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Stakeholders of (De-)Radicalisation in Finland : D3.1 Country Report

Horsmanheimo, Laura; Kylli, Roosa-Maria; Kuokkanen, Kanerva; Palonen, Emilia

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Stakeholders of (De-) Radicalisation in Finland

D3.1 Country Report

April 2021

Laura Horsmanheimo, Roosa-Maria Kylli, Kanerva Kuokkanen & Emilia Palonen – University of Helsinki



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Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at: emilia.palonen@helsinki.fi

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List of abbreviations

CSO	Civil Society Organisation
EU	European Union
EUROPOL	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
FAIR	Fighting Against Inmates' Radicalisation (Project)
FP	Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset)
GDP	Gross domestic product
HEUNI	The European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations
HMA	Helsinki Metropolitan Area
ISIL	The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MoI	Ministry of the Interior (Sisäministeriö)
MoJ	The Ministry of Justice (Oikeusministeriö)
MP	Member of Parliament
NCP	National Coalition Party (Kokoomus)
NRM	Nordic Resistance Movement (Pohjoismainen vastarintaliike)
SOO	Soldiers of Odin
SDP	Social Democratic Party (Sosialidemokraattinen puolue)

REDI©	Model for supporting resilience, democracy and dialogue against violent radicalisation and extremism in educational institutions
SUPO	Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (Suojelupoliisi)
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WP	Work package

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About the project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of “us vs them” identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project’s aims.

Executive summary/Abstract

This report presents the Finnish situation regarding terrorism, radicalisation and de-radicalisation during past 20 years. Based on a desk study, the report's sources include scientific literature, publications of the Ministry of the Interior (Moi), Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO) and other public authorities, nationally relevant news media, and party programmes. By outlining the Finnish context and structures concerning radicalisation, the report shows that terrorism has been rare in the 21st century in Finland, but threat for both far-right and radical-Islamist violent extremism is elevated. The country has no extensive de-radicalisation programmes but relies on cross-sectoral collaboration including public authorities and civil society organisations, often on project funding.

In 2017, the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO) lifted the terrorist threat rating to level two of a four-level scale in 2017, and in March 2021 it noted a growing threat of far-right terrorism and increased international connections of radical Islamist operators in Finland (SUPO 2017, 2021). Indeed, our report presents signs of polarisation in terms of appeal to extremist ideas and ideology in Finnish society, and maps actors and channels of radicalisation as well as stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation.

The two main threats identified by SUPO—far right and radical Islamism—are introduced more specifically. All radical actors are rather marginal in Finnish society, and the minor actors are only briefly discussed in this report. There has been a relatively low amount of serious violence from the far right, especially when compared to violent material online. Far right and anti-immigration mobilisation blossomed in 2015-16, as many organisations and movements emerged, some of which have a more structured ideology (e.g., neo-Nazism or counter-jihad), but others generally positioned themselves against Islam, immigration, multiculturalism, the EU, the political elite or globalism (Sallamaa 2018, p. 5). Violent behaviour led to the first killing in a demonstration action in circa 70 years in one of the main squares of the capital city, Helsinki. Significant other events include school attacks that had some ideological motivation, and a radical Islamist terrorist attack in the former capital city Turku in 2017 that shook the country. Radical Islamist activity consists for the most part of non-violent action such as recruitment or financing, but travel to the conflict zone and back has been increasing (Malkki & Saarinen 2019, p. 11). The report seeks to identify networks of radicalisation that are mostly loosely organised in Finland, but for the far right also have connections to one of the country's main political parties.

Among the Finnish political elite, consensual politics condemns violence and seeks to prevent it, even though extremism has not been at the centre of the political agenda and has been largely ignored in party manifestos and campaigning. While the Finnish political elite opposes violence, in the Finns Party (FP) there are some connections between parliamentary actors and far-right groups. FP caused a populist landslide in the Finnish political scene in 2011 and has been among the most popular parties ever since, with members of the far-right Suomen Sisu elected to parliament in 2015 under FP colours. In 2017 the party split under its new anti-immigration radical right-wing leadership, and the more traditional populist wing established a new party, which remained in government with each of the party's ministers (Palonen 2018). The

relationship between the parliamentary party and the far right is nevertheless complex and unstable.

The report shows that the common view in Finland is that the services of the welfare state play a key role in 'implicit' de-radicalisation policies. The focus of Finnish 'explicit' de-radicalisation policies is on prevention and multi-professional cooperation between different public authorities and civil society. A significant part of the Finnish de-radicalisation policies has concentrated on youth and different generations in penitentiary institutions. The CSOs play a central role in de-radicalisation, which strengthens interaction with the grassroots level but simultaneously poses problems in terms of continuity, as their funding is mostly based on fixed-term projects. We conclude that while 'implicit de-radicalisation' in terms of welfare services that prevent exclusion have a solid position in Finland, 'explicit de-radicalisation programmes' have not yet reached an established form in the social system but are mainly project-based. The report highlights multi-sectoral co-operation and the need to develop de-radicalisation work and programmes and shortly assesses future developments.

1. Introduction

The goal of the report is to delineate the main radicalisation agents and de-radicalisation stakeholders in Finland as part of the Work Package *Mapping Stakeholders and Situations of Radicalisation* of the D.Rad project. By radicalisation, we mean a process involving the increasing rejection of established law, order, and politics and the active pursuit of alternatives, in the form of politically driven violence or justification of violence (i.e. radicalisation here refers to violent forms of radicalisation). By de-radicalisation we mean processes countering such rejection at individual (micro), organisational (meso), or societal (macro) levels resulting in a shift from violent to nonviolent strategies and tactics.

In the report, the prefixes used for the different strands on the spectrum of radical right (e.g., radical, far, extra-parliamentary, extreme) mainly follow those used in the original sources. We use the concept of radical Islamism rather than jihadism in cases where we do not directly refer to existing research using the concept of jihadism, as it is the most established one in official Finnish discourse. This is partly due to the role of the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO) in mainstreaming it in a more specific meaning of “a form of Islamism based on Salafi-Jihadist ideology aiming to create, by using violence, an Islamic society governed by sharia law” (SUPO; see also Saarinen & Malkki 2019).

According to the Finnish Ministry of the Interior (Mol) and the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service SUPO, the biggest violent threat in Finland is related to individual actors whose motives are linked to violent extremism of the far right and radical Islamism (Mol, 2019a; 2020; SUPO 2021). However, violent radicalisation has been marginal in comparison to some other European countries. Radical Islamist activity is still small and is for the most part seen via non-violent action such as recruitment or financing (Malkki & Saarinen 2019, p. 11). The only legally effective judgement where a person has been sentenced for a terrorist crime was the radical Islamist attack that happened in Turku in 2017. The far-right organisations grew their support especially in 2015 during the refugee crisis, but the support has since then reduced to the background. Still, the far right is considered the biggest threat to security in everyday lives (SUPO 2021). At the time of writing, a court case was taking place considering politically motivated violence against a functionary of the Finns Party (FP) from the extreme right within the party that has populist roots but also connections to the far right (YLE, 2021a).

The report is structured as follows: first we will introduce the contextual background in Finland, then structures of radicalisation. Then we will move to actors and channels of radicalisation, as well as stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation. Finally, we will give our conclusions to the report. The study is based on desk research, where we included mainly scientific literature, publications of the Mol and SUPO and other public authorities, Finnish news media sources, and party programmes. Drawing on cultural policy research, we introduce concepts of implicit and explicit de-radicalisation policy (Ahern 2009; Palonen 2010) as useful in the Finnish context.

2. Contextual background

Politically and ideologically based violence has been rare in 21st century in Finland (Sallamaa, 2018). The history of political violence began with the murder of Nikolai Bobrikov, the Russian Governor-General of Finland, in 1904. Violent polarisation of the society was deep in first half of 20th century, particularly during the 1918 civil war between the 'Reds' and 'Whites' (Tepora & Roselius, 2014) and the extreme-right Lapua Movement in 1929–1932 (Koskelainen & Hjelm, 2016). The spectrum of radical movements contained both radical left (see e.g., Jalava 2016), right (see e.g., Sallamaa 2018), and environmental movements (see e.g., Konttinen & Peltokoski, 2004) before the turn of the millennium, but radicalised actors have rarely caused extensive damage. The safety conditions of Finland rank at the top level in the EU through the European Social Progress Index (European Commission, 2020).

Finland is a Nordic welfare state with a strong public sector. It joined the EU in 1995. Finnish democracy is based on a multi-party system and proportional representation, and the political culture is described as consensual (Sjöblom, 2011). Finland has a high association activity, and various channels of direct citizen participation have been developed in the 21st century, particularly at the local level (Kuokkanen, 2016). Municipalities play a central role in the implementation of welfare policies through consensual decision-making that integrates political parties, while regional administration has traditionally been weak (Sjöblom, 2011). Due to economic overheating in the late 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland experienced a deep economic recession in the early 1990s, which led to the restructuring of the welfare state and processes of economic and social differentiation within the urban context and between regions (e.g. Vaattovaara et al, 2018). The public sector net worth increased considerably from 25 to 63 percent of GDP between 2000 and 2007. During the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the net worth of the public sector declined by more than 20 percent of GDP and faster than its debt increased. Since 2008 the Finnish public sector static net worth has remained broadly stable, despite the notable increase in gross debt (Brede & Henn, 2019). Since the 1990s recession, several reforms of social, health and employment policies have sought to reduce unemployment, and to reform the social and health care system and the municipalities' tasks due to changes in the population structure and dependency ratio. Recently, the centre-right Sipilä cabinet (2015-2019) introduced a series of reforms, among them a highly unpopular activation policy for the unemployed.

The Finnish population has traditionally been relatively homogenous. Swedish is the second national language in Finland, and 5.2 percent of Finns have Swedish as their mother tongue (Tilastokeskus, 2018). There are two national churches: The Evangelical Lutheran church and the Orthodox church. Indigenous Sámi populations live an area comprising parts of Northern Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Russia. In Finland, there are also traditional Roma, Tatar, Jewish, Ingrian Finn and Carelian minorities.

Since the late 1980s humanitarian and work- and family-related immigration to Finland have augmented. Because of a very low starting point, the growth of the percentage of people with a foreign background has been relatively high during the last decades. (Saukkonen, 2013, p. 13.) The largest inflow of foreign citizens into Finland began in 2004, when new member states joined to the EU (Lonsky, 2020). Because of the changes in age structure and dependency ratio, according to the Mol, there is rising need of foreign labour (Sisäministeriö). The 'refugee crisis' in 2015 accelerated immigration, and 32 476 refugees arrived in Finland during that

year (UNHCR, 2019). This development temporarily impacted the popularity of radical right-wing groups. Although some of the support soon faded, quick changes in immigration created fertile soil for further extra-parliamentary activity of the radical right (Sallamaa, 2018, p. 1).

Migration in Finland has focused on the big cities, particularly the Helsinki metropolitan area (HMA), at an accelerating volume (Tilastokeskus, 2020). While cities' housing policies promote social mixing (Vaattovaara et al, 2018), geographical segregation has nevertheless increased during the 21st century in Finnish cities (for HMA, see Tilastokeskus, 2020). Housing stock structures differ from one area to another, but there are no intense policies that force ghettoisation (Vilkama, 2011). Language minorities mainly move into neighbourhoods that have a high proportion of rental housing (ibid.). Finnish suburbs have become more multicultural than before, but they are quite safe (Junnilainen, 2019). In the countryside, rural emigration has affected the accessibility of public services (Kivelä, 2014).

The Finnish public elementary school system gives an equal possibility to education for all children nationwide, offering a core for the implicit policies of de-radicalisation. In 2020 the government decided to extend compulsory education until the age of 18 years (Opetus- ja kulttuuriministeriö, 2020). Residential segregation (Bernelius, 2013) and the disparities between the cities and the countryside have led to some geographical differences between schools. Most Finnish young people are doing well, but the gap between deprived and well-off people has deepened (Ohisalo, 2018; Moilanen, Airaksinen & Kangasniemi, 2019).

There have been visible shifts in party politics in the 21st century in Finland. The most notable one was the landslide election victory of the populist FP in 2011 (Palonen & Saresma, 2017, p. 19). The party politicised Finland's EU membership and set themselves as an alternative to the 'traditional parties' that were embroiled in a corruption crisis related to election funding after the 2007 parliamentary elections (Palonen, 2020a). After the 2015 elections, FP was one of three government parties, but split due to party leadership change in 2017, when radical right-wing leader Jussi Halla-aho was elected to lead the party in a more ethno-nationalist direction (Palonen, 2018). Its success has continued: it was the second-largest party in the parliamentary elections in 2019 (Palonen, 2020b). The FP's 'double-speak' at parliament has supported radical undertones (Vaarakallio, 2015). In 2015 parliamentary elections the FP (in the Finnish system open) electoral list included activists from the far-right group Suomen Sisu some of whom became MPs. A radical fraction or edge exists in FP, with several members actively co-operating with extra-parliamentary radical groups (Kotonen, 2019). Some of FP's MPs and municipal politicians have been expelled from the party, and a few of them have also gathered supporters for a potential Blue-Black Party, which has a neofascist agenda and affinity to the interwar Lapua Movement (YLE, 2021b).

Radical extra-parliamentary extreme right-wing activism is seen as the biggest contemporary threat of radical action (Sisäministeriö, 2020a): MoI (ibid, p. 11) states that the most alarming threat is formed of independent actors connected with each other on the internet. Finland has had certain waves of violence, the latest one being in 2015 when the 'refugee crisis' started. However, this also created a counter-reaction among the general public, with broad demonstrations against the far right and racism (see e.g. YLE, 2015). The Finnish extreme right can be described as more of a social media phenomenon at the moment. (Kotonen, 2020, p. 61, 64.) There are many loosely organised movements and groups with about 100 or fewer supporters (Sallamaa, 2018). A visible radical right-wing actor, the national-socialist group

Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM), was under a ban threat since 2017, and it was banned in September 2020. After the ban, the NRM has not resorted to physical violence beyond minor clashes at demonstrations. (Kotonen, 2020, pp. 61-62.)

In the 21st century there have been three school attacks, which shocked Finland: in Jokela in 2007, in Kauhajoki in 2008, and in Kuopio in 2019. There is no clear consensus about whether the motives of these attacks have been political, but the shooter in the 2007 attack self-acknowledged their ideological reason online, and the second, in 2008, followed these posts (see section 3.1.).

Since Syria's and Iraq's conflicts began in 2011, the threat of radicalisation and violent behaviour has increased (see section 4.1). The number of people targeted by anti-terrorism policies has more than doubled in a decade because of foreign fighters and recruitment and support networks linked to the conflict (Sisäministeriö, 2020a, p. 24). Only one case has been judged as a radical Islamist terrorist attack: two people died and eight were wounded in Turku in 2017 (Onnettomuustutkintakeskus, 2017). The Finnish government decided to return the first orphan children from the al-Hol camp in autumn 2019, then two mothers with their children in the end of 2020, which caused discussion about children's rights and public safety. Finland is part of an international coalition against ISIL (Sisäministeriö, 2020a).

Multi-professional prevention work has been at the core of the Finnish de-radicalisation policy. The prevention work has been coordinated nationally and implemented locally since 2012. After the attack in Turku, more attention has been paid to de-radicalisation work (Ministry of the Interior, 2019b).

Compared to many other European countries, Finland has survived from Covid-19 pandemic relatively well. There have been some anti-vaccine action and demonstrations opposing restrictions, some of which partly overlap with the radical right (see section 4.1). The issue has got attention among politicians and in traditional media (see section 3.2.).

Overall, there has been little political violence in Finland. Welfare services are considered central to preventing radicalisation. In Finnish society, there are nevertheless some signs of polarisation, which must be considered when assessing the threat of political violence.

3. Structures of radicalisation

3.1. Political violence in Finland

Although the threat of political violence in Finland is low (Sallamaa, 2018), it has been rising, especially after the start of the Syria and Iraq conflicts (Juntunen, Creutz-Sundblom & Saarinen, 2016) and the 'refugee crisis' in 2015 (Kotonen, 2020). SUPO lifted the terrorist threat rating to level two out of a four-level scale in 2017. Since then, classification has remained. According to SUPO, there are significant support activities and identified actors and groups that are motivated and able to execute terrorist crimes (Sisäministeriö, 2020a, p. 11). According to Europol, there was one terrorist attack (the Turku attack described below) and nine people arrested in Finland for terrorism-related offences in 2017 (Europol, 2018). In 2015, three people were arrested (Europol, 2016), and in 2012 and 2011, two people per year

(Europol, 2011; 2012). Since 2007, no other attacks or arrests have been recorded in Europol's documents.

Mol considers that the radical right is the most alarming threat in the 21st century (Sisäministeriö, 2020a). The action is centred on the internet and, despite individual cases of violent crimes, movements mostly influence through information and propaganda distribution (Sallamaa, 2018). Activity connected to the violent radical right has been observed by police departments in all areas (Sisäministeriö, 2020a). The popularity of right-wing activism momentarily increased after the 'refugee crisis', and this was visible in the streets as street patrols. (Sallamaa, 2018.) A few times, violent confrontations have happened at the annual Independence Day demonstrations, and they have given visibility to extremist groups among ordinary citizens (YLE 2020c).

As the first association to be banned since the 1970s, the extreme right NRM was abolished in September 2020 after a 3-year legal process (Sallamaa & Kotonen, 2020) that started after an incident next to the Helsinki railway station. A passer-by who spat on the face of an NRM member was kicked by the member in a lethal assault during NRM's demonstration in Helsinki in 2016, with the court later deeming that racist convictions motivated the assault (Bjørge & Aasland Ravndal, 2020, p. 44; YLE, 2018). Since the ban, some NRM activists have moved to other groups (see section 4.1.).

So far, the only convicted terrorist crime event in the 21st century in Finland was an attack in Turku in 2017 that killed two people and injured nine, including the offender – a Moroccan young man who came to Finland to apply for asylum and received a negative decision. He claimed to be fighting for ISIL, which ISIL has not confirmed. Before the attack, the police had received a tip-off about the man, but no arrangements were implemented (Onnettomuustutkintakeskus, 2017). Three other cases have been forethought to be prosecuted as terrorist attacks but without consequences (Manner & Teittinen 2021).

In the 2000s there have been three school attacks. The first, in Jokela in 2007, left nine people dead, including the offender, and 12 others injured. The offender published material connected to the crime and interacted with other radicalised people online, aiming to change society by his "operation against humankind" (Kauhajoen koulusurmien tutkintalautakunta, 2010). This killing was associated with the personal problems of the offender, an outcast fellow student (Oikeusministeriö, 2009). In Kauhajoki in 2008, 11 people, including the offender, were killed and three injured at a university of applied sciences. The attacker, a fellow student, did not have any radical social or religious worldview but had shown interest in the Jokela attack. In Kuopio in 2019, a sword attack left two people dead and 10 injured (YLE, 2020a).

SUPO considers that people returning from the conflict areas of ISIL pose both immediate and indirect security threats in the short and long term (Sisäministeriö, 2020a, p. 25; see section 4.1.), and the case of the al-Hol camp has been debated since 2019 (see section 3.2.). SUPO estimates that about 80 people have travelled to Iraq and Syria since the crisis began (Sisäministeriö, 2020a). The leavers have been fighting and being educated, but also, for instance, nursing in the conflict area (Creutz, Saarinen & Juntunen, 2015). No people who have left from Finland for Iraq or Syria have been punished for a terrorist crime (Manner & Teittinen, 2021), due to evidence requirement for a special target of preparation (see Rikoslaki, 2018/874). Smaller numbers of radical left activists have joined Kurdish action in Syria

(Sisäministeriö, 2020a). More information about the main radicalisation events in Finland in the 21st century can be found in Appendix 1.

3.2. The perception of the Finnish political elite of the cases of radicalisation

In the Finnish consensual political culture (see section 2), violence is generally condemned in the state speech. The Finnish official policy explicitly emphasizes the prevention of *violent* radicalisation and extremism (Mol, 2019a; Kotonen, 2020, p. 60) and cooperation with multi-professional specialists and stakeholders continuing over governmental periods. In 2015 the Sipilä government was faced with the 'refugee crisis' with the populist FP as its junior partner, with anti-migration proponents among the rank and file. After the 2019 general elections, Sanna Marin's SDP-led red-green-centrist government introduced gradual changes. The Minister of the Interior Maria Ohisalo and her party, the Greens, underline that internal security should be strengthened by avoiding social exclusion in democratic society, reflected in the policy of Mol (Vihreä liitto, 2016; 2018). The Green Minister of Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto has called for measures against inequality in Europe, so to avoid "hubs of hate and bitterness"; terrorism and extremist movements should be prevented with multi-professional cooperation on site and in Europe (Muhonen 2020, see Appendix 2). The Greens aim to increase the diversity of police officers (Vihreä liitto, 2018). The returning process of children and especially mothers who were in the al-Hol camp has awoken different opinions from Finnish politicians. Haavisto has acted for returning people from the camp (Kervinen, 2020; see Appendix 2), while the opposition—FP and the moderate right-wing National Coalition Party (NCP)—has been against it (Sutinen, 2020a).

The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) is working on the tightening of the terrorism law (Oikeusministeriö, 2020), but also on developing democracy (this will be pursued in WP9 of D.Rad project). There is discussion between politicians and officers about the reform of the terrorism law and the need to criminalise participation in a terrorist group and its actions, including education. The government is planning to criminalise only significant and goal-oriented action, but NCP (2009; 2020) and FP (2011) are demanding a lower threshold for punishments. NCP proposes moving to the model of Denmark, where citizenship can be revoked from members of terrorism groups (Kokoomus, 2009; 2020).

In the aftermath of the Turku stabbing in 2017, the Finnish political elite has discussed reforming the intelligence law. Both left- and right-wing parties see that a stricter law is needed to prevent terrorism. In their foreign and security policy programme, the Left Alliance writes that a new law is needed to eliminate radical right-wing action and all kind of terrorism (Vasemmistoliitto, 2017). They nevertheless press that Finland cannot become a spying society. NCP raises the need for law reform in their parliamentary election programme of 2019 (Kokoomus, 2019a). They also mention the importance of the protection of privacy. Terrorism, radicalism and political violence are not a widely discussed in the policy programmes of Finnish parties represented in parliament. Most Finnish parties' political programmes after 2001 do not include direct references to radicalisation or political violence. Terrorism, mentioned as contemporary problem, is mostly treated as an external risk on an international level (e.g. Kokoomus, 2020; SDP, 2009; 2007; 2004; Vasemmistoliitto, 2020; 2019a; 2019b; Keskusta, 2016). National or international attacks have not had a significant impact on Finnish policy programmes. The Social Democratic Party (SDP), the largest party of Finnish parliament, has recognised terrorism and radicalisation as an internal security threat (SDP,

2020), but not as one of the most probable dangers for the national safety of Finland (SDP, 2017). The perceived international nature of terrorism and radicalism is reflected in the abundance of references to the preventive and problem-solving role of EU across the political spectrum (see Kokoomus, 2020; 2019b; 2009; SDP, 2007; 2004; Vasemmistoliitto, 2019a; Perussuomalaiset, 2019).

For FP, immigration is the main security threat (Perussuomalaiset, 2019). It, alone, has proposed that the law on ethnic agitation should be reformed to a milder version in the name of freedom of speech (Perussuomalaiset, 2020). The 2019 election manifesto singled out Islamic terrorism and the failure of “fortress Europe” (Perussuomalaiset, 2019). FP’s immigration programme (2015) presented that immigration produces ghettoisation, which leads to religious radicalisation, and it proposed to prevent that with a stricter border policy. Jussi Halla-aho, a former MEP and the party leader since 2017, considers Islam as a backward religion that lays the groundwork for terrorism (see appendix 2), highlighting a menacing image of Islam on his blog (e.g., Halla-aho, 2014). Some FP politicians have connections with, and give sympathy to, radical right movements (see section 4.1.). The party has also criticised radical right-wing action, especially when it has contained physical violence (Sallamaa, 2019; Vaaherkumpu, 2020). In a recent interview, Halla-aho was sympathetic to Covid-19 vaccine critics, while many FP supporters refuse vaccines, according to polls (Kervinen, 2021a). In its municipal election programme (Perussuomalaiset, 2021), FP wants to withdraw tax funding from “extremist group actions”, referring to the promotion of multicultural society, and gender diversity and sensitivity. A poem in FP’s parliamentary election programme calls a radical animal rights activist attack at a fur farm an act of terrorism against the company (Perussuomalaiset, 2011). Jussi Halla-aho has called Extinction Rebellion activists “spoiled climate fanatics” and “riffraff” (Tamminen, 2020; see Appendix 2).

Left-wing parties, SDP and the Left Alliance, have defined radical right activism as a threat in Finnish society (Vasemmistoliitto, 2017; SDP, 2020). The action of street patrolling groups (see section 4.1.) is mentioned in the Foreign and Security Policy Programme of the Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto, 2017) and in the municipal election material of SDP (SDP, 2017). SDP (ibid.) writes about street patrolling groups as a result of a security vacuum created by the failed social policy of the centre-right government and the cutting of resources from security authorities. Left Alliance claims that right-wing patrolling groups should be abolished (Vasemmistoliitto, 2017). Left Alliance (ibid.) claimed that border policy is not a remedy to increase safety while the FP opposes this view. Other parties and politicians, for example ex-prime minister Antti Rinne (SDP), worry about the relationship between FP and extremist right action (Konttinen, 2021). SDP has emphasised local democracy in de-radicalisation (SDP, 2016).

NCP envisions refugee policy of the future on its website (Kokoomus, 2019c), arguing that people with illegal status increase threats of insecurity, violent radicalisation and crime. It also claims that intentional prolongation of the asylum process causes frustration, which can lead to radicalisation (Kokoomus 2019c). In 2021, prior to local elections, the party is torn between cosmopolitan and conservative-nationalist values.

The Centre Party has not addressed much terrorism and radicalism in its policy programmes beyond referencing school shootings in three of them (Keskusta 2013; 2014a; 2014). It

emphasises the multi-professional work of officials and CSOs as the solution for protecting the society from new school attacks.

3.3. The perception of the violent threat by the general public

Violent radicalisation does not prominently feature in Finnish studies on fears in life, as people's main fears concern their own health and that of close ones, and climate change in the younger generation (YLE, 2019.) Näsi et al (2018) asked specific questions about the so-called new social threats from a representative sample of Finns. While most respondents did not experience the presented alternatives as personal threats, phenomena mostly perceived as such were immigration (17 percent of the respondents), terrorism and asylum seekers (both 15 percent), extremist movements (13 percent), environmental threats and catastrophes (12 percent), organised crime (11 percent), verbal violence (11 percent), religious fanaticism (8 percent), hate speech on the internet (7 percent) and racism (6 percent). Immigration, terrorism and asylum seekers were perceived more commonly as threats among those with income problems and those using social media, the radical right-wing discussion forum Hommaforum, and the MV-lehti newspaper (described in section 4.1.) as their information sources. The study found a correlation between many of the perceived threats and the level of education. Men perceived immigration, asylum seekers, extremist movements and religious fanaticism as threats more than women, while women perceived terrorism, verbal and sexual violence and hate speech on the internet as threats more than men.

A representative sample of Finnish residents of all national backgrounds were revealed to be most afraid of jihadist terrorism and least afraid of national extreme-right terrorism (Makkonen, 2019; data gathered before the 2017 Turku attack). A positive correlation was found between intolerance and a fear of jihadist terrorism, but also for other types of terrorism. Support for FP did not have a correlation with the fear for terrorism, but it was related to feelings of hate. Women were more afraid of all types of terrorism than men were, while education and age did not augment feelings of fear.

While there have been few large-scale acts of terrorism or politically motivated violence in Finland in the 21st century, the far right and radical Islamists can be seen as potential actors in the field (see also section 4). Consensual politics condemn violence and seek to prevent it, even though extremism has not been at the centre of the political agenda.

4. Agents and channels of radicalisation

According to SUPO's recently released yearbook (2021), individuals and small groups that support the far right or radical-Islamist ideologies form the biggest threat of terrorism in Finland. The threat of the far right augmented during the past year, but the threat of radical Islamists stayed at the same level, although there were multiple people who came back from conflict zones. According to Mol (2019a), this was also true regarding other violent threats than just terrorism.

4.1. The collective agents accountable for the most incidents of violent attacks in Finland

Far right

Far-right and anti-immigration mobilisation blossomed in 2015-16 as many organisations and movements emerged. Some far-right groups have a more structured ideology, for instance, neo-Nazism or counter-jihad, but others generally position themselves against Islam, immigration, multiculturalism, the EU, the political elite or globalism. (Sallamaa, 2018, p. 5.) Also, an anti-gender position is a feature of many right-wing ideologies (Saresma, 2020), and social media is used to spread hate speech as a form of gendered and racist violence (Saresma, Karkulehto & Varis, 2021). Overall, there has been a relatively low amount of serious violence from the far right especially when it is compared with violent material online (Sallamaa 2019). Nevertheless, there were a series of serious attacks with burning and explosive substances on asylum seeker centres in Finland in 2015 (Kotonen & Kovalainen, forthcoming).

The Finnish far right can be described as more of a social media phenomenon since 2015. In particular for Soldiers of Odin (SOO), online recruitment and mobilisation has been significant. Being a virtual community also enabled SOO to be discovered internationally. In 2019, SOO's Facebook pages were taken down and banned, moving communication to closed channels such as Vkontakte and Telegram (Kotonen, 2020, p. 64.). Malkki, Sallamaa, Saarinen and Eerola (2021) found in their recent study that the most violent material in Finnish-speaking online forums was spread in far-right and anti-immigration discussions. Also, resistance to SOO was framed online through the parody group Loldiers of Odin (Laaksonen, Koivukoski & Porttikivi 2021).

NRM is a violent extra-parliamentary far right, neo-Nazi and revolutionary organisation in Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark (Sallamaa, 2018, pp. 39-40). The Finnish chapter of NRM was founded in 2008 and has since been involved in violent acts that target particularly political opponents. It has approximately one hundred members. It was convicted of prohibition of activities in 2019, but its activists have continued to operate under a new organisation called Towards Freedom! (Kohti Vapautta!). Police have investigated links between the two and the possible violation of the prohibition (Kotonen, 2020, pp. 61-63.). Furthermore, NRM is expected to continue its activities through other organisations (Sallamaa & Kotonen, 2020).

NRM has its roots in online communities (Kotonen, 2020, p. 64): online radio Riimuradio, websites and far-right music, using channels such as YouTube, Gab, Bitchute and Discord, and Finnish discussion forums for the general public (Sallamaa, 2018, pp. 47-49). NRM has also published the print and online newspaper *Magneettimedia* after receiving rights from the previous owner, a retail chain owner (Kotonen, 2020, p. 63).

NRM's threat of violence is high, although there have not been violent attacks during recent years (Sisäministeriö, 2020a, p. 17). Previously, there has been violence during street events. The incident that happened in Helsinki in 2016 (see section 3.1.) had a huge impact on the prohibition of charges. In addition to that incident and spontaneous street fights, usually against political opponents, there was a stabbing case at a library in Jyväskylä in 2013 and a group assault at the shopping centre in Jyväskylä in 2015 (Kotonen, 2019, p. 62.) At the time of writing, there is a murder charge against an NRM activist who allegedly murdered another NRM activist on Finnish Independence Day in 2020 (Reinboth, 2020a).

A street patrolling group, SOO, has had chapters in most of the cities in Finland, and was present in more than 20 countries at its height. It has also taken part in demonstrations and done charity work. In its public statements, it states that violence is only allowed when used to self-defence. It sees Islam and especially young refugees as security threats (Kotonen, 2019, p. 241, 252.). SOO had approximately 600 members in Finland at its peak of popularity in 2015-16, but its member count has since dropped by about a third due to several factors such as internal fighting and the ending of the 'refugee crisis'. SOO represents a potentially violent sentiment, although it has in practice been relatively peaceful. There has been more physical violence internally between its members; however, in a few cases, members have attacked migrants and asylum seekers (Kotonen, 2020, pp. 61-62.). There are several links between SOO and NRM: for instance, its founder used to be an NRM member, and SOO members have participated in NRM's demonstrations and disseminated its propaganda (Sallamaa, 2018).

Many members of the extra-parliamentary far right regard FP as a way to influence politics. Also, the public narrative regarding immigrants by some members of FP might lead to outbursts of violence by the far right (Sallamaa 2019.). SOO criticised the immigration policies of the government where FP was a partner from 2015. After the leadership change of FP and party split in 2017, the party's anti-immigration faction returned to the opposition. SOO publicly supported FP candidate Laura Huhtasaari for Finland's presidency. Additionally, local representatives and SOO actives regularly met in some cities (Kotonen, 2019, pp. 242-243, 248.).

Anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism organisation Suomen Sisu was formed in 1998 and spread itself to most parts of Finland. By 2015 it had about 1700 members. Its core principle is "ethnopluralism": to not mix different ethnicities and cultures. Ideological communication happens on the organisation's website and Facebook page, and its members use Hommaforum, an online forum for anti-immigration discussion. (Sallamaa, 2018, pp. 9-16.) Sisu has the closest connection to party politics (with FP) of all the far-right organisations, and it acts as the key connector between far right and party politics since multiple members were elected to the parliament in 2015 via FP. Amongst them was Olli Immonen, who became a symbol of Sisu through his social media presence (Vaarakallio 2015). FP leader Jussi Halla-aho is a former member of Sisu and is known for his racist and misogynist social media writing (Horsti & Saresma 2021).

Sisu's relationship to NRM is complex, as they share same principles, but NRM's authoritarianism and shared Nordic state conflicts with Sisu's nationalism. Like the new proposal for a neofascist party, called Sinimustat (Blue Black Movement), Sisu also focuses against the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland. Sisu's members have also been active in other far-right organisations and have some connections to SOO (Sallamaa, 2018, pp. 9-16.). In addition, 612-association has organised a torch procession on Finnish Independence Day since 2014, uniting different far-right and anti-immigration actors such as Suomen Sisu, NRM and *Sarastus* (an online magazine) (Sallamaa, 2018, pp. 57-58). These demonstrations have acted as connecting events between less and more radicalised people. At the moment, there are charges against people carrying Nazi flags in this demonstration in 2018 (Reinboth 2020b).

While there are links between the far right and FP, their relation is multifaceted. There was an attempted murder of FP's parliamentary assistant Pekka Kataja, who has actively contributed

to the exclusion of some far-right members in FP, in 2020 (Gustafsson, 2020). A far-right activist was charged but the charges fell through, although the trial is expected to continue in the Court of Appeal.

Probably the most discussed far-right counter-media is MV-media (previously MV-magazine), whose late founder was convicted multiple times for ethnic agitation and defamation of character. Other counter-media outlets are Sarastus, Oikea media and Hommaforum. Sarastus describes itself as a traditional and radical online magazine. Oikea media is an anti-immigration and anti-Islam online magazine, which is also against the EU and gender minority rights and has connections to the Finnish conservative Christian right. Hommaforum is an online forum about anti-immigration, and especially about Muslims. It was established in 2008, when the actives on Jussi Halla-aho's Scripta blog wanted to have a discussion forum for anti-immigration topics (Sallamaa, 2018, pp. 67–68, 73.). The network of far-right organisations can be found in Appendix 3.1., where one can also find some smaller organisations connected to the network that were not presented here.

Radical Islamism

SUPO estimates approximately 390 subjects of interest in terrorism prevention, and most of them support radical Islamist terrorism with their actions (Sisäministeriö, 2020a, pp. 23-24). It is still growing in numbers, albeit more slowly than earlier. Malkki and Saarinen (2019, p. 12, 80) consider publicly available information sources about jihadist mobilisation as scarce and inadequate: SUPO's list is not exclusive, and it did not include the assailant of the Turku attack. Networks amongst people interested in jihadism grow, but these remain mostly fragmented and poorly organised (ibid, p.11). No organisations would publicly support radical Islamism, and mobilisation is scarce in international comparison, with only a few "jihadist entrepreneurs" (persons having a crucial role in forming groups and networks and planning the activity). Organisations in the style of Sharia have not formed in Finland, which lacks suburbs with a same kind of concentration of radical Islamist mobilisation as in some other countries. The mobilisation is concentrated in big cities, where most of the Muslim population lives (Malkki & Saarinen, 2019, pp. 63-64, 82-86.). This form of group mobilisation only emerged in Finland after the Syrian conflict began in 2011 (Juntunen, Creutz-Sundblom & Saarinen, 2016, p. 59).

According to Malkki and Saarinen (2019), the few cases of threats online have turned out to be false. The only legally effective jihadist attack happened in Turku in 2017, yet the assailant did not have any known connections to radical Islamist networks in Finland. While only one terrorist attack has been convicted as such, arrests and charges have fallen against Al-Shabaab (for either recruiting foreign fighters to Somalia or financing) supporters in 2011 and 2014. There was also a person expelled from Sweden to Finland because of his ties to the al-Qaeda network in Sweden (Malkki & Saarinen, 2019, pp. 11, 74-76.).

In Finland, jihadist activity mostly consists of non-violent action such as recruitment or financing (Malkki & Saarinen 2019, p. 11). The amount of people who have travelled to conflict zones has increased, with over 70 people having travelled to Syria and Iraq from Finland in 2012-2015. That number does not include minors and people unknown to the authorities. The 19 different ethnicities, 62 percent with Finnish citizenship, evidences a diversity of backgrounds, with most of them leaving from the biggest cities across Finland. The largest cohort was young men aged 21-25, although women were also included (Creutz, Saarinen & Juntunen, 2015, pp. 4-5.). Converted Muslims were interested in a radical association called

Time of Islam (Islamin aika), and Muslims of Helsinki (Helsingin muslimit) activists. In Helsinki, the mosque of Roihuvuori has been called a “radical mosque” in the public discussion, because multiple people who left for Syria or Iraq visited the mosque prior and had got to know each other there. The mosque may also be called Salafist, but not jihadist (Malkki & Saarinen, 2019, pp. 76-77.). One publicly identified example of organised recruitment, radicalisation and facilitation activity in Finland is connected to Mullah Krekar and the Rawti Shax/Didinwe radical network, but few people have left for conflict zones through this network (Juntunen, Creutz-Sundblom & Saarinen, 2016, p. 34).

Although radicalisation and recruiting happen online, one is more likely to radicalise through physical social contacts such as family and friends (Juntunen, Creutz-Sundblom & Saarinen, 2016, pp. 46-52). Social media has made it easier to access radical material, but communication has now moved to closed channels such as Telegram, since publicly available channels on, for example, such as Twitter and Facebook are deleted by those technology companies (Malkki & Saarinen, 2019, p. 12, 90; Malkki & Pohjonen, 2019, p. 12, 81.). Some radicalisation takes place in prisons, although the phenomenon seems to be quite small. The radicalisation of women who leave for conflict zones and their networking beforehand is an avenue that should be studied more (Malkki & Saarinen, 2019, p. 90.). The radical Islamist network can be found in Appendix 3.2.

Others

In Finland, radical separatism does not exist. Mol (2020a, pp. 11-12) considers extra-parliamentary far-left mobilisation (anarchism and anti-fascism) as minor during last years, and mostly visible during demonstrations. It also sees that environmental activism has been minor, although there has been some trespassing and action-disruptive demonstrations. A movement called Extinction Rebellion Finland has recently been active in non-violent activism (ibid.).

While Finnish anti-vaccine movements have a long background, they have risen in awareness in the public discussion in the Covid-19 pandemic (Typpö, 2021; Nieminen, 2021). It became apparent in the anti-pandemic measures demonstration in March 2021 that lifestyle ideologies activists and far-right concerns may entangle (Kerttula et al, 2021). Recently, the QAnon movement has also activated in Finland (Vaaltee, 2020).

4.2. The state agencies contributing to radicalisation

The state provides the legal framework for controlling radicalisation, not only through civil rights and criminal law, but also through its broader social, education and employment policies. The welfare state mostly prevents radicalisation, but the complexity of the system and the discretion of public authorities in means-tested benefits might in some cases lead to feelings of injustice (Rantala et. al, 2018). Recently, a shortening of the child home care allowance periods has been proposed to increase mothers’ employment rates and move children earlier to day-care, affecting especially migrant mothers (Bäckgren, 2020), of whom 50 percent are currently in some form of employment (Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö, 2020, p. 28). In education policy, early access to day-care removes the pressure for children from immigrant families to take Finnish as a secondary language, which currently appears problematic for access to secondary studies and higher education (Niemonen, 2020). However, cuts in the child home

care allowance may unintentionally increase poverty if parents do not gain some form of employment, and thus would have negative social consequences.

The police enjoy a legitimised position in Finland, with 91 percent of Finns saying that they trust the police (Sisäministeriö, 2020b; see also EVA, 2018). The purpose of developing the police is to bring it near the people and communities (Sisäministeriö, 2020c). Nevertheless, Juntunen, Creutz-Sundblom and Saarinen (2016) and Creutz, Juntunen and Saarinen (2015) show in their reports on Muslim communities and radicalisation that intelligence activities can also be seen as breaking the feeling of integration in Western society, which might have unwanted consequences. According to Keskinen et al. (2018), people belonging to ethnic minorities experience many forms of surveillance and ethnic profiling by, for example, the police, security and border guards, customs officers and salespersons. One reason for the ethnic profiling conducted by the police is the unclear formulation of “reasonable suspicion” in the Finnish Alien’s Act, which does not require the police to specify the grounds for their checks. The researchers argue that targeted control acts on unclear grounds might decrease the trust towards Finnish society.

Although the phenomenon has been small, connections between the far right and police officers exist. In 2020 the police informed about a large crime scheme that involved far-right actors planning a crime against life or health, where one suspect was a police officer (YLE, 2020b). However, the investigation has since then stopped due to a lack of enough evidence on the actual execution of the plans (Poliisi, 2021). Also, in 2020, a photograph disseminated on social media showed a police officer posing with members of SOO, which was highly criticised; however, the police said the aim was not to show support but that the picture was from a negotiation situation (Juopperi & Polo, 2020).

We conclude that the far right is highly networked in Finland and it has some connections to party politics, as well. The radical Islamist network is not especially organised, although the information regarding it is scarce. While the state mainly prevents radicalisation through its welfare and education policies, there are policies that might contribute to radicalisation, such as ethnic profiling.

5. Stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation

The Finnish state prevents radicalisation both implicitly—through, for instance, its welfare and education policies—and explicitly, through specific de-radicalisation policies. The focus of Finnish ‘explicit’ de-radicalisation policies is on prevention and multi-professional cooperation between public authorities and civil society (MoI, 2019a). MoI is the main coordinator of de-radicalisation work in Finland. It controls public funding allocated to exit work, which is implemented mostly by CSOs or in cooperation with them. Special allowances to prevent violent extremism and radicalisation by supporting local cooperation, and to strengthen the participation of children and young people in the prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation and in exit activities, are allocated by MoJ.

Goal-directed prevention work in Finland started in 2012, when the first National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism (NAP) was published (MoI, 2019a,

p. 12). The NAP guides local and regional practices based on a local, up-to-date overview. Mol has set a national co-operation group to implement, improve and estimate de-radicalisation in Finland. The group is formed by police and crime officers, ministries (including Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Social Affairs and Health; and Education and Culture), immigrant organisations, education specialists (National Agency for Education), municipal organisations, youth organisations, religious organisations, university researchers and other civil society organisations. Mol has familiarised itself with the de-radicalisation models of European countries with longer traditions of that when formulating its policy (Mol, 2019b).

Prevention is divided into hard and soft tasks (Mol, 2019a, p. 24). Police organisation on different levels is the main actor in hard tasks. SUPO, working under Mol, oversees the most serious security threats and has resources for intelligence and to name people who raise concerns about radicalisation or terrorism. Other actors of the police organisation are the National Bureau of Investigation, which works with criminal investigation and criminal intelligence, and 11 local police stations (Poliisi a; b). Mol claims that the capacity and expertise of the police to prevent violent radicalisation has increased in recent years (Mol, 2019a). Exit work has been done by the police since 2018 funded by the Internal Security Fund of European Commission allowed by Mol (see Appendix 4) until 2020, the fact that financing moved to national sources, the National Bureau of Investigation had an impact on the volume of exit work (Sisäministeriö, 2021).

NAP (Mol, 2019a) notes that the police alone cannot prevent radicalisation and that cooperation is needed from organisations that are felt to be safe and accessible for people who are radicalised or at risk of radicalisation. Mol has determined the relevance of different services and their reachability in the Rajapinta project, in which it identified observations and recommendations for local collaboration on the referral mechanism of persons of concern in local multi-stakeholder collaboration for preventing violent radicalisation. The purpose is that no-one drops off from the service structure (Mol, 2019b.).

Anchor work is multi-professional collaboration aimed to promote the wellbeing of adolescents and prevent crime. It is carried out by multi-professional teams consisting of professionals from the police, social services, health services and youth services. In cases of de-radicalisation, there are no age limits (Moilanen, Airaksinen & Kangasniemi, 2019.). A minimum level of services is set nationally, but, for example, the participation of third sector organisations can be defined locally. Consequently, the availability of services differs from one region to another (Mol, 2019b). Different experts and organisations have trained officers and other stakeholders to prevent and cope with radicalisation, and Finnish actors have participated in the education of the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network since 2011. According to the Mol, there is still a need to develop nationally coordinated training and to devote resources to it (2019a).

A significant part of Finnish de-radicalisation policies has concentrated on youth. Mol emphasises the role of democracy education and participation in the prevention of radicalisation (Sisäministeriö, 2021). Young people also participate in the planning and execution of de-radicalisation action (Mol, 2019a; Sisäministeriö, 2021). Schools, for which education is determined in the national core curriculum, are central in implicit de-radicalisation, and they take part in the anchor work (Mol, 2019a). According to the Finnish National Agency for Education, the school system and early child education are part of the preventive work of

radicalisation through inclusiveness, open discussion and the teaching of civic skills and critical thinking (Opetushallitus, 2018). The Finnish National Agency for Education has published manuals to prevent radicalisation for elementary schools, early education and vocational schools, and it organises training days for education professionals (Opetushallitus, 2018; 2019; 2020).

Competency to talk about and react in cases of radicalisation within school staff is lacking (Opetushallitus, 2018). The Faculty of Educational Sciences at the University of Helsinki coordinates a 'Resilience and violent attitudes in education' expert network, which produces research-based information on the treatment, prevention, and confrontation of ideological extremism and violence for the education sector and for a variety of stakeholders (University of Helsinki, 2021). A research group developed a so-called REDI model, used as a base for education-related issues in National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism 2019-2023 of Mol. The model creates a framework for measures to address violent attitudes, both at the level of the pupil, by the educator and in situations where other actors in the de-radicalisation process, such as the principal, the pupil or student care team and other social and health care actors, are consulted with regarding the person concerned. It focuses on the preconceptions and existing knowledge of the educator, not on profiling students (Vallinkoski, Benjamin & Koirijärvi, 2020.).

CSOs play a central role in de-radicalisation, which augments the potential to reach the grassroots level (see Appendix 4). However, their work is often project-based with fixed-term funding, which causes problems in the continuity of the work. (Mol, 2019b; cf. Kuokkanen, 2016.) Some projects have had to be terminated despite positive results (Roslund, 2018). An example of ended projects is the RADINET project (2016-2018), organised by the Vuolle Settlement, which is a non-profit foundation providing welfare, community and educational services. Diakonissalaitos, a non-profit foundation whose actions are mainly focused on social exclusion, started an exit programme in 2020 that contains therapy and help in taking care of daily life conditions such as housing and education (Diakonissalaitos, 2020), with funding from the Internal Security Fund of European Commission through Mol until summer 2021 (Sisäministeriö, 2021).

Different religious groups and organisations are in a significant position in de-radicalisation, as they are close to their members and have the know-how of their cultures (Mol, 2019b). Mol stresses that the security for religious organisations must be guaranteed (Sisäministeriö, 2021). The goal is the co-operation of religious groups and other de-radicalisation actors, and religious groups have participated in local Anchor work (Moilanen et al. 2019). The Forum of Young Muslims (NMF) promotes the inclusion of 16-19-year-old immigrants and Muslim youth to prevent violent extremism, at their new Muvenna project in Turku (Nuorten muslimien foorumi). Finn Church Aid has worked on de-radicalisation since 2013, and after receiving EU funding it can continue at least until the year 2023. Its ongoing Reach Out 3 project supports the building of cooperation and trust between authorities, different religious communities and organisations, and develops new policies and forms of support for families impinged on by violent radicalisation (Kirkon Ulkomaanapu). Radicalisation was the theme of Finn Church Aid's 'Tekoja' (Acts) campaign in 2015 (Kirkon Ulkomaanapu, 2015) (see Appendix 4).

In cooperation with Reach out action, CSO Save the Children has executed the RadicalWeb project, which has provided knowledge about the impact of the internet in the radicalisation

process. The project has provided education for adults working with young people. It is funded by the Ministry of Education and Culture and will continue until the end of 2021 (Pelastakaa Lapset, also see Appendix 4). Save the Children received an allowance from the MoJ to start a new project in 2021, which aims to increase the resilience of young people aged 15-19 and strengthen their participation in the prevention of violent radicalisation in 10 localities (Sisäministeriö, 2021).

According to the Criminal Sanctions Agency, there has not been much radicalisation in Finnish prisons before 2016. Mol sees prisons as a potential channel of de-radicalisation and in NAP, the Criminal Sanctions Agency has several responsibilities (Mol, 2019a). Although the improvement of de-radicalisation practices in prisons has not completely gone according to the plan of the ministry in all respects during 2020, educating prison staff to cope with radicalisation has progressed (Sisäministeriö, 2021). The Criminal Sanctions Agency had a 2-year project that aimed to augment knowledge about radicalisation in Finnish prisons and create expertise to recognise radicalisation processes (see Appendix 4). It provided training for 400 prison officers and civil servants in the Criminal Sanctions Agency. The improvement of multi-professional, border-crossing information gathering and exchange systems are highlighted in the project report (Rikosseuraamuslaitos, 2018). The Criminal Sanctions Agency still does not have a particular programme that focuses on de-radicalisation in prisons (Rikosseuraamuslaitos, 2017; 2018). Prison healthcare is there to recognise 'people of concern' (*huolta aiheuttava henkilö*, HAH) within the framework of their daily work (Mol, 2019a). Finland has taken a part in the European Criminal Policy Institute's FAIR project during 2017-2019, where the main objectives were to prevent and deter the radicalisation and recruitment of European and foreign citizens by terrorist groups affiliated to ISIL, and to promote disengagement behaviours in radicalised individuals in prisons (HEUNI, see also Appendix 4).

Reception centres are part of the de-radicalisation network. The Finnish Immigration Service oversees implementing the action related to immigration and asylum seekers (Mol, 2019a). The integration of people in reception centres has been improved by, for example, the TRUST – Good relations in Finland project (2016-?), which is funded by MoJ (Oikeusministeriö, 2017).

To sum up, Finnish de-radicalisation work is based on multi-professional cooperation and prevention by both public authorities and the third sector. While welfare services that prevent exclusion have a solid position in Finland, explicit de-radicalisation programmes have not yet reached an established form in the social system.

6. Conclusion

The common view in Finland is that the services of the welfare state play a key role in increasing a sense of belonging and in de-radicalisation. In general, political violence and radicalisation are not seen as the most prominent national security threat by politicians or the general public (see sections 3.2 and 3.3.), and violent radical activity has been minor in Finland. However, SUPO (2021) considers both the far right and radical Islamism as potential threats. The extra-parliamentary far right temporarily raised its head in 2015 and 2016, with outbursts of violence towards reception centres (Kotonen & Kovalainen, forthcoming). The

most visible far-right actor, NRM, was banned in 2020 due to violation of the Association Act. It remains to be seen whether NRM continues its activities in Finland through another organisation; most likely, the movement will continue in at least some form (Kotonen & Sallamaa, 2020).

Small jihadist networks emerged in Finland after the Syrian civil war began in 2011 (Juntunen, Creutz-Sundblom & Saarinen, 2016), but radical Islamist activity is not very visible overall. What needs to be considered is the scarce information about it in available sources (Malkki & Saarinen, 2019, p. 12). When information is deleted from open platforms on social media (e.g., Twitter and Facebook), it does not mean that it will be stopped, but that it will move to closed platforms (e.g., Telegram). This, then, might mean that it is harder to detect and surveil the contents that spread amongst radicalised people. The same can be applied to far right and other extreme ideologies.

Finnish de-radicalisation policies focus on prevention and multi-professional cooperation between different public authorities and civil society (Sisäministeriö, 2019a). The current red-green-centrist government has emphasised the importance of reducing social exclusion as a de-radicalisation practice. As radicalisation and political violence have not been publicly considered phenomena in Finland for a long time, explicit de-radicalisation measures and traditions are at an early stage of development. There is still a need to improve and unify nationally implemented strategies of Anchor work and other de-radicalisation action to equalise regional disparities. CSOs have an important role in implementing de-radicalisation policies, which brings them closer to the grassroots level but simultaneously poses problems for their resources and continuity because of the project-based nature of the action. It is crucial to have continuing de-radicalisation programmes, as they are now funded for only a few years at a time.

Apart from explicit de-radicalisation programmes, implicit de-radicalisation policy can be found in cross-sectoral cooperation and welfare state policies. While the welfare state mainly stabilises radicalising tendencies, the ministries also acknowledge the state agencies' potential contributions to radicalisation—for instance, through ethnic profiling. Feelings of injustice and racism can lead to increasing radicalisation, which can be caused by state officials, the general public or the media (Creutz, Juntunen & Saarinen, 2015). These attitudes may implicitly radicalise and polarise. The importance of listening to target groups must be considered by involving youth, religious groups and other stakeholders in the planning of de-radicalisation activities (Sisäministeriö, 2021).

The political elite is mostly unanimous about the direction of de-radicalisation policies, even if there is some dispersion, for example on the forthcoming reform of the terrorism law. Profiling and migration policy will stay on the agenda in Finnish politics where FP has a central role (see section 3.2.). FP's connection to the far right, albeit complex, is nevertheless an important undercurrent that may boost and mainstream far-right actors by bringing their radicalised opinions to the public through polarising debates. The themes central to FP also spread to other parties. The moderate right-wing NCP, historically a coalition between liberals and conservatives, has become divided around the issue of immigration, which demands for border control during the pandemic further highlights.

The overall impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on radicalisation remains to be seen. In the future, it is likely that online communities will strengthen and provide an arena for new forms of radicalisation around themes that are not or only shortly discussed in this report, such as conspiracy theories (e.g., QAnon), Incel and anti-vaccination movements. These may also entangle with existing movements and their concerns. Here, the international development also affects the Finnish context.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Main (de)-radicalisation events in Finland since 2001

Name	Date or period of time	Description
Anchor work began	Beginning of 21st century	Multi-professional work for promoting the wellbeing of adolescents and preventing crime; recognising radical thoughts and searching for the right tools to detach them, and working as a local safety network; started first locally and during 21st century it has developed into a nationwide practice to prevent radicalisation.
School shooting in Jokela	7.11.2007	Nine people, including the offender, died, and 12 were injured. The offender was a young Finnish man and student of the school. The crime was called a killing, not a terrorist attack, even though the offender had aimed to change society by his operation 'against humankind', in which he had planned to kill as many people as possible and cause disaster and chaos.
School shooting in Kauhajoki	23.11.2008	11 people were killed, including the offender, and three were injured. The offender was a young Finnish man who studied at the university of applied sciences in which he attacked. He did not have a radical social or religious worldview.
The election success of the Finns Party	2011	The landslide election victory of the populist Finns Party.
The First National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism was published	2012	The First National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism was published to guide nationally de-radicalisation practices.
Crisis in Syria and Iraq	2011 – present	Crisis in Syria and Iraq has led about 80 foreign fighters to leave for conflict zone from Finland. ISIL has had an impact on people with its ideology and propaganda.
'Refugee crisis'	2015	32 476 refugees arrived in Finland during that year (UNHCR Regional Representation for Northern Europe). The crisis impacted the

		activity of extremist groups, especially within the radical right.
“Meillä on unelma” demonstration	28.7.2015	About 15,000 people attended a demonstration for multiculturalism and tolerance in Helsinki. There were also politicians and popstars present. The demonstration prompted support for demonstrations elsewhere in Finland.
A killing during NRM's demonstration	24.9.2016	A man was kicked in the chest by a NRM member, and then hit his head on the ground. Allegedly, he had spat on one of the NRM activists. He died a week later.
EXIT work began	2016 – present	EXIT work began in Finland first by the Vuolle Settlement; in 2018, the Criminal Sanctions Agency started EXIT work as well. Now, Diakonissalaitos is implementing it.
Turku stabbing	18.8.2017	The only crime in which the offender was judged for a terrorist crime in the 21st century in Finland happened in Turku. Two people were killed and nine, including the offender, were injured. The offender was a young Moroccan man who had come to Finland to apply for asylum and received a negative decision. He said that he was fighting for ISIL, but ISIL did not confirm that.
Nazi flags in the Independence Day demonstration	6.12.2018	NRM members carried Nazi flags in the Independence Day demonstration. Police confiscated the flags.
School attack in Kuopio	8.9.2019	Two people were killed and 10 were injured. The offender was Finnish man who did not have connections to extremist groups.
Nordic Resistance Movement was banned	September 2020	The most powerful movement, NRM, was banned, which seems to have had a decreasing impact on the popularity of radical right activism after a 3-year legal process.
Violent stabbing of Finns Party functionary in Jämsä	present	A court case of politically motivated violence against a populist Finns Party active from the extreme right within the party.

Appendix 2. Political discourse about radicalisation in Finland


Quotation	Author(s)	Date of quotation	Source	Comments
<p>“The case [Turku stabbing] is not unexpected but obviously a part of the series of Islamist attacks in Europe. As many other attacks that have shaken Europe, the suspect is an Arab man who has exploited the asylum system. [...] We recall that Islamic terrorism is the result of a long-running reckless immigration policy and the failed integration of newcomers. [...] Decision-makers must [...] take legislative and other measures to stop the terrorism wave against innocent bystanders. ... The flow of asylum seekers through safe countries such as Sweden must be cut off. Asylum applications must be processed swiftly and people who have been rejected must be expelled immediately. Persons awaiting deportation must not be lowered, as the risk to public safety is obvious.”</p>	<p>Jussi Halla-aho, Chair of the Finns Party</p>	<p>20.8.2017</p>	<p>Kokemäen perussuomala-laiset, 2017 (Available at: https://kokemaki.perussuomalaiset.fi/uutinen/puheenjohtaja-jussi-halla-ahon-kannanotto)</p>	<p>Jussi Halla-aho commented on the threat of Islamic terrorism and reasons behind it on website of the Finns Party.</p>
<p>“It seems justified to make active participation in terrorist group’s activities punishable when affiliation with terrorist organisations usually manifests itself as such an activity. Public urging to join a terrorist group may, in principle, be considered a dangerous activity.”</p>	<p>Anna-Maja Henriksson, Minister of Justice, Chair of the Swedish People’s Party of Finland</p>	<p>16.6.2020</p>	<p>Sutinen, 2020b (Available at: https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/art-2000006542699.html)</p>	<p>The Minister of Justice commented on the working group’s proposal to tighten terrorist laws.</p>
<p>“Defending democracy is always timely. It is important</p>	<p>Maria Ohisalo, Minist</p>	<p>22.9.2020</p>	<p>Ohisalo, 2020</p>	

that society protects itself from violent extremism. #PVL's [NRM's] actions violated or sought to violate basic and human rights. The Supreme Court decided to abolish the organisation.”	er of the Interior, Chair of the Green League		(Available at: https://twitter.com/MariaOhisalo/status/1308293295236284416)	
“Spoiled climate fanatics, and riffraff.”	Jussi Halla-aho, Chair of the Finns Party	5.10.2020	Tamminen 2020 (Available at: https://www.uusisuomi.fi/uutiset/jussi-halla-aho-elokapina-mielenosoittajista-pilalle-hemmotellut-ilmastofanatikot-rupusakkia/8940c621-315a-44eb-83c4-757582464e03)	Halla-aho talked about Extinction Rebellion activists.
“Backward Islam creates foundation for terrorism, honour related violence, and any other these kinds of by-products. Islamism is not an individual-level mental health problem, it is a violent worldview that is spreading in Europe with immigration and poisoning that happens in mosques and Koranic schools.”	Jussi Halla-aho, Chair of the Finns Party	22.10.2020	Halla-aho 2020 (Available at: https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Asiakohta/Sivut/PTK136+2020+2.1.aspx)	Hallaaho spoke in parliament’s plenary debate.
“European societies have to do a lot to make the integration of different religions and minorities work, and to enable same opportunities for everybody in society and to	Pekka Haavisto, Minister of the Exterior, Chair of the Green League	3.11.2020	Muhonen, 2020 (Available at: https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/art-	Haavisto commented on the situation in Europe after the terrorist attacks in Vienna and Nice.


avoid hubs of hate and bitterness.”			200006935294.html)	
“The bigger problem is that these women [who has been returned from Al-Hol camp] are allowed to be free and continue to sow their toxic ideology in Finland in growing jihadist circles - and to poison the mental landscape of their own children completely unhindered. I think this is an incomprehensible situation. [...] If they were brought to account for having participated in one way or another in the activities of such a throat-cutting organisation or for having voluntarily traveled to the [conflict] area - or if their children could be taken into custody - we would probably assess this return in a slightly different way.”	Jussi Halla-aho, Chair of the Finns Party	21.12.2020	Parkkonen, 2020 (Available at: https://www.iltalehti.fi/politiikka/a/679b32b2-7f1c-4ce3-9c67-932ab875d744)	Jussi Halla-aho criticised the decision to return Finnish mothers from al-Hol camp.
“Their long stay in such a camp could also pose a serious risk for Finland in the future. The fact that we have citizens who have lived in totally different circumstances feeling the bitterness about that they have not been helped.”	Pekka Haavisto , Minister of the Exterior, Chair of the Green League	21.12.2020	Kervinen & Laitinen, 2021 (Available at: https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/art-2000007696584.html)	The Minister of the Exterior commented the importance of returning people from the al-Hol camp.
“Unfortunately, this kind of political violence [the action of Black Lives Matter movement] and unwillingness to recognize the counterparty's right to opinion, or even existence has been a growing phenomenon in the United States and perhaps elsewhere in the world during the last four years. Here one and another has a	Jussi Halla-aho, Chair of the Finns Party	11.1.2021	Kervinen, 2021b (Available at: https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/art-2000007731870.html)	Jussi Halla-aho commented on the actions of Black Lives Matter movement, which he compared to the invasion of the Capitol.

reason to look in the mirror and evaluate their action.”				
<p>“The jihadist movement is a major problem in many European countries, as it is associated very much with terrorism and other lawlessness. Many attacks in various parts of Europe show just the sort of danger the jihadist movement poses. The large number of immigrants has also exacerbated the problem. According to Communication from the Commission COM (2020) 795 final, an estimated 5 000 individuals have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join terrorist groups. In Finland a government study was conducted on the matter in 2019 (Jihadism in Finland, Publications of the Ministry of the Interior 2019:14).</p> <p>I would therefore like to know what possibilities there are for obtaining EU funding for researchers (in the form of a research grant, for example) into jihadism in the Member States or at EU level generally.”</p>	<p>Laura Huhtasaari, MEP in the Identity & Democracy Group, Finns Party</p>	<p>21.1.2021</p>	<p>Huhtasaari, 2021 (Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-9-2021-000352_EN.html)</p>	<p>Huhtasaari left a question for the European Parliament.</p>


Appendix 3. Networks of connection of the main agents of radicalisation in Finland



3.1. Far-right network



3.2. Radical Islamist net



Appendix 4. Main de-radicalisation programmes in Finland

Name	Dates	Agents	Approach	Scale	Targets
Anchor work	Beginning of 21 st century	Multi-professional teams: police, social services, health services and youth services, local NGOs and other local actors (e.g., schools)	Integrative: promotion of the wellbeing of adolescents and prevention of crime; recognition of radical thoughts and research of right tools to detach them.	Local action, national coordination	Individuals (people under 18, in cases of radicalisation no age limits) and their families
Reach Out 1, 2 & 3	2013-2023	Finn Church Aid	Development of new policies and forms of supporting people returning from conflict areas and families impinged on by violent radicalisation; supporting the building of cooperation and trust between authorities, different religious communities and organisations by adding knowledge and coordination		Authorities, religious communities and NGOs
Tekoja campaign	2015	Finn Church Aid	Integrative: promoting opportunities and conditions of youth in Finland and conflict areas	International and local	Youth in Finland and in conflict areas
Rauhan-radikaali	2015	Changemaker (youth department of Finn Church Aid)	Participatory: promoting non-violent participation of youth in workshops Civic educative:	Local (events)	General public, especially youth

			influencing Finns' perceptions of radicalisation, peace and democracy education		
Project of Criminal Sanctions Agency of Southern Finland to recognition of violent extremism and radicalisation	2016-2018	Criminal Sanctions Agency of Southern Finland	Training the staff; creating expertise to recognise radicalisation processes		Prison officers and civil servants in the Criminal Sanctions Agency
RADINET	2016-2018	Vuolle settlement	Integrative: therapy, integration into Finnish society	Local (Helsinki, Oulu)	Individuals (voluntary people wanting to cut loose from a radical ideology)
Utøya-project as part of DIS network	2016-		Education of teachers	Nordic countries	Schools and teachers from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and Finland
FAIR (Fighting Against Inmates' Radicalisation)	2017-2019	HEUNI, Criminal Sanctions Agency, local prisons	Prevention of violent radicalisation of inmates; promotion of disengagement; facilitation reintegration into society by training the staff; mapping the needs and best practices; rehabilitation of inmates; creating new agreements	Inter-national	Professionals working in prisons, inmates and stakeholders
Radical Web	2018-2021	Save the Children	Civic education:	National	Professionals working with young people,

			educating adults working with the young to recognise radicalisation on the internet		especially youth workers
EXIT (Police)	2018-present	Police, CSOs	Integrative: helping an individual to break free from radical thought and practice; co-operating with the field of organisations of the exit activities	National	Individuals (especially people who have had connections to organised crime, and people wanting to cut loose from a radical ideology)
SAFE STADI	2017-2018	Youth workers of city of Helsinki	Outreach youth work; promoting equality	Local (in area of Helsinki)	Youth
De-polarize1 & 2	2018-2023	Miriam Attias, Koneen sä ätiö 2x3 yr funding	Generates understanding of polarisation and a strategy for that with officials	National, brings ideas from the Netherlands to Finland	Officials
EXIT-programme of Diakonialaitos	2020-present (funding ensured until summer 2021)	Diakonialaitos (NGO)	Integrative: therapy, integration into Finnish society; educative: informing the stakeholders; Investigative: mapping the best practices		Individuals (voluntary people wanting to cut loose from a radical ideology); stakeholders
Muvenna	2021-present	The Forum of Young Muslims (NGO)	Integrative: Supporting youth in practical matters, discussion assistance; civic education: training for authorities, youth organisations and the community	Local (area of Turku)	Individuals and groups (16-19 year-old immigrant and Muslim youth affected by violent extremism or at risk of radicalisation), families of the young, stakeholders

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