now fully extending into every area of life, this should include changes in ordinary male as well as female behaviour: 'Luther attempted to redefine his culture's understanding of male gender

53 Lull & Nelson (2015: 328–329).
54 Pettegree (2015: 255, 256, 257, 259).
55 Ozment (1980: 381); quoted in Lindberg (2003: 168).
56 Pettegree (2015: 168, 170).

from uncontrollable impulse to social responsibility.'[57] In Latin American and other parts of the world today where Protestantism is making large new inroads, the largest impact for family life is often a change in male behaviour patterns.[58]

Heinz Schilling goes even further. In 'marriage and sexual relations in marriage,' he considers that Luther found 'what was in effect secular fulfillment of the religious knowledge of grace and secular manifestation of the freedom of the Christian. Both were rooted in God's eternal faithfulness to humanity.' Remarkably, as Schilling thinks, Luther's 'new theology of marriage' was comparable in its long run consequences for society to his theology of salvation 'by faith alone.' As Schilling puts it, the consequences of Luther's thinking about sex, family and marriage 'were hardly any less far-reaching than those of the theology of grace that formed the core of his Reformation.' His own 'marriage and household [...] took on a model character, presenting a norm both for evangelical pastors and professors and for Protestants more generally' in the following centuries. In such respects the applications of Luther's theology and actions thus 'left a permanent mark on both private and public life in Protestant Germany and Europe even into the last [twentieth] century.'[59]

In another distinguished contribution to the recent outpouring of books about Luther and the Reformation, Carlos Eire further explains that 'attitudes towards sex and marriage were the source of one of the sharpest differences between Catholics and Protestants.' For Luther himself,

> the Catholic Church's teaching on sex and marriage was a total inversion of values, and he based much of his criticism on natural rather than theological grounds. Marriage, he argued, was the only way to preserve chastity, the only proper way to handle uncontrollable natural urges.[60]

Indeed, 'all of the magisterial Reformers took the same tack, arguing that celibacy was an impossible goal for most human beings, and therefore "unjust and against God."'[61] This established a prominent basis for a more equal relationship between the sexes in the Nordic world in the centuries to follow.

Because family life has changed less from Luther's time, his views about marriage and family can have a more contemporary feel than other areas of his writings such as the proper ethics of the commercial sphere. Indeed, in terms of the views and actions of Luther 500 years ago, it might not even be much of an exaggeration to say that, despite his patriarchal thinking in some respects, there was also an element of 'Luther the feminist' advocate. Indeed, some women have recently argued that his wife Katherine von Bora should be seen as an early pioneer in advancing the role of women in society. In 2017, the American theologian Ruth Tucker, for example, published *Katie Luther: First Lady of the Reformation*, declaring that in assisting her husband

57 Lindberg (2003: 168, 170).
58 Martin (1993).
59 Schilling (2017: 279).
60 Eire (2016: 712).
61 Eire (2016: 711, 712–713).

in so many ways her importance was such that 'take her out of the equation, [...] and we would be looking at a very different Reformation.' Although her large religious and social impact of course depended on her relationship with Martin Luther, the fact is that 'on her own she accomplished more than did the vast majority of men in the sixteenth century, despite their privilege of gender.'[62]

A 'Second Reformation'

Luther's lifelong goal was to 'reform' the Roman Catholic Church; he had not expected to be the founder of a new religion and might well have been distressed to learn that it would become known to the world in his name as 'Lutheranism.' By 1600, however, a Lutheran canon was already in place, including the Augsburg Confession and other writings included in 1580 in the *Book of Concord*, establishing a Lutheran Orthodoxy that prevailed in the Nordic world throughout the seventeenth and well into the eighteenth century, maintained by the King and the Lutheran state churches of that period.

In Germany, however, important critics of the post-Reformation Lutheran world appeared towards the end of the seventeenth century, most notably in the Pietist movement led by Philipp Jakob Spener. Pietists accused the Lutheran Church of having lapsed into a new Scholasticism of its own, its theology of having become formulaic, generating a large volume of writings but showing little real life. As British historian Christopher Clark writes, Spener taught that the Lutheran 'orthodox ecclesiastical establishment [...] had become so absorbed in the defence of doctrinal correctness that it was neglecting the pastoral needs of ordinary Christians. The religious life of the Lutheran parish had become desiccated and stale.' Hoping to revive Luther's example, Spener called instead for a new 'spiritual intensity' that would 'transform nominal believers into reborn Christians with a powerful sense of God's agency in their lives.'[63]

Although having some Nordic impact in the eighteenth century, Pietism was slower in reaching the Nordic countries and did not really become a significant force in society until the nineteenth century. After Russia had annexed Finland in 1809, the end of the Napoleonic age began a century in which warfare was less central to the histories of the Nordic countries and developments in religion would become larger driving social forces. In part this was due once again to events internal to religion itself, as had been the case for the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century.

Another important factor was that developments in science and the spread of Enlightenment ideas posed a challenge to existing religious beliefs across Europe, including the Lutheran North. The religious meaning and significance of the industrial revolution and its many transforming economic consequences for society also needed to be newly addressed. The French and American Revolutions introduced further radical ideas. In the nineteenth

62 Tucker (2017: 187, 182).
63 Clark (2007: 124).

century, as one might say, the Nordic world thus experienced a 'second Reformation' that sought to come to grips with the many radical changes of the period. As the 'first Reformation' played a large part in the spread of capitalism and modern trends in general over the next few centuries, the second Reformation would play a large part in the nineteenth and twentieth century in creating what we now know as the secularized Nordic welfare and regulatory state.[64]

The historians Øystein Sørensen and Bo Stråth write of the Nordic world over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,

> Religion was nationalized [...] in the 16th century when Lutheran state churches were established. Lutheran orthodoxy and state orientation provoked [19th century] pietism and revivalism. For a long time revivalism has been interpreted as a popular reaction to the Enlightenment and modernization. [...] [However,] revivalism can also be seen as a movement that broke the unity of pre-modern agrarian society, created new social forms, and stood for modernity. Pietism and revivalism meant individualization and de-hierarchization of religion with a long-term secularizing impact when religion moved from the public arena to the private room and from confessional and religious unity guaranteed by the state to personal conviction. The world-view was religious but the emphasis on individual emotions and experiences represented modernity. The long-term impact of the criticism within and outside of Lutheran churches meant the abandoning of religious hierarchies and the [re]emergence of the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers.[65]

In the nineteenth century in the Nordic countries, as they explain further, there were 'countless religious doctrines and movements [that] emerged within established and pietistic forms of Protestantism.' Similar to the first Reformation, one of the major consequences 'of this religious awakening was a gradual abolition of the distinction between the sacred and the profane,' as the new religious forces helped to spur the temperance, suffrage, trade union and other social movements. Once again, these movements now sought fundamental changes in Nordic social and economic life on a religious basis. Sørensen and Stråth thus observe that such 'popular movements are difficult to imagine without their revivalist element. They represented much more than the labour movements and the rising working class.' Indeed, in the countries of the Nordic world 'the labour movements took form and content' in the second half of the nineteenth century 'from this religious ambience and were lastingly influenced' by it.[66] It was Lutheran revivalism and the rise of new free churches that paved the way in the nineteenth century for the Nordic welfare state of the twentieth century. This was all accompanied by a more equal role in society for Nordic women. As noted above, the radically equalizing Nordic consequences of nineteenth century religious developments were evident in the adoption of universal women's suffrage in Finland as early as 1906, Norway in 1913, and Denmark in 1915, before any other European countries.

64 See Gregory (2012).
65 Sørensen & Stråth (1997: 10).
66 Sørensen & Stråth (1997: 11).

Lutheran origins of the Swedish women's movement

By the 1990s, as in the case of scholarly studies of the rise of the Nordic welfare state, a few Nordic researchers in the field of gender relations were beginning to pay more attention to religion. Once again, they found that the importance of religion had been underestimated by twentieth century scholars, and that Nordic religion had indeed been a key factor in the early suffrage movements of the later nineteenth and early twentieth century. In 2000 Finnish historian Pirjo Markkola assembled a series of case studies in a book on *Gender and Vocation: Women, Religion and Social Change in the Nordic Countries, 1830–1940*. Since the Nordic countries had Lutheran state churches, and the residents of these countries were nearly all Lutheran, much of the book focused on the role of Lutheranism in changing Nordic gender relationships over this period.

In one chapter, Swedish historian Inger Hammar studied the role of Lutheran religion in influencing leading nineteenth century figures in the early development of the movement for women's rights in Sweden, focusing in particular on Fredrika Bremer. Bremer is sometimes described as the Swedish Jane Austen and was also, as described by Hammar, the 'foremost in the Swedish women's movement' as it was emerging in the mid and late nineteenth century, whose literary fame enabled her 'to carry the emancipation debate to a much wider audience.' Hammar comments in 2000 that 'since it has long been assumed that the emancipation of women and secularization went hand in hand, research into the history of Swedish women has spent little time in tracing the deeply Christian tone of the [early] feminist movement' – resulting in 'religion blind' research, as was characteristic of so much social science in the twentieth century. In reality, however, in the nineteenth century 'Swedish society was permeated by a Lutheran view of society,' extending to thinking about the role of women as well. For the early leading feminist Bremer, 'the demand for equality for both women and men was [...] derived from a Christian world view.'[67]

Hammar observes that, as in many areas, the Bible was not clear about the proper place of women in society – it contains some passages that 'give expression to a misogynist gender ordering, while in others one finds the equality of men and women.'[68] For Bremer, however, the heart of the matter was the core biblical understanding that human beings, men and women alike, are all made equally 'in the image of God.' In this respect, and unlike most societies and cultures over the long course of world history, Christianity preached the fundamental equality of all human beings, whatever their gender, social status, or other individual features. Bremer thus wrote that in this respect Christianity was 'a fairly strong proclamation from on high of women's equality in right and worth with man, and without which our sex would still languish in its heathen infancy.'[69] As she argued, the time had come to abolish those remaining and ever more obsolete social, political, and

67 Hammar (2000: 36, 57–58, 58, 39).
68 Hammar (2000: 31).
69 Quoted in Hammar (2000: 39).

religious barriers that had in previous centuries limited the full application of Christian thinking to the place of women in Swedish society.

Hammar thus writes that 'in Bremer's eyes, this meant that the roles of society traditionally accorded to women were now doomed. In [the] future, women's "human and social value" must be stressed far more.' Women must newly recognize and act upon the radical 'freedom of the individual [as] had existed from the moment of Creation' at the hand of God. Hence, women should view life 'from the Christian citizenness viewpoint. By drawing on the "individual powers" that [Christian] women possessed, society would be imbued with the "feeling for the holiness, the sense of beauty, the maternal, the caring."'[70] Bremer once wrote that 'I sometimes go whole days with a peaceful joy in my soul over our Savior's communion with women in the Gospel, and hers with him.'[71]

Although Bremer saw Christianity as the fundamental source of the full equality of all women (and all men), she believed that the institutional Lutheran state church, as it had developed in Sweden after the Reformation, had often failed in practice to heed the actual message of the Bible. Much as Luther in his own times had offered a similar verdict with respect to the historic behaviour of the Roman Catholic Church, Bremer now called for a second reformation in the nineteenth century within the Swedish Lutheran church, including especially a more equal role for women, as Luther had originally advanced by his own example in his marriage and in other ways.

She admittedly had a somewhat ambivalent view of Luther himself, once praising 'Luther, the true interpreter of the Bible, the liberator' who had dared to challenge the traditional religious institutions and conventions of his time.[72] Hammar writes that 'the thing she treasured most in Luther was his demand for freedom in interpreting individual Biblical passages.'[73] Yet, she could also offer a 'bitter judgment' of Luther, blaming him for his theology of the three estates in which women were confined to the 'household' estate, leaving men to dominate in other areas of society such as church and government affairs, and to function even within the household as a ruling patriarch.[74]

Bremer recognized that Luther could admittedly be admired for his view that a person – man or woman – might be called by God to ordinary service within the household, thus elevating the religious status of ordinary men and women in their daily lives. As Hammar relates, however, Bremer here again believed that Swedish Lutheran church practice had 'circumscribed women's calling by giving priority to the wifely and maternal roles, leaving them with a severely limited range of action which was to the detriment of both women and society.'[75] The lines between the family and the rest of society, moreover, were breaking down in the nineteenth century; the

70 Hammar (2000: 39).
71 Quoted in Hammar (2000: 41).
72 Quoted in Hammar (2000: 42).
73 Hammar (2000: 42).
74 Quoted in Hammar (2000: 42).
75 Hammar (2000: 38).

concept of the 'household' – where women had traditionally had special responsibilities – thus needed to be greatly expanded. Bremer wrote that in the nineteenth century Swedish society must open the way for women to function as 'a good human being in all walks of life, and independent of marriage.'[76] Instead of finding a calling exclusively within the domestic household itself, Swedish women of the future should extend the range of their potential callings far beyond the family setting alone to include many other acts of social improvement across all walks of Swedish life (as one might say, the whole nation was to become the new Lutheran 'household,' or as it would later be called by social democrats in the 1930s a 'people's home').

Hammar explains that it was not only Bremer but that such thinking was found among many other leading figures in the Swedish movement for women's rights of the nineteenth century. Indeed, it was not until the early twentieth century that many Swedish advocates for women's equality made their case in a secular context outside a Lutheran religious setting. Until then, as had been the case for Bremer

> the feminist pioneers in Sweden did not confront Lutheranism; instead, they wished to gain emancipation with the help of Luther and liberal theology. For them it was a question of redefining and reinterpreting the [Lutheran] idea of women's vocation so that they achieved influence over public life, and not of throwing Lutheran ideas overboard.[77]

They were hostile towards the Lutheran state church of Sweden not because it had followed Luther but because it had failed to follow him far enough. It had acted 'in direct contradiction of Luther's understanding of each Christian's freedom before the Bible.'[78] Thus, contrary to the views of many social democrats and other secular thinkers in the decades to follow in the twentieth century, Christianity for early Swedish advocates of equality for women was not a basic obstacle to a brand new place for women in society. Rather, it was in fact a powerful source of support in seeking to advance the goals of the rising women's movement that by the late nineteenth century was working hard and with growing success to bring gender equality to Sweden.

Pietism, revivalism and the role of women in Finland

Bremer herself considered her approach to religion to be more rational and was sceptical of what she saw as the emotionalism of Swedish pietism and other revivalist movements of the nineteenth century. In Finland, nevertheless, pietism and revivalism played a major role in providing a religious setting for the growing women's movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 2009, a leading scholar of the historic role of women in Finnish society, Irma Sulkunen, thus sought to explain the reasons

76 Quoted in Hammar (2000: 38).
77 Hammar (2000: 45).
78 Hammar (2000: 45).

for the exceptionally early arrival of women's suffrage in Finland in 1906. As she wrote, 'the case for the central significance of religious revivals in the chain of events' is a powerful one.[79] As Sulkunen elaborates,

> First, the revivalist influence reached from the grass-roots level to the highest systems of administration and control. Second, as was characteristic of revivalism, religious conversions based on personal experience undermined the local social traditions, which were rooted in patriarchal communality, and in their place created new voluntary forms of association. Third, the revivals presented a challenge to the spiritual hegemony of the [Lutheran state] church. [...] By breaking down the traditional order of society at all levels and emphasizing the responsibility and conviction of the individual as the basis of religious and social activity, the revivals thus played a significant part in creating the social and ideological conditions for the birth of the modern civil society [in Finland with its new much greater role for women].[80]

Sulkunen thus writes that it was particularly 'significant from the point of view of the suffrage question that in Finland it was women who initiated the early religious movements' in the mid-nineteenth century, 'and in the early stages they played an important role as leaders of them.'[81] Women then transferred their experience and confidence gained in the Lutheran revival movements into wider areas of social reform such as the temperance movement, the women's suffrage movement, and organized efforts in society to help the poor and downtrodden. Pirjo Markkola, the editor of the 2000 book *Gender and Vocation*, also contributed a case study of her own, focusing on the last of these areas in Finland. She examined the late nineteenth century Finnish 'deaconess movement' in which single Lutheran women joined together in societies committed to serve the needs of the less well off (sometimes called 'Protestant nuns' because of the similarities to their Roman Catholic counterparts). She also studied other forms of private charitable work undertaken by women such as remedial homes for prostitutes, alcoholics, and other 'fallen women;' and the direct entry of women into the political arena to cure the evils of Finnish society.

Markkola explains that these 'three forms of women's participation in social reform movements [...] represented the most significant part of moral reform in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Finland.'[82] They were regarded by the many female participants as ways of fulfilling the special Lutheran idea of a calling that emphasized an important role in the eyes of God in taking care of the poor and other needy in society. The Lutheran calling was distinguished from the Calvinist calling by its much greater emphasis on actions that worked to advance the Golden Rule – 'do unto others as you would have them do unto you.' In their pursuit of such a Lutheran calling women would no longer be confined to actions in the immediate household but now all of Nordic society should be their concern.

79 Sulkunen (2009: 99).
80 Sulkunen (2009: 99).
81 Sulkunen (2009: 99).
82 Markkola (2000: 138).

The Finnish Women's Association, formed in 1884 as the first women's rights society in Finland, argued that it was necessary to study 'which rules were ordered by God and which rules were only said to be God-given' by frail human beings falsely claiming to be able to speak for God – an old charge once directed by Luther at the Catholic Church but now directed at Lutheran traditionalists who opposed the new women's role in society. Following Luther's example in this new nineteenth century setting, the Finnish movement of women thus newly sought to lay 'the foundation of women's rights on a [valid] Christian basis.' As Markkola writes, they argued, for example, that

> the same Paul, who told women to keep silence in the meetings or wives to be obedient to their husbands had also promoted gender equality: "[...] there is neither slave nor free man, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus".[83]

Another organization in which nineteenth century Finnish women worked actively in the political arena to address the moral failings of society was the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU). Indeed, the temperance movement was the largest social reform movement in Finland of the late nineteenth century; its membership included large numbers of men as well but about half of its members were women. Markkola writes that the WCTU was 'an association based on Christian values. As clearly, many of the leading members supported feminist ideas of women's rights which according to their understanding had a solid foundation in the Christian social order.' So, along with reducing alcohol consumption itself, 'women's suffrage was an important issue for the movement.' Issues such as temperance and suffrage necessarily brought many Finnish women into the political arena in seeking to advance their Lutheran callings. Women's advocates in both cases now argued that 'Christian women were needed in politics and women who had a Christian worldview should vote for candidates who promoted the right issues and shared the correct values' – the ability to use the political process to make corrective social reforms being another strong reason why women's suffrage was so important to them.

In this way, although Finnish women's political involvement sought broadly to 'promote [the] common good; it also protected religion, abolished the curse of alcohol, promoted nationalism, uplifted poor and suffering and made it possible for women to have more power in other areas of society.' Markkola thus writes that the various Finnish social reform movements with women playing leading roles 'built their arguments around older Christian tradition which, in the name of God, could give women an opportunity to promote [the] good cause' in many areas of Finnish society.[84]

In eliminating the intermediary role of the Roman Catholic Church, one of the most important consequences of Luther's Reformation was to establish a new individualism in the relationship of each of the faithful with

83 Markkola (2000: 132).
84 Markkola (2000: 136, 137).

God. The Reformation was a principal source of the new individualism that would be a main characteristic of the processes of modernization as a whole throughout Europe. As this individualism gradually worked its way through Nordic society to become a defining feature of modernity, it had an especially powerful liberating influence for women. They should be free to choose for themselves their calling and the resulting role they would play in society in the service of God. The distinguished Norwegian historian of Swedish and Norwegian social democracy Francis Sejersted observes that in the Nordic countries 'arguments for women's liberation have been integral to the general liberal rights argument that sees the individual as the primary unit of society.' [85] In the twentieth century the sources of these individual rights were typically seen in the Nordic world in secular terms but a longer historical inquiry reveals that the actual sources were Christian and in particular Protestant, beginning as long ago as Luther himself.

Sejersted further explains in this regard that, as one concrete realization of the newly liberated Nordic citizenry, a 'series of women's associations were formed toward the end of the nineteenth century, partly to perform social work and partly to struggle for women's rights and women's suffrage.' Drawing on Reformation teachings and examples (Luther's defence of the primacy of individual conscience at Worms the most powerful of all), 'the concept of [individual] rights revealed itself to be an important and explosive force in the long run' for the Nordic countries (as elsewhere). As it would now be reinterpreted in the late nineteenth century and then in the twentieth century, Sejersted writes, 'the individual, whether man or woman, has the [full] right to participate in the life of the nation.' It was significantly due to this legacy, originating as far back as Luther and the Reformation, as now put into new forms of practice throughout the twentieth century, that Nordic 'women, through their associations and through their topical actions such as' in Finland were able to win for themselves a prominent place in the Nordic public sphere.[86]

All this advanced much further during the Nordic era of social democracy from the 1930 to the 1980s; it still embodied many of the old Lutheran values but they were now expressed outside of any explicit Lutheran language and setting. Indeed, they were often presented to the contrary as overcoming the failings of an outmoded old Lutheranism for the greater good of secular economic progress and the full social equality of Nordic countries. It is only quite recently that a new recognition of the critical importance of Lutheranism to social democracy has begun to take root in Finland and other Nordic countries.[87]

Reflecting this growing understanding, a special issue of the American *Journal of Church and State* appeared in 2014 on 'Lutheranism and the Nordic Welfare States.' The guest editors were Ingela Naumann and Pirjo Markkola. As they note in their Introduction, for many years it had been 'the dominant understanding that [European] welfare states had developed along the axis

85 Sejersted (2011: 88).
86 Sejersted (2011: 88).
87 Nelson (2017).

of material interests and class conflicts,' reflecting the standard economic determinism of the social sciences in the twentieth century. It has only been more recently, as the editors write, that 'a new comparative scholarship on religion and the welfare state is emerging that seeks to systematically account for the role of all Christian denominations in the formation of the European welfare state.'[88] Much the same can be said of the new equality of women that emerged in the twentieth century in the Nordic world, achieving a level of gender equality unsurpassed elsewhere in the world. Indeed, one might even describe the twentieth century 'modernization' of the Nordic countries under the banner of social democracy as the creation of a newly secular and thus partially disguised form of Lutheranism.[89]

Conclusion

In our own time, it is easy to forget that the core values and beliefs of Western civilization are originally Jewish and Greek, as then reinterpreted and transmitted by Christianity over the past two thousand years. More recently, despite the outward appearance of a decline in Christian influence, it is more accurate to say that Christianity in the modern age changed its outward appearance more than the inner substance was altered.[90] Indeed, in retrospect the past 300 years in Western civilization might now be described as an era of the advancing secularization of Christianity – such as took a secularized Lutheran path in the development of social democracy in the Nordic countries.[91] The British sociologist David Martin regards ideologies such as Marxism as modern forms of 'secular messianism.' He writes that, while many of his contemporary sociologist and other social science colleagues once regarded modernization as 'a transition from the religious to the [secular and rational] political, I regarded their politics as so much secularized religion.'[92] Indeed, for Martin the typical secularist denial of a significant continuing role in society for religion is best understood as a key tenet of secular religion itself.[93]

From the original Jewish side came the belief – now regarded as a secular rather than religious truth – that all people are created equal in the eyes of God, a radical concept for its time and that even in our own day remains so in many nations around the world. This belief offers a fundamental challenge to all efforts to create permanent nobilities, ruling classes, castes, slaves and other social distinctions that see some people as inherently superior and other people as inherently inferior. In the United States, this principle was seen as so fundamental that the nation fought a terrible civil war in the 1860s to resolve the issue of slavery, a struggle that ended the lives of around 800,000 combatants. The American movement for women's suffrage

88 Markkola & Naumann (2014).
89 Nelson (2015b, 2016).
90 Nelson (2015b).
91 Nelson (2015a). See also Gregory (2012) for similar ideas.
92 Martin (2014: 16, 17).
93 See also Smith (2014).

and other rights emerged out of the movement to abolish slavery, as married women took up the fight against their historic status as the property of their husbands. The American abolition movement, followed by the American woman's suffrage movement, drew heavily on Christian arguments for the freedom and equality of each individual person, as based on their all being made equally in the image of God.[94] The American civil rights movement in the 1960s was led by a Baptist minister, Martin Luther King, Jr who made a similar case grounded in the Christian message.

The fact that genuine equality often offers a basic challenge to the ruling authorities of a nation is of course one reason why the maintenance of full equality will always be a difficult task. Over the past 2000 years in Western civilization, some societies have had greater equality, and others less, but in the Judeo-Christian tradition the ideal of full equality has never been lost. Although it has been difficult to realize in practice in this world, in heaven, however, we will all truly be equal, including men and women alike. On earth some compromises will apparently be necessary, but in the Nordic countries with their Lutheran heritages these compromises have normally been less than anywhere else.

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Religious Revival Movements and the Development of the Twentieth-century Welfare-state in Finland

Abstract

The Lutheran state church had a monopoly status in Finland for centuries. But its dominance slowly weakened as pietistic revival movements spread in Finland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These movements had religious purposes, but they were also forerunners of profound social and economic changes in Finland in the twentieth century. In challenging the role of the state church, they challenged national unity, spread Western cultural values, emphasized individual rights, and improved the status of women in society. Men of political eminence, such as Anders Chydenius, introduced these influences on Finnish economic life. Overall, the revival movements helped to pave the way for the modern Finnish welfare state. During that process, the church lost some of its most important social responsibilities – health care, education and social work – as these tasks were assumed by the secular Finnish state.

Introduction

As previous studies have shown, religion is a significant factor in explaining the development of the Scandinavian welfare system.[1] In this chapter I argue that the effects of religious developments should be included as explanatory variables in accounts of the historical rise of the welfare state in Finland as well. My focus is the influence of pietistic revival movements.

Pietist revival movements are an important part of Finnish religious history. Ecstatic movements were born in the 1770s in various parts of Finland and were initially independent of one another. During that time the Christian religion held an unrivalled influence on the beliefs of Finnish citizens, thanks to the determined efforts of the dominant Lutheran state church.[2]

1 See, e.g., Manow (2002) and Anderson (2009).
2 Ruokanen (2002: 37, 253).

The most noteworthy revival movements were those that remained within the Lutheran state church. They began mainly as protest movements, and the followers were somewhat spurned by the officials of the church. These followers belonged formally to the church but were also, to a greater or lesser extent, involved in their own separate groups.

The diversity of Finnish revival movements reflects the fact that they have often been most successful individually in particular geographical areas. Some of the important revival movements in Finnish history are the Awakening Movement (or just the Awakening; *herännäisyys* in Finnish), Beseecherism (*rukoilevaisuus* in Finnish), the Laestadian Movement (*lestadiolaisuus* in Finnish) and the Lutheran Evangelical Movement (*evankelisuus* in Finnish). All these movements have their own traditions, hymns, and religious rhetoric. The latest large revival movement is the Fifth Revival (*viides herätysliike* in Finnish), which has also remained inside the Lutheran church.

The political state of affairs in Finland in the nineteenth century was somewhat different than that of the other Nordic countries, as its separation from the Kingdom of Sweden in 1809 raised the need to strengthen Finnish nationalism. In nineteenth-century Finland the Lutheran church functioned as a safeguard against Russian hegemony. As a result, religious revival movements played an important national unifying role. For political, sociological, and cultural reasons, Finland proved to be fertile soil for new revivals.[3]

Finnish revival movements were thus important cultural and political forces because they spread Western cultural influences, strengthened the work ethic, and emphasized individualism and civil rights. The emphasis of Lutheranism on the importance of daily work and a 'priesthood of all believers' corresponds to values central to the Finnish welfare state: full employment and equality.[4]

History of pietism

In Germany, important dissident voices against the theological mainstream appeared towards the end of the seventeenth century, most notably in the pietist movement led by Philipp Jacob Spener (1635–1705), who was the leader of the congregation in Frankfurt. Pietists accused the Lutheran church of having lapsed into its own version of Scholasticism, its theology repeating similar themes with increasing logical sophistication but showing little real new life. Spener argued that the Lutheran orthodox ecclesiastical establishment had become so absorbed in the defence of doctrinal correctness that it was neglecting the pastoral needs of ordinary Christians. The religious life of the Lutheran parish had become desiccated and stale.[5]

3 Kakkuri (2014: 111).
4 Anderson (2009: 213).
5 Clark (2007: 124).

After Spener, August Herman Francke (1663–1727) founded the famous Francke Foundations. The establishment of this foundation signalled that pietism was not only demanding personal faith, but was a practically oriented movement, emphasizing education, missionary work, and social care.

In Finland, an early forerunner for pietism and a main figure in challenging later Lutheran orthodoxy was Johann Arndt (1555–1621). His books *The Garden of Paradise* (first Finnish translation published 1732, with three other additional editions published during the eighteenth century in Finland) and *True Christianity* (published in 1832 in Finnish) were important guides for Finnish revivals. Pietism proper came ashore in Finland relatively rapidly. One of the first importers of pietism was Johannes Gezelius the younger (1647–1718), who later became the Bishop of Turku. He lived in Frankfurt am Main during the years when pietism was gaining force. There Gezelius became acquainted with Spener and other pietists, with whom he also corresponded after he left Germany.

However, in the eighteenth century, religion was far from being a private matter; it was also an essential political factor. If one struggled against the Lutheran state church, one was fighting against the very identity of the nation and society.[6] This meant severe punishments for some of the more influential pietists. For instance, the most influential early pietist in Finland, Laurentius Ulstadius, caused a riot in Turku during a Mass in 1688 and was sentenced to death in 1692, with the sentence later changed to life in prison. He died in 1732 after spending 44 years in prison. Another early pietist in Finland, Petter Schäfer (1663–1729), first escaped to Germany and later to North America because of his religious convictions. After his long travels, he finally returned to Turku and in 1709 was sentenced to death and imprisoned for his lifetime.[7] Schäfer was detained in the castle of Turku and during his last years in Gävle, Sweden, where he died in 1729. Yet another of the early pietists in Finland was Isaacus Laurbecchius (1677–1719), who was a learned son of the bishop of Viipuri. He got a Doctor's degree at the University of Altdorf at the age of only 23. His contacts with Schäfer caused him serious problems, and he subsequently lost his degree, priesthood, and academic position.[8] Thus, when analysing the importance of the Lutheran church in Finland, not only the theological dimensions are important, but the political as well.

The period when Finland was a Grand Duchy of Russia (1809–1917) was a difficult one for Finnish identity. Under Russian rule, Finland struggled to maintain its Scandinavian culture and autonomy. Several important institutions were 'Russianized' during this time, such as the Senate and the University of Helsinki, among many others.

Nevertheless, one central Finnish authority and institution which was never Russianized was the Lutheran church. It retained its position as a symbol of Western culture. Finland did not change its state religion to Russian Orthodoxy, and the Lutheran church remained as a cultural – and

6 Kakkuri (2014: 74).
7 Schäfer (2000).
8 Schäfer (2000).

a political – symbol of Finland's desire to maintain its Scandinavian and Western culture. This high societal status of the church explains why the Russians never really challenged the monopoly status of the Lutheran church in Finland during the Grand Duchy but even promoted it.[9] The Lutheran church in Finland is more than a religious institution; it is a strong national and political force, supporting Finnish culture and its Scandinavian roots.

In addition to such developments within Lutheranism, another, partially related, impetus for societal change was the Enlightenment. It brought new optimism about the human condition and the prospects for social and economic progress. With the astonishing discoveries of Isaac Newton and others who applied the scientific method, it also appeared that the corruption of human nature had done less damage to human rational capacities than had been supposed. Such events also contributed to the need for a wider rethinking of Lutheranism, also among theologians, as calls for a 'second Reformation' began in the Nordic countries in the late eighteenth century.

The Enlightenment-era clergy believed that when the common folk became more affluent, they would have more opportunities to read and learn Christian doctrine. Nevertheless, at the same time the content of such doctrine also changed. The Enlightenment philosophy supported 'natural theology' and relegated several longstanding fundamental doctrines to a secondary status. Yet this new natural theology had little to offer the common folk, who were more concerned with the individual salvation of their souls.[10]

Through the actions of individual priests, pietistic influences affected public policy-making. One of the most influential was Anders Chydenius (1729–1803). He was a Finnish priest, a member of the Swedish Riksdag, and is known as the leading early classical liberal of Nordic history. He advocated openness and good governance. Ideologically, Chydenius followed a pietist theology and worked hard to advocate anti-monopolistic laws and supported strong protections of private ownership in society.[11] The writings and sermons of Chydenius reflect the influence of emerging pietism in that they emphasize individual religious responsibilities not only in the continuous struggle for righteousness and eternal life, but also for economic success, a strong work ethic, and social responsibility. Chydenius supported diligence, honesty, and modesty. He wrote harshly about luxury consumption and a lifestyle of extravagance.[12] In his writings, Chydenius closely follows the economic arguments of Martin Luther and later pietists.

Revival movements in Finland

As with most major changes in Finnish society, the pietistic revival movements also started small. The first movement to emerge in Finland was Beseecherism. It began when a young herder girl and maidservant, Liisa

9 See, e.g., Portman (2017).
10 Kakkuri (2014: 33).
11 Virrankoski (1986: 383–387).
12 Chydenius (1782: 298–323).

Eerikintytär, from the rural hamlet of Santtio (situated in the village of Kalanti), was 'born again' in 1756. While herding cattle, she read a book by an English Puritan cleric, Arthur Dent, from 1624. Its title was *The Opening of Heaven's Gates* and it created a terrifying fear in Liisa concerning the status of her soul and her possible everlasting fate in hell if she did not enter into full-hearted repentance. Liisa's mystical experience soon had an impact beyond the hamlet of Santtio, spreading like wildfire to towns throughout Southwest Finland, Satakunta and Ostrobotnia. Hundreds of people, especially women, experienced ecstatic visions and screamed as the flames of hell seemed to be appearing before them. Others had ecstatic seizures and visions of good and bad angels and prophecies of a coming heavenly judgment. The local Lutheran priests were astonished and did not know how to deal with the situation.

Only two years after Liisa's first ecstatic vision, vicar Laihiander of the Eura parish (in Satakunta) became aware of hundreds of people who had become active members of this new movement. It was not always well regarded by the state church, although some Lutheran priests supported it, especially vicar Abraham Achrenius (1706–1769), who is usually named as the later leader of the movement. Vicar Immanuel Brunlöf in the nearby town of Uusikylä was not as enthusiastic, sending subordinates Johan Tenlenius and Carl Wallenström to threaten believers with long imprisonment. Strangely, all information about Liisa has disappeared beyond the two to three years after her ecstatic experiences. Some rumours even suggest that the priests might have murdered her, but no evidence of Liisa's later life can be found.

It is important to note that this movement, as well as most of the later revival movements, originated among the common folk. They were the religious expressions of ordinary people, who were taking their religious needs into their own hands, without expecting any help from the established Lutheran state church. Therefore, it is not surprising that these movements were regarded suspiciously, to say at least, by the established religious institution, the monopolistic Lutheran state church. These revival movements challenged the clergy of the Lutheran church, which wielded both religious and political power.

Beseecherism, or Prayerism, was not the only revival movement in Finland heavily influenced by pietism. Another important movement, the Awakening, began as an ecstatic movement in 1796 in the fields of Telppäsniitty where people were collecting hay. Several working people fell to the ground, attributing this to the power of the Holy Spirit, and began to speak in tongues and see spiritual visions. The main leaders of the movement were layman Paavo Ruotsalainen and Lutheran pastor Nils Gustav Malmberg, followed later by his son, pastor Wilhelmi Malmivaara. The Lutheran Evangelical Movement was born in 1843, when Lutheran pastor Fredrik Gabriel Hedberg left the Awakening movement. This revival movement emphasized the original theology and writings of Martin Luther, gaining the largest number of followers in Western Finland.

One of the most important early revival leaders in Finland was Paavo Ruotsalainen (1777–1852). His form of religion was strictly individualistic and had strong pietist roots. As Ruokanen notes, 'Paavo encouraged all his

followers to think, read the Bible and also understand it by themselves. In this was the core of the freedom of thinking and religion.'[13] According to Ruotsalainen, a Finnish peasant was alone, facing his God by himself. He did not need any church, religious institution, or priests between God and himself.

A Bible for the common people

In all these revival movements, the individual reading of the Bible was important. This was made possible by the increasing use of a Finnish-language Bible including the New Testament, which started to find its way into the hands of common people in Finland during the early nineteenth century. This was assisted by the founding of the Finnish Bible Society (FiBS), whose roots trace back to the Evangelical missionary movement in England of the eighteenth century. The core goal of this English missionary movement was the distribution of affordable Bibles throughout the world. The FiBS was founded in 1812 and started printing small and less expensive Bibles. It established local societies around Finland and printed thousands of affordable Bibles. This work was essential for the emerging revival movements in Finland.

The establishment of the Finnish Bible Society was related to three other contemporary developments in Finland. First, FiBS was controlled not only by religious bodies but also by the political elite. One of its aims was to spread the values and thinking of the ruling class among the common people. Increasing access to Finnish-language Bibles was seen as enhancing literacy skill, diligence and perhaps some positive personal traits (such as integrity and a work ethic) among the people. The Russian emperor Alexander I was the official protector of the FiBS from its inception, which was meant to increase the level of trust between Russian officials and the Finnish people. Another factor was an emerging evangelical Christianity and the revival movements. They benefited greatly from increased access to affordable and small-size Bibles. Third, the FiBS was also the first Christian organization in Finland which was open to all people, regardless of social class. The organization was also effective in its work. According to market research done by the British Bible society, in 1834 about 40 percent of Finnish households in Western Finland already had a Bible. Nevertheless, there were large differences in the country, as in Eastern Finland only 20 percent of households had a Bible that year.[14]

Yet it should be noted that not all people among the elite of society supported the FiBS and its aims. Some feared that the organization would put the Bible in the hands of people who lacked the necessary intellectual capacity to interpret it properly. For example, a professor of Greek and Oriental languages from the Academy of Åbo, Johan Bonsdorff, did not join the FiBS. Nevertheless, Bishop Jacob Tengström so vigorously supported the FiBS that no significant opposition emerged.[15]

13 Ruokanen (2002: 94).
14 Kakkuri (2015: 121–122, 149).
15 Björkstrand (2012: 307).

The role of women

Women had an important role in the early revival movements, paving the way for the equality of women in the twentieth century. In addition to Liisa Eerikintytär, mentioned above, Anna Jaakontytär lived in the same town as Liisa and was accused of being a religious separatist in 1759. She had failed to take Communion and attend Mass for seven years, which was seen as a worrisome accusation. Yet Anna Jaakontytär explained that she was receiving Communion directly from Christ and was in no need of spiritual counselling from the official parish. In that time, such thinking and behaviour was considered treason against the state.[16]

Even though the active lifetime of Liisa Eerikintytär was short, she attracted several important followers in the later revival movements. In the city of Pori, on Finland's West coast, three influential women emerged. Two of those, Anna Lagerblad and Juliana Söderborg, were mystic prophets who saw heavenly visions and preached to large crowds. They were investigated, but they were not separatists and were not harshly treated by the Lutheran authorities. Juliana was an active parishioner and was commonly called by priests as one of the 'angels of Lord Sabaoth.'

A third important woman in the Pori area was Anna Rogel, who died young in 1784 at the age of 31. For ten years, however, she was perhaps the best-known female spiritual figure in Finland. She became very ill in 1770 and lay unconscious for seven months. But suddenly, on Christmas Day 1770, she began to preach. She was very weak, not able to eat for several weeks, but could nevertheless preach, sing, pray, and prophesize for hours, lying half-conscious in her bed. Large crowds gathered to hear her words. She kept on preaching for 14 years, until her death in 1784.[17] Again, the official Lutheran church did not react favourably to the new movement. Anna found her leading antagonist in the person of the Lutheran vicar of Merikarvia, Andreas Eneberg. Nevertheless, the movement had a strong and long-lasting effect over a large area of Finland and several laywomen followers emerged during the later years.

Later, the Free Church movement also had its important women leaders. One such figure was Jessie Penn-Lewis (1861–1927), a Welsh evangelical speaker and author of a number of Christian evangelical works. She visited Finland in 1888 and offered a Bible course in Joensuu.[18] She was later a part of the Wales revival in 1904–1905, one of the largest Christian revivals ever to break out.

These revival movements, often dominated by strong female presences, advanced the political movement for increasing the political participation of women in Finland. It should be remembered that Finland was the first European country to introduce universal women's suffrage in 1906 and elected the world's first female members of parliament in the 1907 parliamentary elections. These Finnish women set an example that also helped pave the way for the greater political and cultural role of women elsewhere in Europe.

16 Sulkunen (1999).
17 Sarlin (1961: 5).
18 Nyman (2014: 118).

There was also at least one unfortunate sect, controlled by two spinster women with socialist backgrounds, Alma Kartano and Tilda Reunanen (both from Huittinen), who used their authority in criminal ways.[19] Nevertheless, this sect was an isolated case in the long history of women in religious movements, enabling women's eventual political emergence as equal political and economic participants in Finland's social and economic life.

The Free Church challenge

The religious movements discussed up to this point mostly came from within the Lutheran state church. However, other religious revivals led to the development of new religious organizations outside the state church, thus challenging the dominance of the Lutheran church establishment. The Free Churches disputed the privileged role of the Lutheran church of Finland, as did the labour movement, which was often antireligious.[20] In Finland most revivalists remained officially inside the Lutheran state church but some 'free churches' were also established outside the state church, although they did not gain a legally authorized outside status until the second half of the nineteenth century, thus delaying their full emergence.

By the late nineteenth century missionaries from non-Lutheran religions in other countries were coming to Finland, where they enjoyed a growing influence. It should be noted that many of these later revivalists spread among the upper social classes in Finland, unlike the earlier revivalists, who came from the common Finnish-speaking folk. For instance, the Swedish Missionary organization sent Constantin Boije to Helsinki in 1879, who shortly thereafter invited English revivalists to assist him in his efforts, including Lord Radstock.[21]The real name of Lord Radstock, member of the House of Lords of Great Britain, was Granville Augustus William Waldegrave (1835–1913). His father was a vice admiral and lord, and his honorary title was later inherited by his son. His mother was a daughter of the head of the Bank of England. The English revival movement had thus spread especially among the upper classes and academics and through them to the upper classes in other countries, such as Finland. For instance, Edward Björkenheim, a wealthy landlord, became an enthusiastic Free Church preacher as the revival gained momentum in Finland during the 1880s.

The birth of the Free Church in Finland illustrates the importance of foreign influences on religious developments in Finland. Juho Lehto, the pastor of the Free Church congregation in Helsinki, writes in his Free Church history that 'all Christianity in Finland has been brought from foreign countries: Germany, Sweden, Great Britain and the US. Domestically there is nothing but old Finnish paganism and superstition.'[22] Pastor Lehto also

19 Appelsin (2010).

20 Anderson (2009: 218). However, these antireligious views may have reflected the sentiments of the labour movement's leadership more than those of their followers (see Kannisto 2016).

21 Westin (1975).

22 Nyman (2014: 114).

illustrates the cold attitudes of the Lutheran church towards its competitors during the nineteenth century by writing: 'In its haughty piousness, the Lutheran church walked past the rotting victim of the robbery, lying by the road to Jericho. The religious life was uncivilized and slept its sleep of insouciance.'[23]

Although most foreign revivalist preachers spoke only English or Swedish at first, a Finnish-speaking Free Church had been established by 1885. After Finland's independence in 1917 and the Freedom of Religion Act in 1923, the Free Churches in Finland would split into Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking congregations, gathered together into the Swedish-speaking Fria Missionsförbundet and into the Finnish speaking Suomen Vapaakirkko (Evangelical Free Church of Finland). While these organizations have remained small in number, their influence as a forerunner and strengthener of pietistic theology and individualistic life norms in Finland has been significant. They have always also had extensive poor relief and nursing operations.

Other Protestant churches came to Finland as well. The Baptists were first in establishing new Finnish churches. They began their revival meetings first in Åland in 1856 and the first Baptist congregation was established in Luvia, close to Pori, in 1871. The first Methodist congregation was established in Vaasa in 1881 (Swedish) and the first Finnish-speaking Methodist congregation in Pori in 1887. The Pentecostal movement came to Finland in the 1910s after visits by the Methodist preacher Thomas Ball Barratt from Norway.

The leaders of the Free Churches usually came from the agricultural as well as urban upper classes, but the ordinary members were often industrial workers. The Dissenters' Act of 1889 had allowed for non-Lutheran Protestant denominations, and the constitution of 1919 guaranteed religious freedom, which was subsequently defined more precisely in the Freedom of Religion Act in 1922.[24] The establishment of the Free Churches thus challenged the privileged role of the Lutheran state church.

Nevertheless, the numbers of members in Free Churches and other non-Lutheran Protestant congregations remained low. Their influence in the Finnish religious culture, however, is much larger than what is reflected in membership numbers. These revivals, which led to the building of new Free Churches, spread among the common people, so they did not remain for long as movements of the upper social classes alone.

Such movements have brought new cultural influences and ideas from outside Finland, as these revivals have often been connected to the emerging revivals in the UK and in the US. Because of these connections, the Finnish religious landscape is more Western, diverse and adaptive than would have been the case under the continuing near-complete monopoly of the Lutheran state church. As already noted, the Lutheran church was not especially welcoming to such emerging religious competitors, but it ultimately had to make concessions as legislation gradually allowed for religious freedom.

23 Lehto (1945: 23). Translation by the author.
24 Markkola (2011: 105–106).

Economics of the revival movements

Pietistic Christianity has had a profound influence on the Finnish way of life and mindset. For instance, Finnish people separate faith and everyday life exactly according to pietistic teaching. As pietistic sermons have emphasized, religion is a private matter.

One reason for this strong influence may be that the religious views of Finnish pietism were not so radically different from those of orthodox Lutheranism. It was more important that pietism challenged the established national power structures, that is, the state and the church. The kingdom of Sweden, to which Finland belonged until 1809, based its existence significantly on religious unity: Lutheranism was the binding force of the state because it held the whole Swedish nation together. Every threat to this unity had to be resisted. Pietistic revival movements may seem to be lesser actors, but they were seen as a challenge to Swedish (and later Finnish) national unity. This is why radical pietists were commonly persecuted and sent to jail, largely based on the Conventicle Act passed by the Swedish king Fredrik I in 1726. It remained in force until 1870 and its intent was to restrict the pietistic revival movements in Finland. Using the Conventicle Act, authorities punished pietistic movements and figures, such as Abraham Achrenius at Nousiainen in 1761.[25]

In orthodox Lutheranism the prevailing teachings emphasized the central importance of God's Word and the sacraments (Baptism and the Eucharist). Pietists questioned the central importance of the national state church and saw the Holy Spirit as an essential sign of a true congregation. Pietism was also a threat to the privileged position of the clergy. In pietism, the laymen were expected to preach the Gospel. Pietist laymen broke the unity of the church and thus threatened the unity of the nation. Additionally, one of the reasons for seeing pietism as a threat to national unity was its Prussian origins. The pietist Francke Foundations were very popular in Prussia and thus pietism was sometimes seen in Nordic countries as advancing a foreign influence.[26]

In the Nordic countries, ethnic and religious differences were smaller than in most other parts of Europe. Religion in the German-speaking world showed the danger of differences, whereas in the homogeneous Nordic countries religion demonstrated and underscored that the people were united. The Nordic countries were peasant societies with a weak urban culture. It should be noted that one main bonding force in the Nordic nation-states of the nineteenth century was the 'Bildungsbauertum,' the broad layer of society consisting of a free and educated peasantry. Because of this societal structure, Finland and Norway, two examples of young nations born after the turmoil of the French Revolution, were united in a way that was completely different to the spirit of the French Revolution. In these two countries there was no strong old officialdom to be cast aside. The elite were subordinate to the 'national interest' and thus did not resist

25 Kakkuri (2014: 61, 220).
26 Kakkuri (2014: 44).

state initiatives but emerged instead as parts of a new type of corporate regime based on a division of labour between state, municipality, church, and voluntary agencies, reflecting the ideal of a common set of norms. Even the new revivalist movements of the nineteenth century became important and trustworthy 'nation-builders,' accepting the objectives of the nation to such an extent that they never left the Lutheran state church.[27]

Lutheranism was thus needed as part of the national identity. The Finnish people have strong traditional values anchored in a traditional free peasant society. One could rely on 'positivist' thinking according to which parliamentarians had the legitimate right to decide what was right and wrong (instead of putting faith in such metaphysical concepts as natural law), because one could count on the legislators being steered by fair and just values.[28]

If Finland had remained Catholic, the church and state would not have been one national body, and the country would instead have been modernized according to a conviction that society does have at least two different epistemic and moral authorities. Work, paying taxes, and taking responsibility for the defence of the country were powerful forces bringing the whole population into one and the same societal body. In Finland there is a stronger belief in the existence of fair and above-board solutions, anchored in the strong historical experience of one-norm consensus based on a single common religion.[29]

The threat of Russification

During the nineteenth century in Russia, a number of anarchist movements emerged that took aim against the state. Russian authorities were afraid that Finnish pietists would similarly support such revolutionary designs. Since that did not happen, czars accepted some religious departures from orthodox dogma as long as they were not directed against the state.

Large European revival movements were born in the industrial centres of England, where Free Churches deviated from the Anglican state church. They demanded social equality and schooling for the emerging labour class. Free Churches paved the road for the Labour Party, while the Anglican Church supported conservatives and the British Empire. In Finland, the pietist movements were pre-political forces. They gave peasants self-esteem and literature to consume.[30]

Wilhelmi Malmivaara wrote in 1906 that the suggested separation of church and state would bring a great danger for Finland because it would increase the risk of Russification. The Lutheran church and Lutheran citizens were the best supporters of the Finnish nation by functioning as a bulwark against Russification.[31]

27 Stenius (2015).
28 Strang (2010).
29 Rainio-Niemi (2014); Stenius (2005).
30 Ruokanen (2002: 39–40).
31 Huhta (1999: 25).

Pietistic leaders stressed their loyalty to the czar and other secular authorities. Revivals were not politically revolutionary. On the contrary, from the viewpoint of the Lutheran church, the most important task was to maintain free Lutheran worship and religious practice under the orthodox czar. The diet of Porvoo 1809 did dispel some concerns when the Lutheran church and priests retained their position and privileges.[32]

The development of economic policy

The privileged status of the Lutheran church meant that its social and religious position was protected, forming a virtual monopoly, as the vast majority of the population remained tax-paying members. As a result, the Lutheran state church faced little pressure to adjust its teachings to new social and economic circumstances. The church thus retained a conservative set of teachings that had little appeal to the working classes. It also did not intend that political actors would actually listen to its teachings, so alternative sources of social policy thinking emerged. Therefore, this state church status left a vacuum that could be filled by other actors, such as religiously motivated lay people and secular political forces.[33]

The Lutheran church was gradually losing its central role in the social and economic management of Finland. First, liberalism emphasized individualism and second, revival movements criticized the church on theological grounds.[34] Moreover, with the church law of 1869 and the liberally oriented statute of 1879, responsibility for social assistance slowly shifted from Lutheran congregations to municipalities.[35] Finally, this development led to a political environment where the contemporary welfare state model can be seen as representing a transformation from the original Lutheran ideal of society.[36] Additionally, it should be remembered that the Lutheran church in Finland did not oppose state involvement in social welfare. In this sense it can be said that Lutheranism shaped the development of the Finnish welfare state because, as an organized state religion, it welcomed state involvement in social welfare and even viewed the state as an essential partner in the development of the poor relief system.

Later on, rural parishes and municipalities were separated in Finland and the local responsibility for the poor became a municipal issue. At the same time, the church lost its local administrative function as an organizer of poor relief.[37] These developments were welcomed by both the revivalists and the Lutheran clergy. The revivalist movements had expressed a fear that the church would become an administrative institution solely existing to uphold morality and social order.[38] The clergy, on the other hand, was happy to be relieved from the obligations of poor relief.

32 Ruokanen (2002: 122, 227–228).
33 Anderson (2009: 233).
34 Heininen & Heikkilä (2010: 188); Karisto, Takala & Haapola (2009: 233–237).
35 Heininen & Heikkilä (2010: 181); Malkavaara (2000: 22).
36 Salonen, Niemelä & Kääriäinen (2001: 12–13).
37 Angell & Pessi (2010).
38 Markkola (2011).

Three main social movements and power blocks can be identified over the course of the nineteenth century in Finland. The Lutheran church was, at first, a monopoly ruling institution, which also had major secular tasks, especially in matters of local governance. Later, the emerging labour movement was turning towards ideas of class revolution and gaining followers among the lower social classes. It became somewhat negative in its attitudes towards religion and saw priests and the church as its enemy in the class struggle. Finally, a third faction was the revival movements, both inside and outside the Lutheran state church, which supported their own religious views and began to see the labour movement as opponents, because it had become somewhat atheistic in its thinking.

The socialist believers of Rekikoski

Finnish sociologist Risto Alapuro has used Huittinen, an agricultural town in the Western Finland agricultural heartland of Satakunta, as a micro-cultural dataset.[39] It was precisely in Huittinen, where the tensions between opposite social classes erupted into violent clashes in 1917. The stage for this historical event was interesting, since the labour movement at that time was not well organized and there were few prior signs of possible violence. That was the first clash between the owners of capital and labour in Finland. Industrialization was slowly developing and the labour movement's self-consciousness was low at the beginning of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, there were already in the nineteenth century several active ideologically motivated organizations in Huittinen, including the temperance movement, the fire brigade, the retail co-operatives, and most of all, the religious revival movements.

Alapuro provides a more detailed micro-evaluation of one small locality in Huittinen, named Rekikoski, which offers a revealing example of what these social and religious tensions finally yielded. In Rekikoski, most citizens were active members in the Lutheran Evangelical Movement (*evankelisuus*). Alapuro writes that the aggressive agitators in the labour movement had to 'fight against the believers in Rekikoski.' In Rekikoski, the evangelical revival movement was active even after it had somewhat subsided in the central parts of the region of Huittinen. As would be expected, the born-again believers and members of the revival movement in Rekikoski held an opposing worldview compared to atheist socialists.

Nevertheless, it is strange that the majority (80 percent) of the people in Rekikoski voted for the labour movement, with voting participation high. It would have seemed more likely that the believers in Rekikoski would have voted for candidates supporting Christian values or would have otherwise abstained from voting altogether. But the Christian believers in Rekikoski did neither; they 'voted for openly godless candidates in great numbers.' Parikka even suggests that the religious folk in Rekikoski 'had their very own interpretation of Christianity.'[40]

39 Alapuro (2001).
40 Parikka (1997).

In spite of all their major differences in values, religion and ideology, the Christian believers and socialists found each other in agreement in one key respect: Negative attitudes against the 'rulers' and 'higher social classes.' Both ends of the political spectrum saw themselves as opposing the ruling Lutheran governance of 'rich and proud' office-holding priests and the monopoly church. The socialists saw the Lutheran church as an oppressive instrument of reaction and the tool of the capitalist owning class, as 'the opium of the people.' The revivalist believers saw the state church as a bureaucratic group of nominal Christians and the extinguishers of the true Spirit, perhaps even persecutors to some extent. Therefore, the political voting behaviour of the believers and the socialists was surprisingly similar. 'Votes were given rather against the candidates of the ruling classes than for the labour movement.'[41] The hard work, individualism, and entrepreneurship of Christian revivalism were perhaps quite compatible with the Finnish understanding of democratic socialism of the time.

If so, the example of the small town of Rekikoski illuminates the complex but fertile soil where the revival movements were operating. Remarkably, pietistic revivalists joined forces with atheist socialists. Revival movements were brought to Scandinavia with the winds of Calvinist individualism and supported a larger role for women in society and helped to undermine the monopoly of the Lutheran state church. Social democrats in Finland built the Scandinavian version of 'the socialist paradise on earth' and perhaps owe a debt of gratitude to the pietistic revival movements for aiding their success. It is paradoxical that the lower social classes of Finnish society found each other, by uniting against the common enemy, as warriors fighting the authority of the Lutheran state church.

Conclusion

The monopoly of the Lutheran state church was challenged from two opposing directions. Both extremes, religious revival movements and socialist class warriors, found their enemy in the Lutheran state church. The religious revivalists became economically significant as they empowered the common people to take their economic destiny into their own hands.

Revival movements and several Free Churches partly paved the way for the emergence of the labour movement and secular social care services by challenging the leading role of the Lutheran state church. Therefore, the temporal authorities slowly assumed more responsibility for social care, education and health. Revival movements emphasized individualism, civil rights, and freedom of speech and channelled Western cultural influences to the Nordic countries, thereby easing the transition of Finnish society towards Western capitalism. Many pietists would likely be embarrassed to find out that their eagerness and fervour for Christian revival opened the doors not to the Millennial Kingdom of Christ on earth, but to modern Finland, where the church's role in society is minimized.

41 Alapuro (2001: 125).

Early pietistic preachers such as Anders Chydenius emphasized the themes of a work ethic, economic success, and social responsibility. Religious revivals supported economically beneficial moral traits such as diligence, honesty, and modesty. Due to the religious revivals the literacy rate rose in Finland, as common people obtained their own Bibles and studied them closely. Pietism strengthened the work ethic, rule of law, and the rights of private ownership. Revival movements also gave women new leadership roles in society and enabled them to achieve a growing status in economic life.

Nevertheless, the Lutheran state church remained a national institution. For political reasons, including the need for a bulwark against Russian rule during the Grand Duchy, few people desired to see it completely removed from its position. The Lutheran church needed to remain an essential national institution, connecting Finland strongly to Scandinavian and Western culture and its heritage, where it has always wanted to be found. This development challenged the state church, emphasized individual rights and took from the church some of its most important responsibilities such as health care, education, and social work, and gave these tasks to the secular state. It should also be emphasized that women's role in all these developments was significant. The women's religious movement later assumed a secular form with the development of the temperance movement and the suffrage movement.

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Between Lutheran Legacy and Economy as Religion: The Contested Roles of Philanthropy in Finland Today

Abstract

This chapter discusses the changing role of philanthropy in the Finnish context in light of the country's cultural values and Lutheran history. Philanthropy is defined as the practice of giving money and time to help make life better for other people. The ways in which welfare provision is allocated between the state, market, families, and the third sector influence the needs, norms, and motives for philanthropy in different countries. This chapter introduces the role of societal contexts in shaping philanthropy and the ways in which philanthropy is understood in different contexts. It then discusses traits of Nordic Lutheranism, which influence the Finnish social contract and understandings of the roles and responsibilities of individual citizens and governing authorities, as well as differing viewpoints regarding philanthropy. After analysing these fundamental factors, current changes in the Finnish welfare model and the changing roles of philanthropy and individual citizens in it are discussed.

Introduction

The division of welfare responsibility between the public sector (state, municipalities), market (private businesses), third sector (non-profit organizations, civil society), and family varies in different contexts.[1]

1 I thank Professors Nancy Ammerman and Stephen Kalberg for very beneficial discussions related with this chapter during my position as Visiting Researcher in Boston University in 2016, and Professor Robert H. Nelson for important discussions and cooperation during 2016 and 2017. The first draft of this chapter was presented in the symposium 'Holy money? Economy as Religion' at the University of Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies. I thank the members of the Protestant Roots of Finnish National Identities (ProFini) network and other participants for comments and discussions. I thank the Academy of Finland for funding my research as a part of the project 'Cooperation in Care. Meaning systems, chances and conflicts,' and the project's director Professor Anne Birgitta Pessi as well as the research group for discussions and comments.

Throughout the 20th century, Finland and other Nordic countries developed the role of the public sector in welfare, resulting in a Nordic welfare state model. In this model, the public sector provides the majority of welfare services, whereas other sectors of society complement public welfare. Economic, social, and educational basic rights are guaranteed in Finland by the state and municipal authorities. The social protection granted by the public sector consists of preventive social and health policy, social welfare and health services, as well as sickness, unemployment, old age and other benefits. Practically all households receive a form of income transfer or use social and health services at some point or another. The central government, municipalities and employers mainly finance social expenditures, and the direct contribution to the social protection expenditure made by insured parties is far lower in Finland than in the other EU countries. This is a characteristic feature of countries where benefits are based on the principle of universality, and it has also been strongly supported by the vast majority of Finns.[2]

However, since a severe recession in the 1990s, welfare services have slowly been changing. Services have been outsourced to other sectors of society, resulting in a welfare mix type of system. Also, individual citizens and the third sector have been forced to react to needs which are no longer met by the public sector.[3] Since the economic recession of 2008 and continuing, welfare reforms are increasingly argued with the growing proportion of elderly in the population and the consequently weakening dependency ratio, as well as dependence on the EU and global economies challenging public spending. Political speech and public debates paint cutbacks as inevitable. Individuals are urged to take more responsibility for their loved ones' and their own welfare through insurance and savings for sickness and retirement. The roles of family and volunteers are continuously discussed, for example, in relation to care provided for the elderly.

Thus, the roles of the societal sectors are renegotiated in welfare, and individuals and the third sector are gaining more responsibility. Other changes and situations in the Finnish model also indicate a new era and new (political) attitudes, especially in relation to the non-profit sector and philanthropy. For example, universities have been financially independent after a 2010 university reform ending their role as state accounting offices, and their own fundraising is encouraged by the ministry through financial incentives. Debates related to the role of philanthropy in welfare have grown around fundraising for a new children's hospital. This fundraising led to overwhelming opposition and questions about whether it is appropriate that support for such an essential part of health services depends on philanthropic aid in a welfare state.[4] However, attitudes turned more positive when a very visible campaign was organized for the fundraising effort, including celebrity donors and media attention. Also, volunteering has been implicitly and explicitly discussed in relation to social security and the responsibilities

2 E.g., Pessi & Grönlund (2012); Karvonen & Vaarama (2014).
3 E.g., Grönlund & Hiilamo (2006); Saari & Pessi (2011); Vaarama et al. (2014).
4 *YLE Uutiset*, February 20, 2013.

of different sectors. For example, in 2013, then-Minister of Social Affairs and Health Paula Risikko suggested abolishing unconditional social welfare, proposing that recipients of social welfare payments should be forced to take part in societal activities, very similar to volunteering. The suggestion was widely criticized at that time, and it was not implemented as such.[5]

Furthermore, the role of formal and informal volunteers was discussed amidst the migration of previously unseen numbers of asylum seekers in 2015, which evoked notable voluntary activity and creative ways of helping and welcoming asylum seekers in Finland, as in other European countries. It was generally stated that Finland would not have managed the situation without volunteers, which raised the question of whether volunteers had already been shouldered with too much responsibility.[6] These discussions and debates related to philanthropy and volunteerism have primarily resulted in viewing the role of individual citizens as positive, but they have also portrayed these activities as exceptions in circumstances where things cannot be carried out in the 'normal' manner (through official processes and public funding). They illuminate the ways in which philanthropy is becoming exceedingly visible in Finland. Fundraising and organizing voluntary activities have also professionalized rapidly, and legislation related to both is being revised in order to promote these forms of activity.[7]

The kinds of changes described above challenge customary ways of seeing things and the values behind these views. Both welfare and philanthropy (and more broadly the responsibilities of the individual) are highly personal yet societal questions, and they are intertwined with personal and cultural values. Cultural values change slowly and are rooted in historical developments in different contexts.[8] The cultural values of Finland are linked to the Nordic version of Lutheranism, and they include a strong emphasis on egalitarian values. The Nordic welfare state can be viewed as an expression of these values, as well as an expression of the Lutheran form of Christianity, although the influence of religion has often been overlooked in theories of welfare models.[9]

This chapter discusses the changing role of philanthropy in the Finnish context in light of the country's cultural values and Lutheran history. I will first introduce the role of societal contexts in shaping philanthropy and the ways in which philanthropy is understood in different contexts. I will then discuss traits of Nordic Lutheranism, which influence the Finnish social contract and understandings of the roles and responsibilities of individual citizens and governing authorities, as well as viewpoints regarding philanthropy. After analysing these, I will discuss the current changes in the Finnish welfare model and the role of philanthropy in this changing context.

5 *YLE Uutiset*, August 4, 2013.
6 *Helsingin Sanomat*, September 20, 2015.
7 E.g., Grönlund & Pessi (2015).
8 E.g., Schwartz (1999: 24–25).
9 E.g., Markkola & Naumann (2014: 2).

Cultural contexts of philanthropy

The concept of philanthropy takes on different meanings and can be understood in different ways in different contexts and in different research approaches.[10] Cultural values and socio-political models directly and indirectly influence the practice of and requirements and opportunities for philanthropy, as well as its motivation.[11] This chapter adopts a simple definition, referring to philanthropy as 'the practice of giving money and time to help make life better for other people,'[12] including both donating money and giving time (volunteering). The focus is on individual philanthropy, and especially on the ways in which the role of the individual is understood to make life better for other people in the context of Finland today. The multidimensionality and blurriness of the concept is accepted and even viewed as a precondition for discussing the ways in which different understandings of the concept illuminate different cultural values.

As discussed above, the ways in which welfare provision is allocated between the state, market, families, and the third sector influence the needs, norms, and motives for philanthropy in different countries. Thus, individual philanthropy as a phenomenon is especially intertwined with welfare models, and it is related to the roles of the societal sectors or categories. In countries such as Finland in which the role of the public sector in welfare is significant, philanthropy can be viewed as subordinate to the public sector. For example, the majority of volunteering takes place in activities such as sports, culture, advocacy and hobbies, rather than welfare services. On the other hand, in welfare models where the role of public services is smaller, volunteering is more service-oriented.[13] Lars Trägårdh has suggested that in the Nordic countries, the third sector is 'first and foremost conceived of as the arena in which individuals and groups seek to advance particular political and private interests.'[14] He uses the concept of civil society instead of the non-profit sector when referring to this sector in the Nordic countries.

Philanthropy is usually positioned as part of the third sector, but it is noteworthy to point out that the field of activity is not limited to this sector. For example, municipalities and private businesses organize volunteering in public and private nursing homes. And in the above example of fundraising for a new children's hospital, donations were collected through a foundation for a hospital, which will function as a public service. Church congregations also raise funds through donations, and it can be discussed which sector of society they represent in the European context.[15] The whole idea of separate sectors of society is a simplification of reality, of course, and their boundaries must be recognized as blurry to begin with. This blurriness is emphasized

10 E.g., Taylor et al. (2014: 2–3); Wiepking & Handy (2015).
11 Stadelman-Steffen & Freitag (2011); Hofstede (2001); Inglehart (1997).
12 'Philanthropy' in Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2016).
13 E.g., Salamon & Anheier (1998: 242); Salamon & Sokolowski (2001).
14 Trägårdh (2010: 1).
15 Grönlund & Pessi (2015); Pessi & Grönlund (2012).

in current welfare reforms as the various sectors increasingly cooperate and carry out similar operations and services.

Welfare models of different contexts reflect cultural values, which have developed through the history of these contexts. Values in general refer to desirable goals that motivate action, and cultural values are defined as the implicitly or explicitly shared abstract ideas about what is good, right, and desirable in a society. They form the basis for cultural norms, and individuals in each culture know what is appropriate for different situations based on these norms. Societal institutions such as welfare models express cultural value priorities in their operation. Values are seen as normative and justified, but they are often also emotional and to some extent unrecognized.[16]

As a central part of all cultures, religion has influenced the cultural values and formation of societies throughout human history (and vice versa, religion is always shaped by its cultural context). Religion has been central also in the history of welfare and philanthropy. The ideals of human compassion, benevolence and charity permeate all world religions and their texts, although the emphasis on these vary in different religions. For example, Judaism, Islam, and various Asian religions share strong obligations to give and to help.[17] Religions motivate, organize and create norms of participation for the good of others, and in empirical studies worldwide religious activity is strongly linked with philanthropy. Religions have also been central in motivating and shaping welfare models.[18]

However, religion has not been a very central frame to understand philanthropic cultures or welfare models. Both theories on welfare state regimes and theories on social origins of non-profit sectors (which often build on the former)[19] build mostly on theories of class conflict, overlooking the influence of religion.[20] This chapter focuses on these gaps by discussing the Lutheran cultural background in relation to the role of philanthropy in the Finnish context. This will hopefully also make the current debates related to the changing roles of philanthropy and individual responsibility more understandable, as the cultural values related to different positions become visible.

The Lutheran legacy of the Finnish welfare model and the role of philanthropy

Recent historical research has pointed out the significance of Lutheranism and the relationship between church and state, which is typical of the Lutheran Nordic countries in the construction of their welfare models.[21] Many ideas, values, and structures of social democracy – and the universal

16 Schwartz (2012: 3–4).
17 Cnaan et al. (2016); Neusner & Chilton (2005).
18 E.g., Cnaan et al. (2016); Grönlund & Pessi (2015); Kahl (2005).
19 E.g., Salamon & Anheier (1998); Salamon & Sokolowski (2001).
20 Markkola & Naumann (2014: 2).
21 E.g., Markkola & Naumann (2014).

welfare state as one of its central principles – have been seen as a continuation or a transformation of Lutheranism.[22] The universalistic figure of thought in modern Nordic societies was rooted in the conformist ideals of premodern Lutheran societies. Practices of inclusion underpinning a conformist culture included forcing people to work, not giving philanthropy an important place, and promoting an unusually broad literacy. Citizenship was built on the notion of social, ethnic, and religious commonality to one another.[23]

Especially in Finland and Sweden, Lutheran influence was exerted through a centralized state church.[24] The historical institutional and administrative structures developed by the Lutheran state church provided a fundamental precondition for the universal welfare state of today. The *cuius regio, eius religio* ('whose realm, his religion') thinking of Catholic and Lutheran contexts in Europe has had a profound influence on European churches and the public role of religion in general. But Nordic Lutheran contexts developed a particular social contract. In this social contract, loyalty to the Church has been intertwined with loyalty to secular authority, and it can even be seen having transformed into loyalty to the welfare state.[25]

Luther viewed secular authority as God's will: those in power should treat their inferiors by the Golden Rule, protecting, serving and being useful to them. In this context, an ideal view of the state has been formed in which the state has a strong responsibility for the wellbeing of its citizens. The role and responsibility of the citizen are intertwined with this view of the state. The individual citizen lets the governing authorities take care of the duties that are reserved for them, does not rebel against them, and makes the common good possible by working and financing it through the payment of taxes. Love for one's neighbour is also expressed through other means than work and taxation, but it is strongly connected to the welfare state.[26] Although at the time of strengthening the role of the state in welfare there were also concerns and reluctances in the Church, the relationship between church and state was less contentious than in majority Catholic countries. This contentious relationship led to residual welfare state development in continental Europe.[27]

In the Nordic context, both secular authority and the role of everyday work thus gained an intrinsic value (linked with a now forgotten religious meaning) which continues to have a strong influence today. Finns strongly support the universalistic welfare state. In representative studies conducted since 2010, two thirds of respondents thought that the current level of social security must be sustained, even if it means higher taxes;[28] more than 3 out

22 Nelson (2017); Sørensen & Stråth (1997); Wallman & Trägårdh (2013). See also Hallamaa (1999).
23 Stenius (2012: 219).
24 Arnason & Wittrock (2012: 11).
25 Markkola & Naumann (2014); Nelson (2017); Sørensen & Stråth (1997); Ihalainen (this volume).
26 Hallamaa (1999); Raunio (2007).
27 Markkola & Naumann (2014: 3); see also Naumann (2014).
28 Muuri & Manderbacka (2010: 100).

of 4 respondents thought that income differences are too great in Finland;[29] and more than 3 out of 4 respondents thought that a larger proportion of tax funds should be used for income redistribution than is currently used.[30] Sixty percent of respondents thought that the public sector alone should provide a majority of welfare services, and 30 percent thought that the public sector should provide the majority of welfare services but private services should also be increased.[31] At the same time, individual responsibility is called for. A vast majority of Finns think that the role of individual responsibility should be stronger when it comes to one's wellbeing.[32] These attitudes can be viewed as reflections of Lutheran thinking, and especially the social contract rooted in the dual calling: both the secular authority and the individual citizen must take care of their respective tasks, ensure universal welfare, and work and pay taxes to make that possible.

The strong emphasis on and support for the welfare state has intertwined with the role that voluntary participation and philanthropy have gained in the Nordic context. As discussed in the introduction, the roles of other sectors of society – private services, third sector organizations and the individual citizen's responsibility for family and friends – have in welfare been to complement the public sector, experiment with new working methods, and act as advocates to improve the welfare state. This role of voluntary participation and philanthropy has been influenced by the Lutheran legacy described above. Conformist ideals and practices, the strong ideology of the state taking care of welfare, and the individual participating by working and paying taxes have directed civic engagement and informal participation toward recreation, leisure, and advocacy (often to further develop the welfare state).

But Lutheranism has also other types of influence on the ways in which voluntary participation and philanthropy are viewed in Lutheran contexts. For Luther, good works were a result of faith. They were not a means to attain justification or grace (this view was highlighted through Luther's wish to reform Catholic practices); salvation came by faith alone. Luther also had a reserved attitude toward self-interest and pursuit of profit. Profit was viewed as a means to an end (at the societal level this end was the common good and expressing love for one's neighbour) rather than something the individual should want for oneself.[33] Luther's views on good deeds, together with the reserved attitude toward self-interest, resulted in a specific culture of philanthropy. Good deeds were not to be bragged about or highlighted, as they were not done to gain salvation, merit or reputation. Together with the idea of a universalistic welfare state, this perspective has led to a modest, altruistic, and voluntary ('reflecting God's grace') culture of philanthropy, in which individual activity to benefit those in need is viewed as complementary

29 Karvonen & Vaarama (2014).
30 Muuri & Manderbacka (2010: 102).
31 Muuri & Manderbacka (2010: 110).
32 E.g., Pessi & Grönlund (2012).
33 Doherty (2014); Lull & Nelson (2015: 59–60, 258–260); Nelson (2017); Raunio (2007).

to the welfare state. Selfish motives and showing off one's good deeds are disapproved, and modest philanthropy (such as anonymous donations) is viewed favourably.[34]

These features of Nordic Lutheran thought can be illuminated by contrasting them with another Protestant ethic, that of Calvinism, which Max Weber wrote about.[35] Table 8 describes features of Calvinist influence in the United States and Lutheran influence in Finland. Both also shaped philanthropy in their respective contexts.

Table 8. Calvinist influences in the U.S. contrasted with Lutheran influences in Finland.

U.S. and Calvinism[36]	Finland and Lutheranism[37]
As little as possible power given to government; government and religion are kept separate	Strong reliance on and obedience to the government; government and religion are intertwined
Positive attitude toward pursuit of profit in the private field	Reserved attitude toward pursuit of profit and self-interest (only positive as a means to an end)
Building a good society through individual success and philanthropy	Building a good society through work and the welfare state
Individual responsibility to succeed and then provide philanthropy (universities, welfare, religious communities)	Individual responsibility to work and pay taxes
Visible, normative role of philanthropy	Invisible, modest culture of philanthropy

Thus, the form Calvinism took in the United States (through various influences)[38] sharply differs from Nordic Lutheranism in regard to the relationship between government and the people, the responsibility of the individual, attitudes toward business, and the role of philanthropy. In the American model, philanthropy is central in welfare and other arenas, and its societal role is highly visible and normative. Philanthropic donations and volunteering are expected from people who have the means, and this participation is all but downplayed. Names of big donors as well as the amounts they have donated are commonly visible on the walls of universities and cultural institutions – often so that the names of those who have donated the biggest amounts are written in the largest font, with the size decreasing as the amounts are less. Entire hospitals and libraries, for instance, are commonly named after their benefactors.

In Finland, the societal role of philanthropy is rather invisible, although the activity as such is extensive in international comparison. Up to 42

34 E.g., Grönlund (2013); Grönlund & Pessi (2015).
35 Weber (1978).
36 Kalberg (2014); Nelson (2017).
37 Grönlund & Pessi (2015); Markkola & Naumann (2014); Raunio (2002, 2007).
38 These are discussed in detail, for example, by Kalberg (2014).

percent of Finns volunteer and as many as 70 percent donate to philanthropic causes annually making these an enormous phenomenon economically, not to mention the societal influence they have on people's lives (both those giving and receiving).[39] However, the societal structures of Finnish society in many ways neglect philanthropy. Unlike in several other (also European) countries, there are no research institutions or faculties dedicated to philanthropy and there is no national infrastructure supporting it. Until 2016 there was no ministry responsible for volunteering, and taxation and legislation often hinder rather than encourage philanthropic activity,[40] even though numerous studies have shown it to be central to the wellbeing of individuals, communities, and societies.[41]

The invisible and modest societal role of philanthropy can also be seen in the ways Finns perceive the phenomenon. The following quotes are from a study on the moral frameworks of care among Finnish volunteers.[42] Although not generalizable, they illustrate what has been described above:[43]

> Not everyone helps because they want to help but some are such that they just write in Facebook that I donated here and there, and helped these and those. I'm not saying it's wrong, but the starting point is different from mine.
>
> I mean ... it's okay to help through philanthropy but there are other things that are connected with it ... It's not completely unselfish ... I would rather see that it (the children's hospital) would be funded by taxes so that it would be our joint property, not the philanthropists'.
>
> And I don't want that some person against his or her free will is put into like a nursing home to volunteer because no one will benefit from that, unless some kind of realization happens and (s)he understands that "hey, this is a good thing." A person involuntarily being in a volunteer position, that just doesn't work.

The quotes depict the underlying norm that philanthropy must be altruistic, voluntary, subordinate in relation to the public sector, and not bragged about. Telling about donating or helping in social media is disapproved. Also, the idea of volunteering for other reasons than out of free will is depicted as something that 'just does not work.' In other contexts, however, mandatory and normative forms of volunteerism-type activities (which are also called volunteering, despite their mandatory or normative nature, such as mandatory volunteering in high schools and universities in the United States)[44] are very common and accepted.

39 Grönlund (2015); Grönlund & Pessi (2015).

40 E.g., Vallilluoto (2014).

41 E.g., Haski-Leventhal (2014); Laasanen (2011); 2011 State of the World's Volunteerism (2011).

42 An interview study to 17 informal volunteers in Helsinki (meaning people who volunteer in their local neighbourhood Facebook groups to help others in real life). Interviews were conducted by the author of this article and a research assistant in 2016. The study was a part of the research project Cooperation in Care (2014–2018) funded by the Academy of Finland.

43 For similar results, see, e.g., Grönlund (2011).

44 See, e.g., Haski-Leventhal et al. (2010).

Finland in 2017: Current societal changes, philanthropy, and their interaction with the Lutheran legacy

During the last 20 years, the role of private businesses, family, and the non-profit sector has increased in Finnish (as in many other countries')[45] welfare, resulting in a new type of welfare mix, where public services are outsourced and also cut back. This has left individuals in greater responsibility for their own and their family's wellbeing. These new welfare mix models have also changed the roles of voluntary agencies in several European countries.[46] In Finland, too, productivity and competitiveness have become increasingly central concepts and aims in political decision-making, and they have been used to argue for the new welfare mix model. These dominating principles of market economy have been seen as weakening the emphasis on reciprocity, solidarity and equality, ideals which have previously been central in the Finnish welfare state model.[47]

The new focus on principles of market economy departs from the logic of the implicit principle of love for one's neighbour being the motivation, universal welfare / the welfare state being the goal, and the economy being the means. On the contrary, the economy has become the end rather than a means to an end. Its logics penetrate the public sector, replacing the earlier ideology of solidarity and equality (rooted in and intertwined with the Lutheran understanding of love for one's neighbour). Economic progress has actually been analysed as a secular or implicit religion of its own. Its central 'elements of faith' include the notion that the world advances through economic progress, and economic planning provides the guidance for actions that increase this progress.[48] In this sense, economic progress as religion is challenging the legacy of Lutheran religion (and its secularized form of the welfare state) in the arena of welfare. The role of private businesses has increased and is currently being strengthened even further in major healthcare and social welfare reform, which emphasizes freedom of choice and makes private businesses and public service providers more equal in basic healthcare and social welfare services.[49]

This development is itself in contrast with the Lutheran legacy's reserved approach to pursuit of profit and its view of the welfare state / public services as good and equal. Furthermore, in this context, the role of philanthropy and the ways in which philanthropy is understood are also contested. The invisible nature of philanthropy in Finland leaves room for such a contest. A phenomenon which has been overlooked in arenas such as research, political decision-making, and education can be talked about in different ways, and it is easy to utilize for different purposes.

45 E.g., Smith (2010, 2014).
46 E.g., Bode (2006).
47 Saari & Pessi (2011).
48 Nelson (1991); Nelson (2017).
49 Lakiluonnos asiakkaan valinnanvapaudesta sosiaali- ja terveydenhuollossa [Draft bill for the Freedom of Choice Act] (2017).

For example, as individual responsibility for family, friends, and the unknown others (philanthropy) is called for, it can be presented as an alternative to the care provided by the traditional welfare state model. This discourse includes juxtaposing 'warm, communal' informal care with 'the cold, bureaucratic welfare state.' Such a viewpoint is traditionally more typical, for example, in the United States, as discussed above. Instead, in Finland, individual responsibility has gone hand in hand with the care provided by the public sector, making it possible through work and taxation, and complementing it through voluntary care for loved ones and the unknown others (philanthropy). In this context, paying taxes and thus contributing to public services can actually be viewed as a very noble way to actually care, as discussed earlier in this chapter.

In addition to contributing through taxation, Finns already actively participate in caring for their loved ones and unknown others (philanthropy). For example, Finns volunteer actively,[50] and they widely care for their loved ones.[51] Public services and informal care for loved ones do not exclude one another but can – and do – occur simultaneously. Also, while on the one hand public services replace informal care, on the other hand they enable alternative forms of participation. Basic social security provides psychological and other resources for voluntary participation, as an individual does not have to focus on securing his/her own and loved ones' wellbeing in case of misfortune. And public services enable societal participation for women especially, helping them to not be tied to caring for children and elderly.

Although appealing, the juxtaposition of 'warm, communal informal care' and 'cold, bureaucratic welfare state' is an oversimplification. While problems such as exclusion and loneliness can at first seem to be things best combatted by means of warm, informal care, they are strongly linked with societal inequality, making robust public services the key to overcome them.[52] The societal and political focus on public services has left informal care in a subordinate position societally, but a stronger culture of informal care and communality is not obstructed by a strong public sector. If the aim is to increase informal care, the solution is not cutbacks in public welfare but investments that reinforce the culture and ability of Finnish citizens to care for each other.

Another argument for increasing the responsibility of the individual is framing it as inevitable, as the welfare state is becoming too expensive. This argument draws from the logics of economy, which has been compatible with welfare as the means for the welfare state but contradicts with the strong ethos of free will ('good deeds reflect God's grace') in voluntary action. Although philanthropy and public welfare can both be seen as ways to express love for one's neighbour, from the viewpoint of the Lutheran legacy their logic is different. Public services are rooted in the individuals' role in doing their share, working and paying taxes. Voluntary action and philanthropy have

50 Grönlund (2015: 23–24).
51 E.g., Danielsbacka et al. (2013).
52 E.g., Saari (2016).

not been a part of the social contract in a similar manner, but have existed in their own right and as altruistic, based on free will.

Thus, the fact that the language and ideology of voluntary action and philanthropy in the field of welfare are missing or implicit in the Nordic culture of invisible philanthropy leaves room for foreign viewpoints and interpretations. Rhetoric is knowingly – or probably more often unknowingly – borrowed from contexts, countries and societies where it is strong, such as the United States. John Casey has discussed the implicit export of values in the context of voluntary action and civil societies.[53] People from numerous countries turn to the United States to learn from the very developed and professional methods of voluntary action and philanthropy in the country. Skills related to fundraising and organizing voluntary work are learned and then carried out in other contexts, especially in developing countries. At the same time, an American ideology of voluntary action is knowingly or unknowingly exported to these contexts, especially if the philanthropic field is societally as invisible as it is in Finland. The ideology connected to voluntary action and philanthropy in the United States includes the centrality of individual responsibility, voluntary action and philanthropy in welfare services, as well as the normative, visible nature of philanthropy. Casey points out, however, that there are also ideological boundaries vis-à-vis this exportation of values. In the Finnish context, the ideology of the welfare state and the Lutheran ethos of free will and altruism as central features of philanthropy can be viewed as such boundaries.

Conclusions

To conclude, philanthropy as a phenomenon and the ways in which it is understood fluctuate between different frameworks and competing discourses. As such, philanthropy can prove to have great political and normative power to potentially influence the ways in which welfare and the roles of different sectors are understood. As a phenomenon it is not foreign in any context, but a part of all cultures, and it has mainly positive connotations. Who could oppose the idea of people helping to make life better for other people? Yet, as a blurry concept and phenomenon, a range of implicit values and goals can be attached to it, as discussed above. And these implicit values and goals can challenge and potentially change traditional ways of understanding the roles of different actors in welfare.

This can also be a risk. Adopting discourses and language from other contexts, and posing demands, new norms or different social contracts rooted in different implicit cultural values, may raise opposition. As was discussed above, Finns continue to have high hopes for public services, and the government has been criticized for weakening them and increasing the responsibility of other sectors. The viewpoint of many Finns regarding the role of voluntary participation of individuals is expressed in the following quote from a volunteer:

53 Casey (2015).

> In an ideal society we wouldn't need voluntary work. It would be wonderful if it still existed, but not so that it patches up public services or services that all citizens are entitled to.

In the context of an ideal of altruistic voluntary work, a different rhetoric can threaten societal trust and also motivation for participation in welfare among Finns whose values are rooted in the Lutheran legacy. It may even lead to a diminishing of the participation of Finns in philanthropy, or at least the altruistic motivation to do so, and through that the vast positive influences it has on welfare, as well as on other arenas of society.[54]

Even without normative demands or shifts in responsibilities, philanthropy and individual participation have great possibilities to spread and at the same time influence welfare in a remarkable way. More than half of the 60 percent of Finns who do not volunteer say they would do so if someone asked them to. Attitudes toward philanthropy and helping others are extremely positive.[55] Altruistic motivation is exceptionally powerful.[56] Furthermore, as discussed above, strong public services provide widespread opportunities for voluntary participation, as the majority of citizens have the resources to care for others than just themselves or their loved ones. Together these features have promoted high social trust and a society where individuals care for each other and also for unknown others. These roots, current strengths and the opportunities of philanthropy in the Finnish context should be taken into account when social contracts, welfare models and roles of different actors are reformed and discussed.

In a globalized world, however, influences from other explicitly or implicitly understood religions and welfare models are inevitable. No legacy is static. Danièle Hervieu-Léger writes about the ways in which religious memory mutates in different times, taking on new forms.[57] The Nordic welfare state can be seen as a secularized mutation of Nordic Lutheranism. As the actual understanding of the contents of Lutheran teachings is getting thinner, there is more room for new influences. A new rhetoric of philanthropy can – through a positive and familiar, yet blurry concept – introduce new influences into the traditional Lutheran understanding of the responsibilities of different sectors of society. This can mean merging features of economy as religion or a more 'American' understanding of individual responsibility into the traditional emphases, as well as new ways of expressing love for one's neighbour. In this way, the secularized Lutheran idea of the Nordic welfare state being an ideal model for welfare may be altered to include new understandings, be they mutations of Lutheranism or a 'syncretism' of traditions and influences. Understanding both the dynamics behind such mutations and the resistance they gain requires analysis of deep cultural structures, in which the role of religion cannot be overlooked.

54 On the positive influences e.g., Haski-Leventhal (2014); 2011 State of the World's Volunteerism Report (2011).
55 Grönlund (2015: 25).
56 E.g., Grönlund (2012: 93).
57 Hervieu-Léger (2000).

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IV Church in Adaptation

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Esivalta: The Religious Roots of the Finnish Moral View of Society

Abstract

Apostle Paul's teaching on earthly authorities became important for the Lutheran tradition. The Lutheran interpretation of Paul is crystallized in the peculiar word *esivalta* in Finnish, *överhet* in Swedish. This Lutheran teaching was the only civics the Finnish people received for centuries after the Reformation. From the 19th century on, this teaching was shaped by the idea of legality. This development was spurred in the last decades of the Russian rule due to the legally questionable politics of assimilation of Finland to Russia. The Finnish Civil War in 1918 strengthened the demand for the idea of obedience to the state and its laws. This led to the idea of the legal *esivalta,* in which one should be obedient towards the laws enacted by the parliament.

An oath defining the ideal citizen

Every year young men in their twenties and some women of the same age raise their right arm upwards. They extend their index and the middle fingers side by side so that they point towards heaven. This is the position in which recruits swear the military oath in the presence of the state flag and the flag of the unit. Their relatives are following the solemn promise given after the devotional service held by the unit chaplain. Far more than 90 % of the recruits swear the religious oath although one can freely choose to intone a secular affirmation.[1] After the oath, the recruits are treated as real soldiers.

Due to the general conscription, the great majority of Finnish males swear this oath together with those few females who have voluntarily entered the Finnish Defence Forces. 'Before the Almighty and the Omniscient God,' the recruit swears to be 'a trustworthy and loyal citizen of the Finnish country.'[2]

1 I express my thanks to the Army Senior Chaplain Vesa Aurén for the percentage number.

2 The whole text (also in Swedish as it is the other official language) is decreed by the Council of State (*Valtioneuvoston asetus sotilasvalasta* 741/2000). All English translations in this chapter are mine unless otherwise indicated.

These opening words of the oath decreed by the Council of State make clear that the oath is more than a promise of military virtues. It is a promise of a virtuous citizenship (which includes the military virtues). I claim that the core of this moral is encapsulated in the Finnish word *esivalta*. It recurs twice in the beginning of the text of the oath, in a passage just following the promise to be a trustworthy and loyal citizen.

> Everywhere and in every situation, in peace and war, I will defend the integrity of my fatherland, its legal system of government and the legal *esivalta* of the domain. If I notice or if I become aware of something going on to overthrow the legal *esivalta* or to overrule the system of government in the country, I will inform the officials without delay.

Esivalta is not an everyday word in the Finnish language, but a literary concept for the state with religious and moral overtones, a neologism invented for the first Finnish translation of the New Testament (1548). It is worth looking at what the components of the word *esivalta* are as the translation in different languages steers its understanding. The Finnish translation belongs clearly to the Lutheran tradition with some original overtones.

Esivalta is a translation for the Greek *exousiai* in Romans 13:1. The predecessors of the Finnish translation are German *Obrigkeit* (the word appears also in older forms like *Oberkeit* etc.) in Martin Luther's Bible translation (1534) and Swedish *överhet* in King Gustav Vasa's Bible translation (1541). Following the German and Swedish equivalents *esivalta* is in the singular form despite the fact that the Greek word is plural (cf. the common English translations: powers, authorities). It refers more to the abstract phenomenon of governing than certain persons holding authority.[3] In Greek, the word occurs thrice in singular (Romans 13:2–3) in the same passage, but the first occurrence in plural indicates that these following singulars refer to just one authorial person among many. In verse Romans 13:3, Paul speaks of *archontes* in plural, which means quite the same as *exousiai*.

The word *esivalta* is the combination of two parts *esi-* and *valta*. *Esi-* clearly tries to communicate the same idea as *Obrig-* in German or *över-* in Swedish. These translate Paul's attribute *hyperechousai* ('to be above'), which precedes the proper noun *exousiai* in Romans 13:1. However, the Finnish *esi-* does not refer to something which is over, but to something which comes first, is prior, older or the root of something. *Valta* means power or authority[4] trying to communicate the Greek *exousiai*. Thus, *esivalta* in a sense communicates both the Greek attribute *hyperechousai* and the noun *exousiai* while German and Swedish translation rest on the attribute. All these Lutheran translations, however, communicate somewhat more abstract idea than the Greek original or, for example, the English translations. As the Lutheran tradition bears this certain abstractness, I use – depending on the linguistic context – the Finnish, Swedish, or German word when referring to it.

3 Cf. Saastamoinen (2003: 24–30).
4 See Hyvärinen (2003: 63–69).

The certain intangibility of *esivalta* clearly follows Luther's view. For Luther *Obrigkeit* was an extension of the parents' power in their family, and thus, an extension of the biblical command to 'honour your father and mother' (Exodus 20:12; Deut. 5:16): 'In this commandment belongs a further statement regarding all kinds of obedience to persons in authority [*oberpersonen*] who have to command and to govern. For all authority [*oberkeit*] flows and is propagated from the authority of parents.'[5] Thus, *Obrigkeit* is just a state form of the power structure evident on every level of society. In Luther's doctrine of two kingdoms *Obrigkeit* is the worldly government. The significance of *Obrigkeit* rose in Luther's thought after the peasant wars when he turned strongly against the peasant rebellion. Luther included a direct citation from Paul's text in his Small Catechism.[6] Therefore, the biblical text itself became well-known to people:

> (1) Let every person be subject to the governing authorities [in Greek *exousiai hyperechousai*; in Finnish *esivalta*]; for there is no authority [*exousia*] except from God, and those authorities that exist have been instituted by God. (2) Therefore whoever resists authority [*exousia*] resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgement. (3) For rulers [*archontes*] are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad. Do you wish to have no fear of the authority [*exousia*]? Then do what is good, and you will receive its approval; (4) for it is God's servant for your good. But if you do what is wrong, you should be afraid, for the authority does not bear the sword in vain! It is the servant of God to execute wrath on the wrongdoer. (5) Therefore one must be subject, not only because of wrath but also because of conscience. (6) For the same reason you also pay taxes, for the authorities are God's servants, busy with this very thing. (7) Pay to all what is due to them – taxes to whom taxes are due, revenue to whom revenue is due, respect to whom respect is due, honour to whom honour is due. (Romans 13:1–7.)[7]

Esivalta became the core word of the Finnish Lutheran doctrine of society. During the following centuries it shaped the vernacular views through hymns and prayers in religious rites. Before the existence of public schools the doctrine of *esivalta* in the Lutheran catechisms was practically the only civics lesson for the vast majority of the population – and for a long time in the 20th century even the public schools imparted this Lutheran teaching in its pure religious form.[8] This may create a picture that the Lutheran teaching of earthly authorities remained the same from the 16th century until the present military oath. This, however, is not true.

There occurred a clear shift during the late 19th century and the early 20th century. One can see the shift in the extended catechisms (which included Luther's Small catechism and Christian doctrine in concise form) from the

5 WA 30.152 (Luther 1883). This theory of state authority as an extension of parental authority follows the Medieval views, see, e.g., Thomas Aquinas' explanation of the fourth commandment in his *Collationes in decem praeceptis* (= Torrell 2000). A general introduction to Luther's view on earthly authority, see, e.g., Raunio (2007: 223–234).

6 WA 30.330a (Luther 1883).

7 Translation according to the New Revised Standard Version.

8 Huttunen (2010: 92–93).

years 1893 and 1923. In 1893 the extended catechism did condition *esivalta* in no way. In 1923 the catechism added Acts 5:29: 'We must obey God rather than any human authority.' The clear implication of the addition is to emphasize that one should obey *esivalta* only if it can be done without transgressing divine will. In other words: Christians should judge whether or not *esivalta* deserves to be obeyed. One encounters an analogical feature in the military oath, the wording of which still today roughly follows that of the original of 1918: one swears to defend the legal *esivalta*. The implication is that not all authorities are legal.

My thesis is that certain political changes modified the Finnish understanding of *esivalta.* Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy under the Russian Tsar 1809–1917. The Russian assimilation politics coloured the last years of the Tsarist regime from 1899 on. This political situation essentially questioned loyalty towards *esivalta,* while the bloody Finnish Civil War of 1918 meant its return – but now in a modified form. The political turmoil, however, was just a practical reason for a shift that had already happened within the educated circles. The *ancien régime* with the monarch's person at its centre had already made room for the idea of a constitutional democracy. Analogously there occurred a shift from the unconditioned God-given *esivalta* towards the legal *esivalta*. In this development the rule of law became decisive.[9] On the one hand, the state law conditioned and secularized *esivalta*, whereas, on the other hand, *esivalta* spiritualized the state law. The result was a religiously sanctioned democracy, which consisted of free citizens who are obedient towards the system of government – the ideal citizen defined in the military oath.

Kantian and Hegelian legality shapes Esivalta

The epithet 'legal' before *esivalta* is already found in the Finnish church manual from the year 1614. Thus, the idea to combine legality with *esivalta* is quite as old as the Reformation – or even older. Francis Fukuyama points out that the rule of law has religious origins and that this principle is known around the world: law is binding because it is higher than those holding political power. In the Western Europe the rule of law developed further for institutional reasons: church as a religious authority became independent of the monarchs and rooted the idea of legal rule. According to Fukuyama, Western Europe clearly differs from other societies: 'The result was that few European monarchs ever acquired the concentrated powers of the Chinese state, despite aspirations to do so. Only in Russia, where the Eastern Church was always subordinated to the state, did such regime emerge.'[10]

Although the nascent Lutheran church became subordinated to the monarch, the idea of legal *esivalta* seems to continue the earlier tradition and 'resist' the absolute monarchy. In Finland and Sweden, Olaus Petri's (1493/1497–1552) rules for judges (still printed in the Swedish and the

9 Pekonen (2003: 124–128).
10 Fukuyama (2014: 12).

Finnish statute books) express this legal tradition, which revived in Europe from the 18th century on. Indeed, Prussian – and Lutheran – Immanuel Kant's political theories strongly promoted the idea of political authorities subordinated to the law. In his *Science of Right* (*Metaphysik der Sitten*, 1797) Kant emphasized the duty to obey the authorities. Romans 13 is explicitly paraphrased and called a categorical imperative, while Kant admits its objectionable character:

> Now, it is asserted that obedience must be given to whoever is in possession of the supreme authoritative and legislative power over a people; and this must be done so unconditionally by right, that it would even be penal to inquire publicly into the title of a power thus held, with the view of calling it in doubt, or opposing it in consequence of its being found defective. Accordingly it is maintained, that "Obey the authority which has power over you" (in everything which is not opposed to morality), [*Gehorchet der Obrigkeit (in allem, was nicht dem inneren Moralischen widerstreitet), die Gewalt über euch hat*] is a Categorical Imperative. This is the objectionable proposition [*der anstößige Satz*] which is called into question.[11]

Kant straightforwardly nullifies the duty of obedience, if *Obrigkeit* opposes morality. This, however, is not his main point. Instead, he searches for a general justification for obedience – and finds it in the idea of a legal constitution (*Staatsverfassung*). A people is 'united by laws under a sovereign power (*durch Gesetze unter einer Obrigkeit vereinigt*).' Therefore, people cannot at the same time be entitled to oppose 'the Constitution, however defective it may be,' since it 'would result in a supreme will that would destroy itself.' Any defects in the constitution should be gradually removed by reforms.[12] Kant reduces *Obrigkeit* to laws and especially to the constitution. Instead of obedience towards certain persons (authorities), Kant sees *Obrigkeit* as a system of government steered by a legal constitution which can be reformed if needed. This deviates from the traditional views during the *ancien régime* as the primary loyalty was given to the ruler. The oaths of allegiance were traditionally sworn to the kings and tsars.

Kant's political philosophy was not the only philosophical root for the changing understanding of *Obrigkeit*. In the beginning of the 19th century Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) became an influential moderator. In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* Hegel (surely according to the editors of this posthumous publication) traced back to freedom as the common origin for both religion and the state. In religion people are free before God (*vor Gott*), while in the state they are free in the world (*in der Welt*). 'A nation which has a false or bad conception of God, has also a bad State, bad government, bad laws.' Hegel says that this connection of religion and state finds its vernacular expression 'in the tracing of laws, authority [*Obrigkeit*], and the constitution of the State to a divine origin.'

11 *Metaphysik der Sitten* Rechtslehre I, Beschluβ = Kant (1999: 371); Transl. Hastie (p. 256).

12 *Metaphysik der Sitten* Rechtslehre I, Beschluβ = Kant (1999: 371–372); Transl. Hastie (pp. 256–257).

He further states that '[i]t may be taken as meaning that man obeys God in the act of conforming to the laws, to the ruling authority [*indem man den Gesetzen und der Obrigkeit folgt*], to the powers which hold the State together.'[13] Hegel is clearly in dialogue with the Lutheran teaching of earthly authorities.

Although Hegel notes that this Lutheran view is 'in one aspect correct enough,' it can lead to the incorrect view that people are obliged 'to obey the laws whatever they may happen to be. In this way the act of governing and the giving of laws are abandoned to the caprice of the governing power.' Hegel sees that the problem is most difficult in protestant countries, where the 'unity of religion and the State actually exists.' He clearly refers to the system of state churches and gives special attention to England where 'the ruler was responsible for his actions to God only' during the last kings of the House of Stuart. This also assumes that the ruler knows what is good in the state so that he unites God's will and the state laws. Hence, 'he is an immediate revelation of God.' Hegel, however, claims that this runs against the protestant conviction where there is no distinction between priests and laymen. Priests are not the sole possessors of divine truth. Hegel concludes:

> laws exist through an act of the divine will, still there is another aspect of the matter which is just as important, namely, that we should have a rational knowledge of this divine will, and such knowledge is not anything particular or special, but belongs to all.[14]

This latter aspect played a direct role also in Finland when the political turmoil questioned the obedience to the Tsar.

In Finland, the most influential proponent of Hegelian views was Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1806–1881), who is sometimes called the Finnish national philosopher due to his strong emphasis on Finnish national existence. His main theoretical work was *Läran om staten* (1842; *Study of the state*) written in Swedish. Although Snellman opens his work citing Rousseau, the debt to Hegel is clear throughout his work. This comes to the fore also in Snellman's references to *överhet*. Following Hegel, Snellman sees the state as an expression of freedom. This freedom is no caprice but general rationality, and the laws express this general rationality. Therefore, following the laws also means following rationality and living free. Snellman illustrates the contact between general rationality and laws by saying that most persons do not even know the content of the state law but still the trespasses are quite rare. This situation is due to the religious conviction that one has to follow the will of God. However, Snellman continues, religion can provide only the most abstract rules, for example, the one that a person has to obey *överhet* as it is instituted by God – a clear reference to Romans 13:1. This conviction must be developed rationally. If not, the conviction 'would justify even the

13 *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* I: 237–238; transl. Speirs & Burdon Sanderson (pp. 247–248).

14 *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* I: 238–239; transl. Speirs & Burdon Sanderson (pp. 248–249).

most irrational statutes so that at any moment the prevailing political party, any momentarily victorious incendiary, or any foreign usurper becomes a God-given *överhet*.' Thus, it is not enough to abide by *överhet*. One also has to understand the rationality that is expressed in obedience to the state law.[15] It is clear that Snellman interprets the obedience to *överhet* as obedience to the right and rational laws in contrast to blind obedience to random rulers.

The foregoing dealt only with the philosophical development. There were also political reasons that strengthened the law as a central symbol for Finnish nationality. The Grand Duchy of Finland was autonomous under the Russian Tsar with its own currency and stamps as the most visible everyday expression of its autonomy. Finland had its own governmental system, national languages, army, and economy.[16] Only Finland's foreign policy was in Russian hands. The foundation of the broad autonomy was the Finnish constitution and laws separated from the general imperial legislation. The Finnish literati also clearly realized this legislative foundation of Finnish autonomy and separate national identity. A quite early expression of this is the poem *Landshöfdingen* (Governor) by Finnish national poet Johan Ludvig Runeberg. The poem from the year 1860 belongs to the collection *The Tales of Ensign Stål* (Swedish original: *Fänrik Ståls sägner*) describing the war of 1808–1809, in which Sweden lost Finland to the Russian domain. In the poem a Russian general marches into the governor's office and demands that inhuman measures be carried out. The governor places his hand on the statute book by saying that the book is acknowledged by the Russian ruler and objects. This is clearly a reference to the separate Finnish legislation recognized by the Tsar. The general accepts the objection and turns away. In the end of the poem Runeberg gives a religious and philosophical interpretation on the occasion. The light that seemed to shine on the face of the governor 'came from inside. It was his conscience.' The poem powerfully described the alternatives between arbitrary violence and the rule of law. As the poem was widely read, the idea of legal and moral rule became one of the cornerstones of Finnish nationality.[17]

The artist Albert Edelfelt in his painting from the year 1899 powerfully illustrated Runeberg's poem. This year signalled the beginning of the constitutional crisis as Tsar Nicholas II declared the primary nature of the general Russian legislation in Finland and, thus, violated the separate Finnish constitution. This led to growing unrest and decreasing loyalty to the Tsar. The symbol of the resistance was the Finnish statute book. Edelfelt illustrated just the moment when the governor places his hand on the statute book before the threatening figure of the armed Russian general. The governor's face is lit and beside the statute book, one can distinguish a Bible – a detail not present in Runeberg's poem.[18] The Bible probably illustrates the religious

15 Snellman et al. (1993: 341). The quote translated from Swedish by the author.

16 To be more precise, not all that is listed here prevailed during the whole period of autonomy. Nevertheless, these items are just expressions of the special status that Finland had under the Russian Tsar.

17 Wrede, Solstrand & Terling Hasán (1984: 486–492).

18 Lukkarinen (2000).

colouring at the end of the poem. An even more famous illustration of the oppression felt by the Finns was Eetu Isto's painting *An Assault* (1899). In the painting, a maiden (symbolizing Finland) tries to save the statute book while the two-headed Russian eagle mauls it. The Russian oppression was not just a political threat but also a sheer sacrilege – because the law so clearly bore religious associations. The feeling of a sacrilege becomes clear when realizing one detail in Zachris Topelius' *Book of Our Country* (Swedish original *Boken om vårt land,* 1875) which was an elementary textbook in the public schools. It described the governmental system of the country by adding that, above all, next to God, the Finnish law rules.[19] Topelius presented the national law as the civil intermediary between God and the nation.

The Russian oppression also signalled a crisis for the teaching on *esivalta*. Suddenly, one had to choose, on the one hand, between loyalty towards the ruler and, on the other hand, towards the Finnish law. Both the church and society were divided on the issue. The leaders of the Lutheran Church maintained their loyalty toward the Tsar, although they clearly admitted that he had transgressed the law.[20] This ecclesial stance irritated some people. One can hardly oversee the annoyance of Rafael Erich,[21] professor of jurisprudence in the University of Helsinki, when he wrote that obedience towards *esivalta* had often been misrepresented. With the help of ethics, religion, and law, obedience has been required even when the obedience is in clear conflict with the operative judicial system. Erich seemingly chose to obey the law instead of the ruler. Some Finns were ready for active resistance, and political terror characterized the last decades of the Russian rule. The most famous case was Eugen Schauman's suicide attack in 1904 against the general governor Nikolay Bobrikov, the representative of the Tsar in Finland.[22] Another example is Lennart Hohenthal. He murdered the procurator whose duty it was to oversee the Russian jurisdiction of the country. In his memoirs Hohenthal expressed his disappointment towards the Church, which objected to all resistance on the grounds of obedience to *esivalta*.[23] In his trial, Hohenthal emphasized that he had followed his conscience and sense of justice.[24] The justification was fully in line with the principle that laws express what people sense is right. This is what Hegel and Snellman thought. Topelius also claimed the same in his *Book of Our Country*.[25] G. G. Rosenqvist, professor of dogmatics and theological ethics in the University of Helsinki, expressed the same idea in an article published in reaction to the Tsar's declaration in 1899. Rosenqvist thought that obedience to *överhet* meant obedience to the law. In his article, Rosenqvist did not promote violent resistance, but as Hohenthal's example shows, some people thought violence could be justified by such an argument. The idea that the

19 Topelius (1876: 473).
20 Murtorinne (1964).
21 Erich (1910: 828).
22 Zetterberg (1988).
23 Hohenthal (1909: 3–17).
24 Hohenthal (1909: 141).
25 Topelius (1876: 464).

law expresses the sense of justice actually differentiated the Finnish law from the actual written code. Hohenthal defended the Finnish law by a murder and, thus, by transgressing the law itself!

Despite the requirements of obedience to the Tsar, the Church did not remain untouched by the ideas of legality. In a curious way the political turmoil becomes visible in the changes incurred by the New Testament translation of 1913. Before that year *esivalta* was referred to with the pronoun *hän* just as the Swedish translations until 1883 used the masculine pronoun *han*. The Swedish translation of 1883 referred to *överhet* with the feminine pronoun *hon* as the linguistic gender of *överhet* varied in Swedish. In 1917 even *hon* disappears and *överhet* is referred by *det,* equivalent to the English 'it.' This shift from *han/hon* to *det* is due to the linguistic development in Swedish, as the use of *han* and *hon* were limited to persons during the 19th century.[26] Apparently the first Finnish New Testament (1548) followed the Swedish translation, because in the old Finnish *hän* sometimes could refer to things (e.g., Romans 7:6 in NT 1548), and not only to persons. This translation lasted in Finnish until 1913. Only then was the personal pronoun *hän* replaced by *se,* which clearly refers to things.

The word *hän* referring to *esivalta* fitted well to the situation of the *ancien régime*, as *hän* could easily be interpreted as a reference to the person of the ruler. As late as 1923 a conservative bishop O. I. Colliander lamented Finland's republican constitution, because it is God's will that the monarch is 'God's servant' – a clear reference to Romans 13:4. This is a late echo of the old personal interpretation of *esivalta,* and the majority view had already shifted towards republican democracy.[27] The changing mental climate is illustrated by the New Testament translation of 1913, which replaced the Finnish personal pronoun *hän* ('he/she') to *se* ('it') in the New Testament translation. One may only intuit that the shift was not merely linguistic but also political. At least it takes place at a time of political turmoil. This is not the only indicator of the decreasing appreciation for the ruler. During the same year the Church published a new manual for the rites. The intercessory prayer naturally included a prayer on behalf of the ruler. The slight modifications in comparison to the old prayer hint toward a changing mood. One prayed no longer on behalf of 'the beloved Emperor,' but just on behalf of 'the Emperor.' For the people, one prayed in terms of obedience not only to the *esivalta* but also in terms of the law. These minor changes express the mistrust towards the Tsar and the growing status of the law.[28]

This was the mental situation when the Russian revolution broke out in 1917. The obedience to *esivalta* had become blurred, as it was split between an obedience to the Tsar and an obedience to the Finnish law. Naturally, the revolution undermined the former and traditional interpretation. However, even the latter interpretation had become obscure. The law bore a religious character and its source was seen in people's sense of justice. In

26 I express my thanks to Hanna Lehti-Eklund, Professor of Scandinavian languages, for her information on the history of the Swedish language.

27 Huttunen (2010: 93–94).

28 Huttunen (2010: 95).

this way, the sense of justice was the real law in contrast to the written code. Therefore, one could defend the law even by transgressing what the statute book concretely prohibited. The obedience to *esivalta* meant an increasing obedience to whatever one understood to be good and worthy of promoting. Sowing such seeds in turn reaped the tragic events of 1917–1918.[29]

Civil War: Resisting and assisting Esivalta

The dethroning of the Tsar in March 1917 forced the Finnish politicians to discuss what the new situation meant in relation to the Finnish Constitution. The ostensibly juridical argumentation became utterly politicized.[30] Public order collapsed after the police authorities were dismissed; strikes and prolific unrest characterized public life during the whole year of 1917. In answer to this unrest, socialists and the bourgeoisie organized their own patrols, which developed into full military organizations, that is, into the Red and the White Guards. On January 26, 1918, the reds declared a revolution though they had also pondered legal arguments for their takeover. The open revolution following Marxist principles, however, meant an open rejection of the law and *esivalta*. Lauri Letonmäki, the head of the legal department of the rebellious red government, expressed the new political ideal in his poem 'The justice of the people:'

> It is time to move the rotten bones to the grave,
> the bones which are the laws of the rich.
> The bayonets of the Red Guard draw
> a new law for Finland.[31]

In practice, there was no clear-cut shift to the revolutionary state. 'The justice of the people' continued the legal philosophy in which the general sense of justice was the source of the law. For example, the revolutionary courts had to judge according to 'the conscience and the common sense.' The red government also partly based its function on the old bourgeois laws.[32] Moreover, the traditional teaching of *esivalta* haunted the minds of the reds, which powerfully paralyzed the revolutionary enthusiasm.[33] According to Heikki Ylikangas,[34] the reds felt their rebellion to be 'a defiant uprising against masters, law and *esivalta*, and ultimately against justice itself.' The religious heritage resulted in the fact that – borrowing the words of Anthony

29 For the general introduction to the events, see, e.g., Upton (1980). On the Lutheran Church in 1917–1918, see Kena (1979).
30 Rasilainen (2004).
31 The original in *Kansanvaltuuskunnan tiedonantoja* on February 15, 1918: 'Saa hautahan jo luut lahot siirtää / tuon rikkaiden oikeuden. / Punakaartin pistimet piirtää / lain uuden nyt Suomellen.'
32 Siro (2009: 1–2, 29–30, 177–179, 344–345).
33 Huttunen (2010: 109).
34 Ylikangas (2003: 525).

F. Upton – 'from the Finnish revolution some vital spark was missing.'[35] The whites crushed the last rebels in the beginning of May 1918.

The teaching of *esivalta* had an opposite effect on the white side. As the reds declared themselves rebels, the whites represented the constitutional continuity, and thus also *esivalta*. The white government declared the White Guard as its official army. This had crucial importance for the moral justification of the White Guard as is evident, for example, in these memories:

> At first, one did not really know, if *esivalta* was behind the white guard or if it was just a chore of some coalition [...] The information that we were soldiers of *esivalta* itself, alleviated greatly the incapacitating character of the civil war.[36]

The whites made good use of the moral resources of the teaching on *esivalta*. On February 27, 1918, Antti Rentola, a Lutheran pastor and a member of parliament published a treatise on the moral justification of the war against the revolutionaries. The heart of his strongly biblical argumentation is Romans 13.

> Holy war. This is what we have now – thanks be to God! Because we now have the inevitable war, which we cannot avoid by philosophizing, let us thank God that our war is no militaristic war of plunder. It is the use of the sword of *esivalta* in order to punish the wrongdoer according to the divine dispensation. [...] This is God's war against the Devil. This is David's war against the rebellious Absalom. This is Joshua's war against the Philistines. God has blessed this war and he will continuously bless it, as he has instituted the sword to *esivalta,* so that it would be a punishment for the wicked and approval for the good.

The importance of this piece is illustrated by the fact that it was published as an editorial in the non-ecclesial newspaper *Ilkka.* The reds noted it with strongly disapproving tone.[37] The teaching on *esivalta* really echoed outside the walls of the church, and it was seemingly the moral undertow of the harsh measures the whites applied when overpowering the red resistance. The military operations were regularly followed by mass trials in courts-martial, which passed numerous sentences of death – without any real juridical grounds, despite the recurring references to military laws.[38] These 'laws' meant really the general sense of justice. An example of the teaching on *esivalta* in these operations is preserved from Taipalsaari, a small countryside village in Eastern Finland. A locally influential person held a speech for the execution squad, which was going to execute the convicted for the first time:

> When you now are going to fulfill this important mission, remember to do calmly what you are going to do. These convicted have resisted God and *esivalta,* and their wages is death.[39]

35 Upton (1980: 395).
36 Eräs (1933: 26–27).
37 Huttunen (2010: 107).
38 Tikka (2004).
39 Tikka & Arponen (1999: 265).

The short speech is biblical. Besides adapting the wording of John 13:27 and Romans 6:23, the speaker's argumentation is based on Romans 13:2: 'whoever resists authority (*esivalta*) resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgement.'[40] This morality not only reached the rural population, but it also reached the social elite. One jurist marked on the executions he had passed as a member of a courts-martial: 'These persons are examined and found guilty of rebellion and troublemaking against the legal *esivalta*.'[41] One encounters this morality even at the highest level of juridical expertise. Robert Hermanson, professor emeritus in constitutional and international law in the University of Helsinki, held Olaus Petri lectures in Uppsala, Sweden in the autumn of 1918 – to be followed by Albert Schweitzer as a lecturer in the next year. In these lectures Hermanson argued that the state must have the right to punish, and then suddenly added:[42] 'This answer is warranted by the statement: 'the authority (*överhet*) does not bear the sword in vain! It is the servant of God to execute wrath on the wrongdoer' (Romans 13:4).' Clearly hinting at the reds, he continued that when comparing the crimes against the state and other crimes, one should not be milder in relation to the former ones. Hermanson continues that not even love, of which Paul speaks in 1 Cor. 13 – Hermanson bypasses that Paul speaks of the duty of love also in Romans 13:8–10, just after his words on authorities – should have an alleviating effect, because Paul had clearly stated the right to punish.

The heritage

Already in June of 1918, the procurator as the highest overseer of justice in Finland received the first letter of complaint relating to the illegal executions. Later in the summer, he received similar letters weekly. About 10,000 men and women were executed, and this clearly became a problem for the government, especially for the government, which claimed to be a legal *esivalta*. On December 7, 1918, an amnesty was granted for a large group of red prisoners while similar amnesty was granted also for those whites who had used unnecessarily harsh measures. After that there was no legal way to prosecute the white executioners. The moral problem did not disappear, however, and the vernacular beliefs saw divine justice as the fate of certain people. For example, the person who had encouraged the execution squad in Taipalsaari, lost his business, which was interpreted as God's punishment.[43] Where the divine law was seen to be effective, the secular law was seen as impotent.

It is important to note that, on the red side, *esivalta* was not greatly blamed for the unfortunate degree of pacification. This is possibly due to the fact that the Social Democratic party mainly abandoned the revolutionary

40 Translation according to the New Revised Standard Version.
41 Tikka & Arponen (1999: 225).
42 Hermanson (1919: 202–205).
43 Huttunen (2010: 126–127, 181).

theories after the war. The Social Democratic literature after the war had the character of mourning featuring openly religious overtones. For instance there is a memorial book for the deceased, which bore the biblical name *From the Ways of Sufferings* (*Kärsimysten teiltä* in Finnish*;* cf. *via dolorosa*). The book was opened by a poem, which paralleled Christ in Golgotha and the executed reds. The mourning texts had clear affinities with the Lutheran piety, especially the hymns for Good Friday – with one difference: the mourning texts carefully avoid questions of guilt. The 'red martyr cult' bypassed the discussion on the right to take up arms, but it also avoided arousing revolutionary hatred towards the white, which was typical for the Communist propaganda.[44] Actually, one can even find positive estimations of *esivalta* in the post-war Social Democrat literature. In the above-mentioned memorial book, a socialist author Anton Huotari analyses the reasons for the civil war.[45] Among other reasons he noted the weakening respect for *esivalta*. The historian Jussi T. Lappalainen pinpointed the issue, when he mentioned in passing that the ideas of *esivalta* and of law created a deep conviction among both the red and the white population that the civil war was a rebellion (*kapina* in Finnish) – not a class war (communist interpretation) or a war of freedom against Russia and the Finnish traitors (the white establishment).

It is noteworthy that the white side could never fully reconcile the respect of *esivalta* with the idea of a war for freedom. In the latter interpretation, the war was presented just as a continuation of Finnish activists like Schauman and Hohenthal, who openly resisted the Tsarist *esivalta*. Thus, the idea of a war for freedom was also rebellious. People hardly noted this discrepancy within the white ideology. One exception is Ch. E. Boldt. In the *Teologinen aikakauskirja (Finnish Journal of Theology)* 1919 he refers to the so-called *Jägers,* who joined the German army during WWI with the aim to later free Finland from Russia. This was completely illegal during the Russo-German war. Boldt asks if there is any difference between the *Jägers* and the revolutionary reds. 'Did also the former take up arms against their legal *överhet*?' Boldt asked without generating any further discussion around this awkward question.[46] No one wanted to raise doubts, whether or not the whites really could invoke the law and *esivalta*.

The Lutheran teaching on *esivalta* was too good a resource to exploit for the white establishment to abandon. Not only the conservatives but also the liberal whites invoked it; 'State and church, fatherland and family, *esivalta* and obedience of the subjects regained their credit in the old forms,' wrote the female poet and the cultural personality L. Onerva in a newspaper after the war.[47] The red rebellion shook society so strongly that even the liberals were ready to back it – and the teaching on *esivalta* was at hand to consolidate Finland. From this viewpoint, the wording of the Finnish military oath is no surprise, as the present wording roughly follows the first

44 Huttunen (2010: 215–222).
45 Huotari (1928: 150).
46 Boldt (1919).
47 *Helsingin Sanomat,* May 19, 1918.

wording from the year 1918. The rebellion, however, made clear that one should not require loyalty to any *esivalta*. In the spring of 1918, the white newspapers differentiated the right and the wrong *esivalta* by ridiculing the counterfeit character of the red *esivalta*. It harassed churches, showed off in a childish manner, and became a terror to good conduct, but approved the villainous malefactors –in opposition to what Paul says and, therefore, it was clearly not from God but from the Devil.[48] It is obvious that after the final years of the tsarist government and especially after the red rebellion, there was a demand for limits on obedience towards *esivalta*. The new extended catechism from the year 1923 limited this obedience by referring to Acts 5:29. In the military oath, the differentiation between real and counterfeit *esivalta* was based on the law. One should not obey the revolutionary *esivalta* but only the legal *esivalta*.

Conclusion

The idea of *esivalta* continues its life – besides in ecclesial teaching – as a social resource present, for example, in the military oath or in the rebus (sword of *esivalta*) of police uniforms. *Esivalta* is clearly fit for hierarchical organizations, which demand obedience and execute power over others. Its fit to democratic society is intuitively not so clear, although the idea of the legal *esivalta* clearly adapts the traditional Lutheran doctrine to the civic society by emphasizing the rule of law. There is one recent academic study by Hannu Juntunen,[49] which has newly re-examined the doctrine from the juridical and theological perspective. Its title is illuminating: *We are esivalta* (*Me olemme esivalta*, in Finnish). Juntunen apparently stands in the tradition of the legal *esivalta* as he interprets the obedience towards *esivalta* as an obedience towards the law enacted by the democratic parliament.

However, something remains of the old tradition, and the military oath embodies it: the sword of *esivalta* (Romans 13:4) does not belong to every citizen in contrast to, for example, the second amendment of the US constitution. The sword belongs to the system of government. Despite the democratization process, the history of *esivalta* is still felt in the Finnish society. *Esivalta* is somehow prior (cf. the Finnish prefix *esi-*) or above (cf. the German prefix *Obrig-* or the Swedish prefix *över-*) the people when controlling the possession of weapons. The conscripted soldiers swear in front of God to serve *esivalta* with their weapons. Thus, the oath perfectly reflects the religious roots of the Finnish moral view of the society.

48 Huttunen (2010: 102).
49 Juntunen (2008).

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'A Storm Might Be Brewing:' The Lutheran Church and Secular Authority in Finland, 1944–1948

Abstract

Although Finland, a Nazi-ally, was among the defeated, the country was not invaded after the war, and the governmental system did not change from parliamentary democracy to people's democracy. This does not, however, mean that the war-to-peace transition in Finland was lacking drama. The years from 1944 to 1948 were marked by a series of 'crises of peace' so turbulent that the term 'the war-after-the-war' is warranted. Also for the Lutheran church in Finland the period was in many ways traumatic. The rise to power of the left, backed by the Soviet Union, and the general change in the cultural atmosphere challenged the traditionally symbiotic relation between the church and the state. This chapter examines how Lutheran priests constructed publicly the church's relationship to the state, evolving from mild optimism towards criticism and even martyrdom.

Souls bruised and coats worn inside out: Finland after WWII

The post-1945 period is no longer treated primarily as the incubation period of a new Cold War order; instead, the persistent and lasting after-effects on the history of European societies of the Second World War are now seen as central. That is to say, instead of analysing European societies for what they became, the history of the post-war period tends to focus on the psychological, emotional, and literal rubble from which they emerged, as Frank Biess has succinctly stated.[1]

Ian Kershaw has emphasized that it was extremely difficult to imagine at all in the ruins of 1945. At that time, barely anybody could foresee the extraordinary changes that would come about in Europe within such a short time. The immediate years after the war gave little inkling of the transformation to come; these were years of political uncertainty, economic disorder, social misery, personal tragedy and generally terrible inhumanity. In other words, the future seemed dark – or it did not exist at all. According

1 Biess (2010: 1). See also Ahonen (2003); Judt (2006). All translations from Finnish originals in this chapter have been done by the author.

to Kershaw, only by 1949 would the contours of a new Europe, by this time a continent divided politically, ideologically and economically, have taken shape.[2]

On directing one's attention to Finland one finds an exception to the post-war European 'rubble.' Although Finland had fought in alliance with Nazi Germany and was among the defeated, the country was not invaded, and the governmental system did not change from parliamentary democracy to people's democracy. The basic structures and institutions of the state remained as they had been before the war. In this sense, as Petri Karonen has pointed out, the end of WWII in Finland was not a 'zero hour.'[3]

This does not, however, mean that the war-to-peace transition in Finland was lacking drama. The years from 1944 to 1948 were marked by a series of 'crises of peace.'[4] Although the regime itself did not change, a Soviet-led Control Commission was set up in Helsinki from 1944 to 1947 to observe that Finland would comply with the Moscow armistice, signed in September 1944. Communists were rehabilitated immediately after the war; over 1 000 organizations deemed 'fascist' had to be banned and the leaders held responsible for the war had to be convicted. In the general election of 1945 the Social Democrats got 50 MPs while the People's Democrats[5] got 49. The latter even became the largest party in 1946 after two Social Democrat MPs switched parties. Indeed, at least for the political right, the era was 'the years of danger:' the possibility of a Soviet occupation was considered to be more than real.[6]

At the same time, the economic situation was serious. There was a desperate shortage of housing, commodities and jobs. The situation was made more challenging by the fact that Finland had to pay war reparations to the Soviet Union and at the same time find homes for over 400 000 evacuees from those parts of Karelia that were ceded to the former enemy. In social terms the situation was not significantly better. Families had been torn apart, and for many people there was no return to any former life or 'peace.' Nervous stress manifested itself in a huge increase in alcohol consumption, divorces, and venereal disease.[7] While the extreme left was taking its political revenge,[8] many ordinary Finns had to find a balance between their hopelessness, their disappointment, and enforced self-control.

The years immediately after the Second World War in Finland were therefore so turbulent that they warrant the term 'the war-after-the-war.' A contemporary author, Matti Kurjensaari, wrote in 1948 that although the political transformation happened almost overnight, the mental

2 Kershaw (2016: 448–449).
3 Karonen (2015: 207).
4 See Holmila & Mikkonen (2015); Kivimäki & Hytönen (2015).
5 Established in 1944 after the anti-communist laws were repealed, the Finnish People's Democratic League's aim was to unite political forces left of the Social Democratic Party. Its main member organ was the Communist Party of Finland.
6 Hyvämäki (1954).
7 See for example Malinen (2015).
8 The 'revenge' was, however, rather moderate compared to the kind of purging that went on especially in Eastern Europe.

transformation was much slower. Those who had prepared themselves for victory were disappointed: in the ruins of Germany were buried public and private hopes as well as societal harmony. Especially the self-esteem of those in leading positions in society was severely bruised.[9] Finland was moving toward the future, but this took place 'wearing an old coat inside out and back to front.'[10]

For the Lutheran church, the transformation was in many ways traumatic. Experiences of the war, the subsequent moral crisis, and the collapse of the nationalistic world-view embraced by the church led to a clerical debate in which the relationship between the individual and society was re-examined.[11] The most salient feature of the situation was the rift between the social conceptions of the church inspired by Lundian theology[12] and experiences of the war, and traditional pietism.[13] The rise to power of the left and the general change in the cultural atmosphere also put external pressures on the church, although in the end it did not lose its institutional position.[14]

One of the most crucial issues was how the church should position itself in relation to the state when a significant degree of political power was held by Communists, backed by the Soviet Union. At the same time, the church was needed in order to stabilize the state and give it legitimacy and authority.[15] This chapter examines how Lutheran priests constructed the church's relationship to the state, alternating as they did so between obedience and criticism.

My sources are largely public texts that discussed the relationship between church and state most comprehensively, namely, those published in the unofficial weekly of the Lutheran church, *Kotimaa*[16], and pastoral letters written by Finnish bishops. In addition, the material includes the sermons given at the opening and closing ceremonies of the Finnish parliament

9 Kurjensaari (1948: 203).

10 Haavikko (1977: 194–195); Holmila & Mikkonen (2015: 19–21); Murtorinne (1995: 290).

11 Murtorinne (1995: 294).

12 Drawing on an interpretation of Martin Luther's 'ground motives,' Lundian theology emphasized the social responsibility of the church and the need to take a stand on common problems and issues faced by human communities large and small (Seppo 1997: 531–534).

13 Seppo (1997).

14 Although the constitution of 1919 defined the state as non-confessional, the Lutheran church (with the Finnish Orthodox church) retained its juridical position with the right to, for example, levy church tax. Also religious education in schools remained strictly Lutheran. As of today, the General Synod (est. in 1869) is the church's own decision-making body, it has the sole right to initiate legislation in matters of Church Law.

15 Kivimäki, Hytönen & Karonen (2015: 27); Huotari (1976: 185–193). See Holmila (2008) on the religious dimension of rhetoric of self-control in Finland.

16 The initial aim of *Kotimaa,* established in 1905, was to bring forth a churchly perspective to societal matters. In the 1930s *Kotimaa* was overtly rightist – a fact that it has subsequently apologized. Many prominent Finnish priests and bishops have served in its editorial board.

between 1945 and 1948. My purpose is by no means to present a complete analysis of the Lutheran church during the 'years of danger.' Rather, I aim to examine closely some of the key texts of a period in which the future not only of the church but of the whole nation seemed very uncertain. Before the analysis I will briefly discuss the Lutheran perspective on secular authority and highlight some of its Finnish applications. I will conclude the chapter by discussing the reasons why the church acted as it did.

Between two kingdoms: Lutheranism and secular authority

Walking a tightrope is an inherent characteristic of Lutheranism. In Martin Luther's theology, the Christian is *simul iustus et peccator*, at the same time justified and sinner. By birth every human belongs to the kingdom of sin and unrighteousness, but by faith in Christ one is justified before God.[17] Luther's anthropological dualism extends to the societal level. God governs the world through law and spirit. In the secular sphere, consisting of *politia*, *oeconomia*, and *ecclesia* (the institutional side of the church), law and authority govern. Here the state can legitimately use even coercive measures to keep the peace. In the spiritual realm, on the other hand, God – and only He – rules through the Word and the Spirit. The two realms must be kept separate while acknowledging that they are both instituted by God. They exist, however, for different purposes: one to guarantee external peace, and the other to produce piety through knowledge of sin and grace. Both are needed because of man's sinful nature. The crucial issue, then, is to distinguish what belongs to the secular sphere from spiritual matters.[18] Disobedience, for instance, is tied strictly to spiritual matters; only commands that definitely contradict God's will can be defied. The citizens must obey their secular rulers even to the point of taking up arms and killing – as long as it is done to protect the community.[19] In a nutshell, the spiritual sphere is governed by freedom, while in earthly matters authority and submission are of foremost importance.

The issue is further complicated by the demand that the different spheres of worldly life must be organized harmoniously under God's will. This means that one's actions in political, economic (including the family and household) and ecclesiastical life should all be conducted in a way that 'realizes Christian love.' This is particularly challenging for the church – a nexus for the secular and the spiritual. As a secular institution, it should serve the authorities and keep the peace by preaching and taking care of the worldly tasks assigned to it. On the other hand, if need be, the church as a community of Christians is obligated to protest against any ungodly actions by the political authorities.[20] Consequently, Lutheranism involves a continuous balancing

17 Barth (2012: 179–181).
18 Luther (1962: 366–373); Barth (2012: 313–348).
19 Cargill Thompson (1984: 97–111); Sowle Cahill (1994: 105, 108); Rupp & Drewery (1970: 122).
20 Barth (2012: 56, 280, 328–334).

between spiritual and secular requirements.[21] Historically, this has indeed taken many forms.

In Finland, the church has traditionally emphasized obedience. For example, during the Russification periods of the late 19th century the church leadership, Archbishop Gustaf Johansson in particular, continued to stress obedience, although the Tsar would have acted contrary to the constitutional rights endowed to Finland as the autonomous grand-duchy. Thus, contrary to many secular political actors of the time, for the church illegality was not a factor that would have given grounds to disobey. During the Civil War of 1918, which followed the acquisition of independence in (late) 1917, the prevailing interpretation in the church was that the reds had rebelled against secular authorities – and thus also against God. For this reason they had to be punished.[22]

As another example, obedience was stressed by the Finnish clergy during the Continuation War (1941–1944), an offensive in cooperation with Germany's Operation Barbarossa.[23] The war was defined as a crusade by Field Marshal C. G. E. Mannerheim. Also, the church considered the war a holy one[24] and focused on the Christian duty to obey and Luther's interpretation of the Fifth commandment, according to which God and secular authorities are exempt from the prohibition to kill. The weight put on obedience and spiritual understanding of the nature of the war resulted in neglecting Martin Luther's criticism that religious justification of war would mean mixing the secular and spiritual spheres. On the other hand, it was stressed that animosity was to be expressed first and foremost against the enemy's ideology and the state in which it was realized; as individual human beings, Soviet soldiers were entitled to Christian love as anyone else.[25] Interestingly, for the Finnish Lutheran church walking of the tightrope truly began after the war, as we shall observe next.

21 As many commentators have pointed out, Martin Luther in fact did not have a doctrine but a set of diverse positions that has been subsequently synthesized as doctrine (see for example Witte 2004: 85–118).

22 Huttunen (2008: 206–211); see also Huhta (1999).

23 The 15 months between the Winter War and the Continuation War are known in Finland as the interim peace; it was widely believed that the peace treaty (12 March 1940) would be revised – one way or another. From the late summer of 1940 onwards, while Finnish politicians were doing their best to avoid arousing Soviet suspicions, high-ranking military officers were visiting Germany regularly and exchanging plans with their German colleagues about *Aufbau Ost*, which Hitler had started to plan in July 1940. Although none of this was officially announced until the spring of 1941, in practice it meant that Finland was now an important part of Nazi Germany's planned invasion of the Soviet Union.

24 Holy war with apocalyptic tones was a particularly popular theme in clerical rhetoric in early phases of the war when the Finnish army advanced swiftly. However, by 1943 it became evident that the war was not a Biblical battle between good and evil. At that time crusading against Bolshevism was replaced by, for instance, a crusade against 'national sins.' See Tilli (2017).

25 Tilli (2014).

'A storm might be brewing:' Oscillation between hope and pessimism

Before the 1945 elections, *Kotimaa* declared that voting was a Christian obligation because that was how the secular authority was instituted in a democratic system.[26] Voter turnout percentage was nearly 75, whereas in 1939 it had been 66. Although in the elections the centre and right parties still held the majority of seats, the left had 99 MPs out of the total 200. The result was something of a shock to many people. *Kotimaa* considered the result from the perspective of foreign policy: it was a sign to the world that Finland was governed by 'peaceful and democratic trends.' The newspaper also stressed that unlike, for example, Germany, Finland had never had fascist tendencies and that even during the war both the labour movement and the church had emphasized the importance of democracy.[27] Thus, initially the situation was seen in rather positive terms: all sides were peaceful, democratic, and willing to nurture good relations with each other and with all neighbouring countries.

The success of the People's Democrats in the elections led to their entering the government with seven ministerial positions, the most important being the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Education, and the Minister of Defence. The Minister of Education, Johan Helo, proposed to municipalize the nation's cemeteries (responsibility for which also fell within his portfolio) and, even more dramatically, to investigate the possibility of the separation of state and church. As regards schools, the aim was to move to studying the history of religions and ethics instead of the traditional (Lutheran) religious instruction. The program received a huge amount of publicity – and, not surprisingly, fierce criticism from *Kotimaa* and the church.[28]

Lutheran priests, especially bishops, made numerous public statements and used their private contacts to lobby key politicians, especially the committee revising the national school curriculum in line with Helo's program. Prime Minister Mauno Pekkala[29] had promised that the church would have a say in the reforms. Luckily for the church, in the end the proposal was not finished in time for a decision to be made by the Pekkala government.[30] This political context was nevertheless vividly present in many clerical writings and speeches, as we shall see.

The newly-elected[31] Archbishop, Aleksi Lehtonen, published his first pastoral letter at the beginning of 1945. Lehtonen was an active advocate of Anglican relations, and the above-mentioned pastoral letter included an explication of his theological stance that purported to attain a synthesis of

26 *Kotimaa*, March 16, 1945.
27 *Kotimaa*, March 20, 1945.
28 Helin (1996: 29–33, 42, 63).
29 President C. G. E. Mannerheim resigned in March 1946, and Prime Minister J. K. Paasikivi was appointed as his successor by the parliament. Following this, the People's Democrat Mauno Pekkala became the new prime minister.
30 Helin (1996: 66–67).
31 His predecessor Erkki Kaila had died in December 1944.

Nordic Lutheranism and Anglicanism.[32] Also, reacting to the new political atmosphere, Lehtonen stressed the church's societal role and the connection between the church and the people. He pointed out that the church's role, given by Christ himself, was to maintain 'moral principles and obligations' in national and political life. By maintaining faith in God the church also strengthened the state and democracy: it gave the people power and courage that would endure longer than any 'fleeting enthusiasm aroused by mass meetings.'[33] Because of its democratic influence, the church could not allow itself to be pushed to the margins of society. Any attempt to sever the church from the state would be a drastic measure in a country where a huge majority, 96 per cent of the population, belonged to the Lutheran church. Such action, if it were taken, would not be the result of actual need but of an 'ideology hostile to the Christian way of life.'[34]

At the same time, Lehtonen downplayed the judicial and economic connections between the state and the church. According to him, the church's external ties to the state were already relatively loose; because of the General Synod, the church was autonomous. In addition, any funding received from the state was small, considering that the church fulfilled nationwide responsibilities, and it would be very expensive for the state if the church's responsibility for registering and recording information about the population was transferred to the state.[35]

The archbishop, on the other hand, said cautiously that if the people of Finland had truly distanced themselves from the Christian faith, the separation would happen of itself. But this certainly did not seem to be the case, Lehtonen underlined. His personal hope was that the church and the state would cooperate positively to the benefit of them both, at a time when 'all the constructive powers must work together.' To this end, the church should be open-minded toward different political ideologies while keeping out of party struggles. The archbishop concluded with a hopeful yet realistic remark: 'Let our people choose. We do not know what the immediate future of our church will be. A storm might be brewing.'[36]

The Bishop of Oulu and a former MP of the National Coalition Party, Väinö Malmivaara, was even more hopeful in his pastoral letter. The new era that was beginning after the war journeyed 'under the stars of social progress' and aimed at 'lifting the poor to the level of others and putting in power those thus far kept in the shadows.' The reason for the change of guard in the upper echelons of our society, as the bishop put it, was that the Finnish elite had been distancing themselves from Christianity since the 1880s.[37] Because of their apostasy, power had been taken away from the elite and

32 Pajunen (2008).
33 Lehtonen (1945: 67–68).
34 Lehtonen (1945: 74–75).
35 Lehtonen (1945: 75).
36 Lehtonen (1945, 75–78).
37 The 1880s was a decade characterized by clashes between traditional religious values and secular liberalism (Juva 1956; Pikkusaari 1998).

given to someone else – for God cannot be mocked, a man reaps what he sows, Malmivaara proclaimed with a biblical reference to Galatians (6:7).[38]

As far as legislation on social issues was concerned, the bishop said, the times heralded a pivotal and long-awaited change for the better. He therefore urged all Christians to pray for the secular authorities, so that the predicted transformation would take place peacefully. Praying for the worldly authorities, a holy task and a part of Lutheran priesthood of all believers[39], would guarantee that 'the new time that is now entering will carry in its bosom God's blessing to our people.' Unrest was probable and understandable at a time 'when the new takes over and the old becomes the controlled,' and it might even be that there would be nothing left of the old, the bishop suggested almost revolutionarily.[40]

Kotimaa agreed with Bishop Väinö Malmivaara that the obligation to pray for the secular authorities had been forgotten too easily. The following quotation from an editorial illustrates the ambiguous attitude of the Lutheran Church:

> Although our present government is allegedly putting its coarse hands on things that are of the utmost importance to Christian people, Lutheran Christianity sees secular authority as essentially positive because it fulfills God's government and purposes – even if all the private individuals wielding it are anything but true Christians.[41]

Although suspicion and fear got in the way of 'the spirit of intercessory prayer,' it was worth bearing in mind that the original ecclesia had also prayed for the authorities that had persecuted them. Because the situation in Finland was analogous with the biblical example, it was necessary to remember that the obligation demanded 'the greater internal struggle, the more one felt the government in power was not of one's own political and religious ideals.'[42] In another editorial published in response to demands to 'purge' the church, *Kotimaa* pointed out, in line with the archbishop, that the Finnish Lutheran church was 'pronouncedly democratic,' and thus its faults could be addressed without separating it from the state.[43]

Professor Yrjö J. E. Alanen[44] (1890–1960), who was co-editor-in-chief of *Kotimaa* in 1944–1947, was among those who found a positive side to the situation from an institutional perspective. According to Alanen, history

38 Malmivaara (1945: 51–52).
39 According to this doctrine, the baptized are all equally responsible for (and obligated to) the community. That is, all are 'priests' to one another.
40 Malmivaara (1945: 53–54).
41 *Kotimaa*, July 20, 1945.
42 *Kotimaa*, July 20, 1945.
43 *Kotimaa*, July 10, 1945.
44 Alanen was a mixture of theological conservatism and societal progressiveness. Although he had a traditional pietistic conception of church and faith, he wrote extensively on Christian socialism and was a Christian social democrat. Alanen is a rare exception to the norm that especially before WWII politically active priests were to be found among rightist or centrist parties.

seemed to be developing toward socialism, and it was the duty of the church to do all it could to facilitate the great societal change. Secular institutions played an important role because they could ease the transformation away from the 'medieval ethics of alms.' That is to say, the state was the crucial instrument for realizing human solidarity and increasing well-being. As a result, the church would be able to focus on its key task, namely, preaching the Gospel, the personal emphasis of which was sorely needed in 'a socialized society.'[45] Thus Alanen optimistically reconciled the state and the church: both worked together for the same purpose, even under socialism.

In this discourse, then, the church's relationship to the state was seen as positive, even if power was wielded by people whose ideological stance toward the church was doubting, even hostile. Two arguments were put forward to support this view. First, there were mutual benefits to be gained by both institutions. Particular emphasis was given here to the connection between the church and the people – the roots of the church were in the people.[46] The second reason was theological: because the secular authority was a part of God's rule, Christians should pray for those involved even if they did not personally find the government's particular policies acceptable. This discourse was a part of a national post-war culture that emphasized self-discipline and trust in the political leadership as a way to cope with the turbulence and upheaval of the immediate post-war months.[47] However, the hopeful tone receded and a more pessimistic discourse took over as the situation developed and when the People's Democrats became the leading party in the government in early 1946.

Secular authority that does not deserve to be obeyed

In addition to other crises during this time, the years between 1945 and 1948 were marked by countless strikes and demonstrations. Most of the strikes were related to the struggle between Communists and Social Democrats for power over the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK). Some of the strikes were spontaneous, local conflicts that had not been organized by the rival parties. For many workers, protesting was a way of venting their frustration over the slow improvements in wages and living conditions. However, the impetus behind the wave of strikes was above all the Communists' aim of demonstrating their power to mobilize people and in this way of supporting their position in the government.[48]

This was the case especially after spring 1946, when the Soviet Union urged Finnish communists to organize strikes and political meetings, and to use other extra-parliamentary means. The goal was not only to raise wages and benefits; the even weightier reasons were to demand political purges in state institutions and nationalization of the economy. Although the extreme

45 Alanen (1946: 24, 63, 75–81).
46 For similar arguments in post-war Norway, see Tønnessen (2014).
47 Auvinen, Holmila & Lehtimäki (2015: 232–234).
48 Holmila & Mikkonen (2015: 165–166).

left was certainly very loud and active, it is important to note that the silent majority supported the social democratic approach, which sought to reform the system via parliament. Eventually the Social Democrats won the battle for the workers' souls, which meant that the Communists lacked organized support from trade unions. However, particularly in 1946 and in 1947 the situation was turbulent and unpredictable.[49]

Although the church itself was not a target, demonstrations and rallies were seen as a dangerous phenomenon. More information from continental Europe, where (personal, social, and political) reckoning with those responsible for the horrors of the immediate past was taking place, had traversed also to Finland.[50] Accordingly, *Kotimaa* wrote it seemed from the present economic and political struggles that the war had become an internal war. The newspaper stressed that 'affairs of state' were not decided by demonstrators but by the members of parliament; justice would not be done by taking it into one's own hands.[51] In addition to being theologically against Luther's teachings, such behaviour simply jeopardized the legitimacy of the secular authorities.

In fall 1946 *Kotimaa* condemned the use of extra-parliamentary measures even more strongly: 'And if one wanted to apply the greatly misused term 'fascism' to recent political phenomena, one would be obliged to define as fascist actions aiming at influencing the government by extra-parliamentary routes.' It was undemocratic for a party with one fourth of the seats to attempt to 'dictate' how the republic should be governed.[52] In another editorial, Communism was identified with National Socialism, and it was pointed out that supporters of the former were now doing exactly the same as the latter had done. They were striving toward despotism through a reliance on coercion and their intolerance of other ideologies or critical voices.[53]

Kotimaa continued the theme in several articles, pointing out that the exceptional circumstances brought about by the long war were why ideas about the respectability of law and justice had declined in Finland. To counter this effect, people needed a feeling of security, and that could be given by justice. However, to *Kotimaa* it seemed as if a small part of the people had taken 'the role of harbinger of the destruction of democracy.' The newspaper stressed the often neglected dimension of Lutheran teaching on secular authority:

> Secular authority derives from God. No government can take power on its own. Those setting themselves against secular authority set themselves against God. But the secular authority must be benevolent towards its subjects. [...] Creating and maintaining a feeling of security among the people is a task given to the secular authorities by God. Governments have neglected this many times in the course of history, always bringing about their own downfall.[54]

49 Holmila & Mikkonen (2015: 167–180); Jussila (1990: 253–260).
50 Kershaw (2015: 449–462).
51 *Kotimaa*, August 8, 1945.
52 *Kotimaa*, September 17, 1946.
53 *Kotimaa*, October 25, 1946.
54 *Kotimaa*, June 6, 1947.

The most serious obstacle to achieving this kind of security was now claimed to be the fact that the basis of the present government was the exceptional circumstances rather than the actual support of the people and parliament.[55] In other words, the reason for the failure of secular authority was that it had not been instituted democratically – although it was based on democratic election results! This was a way to condemn the influence the Soviet Union was having on Finland's domestic politics. This issue of representation revealed yet another dilemma faced by the clergy in its relations with the state, this one related to freedom of speech. The people, they argued, were represented publicly by the president and the parliament, not by demonstrations or rallies. Demonstrating and the free expression of opinions in this way was denounced as destructive; instead, what was needed was 'responsible' criticism of the government and of 'those with despotic aspirations.'[56] Thus, by identifying demonstrations with the Communist-led government, *Kotimaa* balanced between stressing the importance of democracy and deploring a government established by a democratically elected parliament.

In addition to the condemnation of political demonstrations and mass meetings, particular attention was paid to the new 'red' state police (the domestic secret service). Purges in the state police had started as early as 1945, as agreed by the Allied Control Commission and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Communist Yrjö Leino. For example, all the department heads were changed, and over 40 percent of vacant positions were filled by Communists or People's Democrats. One third of the new high command had actually been found guilty of treason before or during WWII and sent to prison. The overall amount of personnel was increased significantly. The communist-led state police was arbitrary and often incompetent, which eventually, in October 1948, led to the parliament deciding to decommission it. At the same time there were similar attempts to 'democratize,' that is, purge the army and other official state organs. However, owing to Finland's constitution and political opposition they were eventually unsuccessful, unlike for example in Hungary or Romania.[57]

Concluding a series of editorials lamenting the situation, *Kotimaa* pointed out that the fact that the misconduct of the state police had been discussed in parliament would guarantee that in the future its officials would act more 'in line with the spirit of the law.' This was deemed particularly important because the way the state police was arbitrarily interrupting 'certain political organizations' severely compromised the authority of the state: it seemed as if 'the most immoral and uncivilized elements of society' had been hired and given positions that were supposed to represent the secular authorities.[58]

This attitude was shared by, for example, Tauno Rämesalo, who claimed in a piece published in *Kotimaa* that opportunism typical of the aftermath of any war was widespread in Finland, as evidenced by the contradiction

55 *Kotimaa*, April 15, 1947.
56 *Kotimaa*, January 17, 1947.
57 Jussila (1990: 125–152).
58 *Kotimaa*, November 8, 1946.

between values and actions. According to the priest, despite proclamations about brotherhood, actions were dominated by hatred and revenge; justice had become a caricature of itself, because what was admitted by one to be a right was denounced by another as a crime. In addition, 'people demand important positions without having done anything for the fatherland, they fawn in a cowardly way on visitors and they denounce their neighbours,' Rämesalo lamented.[59]

To summarize, in this discourse, criticism of the government, and particularly of the state police, was articulated in terms of the Lutheran doctrine on the responsibilities of the secular authorities. The argument had two elements. First, the way the state was using its power undermined its authority, because it was not carrying out its divinely instituted duty to maintain order and a feeling of security. In other words, the Communists were not wielding secular authority the way it was supposed to be done. The second argument had a more personal slant: it implied that Communists simply were not fit to hold positions of authority. As a result, secular authorities did not deserve obedience. Here we can thus detect a clerical application of the argument that secular authority may also be illegal, which in Finland had been used to protest policies of the Russian Empire aimed at limiting the status of the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland. Significantly, thus far the argument had been mainly used by other political actors than priests or the church.[60] However, more profound criticism was yet to come.

Church, state and martyrdom?

Martti Simojoki (1908–1999), a chaplain during the Continuation War, a prominent reformer of the Lutheran Church, and subsequently the Archbishop of Finland from 1964 to 1978, discussed the idea of a 'people's church' in the Finnish context and pointed out that one of its weaknesses was precisely its relation to the state.[61] Using Nazi Germany as an example, Simojoki argued that when anti-Christian powers seized the state, the fundamental question of the existence of the church had to be reassessed. In this way, Simojoki prepared his readers for the possibility that the church of the future would not be the kind of people's church that Finns had been used to: if the state made it impossible for the church to function according to its Christian faith, the Lutheran church in Finland would 'change into a new form of church.'[62]

While Martti Simojoki was only slightly more suspicious of the leftist government than many of his colleagues, the Bishop of Kuopio, Eino Sormunen, (1893–1972) was openly pessimistic and quite outspoken in his political critique. Theologically and politically conservative,[63] Sormunen, the

59 Rämesalo (1946: 4); also *Kotimaa*, May 23, 1947.
60 Huttunen (2008: 214).
61 See Seppo (2013).
62 Simojoki (1946: 51–52).
63 Sormunen was an outspoken critic of so-called social Christianity. The extreme left labelled him as 'the Nazi Bishop.' See Helin (1996: 74).

author of nearly 100 books on topics varying from the liturgy to the socio-political and cultural role of religion and the church, considered that the new constellation of power and the expanding role of the state constituted a clear and present danger for the church.

Bishop Sormunen examined the situation from a theoretical perspective. In contrast to earlier theories of representative democracy, according to which 'the state was for the people,' nowadays it was the other way around: the citizen now existed for the state, which subjected every aspect of life, including the church, to serve its own purposes. Total wars such as the previous one were the apex of such development. According to Sormunen, the present exceptional situation was the beginning of a new, abysmal normality, in which 'the principle of a majority and the principle of tolerance' were 'sacrificed for the sake of totality' and free individuals were turned into 'involuntary, thoughtless termites.'[64]

This idea was repeated by the bishop in many public speeches and writings:

> No one has responsibility for anything, no one pays for anything, because the state pays for everything. The state will be centralized and militarized, and this will mean a police state, protective laws, surveillance, inquisitions, whistle-blowing, prisoners and concentration camps. [...] The signs of a total state are massification, collectivism, and a controlled economy (that is, either nationalization or a planned economy).[65]

In other words, for Bishop Sormunen the expanding role of the state in economic life was a dangerous step towards socialism. Paradoxically, the reason for the growing tendencies toward totalitarianism was found in democracy. Drawing on traditional aristocratic critiques of democracy, Sormunen lamented that although the post-WWII period had also made Finland a more perfect democracy, the democratic system itself was at the same time being consumed by hidden doubts about itself, and undermined by the favouring of mediocrity and 'incompetence.' Consequently, it seemed that democracies were sliding toward dictatorship, and capitalism was being replaced by socialism or a planned economy – 'what guarantees that free humanity is furthered in this way?' the bishop asked rhetorically.[66]

For the bishop, the relationship between the state and the church had political and theological dimensions. The Lutheran church was the bulwark of democracy amidst 'evident attempts toward dictatorship,' because it represented 'popular and democratic freedom'[67]. As a result, as he more or less explicitly claimed, the church could not be connected to a state that was not democratic – and reducing the influence of the church on ideological grounds was, like nationalization of the economy, a sign that this was already the state of affairs. When the state neglected the Lutheran dictum that both church and state were part of God's ordinances and started to attack freedom

64 Sormunen (1948: 17–18, also 110, 122).
65 Sormunen (1948: 18).
66 Sormunen (1948: 100).
67 Sormunen (1948: 110).

of conscience, the time had come for the church to separate itself from the state. This could lead even to the path of martyrdom, Sormunen warned.[68] The bishop's pessimism was shared by many other priests as well.[69]

At this point, in 1947, also the unofficial messenger of the Lutheran church, *Kotimaa,* moved to a more critical position – it indeed seemed likely that Finland would end up as part of the Soviet bloc. Taking a different line from those who had claimed that the church should have nothing to do with political or societal issues, *Kotimaa* reminded readers of the church's role as a critic of those in power. If the secular authorities passed laws or acted in ways that were contrary to God's commandments, the church was obligated to speak out against the state. Although it had occurred many times in history, the church must neither become a 'propaganda department' of the state nor withdraw from public life. The church must not automatically give its blessing to everything the secular authorities did; if need be, as was the case when 'the state was aiming at totalitarian control,' the church had to be the conscience of the state. It was possible that this would lead to martyrdom, but this possibility should not hinder the church from carrying out its mission, *Kotimaa* proclaimed.[70]

The church's role toward the state was also stressed by the Bishop of Tampere, Eelis Gulin[71], in a sermon he gave in the parliament's closing ceremony in 1948. According to Gulin, if the church was relegated to the position of a servant of the state, it was no longer a Christian church. The church must be the conscience of the state; it must make sure that the state and those in power followed the principles upon which authority was built. 'The state has to uphold justice for God. If this purpose has been forgotten, the time has come for the church to take up its role as a witness,' the bishop preached to his audience, which included the nation's ecclesiastical and political elite.[72]

Gulin's sermon is exceptional among those delivered at parliamentary ceremonies because he was the only bishop who put emphasis in this way on the church's role toward the state. This is rather surprising, given that Gulin was known for his conciliatory attitude toward the left. We should remember that the position taken by, for example, Gulin and *Kotimaa* above is theologically sound: Martin Luther himself accepted the kind of political preaching that protested against inappropriate behaviour by the authorities. It is well-known that Luther considered those in power to be, more often than not, 'clodhoppers' in dire need of spiritual guidance.[73]

Consequently, in this discourse theological and economic considerations coincided. As regards theology, the state was considered more than a potential

68 Sormunen (1948: 123–124).
69 Leino (1946: 1).
70 *Kotimaa*, July 8, 1947.
71 Eelis Gulin (1893–1975) was Professor of New Testament Exegetics and Bishop of Tampere from 1945 to 1966. In addition to ecumenical issues, Gulin focused on improving the relation between the Lutheran Church of Finland and working people. See Krapu (2009).
72 Gulin (1948: 4528–4529).
73 Barth (2012: 334).

threat because of its possible transgression of the boundaries between the spiritual and secular spheres. If the state acted against God's will, the church should not only distance itself from the state but be prepared for martyrdom, which in this discourse referred to ideologically-based persecution. Allegedly, the first step toward such a condition was nationalization of the economy, which would lead to the loss of personal responsibility. Thus the economy, which in Lutheranism is seen as one of the secular orders through which one serves God[74], was understood in individualistic terms. Hence a collectivistic economy was also theologically problematic.

Conclusion

During the tumultuous period from the fall of 1944 to the middle of 1948, before the Allied Control Commission had left Finland (in fall 1947) and the Communists suffered a major loss in the elections (in summer 1948), clerical attitudes toward the state moved from cautious optimism to a readiness for separation and even martyrdom. This is rather surprising, given that the Lutheran church has traditionally been conceived as being steadfast in its loyalty to the state – come hell or high water. Together, the church and the state have been an irreplaceable component of Finnish national identity. It can be said, though, that unconditional obedience to the state has by no means always been the sole political message of the Lutheran church in Finland. As a part of this reassessment, parliamentary democracy was not seen as automatically positive. At the same time, on the other hand, the church's connection with 'the people' was stressed consistently. The constellation did, however, change: the initial harmonious triangle of church, state and people was broken down and the church's relation to 'the people' used as a leverage against the state.

From a European perspective, until Nazism struck into the heartland of Protestantism, there were no significant moral difficulties in accepting that Christians must obey their rulers, not only because they feared the state's sanctions but also because they supported its function of repressing evil and encouraging good. Although there certainly were some demarcation problems in relation to waging an unjust war, any such problems that did arise were more often than not weighty enough to demand that they be discussed and resolved.[75] In this sense, for the majority of Protestant churches, WWII constituted a critical moment in determining how strong the bond with the state actually was.

Interestingly, as my analysis illustrates, for the Lutheran church in Finland, this was not the case. Waging a war in alliance with Nazi Germany did not constitute such an issue in relation to obedience to the secular authority. It was when the Communists came to power after the war that this liminal moment arrived and the church's relationship to the state had to be critically assessed. Although the decision to support the war is certainly

74 Barth (2012: 326–328).
75 Yoder (1994[1972]: 193–194).

open to criticism on theological or ethical grounds, historical and contextual factors make it understandable and remove any justification for taking the moral high ground now; besides, during the war the very existence of the nation was at stake.

In the first place, clerical anti-communism was not new. The Lutheran church in Finland had been a staunch opponent of communism since the civil war of 1918. The church considered that improving workers' conditions was important, but the workers' taking up arms for their cause was utterly unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of Finnish Lutheran priests.[76] This ideological opposition to communism, together with the theological condemnation of rebellion, were combined in such a way that the church was stigmatized as the 'white church,' and this was further strengthened by its overt nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s. Also, the awful fate of churches in the Soviet Union was well-known. After the war, many priests were consistent in their anti-communism, concluding that if the extreme left was in power that must mean that the church must distance itself from the state. In other words, if there was a conflict between the two, anti-communism was a weightier factor than obedience.

Second, the policies of the rehabilitated left made the position of the 'people's church' uncertain. The new power player, the People's Democrats, included many who supported the complete separation of church and state. With the Soviet-led Allied Control Commission behind them, the People's Democrats would have a crucial role in any decision concerning the church's future. At the same time, however, over 90 per cent of Finns still belonged to the Lutheran church: it was not until the early 1950s that there was a small wave of resignations from the church. The argument that separating the state and the church would be against the will of the people was therefore indeed well-founded. In a democracy this was a factor that had to be taken into consideration.

The third important factor explaining the church's position is connected to the international situation. The 'unfortunate fate' of the German Protestant churches during Nazi rule was often used as an example to warn people of what would happen if the state's power grew too strong.[77] In addition, the problematic situation of the Lutheran churches in Soviet-occupied countries after the war was examined carefully and used to assess the likely actions of Finnish communists. The struggle of the Hungarian Lutheran Church against religious persecution, for example, was keenly followed in *Kotimaa*.[78]

The situation of the Lutheran church in Finland is a fascinating illustration of the dualism inherent in Lutheranism as well as the overall uncertainty in the immediate aftermath of the war. In a situation that

76 Huhta (2009); Huttunen (2010).

77 In fact, during the Nazi regime some Protestant church bodies fared better than others: the Nazi-minded German Christians were accepted by the regime, whereas the Confessing Church was persecuted. For propagandistic purposes, however, at this point it was suitable for Finnish priests to treat the German Protestant Church as a homogenous entity.

78 See Baer (2006).

had been utterly inconceivable during the war, the church had to balance between theologically-required obedience, of which it had a long tradition, and disobedience to a secular authority that did not consider the church to be a divinely instituted ally.

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Towards a Religion of Popular Sovereignty, Democracy and Equality: The Lutheran Sermon as a Nexus of Traditional and Modern Discourses on Political Values and a Collective Identity

Abstract

The external forms of contemporary occasions of Finnish and Swedish national worship organized to celebrate political events differ little from those of early-modern Sweden. However, the expressions of the political values of the national community in them have been totally revolutionized. After discussing social theory on the relationship between religion, nationalism, modernization and secularization and introducing a long-term historical context, this chapter proceeds to analyse two sermons given in 2009 and 2010 to demonstrate the adaptability of the Lutheran religion to modernity: the national churches have turned from advocates of theocratic monarchy and uniformity to preachers of popular sovereignty, democracy and equality in multicultural societies. A gradually redefined religion has reconciled itself with radical societal changes. This development challenges simplifying secularization theses.

Introduction

The external forms of Finnish and Swedish religious services in the observance of national days of commemoration or the openings of parliament in the early twenty-first century differ little from those held in early-modern Sweden. In the common realm of Sweden, such services were used to legitimate the Lutheran monarchy and to construct a shared collective political identity – one that associated the Finns, too, with the Swedish Crown. The occasions were organized in close cooperation between the monarch and the Clerical Estate.[1]

1 Ihalainen (2005b: subchapter 1.3). I am grateful to Gerard McAlester, Robert H. Nelson, Joonas Tammela and Jouni Tilli for their helpful comments. All translations from Swedish and Finnish originals have been done by the author.

Religious beliefs[2] and the content of the prayers and sermons of the services have changed dramatically since the division of the realm in 1809, however. This chapter focuses on the redefinitions of the national community and its societal values within national worship, inquiring into how and why modernity has changed the political content of public religion in two Nordic countries. What happens when long-term Lutheran trajectories such as the principle of unconditional obedience to secular rulers meet modern discourses of popular sovereignty, democracy and equality in a sermon (seen as a nexus, a meeting point of various discourses)? What kinds of new discourse consequently emerge, and how do they transform public religion as an element of national identity and a determinant of supposedly shared societal values? The analytical focus of my textual analysis is on the use of the concepts 'the people,' 'nation' and 'democracy' in political preaching.[3] I suggest that radical transformations in meanings assigned to them are related to the characteristic political flexibility of the Lutheran Church since the Reformation and to accelerating societal change especially after the Second World War.

I start by reviewing recent historical research and social theory on the relationship between public religion, nationalism, modernization and secularization. I then go two centuries back in time, to an age when the modernization of the content of political preaching began. The Protestant higher clergy, as part of the political elite, started to revise their discourse on the values of the national community to accord with the changing conceptions of this elite, communicating these via the lower clergy to wider audiences. Such revisions contributed to an evolutionary transition to modernity without open revolutions while simultaneously gradually secularizing the political theology of Lutheranism.

This adaptability of Lutheranism has maintained elements of an established church in the structures of the Swedish and Finnish polities, but it has led to these churches being politically little more than teachers of the prevailing state values. I demonstrate this by analysing two occasions of national worship that provoked some political debate in Finland and Sweden in the 2000s. The analysis shows that political and social changes related to modernization did not necessarily remove religion from public life though its relative importance may have decreased considerably. Lutheran teachings on obedience and uniformity have been replaced by an emphasis on the civil religion of nationalism, popular sovereignty and representative democracy and, in the Swedish case, even by human rights, equality and the deconstruction of the nation state. The Scandinavian Lutheran cases thus provide an alternative history of the transition to modernity in which gradual change has been reconciled with and assimilated into traditional structures and ways of thinking, with change taking place within the apparent continuity of the established order.

2 Hamberg (2003: 47).

3 For a discussion on the methodology of analysing multi-sited political discourse, including the concepts of trajectory and nexus, see Halonen, Ihalainen & Saarinen (2015: 5–6, 13, 15, 17–18).

Public religion and nationalism in modern times

Brad S. Gregory has emphasized the unintended long-term consequences of the politically supported branches of the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation: the influence of Christianity in civic life has declined, theology been marginalized, pluralism increased, the modern Western world emerged. Gregory's interpretation suggests that, within Protestant churches, Christianity itself has become gradually redefined in revolutionary ways.[4] Yet as Hugh McLeod and his colleagues have shown, relations between church and state and experiences of secularization have been very diverse in different national contexts. This diversity gives reason to a critical review of sociological theories on any necessary connection between secularization and modernization – in the sense of the unavoidable disappearance of the social significance of religion in modern societies – and calls for empirical historical analyses of the changing role of religion.[5]

The relationship between secularization, modernization and the public role of religion has been reconsidered also by sociologists Hans Joas and José Casanova who recommend empirical (historical) studies on this interrelationship as opposed to simplistic teleological secularization theses that tend to view modernization processes as leading inevitably to the disappearance of religion. Joas and Casanova argue that secularization has been a contingent process caused by the intertwining of politics and religion characteristic of the European tradition of state churches;[6] it is not necessarily a universal phenomenon inevitably linked to modernization. The Lutheran Reformation contributed to this intertwining, leading to national churches becoming subordinate to their respective states.

According to Joas, the secular sphere had to be imagined before secularization became possible. Sacred concepts like sovereignty were not simply transferred to the secular ideology; rather, theology was gradually removed from modern theories of sovereignty. At the same time, the notion of sacredness has been frequently connected with secular content in the modern age. The sacralization of the person as opposed to that of the state – 'the institutionalization of the value of universal human dignity' – is a major feature of modern societies,[7] and one powerfully present in one of the sermons analysed below. Nationalism has also continued to award secular ideas a sacred status in modern times, as exemplified by another analysed sermon. Whereas human dignity does not have a cult of its own[8] – though perhaps one is emerging in some sermons – nationalism does have its cults, including the cult of popular sovereignty realized within a nation state. Associations between the sacred and the secular are at their strongest when made in national worship, in political sermons in which the national

4 Gregory (2012).
5 McLeod (2000); McLeod (2003: 13–16).
6 Joas (2008: ix–x, 5, 62); Joas (2009: 1, 4–5); Casanova (2009: 213).
7 Joas (2008: 68–70, 75, 134, 137).
8 See Joas (2008: 144).

identity is constructed, sacralised, secularized – and more recently even deconstructed.

The processes of first the sacralization and then the secularization of national identity both gained speed in the eighteenth century. However, a growing number of historians of eighteenth-century religion have rejected simplistic secularization theses based on the criticism of religion in the French Enlightenment and the French Revolution.[9] In the conventional version, popular sovereignty and democracy superseded religion after the French Revolution as part of the process of modernization.[10] An alternative interpretation has it that even seemingly secular values have been affected by traditional religious ones – either through the persistence of inherited patterns of thought or through their negation. Secularized societies in which the religious and secular spheres have become quite separate may still remain deeply religious in character.[11] Both the Finnish and Swedish polities, for instance, continue to organize occasions of national worship to celebrate political events and to argue over the political uses made of these, even though people's religious beliefs and participation in church services do not correspond with the high rates of membership of the national church in either country. The transition from a collective identification with the national church to one with the nation state[12] or even a multicultural and transnational community has not removed the need to ritualistically reproduce the notion of a common national church and state. The national churches have turned into advocates of popular sovereignty, voices of the people urging the political elites to carry out their duties.

Anthony D. Smith, too, has seen the religion-like elements of nationalism as crucial links between early-modern and modern forms of national thought. According to him, only religious-like sensations of the sacred can explain the survival of some of the strongest expressions of national identity. Many ways of thinking typical of modern nationalism either were constructed on the basis of the early-modern Biblical tradition of creating a collective identity or emerged as reactions against it. The decisive difference is that in nationalism the agent, object and goal of communal worship is the national community itself – no longer God or salvation. 'A sacred communion of the people' with a belief in a common origin, a unifying cult and a feeling of a moral community consisting of equals constitutes the essence of the political religion of nationalism. Within this sacred communion of the people, the voice of God is heard through the voice of the people. Smith has concluded that modern nationalism should be seen as a secularized version of the old myth of the holy chosen people.[13]

If the transition to modern nationalism required the introduction of conceptual innovations derived from the older framework of collective

9 Ihalainen (2012: 232–236).
10 See Casanova (1994: 7), and Casanova (2009: 219–220).
11 See also Casanova (2009: 228).
12 Casanova (2009: 214–215, 220).
13 Smith (2003: vii–viii, 3–6, 10, 15, 17–18, 32–34).

loyalties and identities, as Smith argues,[14] it is worth exploring – in retrospect and trying to avoid teleologies – conceptual transformations within the traditionalist forms of identity construction. Nationalism did not emerge merely as an alternative to religion or as a system of thought exploiting religious forms; it also emerged to some extent within public religion. The interaction between religion and nationalism (and democracy since the twentieth century) has also turned out to be surprisingly lasting in the Nordic countries. Political sermons that tell about the transformation of religious beliefs into national identities (and ultimately into democracy) and the coming together of a variety of political discourses have been produced in connection with national worship in a number of European countries for centuries. In them, evolving understandings of religion and changing discursive constructions of national identity and popular sovereignty have constantly come together, the speakers doing their best to formulate the supposedly shared values of the national community in ways that can be accepted by the majority of their audience. Ever since the late eighteenth century, we can find clergymen depicting the national community as an object evoking feelings of the sacred and even as an agent that can mould its own destiny. References to divine influence on that destiny have become more indirect and eventually been replaced by secular terms for popular sovereignty.[15]

Emerging redefinitions of national communities

Empirical analyses of Protestant political preaching during the long eighteenth century show that a considerable number of conceptual redescriptions of the national community were introduced by the clergy of the national churches of England, the Dutch Republic and Sweden. In a long-term perspective, we can say that clerical formulations of the supposedly common values of these political communities were adapted to accord with the emerging more secular nationalism and, in the revolutionary era, to some extent also with weak notions of the sovereignty of the people, ones that reinforced inherited concepts of estate representation rather than of any modern representative democracy. Reflecting the evolving conceptions of the political elites, to which they themselves belonged, leading clerics increasingly presented the national community as an object of sacral sentience, allowing the nation, and rhetorically even the people at large, to play a more active role in the formation of their own fates.[16] In Smithian terms, the notion of the nation as a sacred community of the people was entering politico-religious discourse on national occasions and was being sacralised by means of traditional religion.[17] Religion and nationalism thus became amalgamated in the early

14 Smith (1991: 74–75).
15 Cf. Smith (2003: 17–18).
16 Ekedahl (2002); Ihalainen (2005b); Ihalainen (2007a); Ihalainen (2007b); Ihalainen (2009); Nordbäck (2009). For the Danish monarchy, see Bregnsbo (1997).
17 Cf. Smith (2003: 17–18).

phase of modern nationalism. This happened in all Christian churches, but it was reflected most distinctly in the Lutheran structures that made the established church part of the state. In the Swedish Diet, the Clerical Estate was one of the four decision-making bodies and the one that was officially responsible for coordinating political preaching as part of state propaganda.[18]

The potential to redefine the national community varied from country to country: the adoption of various secular political discourses led to much clearer reconceptualisations of the national community among the Whig bishops of the Church of England than among the Swedish Lutheran clerics. In England, a state that was a forerunner in modernization, the nation was increasingly described as an active political agent advancing the common good in this world as opposed to an Israel-like fallen nation awaiting divine judgment,[19] which was the traditional Protestant idiom.[20] As the relevance of the prototypical Israelite nation declined, Anglican religion became more nation-centred and more tolerant of other Protestant sects, and even its hostility to the old counter-concept 'popery' declined. The monarchy came to be viewed in less religious terms, while classical notions of patriotism, the rhetoric of liberty, the language of commerce and belief in scientific progress found their way into political sermons, though more distinctly in England than in the Dutch Republic or Sweden.[21] The rise of thought-patterns typical of modern nationalism thus took place not only parallel with and as an alternative to Protestant religion but also within it, as part of the process of the Enlightenment, which in Protestant countries was manifested as a development within the national churches rather than in opposition to them. Traditional religion was not merely replaced by modern national identities from the French Revolution onwards but turned into an increasingly secularized civil religion of nationalism – and later also of democracy. There were differences between Calvinist and Lutheran ways to modernity, and democracy in the sense of universal suffrage was realized in most Protestant countries only after the First World War. Catholic modernization would take yet another path, democracy becoming the source of legitimacy of the state more distinctly only after the Second World War.

Eighteenth-century preachers rarely spoke about popular sovereignty, though references to the supreme power belonging ultimately to the people were emerging in other areas of political discourse. As Smith has put it, nationalism was becoming 'a new religion of the people,' its objects of worship being the people and the fatherland.[22] And this new religion sometimes also possessed a democratic dimension.[23] In English and Swedish parliamentary and public debates, references to the will of the people were increasingly used by rival political groups to legitimate political demands long before the

18 Ihalainen (2005: subchapter 1.3).
19 Ihalainen (2005b: 579–580).
20 See Tilli (2012) and Ihalainen (2017) for twentieth-century examples.
21 Ihalainen (2005b: 581–597).
22 Smith (2003: 42, 45).
23 See Innes & Philp (2013) on the emergence of the discourse on democracy during the early nineteenth century.

outbreak of the American and French Revolutions. There were also some re-evaluations of democracy as an element of a mixed constitution, albeit with reservations.[24] There was a considerable time-lag in incorporating notions of popular sovereignty into political sermons in Anglophone Protestantism as well. Some clerics within the revolutionary Constitutional Church in France, by contrast, had no problem in viewing the nation and the people as objects of veneration and in justifying popular sovereignty, democracy and equality by appealing to both the Old Testament and the Gospels. Bishop Claude Fauchet might present political power as derived from the will of the people as being identical with that of God and insist on politicians being servants of the people. In France, the radicalization of the revolutionary church did not help in the conflict between the Revolution and the anti-reformist Catholic Church and Christianity more generally, as the Revolution ultimately sacralised the people and the nation over Christianity.[25] No similar confrontation between the church and the state ever occurred in Finland and Sweden, which explains the exceptional survival of political preaching in these countries. Revolutionary ideas, on the other hand, did not emerge in the political content of this preaching until the second half of the twentieth century.

The Swedish-Finnish clergy retained traditionalist ideas about a Lutheran national community that resembled that of Israel in the Old Testament up to the division of the realm in 1809 and beyond, particularly in Finland.[26] This challenges some over-interpretations concerning the radical influence of the Enlightenment on the Swedish clergy.[27] The continuities in Swedish political preaching are rather similar to those in Prussia.[28] As Sweden remained outside the direct influence of the French Revolution, no radical impulses were experienced there, although slight changes followed the fall of the Wasa dynasty, the reintroduction of a limited constitutional monarchy and the accession of the Bernadottes. Thus at the Diet of 1810, Bishop Gustaf Murray revised the Lutheran language of politics by advising the Swedes to take their fate into their own hands instead of merely imitating Old Israel. It was through the four estates that 'the voice of the nation' could be heard. The role of the citizen appeared as slightly more active as well: as they enjoyed such a high degree of law-bound civic liberty, the Swedes should love their fatherland and advance the common good.[29] However, the bishops continued to denounce a democratic political order as irreligious, seeing it as an attempt by the masses to constitute the law, a form of revolutionary anarchy that only led to terror and disasters of the French revolutionary kind.[30] Early nineteenth-century Lutheranism was by no means yet the religion of democracy and would not become such for at least a hundred

24 Ihalainen (2010).
25 Ihalainen (2008a: 32–39).
26 Ihalainen (2007a).
27 Winton (2006), for instance.
28 Ihalainen (2008b: 252–257).
29 Ihalainen (2007a: 30, 35–36).
30 Faxe (1818); Bregnsbo & Ihalainen (2011: 117).

years, when some Swedish clergymen became leading advocates of Social Democracy.[31]

In the Finnish case, the continuities in Lutheran political preaching are even more obvious. There was no change resembling the Swedish development when Alexander I of Russia became the Grand Duke of Finland in 1809. The Finnish political elite, including the bishops, aimed at conserving the Gustavian constitution and the Lutheran religion and opposing all Russian alternatives and set out to construct a national identity using the Lutheran Church to do so.[32] In the meantime, the message of political sermons remained in line with traditional Lutheran political theology. Professor Gustaf Gadolin's closing sermon at the Diet of Porvoo in 1809, while recognizing the need to dedicate oneself to public affairs at a diet to which the Emperor had summoned the representatives of the nation, emphasized Christian teachings that enjoined each estate to peacefully concentrate on performing its proper duties. The bishop continued to maintain a non-political understanding of the people as hard-working members of society, loving their monarch and happy with their lot.[33] This was far removed from any French revolutionary or later doctrines of popular sovereignty, democracy and equality.

By the early twenty-first century, however, Lutheran national worship in Finland and Sweden has been transformed so that it is now based on the sacralised principles of popular sovereignty, representative democracy and equality rather than on any original Biblical or Lutheran notions of politics. What has happened? Let us explore two cases to find out.

The contexts of preaching in 2009 and 2010

A service on October 2, 2009 in Turku, initiated by the Finnish government, completed a series of events held over one and a half years to observe the bicentennial of the division of the early modern Swedish realm and the creation of a separate Finnish administration within the Russian Empire. In 1809, Alexander I pacified the conquered country by allowing it to retain the Lutheran religion, the Swedish constitution, its representative estates and the established legal system and to form a bureaucracy of its own.[34] The state service brought together the country's political leaders and, symbolically, through broadcasting, the nation as a whole. It was attended by the political, administrative, military and intellectual elite, including many members of parliament. It was held in Turku Cathedral – generally regarded as a major symbol of historical connections to Western civilization

31 Particularly interesting in this respect is Harald Hallén, a leading Social Democrat MP. Cf. the Lutheran clergy of the conservative National Coalition Party, who chastised the Finnish people for their sins that led to the Civil War (1918). Ihalainen (2017).

32 More on this in Ihalainen (2005a).

33 Gadolin (1809).

34 Ihalainen (2011: 77–78); Ihalainen & Sundin (2011: 189–191).

– and was exceptionally solemn even in comparison with annual services for the opening of parliament and Independence Day.[35] Even though this service was designated as 'ecumenical' and included prayers by Orthodox and Catholic bishops and a representative of the free churches, the Lutheran liturgy dominated.

During the service, Jukka Paarma, the Lutheran Archbishop of Finland, chastised Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen and the political elite as a whole for an ongoing scandal on election financing. This scandal had been escalating for a year and a half. The media had reported how private companies and charity foundations had secretly financed the election campaigns of mainly centrist and rightist candidates before the previous election of 2007, while trade unions had sponsored leftist candidates. While it was legal to sponsor and receive support for elections, some elected MPs had failed to report the sums to the Ministry of Justice in accordance with the law. There had been allegations that Prime Minister Vanhanen had abused his position as the chairman of a charity to arrange election financing for himself. A TV program on current affairs had also claimed that he had received free building materials as a bribe. At the same time, his government was being pressurized to introduce stricter legislation on party financing. Two months later, the Prime Minister would announce that he would step down from the leadership of his Centre Party the following summer. He was later exonerated by the parliament from charges of corruption,[36] but the scandal provided the Archbishop with an opportunity to express the *vox populi* against the government without being accused of populism.

A year later, on October 5, 2010, the Bishop of Stockholm Eva Brunne preached at the opening of the first session of a new parliament in Stockholm Cathedral, where such national ceremonies had been celebrated for centuries. The royal couple, the Crown Princess and many members of the parliament were present at this brief ecumenical service, which focused on the sermon.[37] While the Bishop, a known Social Democrat, was preaching, the MPs of the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats party marched out of the cathedral in protest. Though Brunne named no party, the protesters interpreted her speech as an inappropriate attack against them, particularly as the bishop had the day before participated in a street demonstration protesting the admission of the Sweden Democrats into the parliament. The protest by the Sweden Democrats was condemned by other party leaders as uncalled-for: the Centrist Maud Olfsson and the Social Democrat Mona Sahlin said that the bishop had merely spoken about the equality of all people in accordance with the teachings of the Church of Sweden. For Sahlin, the reaction only confirmed the existing general conception of the Sweden Democrats.[38] Brunne had not only addressed an issue that concerned core

35 The present author attended and observed the ceremony. The references provided here are based on written documents.

36 *Yle News*, January 30, 2013.

37 The program of the opening of the parliamentary session, October 5, 2010.

38 A news report in *Aktuellt* on October 5, 2010, including interviews with leading politicians and Bishop Brunne.

societal values but also participated in a political confrontation in which the other parliamentary parties strove to exclude the right-populists from all cooperation. While the King's speech was distinctively apolitical, hers was a contribution to an ongoing political debate.[39]

These two cases of present-day political preaching show how adaptable the Lutheran churches can be in redefining the political values of national communities: A twenty-first-century Lutheran Archbishop has no problem in declaring the voice of the people – rather than that of God only – to the Prime Minister. Another bishop can voice the 'politically correct' values of the majority of the political elite, promoting the exclusion of a dissident minority.

Both speech acts were legitimated by the inherited position of the church in a changing society and ultimately by the Word of God; however, they also illustrate the radically changed position of the established Lutheran churches: instead of merely declaring the views of the administrators and constructing a political community in accordance with their wishes, the church reminds the state of its values and has moved towards the civil society, becoming one of the pressure groups that try to influence politics in the name of the people, the majority of whom are still members of it.

Owing to its inherited status as the spiritual embodiment of the political community, the church should, in principle, have a powerful say. As a consequence of the secularization of the last fifty years, however, this is far from self-evident: the news coverage of the state service in Turku was limited and exhibited a lack of understanding of its historical background. Some papers pointed to the Archbishop's criticism of the morality of politicians and to the unwillingness of the Prime Minister to answer questions about the scandal, or emphasized the contrast between the power-holders celebrating and the people watching outside.[40] The content of the sermon in Stockholm Cathedral, by contrast, became a major news story because of its topicality. Even the political use of history surfaced when the other parties suggested that the bishop had merely defended the established values of the polity against their violators.[41] The political significance of the church as a forum for national worship and debate on values has evidently survived even in secularized Lutheran political communities.

39 The King's speech at the opening of the parliamentary session, October 5, 2010.

40 The service was broadcast about two weeks after it had taken place; *Ilta-Sanomat*, October 2, 2009; *Iltalehti*, October 2, 2009; *Turun Sanomat*, October 2, 2009; *Keskisuomalainen*, October 2, 2009; A report in *Helsingin Sanomat*, focused on the forms of the ceremony, the complicated security arrangements for a meaningless elitist event, the uncomfortable position of the Prime Minister and his failure to answer questions from the media. Piia Elonen, *Helsingin Sanomat*, October 3, 2009. A former minister sent a letter to the Editor, lamenting the fact that the leading newspaper had failed to see the importance of the event for the national identity and to consider the Archbishop's 'serious message to the holders of power.' Paavo Rantanen, *Helsingin Sanomat*, October 6, 2009. The countenance of Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen when leaving the service suggested to observers that he, too, had taken in the message.

41 *Aktuellt*, October 5, 2010; *Expressen*, October 5, 2010.

Popular sovereignty from the pulpit

Archbishop Paarma, a church historian of early-modern Sweden, viewed himself as a political theorist whose duty it was to express the supposedly shared values of the national community to its assembled representatives. His sermon opened with a passage that had been used on a parallel occasion in the Turku Cathedral two centuries previously: 'Thine arrows are sharp in the heart of the king's enemies. Whereby the people fall under thee' (Psalms 45:5). While emphasizing the timelessness of the quote, Paarma applied it in ways that would have been unthinkable in the small Lutheran Grand Duchy of Finland that had recently come under Russian rule. In 1809, the passage was obviously intended to flatter the conqueror.[42] According to Paarma, its equal relevance for Old Israel, the Grand Duchy of Finland in 1809 and the Republic of Finland in 2009 was to be found in the fact that it concerned 'the means, values and principles by which this country is to be governed' and in expressing 'what the people expect from their holders of power.'[43] This was a modernist reading of an Old Testament theocratic adoration of a new king, proposing that Biblical truths remained applicable to present-day political realities.

After recalling some principles of the Swedish-Lutheran tradition of law-based government, Paarma discussed the political values of the national community through the political use of history, summarizing the relationship between the Finnish people and their rulers during the two previous centuries:[44]

> The people of Finland have always honoured and trusted their rulers when they have recognized that these serve the cause of truth and honesty. Grand dukes [emperors] were respected, and statues were erected in their honour as long as the people understood that the ruler was keeping his words and promises. When that was no longer the case, the trust was lost and a crisis followed.
>
> Thus, if the citizens begin to suspect that the holders of power might be dishonest or that they are testing the limits of the law, the elements of crisis are at hand. If the atmosphere of administration and politics is not clear and transparent but is instead dimmed by doubts, there is every reason to act. If the law does not correspond with the common sense of morality, it must be changed. If there is reason for doubt, there must be repentance. The Finnish people have always been merciful to a contrite repentant.

Paarma's point was that the people wanted the ministry to prepare a new law on party financing as an act of repentance; thereby the politicians would earn the 'mercy' of the Finnish people (note: not of God). Following the

42 The text of the sermon of October 2, 1809 has not survived, unlike the opening and closing sermons of the Diet of Porvoo earlier in 1809. See Ihalainen (2011); The psalm refers to God's anointed one, who is handsome, gracious, blessed and victorious and in whom truth, meekness and righteousness are united. Ps. 45:2–7. Translation above according to the King James Version.

43 Paarma (2009).

44 Paarma (2009).

medieval premise *Vox populi, vox Dei*, the Archbishop was declaring the will of the people. He called on politicians to provide an ethically better example for the people:

> [...] to show that a human being with a conscience lives and prospers here. We need such examples in the leading positions of the various sectors of our nation. They can strengthen the trust through which a nation can pull together.[45]

Paarma proceeded from the principles of popular sovereignty to the construction of a Nordic consensual national community, building on the secularized language of nationalism shared by the members of the political elite. For him, the Lutheran nation of the twenty-first century consisted of virtuous individuals and was itself the major political agent from which all political power derived. In the Finnish language, the semantic connection between 'the people' (*kansa* in Finnish), 'the nation' (*kansakunta* in Finnish) and 'citizens' (*kansalaiset* in Finnish) reinforced associations between ethnicity, democracy and citizenship.[46] This was a sermon on the civil religion of nationalism and representative democracy, not an expression of Old Testament theocracy.

The rest of the program reinforced the message: nationalist Lutheran psalms called for the divine protection of 'our people and land'[47], and the prayers contained Old Testament references to 'the guidance and blessing which He has given to our people,' 'this good country which You have given us,' 'Your mercy which has led our people through many difficulties and struggles to this day' and 'the freedom of the state which You have given to the Finnish people,'[48] the emphasis being throughout on national liberty defended implicitly in the Winter War rather than on individual liberty. There were also calls for divine help 'so that we may take care of each other and act together' and an Orthodox prayer for divine support so that the Finns would 'use the national liberty which You have mercifully given us to develop our country in all possible ways and primarily to build Your realm.'[49] The Catholic bishop characteristically lamented the way in which human weakness and sin had divided Christendom into numerous churches and communities.[50] The representative of the Salvation Army echoed the Lutheran Archbishop's words by praying to God to make all religious leaders 'challenge governments and political leaders to set justice as the first priority for everyone [...] instead of trivial political interests, power and status.'[51] Thus a national community continued to be constructed discursively and

45 Paarma (2009).
46 Hyvärinen (2003: 83).
47 Psalm 550:2 in the Swedish-language psalm book, *Valtioneuvosto 200 vuotta* (2009: 19).
48 Dean Rauno Heikola, *Valtioneuvosto 200 vuotta* (2009: 5, 8).
49 Dean Rauno Heikola, *Valtioneuvosto 200 vuotta* (2009: 5); Leo, Archbishop of Karelia and All Finland, *Valtioneuvosto 200 vuotta* (2009: 13).
50 Bishop Teemu Sippo, Catholic Church, *Valtioneuvosto 200 vuotta* (2009: 14–15).
51 Colonel Dick Krommenhoek, Salvation Army, *Valtioneuvosto 200 vuotta* (2009: 16).

ecumenically, a Protestant feature being to advise political decision-makers on the proper policy. The external forms, the ultimate function and some of the content of the service were early-modern, but the emphasis on nationalism and popular sovereignty were distinctly modern.

Supporting the prevailing definition of democracy

The political controversy which Eva Brunne's sermon at the opening of the Swedish parliament caused demonstrates that state religious services were more than mere ceremonial – that they indeed addressed the key values of the polity. It also illustrates how radically more modern the polity constructed by the Church of Sweden is than the Finnish conception. Eva Brunne herself, an openly lesbian, Social Democratic female bishop whose inauguration had been boycotted by some other Protestant churches, embodies this radicalism.[52] Brunne's understanding of her task, echoed by the interviewed party leaders, was 'to listen to and engage in a dialogue with our age and to make it accord with the Gospels [*stämma av det mot evangelierna* in Swedish].' The equality of all people had been her motto in her election campaign for the bishopry, and it was also the Word of the Scriptures, she emphasized. According to Brunne, she had merely encouraged the MPs to perform the duty they had received from the voters.[53]

Much of Brunne's sermon reiterated the principles of popular sovereignty and democracy, emphasizing the trust which the voters (referred to as 'we' and not 'the people') had demonstrated to the elected MPs and the responsibilities which that entailed. The concept of democracy was central in her argumentation, as in Swedish political discourse more generally, unlike the Finnish debate or Paarma's sermon. Like Paarma, Brunne adopted the role of the voice of the voters' will, recognizing the difference between the original and current audiences but viewing Biblical teachings as applicable today nevertheless. In the spirit of Social Democratic solidarity, she extended the political responsibility of the Swedish MPs beyond the nation state to concern the whole world; instead of 'the people' (*folket* in Swedish), she spoke about 'human beings' (*människor* in Swedish). This reflects a difference between Finnish expressions of nationalism and Swedish tendencies towards universalism and even distances itself from the Social Democratic idea of a 'people's church' (*folkkyrkan*, cf. the Swedish concept of society as *folkhemmet* [people's home]). Brunne's understanding of democracy included a readiness for direct action with God's help on behalf of human rights. This again went far beyond Paarma's conception of a community of a people trusting in their rulers. Brunne's conclusion, which provoked the Sweden Democrats to walk out, was that racism was irreconcilable with Swedish democracy. This not only questioned the justification of the name of the populist party but also endorsed the demonstrations against them. The bishop implied that the great majority of Swedes considered that the human

52 *Svenska Dagbladet*, November 15, 2009.
53 *Aktuellt*, October 5, 2010.

dignity of all persons was the same irrespective of ethnicity, gender, age or sexual orientation and that this majority was, in the name of democracy, ready to prevent any segregation of human beings.[54] She stood on the side of the majority opinion, which wished to exclude the Sweden Democrats from politics on account of their racist opinions. Her speech act was made possible by the prevailing understandings of the Swedish identity, in which the concepts of democracy, freedom, equality and universal solidarity play key roles. The references to Biblical teachings stemmed from the bishop's desire to make a political point relating to a current political debate, not from any Lutheran tradition of preaching. Historical continuity was much less prominent than in Paarma's rather more conventional though still modernist sermon.

Conclusion

When related to the Nordic cases much of what Gregory, McLeod, Joas, Casanova and Smith have argued seems plausible: the analysed examples demonstrate the survival of religion-like elements of nationalism and even democracy, though in radical Swedish Lutheranism even the nation as a sacred community is relativized. The national community has nevertheless risen into an object of communal worship equal to God: it was on behalf of the nation that prayers were recited and hymns sung in Turku, while in the sermons the sovereignty, will, readiness to act and mercy of the people appeared to constitute the driving force behind the progress of the national community.

The political content of Finnish and Swedish Lutheran sermons has evidently changed dramatically during the past two centuries: the theocratic advice of political obedience has been replaced by democratic control of the government and encouragement of the voters to act to advance equality. Paarma and Brunne appear as downright revolutionaries within the Lutheran tradition of political preaching. In the Swedish case, even deconstructions of a uniform nation state have entered political preaching.

Nothing in Luther's writings or an empirical analysis of political sermons from the long eighteenth century suggests that such democratization would be an innate characteristic of Lutheran political theology. However, the political control of public religion that has been a characteristic of Lutheran establishments since the Reformation does explain the flexibility and even resilience of Finnish and Swedish Lutheranism in reconciling its political teachings with those of the current rulers and the opinions prevailing among the political elites. Since the political leaders' conceptions of the national community and the people's political role were transformed after the adoption of the republican constitution in Finland[55] and the introduction of universal suffrage in Sweden in 1919 and increasingly since the 1960s with

54 Brunne (2010).
55 See also Portman (2014).

societal change[56] that has strengthened leftist tendencies within the national churches, the bishops have indeed engaged in a dialogue with the society of their time and accommodated their political teachings accordingly. Thereby Lutheranism has become a religion of popular sovereignty, democracy and equality instead of being one of nationalism only, hiding the revolutionary change behind the trajectories of external form and radically reinterpreting Biblical passages. This change has been more dramatic within the radically modern Swedish political culture than in the rather more conservative Finnish one. The rise of nationalism did not imply the separation of religion and politics in Finland and Sweden, nor did modernization remove the political relevance of religion completely, though it obviously did in the long run secularize its political content thanks to the ability of Lutheranism to constantly redefine its relationship to political power.

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56 McLeod (2003: 16–19).

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Katja Valaskivi

Branding as a Response to the 'Existential Crisis' of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland

Abstract

Rapid changes in recent decades in the social structures of contemporary societies have challenged modern, national institutions, including religious institutions. In the digital age, media and journalistic institutions themselves are less and less capable of controlling the circulation of messages. The idea of the media as an imagined centre of society might have been challenged, but struggle over attention has only grown. Visibility is often equated with importance in discussions over the growing public attention to religion.

The decline of institutional authorities to control the flow of information have created an ever-growing need to influence the circulation of attention. Among the challenged institutions are the Lutheran churches in the Nordic Countries, which have responded by resorting to branding. The chapter examines the search for attention through branding practices in the context of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland.

Introduction

The rapid changes in recent decades in the social structures of contemporary societies have challenged modern, national institutions. In *The Social Construction of Reality*, their famous 1966 contribution to sociology of knowledge, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman note that institutions exist only if they are transmitted to subsequent generations, who also internalize the social world through socialization.[1] In other words the 'symbolic universes,' or the shared beliefs about the societal tasks of institutions, are maintained in socialization. This is a way of making the institutionalized structures of societies plausible and acceptable for individual members of society. In the context of Nordic countries, including Finland, it is apparent that, since the Second World War, this type of socialization has taken place only partially. In addition, the development of the media environment has brought dramatic changes to the infrastructures of human interaction

1 Berger & Luckman (1966).

and socialization.[2] As a result, institutions have been questioned and challenged rather than transmitted to subsequent generations. In the ethos of accelerating modernization and continuous progress, generations now of age have learned to be critical about some societal institutions, before they have learned their tasks and meanings. At the same time, the tasks and roles of institutions have changed, and the perceptions of the tasks within the institutions have been questioned.

The institutions' crisis is amplified by what a leading contemporary scholar on media and social theory Nick Couldry calls the media manifold.[3] No longer are institutions able to control media outlets when the circulation of media images, meanings, representations, and texts has 'slipped from the leash of the political economic structure and threatens to multiply, mutate, and transform itself in an inhuman speed.'[4] In the digital age, media and journalistic institutions themselves are less and less capable of controlling the circulation of messages. Consequently, the idea of the media as an imagined centre of society[5] could have been challenged. However, the struggle over attention and possibility of being seen in the media has not diminished: quite the contrary. The media manifold makes it possible for anyone to strive for attention and fame; simultaneously, the attention is both harder to gain and harder to control. The media manifold also provides outlets for critical attitudes toward the institutions.[6] In this kind of 'attention economy,'[7] the right kind of visibility and potential attention through the amplifier – or beam – of the legacy media appear to parallel to existence, providing a sense of being for individuals and institutions alike. In social media the equal to the desired attention is the amount of likes or positive interaction. Concurrently, the forms of social coming together have been transformed, and the sociality of the social media appears both newsworthy and as altering collective, less visible ways of coming together. In such 'marketplace of attention,'[8] visibility equals importance, prestige and meaning, but also being on the market and in the game. The importance of existing in the media is implied also in claims made by some sociologists of religion, who state that religion's growing media visibility indicates that its societal role and importance is growing, challenging the secularization theory and leading into a post-secular society.[9]

The multiplicity of circulating messages and the decline of institutional authorities to control the flow of information have, thus created an ever-growing need to influence the circulation of attention and social imaginaries created within.[10] Among the challenged institutions are the Lutheran churches in the Nordic countries. Historically these churches have been

2 Couldry & Hepp (2016).
3 Couldry (2012).
4 Peterson (2003).
5 Couldry (2003).
6 Cf. Benkler (2006).
7 E.g., Davenport & Beck (2001).
8 Webster (2014).
9 Cf. e.g., Moberg et al. (2012); Lövheim & Axner (2014).
10 Cf. Taylor (2002); Valaskivi & Sumiala (2014).

in the core in creating the nation states, but no longer have a self-evident position of authority in the society. For instance, in Finland, the Evangelical Lutheran Church has experienced a rapid decline of membership since 2010, when a television discussion on gay rights spurred a social media-induced wave of member resignations. Since this media event for many working in the Church, the public opinion toward the Church and the kind of attention the Church receives have become an existential question: What is the purpose of the Church? Why does it exist? To some degree, this is a very practical point: reduced membership leads to reduced resources. The membership has come down from 85 percentage of the population in 2000 to 69.7 percentage in 2018. The quickest decline has taken place after 2011.

In other words, both the task and the institutional status of the Church seem altered, invoking an existential crisis about the purpose and role of the Church in contemporary society. José Casanova argues that in the European context this is tied to 'the secularist self-understanding of European modernization, which has constructed [...] a rule of European secularization.'[11] This rule or philosophy, according to him, sees secularism as a natural outcome of becoming modern, rather than a choice of modern individuals or modern societies.[12] And, while the principle of the homogeneous state under the Westphalian notion of *cuius regio eius religio* has being called into question, European Churches, including the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, have found themselves in a situation where loosening ties with the state have also meant diminishing membership.

The situation has led the Church to be among those who seek the right kind of attention through strategic communication and branding. These tools are used in the hope that they will, first, create positive, affective attachments in the membership (and beyond) to the Church through the usage of new media outlets and technologies and, second, that they will enhance the 'media image' of the Church, which is internally experienced as heavily negative. Often, these two aspects intertwine in the hope that branding with affective new media projects or created events will attract the positive attention of the legacy media.

As a result, interpreting the crisis as a crisis of communication, the Church directs more and more of its functions toward branding, promotion, and communication. Examples of this are the concern with branding, reputation, and image, as well as the interest in opinion polls and 'audience' reception. The Church has, for instance, employed the Member 360° service for parishes to evaluate members' opinions and lifestyles. The tool is used to develop products that cater to the needs of the members.[13]

This chapter examines the search for attention through branding practices in the context of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. The Church has been employing branding in different aspects of its work throughout the 2000s, but only in 2013 was branding established as an official strategy for developing the relationship of the Church with the media

11 Casanova (2012: 44).
12 Casanova (2012: 33).
13 See http://www.jäsen360.fi/.

and the public. The chapter focuses specifically on the work of the 'Brand Group,' which was reported by the head of communications at the Church Communication Centre at the annual gathering of Church communications specialists in 2014. The event was playfully called 'I Brand U' (*Mää brändään sua*, in Finnish), and approximately 200 communication specialists within the Church attended the event in September 2014 at Tampere.

In what follows, I first discuss the reasons for the contemporary boom of branding and the ways it is employed to respond to the existential crisis of the Church and institutions in general. I will also touch upon the historical and ideological roots of the crisis as well as examine differences of religious branding in the US and the Nordic context. I then move on to analysing the work of the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Church's Brand Group and the motivations of those taking part in the work, as well as inconveniences expressed by these branders. Empirically, my focus is on two cases: the parish election campaign in late 2013 and the 'I Brand U' Church communication event and the presentation given by the head of communications in particular. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications and consequences of branding used as a solution to the existential crisis of the Church.

Existential crisis in the mediatized world

Secularization theory has been tied to the idea that (irrational) religion belongs to the private and that the public is a space for rational argumentation.[14] In other words, the principle of secularism connected with the rational worldview and strong emphasis on individualism – or what Simon During calls 'Protestant methodological individualism'[15] – ties together with the development of the public sphere. The Habermasian ideal of the rational, deliberative public has been – despite critique[16] – a powerful ideal in the understanding of the Western public sphere, media, and journalism. This ideal has also contributed to the strengthening of the immanent frame,[17] meaning the focus on human flourishing in this world rather than aiming at transcendent perspectives beyond this life.

The ideal of the rational public is, however, like the Church, now challenged in the attention economy. The contemporary conjuncture where not only perceptions of public and private are being questioned, but the

14 Mendieta & VanAntwerpen (2010).

15 During (2010). The Protestant emphasis on individualism derives from Martin Luther's idea that it is individual faith in God, the relationship between God and man that is the key in salvation. This relationship does not necessarily require a church or rituals. Instead access to the Word of God was essential, thus writing and publishing in local languages (instead of just Latin) became important. For a fascinating description of Luther's role in the development of the printing industry, see Pettegree (2015).

16 See e.g., Frazer (1990) or Mouffe (2000).

17 Cf. Taylor (2007: 13–17).

pervasiveness of affects and affective interaction in the media have come to challenge the position of the Church.

The secularisation theory has been questioned for quite some time, giving way to theories of the post-secular society.[18] Some strands in this theory try to conceptualise the changing relationship of religion and the media, as well as changes in perceptions of public and private religion.[19] Sometimes, this change is simplified into stating that the societal importance of religion is on the rise, as religion appears to be more visible in the media, or that the presence of religion in social life has increased because of increased visibility in the media.[20] There are attempts to prove 'the mediatization of religion' through studying the amount of news items categorised as being about religion.[21] Together with colleagues,[22] we have pointed out that, in the Nordic context, the greater visibility of religion might be an indication of a less homogeneous religious environment and pluralism of values causing the need for negotiation, rather than the indication of the growing importance of religion.[23] With the Church equalling religion in the public discourse, the Church was a self-evident and, in that sense, invisible part of society. Growing religious pluralism and non-religiosity question this position, thus generating more plurality in the visibility of religion in the media. It is also possible that the secularisation paradigm hindered scholars from seeing the presence of religion, even when it did appear in the public sphere. It has also been pointed out that the theory of the secular, rational public sphere prioritizes one form of religion (Protestantism) and defines the boundaries between public and private within that religion.[24] Secularization, however, in the meaning of the declining membership of institutional religion and separation of these institutions from the state, is by no means a thing of the past,[25] and neither is the strengthening of the immanent frame.[26]

In the globalized society, economic, political, and societal practices are sustained in and through media to an unprecedented degree: society and what has been called the 'collective consciousness' has become deeply mediatized.[27] It is no coincidence that the accelerating proliferation of branding since the 1960s coincides with the expansion of media outlets, channels and the birth of the Internet. The trend of branding spreading to all walks of life can be seen as a part of what is often called the mediatization of society. Mediatization has several theoretical roots. Of these, this chapter

18 Casanova (1994, 2011); Bruce (2011).
19 See e.g., Sumiala-Seppänen et al. (2004).
20 Hjarvard (2013); Lövheim & Axner (2014).
21 Lövheim & Lundby (2013).
22 Valaskivi et al. (2013).
23 It is very difficult to study the hypothesis that the visibility of religion is greater in the media than it was before, as the media environment has changed. So has religion. With the expansion of media platforms, the increase in the amount of media space has given religion and many other entities more media space.
24 Butler (2010).
25 Cf. Casanova (2012).
26 Taylor (2007).
27 Couldry & Hepp (2016).

refers to the institutional theory that considers the role of the media in changing the relationships and position of institutions.[28] Media technologies and related institutions not only define and mediate communication but also take part in forming new ways of coming together – and separating people into 'us' and 'them'. Simultaneously, the developments of individualisation and value pluralism as well as the commercialisation of interactions have contributed to the diminishing role of religion in defining shared community values. Parallel changes in the media, society, and religion intertwine in these circumstances, shifting institutional relationships and causing apparent 'existential anxiety' to old institutions.

In the Nordic countries, the Lutheran churches have for centuries been a part of the building of the nation-state. The churches' historical role is inseparable from the development of the state. Many public tasks currently undertaken by the state were first introduced by the Church, such as help for the poor or schooling.[29] Despite the loosening of ties between the Church and the state, in many Nordic countries, there remain traditions and functions that parallel the Church with other national institutions. For instance, in Sweden, the ruling king or queen has to be a member of the Church of Sweden, and in Finland, the Church has the right to collect membership fees within the national taxation system. In these conditions and in public discourse, the Church has long represented an invisible, rational, and organised form of religiosity, a self-evident part of functioning Nordic society.[30] The secularisation theory presumed that irrational religiosity would gradually disappear with growing industrialisation and rising levels of education, or at least it would disappear from the public sphere.[31] As a consequence, the media has represented the Church as a public authority rather than a religious community.[32]

It is, however, evident that the Church no longer is a self-evident representative of national religiosity in the public sphere. In Finland, the media readily report the numbers of resigned ex-members, and there is an annual dispute over celebrating the endings of school semesters with traditions considered Christian. Although immigration and Muslim minorities are used in arguments for non-religious celebrations, in fact, there are hardly any Muslims involved in the discussions. It appears that, at least in the administration of the Church, the media appear as the place where the definition of relationships between institutions takes place and disputes over religion happen. Hence, branding is brought forth as one of the tools to tackle diminishing membership.

At the same time, media institutions and journalism in particular as the paradigmatic form of sustaining the nation and public sphere have been called into question. In the attention economy, the understanding of the

28 Hjarvard (2013); Lundby (2014); Strömbäck & Esser (2014).
29 Mäkinen 2002); Hanska & Vainio-Korhonen (2010); Heikkinen & Leino-Kaukiainen (2011).
30 Heikkilä et al. (2006).
31 Taylor (2007); Bruce (2011).
32 Hokka et al. (2013).

public sphere is diverging from the ideal of rational deliberation. Different forms of affective interaction and conscious attempts to create affective attachments through promotional means for different purposes have become prevalent modes of communication. With its branding project, the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland is joining the contemporary promotional mode of communication and adopting the transnational trend of branding spreading into religious institutions.

Although the branding of religion is a transnational phenomenon, it is important to note that there are cultural and societal differences in the conditions where branding takes place, which also results in differences in branding practices. The societal role of religion in the public space has historically been very different in the Nordic countries than, for instance, in the US, where religious plurality even within Christian denominations has been much greater. José Casanova describes this in the following way:

> When compared with the very different evidence of continuing vitality in congregational, associational religion in the United States across all denominations – Protestant and Catholic, Jewish and Muslim, and now Hindu and Buddhist – it is obvious that this is the fundamental difference between American and European religiosity. Secularization in Europe takes primarily the form of "un-churching" [...] which should be understood as a form of liberation from the type of territorialized, confessional religiosity which was the legacy of the Westphalian system. European Christianity, for all kinds of reasons, never made the full historical transition from territorial national churches based on the territorial parish [...], to competing denominations of civil society based on voluntary religious associations, a modern form of religious community.[33]

In the US, 'the formation of the voluntary religious associations' has led to competition between different religious groups, denominations, and churches. As a result, religion has been described as a commodity: personal and 'packaged and sold the same way as other marketed goods and services.'[34] According to this perception, there is a market of religions where different denominations and religious beliefs compete with each other, marketing their services. From this point of view stems the idea that religions are service providers, catering to the needs and wants of the audience, and through marketing, aiming at convincing people to join.[35]

The branding of religion derives from the competitive situation in the markets and through growing possibilities of different forms of mediated religion.[36] In addition, according to Einstein, individualisation contributes to competition: There is the possibility of choosing a religion, rather than religion being inherited or grown into. Branding in general is a reaction to a competitive situation, and it is used as a way to distinguish a product or a service.

33 Casanova (2012: 34).
34 Einstein (2008: 19–20).
35 Finke & Iannaccone (1993), quoted in Einstein (2008).
36 Einstein (2008).

Apparently, the churches involved in branding in the Nordic countries experience competition (or threats), which evokes a need to respond with branding. Particularly in the Finnish case, however, there is little competition compared with the US on the part of mediated religion. In fact, it appears that the sense of competition does not derive from actual competition on the part of other religions or alternative forms of practicing religion. As noted, in Finland 75% of the population are members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (2015). Most new-borns (over 70 %) are baptised, and over 84 % of 15 year olds take part in confirmation schools. Those who have left the Church do so mostly not to join another religion, but to remain outside of religious communities. The religious landscape of Finland thus continues to be fairly homogeneous. Nevertheless, the alternative and competition to the Lutheran Church appears to be the general expectation that the public space is free of religion and the kind of illusive neutrality that requires a 'religiouslessness' in the public space created by the legacy media.[37] This expectation is in accord with the European philosophy of the secularist modernization trajectory.[38] At the same time, the strengthening of the immanent frame,[39] as well as ideologies and different value and belief systems challenge traditional religious institutions.[40]

Concurrently, the Nordic Lutheran churches have become increasingly vulnerable to spirals of negative attention. Our research indicates that the Lutheran Church appears in the media as parallel with administrative societal institutions.[41] At the local level, the congregations are covered by the local media like municipal organisations.

The Church is equated to other publicly funded organisations that are also being questioned. Since the Church is the only organisation that one can resign from, all kinds of discontent toward governmental and municipal organisations or the dysfunctionality of public organisations results in peaks in resignations from the Church's membership. As a result, the Church has become vicarious in a less-than-usual meaning: as a scapegoat for all public institutions. Because people have learned to criticise institutions, every time there is a public discussion on taxes or other problems of public institutions, there is a smaller or bigger peak in the number of resignations. The Freethinker's Association maintains a web service for resigning from the Church,[42] and statistics provided by this service are readily reported in the media, adding to the anxiety of Church employees, who feel that the struggle over members takes place in and through mediated means. This is why branding seems like a lucrative strategy, as it entails the promise of providing tools for managing attention.

37 Cf. Moberg et al. (2012).
38 Cf. Casanova (2012).
39 Taylor (2007).
40 Cf. Valaskivi (2012).
41 Hokka et al. (2013).
42 http://www.eroakirkosta.fi.

'What would Jesus do?'

As explained above the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland is very conscious of its diminishing membership. There is anxiety in the Church's administration and a grave sense of urgency regarding the state of the membership and the Church institution. The image projected by the media is considered false and unfair, like many of the imaginaries of the Church circulating in social media. It is recognised that the image strongly influences a great part of the membership, as many members have no direct contact with the Church. This has been seen in the floods of resignations from the Church, which peaked in 2010 because of the Homoilta television discussion where the Church appeared to be condemning homosexuals.

In October 2010, the second television channel of Finland's national broadcaster *YLE* aired a panel debate about gay and lesbian rights. Participants included members of parliament from various parties, actors, celebrities and other public figures, a priest, a bishop, and religious spokes-persons. Despite the initial focus on gay and lesbian rights in society, the topic both in studio and later in different media rather focused on the Lutheran Church's stance on same-sex marriage and the right of gay and lesbian couples to a Christian wedding ceremony. The public discussion polarized rapidly, and during the following weeks after airing of the debate a record number of people resigned their Church membership. The Church was accused of being intolerant, old fashioned, and against human rights. The unfortunate matter from the Church's perspective was that the outrage was mostly spurred by statements made by Member of Parliament Päivi Räsänen, who was by no means a spokesperson of the Church, but was identified as such by the public because of her status as the Chair of the Christian Democratic Party of Finland.[43]

For employees of the Church, the rapid decline was an acute crisis and recognized as a crisis of communication and media relations. Thus, a need for greater media-savviness appeared and branding was proposed as one of the means for a solution to attract members to stay or more people to join the Church. As is typical for a changing institution losing its perceived influence, there is an experienced discrepancy between the image and 'actual Church' among Church employees. Branding is introduced as a remedy to this discrepancy. Like some other public organisations (such as political parties), instead of looking into the question of the institutional functions in a changing society, problems are perceived as miscommunication, and remedies are sought from enhanced communication skills, marketing, and branding.

In the Nordic context, this causes trouble: Because of the public role of the Church, branding is seen as problematic. This is caused by the cultural and societal position the Church enjoys in the Nordic countries and the idea of the historical development of the public sphere. Although all public institutions in the Nordic countries are now trying to do branding, they have ideological difficulties in doing so, as the attachment of a public organisation is to citizens rather than customers. The practice of branding

43 See Hokka (2013).

contributes to a perceptual shift. Through branding, parish members become customers, and the Church becomes a service provider rather than a religious community. This shift is well discussed and problematized within the Church – to the frustration of branding and communication specialists in the Church who would like to see branding in the regular toolbox.

The ambivalence results in a lot of legitimation work caused, first, by the Church's status as a public organisation and the common understanding in the Nordic countries that religion and marketing are mutually exclusive. In other words, commercialisation is considered an undesirable trend for religion. Second, there is the concern over branding being false propaganda, emphasising something that goes against the core nature of the Church. Third, the sense of uneasiness is caused by the fact that methods of branding are drafted to invoke emotions. Branding invites the irrational, feeling, and affective attachments. Thus, the Lutheran Church, inscribed in the European understanding of the rational public sphere and paradigm of secularization, is itself uneasy about employing marketing practices and affective tools.

The communication and branding specialists in the Church attempt to circumvent these issues by insisting that the question is simpler, and only a practical matter. The solution to the dilemma is to state, 'Jesus would use contemporary methods in his work' and that theologians spend too much time on semantics: 'We just need to do things rather than think of what they mean.' Apart from the reference to Jesus, the strategy of stating that branding is just a contemporary means of communication is very common in legitimation processes of branding in all kinds of public organisations. Similar strategies are also used in legitimating nation branding through insisting that it is a non-political tool to achieve a better reputation and more soft power.[44]

Within the Church, the explicit aims of branding for those involved include, first, directing media attention and changing the image of the Church. In the process, the questions regarding image changes are formulated as: 'How can we represent ourselves or be seen?' and 'How can the good that we do be seen in the right light?' Second, the aim is distinction, both from other organisations and other religions. The core distinguishing factor is identified as 'grace' and 'standing by the underdog.' The third aim is creating involvement with the Church: 'This is the Church I believe in.'

'Now we need to take Easter'

I will now move on to analysing the I Brand U event and the work of the 'Brand Group' reported in the event. 'The Brand Group' is shorthand for what is officially called 'The Working Group on Strengths of the Church' of the Finnish Lutheran Church. The group was established in 2013 and consists of members working in different bodies within the Church. The aim of the work is greater integration in public image creation among the participant organisations. The organizations in the process include the Communication

44 Cf. Valaskivi (2016).

Centre, the Central Administration of the Church, the largest parishes, The Finn Church Aid, The Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission, and some smaller organizations.

The I Brand U event was 2014's annual gathering of communications, marketing, and media relations specialists. The parishes in different towns and municipalities take turns in organising the event, and in 2014, it was the turn of the parishes in the Tampere region to take the responsibility for organisation. With the help of *YLE* (National Broadcasting Company), the two-day event was set up as though it were a television show. It was emceed by a famous newscaster and the new head of communications and media relations at the Church Communication Centre. I attended the event because I had been asked to take part in the opening panel discussion titled 'Can the Church be branded? Should the Church be branded?' The event also gathered around 200 people who work in media and communications within the Church.

One of several talks during the event was the presentation of the outgoing head of communications and media relations at the Church, who described the work of the Brand Group. Her presentation mostly focused on a project that had been conducted with an advertising agency, which aimed at identifying possible strengths for the purpose of branding. The group had held a series of workshops identifying strengths and possible targets for branding. Holidays, Easter in particular, were one of the strengths that was enthusiastically identified by the whole group. According to the speaker the group had recognized: 'We more or less have Christmas, but now we need to take Easter.' Celebrated in the memory of death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, Easter is usually considered the most important celebration of Christian calendar. This is also the case in the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, although in terms of media attention, recognisability and Church attendance Easter does lag seriously behind from Christmas. It is this lag that the Brand Group set out to catch up.

Finding ways to 'take Easter' happened in the workshops through the process of first identifying anything profane connected with Easter: decorations, fasting, chicks, children, spring, Easter food, getting drunk, daffodils, rejuvenation, resting, and so on. The group then went on to define those things that combined the 'theological' and profane aspects: suffering, failure, perseverance, hope, light, beginning, silence, mortality, new life, simplifying life etc. From all these, five themes were chosen for further cultivation: food, relinquishing, doing good deeds, quietness, and joy. The cultivation process led to more than 120 ideas for a new branding of Easter. The 'inspiring ideas' selected from these suggestions included events, campaigns and media applications, for instance, 'Cleaning Day' for giving up things, an app for a daily quiet moment for contemplating the meaning of Easter and, paradoxically, a 'Noise Fast,' aiming at spending a day or days without social media and mobile usage.

The parties involved in the branding process had reported four aspects that were beneficial. First, it brought new organisational practices and tools for joint cooperation within the Church, including different sub-organisations forming a new team, the introduction of fresh ways of

using consultants, innovative methods of using media tools, and directing resources in another way. Second, the novel practices spurred more ideas that were quickly realised. Third, the general newness created a sense of enthusiasm and excitement about being able to change things and, fourth and perhaps most importantly, spurred a sense of the Church again being current and up to date rather than slow, old and traditional.

The continuation of the process called for reorganisation and different resources, which is typical for branding processes in public organisations. The most significant changes that branding processes cause in public organisations, in fact, often involve reorganisation, the streamlining of functions and communication, and the redirection of resources toward branding and media operations from core functions.[45]

'Believe in doing good'

The second case of this chapter is the campaign for parish elections, which was the first trial of the Brand Group in late 2013. The election campaign listed its aims as follows: first, to increase the voter turnout percentage; second, to increase the amount of young and new candidates; and third, that the persons elected to a position of trust should represent the whole membership of the Church better than previously. These are the kinds of aims any election promotion campaign might have. In other words, there does not seem to be any particular emphasis on the role of the Church as a religious community. This ties into the mentioned tendency of the Church being seen as part of the public sector and a public institution in Finland.

The publicity campaign set out to

- bring forth the work and messages of the Church
- take part in dialogue about life, values, and the Church
- address and reach out in particular to those members who have a distant relationship with the Church
- emphasize the most important reasons people have for belonging in the Church
- and make use of stories and faces as a part of the campaign

On the website providing material for local parishes, the aims and benefits of the campaign were explained and the slogan 'Believe in doing good' introduced:

> The election makes it possible for the Church to create a national campaign. In our campaign, we emphasize all the good things that Church does through people, on the source of the good deeds, and on what kind of issues one can have influence on through voting and becoming a candidate.
>
> Good things are introduced in the campaign with faces and stories of people. [...] The core message of the campaign aims at activating passive members of the Church to vote and encourages people to run in the election. The doors of the Church are open for change and different opinions.

45 Cf. Valaskivi (2016).

Celebrities and public figures were the faces used in the campaign. In videos, posters, and on the campaign website they would tell about their perceptions of the Church and why they vote: An actor, MP, and well-known black gay-right activist stated in a poster: 'The way forward is to say aloud our will and painting the kind of parish we want.' In another poster young, high-profile actress emphasized: 'The core message of the Church is grace. It is the task of the Church to lead the way in [...] questions of human rights.'

The slogans below the pictures of the celebrities addressed the reader: 'What kind of good do you believe in? Make the Church like you. Vote in the Parish Elections.'

Discussion: Believing in the Church

I analysed the cases in terms of what the object of belief is and what the aims are. In the election case, the objects of belief were 'doing good' and the Church. The first aim of the campaign was political, such as the turnout rate or democratic representation. The second related to the image, in other words, seeking more and better-quality attention. The third aim was related to grace – of the Church, that is, the Church as the actor of doing good, or the platform for the people to do good deeds. It is safe to say that in the framework of election promotion, the Church is within the immanent frame and focuses on matters of this world. This is also how things are supposed to be presented in the format of election promotion.

In the case of the branding of Easter, it is apparent that the aim is to find aspects that are easily relatable for people who are not necessarily familiar with the Christian meanings of Easter. Like in the election case, the Easter case demonstrates how the form of branding invites certain solutions and practices. Despite resorting to branding, the Church, however, has chosen not to begin evoking strong excitement, but rather remains consistent with the rational ideal of the public space. In other words, the Church attempts to apply affective branding without resorting to strong affects.

One way of further studying this complicated relationship of rationality, the Church, and the public sphere in the attention economy might be to apply the concept of emotional regimes used by Ole Riis and Linda Woodhead.[46] The Church appears to be tied to a certain emotional regime that defines its room to manoeuvre in the public space.

Conclusion: An existential crisis and the consequences of branding

The most striking consequences of the aims and perceived benefits of branding within the Church are, first, that branding appears to contribute to the shifting of the emphasis to the immanent frame. The emphasis is to strengthen involvement with the Church rather than with God. Second, branding the Church follows the general rules and values of branding as

46 Riis & Woodhead (2010).

a practice. For instance, the values of being contemporary, fashionable, and up to date are at the core of all branding processes. Being in fashion and inventing something original are some of the most efficient ways of becoming visible in the eyes of the media. Third, branding is both consciously used and results in changes in organisations and the shifting of resources, such as increasing cooperation between different organizations within the church with the aim of image-building.

Branding sets out to solve the existential problem of the Church through increasing and directing public visibility and creating innovative, affective ways of coming together in social media. The aim to reduce the perceived gap between the experienced internal image and media representations results in bringing a gap into the organisation, as branding raises the question of authenticity. All public organisations and institutions resorting to branding end up in a discussion about the relationship of the 'essential core,' authentic self and the representations they wish to produce through branding. Branding thus often becomes a discussion about the identity of the organisation. In the case of the Church, it appears that this discussion obscures the question of the Church's mission.

In practice, branding techniques provide a way of avoiding the actual existential questions haunting the institution. Branding directs both human and monetary resources from core functions to promotion and marketing, also shifting the meaning of what is at the 'core' of the institution. Branding does provide a tool for discussing the core values of the institution and insists on building its strengths on those values. Branding also changes the relationship between the Church and its members. The congregation is transformed into individual consumers of religious services provided by the Church. Furthermore, the frame that branding provides is thoroughly immanent. Branding is a response to the mediatized circumstances within which it is not possible to raise issues of God, salvation, or an afterlife. According to the public presentation of the branding process, those concepts were not even discussed when identifying strengths in Easter. Branding is a response to the mediatized conditions, and these are immanent conditions.

On a more philosophical level, the Church finds itself in a paradox: as modernisation and secularisation have been phenomenologically connected with each other, it is impossible for an institution to modernize without secularizing. Because of this, with every attempt toward becoming a media-savvy, fashionable, and contemporary institution, the Church contributes to further expansion of the immanent frame and secularization, which further undermine its role in society as a religious community.

In light of developments regarding European migrations and growing immigration to Finland, there appears to be a new turn in the developments. In Autumn 2015, the Church and local parishes had their hands full with equipping temporary shelters and taking care of the refugees. The issue of branding remains on the back burner as the Church continues working for the refugees, giving statements against racism,[47] and even helping the paperless and those turned away. A Church employee noted: 'The blessed

47 *YLE News*, December 23, 2015.

refugee crisis.' In my interpretation, what he meant was that, at the moment, the institution again has a purpose and thus does not need to resort to branding and other gimmicks to gain visibility. This indicates that what existential crisis branding is used to respond to is not only external, but also internal. Logically the workers of the Church themselves also wonder about the mission, purpose, and task of the Church in the contemporary mediatized society of declining membership and paradigmatic modernisation. With the refugee crisis, the existence of an institution such as the Church is contextualised from the need to help the refugees, making the question of image-conscious campaigns seem frivolous and superficial. The practices of branding and other means for directing attention have, nevertheless, come to stay in the Church's toolbox.

What the refugee crisis does not change, however, is the expansion of the immanent frame in the Church's work. This interest in conditions of the human life in this world, in other words leaning towards secular humanism[48] might, however, be the kind of redefinition of the role of the Church that can survive in the attention economy. As Charles Taylor emphasizes, secular humanism is essential for human flourishing. In other words, while focusing its work on humanitarian efforts, the Church is not only going back to its historical roots in taking care of those in need, it might also be (re-)finding a purpose, a redefinition of focus – within the immanent frame – that does not call for branding. At least, not for now.

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48 Cf. Taylor (2007); Warner et al. (2010).

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Abstract

On the Legacy of Lutheranism in Finland
Societal Perspectives

Edited by Kaius Sinnemäki, Anneli Portman, Jouni Tilli and Robert H. Nelson

This volume analyses the societal legacy of Lutheranism in Finland in broad terms. It contributes to the recent renewed interest in the history of religion in Finland and the Nordic countries by bringing together researchers in history, political science, economics, social psychology, education, linguistics, media studies, and theology to examine the mutual relationship between Lutheranism and society in Finland. The two main foci are (i) the historical effects of the Reformation and its aftermath on societal structures and on national identity, values, linguistic culture, education, and the economy, and (ii) the adaptation of the church – and its theology – to changes in the geo-political and sociocultural context. Important sub-themes include nationalism and religion, the secularization and institutionalization of traditional values, multiple Protestant ethics, and long continuities in history. Overall the book argues that large changes in societies cannot be explained via 'secular' factors alone, such as economic development or urbanization, but that factors pertaining to religion provide substantial explanatory power for understanding societal change and the resulting societal structures.

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