Securitisation and Finnish Comprehensive Security Model: A Comparative Analysis of Security Strategy for Society (2017 and 2025)

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Abstract:

In this paper, I try to empirically understand the security underpinnings of Finnish Comprehensive Security Model (CSM). Comprehensive security is a holistic approach to national and societal security that integrates military, civil, economic, and societal dimensions to safeguard the vital functions of society.

The main policy making tool for CSM is the Security Strategy for Society, a government resolution that focuses on publishing the general security objectives and guidelines for Finnish Security. Therefore, I comparatively study the SSS of 2017 and 2025 to empirically understand the security underpinnings of Finnish CSM. To better understand security discussions in Finland, I ask three research questions, who are the primarily security actors and what are their roles in determining Finnish security narratives? Second, to understand the perception of threat where risk is uncertain, what does the CSM model recommend? Finally, to understand the

production of security narrative in Finland, I will try to identity what is the future of Finnish security policy? To answer these questions, I make a thematic analysis of the SSS using securitisation theory, particularly related to three aspects, the securitising actor, threat and response. I try to identify what these resolutions say about the future of Finnish CSM, corresponding to the changing dynamics of threat and the increased uncertainty of risks in the Finnish society.

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Glossary of Acronyms

CSM	(Finnish) Comprehensive Security Model
CSS	Copenhagen School of Security
EU	European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
SSS	Security Strategy for Society
SSR	Security Studies Resilience
VF	Vital Functions

1. Introduction

Finland is currently undergoing a period of convoluted political climate, the major political developments in Finland recently could be the decision to enter NATO in 2023, increasing and corresponding political tensions in Finnish-Russian relations, the ramifications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and most recently a change in their parliamentary political leadership, have transformed Finland's geo-political significance in International world order. As a result of which, Finland's foreign and security policy is undergoing constant evaluation and amendments. Whether it is inevitable or by choice, today national security debates are seldom discussed without discussions on migration, borders and immigration policies. It has also been an important and persistent topic of parliamentary debates since the formation of the new political leadership and the EU parliamentary debates, followed the topics of border security force and reinforcement of heightened security, instrumentalization of migration focussing on defence and deterrence as stated by NATO, including Finland's cybersecurity strength (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, April 2023)

The uncertainty arising due to these national and international political developments have produced an environment where security, border and defence have been made priority. With the new release of the Finnish foreign and security policy this year, the central government have highlighted its objective to be a key political player in International Organisations like the European Union, United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Furthermore, the policy has stated its objectives to support the European Union and uphold international laws and the United Nations amidst the ongoing political hostility in Ukraine along with a strong emphasis on Border control, Security, Military might of Finland and its Resilience in security context.

Due to the unprecedented and unpredictability of this current political climate, these policies are bound to be contradictory or unclear at times which can entail to further amendments. There are ongoing and constant developments in Finnish security provisions such as new action plans (concerning security, borders and migration) and the release of the Comprehensive Security for Society in January 2025. These changes have also somewhat contributed to the reconstruction of Finland's location in the geo-political imagination particularly extending the European Security strategy to the Nordic and the Baltic Sea region.

Finland's security policy has undergone a remarkable transformation over its history, transitioning from a position of cautious neutrality to full NATO membership. This shift represents one of the most significant realignments in European security architecture in recent decades. The country's security approach has been shaped by its geopolitical position between East and West, socio-historical experiences of war, and evolving regional security dynamics. Finland's recent NATO accession marks a watershed moment that redefines its security posture, while maintaining distinctive elements of its traditional defence strategy.

Security governance in Finland is said to be rooted in the strong legalistic tradition of "Rechstaat" (Virta & Branders, 2023, p. 266) which aims for the security of the "state, society, people, social welfare, justice and equality". The provision of security in societies require a greater assessment of threats and a wide range of security actors, thus giving rise to the concept of 'comprehensive security' called the comprehensive security model, this is a security governance model in Finland, laying down the general principles of how security should be performed across the government and all the security actors of the Finnish society.

The model's emphasis on resilience, learning, and networked collaboration positions it as a leading framework for managing complex security environments Comprehensive security in Finland has evolved from a narrow, military-focused concept (Total Defence) to a broad,

collaborative, and adaptive governance model (CSM) that integrates all sectors of society and addresses a wide array of modern threats. Its development reflects Finland's unique historical experiences, pragmatic culture, and a commitment to resilience and societal security. (Vitra & Branders, 2023; Valtonen & Brander 2021)

The main document to understanding the policymaking tool of CSM is the Security Strategy of Society, a government resolution laying down the general principles of CSM, these principles in theory, are laid down to be applicable across various governments. CSM has a historical trajectory in Finnish and Nordic security policy. However, the strategy was first introduced in 2003, amended in 2006, further renamed as the Security Strategy for Society in 2010, and republished in 2017 and the latest strategy was released in March of 2025.

The aim of this paper is to understand the Finnish CSM and its security directives considering these developments. Therefore, this paper will comparatively analyse the 2017 and 2025 SSS using the framework of Copenhagen School's Securitisation Theory. To better understand security discussions in Finland, I ask three research questions, who are the primarily security actors and what are their roles in determining Finnish security narratives? Second, to understand the perception of threat where risk is uncertain, what does the CSM model recommend? Finally, to understand the production of security narrative in Finland, I will try to identity what is the future of Finnish security policy?

The first chapter will contextual the historical underpinnings of security policy of Finland which led to the establishment of modern-day Finnish CSM. This will allow us to understand the Finnish context of security and throw light at the current developments. The second chapter gives a brief evaluation of the theoretical framework of Copenhagen's Securitisation Theory. Securitisation theory as formulated by Ole Weaver and Barry Buzan is not enough to understand the 'modern' phenomenon of Finnish CSM which widens the concept of security

through threat, security actors, and resilience. Therefore, I try to expand the scope of securitisation theory using Rita Abrahamsen's (2005) formulation of security as a continuum and Rita Floyd's (2020) theory on Functional Actors. Particularly to understand the concept of resilience and preparedness as advocated by the CSM and to understand the expanding role of security actors like organisations and businesses.

It must be noted that the Security Strategy for Society is a general guideline that outlines the Finnish CSM, therefore, in my analysis I do not aim to produce any normative recommendation of these strategies or CSM or Securitisation theory, it is out of scope for this research project. However, the analysis reveals how different aspects of CSM showcases different elements of Copenhagen's securitisation theory. It can also be noted, that, I do not aim to analyse the problematics or benevolence of such a policy, rather provide an empirical basis to understanding the key elements of Finnish CSM.

2. History of Finnish Security Policy

2.1.Inter-War and Cold War

Finland's approach to security began taking shape immediately after gaining independence from Russia in 1917. During 1918-1922, Finland's early security policy was characterized by inconsistency and a tendency toward “adventurism” as the young nation sought to establish itself. The first Soviet Finnish War of 1918-1920 was intrinsically linked to the Russian Civil War and foreign military intervention. Following the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920, Finland adopted what scholars have described as a policy of "brilliant isolationism" or non-alignment, which would continue until the mid-1930s. The post-World War II era saw Finland develop a distinctive approach to security policy often termed "Finlandization" - maintaining formal neutrality while pragmatically accommodating Soviet security interests. By the early 1970s, Finland had established the fundamental arguments and strategy for an active foreign policy line that promoted peace and security while maintaining acceptability in both East and West.

Finland's security concept during this period was characterized by several key elements. First, it maintained a Nordic security policy that confirmed the "disengaged" position of the Nordic region. (Möttölä, 1982; Forsberg, 2001**;** Pekkola et al., 2023) Second, it developed a defence doctrine legitimating the national defence system calibrated to respond to limited conventional attacks. Third, it carefully balanced the Finnish Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with its neutral stance. The core philosophy of Finland's Cold War security policy was to trust in political regulation as the best security guarantee even in conflict situations. This approach was severely tested in the 1980s by debates about the increased danger of limited nuclear war, which challenged the credibility of a defence doctrine based primarily on conventional capabilities. (Forsberg, 2001)

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990s triggered significant transformations in Finnish security thinking. Finland began evolving from its strict neutrality toward a more flexible position of military non-alignment while pursuing closer integration with Western institutions. This period saw Finland join the European Union in 1995, signalling its Western orientation while still maintaining military non-alignment. Finland's security approaches underwent gradual but significant changes during this period, with a systematic evolution from softer aspects of security toward more rigid forms. This shift coincided with decreasing cooperation with Russia and growing alignment with Western security structures. Finland's EU membership provided a new dimension to its security policy. (Kettunen, 2018) The country began to frame its security not just in terms of territorial defence but also through participation in the EU's common foreign and security policy frameworks. Finland actively developed Nordic defence cooperation while maintaining its distinct position of military non-alignment. (Virta & Branders, 2023; Burgess, 2025)

During this period, Finland continued to demonstrate a commitment to comprehensive security approaches that integrated military defence with broader resilience measures across society. The Finnish model of "comprehensive security" and "comprehensive defence" became distinctive features of its security posture, incorporating civilian preparedness alongside military capabilities. (Virta & Branders, 2023; Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2025)

2.2. Three Crisis of 2010s

After cold war, Finnish security narratives, focussed on military preparedness, along with societal security notions, this mainly attributed to its previous experiences of War. However, during the 2010's scholar's particularly highlight three major crisis that shaped Finnish security narratives, annexation of Crimea in 2014, European migration crisis in 2015 and the Social and Health care reforms. After Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Finland had to reconsider

Russia as a threat to their territorial independence. While, Finland had maintained strong bi-lateral relations with Russia and continued its military neutrality post-cold war period. However, the 2010s also marked the time Finland opened The Annexation bought back the debates of its identity being pro-western or European country. (Forsberg, 2001; Järvenpää, 2015; Koikkalainen, 2022) Along with the annexation of Crimea came about the Migration crisis of 2015 where Finland received more than 30,000 migrants and asylum seekers, which was higher than the European average in proportion to its population at the time. This gave rise to the formulation of stricter migration policy in Finland. Since the 2000s, governments have tried to change and introduce new social and health reforms and in 2015s the then government introduced privatisation of health care and promote cost effective strategies. However, the policy failed in 2019 after a report was submitted by the constitutional committee of the parliament. Finnish security narrative has a complex socio-historic trajectory from social welfare and reforms playing a functional role in achieving national interests to its previous experiences of war. (Kettunen, 2018; Ejersbo et al., 2023) The Finnish CSM is a holistic approach to security that was affected with these developments in international geo-political environments which resulted in further extending the idea that threat and risk to the Finnish society is uncertain and led to the formulation of 'Resilience' of Finnish society. (Virta & Branders, 2023; Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2025)

2.3.The NATO Accession

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 catalysed a dramatic and rapid shift in Finland's security policy. In a decisive break with its long-standing policy of military non-alignment, Finland applied for NATO membership in May 2022, less than three months after the invasion began. This represented the most profound shift in Finnish security orientation since World War II. The speed and decisiveness of this change reflected a fundamental

reassessment of Finland's security environment. The Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that Finland's traditional approach of balancing between East and West was no longer viable in the new European security reality. On April 4, 2023, Finland officially became a member of NATO, marking a historic endpoint to its policy of neutrality.

Finland's NATO accession occurred alongside a similar shift by Sweden, representing a significant reconfiguration of Nordic security architecture. While both countries had maintained military non-alignment for decades (though for different historical reasons), the Russian invasion of Ukraine prompted parallel reassessments of their security positions. This divergence highlights how different European neutral states have responded to the changed security environment, with Finland's response being among the most dramatic.

Finland's integration into NATO represents a complex transformation of its security policy. However, these changes are predominantly incremental rather than revolutionary in nature. The integration process involves adapting Finland's military structures to NATO standards and procedures while participating in the alliance's command structures and collective defence planning. Finland brings substantial capabilities to the alliance, including a well-developed territorial defence system and specialized expertise in Arctic and northern European security considerations. Finland's NATO membership significantly alters the security dynamics in the Baltic Sea region. Together with Sweden's NATO accession, it has transformed the Baltic Sea into a predominantly NATO-controlled space, with Russia's access limited primarily to the eastern portions. This has strategic implications for the region's security architecture and NATO's ability to project power in Northern Europe.

Finland's contribution to European strategic autonomy is particularly relevant in two key areas, strategic defence autonomy and the resilience of critical infrastructure. Finland's long border with Russia gives it particular significance in NATO's eastern flank defences and provides the

alliance with new strategic depth. Finland continues to maintain strong defence relationships with its Nordic neighbours within the NATO framework. The Baltic Sea region, including Finland, has demonstrated leadership potential at the European Union level in promoting initiatives to improve strategic autonomy. This reflects the region's heightened sensitivity to security threats and its proactive stance on defence cooperation following Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Finland's security policy has completed a remarkable journey from cautious neutrality to full NATO integration. This transformation reflects both the dramatic changes in the European security environment and Finland's pragmatic adaptation to new realities. While the 2022 decision to join NATO represents a revolutionary break from the past, the implementation process demonstrates Finland's characteristic evolutionary approach.

Despite joining NATO, Finland has maintained key elements of its traditional security approach. Many foundational aspects of Finland's national defence, such as conscription and models of comprehensive security and comprehensive defence, remain in place. These elements are being transformed in an evolutionary way through adjustments to existing practices rather than through wholesale revolutions in security thinking This continuity reflects Finland's changing approach to security, the Finnish model of comprehensive security, which integrates military defence with broader societal resilience, continues to inform its approach even within the NATO framework Looking ahead, Finland will likely continue balancing its NATO commitments with distinctive national defence traditions. The Finnish approach to comprehensive security and societal resilience offers valuable lessons for other NATO members, potentially influencing alliance thinking on hybrid threats and civil preparedness.

Finland's geostrategic position ensures it will remain a critical actor in European security arrangements, particularly regarding Arctic security and relations with Russia. How Finland navigates its new NATO role while managing its proximity to Russia will be crucial not only

for Finnish security but for European security architecture more broadly. The Finnish case demonstrates that security policy traditions, even when deeply entrenched, can undergo fundamental reorientation when strategic circumstances change dramatically enough. Yet it also shows how continuity can be maintained even through revolutionary shifts in security policy alignment, highlighting the complex interplay between innovation and tradition in national security thinking.

2.4. Development of Comprehensive Security in Finland

Comprehensive security is a holistic approach to national and societal security that integrates military, civil, economic, and societal dimensions to safeguard the vital functions of society. The Finnish model, known as the Comprehensive Security Model (CSM), is internationally recognized for its operational depth and “cooperative” coordination across all sectors of society. Comprehensive security in Finland has a long history that traces back to the aftermath of the 1918 Civil War and subsequent conflicts with the Soviet Union. Early security structures focused on national defence, border security, and material preparedness, establishing collaborative bodies like the Defence Council and Economic Defence Council. Therefore, cooperation and collaborative understanding of security is not new and has been part of its governance model since its independence. (Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2020). After, the devastation of World War II, the Nordic cooperation, and the Haaga Declaration agreement (Larsson & Rhinard, 2025) led to the adoption of "Total Defence" concept wherein security was achieved by mobilizing the whole nation for defence and security. This was also done to understand the growing threats in a convoluted geopolitical scenario, wherein ascertaining security threats was difficult and modern threats were not limited to military threats and therefore, a strong welfare system along with military defence was the resultant solution to rethink security in the Nordics and Finland. Moreover, the Socio- historical trajectory of Finnish civil war led to the

development of fostering a strong will to defend the country, wherein a united nation was believed to be a strong nation. Along with this socio-historic trajectory such as the Continuation War of 1941 to 1944, gave way towards the ideas of self-reliance and early aspects of resilience. (Valtonen and Branders, 2020). Hereafter, “pragmatism” became a guiding principle, emphasizing self-reliance and innovative solutions, especially under the pressures of Cold War neutrality and the need to balance relations with the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Finland's accession to the EU in 1995, further broadened the security perspective beyond military threats. The first government strategy for securing vital societal functions was adopted in 2003, introducing an all-hazards approach and integrating critical infrastructure protection and risk management.

The Finnish governance model retroactively was based on regional cooperative model, with a top-down approach of governance, and the trust for public authorities in Nordic region including Finland has been high, hence it the CSM was easy to implement in this scenario because security thinking had become an everyday practice of the local governing authorities (Larsson and Rhinard, 2025). The Finnish governance system allowed for a stronger role for local and municipal authorities wherein they did not necessarily need to follow ministerial rules but made decisions based on annual directives. Along with this, private security networks in the Nordics were smaller, and limited to risk management and infrastructure. Moreover, this partnership was based not on competition but rather relied on public private partnership models, that accounts to today’s still centralised but cooperative, comprehensive security model. It is this socio-historic trajectories and administrative governance of partnership and cooperation and a strong deference of the welfare state that led to the development of comprehensive security. After the collapse of Soviet Union, Finland continued to develop its military and civil defence including arms production, due to the past transgression with the

Soviet Union and its proximity to Russia. Thus, CSM has a long socio-history of Finland's experience of war and preparing for war. (Valtonen and Branders, 2020)

The shift from "Total Defence" to "Comprehensive Security" was formalized in the early 2000s, with the Hallberg Committee recommending the replacement of the term and the establishment of the Security Committee (Virta & Branders, 2023; ¸: Valtonen and Branders, 2020). The first strategy that focused on cross-administrative and cooperative model of governance was published in 2003 and then subsequently in 2006, 2010, 2017 and most recently released strategy in 2025. The 2006 strategy focused on emergency preparedness and planning whereas in 2010 the strategy was renamed as the Security Strategy for Society. These developments was a result of the changing security environment and the need to include more actors including organisations, research institutes and individual actor.

The CSM now emphasizes safeguarding seven vital functions of society: leadership, international/EU activities, defence capability, internal security, economic infrastructure/security of supply, functional capacity of the population and services, and psychological resilience. (Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2025) It is operationalized through regular collaboration, information sharing, and involvement of citizens through 72 hours concept for household preparedness, and Security Cafés for public engagement. **Holistic and All-Hazards Approach:** Comprehensive security addresses a broad spectrum of threats, both intentional (e.g., military attacks) and unintentional (e.g., natural disasters, cyber threats), emphasizing preparedness, resilience, and continuity of vital societal functions. The comprehensive security model operates on safeguarding, **the** Vital Functions of Society**,** the model identifies seven vital functions that must be secured to ensure societal resilience, particularly focusing on Leadership International and EU activities, Defence capability, Internal security, Economy,

infrastructure, and security of supply, Functional capacity of the population and services, psychological resilience. (Security Strategy for Society: Government Resolution, 2017)

The model relies on coordinated efforts among government authorities, the private sector, NGOs, and citizens. This collaboration is institutionalized through regular forums, shared planning, and joint exercises. The model's emphasis on resilience, learning, and networked collaboration positions it as a leading framework for managing complex security environments Comprehensive security in Finland has evolved from a narrow, military-focused concept (Total Defence) to a broad, collaborative, and adaptive governance model (CSM) that integrates all sectors of society and addresses a wide array of modern threats. Its development reflects Finland's unique historical experiences, pragmatic culture, and a commitment to resilience and societal security. (Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2025)

3. Securitisation Theory

This chapter covers the theoretical framework used in this paper, first it utilises the concept of securitisation given by Copenhagen School of Security studies. The Copenhagen School of Security Studies has emerged as one of the most influential theoretical frameworks in the field of international security since the late 20th century. Developing comprehensive approaches to understanding security beyond traditional military concerns, this school of thought has fundamentally reshaped how scholars and practitioners conceptualize threats, security processes, and international relations. (Stritzel, 2008; Williams, 2010)

It emerged during a period of significant transformation in international relations, particularly following the end of the Cold War. The formal establishment of what would become known as the Copenhagen School materialized through collaborative work between scholars at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. The publication of "Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe" (1993) by Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre marked a significant milestone in the school's development. The theoretical framework was further solidified with the publication of "Security: A New Framework for Analysis" (1997) by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, which is widely considered the definitive presentation of the Copenhagen School's approach. (Filimon, 2016)

However, as a framework to analysis the holistic approach of Finnish CSM, wherein security moves beyond traditional focus but is also intertwined with other sectors of society, we need to expand the concept of securitisation. In the first attempt to understand the concept of resilience in the context of Finnish CSM, I utilise "security as a continuum," given by Rita Abrahamsen. If security is looked like a continuum, then we do not need emergency conditions for a concept to be securitised, this combined with the understanding of Resilience in security

studies provides a unique way to look at Finnish CSM. Moreover, there is a limited understanding of who security actors are in Weaver and Buzan's conceptualisation, Finnish CSM is based on cooperation and multi-level actors, I utilise the concept of Functional Actors given by Floyd.

3.1.Copenhagen School of Securitisation: "Speech Acts" and Sectoral Security

Speech Acts

Perhaps the most influential contribution of the Copenhagen School is securitization theory, which reconceptualizes security as a speech act and intersubjective process rather than an objective condition. According to this theory, security is not merely about the presence or absence of threats but involves a discursive process whereby actors frame issues as existential threats requiring extraordinary measures. (Buzan et al., 1998) Securitization theory contends that by labelling something a security issue, actors move it from the realm of normal politics into a domain where exceptional measures are permitted. This process is inherently political and performative, involving what the Copenhagen School terms "speech acts" that construct threats through language and social practices. Therefore, there is a performative power that underpins threat construction. In contrast, there are only issues that are socially constructed as security threats through processes of 'securitisation'. (Stritzel, 2007; Balzacq, 2010*;* Filimon, 2016)

Those can be defined as 'processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat' (Buzan et al., 1998). Buzan's and Wæver's conceptualisation of securitisation has a strong linguistic dimension, as they argue that security issues are socially constructed as such through 'speech acts' (Wæver, 1995). Moreover, the securitisation framework is rooted in a conventional military-political paradigm of security, in

which the notion of security is predominantly framed through the existential threat to survival. (Williams 2003; Léonard & Kaunert, 2022)

As articulated by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998), a threat becomes a security issue only when a securitizing actor successfully frames it as a threat requiring urgent, extraordinary measures. This process underscores the intersubjective nature of security, wherein an issue is securitized only when an audience accepts the securitizing actor's claims. The audience's role is said to be critical, as their acquiescence legitimizes the suspension of standard political procedures. Although there is always a debate if audience acceptance in neo-political issues relevant to the success of securitisation theory. (Stritzel, 2007; Balzacq, 2010*;* Filimon, 2016)

Securitizing actors are typically elites or authoritative figures, who possess the social capital to legitimize their claims. Their authority stems from institutional positions or public trust, enabling them to invoke security language effectively. There is an element of urgency that is the threat is framed as requiring immediate action to avoid a "point of no return". This in turn leads to the acceptance of extraordinary measures wherein the actor advocates for policies that bypass normal political channels, such as military interventions or emergency legislation. This further suggests that securitisation discourses do not offer an objective or singular representation of security but rather construct and reinforce specific interpretations and understandings of what constitutes security and how it ought to be practised. (Wojczewski, 2019)

Securitization theory remains a vital lens for analysing how threats are constructed, legitimized, and managed. Its findings underscore the political nature of security, the power of language**,** **and the** contingency of emergency measures**.** However, evolving critiques and empirical challenges call for integrating sociological, ethical, and intersectional perspectives to address its limitations in an increasingly complex security landscape.

Sectoral Security

The Copenhagen School expanded the concept of security beyond traditional military concerns to include multiple sectors of society including military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. This sectoral approach allows for a more comprehensive understanding of security challenges and facilitates analysis of how issues in different sectors may become securitized**.** (Albert & Buzan, 2011) The concept of societal security, focusing on threats to collective identities, has been particularly influential but also controversial. In response to criticisms that their approach to identity was too objectivist, Copenhagen School scholars argued that their framework does allow for consideration of the politics of identity formation within security processes. (Herd & Lofgren, 2001) McSweeney's critique that "the view we take of 'identities' is far too objectivist and not (de)constructivist enough". (Herd & Lofgren, 2001) The sectoral approach to security analysis developed by the Copenhagen School has informed studies of international security cooperation, this research identifies distinct historical stages in the development of security cooperation, analysing how institutional choices create path dependencies that shape subsequent security arrangements. (Albert & Buzan, 2011)

The Copenhagen School of Security Studies emphasizes sectoral security as the protection of *collective identities* from existential threats, alongside traditional state-centric security. The strategy aligns with the Copenhagen School's sectoral approach, expanding security beyond military concerns to include societal, economic, and environmental dimensions. Therefore, apart from national borders, society or sectors of society can also be securitised. (Herd & Lofgren, 2001)

Incorporating the ideas and debates of sectoral security, while relevant in the analysis of Finnish CSM that heavily relies on a cooperation-based model, however, it is out of scope for this paper and therefore is not utilised in the analysis. Sectoral security is still relevant for the

historical developments that led to the formulation of CSM and hence why it was important to mention.

3.2. Securitisation- a critique

The Copenhagen School's securitisation theory has significantly shaped the field of Critical Security Studies, yet it has not remained immune to substantial critique. These critiques have not only questioned its foundational assumptions but have also played a vital role in pushing the framework beyond its initial parameters, facilitating its theoretical and empirical development.

One of the foundational criticism, centres on the Copenhagen School's treatment of identity, particularly within its conceptualisation of societal security. McSweeney (1996) challenged the objectivist underpinning of the framework, arguing that it fails to adequately account for the socially constructed nature of identity. By treating identity as a pre-given referent object, critics contend, the theory overlooks how identities are themselves politically contested and co-constituted within securitisation processes. This critique prompted later scholars to incorporate poststructuralist insights, drawing on theorists like Laclau and Mouffe to better understand how discourses shape not just threats but also the identities they claim to protect.

Another major line of critique has targeted the framework's reliance on the speech act, as formulated through Austinian pragmatism. While Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998) foregrounded securitisation as a discursive act—whereby political elites frame issues as existential threats requiring emergency measures—scholars such as Balzacq (2005, 2011), Bigo (2001), and Huysmans (2004, 2006) argue that this approach overprivileges elite rhetoric. They note that such a model risk neglecting the non-discursive and material dimensions of

security construction, including practices, institutional routines, and technological interventions. Balzacq advocated for a sociological approach that examines how policies, bureaucratic procedures, and surveillance tools function as mechanisms of securitisation.

Building on this, scholars from the Paris School, most notably Didier Bigo, proposed that securitisation is as much about practices as it is about language. In his analysis of migration, Bigo demonstrated how threat construction often arises from administrative routines such as risk profiling, population management, and the professional culture of security practitioners. These routinised practices occur irrespective of overt political speech and suggest that securitisation can be enacted through silent, technocratic governance. This shift in focus has led to a more practice-oriented understanding of security, wherein threat construction emerges from the confluence of policy instruments, professional norms, and institutional logics. (Wlliams, 2010; Balzaq, 2010; Léonard & Kaunert, 2022)

The securitisation framework has also been criticised for its normative implications. By framing securitisation as an elite-driven process, the theory risks legitimising dominant narratives while marginalising dissenting voices, especially those from vulnerable or minority groups. Scholars such as Floyd (2010; 2014) have argued for the need to integrate ethical criteria into the analysis of securitisation, particularly to assess the justifiability of invoking emergency measures. This normative concern is especially pertinent in contexts where securitisation reproduces exclusionary power relations, such as in the governance of migration or counter-terrorism policies.

The model's treatment of the audience has similarly come under scrutiny. Initially, the Copenhagen School conceptualised audiences as relatively passive recipients of securitising

moves. McSweeney and others pointed out that this framing sideline the agency of publics, civil society, and alternative political actors. In response, there is a reconceptualised the audience as an active agent capable of contesting, negotiating, or even reversing securitising narratives. This reorientation has opened space for analysing how resistance, desecuritisation, and counter-securitising discourses emerge and gain traction. (Balzaq, 2010; Léonard & Kaunert, 2022)

Empirically, the theory has struggled with operationalisation. Systematic reviews indicate that only a small fraction of empirical studies successfully apply the original model, often due to difficulties in demonstrating "audience acceptance" or in distinguishing securitisation from politicisation. These challenges are compounded in non-Western contexts where the model's assumptions about political communication and institutional structure may not hold. Consequently, scholars have called for more adaptable and context-sensitive methodological tools.

New Copenhagen's Security

Responding to concerns over discursivity, the theory has broadened to include the material and practical dimensions of security. Scholars now examine how policy tools, bureaucratic practices, and surveillance technologies contribute to the construction of threats. This practice-based turn aligns securitisation theory more closely with Foucauldian governmentality and the sociology of security. (Léonard & Kaunert, 2022) Recent contributions have brought greater reflexivity to the theory's normative dimensions. There is now a growing emphasis on evaluating the ethical consequences of securitisation, including who benefits from and who is marginalised by security discourses. This has led to increased attention to desecuritisation

processes and to the role of civil society in challenging exceptionalist framings. (Bulzaq, 2010.)

The framework has also drawn from poststructuralist theory to problematise fixed boundaries between discourse and practice. Drawing on scholars like David Campbell and Lene Hansen, contemporary securitisation studies emphasise the relational and performative dimensions of identity and threat. Security is increasingly seen as a fluid and contested process embedded in broader struggles over meaning and power. (Williams, 2010)

Buzan and Wæver themselves acknowledged early on that securitisation can become institutionalised, such that explicit speech acts may no longer be necessary. This insight paved the way for more nuanced understandings of how security becomes embedded in institutional routines and governance structures. For instance, bodies such as Frontex operate through technocratic mechanisms rather than political rhetoric yet still contribute to the securitisation of issues like migration. (Bigo, 2014; Léonard & Kaunert, 2022)

The evolution of securitisation theory reflects a broader shift in security studies toward a more pluralistic, reflexive, and empirically grounded approach. While the Copenhagen School initially emphasised discursive constructions of threat via elite speech acts, subsequent scholarship has expanded the framework to account for practices, technologies, institutions, and ethical considerations. This ongoing dialogue between critics and proponents has transformed securitisation theory into a more comprehensive tool for analysing the complex processes through which security is socially constructed and contested across diverse contexts.

Desecuritisation

Desecuritisation – the process of moving an issue out of emergency politics and back into normal political debate – is the Copenhagen School's normative aim. Wæver (1999) explains that desecuritisation ideally "downgrades" an issue to "the world of process-type remedies on normal political deliberation and haggling" (p. 335). In practice, this typically requires counter-narratives and institutional checks. Civil society actors (NGOs, activists, media) can contest securitised framings with alternative discourses and facts. For instance, broad public demonstrations and campaigns by ordinary citizens serve as "social expressions" that shift issues out of emergency mode.

One study emphasizes that "social expressions and collective actions… by ordinary members of civil society" are needed to reset a securitised issue back into routine politics. Governments and publics can also use formal mechanisms (parliamentary debate, courts, international agreements) to demand justification of security measures, thereby normalising the issue. In some cases, negotiable fixes (e.g. arms control treaties or diplomatic accords) have explicitly removed the security label from disputes (Wæver, 1995). Therefore, desecuritisation mechanisms include activist counter-speech, inclusive dialogue, and legal and political processes that reframe threats as ordinary policy problems.

However, desecuritisation often faces deep hurdles. Critical studies warn of "deep securitisations" (Abulof, 2014) where threat narratives become so ingrained that normalisation is nearly impossible. Once, security bureaucracies and technologies are mobilised, civil society can lose influence: Paris School analysis notes that after securitisation, "civil society gradually loses its power" as states deploy surveillance, policing and even military measures to counter the "newly created threat". In other words, once a matter is officially securitised it acquires institutional momentum that resists reversal. Moreover, power asymmetries often favour

securitising actors: without access to the levers of authority, public counter-narratives can struggle to gain traction. Finally, crises or shocks can abruptly re-securitise issues. (Balzaq, 2010; Bigo, 2014)

The Copenhagen School anchors securitisation in speech acts and audience approval.
Critics (e.g. McSweeney, 1996) have argued this over-emphasises powerful actors and passive audiences Subsequent work – including by the founders themselves – recognises a practice dimension: routinized state practices and expert techniques can securitise issues even without dramatic speech acts. Over time the school's epistemology has shifted toward broader constructivist and poststructuralist insights that underscore power relations in the discourse-practice complex. Finally, desecuritisation relies on public counter-discourse and institutional channels, but is often impeded by entrenched threat-frames and coercive state apparatus.

3.3. Security as a Continuum

The concept of "security as a continuum," articulated by Rita Abrahamsen, represents a paradigm shift in Security Studies by challenging traditional state-centric and fragmented approaches to understanding security. This framework emphasizes the interconnectedness of security actors, practices, and scales, arguing that security cannot be neatly compartmentalized into discrete categories such as "national" versus "human" or "public" versus "private." Instead, security operates across a fluid spectrum where state institutions, private entities, non-governmental organizations, and local communities interact dynamically to address threats. From that perspective, the ideas of survival and existential threats are not abandoned but are placed at the end of a continuum. As advocated by Abrahamsen (2005), security as a continuum and examines its theoretical and practical relationship to resilience—a concept increasingly

central to contemporary Security Studies. Abrahamsen's work critiques conventional security models that prioritize state sovereignty and military defence as primary mechanisms for threat mitigation. In her analysis, these models fail to account for the complex realities of globalization, where transnational threats like cyberattacks, climate change, and pandemics transcend territorial boundaries. The continuum framework posits that security is not a binary condition of "safe" versus "unsafe" but a series of interconnected processes involving multiple stakeholders. (Léonard & Kaunert, 2022) For instance, private security firms in Finland often operate in partnership with state agencies to address particularly risk management, which lead to the cooperative governance of public private partnerships, thus blurring the lines between public and private responsibilities. This interplay reflects what Abrahamsen describes as the "hybridization" of security governance, where power and authority diffuse across networks rather than remaining centralized. Central to the continuum concept is the integration of local, national, and global security practices. A community's ability to combat organized crime, for example, may depend on international intelligence sharing, local policing reforms, and private sector investments in surveillance technologies. This multi-scalar approach aligns with Finnish resilience and comprehensive security model, where safeguarding critical infrastructure requires collaboration between governments, organisations, business, other experts and most importantly individuals. (Virta & Branders,2023)

This conceptualisation is in line with the understanding of securitisation as a spiralling process, which is at the heart of this special issue, and which refers to the idea that the intensity of a phenomenon can increase or decrease in a dramatic fashion and over a short period of time (Bello 2022). Abrahamsen's continuum redefines security as a fluid process where issues transition through stages of normalcy where the issue is managed through routine political processes. To Worrisome/Troublesome, it gains attention as a potential risk but does not yet

demand emergency action. Third, it moves to the idea of risk, where it is perceived as a systemic challenge requiring proactive management. Finally, it moves to the idea of existential threat, where the issue is framed as an immediate survival risk, justifying exceptional measures.

This model acknowledges that most security issues never reach the existential threat stage. For example, hybrid warfare—such as Iran's use of proxy groups like Hezbollah against Israel—often occupies the **risk** or **worrisome** tiers. Israeli countermeasures, including targeted strikes and cyber operations, reflect a calibrated response to a threat that is securitized but not fully existential.

Movement along the continuum is driven by discursive practices **of** Speech acts by elites or through Practices or non-verbal actions, such as military deployments or surveillance, which reinforce threat perceptions and Audience Reception**:** The acceptance or rejection of securitizing claims by domestic and international audiences.

The continuum model challenges the Copenhagen School's binary framework by introducing partial securitization**.** Issues can occupy intermediate positions, enabling tailored responses such as Hybrid Warfare. This approach avoids the pitfalls of over-securitization, which can legitimize authoritarian measures or divert resources from systemic solutions. For example, framing climate change as an **existential threat** risks militarizing environmental policy, whereas positioning it as a **risk** emphasizes adaptation and multilateral cooperation.

Abrahamsen's theory of security as a continuum that Desecuritization—the process of moving issues back toward normal politics—is integral to the continuum. However, reversing securitization is often contentious. Abrahamsen's model underscores that desecuritization is not a binary reversal but a repositioning along the continuum. For example, after the 2015 EU

migration crisis even though emergency measures went back to normal but migration remains a securitised issue in the EU. (Léonard & Kaunert, 2022) In sum, the continuum model does not negate the concept of existential threats but contextualizes them within a broader, more flexible framework—one that reflects the complexities of modern security landscape.

The Copenhagen School's original securitisation framework is fundamentally descriptive. It views security as a social construction: when an authoritative actor labels an issue an existential threat, it becomes a security issue. In Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde's formulation, securitisation is essentially an illocutionary speech act claiming an urgent threat to a referent object, which legitimates extraordinary measures. The process requires that a securitising actor (typically a political elite) convinces a relevant audience to accept the threat, thereby moving the issue outside "normal politics" and into an emergency mode. Notably, this framework deliberately avoids moral evaluation of securitisation itself. Rather, it specifies criteria for when securitisation occurs and how it succeeds (existential threat, persuasive speech act, audience acquiescence), without judging whether it should happen.

3.4. Role of Functional Actors

Rita Floyd expands the Copenhagen framework by examining who participates in securitisation and how. In "Securitization and the Function of Functional Actors" (2021), she argues that the traditional focus on politicians (securitising actors) and audiences neglects a category she calls functional actors. These are agents who, although not initiators of the speech act, play active roles in the securitisation process. For example, bureaucrats, experts, technocrats, or even scholars can endorse or veto a security move on behalf of others, effectively shaping its outcome. As Floyd notes: functional actors "may contest securitisation" and can "veto/endorse securitisation on behalf of others". In other words, when an issue is

framed as a threat, these actors (such as civil servants or NGO experts) may provide technical assessments, implement emergency measures, or publicly support or oppose the securitising decision. Floyd even identifies scholars as functional actors, since they can critically intervene in security debates without relying on a mass audience.

Functional actors are distinct from securitising actors and audiences only if they perform unique functions. Floyd finds that most of their functions (planning, implementing, monitoring) overlap with other actors, but their unique role lies in contesting the securitisation claim. If an audience is strictly the addressee of the speech act, then typically only referent objects (the threatened parties) could logically object. Functional actors explain why others (lawyers, experts, competitors) often do. By introducing functional actors, Floyd broadens the theory's analytical scope. Copenhagen securitisation focuses on who speaks and who listens, but Floyd highlights the background network of actors that give substance to speech acts. This enriches the description of the securitisation process by accounting for veto points and supporting actors beyond elected elites. In effect, Floyd makes the model more fine-grained: securitisation is not only the elite speech act and public acceptance, but also the work of experts and bureaucrats who enable, shape, or resist emergency policies.

These criteria mirror the Copenhagen School's existence/success conditions in form but invert their purpose. Whereas Buzan et al. (1998) specify what empirically constitutes a successful securitisation (believable threat, compliance by audience), Floyd's criteria judge the rightfulness of securitisation. For example, a genuinely catastrophic disease outbreak might satisfy Floyd's criteria (objective threat, public welfare as referent, proportionate lockdown), whereas an illusory "economic war" against a scapegoated minority might fail (no real existential threat, illegitimate targeting, overly repressive measures). Floyd develops this into

a full Just Securitisation Theory. In her book The Morality of Security (2019), she extends the above into three phases (initiation, conduct, termination) analogous to just war's jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. For instance, she enumerates multiple "just initiation" conditions (such as last resort, right intention, probability of success) inspired by classical just war principles. Thus, Floyd transforms securitisation theory from a purely analytical model into a normative framework for evaluating security policies.

The contrast between the Copenhagen and Floydian approaches is stark. The Copenhagen School deliberately avoids prescribing what to do; as Floyd notes, securitisation theory "by itself does not enable the analyst to say what security should or should not be". It treats any political community's speech-acts as data, not as ethical guidance. Indeed, as Floyd points out, even Wæver's plea that "security should be seen as a negative" is a personal, normative preference outside the theory's domain. (Floyd, 2011) In practice, Copenhagen-style analysis simply traces how actors frame issues as threats and how audiences react, remaining agnostic about whether those frames are justified. Floyd explicitly breaks with that neutrality. She argues that securitisation is not value-free, since labelling an issue "security" typically involves coercion and rights restrictions. Her JST makes securitisation subject to moral scrutiny: only those moves meeting her criteria count as legitimate emergency measures. (Léonard & Kaunert, 2022)

Floyd notes, even her normative theory "retains the functional distinction between the security analyst and the securitizing actor"). But Copenhagen uses that split to focus on audience legitimacy, whereas Floyd uses it to formulate moral standards. The addition of functional actors also interacts with this normative turn. By recognizing that experts and other officials can objectively assess threats; Floyd subtly weaves an ethical element back into description.

Functional actors (e.g. public health officials or international jurists) often invoke humanitarian or legal norms when they intervene in securitisation. Thus, Floyd's framework allows these actors to be norm entrepreneurs within the process – another departure from the Copenhagen emphasis on public "audience" acquiescence. In essence, by expanding the cast of characters Floyd grants agency to those who can apply ethical standards in real time. Rita Floyd's work enriches securitisation theory on two fronts. First, by introducing functional actors, she corrects the Copenhagen School's narrow focus on political elites and mass audiences, showing how non-elites (experts, bureaucrats, scholars) materially shape and contest security processes. Second, by formulating a just securitisation framework, she injects a normative dimension into a previously descriptive theory. The Copenhagen School lays out the grammar of securitisation (speech act, threat, audience, emergency measures) as a value-neutral description of political dynamics. Floyd adds both new grammar elements (functional actors as additional participants) and a moral compass (criteria of justice for securitising acts). Together, these contributions make the theory more comprehensive: it can now explain who enforces or resists securitisation and under what moral conditions it might be justified. This bridges the gap between "what is" and "what ought to be" in the study of security, a depth of analysis well suited to advanced political science research.

4. Methodology

In this paper, I try to empirically understand the security underpinnings of Finnish Comprehensive Security Model (CSM). Comprehensive security is a holistic approach to national and societal security that integrates military, civil, economic, and societal dimensions to safeguard the vital functions of society. Comprehensive security in Finland has a long history that traces back to the aftermath of the 1918 Civil War and subsequent conflicts with the Soviet Union. The aim of this paper is to empirically understand the Finnish CSM and its security narratives considering the recent developments in international geopolitics.

The main policy making tool for CSM is the Security Strategy for Society, a government resolution that focuses on publishing the general security objectives and guidelines for Finnish Security. Therefore, I comparatively study the SSS of 2017 and 2025 to empirically understand the security underpinnings of Finnish CSM. To better understand security discussions in Finland, I ask three research questions, who are the primarily security actors and what are their roles in determining Finnish security narratives? Second, to understand the perception of threat where risk is uncertain, what does the CSM model recommend? Finally, to understand the production of security narrative in Finland, I will try to identity what is the future of Finnish security policy?

To answer these questions, I make a thematic analysis of the SSS using securitisation theory, particularly related to three aspects, the securitising actor, threat and response. Scholars like Virta, Branders, Larsson and others have been studying the cooperation and cross-administrative model of governance that CSM assumes. Most of the literature on CSM focus on the historical evaluation of CSM that alludes to a securitisation concept of extending security narratives and mobilisation of all actors. Since the Finnish CSM, is based on cooperation and cross-administration, Copenhagen's understanding of security actors is not

sufficient In my analysis, I try to locate the roles of these actors, who are the primary securitising actor and what are the roles of other actors, to allude further into their discursive power nexus, I utilise Rita Floyd's (2021) understanding of Functional actors, wherein security actors who is not the primary securitising agents can also securitise and influence security objectives of CSM. This is primarily useful to understanding the increasing involvement of organisations and businesses in performing strategic tasks of security as mentioned in the SSS.

The concept of CSM, not only mobilises multiple actors like local and municipal authorities and others like organisations, businesses and individuals, it also aims to combine various sectors of society, wherein threat production also increases. CSM model developed from "Total Defence" into "Comparative Security", wherein risk or threat to the vital functions of society becomes uncertain. It is not limited to welfare and military threats but also includes hybrid threats like migration, cybersecurity and environmental risks.

While a critical review of such a narrative is studied by various scholars, particularly of combining environmental security into comprehensive security. There is rarely any literature (in English) on comparative analysis of such changing of threat perception. While securitisation can help us understand how an issue becomes threat, as discussed in the earlier chapter, it's emphasis on discursive practices of speech act and emergency condition limits the analysis of modern-day threats. Therefore, I utilise the concept of security in a continuum theorised by Abrahamsen (2005), which theorises that securitisation is a fluid process where issues transition through stages of normalcy to survival of threat, where the issue is managed through routine political processes. Thus, it by passes the traditional security underpinning of Copenhagen's securitisation theory which emphasis on discursive practices and the need for emergency conditions. Therefore, with Abrahamsen's understanding of securitisation as a

continuum, we can understand that threat can be securitised in normal conditions, and it occurs in routine process and does not require it to be threat to survival.

Finally, to understand the securitisation of CSM, I aim to analyse the key elements of this model utilising the historical development of CSM and the current guidelines as highlighted in the SSS of 2017 and 2022. Further, to complete my analysis I try to identify what these resolutions say about the future of CSM, corresponding to the changing dynamics of threat and the increased uncertainty of risks to the Finnish society.

It must be noted that the Security Strategy for Society is a general guideline that outlines the Finnish CSM, therefore, in my analysis I do not aim to produce any normative recommendation of these strategies or CSM or Securitisation theory, it is out of scope for this research project. However, the analysis reveals how different aspects of CSM showcases different elements of Copenhagen's securitisation theory. It can also be noted, that, I do not aim to analyse the problematics or benevolence of such a policy, rather provide an empirical basis to understanding the key elements of Finnish CSM. Moreover, it is not a binding policy document but rather a report highlighting the key strategies of Finnish security strategies. It provides an institutionalised guidelines for various key actors on security agenda and their roles in ensuring security (resilience) for the 'Finnish Society'.

These reports are broad and overarching and may not cohesively reflect the political will and intentions of the government and may not appropriately reflect the ongoing (or future) policy practices of the government particularly if the operational environment changes unexpectedly. This report while primarily formulated by the Security Committee, the process of drafting involves different authorities and participants wherein the resultant report can be seen as a 'political compromise' between the participants. (Vanhanen, 2020). To supplement these limitations, I will employ a comparative analysis of the two SSS to understand the change in

security narrative of CSM, over a temporal plane. Therefore, this paper will employ two main analytical tool, deductive thematic analysis using securitisation framework to understand the different security themes in the report and discourse analysis by evaluating literature on the historical development of CSM. I aim to find common themes in CSM and recognise the key differences how security is performed in each of these reports, thus alluding to the securitisation of CSM in Finland.

5. Analysis

To understand the Finnish CSM, I analysis the SSS published in 2017 and 2025. The SSS is the main policy tool of practicing CSM in Finland. In examining a comprehensive security resolution such as Finland's, it is essential to recognise that multiple conceptual frameworks within security and critical security studies could be employed for analytical purposes. However, this analysis adopts securitisation theory, particularly drawing upon the Copenhagen School, due to its emphasis on the discursive construction of threats and its expansion of the security agenda beyond traditional military concerns.

This chapter undertakes a comparative analysis of Finland's Security Strategy for Society (SSS), beginning with the 2017 iteration, followed by an examination of the updated 2025 strategy. The analysis is structured around key themes central to securitisation theory, as outlined in Chapter Three, including the discursive construction of threats, the identification and role of security actors, and the overarching principles guiding each document. Through this comparative lens, the chapter elucidates both continuities and shifts in Finland's approach to societal security, with particular attention to how threat are produced and described, how responsibilities are distributed among various actors, and how the securitisation logic has evolved between the two strategies.

5.1.Finnish Security Strategy for Society (2017)

The Security Strategy for Society is a resolution of the Finnish government to develop principles of security and preparedness corresponding to the changing dynamics of threat and the increased uncertainty of risks to the Finnish society. This is done by proposing the concept of 'Comprehensive Security', which is said to be a "cooperation-based preparedness model"

[07][1] where the vital functions of Finnish society are managed by a multitude of security actors ranging from government actors, private sector operators as well as the individuals and other members of civil society. The security principle of the Finnish society identifies seven vital functions, Leadership, International and EU activities, Defence capabilities, Internal Security, Economy, infrastructure and security of supply, the Functional capacity of the population and services, and finally, Psychological Resilience.

Comprehensive security also aims to redefine threats from the traditional geopolitical narrative of security to include risks that are uncertain and dynamic; the risk in this model consists of both external threats and inter-state threats that are internal to the society, including and not limited to crimes, social exclusion, supply chains, hunger and poverty.

The general principles of comprehensive security include democracy and the rule of law; lines of authority based on competence; preparedness and cooperation; foresight and recovery; international level of preparedness, monitoring and disseminating security information. [28][2] It is a cross-administrative strategy to coordinate, monitor, and analyse risks, develop recovery strategies, and build the resilience of the Finnish society with an emphasis on continued operations of the vital functions of the society. Therefore, according to the resolution, security could be construed as the preparedness of the Finnish society against the uncertain risks to the operations of vital functions.

The resolution provides an extensive characterisation of security with a complex web of conceptual connotations comprising of traditional geopolitical narrative to security, sectoral

[1] https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/YTS_2017_english.pdf, p-7
[2] *Ibid,* P-28

securitisation approach, risk paradigm, and the concept of resilience to develop the principles of comprehensive security. This new conceptualisation of security tries to "*evolve"* [5][3] from the traditional narrative of threat to the concept of risk, wherein the description broadens to include external and internal threats. It comprehends 'risk' to be dynamic and uncertain, contingent on the operational environment of the security narrative.

The security description in these principles emphasises cross-administration, wherein multiple security actors collaborate and coordinate. Therefore, this cross-administration strategy manifests in various functional security operations based on competence, including risk assessment, management, preparedness plans, continued operations of vital functions, recovery and resilience. In theory, the level of security analysis is dispersed from national, regional, municipal, including individuals and the private sector based on authority competence. The comprehensive security policy also focuses on collaboration and coordination at the international level, particularly the European Union and other countries.

There is also a focus on analysing risk, training and education and research institutions, and educational institutions are also considered security actors in this cooperation model based on effective communication between the different sectors of analysis. Therefore, risk assessments and management planning at various levels of government authority, organisations, individuals and civil society need to communicate and coordinate to strengthen Finnish society to be resilient and for preparedness planning. At the operational level of allocating resources, determining the contingency plan and issuing emergency measures indicates a traditional state-centric security actor.

[3] *Ibid,* P-5

Apart from the focus on preparedness and contingency planning, the principles of comprehensive security also focus on democracy and the rule of law; this is ensured through continued operations of various institutions and to build the trust of the audience or the individuals in the democratic government. Here there is a discursive narrative of security forming wherein the vital functions of Finnish society primarily signify the territorial survival of the state, especially evident in the security narrative of immigration, military defence and border control. There is also an emphasis on the routinisation of the bureaucratic processes with functional roles assigned to various levels of authority for risk assessment and the continuation of vital operations like political, societal and economic activities at normal and times of emergency. They also focus on providing training and maintaining a routine at the individual level to strengthen the resilience of the Finnish society against the risk.

In the comprehensive security principle, the assumption of preparedness planning is said to focus on "proaction instead of reaction" [10][4] but the descriptions of uncertainty of risk, risk management and a focus on psychological reliance as security narrative; contradicts, "proaction" notion of security, in practice, with the increased uncertainty of risk, it is challenging to anticipate risk, and security has failed, and then the concepts of contingency planning and reliance on psychological resilience of the citizens are called upon with training, volunteering and dissemination of security information.

While the traditional state-centric narrative persists in the Finnish definition of comprehensive security, there is also a bio- politicisation of security narratives within the resolution, particularly within internal security concepts, wherein the referent object is understood in terms of individuals. The Finnish solution on security strategy is built on preparedness and contingency planning, training and psychological resilience-building. Therefore, with the idea

[4] *Ibid,* P-10

of resilience building and preparedness, the strategy also emphasis almost a need for surveillance, patterning, information gathering and cost-benefits as part of risk assessment.

Moreover, the Finnish security definition denotes the conceptualisation of security through resilience and risk assessment, within contemporary governance, resilience functions as a political rationality that produces specific subjectivities. Its deployment reflects broader shifts in statecraft, whereby responsibilities for managing risk and insecurity are devolved from central authorities to local institutions and individual citizens. (Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2025) This is rooted in neoliberal governance logics or pragmatic state withdrawal, where it reconfigures accountability and blame, privileging decentralised, self-organising responses to crisis (Hagmann & Dunn Cavelty, 2012).

Resilience thus emerges not merely as a policy tool but as a mode of governance that reconstitutes the citizen as an active agent responsible for their own security. Scholars have argued that this responsibility is framed as a form of empowerment, especially when tied to participatory governance and grassroots mobilisation. However, these idealised portrayals of community resilience, particularly when invoked to manage marginalised populations can be seen as shifting the responsibility towards the population or individual actors, as in the Finnish SSS. In this regard, resilience presupposes vulnerability as it relies on the anticipation of harm to justify its logic. Critics contend that this perpetuates a depoliticised form of governance, wherein life is recast as a continuous process of adaptation to external threats beyond democratic contestation. Therefore, resilience does not empower political agency but instead reduces subjects to “passive bearers” of risk, governed through logics of neoliberalism and technocratic control. (Dunn Cavelty et al., 2015) However, such critiques have themselves been challenged for portraying resilience as a monolithic, unidirectional force. By denying its potential for contestation or democratic engagement, these accounts risk foreclosing the very

political spaces they seek to defend (Schott, 2013; Bulley, 2013; Rogers, 2013; Evans & Reid, 2014; Neocleous, 2013). The aim is not to assess whether resilience is inherently beneficial or harmful, but to recognise that it does not offer a definitive solution to the growing uncertainties associated with risk. Such a proposition, fails to address the paradox that resilience, in seeking to manage uncertainty, is itself shaped by uncertainty (Brassett et al., 2013)

The framework of comprehensive security might seem like an attempt of the Finnish government to recombine the existing conceptualisation of security; however, we must consider that these assumptions of security, translated in this resolution have specific consequences. Security is redefined to understand the risk towards the vital functions of the society which are specifically identified by the government. This security narrative is not only about predicting and managing the uncertain risks in the operating environment but to ensure uninterrupted and continued operations of these vital functions in normal and emergency environments. Therefore, comprehensive security is a cooperation-based preparedness model to achieve security through building the resilience of the Finnish society particularly of individuals. (Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2025)

5.2. Finland's Security Strategy for Society (2025)

The Finnish Security Strategy for has been updated for the fifth time and have released in March of 2025. This was a much-anticipated publication especially after joining NATO in 2023 and the change in Government in 2023 and the increase of hybrid threats in Finland, particularly related to the ongoing conflict of Russian Ukrainian war. This resolution attempts to reaffirm that Finland’s conceptualisation of comprehensive security is a long-standing notion that has put solid foundation that is the reason for the resilience of the Finnish Society. The strategy has also recognised the convolution of geo-political including “instrumentalization of migration”,

"energy supply" and the "Russia's invasion of Ukraine (*Security Strategy for Society: Government Resolution*, 2025, P. 2)[5]. This new strategy while acknowledging the concept of preparedness and resilience, primarily focuses on "action" (P. 2)[6], this "action" primarily refers to the strategic task that different security actors, such as authorities, organisation and individuals and their responsibility towards building a resilient Finnish society. They were particular to emphasise that this strategy was written with the aim of laying down principles that can "stand the test of time". (p. 2)[7]

Along with this resolution, several other documents were mentioned such as Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, Government Defence Report and other EU and NATO directives, that highlights the comprehensiveness of security and concur the multi-actor functionality of security in the Finnish CSM. This resolution like its percussors identify seven vital functions of society, these functions are essential for the survival of security that are highly interdependent and requires cooperation from various actors in the society. This creates an element of existential threat to its survival of the society as a whole and thus securitising the whole of society as the referent object. The objective of this resolution to be transtemporal also requires it to be "general" (p. 2)[8] and thus becomes contradictory when it seeks to develop strategic tasks based on a changing operational environment. (p. 14)[9] This is not to allude to minor discursive inconsistencies in this resolution but it highlights the greater complexity of

[5] *Security Strategy for Society: Government resolution*. (2025). https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/en/security-strategy-for-society/

[6] *Ibid, p.2*
[7] *Ibid, p 2*
[8] *Ibid, p-2*
[9] *Ibid, p-14*

Finnish CSM, wherein the referent object or the threat is not only widened but also illusive, wherein the uncertainty of threat may lead to losing sight of the referent subject. (Dunn Cavelty et al., 2015)

CSM is based on maintaining the Vital Functions of Society at "all times" (p.14)[10] and this includes both during crisis and normalcy. This could also be interpreted as the widening of 'emergency' or existential threat conditions needed for securitising and issue, therefor CSM can become a tool for discursively constructing threat during any operational environment if deemed to be threatening any of the seven vital functions of society. This Finnish CSM aims to protect the Finnish Society, however, from the above analysis it can be interpreted that the real referent subjects in this model are these seven vital functions. Therefore, requiring further analysis of recognising who are the security actors responsible for the functions of these seven VF. (Burgess, 2020; Stępka, 2022)

Vital Functions in this resolution is the same as the 2017 SSS, focusing on psychological resilience, leadership, international and EU activities, internal security, defence capacity, economy, infrastructure and security of supply and functional capacity of the actors. While scholars have identified that expansion of security to different operational sectors or functions of society. While the resolution aimed at describing the principle guidelines of Finnish CSM, it can be observed that the current resolution emphasis the role of competent authority. Wherein, the strategic task of Risk assessment, Response and Preparedness was understood in lieu of leadership function in SSS.

[10] *Ibid, p-14*

Although the concept of comprehensive security ostensibly broadens the scope of actors involved, emphasising cooperative model of civic responsibilities, it remains fundamentally state-centric in both structure and execution. While contemporary understandings of security now include an expanded range of threats and recognise the role of societal actors, the locus of decision-making and strategic authority continues to reside predominantly with national governments. Leadership within this framework is characterised by hierarchical power relations and centralised authority, particularly concerning threat assessment and response management. Although the text under discussion does not explicitly theorise power dynamics, it implicitly affirms the state as the primary securitising actor. Supranational institutions such as the EU and NATO may serve as partners or normative frameworks, yet ultimate responsibility for security governance remains with national authorities.

Leadership functions, especially in contexts of preparedness and response, further reinforce this centralisation. Activities such as situational awareness, information gathering, strategic planning, and organisational coordination are primarily executed by state agencies. Despite the rhetoric of inclusivity in security governance, these responsibilities are largely embedded in formal institutional hierarchies. Thus, while comprehensive security discourse acknowledges a wider array of security actors, the operationalisation of security policy continues to reflect a top-down model dominated by state authorities. It can also be noted that leadership entails critical decision-making processes, often shaped by the experiential knowledge of those in power, further reinforcing the centralised nature of securitisation practices. (see, p-16 & 17; P-37 & 38)[11]

[11] *Ibid, p-16-17 & p-37-38*

The strategy also recognises the importance of international and cross-border cooperation in enhancing national security. However, despite this acknowledgement, the Finnish Comprehensive Security Model (CSM) remains firmly anchored in the protection of national sovereignty, with a pronounced emphasis on safeguarding territorial integrity and maintaining national independence (p. 17).[12] This orientation reflects Finland's socio-historical experience and geopolitical positioning as discussed in the previous chapters. While international cooperation is framed as a supportive mechanism, it primarily serves to reinforce the national security agenda—particularly through the principles of deterrence, defence, and the prevention of military conflict. In this context, transnational partnerships are instrumental but subordinate to the overarching imperative of state-centric security.

While the Finnish Comprehensive Security Model (CSM) maintains a centralised, state-led approach to security, it simultaneously exhibits a collaborative ethos in practice, shaped by its historical evolution. The model expands the conception of security actors to include local and municipal authorities, whose coordination and communication are considered essential to societal security. This decentralised cooperation reflects an understanding of security as a shared responsibility that transcends the national level. Notably, the CSM acknowledges the crucial roles played by civil society organisations and the private sector in maintaining the vital functions of society. Although ultimate authority for securitisation—particularly in decision-making and threat elimination—remains vested in national and regional governmental bodies, the model deliberately extends certain responsibilities to societal actors.

Importantly, while this extension does not extend to construction of threat, it does reframe security as a collective societal endeavour. In particular, civil society and individual citizens

[12] *Ibid, p-17*

are positioned as key contributors to resilience-building, rather than to traditional preparedness and response mechanisms. This allocation of roles marks them as functional actors within the broader security architecture, aligning with theoretical discussions outlined earlier in this thesis. Thus, the CSM presents a hybrid model in which centralised authority coexists with a broader participatory framework of security governance.

The principle of prevention is systematically embedded across all the Vital Functions outlined in the Finnish Comprehensive Security Model (CSM), encompassing both defence and internal security. Closely aligned with the twin pillars of preparedness and response—central tenets of the CSM (p. 24)—this preventative orientation underscores the importance of continuous communication, data collection, and inter-agency coordination. As the strategy evolves, it moves beyond institutional preparedness into the domain of psychological resilience, where the emphasis increasingly falls on non-state actors. In this context, citizens are not merely passive recipients of security but are framed as pivotal agents in achieving societal resilience. The strategy places particular emphasis on the interplay between individual rights and responsibilities, thereby reinforcing a civic ethic within the broader security architecture.

Mirroring the 2017 strategy, the current framework evidences a discernible shift in the locus of responsibility, from state authorities to individual citizens. This decentralisation is most visible in the domain of resilience-building, where the individual's "will" or security mindset, is identified as a critical component of national preparedness. Mutual trust among citizens is thereby elevated as a strategic asset, integral to sustaining both social cohesion and national security. This emphasis on collective identity and civic solidarity underscores the Finnish model's framing of societal cohesion as a foundational pillar of security governance.

5.3. Comparative Analysis and Discussions

Both the 2017 and 2025 Finnish Security Strategies for Society (SSS) serve as operational articulations of the Finnish Comprehensive Security Model (CSM), presenting updated mechanisms while retaining continuity in key conceptual foundations. Despite temporal and contextual differences, both strategies are underpinned by shared normative principles, including democracy, the rule of law, national and international cooperation, the principle of preparedness, and the competent authority model. These recurring themes provide a coherent framework for understanding the enduring characteristics of Finland's CSM.

While the strategies emphasise collaborative approaches to security, a centralised narrative remains prominent. This centralisation is historically situated within Finland's socio-political trajectory, where experiences of war and military preparedness were closely linked with the development of social welfare. Consequently, territorial integrity and national independence continue to feature prominently in Finland's security discourse. However, a discursive evolution is evident between the two documents, particularly in relation to Finland's positioning within international alliances. Both strategies acknowledge the importance of alignment with broader international frameworks—namely the European Union and NATO—but the 2025 strategy notably advances a more proactive stance. It suggests that the Finnish CSM may serve not only as a domestic guiding model but also as a potential blueprint for shaping EU-wide security narratives. This discursive shift signals Finland's growing geopolitical confidence and evolving role in the European security architecture.

Another recurring and significant theme in both strategies is the emphasis on public trust and the collective "will" of the people, which echoes Finland's wartime legacy of societal unity and self-determination. The high levels of institutional trust traditionally observed in Nordic societies provide a favourable context for this strategic framing. Security, within this paradigm,

is not solely the remit of state institutions but also a function of societal cohesion and citizen engagement. This framing is operationalised through the emphasis on psychological resilience and individual preparedness, both of which were particularly pronounced in the 2017 strategy. The 2017 document, developed in the context of increased geopolitical uncertainty—especially regarding Russian aggression, migration, and the strain on welfare systems—transitions the discourse from specific threat perception towards an overarching logic of risk and uncertainty. This shift led to a partial redistribution of security responsibilities from state authorities to individuals and communities, aligning with broader trends in resilience-focused governance.

By contrast, the 2025 strategy reaffirms the principle of comprehensive security while placing a greater emphasis on the role of competent authorities. It advances a more structured division of responsibilities, particularly in the realms of leadership, strategic planning, and crisis decision-making. Although individual resilience continues to be valorised, it is framed more explicitly as a matter of civic responsibility, underscoring the rhetorical linkage between individual will and national security. Additionally, the role of business actors and civil society organisations is further institutionalised, particularly in upholding internal security functions such as economic continuity and infrastructure resilience. However, their roles are still largely confined to risk management rather than strategic decision-making, which remains the purview of national and local authorities.

One of the most notable differences between the two strategies lies in the level of specificity regarding actor roles. The 2017 strategy endorsed an expansive cooperation model that included research institutions, experts, and private organisations, but their responsibilities were described in rather vague terms. The 2025 strategy, by contrast, delineates roles with greater clarity, presenting a more integrated vision of whole-of-society mobilisation. This not only

facilitates more effective coordination but also aligns with the broader logic of "strategic task allocation" central to Finland's competent authority model.

It is essential, however, to differentiate between the institutional actors outlined in these strategies and the concept of securitising actors as understood within securitisation theory. The actors identified in the strategies are often simultaneously the agents and the audiences of security discourse, reflecting the cooperative and decentralised nature of the Finnish model. In this context, the distinction between power and duty becomes blurred: security becomes a co-produced endeavour involving multiple layers of society. Local actors, including municipalities and civil society organisations, may function both as executors of state security strategies and as autonomous functional actors—as theorised by Rita Floyd—capable of shaping and implementing security practices within their respective domains.

Ultimately, this convergence of cooperation, coordination, and decentralised responsibility illustrates a uniquely Finnish adaptation of comprehensive security, where the boundaries between securitising agents, functional actors, and audiences are fluid and dynamic. The 2025 strategy thus marks a significant step in refining the operational logic of CSM by clarifying actor roles, enhancing inter-agency coordination, and articulating a vision of security grounded in societal trust, shared responsibility, and evolving international engagement.

Finland's security strategy broadly aligns with the Copenhagen School's societal security framework by extending the concept of security beyond military threats to encompass identity, culture, and other non-military dimensions. It operationalises securitisation through both state and non-state actors, framing diverse challenges, such as hybrid threats and societal disruption—as existential in nature. Simultaneously, the strategy underscores the importance of resilience and preparedness as mechanisms for mitigating and, over time, desecuritising certain risks.

However, the Finnish approach diverges from the Copenhagen School's emphasis on the contestability of security narratives. It maintains a predominantly state-centric orientation, wherein the state remains the principal agent of securitisation and coordination, and discursive space for alternative security articulations appears limited. Despite this, the strategy represents a compelling example of how societal security can be institutionalised in national policy—blending traditional and non-traditional threat responses, while also navigating Finland's increasing integration into EU and NATO frameworks.

A significant discursive shift can be observed between the 2017 and 2025 strategies, particularly in relation to Finland's positioning within the international order. The 2017 strategy emphasised *compliance* with national and EU legislation, reflecting a more pragmatic, obligation-based orientation consistent with Finland's post-Cold War foreign policy ethos. In contrast, the 2025 strategy introduces the notion of *influencing* EU-level security discourse, signalling Finland's increasing assertiveness and confidence as a normative actor in European security governance. This shift does not imply a diminished commitment to national sovereignty or territorial integrity; both remain central to Finnish security identity—but rather marks the addition of a new dimension: Finland's emerging role as a contributor to international security agenda-setting.

This rhetorical and strategic evolution mirrors Finland's changing geopolitical position. While the 2017 document remained grounded in cautious pragmatism, (Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2025) the 2025 strategy reflects a more confident and outward-facing security posture. It suggests that Finland is no longer content to be a compliant participant within existing frameworks but instead seeks to shape them, a development that resonates with the country's deepening involvement in EU and NATO structures.

A critical divergence between the 2017 and 2025 Finnish Security Strategy of Society (SSS) lies in their conceptualisation of threat. The 2017 strategy characterises the operational environment as one of uncertainty, with risk framed as diffuse, contingent, and difficult to anticipate. In contrast, the 2025 strategy adopts a more targeted and militarised understanding of threat, prioritising the concept of "hybrid threats", (p. 30) [13]which encompass cyberattacks, sabotage, terrorism, and the "instrumentalization" of migration. This transition reflects a shift from generalised risk awareness to a more defined threat taxonomy, marking a maturation in Finland's strategic posture.

While both strategies acknowledge the role of military preparedness, the 2025 document explicitly aligns Finnish defence planning with the European Union's, "Total Defence" concept, signalling a more integrated and militarised approach to national and regional security. This also suggests a normative shift in Finland's geopolitical self-perception: from a neutral, risk-managing actor to a proactive security contributor within NATO and the EU. (Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2025)

The differences in risk assessment further reinforce this divergence. The 2017 strategy adopts an inclusive risk framework based on the National Risk Assessment, reflecting a holistic and uncertain operational environment. Conversely, the 2025 strategy identifies specific threats, notably the "instrumentalization" of migration (p. 49), which is presented as a concrete risk to internal cohesion and social order. Unlike the 2017 framework, which was more aspirational and descriptive, the 2025 version introduces strategic tasking and contingency planning, distinguishing between preparedness (pre-crisis) and response (during crisis), and thereby institutionalising a more directive security apparatus.

[13] *Ibid, p-30*

Moreover, the 2025 strategy expands the roles of civil society and business actors, positioning them as functional actors within the securitisation process, a concept advanced by Rita Floyd. While both strategies stress societal involvement, the 2025 version places a heightened emphasis on individual responsibility, operationalised through notions of will, voluntary participation, and civic duty. The shift from vague inclusion in 2017 to clearly articulated societal obligations in 2025 signals an intensification of securitisation from state institutions to individual actors. However, despite this diffusion, the state remains the principal securitising actor, with non-state entities largely assigned supportive functions.

This comparative analysis illustrates that security, as both discourse and practice, is an evolving process shaped by shifts in the operational environment. Securitisation is no longer confined to traditional speech acts but is increasingly embedded in legal instruments, strategy documents, and implementation frameworks. The rearticulation of migration as a security threat, notably through the language of “instrumentalization”, illustrates this dynamic. The 2017 strategy assigns numerical thresholds (e.g., 20,000 migrants) to such threats, thereby substantiating securitising moves with quantifiable indicators whereas the 2025 SSS does not have such clear indications.

Such a development resonates with Abrahamsen's (2005) conception of the continuum of security, wherein security threats gradually move toward militarisation. It also aligns with Léonard and Kaunert’s (2022) observation of the increasing technologization of EU border control mechanisms. While Finland’s initial response to the 2015 migration crisis was diplomatically cautious, its later adoption of restrictive and legally codified border measures reflects the broader European trend of normalising exceptionalism. This evolution is especially

notable as countries previously criticised for pushback policies—such as Poland—now find precedents and justification in Finland's legalised frameworks.

Ultimately, the securitisation of migration in the Finnish context raises a fundamental normative question about the EU's capacity to navigate the complex realities of migration politics. While the EU provides a shared platform for framing and responding to such issues, it remains unclear whether it possesses the institutional and political coherence required to address the divergent experiences and policy preferences of its member states. (M. Cini and N. Borragán, 2022 ; Santino Lo Bianco et al., 2019) The Finnish case illustrates both the utility and the limitations of EU-wide securitisation approaches in managing national-level challenges.

Discussions

An examination of Finland's application of the Comprehensive Security Model (CSM) through the 2017 and 2025 Security Strategies for Society (SSS) reveals its influential role in the securitisation of various societal functions. The 2017 strategy, framed in the context of uncertain and diffuse risks, prioritised preparedness and underscored psychological resilience. It notably expanded the remit of security governance by emphasising cooperative engagement across multiple societal levels, particularly highlighting the agency of individuals as contributors to national resilience.

By contrast, the 2025 strategy reflects a shift driven by transformations in the operational environment, particularly the growing salience of hybrid threats such as cyberattacks and the instrumentalization of migration. These developments recast the security landscape, no longer defined solely by uncertainty, but by identifiable and urgent threats that necessitate active

responses. As such, the 2025 strategy reinforces a more centralised model of security governance, with an emphasis on the leadership and competence of state authorities. This centralisation simultaneously narrows the scope for non-state actors—such as businesses, civil society organisations, and individuals—to shape security discourse, while assigning them clearly delineated strategic tasks. This move towards role-specific functional actors aligns with Floyd's (2021) conceptualisation of actors in securitisation processes, suggesting a potential institutionalisation of these roles in future strategy formulations.

Furthermore, the strategies illustrate that securitisation in Finland unfolds along a continuum. While the 2017 strategy focused on managing risk through preparedness, the 2025 strategy positions threats such as cybersecurity breaches and instrumentalization of migration as existential challenges to internal stability and societal order. This discursive evolution signifies a reorientation from a resilience-based approach to a response-based imperative, thereby enhancing the state's capacity to frame and mobilise threat perceptions.

Despite the centralisation evident in the latest strategic iteration, Finland's cooperative governance tradition and historical emphasis on collective resilience ensure that individuals and non-state actors remain integral, particularly in fostering societal trust and psychological preparedness. The participatory ethos embedded within the CSM, albeit now more limited in capacity, continues to rely on broad-based societal engagement, reinforcing the dual role of the individual as both subject and agent within the securitisation process.

The 2025 iteration of Finland's Security Strategy for Society (SSS) introduces a section on the future trajectory of comprehensive security, which places increased emphasis on the principle of whole-of-society involvement. While this inclusive approach reflects the normative

expansion of security beyond traditional state-centric paradigms, it also signals a discursive shift towards aligning national security objectives with broader international frameworks, including the EU and NATO. Although the document stops short of detailing what such alignment entails for Finland's military capabilities, an issue beyond the scope of this thesis, it does raise important questions regarding future civil-military integration.

One notable conceptual development within this section is the strategy's emphasis on enhancing national capacity for situational awareness. This entails a move towards greater technocratisation across various sectors, implicitly raising the potential for increased surveillance, even though the strategy does not provide explicit implementation mechanisms. Discursively, however, it outlines a vision in which the individual is expected to play a more significant role in the architecture of national security. This prospective shift represents not merely a redistribution of responsibility but a reconfiguration of the referent object itself. As security becomes increasingly embedded in the everyday practices of citizens, the boundary between state and individual responsibilities blurs.

This expansion of comprehensive security suggests a discursive framework wherein virtually any societal domain may be rendered a matter of security. In doing so, it opens the possibility for individuals themselves to become objects of securitisation, should their behaviour or perceived vulnerabilities be construed as security risks. Here, the relevance of Rita Floyd's (2011) theorisation of functional actors becomes particularly salient. By extending responsibilities to societal actors beyond the traditional state apparatus, the strategy implicitly empowers non-state agents—such as civil society, businesses, and individuals—to function as securitising or desecuritising actors. While this decentralisation may foster resilience, it also

risks obscuring lines of accountability and reinforcing technocratic or moral imperatives under the guise of national security.

The Finnish Comprehensive Security Model (CSM) is underpinned by four core principles that reflect both its normative orientation and practical execution. First, adaptive governance characterises the CSM's approach to security planning. Rather than being constrained by rigid administrative hierarchies, the model emphasises cross-sectoral coordination and responsiveness to the operational environment. This enables Finland to mount flexible, adaptive responses to emergent and hybrid threats, aligning strategic planning with real-time exigencies rather than bureaucratic silos. (Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2020)

Second, the rule of law and the principle of competent authority are central to the CSM's legitimacy and institutional structure. Security provision is embedded within a clear legal framework that delineates responsibilities across government actors, with designated "competent authorities" assuming primary roles during routine and crisis conditions. These frameworks also include contingencies for the use of extraordinary powers during states of emergency, thereby preserving democratic accountability while ensuring state capacity in high-risk scenarios.

Third, preparedness and societal resilience are conceived as proactive, rather than reactive, dimensions of security. Scenario-based exercises and strategic foresight activities are regularly undertaken to anticipate and manage complex risks, ranging from natural disasters to cyberattacks and geopolitical disruptions. These practices institutionalise a culture of readiness, enhancing the robustness of both state institutions and civil society in the face of uncertainty. (Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2020)

Finally, the CSM embeds a strong normative commitment to public engagement and awareness (will and trust of the people). Citizens are not merely passive recipients of security but are encouraged to assume a participatory role. Initiatives such as the “72 hours” preparedness guideline promote individual responsibility for crisis resilience, while forums like “Security Cafés” facilitate public deliberation on national security issues. This participatory ethos reinforces social trust and collective efficacy, key components of the Finnish resilience paradigm. (Larsson & Rhinard, 2025)

6. Conclusion

Finland’s Comprehensive Security Model (CSM) is deeply embedded in the country's socio-historical context, shaped by experiences of war, long-standing Nordic cooperation, proximity to Russia, EU and NATO integration, and a robust welfare state. These historical contingencies and contemporary geopolitical shifts have cumulatively informed the evolution of the CSM as a holistic framework for national security. Central to its operationalisation is the *Security Strategy for Society* (SSS)—a government-issued resolution that translates the abstract principles of comprehensive security into concrete policy. First introduced in 2003, the SSS has undergone iterative revisions, often prompted by shifts in the security environment or changes in governmental leadership, reflecting the model’s adaptive capacity.

To investigate how securitisation occurs within this cooperative security architecture, I conducted a comparative analysis of the 2017 and 2025 strategies, employing securitisation theory as an analytical lens. The aim was to identify securitising actors, trace the construction of threats, and assess how securitisation unfolds within a model that ostensibly prioritises broad societal inclusion. This approach allowed for an exploration of the dynamics underpinning security articulation in a context where the state actively engages with a multiplicity of societal actors.

The analysis revealed that the foundational logic of the CSM resides in the general principles articulated within the SSS documents—principles that have remained largely consistent since the model's inception. However, while all societal functions are designated as ‘vital,’ some are discursively elevated in response to evolving threat perceptions. In the 2017 strategy, for instance, psychological resilience and preparedness were foregrounded, emphasising the role

of individuals and societal cohesion. In contrast, the 2025 iteration reflects a shift toward centralised authority, privileging the leadership and competence of institutional actors considering emerging hybrid threats, such as cyberattacks and the instrumentalization of migration. This securitisation of leadership and institutional capacity suggests a recalibration of actor hierarchies within the CSM.

Moreover, the findings expose a structural tension at the heart of the Finnish CSM: while it aspires to a 'whole-of-society' approach to security, its strategic core remains deeply rooted in the protection of territorial integrity and national sovereignty. This duality produces a hybrid model in which military and societal logics of security coexist. In practice, this results in a centralised form of cooperative governance, where competent state authorities—working alongside local administrative bodies—play a dominant role in articulating security narratives and conducting threat assessments. Ultimately, the Finnish CSM represents a unique attempt to fuse decentralised societal participation with a historically conditioned imperative for state-centric defence.

The four key themes that are part of CSM model are, first, adaptive governance characterises the CSM's approach to security planning. the rule of law and the principle of competent authority are central to the CSM's legitimacy and institutional structure. preparedness and societal resilience are conceived as proactive, rather than reactive, dimensions of security. Finally, the CSM embeds a strong normative commitment to public engagement and awareness. The 2025 strategy introduces certain objectives for the future of CSM, which places increased emphasis on the principle of collaboration and cooperation between different actors particularly of organisations and business. While this inclusive approach reflects the normative expansion of security beyond traditional state-centric paradigms, it also signals a discursive shift towards aligning national security objectives with broader international frameworks,

including the EU and NATO. Although the document stops short of detailing what such alignment entails for Finland's military capabilities, an issue beyond the scope of this thesis, it does raise important questions regarding future civil-military integration

This study can be further elaborated in the future, Finnish CSM utilises various concept of security studies and can be studied using various different concepts of security theory including the idea of 'death of security', risk governance and bio politicisation of security. Apart from this, Finland has also been undergoing a change in its Political Rhetoric of Security in terms of Borders and Migration. In Finland, the current greater political discourses on centralised ideas of security (few action plans and government announcements) can be two-folds, on the one hand it is based on the ideas of "rights revolution" based on human rights, rule of law and market liberalisation. On the other side, there is an increasing centralised ideas of National Security with the production of restrictive immigration policies, protective status provision and border control. One of the primary reasons for choosing this topic is the changing political narrative of Identity from a constructed "homogeneous" Finnishness that is tied to both racial and cultural connotations (Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola*,* 2020*;* J. Häkli, 2005*;* Anssi Paasi, 1998) to a one that is or has always been diverse (Jaana Palander and Saara Pellander, 2019) and its corresponding response to tackle this through different policy changes and security narratives in the country. Therefore, we can make a critical, decolonial and intersectional study of Finnish CSM in the future.

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