



UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI



<https://helda.helsinki.fi>

Helda

Normative Stories of the Formative Moment : Construction of Estonian National Identity in Postimees during the EU Accession Process

Kaasik-Krogerus, Sigrid

2016-02-12

Kaasik-Krogerus, S 2016, 'Normative Stories of the Formative Moment : Construction of Estonian National Identity in Postimees during the EU Accession Process', Helsinki. <
<http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-51-1048-0> >

<http://hdl.handle.net/10138/229493>

publishedVersion

Downloaded from Helda, University of Helsinki institutional repository.

This is an electronic reprint of the original article.

This reprint may differ from the original in pagination and typographic detail.

Please cite the original version.

Department of Social Research
University of Helsinki
Finland

NORMATIVE STORIES OF THE FORMATIVE MOMENT

CONSTRUCTION OF ESTONIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY IN
POSTIMEES DURING THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS

Sigrid Kaasik-Krogerus

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences of
the University of Helsinki, for public examination in lecture room 10,
University main building, on 12 February 2016, at 12 noon.

Helsinki 2016

Publications of the Faculty of Social Sciences 1 (2016)
Media and Communication Studies

© Sigrid Kaasik-Krogerus

Cover: Riikka Hyypiä & Hanna Sario

Distribution and Sales:

Unigrafia Bookstore

<http://kirjakauppa.unigrafia.fi/>

books@unigrafia.fi

PL 4 (Vuorikatu 3 A) 00014 Helsingin yliopisto

ISSN 2343-273X (Print)

ISSN 2343-2748 (Online)

ISBN 978-951-51-1047-3 (Paperback)

ISBN 978-951-51-1048-0 (PDF)

Unigrafia, Helsinki 2016

ABSTRACT

This longitudinal research analyzes the construction of Estonian national identity in the country's largest and oldest daily newspaper *Postimees* in relation to the European Union (EU) in the course of Estonia's EU accession process 1997-2003. I combine media studies with political science, EU studies and nationalism studies to scrutinize this period as an example of a 'formative moment'. During this formative moment the EU became 'the new official Other' in relation to which a new temporary community, Estonia as a candidate country, was 'imagined' in the paper.

The study is based on the assumption that national identity as a normative process of making a distinction between *us* and Others occurs in societal texts, such as the media. The overall framework consists of critical discourse analysis in three phases. Text level refers to the media content whereas the evolution of the categories of writers of the opinion articles during the accession process is approached as a discourse practice. The formative moment stands for sociocultural practice as wider societal context. The empirical data consists of 1780 opinion articles of *Postimees*.

First, in the text level a characteristic feature of this formative moment is the open normativity of identity. In three discourses formed on the basis of the empirical data, *European Estonia*, *Independent Estonia* and *Humble Estonia*, the question of 'who *we* are' is challenged both internally and externally by 'who *we* should become'. Internally, the aim is to socialize the newspaper's readers into becoming informed, rational and realist citizens. Externally, in relation to the EU, the necessity to become European, independent or humble is emphasized in the pertinent discourses.

Second, four categories of writers, namely Staff Journalists, Cultural and Political Elite as well as the Readers (letters to the editor), emerged from the analysis. The analysis shows that in the beginning of the accession process only a limited group of people, mostly journalists and political decision makers, wrote about the EU. By 2003, however, both the number of articles as well as the variety of authors had multiplied several times. This shows, how a new community, Estonia as a candidate country, is first 'imagined' by a small number of people and then expands into the wider public.

Last but not least, this formative moment can be seen as a disciplining sociocultural practice. Here a link between normative public discussion and critical public opinion towards the EU during country's accession process can be drawn. Even though the newspaper tried to 'bring the EU closer to the people' this attempt was accompanied by top-down discussions downplaying everyday problems. This study also shows the paradox of how a necessity to improve *us* and become someone else is communicated in the public discussion in parallel to claiming that 'Estonia as an EU member does not have to change much'.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During the years of conducting this study I have been lucky to study and work together with a number of inspiring people who have all left their traces on the end result. I would like to express my gratitude to all those who accompanied me on this long journey.

First of all, I want to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisors Professor emerita Ullamaija Kivikuru and Professor Markku Kangaspuro. Ullamaija has supervised this thesis from the very beginning. She has always been there with her wise comments and encouraging remarks, offering not only academic advice but also psychological support during the years. I want to thank you for believing in this project, particularly at those low moments when I was losing my own belief and faith in my abilities. Markku has contributed to the thesis from an historian's viewpoint and shared with me his deep knowledge about nationalism studies. Part of the time I have also been fortunate to participate in and receive funding from Markku's research project.

Professor Epp Lauk and Professor Inka Salovaara-Moring acted as the pre-examiners of the thesis. In the final phase of editing the manuscript I benefitted a lot from their thorough and insightful comments. I am also grateful for Inka Salovaara-Moring for agreeing to be my opponent in the public examination of the thesis and Professor Esa Väliverronen to act as a custos in the same ceremony. Last but not least, I like to thank Marcus at Derettens OÜ for checking my English.

The main source of funding the research has been the Finnish Doctoral Programme for Russian and East European Studies coordinated by the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki. I am also very grateful for Emil Aaltonen Foundation, Oskar Öflund Foundation, Research Foundation of the University of Helsinki and my home unit, Media and Communication Studies of the University of Helsinki for their financial contribution.

My "academic home" during the research process has been Aleksanteri Institute. I have been very fortunate to enjoy the institute's positive and inspirational interdisciplinary atmosphere. The gratitude goes to all of you who work or have worked with me at the Aleksanteri Institute. I have benefitted from the visionary approach and insightful discussions with Director Professor Markku Kivinen during different phases of the thesis. I am also very fortunate to be part of Katalin Miklossy's Eastern European Research Group. The energy and passion Katalin has used to organize us into a truly creative academic community is simply admirable. I also like to thank the Cluster leader of the Finnish Centre of Excellence in Russian Studies at the Aleksanteri Institute, Sanna Turoma, for the possibility to affiliate with the lively Cultural and Philosophical Interpretations of Russian Modernisation-cluster and I am looking forward to our future cooperation. Grateful thanks also to the Head of Development, Anna-Maria Salmi, for all the

encouragement and support I have got from you. The helpfulness of the heads of the doctoral programme Ira Jänis-Isokangas and Hanna Ruutu during the research process deserves my deepest gratitude. I also want to thank personally other colleagues with whom I have worked the most: Katja Lehtisaari, Dragana Cvetanovic, Mila Oiva, Ira Österberg, Anna Halonen, Kaarina Aitamurto, Jukka Pietiläinen, Anna Korhonen, Sari Autio-Saraso, Tapani Kaakkurniemi, Jouni Järvinen, Hanna Peltonen, Minna Oroza and Eeva Korteniemi.

Media and Communication Studies at the Department of Social Research, University of Helsinki has been my home unit throughout the research process. I want to thank Professor Esa Väliverronen and Professor Hannu Nieminen for their support and advice in various phases of the study. During the years Anu Kantola, Salli Hakala, Lotta Lounasmeri, Yonca Ermutlu and others have contributed to the research in one way or another. I am also grateful for the future cooperation perspectives with Mervi Pantti and Markus Ojala that have emerged during the last stage of my doctoral research.

Last but not least, I want to thank my first “academic home”, the Department of Journalism at the University of Tartu, Estonia. Professor Peeter Vihalemm and Professor Epp Lauk acted as supervisors of my Bachelor and Masters thesis respectively, raising my interest towards scientific work and guiding my initial steps in the academic world. Also Professor emerita Marju Lauristin and Professor Maarja Lõhmus played crucial roles in forming my deep interest in social sciences.

Over the years I have benefitted from cooperation with a number of research institutions. I would like to express my gratitude towards the social and political researchers from the University of Helsinki Newtork for European Studies, University of Tampere, University of Turku, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, University of Glasgow, University of Söderörn, University of Uppsala, and University of Tallinn, to name the most important ones, for various interesting and inspiring academic discussions and forums.

In the final phase of the research several people read and commented on the manuscript, and for their time and valuable comments I would like to thank: Markku Kivinen, Anna-Maria Salmi, Hannu Nieminen, Anna Korhonen, Lotta Lounasmeri, Kari Karppinen and Kinga Polynczuk-Alenius. My special thanks goes to my friend Kristi Raik both for her scientific advice at different stages of the study as well as her excellent example of how to perform as a social scientist. I also want to thank my friends Teppo Heiskanen and Laura Kauppila for their linguistic tips during the writing process.

Last but not least, biggest gratitude go to my family and friends. My parents have been always supportive of my academic career and my dad would be proud to see me at this big day. My three children have ensured on a daily basis that I also have something more important to think about than research. However, my biggest thanks goes to my husband Sami for believing in this project, helping to bear my stress over the years and offering practical support in all spheres of life throughout the PhD process.

CONTENTS

Abstract.....	3
Acknowledgements.....	4
Contents.....	6
List of Figures and Tables	11
1. Introduction.....	12
1.1 National Identity, Media and Discourse.....	15
1.2 Estonian Accession Process to the EU: the New Official Other and the Formative Moment	18
1.3 Structure of the Dissertation	23
2. Media Content and Media Institution in Terms of Critical Discourse Analysis	25
2.1 National Identity as a Discursive Normative Process	27
National Identity as a Discursive Process.....	27
National Identity as a Process of Constructing <i>us</i>	28
National Identity as a Normative Process	30
Old and New Community: Formation and Maintenance....	31
2.2 Imagined Communities and Banal Nationalism in Terms of Discourse Analysis	34
2.3 Formative Moment in terms of Discourse Analysis	35
2.4 Summary	37
3. Formative Moment of Setting the Norms and Imagining the Community	38
3.1 Text Level: National Identity in the Media Content	38
<i>Us</i> and Others in International Relations	40
EU Accession Process: Confirmation or Challenge to Estonian Europeanness.....	42
Construction of National Identity in the Media	46

	Relations and Identities: Depicting Internal Others.....	48
	Summary	51
3.2	Imagining Community as a Discourse Practice	52
	Estonian Media: Political Activist in Historical Events	53
	Formative Moment of Estonian Media	55
	The Newspaper <i>Postimees</i>	57
	Writers of <i>Postimees</i>	58
	Imagining New Community: from Few to Many	62
	Summary	65
3.3	Formative Moment as a Sociocultural Practice	65
	Various Flexible Formative Moments	66
	Construction of the Formative Moment.....	68
	Constructing Special Time in <i>Postimees</i>	70
	Using Special Time in <i>Postimees</i>	73
	Summary	74
4.	Principles of Selecting Articles, Forming and Analyzing Discourses.....	76
4.1	Selecting the Articles for the Analysis	76
4.2	Forming Discourses on the Basis of the Articles.....	79
4.3	Analyzing Discourses	82
5.	Representation: Estonian National Identity Discourses	85
5.1	Discourse of European Estonia	86
	Being European.....	90
	Follow EU practice	91
	Accept EU authority	95
	Becoming European.....	99
	Should follow EU practice.....	100

	Failure to follow EU practice	107
	Should accept EU authority	116
	Failure to accept EU authority	121
	Conclusions of European Estonia	127
5.2	Discourse of Independent Estonia	129
	Being Independent.....	131
	Form own practice.....	132
	Deny EU authority.....	137
	Becoming Independent.....	141
	Should form own practice	142
	Failure to form own practice.....	145
	Should deny EU authority.....	149
	Failure to deny EU authority	154
	Conclusions of Independent Estonia.....	157
5.3	Discourse of Humble Estonia	158
	Being Humble	162
	Accept reality as own practice.....	163
	Realize EU authority	166
	Becoming Humble.....	169
	Should accept reality as own practice	170
	Failure to accept reality as own practice.....	174
	Should realize EU authority	179
	Failure to realize EU authority.....	181
	Conclusions of Humble Estonia	186
5.4	Conclusions: Representation of Estonian National Identity Discourses	187
6.	Relations and Identities: Estonian National Identity Discourses	191

6.1	Being and Becoming Informed: “It is a Sin to Save up from Information” (PM, 02.07.2003b)	192
	Being Informed or Uninformed.....	192
	Should Inform and Be Informed: Model of Five “W”	194
	Sender and recipient: what is the difference between monologue and dialogue?	195
	Sender and recipient: one should get informed for informing people.....	198
	Sender: not "the only ones called upon" (PM, 21.05.2003a)	201
	Recipient: guilty of being uninformed or too informed.....	202
	Effect: informed people vote <i>Yes</i> or ... <i>Yes</i>	205
	Message: from information to explanations – no secrets, lies and propaganda!.....	207
	Summary: Passive Citizens Decide After Apolitical Campaign.....	210
	Leaving or Improving Transmission Model: Feedback	211
6.2	The Importance of Being Rational	213
	Being Rational.....	213
	Becoming Rational.....	217
	Condemn emotionality.....	218
	Ignore irrational elements	222
	Summary	224
6.3	Estonians, Know Your Limits!.....	225
	Being Realist	225
	Becoming Realist	226
	Failure to live in reality	227
	Failure to be real	230
	Summary	232

7. Conclusions.....	233
References.....	244

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

5.1	Sub-discourses of <i>European Estonia</i>	90
5.2	Sub-discourses of <i>Independent Estonia</i>	131
5.3	Sub-discourses of <i>Humble Estonia</i>	162

LIST OF TABLES

2.1	National identity in terms of discourse analysis: text, discourse practice and sociocultural practice	37
3.1	Operationalization of representation, relations and identities	51
3.2	Categories of Writers of articles published in <i>Postimees</i> during the EU accession process, frequency and percentage of annual	62
4.1	Number of articles published and analyzed per year and in total	79
4.2	Scheme for forming and analyzing discourses	84
5.1	Sub-discourses of <i>Being and Becoming European</i>	90
5.2	Sub-discourses of <i>Being and Becoming independent</i>	131
5.3	Sub-discourses of <i>Being and Becoming humble</i>	161

1. INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of Estonia's accession process to the European Union (EU) dominated and shaped the country's social reality during the change of the millennia. The Europe Agreement between Estonia and the EU was signed in 1995 and at the end of the same year Estonia submitted its application for full membership of the EU. At the time, ten former socialist bloc countries, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania applied for EU membership.¹

According to the recommendation of European Commission and the decision of the Luxemburg European Council in 1997, accession negotiations were opened with six of these countries - Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and Cyprus - in March 1998.² As Andres Kasekamp (2013) writes, the inclusion of Estonia among the first group has been characterized as a tremendous breakthrough for Estonia, which at this point was a little-known post-Soviet country. Also, the EU's decision was depicted as a great surprise because the geopolitical perception of that time held that Western organizations should not cross the 'red line', the border of the former Soviet Union (Kasekamp 2013, 100; see also Raik 2003, 47).

In the debate concerning the pros and cons of Estonia's EU membership, the majority of the country's political elite, the national media channels, including the largest daily newspaper *Postimees*, as well as the representatives of the cultural and economic elite were pro-EU. The main argument of the pro-EU camp saw Estonia's membership as necessary for preventing future threats to the country's sovereignty, and avoiding the neutrality of the interwar period that led to the Soviet occupation of fifty years (for example Herd and Löfgren 2001, 274). As Merje Kuus (2002c) writes, the premise of this strong elite support for international integration was that EU and NATO memberships unequivocally located Estonia in the West. This was considered inevitable, since a failure to clearly demarcate Estonia's location in the West would have placed Estonia in the geopolitical 'grey zone' between East and West, and inevitably into the Russian sphere of influence (Kuus 2002c, 305). Secondary pro-EU arguments concerned the benefits of economic development possibilities inside the EU.

Nevertheless, the Estonian situation resembled the general tendency characterized by Göran Therborn, in which people in positions of political, cultural, economic and spatial centrality tend to support EU membership, whereas people on the periphery are skeptical (Therborn 1995, 249). In Estonia's case, this meant that despite frequent changes of government in 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, the national policy aimed at attaining EU

¹ Malta and Cyprus also applied for EU membership at the time.

² Negotiations began in 2000 with the other six countries.

membership as soon as possible remained constant (Raik 2003, 44, 47). Nevertheless, the public opinion towards Estonia's EU membership during the accession process was quite critical³ (for example Vetik 2003, 257-258, 261; Pettai 2005, 42, 45-47; Feldman 2001, 8 and Berg 2002, 118-119). In the referendum on EU membership in 2003 67% voted *Yes* and 33% voted *No* (turnout for the referendum was 64%). These were the lowest pro-EU accession votes (along with Latvia) among candidate countries at the time.

Due to the cleavage between the official aim to join the EU as soon as possible and critical public opinion that made the result of the referendum far from certain (Raik 2003, 47), a range of studies were conducted during the accession process to find out the reasons for the low level of EU support. These studies showed that Estonian public opinion was reflecting continuous distrust towards the political elite, and therefore saw the EU accession process as a 'project of the elite' (Raik 2001, 63; Vetik 2003, 262-263; Pettai 2005, 43-44, 51; Sikk and Ehin 2005, 29-30, 36). Also, the image of Estonia as a successful reform country depicted by various international actors (including EU representatives) in the international arena was not appreciated in the same way inside the country (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2002, 43, 46; Lauristin 2003 and Raik 2003, 188). One of the reasons for the low level of support was concern about the effects of international integration on Estonia's sovereignty (for example Kuus 2002b, 394). Last but not least, on the basis of the semiotic model indicating interaction as a basis of identity, Raivo Vetik (2003, 266) points out that due to the absence of dialogue between Estonia and the EU, the latter was perceived as a possible threat, which led to a reactive identity in the form of confrontation with the EU (see also Vetik et al. 2006).

In view of seeing the public discussion and public opinion tightly interlinked as well as taking into account that the Estonian media was the most important information channel for the public in relation to the EU accession process (Kaasik 2001; see also Sikk and Ehin 2005, 31-32), it is rather surprising that systematic analysis of Estonian media from this period are rare. More precisely, instead of studying the national debates as fields of political action, the tendency has rather been to reify the dominant narratives of the political elites, as Sami Moisio (2006, 444) characterizes the process in a range of candidate countries. This kind of approach ignores the idea that Estonia's EU accession process can be seen as a period of rapid and continuous change in society and that the media had a significant role in reflecting the changes (Fairclough 1995, 61). As "a sensitive barometer of sociocultural change" (Fairclough 1995, 52) media texts enable scholars to scrutinize and draw conclusions about wider societal patterns and changes (for example Kunelius 1996, 393-394 and Kantola et al. 1998, 8).

Nevertheless, a few media studies conducted during the access process do focus on the ongoing public discussion (Talts and Kirch 1998; Talts 2000;

³ A remarkable number of the people did not have a clear position on the *Yes/No* question. Kristi Raik (2001, 63) coined the term "euro apathy" to characterize the phenomenon.

Talts 2002 and Raik 2003, 155-199). These studies have been largely structured on the basis of a *Yes/No* axis, with a rationale of promoting the accession process by making visible the characteristics and problems related to the EU-themed public discussion of that time.

The aim of the current study is to conduct a systematic media analysis of the largest Estonian daily newspaper *Postimees* focusing on the period of the country's accession process. The period is framed in this research from the decision made by Luxembourg European Council in 1997⁴ to start the accession negotiations until Estonia's accession referendum in 2003. Apart from these two significant years, 1998 and 2002 (respectively the start and end of the accession negotiations) have been chosen for empirical analysis. *Postimees*, as Estonia's oldest, largest and most stable daily paper, has uniquely in Estonia been published in one form or another since the middle of 19th century and offers fruitful empirical data. During Estonia's EU accession process, *Postimees*, like all Estonian language national daily newspapers, openly supported EU membership. This fact allows, to a certain extent, to extend the generalization of the results of this study to the rest of Estonia's mother-tongue national papers.⁵

However, instead of examining the campaigns for the *Yes/No* issue, the analysis focuses on the relationship between the EU and Estonia from the perspective of constructing national identity, which is a common denominator closely related to both Estonia's accession process as well as the role of the media in contemporary society. Finnish scholars Mikko Lagerspetz and Henri Vogt (2004, 80-81) write that in Estonia the post-socialist reforms necessary for the EU accession were made possible by connecting these to the national identity and by doing so achieving consensus (see also Lagerspetz 1999, 388 and Raik 2003, 64). For example, integration with Western-based political structures was explicitly legitimized by referring to inherited 'Europeanness' (Berg 2002, 115) and interpreting the developments as a return to previous stages in history (Lagerspetz 1999, 377). Consequently, identity used for instrumental purpose (Mole 2007a, 9), is seen as distinct from, and therefore not 'spoilt' by, the EU accession process.

However, on the basis of the understanding that media constructs and continuously (re)-negotiates national identity (Mole 2007a, 4), this study does not scrutinize identity as a ready-made concept *used* during EU accession process. Instead the research design involves the role of the media in constructing national identity. I will start from the relationship between the media and the national identity and will then elaborate the characteristics of Estonian national identity constructed in and by the media during the EU accession process in relation to the EU.

⁴ The beginning of the accession process could be counted also from 1995 when the Europe Agreement between Estonia and the EU was concluded.

⁵ While Estonian language newspapers dominate, Russian language newspapers serve the sizable Russian speaking minority (ca 1/3 of the whole population).

1.1 NATIONAL IDENTITY, MEDIA AND DISCOURSE

As De Levita (1965, 29, 34) writes, the term ‘identity’ that originates from philosophy, was given a modern definition by William James who emphasized the relationship between self and other people. Thereafter, this distinction making has been addressed by different disciplines, including nationalism studies. On that basis national identity is seen to have a “double-edged-character” capacity to define who belongs to and who does not belong to the nation (Triandafyllidou 1998, 593). This understanding enables us to see national identity as a “system of cultural representation” where a distinction between *us* and Others is made (Hall 1996, 612; see also Hall [1997]2003, 234).

However, for analyzing this system, a situation where investigating the national identity is “complicit with the nation’s own story” (Bennington 1990, 121) has to be avoided. Namely, it is important to make a distinction between identity as a category of practice and a category of analysis (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 4-6). The category of practice refers to the everyday social experience of the individual. It is based on people’s need to make sense of the chaotic world, since categorization helps to make a life that offers few explicit lines of division more understandable. By defining *our* location and that of Others in the social world, it enables us to make sense of *our* environment (Mole 2007a, 3-4). The category of analysis, on the other hand, enables scholars to depict the processes and mechanisms of identity (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 5). Here, for example the distinctions between *us* and Others brought into daily routines via language use in the media can be analyzed (see Kivikuru 2004, 37).

In this study the category of analysis is used to scrutinize the relationship between the national identity and the media on two alternative basis. The first one is based on Benedict Anderson’s [1983](2006) idea about the routines and rituals related to the print media in forming “imagined communities” of its readers. As Lund et al. (2011, 49) explain newspapers in the 2000s still delivered the lion’s share of news production and the public debate, even though fewer people in contemporary society read a morning paper or watch the evening news (see for example Knudsen 2010, 43-46). Nevertheless, it has to be kept in mind that the current study is dated to 1997-2003, which as a time period preceded the emergence of both social media and smart phones and occurred when the role of the mass media in ‘imagining communities’ was clearer than nowadays. From two equally important and complementary aspects, namely the newspaper as an actor, which ‘imagines’ a community and the audience of the paper as a community ‘imagined’, I focus on the actor, *Postimees* as a cultural institution.

The second basis for the relationship between the national identity and the media follows the logics that “nation is inseparable from its narration” (Bennington 1990, 132; see also Hall 1992, 613-614) and societies live in the stories that are told about them (Jokinen and Saaristo 2002, 12; see also

Alasuutari and Ruuska 1999, 7, 27, 29). Here, media is seen as one of the greatest storytellers of the modern communities (Schlesinger 1991 and Schlesinger 1996, 164-165). More precisely, the endless stream of everyday journalistic texts can be seen as a daily chronicle of *us*, stories maintaining the 'banal' understanding of *us* as a community and *our* relationship with Others⁶ (Billig 1995; see also Moisiu 2003a, 41, 150). In these texts, issues like 'where do *we* belong to?' and 'who *we* are?' are described, analyzed, interpreted, debated and contested on a daily basis (Kantola 2007, 193).

To incorporate these two approaches into the same study in the context of the relationship between the media and the national identity, I use critical discourse analysis. My elaboration is largely based on Norman Fairclough's interpretation that is combined with the understandings of other authors (like Michel Foucault). To conceptualize discourse, Fairclough (1995, 18-19, 54-55) distinguishes between discourse as an abstract and as a countable noun. The first one refers to the media discourse as a whole, i.e. the discourse of *Postimees*. Discourse as a countable noun (one or many discourses) appears ontologically in the concrete form of particular texts (Fairclough 2010)⁷. Therefore, certain discourses can be depicted from *Postimees* as a result of the empirical analysis.

Combining media discourse with discourses in the media enables us to understand discourse as a mixture of social action and interaction with a form of knowledge resulting from a social construction of reality (Fairclough 1995, 18-19, 44-45). Thus, discourse is mapped as simultaneously a system of meaning/representation and a social practice of meaning giving (Raik 2003, 27-28; see also Fairclough 1995, 2) that does not just represent but constitutes the world in meaning (Fairclough [1992]2003, 64).

While the media texts are seen as central to analyzing discourses (Fairclough 1995, 16), the role of the actors in relation to discourses evokes various opinions. Actors are given a rather minor role in foucauldian understanding where discourses constitute reality and determine human existence (Foucault 1981, 86). This understanding is criticized by Fairclough for placing too much emphasis on representation and too little on agency and struggle, in which actors are able to establish their visions and interpretations as right and can exercise power (Fairclough [1992]2003, 28-29, 33-34, 36; see also Raik 2003, 26, 28). Similarly to the above mentioned, I also agree that the actors deserve attention, especially during major social changes (like the EU accession process) when the role of actors in (re)-producing discourses and (re)-constituting meanings acquires great importance (Raik 2003, 27).

⁶ To be precise, instead of Others, Billig (1995, 79) talks about 'foreigners' as a specific category and not merely any 'other' in the age of the nation-state. However, since I analyze the construction of Estonia as *us* in relation to the EU as the Other, the term 'foreigner' is not suitable here.

⁷ The other aspects pointed out as parts of discourse, namely, nonverbal communication and visual images (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 38), are beyond the scope of the current study.

Applied to the current study, the role of actors focuses on *Postimees* as a cultural institution that produces media texts where the national chronicle of *us* is written on a daily basis. ‘Banality’ and ‘processuality’ of this chronicle make it extra useful to analyze the texts in terms of discourses. ‘Banality’ relates first and foremost to the discourse as meaning and ‘processuality’ to the social practice of meaning giving.

The idea of ‘banality’ is based on Billig’s understanding that media describes and discusses the relationship between *us* and Others as well as *our* being and belonging in a banal manner on a daily basis (Billig 1995). Therefore, identity ‘written’ in the media texts differs from the national master narratives, hegemonic versions of understanding the nation. As a characteristic to master narrative it is a coherent whole that organizes events on the basis of the medium it is presented in and reason for which it is told. Narrative depicts nation as a unified group moving through history as a subjective image of the continuity of the nation containing also values and the norms (see Zerubavel 1995, 7 and Pääbo 2011, 39-40). The evidence used in this process is (partly) truthful, however distorted, since narratives are plotted in a way, in which life is not (Trouillot 1995, 6). For example, Heiko Pääbo (2011) basis his analysis of the potential of international identity conflicts in post-imperial space on the difference of Estonian, Georgian and Ukrainian master narratives in comparison to the Russian one.

Unlike master narratives, explicit media content deals with everyday issues and is not plotted into a coherent whole. Therefore, for substantial characterization of the empirical data formed of media texts/content/articles⁸, I use the term ‘national identity stories’. In the current study, the Estonia-EU relationship dealt with during the Estonian EU accession process in the media is analyzed as a substance of these stories. However, since media seldom writes about ‘identity’ it has to be ‘coded’ from the media content by discourse analysis, which shows how an opaque form of power is used to construct social reality (Fairclough [1989]2001, 33).

In the context of media, the power used in constructing social reality is cumulative and based on the repetition of particular ways of handling issues (Fairclough [1989]2001, 45). Paradoxically, the repetition contributes to the invisibility of the strongest discourses that are taken for granted as matters of common sense without rhetorical devices to persuade audiences to see things in a certain way (Fairclough [1989]2001, 64 and Fairclough 1995, 45). This leads us to the second point, process of exercising power in (re)producing meanings (Raik 2003, 24). Here, I agree with the claim of Jenkins and Sofos (1996, 11) that elements like culture, language, history, territory etc. as “raw material” of nationhood are less important and interesting than the social-historical processes that have mobilized these elements and promoted the proliferation of nations and nation-states. Therefore, instead of asking about the potential elements of national identity in the media texts as well as their

⁸ These three are used as synonyms in the thesis.

accuracy and relevance⁹, ‘processuality’ shifts the focus to how identity is constructed in these texts.

This way, identity is not approached as a thing but a continuous process of meaning giving that produces a complex mixture of various views and practices on a daily basis (see also Hall 1992). Although not incorporating everything, it still aims to enable as many people as possible to recognize themselves (see also Lehtonen and Koivunen 2010, 236-237). Nevertheless, a normative distinction is made in the same process as to what characteristics are mobilized as typical for the group and which are marginalized as deviant (Riegert 2004, 11).

Paradoxically, as a category of practice (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 4-6), the ability to incorporate a variety of elements, including conflicts is seen to make national imaginaries powerful (Kantola 2010, 238). On the other hand, as a category of analysis (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 4-6), national identity can be scrutinized as a banal normative process where a distinction between *us* and Others as grounds for this collective identity is made (see also Hall 1992; Hall 1996, 4 and Mole 2012, 1-3).

1.2 ESTONIAN ACCESSION PROCESS TO THE EU: THE NEW OFFICIAL OTHER AND THE FORMATIVE MOMENT

So far, I have mapped the relationship between media and the national identity in terms of discourse analysis whereas in the following part of the study, Estonia’s EU accession process is incorporated into the same process. This enables me to analyze how a distinction is made between *us* and the Other, in the current case Estonia and the EU, at the level of discourse as well as to deal with a dialectical relationship between the discourse and the wider social reality.

As one basis for national identity, Anna Triandafyllidou (1998) characterizes the universalism of particular. Namely, “world is made up of nations, all of equal worth and value because they are all unique” (Triandafyllidou 1998, 595). Therefore, the particularity of the national identity is mapped on the universal basis, as a nation amongst other nations (Billig 1995, 73, 83, 85; Bennington 1990, 121-122). As part of the same process, *our* uniqueness is used as a specialty that enables us to define *our* nation as different from, or superior in comparison to, other nations (for example Hall 1996 and Bennington 1990, 132). As Anna Roosvall and Inka Salovaara-Moring (2010, 11) write, the early survival of nations depended on their ability to claim and defend their territory both in material and symbolic

⁹ In case of Estonia, one could depict the ‘national elements’ of both Estonian and Russian language communities. Thus, for analyzing the elements of identity, empirical data should include both Estonian and Russian language texts.

dimensions. Therefore, solidarity within a nation has been built partly on a sense of possible victory and is connected to potential and desirable superiority over other nations. In brief, usually the issue concerns positive distinctiveness, not just distinctiveness (Mole 2012, 6).

Nevertheless, it is not justified to reduce any relationship between *us* and Others into *the* relationship between *us* and Others. For example Anna Triandafyllidou writes about three types of ‘significant others’: the dominant nation from which the ingroup tries to liberate or distinguish itself, rival nations that contest part of ingroup’s homeland and external Others who threaten ingroup’s sense of uniqueness and authenticity (Triandafyllidou 1998, 602). Therefore, the possibility of seeing Others as different from *us*, threatening to *us* or *us* as superior to Others, refers to the variety of otherness (for example Connor 1993, 386; Schmitt 1996, 26-27; Wæver 2002, 24 and Petersoo 2007). This is also in accordance with the criticism towards fixed and static understanding of *us*-versus-the Other division as a fallacy based on structuralist logic (for example Soja and Hooper 1993, 184-200; see also Mole 2012, 3). In line with the criticism, this study understands both the concepts of *us* and Others as well as the relationship between them as flexible process.

As an example of this flexibility, the specific features of analyzing the EU as the Other for Estonia deserve further attention. Although focusing on the EU, I do not claim it to be *the* Other but admit that various Others of Estonia could be scrutinized. Here I disagree with Triandafyllidou’s (1998, 600) argument that at any time there is one significant other for each nation which affects the formation of its identity and claim instead that for instance the neighbouring countries, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Sweden could all be focused on as Estonia’s Others. Although the difference of these Others would affect the emphasizes of the national identity constructed in relation to them, the fact that all above mentioned are states/nations make them also similar to each other and different from the EU as the Other. As a starting point, the relationships with neighboring and/or other significant countries are supposedly based on notions of co-existence without further (voluntary) integration, whereas during the accession process the Estonia-EU relationship was based on Estonia’s attempt to become part of the EU.

In this context the characteristics of how Estonia as *us* is constructed in relation to the EU, an international organization, as the Other deserves further attention. Even though the EU has had an important role in Estonian development since the beginning of the 1990s (for example Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009, 8-12) and ‘Europe’ has been present in Estonian national identity constructions for a much longer period (often accompanied by an understanding of the EU as a concrete phenomenon of Europe¹⁰), the position

¹⁰ Even though it is easy to agree with the idea of Europe being a broader concept than the EU, ‘Europe’ has still increasingly come to be defined in terms of the EU and these two terms were frequently used as synonyms or overlapping categories during Estonia’s accession process (for example Miniotaite 2003, 214-215; see also Salovaara-Moring 2006, 112-113). Similarly, the impact of European integration

of a candidate country during the accession negotiations brought a new official dimension to this relationship. In practice, the accession process meant that the EU set the rules and norms for socializing the candidate countries, which the candidates were supposed to follow in order to reorganize their societies (see Schimmelfennig 2000, 111).¹¹ As central guidelines, the Copenhagen criteria, containing the norms in the political, economic and legislative sphere can be depicted. Thus, from the Estonian perspective, starting the accession negotiations can be interpreted as an institutionalization of identification with Western values and norms (Miniotaitte 2003, 217). In this process, the unproblematic and accepted understanding of Estonia as an integral part of Europe (for example Kirch and Kirch 2001; Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997b; see also Lagerspetz 1999, 389 and Feldman 2001, 9-13) was challenged (see Mälksoo 2006 and Pettai 2005, 58-60).

Since newspaper content by default deals with everyday issues, one can ask whether or not the guidance to the candidate countries combined with dissatisfaction with the ongoing situation and the necessity to improve society accompanied by a new official EU relationship also gave the identity constructed in the media a contradictory and openly normative aspect. This suggests that instead of the superiority of *us*, the identity stories in *Postimees* indicate the EU's superiority (Other). In terms of discourse analysis the issues of normativity, contradictions and superiority can be seen as an example of how discourses are conditioned, reproduced and transformed by social reality, and explains how the accession process as a social reality is constitutive to the identity discourses in *Postimees*.

This leads us to the second point of a dialectically constitutive relationship between discourse and social reality. Since dialectically constitutive, apart from social reality being constitutive to discourses also discourses constitute to social reality by legitimizing particular attitudes and practices. In the current case, it can be assumed that normative and contradictory identity discourses legitimize the position of the EU as 'the new official Other' and on that basis the EU accession process can be analyzed as a "formative moment" (Ringmar 1996, 83). Indeed Erik Ringmar (1996) defines the formative moment as the time when questions of identities suddenly come to the fore, old identities break down and new ones are created in their place; all because new stories are being told and submitted to audiences, and new demands for recognition are presented. In this process, where various actors participate

has been widely dealt with as Europeanisation (for example Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 1) and the 'Europeanisation' or 'Europeanness' of individual countries has come to be measured by the intensity of institutional relations with the EU and by the adoption of its organizational norms and rules (for example Katzenstein 1997, 262; see also Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 501).

¹¹ Concerning the norms set by the EU, Merje Kuus (2002b) has criticized the idea of viewing the enlargement process as simple adoption of political norms by the applicant countries. I agree with her point but simultaneously claim that in public discussion the enlargement process was largely depicted as 'one should follow the EU's orders'.

with their viewpoints (see also Moisiu 2003b, 108 and Lehti 2003a, 114), old identity stories get challenged by the new emerging ones (Ringmar, 1996, 83). As Ringmar writes:

However, since the applicability and value of a new interpretation rarely is self-evident, meanings do not replace each other according to some pre-established rules of succession. Instead formative moments are periods when meanings are contested and fought over with the help of all sorts of rhetoric and propaganda.

Ringmar 1996, 85

In this process, power relations are understood as relations of struggle where power is not simply exercised but fought over (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 24, 62), because it is not a permanent attribute of any social grouping (Fairclough [1989]2001, 57). In terms of identity, any power struggle related to the formative moment challenges the 'banality' of the identity.¹² In this process national identity is put into practice through discursive struggles in which societal actors aim at establishing their visions and interpretations of Estonia in relation to the EU in the articles of *Postimees* (see Fairclough 1995, 2 and Raik 2003, 28). Even though constructed implicitly in the daily topics and thus invisible (Billig 1995, 20), construction of identity in this process is at the same time openly normative. As an actor in forming this daily chronology, *Postimees* offers a space for the other societal actors, structures a discussion and last but not least, expresses its own position.

As a research problem I state that the Estonian accession process to the EU can be seen as an example of a formative moment, at which point the emergence of the EU as 'the new official Other' challenged the national identity discourses in *Postimees* by evoking a struggle between *being* (who we are) and *becoming* (who we should be/become). Simultaneously, in the everyday chronology of the paper a new temporary community (Estonia as a candidate country) was imagined.

In this connection, two further points have to be made.

First, the current research is a case study that analysis Estonia's EU accession process during a certain time period. Nevertheless, the periodization of these years can and has also been made on an alternative basis. For example, Lauristin and Vihalemm (2009, 5) write that the time from 1995-1998 can be seen as a period of economic stabilization and the start of the period of integration with the EU and NATO, whereas 1999-2004 stands for a preparation for EU accession, as well as growing inner tensions.

¹² Michael Billig has defined "banal nationalism" as the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced (1995, 6) whereas I distance myself from the fixed categories of 'West' and 'East' and use it for analyzing Estonia.

Also, instead of dividing time periods into formative and non-formative moments, or claiming that the EU accession process was the most formative moment Estonia has experienced, my aim is to show the above mentioned period as an example of how the concept 'formative moment' works while applied to empirical research. Nevertheless, I am aware that either a longer or a shorter period could have been chosen for analyzing the formative moment. For example, Sami Moision (2002) refers to the end of the Cold War in Eastern European countries as a time when new questions were asked about their role in Europe, and new narratives were told of their identities. This period was, thus, a constitutive moment for new identity narratives to be created (Moision 2002, 110).

In the case of Estonia, the first half of the 1990s has been characterized as a period of rapid and dramatic changes at the institutional level. During this period, a new and ambitious political and economic elite was able to launch radical liberal reforms, which helped Estonia to become one of the leaders of transition (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009, 20). This period could have been studied as a formative moment. One can claim that another formative moment occurred during Estonia's EU accession in 2004, because Estonia stood at the crossroads and had to make fundamental choices (Vihalemm et al. 2012, 13).

Secondly, this study follows the legacy of emphasizing the importance of *becoming* in relation to identity, which reflects the inherently processual nature of collective identity formation (Calhoun 1994 and Mälksoo 2006, 278). As Stuart Hall argues, identity is about using resources of history, language and culture in the incomplete process of becoming rather than being (Hall 1996, 4; see also Roosvall and Salovaara-Moring 2010, 14). In connection with analyzing this process, I focus first and foremost on the normativity aspect.

Finally, in order to scrutinize the construction of national identity as a banal process that occurs daily in media texts (opinion articles of *Postimees*), involves the paper as a cultural institution, and is closely related to the wider social reality (EU accession process as formative moment), I use Fairclough's ([1989]2001; 1995) model of critical discourse analysis. The analysis is based on the epistemological understanding of discourses as abstract entities, which are established on the basis of repetition and recurrence over time and in diverse social sites (Fairclough 2010). The empirical data from four years enables the study to focus on the recurrence of discourses whereas other social sites remain out of the scope of the empirical analysis. However, identity discourses (as a countable noun) are also put to the context of the former studies and the discourse of *Postimees* (as an abstract noun) is compared to Estonian official EU enlargement/integration discourse (see Raik 2003).

Fairclough's ([1989]2001; 1995) model of analysis is based on the understanding of discourse depicted above and consists of three dimensions. First, the text level, refers to media texts. Discourse practice means in the current study, the analysis of the production of the media texts and

sociocultural practice¹³ focuses on a wider societal matrix of the discourse (Fairclough 1995, 16). The interrelations between the three dimensions show how discourse is constituted by and is constitutive to social reality. 'Criticality' of the analysis refers to the aim to reveal hidden connections between language and power: by focusing on the linguistic elements, the objective of the analysis is to reveal the hidden determinants in the system of social relationships (Fairclough [1989]2001, 4 and Fairclough 1995, 4). Last but not least, since critical discourse analysis can be seen as a constantly evolving method (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 59), the model is adapted on the basis of the premises and interests of this research.

1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

Apart from the Introduction and the Conclusions, the dissertation consists of five major chapters. The second chapter elaborates the idea of approaching national identity in discursive terms by further bringing media institutions and their texts together.

The third chapter focuses on three levels of analysis: text (representation, relations and identities), discourse practice and sociocultural practice as well as the relationship between these three (Fairclough [1989]2001, 21 and Fairclough 1995, 57-62). The text level grounds the empirical analysis in the division of *us-versus-the Other* (Estonia-EU) relationship, and the elements of relations and identities are operationalized. In the context of the discourse practice, the actors – *Postimees* and the journalists' profession in Estonia are initially elaborated. The focus then switches to the authors of the opinion articles published in *Postimees* to scrutinize how the new community is imagined. The sociocultural practice of the analysis is dedicated to the formative moment. I analyze the formative moment on the basis of academic texts as well as articles in *Postimees*. The articles are categorized into construction and usage of the formative moment in *Postimees*. Both discourse practice and sociocultural practice are dealt with in connection with the discourse of *Postimees*, not separately in case of each discourse.

The fourth chapter maps the principles how the newspaper articles are selected and analyzed.

The fifth chapter covers the main empirical part of the study. In this chapter, I return to the text level and analyze how, on the basis of *us-versus-the Other* relations, the opinion articles of *Postimees* construct national

¹³ In some of Fairclough's works, apart from social practice, social structures are also emphasized, since the author(s) combine(s) constructivism and structuralism for mapping the dialectical relationship between structures and practices (for example Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 48; also Fairclough [1989]2001, 14). In this study, the model of Fairclough (1995, 59) is followed that includes "sociocultural practice" and I do not deal with the relationship between societal practice and social structure.

identity. I define three identity discourses: the discourse of *European Estonia*, *Independent Estonia* and *Humble Estonia*. Each discourse is analyzed at both the level of representation (in Chapter 5) as well as relations and identities (in Chapter 6).

The final chapter draws up the conclusions of the study.

2. MEDIA CONTENT AND MEDIA INSTITUTION IN TERMS OF CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Even though the link between nation as a community and the media in today's societies has been widely accepted, answers to the questions about their exact relationship reflect a range of understandings. For example, while analyzing the relationship between the media and the nation, the most crucial aspects maybe defined as media technology, institution or content. Mirca Madianou points out that studies focusing on the role of the media in nation formation tend to emphasize media as technologies, whereas those dealing with maintenance and reproduction of the nation tend to be based on the form or the content of the media (Madianou 2005, 16; see also Edensor 2002, 10-11).

Concerning the formation of the nation, modernist scholars Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson have linked common culture and education as parts of the processes of modernization and industrialization to the spread of nationalism and the birth of modern nations (Madianou 2005, 12, 14). As Gellner (1983) writes, the establishment of the cultural institutions, of which media is one, has been crucial for dividing the regional populations into nations (see also Gellner 1996, 105-110). More concretely, Gellner writes the media automatically engender the core idea of nationalism, quite irrespective of what in particular is being put into the specific messages transmitted. The core message, Gellner claims, is not only that the language and style of the transmissions is important, but that only those who can understand them, or can acquire comprehension, are included in the moral and economic community. The converse is also true. Those who cannot comprehend are excluded from that community (Gellner 1983, 121-122).

In "Imagined Communities" ([1983]2006) Benedict Anderson communicates a similar idea, emphasizing the significance of 'extraordinary mass ceremony' related to the newspaper as a medium. In the almost simultaneous consumption (Anderson [1983]2006, 35), each communicant is well aware that the ceremony they perform is being replicated simultaneously by thousands of others, of whose existence they are confident. The key aspect is the ability of the media to draw people together in fellowship and commonality (see also Carey 1989, 18).

While Gellner and Anderson focus on the formation of the nation and the role of the media as cultural institution in this process, other scholars emphasize the importance of media content in relation to the daily maintenance of the nation. Maintenance can be managed by talking explicitly about the nation (during Independence Day, for example) and, as Hobsbawm (1992, 142) explains by making national symbols part of the life of every individual and therefore breaking the boundaries between the personal and

public life of citizens. Furthermore, the logic of Michael Billig's (1995) "Banal Nationalism" allows a nation to be daily maintained in a 'banal' way.

Billig (1995) agrees with Anderson's point about the importance of the newspapers in the reproduction of nationality, but also criticizes Anderson for neglecting the content of the media texts. Billig questions the idea that a feeling of national community is produced by the knowledge that all over the nation people are performing the daily ritual of reading the same newspaper. As an example, he argues that the ritual of reading sports results can produce a divided as opposed to a homogenous sporting community (see also Mihelj 2011, 25). Thus, Billig (1995, 125) emphasizes the direct operation of the media through their messages, stereotypes and deixes rather than the possibility for a reading ritual, or the perceived feeling of community gained through reading, as the key sphere of interest.

In Billig's understanding media content has a central role in constructing nations and national identity as an ordinary process taking place on a daily basis even though the media texts hardly ever deal with the issues clearly stated as 'national identity' (Billig 1995, 93-127). Billig provides various examples of this 'ordinariness'. He points out the division of the newspaper into domestic and the foreign news (*our* country versus foreign countries), the presentation of the weather forecasts covering the territory of a (nation) state and the usage of the terms *us* and *here* in the articles as references to the nation and its territory (Billig 1995; see also Saukkonen 1999, 51).

In order to combine the research interests of the current study to the above mentioned understandings of the relationship between the media and the nation, a deeper elaboration of three aspects is needed. First, in order to apply to the current study Billig's basic idea that media constructs a national *us* on a daily basis, further elaboration of 'national identity' as a concept is needed. In the following three sections I will deal with the concept as a discursive normative process that keeps *us* together and makes a distinction between *us* and Others. Second, in the current study the formation and maintenance of the community are combined in a form of Estonia (as existing state and society) and Estonia as a candidate country (as new community). Third, to be able to analyze national identity and community by focusing on the media content and media as cultural institution, an analytical framework is necessary. Therefore, I scrutinize the whole process as a three dimensional discourse analysis containing a level of text (consists of representation, relations and identities), discourse practice and sociocultural practice (Fairclough 1995, 57-62).

2.1 NATIONAL IDENTITY AS A DISCURSIVE NORMATIVE PROCESS

NATIONAL IDENTITY AS A DISCURSIVE PROCESS

In this study, the understanding of the national identity as a discursive process is based on two media-related aspects. I first differentiate between identity stories and master narratives. Secondly, I identify the relationship between identity stories and peoples' self-identification.

It is rather usual to emphasize the narrative character of the identity where the stories have been pointed out as discrete events interlinked into a meaningful history (Bhabha 1990). As Estonian historian Marek Tamm writes, a narrative template is a very common way to conceptualize national identity, as an essential device for guaranteeing the coherence of the events of the past (Tamm 2008, 502, 505, 510-511). As a result of this process, the 'master narrative' as dominant and widely accepted story of the nation can be taken as an example.

However, this study takes a different approach towards the story of *us*. In order to distinguish between the coherent narrative templates and the contradictory stories characteristic to the media texts, I would call the stories of *us* as discursive, not narrative, emphasizing the role of the actors as well as potential confrontation between the stories. My aim is not to show how odd things are used to construct meaningful history but to deal with these odd and often contradictory things as part of banal everyday stories. This way, as Jansen (2012, 79) writes, it is possible to show that national identity is often incongruous and frequently tension laden. Furthermore, it also has to be noted that while in relation with narratives, the importance of history and cultural memory are emphasized, in the current study the stories are based on everyday topics and not historical events.

Another point that deserves further attention is the relationship between the identity stories of the media and peoples' self-identification. Mirca Madianou (2005) criticizes analyzing identities on the basis of the media content as an example of the top-down perspective and textual determinism. As an alternative approach, she emphasizes the need for a bottom-up perspective that will examine identities as lived, performed and articulated by the people (Madianou 2005, 3, 19, 48, 129, 131). Thus, instead of asking if the media provides 'social glue' to bind people together into nation, the actual question is what impact if any media have on the ways people talk about themselves and the nation (Madianou 2005, 2).

Here it has to be noted that Madianou's understanding and analysis of identity is based on the people's manifold self-identification that the media may or may not influence, whereas the understanding of national identity as stories of *us* presumes that identity is constructed in the media texts. Therefore, these stories can also be analyzed on the basis of the media content

without, however, drawing causal connection between the media content and the self-identification of the people.

Nevertheless, it still has to be noted that the lack of a causal connection cannot be equated to the non-existence of any link. First, I agree with the claim that the media contribute to creating a common communicative space where the majority of people participate and that either include or exclude (Schlesinger 2000 and Madianou 2005, 56, 73-74). In this process, particular phraseology is made available to the people for thinking and talking about the nation. Furthermore, representations about the nation, for example its place in the world and its relationship to Others, are offered in these spaces (Madianou 2005, 19, 129).

Second, I agree with Madianou's point that it is misleading to assume that people necessarily adopt the views presented in the media since they might contest them (2005, 15, 17, 129). In the current study, this point refers to the views concerning Estonia's EU accession. The EU accession process and forming of Estonia as a candidate country fits rather well to the claim that the less direct experience individuals have with a given issue area, the more people will rely on the news media (Zucker 1978, 227; see also Suhonen 1994, 47-53). As d'Haenens and Mattelart (2011, 237) write especially in connection with unfamiliar topics that are far removed from people's daily lives, media functions as a substitute for the real experiences and constructs the social fabric of people's lives (see also Vallaste 2013, 65 and Past and Palk 2005, 64). For example, the vocabulary of the accession process had launched neologisms like 'Euro negotiations', 'Euro norms' etc., that have become familiar through the media and taken into usage by the wider public.

Furthermore, since Estonian accession was decided by a binding referendum, EU related public opinion as well as the media's role in forming it was continuously surveyed by opinion polls. Therefore, the data obtained from the various opinion polls can be combined with the media analysis to reveal the potential links between these two data sets as common denominators characterizing the whole process (see also Raik 2003).

NATIONAL IDENTITY AS A PROCESS OF CONSTRUCTING *US*

The discursivity of national identity clarifies the importance of the media in relation to national identity stories, whereas in this section I will deal with the question, of how and on the basis of what is identity constructed. Even though Billig's (1995) notion of banal nationalism enables us to understand identity as a discursive process that takes place on a daily basis in the media texts, his keys for scrutinizing how it is done, are not applicable to the current study. For instance, the weather forecasts and sporting sections analyzed by Billig are out of the scope of the current study.

In principle, I could focus on the usage of *us* and *here* in the media texts that would probably lead to the conclusions that in *Postimees*, the word *us* refers widely to the nation but probably also to some other community(ies)

(see Rosie et al. 2006). Nevertheless, such a simple analysis does not say much about how Estonian national identity in relation to the EU is constructed in *Postimees*.

One way to solve this problem would be to focus on what can be characterized as aspects of Estonian national identity in the media texts. The aspects can be defined by combining the legacy of Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft* ([1887]2001) as a community that resembles the Herderian concept of *Kulturnation* to that of *Gesellschaft*. The last one is a complex and interpersonal society built on socially established bonds of belonging under the same authority and common territory as the basis for membership (Tönnies [1887]2001; see also Jenkins and Sofos 1996, 11-13 and Smith A. D. 1998, 8-24). Using the categorization of Hans Kohn (1965), Eastern nationalism is based on the ethnic origin, boundaries of language, tribe, or religion, whereas in the Western case, citizenship and state boundaries are seen as a cohesive force (for example Robinson et al. 2001, 963-965).¹⁴

Even though the *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* and Eastern-Western nationalism both aim at explaining the developments in various countries and/or among different nations, they both are also ideal types that rarely exist (see also Jenkins and Sofos 1996, 13). Rather, various mixtures of the ideal types are used to distinguish those who belong to the nation from those who do not (Triandafyllidou 1998, 597, 599; Saukkonen 1999, 144-145; Robinson et al. 2001, 964; Michaels and Stevick 2009, 228). The variety of these mixtures can also be one reason why 'nation' as a concept has been criticized for the ambiguity and the lack of a clear meaning (Snead 1990, 231; see also Kivikuru 2004, 20).

For instance, ethno-methodologist Anthony D. Smith has defined nation on the basis of historic territory, common myths and memories, a mass, public culture, common economy and legal rights and duties (Smith 1991, 14). In his latter version of the definition the economy has been removed and legal rights and duties replaced by common laws and customs (Smith 2002, 15; see also Guibernau 2004, 127). Concerning Estonians, language, education, traditional culture, secularity, being democratic and peaceful, rural and maritime, homogenous, and always lived in their current territory have been mapped as crucial aspects (Pääbo 2011, 87-96; see also Berg 2002, 111-113 and Mole 2007b, 160-161).

Nevertheless, in connection with the media analysis, the aspects also raise new questions. First, the analysis based on the ready-made aspects of identity in the media texts is not in accordance with the idea of banal nationalism. Indeed, the whole idea of 'banality' emphasized by Billig (1995) refers to the

¹⁴ The division into cultural and civic nation should not be confused with the understanding of cultural identity, separate from national identity. As Ullamaija Kivikuru (2004, 26) explains there are usually a multitude of cultural identities in society since the community is stronger if it allows many flowers to flourish. However, cultural identity as well as the more detailed difference between the cultural and national one remain out of the scope of interest of this study.

inconspicuousness of the national identity instead of any explicit exposure in the media content.

Second, by looking for the ready-made aspects from the texts makes the position of the EU as the Other a rather ceremonial one, since replacing the Other would not have any effect on *us*. Therefore, instead of studying identity as a process, focus would be on a static picture of *us*.

Third, from the methodological perspective it is rather problematic to make qualitative analysis by applying the ready-made categories to the empirical data. Nevertheless, the problem cannot be solved by choosing a quantitative methodology, since the aspects of national identity mentioned by Pääbo (2011) might not be available in the media texts in the same form. On that basis, the research could lead to conclusions that the articles deal with a lot of other things apart from these aspects, and not all the aspects are necessarily present in the media content. Thus, the question arises if, on the basis of analyzing 'only the media', any conclusions about the identity could be drawn.

To overcome this problem, I claim that it is necessary to start from the question how identity is constructed. The question of what it is made of, is secondary. Some of the above mentioned national aspects might still have an important role in the process, however, not as static elements but as norms used for constructing the identity as a daily chronology.

NATIONAL IDENTITY AS A NORMATIVE PROCESS

Citrin et al. (2001, 72-76) distinguish between three dimensions of national identity. Two of these are elements of social identity theory (Tajfel 1978): the cognitive dimension (identification as) and the affective dimension (identification with). The third is the normative dimension, which refers to the particular set of ideas about what makes the nation distinctive. More concretely, the normative dimension contains notions about its members, their core values and goals, the territories they ought to occupy, and their relations to other nations as constitutive norms (Citrin et al. 2001, 75-76; Abdelal et al. 2009, 19; see also Robins and Morley 1993, 390).

On the basis of this dimension, *us* can be defined as unique and homogeneous in relation to both the internal as well as the external Others. Nevertheless, as a dark side of this process, a sense of superiority to the other nations/countries has been depicted by scholars (see Section 1.2, also Billig 1995, 81; Sullivan et al. 1992; Citrin et al. 2001, 74; Riegert 2004, 11 and Kivikuru 2004, 24).

In order to analyze this normative process, the logic of Brubaker and Cooper (2000, 4-6) can be used to distinguish between identity as a category of practice and a category of analysis (see Section 1.1). In the category of practice, the question is about making sense of *ourselves*, of *our* activities, of what *we* share with, and how *we* differ from Others. Following the logic of Foucault, the process can be seen as an interrelationship between power, knowledge and truth. For Foucault ([1976]1980) power is not a restrictive, but

a productive society-wide network that offers tools for shaping reality. Thus, power constructs its field of knowledge as a truth and there is no knowledge outside the power relations (Foucault [1976]1980, 59, 89, 93-94 and Foucault [1975]1979, 27-28). As a result, certain discourses lose their conditional nature and get a dominant position of truth, i.e. 'how things really are' (Foucault [1969]1972, 153-154; see also Rantanen 1997, 20).

Due to the power of discourse, the construction process remains unnoticed, self-evident and hidden. On that basis, the category of analysis is necessary for scrutinizing how these 'truths' are constructed in the discourses. Particularly, how discourses systematically form the objects of which they speak (Foucault [1969]1972, 49) and reproduce the positions of subjects in social relations (Raik 2003, 26).

Mother tongues connected to national identity can be taken as examples. While the category of practice recognizes and accepts the importance of the mother tongue for the people, the category of analysis neither aims at measuring its importance nor tries to answer the question of who 'really' belongs together on the basis of mother tongue. Rather, the question is how this position has been acquired, but more importantly what are the consequences from the perspective of mapping *us* and distinguishing *us* from Others in the discourses. Thus, the issue of how the relationship between *us* and the Other (external but also internal) is constructed as a consequence of the normative process, as opposed to the norms of Estonian national identity, deserves the main attention.

OLD AND NEW COMMUNITY: FORMATION AND MAINTENANCE

National identity as a research object also raises the question about the community. Since the newspaper articles selected for the empirical analysis deal with the relationship between the EU and Estonia presumably 'Estonia' stands for a state, not a nation. However, before drawing the conclusion that instead of national identity, state identity should be scrutinized on the basis of the media content, certain characteristics of the media deserve further elaboration.

Even though various terms are used in media texts daily, only a fraction of these is defined in connection with the usage. Thus, the term 'Estonia' allows the paper to refer to Estonia as a state, Estonian society, Estonian people or a mixture of all these. In the current study, however, one more aspect can be added, namely Estonia as a candidate country. Even though the term 'candidate country' refers to the state level, I assume that the public discussion dealing with the candidate country as a community includes all the above mentioned levels: nation, society and state. Furthermore, I assume that even though no explicit distinction between Estonia and Estonia as a candidate country is made in the media content, analytically one can still deal with these as two partly distinct communities. Therefore, in addition to the daily maintenance of Estonia as a community that has taken place in the content of

Postimees both before and after the accession process, forming Estonia as a candidate country can be depicted in the current case.

At this point further clarification is needed on how forming a community that commonly refers to the emergence of the nations, is understood in relation to the candidate country. Due to the constructivist basis, I distance myself from a primordial understanding of nations that can be 'woken up' when the right time comes, and understand nations as modern communities. Therefore also 'national' is defined as a modernist concept in connection to modernization as a wide umbrella concept that can be divided into the understanding of economic, political and cultural modernists emphasizing different aspects of modernization. An example of the cultural modernists, who are most relevant to this study is Ernest Gellner and the opinion that modern society is held together above all by a shared, standardized high culture (Gellner 1983, 57; Gellner 1996, 106-107, 109; see also Edensor 2002, 2-4)¹⁵.

Alternatively to modernists, ethno-methodologist Anthony D. Smith claims that even though nation is based on modernist phenomena, it cannot be created/invented out of nowhere but is based on the myths, historical memories, values, symbols and ethnic identities that have their roots in pre-modernist history (Smith 1998, 190-198; Smith 1995, 189-194; Pakkasvirta and Saukkonen 2005, 36-37 and Remy 2005, 54-55).

In the context of Estonia, scholars have noted that nationalism and the idea of nation was emerging before the creation of *own* state (for example Hroch 1985; see also Pakkasvirta and Saukkonen 2005, 9 and Remy 2005, 67). Therefore, Western European experiences of the states waiting for the creation of the nation are not automatically applicable to the emergence of the nation in Estonia.

The same can be said about forming the candidate country. Instead of a ready-made state waiting for the nation, we are dealing with the re-formation of the whole society and state into a candidate country. In Estonia's case, this re-formation has meant transformation that was mostly targeted towards the political and economic sector of the country. On this basis, we can ask if, as a byproduct of this process, a candidate country identity emerged. However, a clear difference between forming a nation and a candidate country can be found in the temporal aspect. Nations are formed permanently whereas in the case of the candidate country, the question is about a temporary community aiming at EU membership. Thus, we have a schizophrenic situation, where in an ideal case, the formed community ceases to exist as soon as possible.

In order to meld the formation of a community with the construction of identity, it is necessary to come back to the role of the media in this process. On the basis of Madianou's (2005) division between the studies that focus on

¹⁵ On the other hand, Sabina Mihelj categorises Gellner on the basis of the emphasis he gives to economic processes. In connection with the culture centered approach to the nationalism as a modern phenomenon she mentions Elie Kedourie, Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm (Mihelj 2011, 71-74).

the role of the media in nation formation and the ones that deal with the maintenance and reproduction of the nation (see also Edensor 2002, 10-11) the current study includes both sides. From the perspective of analysis this means analyzing formation of the candidate country simultaneously with the maintenance of Estonia in a situation where the newspaper does not make a clear distinction between these two processes. Therefore, a perspective on the media in the process of 'imagining communities' is needed.

The term "imagined communities" was coined by Benedict Anderson who sees national communities as imagined because, as he claims "the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson [1983]2006, 6). In this way, Anderson argues, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact are mediated and therefore imagined ([1983]2006, 6). Anderson focuses on the establishment of the nations at a macro level by emphasizing two processes: the development of the print technology and the economy of capitalism that enabled the mass production of books and newspapers ([1983]2006, 33-34, 46; see also Madianou 2005, 15). Consequently, written languages started to develop bringing about the spread of newspapers and novels as simultaneous mediated communication to the masses (Anderson [1983]2006, 33-35). Thus, as Madianou (2005, 15) explains, for Anderson the print media made the nation possible, since people reading the same papers recognize themselves as part of an imagined community.

Paradoxically, as Mihelj (2011, 14-15) points out, references to Anderson's legacy have mostly focused on the eloquent metaphor of 'imagined communities' and thus the media content, whereas the material and institutional basis of the media has received less attention. While Anderson did not elaborate any further as to how exactly the discursive 'imagining' of the communities takes place, De Cillia et al. (1999) argue that the idea of an 'imagined political community' becomes reality through discourses continually launched by politicians, intellectuals and media people and disseminated through systems like education, mass communication and larger social gatherings. Since various authors point out national imaginaries in the media content as the legacy of the imagined communities (for example Kantola 2010, 240 and Esparza 2010), the question arises what added value does dealing with 'banal stories of us' and the 'imagined communities' as two distinct approaches bring to the media analysis. In order to answer this question, both approaches are elaborated in the framework of discourse analysis.

2.2 IMAGINED COMMUNITIES AND BANAL NATIONALISM IN TERMS OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Applied to this study, three dimensions of Fairclough's discourse analysis bring flexibility to the relationship between the media, identity and community and enable the research to focus in parallel on 'banal stories of *us*' and 'imagined communities' as part of the same whole. As a result both media texts as well as material and the institutional basis of the media in forming a community is scrutinized (Mihelj 2011, 14-15 and Madianou 2005, 16).

Here also the criticism expressed towards both approaches deserves attention. As Mirca Madianou (2005, 15) writes, the theory of Anderson is speculative, based on assumption of a strong media, not the empirical analysis showing the role of the media. Similarly, Sabina Mihelj (2011) argues it is misleading to assume that any facility of communication is uniquely predisposed to serve as a purveyor of national imagination, since facilities of mass communication are able to accommodate different kinds of imagined communities. Thus, she continues, the shared facilities of communication may represent an indispensable, but not sufficient, means of achieving and maintaining cohesion within certain group, and of spreading national imagination (Mihelj 2011, 25).

I agree with Mihelj (2011) and Madianou (2005) that on the basis of facilities and commodities of communication (here print media and newspapers) it is problematic to assume a linear correlation between the media and its audience as a homogenous nation. Nevertheless, I am not ready to drop Anderson's idea, but claim that the dilemma could be solved with the help of flexibility that focus on discourses brings to the whole process.

In this way media content as banal stories of *us* is analyzed as text level. By contrast, imagined communities are approached as a discourse practice, which Fairclough (1995, 58) has elaborated, as various aspects of the processes of text production and text consumption (see also Richardson 2007, 75). The distinction made between the production and consumption of the media texts enables the study to analytically differentiate 'imagined' (consumption) from 'imagining' (production) communities. Therefore, it is possible to refer to the media as a cultural institution that offers a public arena to societal actors for forming communities, without analyzing empirically the communities formed (consumption). Logically, conclusions also are drawn about the production, not the consumption aspect.

Due to discourse analysis, banal stories of *us* constructed in the media content become flexible, since at the text level, identities might be constructed in the same articles in different discourses (see also Madianou 2005, 25). Thus the assumption that national identity is constructed in the media texts does not mean that the whole newspaper would emphasize the nation as *us*. Accordingly, while Rosie et al. (2006) criticize Billig's claim that *us* present in the newspapers refers by default to the nation and argue that in Scottish

papers *us* might also stand for the local or regional identity (Scottish instead of British) as opposite to the national one, this study claims that instead of the either/or issue, both national and regional *us* can be communicated in the same media texts. Applied to this study, the question is, however, not about the construction of a regional or national *us* but about maintaining the national *us* together with forming *us* as a candidate country.

To summarize, even though it is improbable that a systematic or conscious distinction between Estonia and Estonia as candidate country had been made in the media content, I still assume that it is fruitful to analyze both the text level, as well as the discourse practice, in order to scrutinize the emergence of the new community. This way, on the basis of the media content, conclusions about the formation and maintenance of the identity story can be drawn whereas the discourse practice offers a perspective to the media as a cultural institution in a process of forming (or imagining) the candidate country as a new community.

This leaves *us* with the third dimension of the discourse analysis, sociocultural practice (Fairclough 1995, 16, 57). In the current study, the empirical conclusions about both the content and the production of the daily chronicle of *us* are drawn in the context of the formative moment (Ringmar 1996, 85-87) as a sociocultural practice.

2.3 FORMATIVE MOMENT IN TERMS OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

In connection with mapping sociocultural practice, two aspects must be pointed out. First, I agree with Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, 23, 26) that all practices are reflexive, since discourse forms a significant part of it. Namely, all practices involve use of language and discursive constructions that constitute part of practice, and thus the practices are partly discursive and also discursively represented (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 37). Second, practices as production of social life are related to the network of other practices (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 22-23).

Both aspects make sociocultural practice flexible and open to interpretations. For example, the level of abstraction can vary from the concrete societal developments to the more abstract phenomena. Nevertheless, the suitability of the level is related to the research object: a more abstract object indicates an abstract approach to the practice leading to appropriate selection from the network of practices. For instance, in the case of analyzing the EU accession from the political or economic perspective, the practice could be a transformation of the whole society, which has to a great extent meant a transformation in language (new terms, ways of talking about things etc.).

The current study views the Estonian accession process through a society-wide but more abstract perspective, which is also the reason the study

approaches sociocultural practice at an abstract level as the special formative time period when Estonia was 'moving from the East to the West'. This includes, though, both the identity aspect as well as the transformation of Estonian society at that time.

The literature that deals with identity usually focuses on the temporal context. For example, Billig refers to ordinary times when the identity discussion remains unnoticed due to its banality, as well as to well-known occasions when ordinary routines are suspended, and the state celebrates itself on the basis of certain conventions (Billig 1995, 44-45; see also McIntosh et al. 2004, 46). Some of these occasions can be characterized as media events, defined by Dayan and Katz (1992, 1-54) as special, widely known and celebrated occasions targeted spontaneously at the nation as a whole, as highlights cutting the everyday routine. Scholars have divided these into three categories: contests (as, for example, the Eurovision Song Contest), conquest (for example, the first man on the moon) and coronation (like royal marriages)¹⁶.

Even though national celebrations and media events do cut the everyday routine by offering longer or shorter breaks for common celebrations, they still do not make the time special. As Madianou (2005) explains, Billig's (1995) banal reproduction of nationalism and the celebration of the nation through the festive media events (Dayan and Katz 1992) are not contradictory to each other but can occur in parallel. Nevertheless, there is a broad understanding that the construction of identity becomes actual and visible at times of unplanned and unexpected moments of crises that differ from the conventional national celebrations. In Billig's terms we can conceptualize this process as moving from banal nationalism symbolized by un-waved flags to hot nationalism characterized by waved or saluted flags, from maintaining to (re-)establishing a community (Billig 1995, 43).

Similarly, Erik Ringmar contends that not all times are 'normal' but there are moments when questions of identities suddenly come to the fore. He conceptualizes these as "formative moments" when old identities break down and new ones are created in their place (Ringmar 1996, 83). Ringmar uses the concept of the formative moment to explain why Sweden went to war in 1630. Therefore, the radical identity discussions and re-formations are accompanied by wider societal changes. As previously elaborated, Estonia's EU accession process can also be seen as a similar example.

In order to be able to use the formative moment as a sociocultural practice, it has to be elaborated from two perspectives related to the current study. First, my aim is to analyze the developments of the 20th and 21st centuries as formative moment. This aim means that the discursive aspect of sociocultural practice, i.e. the issue of the public discussion and the role of the media in

¹⁶ Fifteen years later, Katz and Liebes (2007), the revised the categories to include a new trio—disaster, terror and war - for media catastrophes and disasters.

connection with creating new identity stories and submitting these to the audiences, becomes crucial. Nevertheless, the role of the media is not limited to the processes taking place during the formative moment, but also occur up to the formative moment. In this way, instead of dealing with the changing identities in the context of the fixed and objectively formative moment, the formative moment is socially constructed and reproduced by the societal actors. As a result, this certain time period starts to live a life of its own as part of the network of practices and can in turn be used as an explanatory power to reason the societal developments (see also Madianou 2005, 19).

Second, the definition of the formative moment as a certain time period indicates both a beginning and an end. However, in the current study, where the formative moment is applied to Estonia’s EU accession process, the temporal character of both the formative moment and the formed community – Estonia as EU candidate country – deserves attention. Thus, this formative moment is characterized by maintaining Estonia and forming Estonia as a candidate country in relation to the EU.

2.4 SUMMARY

The aim of this chapter has been to elaborate the multifaceted relationship between national identity, community and the media. In order to reach a coherent framework, the relationship was operationalized in terms of discourse analysis (Fairclough 1995). In the Table 2.1. the concepts of Billig, Anderson and Ringmar, which create a basis for media analysis, are positioned in the framework of discourse analysis.

Table 2.1. *National identity in terms of discourse analysis: text, discourse practice and sociocultural practice.*

	Text*	Discourse practice	Sociocultural practice
Author	Billig	Anderson	Ringmar
Concept	story of us	imagining communities	formative moment
Focus of empirical analysis	national identity stories	national communities	time depicted as a special one

*Text consists of representations, relations and identity (Fairclough 1995, 57).

3. FORMATIVE MOMENT OF SETTING THE NORMS AND IMAGINING THE COMMUNITY

In the following chapter my aim is to operationalize national identity in the framework of discourse analysis in order to analyze it from the perspective of representation, relations and identities, i.e. the three aspects of text level (Fairclough 1995, 57-58). These aspects are based on Halliday's (1978) understanding of the functional linguistic theory, in which representation refers to the ideational and relations and identities to the interpersonal function¹⁷. An ideational function deals with the issues of knowledge whereas interpersonal function focuses on social relationship and social identity (Fairclough 1995, 17-18).

I will combine these three aspects with the issues of belonging (where do *we* belong to?) and being (who are *we*?) that enables the study to scrutinize the relationship between Estonia and the EU as a representation of the text level and the question of belonging. The second question, (who *we* are?) offers a way towards the relations and identities as internal *us*-versus-Others relations constructed in the media content. In both questions the focus is on the distinction making process between *us* and Others.

Last but not least, formative moment as a sociocultural practice is dealt with at the end of this chapter. In between these two aspects, discourse practice is analyzed on the basis of the societal actors who construct identity in *Postimeses*.

3.1 TEXT LEVEL: NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE MEDIA CONTENT

As Zygmunt Bauman (1993) writes Others and/or strangers can be seen as the precondition for *our* never-ending quest to fasten *our* individual identities on a relentlessly moving landscape of uncertainty, where identity can be temporary, tentative and fragile. Thus, instead of a single relationship between *us* and the Other, there are several Others and several relationships, all of which are in continuous motion (see Section 1.2; Moisio 2008, 83). For example, Harle and Moisio (2000) write about relations between Finland and its neighbors Sweden and Russia, claiming that while Russian military force is seen as a threat and nuclear power plants considered to be dangerous, those of Sweden are not.

¹⁷ Halliday (1978) also uses the phrase textual level to refer to grammatical aspects of the texts, which this study does not analyze.

Nevertheless, the same Other can be given alternative meanings in relation to *us* during different times (Billig 1995, 81). For example, the ‘Baltic Germans’ were the ruling class of the Baltic provinces of Estland (part of current Estonia) and Livland (parts of current Estonia and Latvia) for almost seven centuries (Smith D. J. 2002). As Pille Petersoo (2007) writes, Estonian population deeply resented the German upper class until the first Soviet annexation of Estonia (1939-41) forced the majority to leave. After their departure, and during the occupation by Soviet forces, the Baltic Germans were no longer seen as a threat to Estonian culture, as reflected in the more positive writings about them (Petersoo 2007, 122).

Of these two examples, the one about Finland and its neighbors is based on heterogeneity in space (various Others at the same time), whereas the changing attitude towards the Baltic Germans shows how the position of the Other changes in time. However, both cases can also be taken as examples of the static approach. Even though conceding that instead of one Other several can be depicted, each single relationship is considered to be a rather homogenous whole. Similarly, despite illuminating a change of the *us*-versus-the Other relationship, the change does not lead to ambivalence but to a new fixed understanding of the Other.

In order to see *us*-versus Others relationship as an ambivalent process one has to include a discursive aspect based on the struggle over meanings. The relationship is seen to be constructed in discourses that can be read from various texts, including the media texts. For example, Maria Mälksoo (2009, 66, 68-69) writes about collective identities as triadic structures where between the *us* and Others lies a space for negotiations between the *us* and Others. Likewise, Daniel Esparza (2010) has depicted the EU in relation to Czech national identity as being both friendly and unfriendly on the basis of the perceptions of the world¹⁸.

A firm basis to the perceptions of Others can be found from the international relations (IR) theories, namely realist, liberalist and constructivist schools¹⁹ that explain states’ agency in the international arena from certain perspectives. It is also common that scholars who use these theories position themselves either as realists, liberalists or constructivists and analyze world political events from their perspective. This study, however, takes a different approach. Even though the overall framework of this study is constructive, I use the perceptions of IR schools as background that enables to map *us*-versus- Others relationship.

¹⁸ Here it is important to make a distinction between the EU as manifold Other and being for or against EU membership, since these two do not necessarily have a linear correlation. On the basis of the media texts it can be said that the EU might not have been seen as a good partner for Estonia. However, membership might still have been considered as the best option for Estonia as a small country in an unfriendly world.

¹⁹ For a wider overview about the *us*-versus-the Other problem in international relations, see Neumann (1999, 20-37).

US AND OTHERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Both realism and liberalism as two rationalist schools have neglected the identity formation of actors, whereas the founder of the constructivist school Alexander Wendt (1999) depicts the way Others are understood in the cases of the realist, liberalist and constructivist perception of the world. Wendt (1999, 257-259) argues, in the case of realism, Others are seen as enemies (Hobbesian culture), in the case of liberalism as rivals (Lockean culture) and in the case of constructivism as friends (Kantian culture).

According to the realist school, power is a central force and the main object of study in an anarchical international system (Pääbo 2011, 53). The distribution of capabilities within that system determine states' foreign policies by forcing states to certain actions (Waltz 1990, 29–30; Proedrou 2010, 445; see also Moisiu 2008, 87). In particular, however, realism is more concerned with structures than with agents.

Since the realist school sees Others as enemies on the basis of Hobbesian culture, they are also supposed to be deeply different from *us* (Wendt 1999, 260-263). The distinction is made on the basis of the axis of good and bad (Harle 1991, 18, 41). More concretely, the idea that the bad Other is threatening the good *us*, refers to the Other's aggressiveness, violence and destructiveness (Silverstein 1989, 903-905; Zur 1991 and Harle, 1991, 15) and therefore also to the importance of military security.

In the case of liberalism, based on Lockean culture, Others are seen as rivals whose intentions differ from the ones of the enemies (Wendt 1999, 279). While in connection with realism, it is claimed that the Other is trying to destroy, enslave or fundamentally alter *us*, rivalry recognizes the right of *us* to exist as a free subject even though it tries to 'steal' from *us* (Wendt 1999, 260–261, 279-281; see also Moisiu 2008, 88). States are seen as capable of having an "an expanded sense of Self" (Wendt 1999, 293) that in turn produces a capacity for other-help (see also Moisiu 2008, 88). Therefore, liberalism recognizes reciprocity in international relations: cooperation among states at the international level is based on an understanding that in case they share mutual interests, cooperation, for example in the form of international organizations enables to make common benefits possible (Keohane 1996, 468-470).

Both realism and liberalism see that states act on the basis of material capabilities thus bracketing the ideational factors or seeing the interests and identities of states largely as fixed and given (Groeneveld 2012, 16). While rational schools see that states favor the kind and degree of horizontal institutionalization that maximizes their net benefits, constructivism emphasizes ideational and cultural factors to the degree, in which the actors inside and outside the organization share a collective identity and fundamental beliefs (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 509-510, 513).

Unlike rational approaches, constructivism disagrees on the issue of anarchic structure of the international community by claiming that the structure does not work without actors. Thus, the international world is seen to consist of both ideational and material factors (Groeneveld 2012, 19), the

structures and actors are seen to constitute to each other, and practices of actors to determine the character of anarchy (Pursiainen 1998, 175).

Here, it has to be noted that the term 'constructivism' is used, in connection with the international relations theories, in two senses. First, as stated above, constructivism is seen as an IR school that focuses on the ideas and norms as a basis for identity as opposed to material interests guiding states' action. Since Others are seen as friends, each other's security is not just instrumentally related to their *own*, but literally is their *own* (Wendt 1999, 297–307). This means that the cognitive boundaries of *us* are extended to include the Other, so that the security of the Other becomes a property of *us* (Wendt 1999 and Moio 2008, 88).

The second option, used in, but not restricted to, IR theories, is constructivism focusing on how *us-versus- Others* relationship is constructed, not what it is based on or formed from. Even though it has been claimed that actors make decisions on the basis of their perceptions of *us* and Others (Wendt 1992, 396-399; Proedrou 2010, 446; Hansen 2002, 1-13 and Ehin and Berg 2009, 8), constructivism does not map the content of these perceptions²⁰. From this perspective, foreign policy is a mutual construction of *us* and Others in relation to each other that can be analyzed for understanding how Others and the world are understood as well as what message about *us* is transmitted to the world (Jakniunaite 2009, 119). Here, constructivism is no longer an alternative to the realist and liberalist school but can be used for scrutinizing, for example, how the realist or liberalist logic is used for constructing identities.

As a whole, the current study is based on the second understanding of constructivism, since I claim that identities are constructed in the media. Simultaneously, constructivism as an idealist IR school is used as a background theory together with realism and liberalism in forming the discourses. However, since instead of the relationship between the states in the international arena, construction of Estonian-EU relationship in *Postimees* is analyzed, the usage of IR theories as a background for analyzing *us-versus- Others* relationship deserves further elaboration from two perspectives.

First, even though some branches of constructivism emphasize that it is important to take into account "the domestic identity relationships between a state and its society and how these stand with regard to other states in the world" (Hopf 2009, 295), as well as point out the influence of the domestic discourse on state's foreign policy decisions (Hopf 2009 and Groeneveld 2012, 13), the majority of IR studies are based on the idea that states perform on international level as unitary entities. This study, however, does not analyze the impact *Postimees* has on the foreign political relationship between Estonia and the EU. Instead of that, IR theories are used to scrutinize the basis of the arguments authors of the paper adopt while writing about this relationship.

²⁰ I would like to thank Kristi Raik for her valuable comments concerning this point.

Since opinion articles are unofficial texts written by various representatives of society, one can also expect some heterogeneity in the writers' perceptions of the world that form a basis for the discourses in *Postimees*.

Another issue that needs further attention is the focus on Estonia's relation with the EU as an international organization, instead of a relationship between two states. Even though rationalist schools see international organizations as instrumental associations that are designed to help states pursue their interests more efficiently, organizations are not seen as purposive and autonomous actors, but as instruments of states in international politics (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 509). This makes it problematic to apply to the EU, which does not carry state-like features (for example Manners 2002, 239, 240), the IR theories above that theorize relationships between states. For example, issues like the axis of good and bad, and military security, as well as a possibility to see the EU as an enemy who tries to destroy Estonia or a rival trying to steal from Estonia, sound rather utopian. To overcome the problem, I will start from previous studies about Estonia-EU relations during the accession process.

EU ACCESSION PROCESS: CONFIRMATION OR CHALLENGE TO ESTONIAN EUROPEANNESS

The studies about the relationship between Estonia and the EU during the accession process, offer two opposite interpretations of Estonia as being or not being European. In the first, the integration is seen to confirm that Estonia is European, whereas in the second, the idea of Estonia as European is considered to be challenged by the same process. From the perspective of discourse, this is an example of contingency of meanings of Estonian EU accession process (see also Raik 2003, 24-25).

According to the first interpretation, Estonia's integration to the EU was part of "Return to Europe" (Feldman 2001, 9), a process shifting Estonia culturally and geopolitically West on the map (Feldman 2001, 9-11; see also Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997b). In this process the EU represents a concrete phenomenon of Europe. Since Estonia is seen as an integral part of Europe's economic, political and cultural life, at least since the Middle Ages (Feldman 2001, 10), culture, religion²¹ and history had widely been used as norms in the accession debates for mapping the a way back to Europe as a revival of historical justice (see also Berg 2002, 113).

Apart from using Western heritage to legitimize EU membership as a natural development for Estonia, it was also used to impose on the EU a moral obligation to accept Estonia and other Central and Eastern European

²¹ On the basis of Estonian statistics, 54% of the population aged 15 and older does not feel an affiliation to any religion (<http://www.stat.ee/65352/?highlight=religion>). Thus, the country can be characterized as being rather secular. Despite these statistics, the Christian background has been one argument in reasoning Estonian Europeanness during the accession process (see also Kuus 2002a, 97).

countries as members (Lagerspetz 1999, 388). The last point can be seen as an example of *us* presented to Others (see also O'Connor 1993) where Western heritage stands for an identity matter that complements to the practice of the accession process in a form of how *we* want you to see *us* (see also Light 2001, 1055).

At the same time, while seeing the EU (and NATO) as representatives of Western Europe, Europe or the West in general, a clear distinction was made between Estonia and Russia based on a dichotomy of Europeanisation and Russification as good versus bad (Berg 2002, 111). In this process, the East (Russia) was used to show Estonia's differences from Russia as well as its similarities with Europe (for example Moisio 2002, 92-93, 101-102; Mällksoo 2006, 276; Lagerspetz 1999, 388; Mole 2007b, 161-162; see also Salovaara-Moring 2010b, 54). Thus, the aim has been to make the border with Russia as firm as possible while the other borders become more permeable (Merritt 2000, 244, 255-256 and Berg and Oras 2000, 604). As Merje Kuus (2003) contends, security has been used in this process as one of the main arguments, even though rather than having been pushed to the West by a threat of invasion, Estonia has been pulled in by common values (Kuus 2003, 574-578; see also Talts and Kirch 1998, 105).

On the basis of the second, opposite interpretation, the EU accession process challenged the idea that Estonia had always been part of Europe. While in the former examples, Estonia's belonging to Europe was mapped on the basis of culture, history, geography etc., here Estonia's integral Europeaness was challenged by the official rules and regulations set by the EU during the accession process. As a result, one deals with the transformation of *us*, indicated by the EU (and other international organizations) not the simple relocation of *us* to the West.

The process has been depicted as an example of international socialization, Europeanisation where the formal and informal rules, procedures, policies and norms are constructed, diffused and institutionalized. These norms, procedures, policies, and rules have first been defined and consolidated at the European level and then incorporated into domestic institutions, policies, identities, and discourses (Radaelli 2000, 4; see also Schimmelfennig 2000, 109-112; Schimmelfennig 1998, 198-200; Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009, 6, 14). Thus, the issue is about teaching and learning community values and norms by reinforcement (Schimmelfennig 2000, 111, 123; Schimmelfennig 1998, 221, see also Miniotaite 2003, 216-217). In this process, the accession states have been learners or adopters of European norms (Kuus 2004a, 473; Aalto and Berg 2002, 264; Kuus 2004a, 474; Nielsen et al. 2009, 253 and Raik 2003, 101)²² under the EU's supervision (Miniotaite 2003, 217). Integration is conceived as a kind of graduation from Eastern Europe to Europe, a process in which the accession countries must prove that they are willing to and

²² For the idea of being learner see also in Neumann 1999, 78.

capable of internalizing EU values and norms (Schimmelfennig, 2000, 111 and Kuus 2004a, 477).

On that basis it is not surprising that the EU has been depicted as a normative power (Manners 2002, 240, 252 and Manners 2006). The claim refers to the EU acting in a normative (i.e. ethically good) way on the basis of its normative constitution, substantive normative principles. The most essential of these is 'peace', which is based on political, civil, and economic freedom, and democracy, which is based on the rule of law and good governance (Manners 2008, 45-46, 48-59 and Manners 2002, 242-244). Accordingly, scholars have scrutinized the role of the EU in promoting democracy (for example van Elsuwege 2006; Raik 2006 and Stewart 2006), conducting reforms (for example Nyman-Metcalf 2006, 111-112) or forming transition agenda (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009, 6) outside its boundaries.

At this point, two issues have to be specified. First, from the perspective of the national identity, the relevance of the norms set during the official accession process depends on how the identity is understood. In the case of dealing with the aspects of identity like history, culture etc., taking over EU's legislation, *acquis communautaire*, and reforming the society according to the guidance of the EU can be largely left out of the substantial scope of the national identity. However, as Wendt (1994, 390) explains, from the constructivist perspective one can also say that the actor will gradually internalize new identity by changing its own beliefs about what it is, while at the same time the actors are simultaneously learning to identify with each other and see themselves as *us* bound by certain norms. Thus, the EU can be seen as an example of constitutive institutions that "contribute to shaping actors' identities" (Schimmelfennig 1998, 211). This enables the study to analyze, how the identity stories (as *being*) are challenged in the discursive struggle of *becoming*.

Second, even though this research does not use the term 'normative' to refer to the EU as objectively and universally good and valuable, the EU was during the accession process nevertheless trying to impart to the candidate countries "its vision of the good world" (Nielsen, Berg and Roll 2009, 253). It was done through the institutionalization of the rules and norms (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 503) as "politics of conditionality" (Haukenes and Freyberg-Inan 2013, 1269) where candidate countries complied with the EU's conditions due to the incentives of membership and the EU had a crucial role in reshaping their political, economic, and legal systems (see also Raik 2003, 95-116). Thus, on the basis of the German example, Hörschelmann (2001, 986) writes that the comparison between East and West almost always changed into a comparison of East with West where one was ascribing "normality" to one side only whereas the Other had to measure itself against that.

The idea that the candidate countries, including Estonia were depicted by the EU as not European or only partly European (for example semi-insiders, as claimed by Aalto 2006) has been pointed out by scholars as part of the wider

construction of Eastern Europe and a paradox of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion as Europe, but not Europe (Wolff 1994, 7; Mälksoo 2006, 276; Moisio 2002, 98-99; see also Hobson 2004 and Flockhart 2008). This notion was originally invented in the eighteenth century (Wolff 1994, 7), when Eastern Europe became one of the generalized Others necessary for Europe's self-image (Neumann 1999, 143-160; see also Salovaara-Moring 2010b, 51-52). From this perspective, the EU enlargement has been depicted as a manifestation of this dual framing of the Central and Eastern European countries (Kuus 2004a; Mälksoo 2004 and Mälksoo 2006, 276). As Merje Kuus writes, various Othering processes made them appear as not-yet-fully European, thus constantly seeking confirmation of their Europeanness from Europe (Kuus 2004a, 472-474, 483-484; Jakniunaite 2009, 119, 123; see also Kuus 2004b, 194).

In more theoretical terms, this can be seen as an example of how frontiers and boundaries between *us* and Others are crossed and transgressed (Bennington 1990, 24). For mapping this condition, Victor Turner's concept of liminality as an ambiguous borderline condition, of the state of being "neither here nor there" but "bewixt and between" (Turner [1969]1991, 95) has been used (for example Mälksoo 2006; 2009 and Salovaara-Moring 2010b, 49-50). According to Turner liminality is a period marking the passage of the ritual subject through "a cultural realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming state" (Turner [1969]1991, 94). Constructing candidate countries as liminal Europeans (Mälksoo 2006, 276 and Mälksoo 2009, 67) therefore means locating them in a liminal space neither developed nor underdeveloped, neither learned nor wholly ignorant, as Europe but not quite Europe in the process of becoming mature Europeans (Kuus 2004a, 476).

While studies that analyze the accession process as a 'return to Europe' focus on how Estonia maps itself as European, here the EU is the entity that maps the candidate countries and sets conditions for becoming European. As Merje Kuus (2004a) writes, East Europeans are framed as naïve and immature entities who need to overcome the 'mental straightjacket' of communist society and the relationship between the West and East-Central Europe is therefore construed on the basis of the viewing the (Western) subject and the monitored (Eastern) object (see also Hörschelmann 2001, 986 and Smith 2001, 221). Conclusively, also the issue of *our* superiority over the Other depicted in connection with identity (see Section 1.2 and Section 2.1) has to be revised. The superiority of the EU over Estonia as the Other can be depicted from this process whereas, as Maria Mälksoo (2006, 276) points out, not much analysis on, how Estonia and other Central and Eastern European countries have responded to being constructed as liminal Europeans has been done.

The studies that deal with Estonian agency during the accession process communicate various understandings of the country's position. Gregory Feldman (2000, 407) writes that as a small country with a lack of economic resources, political capital on the international scene, and military strength, Estonia does not see that it could dictate the terms of its international

relations. Rather the country adapts to the trends spanning Europe to avoid a situation where the appeals to the uniqueness and superiority of Estonian nation would have the counterproductive effects of alienating Estonia's Western benefactors. Also Kristi Raik (2003, 101) writes about asymmetrical and one-directional process where Estonia as one of the applicant countries has adapted itself to EU rules and adopted its patterns.

At the same time, the idea of Estonia following the EU norms in the learning process has also been questioned as being too simplistic (Kuus 2002c, 302; see also Moisiu 2009, 103), even though it is admitted that the accession countries observe and mostly follow EU recommendations in their policy-making (Kuus 2004a, 478). Indeed

[T]he EU enlargement process should be viewed not in terms of wholesale adoption of political norms by the applicant countries but, rather, in terms of selective appropriation of political narratives for the specific political strategies of specific political groups in these countries.

Kuus 2002b, 394

Thus, Estonian statecraft selects the views that suit its strategies instead of just relaying the views that are prevalent or influential in the West, and the "learning process" (Kuus 2004b, 203) involves also the appropriation of these Western norms by specific groups inside the country (see also Kuus 2007a, 99 and Raik 2003, 113, 191-194).

I agree with the points raised by Merje Kuus (2004b; 2007a) but in relation to the current study, an additional specification has to be made: in the place of the statecraft, media represents an Estonian agency. Therefore, the accession process is not dealt with from the perspective of Estonia as a candidate country in relation to the EU, but the one constructed in *Postimees*. The two above mentioned issues, how the EU constructs Estonia and how Estonia as the EU's Other responds to the construction of its identity by the EU (Mälksoo 2006, 276) are included in the same process.

CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE MEDIA

In order to use IR theories, Europeanisation and normativity as a basis of analysis, all three concepts need to be adapted to media studies. To start from the perspective of IR theories and Europeanization, research has claimed that in connection with the foreign news coverage a strong nationalistic bias can be depicted, e.g. journalists tend to defend what they understand as national interests (Trenz 2009, 41). Also, in the case of dealing with EU related issues, national media tends to stick to the national perspective, thus confirming the idea of the media as a national story teller by incorporating integration into national stories of *us*. In this process, the relationship between *us* and the Other means that a nation's visions of Europe are compatible to its visions of

itself (Wæver 2002, 25). This enables the study to presume that the difference between international organizations and the states as Others (see Section 1.2) is not entirely communicated in the media. Thus, even though hostile and friendly perceptions of the world are indicated by the IR theories to analyze relationship between the states, I assume that combining these to Europeanisation and a question of superiority, offer a fruitful framework to analyze Estonia-EU relations in the media texts²³.

From IR theories, liberalism indicates sympathetic attitude towards international cooperation and EU's superiority is admitted on the basis of Europeanisation process. The constructivist claim that states form 'anarchy' (Wendt 1992) means in the current context that Estonia and the EU are seen as actors who in principal have equal possibilities to influence things. The idea about the EU as part of wider hostile world where small Estonia has to survive is based on the logic of the realist school. Despite the fact that in the foreign political arena the EU has never really threatened Estonia, in the articles of *Postimees* one could still depict the EU as dangerous, or even fatal, for instance from the perspective of Estonian language or culture. Also here, the EU's superiority over Estonia is admitted. However, while in relation to Europeanisation the issue is about the EU as an authority appreciated by Estonia, here the relationship is seen to have an authoritarian character.

Coming to the second point, I see normativity of Estonia-EU relations as a basis that enables the study to make a distinction between *being* and *becoming* communicated in the media content. Here, *becoming* is seen somewhat differently from what Mikko Lagerspetz (1999, 386) has mapped as a logic of transition: having a given normal state of society which will be reached through a teleological process and the end of socialism enables to return to the rationality of the "normal order of things". On the basis of similar logic, Lauristin and Vihalemm (2009, 15) argue that by the time Estonia joined the EU, the main task of the post-communist reforms seemed to be completed and Estonia had stepped into the new millennium as a 'normal' free-market society (see also Vihalemm 2003, 598 and Pavlovaite 2003, 240, 245).

Similarly, the issues about whether it is possible that the Baltic countries are "finally and truly belonging to Europe" (Jakniunaite 2009, 131) or, as membership in the EU and NATO, to gain Western recognition of their "European subjectivity" (Mälksoo 2009, 69) are carried by the same logic but based on another viewpoint. The scholars who emphasize the liminality of the Estonian position inside the EU do so on the basis of the EU perspective (the EU still does not regard Estonia as 'truly European')²⁴ whereas the claims of Lauristin and Vihalemm (2009, 15) about a 'normal' country are based on the Estonian perception of itself as a country who has made the about-turn from

²³ In this point one has though to note the paradox that out of three IR theories constructivism is the only approach considering identities, recognition etc. as a basis of action.

²⁴ In the article of Eiki Berg (2007, 49-50), also being in between has been depicted as Estonian self-positioning.

the East to the West in various spheres of life as part of the transition process (see also Vihalemm 2005 and Vihalemm 2007, 793).

Although the current study distinguishes between *being* and *becoming*, the research focuses not on the ‘normality’ as an end product but the daily struggle held in the media between *being* and *becoming* as equally normative phases of the construction of identity. The struggle is seen as a manifestation of a formative moment. In this process, *becoming* is openly normative whereas in the case of *being*, the norms are taken for granted as ‘truth’ in the Foucauldian sense, and therefore, not noticed (see Section 2.1). From this perspective the idea of ‘finally becoming a normal European country’ does not mean that one moves from the normative to the non-normative phase, but that the norms are no longer explicitly stated.

In sum, media texts as an indicator of societal changes offers a very good perspective to the self-perception of Estonia in relation to the EU during the accession process and therefore enables us to analyze national identity as banal normative process with the focus on both *being* and *becoming* as well as a struggle between these two²⁵. In the overall framework of the discourse analysis (see Sections 2.3 and 2.4), so far a basis has been formed for analyzing representation of the text level (Fairclough 1995, 57), i.e. the relationship between Estonia and the EU. On that grounds, the issue about Estonia and the EU as equal partners or Estonia as a party willing or reluctant to learn from the EU can be answered on the basis of the empirical analysis.

RELATIONS AND IDENTITIES: DEPICTING INTERNAL OTHERS

After having clarified the framework necessary for analyzing representation, I now move on with what Fairclough (1995, 57-58) has mapped as the other parts of the text level, relations and identities. While representation deals with the division between the internal *us* and the external Other (Estonia and the EU), this section focuses on the identification of the writers in their articles as well as how they map the relationship between themselves and their potential audience by particular subject positions (Fairclough [1989]2001, 31-32). Accordingly, each discourse type establishes its particular set of subject positions and people are coming to be placed in a range of subject positions during the socialization process (Fairclough [1989]2001, 85).

In the current study the process of inclusion and exclusion/alienation (or unification and separation) for making a distinction between the ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ citizens in the media in connection with the EU accession is analyzed. Like Ullamaija Kivikuru writes, the media shows “what kind of qualities good citizens should have and where the border with bad citizens

²⁵ Apart from the public texts, the division between *us* and Others can also be analyzed on the basis of the self-identification of the people. Even though these can be seen as two complementary sides of the same process, in the current case, people’s experiences remain out of the scope of this study (see also Section 2.1).

lies.” (Kivikuru 2004, 33). In between these two there occurs the concept of ambivalent inclusion, including the particular and excluding the rest (Fairclough 1995, 181).

Fairclough (1995, 181) has mapped inclusion as a common feature of political discourse that is based on claiming solidarity by placing everyone in the same boat. In this situation a leader has the right to speak for the people as a whole. The same has also been characterized by Zygmunt Bauman (1997) as a process of keeping the nation as proper citizens under control in a tight connection between the elite and the media. During the formative moment scrutinized in this study, mobilizing people for a certain goal can be taken as an example. In this process the main idea of exclusion is to rule out those who do not fit in the norm of a “member of the nation” (Bishop and Jaworski 2003, 250). Sometimes the excluded ones are not just improper but a potential threat to the whole society.

In Estonia’s case, the internal normativity and criteria of being accepted are most often related to the ethnic relations and the Russian-speaking minority (for example Laitin, 1998; Smith G. 1998; see also Kuus 2002a, 93). For instance, Merje Feldman (2001) gives an example on how scientific evidence, sociological surveys and ‘western commentators’ are used for confirming a true Estonian identity narrative as scientifically proven, and hence not open for discussion. She continues that the references to DNA evidence construct identity as a biological matter and loyalty to Estonia that is based on survey data is widely cited as an indicator of “Russian mindset” incorporated even into the Bases of the Estonian State Integration Policy (Kuus 2001, 16). Similarly, Huntington is referred to as a Western expert and his “[c]onflict between civilizations” (Huntington 1996, 22) is cited as a fact (Feldman 2001, 10-13; Kuus 2002a, 104; see also Aalto and Berg 2002, 262)²⁶.

At the same time in the studies conducted about Estonian national identity so far, the normative aspect in the form of keeping people under control has largely been missing. It can be reasoned with the importance of the ethnic aspects over the civic as a characteristic feature of Estonia (see Section 2.1; see also Piirimäe 2009, 45) where the nation was formed before the state. Later on, during the Soviet times the state was seen as the hostile Other against which (ethnic) national identity was reproduced. After 1991 when the Estonian Republic was re-established, the state has been widely considered as a protector of language and culture, as they are key elements for national identity (see also Galbreath 2005, 155).

²⁶ While in the initial years of independence the constitution of boundaries within Estonia (between Estonians and Russian-speakers) and the border between Estonia and Russia was considerably overlapping (Merritt 2000, 255-256) and also Russian speaking inhabitants were seen as a threat to the national identity later on they have also been seen as a valuable human resource potential (for example Berg 2002, 115; see also Kuus 2003, 576).

In line with that also the idea about banal national identity constructed on a daily basis has got less attention in Estonia than the master narratives of the nation (see Section 1.1). The process has resembled the characterization of Sami Moisio (2003a, 101), although Moisio writes about Finland, in which the identity related suppositions are taken as a starting point that has to be protected as a true national history. In this process, where no distinction is made between a category of practice and a category of analysis (see Section 1.1) the researchers and their values are connected to the selected national story that one tries to confirm through the research. Logically, this approach omits the daily process of inclusion and exclusion, in which media tell people what they are obliged or not entitled to do, from the scope of identity.

The current study holds similarities with the analysis that the Finnish scholar, Anu Kantola (1998) conducted while scrutinizing Finnish independence day TV programs. Kantola deals with the characteristics that are used for making a distinction between ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ citizens, i.e. realism and sensibility (Kantola 1998, 60-63). Realism as the opposite of idealism²⁷ refers to the maturity to understand the lack of choices. At the same time, it enables the ‘realists’ to get rid of the contradictions: they accept the situation as it is. In this way the actors become subordinate to the reality: since one is not capable of changing reality, all one has to do is to accept the things (Kantola 1998, 60-63). From the perspective of inclusion or exclusion, realism is thus an efficient way to keep the community under control. Instead of interpretations or choices one is talking about unchanging facts and circumstances. At the same time, as Kantola (1998, 58-60) writes, disagreement is seen as the greatest threat and those, who are considered to be responsible for breaking the homogeneity, are the ones excluded from *us* in order to save the rest of the community. Another characteristic feature of a proper citizen pointed out by Kantola (1998, 60-63) is the victory of sense over the emotions that enables one to make a division between rational and emotional people.

While combining the distinction making basis, that Kantola (1998) depicts, with the IR theories as a background for forming the discourses, several parallels can be found. The basic idea of the IR realism is clearly in accordance with the realism described by Kantola. The main idea of liberalism, a theoretical approach considering international organizations to be significant in the world anarchy, can be brought to the level of the citizens as a norm of being informed about these important organizations (in this case the EU). This leaves us with IR constructivism and the rationalism found by Kantola (1998) as a characteristic of a proper citizen. This combination might seem rather artificial, not least because constructivism is the IR theory that is idealist not

²⁷ Instead of ‘idealism’, I use the term ‘illusionism’ as an opposite to realism for making a distinction between an ideal as something one should aim at and the illusions that are pointless from the perspective of realism.

rationalist like liberalism and realism. However, since constructivist IR theory emphasizes also the role of the agency in forming the reality in the current study one can expect the citizens' action to have a rational, not an emotional basis.

SUMMARY

The content of Table 3.1 is based on the arguments presented in the previous sections and also operationalizes the representation, relations and identities for empirical analysis.

Table 3.1. Operationalization of representation, relations and identities.

Formative moment	Struggle	Text level of discourse	Question
Appearance of the new Other (EU)	<i>Becoming vs being</i>	Representation (Estonia-EU)	Where do we belong?
Appearance of internal Others during EU accession process	<i>Becoming vs being</i>	Relations and identities (Inclusion-exclusion)	Who are we?

Even though the EU has been widely seen in Estonian academic texts as a concrete phenomenon of a wider Europe and the EU accession has therefore been dealt with as a 'return to Europe', in the current study the setting is turned the other way round. The EU is dealt with as 'the new official Other' whose superiority and ambivalence is formed in public discussion where the openly normative discursive struggle over who *we* are and where do *we* belong to was held during the accession process. In this struggle the taken-for-granted understanding of *being* was challenged by the necessity to become something else.

The current section can be seen as a background theoretical basis that is used to form the discourses from the empirical data. The linguistic basis as another important aspect will be dealt with in the fourth chapter of the thesis. Before that, however, I focus on two other aspects of the discourse analysis: discourse practice and the sociocultural practice.

3.2 IMAGINING COMMUNITY AS A DISCOURSE PRACTICE

From the text level and the media content, I now move to the processes that take place at the institutional level. In terms of the discourse analysis, I will deal with the discourse practice, as the issues connected to the production and consumption of the media texts (Fairclough, 1995, 58-62). Since discourse practice can be seen as a link between the text and sociocultural practice, the latter shapes texts by shaping “the nature of the discourse practice”, i.e. the ways the texts are produced and consumed (Fairclough 1995, 60). In the current study, this means interrelations between the media content (as text level), writers of the texts (as discourse practice), and the formative moment (as sociocultural practice) as constitutive to each other.

From the text production and consumption, I focus on production, since I find it problematic to analyze the consumption of the texts on the basis of the media content as an empirical data (see Section 2.2). However, possible links between the media texts and the public opinion is discussed in the conclusions of the study. While Fairclough (1995, 49) has mapped the production of the media texts as series of transformation which link source events in the public domain to the consumption of media texts, I have chosen one aspect of this series of transformations. In relation to the production of the opinion articles, I analyze the journalists and other actors who perform as writers of the articles as an example of discourse practice.

From the perspective of discourse analysis focusing on writers of texts might also raise questions, since scholars have controversial opinions concerning actors’ capability to change discourses as system of representation (Section 1.1; see also Mole 2012, 1). I agree with the scholars who emphasize the importance of actors claiming that no discourses exist without human agency (Richardson 2007, 28) even though the agency is opaque in cases when discourses get a dominant position of truth. However, these two options can also be seen as parallels, and not exclusive. As Richard Mole writes, discourse can condition and constrain political action or can be employed instrumentally by political actors to further their socio-political goals (Mole 2007b, 157 and Mole 2012, 1; see also Lagerspetz and Vogt 2004, 80-81). Consequently, on the last case writers as discourse practice are constitutive to the text level of discourses.

Another constitutive relationship between discourse practice and formative moment as sociocultural practice also emphasizes the role of the actors. I follow the logic of Karsten Friis (2000) that while Foucault’s understanding of discourses might not leave much room for political entrepreneurs, introducing agency does not necessarily imply a rejection of the foucauldian framework, since Ringmar’s formative moments can be seen as periods where there is more room and influence for agency (see also Browning 2008, 60). Therefore, instead of an unquestioned hegemony and the status quo, the struggle inside as well as between the discourses can be depicted (see

also Jokinen and Juhila 1991, 36). A same argument has been made by Kristi Raik who uses the term “power *over* discourse” in comparison to “power *of* and *in* discourse” (2003, 27). While the last two refer to the actors as constituted by stable systems of meaning, the focus of the first one is on change and agency.

I start this part of the study with the position of media and journalists as well as close interconnections between the societal actors in Estonia as a small country. Actors are also connected to the formative moments that in this section are not limited to Estonia’s EU accession process only but refer also to other time periods of great societal changes. Focus on different periods also enables me to deal with the discourse practice as a process.

ESTONIAN MEDIA: POLITICAL ACTIVIST IN HISTORICAL EVENTS

For elaborating the role media and journalists have played in Estonia, I start from the relationship between universal and particular. As Balčytienė et al. (2011, 221-230) explain journalists in many countries around Europe work in rather similar professional environments: they use similar equipment, new media technologies, and share certain ideas (e.g. informational function of journalism) in their occupational ideology. The position of journalists is depicted as the one of modern professionals, “whose daily practices deploy, reproduce and recreate social imaginaries on the modern social order” (Heikkilä and Kunelius 2006, 67). At the normative level, the professionalism of journalists has also been connected to their responsibility to produce diversity oriented and sensitive media coverage (Jakubowicz and Süskösd 2008, 33).

At the same time columns, editorials and other forms of news analysis will never qualify as 'objective reporting', since the voice of the journalist is too loud or too central for them to be objective (Richardson 2007, 86). Rather, in opinion articles and commentaries the newspaper mobilizes public opinion, enters the arena as a political actor and puts aside the professional standards of impartiality and objectivity (Trenz 2007, 90). As Trenz argues, in the editorial, the journalists turn into essayists who dissociate themselves from daily events and unfold a more reflexive position and evaluation of long trends and contextualized problems (Trenz 2007, 90).

In this process, journalists can be seen as part of the (national) intelligentsia who have an important position in connection with constructing nation as a social imaginary. This leads us to the second aspect, the situational and particularistic factors, since journalism is strongly influenced by factors like traditions and values of national journalism culture (Balčytienė et al. 2011, 221-230).

Paradoxically, the particular aspects of Estonian journalists as societal actors are rather similar to those pointed out in connection with the opinion articles. As Epp Lauk (1996) and Inka Salovaara-Moring (2009) write, the role of the journalist in Central and Eastern Europe has traditionally been regarded

more as a political activist and an advocate of certain values, than that of a content producer or manufacturer of the news for the market. Thus, the traditional role of a journalist has been closer to that of an intellectual, artist or writer – someone who spoke on behalf of the people and to the people (Lauk 1996, 95 and Salovaara-Moring 2009, 99).

Examples of this activist approach have a long historical background (see Høyer, Lauk and Vihalemm 1993). Epp Lauk (2008, 196) writes that from the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth century, Estonian press strongly contributed to the development of national identity and culture in national language and served as a safeguard of national language during the period of Russification in the late nineteenth century.

Similar features are also characteristic to the Soviet period (1944-1991) when, from the perspective of journalists, the situation was rather ambiguous: while working within the framework of ideological brain-washing, some journalists were also involved in cultural resistance (Lauk 1996, 93). More concretely, as Epp Lauk (1996, 95) explains, national goals were not lacking from journalism despite official ideology but Estonian media tried to contribute to the objectives of national survival (including the survival of national identity as well as common native language) through 'silent resistance' that was mainly based on the preservation of traditional national cultural forms (see also Vihalemm 2006, 17). This can be seen as one example of what Inka Salovaara-Moring (2009, 118) has depicted as the hidden practice of nationhood that was characteristic to the situation before the national 'new awakening' at the end of 1980s²⁸.

Against this historical background, the leading position of the Estonian media during the 'new awakening' can be seen as a logical continuation of the former pattern. Several scholars argue that from 1987 until the restoration of independence in 1991, media were the most important mechanisms used for the political breakthrough in all Baltic societies (Vihalemm et al. 1997, 227; see also Lauk 1996, 93) and the changes in society could not have been the same without the direct involvement of the media (Vihalemm 2003, 587).

As one feature of this phenomenon, the close cooperation between the media and the leaders of the political activities of that period has been pointed out. The media became a network, through which the growing political activity of the nation functioned and political opposition was organized (Vihalemm et

²⁸ This name for the period distinguishes it from the Age of Awakening in the 19th century.

al. 1997, 227; Vihalemm 2006, 18 and Vihalemm 2003, 587-590). As Lauristin and Vihalemm argue

The ability of the broadcast media, with their direct online access to the mass audience, to mobilize people and to stimulate protest movements was fully utilized by the Baltic opposition politicians.

Lauristin and Vihalemm 2002, 25

For example, the six hundred kilometer Baltic human chain from Tallinn to Vilnius on August 23, 1989 was not only broadcasted directly by all radio and TV channels in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania but was assisted by the media (Vihalemm 2003, 588). Similarly, during the Soviet military intervention in January 1991 and August 1991 coup, mass resistance was organized by media in all Baltic countries (Vihalemm et al. 1997, 227).

Thus, it is not surprising that during the 'new awakening' the circulation of Estonian newspapers was the highest ever (the dailies *Edasi* 154 000 and *Rahva Hää* 205 000 in January 1990)²⁹ (Vihalemm 2003, 588 and Vihalemm and Kõuts 2004, 65). For example on the basis of a survey conducted by the Department of Journalism at Tartu University, the average Estonian in 1990 read twelve newspapers and magazines regularly (Vihalemm 2003, 588). The period has been called also the zenith for Estonian Television (Šein 2004, 148).

FORMATIVE MOMENT OF ESTONIAN MEDIA

The characteristic feature of the examples given above is that scholars focus on the role of the rather stable media institutions in the radically changing society, whereas after Estonia regained its independence in 1991, both the media and the societal framework changed remarkably. In terms of discourse analysis media plays an important role in the diffusion of social and cultural changes and is, simultaneously, shaped by the same changes (Fairclough 1995, 33, 51). Thus, the shift in the societal power relations manifested by general transformation process can be analyzed also at the level of media organizations (see also Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 24). Although this is also done in the Estonian case, most studies do not deal with it in the framework of shift in societal power relations.

As Epp Lauk (2008) argues the media and journalists in Estonia during the transition years found themselves in a certain normative vacuum of the changing public sphere, in which the old patterns did not work and the new ones were yet to be introduced or adapted. In this process both the functions and roles of journalists as professionals and the media system in the changing society needed to be redefined and reshaped (Lauk 2008, 193). In terms of discourse analysis, the situation can be characterized as a time of rapid and

²⁹ The same figures in 1998 were 65 200 for *Postimees* (a renamed *Edasi*) and 47 200 for *Eesti Päevaleht* as a successor of *Rahva Hää* (<http://www.eall.ee/tiraazhid/1998.html>).

continuous change (formative moment) where the discourse practice of media (actors) are in continuous flux (see Fairclough 1995, 61).

As an example of the situational and particularistic factors, one of the most significant changes that took place in Estonia in the first half of 1990s was a generational replacement of the editorial staff: the majority of the journalists were replaced by new, young and often also uneducated ones. At the same time the attachment of the young generation of journalists to the liberal model of journalism exported to Estonia largely by Western experts, changed the previously cooperative relationships between the political elite and the media which had been based on memories about common participation in national liberation movements (Vihalemm 2003, 589, 591; Lauk 2008, 194 and Salovaara-Moring 2010a, 115). Thus, the main trends of media development from 1991 till 1994 have been described by Peeter Vihalemm (2003, 589) as the emancipation of the media from the state and political forces as well as adaptation to the conditions of the open market.

While interpreting the new relationship between the political elite and the media, contrasting aspects have been pointed out. Even though Estonian media was seen to have been relatively successful in obtaining political independence in comparison with some other Central and Eastern European countries, the lack of critical assessment of information provided by influential sources has been depicted as common to the journalistic culture in all post-Communist countries, including Estonia (Vihalemm 2003, 589-590). For example, the leading print media invited politicians to write columns as unilateral sources and by doing so incorporated politicians into becoming part of the journalistic interpretation of political events (Vihalemm 2003, 589-590).

Thus, it is not surprising that a lot of similarities have been found from the way journalists and the political elite have interpreted the societal developments of Estonia. More concretely, since the politics of radical liberal reforms implemented in Estonia in the 1990s were seen to correspond to the interests and convictions of the youth, it was also widely supported by young journalists. Therefore, the journalists intuitively stood at the side of the 'winners' - young, educated, well-paid and living in the bigger cities of Estonia - and Estonian media helped to form the climate of opinions that supported the implementation of shock therapy in the other sectors of society (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2002, 50; Vihalemm 2003, 590-591 and Vihalemm and Lauristin 2004, 21-22).

The supportive attitude of the Estonian media towards the EU throughout the accession process can be seen as one example of the same phenomenon. According to opinion polls, Estonia's accession to the EU was supported the most by the 'winners'. Thus, the profile of the pro-EU side was rather similar to that of the new generation of journalists working in the national dailies.

At the same time the support can also be interpreted from a universalist perspective. This perspective enables the study to point out the general tendency that, especially in connection with the foreign reporting, the political

elite and the national media tend to understand and map the idea of 'national' in a similar way (for example Riegert 2010, 199). In the current case the common understanding among journalists and the political elite (as well as other elites) means that EU accession is seen to be in accordance to Estonia's interests.

While changing the perspective from the media to the audience, the key changes at the end of 1980s and beginning of 1990s were the simultaneous reduction in subscription figures and the public trust in the media. For instance, between 1990 and 1995, the circulation of Estonian national dailies fell by more than a factor of 3.5 (Vihalemm 2003, 592). However, the shrinking circulation did not mean an equally dramatic decrease in readers, since instead of subscribing or buying papers, people started to read newspapers in public libraries or at work, borrowed them from neighbors or friends, and also began to read the news on the Internet (Vihalemm 2003, 592). During the first years of 2000s only about 5-10 per cent did not read any newspapers at all, whereas 25-30 per cent did not read newspapers regularly (Vihalemm 2006, 21).

In the context of trust towards the Estonian media, Peeter Vihalemm (2003) contends that complaints in the media about the alienation of politicians from ordinary people had diminished the public trust in politics and politicians. However, as part of the same process, the media became embroiled by the growing cynicism of the public. As a result, public opinion polls indicated that trust in the media had fallen sharply between 1995-2002 (Vihalemm 2003, 596-597).

The same process can be interpreted on the basis of the distinction made by Fairclough (1995, 46) between social relations and social representations. Fairclough writes that these two can be at odds to each other: the media's cynicism towards the political elite can be accompanied by legitimizing their agenda. As Kristi Raik (2003, 160) writes, Estonian media has been both too critical and not critical enough towards the political elite: it has been critical towards politics and politicians but not offered much substantive criticism of the government activities. Last but not least, in relation to the EU accession process it has to be added that concerning the information and knowledge about the EU, media was still seen as the most important source in the public opinion polls (for example Kaasik 2001).

THE NEWSPAPER *POSTIMEES*

The historical continuity of *Postimees*, being published in one form or another since the middle of 19th century is unique in Estonia. The paper is a successor to *Perno Postimees* which was established in 1857. In 1891, *Postimees* became first Estonian daily (Saks 2002, 196). During the Soviet time the paper was published under the title *Edasi*.

In the current form, during the privatization process that encompassed the nation's entire business sector following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Paju

2004, 29), *Edasi* became the first privatized paper (the employees took control), and was renamed *Postimees*. Later on the shares were bought by Heldur Tõnisson, an Estonian businessman from Switzerland and the son of Jaan Tõnisson who had been in the interwar years both an Estonian politician as well as the principle owner and editor-in-chief of *Postimees*. When, in the second half of 1990s foreign capital flowed into the Estonian media market (Vihalemm 2003, 592), the Norwegian company *Schibsted* bought 92% of the *Postimees* shares in 1998 (Saks 2002, 195-196).

Characteristically in the first half of 1990s, several newspapers were established in Estonia (for example *Hommikuleht* in 1993 and *Eesti Sõnumid* in 1994), but rapidly became bankrupt or merged with other media. Neither *Hommikuleht* nor *Eesti Sõnumid* were published after 1995. Overall, the media market in the second half of the 1990s experienced a reduction of national newspapers from six national dailies in Estonian to four: two political national dailies, one business paper and one 'yellow newspaper' (Vihalemm 2003, 592, 595). The short life cycle of the papers is at least partly explained by the small size of the Estonian media market: of Estonia's circa 1.5 million³⁰ inhabitants some 950 000 are Estonian-speakers (Vihalemm, Lauk and Lauristin 1997, 232).

Unlike any other Estonian national daily newspaper, not only did *Postimees* avoid involvement in any mergers but has maintained a stable position in the national newspaper market, which currently consists of *Postimees* and *Eesti Päevaleht* (both Estonian-language national dailies), *Äripäev* (focusing on business and economic issues) and *Õhtuleht* ('evening edition' paper; *Sõnumileht* and *Õhtuleht* merged in 2000 into the *SL-Õhtuleht*). In November 2005, a Russian language version of *Postimees* was established. This version contains both Russian language translations of the parent paper's articles as well as some original Russian language articles (PM, 04.11.2005).

WRITERS OF POSTIMEES

While in the previous sections, Estonian media in general, *Postimees* in specific and the role of Estonian journalists have been elaborated, one aspect that deserves attention in relation to analyzing the opinion articles is the forum offered by the paper. I agree with the aforementioned claims above that in the context of opinion articles, the ideals of objective journalism step aside from the media as a political actor and the paper performs as an arena for the wider public discussion (for example Eide and Hernes 1987 cited in Haavisto 2011, 14-15). Therefore, opinion articles can be seen as easily comparable empirical data produced in a more or less similar form (expressing opinion) about issues that are considered to be sufficiently important to give them further coverage

³⁰ The population has decreased since 1997. At the beginning of 2015, the population was close to 1.3 million (<http://www.stat.ee/12808>).

and deeper analysis on the editorial pages. Since the opinion articles are written by various societal actors they enable the study to analyze opinions expressed by a variety of societal groups.

Paradoxically, the limitations of the media as an arena also become visible in relation to the opinion articles, since the decision about what to publish is still made in the newsroom and not everybody gets access to the forum offered by the paper. Writer-wise, in case of the national media, the question largely concerns the overrepresentation of elites compared to the common people as those can express themselves in the letters to the editor. Accordingly, in relation to substance, the question concerns sticking to the mainstream positions that at the same time set parameters to the public discussion. More concretely, accepting certain statements as mainstream, relevant and natural means that that others have been de-legitimized as marginal and irrelevant (Kuus 2003, 574; see also Feldman 2001, 9). Therefore, in terms of discourses, dominant does not mean any unanimous understanding about things but a lack of credible competing discourses (Harle and Moisiu 2002, 46). Since from the perspective of democracy the question of being represented or excluded is highly relevant, it will be dealt with later in the thesis.

I start the analysis of the writers of *Postimees* with the categorization for dividing them into groups. This is a rather mechanical task in connection with two categories, Staff Journalists and Readers. The Staff Journalists category is based on unsigned editorials and columns signed by single journalists, whereas the second category consists of letters to the editor written by Readers. Since the Estonian term for the 'letters to the editor' is *lugejakirjad*, (letters of reader), the genre first and foremost refers to the writers identified only by name (and sometimes the city/village and/or the educational level) without any official titles³¹. At the same time some of these people also act as 'professional' writers, commenting in their letters on various topics on a regular basis.

However, when the writers of the letters to the editor were further identified by either or both a title and an affiliation, the writers were no longer categorized as Readers. Instead, the classification was made on the basis of their affiliation. Also, I categorized all these writers on the basis of their titles/affiliations that the paper printed and not on the basis of my own background knowledge about the writers. This choice is based on the overall constructivist logic of the study: the assumption is that reality is constructed in and by *Postimees* and focusing on the production of the reality means that I analyze how it is done in the paper instead of sticking to my own understandings of the 'actual reality'.

On the basis of the titles and affiliations present in *Postimees*, flexible and multiple roles of societal figures become clear. Flexibility has its roots during the 'new awakening' in the end of 1980s, when many prominent intellectuals

³¹ Sometimes, instead of the full name, the initials or the initial and surname were presented. In rare cases writers were referred to on the basis of their e-mail addresses.

and journalists became activists and politicians (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2002, 25), thus shifting from one role to another (and sometimes also back) or performing in different roles at the same time. Consequently, as Merje Kuus suggests, Central and Eastern Europe's new post-socialist political elites included many intellectuals who played a key role in bringing down the socialist regimes and by moving back and forth between intellectual and political work, the roles of politician and intellectual became rather indistinguishable (Verdery 1996, 106 and Kuus 2007b, 244). Also the political and social scientific discourses were closely interlinked (see also Lehti 2003b, 21).

On the basis of analyzing the writers of the opinion articles, a range of examples of the flexibility of the societal roles can be depicted. For example, these journalists who have been most represented among the writers of the analyzed opinion articles in 1997, such as Aivar Jarne, Paavo Kivine and Paavo Palk were no longer represented as writers at the end of the Estonian accession process³². Other societal actors like Ivar Tallo, Eiki Berg, Marju Lauristin, Igor Gräzin, Marko Mihkelson, Rein Taagepera, Ene Ergma and Jaan Leetsaar, were characterized in different years of the EU accession as professors/academic persons or as members of parliament and representatives of a certain party.

While analyzing this dual role of Estonian intellectuals and politicians, as a background feature, one also has to take into account the society's low trust towards politicians and political institutions during the EU accession process vis-à-vis the high credibility of academics as impartial experts, or the cultural elite in general as those who had maintained the national spirit of Estonia during the Soviet period. On that basis it has been claimed that these people often cultivated their intellectual aura and emphasized their literary and academic credentials in the political sphere (Kuus 2007b, 241). Therefore, being politically active but as an outsider of formal politics, the intellectual rather than the politician has been seen as an important source of legitimacy (Kuus 2007b, 242-245 and Moisio 2009, 106).

From the perspective of discourse analysis, the flexibility of societal roles is related to intertextuality. The concept of intertextuality draws on Bakhtin's works in which utterances are seen as links in chains, each building on previous elements and also shaped by the utterances expected to follow one's own speech or writing (Bakhtin 1986 and Fairclough [1992]2003, 101-102). Here, at least two perspectives to the intertextuality in connection with producing the texts can be depicted. First, the same people performing in various arenas during different times means a mixture of discourse. For example, academics heading towards politics consciously or unconsciously contribute to the political discourse from an academic perspective. Second,

³² The most published author of the later years, Erkki Bahovski, worked for the paper from the beginning of the accession process, but was not writing about EU issues at the time.

people performing in various roles at the same time, means an even bigger textual mixture between journalistic, political and cultural discourse.

Against the framework depicted above, it is not surprising that apart from the Staff Journalists and Readers as writers, two other large groups that could be depicted in all analyzed years were the Cultural Elite and the Political Elite. In addition to that businessmen, civil servants and representatives of non-governmental organizations were represented as groups of authors. However, in 1997 non of these groups were clearly represented as authors whereas by 2002 representation of businessmen had increased to 27 articles and civil servants to 32 articles. Compared to Staff Journalists, Readers, Political Elite and Cultural Elite, representation of businessmen, civil servants and representatives of the NGOs was marginal and/or irregular during the years of accession process. Therefore no separate categories were formed. Instead I gathered these into the category of 'Others' and excluded them from the further analysis as not being entirely comparable.

Since the term 'elite', used in two categories, can be seen as a rather ambiguous one, the question who are and who are not counted as members of the elite as well as on what basis the division is made deserves further attention. I use the term with the aim of keeping the classification of writers as clear and simple as possible by forming large general categories instead of small and specific. The former also enabled the reduction of the category of 'Others' and include a majority of the articles for analysis.

At the same time the term 'elite' is used analytically without aiming at comprehensive substantial definition of who does and who does not belong to the elite. Nevertheless, the focus is on production not consumption: I have categorized writers on the basis of their titles presented in the paper, not the potential roles recognized in the society.

Conclusively, the category Political Elite contains the Estonian President, Prime Minister, members and former members of the government and parliament, their advisors, leaders of the municipalities and representatives of the parties. Cultural Elite contains the representatives of the academic sector (students, lecturers, professors, rectors of the universities), musicians, writers, artists, composers, columnists, teachers, analysts etc. cultural figures of the society. In both cases a marginal quantity of foreign writers (representatives of other countries or the EU) can be discerned.

Table 3.2. *Categories of Writers of articles published in Postimees during the EU accession process, frequency and percentage of annual.*³³

Writers	1997		1998		2002		2003	
	N-value	% of annual	N-value	% of annual	N-value	% of annual	N-value	% of annual
Staff Journalists	143	38.0	124	29.1	88	23.1	145	24.3
Political Elite	101	26.9	120	28.2	81	21.3	75	12.5
Cultural Elite	61	16.2	69	16.2	79	20.7	145	24.3
Readers	56	14.9	70	16.4	44	11.5	142	23.7
Other writers	15	4.0	43	10.1	89	22.8	90	15.1
Total	376		426		381		597	

IMAGINING NEW COMMUNITY: FROM FEW TO MANY

From the perspective of national identity, writers of the articles are actors who participated in the process of imagining Estonia as a new community (candidate country) in relation to the EU during the accession process. The division of the writers is clarified in Table 3.2.

While looking at the representation of the categories of writers during different years, various trends can be seen. The quantity of the Political Elite decreased during the accession period, being 26.9% of the writers in 1997 and 28.2% in 1998 but 21.3% in 2002 and 12.5% in 2003. The trend of Staff Journalists is rather similar: while in 1997 the amount of the articles produced by the paper's journalists was 38.0% and 29.1% in 1998, by 2003 the proportion had decreased to 24.3%. The opposite trend takes place amongst the Cultural Elite, starting from 16.2% in 1997 and 1998 and reaching 24.3% in 2003.

The trend amongst Readers did not follow the same pattern. The proportions for 1997 and 1998 (14.9 and 16.4 respectively) were smaller than the proportion for 2003 (23.7%). However, the smallest proportion occurred in 2002 - 11.5%. This anomaly might partly be due to the change by 2002 of adding titles and affiliations to the names of writers. Therefore, writers who were coded as Readers in 1997 and 1998 could have been coded on the basis of their affiliation in 2002 and 2003. However, presumably due to approaching referendum, the effect is not visible in 2003. Last but not least, the emergence and increase of sub-categories of businessmen, civil servants and representatives of the non-governmental organizations as part of category of 'Others' during the accession process can be added.

³³ In 1997 the EU decided to start negotiations with Estonia, which in 1998 were started and ended in 2002. In 2003, a binding referendum about EU membership was organized (for more detailed chronology of Estonian accession process see Chapter 1).

For interpreting the increase and decrease among the writers, various possibilities can be found. On the basis of analyzing the EU articles of *Postimees* from 1995 till 2000, Kristi Raik (2003) draws the conclusions that during these years, the shift from existential to pragmatic issues took place that also lead towards a more active debate between the pro- and anti-EU sides. Raik argues that, in the context of pragmatic discussions, the empty signifier of “national interests” (2003, 194; see Laclau 1996, 36-46) has been more open to debate and negotiation than the nodal point of national existence. Therefore, competing groups and positions have been more easily accepted and not seen as a threat to one’s own existence, which has left more scope for deliberation and listening to alternative views. This shift in the EU debate is characterized as part of “normalizing EU politics” (Raik 2003, 194).

Even though the years 2002 and 2003 used in the empirical analysis of this study, were beyond the scope of Raik’s study, an assumption about the continuity of the same process can be made. Thus, the decrease in the number of articles written by the Political Elite and Staff Journalists and the increase of those written by the Cultural Elite and Readers can be correlated to the greater variety of topics as well as moving from the existential topics to the more pragmatic issues). Consequently, increase in both topics and writers can be seen as part of the same trend.

In 2003, the increases in the quantity of Readers’ letters to the editor and the articles by the Cultural Elite as well as the decrease in the articles by the Political Elite can also be equated to the approaching referendum as a concrete task for Estonian public. At the same time these results can be connected to the outcome of the referendum as being far from certain in advance (Raik 2003, 47) and an assumption that who is talking matters more than the EU topic under discussion. On that basis one can ask if the unpopular political elite disappeared and the popular cultural elite filled the gap to familiarize the EU to the people in the name of raising the EU’s popularity beyond the threshold of the accession referendum. At the same time this process does not necessarily mark only a change of the persons but, taking into account the close link and interconnections between the cultural and the political elite, can also be based on a change of the titles of writers.

Another possibility to interpret the developments in writership during the years can be found from the logic of building new communities as a process with various phases. For example, the Finnish scholar Pasi Saukkonen (1996) refers to the three phases of building new communities: the imagination, the naming³⁴ and the recognition phase. In the first and the second phases, the

³⁴ Naming is based on the nominalist view claiming that names are results of special deeds called naming, done by someone specific at a unique situation. The name is not discovered from the object (it is arbitrary, following the logic of Saussure) but has to be devised and be accepted by others (Palonen 1997, 239 and Korhonen 1999, 124). General acceptance of the names depends on a certain political constellation and by changing that the names also often change (in Estonia at the end of 1980s). Since we are seldom able to locate the individuals who first uttered specific names, the names can usually be

ideas are created and presented in the media texts to get publicity and to activate discussion. The third phase aims at legitimizing this process: for making a community alive it has to be recognized (Saukkonen 1996, 9; see also Lehti 2003a, 120). As Ringmar (1996, 81) writes, only after being recognized can we conclusively establish a certain identity.

Even though in the current study, the question is not about the construction of a new community in a classical sense (as a nation or a region), we can still talk about the construction of Estonia as EU candidate country. From this perspective, the shift from the Political Elite to the Cultural Elite and Readers as well as the aforementioned sub-categories of Others infers that since Estonia's EU accession process was initiated in the sphere of country's foreign policy, Estonia as a candidate country was first imagined at the political level. During the years, it spread from there to other groups in society. Here, the spreading to the other groups is interpreted as a wider recognition at the societal level.

In this context, apart from the shift between the categories of writers, the developments inside the groups deserve attention. In order to analyze the trends in the categories, I divided the quantity of articles written by a certain group by the quantity of the writers, which enabled me to determine the number of articles each writer published. The results show that the variety of writers across all groups increased. In 1997, 143 Journalist articles per author equates to 13 distinct writers (11 per author), whereas the same statistics for 1998 are 124 articles and 16 authors (7.75 per author). In 2003 the numbers were 145 articles and 26 authors (5.58 per author). Accordingly the numbers for Political Elite articles were 101 articles and 46 authors (2.20 per author) in 1997 and 75 articles and 50 authors (1.5 per author) in 2003. The same trend of increasing variety of writers is visible also in the other categories.

In addition to this quantitative division, I also analyzed the qualitative variety among the writers. The focus on different names not only ensures the result of the quantitative division but also shows that the process of moving from few to many writers is even more radical. For example, in 1997, of 11 authors responsible for Staff Journalist articles 1 writer, Aivar Jarne had written 56 (of 143 articles) as almost 40% of the category's total. In 2003, on the other hand, the most published single author of Staff Journalists, Erkki Bahovski, had only authored 10 articles, which equates, at best, to 7% of the category's total³⁵. Thus, apart from the general level (categories of writers) the increase from a few writers to a great many is also visible at the more specific level (inside each category).

studied as symbols of collective subjectivity (Korhonen 1999, 124).

³⁵ In 2003, almost 60% of Staff Journalists articles were editorials authored by "*Postimees*" (84 of 145).

SUMMARY

The aim of this part of the study was to operationalize the concept of discourse practice both in relation to the text as well as to the formative moment as a sociocultural practice. Especially in the latter case, a clear connection can be seen: Estonian media institutions have been strongly influenced by societal changes and vice versa.

In order to map the relevant developments of discourse practice, I did not restrict the focus to just the EU accession process. The historical background and longer societal processes were also examined, as other potential formative moments relevant for interpreting the EU enlargement. In this context, depicting the Political Elite and the Cultural Elite as the two most represented groups of writers apart from Staff Journalists and the Readers is not a surprising phenomenon. Rather it can be connected to both the close-knit interrelations which the intelligentsia and the political leadership of Estonia have had at individual levels since the 'new awakening' as well as to the substantial importance of Estonian intelligentsia linked to political events.

On the basis of analyzing the categories of writers present in *Postimees*, the spread of the ideas from the rather narrow circle of the political elite and journalists to the wider public can be depicted. For example, during the accession process the category of Staff Journalists expanded from being dominated by a single 'expert' (Aivar Jarne) to a broad variety of writers. This indicates that a new community, Estonia as EU candidate country, had been imagined and recognized.

3.3 FORMATIVE MOMENT AS A SOCIOCULTURAL PRACTICE

In this section, sociocultural practice, the third dimension of Fairclough's discourse analysis, in a form of the formative moment is operationalized and applied to the current study. Fairclough (1995) maps sociocultural practice as economic, political and cultural practices occurring at situational, institutional and societal levels. These mean specific social events that the discourse is part of, i.e. the institutional frameworks that the discourse occurs within and the wider societal matrix of the discourse (Fairclough [1989]2001, 20-21 and Fairclough 1995, 16, 62). In the current study, the most relevant of these is the situational context of political and cultural practice that the discourses are part of, i.e. the formative moment as a social condition (Fairclough [1989]2001, 21).

The concept 'formative moment' refers to a period during which traditional identity stories are revised and challenged by new ones (Ringmar 1996, 83). A similar phenomenon has also been characterized by other scholars, who have used a range of terms. For example Anna Triandafyllidou (1998, 603) writes about the periods of instability and crisis when the boundaries of ingroup become unstable. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 909) refer to world historical

events (like major wars or depressions) that lead to a search for new ideas and norms for mapping the world (see also Browning 2008, 59). Alexander Wendt (1999) uses the moment of reflexivity for depicting cases when collectives become aware of the social kinds they constitute, and move to change them. As Wendt (1999, 76) claims, if a social kind can “know itself” then it may also be able to recall its human authorship and create new social kinds. In the context of Estonia, Kristi Raik (2003, 27) writes about the periods of change when competition between alternative meanings of social practices and institutions takes place and old conceptions are re-evaluated. In media studies, Ullamaija Kivikuru (1996b, 23) characterizes the checkpoints or intermediate spaces related to the Finnish accession to the EU as deviant from the ‘normal situation’ (see also Kivikuru 1996a, 401).

At the same time, different origins and understandings for the term “formative moment” Jonsson (2006) suggests the Swedish political scientist Bo Rothstein (1992, 173-174) coined the term to explain the possibilities political actors have under certain periods to change institutional parameters or the nature of political systems.

The key aspect is not, which definition is the original, but the difference between them. Ringmar (1996) sees identities as the main reasons for human action. Thus, he focuses on the formative moment while exploring the relationship between identity and foreign policy, more specifically on *us* and the Other in foreign policy (see also Neumann 1999, 222-225). By contrast, Rothstein (1992, 174) deals with the “the rules of the game” in domestic policy, and attempts to explain why Sweden's political system became highly corporatist. Nevertheless, Rothstein’s formative moment (in the early 1930s) is clearly shorter than Ringmar’s that lasts from 1520-1630 (see also Neumann 1999, 224).

Since from the perspective of the current study, Ringmar’s (1996) understanding of the formative moment is clearly more suitable, I will focus on this and deal next with its usage in a range of, mostly foreign policy related studies. I will then depict the relationship between the formative moment and the media. Finally, I will analyze how a certain time period becomes significant in the newspaper articles of *Postimees* in the context of the EU and how this special period is then used for arguing different issues (see Section 3.2).

VARIOUS FLEXIBLE FORMATIVE MOMENTS

Several studies have depicted alternative periods as formative moments. Concerning the more distant history, Anni Kangas (2008, 232) contends the somewhat surprising independence of Finland from the Russian Empire in 1917, which was followed by a bloody civil war in spring 1918 can be constituted as a political crisis and an epoch of a formative moment in the Finnish political imaginary on Russia. In the context of more recent history, Sengueler (2009/2010, 39) suggests the post-WWII situation, often referred to, in German history, as a new beginning (*Stunde Null*), has been analyzed as

a formative moment that has led to a complete break with the German Nazi past and the reinterpretation of Germanness.

From an even more recent period, several scholars analyze the decade of 1990s as a formative moment in the Baltic Sea region. For example, Musial (2009, 293) claims that the 1990s constituted a formative moment for the Baltic Sea region, as a decade when the region was depicted as sharing a common historical experience. Similarly, Sami Moisio (2006, 442) argues the end of the Cold War may be regarded as a formative moment that not only opened up space for the reorganization of national narratives, but also challenged the prevailing assumptions and generated political struggles within the new independent states like Estonia and previously neutral states like Finland.

At the same time, the period following EU and NATO accession in the first half of 2000s has been dealt with as a formative moment. Christopher Browning (2005, 1-2) writes that as a result of the unfolding formative moment, all those understandings, policies and orientations, which developed during the post-Cold War period are in need of revision (see also Browning and Joenniemi 2004, 229).

Apart from the nations located around the Baltic Sea, similar processes are also depicted in the other regions during the same period. In the former Yugoslavia, Ferreira (2006, 148) deals with Kusturica's movie "Underground" as an example of narrating the nation at a distinctive historical juncture, conceptualized as a formative moment that runs since Tito's death to the 1990s. Michel-André Horelt and Judith Renner (2008) depict a formative moment in Croatia in relation to analyzing identity constructions in 1990s from the perspective of foreign policy.

In connection with international organizations, EU enlargement has been studied as a formative moment (Moisio 2009, 99-100) whereas the events of 9/11 have been analyzed as a formative moment from the perspective of NATO which had to adjust to these changed circumstances (Bolcu 2012, 30-31). Unlike Ringmar (1996), who deals with defending an already established identity on the basis of going to war as a final action, Bolcu (2011, 17) scrutinizes how NATO acted in order to project (or even impose) a new kind of identity as an entire succession of events (see also Bolcu 2012). Thus, similar to the current study, Bolcu focuses on the process of identity construction, with a special emphasis on how this relationship is mutually constituted.

However, since identity consists of various interpretations which compete and try to gain dominance (Horelt and Renner 2008, 11), formative moments are not only times of freedom and creativity, but also times of struggle where not all stories are recognized as equally important (Ringmar 1996, 151).

In sum, since the concept has been applied to various time periods it is clear that instead of seeing Estonia's EU accession period as the nation's only formative moment, Estonia has experienced a range of such formative moments. Furthermore the accession processes to both the EU and NATO can be seen as part of the trend that started from the collapse of the old Soviet

Socialist societal system and created a necessity to develop a new kind of society and find new international position for the country (see also Lauristin and Vihalemm 2002). Therefore, instead of showing the characteristics of formative versus non-formative moments, the current study aims to show how a concrete formative moment works. Focusing on some other period, for example the ‘new awakening’ as a formative moment would have also meant that the *us-versus-the Other* relationship between Estonia and the EU would not have been the same, largely because any analysis of the construction of Estonia as an EU candidate country, or the EU as ‘the new official Other’ for Estonia was not possible.

At the same time one can still ask about the beginning and the end, as well as the flexibility, of the chosen period. The issue is whether the formative moment, mapped here on the basis of the Estonian accession process, could have started already in 1995 while Estonia and the EU signed the Europe Agreement, instead of 1997 as indicated in this study. Although explicitly nothing related to a new identity emerged in 1997, the EU’s decision to start the accession negotiations with Estonia meant a clear change in the intensity of Estonia-EU relationship constructed in *Postimees*. While, for example in 1993, 35 opinion articles were published in *Postimees* dealing with the relationship between Estonia and the EU, in 1994 the same number was 105 and two years later 150. In 1997, the number of EU accession related articles was 376, and increased even more during the following years of accession process (see Table 3.2 for the exact numbers) (see also Raik 2003, 161-162). In terms of discourse analysis, this can be seen as an example of the close correlation between (foreign) political and media discourse in that deepening relations in the former are visible in the latter.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE FORMATIVE MOMENT

Even though the increasing interest by *Postimees* towards Estonian-EU relations from 1997 onwards can be seen as an ‘objective’ basis for mapping the formative moment, I still understand formative moment as a social construction (see also Browning 2008, 59-60). Therefore, my decision to map the beginning of the formative moment on the basis of EU accession negotiations accompanied by the increase of EU related opinion articles in *Postimees* is an example of how a researcher frames a formative moment on the basis of certain societal developments.

The exceptionality of the Estonian EU accession can be conceptualized from the temporal perspective in various ways. First, in relation to the EU accession process, one can depict the uniqueness of the time: the process takes place for the first (and the last) time ever. In the Estonian context this has been flavored by the argument that the ‘window of opportunity will be open for just a moment’. Second, the position of a candidate country is characterized by intense preparations and a need to make changes as soon as possible. For example Lauristin and Vihalemm (2009, 12-13) write that after the elections

held in 1999, Estonian society reached a “pre-accession situation” that is characterized by intense preparations to achieve EU accession and integration with NATO. Third, the position of a candidate country is a temporary one. Apart from massive internal reforms it is characterized by the lack of knowledge about if and when the move to the final destination takes place. From this perspective, Estonian accession to the EU can be interpreted as an end of this formative moment. As Lauristin and Vihalemm (2009, 15) suggest, by the time Estonia joined the EU, the break with the communist political and economic order and establishment of the new (capitalist) free-market economy seemed to have been completed.

In the media analysis, societal crises have been analyzed as an example of special times. For instance Sabina Mihelj (2011, 5-6) writes about the national crisis-conflict situation where the media – politics relationship tightens, the media abandons temporarily professional routines of reporting and journalists adopt a patriotic stance. In the framework of the current study, the national crisis-conflict situation can be seen as one potential aspect of the formative moment. Simultaneously, as a time when new identity stories emerge, a formative moment can also be interpreted from the perspective of new possibilities or a mixture of both crisis and options. Since the study interprets the formative moment as a sociocultural practice, the various interpretations are related to the logic of the discourses and a range of understandings of actors.

Approaching formative moment as a construction enables the study to focus on another part of the two-way process. While a certain period is depicted on the basis of the societal developments as a special time, one also starts to interpret other societal trends through the prism of this formative moment. Since time is neither dependent on people nor can it be controlled by human agency, a certain moment in time as an exceptional period can be used for legitimizing and naturalizing particular societal trends as natural processes.

An example of how the specialty of time is used as a combination of political and ideological practices for naturalizing certain processes and producing ‘facts’ can be taken from the article of Lauristin and Vihalemm (2009). The authors argue that the pre-accession atmosphere contributed to the marginalization of socially oriented political choices:

The focus of the Maastricht criteria on market liberalization had much stronger effects on domestic policy than the comparatively weak and patchy ‘social dimension’ of the Copenhagen criteria. The high bureaucratic pressure supported technocratic elitism, and weakened even further the democratic mechanisms of social accountability.

Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009, 12

Thus, a ‘spiral of silence’ surrounded the opposition to the reforms, and as a result the majority of Estonian society accepted shock therapy as the only safe

way to get out of Russia's sphere of economic influence (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009, 11). From the perspective of agency, this means that the groups with the weaker social and economic positions were politically marginalized. By contrast the new, young entrepreneurial groups together with representatives of the middle-aged managerial class, formed the new capitalist elite (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009, 20).

Since the current study focuses on the media, the role of the media in the process of forming, as well as using, the formative moment deserves further attention. For scrutinizing the media's role, the opinion articles of *Postimees* written by journalists are analyzed as concrete examples of how special time is framed. Even though the paper does not use the term 'formative moment', time is given significance to being either special and/or a unique in the articles. Following the logic of the two-way process, I make a distinction between constructing special time in *Postimees* on the basis of societal developments and using it as an existing entity for legitimizing societal developments. In the first case, the dilemma between threat and opportunity, and in the second case the emergence of societal truths, are discussed.

Analyzing the articles of *Postimees* as both text as well as sociocultural practice, is supported by the logic that despite conceptualizing text and sociocultural practice differently, as intertwined entities and example of intertextuality (Section 3.2), context³⁶ is largely constructed in the same articles that are analyzed as empirical data for forming the discourses. Thus, focusing on contextuality does not mean jumping out of the text, since in the discourse analysis context does not exist outside the text (Rantanen 1997, 44).

CONSTRUCTING SPECIAL TIME IN *POSTIMEES*

Constructing the formative moment in *Postimees* means that a certain time period is mapped as a special one on the basis of the current societal trends as well as those that have taken place in the past. In the latter case, the importance of the current time is shown by drawing parallels between the present and historical events, both mapped as crucial ones. For example, a day after the EU referendum, *Postimees* wrote that yesterday Estonian people made history again, as they have done before (in 1869, 1918, 1920, 1988, and 1991). The article related that the 14th of September 2003 goes down in Estonian history as the European self-definition of the Estonian state and nation, and urged readers to understand the greatness of the moment (PM, 15.09.2003). In another example, the paper refers to the play "*Tuulte pöörises*" (Whirlwind) written in 1906 by August Kitzberg by claiming that on the basis of the EU referendum, stormy times are forecast again for Estonia (PM, 17.07.2003). Even though, in both examples, the past is used for making the significance of the current time clear, in the first case the greatness of time

³⁶ Here the terms 'sociocultural practice' and 'context' are used as synonyms.

is seen as a merit of Estonian people whereas in the second case, the issue concerns the (natural) forces that occasionally make time special.

Apart from drawing parallels between the remarkable times of past and present as in the previous cases, experiences of the past are also used as a background by *Postimees* to show the present time as truly exceptional. An example can be found in connection with starting the accession negotiations in 1998 when the paper claims: "But this time the sun should rise from the west."³⁷ (PM, 03.04.1998). This example, crystallized to one sentence only can be analyzed from both geographical as well as temporal aspects. The author uses the East-West division for referring to the symbolic act of moving from one to another. Nevertheless, the exceptionality of the case is communicated by claiming that the sun should rise from the west as an extraordinary event, breaking the laws of nature, and also being out of the scope of any human actors.

In various examples, the singularity of time was emphasized by using the expression '(n)ever before'. As the paper claims in the beginning of 1997, the duty of Estonian foreign policy is clearer than ever before (PM, 07.01.1997). Another article stated that even though EU membership implies Estonia gave an illusorily part of its sovereignty to Europe, Estonia in fact became a more sovereign state than ever before in its history³⁸ (PM, 14.12.1997). Other similar examples that emphasize '(n)ever before' can be found in connection with organizing the EU referendum (PM, 03.11.1998) and referring to the year 1997 as being more successful in the context of Estonian foreign policy than any other year (PM, 22.12.1997). Also, the five years of accession negotiations is seen by *Postimees* as an unprecedented sign in Estonian diplomacy that will remain unexcelled for a long time (PM, 14.12.2002).

Mapping different events as historical and/or exceptional is very much in accordance with the claim of Finnish historian Marko Lehti (2003b, 131) that history as a collective memory of society is, similar to the memory of an individual, a selective narrative where something is emphasized, and something is forgotten when stories are told. Even though in the case of newspaper articles the issue is not about writing official history, the paper still follows similar practice by creating the stories of *us* as a daily chronology.

In relation to national identity, the importance of the past is emphasized, for instance, by Göran Therborn (1995, 231) who argues that whatever there is to ethnicity or national belonging, it is inherited from the past. Emphasizing the historical viewpoint, has on the other hand, been criticized by Tim Edensor (2002, 10-11, 18-19) who stresses the present as crucial in connection with national identity. The articles of *Postimees* referred to above show a combination of both: the importance of the present is emphasized in *Postimees* by relating it to the past.

³⁷ Seekord peaks päike aga tõusma läänest.

³⁸ A distinction between the illusory and real features is made in this example with a clear emphasis on the importance of the latter.

Using the logic of 'never before' in an opposite way, *Postimees* writes that the president, after looking as a statesman at past millennia, said that Estonia has always belonged to Europe and warned about the economic loss that would be caused by staying out of Europe (PM, 26.06.2003). In this case, the issue is not about the extraordinary possibility to join Europe, since Estonia has always been there. Thus, the formative moment, as a new condition, refers to the potential end of something that has always existed. The logic used is in accordance with the ideas of Finnish scholar Veikko Anttonen (1993, 52) who argues that the past does not only contain the achievements and the events that have brought honor, but also the worries and suffering. In the current case, however, the worries and the suffering are not seen coming from the past, which was a rather stable period (as the state had always belonged to Europe) but from the future outside Europe.

Since the past and the future have been depicted as two equally important features in relation to national identity, the focus on the past and the future has been depicted as a sense of double time by scholars (Bhabha 1990, 295; see also Nairn 1977). In *Postimees*, the future was implicitly present in the examples that signified the current time period as an end of an era. Due to the EU's decision to start the accession negotiations with Estonia in 1998, the time was interpreted as a breaking point in the independent Estonia's status and fate (PM, 14.12.1997). The paper continues that Estonia starts the negotiations with the EU about the issues that will influence the life of all of *us* in the next millennium (PM, 14.12.1997; see also PM, 22.12.1997). In these examples, the future is indicated by referring to 'breaking point', 'fate' and 'next millennium'.

Interestingly, the same terms were used also five years later, at the time when the accession negotiations were finished and Estonia was invited to join the EU (and NATO). This time *Postimees* wrote that for Estonia, these decisions had an influence that reached beyond the horizon and celebrated the end of the transition period (PM, 31.12.2002). For emphasizing the long-lasting character of the influence, the spatial expression about horizon as the most distant point one could possibly see, was used. Similarly, after the EU made the decision about finishing the accession negotiations in the Copenhagen Summit in 2002, *Postimees* wrote about the post-Copenhagen time (PM, 26.10.2002) and stated that the EU's Copenhagen Summit surely meant an end of one era in Estonian foreign policy (PM, 14.12.2002).

On the basis of the examples of *Postimees*, the formative moment can be seen as a great highlighted time that has been stopped for admiring its importance as an end result of a certain process. The references made both to the past and future were illustrative and aimed at emphasizing the greatness of the present moment. This also means that while the formative moment was mapped as a highlight, it is rather problematic to interpret formative moment as a threat or an opportunity. Both the past and the future form a background to the current moment that has to be accepted as a certain kind of truth.

USING SPECIAL TIME IN *POSTIMEES*

While constructing the formative moment, an era is mapped as a special one, using the formative moment means that the importance of a particular time period is taken for granted, and used as an argument for reasoning and legitimizing certain actions and societal developments. Accordingly, ignoring the importance of time leads to the criticism of wrong timing and/or failure to understand ‘how things really are’.

For emphasizing the importance of the present time and Estonian action that is not in accordance to that important time, the expression ‘especially not at the moment when’ was used by *Postimees* (for example PM, 10.05.1997; PM, 09.06.1997 and PM, 05.05.1997). As the paper writes: “Especially at the time when Estonian accession to the EU is on a razor edge and every wrong step is erasing us from amongst the first candidates.”³⁹ (PM, 14.04.1997; see also PM, 03.01.2003). The expression ‘razor edge’ indicates that all the energy should be concentrated on keeping balanced. However, the issue is not only about falling down but also about getting hurt, since knives tend to be sharp. Thus, although one should focus on the most relevant thing, it is also better to do nothing than to do wrong things.

Similarly, the Estonian governmental crisis at the time of EU’s Summit in December 1997 was interpreted as a possibility for Latvia and Lithuania to point a finger at Estonia as a country even more unstable than them (PM, 21.11.1997). Again, the issue was not about the governmental crisis, which was quite typical for Estonia in the 1990s. Instead the issue is about the appalling timing of the governmental crisis and the fear that the others could take advantage of *our* misfortune.

Apart from the accession process as such, several articles focused on the proper action before the accession referendum. *Postimees* writes that there is not much time left and even the smallest mistake can influence the whole process (PM, 04.07.2003; see also 18.06.2003). Thus, the time before the referendum presumes clear explanations and fair addressing from all politicians (PM, 04.07.2003).

Similar to constructing the formative moment, the argument ‘(n)ever before’ was used in connection with using the formative moment for referring to the future developments. However, here the issue was not about admiring the moment, but taking it as a basis for further obligations, since the action should follow the logic of the moment. For example, after Estonia got to the first round of the accession negotiations together with five other EU candidate countries, *Postimees* wrote that this should mark the beginning of an absolutely new phase in the internal political EU debate (PM, 12.07.1997 and PM, 11.01.1997)⁴⁰. Five years later, in connection with finishing the accession

³⁹ Eriti veel ajal, kui Eesti liitumine Euroopa Liiduga on noateral ja iga valesamm kustutab meid esimeste kandidaatide seast.

⁴⁰ As a background, the EU’s decision to divide the candidate countries into two groups – those who started the negotiations in 1998 and those who did not even know when and if their negotiations would

negotiations, the paper claimed that at the moment, more than ever before, the importance of the decisions that stand in front of Estonia in the near future are manifest (PM, 19.11.2002). In 2003, *Postimees* stated that a very realistic, or at least a very much expected accession to the EU and NATO should finally turn a new page in history by liberating *us* from the label of being a former Soviet Socialist Republic, for the good times are ahead for Estonia (PM, 31.03.2003).

In sum, on the basis of using the formative moment, time becomes a crucial factor that enables the determination of the correct and condemnation of incorrect action. At the same time, the principal issues receive relativist treatment. For example, instead of condemning the governmental crisis in principle, it is considered to be improper in a certain situation.

While in the context of constructing the formative moment, the actors did not have an important role, in using the formative moment the actors and their action were significant. This means that certain trends were seen and emphasized as something, for which actors should be responsible. Behind the openly normative examples, stating how things should be done and condemning the wrong ways of doing them, 'the truth' about the EU accession process as inevitable from the Estonian perspective can be found.

SUMMARY

In this part of the study, the formative moment was analyzed as a sociocultural practice. Even though the articles from four years were used, from the perspective of the formative moment, no remarkable differences can be depicted in the beginning and the end of the accession process.

Connected to the logic of the three schools of IR theories, realism, liberalism or constructivism, the formative moment can be either seen as a restrictive or an enabling factor. In connection with the realist claim that small countries do not have any power at the international level, the formative moment can bring an unexpected and brief change to this situation. By contrast, in the context of constructivism, the opportunity for small states to participate in forming international anarchy can be limited to a certain period. Thus, as a temporal factor, the formative moment could bring discourses based on different perceptions of the world closer to each other.

However, apart from that obligation can be used to characterize the formative moment. The time period is constitutive to the discourses and vice versa, since the decisions made at that special time are expected to be based on responsible and right actions as no corrections can be made later. The distinction made between constructing and using the formative moment, refers to the internal struggle of the discourses (what one is versus what one

start – created an atmosphere of competition. The competition was forced by the length of the whole process (1998-2002) and the EU's failure to clarify the organization's readiness to accept the new members during the initial years of the negotiations.

should be). Constructing the formative moment is shown to be a process that does not demand anything from the actors: they can just lie back and look at the fabulous moment. In the context of using the formative moment, the actors are supposed to take into account the moment as something taken for granted and thus determining their action (see also Browning 2008, 60).

4. PRINCIPLES OF SELECTING ARTICLES, FORMING AND ANALYZING DISCOURSES

The aim of this chapter is to clarify the three spheres that frame the empirical analysis. I explain first, the principles used for selecting the articles for analysis; second how the discourses were formed and last how the discourses were analyzed.

In order to avoid unnecessary verbosity, articles written by representatives of one of the four categories of writers, Staff Journalist, Political Elite, Cultural Elite, Readers, will be referred to by the category plus the word 'article'. Hence the quartet of Staff Journalist article, Political Elite article, Cultural Elite article, and Readers article.

4.1 SELECTING THE ARTICLES FOR THE ANALYSIS

The data for empirical analysis consisted of articles from the opinion pages of *Postimees* dealing with the relationship between Estonia and the European Union during four years, 1997, 1998, 2002 and 2003. These four years were chosen for the analysis as certain highlights of the long accession process. More concretely, 1997 was the year the EU decided to start accession negotiations with Estonia, in 1998 the negotiations were started and finished in 2002 and in 2003 Estonia organized a binding referendum about EU membership (for more detailed chronology of Estonian accession process see Chapter 1).

Since the decision to focus on the opinion pages was based on an assumption that each article reflected the views of the writer, some minor sections in *Postimees* that did not meet this criterion were excluded from the analysis. I left out the sections like Questionnaire (*Küsitlus*)⁴¹ and the Tough Word (*Kõva sõna*)⁴². Also the sections based either on the references to other Estonian papers (*Teised lehed*) or Russian Journalism (*Venemaa ajakirjandus*) were excluded from the analysis. Also omitted, from the data sets for 2002 and 2003 were anonymous internet commentaries, of which précis summaries were published in the section Letters to the Editor (*Lugejakirjad*).

⁴¹ *Küsitlus* is based on brief comments from readers referring to something that had appeared in *Postimees* or some other media.

⁴² Maybe defined as strong topical opinions that catch the audience's attention to the extent they re-use the expression, phrase or wording. Popular re-tweeted hashtags on Twitter maybe viewed as the digital version of the *Kõva sõna* section in *Postimees*.

Even though selecting articles on the basis of the keywords might seem to be a mechanical task, the current study revealed something else. While John E. Richardson (2007, 18) writes about the possible obscurities and questions to be discussed in connection with interpreting articles, I was facing the same problems before the interpretation phase. Therefore, the starting points of naming, metonymy and neologisms, as Richardson (2007) suggests for interpreting the data were very useful during the selection process. At the same time these three can be seen as tools used in the discourse of *Postimees* for constructing social meanings and legitimizing group membership (Bishop and Jaworski 2003, 262).

When gathering the empirical data, I looked through all the opinion articles published during these four years that are available in the digital archive of *Postimees*. In this selection process, four key words were used to get as broad sample as possible: European Union (*Euroopa Liit*), EU (*EU*), Brussels (*Brüssel*) and Euro (*euro*). The initial two lie in Richardson's (2007) naming category, Brussels is metonymic and Euro is neologic.

Since my aim is to analyze the relationship between Estonia and the European Union, I omitted articles that only mentioned Europe (*Euroopa*), Western Europe (*Lääne-Euroopa*) or West (*Lääs*) without any clear references to the EU. Especially in the beginning of the accession process, 'Europe' was also used as a synonym of the Council of Europe instead or in addition to the EU. For example, in connection with discussing the need to abandon the death penalty in September 1997, both organizations were referred to. The term, 'West', on the other hand, was often related to the transatlantic element represented by the USA and NATO.

However, the articles that included references to the European Union (EU) as well as 'union' or 'Europe' as synonyms of the EU were included. For instance, articles that spoke of 'going to Europe' after an initial discussion about the situation in the EU. Also articles to 'Euro'+suffix, which clearly refer to the EU, were included.

The articles where EU member states or candidate countries were mentioned without referring to the European Union as a whole were omitted as were articles where the only reference was 'in all European countries', 'in Europe' and 'in the developed European countries' that could refer to the wider Western Europe. On the other hand, if the wording concerned 'European Union countries/nations/member states', those articles were included. Also the claim that Estonians are becoming European citizens (PM, 18.03.1998) refers to the EU, since citizenship is connected specifically to the EU, not Europe in general.

Richardson (2007, 18) suggests that it is as important to pay attention to metonymy and naming. Thus, the articles dealing with 'Brussels' and the EU institutions or their representatives as metonymical references to the EU were included. For example, the articles could refer to the President of the European Commission at the time, Romano Prodi, some other commissioners or Brussels in general. Also those articles that referred to certain EU programs

directed at Estonia as a candidate country were included (for example the Phare program).

On the other hand, the articles referring to Brussels as a city, not the representative of the EU, were excluded from the analysis (for example PM, 18.06.1998). Also the articles where a reference to the single currency Euro was made without any further reference to the European Union were left out of the analysis. The quantity of these articles was marginal and mostly related to discussions about the Estonian possibility to use Euro currency on the basis of Estonia's decision only.

The most common way of making neologisms in the paper was using the prefix 'Euro'. Each example was evaluated separately on the basis of whether or not the reference was made to the European Union. Again, I did not include those articles where 'Euro' was referring to a certain quality, e.g. "Euro prisons" (*eurovanglate*), "Euro shelters" (*euroturvakodudel*) (PM, 26.05.1998), "Euro renovation" (*euromont*) (PM, 31.07.1998) and "Euro skin" (*eurokesta*) (PM, 31.10.1997).

At the same time those numerous neologisms where the term 'Euro' was replacing European Union were included, for example "Euro Commission" (*euromisjon*) (PM, 28.06.1997) and "Euro Parliament" (*Europarlament*) (PM, 14.08.1997). The term "Euro race" (*euromõeldu*) (PM, 24.07.1997b) referred to the stiff competition between the twelve candidate countries. Also the terms "Euro negotiations" (*euroläbirääkimiste*) (PM, 12.11.1997) instead of the negotiations with the EU, "Euro integration" (*euromõeldu*) (PM, 26.05.1997) instead of integrating to the European Union, "Euro Union" (*Euroliid*) (PM, 26.11.1997) instead of the European Union, as well as "Euro norms" (*euromõeldu*) (PM, 28.07.1997), "Euro demand" (*Euromõeldu*) (PM, 17.11.1997) and "Euro policy" (*europolitiika*) (PM, 27.05.1997) in connection with the accession negotiations appeared. I also included "Euro optimism" (*euromõeldu*) (PM, 04.01.2003), "Euro process" (*Euromõeldu*) (PM, 09.02.1998), "Euro debate" (*euromõeldu*) (PM, 12.11.2003) and "Euro sceptics" (*euromõeldu*) (PM, 12.07.1997), "Euro support" (*euromõeldu*) and "Euro propaganda" (*euromõeldu*) (PM, 02.06.1997) since all these were related to the European Union. Also for instance, "Euro corridors" (*euromõeldu*), "Euro minded people" (*euromõeldu rahval*), "Euro desire" (*euromõeldu*) (PM, 12.07.1997), "Euro diagnosis" (*Euromõeldu*), "Euro road" (*euromõeldu*) (PM, 24.07.1997a), "Euro train" (*euromõeldu*), "Euro autumn" (*Euromõeldu*) (PM, 05.09.1997), "Euro information" (*euromõeldu*), "Euro discussion" (*Euromõeldu*) (PM, 11.09.1997), "Euro door" (*euromõeldu*) (PM, 22.10.1997) and "Euro fog" (*euromõeldu*) (PM, 13.11.1997) were included.

In the selected articles, aside from the EU, Estonia was always present in one way or another. I included those articles where the reference to 'Estonian something/representative' or 'us' as Estonia was made. On the other hand, I did not include the articles where Estonia was replaced by Baltic countries/nations, East European countries/nations or only candidate countries of the EU were mentioned. Also those few articles that focused on

the municipal or local level dealing with, for example, the development of a certain Estonian city, municipalities or local, not national *us* were excluded from the further analysis (see Section 2.4).

Only those parts of the articles where both Estonia and the EU were present were selected for the analysis. In some cases this could mean the whole article whereas for other articles, one paragraph was selected on the basis of the above mentioned key words. At the same time it should be noted that even though visually it is easy to notice where one paragraph ends and the other one starts, this does not make paragraphs objective and neutral categories, neither are they necessarily logical entities. In some cases, a particular paragraph contained several topics of which only a small proportion concerned the EU. In other articles the same ideas and arguments continued across several paragraphs (even though the EU could have been mentioned in one of these only). Consequently, in order to understand the text, the preceding and following paragraphs were included in the analysis. This way mechanical categorization was replaced by distinct evaluations.

In sum, on the basis of the above criteria, the aggregate of articles selected 1997, 1998, 2002 and 2003 was 1780, of which 1543⁴³ of were analyzed (see Section 3.2). The more concrete division by years is shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1. *Number of articles published and analyzed per year and in total.*

Year	1997	1998	2002	2003	Total
Number of articles published by <i>Postimees</i>	376	426	381	597	1780
Number of analyzed articles	361	383	292	507	1543

4.2 FORMING DISCOURSES ON THE BASIS OF THE ARTICLES

As a pre-analysis phase each article was transferred from *Postimees*' archive to a separate digital file. The articles were gathered into Year Specific folders each containing files for the each of the categories of writers, Staff Journalists, Political Elite, Cultural Elite and Readers. After the filing process, I printed out each article and read through it twice underlining the relevant parts and commenting on them (using keywords such as irony, expressions etc.). Finally,

⁴³ The difference in these figures was caused by the decision to discard the mixed group of 'Others' (see Section 3.2) from the process of analysis.

I translated the relevant parts into English and transferred them to a digital storage file.

The analysis started from the linguistic properties extant in the process of forming discourses. For example, naming, metaphors, metonymy, presuppositions, usage of active and passive voice and nominalization were used in the initial categorization (see Richardson 2007, 51-63). During this phase, the articles were also divided into initial categories (such as Image, Estonia as Special etc.) that emerged from the data. The categories arising from the texts indicated the substantial means (the axes of friendliness/hostility and equality/inequality) that were dealt with in the Chapter 3 of this thesis (see also Fairclough [1992]2003, 2 and Raik 2003, 35).

The process, however, was two dimensional, since the theoretical framework was developed hand-in hand with the empirical research (see also Raik 2003, 30-31). As a result, instead of 'picking-up' discourses they were formed by the researcher in the interaction process with both theoretical background and empirical data. The theoretical basis has also enabled me to depict the wider and more abstract systems of meanings and avoid 'tennis discourses' (Valtonen 1998, 98) formed on the basis of the topics dealt with in the articles (like 'language discourse' or 'culture discourse' while talking about language and culture accordingly). Forming the discourses did not void the texts from other analysis as other combinations of the properties of the text and of the interpreter (social positioning, knowledge, values) were equally valid (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 67). Thus, by choosing some other theoretical basis for the analysis, different discourses could be found within the same empirical data (see also Raik 2003, 30-31).

In the second phase of the analysis, the usage of substantial and linguistic means started to diverge with an emphasis of substantial means over the linguistic ones. On the basis of the analysis grounded on the substantial means (friendliness/hostility and equality-inequality of Estonia-EU relationship), three discourses emerged rather clearly from the empirical data. The first of these discourses was *European Estonia* which sees the EU as an authority for Estonia, the second was *Independent Estonia*, which views Estonia and the EU as equal partners and the third was *Humble Estonia*, which sees the EU as an authoritarian actor and Estonia as a humble small country without any influence.

However, even though the overall structure of the discourses is formed on the substantial basis, linguistic means have given a basis to the struggle inside each discourse as a cleavage between what Estonia is and what it is not/should be/become in relation to the EU. The cleavage could be found in the articles of all years and of all above mentioned categories of authors. In terms of discourses Fairclough (1995, 55) language use can be constitutive in conventional ways (reproducing and maintaining existing social identities, relations and systems of knowledge) as well as creative ways (help to transform them). The current analysis shows both usages.

In the context of forming the discourses, the issue about their beginning and end in the media text as a unit of analysis deserves an explanation. The logic of having one entire article displaying a discourse was to be less the rule and rather more the exception. A discourse limited to a paragraph was more common. In some cases, a discourse continued through several paragraphs (with a potential interruption in between), in others the discourses changed within a particular paragraph. An example of the last one can be found from the article of *Postimees* referring to the ideas of Mart Laar (Estonian Prime Minister at the time)⁴⁴:

*Laar closes his article with a positive message: the whole of Europe should be changed into "new". Here is Estonia's real chance: to bear ethical values and knock continuously on the conscience of the big countries. Only of course when these things are in order at home.*⁴⁵

PM, 20.02.2003

The example starts with an assumption that Estonia as an independent actor can contribute to the EU. The discourse, however, ends before the last sentence where Estonia's ability to be a role model for the whole EU is no more taken for granted.

Another example of the movement of discourse to the formative moment, can be found in an editorial of *Postimees* published in the end of the accession process. A Staff journalist writes that the progress reports of the European Commission have created a fruitful ground for finishing the accession negotiations, and as the candidate countries have done their homework well, now it is left to wait for the answer from the member countries of the European Union. *Postimees* continues that time for the enlargement is more mature than ever before (PM, 10.10.2002). The first part of the text refers to the feedback given by the European Commission to the candidate countries as recognition given by the EU. The last sentence, however, moves to the formative moment as a special time. Instead of Estonia or the EU, here the time is seen to have the main agency: enlargement is taking place due to the proper time, not the action of the candidate countries or the EU.

The finding that the same article, paragraph or even sentence could contain a variety of discourses also enabled me to ignore the question 'what does the writer really mean' usually asked when contradictory attitudes appear in the same text. If the notion of discourse analysis is employed contradictory attitudes can be analyzed as examples of separate discourses present in the same article.

⁴⁴ Similar examples can be found also from Political Elite articles (PM, 28.08.1997 and PM, 13.09.1997).

⁴⁵ Laar lõpetab artikli positiivse sõnumiga - kogu Euroopa tuleb «uueks» muuta. Siin peitubki tegelikult Eesti shans - olla eetiliste väärtuste kandjaks ja koputada pidevalt suurriikide südametunnistusele. Seda muidugi eeldusel, et ka kodus on need asjad korras.

4.3 ANALYZING DISCOURSES

In order to analyze the relationship between Estonia and the EU in the discourses, I focus on identification-recognition, internal action-interaction (practice-agency), image-substance and the current state of order-the status quo as different, though partly overlapping means used for making a distinction between *us* and the Other.

In identification-recognition, identification refers to self-understanding as a basis of identity whereas recognition means others' perception of this understanding. The importance of recognition in relation to (national) identity has been emphasized by variety of scholars (for instance Ringmar 1996, 81; Kivikuru 2004, 30; see also Therborn 1995, 231-232). Also, Eric Hobsbawm (1992, 8) argues that apart from regarding oneself as a member of a nation it is important to be treated as such.

It has been argued that during the EU accession process applicant states strive for recognition as European states: on accepting a new member the other member states recognize the applicant's Europeanness *de facto* (Moisio 2002, 93, 97). Recognition given by the EU has been seen as important not only from the perspective of the accession negotiations but also in relation to the new national identity narratives of post-communist states (the story *we* tell of ourselves) (Moisio 2002, 93, 110; see also Section 3.1 and Robins and Morley 1993, 405-410).

At the same time the characteristic feature of the media texts is internal recognition: apart from the EU, recognition can also come from internal actors. For instance, citizens' support towards Estonia's EU accession is an example of internal recognition during the accession process. As a mixture of external and internal recognition, internal actors mediate in the media texts (putative) recognition of the EU. In this study identification appears either in the form of *who/what we* are or *what we* should do/be/become (setting the norms explicitly) whereas recognition as evaluation often in a form of criticism, is a characteristic feature of becoming. At the same time, in the context of *becoming*, identification implicitly seeks recognition: by emphasizing what should be done, a possibility of further evaluation concerning success or failure is opened. However, no chronological linear process in the form of 'being/doing something, should be/do something else, not having achieved the aim yet (as a recognition)' with a clear beginning and an end can be depicted from the texts (see also Rantanen 1997, 55-56). Instead, recognition can be given both to the attempts to make changes and to the original situation, it can refer to the current trends or forecast the future.

In agency-practice relations, agency refers to the EU, which is present in the media texts as an actor in the form of its representatives, institutions, legislative acts etc., indicating also interaction between Estonia and the EU. Even though practice refers to dealing with the EU, the focus is on how, on the basis of Estonian observations, things are arranged in the EU. At the same time Estonia is not interacting with the EU but is depicting the EU's practice from

the perspective of internal action. Thus, for instance a suggestion that Estonia should raise a certain tax to the level of the EU refers to the internal action and practice of the EU. At the same time the claim that the tax should be raised in Estonia due to the EU demands or directive is classified as an interaction between Estonia and the EU as an agency.

Substance and image can be seen as complementary sides, that Light (2001, 1055) maps as who *we* are and how *we* want Others to see *us* (see also Section 3.1 and Young and Light 2001, 947). Substance (what is going on and how things are) provides a basis for the image targeted towards the Other (showing what is going on and how things are).

At the same time, the complementarity of the relationship cannot be taken for granted, since the superiority of one side at the expense of the other can occur. In the context of valuing the substance as ‘a real thing’, the image is criticized as ‘just a picture’ that is not in accordance with reality. On the other hand, image can be seen as valuable. In such cases, despite the actual substance, it is still considered, at the least, to maintain the image.

Last but not least, the relationship between *us* and the Other can be analyzed on the basis of mapping the status quo and the current condition. The latter concept refers to the situation that might be changed in the future whereas in connection with status quo both flexibility of processes as well as actors’ possibility to change things are abolished. Therefore, several issues that are actually considered to be problematic are treated as sealed for good.

In sum, this brief chapter provides an overview of the principles for selecting the newspaper articles for the empirical analysis. The process involved substantial as well as linguistic means for forming and analyzing the discourses, which were presented. The substantial means formed a basis for making a distinction between the discourses whereas linguistic means had their role in finding out what was going on inside the discourses (the struggle between *being* and *becoming*). An overview of both is also given in the Table 4.2.

Table 4.2. *Scheme for forming and analyzing discourses.*

	Substantial means	Linguistic means
Forming discourses		
Background of analysis	IR and Europeanisation theories	Indicative/conditional; affirmative sentence/negation
Question	What discourses can be formed	How are discourses formed
Analyzing discourses		
Focus of analysis	Construction of <i>us-</i> the Other relations	Wording, expressions etc.
Question	What means are used for construction	How are the means formed

5. REPRESENTATION: ESTONIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY DISCOURSES

Using the means presented in the previous chapter, three discourses based on a trio of understandings about the relationships between Estonia and the EU were formed: *European Estonia*, *Independent Estonia* and *Humble Estonia*. Analysis of these is based on an assumption that at the textual level, language use constitutes to three aspects of society and culture: systems of knowledge as representation, social identities as well as social relations (Fairclough 1995, 55). Accordingly, in each discourse all three constitutive aspects, representation, relations and identities of the text level are analyzed (see Section 3.1). This chapter analyzes representation whereas Chapter 6 focuses on relations and identities.

The discourse *European Estonia* was formed in relation to the liberalist approach of IR theories, more precisely the importance of international organizations from the perspectives of nation states. I have combined this understanding with the equality axis that indicates the EU's authority over Estonia. As a result, the EU is seen as a superior Other that Estonia either or both admires or should admire, follow and obey. The general admittance of EU authority in this discourse makes it rather similar to the official enlargement discourse (see Raik 2003, 114-115, 123-126, 128).

The discourse of *Independent Estonia* was formed in relation to the constructivist approach of the IR theories. Here, the main idea is that actors, irrespective of size have certain roles in forming world anarchy. Since Estonia is seen to be a plenipotentiary actor, Estonia and the EU are either taken as equal partners or their equality is emphasized as a necessity.

The discourse of *Humble Estonia* was formed in relation to the realist approach of the IR theories indicating that small states have rather poor opportunities in the hostile world anarchy. In this connection the EU as part of the same world is seen to be authoritarian (not necessarily hostile but ignorant towards Estonia) and Estonia is expected to realize this situation as well as its own opportunities.

In every discourse, I analyze the two competing sides. The first refers to *being* and the second one challenges this by emphasizing what should be done to reach that goal. In the instance of *being* the actual situation accords to expectations and society is seen as rather homogenous without internal contradictions in the understanding of who *we* are. *Becoming*, on the other hand, is based on an assumption that reality and ideals are not in accordance to each other. Thus, the necessity to change the situation is indicated in the texts either implicitly by criticizing the current situation and pointing out its limitations or explicitly by claiming what has to be changed. In this process, internal cleavages of society also become visible.

Since my empirical data consists of opinion articles published over four years and written by four categories of writers (defined by authorship), in addition to the general overview, a distinction on the basis of the years and the writers can be made. First, the development of the discourses during the accession process will be analyzed. Second, a closer look and a comparison of the categories of articles in the discourses will be made.

In order to locate the discourses in the wider societal context of Estonia, I will start in all three cases from the overview of the academic texts that communicate the understanding of either *European Estonia*, *Independent Estonia* or *Humble Estonia*. The reason is that as an example of intertextuality the discourses emerging from *Postimees* are also quite widely represented in academic texts. In discursive terms the academic texts referred to can be taken as an academic discourse (vis-à-vis media discourse of *Postimees*, see Section 1.1).

Before the actual analysis two aspects have to be noted. First, although the authors of the academic texts communicate the understanding of Estonia-EU relationship in the framework of a particular discourse, this does not mean that the authors could not position themselves differently. For instance, scholars can refer to the political discussion that Estonia has always belonged to Europe as an example of how the idea of *European Estonia* is spread in Estonian society. As an alternative option, the same author could conclude that this discussion proves that Estonia ‘truly’ is a European country. The first case is an example of distinct categories of analysis and practice, in the second case the category of practice is reproduced in category of analysis (see Section 1.1).

Second, even though academic texts are placed at the beginning of each discourse, the sequence of analysis was different because the comparison between media and the academic texts was made after the discourses of *Postimees* had been formed. Thus, the academic texts were not used as a ready-made basis for finding the same discourses in the paper.

5.1 DISCOURSE OF EUROPEAN ESTONIA

In various academic texts published during the accession process, the relationship between Europe⁴⁶ and Estonia is based on the understanding that Estonia is a European country (see section 3.1). For example, Aksel Kirch and Marika Kirch (2001, 129) write that Estonia can be seen as a part of the West due to the common cultural values and background that contains Western ideas like individualism, liberalism, the rule of law, constitutionalism, free markets as well as separation of church and the state (see also Kirch 2002, 91 and Kuus 2002c, 307). Being part of European civilization has also been

⁴⁶ Especially in these texts, European Union is widely equated with Europe. In some examples the terms West and Western Europe are used for the same reference.

depicted as one of the main features of Estonian national identity (Jaanson 1999, 17).

Berg and Oras (2002, 30) write that Estonia belongs to Europe geographically, culturally, economically and politically, which points of view support the assertion:

On the Estonian side there is an historic fortress [Narva - SKK] built by the Swedes, Danes and Germans in full accordance with the cultural traditions of the Western Europe, on the other side there is a historical fortress [Ivangorod – SKK] representing Slavic-Orthodox cultural traditions. The distance between these two fortresses is approximately 1000 meters, but the cultural differences are greater.

Kirch and Kirch 2001, 129

In addition to the aspects like culture, geography etc. also the wide identification with Europe among the groups of the society was brought out in the academic texts. For example Marika Kirch (2002, 94, 95) refers to the results of an opinion poll from the beginning of 1993, which indicates the majority of Estonians see themselves in a more or less equal amount the carriers of Estonian as well as European identity. Kirch (2002, 95) draws the conclusions that for Estonians European identity is not just a political rhetoric but the self-understanding of the nation and a creation of a conscious connection with the wider cultural context that is closest to Estonia⁴⁷. As Kirch and Kirch (2001, 130) state: "No distinguished Estonian researchers, writers or politicians have doubted that Estonia belongs to the Western world" (see also Vihalemm 1997, 132 and Kirch 2002, 91).

One argument common to some texts was the reference to the temporal aspect, either in a form of distant history or timeless eternity. An example of the first is the claim that Estonia has been an integral part of the Western Europe's economic, political and cultural life since, at least, the Middle Ages (Hanseatic League, own language, administrative system, religion) (Kuus 2002a, 97). Similarly, the slogan 'Let's be Estonians, but let's also become Europeans!' of the literary movement "Young Estonians" from the beginning of the 20th century was referred to in the beginning of 1990s as a historical proof of being European (see Kirch and Kirch 2001, 130).

An example of the timeless relationship can be found from the book "Return to the Western World" (Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997b). The authors write that Estonia has always belonged to Western civilization (as opposed to Russian orthodox Byzantine culture). Thus, Estonian Westernness did not disappear during the Soviet time but made Estonia at that time a part of the so called Soviet West until the country's historical position as a part of the Western world was re-established (Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997b).

⁴⁷ At the same time the opinion polls showed that the attitude towards Estonian EU membership was rather critical (see Chapter 1).

From the EU perspective an attempt to emphasize Estonian Europeanness during the accession process could be seen as an aim to seek for the recognition of Estonian Europeanness in a form of EU accession (Lagerspetz 1999, 388). As Marju Lauristin (1997) writes about Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania:

Their wish to be accepted again by the West and to be recognized as an integral part of the Western cultural realm is a more substantial driving force in their development than mere economic or political motivation could ever be.

Lauristin 1997, 29

One example of this process was an attempt to make Estonia look like one of the Nordic countries⁴⁸, since being Nordic was seen to be complementary with being European (for example Vihalemm 1999). Since the EU did not decide until the late 2000, either which of the candidate countries was going to be invited to join in the first round or when the enlargement would take place, Estonia's statecraft considered it important to make a distinction between Estonia as a 'real Nordic country' and the 'former Soviet republics of Latvia and Lithuania'. As a part of this process, the Estonia's Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time Toomas Hendrik Ilves invented the concept of Christmas lands in his speech "Estonia as a Nordic Country" held at the Institute of Foreign Policy in Stockholm. Ilves claimed that Estonia belonged to the Northern European Region of "Jõulumaa" (Yule-land - Christmas Land). Members of this region (Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain and Estonia) share linguistically similar kinds of term for Christmas (Jul, Joul, Yule). In addition to linguistic and traditional similarities, the countries have in common a low level of corruption, trade amongst themselves and a large number of mobile phone and internet users (Välisministeeriumi Pressitalitus 1999). Similar ideas were also presented by other societal figures (for example Eerik-Niiles Kross 2001 and Tarand 2001) in Estonian media as well as reflected in academic texts (for example Vihalemm 1999).

In the current study, the discourse of *European Estonia* is formed of *Being* and *Becoming European*. *Being European* is based on the idea that Estonian membership in the EU is rather clear: questions of the category similar to whether either or both Estonia wants to become a member of the EU and the EU wants to accept Estonian accession are seen as irrelevant, since this issue

⁴⁸ The idea that Estonia could be one of the Nordic countries was invented during the interwar period for securing the country's international position and finding allies in international relations. The project of the Baltic League was presented in 1918 and at the end of the 1920s the concept of Baltoscandia that was based on the geopolitical logic was created (Lehti 1998). According to these views Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Scandinavia formed the same entity whereas Russia was seen as the Other (Lehti 1998). In practice, Baltoscandia failed to get support in the Scandinavian states (Lehti 1998 and Lehti 1999, 434).

has been decided upon already. Also the similarity between Estonia and the EU is taken for granted.

Even though having a similar basis, *Becoming European* challenges *Being European* either by criticizing what Estonia is not, or emphasizing what it should be as a cleavage between the ideal and Estonian reality. Since the EU is in a position of authority, Estonia has to follow the duties, tasks or an example set by Brussels. Instead of an active Estonia, a reactive Estonia that has to work hard to become suitable for the EU membership can be depicted.

On the basis of whether the main emphasis is on the agency or practice both *being* and *becoming* are divided into two sub-discourses. In the case of emphasizing the EU as an agency, the focus is on the rhetoric/discursive level and Estonia is either following or is supposed to follow EU's laws, statements orders etc. The EU's practice does not tell what should or should not be done in Estonia in connection with the accession process but the issue concerns the observations made while comparing Estonian practice to the superior one of the EU.

The relations depicted in the previous chapter (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3) are analyzed against each sub-discourse. This way, the internal logic of the data is mapped by taking into account the above mentioned recognition/identification (in the case of *becoming*). Apart from that the attention is paid to the EU norms/internalized norms (in the case of *being* and *becoming*).

In this discourse, identification means tasks set either by the writers (of the articles) or the EU whereas the recognition is feedback, evaluation and estimations as a stick or a carrot given in relation to *becoming*. EU norms refer to the EU as an expert/authority or the good practices valid in the EU as an ideal for Estonia whereas the internalized norms means that even though the norms are still coming from the EU, these are not taken as orders coming from outside but followed as part of own aims and promises. Thus, the EU norms are no more external but understood as part of Estonia's goals⁴⁹.

The interplay between the identification/recognition and the EU norms/internalized norms can be depicted in two ways for *being* and four ways for *becoming*. The division is capsulized in Table 5.1 and the hierarchy of the discourse is clarified in Figure 5.1. The elements in Figure 5.1, which this chapter deals with are *Being European* and *Becoming European*, whereas Chapter 6 analyzes *Being Informed* and *Becoming informed*.

⁴⁹ EU norms are thus an example of what Trine Flockhart (2008, 6) has called "thin" Europeanisation and internalized norms (own aims) as "thick" Europeanisation. Here, however, the focus is on how the process has been interpreted, not on the actual situation in taking over the *acquis communautaire*.

Table 5.1. *Sub-discourses of Being and Becoming European.*

<i>Being European</i>	<i>Becoming European</i>
Follow EU practice	Should follow EU practice
	Failure to follow EU practice
Accept EU authority	Should accept EU authority
	Failure to accept EU authority




Figure 5.1. *Sub-discourses of European Estonia.*

BEING EUROPEAN

Being European is split into two sub-discourses, *Follow EU practice* and *Accept EU authority*. *Follow EU practice* emphasizes the uniformity of Estonian and European/EU practice without paying attention to the agency of the EU. A Cultural Elite article suggests, Estonia just belongs to Europe: “We just belong here and that is why it is important to settle down here as well and practically as possible. EU is by far the best opportunity to do that.”⁵⁰ (PM, 13.09.2003c).

⁵⁰ Me lihtsalt kuulume siia ja sellepärast on oluline ennast siin nii hästi ja otstarbekalt sisse seada kui vähegi võimalik. EL on kaugelt parim võimalus seda teha.

Accept EU authority deals with the EU as an agency that helps, guides and supports Estonia or at least creates a good framework for the development. As a Cultural Elite article writes about help got from Brussels:

The development of Estonian society is supported already now from several international foundations and sources. /.../ When Estonia one day becomes a member of the European Union, the sources and amounts of the support will increase several times.⁵¹

PM, 25.01.1997

Follow EU practice

Follow EU practice means that the accession process in general and the preparations made for the membership are seen as Estonian internal tasks not a result of the interaction between Estonia and Brussels. The basic idea is similar to the one that Estonia has always belonged to Europe (see above). However, while academic texts concentrate more widely on Europe and the 'timeless values' like language, culture etc., the discourse of *Postimees* focuses on Estonian developments during the integration process. Depending on the articles it is either claimed that Estonia has already reached its destination and is European, since it follows EU practice, or at least a linear way towards the EU has been developed during the accession process.

The main idea of the EU as an **already reached destination** is expressed in a Readers article three months before the accession referendum, which created the analogy of a residential neighborhood for the EU: Estonia has a choice either to buy the best house in the worst district or the other way round. The writer continues that *we* are already the fruitful habitants (*viljakad elanikud*) of the neighborhood called Europe (PM, 20.06.2003c; see also Political Elite article, PM, 20.06.2003a). Also several Cultural Elite articles express the same idea by writing that *we* are Europeans and experience all Europe's developments and crisis together with Europe (PM, 11.12.1998a), referring to Martin Luther's famous statement that here *we* stand on this side of European border and *we* can do no other (PM, 08.08.2003a), claiming that Estonia is rooted to Europe (PM, 13.09.2003c) and seeing Estonia as a potential weak link in EU and NATO that could be threatened by international terrorism (PM, 27.10.2003).

The most common way of constructing the EU as a destination that Estonia has already reached is by pointing out the spheres of life where Estonian practice resembles the admired European one. At the most abstract level - common values, opinions and ideas are pointed out mostly by Cultural Elite articles (see also Journalist article, PM 20.09.2003). The articles argue that

⁵¹ Eesti ühiskonna arengut toetatakse juba nüüd mitmetest rahvusvahelistest fondidest ja allikatest. /.../ Kui Eesti saab kunagi Euroopa Liidu liikmeks, kasvavad allikad ja toetuste määrad mitmekordseks.

the main themes of Estonia to aim to join the EU and NATO have been the common values and way of life that connect us to the Western world (PM, 06.02.2003). Similarly, on the basis of the distance to power (*võimukaugus*) and individualism, Estonia is seen as having been in Europe for a long time already (PM, 06.09.2003a). Also on the basis of Euroscepticism as a European phenomenon, Estonia is considered to belong to Europe (PM, 17.07.1998). Concerning Estonian habitants, it is asked if politicians have shifted their party-centered thinking to being state centered as a characteristic of the EU (PM, 02.10.2003b) and similarly to the majority of the citizens in all EU countries, opinion polls show that in Estonia most of the people were against the Iraqi war (PM, 04.02.2003).

At a more concrete level, the articles of the Journalists, the Political Elite and the Cultural Elite refer mostly to the economic sphere, legislation of the society or a combination of both for showing Estonia as European. At the same time the opportunity to skip the Estonian accession referendum on the basis of the example of several EU member countries (Cultural Elite article, PM, 19.03.1998) can be seen as an exceptional issue.

Concerning the economy and regulation of the society Political Elite articles write that Estonia is already part of EU's legal and economic space (PM, 04.07.2003b; see also Cultural Elite articles, PM, 22.06.1998 and PM, 06.09.2002) and Estonian economic development after the independence is directly connected to the economic environment of the European common market (PM, 21.07.1998). Similarly, a Journalist article argues that within a year the prices of goods and services have risen only 2.4 per cent, the same rate of inflation as the Euro zone countries. Therefore, thanks to the competition of the free market, the prices of most goods and services are already at the EU level, thus one does not have to be afraid of special price jumps in the future (PM, 08.04.2003b). Even though high prices are seldom considered as positive, these are taken as a sign of the similarity between Estonia and the EU and therefore used as a proof that Estonia already has a stable economic sector like the EU member countries.

Regulation of the society is mostly related to EU legislative acts implemented in various spheres, including the economy. Most of the articles are dated towards the end of the accession process (with the exceptions of a Political Elite articles, PM, 18.07.1997b and PM, 09.07.1998 as well as Cultural Elite articles, PM, 21.11.1997 and PM, 22.12.1997). A Political Elite article contends that Estonia has adopted all current EU laws with several transition periods whereas new basic treaty of the EU will be accepted by Estonia, which by then will already be an EU member (PM, 27.01.2003). In a similar example, a Political Elite article claims that Estonian conservation systems are already in accordance to EU's Natura-principles (PM, 01.04.2002; see also Journalist article, PM, 21.04.2003).

Similar arguments can be found in Cultural Elite articles. The articles claim that Estonia has European governmental rule (*valitsuslahend*) (PM, 20.03.2003; see also PM, 12.09.2002b). In Estonia, as in the EU member

countries the population is representative of a sovereign state (PM, 02.05.2003b). Estonia has developed a democratic society and harmonized legal space, standards etc. (PM, 27.06.2003), the principles known and recognized in Europe for a longer time have now found their way also to become valid laws of Estonia (PM, 19.03.2002) and Estonian laws regulating language issues are already now in accordance to the EU (PM, 02.09.2003a; see also PM, 30.03.2002a and Readers article, PM, 14.07.2003b). The articles also suggest the same corn species are allowed on the basis of Estonian and the EU regulations (PM, 16.09.2003b), as an EU member, the principle of superiority of the EU law would be valid for Estonia as with all other member states (PM, 13.05.2002a; see also PM, 15.01.2003b) and Estonia has already used the rights of a future member state (PM, 13.09.2003c).

Apart from the above mentioned regulations, the Cultural Elite articles emphasize education, research and science as spheres confirming Estonian Europeanness (PM, 28.10.1997 and PM, 12.01.1998). In the beginning of the accession process, articles appeared concerning the organization of science (PM, 06.02.1997), mutual scientific priorities valid in Estonia and the EU (PM, 16.05.1997) and new study programs similar to the EU ones (PM, 19.02.1998). At the end of the accession process, writers say that training, culture and consolidating people as Estonian priorities are considered to be in accordance with the priorities of the EU (PM, 13.09.2003e), Estonian principles of financing science are in accordance to the main principles of the EU and the centres of excellence have been selected on the basis of the EU science policy for ensuring and valuing the high level of the research (PM, 08.02.2003a). Last but not least, the Bologna declaration is guiding the action of Estonian universities and Estonia is participating in the EU Socrates program (PM, 06.08.2003a).

In sum, by pointing out the similarities between Estonia and the EU, writers claim that Estonian practice is already the same as that in the EU. As a Political Elite article explains, one has to get used to the idea that the EU's policy and the decisions at this level are part of Estonian internal policy (PM, 20.06.2003a). Even though not all issues pointed out by articles can be seen as positive ones, e.g. high prices and distance to power, in general Estonian similarity to the EU is seen as positive.

Another part of *Follow EU practice* is based on the idea that even though the destination has not been reached yet, the **linear way towards the EU** has been built (Political Elite article 07.08.1997 and Journalist articles, PM, 01.12.1997b and PM, 23.02.2002) and Estonia is seen as a probable future member country (Political Elite articles, PM, 10.07.1997b and PM, 18.03.1998b; see also Journalist article, PM, 14.12.1998b and Cultural Elite article, PM, 28.08.2003). Amongst Political Elite articles, are depictions of the correlation between starting the accession negotiations in 1998 and future membership in the EU (PM, 23.10.1997 and PM, 21.10.1998; see also Journalist article, PM, 06.12.1998).

Similarly, a Cultural Elite article says that Estonia has got into the process of the EU accession negotiations and consequently the main political decision about *us* in the European direction has been made (PM, 31.01.1998). The same kind of ideas are also presented in other Cultural Elite articles, which argue that: Estonian accession to the EU has become much more real (PM, 20.06.1998b), Estonia is closer to joining the EU than ever before (PM, 23.12.1997), Estonia, on its way to membership, stands on the threshold of accession negotiations (PM, 06.11.1997), Estonia has all preconditions to join the EU soon (PM, 11.11.1997b) and most probably Estonia gets in whereas Latvia and Lithuania will at initially remain aside (PM, 01.08.1997a; see also Political Elite article, PM, 18.07.1997b). Substantially the Estonian-Russian (similarly to Latvian-Russian) border is about to become a contact line between the EU and Commonwealth of Independent States (PM, 04.02.1998) and the EU as well as the free movement of labour are waiting ahead of *us* (PM, 06.03.1998d). Even though all these indicate Estonia's success, the country is in a rather passive position guided by political decisions made about the country that create good preconditions for Estonia's linear way to the EU.

The same line of argument is continued towards the end of the accession process. Journalist article suggests after the end of the accession negotiations that in the following year Estonia faces the very real, or at least very much hoped for, possibility of joining the EU and NATO (PM, 31.03.2003) and a Political Elite article claims that it is rather sure that the country will quite soon be a member of the EU (PM, 30.01.2003). Also the act of the Estonia's President in signing the accession treaty is interpreted as more symbolic than being a substantial step but still brings *us* closer to the EU (PM, 16.04.2003a).

The linear way to the EU was the most represented in Cultural Elite articles. The articles argue about the looming (*terendumine*) of the EU (PM, 11.10.2002), Estonia as almost a member of the EU already (PM, 23.12.2002a; see also PM, 15.06.2002a), as soon as the candidate countries like Estonia will be accepted as full members (PM, 19.04.2003), forthcoming accession to the EU (PM, 18.01.2003a), Estonia having an opportunity to join the EU (PM, 27.07.2002b), Estonia moving towards the EU (PM, 06.08.2003a) and Estonia's future among the states of the enlarged EU (PM, 13.09.2003c). Conclusively, as one Cultural Elite article suggests, *we* started twelve years ago from a mature post-World War II Europe, and the way chosen by *us* has been European all these years – it is a way of peace and creative reconstruction (PM, 02.09.2003b; see also PM, 15.09.2003). Another article says that presumably Estonia's progress (*kulgemine*) to the EU has been determined both by *our* own former decisions and the preceding *Yes*-decisions of the other states (PM, 10.09.2003b).

In a Readers article, the EU accession is connected to the question of expenses, thus making the *No*-direction visible, even though not reasonable. The article suggests that if Estonian laws have been harmonized with those of the EU, can *we* vote against the accession, although a lot of *our* money has already been spent on the accession, hiring four to five people for the EU

integration bureau? The article continues that if one really wants to know people's opinion it should have been asked *before* spending the money (PM, 02.06.1997).

In sum, in the examples that depict Estonia's linear way to joining the EU, the country is given a rather passive position. Since the conclusions about the linear way are drawn on the basis of events during the accession process, the role left to the accession referendum is rather formal. Instead of seeing the referendum as a forum where the actual decision is made and practice formed, it is rather depicted as a forum that either follows the existing practice (in the case of *Yes*) or questions it in the discursive level (*No* to the EU). The latter, however, indicates quite illogical behavior from the perspective of the linear way.

Accept EU authority

The second sub-discourse of *Being European, Accept EU authority*, is based on the EU agency and interaction between Estonia and the EU. The EU is no more seen as a destination raised to the pedestal but an agency that has a positive impact on the development of Estonia. This impact is depicted either as an interplay between Estonia (the needy) and the EU (the carer) or by pointing out the beneficial framework the EU offers to Estonia. In both cases help and care gained from the EU are seen as additional value for Estonia, unrelated to the necessity to solve problems or to become something else.

EU taking care is based on the EU as an active agency who helps Estonia (Political Elite articles, PM, 18.07.1997b and PM, 05.01.1998a and Cultural Elite article, PM, 02.10.2003c). In the beginning of the accession process, this relationship is characterized by using family terms, hierarchical face-to-face relations based on deep emotional bonds. For instance the European Commission's general attitude towards Estonia is fatherly strict (*isalikult karm*) (Cultural Elite article PM, 26.06.1998). Similarly, a Journalist article claims that Nordic countries have taken the inclusion of the Baltic countries to the EU to their heart (PM 24.03.1997). As a representative of this 'Nordic care' the paper refers to Finland's president at the time, Tarja Halonen: "As an older sister she guides younger brother in the winding road of the EU, she teaches and warns at the same time."⁵² (PM, 22.10.1997a). By mapping Finland as an older sister and Estonia as a younger brother article also seals the role of both actors for good.

In most examples, however, care and support are not based on love and warm feelings but calculations of how to maximize the benefits. A Journalist article writes, by helping *them* we also help *ourselves* has been motto of Europe (PM, 31.03.1998b). On a more concrete level, the same idea is expressed by a Political Elite article: since the EU accession means that

⁵² Justkui vanem õde juhatab ta nooremat venda euroliidu käänulisel teel, ta õpetab ja hoiatab samal ajal.

Estonia has to unavoidably sign both the Maastricht and Schengen treaties, the good work of the Estonian police and border guards is in the interest of all EU member states as even a question of life and death (PM, 17.07.1997).

Towards the end of the accession process, the sphere, in which the EU's help was widely noticed and authority was recognized, was the financial support offered to Estonia (Cultural Elite article, PM, 09.08.2003a). As another Cultural Elite article states, the support Estonia already gets from the EU is increasing in connection with the proposed membership (PM, 25.01.1997).

In more concrete examples, Political Elite articles revealed Estonian programs and targets for EU financing (PM, 05.01.1998a; PM, 28.08.1998; PM, 24.10.2002 and PM, 04.07.2003b). Concerning more concrete specifics, a Journalist article suggests that Estonia has a reason to be thankful to the EU for the Phare money (PM, 06.11.2003a). Similarly, Cultural Elite articles point out that as part of the Phare program, EU supports language training and teaching Estonian language to Russian-speakers (PM, 22.12.1997; 02.09.2003a; see also PM, 08.08.2003a) as well as EU finances targeted to the educational sector of Estonia (PM, 15.10.2002a).

Apart from that Journalist articles discussed the opportunities to use EU aid to improve Estonian railways (15.04.2003a; PM, 24.04.2003 and PM, 05.11.2003) and Political Elite articles discussed agriculture (PM, 01.02.2002 and PM, 13.02.2002) and environmental protection (PM, 01.04.2002). Compared to the other three categories of articles, only a few Readers articles emphasized the EU's aid to Estonia (PM, 14.07.2003b and PM, 21.08.1997a).

In addition to the help Estonia is getting or going to get from the EU, the articles depict the ***EU as a good framework*** for Estonia. Here, instead of offering help, the EU creates a safe and secure framework for Estonia (Political Elite article, PM, 19.03.1997). As a Cultural Elite article writes, until now *our* attitude towards the EU has been first and foremost consumer-like but in reality the EU is an opportunity for *us* to develop *ourselves* more efficiently (PM, 12.07.1997a). Another Cultural Elite article claims that in the new reality of Europe, small countries have also been given the opportunity to define their fate with deeds (PM, 04.02.1998; see also PM, 02.07.1998).

Similar to these, in most cases the idea of good framework is explicitly related to the future whereas the past or the present are referred to implicitly. More concretely, the focus is on predicting what opportunities would EU membership bring to Estonia. A Cultural Elite article states the EU will increase remarkably Estonia's administrative capacity and restrict not only corruption and the uncontrollable movement of money but also other social vices (PM, 13.09.2003c).

The benefits depicted by the articles both in the beginning as well as the end of the accession process are rather similar. The Cultural Elite articles tell of choosing peace that the EU together with the United States of America has guaranteed to *me* for the past 56 years (PM, 02.09.2003b), see the EU as one of the great guarantees (garant) of *our* national existence (PM, 13.02.1998)

that ensures Estonian statehood (PM, 08.08.2003a) and prevents potential military aggression against Estonia (PM, 27.10.2003). Therefore, compared to the accession of Nordic countries which felt secure and could bargain with the EU as equals, “[w]e have much more to win from the [European –SKK] Union and little or nothing to lose.”⁵³ (Journalist article, PM, 11.09.1997a).

Apart from the EU as a framework where existence of Estonian statehood is guaranteed, the articles refer to the improvement of Estonia’s international position in relation to the EU. Membership is expected to strengthen the existence Estonia (Cultural Elite article, PM, 02.10.2003a). In an allegoric example where the attributes of ‘Russia’ and ‘Estonia’ are used in an opposite way, a Cultural Elite article writes about the increasing importance of the “small Russia” (*väike Venemaa*) in connection with that country’s EU accession (PM, 08.12.2003). Since the EU is seen to give Estonia a good foreign political reference group (Political Elite article, 05.05.2003), a Political Elite article claims that as an EU member, Estonia can more easily negotiate with Third Countries (PM, 21.10.1998).

At a more concrete level, the influence of the EU on Estonian relations with single countries is dealt with. A Cultural Elite article writes that after Estonia and Poland belong together to the EU, Polish border guard no longer consider it necessary to show its importance and thoroughness at the border crossing points (PM, 04.07.2003c). In a common article of Estonian and Finnish Ministers of Foreign Affairs at the time the writers emphasize the cooperation opportunities opening up from Estonian EU membership (PM, 09.10.2002a).

Concerning the relations between Estonia and Russia, a Cultural Elite article argues that after the EU called Estonia to begin the accession negotiations, Russia tried to show the world that it wished to improve its relations with Estonia (PM, 06.01.1998a). The articles also claim that EU accession finally offers a new opportunity to deal with the large neighboring state (*naabrist suurriigiga*) with dignity (*väärikalt asju ajda*) (PM, 11.11.1997b) and when Brussels says *yes* to Estonia’s accession (and why not Latvia’s and Lithuania’s) to the EU, Russia will also sign the border agreement with *us* and Latvia without further dawdling (*venitamine*) (PM, 29.11.1997a). At the end of the accession process the same line of argument is continued. Cultural Elite article argues that Estonia’s, Latvia’s and Lithuania’s full membership in the EU and NATO will make Moscow treat the Baltic provinces completely different from previous centuries (PM, 26.11.2002; see also PM, 07.11.2002).

Apart from Estonia’s international relations, the influence of the EU is mapped also in the other spheres of life. In the Cultural Elite articles, language, culture, identity but also science and education are emphasized at the end of the accession process. The articles claim that membership enables the EU to protect the identity of a small country (PM, 27.06.2003), that cultures are protected, not destroyed in the EU where the Estonian language will be one of

⁵³ [m]eil on liidust võrratult rohkem võita ning kaotada pole suurt midagi.

the official languages of *our* civilization and Estonia will have a say with full rights (*täieõiguslikuks kaasarääkijaks*) in all main questions of *our* civilization (PM, 08.08.2003a; see also PM, 16.09.1998 and PM, 02.09.2003a). Another article states that Estonian participation in the EU common scientific space has been very fruitful (*kandnud head vilja*) already and EU membership is considered to be a necessary condition for creating a knowledge based Estonia (PM, 03.09.2003b; see also Political Elite article, PM, 04.01.2002).

Also most of the economy related arguments in the paper are presented by the Political and Cultural Elite articles. A Political Elite article claims that the Free Trade Agreement with the EU has helped to bring investments to Estonia and enabled *us* to become a part of the steadily developing economic region (PM, 21.07.1998). On the basis of a similar logic, other writers say that a formal EU accession occurring as soon as possible presumably offers new opportunities to Estonian economy (Political Elite article PM, 03.11.1998; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 15.08.2002 and Readers article, PM, 27.04.1998). The decision to put Estonia into the first group in the accession negotiations was seen to raise trust towards the country and reduce the outward flow of money from the economy (Cultural Elite article PM, 09.10.1998; see also Political Elite article PM, 17.07.1997). EU membership is expected to increase Estonia's trustworthiness and economic interests of the other countries towards Estonia even further (Political Elite article, PM, 22.05.1998 and Cultural Elite articles PM, 16.11.2002 and PM, 12.08.2003a).

At a more concrete level articles state that as an EU member, Estonia will have easier access to the Eastern market (Political Elite article, PM, 25.07.1997a; PM, 21.07.1998 and PM, 26.08.2003b), Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) will be a tangible benefit for Estonia (Political Elite article, PM, 04.07.2003b) and EU offers a good framework for a knowledge based economy (Cultural Elite article PM, 27.06.2003). Conclusively, a Cultural Elite article writes, on the basis of the experiences of Ireland, Portugal and Greece one can, without much hesitation, hope for an increase of welfare in Estonia (PM, 24.12.1997c).

The sphere that was present in the Readers articles and in the Cultural Elite articles were the new opportunities from the human perspective. As a Cultural Elite article writes, *I* have no doubt that joining the EU would help to make Estonia a more human friendly (*inimsõbarlikumaks*) place (PM, 14.11.1998). Also the power of the people as the highest power holder (*võimukandja*) is seen to increase, since apart from the national bodies people practice their power through EU institutions (PM, 02.05.2003b).

Similarly, a Readers article says that in the EU, future generations will have more opportunities (PM, 01.09.2003). In the economic sphere, one expects the EU to help to save money in everyday life (Readers article, PM, 18.02.2003) and the free movement of labor is seen to enable *our* people to enter themselves into the EU wide labor market for a better remuneration (Cultural Elite article, PM, 04.07.2003c; see also PM, 11.07.2003c).

Membership of the EU is also related to the new opportunities for the students (Cultural Elite article PM, 06.08.2003a). In another example of the Cultural Elite article however, the idea of various opportunities is expressed more ironically: if Estonia joins the EU for good, the slaves will run away and the world of Estonian libertarians and new capitalists tends to break down, logically and rightfully (PM, 05.12.2003).

In sum, in *Follow EU practice*, the aim is to show that either Estonia has reached its destination already or has at least direct access to the EU. *Accept EU authority*, on the other hand, emphasizes either the EU as an actor that cares for Estonia (EU helping us) or concentrates on the beneficial framework created for Estonia by EU membership. The latter is largely based on the anticipated developments inside the EU. Both sub-discourses, however, can be characterized by a comparison in which ‘normality’ is ascribed to one side only whereas the other side measures itself against evaluation (Hörschelmann 2001, 986; see also Section 3.1).

The position of Estonia in *Follow EU practice* is either static or reactive. In static cases the similarity between Estonia and the EU is depicted as a concept that just exists (for instance, like the EU, we are also Eurosceptical and individualistic). Reactivity, on the other hand, is based on the idea that the country has already successfully internalized the practice of the EU.

In *Accept EU authority*, Estonia is rather passively looking forward to the EU's help. Also in the case of the EU as a beneficial framework, the focus is more on the opportunities created by the EU than by Estonian agency. This way the new opportunities also do not refer to the urgent need to change Estonia but possibilities that the nation can take advantage of.

In both sub-discourses, the Cultural Elite articles as well as the Political Elite articles are dominant, whereas the Readers articles and the Journalist articles are more modestly represented. Since *Accept EU authority* is based on the arguments for joining the EU, the relative absence of Journalist articles can be seen as an outcome of a mixture of the ideal of objectivity and the pro-EU attitude. Instead of directly arguing for the EU membership, *Postimees* offers a platform to the representatives of society for praising the EU. This way the newspaper can simultaneously take a particular stand as well as remain objective⁵⁴. In the case of Readers articles, their weak representation can be connected to their rather critical attitude towards Estonia's EU accession.

BECOMING EUROPEAN

The scheme of *Becoming European* follows the logic of *Being European*: the sub-discourses *Follow EU practice* and *Accept EU authority* are accordingly challenged by the sub-discourses *Should follow EU practice* and *Should accept EU authority*. *Should follow EU practice* is based on the difference of

⁵⁴ However, in the third discourse, Humble Estonia, PM was taking stand by giving a negative forecast about Estonian development outside the EU (threats instead of the promises).

Estonian practice from the one of the EU as an ideal that should be achieved. For example, a Political Elite article emphasizes the necessity to follow European norms in connection with prisons: "On the basis of the European norms we have approximately 3000 prison places and we keep 5000 inmates in these. Sooner or later we have to build more prisons.⁵⁵" (PM, 10.12.2002).

Similar to *Accept EU authority*, *Should accept EU authority* deals with EU agency. Here, instead of help or benefits offered by the EU, the focus is on the EU's orders Estonia should fulfill.

The cleavage between ideal and reality means that apart from the identification, recognition can also be analyzed. Thus, both sub-discourses consist of two parts: one refers to what should be done as identification and the other recognizes the situation either as a starting point or a result of the changes. Recognition in a form of *Failure to follow EU practice* is presented in relation to the small financial support given to the *No* side of the *Yes/No* debate before the accession referendum:

By comparing these numbers but, above all, the attitudes one can conclude that in our EU process the principles of democracy are ignored and even the Copenhagen democracy-criteria set for [evaluating - SKK] the compliance of Estonia to the EU accession are called in question.⁵⁶

Cultural Elite article PM, 15.01.2003b

Failure to accept EU authority deals with the EU as an actor who gives feedback to Estonia. A Political Elite article states:

Cheap public sector does not guarantee sufficient institutional development of the state that, however, is our weakest point on the basis of the evaluation of the European Union specialists. The laws do not function and officials do not fulfill their duty.⁵⁷

PM, 22.11.1997

Should follow EU practice

Similar to *Follow EU practice*, *Should follow EU practice* deals with the EU accession as an internal process. The emphasis is either on the process (linear

⁵⁵ Euroopa normide järgi on meil umbes 3000 vanglakohta ja me peame nendes 5000 vangi. Varem või hiljem peame vanglaid juurde ehitama.

⁵⁶ Neid arve, eelkõige aga suhtumisi võrreldes saab järelada, et meie ELi-protsessis eiratakse demokraatia printsiipe, seades kahtluse alla isegi Eesti vastavuse ELi ühinemiseks kehtestatud Kopenhaageni demokraatia-kriteeriumidele.

⁵⁷ Odav avalik sektor ei taga piisavalt riigi institutsionaalset arengut, mis aga Euroopa Liidu spetsialistide hinnangul on meie nõrgim koht. Seadused ei toimi ja ametnikkond ei täida oma rolli.

towards the EU) or a destination (reached destination). However, both process and destination are challenged by what one should be/do as identification and failing to be/do that as recognition. In connection with linearity, Estonia is supposed to follow the EU practice as a norm (or admit a failure to do so). Thus, the EU's practice is seen as an ideal to be achieved for Estonia's own sake. The reached destination, on the other hand, is challenged by the necessity to follow EU practice as an own aim (or failure to do so). In this case the focus is on the cleavage between the rhetoric (goals of Estonia) and the actual practice of the country (that in ideal should be complementary to the rhetoric).

The emphasis on the internal relations means that even though following the EU practice, the process is based on the observations made by the Estonian side (should be/do, since consider EU practice is valuable for *us*), not the orders given by the EU to Estonia as a candidate country. Also the EU-related goals are set by Estonia itself. The same is also valid in connection with the recognition to both the EU practice as a norm and as own aims.

In relation to the first half of this sub-discourse, understanding that Estonia ***should follow EU practice as a norm***, the superiority of the EU practice over Estonia's is depicted from three perspectives: image, substance and development. In the case of image, the EU is seen as a quality label whereas the substance is based on the practical value gained by following the example of the EU. The third case, development, can be seen as a mixture of both image and substance.

According to the EU, as a quality label, the notion that things are organized differently in the EU is sufficient reason to do the same in Estonia. This way the label 'made in/by the EU' is sufficient to legitimize the value of certain practices for Estonia (Political Elite article, PM, 25.05.1998a).

The categories of writers which most actively depict the EU as a quality label are the Political and especially the Cultural Elite whereas the Journalist articles and the Readers articles are less represented. The topics by categories are rather heterogeneous, from value added tax for books (Political Elite article, PM 17.04.1998) and EU market regulation as being very instructive for Estonia (Political Elite article, PM, 11.12.1998b) to the labor force strike as a common practice in the EU (Readers, PM, 18.04.2002c). In between these themes, the Cultural Elite articles portray the necessity to increase welfare (PM, 02.09.2002) and the need to get used to commuting from 50 to 100 kilometers for finding a job as per the average European practice (PM, 12.08.2003a).

The spheres represented in the Journalist articles are EU practice in agriculture (PM, 15.03.2003) and financing of medical services (PM, 19.05.2003). Readers article approaches the latter topic from the grass root perspective. In relation to the case of mother of the small children who had leukemia and was fighting publicly to get her medicines compensated from Estonia's health insurance fund, a Readers article explains: since this expensive medicine is compensated even in Latvia and of course in all EU

countries one can clearly see where also *we* should be heading (PM, 27.11.2002b). The argument that in the EU countries, the medicine is 'of course compensated', is strengthened by the claim that even in Latvia the same practice is followed.

The most numerous articles are the Cultural Elite, which deal largely with education and research. For example, Finland is seen as an example of qualitative vocational training in the EU and Estonia's development is expected to be guided in this direction (PM, 31.01.2002). Similarly, another article claims that the common EU criteria for education and training could be used also for evaluating *our* educational policy program (PM, 27.02.2003). Other articles state that in EU countries, higher education is developed on a quality basis that is the only possible route for Estonia's higher education (PM, 06.08.2003a), one should follow the example of the EU countries in diversifying basic education (PM, 06.04.1998a) and the EU is seen as a role model in connection with the percentage of the GDP used for research (PM, 14.02.1997).

While in connection with the quality label, EU practice is seen as valuable and worth following, substance deals with the genuine benefits Estonia would gain by following the EU practice. At the same time, the current practice of Estonia is seen as insufficient. Therefore the EU practice is presented as a necessity not an added value. For example, a Journalist article writes that by approaching the EU, the Estonia-Russia relationship will be improved, since Estonia has to make the decisions that please Russia (PM, 28.11.1997). A Political Elite article writes about the possibility to save *our* agriculture by implementing the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) whereas any other option would be a dead end (PM, 02.04.2003a). The claim emerges from the liberal principle of adopting 'as much of the state as necessary and as little as possible' as a leading idea for reforming Estonia's economic sector. In agriculture, this meant opening up borders and decreasing subventions. Among the farmers this was widely seen as a destructive decision that had put Estonian farmers into a poorer position and made the competition unequal.

Several of the Political Elite articles and Journalist articles argue that EU practice is elaborated from the perspective of making Estonian life safer and protecting the people. As a Journalist article says, the norms of the EU are not made from whole cloth (*laest võetud*) but are necessary for guaranteeing consumers good and wholesome food products (PM 24.12.1997a; see also Political Elite article, PM, 07.09.1998a). Other examples focus on the EU practice concerning the safety of play and sport grounds that is necessary to protect children's health (Journalist article, PM, 07.06.2002) and substantial basis of following the environmental norms (Journalist article, PM, 29.08.2002 and Political Elite articles PM, 19.03.1997 and PM, 01.04.2002).

In addition to substantial superiority of EU practice depicted above, in some examples the main focus is on the urgent need to change Estonian practice. A Readers article writes in relation to the unhygienic situation in *Kuusalu* children camp that for Estonian people the elementary behaviour

norms (including basic sanitary norms) have to be pressed upon (*pähe taguda*) even from outside under the name of EU norms (PM, 15.06.2002b). The expression 'press upon' refers to the way children are taught: endless repetition of activities until they remember, adopt and start to behave on the basis of these repetitions. Thus, EU practice is necessary for the development of Estonian people. Similarly, a Cultural Elite article writes that even with the most stupid EU standard it could be possible to eliminate several colonies of chaos and irresponsible incompetency in Estonian life (PM, 14.11.1998; see also Readers article, PM, 02.09.2003c).

The previous two parts above focus on the EU as a quality label and the substance of the EU practice whereas in the last part, development can be seen as a mixture of both concepts. Simultaneously, the EU is used as a quality control tool and the practice of the EU is depicted as being necessary for improving Estonia. As a Political Elite article writes:

If the European Union that is much wealthier than Estonia, has considered the regional policy that important, also we should not proceed from the simplified ideological understanding and hope under the label of right-wingness that the free market economy as such develops the life in South Eastern or North Western Estonia.⁵⁸

PM, 03.06.1998b

The value of the EU experience is legitimized by referring to the EU as a much wealthier entity in comparison with the rather poor and naïve Estonia.

In some cases the superiority of the EU practice is created by locating the EU metaphorically more superior than Estonia and using the adjectives like 'wider', 'higher', 'more real' etc. to refer to the necessary progress. In the Political Elite articles and Cultural Elite articles as well as in those of the Readers, the references to 'EU/Euro level/standards/quality' are made as a sign of quality and inevitability (Cultural Elite article PM, 12.01.1998 and Readers article, PM, 30.08.2002). In the articles of the Political Elite articles, the EU level is connected to the development of the political culture (PM 05.03.2003a) and the quality of education (PM, 21.07.2003b).

Other adjectives used for showing the superiority of the EU practice are 'truthful', 'real', 'equal' and 'covering'. A Readers article states that the EU salary and taxation system is quite close to the truth (PM, 08.10.1998a) and a Journalist article depicts cooperation among the EU countries as the real one based on flesh and blood (*vis-à-vis* the one between Baltic countries) (PM, 12.05.1998a). Another Journalist article writes about the necessity for treating

⁵⁸ Kui Eestist tunduvalt jõukam Euroopa Liit on regionaalpoliitikat nii oluliseks pidanud, siis ei tohi meie kindlasti lähtuda lihtsustatud ideoloogilisest käsitlusest ja parempoolsuse sildi all loota, et vabaturumajandus arendab iseenesest Kagu- või Kirde-Eesti elu.

Estonian and EU students equally in Estonia, since the EU leans on the principle of equality (PM, 12.11.2003a).

In some cases, the value gained from following the EU practice in a variety of spheres is characterized as simply 'becoming European'. A Journalist article urges that Estonia's legislators should follow European traditions and enable the children of inhabitants without any citizenship⁵⁹ to gain Estonian citizenship (PM, 22.10.1998b; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 28.08.1997). As a Journalist article writes:

Let's still see things more broadly than the soil of Saint Mary's Land we are accustomed to, the one that we are still willing to consider a measure of everything else in the world. Let's look at the things in a European way.⁶⁰

PM, 02.06.2003b

The term Saint Mary's Land refers to the name given to the current Estonian territory in the 13th century by Bishop Albert. The term is usually used in the ceremonial contexts to emphasize Estonia's specialty one is proud of. Also the soil or 'homeland's dust' is an expression that usually refers to the land as holy and valuable, represented for example in a "homeland narrative" (Feldman 2001, 13-15; see also Berg 2002, 111). In this example, however, the meaning of both terms is turned around to signify a confined and uncivilized world view based on an imagination that Estonia is at the center of everything (see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 28.11.2003).

The second part of Estonia *Should follow EU practice*, is based on the understanding that Estonia **should follow EU practice as own aim**, as a destination to be achieved. While the former part was based on a cleavage between Estonian and EU practice of which the latter was seen as an ideal, here a cleavage between Estonian goals as an ideal (rhetoric) and practice of fulfilling these goals is depicted.

The major goal referred to in the articles is EU membership. As Journalist articles suggest, Estonia has to work hard and put in an effort to achieve that goal (PM, 11.11.1997a and PM 05.12.1997b). At a more concrete level several examples can be found in the articles of all four categories from both the beginning as well as the end of the accession process. The least represented are the Political Elite articles.

Readers articles claim that since the Estonian government heads towards the EU, for making the aim real, this should be visible also in the other spheres of life. One Readers article writes that since *our* government pushes Estonia towards the EU and NATO with full force (*tüiel rinnal*) our fathers of the

⁵⁹ Article refers to those Russian speakers who are neither Estonian nor Russian citizens.

⁶⁰ Nähkem siiski asju avaramalt kui harjumuspärane Maarjamaa mullakamar, mida kipume ikka veel kõikide maailma asjade mõõduks pidama. Vaadakem asjadele euroopalikult.

people (*riigiisad*) should seriously consider a transition to progressive income tax (PM, 22.02.1997). Other examples of Readers articles show concern for the necessity to increase the state budget (PM, 14.08.2003b), cease using the term KAPO as an abbreviation of the Estonian Security Police (*Kaitsepolitsei*) due to its analogy with the history of Nazi-Germany (PM, 26.08.1997c) and stop using bears in circuses, since it's a torment to the animals (PM, 02.11.2002).

Also a Journalist article writes that the changes that should be made are logically connected to or inevitable for achieving the membership. Even though concrete single tasks may originally come from the EU, these are internalized by referring to the EU accession as Estonian aim. Thus, the paper writes that it is difficult to imagine Estonian EU membership without establishing a market regulation system (PM, 12.09.2002a), Estonia has a discussion concerning future foreign labor and migration policies due to joining the EU (PM, 01.02.2003), and in connection with keeping Estonia's leading position in the EU direction ahead of Latvia, Estonia should liberalize its citizenship policy since this has been done in Latvia (PM, 22.10.1998b; see also PM, 08.04.1997).

Similar claims can be found in the Cultural Elite articles and Political Elite articles. A Cultural Elite article refers to the conclusions of the Commission of Juridical Expertise that the constitution has to be changed for joining the EU (PM, 11.06.2002b). Another article writes that one has to rethink how *our* current citizenship policy serves the objectives that are relevant in connection with the EU accession (PM, 06.11.1997; see also PM, 18.11.1997; PM, 19.02.1998; PM, 12.11.1998a and PM, 11.01.2002). The Political Elite articles write that the wish to join the EU gives *us* another obligation: to harmonize Estonian laws with those of the EU (PM, 15.04.1997c), for normal economic interaction with the EU countries Estonia has to reorganize the state organization, create new institutions, accept the laws, train officials etc. (PM, 13.10.1998) and to consider quick implementation of progressive income tax since in the EU *we* can hardly avoid that (PM, 29.07.2003; see also PM, 04.07.2003b).

In sum, in the examples above the relationship between Estonia's goal and its duties is communicated by emphasizing the necessity to fulfill the tasks whereas in the following examples the focus is on the necessity to fulfill the tasks completely and properly. For instance, a Journalist article writes in relation to the law that regulates gender equality that hopefully this legislative proposal will not remain only a declarative act but will really engage new mechanisms for avoiding any kind of discrimination, and will give Estonia an opportunity to shadow Europe in the sphere of societal developments (PM, 13.11.2003a). Similarly, a Readers article asks rhetorically that even though externally (formally) everything is in order and norms harmonized the question remains what is the internal situation? (PM, 06.01.2003a).

The willingness to change Estonian practice is also connected to the question of whether joining the EU really is the goal for Estonia. For example, a Political Elite article writes that if *we* in the first place want to become

members of the EU, taking over EU's tariff policy demands of *us* a quick change of *our* constitution (PM, 15.08.1998). Another article claims that if *we* want to join the EU, sooner or later *we* also have to abandon the death penalty (Political Elite article, PM, 09.06.1997). A Cultural Elite article writes that if one declares joining the EU, *our* first big duty is to stop the cowboy capitalism and Friedmanship (*friedmanlus*) that has lasted for more than ten years and to head together with the European core states towards a proper social and balanced society (PM, 11.07.2003a).

Like in the last example, several Cultural Elite articles point out the consequences in the economic sector. For example, one has to deal more with social guarantees, to improve working conditions, welfare of the workers and labour policy. The article continues that if one belongs to the club of rich states, many major truths that have been thrown aside in the current cowboy capitalism have to be accepted (PM, 12.08.2003a). Another article states that since the accession to the EU causes a significant change in the movement of goods, money and people in the Baltic Sea region, one cannot escape from creating an enormous logistical service region in the area of Narva-Vaivara-Sillamäe (PM, 02.04.2003b, see also PM, 25.08.2003a). A Cultural Elite article writes that, as a member state, Estonia has to start following stricter rules of national support. Thus, it would not be bad at all if one started to fulfill these criteria now (PM, 09.11.1998a, see also PM, 18.11.1997 and PM, 11.08.1997).

One topic dealt with both by Journalist articles as well as Cultural Elite articles is the demand for additions to the labor force due to the EU accession. A Journalist article writes that in the process of joining the EU, the Ministry of Agriculture needs a complementary work force, since the agricultural policy is simply the most laborious sphere (PM, 31.05.2003). Estonia's membership is also connected to the need to benefit from an increasing bureaucracy (18.06.2003b; see also Journalist article, PM, 17.07.2003a) and the necessity to have professionals of different spheres (Cultural Elite article PM, 13.01.2003; see also PM, 12.06.2002a and PM, 26.02.2003). From the substantial perspective, the new tasks for the farmers are pointed out by a Cultural Elite article: the farmers have to be competitive, prefer quality over quantity and discover the necessary specialty for adapting to the market that has been formed on the basis of new principles (PM, 15.08.2002).

As in the case of *Follow EU practice*, the sphere dealt with by the Cultural Elite article is education. Thus, in connection with Estonia's accession to the EU and the promotion of the Tartu University as the national university, *our* country, people and culture need to be introduced in the international arena more intensively (PM, 03.05.2003b; see also PM, 06.08.2003a). Another article states that since Europe's objective is a knowledge based society, everybody separately should try hard to create and deliver knowledge and resources and agree upon common rules (PM, 03.09.2003b).

In sum, while *should follow EU practice as a norm* was targeted towards 'becoming European' in a wider sense, the focus of *should follow EU practice*

as own aim was on achieving Estonia's EU membership or acting as a member country. The frequency of both arguments was increasing by the end of the accession process. All four categories of articles participated with the least represented being Readers articles.

Substantially, Readers articles differ from the other categories in two ways. First, in the case of the good EU practice one should follow, the attention of the other three categories was on the official sphere whereas Readers articles focus on all the spheres of (everyday) life more than any other category. At the same time Readers articles do not contribute to the idea that the official EU practice should be followed for one's *own* sake.

Second, in relation to the EU membership as Estonian goal, Readers articles emphasize the duties of the other societal actors (mostly politicians) whereas the emphasis in the other three categories is on 'us/Estonia' and 'our duties' for joining the EU. This way, Readers articles distance themselves from the idea that EU accession is a common goal and use the EU for 'blackmailing' the political elite (*you* have to show that *you* really want to go there). On the other hand, talking in the name of *us* enables the articles of the Journalists, Political Elite and Cultural Elite to ignore potential criticism towards the changes made in the name of the EU as a common goal of the whole society. Logically, the ones who are against making these changes can also be excluded from *us* on the basis of not sharing this goal.

Failure to follow EU practice

In the previous section, the need to follow EU practice as a norm or own aims was dealt with as identification whereas this section is based on the recognition given to Estonia in the same process. Accordingly, recognition is divided into *failure to follow EU practice as a norm* and *failure to follow EU practice as own aim*. On the basis of comparing Estonian practice to the one of the EU, conclusions are drawn about the cleavage between them. Similarly, a cleavage between Estonian goals and practice is depicted in the other, clearly shorter half of this section. Both parts are based on internal recognition, not EU evaluation.

In the articles of the first half of this sub-discourse, ***failure to follow EU practice as a norm***, conclusions are drawn on the basis of societal spheres, processes and statistical means, about the failure of Estonian practice in relation to the EU practice as a norm. Furthermore, in some articles, conclusions about Estonian failure are drawn on the basis of Estonian people whose behavior does not conform to EU standards.

The sphere Cultural Elite articles mostly emphasize is legislation. The articles argue that Estonian laws are not at the level of the EU countries (PM, 28.05.1998), democratic principles are ignored in *our* EU process questioning even Estonian accordance with the Copenhagen democracy criteria set for the EU accession (PM, 15.01.2003b) and Estonia's uneven legislation concerning gender equality is a potential restriction in connection with introducing EU

support and this in turn slows down Estonian development and decreases competitiveness (PM, 02.06.2003a; see also PM, 30.08.2003).

In the examples above Estonian backwardness is stated in a rather status quo manner whereas in the following cases it is seen as a current condition and thus naturally changing. Here failures are pointed out as implicit encouragement to solve the problems. One article writes that it still takes time before European laws will match Estonian life (Cultural Elite article PM, 28.03.2002). Similarly, a Political Elite article claims that it takes time until Estonia reaches the EU's legal space in practice (PM, 21.12.1998) and a Cultural Elite article states that normalization of politics as well as *our* real going to Europe becomes true after the end of the ongoing process that alienates people from politics (PM, 28.02.1998b).

In addition to legislation, the Political Elite articles and Cultural Elite articles depict Estonian failure on the basis of the societal practices and institutions. The articles argue that Estonia and the EU differ in their views on the curriculum of teaching (Political Elite article, PM, 22.10.1997b) and the term 'integration' is interpreted differently (Political Elite article, PM, 27.07.1998). Similarly, the Cultural Elite articles write that science is gaining a profit in the EU (PM, 17.05.2002), information policies of most EU countries, where libraries are treated as institutions that produce content of information and provide public services, differ from Estonia's (PM, 30.10.2002), in the EU countries, unlike Estonia, milk industries belong to the farmers (PM, 25.10.2002a), non-working Estonian public transportation does not enable Estonia to follow the EU model in the labor market (PM, 12.08.2003a) and the Eastern European banana economies are not suitable in the EU context (PM, 11.07.2003a; see also Journalist article, PM, 09.01.1997). Similarly, Readers article claims that with the current social policy, Estonia has nothing to do in the EU (PM, 14.12.1998a; see also PM, 23.03.2002).

Concerning gender equality, a Political Elite article writes that the developed Europe where Estonia aims at has paid great attention to the equality question whereas, in this context, Estonian society is as blind as a kitten (PM, 25.03.1998). Characterizing Estonia as a new born kitten refers to a totally helpless creature that can survive only if somebody is taking care of it. However, the kitten-phase can also be seen as a temporary one: after for a while kitten's eyes open and it is able to see. Thus, here the question is about the current condition: Estonia has to go through certain phases before reaching the EU level.

In some articles, the same understanding is communicated by the expression 'lagging behind'. A Political Elite article writes the Estonian living standard is still lagging much behind from the developed Europe and also that understanding about European values and management of democracy lag behind (PM, 03.06.1998a).

The examples of 'lagging behind' refer to the linear development where the one who lags behind has at least a theoretical possibility to catch the leader whereas some Political Elite articles distinguish between Estonia and the EU

on the basis of spatial grounds. Here, a cleavage is seen again as a rather permanent characteristic. As one article asks rhetorically, for which union is Estonia actually suitable (PM, 30.07.1997). In another Political Elite article, answer is given to this question. For example, due to being politicized Estonia is considered to move towards the East (PM, 01.10.1998). In the context of Estonian nepotism, a Readers article suggests the African Union as a proper alternative, since unfortunately in Europe that kind of action is not acceptable:

In this connection I make a proposal to finish the accession negotiations with the European Union and join the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Despite our different skin color the behavior is the same.⁶¹

PM, 11.03.2002a

Apart from the societal practices and developments, various articles express Estonia's failure to follow EU practice on the basis of statistical indicators. Readers articles are particularly concerned by the numbers of policemen and murders per capita (PM, 06.11.1998b) and different understandings of economic indicators (PM, 22.05.1997). Similarly, a Political Elite article writes that Estonian GDP is less than a quarter of the EU's average (PM, 02.08.1997; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 24.12.1997c).

Here, the most represented category is the Cultural Elite articles (PM, 12.06.1997; PM, 20.05.1997 and PM, 08.04.1998). Amongst the articles, statistical indicators and percentages of various spheres are dealt with. For instance renewable energy in Estonia and the EU in 2010 (PM, 02.08.2002), EU average salary compared to Estonian one (PM, 03.12.2003), relationship between the domestic loan portfolio and the GDP (PM, 25.09.2002), small enterprises per 100 000 inhabitants (PM, 12.08.2003a) and the percentage of the adults who participate in lifelong learning in Estonia and the EU (PM, 06.12.2003 and PM, 27.02.2003) are some of the examples. Apart from that, the amount of long term unemployed who return to the labor market in Estonia is estimated to be a half the EU average (PM, 23.05.2003b), the level of social stratification is seen to differ (PM, 21.11.2003), the average life expectation of men is clearly shorter in Estonia than in the EU (PM, 13.11.2003b) and the proportion of the population that supports the death penalty is higher in Estonia than in the EU (PM, 06.09.2003a).

In several cases the comparison is based on the money available in different spheres. Here, the articles of the Cultural Elite and the Political Elite are represented. For instance, Political Elite articles write that the price of land has collapsed and is tens times lower than the price level of the EU countries

⁶¹ Seoses sellega teen ettepaneku lõpetada liitumisläbirääkimised Euroopa Liiduga ja astuda hoopis Aafrika Ühtsuse Organisatsiooni (AÜO) liikmeks. Nahavärv on meil küll teine, kuid kombed samad.

(PM, 19.07.2002b) and Estonian public spending on employment is almost ten times below the EU's average (PM, 15.01.2003a). Other Political Elite articles draw conclusions on the basis of the differences in national subsidies for agriculture (PM, 08.01.1998) and spending on higher education in Estonia and the EU (PM, 30.09.3002).

Financing higher education and science are the topics present in the Cultural Elite articles. The articles argue that the salaries in the academic sector are not competitive (PM, 15.10.2002a) and in the EU the financing of research and development has increased to 3% of the GDP whereas the current level of Estonia, 0.6% of the GDP, sets us in a long perspective to the periphery of the world (PM, 06.08.2003a; see also PM, 14.02.1997; PM, 01.11.2002; PM, 12.11.2002 and PM, 29.01.2003). Apart from that, the difference of spending on the labor policy is dealt with by the Cultural Elite articles (PM, 02.12.1998 and PM, 19.12.2002a).

Sometimes Estonia's failure is depicted also in the cases when Estonia seems at first glance to do better than the EU. For example, even though the statistics shows that Estonia has six times less accidents at work than the EU, a Journalist article continues: However, the working inspection knows the reason for this 'small' variable - most of the occupational accidents are not officially registered and only the really difficult cases are reflected in the statistics (PM, 31.08.2002). Similar points are also written by the Cultural Elite articles concerning higher education in Estonia (PM, 18.04.2002a) and the future developments in the secondary education (PM, 27.02.2003).

The latter examples can also be characterized as the 'half EU level' (Political Elite article, PM, 15.08.1998). The characteristic feature of Readers articles that refer the most to the half EU level is an ironical attitude targeted towards aiming at the EU practice in some but not in all spheres. For example, prices and taxes are already similar to the EU's but with the quality of Estonian roads it is embarrassing to knock on the EU's door (PM, 31.10.1997b), Estonian prices are at the EU level, salaries are not (PM, 19.12.1997a), prisons and courtrooms are at the EU level whereas schools and hospitals are not (PM, 14.09.2002), excise of gasoline is raised whereas the social benefits (PM, 15.04.1997b), salaries and pensions are not (PM, 16.04.1997b and PM, 29.04.1997). In one Readers article, the same idea is communicated by talking about the EU accession in terms of entering the house: "Estonia has already got one foot in the door but we still have to look how the elderly, mentally and physically disabled, by compulsion, clean the sidewalks of the city with brooms."⁶²(PM, 28.01.2002).

Conclusively, in the examples above Estonian practice is criticized in a rather general level whereas the following criticism focuses on those Estonians who don't conform to EU standards. A distinction can be made between these Estonians as not being European (used mostly by Journalist articles to refer to

⁶² Eestil on juba jalg ELi ukse vahel, aga ikka peame veel vaatama, kuidas vanurid, vigased ja sandid luuakntsuga sunniviisiliselt linna kõnniteid puhastavad.

the political elite) and mapping certain Estonians (citizens) who are responsible for Estonia not reaching the EU norms.

The inability of Estonian politicians to perform in European way is depicted by Journalist articles either as a single failure or a more permanent shortcoming. An example of the former, is an article that suggests that Lennart Meri (Estonia's President at the time) had, by meeting Belorussian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko, abandoned good European traditions (PM, 30.08.1997). Another example concerns the meeting of Toomas Hendrik Ilves (Estonia's Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time) with the head of Latvia's main opposition party: "For a European Union member states' Minister of Foreign Affairs to flirt with the neighbouring country's opposition over such a delicate question as a border would have certainly cost [him - SKK] his post."⁶³ (PM, 25.08.1998). Referring to the meeting as a flirt makes the Minister look like a gigolo having fun, which brings the flirting and its consequences down to the everyday level: flirting with somebody in the wrong situation could, for example, cause marital trouble (or cost someone their post, like in the current case).

In general, however, the tone of Journalist articles while condemning the single violations of Estonian political elite is rather friendly (PM, 03.07.1998). Sometimes the newspaper acts as a parent reproving their child. For example, when reminding Ene Ergma (Speaker of Estonia's Parliament at the time) Estonia's responsibilities as a future EU and NATO member, the Journalist article represents the reproving attitude of a caring parent: it reminds the child about its improper behaviour but tries not to shame her in front of the other people. More concretely, the article claims that Ergma has given too much hope for Ukrainians concerning their future membership in the EU and continues that it would not like to displease Ene Ergma but would like to remind her quietly that from now on the words of Estonian politicians carry much more gravitas (PM, 03.10.2003).

Unlike the delicacy prevalent in the articles covering cases of single failure, the tone of the articles concerning permanent shortcomings are cynical. For instance, a Journalist article refers to the shameful fact that some deputies of Estonian parliament are unable to interact in one foreign language, let alone two or three. The article continues by asking how does this kind of politician plan to protect *our* interests at the international level - how do they for example persuade the representatives of the European Commission that an Estonian farmer wants to produce 900 000 tons of milk per year, do they expect an interpreter to be hired with the tax payers' money? The article also asks if they presume that their discussion partner, a Member of the European Parliament or a minister of a foreign country, has sufficient time and politeness to wait, until the valuable thoughts of the Estonian politician are translated into another language (PM, 26.09.2002).

⁶³ Ühele Euroopa Liidu liikmesriigi välisministrile oleks flirt naaberriigi opositsiooniga nii peenetundelises küsimuses kui piir läinud kindlasti maksma ametikoha.

The fact that the Journalist article creates a link between the Estonian deputies who do not speak foreign languages and the topic of agricultural quotas can be reasoned by *Postimees'* generally critical attitude towards Estonia's 'rural politicians' during the accession process. The sarcastic claim about the 'valuable thoughts' infers an assumption that the thoughts have no value at all. At the same time, one can ask if the language skills really affect this situation: would those thoughts get additional value if the person had voiced them in English or some other foreign language?

Apart from Journalist articles, other categories of articles express similar criticism. A Political Elite article criticizes Estonian officials by saying that their first worry is not to obey the law but to fight for changing it (PM, 15.04.1997c). A Readers article states that not all the politicians are good enough to represent Estonia at the Convention on the Future of Europe (PM, 22.02.2002). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article claims that the tendency of Estonian politicians to see a representative democracy as the only instrument of democracy does not suit the open society principles accepted in the EU (PM, 25.08.2003a). Another Cultural Elite article comments on the proposal that was made by Ken Martti Vaher (Estonia's Minister of Justice at the time) to have a life sentence for drug crimes:

But I feel hollow if the Minister of the country soon [gaining - SKK] access to the EU tells a story about the life sentence. Will we become something like a European Thailand, where the prisons are full of suffering people?⁶⁴

PM, 24.05.2003

The expression 'tell a story about' refers more to the fairy tale than the official policy and thus, makes the Minister's statement sound like entertainment. The rhetorical question about Estonia as a European Thailand makes the Minister's proposal sound even more absurd, since a country with Thailand-type prisons would never gain acceptance by the EU.

In addition to the aforementioned criticism expressed towards the Estonian politicians as not being European, criticism is also leveled at Estonian citizens (Cultural Elite article, PM, 11.07.2003c). For example a Journalist article refers to active EU citizens in comparison with the passive citizens of Estonia who complain about things but do nothing to change them (PM, 26.03.1998).

Similar to the sarcastic tone used to criticize the political elite, the articles use the same tone for citizens. However, instead of distancing itself from the inappropriate citizens, the articles refer to the citizens as *us*. Thus, *our* poorness in relation to the EU is admitted and the citizens are seen as the ones

⁶⁴ Aga mul on kõhe, kui sellist eluaegse-juttu ajab varsti ELi astuva riigi justiitsminister. Kas meist saab midagi Euroopa Taimaa-laadset, kus vanglad on täis piinlevaid inimesi?

who are responsible. For example, a Journalist article comments on the usage of services offered by local entrepreneurs:

In the developed countries the local entrepreneurs are preferred under similar conditions /.../ but obviously we are too poor or stupid to think about these kinds of things. While looking from Narva, the Soviet Union might also be closer to Estonia than the European Union and not the solid building firms who pay taxes but the experts behind the store are asked to build a shed for a bottle.⁶⁵

PM, 05.07.2002b

In this example, the article makes a distinction between the developed countries and Estonia as *us*. After that, however, more specific reference is made to Narva, the Estonian city, situated at the Russian border, of which more than 90% of its population is Russian speaking. Even though the article was published in 2002, eleven years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the city still dwells in a different era. At the same time, the way things are done in Narva are seen to map Estonia as a whole. On the basis of the title of the article, “Prefer Estonian” (*Eelista eestimast!*), one might assume that only the solid firms, and not the ones (most probably Russian speakers) who provide their service ‘behind the store’, are seen as ‘Estonian’. Therefore, the Russian speakers are excluded despite the fact they are probably as ‘local’ as one could be.

Since the citizens are seen as the only ones who could change the situation by changing themselves, a Journalist article accepts the current situation with regrets. The paper writes that it is very difficult to say what would make the people follow the laws in a European way and continues that it can be claimed for sure that one is not going to do it for getting into the EU (PM, 20.03.1997a). Another Journalist article refers to *our* self-pity as an attribute, with which one cannot reach to Europe with (PM, 02.06.2003b).

In comparison to the *failure to follow EU practice as a norm* depicted so far, another part of this sub-discourse, ***failure to follow EU practice as own aim***, is clearly less represented in the articles. In this part the main distinction is made between criticizing the situation either as a current condition or a status quo.

Even though in the case of current condition the cleavage between Estonian goals and its practice is admitted, one does not question EU membership as a goal but condemns the current practice instead. For example a Political Elite article writes that it is weird that in Estonia that aims at the EU it is still

⁶⁵ Arenenud riikides eelistatakse sarnastel tingimustel ikka kohalikke ettevõtjaid /.../ kuid ju me siis oleme nii vaesed või rumalad, et selliste asjade peale mõelda. Narvast vaadates võib ka Nõukogude Liit olla Eestile Euroopa Liidust lähemal ning kuuri kutsutakse pudeli eest ehitama oskajaid poe tagant, mitte riigimakse tasuvaid soliidseid ehitusfirmasid.

presumed that a Minister has to get involved with the problems of enterprise at the level of operative management (PM, 20.06.1998a; see also Journalist articles, PM, 03.04.1997 and PM, 10.11.2003b and Cultural Elite articles, PM, 30.05.2002 and PM, 22.08.2002).

The most represented articles in the examples of the current condition are Readers. For example, a Readers article comments on the decision to close the national library for the whole of July saying this kind of action is inappropriate but even unheard of in a state that aims at the EU with all one's might (*kõigest väest*) (PM, 05.07.1997b). Other similar Readers articles show a paradox between Estonia's goal to join the EU and an attempt to avoid the implementation of the 21st century railway development program (PM, 30.07.2002), consider it impossible to live, as an honest man, in Estonia that aims at the EU (PM 05.06.2003) and claims that in Estonia that officially aims at the EU membership, there still sprawls a deep double moral of stagnation (PM, 16.05.2003; see also Readers article PM, 21.02.1998 and Political Elite article, PM, 13.11.2002). In the last example, reference to the (Soviet) stagnation period as a temporal argument is used to show a cleavage between the EU as an Estonian goal and the current reality. Another Readers article writes that Estonia tries, no matter what, to join the EU by forgetting that for administrating property in the cities, *we* still use the law of slavery (*teoorjuse seadus*) from the 15th century (PM, 28.01.2002).

Towards the end of the accession process, criticism is also targeted at the failure to act in the EU in a proper way. A Cultural Elite article writes that taking into account the necessity to organize the usage of billions of *kroons* that came from the European structural foundations, the decision to abandon regional structures was even more critical (PM, 28.03.2003). Other articles write that at the threshold of joining the EU no means has been planned to the budget that would enable to include the financial means of the EU foundations and programs for developing *our* culture (PM, 16.10.2002) and after two years one needs 300-400 (!) top level translators who just do not exist (PM, 13.01.2003). Several Journalist articles see weak administrative capacity as something Estonia suffers from already and will become even more critical in the EU (for example PM, 17.06.2002a; PM, 18.06.2003b and PM, 05.08.2003b).

In contrast to the current condition, in the case of seeing Estonian practice as a status quo, articles follow the logic that it is easier to change the goal as 'words only' rather than the existing practice that determines what is 'really going on'. Therefore, if these two are not in accordance with each other, the goal loses its credibility. A Political Elite article writes, it is fairer if the People's Union (*Rahvaliit*) stated clearly that they no longer support EU accession (PM, 05.08.2002b). Similarly, a Journalist article asks rhetorically if Estonian authorities also really aim at the EU or just keep talking about this (PM, 16.08.1997) and a Political Elite article claims that at least rhetorically also the current coalition has supported Estonia's EU accession (PM, 23.04.1997; see also Cultural Elite article PM, 14.02.1997 and Readers article PM,

23.08.2003b). A Journalist article writes that even though one talks about the integration to the EU in a loud voice, on the basis of money delivered to governmental institutions, the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture has increased the most (PM, 07.01.1998b). Therefore, agriculture is not seen as an important part of, but an alternative to, the EU integration.

The category of articles most concerned at the beginning of the accession process about the sincerity of the claims that the EU accession is Estonian priority were Readers. For example an article argues that may be the politicians and officials leading *our* country are not actually really interested in joining the EU (PM, 06.03.1998a). Another article criticizes Andres Varik (Estonia's Minister of Agriculture at the time) for gambling (*maha mängida*) the liberal tariff policy that has been Estonia's advantage, and continues: one cannot avoid the ideas coming to one's mind that Varik and other Ministers do not lean towards the EU but peep over the shoulder towards the East (PM, 15.04.1997a). The article's reference to gambling makes the Minister's action clearly irresponsible and irrational. The verb 'peep' creates an impression that the Minister also tries to keep his real motives in secret.

In sum, *Failure to follow EU practice* is stronger in the articles than the necessity to follow EU practice. At the same time the first part of the sub-discourse, *failure to follow EU practice as a norm* is clearly more represented in the opinion articles than the second part, *failure to follow EU practice as own aim*.

The Cultural Elite articles criticize Estonian practice in relation to the EU practice the most, whereas Journalist articles are the least represented. The situation is rather the opposite in the context of criticizing the representatives of Estonia where the majority of the articles are Journalist articles. At the same time a contrasting development can be seen in the authorship of Political Elite and Cultural Elite articles. At the beginning of the accession process the Political Elite articles criticizing Estonia's practices are more numerous than their Cultural Elite counterparts whereas towards the end of the accession process the Cultural Elite articles are infinitely more numerous than their Political Elite counterparts. The development accords to the general changes amongst the articles: the Political Elite became less actively vociferous during the accession process, whereas the Cultural Elite became more actively vociferous (see Table 3.2).

Both sub-categories of recognition show the problems and weaknesses as well as heterogeneity of Estonian society. In the current case, both citizens and the political elite are depicted as being either not European by themselves or responsible for Estonia's problems. In the context of the low public trust towards the political institutions and the correlation between the low EU support due to the suspicious attitude towards Estonian political elite (see Chapter 1), it is interesting that Journalist articles *are* more eager to depict Estonian politicians as not European than the Readers articles. On the other hand, it is in accordance to the claims that at the time the media were critical

towards the politicians as actors but did not offer substantial criticism (see Section 3.2).

However, in recognizing a cleavage between Estonian practice and the goal to join the EU, either the practice as a current condition or the goal as 'talk only' is criticized. In both cases, Readers articles are most represented and politicians are held responsible for the situation. References to Estonian goals instead of EU practice as an ideal enables Readers articles to criticize the current situation and the politicians without idealizing the EU or identifying oneself with the EU. At the same time the politicians are reminded their commitment to the EU accession should guide their action in all spheres.

Should accept EU authority

Should accept EU authority (as *becoming*) challenges *Accept EU authority* (as *being*) by what one should be/do (as identification) and failing to be/do (as recognition). While *Accept EU authority* is based on the aid and beneficial framework got from the EU, in connection with *becoming*, Estonia is expected to be the active side, the one who gets the rod instead of fish. Thus, one should follow the EU guidance (in a form of demands, regulations, statements etc.) now (getting a rod) for being capable to take care of oneself in a long run (as a member of the EU). The EU is present in the articles as an actor who is obeyed and to whom the promises are given. This way the focus is on interaction between Estonia and the EU.

More concretely, the *should* part of *EU taking care* is titled as *should listen to the EU*. Here, the EU guidance for Estonia is seen as an ideal. *EU as a good framework*, on the other hand, is challenged by *should keep own promises*. In this section the focus is on internalized goals, however, in a form of promises given to the EU. As a necessity, keeping these promises is emphasized.

In *should listen to the EU*, the EU's authority is taken for granted and its orders or advice in one form or another are used for reasoning why certain changes are considered necessary. One example of the orders is 'Euro norms' (*euronormid*) and 'Euro demands' (*euronõuded*). For instance a Political Elite article points out the necessity to adjust the school canteens in accordance to the EU demands (PM, 06.11.2002), in the other articles the same need is communicated in relation to Estonian veterinary education and inspection (PM, 18.03.2002) and environment (PM, 19.03.1997). Similarly, a Journalist article refers to the 'Euro demands' Estonia should fulfill in connection with pensions (PM, 31.10.2003). In some articles also 'EU suggestions' are referred to, for instance concerning the progressive income tax (Political Elite articles, PM, 27.06.1998b and PM, 24.09.1998).

While in the case of taking over the EU practice, a distinction could be made between the EU as a quality label and the substantial benefits achievable by following the EU practice, here a distinction between following EU guidance (substance) and giving an impression of doing that (as image) can be made. In

the last case the focus is not on the substantial changes but on impressing and pleasing the EU.

As an example of substance, a Cultural Elite article uses a comparison with the housing company: just like becoming a member of the club or joining the housing company, one takes over the rules and regulations valid therein (PM, 17.12.1997a; see also PM, 24.12.1997c; PM, 10.11.1997 and PM, 13.05.2002a). Thus, Estonia should not have too high expectations for the negotiations, since, like a Political Elite article writes, EU expects Estonia to do its homework (PM, 04.03.1997). More concretely, a Journalist article points out that the candidate countries should adopt all EU legislation, 80 000 pages, and it is not possible to bargain that *we* accept only 67 000 pages (PM 11.12.1997; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 12.02.2003). As Political Elite article writes, Estonia cannot get a positive answer to all its wishes in the accession negotiations and for sure the government has to make choices and decisions (PM, 08.03.2002b).

Apart from the EU as a whole, mostly at the beginning of the accession process, representatives of the EU were referred to as authorities. In some articles, the reference is made on a rather general level whereas other examples dealt with suggestions of concrete persons. As an example of the general level, a Journalist article writes about the necessity to listen to the criticism and suggestions of the EU representatives (PM, 20.03.1997a). In a more concrete case, the focus is on a single country as a representative of the EU. A Journalist article refers to Austria as the country that was holding the EU presidency at the time and writes that Austria is the one which has set the schedule whereas Estonia has to work hard to stay in it (PM, 04.07.1998). Similarly, the Political Elite article writes about European Commission's suggestions to Estonia not to increase country's budgetary deficit (PM, 07.01.2003).

At the most concrete level, authors refer to single Commissioners as an authority. For example, Political Elite article quotes Franz Fischler, Commissioner of the Agricultural Affairs at the time that Estonia has to increase the competitiveness of the farms but should not also forget about the environmental aspects and other differences of conditions (PM, 10.03.1998). Another article refers to Fischler's suggestions concerning agricultural production (PM, 12.08.1997a). Also the claim of Hans van den Broek, European Commissioner of External Relations at the time that harmonized laws are a decisive factor in getting accepted to the EU is emphasized (Political Elite article, PM, 19.04.1997).

In addition to the statements of the EU institutions and representatives, the Political Elite articles use the EU documents and legislative acts as a basis for emphasizing the authority of the EU (PM, 18.07.1997b). The articles state that according to the EU treaty *we* have to harmonize *our* economy with the demands valid in the EU (PM, 19.04.1997) and the necessity to decrease the amount of the persons without citizenship is skillfully written also to the Agenda 2000, document, that is *our* entrance ticket to the EU (PM,

13.03.1998). As an example, water policy is one sector where Estonia has to transform itself on the basis of the EU directives (PM, 22.10.1998a). In several Political Elite articles the focus is on EU's agricultural principles (PM, 31.03.1998a), mostly based on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The articles argue that already today *we* should keep in mind the CAP of Europe for being able to implement it while joining the EU at latest (PM, 06.11.1998a; see also PM, 18.11.1998).

The examples above have emphasized the necessity to follow EU's guidance whereas in the following cases the focus is on impressing and pleasing the EU as the main goal. In some articles it is though done by improving substance. A Political Elite article writes about the atmosphere of unawareness concerning Estonia's position in the EU ranking list and the opportunity to start the accession negotiations among the first countries. Article continues that the developments concerning democracy are, of course, followed attentively in the case of Estonia as the newcomer in the EU integration. Thus, the article continues, it is especially important that the democratic control over the authorities and responsibility of the authorities (*võimuvastutus*) in Estonia worked immaculately (PM, 03.02.1997a; see also PM, 02.10.1998b). Since the EU neither knows nor trusts Estonia (yet), Estonia should prove itself. According to a Political Elite article the tariffs, implemented as a tool for immediate reaction (*kiirreageerimisvahendina*), is exactly the thing that would prove Estonia's capability to administrate the tariffs in front of the EU (PM, 11.09.1997b).

Unlike the former examples, image and substance are also dealt with as two aspects unrelated to each other (Political Elite article, PM, 28.03.1998a). For example a Journalist article writes that in issuing visas, cosmetic improvements that give a more European impression of Estonia are welcome by all odds (PM, 29.12.1997c). The expression 'cosmetic improvements' refers to using make up and thus, the importance of improving the image is emphasized instead of the need to make Estonian society substantially more European.

Similarly, in connection with Poland's decision to state in its constitution the civilian control over the army and the possibility to delegate part of the state power to the international organizations, a Journalist article writes: "For pleasing Brussels we should probably set these so called Euro clauses."⁶⁶ (PM, 28.05.1997). The term 'Euroclause' indicates that the clause is necessary for improving Estonian image and making Brussels happy, not for contributing to Estonian development.

In another similar example, a Journalist article writes that for getting into the EU, Estonia has to create structures for influencing the vegetable market with active support purchases as well as the temporary protection tariffs that have not been implemented yet in Estonia. The article continues that the question still remains, if one can learn to swim while practicing in an empty

⁶⁶ Need nn eurosättd peaksime ilmselt ka meie Brüsselile meeldimiseks sisse viima.

pool (PM, 16.07.2002). The metaphor of 'swimming in the empty pool' maps EU demands as artificial measurements necessary for pleasing the EU but without any substantial value.

Another part of *Should accept EU authority* is based on the idea Estonia ***should keep own promises*** given to the EU. More concretely, in the former part, Estonia was supposed to fulfill the EU norms because the EU had told it to do so, whereas here the EU authority has been internalized by the engagement Estonia has taken in relation to its aim to join the EU. Therefore, the logic is the same as in the case of *should follow EU practice as own aim* but instead of own aims, the focus is on the promises given to the EU or its justified expectations towards Estonia. This way the willingness to become a member of the EU is no more an internal issue but is dealt with as an interaction with the EU. As a Journalist article writes, Estonia has to confirm the EU that *we* could fulfill the accession conditions in reasonable time (PM, 06.03.1998c). Similarly, articles deal with Estonia's Eastern border, the future EU's external border as something Estonia should take the responsibility for (Political Elite article, PM, 11.09.1997b and Journalist article, PM, 13.05.2002b). Concerning the everyday working conditions of the border guards, a Journalist article writes:

*If the Estonian state wishes to take its priorities seriously, be this raising national security and seriously fighting crime or keeping the promises that have been given for getting into the EU, then it should not allow the people who do this work daily to be pushed into rotting behind-the-corners.*⁶⁷

PM, 19.07.2002a

In comparison with the beginning of the accession process, the scale of the spheres where Estonia was urged to take responsibility had increased in the articles by the end of the negotiations. The articles suggest that since the Estonian language was about to get the status of being one of the EU's official languages, it sets out the duties of the Estonian state, and not just to the EU (Journalist article, PM, 16.07.2003b). Another article states that Estonia does not apply at the transition period for the medicines, and thus, from 2004 all medicines sold in Estonia should be in accordance to the EU's demands (PM, 18.04.2002b).

Apart from Estonia's promises to the EU, in some examples the emphasis is on the expectations EU has in relation to Estonia's accession. For instance a Journalist article writes that just like *we ourselves* also the EU is expecting Estonia to increase its administrative capacity (PM, 17.07.2003b). Another article claims that Estonia has an opportunity to show if the praising

⁶⁷ Kui Eesti riik soovib tõsiselt täita oma eeliseesmärke - olgu selleks siis turvalisuse tõstmine ja tõsine võitlus kuritegevusega või Euroopa Liitu pääsemiseks antud lubaduste täitmine -, siis ei tohiks ta sallida, et inimesed, kes seda tööd igapäevaselt teevad, on surutud kõdunevatesse nurgatagustesse.

evaluations concerning its economic and political readiness to join the EU are being true (PM, 04.07.1998). One article states that most of the foreign real estate investors are sure that Estonia says *Yes* in the EU referendum and one is not afraid to invest hundreds of millions of *kroons* to Estonia only because in the mutual “Eurospot” (*euroanumas*) prices should get harmonized like it used to be in the other parts of Europe (Journalist article, PM, 14.08.2003a). In both cases Estonia has already been praised. This, however, means, that the other side has reasoned expectations towards Estonia which now has to fulfill its obligations as a part of the contract.

Towards the end of the accession process, the Cultural Elite articles refer to the EU foreign policy related expectations towards Estonia in connection with the Iraq crisis (PM, 21.02.2003; PM, 15.04.2003b and PM, 25.07.2003a). Another article claims that normal Estonian-Russian relations will soon become an absolute necessity for the third partners – Nordic countries, Baltic Sea region and the EU (PM, 02.04.2003b).

Both in the beginning and towards the end of the accession process, some articles argue that since the EU is ready for a great financial contribution, Estonia should contribute at least a little from its side. For example, a Journalist article writes about investments to agriculture (PM, 01.08.1998a) and a Political Elite article about regional development (PM, 03.06.1998b). In sum, as the articles state, if Estonia next year gives to the EU’s budget less than billion *kroons* but receives more than two billions, then simple arithmetic shows that to achieve this difference it is worth to take an effort and put something into the game as well (Journalist article, PM, 18.06.2003b). The latter example is empowered by talking about the game, since it is common knowledge that to take part of any game as a freeloader is unacceptable. The reference to simple arithmetic makes the argument stronger, since the question is no more about the options and choices but a truth that can be shown by counting.

On the other hand, apart from the articles indicating that in addition to the EU, Estonia should contribute to certain spheres of life, in some cases Estonia is seen as the only one responsible for certain issues and not entitled to any support from the EU. These examples are based on the background logic that even though the EU takes care of most of the things, not everything can be externalized to the EU. A Cultural Elite article writes that one example where Estonia should manage by itself is protection and development of the Estonian language, since this is a sphere in which we should cope without Brussels’ guidance (PM, 16.03.2002). Other articles make the same claim about higher education (PM, 06.04.1998b and PM, 11.12.2002b).

In addition to Estonia in general, some articles emphasize the responsibility of Estonia’s political elite. For instance, a Cultural Elite article writes that strong institutions are needed for international cooperation and continues that for understanding this *we* do not need EU’s pointing finger (*näpuganäitamist*) but *our* politicians should deal with this (PM, 29.12.1998b). Similarly, an article comments on the promise of Estonia’s

Prime Minister that life in Estonia will get better: for keeping this promise one should not look at the EU direction – also inside the EU, *our* politicians themselves have to solve the problems of Estonia (Cultural elite articles, PM, 15.09.2003 and PM, 14.11.1998; see also PM, 06.05.2002).

In sum, *should keep own promises* is rather weakly represented both in the beginning as well as in the end of the accession process whereas *should listen to the EU* is dated more to the beginning. Since *should follow EU practice* increases during the accession process, the shift from following the EU's orders and norms towards following the EU's practice can be depicted. Towards the end of the accession process more observations about EU practice as something valuable is made whereas the EU's orders and statements are less used as a basis of the EU's authority. In the context where the EU's low popularity in Estonia is related to the orders and 'to do lists' given in the name of the EU (for example Raik 2003, 106, 233-235), the shift from EU's orders to its practices in the articles can also be seen as tactical means with an aim to rise EU's popularity.

Among the categories of articles, the most represented is Political Elite as a group who emphasized the need to listen to the EU. This supports the results of the former studies that by referring to the EU authority, Estonia's political elite had tried to legitimize their own positions during the accession process (see also Raik 2003, 233-235). At the same time Readers articles are missing from *should listen to the EU*. This is in accordance to the previous sub-discourse *Should follow EU practice*, where the Readers, unlike the other groups, did not contribute to the idea that the official EU practice is worth following.

The Readers also miss as contributors from *should keep own promises* whereas the most represented here are Journalist articles and Cultural Elite articles. Both remind the political elite of their duty in front of the EU and society, what the EU is doing/has done already for Estonia and what should be the Estonian contribution to the same process. Lack of Readers articles in *should keep own promises* is rather compatible to the conclusions drawn about *should follow EU practice as own aim*. There, instead of identifying oneself with Estonian goals, Readers articles claim the country's political elite who have set the goals, should also work for achieving them. At the same time, Readers articles rather weakly identify themselves with those who have set the goals and given promises to the EU.

Failure to accept EU authority

While in the previous section, the necessity to accept EU authority by listening to the EU or keeping one's promises was dealt with as identification, this part is based on the recognition given to Estonia in the same process as *failure to listen to the EU* or *failure to keep own promises*.

Compared to the recognition of *Failure to follow EU practice*, two differences can be depicted. First, no positive recognition was expressed in the

former case whereas here both stick and carrot are offered. Second, the recognition in relation to comparing Estonian practice with the one of the EU or Estonian goals with country's practice was based on the observation of Estonian actors. Here, on the other hand, the EU feedback in various forms is used as a source of authority. In most of the cases, however, it is mediated by Estonian actors⁶⁸.

In ***failure to listen to the EU***, a distinction between current condition and status quo situation can be made. In the beginning of the accession process, the Political Elite articles, especially, point out the Estonian failure to listen to the EU as a current condition that deserves criticism. The articles argue that EU experts have notified of the problems of Estonian land reform (PM, 07.10.1998), the specialists of the EU consider the state's institutional development as *our* weakest point (PM, 22.11.1997), the EU has blamed Estonia for the low prices of *our* agricultural products that prevents Estonian accession to the EU (PM, 20.10.1998) and EU's high representatives' have continuously notified Estonia's irresponsibility in connection with the external trade deficit and current account deficit (PM, 13.04.1998a; see also Cultural Elite article PM, 06.08.1997).

In addition to 'high representatives' and 'specialists', the EU's authority is also communicated on the basis of its institutions, documents and regulations (Cultural Elite articles PM, 17.12.1997a and PM, 21.11.1997). For example a Cultural Elite article writes that the main problem, the European Commission marked this year (as well as last year) is the continuous deficit in both trade and the current account (PM, 09.11.1998a; see also Journalist article, PM, 05.05.1997). Similarly, a Political Elite article claims that weak regional policy is criticized in the *avis* (PM, 03.06.1998b) and on the basis of Agenda 2000, the law for insuring the bank deposits was supposed to be accepted in October 1997 but Parliament's Monetary Commission has not even started to proceed with this issue (PM, 12.11.1997).

Similar to the last example, negative feedback from the EU is used for communicating heterogeneity of society also in other articles. By expressing an ironic attitude and *schadenfreude* in the form of 'I told you so', the articles distance themselves from 'Estonia' to which the feedback is given. For example a Journalist article writes at the time when the decisions about the accession negotiations had not yet been made: It has become clear that no unanimity dominates in the EU concerning *our* great readiness to start the accession negotiations (PM, 24.07.1997). Also a Readers article depicts the unrealistic imaginations of Estonian greatness and writes that those on whom *our* acceptance depends do not operate only with the positive information given by *us* (PM, 06.05.1997). Another Readers article refers to the free movement

⁶⁸ Apart from the articles written by Estonian authors, also some EU representatives are among the authors who evaluate Estonia. The article of Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Per Stig Muller (PM, 01.07.2002) and another one by British Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Robin Cook (PM, 28.08.1998) can be taken as examples.

of people in the EU by commenting on the fear that EU citizens would crowd into Estonia after the accession: Estonia might be proud of its economic achievements but the queue of the ones moving from the EU to Estonia is in no case a very long one (PM, 02.09.1997; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 12.08.1997b).

Negative feedback creates a basis for the current condition whereas positive feedback from the EU is used for creating a status quo situation. Here, failure does not mean shortcomings of society but shortcomings of interpreting issues. At the same time no further discussion is expected, since the EU as an authority has said its final (praising) word (Political Elite article, PM, 13.02.2002). For example a Political Elite article writes that no changes concerning Eastern border are necessary, since the EU is completely satisfied with *our* control line (PM, 14.08.1998 and PM, 20.02.1997; see also Readers article, PM, 13.02.1997).

In another example a Political Elite article calms down the ones who are worried about the deficit of the current account of the balance of payments (*maksebilansi jooksevkonto*) by writing that *we* should not have any particular problems, since Estonia was let into the first round of the EU accession negotiations and *we* are continuously set as a role model to a few in the world (PM, 01.04.1998). Apart from that a Political Elite article admits that Estonia's economic policy with limited resources and reforms has not been pleasant for everybody but this economic policy is also one reason why Estonia stands at the threshold of the EU negotiations (PM, 25.11.1997; see also PM, 18.07.1997b). Thus, on the basis of the most important indicator – EU recognition – the right choices have been made.

At the same time articles, directly or indirectly condemn the ones who are critical towards Estonia's development by indicating their failure to accept EU authority (in these cases, failure to believe and admit that Estonia is doing well). On the basis of the European Commission's reports and a decision to take Estonia into the first round of the accession negotiations the articles communicate an understanding of Estonia's success by writing that the country was considered to be 'Euro proper' (*eurokõlblik*) (Readers articles, PM, 18.12.1997b and PM, 19.11.1997), Estonia deserves a place behind the negotiations' table (Cultural Elite article PM, 09.11.1998a) and the decision to start negotiations is an acknowledgement of the development of Estonian economy and democracy as a whole (Political Elite articles, PM, 25.07.1997b and PM, 18.07.1997b; see also Journalist article, PM, 28.11.1998). As a Political Elite article writes, from European Commission's analysis published on the 12th of October it becomes clear that on the basis of the GDP growth since 1997 *we* have been the ultimate best among the ten EU candidate countries (PM, 07.12.1998; see also Journalist article, PM, 10.10.2002a). A Readers article emphasizes the importance of the fact that only Estonia, but neither Latvia nor Lithuania are ready for accession negotiations (PM, 18.07.1997a).

One option for creating the status quo situation is by referring to the finality of the EU's evaluation. On the basis of the EU statements a Journalist article writes that Estonia is no more a “[f]ormer republic of the [Soviet Socialist - SKK] union but the country that holds official accession negotiations with the Euro Union (*euoliit*)”⁶⁹ (PM, 20.04.1998; see also PM, 04.11.1997 and PM, 28.12.1998 and Political Elite articles, PM, 17.07.1997; PM, 22.05.1998 and PM 05.01.1998a). In connection with the visa freedom between Estonia and Schengen countries, a Journalist article writes:

*When the demand for visa will be abandoned in the 1st of March next year, this means that Estonians will no more be in the position of schoolboys in Europe and Estonia is considered to belong to Europe so that we are no longer directly connected to political and economic mess in Moscow or Russian mafia.*⁷⁰

PM, 20.12.1998

Towards the end of the accession process, positive recognition is communicated as a sign that it is not necessary for Estonia to prove itself any more. For example a Journalist article writes that the number of closed chapters does not matter anymore since the EU has decided that at the end of this year the accession negotiations will be finished (PM, 17.01.2002). On the basis of the European Commission's progress report, another Journalist article claims that this increases Estonia's and other candidate countries' courage to assume that the EU enlargement to ten countries will become true in 2004 (PM, 10.10.2002a; see also Political Elite article, PM, 25.02.2003a).

Another part of *Failure to accept EU authority, failure to keep own promises* is based on the negative recognition got from the EU with the focus on the further consequences of these shortcomings (Journalist article, PM, 12.09.2002a). The criticism is targeted either towards the whole society or towards certain representatives of Estonia whereas the consequences faced are either real or potential ones.

As real consequences for the whole society, the Political Elite articles write at the beginning of the accession negotiations that a collapse of Estonia's image is very harmful to *our* negotiations with the EU (PM, 25.05.1998b) and if Estonia does not change its attitude *we* might face unpleasant surprises in 1997 (PM, 04.01.1997). The same attitude is expressed in a Readers article arguing ironically that *our* achievements are supposed to be so good that *our* neighbors are claimed to explode of jealousy (*lähevad kadedusest lõhki*) but is not this self-praising one of the reasons why one would not rather like to see *us* as a member of the EU or NATO (PM, 06.05.1997).

⁶⁹ [e]ndise liidubariigiga, vaid euoliiduga ametlikke liitumisläbirääkimisi pidava maaga.

⁷⁰ Kui viisanõue tuleva aasta 1. märtsiks kaotatakse, tähendab see, et eestlased pole Euroopas enam koolipoisi seisuses ning Eestit peetakse niivõrd Euroopasse kuuluvaks, et meid ei seostata enam otseselt poliitilise ja majandusliku segadusega Moskvast või vene maffiaga.

The same consequence – not getting into the EU – due to broken promises is indicated by the Cultural Elite articles, which argue that with hundreds of thousands of non-citizens Estonia will not be accepted into the EU (PM, 28.08.1997), Estonia just does not get to the EU, if its laws are not in accordance with the democratic traditions valid in the EU (PM, 21.11.1998) and if Estonia does not succeed in accomplishing the accession requirements in reasonable time, the negotiations will be put on hold (Journalist article, PM, 06.03.1998c).

Some articles view the representatives of Estonia who have given and broken promises as responsible for the consequences. The criticism is mostly targeted towards Estonia's political elite whereas the entire society will face the consequence. For example, Readers article states that if Estonia's parliament had amongst the laws to be accepted, adopted the law against corruption, the state's wallet would be much bigger and what is more important *our* image in the eyes of those who decide upon EU and NATO members would be more positive (PM, 06.05.1997).

In connection with the governmental crisis in 1997, several articles deal with the consequences of instability. The Political Elite articles write that the door to the EU enlargement's first round will be closed if Estonia's next government remains in power for less than half a year (PM, 02.04.1997) and that if one is not going to replace the tired leader of the ruling party, there is a danger that Estonia will lose for good the possibility to be taken seriously in Europe (PM, 07.02.1997; see also PM, 04.03.1997). Also a Readers article writes that the EU cannot take *us* seriously at the negotiations' table if it hears that a continuous power struggle takes place in Estonia (PM, 05.01.1998b).

Apart from the society-wide consequences, in some articles, the wrongdoings of the political elite are seen to lead towards the unpleasant consequences for themselves. For example, a Journalist article refers to an unpleasant situation where the Prime Minister personally had had to admit a serious lagging behind in addressing the laws necessary for joining the EU (PM, 28.05.2002a). Another article points out the shame as a consequence:

Estonian authorities are ashamed above all because at the same time when the government emphasizes the necessity to decrease the state bureaucracy, [Hans – SKK] van den Broek comes from Brussels and practically demands opposite decision.⁷¹

PM, 16.04.1997a

Another article depicts Lennart Meri (Estonia's President at the time) as a schoolboy standing in front of an EU representative, not daring to look at him but keeping his eyes down. The article writes that Lennart Meri had to cast down his eyes in front of Commissioner Hans van den Broek, when out of

⁷¹ Piinlik on Eesti võimudel eeskätt seetõttu, et samal ajal, kui valitsus rõhutab riigi bürokraatia vähendamise vajalikkust, tuleb van den Broek Brüsselist ning sisuliselt nõuab vastupidist otsust.

almost half thousand necessary EU directives and laws Estonia had harmonized only seventy (Journalist article, PM, 15.05.1997).

In the examples above, real consequences are pointed out whereas the following ones focus on the potential consequences for Estonia, as wishful thinking. In the case of Estonia's political elite breaking their promises, a Journalist article calls for the EU as the one Estonian politicians should or could listen to. For instance:

We are talking again about the hypocrisy that should bring some Estonian swear word to the lips of the EU Commissioner Hans van der Broek.

Government had promised Broek in April [1997 - SKK] with their hands on their hearts that in Toompea everything they can do is made for harmonizing Estonian and Brussels' laws.⁷²

PM, 16.08.1997

In another similar example, a Journalist article states that if Estonia's government thinks that promises are given for not keeping, the EU probably does not think this way (PM, 30.03.2002b).

Examples found in Readers articles address the EU as a hope of the last instance, whose potential interruption as a consequence is expected to improve the situation in Estonia. The arguments are formed as rhetorical questions to the decision-makers based on an assumption that the EU would be on the side of the ordinary people. For example, Estonia's ethical situation is criticized by claims that Europe is said to be surprised at the goings-on in Estonia (PM, 12.02.1997). Another article refers to the necessity to have everything as in Europe and argues that it is embarrassing to start knocking on EU's door with the kind of roads Estonia has. What could *they* think about *us*? (PM, 31.10.1997b). Towards the end of the accession process, the rise of food prices in connection with the EU membership that makes the life of the poor people even more difficult is depicted. The Readers article asks if the EU into what *we* are trying to get, approves, that associated country takes this kind of attitude towards its population (since, as article claims, ca 2/3 of Estonian population is poor) (PM, 06.08.2002).

Usage of the rhetorical questions in these examples can be interpreted in two ways. Even though the EU has not made the statements in these issues, Readers articles look for EU recognition to legitimize their own criticism. More concretely, EU statements are seen as the consequences that might have

⁷² Tegemist on jälle silmakirjalikkusega, mis eurovolinik Hans van der Broekil huulile peaks tooma kill mõne eestikeelse vandesõna.

Kätt südamele pannes lubas ju valitsus Broekile alles aprillis, et Toompeal tehakse kõik endast olenev Eesti ja Brüsseli seaduste ühtlustamiseks.

impact on Estonia's political elite. On the other hand, the rhetorical question - 'whether Estonia is good enough for the EU' - can also be seen as ironical reference to the continuous worry of the Estonian political elite at the time.

In sum, compared to *Failure to follow EU practice* as recognition, the characteristic features of *Failure to accept EU authority* are presence of both sticks and carrots as well as real and potential recognition. In the case of sticks, a change is indicated on the basis of the EU feedback, whereas the carrots are used by the articles to set up a status quo situation that cannot be undermined by individual's or some other groups' criticism. Therefore, implicitly or explicitly a change of attitude is aimed at, since the actual situation is sealed with positive feedback from the EU. An analogy can be taken from the play "*Pisuhänd*" (*Vihtahousu/Devil*) of Estonian writer Eduard Vilde, where the novel published under the name of a wannabe writer is criticized by his sister-in-law. Offended, the wannabe writer states that 'as you see from the reviews, everything is fine'.

The second characteristic feature, potential recognition, shows the EU's interference as the only hope to make Estonian political decision makers to keep their promises and/or to improve the living conditions of Estonian people. At the same time citizens' claims for the EU's opinion can be taken as a parody of the general atmosphere where EU's opinion is highly evaluated.

The Political Elite articles and the Journalist articles are the dominant categories writing about the *Failure to accept EU authority* whereas the least represented are the Cultural Elite articles. Timely, this sub-discourse is clearly more restricted to the beginning of the accession process. This is in line with previous parts of the discourse indicating that towards the end of the accession process the focus is more on the EU practice, not the EU as an agency which puts some pressure on Estonia. Logically, also the claims for potential consequences get weaker towards the end of the accession process.

CONCLUSIONS OF EUROPEAN ESTONIA

Internal development of the *European Estonia* discourse leads from the EU as an authority to following EU practice. The necessity to follow the EU's orders and impress it as an authority is dated more to the beginning than to the end of the accession process whereas during the accession process, a shift from following EU's orders and norms (interaction with the EU) towards following EU's practice (internal considerations) is visible. The idea of becoming European was thus internalized during the accession process: instead of following the orders of the EU, observations about the EU practice as something valuable are made in the end. This resembles the conclusions drawn about Estonian EU debate by Kristi Raik (2003) that during the accession years a shift from an existential to a pragmatic approach occurred in the form of working out domestic solutions instead of doing what is inevitable for membership (see Section 3.2).

Concerning the general tone of the articles, a shift from the EU orders to own observations could be discerned on the basis of the language used. Especially in the Journalist articles a certain ‘calming down’ took place during the accession negotiations. While at the beginning of the negotiations, a critical situation was created by terms like ‘strict orders’, ‘things in order’, ‘take efforts’ etc., towards the end of the accession process, the accession issues were more about the normal routines.

This ‘calming down’ is in accordance to the results of previous studies that deal with developments in Estonian society. For example, Finnish scholar Henri Vogt (2005) writes how at some point the style of policy making where the political elite spoke with the voice of international authorities started to have a negative impact on the credibility and legitimacy of the government. Also Lauristin and Vihalemm (2009, 12) point out that the pre-accession period 1999 onwards was characterized by the strengthening influence of domestic agencies.

On the basis of the *European Estonia* discourse it can be said that the changes in society and in *Postimees* are interlinked. On one hand it can be assumed that the paper reflects general societal developments. On the other hand the focus on EU practice instead of orders given by the EU can also be based on conscious policy to decrease the amount of ‘orders’ given by the EU, since according to the opinion polls these ‘orders’ were one reason for low public support towards the EU. Also the decrease of the (unpopular) Political Elite articles and increase of the (trustworthy) Cultural Elite articles during the accession process can be interpreted as part of the same process, especially while the Cultural Elite articles dominated in communicating the necessity and failure to follow EU practice whereas the focus of the Political Elite articles was on the need and failure to follow EU authority.

However, the decrease of EU agency does not change the fact that of two sides of the discourse, *Becoming European* is clearly stronger than *Being European*, which was the prevalent side in the Cultural Elite articles. This also means that change is indicated in this discourse in the form of *becoming*, the most as critical recognition in *Failure to follow EU practice*. Thus, the idea that one is not good enough is strongly communicated in the discourse of *European Estonia*.

5.2 DISCOURSE OF INDEPENDENT ESTONIA

In the academic texts Estonia as a sovereign actor in the world context is mapped on the basis of its position between East and West as a cultural meeting point, economic gateway and a political mediator (for example Berg and Oras 2002, 46, 54). Estonian territory is seen as an important geopolitical region in the world (Berg and Oras 2002, 29, 30), location on the board of the Baltic Sea is considered to be important place where the rest of the world has been trying to get their interests through (Berg and Oras 2002, 44-45, see also Vihalemm 1997, 132).

Mapping Estonia's unique position as a bridge between Russia and Western Europe has also been depicted as the most dominant vision in Estonian foreign policy (for example Berg and Oras 2002, 46, 54; Berg 2007, 50). On one hand Estonia is seen to share similar identity and cultural experiences with Europe, but also 'knows Russia' and can work as a translator between Russia and the rest of the world (Berg and Oras 2002, 45; Berg 2002, 115-116). At the same time, Merje Kuus (2002c, 308) writes that the scenarios of Estonia as a neutral meeting point and a gateway between the West and Russia had considerable currency in the first half of the 1990s while later such visions have been gradually supplanted by the exclusive civilizational narrative (from bridge-state to bridgehead-state) (see also Miniotaite 2003, 214-215, 220).

In various cases the strength of Estonian agency is seen to be based on its language and culture as crucial in self-understanding. During the Soviet period, the role of culture and language was remarkable also from the political perspective (for example Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997a, 74; Vihalemm, Lauk and Lauristin 1997, 230 and Lauristin and Vihalemm 2002, 20). As Mikko Lagerspetz (1996, 55) writes, disguised political opposition could be expressed through national culture even though explicitly political themes were avoided. Even though from the IR perspective at that time, Estonia was not an independent actor in the world context but part of the Soviet Union, references to culture enable to show its agency at some level. In the same spirit the quotation of the initiator of the huge Estonian folklore archive Jakob Hurt from the 19th century, if Estonians cannot become a big nation due to size of population, it can become big through its spirit and intellectuality, is considered relevant also nowadays (Kirch and Kirch 2001, 130).

From the end of the 1990s, flexibility as a characteristic feature has been referred to in connection with Estonian agency. For example, Berg and Oras (2002) write that Estonia is a small country that is mobile and flexible to being changed, and that it is smallest state in Europe which has a modern culture in its own language. At the same time the smallness of the territory and the small population are seen as reasons for the country's success in the international arena as well as for its ability to complete the internal changes in short order (Berg and Oras 2002, 27). According to Lauristin and Vihalemm (1997a, 106), young politicians and businessmen created a new vision of Estonia and

its people as a nation capable of successful integration with the West. An attempt to show Estonia as an innovative information technology country ahead of the 'old EU' during the accession process is part of the same understanding (for example Lehti 2006, 82-84).

In *Postimees*, the discourse of *Independent Estonia* is based on the struggle between *Being independent* and *Becoming independent*. In *Being independent* the country is free to choose, follow its interests and act on the basis of own specialties. Estonia is depicted in *Postimees* as an independent country that is able to make up its mind on the basis of own calculations. A Political Elite article writes that even though the EU supports *us*, the responsibility how to use this support is left to *us*, the citizens of the Republic of Estonia (PM, 24.07.2003b).

Being independent contains two sub-discourses. *Form own practice* is based on internal relations and characterize the EU either as a framework Estonia could make use of or see EU's agency insignificant from the Estonian perspective. *Deny EU authority*, on the other hand takes shape in interaction between Estonia and the EU. Since in connection with *being* no change is intended, nor is separate recognition given.

Becoming independent, on the other hand, indicates that Estonia's current performance is not in accordance to that of an independent country. As Political Elite article asks, why do *we* want to invade somewhere where *we* are not really wanted to (PM, 10.07.2003), especially while *No* in the referendum makes the EU officials take *us* far more seriously (Cultural Elite article, PM, 09.07.2003). At the same time, it has to be noted that in most of the articles 'independent' does not refer to a need to stay outside the EU but to act as an independent country in relation to the EU both during the accession process as well as afterwards. As an equal agency, not an authority, the EU is mapped as one possible partner for Estonia, but not the only option for the country. Therefore, membership is seen to be justified only if it is beneficial from an Estonian perspective.

On the basis of internal relations/interaction, rhetoric (discourse)/practice and identification/recognition, *Becoming independent* can be divided into four parts. *Should form own practice* focuses on internal relations, *Should deny EU authority* is based on interaction and EU agency. Inside these, the axis of rhetoric consists of defining and letting the EU know Estonia's interests as identification but also a failure to do the same things as recognition. Practice is based on action: either acting on the basis of own interests or protecting these (identification). As recognition, a failure to do both can be depicted. In all cases, recognition is based on Estonia's own evaluation.

The interplay between the identification/recognition and the EU agency/practice enables to depict two ways of *being* and four ways of *becoming*. The division is capsulized in Table 5.2 and the hierarchy of the discourse clarified in Figure 5.2. In the following part, *Being* and *Becoming independent* (representation) are dealt with whereas Chapter 6 analyzes *Being* and *Becoming rational* (relations and identities).

Table 5.2. Sub-discourses of *Being and Becoming independent*.

Being independent	Becoming independent
Form own practice	Should form own practice
	Failure to form own practice
Deny EU authority	Should deny EU authority
	Failure to deny EU authority




Figure 5.2. Sub-discourses of *Independent Estonia*.

BEING INDEPENDENT

Form own practice emphasizes Estonia as independent of the EU, without, however paying attention to the agency of the EU. As Political Elite article writes: “[w]e are an independent state. We do not have to do anything we do not want to do.”⁷³(PM, 10.07.2003).

Deny EU authority focuses on the EU as an agency whereas the EU’s authority over Estonia is denied, which is done by seeing Estonia and the EU as equal actors or claiming that the EU cannot be taken seriously. An example of the equal actors is given by a Cultural Elite article:

⁷³ Me oleme iseseisev riik. Me ei pea tegema midagi, mida me ei taha teha.

*If we during the Soviet order were able to maintain Estonian language and culture then in the EU it is a piece of cake. Europe has prides with its cultural heterogeneity and the creativity emerging from that. Thus, there is no need to worry.*⁷⁴

PM, 13.09.2003c

Form own practice

Form own practice deals with Estonian practices, possibilities or agency as an independent country that is not necessarily tied to the EU. This can also be seen as a difference in comparison with the academic texts above where independence is complemented by (wider) Europeanness. Nevertheless, the focus of the academic texts is on wider issues as Estonia as a mediator between East and West whereas the discourse of *Postimees* concentrates on Estonia's agency in relation to country's accession process.

The first section of this sub-discourse, ***own practices and possibilities*** either shows Estonia and the EU as separate entities, build a hierarchy where Estonia beats the EU on the basis of variety of indicators or is based on a mixture of these two. The conclusions about the country are drawn on the basis of Estonian possibilities and characteristic features of the country.

The idea that Estonia and the EU are different entities is communicated by a Cultural Elite article which writes that EU membership is only one possible future vision, just not the only one (PM, 26.08.1997b; see also Readers article, PM, 27.08.2003). Similarly, a Journalist article claims that on the basis of the former experiences, tearing oneself apart from the Soviet structure and building an economic system from scratch, *we* can for sure manage also in case of a *No*-scenario in the accession referendum (PM, 17.07.2003a). In some articles the EU is dealt with in relation to the other spatial entities. A Readers article writes that the Russian market is more important for Estonia than the European Union (PM, 29.07.1997). Similarly, a Journalist article emphasizes the importance of the USA in the world context (PM, 02.04.1998a).

Apart from pointing out spatial alternatives, the difference between the EU and Estonia is made on the substantial basis. An example can be taken from a Readers article which claims that the logic established in the West for making a division between the supporters and opponents of the EU does not work in Estonia where the farmers and the others who need support do not get any help from the state (PM, 22.07.1997). Another example concerns the differing habits of Estonia and the EU in using rye in the bread industry. A Journalist article writes that rye, the bread grain loved in Estonia, is burnt in the EU, since black bread and also *kama* are just not known in many regions (PM,

⁷⁴ Kui me nõukogude korra ajal suutsime säilitada eesti keele ja kultuuri, siis ELis on see naljaasi. Euroopa uhkustab oma kultuurilise mitmekesisuse ja sellest tuleneva loovusega. Nii et pole põhjust muretseda.

05.08.2002a). Even though eating habits can be based on preferences, here instead of the taste, the focus is on knowledge as remarkable from the perspective of forming Estonian and EU practice (see also Journalist article, PM, 17.11.1998d).

Various practices of Estonia and the EU are also mapped by the Cultural Elite articles. An article writes that security questions are solved differently throughout the EU, and Estonia does not have much in common with the solutions of the other countries (PM, 12.09.2003; see also PM, 15.08.2003). In the sphere of immigration, the Estonian situation is seen to be more complicated than that of the European Union (PM, 30.03.2002a). Also the distinction to Euro optimists and pessimists has a different historical basis in Estonia than in the EU member countries (PM, 04.08.1997a) and Estonia is seen as one of the protectors of the Western culture and its basic values from departmental nihilism and leveling as characteristic features of the EU (PM, 09.07.2003).

In some articles, borderline cases can be found that at the same time depict parallel practices of Estonia and the EU as well as refer to the common trajectory. For instance, a Political Elite article writes that it is also a fact that Estonian society is by far more human, free and democratic than any EU institution (PM, 23.08.1997) and a Cultural Elite article claims that the Estonian constitution is one of the most 'sovereign' in Europe (PM, 13.05.2002a). Usage of the term 'by far' (*võrreldamatult*) whose direct translation would be 'incomparably' in the first example creates a friction between the claims and the practice depicted by the article: even though things are characterized as non-comparable, article still makes a comparison and claims Estonian superiority on that basis.

Also a Journalist article writes that compared to the EU, in several accession countries, including Estonia, fortunately more environment has been preserved. The article continues that this is why *we*, unlike the EU, have practiced regulated hunting and as many environmental specialists claim, without this the natural balance of environment would be entirely unbalanced (PM, 29.08.2002). On one hand the article refers to two practices, on the other hand at the more abstract level, a common scale is used for mapping how much environment has been preserved. In this scale, Estonia is in the leading position with 'fortunately' more environment.

In another similar example, a Journalist article refers to the dispute concerning the Iraq war between Mart Laar (Estonia's Prime Minister at the time) and French President at the time Jacques Chirac. Since the EU and USA took different stands towards the war in Iraq, the EU candidate countries, including Estonia, started to support the position of the USA. Chirac claimed that the candidate countries had 'missed a good chance to shut up/take a chance to be silent'. A Journalist article writes that Laar was right when he said that unlike Western Europe, the countries that have suffered under the communist occupation had a more value-based foreign policy (PM, 19.02.2003; see also Political Elite article, PM, 11.02.2002). At the ontological

level, the EU and Estonia (as a candidate country) are seen to have backgrounds that are entirely different and thus not comparable. However, despite this difference, a comparison is made with the conclusions of Estonian superiority.

As the borderline cases above indicate, the third version, locating Estonia and the EU to the same trajectory is based on the comparison that enables to show Estonian superiority. For example, a Journalist article writes about the potential situation where *we* are ready for the enlargement but the EU itself is not (PM, 11.06.2002a) and a Cultural Elite article claims that it is possible for Estonia to reach a secure, sustainable and fair society in a briefer way than the current Europe (PM, 03.11.2003b). Variety of articles also point out Estonia's superiority in connection with foreign policy and the country's international position (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 11.01.2003 and PM, 13.09.2003d; see also Political Elite article, PM, 16.04.2003a). As Journalist article writes Estonia has a real chance to bear ethical values in the EU (PM, 19.02.2003).

Apart from the foreign political issues, in most cases a comparison between Estonia and the EU is made on the basis of the economic indicators that prove the 'objective' superiority of Estonia. For example the Cultural Elite article writes that Estonia, as other quickly moving Eastern European countries has developed much faster than the EU countries (PM, 13.09.2003c; see also PM, 11.11.2003 and PM, 09.10.2002b). At a more concrete level, the Political Elite article claims that Estonian development depends largely on the investments whose level is considerably higher than in the other transition countries or the European Union average (PM, 27.10.1998b) and that the lower tax level has created certain advantages to *our* economy in comparison to the other countries (PM, 12.06.2002b). Also a Journalist article writes that the so called stability pact of the European Union enables a budgetary deficit even up to 3% of GDP and several countries that are notably bigger and have stronger economy than Estonia, have trouble with this indicator (PM, 18.09.2002).

In some examples statistical indicators are referred to. For example a Journalist article writes about Estonia's high ownership of cars per capita (PM, 18.04.1998) and a Cultural Elite article mentions that more Estonian people have at least secondary education compared to the EU average (PM, 27.02.2003). Estonia has also a possibility to be the first and a pioneer in financing higher education (Cultural Elite article, PM, 14.02.2002).

The examples above focused on Estonian practices and possibilities whereas the following part, ***own agency*** is based on Estonian interests, achievements and influence both at present and in the future perspective. As a Cultural Elite article writes, the question what is the EU by 2020 depends to certain extent also on *us* (Cultural Elite article, PM, 01.08.2003d; see also PM, 14.06.2003b and PM, 13.09.2003c). Substantially, the current achievements, interests and influence are connected to Estonian accession process and the future ones to Estonian goals in the EU. Since the focus is on internal relations, no interaction between Estonia and the EU is depicted.

Estonian interests that form a basis for action are mapped in connection with the accession process. For example a Cultural Elite article writes that the country's foreign political strategy is based on Estonian membership in the Western world and that the Estonian state now finally tries to formulate a plenipotentiary political membership of the EU and NATO (PM, 27.11.2002a). Another article claims, in relation to the accession negotiations, that Estonia has quite a lot of possibilities to perform as a sovereign state (PM, 24.12.1997c) and put forth realistic policy (Journalist article, PM, 29.10.2002). Similarly, the Political Elite article write that Estonian negotiations go with exactly the speed *we* ourselves have wished and decided upon (PM, 08.03.2002b; see also Cultural Elite article PM, 01.06.1998) and it is up to *us* to decide what regime is implemented to the protected areas *we* are going to form (PM, 01.04.2002).

The same idea is indicated in the articles that deal with Estonian EU membership. For example a Cultural Elite article writes that as an EU member Estonia and Poland will intensively demand the inclusion of Lithuania and Latvia, since it is geopolitically useful for them⁷⁵ (PM, 01.09.1998; see also PM, 14.03.1998). Another article claims that the first security interest of Estonia is to ensure that the super structures (EU and NATO) would neither crush nor break up (PM, 27.10.2003). Similarly, the Political Elite articles write that the aim of Estonia is to have the European Union as a union of sovereign states (PM, 25.02.2003b and PM, 08.02.2003b) whereas the EU as a federal state is not suitable for the small countries like *us* (PM, 13.12.2002). Conclusively, until the EU remains an organ that organizes mostly economic issues, it can be only beneficial for *us* as also for all the others, including well-off larger countries (Cultural Elite article, PM, 11.12.1998a).

At the same time, Estonian interests are not necessarily mapped as unchangeable, but if needed, corrections can be made. A Journalist article writes about increasing Baltic unity after Russian aggression towards Latvia and the fact that the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had basically distanced itself from its report to the European Commission where Lithuanian privatization policy was criticized. The paper continues that “[t]his could though be called a withdrawal but there are situations when withdrawal is justified.”⁷⁶ (PM, 16.03.1998).

Apart from Estonian interests mapped in the examples above as guidelines for action, Estonian achievements as positive self-evaluation in connection with the accession process are depicted (Political Elite article, PM, 16.04.2003a). In relation to EU's decision to start the accession negotiations with Estonia, a Journalist article calls Estonian foreign political efforts as very successful ones (PM, 10.07.1997a). Thus, another article writes, despite the growing suspicion towards the EU inside the country, Estonia can still remain the EU's darling (*pailaps*) at the time when the accession negotiations are

⁷⁵ At the time nobody knew when the accession negotiations with Latvia and Lithuania would be started.

⁷⁶ Seda võiks ju nimetada taganemiseks, kuid on olukordi, kus taganemine on õigustatud.

started (PM, 01.11.1998)⁷⁷. Since Estonia has been active with good reason in the EU and NATO direction as unarguable priorities (Cultural Elite article, PM, 16.01.2002) after the Copenhagen Summit the country has achieved its second great foreign political goal: finished the negotiations with the European Union with good results (Journalist articles, PM, 14.12.2002 and PM, 11.12.2002a). The same idea is expressed also by a Cultural Elite article which writes that the experience with the European Union and NATO shows that *we* are capable of agreeing upon priorities and also keeping these up during a longer period (PM, 09.12.2002a; similar Journalist article, PM, 19.02.2003).

In addition to the agency of Estonia as a whole based on the interests and achievements, agency of the social groups is depicted on the basis of their influence. Concerning the influence of Estonian citizens, a Cultural Elite article claims that by accepting the so called third act of the constitution, Estonian people would give a necessary mandate for joining the EU (PM, 13.05.2002a) and the more actively people participate in the referendum, the stronger is the position of Estonian sovereignty in the EU (PM, 02.05.2003b). In relation to the role of the people inside the EU, an article asks rhetorically who are those who take care of everything in Estonian society, work hard, protect the state etc. and “stand for Estonian issues” (*ajavad Eesti asja*) in the EU (Cultural Elite article, PM, 09.01.2003; see also PM, 18.01.2003b).

Apart from the influence of the citizens pointed out by the Cultural Elite articles, some Political Elite articles focus on their own influence as actors. In the beginning of the accession process article aligned to Pro Patria Union (*Isamaaliit*) writes that the image of Estonia as a successful reform country was kept up in the international arena and on the basis of the reforms conducted by Pro Patria Union, Estonia is taken to the EU negotiations (PM, 04.12.1997b). Towards the end of the same process also other political actors expressed similar positions (PM, 20.06.2003a and PM, 08.02.2003b).

In sum, the sub-discourse *Form own practice* is clearly stronger in the end of the accession process. This concerns both *own practices and possibilities* as well as *own agency* as rather equal parts of the sub-discourse. In most of the articles, Estonian possibilities and influence are visualized in relation to country's EU membership, not the position outside the EU. The latter is depicted in few cases on the basis of the spatial alternatives that are, however, not necessarily seen as the best choices for Estonia.

In this sub-discourse, the Cultural Elite articles are the most represented, especially towards the end of the accession process, when the majority of the categories' articles appeared. Journalist articles and the Political Elite articles share a second position and the category lacking almost any representation are Readers articles.

⁷⁷ In this case, despite the positive evaluation, internal and external developments are confronted whereas the external goals are seen as the major ones.

Deny EU authority

The sub-discourse *Deny EU authority* focuses on interaction between Estonia and the EU either in a form of *equal partnership with the EU* or *not being able to take the EU seriously*. In both cases the relationship is based on the EU agency. However, unlike the *European Estonia* discourse, here the question is not about accepting but questioning the EU agency as an authority. A Cultural Elite article writes, European worldliness (*maisus*) and pragmatism has become touchable by today and in the 14th of September idealism of going is turning to the routine of being (PM, 25.08.2003a).

As the heading says, ***equal partnership with the EU*** depicts Estonia-EU relationship as the one between equal parties. As a Readers article claims, the member states have partly common demands and the other part has been negotiated and agreed upon on the basis of the speciality of the state (PM, 19.07.1997b).

In the articles, partnership is characterized both on the basis of collaboration as well as conflicts. In case of collaboration the articles deal with the EU as a safe partner which does not cause any harm from an Estonian perspective. Most of the examples can be found from the end of the accession process and one of the main issues dealt with is Estonian sovereignty (Political Elite article, PM, 04.07.2003b and Cultural Elite article, PM, 10.09.2003b). As the Cultural Elite articles write, Estonia remains independent in the EU (PM, 04.07.2003c) since the EU accession does not concern the existence of people's sovereignty (PM, 02.05.2003b). At the same time, if the European Union really turns into an organization whose demands start to confront survival instinct of Estonians, they can vote in the forthcoming EU referendum against the EU (PM, 19.03.1998). At a more concrete level the Cultural Elite articles write that also after accession, the language relations inside the country remain largely to be organized by each state and its citizens (PM, 02.09.2003a) and EU's rules of law and the main values of the Estonian Republic's constitution do not have to be wholly identical (PM, 13.05.2002a; see also Journalist article, PM, 05.08.2002b).

One way of showing the EU as harmless for Estonia is by making a comparison between the EU and the Soviet Union (Cultural Elite article, PM, 02.05.2003b). As Cultural Elite articles write, unlike in the Soviet Union, the composition of *our* parliament is not set or *our* government is not named from Brussels (PM, 12.08.2003c). Another similar example depicts the Soviet Union as an empire whose colony Estonia was, and continues that since history does not know the cases when four or five big countries had a common colony things are different in the European Union (PM, 18.01.2003b; see also PM, 13.09.2003c).

In addition to the differences between the Soviet Union and the EU, some articles focus on their similarities for showing Estonia as the EU's equal partner. In these cases, however, the question is about conflicting, not collaborative partnership. For example, in relation to continuance of Estonian culture, a Readers article writes that if Estonianness (*eestlus*) lasted in the

Soviet Union, *we* should remain *ourselves* in the EU as well (PM, 14.03.2003; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 13.09.2003c).

In most cases the conflicting partnership between Estonia and the EU is based on country's refusal to follow EU's guidelines. At the same time unlike *not being able to take the EU seriously* the EU as an entity is not questioned. For example a Cultural Elite article questions the EU's pressure on Estonia to adapt the legislation of gender equality, reasoning its arguments with the claim that in Estonia, no injustice similar to that of Western Europe has existed (PM, 20.11.2003). Another Journalist article writes about the EU's inefficient pressure on Latvia in relation to the acceptance of the citizenship law. However, instead of learning from this failure, the EU tries similar "soft pressure policy" (*pehmet survepoliitikat*) based on expressions as "we hope" (*loodame*) in Estonian case. On the ground of that the article claims that hopefully those memorable times, when the laws were changed only due to "Stoel's finger-waving" (*Stoeli näpuviibutuse peale*), are over in Estonia for good (PM, 29.08.1998). For showing the unacceptable manner of the EU's behavior, the article writes about 'Stoel's finger-waving', a gesture with an aim to make the other side to obey. At the same time this gesture refers to the adult-child relationship and cannot be considered as a proper behavior among grown-ups. Also the hope that 'these times are over for good' can refer to the adult-child interaction: even though Estonia used to be the one obeying the EU, these days are now gone, since the child has grown up. The whole process is based on an unavoidable development: children grow up, time passes by and neither the EU nor other actors are capable of changing that process.

In some articles, the reason for not following the EU's guidance is an unwished consequence. A Cultural Elite article writes that too much compliance with the demands of the European Union and OSCE might have a catastrophic impact on European Union's prestige among Estonians. The article continues that in any case, it already is on a knife-edge (*noateral*) (PM, 26.06.1998). The terms 'catastrophic' and 'on a knife-edge' make the situation look very inflammable and following the EU's guidelines could thus, cause a disaster. Ironically, here 'disaster' means a decrease of the popularity of the same EU among Estonians. Therefore, Estonia actually protects the EU from itself.

Similarly, a Journalist article characterizes the potential EU penalties to the candidate countries as illogical: "In relation to an attempt to set the penalties Euro support in the candidate countries would definitely decrease and thus the result of the Euro referendum would become totally unexpected."⁷⁸ (PM, 27.07.2002a). Another article writes about the European Commission's program concerning agricultural support to the future member countries and claims that also without this program there had been enough to do, since the agricultural chapter forms more than 40% of the legislation (PM,

⁷⁸ Trahvikavatsuse korral väheneks kahtlemata kandidaatmaade eurotoetus ja seega muutuks euroreferendumi tulemus täiesti ennustamatuks.

30.01.2002). On the basis of the criticism, the European Commission's behavior can be seen as an irresponsible one that threatens to slow down negotiations.

Another part of this sub-discourse, ***not being able to take the EU seriously*** focuses either on the EU as a whole or some representatives of the EU. In both cases the EU's entity is questioned and its action is mapped as absurd, hypocritical or unacceptable on the basis of its substance. For instance a Cultural Elite article refers to the EU as an absurd administrative monster similar to the structure lead by rabbits in Estonian satirical animation "Night of the Carrots" (*Porgandite öö*) (PM, 18.12.1998b).

At a more concrete level a Readers article finds it senseless that on the basis of the EU laws, prisoners who suffer from Aids share cells with the rest of the inmates (PM, 09.03.2002b). Another article writes that the chapters of the European Union Accession Treaty set the size of potato and carrot but there is no single chapter about restricting the alcohol usage in connection with rising youth (PM, 28.05.2002b). Similarly, a Journalist article claims that instead of demanding the school canteens and tourist farms to have five to six lavatories, the EU officials could stand for the human standard (*inimliku taseme*) and the security of the buses (PM, 19.07.2003b). In these examples, the EU norms are seen at the same time as excessive and insufficient. The EU is blamed for regulating the minor details (the optimal amount of lavatories or size of potatoes and carrots) whereas larger and substantially important issues are left unnoticed.

Concerning EU's hypocrisy one Cultural Elite article characterizes the EU by calling for the human rights as hypocrisy and administrative capability and restrictions as reality (PM, 30.03.2002a). In another example, EU bureaucracy is commented on: as in the army (*kroonu värk!*). First to the louse sauna (*täisaun*) only after that a new uniform with gold stars is given. First cleanliness and after that administrative capacity (PM, 09.11.2002).

In addition to the EU as a whole, articles question the authority of some EU institutions and representatives. For instance a Journalist article writes that even though the European Parliament wants to say something about the enlargement it suffers from the lack of authority and substantial power (PM, 14.08.1997; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 23.12.2002a). One article writes about the EU officials who suffer from dullness and as a result, start to deal with stupidities:

It seems that only the official who has got bored and has nothing reasonable to do starts to figure out the shape of ideal swede, acorn or banana. Also the complicated system created in the European Union for agricultural support that every farmer is in need of the book-keeper skills for implementing that has made Estonians smirk.⁷⁹

PM, 12.12.1998a

Similarly, a Readers article comments on the visit of the EU Enlargement Commissioner by writing that life in Estonia would be better and safer if these kinds of emissaries kept their nose at home (PM, 03.09.2003a). In the current case, the abstract is used even though article writes about a concrete recognizable person. Also the title of the Commissioner is distorted in purpose: the usage of the term 'emissaries' instead of Commissioner refers to the Soviet bureaucracy and indicates that the world is full of these kinds of insignificant useless actors.

At the beginning of the accession process a Journalist article addresses the 'personal question' of Jörn Donner (a Finnish Member of European Parliament at the time). Donner's 'popularity' is caused by his suggestions concerning Estonian citizenship policy. The article depicts the suggestions as absurd and unbelievable, not even worth discussing and expresses its resentment by claiming "*Donner wetter!*" - a German expression that sounds as a curse and also includes Donner's name. The article asks:

Did we tear [ourselves - SKK] away from one union to now follow the guidance of one Finnish bohemian socialist and start to do the things that even Moscow did not want to say straight. After all [the guidance of - SKK] this kind of man who only lately changed the right wing Swedish People's Party into social democrats.⁸⁰

PM, 08.08.1997b

The example clearly indicates that apart from being extremely rude (even Moscow did not dare to say something like that), one good reason for not taking these suggestions seriously is the personality of Jörn Donner. Characterizing Donner as 'a Finnish bohemian socialist' makes him one of the many bohemians who are rarely treated as an authority in serious issues. Apart from that the fact that he has changed the right wing party to being social

⁷⁹ Tundub, et vaid igavlev ametnik, kel pole mõistlikku tegevust, hakkab välja mõtlema ideaalse kaalika, tammetõru või banaani kuju. Samamoodi on eestlasi muigama ajanud Euroopa Liidus põllumajanduse toetuseks loodud keeruline süsteem, mille rakendamiseks iga farmer vajab raamatupidaja oskusi.

⁸⁰ Kas me selle pärast endisest liidust lahti rebisime, et nüüd ühe Soome boheemlasest sotsialisti juhtnööride järgi hakata tegema seda, mida isegi Moskva otsesõnu ei tahtnud välja öelda. Pealegi veel niisuguse mehe, kes alles hiljuti parempoolse Rootsi Rahvapartei sotsiaaldemokraatide partei vastu vahetas.

democrat is presented as an unbelievable act. The latter issue is understandable in the Estonian context where the Social Democratic Party (*Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond*), used to be until 2004, the People's Party Moderates (*Rahvaerakond Mõõdukad*) for not being related to the former socialist times and actors.

In sum, the sub-discourse *Deny EU authority* is based on equal partnership with or criticism targeted towards the EU. The comparison of two parts shows a dominance of the first one, *equal partnership with the EU*. The Cultural Elite articles are the most represented.

From the two sub-discourses, *Form own practice* is clearly stronger than *Deny EU authority*. Thus, the idea of *Being independent* is largely based on Estonian possibilities and achievements. Since these possibilities and achievements are mostly dealt with inside the EU, *Being independent* goes hand in hand with Estonian EU membership. Also these articles that criticize the EU hardly question the necessity of Estonian accession. Therefore, the criticism targeted towards the EU even though Estonian membership is supported, can be seen as an example of 'objective journalism'.

Since the overall amount of the examples is rather limited, no remarkable differences or developments have taken place during the accession process. Similarly to *Being European*, also *Being independent* is the most emphasized by the Cultural Elite articles. The least represented are the Political Elite articles.

BECOMING INDEPENDENT

In the *Becoming independent* sub-discourses *Form own practice* and *Deny EU authority* are accordingly challenged by the sub-discourses *Should form own practice* and *Should deny EU authority*. Prioritizing Estonian interests and denying EU authority are seen as ideals Estonia is encouraged to achieve. Accordingly, country's incapability to perform this way is seen as a failure. Thus, the focus is either on what is necessary for achieving this ideal (what should be done to 'become independent') or what Estonia is not (criticizing reality of not *being independent*).

As an example of *Should form own practice* a Journalist article writes in relation to signing the accession treaty with the EU:

Thus, one should not immediately rise one's voice or throw the gun to the bush if at first something goes wrong or remains incomprehensible

*in relation to Brussels. One learns from the mistakes and by May 1, 2004 we should be as ready as possible to start serious work.*⁸¹

PM, 16.04.2003b

Similar to *Deny EU authority*, *Should deny EU authority* deals with the EU agency in relation to Estonia. A Political Elite article writes:

*At the moment two first co-operations should be to protect Estonian national interests in the final phase of the Euro negotiations and guarantee the future of the nation by supporting the children and families.*⁸²

PM, 21.06.2002

As in all discourses, cleavage between ideal and current reality means that apart from identification, recognition can be analyzed. Recognition as *Failure to form own practice* is presented in a following example of a Cultural Elite article:

*More than a decade have our top politicians and media tried to lead the people keeping a piece of grass put on the rod under his nose as if he were a donkey /.../. It started from the IME-program whereas the current magic rods are joining the European Union and NATO.*⁸³

PM, 14.03.2002

Failure to deny EU authority deals with the wrong decisions as 'lost cases'. A Cultural Elite article writes: "The signatures of the President and Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Accession Treaty with the EU are illegal."⁸⁴ (PM, 13.08.2003a).

Should form own practice

In *Should form own practice* identification is based on *should define own interests* and *should act on the basis of own interests*. *Should define own*

⁸¹ Ning seega ei maksaks kohe häält tõsta või püssi põõsasse visata, kui midagi alguses suhetes Brüsseliga vussi läheb või arusaamatuks jääb. Vigadest õpitakse ja 1. maiks 2004 peame olema maksimaalselt valmis alustama tõsist tööd.

⁸² Praegu peaks kaks esmast koostehet olema Eesti rahvuslike huvide kaitse euroläbirääkimiste lõppfaasis ning rahvuse tuleviku tagamine laste ja perede toetamise kaudu.

⁸³Rohkem kui aastakümme on meie tipp-poliitikud ja meedia püüdnud rahvast talutada, hoides tal kui eeslil nina ees ridva otsas heinatuusti /.../. Algas see IME-programmist, tänasteks võluvitsadeks on Euroopa Liitu ja NATOsse astumine.

⁸⁴ Presidendi ja välisministri allkirjad ühinemislepingul ELiga on seadusvastased.

interests challenges *Estonian practices and possibilities* and *should act of the basis of own interests* accordingly *Estonian agency*. In both cases the focus is on the internal relations: even though the interests are related to the EU, Estonia is the one whose practice and action are followed.

The idea of ***should define own interests*** is emphasized either due to or despite Estonian EU accession process. The necessity to define Estonian interests despite the accession process considers the latter as rather insignificant from the perspective of national interests and stresses that the interests should be defined on the substantial basis. For example, a Readers article writes in connection with rising the youth that it is easy to punish, difficult to rise but if one does not start from that, *we* do not have any hope neither inside the EU nor outside of it (PM, 11.08.2003b). Similarly, a Political Elite article claims that development of Estonia cannot be restricted to aiming at the European Union only (PM, 22.08.1998).

In connection with Estonian EU-related interests, the necessity to define country's positions is emphasized as a first step for being able to protect these (Cultural Elite article, PM, 10.11.1997). As a Political Elite article writes, *we* have to know in which spheres *we* want to have longer transition periods, in which spheres *we* do consider impossible to integrate at first and in which sectors *we* are ready to have the negotiations with certain reservations (PM, 25.07.1997a). Another article states that it has to be clarified and agreed upon what *we* want (Political Elite article, PM, 22.12.1998). Similarly, a Political Elite article writes that in connection with the huge work load the Estonian parliament has ahead, first and foremost one has to come to terms with Estonian *own* national interests (PM, 30.12.1997a).

The necessity to define Estonian interests for being able to act on the basis of these is emphasized towards the end of the negotiations process (Political Elite article, PM, 05.08.2002a and Cultural Elite article, PM, 28.10.2002). Apart from that articles point out a need to define the interests of Estonia as EU member state (Political Elite article, PM, 16.04.2003a; see also Cultural Elite articles, PM, 01.08.2003d and PM, 15.12.2003). A Political Elite article writes that the first real priority of 2004 is surely to form a real Europe-strategy for Estonia: "One has to define national interests that we are going to realize in Europe and have to do it in much more practical way than the general discourse offered so far."⁸⁵ (PM, 20.06.2003a). The article uses the term 'formula' of Estonian interests as an implicit reference to the natural sciences: once figured out, a formula is always valid. Thus, if one is capable of finding a formula in this case, it will be suitable from now on and make the further discussions needless.

In addition to the EU related interests, those that refer to the wider world context are emphasized in the end of the accession process. At the same time,

⁸⁵ Vaja on sõnastada rahvuslikud huvid, mida läheme Euroopasse realiseerima, tehes seda väga palju praktilisemalt seni pakutud üldistest diskursustest.

the country's new position of EU membership, is taken for granted as a background feature. For instance a Readers article writes that in connection with Estonia's imminent accession to NATO and the EU (nobody should suspect its necessity) but also the generally changed situation in the world, it is about time to start to think how should *we* act in this new world (PM, 21.07.2003c). A similar example is given by a Political Elite article which writes that as a member of the EU, Estonia needs more than ever before a clear worldview and a firm self-consciousness (PM, 06.12.2002). A Journalist article claims in connection with the debate whether Estonia should sign a treaty that gives immunity to the soldiers of the USA that despite the hopes expressed by Siim Kallas (Estonia's Prime Minister at the time) that the EU and USA would reach a compromise, *we* still have to have a strategy in case the compromise will not be reached (PM, 14.08.2002a).

Similarly to *should define own interests*, also ***should act on the basis of own interests*** is either depicted in connection with or by ignoring the EU. In connection with the EU, articles write that *we* have to act on the basis of knowledge of what kind of Estonia and Europe *we* want to (Cultural Elite article, PM, 01.08.2003d; see also Political Elite article, PM, 18.07.1997b), since bargain for the sake of bargaining does not make sense (Journalist article, PM, 10.09.1998). After joining the EU, a new way of life should be launched inside the EU (Cultural Elite article, PM, 06.12.2003).

At a more concrete level a Cultural Elite article claims that Estonia has to take care of the knowledge about history as well as honor towards Estonian language, since in changing Europe, self-consciousness of Estonians is needed more than ever before (PM, 14.06.2003b). Another similar example indicates that for being able to develop the Estonian tourism sector à la Costa del Sol, the price level should be kept inexpensive compared to the other states after joining the EU (PM, 01.06.2002b; see also PM, 14.11.2003).

In most cases, however necessity to act on the basis of own interests is emphasized independently of the EU (Political Elite article, PM 04.12.1997a; Readers article, PM, 19.07.1997b and Cultural Elite article, PM, 26.07.1997b). This means that the relationship between Estonia's EU accession and the country's interests is questioned by asking why not try to manage by *ourselves* (Readers article, PM, 05.07.2003a) or if it is necessary to choose the EU for belonging to the West (Cultural Elite article, PM, 09.07.2003), since one can even ask if it is useful for Estonia to join the federalizing EU (Cultural Elite article, PM, 18.11.2002a). Conclusively, as a Readers article writes, if the positive side does not outweigh the negative ones, the Estonian nation should may be choose the Norwegian way instead and keep standing on *our own* feet (PM, 05.03.1997). The expression 'keep standing on its own feet' personifies Estonia as human being who is capable to stand without anyone's support.

Apart from membership, the timing and speed of the accession process is questioned in the Readers articles. At the beginning of the accession process, an article writes that concerning the European Union, *we* will surely eventually get there but the old folks (*vanarahvas*) say: long done, lovely

(*kauda teatud, kaunikene*) (PM, 03.10.1998). Thus, the wisdom of the former generations is presented as an authority that cannot be ignored easily. Similarly, another article writes: yes, the fact that Estonia joins the family of European countries as a plenipotentiary member is without doubt an uplifting perspective. However, the article continues that during the longing and wishing for this, remember the prayer of the Father of the Church Augustinus from his youth when he was still a perky playboy: omnipotent, let *me* turn away from the sin but not yet today! (PM, 17.11.1998c). A Cultural Elite article writes that *we* should not hurry but see at first, if the EU can become more flexible or if it drowns in a swamp of bureaucracy, gigantomania and indecisiveness (PM, 26.08.1997b). The same logic is used also towards the end of the accession negotiations. Readers articles write that one should stay away from the EU as long as possible (PM, 14.06.2003a) and claim that the best for *us* is to remain a friendly associated country: *we* wished to be unyoked (*ikkeest lahti*). *We* achieved this. Why the rush? (PM, 16.06.2003b).

The idea that accession should be postponed to the future for finding a more suitable moment could refer to Estonian interests as process not fixed and unchanging entity: even though the EU is not topical at the moment, it is not excluded for good. The current examples, however, can be interpreted also from another perspective, as border cases between living along Estonian interests and protecting these in relation to the EU. In the latter case, staying away from the EU as long as possible can be seen as a necessary resistance for not giving up without struggle.

In sum, both *should define own interests* and *should act on the basis of own interests* are more represented towards the end of the accession process.

Those who urge the necessity to define Estonian interests either in connection with or indifferent of the EU both in the beginning as well as in the end of the accession process the most are the Political Elite articles. A characteristic feature of these claims is the acceptance of Estonian (future) membership either implicitly or explicitly.

The second part, *should act on the basis of own interests* is mostly based on the Readers articles and the Cultural Elite articles. The latter focuses more on Estonia in the EU framework (similarly to *own agency* from the *being* side) whereas the Readers articles deal with Estonia outside the EU.

The examples indicate that the necessity to define own interests is dealt with as a concrete event (doing it once and for all) whereas the need that one *should act on the basis of own interests* has a bigger variety and more alternatives (acting now or later and expressing hesitations). Therefore, it can also be interpreted as a freedom to choose from various options and/or a freedom to question things without facing actual or potential consequences.

Failure to form own practice

Failure to form own practice is based on critical self-recognition in the form of *failure to define own interests* or *failure to act on the basis of own interests*.

Self-evaluation also makes a clear difference between the current recognition and the one of *European Estonia*, where, instead of own criteria, the evaluation was based on the norms set by or the practice valid in the EU.

As ***failure to define own interests***, a Political Elite article writes that Estonia should have defined its national interest in relation to the agricultural land by the beginning of 2000 at the latest (PM, 05.08.2002a), indicating thus a two years delay. Similarly, a Cultural Elite article regrets that until now no one has seriously analyzed in Estonia what type of EU would be useful to join (PM, 18.11.2002a).

The claim that the EU is Estonia's main interest is criticized as an empty mantra and a substitute to the substance-based interests (Journalist article, PM, 01.12.1997a). A Political Elite article writes that *we* should admit that Estonia is lacking ideas for developing society and the state, since single slogans in a form of concrete goals (European Union, NATO etc.) do not replace these (PM, 21.12.1998; see also PM, 04.12.1997a and Cultural Elite articles, PM, 13.05.1997 and PM, 06.01.2003b). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article claims that the religion of the party has been replaced by the religion of Europe, America, Radio Free Europe, a free market based economy and other values (PM, 04.01.1998). Also Readers article points to the same phenomena:

*A year or a year and a half ago Estonian politicians and diplomats ensured that Estonia is in the first round of the NATO enlargement. Soon this kind of firmness disappeared and turned into a belief that we are in the first round of the European Union enlargement.*⁸⁶

PM, 15.07.1997b

Another Readers article asks what are these Estonian politicians doing, they who, for a long time already, have promised NATO accession and replies that now they promise the European Union (PM 17.03.1997a; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 14.03.2002).

Apart from 'promising the EU', also 'threatening with the EU' is condemned in the articles (Political Elite article, 21.07.1998 and Cultural Elite article, PM, 09.11.1998b). For example a Political Elite article answers the coalition's accusations that the opposition wastes tax-payers money by asking would not a lack of parliament enable to save even bigger sums of money. The article continues: one parliament member who belongs to the government coalition found that the opposition dishonors parliament, the other one thought lately that the opposition should be quiet otherwise *we* are not accepted to the European Union (PM, 05.07.1997a; similar also Cultural Elite articles, PM, 24.04.1997 and PM, 12.12.1997). Other Political Elite articles

⁸⁶ Aasta-poolteist tagasi kinnitasid Eesti poliitikud ja diplomaadid, et Eesti on NATO laienemisel esimeses voorus. Peatselt selline kindlus kadus ja muutus veendumuseks, et oleme esimeses Euroopa Liidu laienemise voorus.

refer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that was frightening the public with all kind of things, including the fact that European Union officials could get offended (PM, 15.01.1998) and claims that in the 24th hour the deformed demands supposedly got from Brussels were presented in a government session (PM, 01.08.1998b).

Promising and threatening with the EU leads to cynicism concerning the EU as an omnipotent argument: everything around is prefixed by “Euro” (*euro*), starting from the “Euro privy” (*europeldik*) and finishing with the “Euro Union” (*euoliit*) (Cultural Elite article, PM, 11.12.1998a). Another article writes that access to the European Union has glowed (*terendanud*) all the time to the finish line, and crossing it enabled *us* to say farewell to *our* current harsh history and pallid being. As if at the other side of this line was the end of history, a consumer paradise with the social guarantees, a reasonable equivalent to all the utopias on earth (Cultural Elite articles PM, 14.11.1998 and PM, 28.03.2002).

The same idea is communicated in several Readers articles. On the basis of a fairy tale, a Readers article writes that the EU is served up as a particular kind of magic wand that fulfills all wishes. The article continues that still, it has to be remembered that the time of self-covering tables and flying carpets is over (PM, 19.07.1997b; see also PM, 15.01.1997). Instead of stating that fairy-tale connected beliefs are totally surreal, the article claims that the time of magic is over. This way, those who still believe in it are seen as a bit eccentric, but not from a totally different world.

Most Readers articles, however, criticise references to the EU in all possible circumstances, and point out particularly unrealistic expectations related to the EU in a sarcastic manner. In connection with city planning a Readers article writes: sure enough, this absolutely modern glass-Godzilla construction built according to the best EU standards costs tens of millions. The article asks about the need to talk about a so-called priceless view in Tallinn Old Town, that will not be brought back irrespective of however much is spent (PM, 16.06.2003b). Another article deals with new city toilets that have been built for two million *kroons*: *we* could appeal with an entry in the Guinness Book [of Records - SKK]! Hurray! Estonia joins the European Union with its new out-houses! (PM, 22.01.2002b). Similarly, an article writes that inside the EU all kind of funding aids and foundations appear like magic - no one has to work in the garden of Eden under the apple trees (PM, 27.05.2003; similar also PM, 20.06.2003b and PM, 14.06.2003a). The examples above make a distinction between reality and fairy tales: things happen by magic and the EU is compared to the garden of Eden.

This way, the EU (or Europe as used in some examples) becomes an empty signifier (Laclau 1996, 36-46): since the term does not have a fixed and clear substantial meaning it can be filled with various meanings as well as be replaced by other similar terms if needed (see also Raik 2003, 157-158). As a result articles criticize the situation where the clear substance of own interests is replaced by the EU as an empty signifier usable in all possible cases.

In another part of this sub-discourse, *failure to act on the basis of own interests*, articles aim at correcting false information that is given by Estonian actors in the name of the EU. The criticism is targeted towards following 'EU guidance' instead of own interests, whereas the latter are, however, not necessarily explicitly defined. For example, a Readers article writes that the claims that the Eastern border of NATO and the EU have to be set by international treaty, is not true: it is sufficient if the present border line of control is fixed (PM, 17.11.1998b). Similarly, a Political Elite article claims that it is false to reason the necessity to abandon death penalty with the EU's demands, since the issue was not mentioned in the claims presented to Estonia by the European Commission (PM, 08.08.1997a and PM; 02.04.1998b; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 08.08.1997c).

In connection with the debate about the taxation system, claims that the progressive income tax is in accordance to the suggestions of the European Union are criticized by a Readers article: on the basis of newly audited data *I/we* confirm that the European Union has not made this kind of suggestion (PM, 15.09.1998c; see also Journalist article, PM, 01.12.1997a). Another Readers article questions the claim that European Union is a tariff union and if Estonia does not have the protective tariffs, *we* are not taken into the gang: as far as *I/we* know, the EU states do not have protective tariffs between each other (PM, 20.06.1997). Even though the criticism is presented in a polite manner as if correcting minor mistakes, the expression 'not taken into the gang' points to the familiar relations between children or youngsters. Therefore, those responsible for tariff claims are at the same time also shown as being youths: not too analytical and guided by the fear of being left alone.

The examples above criticize incorrect references to the EU instead of following own interests whereas in the following cases the criticism is targeted towards using the EU as an alibi to soften the intentional malevolent acts of Estonia's political elite. Concerning corruption in Estonia, a Readers article writes: should these things be seen as just minor roughness on the way towards the European Union? (PM, 27.01.1997). The article characterizes Estonia's EU accession process as a road where 'roughness' makes the trip bumpy. At the same time an attempt to avoid responsibility and diminish the acts of corruption into 'minor roughness' as a normal part of any trip is criticized.

In another similar example, a Political Elite article relates the scandal of privatizing apartments to Estonian success story: as if this was apprentice money (*õpipoisiraha*) for getting into the European Union (PM, 07.02.1997). The article criticizes Estonia as apprentice and the mess at this phase of the EU accession process. Similarly, another Political Elite article writes that government wants to get the money from *our* consumers by appealing to the EU demands before the EU gives up its subsidizing policy that has no perspective (PM, 19.12.1997b).

In sum, articles aimed at both *failure to define own interests* and *failure to act on the basis of own interests* are mostly confined to the beginning of the accession process and the frequency decreases towards the end. Readers

articles are the most represented, whereas Journalist articles are noticeably absent.

Even though the first part of recognition focuses on defining and the second part on living own interests, in both cases the same phenomenon is criticized. The irony is targeted towards internal actors who, instead of taking responsibility, use the EU as a slogan and excuse for all possible purposes. Therefore, the main reason for *failure* is seen to be acceptance of certain issues in the name and under the auspice of the EU and closing the internal substantial discussion on that basis.

Should deny EU authority

Should deny EU authority as becoming challenges *Deny EU authority* as *being*. This sub-discourse is based on interaction between Estonia and the EU. Here a distinction between *should let the EU know own interests* and *should protect own interests* can be made as identification. The first one challenges *equal partnership with the EU* and the second one *not being able to take the EU seriously* as sub-discourses of *being*.

The idea of ***should let the EU know own interests*** is based on two objectives: either Estonia should let the EU know its interests for getting an understanding from the EU or for spreading own interests to the EU which might take these over. As a Journalist article writes, for reasoning *own* interests, sometimes even the method of explain in plain has to be used (PM, 29.08.2002). The expression 'explain in plain' carries the idea that the EU might not be that clever after all. The same is indicated by the claim that the only possibility left to Estonian hunters and foresters to ensure that hunting large wild animals continues in Estonia is a persistent negotiation tactic of explaining and persuading (PM, 29.08.2002).

Similarly, a Political Elite article writes that the EU does not stand for *our* national interests but, of course, unlike *our* Eastern neighbor, it understands *our* reasoned wishes, if *we ourselves* do not stop expressing these (PM, 15.08.1998; similar also Cultural Elite, PM, 17.02.1998). A Readers article claims that *we* definitely have to present *our* conditions instead of fulfilling blindly those of the EU (PM, 17.12.1997c). A Cultural Elite article expresses the same idea by using the allegory of coughing: "Whoever realizes a threat should cough or quack. Also Estonia. But in a way that it is heard and taken into account. /.../ Estonia should, if using a fashionable phrase, cough with dignity."⁸⁷ (PM, 18.01.2003b).

At a more concrete level, substance of interests is dealt with by Cultural Elite articles. One article argues that it would be much wiser to let the European Union know that it is better if the question of widening Estonian citizenry was frozen in the accession negotiations (PM, 26.06.1998). Another

⁸⁷ Kes iganes tajub ohtu, peaks kõhatama või kraaksatama. Ka Eesti. Aga nii, et teda kuuldaks ja kuulda võetaks. /.../ Eesti peaks, kui kasutada moesõna, kõhatama väarikalt.

article claims that what if *we* say in the following negotiations that *our* first interest is actually neither the milk quota nor free movement of labor, not even the permission to hunt bears but the question how to liberate Gedhun Choekyi Nyima⁸⁸ (PM, 07.12.2002).

In addition to letting the EU know what is important for Estonia in some articles the necessity to spread Estonian positions to the EU is emphasized. For example, a Cultural Elite article suggests that the nuthatch, (*Sitta europea*), should become the EU's heraldic bird (PM, 30.04.2002). Similarly, a Journalist article writes in connection with daylight saving time that if turning the clock back is not suitable for most Estonians, what could be more glorious than to help Europe to find the right time? (PM, 28.03.1998b). Even though the first example reasons the choice by naming the characteristics of this bird, implicitly the focus is on bird's name in Latin, since '*sitta*' is the partitive case of the Estonian word '*sitt*' that means shit. In the second example, the aim of helping the EU to find the right time carries the presupposition that the time currently used in the EU is somehow the wrong one.

In some cases, Estonian ideas are valued as those presented by a small and smart country. For example, a Journalist article analyzes the usage of rye in Estonia and the EU from the perspective of the EU's backwardness. The article writes that Estonian farmers surely remember that in the Soviet period it was reasonable to feed cows with bread and continues that may be also the EU could use rye for making bread for the cows instead of burning it (PM, 05.08.2002b). The comparison drawn with the Soviet Union is based on Estonian expertise gained from this not too clever giant. Currently, Estonia is ready to share its knowledge for the sake of improving the EU. In another example, the EU is taken as the Estonian national hero, *Kalevipoeg*, who despite being big and powerful, is simple enough to need a hedgehog's advice in a fight with the Devil. On the basis of this analogy, the article writes that maybe *we* should have an Estonian hedgehog beside every European *Kalevipoeg* who would remind him whenever necessary: edgewise, always edgewise (*serviti, ikka serviti*)⁸⁹ (PM, 17.06.2003a).

Another part of this sub-discourse, ***should protect own interests***, is based on the conflict of interests between Estonia and the EU. On the grounds of their focus, examples can be divided into three categories, those that empathize: with Estonia, with the EU and with interaction between Estonia and the EU. In the first two cases, interests are protected as a zero-sum game: since both sides have fixed interests, it is important to achieve own aims. The main idea of the last part, on the other hand, is to find a consensus that is based on a common denominator.

⁸⁸ Gedhun Choekyi Nyima is 11th Panchen Lama of Tibetan Buddhism.

⁸⁹ In a fight with the Devil, the advice is to use a plank edgewise for hitting.

Especially towards the end of the accession process, several articles express a necessity to protect 'national interests'⁹⁰ (Political Elite article, PM, 08.03.2002b). A Journalist article writes that one should not forget in the EU about *own* politics and beliefs (PM, 03.11.2003a) and a Political Elite article claims that at the time of the EU accession Estonia needs strong government to protect its interests (PM,10.03.2003b). Similar examples about the necessity to protect national interests can also be found from the other articles (Political Elite articles, PM, 21.06.2002 and PM, 03.02.1998; Cultural Elite articles, PM 08.09.1997 and PM, 16.02.2002). Conclusively, as a Journalist article writes:

[E]stonia should finally give up embellishment of the EU and move over to pragmatic relations where it is necessary to protect its own producers. Brussels takes us seriously and it is time to take also Brussels seriously.⁹¹

PM, 08.08.1998; see also PM, 29.10.2002

The examples above indicate not only that Estonia should give up embellished beliefs concerning the EU but also realize that EU is not an authority Estonia should please.

Apart from the rather general 'national interests' examples about the more concrete issues can be found especially in the Political Elite articles and Cultural Elite articles. A Political Elite article writes that in the accession negotiations, Estonia should protect its interests in the economic and tax sphere (PM, 31.10.1997a). Another article, in the same vein, claims that *our* negotiators have to stand up for the vitality of *our* rural regions, also if for Brussels the name of this vitality consists of quotas and subsidies (PM, 02.04.2002c; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 15.08.2002). Therefore:

In a situation where the European Union offers Estonia irresponsibly the milk quota that is 60% of the production level of the year 1938, our negotiators should immediately open the chapter number 4, free movement of capital, which has been temporarily closed.⁹²

PM, 19.07.2002b; see also PM 12.08.2002

In relation to gender equality legislation, a Cultural Elite article writes that one should use a possibility to raise a precedent and thus increase Estonia's authority (PM, 20.11.2003; see also PM, 13.05.2002a). Concerning the issue

⁹⁰ In some articles also mapped as 'Estonian' or 'own' interests.

⁹¹ [E]estil tuleb lõpuks loobuda ELi ilustamisest ning minna üle pragmaatilistele suhetele, kus on vaja kaitsta eelkõige oma tootjaid. Brüssel võtab meid tõsiselt ning aeg on tõsiselt võtta ka Brüsselit.

⁹² Olukorras, kus Euroopa Liit pakub süüdimatult piimakvooti, mis on 60% Eesti 1938. aasta tootmistasemest, peaksid meie läbirääkijad viivitamatult avama ajutiselt suletud peatüki nr 4 - kapitali vaba liikumine.

bilingualism, a Journalist article states that Estonia should not in any case give up a principle that the Estonian language is the only official language in Estonia (PM, 08.08.1997b). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article writes concerning Estonian citizenship policy that it is clear that *we* are tried to influence and put a pressure on: still, *we* should not get disturbed by that (PM, 12.12.1997; see also Journalist article, PM, 20.10.1997).

Apart from Estonian development and legislation, articles write that Estonia has to protect its interests in connection with the development of the EU. A Political Elite article claims that it is important for *us* as a small country that EU's future action were directed more towards solving the strategic key issues and additionally *we* have to stand for low level decision making also in the future (PM, 11.02.2002). The same line is continued by a Cultural Elite article which writes that Estonia could support so called multi speed European integration in a variety of spheres and, on the basis of the subsidiarity principle, apply at the possibility to bring the competences back to the nation state level (PM, 19.11.2002a).

The examples above focus on Estonia's duty to protect its interests whereas in the following paragraphs the articles that emphasize the EU by criticizing the EU's demands are dealt with. Without questioning the EU as a whole, the applicability of the EU's demands is denied by the articles. As a Political Elite article writes, EU norms are not necessarily suitable for Estonia in all cases (PM, 22.12.1998; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 16.12.1997).

At a more concrete level, a Journalist article questions the EU's guidance to connect pension index to the salary of the male unskilled workers. The article suggests that the EU norm should not be taken too seriously, since the salary of very few male unskilled workers cannot be the main indicator on which the welfare of pensioners depends (PM, 06.11.2003b). Similarly, in relation to the EU's critical position towards the privatization of Estonian electricity power plants to USA firm NRG Energy, a Journalist article writes: why should Estonia accept EU's position if, according to the international advisors, neither EU nor Estonian law has been broken (PM, 30.09.1998). Also a Political Elite article writes that even though Estonia cannot avoid a whole mountain of Brussels' directives, own correct daylight saving time is a thing Brussels has nothing to do with (PM, 13.04.1998b). The latter example can also be seen as a therapeutic one: even though the EU demands a lot and intervenes into many spheres of life, at least this issue does not belong under the authority of the EU (see also Readers article, PM, 19.01.1998).

Towards the end of the accession process, the legislative basis is dealt with in relation to the Accession Treaty. A Cultural Elite article writes that one should not accept the priority of the EU law in a way that it contradicts to the general principles of the state set by constitution (PM, 11.06.2002b). Another article claims that in the bill of the third act of constitution, one should avoid direct references to the superiority of EU law over the constitution (PM, 13.05.2002a).

In some cases, one is urged to deny EU authority, since Estonia is seen to be more progressive than the EU (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 08.04.2003a and PM, 02.10.2003c). For example a Readers article writes that Estonia should not repeat others' mistakes, since there are conservatives (*vanameelsed*) in the West as well (PM, 07.01.1998a; see also Political Elite article, PM, 07.09.1998b and Cultural Elite article, PM, 18.12.1998a). Similarly, a Journalist article states that in a situation where developed European countries are not able to actualize their rigid tax system, Estonia should not give up its advantages (PM, 09.03.2002a).

Here, however, an assumption of Estonian progressiveness might also lead to confrontation and thus a denial of the EU as a whole. A Readers article asks on the basis of friction related to abandoning the death penalty, what if *we* did not go to this union but learned from the American example instead (PM, 07.02.1998b; see also Cultural Elite, PM, 28.02.1998a). Similarly, a Journalist article writes that if the positions of the small countries are going to weaken and those of the big countries are strengthened then the question arises, “[w]hy for us the EU that has been advertised for the public exactly as a place where Estonia can be an equal among the equals?”⁹³ (PM, 17.05.2003). Another example that deals with the potential penalties for the candidate countries asks about the need to pay the penalties for poor implementation of the accession preparations if one might not necessarily join at all (PM, 27.07.2002a; see also PM, 30.01.2002).

The two previous parts above that focused on either Estonia or the EU were based on zero-sum logic whereas the third part emphasizes interaction and aims at finding a compromise that satisfies both sides. A Journalist article writes in the beginning of the accession process: Estonia has to find a proper synthesis between its needs and the offers of the EU (PM, 01.08.1998a). Another article states that for not undermining its relations with the EU, wise strategic decisions have to be made (PM, 04.04.1997). Towards the end of the accession process an article claims that as a probable future member Estonia is obliged to say how the EU could be changed and at the same time protect its *own* interests (PM, 19.11.2002a). Therefore, the country has a difficult duty in the intergovernmental conference: to protect *own* interests and at the same time not to prevent launching a new Europe (PM, 06.10.2003a).

Also a Cultural Elite article claims that *we* have to integrate into the European Union for sure but at the same time *we* have to protect *our* national interests as firmly (PM, 05.07.2002a). Another article argues that energetic and educated Estonia does not have to be afraid of widening cooperation with Europe but rather make better usage of the new possibilities (PM, 03.09.2003b).

⁹³ [m]illeks meile EL, mida on avalikkusele reklaamitud just kohana, kus Eesti saab olla võrdsena võrdsete seas.

Negotiations and bargaining, as practical tools for interaction, are pointed out by Journalist articles (for example PM, 21.04.2003). In the beginning of the accession negotiations an article claims that Estonia has to work for getting EU member countries' support for its accession: for exceeding EU's threshold it is necessary to get the acceptance of the big European countries (PM 17.02.1997). The term 'threshold' makes the EU look like a house and in order to enter, one has to get the acceptance of the oldest and largest of the current inhabitants. Nevertheless, the article writes about bargaining for shorter or longer transition periods and equivalent financial coverage to get into shape (PM, 08.10.1998b; similar also PM, 03.04.1998). Also more concrete options for getting the transition periods are presented: should *we* sacrifice tax free status, release of corporate income tax or would it be possible to explain *our* situation to the future partners and save *us* from sacrifices (PM, 09.03.2002a; see also Cultural Elite, PM, 27.06.1998a).

In sum, *should protect own interests* is equally present both in the beginning as well as towards the end of the accession process, it is also clearly stronger than *should let the EU know own interests*. Journalist articles are the most represented and Readers articles are the least, in both cases.

In *should let the EU know own interests*, a rather patronizing attitude towards the big and powerful but not that clever EU is expressed and the superiority of small and smart Estonia is indicated. At the same time the actual influence of Estonia is expressed in a rather humorist manner by using folklore, language games, allegory etc. Also the issues Estonia could contribute to are rather marginal ones (daylight saving time, a heraldic bird).

The necessity to protect *own* interests is based on implicit or explicit confrontation between Estonia and the EU and the first one is urged to deny the EU authority that was admired in *European Estonia*. Therefore, instead of a qualitative difference, the necessity to protect *own* interests is based on the same action-reaction model as the necessity to follow EU's guidance.

Failure to deny EU authority

In addition to the identification part, recognition as a *Failure to deny EU authority* can be found in the articles. On the grounds of the general logic of *Independent Estonia*, recognition is given by Estonian actors and is based on their evaluations. At the same time the cleavages and the heterogeneity of society are emphasized in connection with feedback. Recognition is divided into *failure to let the EU know own interests* and *failure to protect own interests*. The first part focuses on issues Estonia should have told the EU whereas failure to protect Estonian interests deals with the cases where Estonia should have acted differently.

In both cases Estonia is depicted as an immature actor incapable of taking responsibility and treats the EU erroneously as an authority (Cultural Elite article, PM, 19.12.1997c). As a Cultural Elite article writes *we* are still some kind of schoolboys who are sent to a penalty period (*paneb nurka*) by a class

teacher (PM, 02.04.2002b; see also in PM, 06.12.2003). Another article writes that at the time when Estonian politicians fight for their places in the Convention on the Future of Europe, Visegrad countries show that a new era has arrived for the candidates' relationships with the European Union (Cultural elite article, PM, 16.02.2002).

As part of **failure to let the EU know own interests** Political Elite articles write that *we*, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, should have been decisive enough in relation to the EU in the end of the last year (PM, 15.08.1998) and the indecision of the government has created a great mess in the European Union negotiations (PM, 21.06.2002). Similarly, after the foreign diplomats and economic specialists have claimed that Estonia is the outsider in the EU accession negotiations, a Journalist article asks:

Against this negative information it remains unclear why does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tallinn still snooze and does not try to change the picture of Estonia /.../ as the poorest country which has started the accession negotiations.⁹⁴

PM, 14.04.1998

Here, the reference to 'snoozing' as a very passive state of being clearly shows a lack of necessary action.

In another similar example, a Journalist article writes that even though Mart Siimann (Estonia's Prime Minister at the time) could have enforced Brussels' praise concerning Estonia, he did not do so. The article continues that in the EU's Vienna summit, Siimann just said that Estonia wants to become an EU member on the first of January 2003, but it is not a problem if it happens later: just as one would like to drink beer with friends but is satisfied also with swallowing kissel instead (PM, 12.12.1998b). The comparison of beer to a dessert kissel (a sweet concoction loosely based on fruit juice) that few people hardly if ever drink socially is an allegory, which brings the situation to the everyday level and also makes its absurdity very clear.

In Cultural Elite articles a failure to let the EU know Estonian interests is communicated by confronting the EU and Estonian nation as two opposite sides (PM, 09.07.2003). One article draws parallels with the pattern that was followed during the Soviet time already: the party leaders were toadying to (*pugesid*) Moscow instead of taking into account the needs and opinions of *own* nation (PM, 24.04.1997). Another similar article criticizes the fact that the poor living standard of the Estonian people is hidden from the EU by Estonian officials (PM, 28.02.1998b).

In **failure to protect own interests**, the need to follow of EU guidance that was considered as a necessity in *European Estonia*, is criticized as an improper way of action (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 18.12.1998a and PM,

⁹⁴ Selle negatiivse info tausta jääb arusaamatuks, miks tükub seni välisministeerium Tallinnas ning ei ürita muuta /.../ pilti Eestist, kui vaesemast Euroopa Liiduga ühinemiskõnelusi alustanud riigist.

17.06.2003b; Journalist articles, PM, 29.12.1997c and PM, 08.08.1998). For example, a Cultural Elite article writes about the attempts to regulate gender equality as a “non existent sphere” (*olematut valdkonda*) in Estonia, on the basis of the European Union requirements (PM, 27.03.2002; see also PM, 11.09.2003b). Another article writes that for the extremely slothful (*mõttelaiskadel*) officials it is easiest to transmit EU directive wholly to Estonia instead of thinking how it could be implemented in most rational way (Cultural Elite article, PM, 15.09.2003; see also PM, 02.12.1998).

Most examples focus either on the current or potential consequences of the failure. As an example of the current consequence, a Political Elite article writes that in a situation where land is ten times cheaper in Estonia than in the EU, it was totally unacceptable to close the chapter of free movement of capital in the accession negotiations without demanding a transition period for selling arable and forestry land (PM, 19.07.2002b). Similarly, consequences are depicted also by Cultural Elite articles (PM, 23.09.1998; PM, 13.08.2003a and PM, 27.11.2002a) and Journalist article (PM, 11.03.1998).

A Readers article calls it quite shocking that since a sanctuary’s kitchen is not in accordance to the EU norms, it is not allowed to cook soup there (PM, 16.12.2002b; see also PM, 29.01.1997). Another article writes that if *we* have democracy then abandoning the death penalty should be put to the vote instead of listening to guidance from Brussels (PM 13.08.1997; see also Cultural Elite, PM, 09.10.2003). In the last example, a dual trap is formed from the accession perspective. Even though ignoring EU’s norms can lead to the disclosure from the EU, ignoring people’s opinion as an undemocratic alternative can have the same consequences.

Apart from the criticism expressed in a general manner, some articles criticize concrete scapegoats as being responsible for failures. In the beginning of the accession process a Readers article comments on the statement of Andres Varik (Estonia’s Minister of Agriculture at the time) that supporting Estonia’s exports is not the Ministry’s business: What is their business? Only tariff-fully (*tolli-lollitamine*)? The article continues by arguing that quitting the export of milk products to the European Union countries is directly a failure of the Ministry of Agriculture (PM, 07.01.1998a).

Towards the end of the accession negotiations, a Political Elite article claims that Jaanus Marrandi (Estonia’s Minister of Agriculture at the time) acted irresponsibly in connection with selling land and thus not protecting the interests of *own* nation: in a situation where the EU does not treat Estonia as an equal partner and offers *us* only half of the milk and cereal seed quota, the Minister of a dignified independent state should not just sing a lamentation (*nutulaulu laulda*) (PM, 12.08.2002).

In addition to the current consequences resulting from not protecting one’s interests, potential consequences are depicted by a Political Elite articles (PM, 31.10.1998b). An article argues that while Estonia does not implement counter measures, rude vicious competition targeted at *our* producers is faced, in which Estonia’s farmers are deemed to be the losers in advance (PM,

31.10.1998a). In another article, a similar scenario is given in relation to the environmental and energy issues: if long transition periods cannot be achieved in the negotiations concerning fulfillment of the environmental norms this could mean abandoning of *our* oil shale energies and cause the dramatic rise in the production costs of the other spheres (PM, 21.07.1998).

Apart from Political Elite articles, a Cultural Elite article writes that instead of becoming an active subject of the Western union [the EU - SKK], Estonia faces a threat to become a peripheral object of the norms and relations of the EU (PM, 27.11.2002a; see also Journalist article, PM, 20.02.2002). In other articles the consequences are related to Russia, which imposes its demands on Estonia through the European Council, OSCE, and the European Union and Estonian government is now ready to fulfill all EU prescriptions (Cultural Elite article, PM, 19.03.1998). A similar example is given by a Political Elite article which claims that the EU does not protect *us* from the infiltration (*sisseimbumine*) and if also *we* cannot protect *ourselves*, *we* will turn into an improper partner for the EU (PM, 15.09.1998b).

Potential consequences are also referred to in the satire displayed by a Cultural Elite article, which suggests that Estonian history should be rewritten on the basis of the current needs related to the EU authority. More concretely, *we* should look through the role that Lembitu, the ancient landlord (*muistne maavanem*) of one Estonian region at the time Sakala has in *our* history. *We* should admit that in his case *we* can talk about a severe EU opponent who suggested to fight against the values of the Western world until a “[o]ne year old or a toddler can be found in the country”.⁹⁵ (PM, 06.06.2002).

In sum, both *failure to let the EU know own interests* and *failure to protect own interests* are present in the beginning as well as towards the end of the accession process whereas *failure to protect own interests* is stronger than *failure to let the EU know own interests*. The Political Elite articles and the Cultural Elite articles are the most represented in both parts, whereas Journalist articles and Readers articles are notably quiet. Those most often seen in the articles as responsible for failures are the political elite and the high level officials related to the accession negotiations.

For illustrating Estonian passive behavior, various terms are used in the articles. The claim about ‘snoozing’ shows the absolute passivity of the Estonian side. The ‘lamentation’ refers to a situation where one just complains about things without even trying to change them. The EU on the other hand, is shown to have an active role which in the current case is seen as potentially harmful from Estonian perspective.

CONCLUSIONS OF INDEPENDENT ESTONIA

In principle, the discourse *Independent Estonia* sees Estonia and the EU as equal partners. On the basis of the articles, this partnership includes

⁹⁵ «[m]aal leidub aastavanune või küünrapikkune poisike».

harmonious cooperation based on mutual interests, the search for common denominators as well as protecting own interests and the need to do so. From the identification and recognition side, identification in a form of what should be done is more represented here than a *failure-part*. Therefore, *Becoming independent* is different from *Becoming European* that was more based on the recognition side.

Similar to *European Estonia*, *Independent Estonia* distinguishes between the EU as an agency and EU practice. Practice refers to the EU as a context that enables Estonia to define its interests and follow them (or Estonia is urged to do so). Unlike in *European Estonia*, EU agency is unwelcome to interrupt into Estonian life in *Independent Estonia*. In line with that, anyone who treats the EU as an authority is criticized.

All categories of authors are present in the discourse. *Being independent* is mostly communicated by Cultural Elite articles but seldom by Readers articles. Most of the *being-part* focuses on Estonian possibilities and agency whereas these articles that criticize the EU by denying its authority are clearly in minority.

Journalist articles and Cultural Elite article are the most represented articles in connection with the necessity to protect own interests, an issue about which Readers articles are almost wholly silent. Since most of the articles which urge to protect Estonian interests focus on the official accession process the logic is rather in accordance to the *European Estonia* where instead of the EU legislation and official accession process, Readers articles focused on the everyday practice of the EU. Nevertheless, in covering the everyday practice of Estonia, Readers articles expressed it as a need to define own interests and act on that basis. The main criticism is targeted towards dealing with the EU as an 'empty signifier' that can be used in any kinds of situation and filled in with various substance whereas 'real interests' are neglected at the same time.

Even though *European Estonia* and *Independent Estonia* are based on different assumptions of Estonian agency, Estonia, in the latter, is often represented as reactive (defining ourselves by denying the EU) rather than being pro-active. Instead of visualizing what Estonia should do by forming its path in relation to the EU (Cultural Elite article, PM, 18.11.2002a), the country is mostly positioned by denying the path that is formed by the EU. At the same time this denial does not necessarily mean any radical action like waiving EU membership.

5.3 DISCOURSE OF HUMBLE ESTONIA

The discourse of *Humble Estonia* is based on the realist perception of the world that small countries have limited possibilities in the world anarchy. On the basis of Wendt's classification (see Section 3.1), the Other is an enemy who tries to destroy *us*. In the current study, a realist perception is combined with

the superiority of the EU over Estonia (on the basis of Europeanisation). Therefore, instead of destruction, this discourse deals with issues like a threat to Estonia's independence, sovereignty and/or security (for example Jakniunaite 2009, 119 and Feldman 2001, 15).

Also in the academic texts the same logic is communicated and various scholars point out the threats a small country is seen to face in the international arena: threat to disappear (Berg and Oras 2002, 27), to remain invisible and have no influence in the international arena due to its size (Berg and Oras 2002, 27; Kirch and Kirch 2001, 140). For example, it has been claimed that Estonia is not an equal partner to Russia, Germany or the Scandinavian countries (Made 2003, 190-191). Therefore, quite logically, maximizing its security can be seen as the country's main goal.

Estonia's location between East and West (Berg and Oras 2002, 47) is not seen in this discourse as an option as in the discourse of *Independent Estonia*. Rather it is connected to the unstable position on the border between two civilizations (Kuus 2002a, 97) or a periphery in both a geographical and a historical sense (Vetik 2003, 267 and Pettai 2005, 58-60). The latter refers to the importance of recognition, since in relation to periphery the acceptance and opinion of the center is seen to be important (Kivikuru 1996b, 13; see also Vetik 2003, 267).

In *Humble Estonia*, the center is represented by West or Western Europe (more concretely known by the civic society/military duo, EU/NATO). Scholars write that Estonia is not really recognized as Western by the West (see also Section 3.1). For example Berg and Oras (2002, 48) point to the suspicious attitude of the West towards Estonia, since Estonia is located on the border and is not a pure West. Furthermore, Estonia is seen to lag behind Western Europe due to its history. As Vahur Made (2003, 190-191) writes, being fifty years behind the Iron Curtain, under the Soviet regime, has influenced both economic and social development. As Lauristin and Vihalemm conclude:

After the jubilation of the initial years, the West did not sincerely recognize Eastern Europe, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as a part of the common past. The border between East and West was culturally constructed deep in European history, and breaking through this border seemed even more difficult than breaking with the Soviet Union.

Lauristin and Vihalemm 2002, 57-58

Even though the focus of my empirical data is on constructing national identity in relation to the EU, the dangerous Other of Estonia referred to in the academic texts, is Russia. Estonia's location is mapped from the perspective of Russia's neighborhood (for example Berg and Oras 2002, 46 and Veemaa 2002, 173-174). Estonia is seen as a 'grey' area which is vulnerable to an economic or political crisis in Russia, if the country stayed outside the EU and

NATO (Kirch and Kirch 2001, 135, 140; see also Berg and Oras 2002, 49; Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997a, 118 and Kuus 2002b, 394). Apart from Russia the threat is sometimes depicted in relation to the 'Russian agents' inside Estonia, who, like Merje Kuus writes are due to their background seen as part of the civilizational conflict, since Russian speakers are treated as bearers of non-Western culture. Therefore the recommendations to integrate non-Estonians can also be seen as a pressure to compromise Estonia's Western identity (Kuus, 2002a, 98-99, 102).

At the same time, however, the EU is scrutinized critically, both in the academic texts as well as in *Postimees*. According to Kuus, the EU is sometimes seen to undermine the undivided authority of the Estonia's nation-state over its territory and especially in the matters of citizenship and minority rights can be construed as a source of threat (Kuus 2002b, 394). Also in the articles of *Postimees*, the EU as well as the world in general is perceived on the basis of the hostile logic of the world. Even though the EU can still be seen as unavoidable from Estonia's perspective, the calculation is not based on the high expectations but on the vision of the even worse future outside the EU.

Similar to the discourse of *European Estonia*, the EU is seen as superior to Estonia in this discourse. However, in *European Estonia* the EU is admired whereas here the EU is seen as either a specific authoritarian actor in relation to Estonia or just part of the wider authoritarian world. More concretely this means that instead of cooperation and mutual understanding, decisions are made by the EU, and Estonia has no choice but to accept. At the same time 'authoritarian' cannot be equated to 'hostile', since the EU's attitude towards Estonia is often depicted as indifferent.

The major difference, between this discourse and the first two, is the reflective tone. While in the case of the first two discourses, *becoming* is stated as a goal, something that the country is supposed to reach by improving itself or changing its behavior, in this discourse, Estonia is seen as passive and not in a position to set these goals. Therefore, *Becoming humble* is neither a purpose nor a progressive goal to work towards, but part of the essential development, a threat that cannot necessarily be avoided by Estonia, since it is caused by the action of great forces. The only thing that Estonia is capable of changing is its attitude/perception of the world as a basis for drawing conclusions. The contradiction between *being* and *becoming* is thus not based on the current action and its improvement but on criticizing and changing Estonia's former attitude towards the EU or towards general reality. Estonia can make comments either by understanding and accepting or by expressing dissatisfaction and criticism. Still, neither of these leads to changes in practice.

Structurally, the discourse of *Humble Estonia* contains sub-discourses that are based on the same relations as the first two discourses. In connection with *being*, the discourse contains two sub-discourses. *Accept reality as own practice* grounds on practice and focuses on internal relations. *Realize EU authority* focuses on the discourse/rhetoric and is based on the interaction

between Estonia and the EU as an agency. Since in connection with *being* no change is indicated, no separate recognition is given either.

Similarly to the other two discourses, in the level of *becoming*, both sub-discourses contain four parts based on the internal relations/interaction, rhetoric (discourse)/practice and identification/recognition axes. While *Should accept reality as own practice* focuses on internal relations, *Should realize EU authority* is based on interaction and EU agency. The axis of rhetoric contains of *Should realize EU authority* as identification but also failure to do that as recognition. Practice gives a basis to *Should accept reality as own practice* (identification) and failure to do that (recognition).

Conclusively, the division of sub-discourses is capsulized in Table 5.3 and the hierarchy of the discourse is clarified in Figure 5.3. In the following part, *Being* and *Becoming humble* (as representation) are dealt with whereas *Being* and *Becoming realist* (as relations and identities) are analyzed in Chapter 6.

Table 5.3. *Sub-discourses of Being and Becoming humble.*

Being humble	Becoming humble (in/due to the EU)
Accept reality as own practice	Should accept reality as own practice
	Failure to accept reality as own practice
Realize EU authority	Should realize EU authority
	Failure to realize EU authority




Figure 5.3. Sub-discourses of *Humble Estonia*.

BEING HUMBLE

Being humble consists of two sub-discourses: *Accept reality as own practice* and *Realize EU authority*. In the former ‘reality’ as a main factor in Estonia’s development is understood and accepted whereas EU’s agency is not paid attention to. A Cultural Elite article writes about country’s EU membership: “Taking into account the more general polito-economic processes of the world Estonia is in front of historical (and not only securital) inevitability.”⁹⁶ (PM, 15.07.1998).

In the latter sub-discourse the EU is dealt with as an authoritarian agency from Estonia’s perspective. The relationship between the parties is based on a lack of influence on Estonia’s side and the ability of the EU to decide upon things. The EU’s impact and Estonia’s lack of influence is in the world context depicted in a Readers article: “Estonia’s participation in NATO and the EU depends largely on the meeting of these organizations in April and May. Referring to American proverb: NATO and EU are now ‘a new ball game’.”⁹⁷ (PM, 29.12.1998a).

⁹⁶ Võttes arvesse maailma üldisemaid majandus-poliitilisi protsesse on Eesti ajaloolise (ja mitte ainult julgeolekualase) paratamatuse ees.

⁹⁷ Eesti osalus NATO ja ELis oleneb suurel määral nende organisatsioonide kokkutulemisest aprillis ja mais. Ameerika kõnekäänuga - NATO ja EL on nüüd ”uus pallimäng”.

Accept reality as own practice

This sub-discourse contains two parts, *accept reality* and *know own limits*, both based on internal relations. Since as a starting point, (EU as) reality is accepted and own limits are recognized the risk of being disappointed at any point is rather small. Therefore, in the part of *becoming* one is urged to 'take life as it is' (to accept issues).

In ***accept reality***, reality is seen to exist independently of Estonia as well as any other actors. This also means that the responsible actors are either completely missing from the examples or the responsibility is blurred and the actors are mentioned at a very abstract level, like, the rules of the game and power that guide the human world (Cultural Elite article, PM, 15.10.2002b).

Especially in the case of missing actors, the articles emphasize the impossibility to change the prevailing conditions. A Journalist article writes that in the current situation, acceptance of Estonia to the international organizations is regrettably coinciding with several important changes of the power balance (*jõujoon*) (PM, 23.08.2002). The words 'regrettably' and 'coincide' make the whole situation sound like a destiny that cannot be changed. Also 'acceptance of Estonia' refers to the case when membership just happens and no particular actor is responsible for that.

In a similar example, a Readers article writes that the accession of 2004 is inevitable just like the accession⁹⁸ that took place in 1940: it is also inevitable that Estonia's *own* constitution turns into a secondary file and it is hardly considered rational to print it out after the accession (PM, 17.06.2002b; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 11.06.2002b). Similarly, a Cultural Elite articles claim that world's general international development excludes the possibility of Estonia to exist independently between East and West (PM, 12.07.1997a; see also PM, 15.07.1998) and the accession is inevitable, since it is programmed to the century's development (PM, 06.03.1998b).

In the case the EU (and NATO) are mentioned as actors, they are seen as subordinate to the bigger forces. A Readers article writes that those who followed more attentively the distribution of NATO-invitations to Estonia and the other Eastern European countries that took place soon after the countries were invited into the EU, could, on the basis of the general rather bitter atmosphere, assume a running competition between the USA and the EU (PM, 05.03.2003b). Even though both EU and NATO are mentioned in this example, also they are guided by the 'general atmosphere', a major force that decides among other things upon Estonia's fate.

The same logic is followed in the Cultural Elite articles which see EU membership as incapable of preventing things that are determined to happen. One article writes that soon Estonians will smoothly become voluntary users of the English language - long time before the referendum and hardly even a big *No* to the EU would result in any remarkable change to this communicative adoption (PM, 28.06.2003; see also PM, 13.09.1997 and PM, 24.12.1997c).

⁹⁸ Author uses the word "accession" (*liitumine*) instead of "occupation" (*okupatsioon*).

Another similar article claims that in the current situation a *No*-decision would be quite a threat to independence since even if *we* did not change the constitution it will no more maintain *our* independence (PM, 10.09.2003b). An article also writes that not joining the EU does not prevent the immigration (PM, 02.09.2003a; see also Political Elite article, PM, 07.02.1998a). All examples are based on determinism: certain things happen since they are deemed to happen and no actors are capable of changing them (Cultural Elite article, PM, 26.11.1997).

As another option, the examples of blurred responsibility are dated to the beginning of the accession process and deal with the uncertainty of the countries that are called to the accession negotiations. Even though officially Estonia's goal was to be part of the 'first group', here the country is depicted as a pawn without any influence. At the same time, the EU's responsibility is rather unclear. For example a Political Elite article writes about "Estonia's possible involvement in the first round of the European Union enlargement..."⁹⁹(PM, 16.01.1997). Similarly, a Journalist article writes how it was planned to give the candidate countries a clear message, as to which of them are suitable for the accession negotiations, but the plan was postponed since no consensus prevailed inside the EU (PM, 27.11.1997). Even though the EU is present in these examples, the process is seen as accidental and uncontrolled. Instead of EU agency and clear decision making process, unclear agency is expected to decide Estonia's fate.

In the examples of accepting reality depicted above, one focuses on things that just happen to Estonia whereas ***know own limits*** concentrates on the specific features of the country as limits of Estonia. On the basis of the examples, one deals either with fixed, and stable, or flexible features and characteristics.

In the case of fixed and stable features, geographical size but also history and location of the country as well as interrelations between these are emphasized (Cultural Elite article, PM, 06.09.2003b). The division of big and small countries is crucial here, since certain rules and regulations are considered to be valid for the small but not for the big countries. As Cultural Elite article claims, in the region where Estonia is located, the *No* of a small border state to ones inevitably means *Yes* to the others (PM, 28.06.2003). Similarly, a Political Elite article writes that Estonia's integration into Europe derives from its history and geographical location (PM, 29.11.1997b; see also Cultural Elite articles, PM, 15.09.2003; PM, 15.08.2003; PM, 28.06.2003 and PM, 12.07.1997a).

For showing the importance of Estonia's smallness, Estonia is portrayed as a "midget state" (*kääbusriik*) (Cultural Elite article, PM, 10.11.1997). A Political Elite article writes that *we* balance continuously on the border where, by leaning to one direction *we* could become isolated from the European and world structures, but to the other *we* can give up dangerously lot of *our* self-

⁹⁹ Eesti võimalik sattumine Euroopa Liidu laienemise esimesse ringi...

being (PM, 10.02.1997). Balancing on the border is characterized here as a circus trick that includes the real danger of falling: only those who have gained virtuous skills by continuous practicing are capable of balancing on the wire, and even for them, accidents can easily happen.

Another example, a Political Elite article writes that for Estonia as a small state, there is nothing worse than to remain between two mill-stones (PM, 14.08.2002b; see also Readers article, PM, 22.07.1997 and Cultural Elite article, PM, 12.08.1997b). Since the function of mill-stones is to smash everything by raw force, this analogy makes the options of Estonia rather clear. Similarly, a Journalist article quotes the speech of Ene Ergma, (Estonia's Speaker of Parliament at the time), who suggested looking at Estonia's situation from outer space: since Estonia is between two big entities – the European Union and the Russian Federation – of which the former can be imagined as green and the second as blue, Estonia is inevitably only a small white spot between them. Thus, the article continues with Ergma's conclusions that while looked from the outer space, this white spot is not visible and does not exist (PM, 26.06.2003). Ene Ergma, whose analysis the article uses for legitimizing its arguments is an astrophysicist and a member of the Estonian Academy of Science. She can, thus, perform as an expert who bases her arguments on the rules of natural science being an unquestionable truth. This way Estonia's accession to the EU becomes part of an astrophysicist process, not a question of political choice.

Apart from the stable and fixed features, more flexible factors like the economy are referred to as Estonia's limits (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 12.08.1997b and PM, 25.09.1998). For instance, a Political Elite article writes about a stable EU and the unsettled stock market of Estonia (PM, 09.07.1998). Similarly, Readers articles reveal the weaknesses of Estonia's economy in comparison with Norway. One article writes that in Estonia it is of course more difficult to find arguments against EU membership than it was for Norway, since Estonia neither has a strong economy nor its *own* gas reserves (PM, 15.07.1997a). Another Readers article claims that *we* are not yet that rich that European Union could take instead of giving as in the case of Norway (PM, 22.07.1997).

In addition to the certain characteristics or spheres of life, some articles emphasize Estonia's action as rather meaningless and without much influence. In these cases, on the basis of action, conclusions about the limits are drawn and vice versa. A Cultural Elite article writes that Estonia's possibilities to choose are often limited or nonexistent in many important sectors (PM, 14.02.2002). At a more concrete level, a Political Elite article refers to Estonia's restricted possibilities in building an extensive network of foreign embassies (PM, 26.08.2003b; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 14.03.1998).

In sum, reference to reality as an argument that cannot be ignored is made both in the beginning as well as towards the end of the accession process. Those articles most present during the whole accession process are Cultural

Elite articles whereas the other three categories of articles are rather equally but not very strongly represented.

Since reality forms the main (f)actor of this sub-discourse, it also makes the role of all the other actors insignificant. In the first part of the sub-discourse, the EU is seen as part of the reality, and in the second part reality determines the limitations of Estonia. In different cases, reality is based on a variety of indicators: facts, natural laws, historical logic etc. Accordingly, on the basis of these indicators final conclusions about 'how things really are' are drawn in the articles.

Realize EU authority

The sub-discourse *Realize EU authority* can be divided into two parts, *have only hope* and *let the EU form practice*. In the first part, Estonia's (not too optimistic) expectations in relation to the EU are emphasized, in the second part the focus is the EU's impact. Both parts are based on the idea that Estonia, unlike the EU, is not in a position to define reality or influence developments. At the same time, unlike in the previous *accept reality* as Estonia's practice, here dissatisfaction is expressed about the situation.

Have only hope is based on an assumption that since Estonia is capable of neither managing alone in the world anarchy nor changing the situation, the best it can do is to hope. The hopes and expectations are targeted towards the EU, which is an actor implicitly or explicitly present in the examples. In the beginning of the accession process, a Journalist article claims that in relation to the EU, Estonia has nothing left but to hope (PM, 26.03.1997 and PM, 13.01.1997).

Some Journalist articles target the hopes towards more concrete actors, for instance the Schengen countries (PM, 03.12.1998). In connection with an attempt to get into the first round of the accession negotiations, the importance of certain powerful allies, like the USA and Great Britain, is emphasized and the article continues that the position of Estonia and the other Baltic countries is not absolutely hopeless: "With the help of [Bill - SKK] Clinton, [Tony - SKK] Blair can make miracles in Europe. Why not in the sphere of enlargement?"¹⁰⁰ (PM, 26.05.1997). The contradiction between the passive Estonia and the active countries is reflected also by wording: while Estonia's situation is not 'absolutely hopeless', the other party can 'make miracles'.

In most articles, however, the claim that the EU is the one capable of changing things does not create high expectations. The overall tone is skeptical and the situation portrayed as quite bleak. Towards the end of the accession process Estonia's hopes are connected to the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a tool for improving Estonia's positions

¹⁰⁰ Clintoni toel võib Blair Euroopas teha veel imesid. Miks mitte siis laienemise vallas?

in relation to Russia. A Journalist article writes that the case of the International Criminal Court shows clearly that it is too early for the EU to dream about the CFSP, and asks what happens then to Estonia's hopes (PM, 02.10.2002). Another article writes about the prognosis that the prices of goods and services will rise in connection with the EU membership, and continues: *we* cannot escape this unfair order and thus there is nothing to do but to hope that *we* could also get something good from the EU as compensation (Journalist article, PM, 22.01.2003). As the only theoretical option for Estonia, the article mentions 'escaping' but also admits that this is not applicable in practice.

Paradoxically, even though Estonia is admitted to have only hopes, in substantial terms the EU is not necessarily seen to be ahead of Estonia. On the contrary, in some Journalist articles Estonia is seen as more developed, efficient etc. than the EU. For instance, even though Estonia is seen to have better understanding of Russia's action than the EU does, the article does not indicate that Estonia could educate the EU but expresses implicit hope that the EU is capable of understanding it (PM, 11.01.1997). Another article writes that despite EU claims that the candidate countries should speed up their reforms, find the solutions to internal problems and develop their economy, the main difficulties are on the EU side, since the EU has not solved the main issues like a decision making process and a way of dividing the funding. Therefore, the article argues that Estonia has been left to wait and hope that the EU will implement its internal changes in the near future (PM, 27.10.1998a). The expressions like 'left to wait and hope' and 'near future' create an understanding of Estonia which would like to see the EU act quickly but does not necessarily dare to hope it will.

Another part of *Realize EU authority* is ***let the EU form practice*** that focuses on weakness of Estonia and strength of the EU (Journalist article, PM, 11.12.1997). For example in connection with the accession negotiations, Estonia's weak or non-existing influence is shown by referring to the EU's strong position and impact on various issues (Journalist article, PM, 17.12.1997b and Cultural Elite article, PM, 01.08.1997a). As a Political Elite article writes, especially in economic and social questions, Estonia can hardly bargain for extensive exceptions (PM, 31.10.1997a). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article claims that since the tariff union is the main basis of the EU's economic space, it is out of the question that Estonia could shake this (PM, 23.12.1997; see also Readers article, PM, 18.12.1997b).

At a more abstract level a Cultural Elite article writes that if Estonia had remained out of this enlargement wave, maybe *we* would have waited for the next one forever (PM, 21.07.1997), since the speed of the enlargement process and the amount of the countries accepted into this depend on the EU more than on Estonia (Journalist article, PM 07.01.1997; see also PM, 21.05.1997). The same idea is also communicated by Political Elite articles (PM, 05.04.1997; PM, 06.06.1997; PM, 16.06.1997; and PM, 29.11.1997b) and a Readers article that argues if the EU wants to receive *us* (PM, 22.07.1997).

Another Journalist article writes about the Intergovernmental Conference where the EU was expected to make the preparations for the enlargement, and states that since the EU is dancing a slow waltz at the moment, the deadline for the enlargement will be postponed in spite of *us* for two to three years (PM, 14.12.1998b). Since the Summit was held in Vienna, the article uses the analogy with dancing, referring not to the quick tempo of the Vienna waltz but the slow tempo of a slow waltz. At the same time a reference to the 'EU dance' shows as the EU having fun instead of dealing with serious issues¹⁰¹.

Apart from the accession process, Cultural Elite articles deal with the accession at a principal level as something Estonia cannot avoid or influence. For example, an article writes that as a matter of fact *we* do not have a choice, since the European Union (where *we* will go in any case) has set clear future directions in the Lisbon Summit (PM, 21.08.2003). Therefore, if Estonia's (or some other donor country's) referendum did not bring about the planned result, soon another one will be held (PM, 09.07.2003). All in all, even if Estonia did not join the EU, the accession of the other countries would cause quite a crash of meteors (*paraaja meteoriidimürtsu*), similar to *our own* accession (PM, 10.09.2003b) and the accession conditions do not improve but get worse in the next wave of enlargement (PM, 15.08.2002). Therefore, as a Political Elite article writes, Estonia will join the EU: not due to the wisdom of Estonia's EU officials but as a result of a political agreement, since several current members of the EU are organically interested in Estonia's membership (PM, 15.09.1998b).

Even though the above examples indicate the EU's impact and power to decide upon things, similar to *have only hope*, substantially the EU is not necessarily seen to be ahead of Estonia. In the beginning of the accession process, a Political Elite article writes about the EU officials whose incompetency answered the question why *we* still do not have visa freedom with the Schengen countries (PM, 15.09.1998b; see also Journalist article, PM, 03.02.1997b).

In some articles, a distinction is made on the basis of being 'political' like the EU and appealing to the 'objective criteria' in a form of closed paragraphs and progress reports, like Estonia. In the beginning of the accession process, a Political Elite article writes that if the opinion wins that the same countries should be called to the EU and NATO then despite *our* good economic indicators, *our* accession to the European Union among the first ones can become doubtful (PM, 20.03.1997b; see also Journalist article, PM, 03.06.1997). Similarly, towards the end of the accession process a Journalist

¹⁰¹ The idea about a 'slow' union is related to two parallel attempts of the EU, to deepen and widen the integration at the same time. When Estonia started the accession process, the Maastricht Treaty was valid. In 1999 it was followed by the Amsterdam Treaty (signed in 1997). However, at the same time the necessity of further institutional reforms of the EU and a change of the power-relations between the institutions was admitted.

article claims that the Irish *No* to the Treaty of Nice would mean a political catastrophe from the perspective of the enlargement despite the progress report (PM, 10.10.2002a; see also PM, 11.06.2002a).

In sum, most of the articles of this sub-discourse are published in the beginning of the accession process. Journalist articles are the most represented for the part of *have only hope* whereas Cultural Elite articles are the most represented for *let the EU form practice*. Readers articles are notable for their absence from this sub-discourse.

Since *Realize EU authority* is based on Estonia's interaction with the EU, the dominance of *let the EU form practice* in the beginning of the accession process indicates the same phenomenon as agency part in the discourse of *European Estonia*. In both cases, the EU agency in forming Estonia's practice is seen as legitimate. At the same time, unlike in *Accept EU authority*, it is not praised here but taken as something one is not capable of changing.

BECOMING HUMBLE

The scheme of *Becoming humble* follows the logic of *Being humble*: the sub-discourses *Should accept reality as own practice* and *Should realize EU authority* both challenge *Accept reality as own practice* and *Realize EU authority*. Both sub-discourses can be divided into four parts: two based on identification (what should be done) and two on recognition (failure to do something). One of the identification-recognition pairs focuses on the discursive level and the other pair on practice.

While in connection with accepting reality as *being*, the responsible actors were either missing from the texts or the responsibility was blurred, *Should accept reality as own practice* indicates that the EU should be taken as Estonia's reality, since no alternatives can be found. A Readers article writes: "I call all elderly people to vote for the EU since only if being there Estonia's youth will have a future in their homeland..."¹⁰² (PM, 18.08.2003). Otherwise the articles suggest Estonia should know *own* limits.

Accordingly, the recognition part as the failure to accept reality as Estonia's practice is based on the negative scenario of Estonia outside the EU. In Fairclough's (2006, 78-79) terms, as a discursive strategy the focus is on the future consequences of failure to act in the present. For example, a Cultural Elite article writes about the *No* vote:

The result would be very unfavorable for Estonia. Having a large number of Russia-minded people with Estonian passports among the

¹⁰² Kutsun üles kõiki vanemaid inimesi hääletama ELi poolt, sest vaid sinna kuuludes on eesti noortel tulevikku oma kodumaal...

*electorate, Estonia would at the same time remain outside the European Union.*¹⁰³

PM, 26.06.1998

The identification of the second sub-discourse, *Should realize EU authority*, focuses on the problems related to EU's superiority over Estonia. A Cultural Elite article writes: "In Estonia, agriculture is until now in vicious competition with our close neighbors (EU and Russia). As a result Estonia's most competitive industry is stalled and the rural life is ruined."¹⁰⁴ (PM, 17.10.1997).

Failure to realize EU authority as recognition is based on the negative scenario of Estonia inside the EU. A Readers article writes:

*Due to the salary that is tens of times smaller, specialists (for example doctors) and other enterprising youth leave the homeland and this trend will increase even more in relation to joining the EU.*¹⁰⁵

PM, 22.03.2003

Should accept reality as own practice

Should accept reality as own practice contains two parts, *should accept the EU as reality* and *should know own limits*. The first part indicates that instead of trying to find alternative solutions one **should accept the EU as reality**, since no proper alternatives can be found. Similar to *being*, the vocabulary uses words like 'regrettably' (*paraku*) and 'inevitably' (*paratamatu*), but also 'only way' (*ainus võimalus*) to emphasize determinism. As cultural Elite articles write, in the contemporary world the economy of any functioning country cannot stay in isolation in any circumstances (PM, 11.12.1998a) and concerning the accession to Europe it is clear that one has to go (PM, 14.08.2003c). Another article concludes that the only way to avoid the emergence of a provincial economically regressed state is to join the official Europe (PM, 15.07.1998).

Especially in the beginning of the accession process, one is urged to accept the fact that Estonia is moving towards the EU. For example a Political Elite article writes that since *we* move inevitably in the direction of the EU and the World Trade Organization (WTO) let's start using the means that are in

¹⁰³ Tulemuseks oleks Eesti jaoks äärmiselt ebasoodus. Omades valijaskonnas suurt hulka Venemaalmeelseid, kuid Eesti passi omavaid inimesi, jääks Eesti samas eemale Euroopa Liidust.

¹⁰⁴ Eestis on põllumajandus senini meie lähinaabrite (ELi ja Venemaa) kõlvatu konkurentsi meelevallas. Selle tulemusena suretatakse Eestis välja konkurentsivõimeline tootmisharu ja laostatakse maaelu.

¹⁰⁵ Kümneid kordi madalama töötasu tõttu lahkuvad kodumaalt spetsialistid (näiteks arstid) ja muidu hakkajad noored ning see tendents kasvab seoses euroliitu astumisega veelgi.

accordance to the demands of these organizations (PM, 27.11.1998). A Readers article claims that Estonia does not have any alternatives to the EU and NATO, organizations that are essential for keeping *our* independence (PM, 26.07.1997a). Another article states that against the events in Russia *I/we* believe that *we* really do not have an alternative but *we* have to speed up the negotiations with the European Union in all spheres (PM, 15.09.1998a). In the first two examples the EU is paralleled to the other organizations, WTO and NATO. This way all three are made part of the same reality Estonia should head towards. At the same time one distances itself from Russia, as mentioned in the last example.

Since the EU accession is seen to be tightly interlinked to the other spheres of life, articles claim that in connection with the decisions in the other fields, the accession process should be taken into account. For example, a Journalist article writes about abandoning the death penalty:

In the death penalty question Estonia has to take into account its wish to integrate into Europe: no alternative serious developmental scenario is offered by any accountable Estonia's politician.¹⁰⁶

PM 03.03.1998

The necessity of EU integration is emphasized by the argument that no serious politician has been able to figure out an alternative scenario. At the same time the article closes the case implicitly: if someone tries to offer an alternative, the focus turns from the idea to the author as the irresponsible one.

Apart from referring to the lack of numerous alternatives, the articles also emphasize that Estonia has 'two alternatives only' that are situated at the opposite extremes of both space and time¹⁰⁷. However, with two alternatives instead of one, no qualitative (or substantial) difference is brought to the solution. As Cultural Elite article writes the freedom of choice (*valikuvabadus*) is imaginary since *we* have regrettably a choice only between European Union and the grey zone (PM, 06.11.1998c; see also PM, 19.03.1998 and Political Elite article PM, 25.07.1997a). Also a Journalist article claims that Estonia has only two choices, not the third one of being proudly independent like Norway (PM, 12.07.1997b; PM, 26.06.2003; see also Political Elite article PM, 22.05.1998 and Cultural Elite articles, PM, 12.08.1997b and PM, 01.07.1998). Another article states on the basis of the novel *Rehepapp* (translated into Finnish as *Riihiukko*) by Andrus Kivirähk, a nationally recognized author, that if Estonia does not want to remain a particular kind of weirdo-land (*rehepapl*), *we* should go along with the other European countries (PM, 23.08.2003a).

Some articles state even more clearly that the only alternative to the EU membership is East/Russia/Commonwealth of Independent States and

¹⁰⁶ Eestis peab aga surmanuhtluse küsimuses arvestama soovi integreeruda Euroopaga - mõnda teist tõsiseltvõetavat arengustsenaariumi ei paku ükski arvestatav Eesti poliitik.

¹⁰⁷ Katri Vallaste (2013, 98) has referred to the same phenomenon as a usage of false dichotomy.

therefore the EU is the only choice one can take seriously (for example Readers articles PM, 16.08.2003a; PM, 18.08.2003 and Political Elite article PM, 23.11.1998). As Political Elite article claims, Estonia can choose between *Yes* (English) or *Nyet* (Russian): *I/we* am/are quite sure that this is regrettably just like that, since the globalizing world of the 21st century will not allow grey zones (PM, 11.07.2003b). Unlike in most of the articles concerning this part of the sub-discourse, this last example shows the agency responsible for the current situation: the globalizing world of the 21st century.

Another part of this sub-discourse, ***should know own limits*** emphasizes Estonia's particularity as determining factor that one is urged to realize and accept. Similar to *know own limits*, smallness is one factor emphasized in the articles. For instance a Cultural Elite article writes that Estonia can go to Eastern Asia only together with Europe and the United States: alone *we* are a piece of dust on the feet of Asian giants (PM, 04.07.1997). The expressions used, 'piece of dust' and 'giant', make Estonia's size rather clear. At the same time reference to 'dust' enables also substantial evaluation.

For a more concrete example, a Cultural Elite article writes that the decision makers have to acknowledge the boundaries of Estonia's possibilities and choices: with *our* 1.4 million population *we* form at the moment 0.37% and after couple of years 0.31% of the eating mouths and working hands of the EU (PM, 15.10.2002b; see also Journalist article, PM, 19.11.1998). Also, a Journalist article claims that it should not be expected that the EU with a population of 370 million, would know the local situation within Estonia, which has a population of a bit more than one million (PM, 29.08.2002; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 28.06.2003). Another Journalist article claims that Estonia is not a big country that could obstinately present its demands and complain that the European Union is some kind of mystical formation that it is difficult to understand (PM, 13.11.1997; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 06.08.2003a). Instead of just pointing out Estonia's smallness, the article denies that Estonia is a big country. At the same time a small country is actually seen to be more developed than the big ones which, due to their size, have an option to behave 'obstinately' like children.

In addition to small size, Estonia's location is depicted by the articles as a limit one should take into account (Readers article, PM, 02.07.2003a; see also Political Elite article PM, 25.07.1997a). For example, a Journalist article writes that Estonia's positions in Europe are not very strong: next-door to unstable Russia *we* still have to prove that taking Estonia into the European Union does not cause new problems (PM, 10.09.1998). In this example, however, location is not a fixed dimension. The term 'still' indicates the current state of order, not the status quo.

Similarly, the following examples indicating the limits are related to the current state of order. More concretely, Estonia's poverty and instability are urged to be accepted as limits. For instance a Journalist article writes that the GDP that is 50-60% of the EU's average is not yet a result that would enable

us to march at forefront (*rind ees*) among the other European states (PM, 18.07.1997c; see also Cultural Elite articles, PM, 20.05.1997; 01.07.1998 and PM, 25.10.2002a). Another Journalist article claims:

*Compared to Europe Estonia is so poor that for us joining the European Union is as important as was the Marshall aid for the Western Europe after the Second World War. Money should fix Estonia's interests to join the European Union.*¹⁰⁸

PM, 09.12.1997

A comparison of Estonia's current situation with the Marshall Plan gives an implicit hope of a brighter future. At the same time a message is sent to those who are against joining the EU: by rejecting the EU, Estonia is deemed to remain poor.

Towards the end of the accession process, the Cultural Elite articles and Political Elite articles refer to the instability that is related to Estonia's development. An article admits that Estonia's development has been faster than that of the EU but only because *we* have used the privileges without the duties of the EU and NATO (Cultural Elite article, PM, 13.09.2003c). One example is that in the sphere of free movement of citizens, an exception has been made for *us* (Political Elite article, PM, 26.08.2003a). Thus, a *Yes* vote means continuity of the current development and way of life, whereas a *No* means principal changes (Cultural Elite article, PM, 12.08.2003c; see also Political Elite article, PM, 19.08.2003b).

In sum, the necessity to accept reality as well as know own limits are rather equally presented in the articles both in the beginning as well as towards the end of the accession process. The most represented are Journalist articles and Cultural Elite articles.

Substantially both *should accept the EU as reality* and *should know own limits* deal with the impossibility of Estonia to exist outside the EU. The difference between two parts is made on the basis of focus: in case of a need to accept reality, the focus is on the EU (even though no interaction between the parties is depicted) whereas the need to know own limits is communicated by the examples that deal with Estonia's characteristic features.

The main action expected from Estonia is to acknowledge both own limits as well as the EU as Estonia's reality. All other possible actions (preparations for membership etc.) are seen as subordinate to this understanding. Therefore, no substantial change is expected to take place from *being* to *becoming* (both focus on the same reality and limits).

¹⁰⁸ Euroopaga võrreldes on Eesti aga nii vaene, et meile on ühinemine Euroopa Liiduga mitmeti sama oluline nagu oli Marshalli abi Teise maailmasõja järgsele Lääne-Euroopale. Raha peaks Eesti huvi ühineda Euroopa Liiduga paika panema.

Failure to accept reality as own practice

Similar to identification, *Failure to accept reality as own practice* contains of two parts, *failure to accept the EU as reality* and *failure to know own limits*. Both are based on the evaluation from Estonia's actors, not the EU feedback.

In the necessity to accept the EU as Estonia's reality, the inevitability of joining the EU was indicated. Therefore, the current part, ***failure to accept the EU as reality***, focuses on the negative scenarios for Estonia outside the EU. In these scenarios, Estonia is seen as a passive object that faces difficulties in various spheres of life. Apart from that the internal heterogeneity is depicted in some articles.

In the case of Estonia as a whole, scenarios are related to the developments inside the country as well as Estonia's position in the world context. As an example of internal development, a Cultural Elite article writes that if Estonia remained behind the EU's door, its everyday level Europeanisation would start taking place clearly faster and in a more barbarous way than until now (PM, 14.11.1998). Similar examples from variety of spheres can also be found in other Cultural Elite articles (PM, 21.07.1997; PM, 06.08.2003a and PM, 02.09.2003a).

Most of the examples that are related to Estonia's internal development deal with enterprise and agriculture (Political Elite article, PM, 19.08.2003b and Journalist article, PM, 23.08.2003a). For example, a Cultural Elite article writes, in case of a *No*, in October the hair of some entrepreneurs and statesmen will be even more grey and by Christmas most of *us* will complain; due to the decrease in Estonia's exports and investments a year after *No* Estonia will have 5000 to 7000 more unemployed people than now (PM, 08.07.2003; see also PM, 13.09.2003c).

Some articles present the scenario outside the EU in terms of natural forces. For example a Journalist article writes that entrepreneurs were sure that “[n]o would bring along cold winds to our economic environment”¹⁰⁹ as well as “[b]igger instability, harder economic conditions and smaller social guarantees.”¹¹⁰ (PM, 17.07.2003a). Another article states that if the loan holders cannot find additional guarantees, the same can happen in the real estate market that happened in 1997 in the stock market, the bubble bursts (PM, 14.08.2003a). In the examples above, various processes affect Estonia: conditions get hard, cold winds blow and bubbles burst. The unpleasant experience of standing outside in the cold wind is familiar to everybody but experiencing this as a future status quo situation is something no one would probably like to experience. Also the bursting bubble refers to the totality: it takes less than a second to burst a bubble and it is impossible to repair it.

Other similar examples personify Estonia as a tiger. A Journalist article writes that for a tiger that tries to move quickly up the development ladder would be a knock if one restricted its possibilities to move: at the time when

¹⁰⁹ "[e]i" tooks kaasa külmad tuuled meie majandusmaastikule.

¹¹⁰ [s]uuremat ebastabiilsust, karmimaid majandusolusid ning väiksemaid sotsiaalseid tagatiseid.

our Baltic partners hasten their growth in the conditions of the Euro green house (*eurokasvuhoone*), can the economic stand-still, achieved in adverse circumstances, seem like a recession that harms motivation and self-belief (PM, 17.07.2003a). The 'tiger' refers to an understanding of the economies of the Baltic countries as the 'Baltic tigers' (similar to the 'Asian tiger' economies). Here the term also indicates that Estonia cannot help its nature: if a wild animal is forced to stop or has to move backwards, it gets depressed (or its motivation and self-belief gets harmed) and probably dies. For emphasizing the violence of the process, the word 'knock' is used. At the same time the EU is seen as a greenhouse, a place where the plants – like the economies of Latvia and Lithuania, will blossom. Therefore, unlike Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are seen as floral and not wild animals.

The articles that deal with Estonia in the world context scenario outside the EU indicate that the country will have no impact, it will be forgotten and disappear from the international arena. As Political Elite article writes, by limiting *ourselves* to participation in the European economic space *we* would give up any possibility to decide upon things that will influence *us* all on a daily basis (PM, 12.07.2003a; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 06.08.1997). Another Political Elite article claims that Estonia will be left alone: *we* can only hope that somebody would say a necessary word for *us* (PM, 19.08.2003b; see also Readers article PM, 02.07.2003a and Cultural Elite article PM, 15.08.2003). As Readers articles write Estonia will stop existing for the EU (PM, 14.07.2003b) and it is seen even questionable if the Republic of Estonia is going to survive (PM, 25.08.2003b). Conclusively, if the referendum left *us* excluded from the EU, *our* independence would become even cheaper and more vulnerable (Cultural Elite article, PM, 04.07.2003c). Since the terms 'survive' and 'vulnerable' refer to actual threat and danger, they make also this decision look like a question of life and death.

In order to show the poor opportunities of existing in the world context outside the EU, some Readers articles use spatial and temporal indicators. More concretely, the claims about East and the West as well as center and periphery are based on spatial references whereas predicting the future on the basis of the past is temporal. One Readers article refers to the future location of Estonia by asking in whose interest is it *we* would remain languishing (*kiduma*) on the border of two worlds (PM, 05.08.2003c; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 11.07.2003c). The word 'languish' refers to living organism, most probably a plant that is neither dead nor alive. Another Readers article states: think how your kids will curse you after ten or twenty years, since you have led them away from the European main road, wilting (*tohletama*) on some incidental village road (*kõrvaline külatee*) (PM, 01.08.2003c). In this example, degeneration is symbolized by village roads whereas the main roads stand for development. This is emphasized even more with the word 'wilting', which is used to describe a particular condition of vegetables. This way, Estonia's future outside the EU is similar to old harvested vegetable.

In addition to spatial references, temporal ones are used to show a connection between past and future. For example a Cultural Elite article writes that if *No* wins in both Estonia and Latvia, *our* only possible ally would be Latvia, exactly like before the Second World War (PM, 14.08.2003d). A Readers article sees the camps of the Gulag as an alternative to the EU: “I still hope that Estonia’s people have enough sense to say *Yes*, then we do not meet up in the GULAG.”¹¹¹ (PM, 13.09.2003a). Here, by making a choice between *Yes* and *No*, one also decides if Estonia moves back to the past, the time of the Soviet terror when the GULAG still existed. Implicitly, this is also a reference to the East/West dichotomy, in which the GULAG is metonymic of the Soviet Union.

Similarly, a Political Elite article depicts a dilemma between the past and the future. However, in this case the past and the present is seen as one, since the article writes that if *we* stay outside the European Union, *we* might never get Estonia’s natural environment settled (*korda*) and would struggle with Soviet mentality in the agriculture sector for a long time yet (PM, 26.08.2003a). Both past and present are characterized by the Soviet mentality that one could get possibly rid of only in the EU future (even though it is not explicitly promised). At the same time, the status quo and the current condition approach alternate their positions: even though it is stated that one would ‘never’ get Estonia’s environment settled, in the end instead of eternity reference to ‘long time’ is made.

The examples above deal with Estonia as whole, whereas the following cases focus on internal heterogeneity. More concretely, outside the EU, the society is no more seen as one whole but fragmented and full of contradictions. In this spirit, a distinction is made between the potential losers, winners and those responsible for that development.

As potential losers, groups like farmers, other rural people and pensioners are referred to in separate examples. A Journalist article writes that the biggest loss would hit people who due to quitting their work places would lose their source of income and this would be a great loss for the rural areas (PM, 17.07.2003a). In relation to a lower taxation level and more liberal economic policy outside the EU, another article writes: those who are going to suffer from this are probably, again, both farmers and pensioners, since a tiger cannot just withstand the tariffs and large social benefits (Journalist article, PM, 05.07.2003b; see also Political Elite article, PM, 22.08.2003). Since Estonia is again personified as a tiger (also in PM, 17.07.2003a), the further development is no more dependent on the political priorities, choices and decisions, but a tiger’s nature.

Apart from the losers, the articles refer to the winners who, in the scenario of a *No*-referendum, distance themselves from the rest of the country as an inevitable reaction. For example, a Readers article writes that Estonia’s progressive youth have no reason to stay in Estonia, if Finland or Latvia who

¹¹¹ Loodan siiski, et eesti rahval jätkub mõistust öelda «jah», siis me ei kohtu GULAGis.

will also belong to the EU in the future, offer much better living and studying conditions (PM, 18.08.2003). Similarly a Political Elite article writes that if [the decision is to - SKK] not join the EU, Estonia's best youths will leave the country: of course they do not leave with their bare hands but take their capital along and invest it in other European countries. The article continues that this will cause a recession in Estonia that will lead us towards poverty and Estonia can slide into being akin to a developing country (PM, 22.08.2003). Even though in the last example the regression is caused by the loss of human and financial resources, neither the winners nor the losers are seen as responsible for the situation. Rather both sides are dealt with as victims who do not have a choice. Therefore, the individualist reaction is accepted as inevitability.

However, those who are seen as responsible for the negative scenario outside the EU are those who consider voting *No* in the referendum. A Journalist article writes:

Estonia's society is already full of /.../ division lines: urban-rural, Tallinn-other regions, young-old, educated-less educated, richer-poorer etc. Like the analysis of the Estonian Institute of Future Studies shows, in the case of No, confrontation between the so called ärapanijad and the groups of inhabitants who support the European Union accrues to the current tensions.¹¹²

PM, 23.08.2003a

Even though the opinion polls at the time indicated the presence of both *Yes* and *No* opinions in Estonia's society, the article writes about the tension between the *Yes-No* camps as something forthcoming. At the same time the *Yes*-camp is depicted as those who support the European Union whereas the *No*-camp is called *ärapanijad* on the basis of Estonia's popular TV program that deals with the current affairs from a humorous and ironic perspective. However, the program has also been criticized for spiteful overkills while making fun of the societal actors. Therefore calling the *No*-camp as *ärapanijad* shows their decision to vote against the EU as a nasty trick meant for irritating the rest of the society.

Similarly, a Political Elite article writes that in the case of *No*-scenario we have to admit honestly that Estonia is longing for the 'good old times' where the domicile was given for free and a worker's salary was at the same level as the director's salary. The article continues with the question, is it even necessary to take this mentality to the EU? (PM, 19.08.2003b). The example

¹¹² Eesti ühiskond on juba täis /.../ eraldusjooni - linn-maa, Tallinn - muud piirkonnad, noored-vanad, haritud-vähemharitud, jõukamad-vaesed jne. Nagu näitab tuleviku-uuringute instituudi analüüs, lisandub «ei» korral juba olemasolevatele pingetele n-ö ärapanijate ja Euroopa Liitu pooldavate elanikkonnagruppide vastuolu.

can also be understood as a provocative trap: for proving that if Estonia is actually good enough for the EU, *Yes* should be voted.

Another part of the recognition, *failure to know own limits*, is also based on the future prognosis outside the EU and is dated mostly to the time preceding the referendum. Most of the examples deal with economy and Estonia's position in the world. However, here the emphasis is not on the development of the country but the characteristic features that determine the future.

For example in connection with predicting remarkable growth of Estonia's risk rating and necrotic (dying) investment flows resulting from a *No*-scenario, a Journalist article writes: for a state that has a small market and a weak export industry this would be like reducing the air in lungs - it can move slowly but no longer quickly (PM, 17.07.2003a). Even though the article deals with economy, it characterizes the processes as if dealing with living organisms - necrosis of the investment flow refers to the death of cells. As a result, Estonia as a small and weak country can become seriously handicapped.

Size is also used as a factor in the arguments. A Readers article writes that Edgar Savisaar, as a philosopher and analyst of the global problems and leader of the Estonia's Center Party (*Eesti Keskerakond*), understands for sure that such a small country like Estonia which has a limited population and natural resources will sooner or later no longer have a place in the globalized world (PM, 09.08.2003c). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article points out Estonia's weakness as a factor that prevents the country's possibility of existing alone (PM, 17.09.1998).

Concerning Estonia's geopolitical location but also population as a determinant, a Readers article writes:

*Taking into account the geopolitical location of our country, national constitution of the population and the fact that big part of the non-Estonians have tight interaction with the Eastern neighboring country, it is quite logical that otherwise the focus of whole interaction inclines to this direction.*¹¹³

PM, 16.07.2003a; see also PM, 17.09.1998

While most of the recognition is based on Estonia's evaluation, some articles also take the EU perspective for showing Estonia's limits. A Cultural Elite article writes that in case of a *No*, Estonia could become the European fool (PM, 15.08.2003). Similarly, a Political Elite article writes that in the spirit of German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder most Europeans will probably think that Estonians are the last barbarians of Europe (PM, 19.08.2003b; see

¹¹³ Arvestades meie riigi geoliitilist asendit, elanikkonna rahvuslikku koosseisu ja fakti, et suurel osal mitte-eestlastest on tihe läbikäimine just idapoolse naaberriigiga, on vastasel juhul üsna loomulik ka kogu suhtlemise raskuskeskme kaldumine sinnapoole.

also PM, 12.08.1997b)¹¹⁴. Here, the question is not only about being profoundly different from Europe and Europeans but being the one and only one of a kind.

In sum, both *failure to accept the EU as reality* and *failure to know own limits* are based on the negative scenario outside the EU whereas the first part is clearly stronger than the second one. All categories of articles are rather equally represented in both sides and the focus of the sub-discourse is clearly towards the end of the accession process.

Concerning Estonia's limits, a certain sequence is followed through *being*, *becoming* and a *failure* to know the limits. In the case of *being*, Estonia's limits have been stated, whereas in the case of *becoming*, one argues about the necessity to take these into account and in the case of *failure* to know the limits, the consequences of ignoring those are presented. The same logic is also followed in accepting reality where the scenario outside the EU can be seen as a serious consequence of *failure*.

Conclusively, in both *failure*-parts the support towards Estonia's EU membership is expressed by showing the hopelessness of life outside the EU. At the same time no promises are given about the expected developments inside the EU. This way, instead of mapping the EU membership as a great success, the scenario outside the EU is shown as a clear drop from the current situation into a clearly worse one (see also Kaasik-Krogerus 2007).

Should realize EU authority

In this sub-discourse, identification contains *should not hope* and *should note problems with let the EU form practice*, both based on interaction and EU agency. As indicated already in *have only hope as being*, also ***should not hope*** as *becoming* is rather pessimistic. Therefore, the substantial difference between *being* and *becoming* is not a remarkable one: in case of *being* it is stated that hope is all we have whereas in the current part, it is warned that one should not hope at all (or too much).

The cleavage between *being* and *becoming* is based on previous experiences: in connection with *should not hope* the current situation is evaluated and the conclusion, that there is no reason to hope, are drawn on the basis of previous experiences. A Journalist article writes: there is no certainty that the promise given by Klaus Kinkel (German Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time) concerning visa freedom would hold true (PM, 12.05.1998b; see also Readers article, PM, 21.10.1997). Even though Kinkel had not broken his promise, one is still supposed to be suspicious just in case, presumably on the basis of previous experiences. Similarly, in connection with the agricultural sector, a Journalist article writes that there is probably no reason to hope such a great concession from the European Union that would allow candidate

¹¹⁴ Even though referring to Estonia's limits, this example is also based on the agency of the EU and can therefore be seen as a border case between two sub-discourses.

countries' quotas to be counted on the basis of the best years (PM, 19.04.2002; see also Journalist article, PM, 16.07.1998).

In some examples, the articles question the hope that things will get better in the EU. A Cultural Elite article writes that despite the stories about regional policy support to *our* counties that suffer from unemployment not too much hope should be put on the funding foundations of the EU (PM, 23.01.1998). Similarly, another article claims on the grounds of Estonia's experience that even though *we* are soon translated into couple of dozens languages, things are still dealt with as they are in the tavern at *Vargamäe*, where aristocrat converses with aristocrat and servant speaks servant [and none the twain will meet - SKK] (PM, 18.01.2003b). The article draws conclusions about the EU on the basis of Estonian writer's Anton Hansen Tammsaare's foundational novel "Truth and Justice" (*Tõde ja õigus*) and deals with Estonia implicitly as a 'servant'. Therefore, despite translating languages, one should not have too great substantial expectations.

While in connection with letting the EU form Estonia's practice, one adapted to that situation, in the *should*-part a shift from observing the situation to 'taking the EU personally' is made. The articles focus on the problems related to the process but also admit that Estonia is not capable of changing things. Therefore, instead of active resistance, ***should note problems with letting the EU form practice*** expresses criticism towards the EU's ignorance. For instance a Political Elite article writes that of the four free movements, goods, capital, services, and people, in relation to the free movement of capital it is not taken into account that Estonia's land reform is still incomplete; land owners live to great extent in the cities and farmers do not have any land (PM, 05.08.2002b). Similarly, a Journalist article writes that Estonia's milk farms and dairy industries should be in accordance to EU demands but their high levels of production should be consumed by *ourselves*, since Europe does not want to allow *us* to their market:

At the same time quite a big part of Estonia's population has low income and is not capable to buy high quality food, not talking about the green electricity that promises clean environment.¹¹⁵

PM, 09.03.2002a

In the last example, the practice formed by the EU is criticized due to two problems. First, the EU norms in one sector do not change the whole picture (high quality food does not increase people's income). Second, even though Estonia is made to follow EU norms, the EU still does not open its market to Estonia's high quality products.

¹¹⁵ Samas on suhteliselt suur hulk Eesti elanikkonnast madala sissetulekuga ega suuda kvaliteetset toitu osta, rääkimata puhast loodust lubavast rohelisest elektrist.

One sphere of criticism is the EU's guidance concerning the Estonia's relationships with both Russia and the country's Russian-speaking minority. A Cultural Elite article writes that with the initiative of the EU, Russia will probably achieve the goals in Estonia it has aimed at for the last ten years (PM, 07.11.2002; see also Political Elite article, PM, 17.11.1998a and Journalist article, PM, 20.12.1997). Similarly, a Political Elite article outlines a double trap: in the name of economic growth, foreign labor should be imported and for getting into the European Union one should give citizenship to foreigners born in Estonia. The article continues that these two factors together undermine the survival of Estonia as a nation state (PM, 05.12.1997a; see also PM, 21.07.1998 and Cultural Elite article, PM, 17.10.1997). Another Political Elite article comments on Estonia's attempts to capture Russia positively: by complying with the egoistic attempts of the West, Estonia can waste its sovereignty and make itself unacceptable to both the European Union and NATO (PM, 16.01.1997). Here, the term 'waste' refers to gambling as rather unsafe entertainment.

Conclusively, as a Journalist article writes, the EU's bureaucracy can soon start to harass actors in any economic sphere, the more often and deeper beneath the Brussels umbrella *we* shall crawl. The article also calls the EU 'a large Western neighbor' (PM, 24.12.1997a). In this example 'umbrella' indicates Estonia's wish that the EU would protect the country from negative experiences. At the same time, however, new problems are faced, since Estonia is not the only one under the umbrella. The term 'large Western neighbor' creates an analogy with 'large Eastern neighbor' – Russia. This way it is made clear that the price for protection might be rather high for Estonia.

In sum, as *becoming - should not hope* and *should note problems with letting the EU form practice* challenge the *being*-part by indicating that good expectations are not going to be fulfilled and the EU's guidance is problematic for Estonia¹¹⁶. All four categories of articles present arguments in this sub-discourse, although of note the Readers are the least represented. The articles appear at both the beginning as well as towards the end of the accession process. Compared to both *being* as well as the *failure*-part, the weakest representation occurs for *Should realize EU authority*.

Failure to realize EU authority

This recognition part focuses on *failure to hope* and *failure to let the EU form practice* that are both based on EU agency and the interaction with the EU. The evaluation, however, is given by Estonia's side.

In ***failure to hope***, it is Estonia's hopes that had been expressed at the discursive level and are now being betrayed in practice. The examples either

¹¹⁶ Similar problems are also pointed out in *Independent Estonia* discourse. However, there the admittance of the problems leads to a necessity to protect one's interests, whereas in the current case Estonia's possibilities to change the situation are not indicated.

point out betrayal or express dissatisfaction as a reaction to betrayal. For example a Political Elite article writes of betrayal that *we* hoped the EU treats small Estonia in a precious and equal manner but the negotiations have shown that this is not the case (PM, 12.08.2002). Similarly, a Journalist article writes the European Commission, which was deemed to be friend of Estonia, now finds that Latvia has developed the most and Estonia the least of the Baltic countries (PM, 12.10.1998). In the last example, a connection between friendship and the accession report is created. Therefore, the Commission's report that praises Latvia but not Estonia is taken as a sign of disloyalty.

Towards the end of the accession process, a Journalist article writes that the European Commission does not follow its own principle that every candidate country should be looked at individually on the basis of its achievements. The article continues that Commission broke this principle concerning the transition period for the free movement of people, and now a principle is broken even more rudely with the limitations of agricultural support (PM, 30.01.2002; see also PM 04.02.2002).

The examples above criticize first and foremost an act of betrayal whereas in some articles the focus is more on Estonia's indignation as a reaction to this act. This can be seen as passive resistance: even though Estonia is dissatisfied with the situation it is not in a position to effect any change. For instance, in the beginning of the accession negotiations a Journalist article writes:

Our leaders have said that Estonia wants to join the EU on the basis of objective political-economic achievements. In the name of that all EU's demands were punctually followed and one was trying to show itself as a fine small European state. Was it useless?¹¹⁷

PM, 18.03.1997

In relation to agreeing upon visa-freedom with the Nordic countries, one hoped that the same pattern was going to be followed by the whole European Union (Schengen region). Since it was not the case (at the time) a Journalist article writes that it is extra embarrassing, since although Estonia has been asked to the EU accession negotiations, *our* negotiators have to apply for a visa to travel to Brussels (PM, 02.10.1998a). In the current case, a double disappointment can be depicted: letting Estonia attend the accession negotiations created pointless expectations of visa freedom, and the visa freedom agreement with the Nordic countries did not lead to the same within the Schengen area.

Similarly, at the time when one waited for the EU's final decision about the countries with whom the accession negotiations would be started in 1998, a Journalist article writes that Estonia's government sadly follows how

¹¹⁷ Meie riigijuhid on öelnud, et Eesti tahab liitu astuda lähtudes objektiivsetest majanduspoliitilistest saavutustest. Selle nimel täideti punktuaalselt kõiki euroliidu nõudmisi ning püüti näidata end tubli Euroopa väikeriigina. Kas asjata?

European Union has started to dilute the accession process during Luxembourg's presidency. The article continues that it is especially depressing since Estonia is helpless¹¹⁸ (PM, 27.11.1997; see also PM, 27.10.1998a). The article uses the terms 'sadly' and 'depressing' to show Estonia's helpless position: despite dissatisfaction, the country is not capable of doing anything. Dealing with the accession process as a soup helps to understand that even though by diluting one can get more soup, taste and nutritional value suffer from that.

Towards the end of the accession process even stronger words are used to characterize Estonia's attitude towards EU's action. In connection with European Commission's proposal that candidate countries' would have only partial access to the community's agricultural foundations, Journalist article writes: it was not a long time ago when the candidate countries were shocked with the message that their citizens cannot move freely inside the borders of the European Union but have to settle with a transition period (PM, 30.01.2002). The same article comments on the lower than expected agricultural support for the new member countries as a painful blow to farmers who will now become victims of unfair competition, since it is easy for the EU farmers, who enjoy direct support, to flood the candidate countries' market with cheap products (PM, 30.01.2002). Even though the EU does not harm Estonia physically, expressions like 'blow' and 'shock' are used to emphasize this painful and unexpected experience. At the same time the EU farmers are seen as capable of 'flooding' the markets of candidate countries with cheap produce: their ability to cause conditions that are similar to natural disasters gives them an almost divine position.

The other part of the sub-discourse, *failure to let the EU form practice* deals with the EU membership as a negative scenario for Estonia. Therefore, it indicates an opposite of *failure to accept the EU as reality* that is based on a negative future scenario outside the EU. For example a Cultural Elite article refers to Estonia's weak position in the EU by writing that in the future Estonia will be shaken into the block of the Nordic countries of the EU (PM, 23.08.2003c; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 26.08.1997b). Another article points out that in the EU *we* can end up in a position that Central Asia had in the Soviet Union (Cultural Elite article, PM, 04.08.1997a).

Conclusions about Estonia's weak position in the EU are drawn also on the basis of the country's minor influence in the decision making process. For example a Journalist article writes that since Estonia has only 3 of the 87 votes in the Council of Ministers, one can imagine the country's possibilities to enforce its will in the future (PM, 15.05.1998). Also a Political Elite article

¹¹⁸ One characteristic feature of this article is also the attitude that the game has been lost already even though the final decision that was favorable for Estonia was made only a month later. The article writes that, for Estonia, the best solution would be if the Summit had accepted the Commission's proposal and the Commission had started the negotiations with six countries in the following year (PM, 27.11.1997).

claims that while Estonia can represent itself in EU institutions in decision making *we* could just be voted out, since most of the decisions that deal with the internal market are made with a two-thirds majority (PM, 29.05.1998a). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article writes that as a EU member Estonia remains a small shareholder whose possibilities to influence the processes are more than modest (PM, 17.09.1998; see also PM, 17.12.1997a).

In some articles, a future scenario in the EU is predicted on the basis of the historical experiences, just as it was done for the scenario outside the EU (Cultural Elite article, PM, 26.07.1997b). For example, a Readers article writes that the Soviet empire is about to be replaced by the EU Imperium, and now one plans to use the services of the political assistants or *politruks* (abbreviation from the Russian words) as done during the Soviet period (PM, 02.05.2003a). Another article states that if one was not able to collaborate in the Soviet Union to save the nation, it is not going to happen in the EU (PM, 02.06.2003c). Commenting on the claim that in the EU things will get better, a Cultural Elite article writes: *I/we* say that actually socialism will come back; *you* will see (PM, 24.10.1997).

A sphere that the articles were also concerned was the migrations of peoples; emigration and immigration. Articles write that as an EU member country, Estonia faces the threat of losing its human resources to the EU (Political Elite article, PM, 15.02.2003; Readers article, PM, 22.03.2003 and Cultural Elite articles, PM, 11.12.2002b; PM, 14.06.2003b and PM, 12.08.2003a). At the same time, immigration to Estonia is projected to increase (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 26.08.1997b and PM, 08.03.2003 and Readers article, PM, 03.09.2003a). As a Cultural Elite article writes, Estonia's weak and bizarre social protection system does not attract any of the EU's unemployed but in the future less competitive specialists as consultants, commissioners, controllers etc. will be smuggled here (PM, 23.01.1998).

Similar to the scenario outside the EU, various articles focus on economy. A Cultural Elite article states that the fee for European Union membership will take one milliard from the public sector (PM, 29.03.2003; see also PM, 16.04.2003c and PM, 26.07.1997b). Apart from that the regulations implemented in connection to the EU's membership make Estonia move backwards: current liberal economy gets strongly bridled (*saab tugevad päitsed pähe*) (Political Elite article, PM, 29.05.1998a). Also a Cultural Elite article writes that by choosing the European Union, *we* got an increasing interruption of the state to the economy (PM, 12.11.2003b; see also PM, 18.11.2002b and Journalist article, PM, 07.05.2003). Another Cultural Elite article claims that it is not easy to manage in the common market with all kinds of quotas and direct supports that 'regulate' the market (PM, 15.08.2002). At a more concrete level an article writes that Estonia's labor market is threatened to become over regulated (PM, 12.08.2003a; see also PM, 18.11.1997). Additionally the problem that salaries in Estonia's academic sector are not competitive is seen to deepen in the EU (PM, 15.10.2002a). Another article writes that the EU is about to destroy Estonia's herring culture with the

accession treaty (PM, 09.10.2002b; see also PM, 05.09.2002). In conclusion, a Cultural Elite article writes:

*Now, from close perspective, this dream-Europe looks rather like a boring administrative machinery that produces restrictions and bureaucracy. We still have to close a lot of rural shops and township pubs, install thousands of steel lavatories to the school cantinas to pass strict sanitary quarantine.*¹¹⁹

PM, 09.11.2002

Apart from that, increasing part of *our* limited labor force starts to redirect the income, laziness deepens and in the end nothing special happens despite the rose development plans (Cultural Elite article, PM, 12.11.2003b).

At a more abstract level, the same phenomena are described by a Cultural Elite article which claims the idea that Estonia and the EU will walk together towards the future arm-in-arm is an illusion (PM, 25.07.1998). In contrast, in the EU it is not possible to talk about thinking liberally like a free man (Political Elite article, PM, 31.10.1998a) but one has to walk the tight-rope (*käia mööda nõõri*) (Cultural Elite article, PM, 20.11.2003; see also PM, 15.06.2002a).

Towards the end of the accession process, Estonia's membership is also compared to colonization. Commenting on the ideas of Estonia's linguist Jüri Eintalu, a Journalist article writes: "As a result, formally Estonia might become an equal member of the European Union but this does not save us from intellectual colonization."¹²⁰ (PM, 09.02.2002).

Similarly, the idea of colonization is used by a Readers article arguing that it is time to understand that by joining the EU, Estonia will remain a wordless half colonial state on the periphery for a very long time (PM, 14.06.2003a). The current situation is also implicitly compared to the former colonial policy by a Cultural Elite article (PM, 14.08.2003c).

In sum, similar to *being* and the *should*-part, *failure to hope* is weaker than *failure to let the EU form practice*. Also like *have only hope (being)*, *failure to hope* is almost entirely communicated by Journalist articles. The absence of the other three categories of articles is in accordance with the general line: if one does not initially express hopes, they cannot be betrayed or the trust broken.

In *failure to let the EU form practice* a future vision inside the EU is presented. Both in the beginning as well as towards the end of the accession

¹¹⁹ Nüüd, lähedalt, paistab too unistuse-Euroopa pigem tüütu administratiivse masinavärgina, mis toodab piiranguid ja bürokraatiat. Meil tuleb veel sulgeda hulk maapoode ja alevikõrte, installeerida koolisööklatesse tuhandeid terasest kraanikausse, et rangest sanitaarkarantiinist läbi pääseda.

¹²⁰ Tulemuseks on, et vormiliselt võib Eestist küll saada Euroopa Liidu võrdõiguslik liige, kuid see ei päästa meid intellektuaalsest koloniseerimisest.

process the Cultural Elite articles are clearly the most represented. Timely articles can be found from towards the end of the accession process.

Failure to let the EU form practice presents a pessimistic future vision inside the EU and therefore indicates implicitly an idea that the current situation is better. However, at the same time, the superiority of the current situation is not explicitly praised. Also, a negative scenario inside the EU does not necessarily correlate to being against Estonia's membership. In most of the cases, the articles criticize certain developments inside the EU without drawing any conclusions that Estonia should stay out of the EU. This is also a clear difference compared to the negative scenario outside the EU where EU membership is indicated.

CONCLUSIONS OF HUMBLE ESTONIA

While irony was used in the discourse of *Independent Estonia* to criticize the country's humble attitude in front of the EU and urge to change that attitude, in *Humble Estonia* variety of expressions and comparisons are used to show Estonia's relative poverty. Besides this notion, the strength of both EU agency as well as reality in general are emphasized whereas Estonia's agency is rather weak. The country is seen as an observer which takes notes and sometimes criticizes but is not in a position to change anything despite dissatisfaction (lack of influence).

The attitude expressed towards the EU makes a difference between the two sub-discourses. In *Realize EU authority*, the EU is seen as an actor which decides and influences things. Estonia in turn is expected to change its attitude and get rid of unreasoned optimism and faulty expectations. In another sub-discourse *Accept reality as own practice* both abstract reality as well as own limitations are presented as factors that determine Estonia's fate. In this sub-discourse, the EU is not an actor but a circumstance, part of the inevitable reality ahead of Estonia. This way it does not make sense to look for the alternatives to the EU.

However, in the form of a referendum, Estonia is seen to have one major and extraordinary possibility to act. Mapping this as a truly special and exceptional case also means a great responsibility. In a 'once in a lifetime' case it is necessary to make the right decision. This one-time-only approach is characteristic of scenarios both inside as well as outside the EU. More concretely, after making a decision in the referendum, one can forget about Estonia's agency and simply accept whatever follows.

In order to argue either for or against the EU, various articles refer to both culture and language as being crucial to the existence of a small nation. Both joining the EU, as well as staying outside the EU, are claimed to be equally disastrous to language and culture. On one hand the dominance of major languages, especially English (but also French) inside the EU are seen as a potential threat to the small languages like Estonia's. On the other hand, the future of Estonian language is related to the position of Russian-speaking

minority and the Russian language in Estonia whether it is inside or outside the EU.

A lack of security is also admitted and debated in the articles. References are made to the hostile world and the necessity to admit to cold facts like Estonia's location beside Russia, as well as the historical experience of losing independence. The discussion is largely based on the dichotomies of the East and West as stable and fixed entities. This is accompanied by the idea that a small country has never many options to choose from.

Compared to the two previous discourses, *should be/become* is rather weakly represented in the current case whereas the *failure*-part is predominantly stronger than *should*-part (except in the case of own limits). This is in line with the overall dynamic of the discourse. Since hoping or accepting things do not necessarily have consequences in practice, the necessity of doing these might not be considered as too important. In the case of *failure*, however, one focuses on the practical consequences: negative future visions as potential consequences of current improper attitudes. This way, *failure* is used to point out the necessary corrections to current attitudes (in a form of 'or else...').

Time-wise, negative scenarios inside the EU are presented both in the beginning as well as towards the end of the accession process whereas the negative scenarios outside the EU are concentrated towards the end, just prior to the referendum (mostly in 2003). This can be seen as part of the general pro-EU position taken by *Postimees*.

Concerning the articles, a scenario outside the EU is equally present in the articles of all groups. The Political Elite articles emphasize the scenario inside the EU in the beginning of the accession process and the Readers in the end. More concretely, Readers almost lack as articles in 1997, no hopes and thus also no disappointment is presented in the letters to the editor. On the other hand the scenario inside the EU as fears and disappointment is clearly represented by Readers in 2002 and 2003. Thus, by the time the accession process had become more concrete the negative EU related scenarios had strengthened among the Readers and weakened among the Political Elite article.

5.4 CONCLUSIONS: REPRESENTATION OF ESTONIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY DISCOURSES

On the basis of this chapter, conclusions both about the discourses in *Postimees* as well as discourse of *Postimees* can be drawn. The first is based on the constitutivity of the discourses in the text level and being constituted by the sociocultural practice, whereas the second refers to the link between the text level and discourse practice in a form of intertextuality.

While Fairclough (1995, 55) writes that language use can be constitutive in conventional ways (reproducing and maintaining existing social identities,

relations and systems of knowledge) as well as creative ways (help to transform them), in the current analysis both conventional and creative ways can be found. In all three discourses, following the terminology of Fairclough (1995, 55) the creative way challenges conventional way of being constitutive; in the representation part of all three discourses, *becoming* is stronger than *being*. In *European Estonia* the *becoming*-part is mostly communicated through failure whereas in *Independent Estonia* where one does not lean on the EU norms, recognition is weaker than *should*-part.

In general, this struggle in all three discourses can be seen as sign of social and political tensions that indicate scope for change (Raik 2003, 37). At the more concrete level, in each discourse the necessity of *becoming* is based on the overall logic of the discourse. In *European Estonia* where EU authority is admired, a need to change Estonia and become similar to the EU is communicated. The main idea of *Independent Estonia* is to behave as an independent country by changing its actions. Here, however, no explicit reference to transforming into something else is made. In *Humble Estonia* the focus is on changing one's attitude towards the EU as the only aspect Estonia is capable of influencing. In all three cases, identity and action are tightly interlinked. The articles deal with different forms of action that are taken in this study as the basis of identity.

However, despite the challenge, the term 'creative' could also be questioned in the framework of the current study. Although *becoming* indicates change, it also points to concrete (mostly EU-given, in implicit or explicit ways) directions and gives guidance to what should be done without leaving much space for the 'free flow of creativity'. This is though in accordance with the character of formative moment (see Section 3.3). Analysis shows that instead of seeing this formative moment from the perspective of various possibilities, the question is about rational action during this window of opportunity.

This link indicates a constitutive relationship between the text level and sociocultural practice: texts are socio-culturally shaped and they simultaneously constitute to society (Fairclough 1995, 34). The strength of *becoming* in discourses is a way that the formative moment as sociocultural practice constitutes to discourses. At the same time, the openly normative discourses constitute to the disciplined understanding of the formative moment.

Even though the current research follows the logic of Billig (1995) in connection with banal stories of identity, it has not been directly applied here.

First, while Billig writes about *us*, I analyze the relationship between Estonia and the EU that is often explicitly mapped in the media texts as a relationship between *us* and the EU. Here *us* refers to state, nation, citizens but also different spheres of life (for example Estonia's education or agriculture). Therefore, the geographical division into local-regional-national community as *us* is one but not the only characteristic present in the media texts (see also Section 2.1).

At the same time, Estonia is not necessarily mapped as *us*. Some articles consciously distance themselves from ‘Estonia’ and criticize it heavily. A clear minority of the articles are also written by Estonians living abroad or foreigners living in Estonia.

Second, on the basis of the analysis, a distinction can be made between the articles that clearly focus on Estonia-EU relations and those where the EU is only mentioned. While asking about the relevance of the latter, in the spirit of Billig (1995) it can be claimed that the question is about ‘banal EU’ – something that is not necessarily paid attention to but if continuously used, still makes the EU part of the everyday practice.

Third, a banal communication of pro-EU attitude refers to the fact that only a few articles declare explicitly that one should vote for the EU. Implicit ways to communicate the same message are used much more often. A rather common setting in the articles is that negative developments and failures in society are ‘somebody’s fault’ and therefore followed by ambivalent inclusion (see Section 3.1 and Bishop and Jaworski 2003, 257, 261-262) whereas ‘all of us’ have contributed to the success. Needless to say that in the current case, developments in the EU accession process can be mapped as examples of this kind of success. As another example of banal support, articles position themselves substantially against but formally for the EU in a form of ‘*I/we* will vote for the EU even though *I/we* am/are not a Euro optimist(s)’. This also means that the general tone of the discussion is rather sceptical in the cases of all the discourses. Last but not least, the scenario outside the EU pointed out in *Humble Estonia* can be taken as an example where the setting between a ‘bad and worse options’ is made.

Although the analysis has focused on the struggle between, as well as inside, all three discourses, *European Estonia* is the most represented and also the most coherent. Throughout Estonia’s EU membership, this discourse has clearly become institutionalized (Estonia has ‘become European’). At the same time, for example, in *Humble Estonia* the situation is much more confusing since the potential consequences of this discourse at any point are not that clear cut.

On the basis of the second point, the discourse of *Postimees*, the link between the text level and actors (discourse practice) in a form of intertextuality between official and newspaper discourse can be drawn. Logically, Estonia’s official enlargement/integration discourse has been widely based on official documents. At the core of this discourse, Kristi Raik (2003, 114-115, 123-126) has depicted the documents produced by the European Commission which was outlining its position as a non-political expert. In this way, the European Commission reports have played a central role in the formulation of Estonia’s integration policy and therefore has had a power role in constructing Estonia’s political and societal realities (Raik 2003, 115, 128).

The current study shows a strong position of the official discourse in the discourse of *Postimees* especially in the beginning of the accession process

when the EU as actor was referred to as an authority (sometimes ‘political’ though instead of ‘objective’, see *Realize EU authority*)¹²¹. Also the topics dealt with in *Postimees* clearly repeated the processes taking place at the official arena (Estonia-EU relations). From the identity perspective, this means that the national identity is not just constructed in relation to the EU, in and by *Postimees*, but that the EU as an actor is allowed to take part of the identity construction process. Accordingly, the everyday level of ‘the common people’ remains in a rather illustrative role in the opinion articles.

However, this study shows also that while in the beginning of the accession process the EU as an agency was used in *Postimees* for reasoning necessary societal changes and the Political Elite were very much present as the articles indicate, by the end of the accession process a shift away from EU as an agency and the Political Elite can be depicted. In terms of power relations this means that in reproducing the official discourse, and the EU as an integral part, the discourse of *Postimees* was evolving during the accession process. Accordingly the voices of the Cultural Elite as well as the Readers strengthened while the voice of the Political Elite weakened.

In order to explain the change, parallels to the research of Kristi Raik can be drawn. Raik (2003) writes about a shift in Estonia’s public EU discussion from an existential to a pragmatic approach. She claims that it was further confirmed by the invitation to Estonia to start membership negotiations with NATO in 2002 which weakened the argument that EU membership is necessary for the country’s security (2003, 195-199).

However, the shift can also be linked to Estonia’s opinion polls at the time, since the polls showed that references to the EU authority in relation to societal reforms as well as EU accession as a project of the elite were both indicators behind the low public support towards EU accession (see Chapter 1). Therefore, it is possible to ask whether or not this shift was based on the conscious decision of *Postimees* to raise public support for Estonia’s EU accession.

¹²¹ Similar conclusions were also drawn by Kristi Raik (2003, 197) on the basis of analysing *Postimees* from 1995-2000.

6. RELATIONS AND IDENTITIES: ESTONIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY DISCOURSES

Apart from the relationship between Estonia and the EU as representation, relations and identities at the meta-level are analyzed in the articles of *Postimees* (see Figures 5.1-5.3). This part of the study is based on an interpersonal function of the language that in principle implicitly claims co-membership and solidarity between the paper and audience (Fairclough 1995, 71). In the context of representation, the issue is about the (re)action of *us* in relation to the EU as the Other whereas this chapter focuses on self-reflection of *us* and *our* understandings, (re)producing of subject positions in three discourses (see Section 3.1). Therefore, the analysis is focused on the social identities and relationships set up in the texts (Fairclough 1995, 5). Accordingly, the normativity is not related to EU's practice or agency (substance of the accession) but to the values and virtues appreciated in the society¹²². Since I, as an author, take the citizens' viewpoint in this section of the monograph, my own position is more normative and therefore also more visible than it was in the previous chapter.

Since Fairclough's discourse analysis does not provide a practical model for analyzing relations and identities, the current framework has been built in connection to the empirical analysis. The current study understands identities either as subject positions that are taken by articles or a way of mapping the other societal parties (those who are talked about and talked to). While own position is not explicitly named, mapping the other parties starts from naming: they can be called Eurosceptics, politicians, people etc. In the articles the explicit focus is either on the author of the article, those addressed in the texts or both, even though implicitly both sides are present.

Identities form the basis for reciprocal relations between the writers and those addressed in their articles. The tone used for addressing society in general or certain parties, varies from friendly to ironical and hostile. The aim of the articles, in the first case, is to integrate and include society, to show the common worries and duties. In the second case, the aim is to exclude the improper element from the common *us*. This process is an example of inclusion and exclusion/alienation for making a distinction between the 'proper' and 'improper' citizens (Fairclough 1995, 181; see also Section 3.1). For instance a Journalist article that deals with abandoning the death penalty, claims that the Estonian state already shares the European level of understanding that sooner or later the death penalty should be abandoned. The article continues that it might little by little spread also to the masses, to

¹²² At the same time though, the articles deal with the EU as well and some of them could be (and have been) analysed as part of both representation as well as relations and identities (for example Political Elite article, PM, 03.02.1998).

the conscience of the people who should after for a while become European citizens (PM, 18.03.1998a). Instead of citizens, the Journalist article talks about the masses, as anonymous and impersonal group of people. While the state officials understand what is going on the 'masses' are not that intelligent and therefore do not qualify as European citizens (yet).

In all three discourses, *European Estonia*, *Independent Estonia* and *Humble Estonia*, similar to representation, the notions of relations and identities can be divided into *being* and *becoming*, and thus accordingly *Being/Becoming informed*, *Being/Becoming rational* and *Being/Becoming realist*. The norms communicated by being informed, rational and realist are all based on a certain logic of understanding things, not the substance of realism or the rationality. Even though information is debated in some articles, the notions of *being* and *becoming* informed refers mostly to the logic of the linear communication model as the basis of being informed.

6.1 BEING AND BECOMING INFORMED: "IT IS A SIN TO SAVE UP FROM INFORMATION" (PM, 02.07.2003B)

In the representation part of *European Estonia* (where do *we* belong), the EU was seen as an authority whose guidance Estonia is supposed to follow without complaining whereas the current part, relations and identities (who *we* are) focuses on the ideal of being informed about the EU. Both sides of the discourse, representation as well as relations and identities are brought together in an example of a Political Elite article which writes that in addition to the technical problems there are nuances that one should also make oneself clear before joining the EU (PM, 03.02.1998). The article refers to the technical problems that should be solved before the accession (representation). In parallel the meta-level (relations and identities) can be depicted: it is necessary to make certain issues clear and become informed and aware of them.

BEING INFORMED OR UNINFORMED

In *Being informed* one either admits that people know a lot about the EU (Cultural Elite article, PM, 05.06.1998b) or they lack knowledge (Cultural Elite article, PM, 06.08.1998). Here, however, the lack of knowledge is presented as being acceptable and not as a shortcoming. Accordingly, no one is blamed.

Especially at the beginning of the accession process, it is admitted that nobody actually knows everything about the EU: it is not clear though what the act of joining the European Union gives *us*, since nobody talks about it and this leads to the real conclusions that nobody knows (Political Elite article, PM, 17.03.1997b). Another Political Elite article writes that the curious aspect of the forthcoming negotiations is that *we* do not know and cannot know at the

moment into which EU *we* will go (PM, 29.10.1998). Similarly, a Journalist article claims that *we* do not even know yet what the anthem of the new EU is or if it even exists (PM, 08.11.1998; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 16.09.1998).

Towards the end of the accession process a Cultural Elite article writes allegorically that *we* do not know if it is allowed to cough in the EU, since from *our* perspective joining the European Union under the current conditions is like jumping into the water in an unknown place (PM, 18.01.2003b). Even though the articles, and thus their authors by default, referred to above admit that nobody knows what the EU accession means in practice, the situation is accepted. With the term *us* everybody is also put into the same position and no specific groups are excluded.

Apart from the articles that deal with 'all of *us*', in some cases certain people are pointed out as those who lack knowledge. However, these people are understood and helped, not condemned for their ignorance (Cultural Elite article, PM, 25.10.1997). For example, a Readers article writes about the threatened rise of sugar and gas prices in connection with the EU accession that inevitably brings about rising prices of other goods and services, all of which makes people extremely nervous (PM, 16.07.2003a; see also PM, 30.07.2003). The connection made between the EU accession and the sugar and gas prices also means that the term 'people' refers to those who are worried about their difficult socioeconomic situation. A similar understanding of 'people' is also expressed in a Journalist article about the EU information day: "In places one is not as much against the Euro Union as against the unawareness that joining the EU brings about."¹²³ (PM, 11.04.1997; see also Political Elite article PM, 23.04.2003). The term 'places' used by the article is a rather exceptional way of talking about the people who live in small towns and villages.

Apart from knowing or not knowing, the articles also deal with understanding or not understanding things. A Cultural Elite article writes that on the basis of the research results one can draw the conclusion that at the personal level, Estonians have not yet clearly realized the potential positive changes that joining the EU infers (PM, 17.09.1998). An opposite view is expressed in another article on the basis of an opinion poll indicating that at least 60% of people think that Estonia gets direct benefits from the European integration process. Article contends that despite some hesitancy, most Estonians have quite a clear understanding that while joining the European Union, Estonia is more likely to win than lose (PM, 16.06.1998; see also Cultural Elite article PM, 12.07.2003b). Another example, a Political Elite article claims that probably more and more people have gone deep into the accession details and reached to the conviction that joining the European Union is a reasonable activity and those who have worked hard for this, have

¹²³ Kohtadel polda meelestatud niivõrd euoliidu vastu, kuivõrd teadmatuse vastu, mis sinna astumine kaasa toob.

done it well (PM, 13.12.2002). Therefore, the main issue is not related to the variety of opinions about the EU membership but correct understanding of things. Similarly, a Readers article praises the correct understanding in case of the politicians who have been active in connection with regaining Estonian independence like Lennart Meri, Siim Kallas, Marju Lauristin, Tunne Kelam etc. The article writes that they are clearly for joining the EU, since they understand that the EU secures *our* independence (PM, 12.07.2003c). Mapping the politicians as ‘those who helped to regain Estonian independence’ gives extra credit to their opinions also on the EU issue.

Conclusively, even though no openly normative statements are made in the *being*-part, implicitly the examples still contain a message to those different from *us*. Praising those who have understood things in a correct way means that the same goal is set for the rest as a precondition for being part of *us*. In the case of ‘people’, one understands and accepts their lack of knowledge but also lets the more informed groups know that their help is possibly needed in this situation.

SHOULD INFORM AND BE INFORMED: MODEL OF FIVE “W”

The logic of *Becoming informed* can be understood with the help of a transmission model as analytical tool. Instead of one single model, various models can be depicted (for example Fiske [1982]1990, 6-38), as a common feature, they all view the communication process as a linear one (from sender to the recipient) with the clear goal to get the message transmitted. From the various models, I use Harold Lasswell’s ‘five Ws’ for this study (Lasswell 1948). The Ws refer to ‘who’ says ‘what’ to ‘whom’ through ‘which channel’ with ‘what effect’. Except for the channel, the current analysis pays attention to all aspects of this model as well as the relationships between the aspects. In doing so I take the model as a tool for systematizing and analyzing the empirical data (similarly to the usage of the IR theories).

As in representation, normativity is expressed either by criticizing the current situation or stating normatively what should be done. Combining this distinction with Lasswell’s model would, however, make the whole picture rather complicated. Therefore, in this part, both criticism and statements of what should be done are dealt with together.

As an example of criticism, a Readers article writes that the accusation expressed in journalism to the Minister of Foreign Affairs as if he did not want to present *own* conditions in the negotiations, shows *our* scant knowledge about EU institutions as well as the principles of action (PM, 18.12.1997b; see also Political Elite article, PM, 27.01.2003). As a *should*-statement, a Readers article writes that the information guiding *us* towards the EU should give the rural people a clear and detailed picture of things they consider important (PM, 30.07.2003). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article claims that one has to know the whole Accession Treaty literally (PM, 04.01.2003; see also PM, 02.05.2003b) and a Journalist article states: *I/we* very much hope that

Estonians as an educated nation make the situation to themselves as clear as possible (PM, 08.10.1998b). Despite the open normativity common to all the articles, they each have a different target. In the first example, the article focuses on the content of the information whereas the latter emphasize a necessity to make things clear.

In the following analysis, distinctions are made between the four “W”s, even though the borders drawn between these are clearly analytical ones. For example, in relation to informing people, both the information as a message and the people as recipients can be analyzed, although we are not talking about the sender who is supposed to deliver the information. However, starting with the relationship between sender and recipient and moving on with the message and effect enables systematic analysis of the data from various aspects.

Sender and recipient: what is the difference between monologue and dialogue?

Despite the logic of linear communication, most of the articles urge society to have ‘debates’ or ‘discussions’ related to the EU (Cultural Elite article, PM, 12.08.1997b). A Political Elite article writes before the beginning of the accession negotiations that Estonia has to form clear positions and know its aims: this is the topic political forces should speak out about (*oma suud puhtaks rääkima*), thus later nobody could complain why it was not done in this way or that way (PM, 25.07.1997a; see also PM, 05.08.2002b). The same logic is used by a Journalist article which writes that conspiracy theories show that everything has not been sufficiently explained (*selgeks räägitud*) in Estonia (PM, 01.06.2002a). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article claims that issues with such importance should be always cleared by finding a solution (PM, 06.11.1998c) and reaching mutual understanding about things (PM, 04.09.2002).

Even though the examples above urge dialogue or debate, the focus is not on the process but the final result, reaching a conclusion and thus closing the case. Another common feature of the examples is the restrictions on participation: the claim that political forces should clear up issues indicates that the discussion is meant first and foremost for political decision makers.

In relation to the wider public, discussion is considered either necessary or futile. At the beginning of the accession process a Journalist article argues for the futility of discussion:

*Estonia does not need Euro discussion but Euro enlightenment, Euro information like one has used to call it in our state apparatus. In this sphere there is really a lot to do.*¹²⁴

PM, 11.09.1997a

With the term ‘enlightenment’, the article shows that qualitative change is needed before being able to even think about the discussion. In order to make the change possible one considers it necessary that a sufficient amount of information is initially sent to the recipients.

In a similar example a Cultural Elite article writes that since both EU officials as well as Estonian politicians have emphasized the importance of the debate, in their footsteps journalists have tried for several months already to desperately find the Eurosceptics for keeping at least some of the debate going (*vähegi vaidlusena üleval*) (PM, 24.12.1997c). Thus, the debate is not kept going due to its substantial importance but since some groups have considered it necessary. However, as a ‘desperate’ search for the Eurosceptics clearly shows, substantially this kind of debate does not offer any additional value.

In most cases, however, societal debate or discussion during the accession process is considered necessary (Readers article, PM, 18.12.1997b). For example, a Political Elite article calls for serious internal debate and discussion at a more advanced level and states that *we* have to move on from the rhetoric used dozen years ago as “federal state or the union of the states” (*liitriik või riikide liit*) (PM, 11.02.2002). Similarly, other Political Elite articles write that the wider public discussion concerning changes of constitution should be opened (PM, 22.01.2002a) and Estonians have to start discussing now, what role *we* are going to perform in Europe and how it is done (PM, 16.04.2003a)¹²⁵. Also a Journalist article points out critically that until now, no substantial debate has been held in society (PM, 13.08.2003d).

At the same time, the articles urging people to participate in the public discussion are rather exceptional (Political Elite articles, PM, 28.07.1998 and PM, 02.04.2002c). In most cases people are seen as an audience to whom the EU knowledge should be delivered in a form of a debate or a discussion. Therefore, in substantial means, the calls for debate or discussion do not necessarily differ much from the requests to inform people (a monologue). For example, a Readers article writes that the media should promote EU discussion, since half of Estonia’s population cannot use the Internet, many do not have a phone but the newspapers are published in every corner of Estonia and everybody reads them (PM, 27.08.2003; see also PM, 18.12.1997b).

¹²⁴ Eesti ei vaja mitte eurodiskussiooni, vaid pigem euroalgustust, euroinfot, nagu meie riigiaparaadis seda on harjutud kutsuma. Sellel alal on aga küll väga palju teha.

¹²⁵ Apart from that the EU is seen in some articles as a good reason to activate general societal debate. For example a Political Elite article writes that the future of the EU and Estonian position in it offer a good topic for a Prime Minister to talk about to the people (PM, 10.10.2002b; see also PM, 09.06.1997).

Another Readers article states that discussion should be open to explain the possibilities handicapped people have in the EU (PM, 28.07.2003). Even though the examples above emphasize the importance of discussion, people are still in a position of recipients: the issue is first and foremost about getting knowledge about the EU, not making oneself heard.

Before the accession referendum, active participation of one more group, various experts, is proclaimed by a Readers article (PM, 21.07.2003c). Similarly, a Journalist article writes that one task for the politicians, including the members of the parliament, is to participate in the debates of the European Union enlargement referendum, thus the people can make a reasonable choice after being aware of the benefit as well as any possible threats (PM, 31.03.2003).

Also substantially, a discussion is emphasized mostly in relation to those issues that come from the EU side, not those that arise domestically. For example, a Cultural Elite article writes that most of the people do not probably wish to give an unclear mandate for cutting their constitutional rights, but wish to know exactly what paragraphs of the constitution will be implemented on the basis of the EU norms (PM, 04.01.2003). Similarly, a Political Elite article writes that unfortunately the government has not considered it necessary to talk with the people and its representatives about what the key issues of Estonian development are (PM, 09.12.2002b). The terms 'people' and 'its representatives' might refer to the ordinary people and the opinion leaders. At the same time the 'representatives of the people' (*rahvaesindajad*) means members of the parliament. Therefore, the criticism is not necessarily targeted towards the lack of public discussion but the lack of discussion between the government and the opposition.

Conclusively, even though the articles urge for 'debate' and 'discussion' or criticize these for being limited and superficial (Cultural Elite article, PM, 23.01.2003), substantially the issue is rather about informing people as an audience of the decision makers. This way from the people's perspective, the term 'show' that can be followed would be a more precise definition (Readers article, PM, 15.07.1997a) At the time when two teams, for and against the EU, get ready for the debate, the rest of the people as an audience can sit back and follow how the community is imagined (about similar setting in Finland see Kivikuru 1996a, 395).

In substantial means the debates offered for the people are meant for delivering ready-made objective information to the audience. On the basis of these debates, people are supposed to learn the pluses and minuses of the EU membership. This way the individual aspect is rather excluded from the process, since the general basis for the decision making is supposed to be the same for everybody.

Sender and recipient: one should get informed for informing people

In the previous part the focus was on linear communication process between the sender and the recipient whereas here the roles and relationship between these two sides are analyzed. In general, the relationship is based on expectation that experts, like the political elite, take the responsibility for informing people. In some cases, however, as a starting point, politicians are urged to get informed (Cultural Elite article, PM, 24.12.1997c), since during the EU accession, competent people are needed (Cultural Elite article, PM, 11.11.2003). Similarly, it is stated that politicians have to make things substantially clear to themselves (Cultural Elite article, PM, 08.09.1997 and Political Elite article, PM, 12.08.2002) before they start to teach the others (Cultural Elite article, PM, 14.08.2003c).

In most articles, however, the necessity that politicians should make things clear to themselves is communicated by criticism that they are currently uninformed (for example Political Elite article, PM, 29.05.1997; Journalist article, PM, 20.02.2002; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 14.02.1997). For example a Journalist article writes about the discussion held in the parliament during the visit of Finnish high level foreign political actor Jaakko Iloniemi:

Raoul Üksvärav, with a probable attempt to refer to the bureaucracy and the decision making mechanisms was interested if Brussels really is like Moscow was once.

Juhan Aare, in turn was worried if Estonian language is going to survive in the European Union.¹²⁶

PM, 10.04.1997b

The article concludes that if the decision making of *Riigikogu* is based on this kind of level of awareness it is quite terrifying to think about the future (PM, 10.04.1997b). By this conclusion it is also made clear that stupid questions do exist and it is always better to avoid than to ask them.

Some articles take the position of a (not too sincere) therapist, (who pretends) to understand why politicians are uninformed. For example, a Political Elite article writes that Edgar Savisaar's superficial knowledge about European development is probably caused by his huge work load as the Mayor of Tallinn (PM, 11.07.2003b). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article claims that those who juggle with the coalition agreement budget numbers have probably forgotten about the impact of the EU accession on incoming taxes (PM, 01.04.2003).

Apart from politicians the other actors responsible for informing people are also criticized for not being informed. A Political Elite article writes that most

¹²⁶ Raoul Üksvärav tundis huvi, kas Brüssel on ikka nagu Moskva vanasti, tahtes ilmselt viidata bürokraatiale ja otsuste tegemise mehhanismidele.

Juhan Aare omakorda tundis muret, kas eesti keel ikka jääb Euroopa Liidus kestma.

of *our* members of parliament and businessmen not to mention journalists have not until now made themselves clear as to what the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) means in practice (PM, 31.10.1998a). Another article claims that even this part of the mental elite (*vaimueliit*) to whom the information is most accessible, has not understood European orientations (Political Elite article, PM, 10.03.1998 and Readers article, PM, 19.07.1997b).

Journalists are also amongst the uninformed (Political Elite article, PM, 07.12.1998). For instance a Cultural Elite article asks ironically: Cannot Estonia set its conditions in the negotiations with the European Union? Are not *we* able to let them know that *we* leave part of the European Union demands outstanding and from the 80 000 pages of the EU laws *we* will take over only the things *we* like? These discoveries have in recent weeks struck Estonian journalists¹²⁷ out of the blue (*välk selgest taevast*) (PM, 17.12.1997a). The article also uses an expression "the forces of the startled ones" (*jahmunute vägi*) to characterize the pathos of Estonian journalists who are struck (by surprise) by self-evident things.

However most of the articles treat politicians, and other leading societal groups who are above being criticized for being uninformed, as responsible for informing the general public. This accords with what Fairclough (1995, 4) has characterized as a relationship between authors and audience: those who know have a right to tell whereas the audience as receptive waits to be told. As the senders in the 5W model they are urged to inform rather passive people and criticized for not doing so.

The articles widely communicate the attitude that those who are more educated/experienced/know more, for example politicians (Readers article, PM, 09.02.1998) have to inform the uninformed ones (Political Elite articles, PM, 03.07.1997 and PM, 18.06.1997 and Cultural Elite article, PM, 29.07.1997). As Cultural Elite article writes the EU accession has been a priority of all Estonian governments [since 1991 - SKK] and therefore one should not be ashamed of this policy but to declare, protect and explain it forcefully (PM, 21.07.2003a; see also PM, 08.09.1997). Also the Cultural Elite articles emphasize the necessity to enlighten people in the EU issue (PM, 29.07.1997) and introduce the EU (PM, 24.12.1997c; see also PM, 04.08.1997a).

Similarly, Readers articles write that as a preparation for the EU it is necessary to tell people what difficulties Estonia has, to date, had in the United Nations (PM, 24.03.2003) and the possibility to use the phrase 'from one union to another' enforces the leaders to make extra careful distinction between the aspects that make the EU different from the Soviet Union (PM, 24.12.1997b). Therefore, the government has to read and translate into Estonian all the European Union legislative acts and present them to the people (Readers article, PM, 03.05.2003a), since it is government's duty to

¹²⁷ In Estonian, the target of criticism is "Eesti ajakirjandus", of what the direct translation would be "Estonian journalism".

give people enough knowledge what will bring the EU accession to the ordinary citizen (Political Elite article, PM, 23.08.1997).

In addition to politicians, other groups, for instance the cultural elite (Journalist article, PM, 14.07.2003a) are seen as responsible for, as well as entitled to, informing people. For instance a Readers article writes that before the referendum one would like to see in all Estonian papers absolutely objective analysis where all positive and negative phenomena in politics, economy and culture related to the European Union accession are listed (PM, 05.03.1997; see also PM, 27.08.2003). Journalist article claims that it is necessary to have more academic but interesting books about the EU that are not unintelligible to people (PM, 10.11.2003a; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 25.10.1997). Another article writes that in the countries where the referendum has been held already, practice has shown that sportsmen, actors, singers and other well-known people help to explain European Union to the people. The article continues that this has been done in a very simple way and also Estonia's campaign could be based on this (Journalist article, PM, 21.05.2003a). Therefore, being well known in one sphere of life is counted as an asset also in EU expertise.

Apart from urging actors to inform people, they are also criticized for not doing so (for example Cultural Elite article, PM, 01.03.2003). A Cultural Elite article writes about the era of minimalist outreach (PM, 21.07.2003a) and a Journalist article claims that the obscure moves of the Minister of European Affairs and the conferences with difficult names held in the conference halls of the capital city do not bring the EU thing closer to the people (PM, 11.09.1997a; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 25.10.1997). Similarly, a Readers article claims that nobody has explained the EU to the people: for *your* information, in the EU this kind of pluses and minuses are waiting for *us* (PM, 30.05.1997; see also Political Elite article, PM, 23.08.1997).

At a more concrete level, a Readers article indicates that the head of Estonian Center Party (*Eesti Keskerakond*) Edgar Savisaar is the one responsible for not giving information about the EU to the supporters of the party (PM, 13.08.2003b). Another Readers article writes that President's words that the EU is *our* first priority are not enough and also the yearly drawing and essay competitions do not give pupils an overview of reality (PM, 04.03.1998; see also Political Elite article, PM, 23.04.2002).

In the examples above that let the decision makers know their responsibility to inform people and explain things to them people are mostly implicitly mapped as passive recipients. In some cases, the inability of people to inform themselves is also clearly stated. For instance a Journalist article writes that at the time when parties compete through the mediation of the PR firms and waste several times more money for than it is used for the EU campaign, it would suddenly be too much to hope that an individual finds an answer to the issue oppressing her in her own head (PM, 06.08.2003b). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article outlines the ironic picture about the ideal 'common people' by using their first names only ("Leida" and "Ants") to whom

the current elitist EU campaign is targeted. The criticism is directed towards putative expectation that people are supposed to make things clear to themselves and convince themselves in the positive essence of the EU (PM, 21.07.2003a). Conclusively, one does not just have to make the accession treaty available for everybody but to discuss it comprehensively (Cultural Elite article, PM, 04.01.2003).

In addition to 'people' in general, certain groups are pointed out as those who should be informed or who have not been informed enough. For example in the Readers articles, rural people are mentioned as those who should be informed. An article expresses an indignation that one has not let the milk producers know what are the EU demands and thus, many do not dare to start renovation (PM, 06.01.1998b). Another article writes that since the inhabitants of the periphery are not as informed as those living in Tallinn, Tartu or Pärnu, those who do EU propaganda could travel more around Estonia, so that also the people in the smaller places would get more information (PM, 15.09.1998a; see also PM, 30.07.2003). In all these examples information about the EU is seen as background knowledge that is necessary to the people for a variety reasons.

Conclusively, a Cultural Elite article writes that Estonian voters, whose lowest intellectual entertainment are "The Bold and the Beautiful" and other programs of that kind, do not want to fidget in the net (*võrgus sipelda*) of for and against arguments for the EU, but gets angry when one demands such an effort (PM, 21.07.2003a). It is clear, though, that one cannot ask people to take the responsibility for them if they are like fish in the net: not too intellectual but get panicked or aggressive in front of too complicated tasks.

Even though the idea about passive people who are informed by various facets is a common way to understand communication process, some articles also question the model. In the case of the sender, it means that the role of politicians is diminished. In the context of the recipient the responsibility of the people is emphasized.

Sender: not "the only ones called upon" (PM, 21.05.2003a)

Despite the strong claim that as 'experts' politicians are responsible for informing people, the overall attitude towards the politicians as informants was ambivalent. Apart from admitting their expertise in the EU issue, politicians and their statements are also framed as indifferent (Journalist article, PM, 26.07.2003) or illegitimate. Another article writes that in the case information comes from an unpopular party, the information also becomes unpopular. Therefore, the article concludes, it is not good if the government will be responsible for delivering EU information (PM, 02.06.1997), since people identify the sins of Estonian politicians with the EU (PM, 19.08.2003a).

In addition to the biblical terms used above, criticism towards the politicians is expressed on a secular basis. A Political Elite article blames government for messing up things on purpose and seeing the referendum as a

game without rules (PM, 13.08.2003c). A Readers article writes in connection with the EU passports that *our own* politicians and officials have, previously and now, spoken a lot of humbug (*mesijuttu*) (PM, 02.05.2003c) and a Cultural Elite article expresses criticism that the accession referendum was connected to the party propaganda in a way that could have warned of the result (PM, 16.10.2003). A Journalist article also writes about the hypocrisy of politicians (PM, 14.07.2003a).

In some examples criticism is directed towards political hassle and the conflict of politicians (Political Elite article, PM, 08.03.2002b). A Journalist article describes the atmosphere of general rivalry and cockfighting in which the European Union accession negotiations were turned in its decisive moment into a battlefield of the interested parties (PM, 14.08.2003a). Similarly, a reference about the front line between the for and against side is made by a Cultural Elite article (PM, 08.09.1997). Another article states that mistakenly, the enlargement issue has been turned into the battleground of the parties, even though less than ten percent of the society belongs to them (PM, 13.08.2003d). On the basis of their membership, the article depicts the parties as minor actors of the society and thus implicitly also questions the position they have from the perspective of representative democracy.

Conclusively, a Journalist article writes, it is better if the party politicians, especially those who people remember from their hypocrisy in previous times, would not take too brave a bow (*eriti uljaid poognaid*) on the stage of the EU-dance but give the experts and commoners (*lihtinimestel*) a possibility to discuss the wins and losses that the accession brings about (PM, 14.07.2003a). Reference to the dance makes politicians' action in connection with the EU as something that might look nice but does not have any substantial value comparable to the discussion of experts and ordinary people. At the same time the terms 'experts' and 'commoners' used for mapping the parties give a picture of rather imbalanced communication process where, to the latter, at least implicitly recipient's position is reserved.

Recipient: guilty of being uninformed or too informed

Unlike in the previous cases that emphasized the necessity to inform people, here the ideal is based on an assumption that people are responsible for making things clear to themselves (Cultural Elite article, PM, 04.07.2003c and PM, 12.07.2003b). A Political Elite article writes, everybody should follow what is going on in the EU Summit, since the decisions made there affect everyone in Estonia (PM, 20.06.2003a) and it is important to know *our* rights as citizens in the legal space of Europe (PM, 11.02.2002; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 02.05.2003b). As a result of the EU discussion every Estonian could define why and how is the EU accession useful or harmful not only to Estonia but also to themselves and what are the consequences it will bring about (Cultural Elite article, PM, 06.08.1997; see also Political Elite article, 18.05.1998).

At the same time, responsibility is used as an exclusion mechanism to take a distance from the people. For example, a Cultural Elite article criticizes those who live in history without any knowledge about the current time: some live in the year 1979, others in 1939. The article continues that it is none of their business that meanwhile the world and Europe have changed remarkably (PM, 01.08.2003d). Similarly, a Journalist article confronts itself to those who complain about information:

At the moment, it is popular to yammer that Euro propaganda kills. At the same time, in case of not having Euro propaganda, one could complain why media and the government do not inform the people. It is always possible to moan.

To crown it all, it seems that in the background of the information campaign people are still not informed about the European Union.¹²⁸

PM, 06.08.2003b

The example above criticizes people for two things: continuous complaints about the delivery of information as well as lacking EU knowledge. By the term 'it is popular...' the criticism of EU propaganda is shown as fashionable attitude, not a substantial position. At the same time complaining is seen as a vital condition of the people who are labelled as uninformed. The article also uses 'information' and 'propaganda' as synonyms. However, a distinction is made between *Postimees* which understands the value of the EU information and the people who call EU information 'propaganda' for underestimating its value (see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 11.12.2002b and Political Elite article, PM, 23.08.1997).

The most criticized people, who are also urged to clarify things to them are those against Estonia's EU accession. Also those who have not decided yet are urged to gather information (Readers article, PM, 04.08.2003). The ones against the EU are either criticized for being uninformed and not knowing what is going on (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 01.06.1998 and PM, 21.07.1997) or misunderstanding things (Readers article, PM, 27.04.1998 and Cultural Elite article, PM, 19.07.2003a). A Readers article writes that at the moment it seems that half of the schoolchildren are Euro optimists and half Euro pessimists whereas the latter suffer from lack of information, since they do not bother (*viitsi*) to look for it from the media (PM, 04.03.1998). With the term 'suffer from' being 'Euro pessimist' is indicated as a not too comfortable position. However, the claim that those who suffer still do not bother to look for information, shows that apart from being ignorant, they are also lazy.

¹²⁸ Popp on praegu haliseda selle üle, kuidas europropaganda tapab. Samas saaks europropaganda puudumisel hädaldada selle üle, miks ajakirjandus ja valitsus inimesi ei teavita. Viriseda saab alati.

Kõigele krooniks tundub, et teavitamiskampaania taustal ei ole inimesed Euroopa Liidust ikka informeeritud.

In addition to criticizing unawareness, those against EU are also urged to find out about things. A Cultural Elite article writes that before getting into polemics, they should make the subject they polemicize about clear to themselves (PM, 06.08.1997). Similarly, a Journalist article claims that what Eurosceptics should learn from the Danes' EU debates is that stubborn thinking can give good results only if one is capable of counting (PM, 29.05.1998b). Another article states that it would be instructive to read once more this part of the state leaders' statement that predicts what happens if *we* do not join the European Union (PM, 26.06.2003). Also a Readers article writes that before making their decision all those who are against the EU should get to know the (near) history of Estonia and its neighboring countries especially in the Russian context as profoundly as possible (PM, 02.07.2003a).

Apart from urging people to get informed some articles question how uninformed people can participate in the referendum. For example, a Readers article asks how can one decide without knowing slightest bit about the legislative acts valid in the EU and continues that only after general exploration of the EU information people could have their say in the referendum (PM, 03.05.2003a). Also Political Elite articles claim that in the current situation it does not make any sense to organize a referendum (PM, 17.07.1997 and PM, 21.08.1997b).

Paradoxically, in parallel to criticizing people for the lack of information and urging them to get informed it is also claimed that one should not ask for too much information. A Cultural Elite article writes that it seems that people have an unfettered wish to get more explanations and the attitude of the askers (*pärijad*) is especially interesting, since if one answers their questions, immediately twice as many new questions and askers (*küsijaid*) emerge (PM, 22.06.1998; see also PM, 12.08.1997b). Similarly, a Journalist article uses an expression 'curiosity killed a cat' to show the absurdness of the claim that one should know everything about the European Union before joining it, since it is impossible to know everything about the EU. Apart from the impossible, a wish to know everything is also claimed to be deadly dangerous by the article and therefore *we* have to be curious but not too curious (PM 13.11.1997).

The argument that one does not have to be too informed is also illustrated by the examples of everyday life. As Journalist article writes: just as not every high school graduate has to take a baccalaureate in mathematics, not every Estonian has to pass profound EU training (PM, 05.06.1998a). Mathematics has an image as a rather difficult and demanding discipline that some people are incapable of understanding. Thus, implicitly, the example makes a difference between the clever and dim people. At the same time one of the main arguments against having a final examination in mathematics is the claim that most of the people do not need it in their future life. Therefore, by comparing EU training to mathematics, the first is shown as passive theoretical knowledge, not something one could use in everyday life.

The same article also claims that for being able to roast potatoes at home, one does not need Peeter Kard's cookbook. Here, the article refers to an

Estonian actor who is also known as an amateur chef and author of cook books. Again a difference is made between the simple 'kitchen tasks' like roasting potatoes, meant for everybody and the more demanding issues (like writing cook books or dealing with the EU) that most people do not have to worry about.

A Political Elite article uses similar logic when comparing the EU referendum to buying a washing machine. The article writes that instead of testing the machine in the store, it is normal to trust the expert information got from the shop assistants. The article calls for the same pattern for the issue of the EU: in a way it is presumed that all who vote have to read a treaty of 6000 pages and for being able to understand this they have passed voluminous courses of economics, law, European history etc. Until this has been completed, one can keep saying that people are not informed enough (PM, 12.08.2003b). Comparing the EU accession to buying a washing machine equates referendum to a rather trivial everyday decision, like whether to prefer Siemens or Bosch. In order to help people to decide experts, who are capable of providing objective information about the pluses and minuses, are listened to. This way the decision whether or not to join the EU, is supposed to be based on technical data and pure facts¹²⁹.

Conclusively, explicitly or implicitly, the necessity to find out about the EU issues or a criticism of doing or not doing that is at large targeted towards those who are against the EU. The claims that people should get informed before participating in the debates or keep quiet, since they do not know enough are based on the logic that knowledge about the EU would probably change critical attitude into more positive direction. At the same time those who complain about lack of information and knowledge are urged to trust the experts and focus on their everyday life where the detailed EU knowledge is not needed.

Effect: informed people vote Yes or ... Yes¹³⁰

At the theoretical level, the most important element of the linear communication model is the effect aimed at by the sender. In the current case, the expected effect is very much related to the support towards Estonian EU membership. As Journalist article writes, the information and explanations concerning the EU are supposed to help to block the claims as if the European Union was a project of the rich guys (*rikkurid*), the 'first Estonia'¹³¹(PM,

¹²⁹ Similar observations are also made by a Cultural Elite article in an answer to this article (PM, 16.08.2003b).

¹³⁰ Informing people better about the EU as the main 'solution' offered in the articles to reduce Euroscepticism is pointed out also by Vallaste (2013, 119, 189).

¹³¹ The term "first Estonia" was launched in 2002 in the public letter of social scientists (see Aarelaid, Berg, et al., PM, 23.04.2001) who were worried about the cleavages of society and the division between the minority getting along and not caring about the majority, the losers called "second/other Estonia" by the authors. The idea that Estonian society is divided into 'winners' and 'losers' has been cultivated also

21.05.2003a) and enable people to make a right decision in the referendum (Readers article, PM, 30.05.1997 and Cultural Elite article, PM, 12.08.1997b). A Cultural Elite article claims that despite the current low EU support the situation could still be saved if one explained Estonians that the European Union would become a factor that increases Estonian security (PM, 26.06.1998). After the end of the accession negotiations a Journalist article emphasizes the need to explain to people the benefits behind the numbers achieved at the Copenhagen Summit and their influence on people's wallets (Journalist article, PM, 11.12.2002a).

Despite the goal of getting a *Yes* from the people in the referendum, the articles do not necessarily talk to the people but to those who are considered to be capable of and responsible for influencing people, like politicians (Readers article, PM, 18.07.1997a) or the politicians and officials in government (Cultural Elite article, PM, 17.09.1998 and Journalist article, PM, 11.09.1997a). Government's current measurements are also criticized (Cultural Elite article, PM, 21.07.2003a) and for improving the situation, all means are seen to be necessary for the ultimate outcome - *Yes* - in the accession referendum:

*The government has to try even harder to explain people the conditions achieved in the negotiations. Otherwise the stories about politicians' self-sufficient Brussels-project remain strong and there is no hope to get the Yes-word in the referendum held in September.*¹³²

Journalist article, PM, 14.12.2002

Similar examples are also in a Readers article (PM, 04.03.1998) and a Cultural Elite article (PM, 19.07.2003a).

Conclusively, *we* get the answer when people have understood that accession is useful for *us* and does not harm *our* national interests (Political Elite article, PM, 23.08.1997). Similarly, in the context of the necessity of people to be aware but not too aware of the EU, a vicious circle is formed: even though one has to ask for people's opinion, it should not be done before they are sufficiently informed to be able to give the right answer. Thus, the referendum is supposed to be an event where the actual, major, work gets sealed not ruined. Implicitly, the setting leaves two options: either behave and vote *Yes* or take a role of an ignorant ingrate.

by the other scholars. For example, according to Peeter Vihalemm (2003, 590) the "losers" included people who had participated in the restoration of an independent Estonia like intellectuals, the older generation, survivors of Stalinist repressions and people in the villages and small towns. For personal reasons they also opposed rapid changes.

¹³² Seda enam peab valitsus nüüd pingutama, et selgitada rahvale läbirääkimistel saavutatud tingimusi. Vastasel korral jäävad endiselt tugevaks jutud poliitikute omakasupüüdlisest Brüsseli-projektist ning euroreferendumil septembris pole rahvalt jah-sõna loota.

Message: From information to explanations – no secrets, lies and propaganda!

On the basis of the 5 Ws transmission model, the message is supposed to be identical in the phase of sending and receiving. In the case this is not so, the claim is that noise has disturbed the communication process, not for example, that the recipient might interpret the same information differently.

The articles see the ideal message as true (Journalist article, PM, 11.09.1997a), objective and providing impartial information (Cultural Elite article, PM, 29.07.1997 and Political Elite article, PM, 23.08.1997). The idea is in accordance to reality (Cultural Elite article, PM, 06.08.1997 and Readers article, PM, 24.07.2003a) and based on the arguments one can take seriously (Cultural Elite article, PM, 10.08.1998). The Cultural Elite article writes that apart from the arguments that have become trivial it would be suitable to look for new claims and explanations where and why *we* will go (PM, 15.07.1998). Apart from that, concrete research is needed to find out about things (Cultural Elite article, PM, 10.08.1998). The articles also emphasize the importance of clarity and clear answers (Political Elite article, PM, 15.07.2002; Readers article, PM, 27.08.2003 and Cultural Elite article, PM, 12.07.2003b).

At the same time a difference is made between proper and improper information, numbers versus verbiage (*sõnamulin*), as explained by a Readers article (PM, 03.07.2003b; see also Political Elite articles PM, 10.03.1998 and PM, 19.08.2003b). Improper information is framed on the basis of qualitative and quantitative means. An example of the former is wrong information, and of the latter, a shortage or an overload of the information.

The articles critique telling lies, half-truths, hiding the truth or transmitting propaganda as wrong information. For example, a Political Elite article criticizes the Estonian Reform Party (*Eesti Reformierakond*) for re-explaining the words of the highest agricultural official Franz Fischler on the basis of *own* taste (PM, 04.08.1997b). Also a Cultural Elite article writes that the claim that the rise of excise (*aktsiisid*) has been set by the EU directives, is nothing but pulling the wool over our eyes (*puru silma ajamine*) (PM, 30.03.1998).

Towards the end of the accession process, criticism towards telling lies about Estonia's future in the EU is expressed (Cultural Elite article, PM, 02.05.2003b; Readers articles, PM, 25.07.2003b and PM, 02.06.2003c and Political Elite article PM, 09.08.2003b). Another Readers article comments on the claim that Estonia becomes more independent in the EU by asking why people are told lies and no real nature of the EU has been explained? (PM, 24.07.2003c; see also Readers article, PM, 01.09.2003 and Cultural Elite article, PM, 14.08.2003c).

The articles particularly criticized attempts by politicians to reason their actions with the demands of the EU (Readers article, PM, 10.12.1998). As Political Elite articles write the incompetent reasoning of the decisions that are either unpopular or even harmful to Estonian development with the demands of the European Union is a conceptual failure and anti-propaganda to the EU (PM, 16.12.1997; see also PM, 09.06.1998; PM, 21.07.1998 and PM,

10.02.1998; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 15.09.2003). Another Political Elite article raises the same issue in connection with officials and writes that for some of them the European Union seems to be a comfortable shadow for hiding suspicious initiatives (PM, 02.04.1997).

As an example of half-truth a Readers article writes that people think what *we* are going to get from the EU but nothing is told about what *we* ourselves have to give back (PM, 17.12.1997c). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article expresses astonishment about the debates where the basic concept of the EU, peace, is forgotten (PM, 02.09.2003b). A Journalist article, in turn, writes that negative information concerning Estonia's accession process tends not to spread (PM, 10.04.1997a) and a Cultural Elite article claims that in the shadow of the pseudo discussions, the real mechanisms of the negotiations are quietly decided upon (PM, 24.12.1997c; see also PM, 05.09.2003 and Political Elite article, PM, 16.04.1998). Another Journalist article states that in the internal circle of politicians, one tells how things really are whereas for the people the idyllic (*roosamanna*) version is given (PM, 04.07.2003a; see also Cultural Elite articles, PM, 25.10.1997 and PM, 04.09.2002). In the last example, the article confronts the dessert that looks nice and tastes good to the truth that is supposed to be the opposite.

Apart from half-truths, incomprehensive information is criticized. For example, a Journalist article condemns an unclear picture given about the agricultural sector in relation to the EU (PM, 17.04.2002) and a Cultural Elite article criticizes the Estonian Center Party (*Eesti Keskerakond*) for not offering a clear vision about Estonia outside the EU (PM, 12.08.2003c). In addition Cultural Elite articles criticize declarative slogans and arguments (PM, 04.08.1997a), contradictory claims (PM, 23.01.2003), Yes-biased information (PM, 15.01.2003b) and black and white arguments in connection with the referendum (PM, 12.08.2003a).

One way to show that certain information is not good enough is to call it 'propaganda' (Journalist article, PM, 04.06.1997; Cultural Elite articles, PM, 06.08.1997; PM, 23.07.2003 and PM, 09.08.2003a and Political Elite article, PM, 17.05.1997). Even though in some articles a distinction is made between good and poor quality propaganda (Journalist article, PM, 01.08.2003a), in most cases the propaganda is mapped on the basis of its poor quality (Cultural Elite article, PM, 10.09.2003b). For example a Readers article writes that the propaganda of those who are against the EU try to convince the voter that there will be no benefits but all kind of restrictions, prices will rise and salaries will be cut in the EU (PM, 02.07.2003a). Similarly, a Political Elite article states that *we* do not need any kind of stupid EU propaganda, no unreasoned claims about the rise of income and pensions waiting ahead (PM, 09.08.2003b).

Apart from showing propaganda as useless, it was also depicted as harmful. For example a Cultural Elite article writes that possibly due to the shortage of the objective information, the attitude of the rural people towards the EU is predominantly irrelevant, since anyone who has grown up during the Soviet

period does not probably take the cheap propaganda booklets seriously (PM, 26.08.1997b).

As a second basis of criticism, the articles deal with quantitative means in a form of overload or shortage of information. Cultural Elite articles write about the shortage of information concerning the actual negotiation process (PM, 16.06.1998) and point out that the multitude of articles about a certain issue does not show yet that anyone actually knows the topic: if ten fools teach each other, this does not mean that they all become wiser (PM, 06.08.1997). The last example confronts the qualitative and quantitative side by indicating that if they are not in accordance with each other, quality matters. For characterizing information overload, a Journalist article writes that there is too much information about the EU and it is difficult to orientate what is important and what is not (PM, 08.03.2002a), since the EU is urged on with all possible methods (Readers article, PM, 08.09.2003).

Towards the end of the accession process, a shift from giving information to providing explanations to the people can be discerned. Even though one admits that things can be interpreted in various ways, it is also assumed that not all of these ways are equally correct ones and therefore guidance for interpretation should be given. For example, a Journalist article writes about the necessity to explain to people the pros and cons, as well as Estonian accession conditions before the EU referendum (PM, 16.12.2002a; see also PM, 21.05.2003a and Readers articles, PM, 15.09.1998a and PM, 03.07.2003b). Similarly, a Political Elite article claims that politicians should properly illuminate (*läbi valgustada*) the problems connected to the EU in front of the voters so that the latter could make a justifiable choice with both heart and reason (PM, 10.07.2003). The term 'illuminate' refers to X-rays and emphasizes the impossibility of the ordinary people to understand anything on their own. Just as one needs a specialist to read the radiograph, an expert is needed to get to know the EU issues.

Apart from general explanations, a shift from the macro to micro level is urged to explain more specific topics (Readers articles, PM, 16.07.2003a and PM, 30.07.2003) or take a debate to the level of the citizens (Cultural Elite article, PM, 02.05.2003b). For example, a Journalist article writes that the accession conditions should explain what is going to change in individual's life when Estonia joins to the European Union. The article continues with a criticism that the issue about the constitution surely takes the discussion back to the macro level where the main energy is used for arguing about such concepts like "nation state" (*rahvusriik*), "sovereignty" (*suveräänsus*) and "independence" (*iseseisvus*) (PM, 19.12.2002b; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 25.10.1997). Here, the future scenario in the EU is presented as a certain package that 'brings something along' to the citizens. From the people's perspective it is possible to either accept or reject the whole package but not to influence its content. This way, the call to bring the explanations into the micro level for getting closer to people's everyday life goes hand in hand with the restricted agency of the citizens.

Conclusively, as an ideal clear, impartial, objective, comprehensive and sufficient information should be provided not a propaganda that is based on lies or half-truths. Also information overload or shortage is criticized by the articles. Analysis shows that the message in a form of information or explanations is targeted towards the people as recipients.

SUMMARY: PASSIVE CITIZENS DECIDE AFTER APOLITICAL CAMPAIGN

In *Being* and *Becoming informed* both ideal message as well as ideals for the sender and recipient are expressed. It is done similarly in the articles at both in the beginning and towards the end of the accession process. Namely, an ideal message is true and easily understandable, senders should tell the truth and recipients are expected to believe this. Therefore, the articles indicate transmission of the information as a general ideal.

Even though the articles write about informing, explaining and debating, all these refer more or less to objective, true and neutral information or clear explanations that should be given. On the basis of the general assumption present in the articles 'the people' as subject (Fairclough [1989]2001, 153-155) lacks EU knowledge. Therefore, it should be provided by the politicians, other opinion leaders and the media. As part of the same process, EU issues are pointed out by the articles as something that people do not have first-hand experience about (see also Section 2.1).

At the same time the ideal of efficiency characteristic to Estonia's accession process (for example Raik 2003) is visible also in the public discussion. Instead of an arena for debates and a struggle for finding the best solution, the issue is about the debates as a show where the objective information as a ready-made truth is delivered to the people (for similar process in Finland see Kivikuru 1996a).

In parallel to the call that political elite should inform people, also a fear of making the EU campaign 'political' is expressed. Here, the 'political' is not understood as a struggle for deciding about common things but a way of diminishing important things and tarnishing them. In the Estonian case, this fear can be connected to the low trust of political institutions and the poor image of the politicians at the time (see Chapter 1). It is, however, interesting, that the criticism towards politicians as improper informants is presented mostly by Journalist articles (see Section 3.2) whereas Readers articles urge politicians to give people true knowledge about things.

For the citizens, the articles set out an ideal of being informed but not too informed. Apart from that, a linear connection between knowledge and attitude towards the EU is drawn. More concretely, a correlation between sufficient knowledge and the pro-EU attitude as well as lack of knowledge and being against the EU is seen. On the basis of this logic, any discussion between the *Yes* and *No* camps is rather impossible, since one is either informed and

understands things in a (single) correct way or is not informed and lacks EU knowledge.

As a desirable effect of the communication process, the *Yes* vote in the referendum is pointed out. The one responsible for getting its message through and achieving that effect is the sender (see also Kivikuru 1996a, 393). Thus, while Katri Vallaste (2013, 115) writes that the articles of Postimees (from 2000-2006) dealing with Euroscepticism do not present the topic as a result of the ways in which national politicians or the media inform the public about the EU the current study shows that it is not the people but the experts (mostly political elite) are those seen to be responsible. In this context a *No* vote in the referendum could have been proof of a failed communication process and the sender is the one responsible for that.

On the basis of the above mentioned, it can be said that the EU discussion is rather separated from the quotidian issues and a distinction is made between the everyday life where the people perform and the EU issues as expert knowledge. As a result, an individual decision in the referendum is expected to be made on the basis of same objective information being made available for everybody. In this way, the life world of the ordinary people is kept away from the great goals of the state and society. Even though not dealt with in the articles, this ideal enables us to ask about the origin and a possibility of totally objective information.

An emphasis on the effect as a characteristic feature of the transmission model also means that no separate feedback is expected: the recipient is supposed to listen to the message but not to get listened to. Therefore, from the psychological perspective of the recipient the transmission model is rather problematic. Agreeing with the substance still leaves a question about being satisfied with the position of a passive recipient. As a result, frustration and a critical attitude also towards the substance can emerge (in the current case of EU criticality). At the level of agency, this means distancing oneself from those who, not consciously though, frame the people as recipients. In the current case, they happen to be the same people who also guide Estonia's EU accession process and support the country's membership.

LEAVING OR IMPROVING TRANSMISSION MODEL: FEEDBACK

Even though the majority of *Being* and *Becoming informed* follows the logic of transmission model, minor part urges to listen to the people and have a wider societal discussion. By that, a link from recipient to sender is created as a feedback. Here the focus is no more on the adequate information about the EU but a need to listen and/or accept the expectations and positions of Estonian people in general or some more concrete groups (like those against the EU). In terms of discourses feedback brings this part closer to *Independent Estonia*.

Several articles critique the current situation where no real discussion between the EU pessimists and optimists is held and people are not listened

to (Cultural Elite article, PM, 21.07.1997 and Political Elite article, PM, 07.07.1997¹³³). As Political Elite articles write, the EU accession is seen as an inevitable step that is decided for good without taking into account public opinion (PM, 02.06.1998 and PM, 27.07.1998). Similarly, a Readers article writes that nobody has yet taken into account whether people want to join the European Union and nobody has talked about it yet (PM, 18.07.1997a).

Towards the end of the accession process, the criticism is targeted to manipulating people in relation to the accession referendum. A Readers article writes that even though the referendum cannot collapse, one has started to use this term as an effective psychological tool: the referendum is not meant for getting to know people's opinion but blackmailing the *Yes*-word with any possible means (PM, 08.09.2003; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 16.08.2003b). A Cultural Elite article claims to prefer the internal wisdom of the people to the promotion that has dried up into an insipid (*lääge*) propaganda (PM, 10.09.2003b; see also PM, 04.09.2003). A Political Elite article writes that altogether there is about to be a fear that people understand what is really going on and vote against joining the EU (PM, 12.08.2002; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 16.08.2003b). Here, the ideal of 'informed citizen' is dealt with ironically, since the articles claim that the main goal is not to spread but to hide relevant information.

Apart from criticizing the current situation, a need to discuss issues and listen to the people is communicated, mostly by the Cultural Elite articles (PM, 29.08.2003b). One article writes that since in the European Union the direct voice of the people has only indicative nature (*soovitusik iseloom*) to the European Commission, for maintaining democracy, at least before the accession people should let to discharged to talk (*end tühjaks rääkida*) (PM, 24.12.1997c). Here, instead of permanent practice to listen to the people, the time before the EU accession is seen as the last chance to listen to them. The article takes the attitude of a psychologist: even though people are not capable of changing things it is considered important to at least listen to their opinion.

Concerning the referendum, the necessity to support people's choice in the accession issue is emphasized (Journalist article, PM, 26.06.2003). As a Cultural Elite article writes, no matter what the outcome of the referendum, it should be the word of the people who have spoken but not the "silence of the lambs" (*voonakeste vaikimine*) (PM, 23.07.2003). Similarly, another article writes that since the referendum is not an ordinary event, discussion preceding the referendum should be as open and tolerant as possible (PM, 12.08.2003c). Last but not least, everybody has to have a right to their own opinion and it is wrong to see the Euro pessimists as a homogeneous mass towards whom one should target civilizing explanation work (PM, 06.10.2003b).

Conclusively, like a Cultural Elite article writes:

¹³³ The last example can also be seen as a mixture of *European Estonia* and *Independent Estonia* discourse. While in connection with the relations and identities, the importance of having a discussion is stated, the topic that one should discuss is based on the logic of *Independent Estonia*.

We do not assume that everybody would read thousands of pages of juridical text. We assume that both the proponents and opponents of the accession have a possibility to present their attitudes publicly. We assume that the sides who have deeply different opinions can argue without insults, scaring and threatening.¹³⁴

PM, 16.08.2003b

6.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING RATIONAL

As a norm, in the representation level of the *Independent Estonia* discourse, Estonia was seen as an active actor capable of and obliged to influence processes and form a wider reality. At the level of relations and identities, the key phrase is 'rational action' and the actors are urged to give up emotions, which are seen as indicative of immaturity. As a basis of *Being* and *Becoming rational* responsible action based on rational calculations is emphasized (see also Kivikuru 1996 a, 398).

BEING RATIONAL

In most cases a link between *Being rational* and having certain attitude towards the EU can be found (for an exception see Journalist article, PM, 26.05.1997). Some examples divide people on the *Yes-No* basis without, however, taking sides. Instead, a rational basis is depicted both in connection with being for and against the EU (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 04.01.2003; PM, 19.07.2003a and PM, 12.07.2003b). Most of the examples, however, focus on either the for-EU or against-EU attitude as a rational one.

An example of emphasizing the for-EU attitude as a rational one, a Political Elite article writes that, the result of the accession negotiations could be a good reason for the smart people to say *Yes* in the referendum (PM, 13.12.2002). Also a Cultural Elite article writes that after considering all the arguments that could have been a reason to vote against the EU, those who had hesitated until now have probably found that the decision is too important to defeat it with the daily political dissatisfaction (PM, 15.09.2003). Negotiation results as a 'good reason' gives a reasonable basis to support Estonian EU membership. At the same time a distinction is made between the smart people who understand this correlation as well as the rest.

However, in most cases not lending strong positive support to the EU accession but a calculative and skeptical attitude is seen to be rational (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 25.10.1997 and PM, 23.07.2003). As a Cultural

¹³⁴ Me ei eelda, et kõik loeksid läbi tuhandeid lehekülgi juriidilist teksti. Eeldame, et nii liitumise pooldajad kui vastased saavad võimaluse oma seisukohti avalikult esitada. Eeldame, et sügavaid eriarvamusi omavad pooled saavad omavahel vaielda ilma solvangute, hirmutamise ja ähvardusteta.

Elite article claims “[e]ven though I have supported joining the EU, I do not consider myself a particular Euro optimist”¹³⁵ (PM, 21.07.1997) and in the course of time people’s sharpness has grown and of almost unanimous excitement of making IME¹³⁶ one has reached a fifty-fifty relationship in case of the EU (PM, 14.03.2002).

The same logic is applied to the referendum. In comparison to the other Baltic countries, Lithuania is seen as the most optimistic, whereas Estonia and Latvia are seen to represent more sober lines (Journalist article, PM, 22.09.2003; see also Cultural Elite articles, PM, 12.08.2003c; PM, 15.09.2003 and PM, 06.10.2003b). In these cases ‘sober line’ can also be seen as a gesture made towards those who are critical towards the EU and/or who had voted *No* in the referendum. More concretely, even though ‘losing’ in the referendum, the sober and pragmatic line is appreciated as a common feature that characterizes whole nation. As Journalist article writes this line is based on rustic skepticism and a pragmatic adjustment strategy, which helps Estonia to manage inside the EU (PM, 17.01.2003).

Apart from Estonia as a whole, the articles praise certain societal groups for their rationality. Here, however, it is not done on the basis of their *Yes* or *No* attitude (Cultural Elite article, PM, 11.06.2002b). At the beginning of the accession process, a Journalist article gives credit to the political line of Estonia where European practicality, strictness and perseverance dominate over suspicions, accusations and emotions (PM, 19.07.1997a and Political Elite article, PM, 18.07.1997b). Similarly, state leaders’ decision to express their personal attitude about the EU before the referendum is justified by a Journalist article, since the European Union has been talked about as the top of the priorities for a long time and being silent in a decisive moment can give a signal of uncertainty to the people (PM, 26.06.2003).

In addition to the groups, the articles also praise concrete actors for their rationality. A Journalist article comments on the claim of Mart Siimann (Estonia’s Prime Minister at the time) that it is not rational to use a lot of taxpayers money for making propaganda, by writing that Siimann has become known for his calm and sober attitude towards the EU and he has also toned down the rash optimism about *our* quick entry into Europe (PM, 05.06.1998a). Towards the end of the accession process, an article acknowledges the position of the People’s Union (*Rahvaliid*) which had declared its support for Estonia’s EU membership, because as the article writes, the party feels responsible for their supporters (PM, 04.07.2003a; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 01.03.1997).

Even though the common feature of all the examples above is praising rationality over emotions, some articles see these two as complementary. In these cases, emotions are accepted as part of the rational process (Cultural

¹³⁵ [e]hkki olen ELi astumist kaitsnud, ei pea ma end eriliseks eurooptimistiks.

¹³⁶ IME stands for *Isemajandav Eesti*, plan for economic autonomy within the Soviet Union. The term ‘ime’ also means miracle in Estonian.

Elite article, PM, 09.10.2003). In a Cultural Elite article, the time after the referendum is seen as an emotional break of the rational process:

I understand why after the EU referendum people were congratulating one another, why people were partying. /.../ Acceptance to the European Union is or would be the second recognition of the Estonian state de iure!¹³⁷

PM, 22.12.2003; see also PM, 04.01.1998

Similarly, a Journalist article claims towards the end of the accession negotiations:

Dedicated to the work as Estonians we still want to party after Copenhagen and subsequent to getting sober again, to start to think about the duties that wait ahead of us.¹³⁸

PM, 14.12.2002

The example makes clear that for Estonians, work comes first and foremost. However, after getting it done (finishing the accession negotiations) one has deserved a break, a party that is followed by getting sober and the return to the rational everyday life.

Several articles show an understanding towards the emotions of the other people (Cultural Elite article, PM, 09.10.2003). A Journalist article writes that the Estonian historical experience as a small state certainly makes [us-SKK] cautious (PM, 06.10.2003a). Another article states that since the German Chancellor has had a weak attitude towards the EU accessions of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, it is no wonder that President [Lennart - SKK] Meri's nerves could not stand it (PM, 09.05.1997; see also Cultural Elite articles, PM, 26.06.1998 and PM, 25.07.1998). Even though the lack of enthusiasm on the German side could also be interpreted as calm and rational approach, in this case, the article understands the President Meri's emotions. Similarly, a Journalist article comments on the claim that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary could be the first countries to join the EU by stating that this can, of course, make Tallinn even more nervous but fortunately the EU is too busy by itself to notice that likelihood (PM 23.05.1997). Even though the nervousness of Estonian leaders (referred to as Tallinn) is understood, the article also claims that it is still good to hide the nerviness from outsiders (not showing Estonia's weakness to the EU).

¹³⁷ Mõistan, miks euroreferendumi järel üksteist õnnitleti, miks pidutseti. /.../ Vastuvõtt Euroopa Liitu on või oleks Eesti riigi teistkordne tunnustamine *de iure!*

¹³⁸ Eestlaslikult tööle pühendununa tahame siiski pärast Kopenhaagenit pidutseda ja samas kainenenuna hakata mõtlema juba eelseisvatele ülesannetele.

In the examples above, understanding is mostly shown towards politicians' emotions whereas in some articles, people's emotions are understood. Some articles reflect the people's fear (Readers article, PM, 10.06.2003) and worry (Journalist article, PM, 19.11.2002a and Cultural Elite article, PM, 02.05.2003b). A Cultural Elite article writes that people certainly have a right to be upset, especially in a situation of a shortage of information about the accession negotiations (PM, 16.06.1998; see also PM, 04.09.2003). Similarly, a Readers article claims that the words "rule of law" (*õigusriik*) and the "Euro demands" (*euronõuded*) leads anyone with common sense to desperation, since these abstract ideas are derogatory to humanity as a whole (PM, 16.12.2002b). Therefore, as a Cultural Elite article writes, the call to boycott the accession referendum is the only normal and thinkable reaction of a deeply intellectual person who has a sound knowledge of Europe (PM, 23.07.2003; see also Journalist article, PM, 31.07.2003).

In the context of the proposal, made by the European Commission that the farmers of the new member states would get only 40% of the agricultural support of the old member countries, a Journalist article does not just accept emotions but gives a signal for expressing them. The article writes that there is no doubt that the Commission's plan would cause a tumbling collapse of the support in Estonia towards the EU enlargement; the article continues that *we* will wait for the new opinion polls with great interest (PM, 30.01.2002). The term 'cause a tumbling collapse' refers to the spontaneous process that is, however, in the current case planned in advance already. Thus, indirectly people are given the hint that now is the time to 'release the steam'¹³⁹.

One way that articles make emotions acceptable is by expressing these by themselves (Journalist articles, PM, 10.12.1997 and PM, 05.09.1997). In relation to Sweden's *No* to the Euro zone, a Journalist article writes that calculations and considerations still leave space for emotions: it is a pity (PM, 16.09.2003a). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article claims that it is a pity that voting in the referendum is not followed by personal sanctions: for example those who say *Yes* will get the passport of the European Union whereas those who vote against have to start to apply for visas again (PM, 29.08.2003a).

In addition to pity, other emotions are expressed by the articles. A Political Elite article writes that it is sad to read about the project of national development plan concerning the structural foundations of the European Union (PM, 02.12.2002; see also Readers article, PM, 01.08.2003c and Cultural Elite article, PM, 01.03.2003). Cultural Elite articles express astonishment (PM, 02.09.2003b), irritableness (PM, 02.04.2002b), relief

¹³⁹ However, month and a half later an article writes that it will be seen if the local farmers are going to feel themselves as the second class EU members and it might also be that they do not consider the issues connected to the direct agricultural support that important (PM, 20.03.2002). In this example the article has distanced itself from the previous request to get people's emotional reaction and the topic is dealt with as a personal issue of the farmers.

(PM, 03.03.2003), worry (PM, 21.05.2003b), being terrified (PM, 29.08.2003a) and conscious stubbornness as a revenge for those who make stupid tickets (*sedel*) to the referendum (PM, 23.12.2002b).

BECOMING RATIONAL

On the basis of the examples, *Becoming rational* can be divided into three parts: *Necessity to act rationally*, *Condemn emotionality* and *Ignore irrational elements*. Here *Necessity to act rationally* (as *should-part*) is weaker than the failure expressed in *Condemn emotionality*. *Ignore irrational elements* can be seen as a mixture of both.

Since rational action is largely reasoned with awareness, similarities between *Necessity to act rationally* and *Becoming informed* can be found. Here, however, information and awareness are seen as tools necessary for rational action in various spheres. As Journalist article writes before the accession negotiations, citizens, producers and tradesmen have to make themselves clear these legitimate and reasoned demands that could be given to Estonian negotiations delegation (PM, 14.12.1997; see also Political Elite article, PM, 20.06.2003a).

At the same time people are urged to make personal *Yes* or *No* decision on a rational basis (Readers article, PM, 25.10.2002b; see also Political Elite article, PM, 25.07.1997a). As Cultural Elite articles write everybody makes a decision concerning the EU accession by oneself and for that, people have to break through the whole information sea (PM, 12.08.2003a) and pay attention to the right things (PM, 28.06.2003) for being able to make a choice in the referendum (PM, 23.01.2003). Similarly, a Political Elite article suggests that one should calmly think how to continue life without the EU (PM, 22.08.2003; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 22.06.1998).

In addition to awareness as a basis of rationality, the articles urge being rational as an opposite of being emotional (Journalist article, PM, 17.09.2003 and Political Elite article, PM, 04.12.1997c). Writers call for peace and only peace (Political Elite article, PM, 08.03.2002b), not to hurry with the EU discussion (Journalist article, PM, 05.06.1998a), state that there is no need for an exaggerated optimism (Cultural Elite article, PM, 09.11.1998a) and Euro euphoria should not be followed uncritically (Political Elite article, PM, 31.10.1997a). The other way round, it is important to stay calm and not get desperate (Journalist article, PM, 08.05.1997), since the calmer *we* stay, the better *we* seem to get ahead in a chosen road (Cultural Elite article, PM, 11.12.1998a). From rational perspective it has to be admitted that the EU and the Soviet Union have a principal difference (Political Elite article, PM, 17.05.1997; see also PM, 23.08.1997). Also, in relation to the fear of losing itself in the EU, a Journalist article writes that *we* should be encouraged by the knowledge that, in the end, Malta with hardly 400 000 inhabitants was not afraid of diffusing to the European Union (PM, 10.03.2003a). Here, instead of

an emotional approach (fear), Malta's example should be taken into account as a rational basis for Estonia's decision.

Condemn emotionality

In this part emotional fiddling as improper basis for the action (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 06.08.1997 and PM, 15.07.1998) that brings quick but instable results (Cultural Elite article, PM, 15.10.2003) is condemned. For example, gathering signatures for an appeal that aims at a ten year long transition period for selling land to foreigners is seen as useless campaign that does not stop selling land but provokes emotions (Political Elite article, PM, 05.08.2002b; see also Journalist article, PM, 02.05.1998).

At a more concrete level, Euro euphoria (Cultural Elite article, PM, 25.07.1997b) or two kinds of madness are seen to have seized the people: the EU referendum and gathering mushrooms (Readers article, PM, 11.09.2003a). Also the EU campaign is depicted as too emotional where emotions boil and ferment (*keevad ja käärivad*), debates and campaigns are organized and tens of millions [of money - SKK] are delivered here and there without question (Readers article, PM, 03.07.2003b). Another Readers article writes that the EU has been made a question of life and death (PM, 27.08.2003). Cultural Elite articles refer to senseless hysterical shouting to organize referendum immediately (PM, 06.08.1997 and PM, 08.09.1997) and Political Elite articles characterize Estonian EU policy during previous year as much noise and a poor outcome (*palju kära, vähe villa*) (PM, 04.01.1997 and PM, 07.07.1997). As an example of useless noise, a Journalist article writes:

Remember, how loud it was drummed in Estonian accession negotiations with the European Union when the tax-free was talked about. /.../

As a result of abandoning tax free status in Europe, Estonia's economy was supposed to be on all fours. Now things seem to be the other way round: The Finnish interest in buying alcohol, especially beer, increases while the borders disappear and thus also the amount of money left in Estonia increases.¹⁴⁰

PM, 05.08.2003a

¹⁴⁰ Mäletatavasti löödi kõvasti trummi Eesti liitumiskõnelustel Euroopa Liiduga, kui jutt käis *tax-free*'st. /.../

Paha Euroopa Liit kaotas *tax-free* ja Eesti olla seetõttu kähuli. Nüüd paistab hoopis vastupidine - et soomlaste huvi piiride kadudes Eestist alkoholi, eriti õlut osta kasvab ja järelikult ka Eestisse jäetava raha hulk suureneb.

The article condemns emotional reaction by referring to drumming as loud unpleasant sound. Also 'being on all fours' refers to clear and ridiculous emotional overreaction.

Similar to the previous article, several others condemn fear. One article writes that at the threshold of the referendum substantial dispute has been replaced by the carnival of fear and hope (Cultural Elite article, PM, 10.09.2003b). Fear as unreasoned basis for action is also condemned in Cultural Elite articles (PM, 13.08.2003a and PM, 23.07.2003) and Journalist article (PM, 10.09.2003a)¹⁴¹.

In addition to emotional behavior certain groups are criticized for their emotionality and lack of rationality (for example Cultural Elite article, PM, 12.07.2003b). As responsible party politicians are also condemned for appealing to people's emotions. For example, in relation to viewing at Russia as a threat, a Political Elite article writes that if the supporters of the EU cannot figure out better arguments, there is no reason to practice this kind of frightening language (PM, 10.07.2003; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 09.07.2003).

Thus, it is not surprising that the groups criticized the most are politicians and those against the EU but also those who support EU accession too eagerly (or to both at the same time as in Political Elite article, PM, 21.08.1997b and Cultural Elite articles, PM, 06.08.1997; PM, 01.07.1998 and PM, 10.09.2003b). The ones against the EU are criticized as irrational, whereas the politicians and the eager pro-EU people are mostly condemned for too much enthusiasm (for example Cultural Elite articles, PM, 28.02.1998b; PM, 06.08.1997 and PM, 04.01.2003).

As an example, a Journalist article criticizes Toomas Hendrik Ilves (Estonia's Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time) for too spontaneous claims that Estonia is not going to set any conditions to the EU and will, for sure, join the European Monetary Union (EMU) as well. The article continues that it is probable that the Minister will get over his euphoria concerning Estonian accession process and understands that he should not forget about whose interests he should protect in Europe (PM 15.12.1997; see also Political Elite article, PM, 21.08.1997b). Towards the end of the accession process, a Journalist article writes similarly about Siim Kallas (Estonia's Prime Minister at the time) that he should know that waving with (*vehkimine*) all kind of deadlines does not give a good result (PM, 08.03.2002a). Another article calls for Euro propagandists to stop pointless and poor whacking (PM, 01.08.2003a). The term 'waving' draws a picture of the over-enthusiastic and emotional Prime Minister. 'Whacking' on the other hand refers to unintelligent aggressive behavior. In all cases those criticized are assumed to be incapable of controlling themselves.

¹⁴¹ In her doctoral thesis, Katri Vallaste (2013, 76) has pointed out how media frames Euroscepticism as a "phobia".

The rhetoric tool used the most for criticizing the political elite for their enthusiasm is, irony. A Journalist article writes that the politicians and officials talk about the EU as if it had been decided already and the issue would only be about the final deadline - just to get in (*saaks aga sisse!*) (PM, 08.11.1998). Similarly, a Readers article claims that thinking only (*mõelda vaid*) European Union opened the door to the accession negotiations to Estonia from all Baltic countries. The article continues that *our* authorities seem to have got into euphoria after this message: as if Prime Minister had forgotten that for joining the EU it is necessary to get over one more obstacle, a referendum (PM, 23.07.1997). Confronting the reluctant people to enthusiastic politicians makes clear that the elite and the people are not on the same side. Reference made to the referendum as an 'obstacle' also shows people as those who prevent politicians from achieving their goals.

Also other ironical terms are used by the articles. For example a Cultural Elite article writes about cold weather (PM, 14.08.2003d) and a Political Elite article about cold shower that calms down those against the EU if staying outside the EU (PM, 19.08.2003b). At the same time a Journalist article uses shower-rhetoric to characterize those who aim at the EU too eagerly. The article writes that if after the Commission's positive decision *we* could already hear the cry of victory about reaching the EU, the day before yesterday in Brussels was like a cold shower to the hotheads (PM, 24.07.1997; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 25.07.1997b). The ones who are not capable of handling their emotions are mapped by the article with the terms like 'cry of victory' and 'hotheads'. This way the process can be seen as similar to the sporting competition where timing matters. Spectators are allowed to express overflowing emotions after a victory as a proper moment. In the current case, however, they did not act rationally but rejoiced at the wrong time. Similar logic that emphasizes an importance of timing in connection with emotions is used also in the other, though, not ironical articles (Journalist articles, PM, 16.05.2002; PM, 21.10.2002 and PM, 26.06.2003).

Apart from those who are overly enthusiastic about Estonian EU accession process, articles condemn irrational and emotional stubbornness of those politicians who are critical towards the EU or its rules. Concerning agricultural tariffs, a Journalist article writes that according to the treaties it is forbidden to set tariffs for EU countries as well as Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine but the political parties of the Country Union (*Maaliit*) and the Country People's Party (*Maarahvaerakond*) still want the tariffs: they know that it is impossible, but they still demand the tariffs (PM, 07.01.1998b). Both the content and the form of this example make the subjects look like children: they have been told several times that one is not going to buy candy today, they know that but keep arguing about the same topic. Instead of the rational calculations, their stubbornness is based on their desires and wishes. *Postimees*, on the other hand stands for voice of reason: if something is set out in a treaty, one has to accept that without further arguments.

A similar reference to childish irrational behavior can be found in a Journalist article towards the end of the accession process concerning the decision of the leading figure of the Estonian Center Party (*Eesti Keskerakond*), Vilja Savisaar to say *No* to the EU. The article writes that by this decision Savisaar starts to support those who want to drop the work done by all Estonian governments since 1995 (PM, 23.05.2003a; see also PM, 10.03.2003a and PM, 26.08.1997a). In this case, being for or against the EU is not a personal choice but a great responsibility one has to take. The childish wish to say *No* is therefore an egoistic and irresponsible solution.

In addition to the political decision makers, a more abstract group of those against the EU, Eurosceptics, is criticized for their overreaction as well as irrational arguments and behavior¹⁴². A Cultural Elite article states that in comparison to their Polish counterparts, Estonian Eurosceptics are rather immature (PM, 01.06.1998). Similarly, a Journalist article writes, Euro pessimists have not presented the arguments that would be even a bit waterproof (PM, 15.05.1998). Another article claims that without deploring the more substantial part of the Euroscepticism, one should start to prevent its possible emotional bursts (PM, 08.11.1998; see also Cultural Elite articles, PM, 21.07.1997 and PM, 12.08.1997b).

In most cases, instead of Eurosceptics, an expression 'those against the EU' is used for making a distinction between activists and the greater public. A Political Elite article writes about rural people who, emotionally heated up, start to deny Estonian accession to the EU (PM, 05.08.2002b; see also PM, 26.08.2003b and Readers article, 30.07.2003). A Journalist article claims that the arguments of those against the EU can in any future EU discussion be based mostly on the emotional exclamations (previously Moscow, now Brussels) or stupid claims (*à la* EU norms are about to destroy *our* specialty) (PM, 11.09.1997a). Saying *No* is also seen as madness (PM, 29.08.2003a) and related to bitterness (PM, 02.07.2003b). According to this classification, it is no longer possible to use the loss of sovereignty as a rational argument, since it is seen to be based on emotional fear.

The logic of condemning emotionality also works the other way round: it enables to discredit certain arguments on the basis of their emotionality as well as condemn the *No*-campaign as the one that appeals to people's subconsciousness and emotions (Political Elite article, PM, 12.08.2003b). For example a Political Elite article writes that looking for the parallels between the Soviet Union and the EU has an emotional effect (PM, 17.05.1997) and a

¹⁴² Also opposite examples can be found. For example a Cultural Elite article writes about those who are willing to stay outside the EU, since it is economically beneficial for them. Among them great global investors who have specialized on acting in extremely dirty water and the local actors who are still tethered by the KGB and restore quietly the Soviet Union are mentioned. The article continues that questions they ask are of course totally rational and deserve respect in this sense (PM, 22.06.1998). Therefore, though respecting their rational action, the article also creates a framework for these people: either one is criminal or related to the KGB.

Journalist article concludes after the referendum that one has often individual and emotional reasons for being against the European Union (PM, 17.09.2003)¹⁴³. Implicitly, more general objective rational reasons are depicted in the background of the *Yes*-votes.

Apart from simply condemning the *No*-camp, in some cases the articles express understanding towards their motives, without, however, accepting these¹⁴⁴. A Cultural Elite article claims to understand those who are suspicious about the capability of the parliament and its representatives to organize valid negotiations with the EU (PM, 06.08.1997) and shows understanding towards victims of the EU-poisoning (PM, 06.11.1998c). Similarly, a Political Elite article writes:

*Of course I understand today's aged people who have toiled their whole life in the Soviet Union and are today bitter due to the changes that were brought along by Estonian re-independence. But do they have a right to vote against joining the EU on the basis of revenge or some other excuse putting this way a brake to Estonian development?*¹⁴⁵

PM, 19.08.2003b

Similarly, a Journalist article writes about Estonian farmers who are not doing well since as a response to Estonia's decision to give up tariffs Brussels prohibited the export of Estonian milk products to the EU. The article continues that this naturally causes anger and thus it is hoped to get at least symbolic tariffs for instance for South East Asian or Latin American agricultural products (PM, 07.01.1998b). On one hand the article shows understanding for those who feel upset about this unfair deal: Estonian farmers made a gesture but the EU answers in an unexpected way. On the other hand, even though the reaction of Estonian farmers is seen as understandable, it is also considered to be irrational, based on the need to dissolve the anger. More concretely, tariffs are wanted for the sake of principle, since these parts of the world are rather minor trade partners for Estonia.

Ignore irrational elements

While in the previous examples related to the referendum the voters were implicitly or explicitly urged to base their decision on rational calculations

¹⁴³ This is somewhat similar to the marginalization of the 'losers' as people who are unable to manage their own lives and thus for personal reasons, oppose rapid changes (Vihalemm 2003, 591).

¹⁴⁴ In some cases also acceptance towards these who are too optimistic ones is expressed (Journalist article, PM, 08.03.2002a).

¹⁴⁵ Muidugi mõistan ma tänaseid eakaid, kes kogu elu on rüganud NSVLis ja on täna kibestunud muudatuste pärast, mis Eesti taasiseseisvumine kaasa tõi. Kuid kas neil on õigus kättemaksu või mõnel muul ajendil hääletada ELiga liitumise vastu, pannes sellega Eesti arengule piduri?

Ignore irrational elements ignores general public¹⁴⁶. Instead, articles address more trustworthy facets to ensure that one will get the *Yes*- answer from the referendum (Journalist article, PM, 10.03.2003a).

Several articles focus on the strategies that would enable Estonia to get the expected result from the referendum. Unlike in the part *Effect: informed people vote Yes or ...Yes* (Section 6.1) here the strategies do not include people's agency but aim at an efficient campaign and referendum that people are not able to ruin. For example, in connection with forming a new government that would include the People's Union (*Rahvaliid*), a Journalist article writes that this would give the EU referendum held in September a stronger guarantee of success (PM, 04.03.2003). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article asks if Arnold Rüütel (Estonia's President at the time) has to take Estonia to the European Union with his authority (PM, 21.05.2003b).

Concerning the question asked in the referendum, a Journalist article criticizes forming it of two parts as nothing but a dilettante act of parliament, because with two sided question it can easily happen that the hoped *Yes*-word is not coming from the referendum (PM, 19.12.2002b). Also a Cultural Elite article writes about *No* as a failure of referendum (PM, 21.07.2003a). Therefore, the possibility that people vote on the basis of their convictions is not foreseen but the success of the referendum is based on the organizing skills of the responsible ones.

Since Estonia's referendum was almost the last among the new member states (only Latvia had its referendum after Estonia), a Journalist article refers to the favorable international climate as important for finishing *our* referendum with *Yes* (PM 10.03.2003a) and several more articles use the experience of the other countries as a basis for Estonian strategy. One Journalist article writes about the Lithuanian campaign as simple and easy to remember and claims that the Estonian government should learn from them because their main worry is not the low participation of voting but to ensure the *Yes*-word to the European Union. However, the Journalist article continues that at the same time participation should not be left without any attention, since in case of low participation those against the EU can always say that Estonia went to the EU without people's mandate (PM, 12.05.2003 and PM, 14.04.2003). A necessity to get a blessing from the people shows the referendum as a formality, a ritual with no substantial meaning, since people are not expected to influence the substance. However, for the sake of correctness and avoiding further criticism, the organizing work has to be strict. Conclusively, here the focus is on the strategy of making politics. This is, however, made public in the articles that address the more reliable actors of the society than the actual voters.

¹⁴⁶ As a similar phenomenon, Katri Vallaste (2013, 188) has written about making a distinction of pro-EU *us* and anti-EU *them* in Estonian, Finnish and Swedish daily newspapers.

SUMMARY

The current discourse condemns irrationality and emotionality and praises rationality as a firm basis for action. The scheme works also the other way round: for praising something, it is mapped as 'rational' whereas for criticism, things or behavior are depicted as 'emotional' or more widely 'irrational' (see also Raik 2003, 169). At the same time emotionality is not necessarily seen as an opposite of rationality but as suitable during 'relaxation points' when no clear task is waiting ahead. At these times proper amount of emotionality is accepted as part of the rational action. Especially Journalist articles deal with the emotions as a logical part of the rational process and thus subordinate to the overall rationality.

Among the articles, the Cultural Elite articles and Journalist articles are the most represented both in the beginning as well as towards the end of the accession process. Especially in relation to referendum, the articles address *Postimees'* readers as voters, urged to calculate things and act rationally. Towards the end of the accession process, however, several articles are targeted to the (political) decision makers where the agency of the people as irrational elements is defused.

The groups criticized the most in connection with *becoming-part*, mostly by Journalist articles, are those against the EU membership, those too eager about it and the political decision makers (as often overlapping with either the *Yes-* or *No-side*). Similar conclusions have been drawn also in the other studies. For instance Kristi Raik (2003, 134-135, 147) writes that for being ready to join the EU as soon as possible as well as at any price have been the most criticized aspects of the whole accession process. Concerning the media debate, Katri Vallaste (2013, 100) argues that irrationality was used in the media for labeling those critical towards the EU. In the context of Finnish EU accession in the first half of 1990s, the same has been indicated by Finnish scholars who have analyzed the process (for example Mörä 1999, 216).

However, this study shows that both EU optimism as well as skepticism are seen as acceptable at certain points (sceptics as rational and calculative). At the same time both sides are also criticized for their irrationality and emotionality whereas essences of the criticism in *Yes-* and *No-case* are different. In the case of those overly enthusiastic about Estonian EU accession, the criticism is not targeted towards undermining the actual point (being for the membership) but towards the way this point is expressed (wrong timing, emotional statements instead of expressing the same positions in a rational way etc.). Thus, their action and methods, not goals behind that (EU membership) are criticized. Even further, in some cases it can be said that the articles consider the goals too important to be threatened by irrationality. In the *No-case*, on the other hand, the actual substantial point is questioned by mapping it as emotional and/or irrational. Therefore one can talk about principal disagreement where being against is not a rational choice¹⁴⁷.

¹⁴⁷ The substance here cannot be mixed with the representation level where articles focus on Estonia-

Conclusively, even though by criticizing both *Yes* and *No* camps, a certain objectivity is maintained, at the same time also implicit or explicit support towards Estonian membership is expressed.

6.3 ESTONIANS, KNOW YOUR LIMITS!

The relations and identities part of the discourse of *Humble Estonia* titled *Estonians, know your limits!* emphasizes realism in connection with understandings and misunderstandings (*vis-à-vis* representation part where realism was used in relation to the EU as an actor or general world practice). On the basis of the distinction made between realists and illusionists as well as fake and real, being realist and accepting circumstances mapped as 'reality' is used as an acknowledgement. This is similar to Sami Moisio's (2006, 446) findings as to how Finland's membership in the EU is explained by political realism and wisdom.

I start the analysis from *Being realist* that is however, more weakly represented than the *becoming*-part. On the basis of the position given to the actor, both parts are divided into two. First, it is argued that one lives or should live in reality, not in illusions. This means for instance that it is important to understand and be aware of what is 'really' going on. Second, honesty is evaluated in the articles: it is important not to falsify but show the real position.

BEING REALIST

In the case of *living in reality* certain things are accepted as facts (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 15.01.2003b and PM, 02.10.2003a) whereas *being real* indicates honesty instead of faking. As an example of *living in reality*, a Cultural Elite article writes that somebody can just have a susceptible nature and be suspicious about Estonian success both inside the EU as well as outside that (PM, 09.08.2003a; see also PM, 15.09.2003).

Another Cultural Elite article claims that since *we* are not the first but at least the tenth of those who join the EU, any discussion about this topic can be generalized and the main features of those who are against and who are for the European Union can be depicted. The article continues that integration is supported by more developed economic branches and regions as well as professions and people connected to these, in a word more competitive forces in the society whereas against are these whose current way of life is crumbled by modernization (PM, 12.07.1997a; see also PM, 12.08.2003c). In this example both those who are for and those against the EU are seen as part of the fixed and widely spread reality. Therefore, an attempt to influence those

EU relations.

who are against does not make much sense. At the same time, by being against, one finds oneself among people who are not that progressive.

After the Estonian Center Party (*Eesti Keskerakond*) congress decided to be against Estonia's EU membership, a Cultural Elite article writes that political representativeness concerning the EU issue is now more adequate, since it would to a certain extent have been abnormal had the 40% of the electorate who were suspicious about the membership not had political representation in parliament (PM, 12.08.2003c). Another article answers the question as to who decides about the accession as the issue defines Estonian political reality (PM, 11.06.2002b).

Second, as an example of *being real*, a Journalist article writes that no tricks are needed in the referendum to urge the people to vote, since Estonia does not have to reach the compulsory fifty per cent of participation (PM, 21.05.2003a). Here, flagging up the necessity to raise the participation proportion in the referendum is seen as a trick, similar to the long endured refusal of the Center Party to tell whether it is for or against Estonian membership. A Journalist article writes about some ministers of the party as those who do not give an impression as if they did not have a clear attitude concerning the European Union and continues that this Center Party would already be bought by the cats (PM, 11.03.2003). For praising certain ministers as opposed to the rest of the party, the article uses a reference to the cats taken from the commercial of Whiskas (cats would buy Whiskas). Even though one emphasizes quality here, reference to the cats also leaves a question, what would the citizens do.

BECOMING REALIST

Becoming realist is based on the necessity to see what is and what is not 'real'. For example, instead of a methodologically correct answer in the referendum, it is important to get the real result in a form of *Yes* or *No* from the people (Cultural Elite article, PM, 04.01.2003; see also PM, 11.06.2002b). Another Cultural Elite article replies to the issue of trying prevent EU membership if it seems dangerous to Estonia: it is necessary to know and analyze how things are, not what those are imagined to be¹⁴⁸ (PM, 21.07.1997; see also PM, 28.06.2003; PM, 10.09.2003b and Political Elite article, PM, 27.10.1998b). One article emphasizes the seriousness of reality by urging not to talk nonsense and continues: the referendum is not another rehearsal of design in the style of if it fails *we* can do it again, it is a serious act: if the referendum fails, nobody will pay for Estonia's loss (Cultural Elite article, PM, 21.07.2003a).

In general, however, more than urging to hold a realist understanding of things (Cultural Elite article, PM, 14.10.2002) the articles of *Becoming*

¹⁴⁸ This example is close to *becoming informed*. However, here, the focus is on real vs imagined knowledge, not true vs false one.

realist are based on wide usage of negation where the mistaken views are criticized. Therefore, instead of claiming what should be done, criticism is expressed towards a failure to understand reality as well as act honestly. On that ground next sections are titled *Failure to live in reality* and *Failure to be real*.

Failure to live in reality

As an example of *Failure to live in reality* a Readers article writes that it is not realistic to demand a “neutral campaign” (*neutraalset kampaaniat*) from the government since all Estonian governments since 1991 have had the goal to become a member of the EU (PM, 24.07.2003a). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article claims in connection with the accession referendum that on the basis of journalism one has got the impression that the Estonian accession to the European Union will not be decided by the referendum of 14th of September but at the congress of Center Party (*Eesti Keskerakond*) held in Tartu on the 9th of August (PM, 12.08.2003c; see also Political Elite article, PM, 01.08.1997b).

Also the articles analyze the background of unrealistic understandings with the aim of finding the causes. For example, mental sickness is pointed out as one reason for losing a sense of reality. As a Journalist article writes, some of *my* foreign acquaintances have referred to *our* “complex of going from one union to another”¹⁴⁹ and continues that they understand the reasons but think however, that this kind of fear is paranoid (PM, 03.07.2003a). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article states that the claim that Europe needs us that much is another megalomaniac summer imagination (PM, 14.08.2003d).

Apart from mental problems, especially in Cultural Elite articles other reasons for unrealistic understandings are depicted. The articles criticize beliefs (PM, 29.11.2002), religion (PM, 21.07.1997; PM, 06.08.1997 and PM, 04.01.1998), mythological imaginations (PM, 14.11.1998), magic (Readers article, PM, 27.05.2003) and fairy tales (Readers article, PM, 19.07.1997b). A Readers article claims that it is naïve to think that those who decide upon acceptance to the EU base their decision on the external indicators of the state only (PM, 31.05.1997; see also Political elite articles, PM, 23.08.1997 and PM, 29.12.1997b and Journalist articles, PM, 13.11.1997 and 31.03.1998b).

Also forgetting about (Cultural Elite article, PM, 14.08.2003d) and not understanding certain things is criticized in the articles. A Journalist article writes: “Does not Estonia understand that even the United States that pushes any Baltic country into the EU as a counterbalance of staying out of the NATO, makes geopolitics.”¹⁵⁰ (PM, 18.03.1997). By asking rhetorically ‘does not Estonia understand’, the article distances itself from those criticized. At the

¹⁴⁹ «[ü]hest liidust teise minemise kompleksile».

¹⁵⁰ Kas Eesti siis ei taipa, et isegi Ameerika Ühendriigid, kes suruvad mõnd Balti riiki ELi vastukaaluks NATOst väljajäämise eest, teevad geopoliitikat.

same time, there is still a sense of concern for Estonia's capability to understand things. Even though on the basis of substance, the last message is targeted at the political decision makers, it is presented as a common worry that concerns everybody.

The last example can also be seen as an example of not just criticizing but expressing astonishment towards those who do not live in reality. The same can be found also from the other articles. For example, a Cultural Elite article asks how was it possible to believe that these two goals – nostalgic and dreamy, the last one standing for EU, are achievable at the same time (PM, 09.11.2002). Similarly, A Journalist article questions the statements as if the EU supported Estonian delegation behind the negotiations table:

*But how can they anyway support us if from the 31st of March on one side of the negotiations table sit the EU and European Commission and on the other side Estonia. How can the EU member states be on our side, if they still have to protect their interests and those of the EU?*¹⁵¹

PM 06.03.1998c; also PM, 06.09.1998

The example uses negotiations table as an argument that visualizes how things really are: the fact that one sits on the opposite side means also that one is in opposite team.

In addition to Estonia as a whole, some examples focus clearly on certain groups of the society, mostly politicians and Eurosceptics¹⁵². Here, criticism is targeted towards unrealistic imaginations and expectations as well as forgetting about reality. For example, a Journalist article writes that some politicians imagine as if the EU did everything for *us* that *we* have not managed to do, as if the EU were *our* relative who had unlimited love for *us* and who waits for *us* (PM, 13.12.1997; see also PM, 11.11.2002). Similarly, in relation to the expectations that Lithuania supported Estonian access to the EU negotiations, another Journalist article claims that instead of a true agreement, one can talk about Estonian imagination: if Estonian leadership (*Toompea*) has not noticed Lithuanian stubbornness in the EU direction one can only blame oneself (PM, 17.06.1997).

In addition to 'some politicians' the false imaginations of certain people are criticized. For instance a Journalist article writes that Estonia's Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, should be helped to come back to earth (PM, 15.12.1997). Another article questions the statements of

¹⁵¹ Ent kuidas ikkagi saavad nad meid toetada, kui alates 31. märtsist istuvad ühel pool läbirääkimistelaua taga ELi ja Euroopa Komisjoni esindajad ning teisel pool Eesti. Mil moel saavad ELi liikmesriigid olla meie poolel, kui nad peavad kaitsma ikkagi endi ning euroliidu huve?

¹⁵² Also opposite examples can be found in Cultural Elite articles. One article confronts wise Eurosceptics with blue-eyed EU optimists (PM, 08.09.1997), another one writes that the analytical mind and intellectual potentials of the Eurosceptics are useful for Estonia (PM, 21.07.1997).

Hardo Aasmäe, a politician of Progressive Party (*Arengupartei*) at the time, by equating his criticism towards vagueness of the EU with an aim that the prices of Estonian gas stations are cut into stone (PM, 13.11.1997). It is difficult to take seriously somebody who has left the earth as well as the one who suggests that the gas prices should be cut into stone.

In addition to wrong imaginations, ironical criticism is targeted towards ‘forgetting’ about (Estonian) reality. As a Political Elite article writes, during the especially short time of continuous blowing back and forth to Brussels (*lendmine Brüsseli vahel*) erases from the memory the pictures of Paunvere¹⁵³, not talking about the cowshed (*talulaut*) during the morning milking (*lüksiaegne*) or autumn plowing (*sügiskünd*) in the end of October (PM, 12.11.1998b; see also Readers article, PM, 30.12.1997b). The term ‘blow’ instead of ‘fly’ equates politicians to a butterfly which just blows around according to the vagaries of the weather without a clear goal or understanding of its action. As an opposite to Brussels, signs of the real life that one can experience in Estonia are listed (small village Paunvere, cowshed, milking and plowing).

In addition to the politicians, the social groups against EU membership, for example, pensioners are called to take into account the economic and political realities (Journalist article, PM, 23.08.2003a) and Eurosceptics are ironically criticized for living in illusions. For instance, a Readers article urges the Eurosceptics to move ahead of time to their “dreamland” (*unistustemaale*) (PM, 01.08.2003b). Another Readers article calls the statement of Eurosceptics that *we* become happy by trading with America and China ironically a “lovely idea” (*kaunis mõte*) (PM, 05.08.2003c; see also Cultural Elite articles, PM, 04.07.1997 and PM, 14.08.2003d).

Similarly, a Journalist article writes that the fall in Tallinn’s stock market and the liquidity crisis of banks should dispel euphoria and self-confidence that has emerged among some entrepreneurs, as if Estonia did not need the European Union that much¹⁵⁴ (PM, 11.11.1997a). The terms like ‘dreamland’, ‘lovely’, ‘happy’ and ‘euphoria’ are used to show the absurdness of these proposals that can also lead to serious consequences, which another Journalist article points out. The article writes about the case when an Estonian citizen urgently needed organ transplant in Italy and reveals that the patient was lucky to be there (Italy) and not in Estonia, since smaller states have even fewer possibilities to get organ transplants:

¹⁵³ A fictional place from the works of Estonian writer Oskar Luts.

¹⁵⁴ On the basis of “euphoria”, this example is similar to the former, rationality part. However, since the main focus is not on the emotionality but the absurdness of this unrealistic idea, it is part of the current discourse.

Maybe those who see the European Union only as an eternal monster and paint it to the others as well would think also about this kind of human aspect. Maybe then many 'euro opposed' words die in the mouth already.¹⁵⁵

PM, 19.11.2002b

The argument is based on the logic of market economics: the bigger market, the bigger are the possibilities. However, as a consequence, those critical about the EU are not only seen as illogical but also responsible for the lost lives caused by the lack of organs. EU criticism as 'seeing and painting the monsters' also enables us to ask how seriously one can take the people who suffer from delusions.

Failure to be real

In the current *failure*-part, a conscious attempt to deny reality or perform falsely is criticized. While in the examples above, living in an illusion is seen as a problem, here the criticism is targeted towards giving consciously the wrong impression of things or of themselves (Cultural Elite article, PM, 18.12.1997a). A Journalist article writes in relation to EU demands that concern Estonian language policy, it is not realized or wanted to realize that most of these demands have come from Russia (PM, 20.12.1997). Another article comments on the scenario leaving Estonia outside the EU and claims that *we* are not tough guys even though *we* sometimes want to believe that *we* are those who have been given some unprecedented world historical role (PM, 23.08.2003a).

As in the examples above, those considered responsible for lying and creating wrong impressions on purpose are the political decision makers (for example Journalist article, PM, 26.01.2002; Political Elite articles, PM, 02.06.1998 and PM, 23.11.1998). A Political Elite article writes that it is not possible to take seriously the Minister of Finance who ensures that he has not even for a year had any idea what was going on in the EU negotiations concerning the taxation chapter (PM, 08.03.2002b). Concerning the government as a whole, a Cultural Elite article writes that externally everything seems to be fine, the main coalition party states that it supports the EU direction whereas other members of the coalition keep conspiratorially silent (PM, 23.12.1997).

Similar to the previous example, in most cases the criticism is targeted towards those politicians who are either against the EU (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 17.07.1998 and PM, 14.08.2003d) or who hide their position (Journalist articles, PM, 08.08.2003b and PM, 11.08.2003a). Attitude towards those who

¹⁵⁵ Ehk tasuks kõigil neil, kes Euroopa Liidus vaid lõputut kolli näevad ja seda teistelegi maalivad, mõelda ka niisugusele inimlikule aspektile. Võibolla siis surevad paljud «eurovastased» sõnad juba suus.

have expressed anti-EU views is rather suspicious, since it is not seen as sincere as the pro-EU position. As Cultural Elite article writes, it is fashionable to be Eurosceptic in the forthcoming elections, since this brings in a lot of votes (PM, 23.12.1997). Another Political Elite article writes that the referendum campaign will be a big circus show where the clowns and provocateurs who call themselves Euro opponents are superbly better actors than those who are for the EU (PM, 12.08.2003b). In both cases being against the EU is depicted as a role played to get votes or to have fun. It is made especially clear in the second example where the fakers, the clowns and provocateurs who 'claim to be against the EU' are confronted by those who 'are for the EU'.

Apart from those who claim to be against the EU, those who have taken a hesitant position towards the EU are seen to be fake and therefore irresponsible. A Journalist article claims to understand the opinion leaders who have formed a clear and reasoned attitude, be it *Yes* or *No* and continues:

*But I have no understanding at all towards these compatriots whose words matter but who turn it over as if it were a hot potato. From day to day, from week to week, from month to month. Who else if not they should have a firm attitude that one is also brave enough to express.*¹⁵⁶

PM, 03.07.2003a

Instead of naming either certain party or concrete politicians, the article refers to 'these compatriots whose words matter'. The sincerity of those who are incapable of forming their own opinions are questioned in the last sentence. Thus, the real question is not a difficulty to form one's position but cowardice to take responsibility. While both *Yes* and *No* are seen as acceptable positions before the referendum, the response of 'have not decided yet' is not acceptable (Journalist article, PM, 19.08.2003a).

Since among the parties represented in Estonian parliament at the time, the one which had not taken a clear *Yes* or *No* attitude well in advance of the referendum was Estonian Center Party (*Eesti Keskerakond*) (Cultural Elite article, PM, 21.03.2003), several articles specifically addressed this issue. A Journalist article writes that even *No* would be better than hesitation and there would for sure have fewer who were suspicious about the EU (*eurokõhklejaid*) if the party had had a firm position (PM, 18.06.2003a; see also PM, 16.06.2003c). The Party's hesitation is also called a "home made circus" (*kodukootud tsirkust*) (Journalist article, PM, 13.08.2003d) as a low level entertainment for making the absurdness of the situation clear.

While the political decision makers are seen as responsible for the failure to be real, people as a wider public are given the position of being the

¹⁵⁶ Aga ma ei mõista üldse neid kaasmaalasi, kelle sõnal on kaalu, ent kes veeretavad ühinemisteemat nagu kuumat kartulit. Päevast päeva, nädalast nädalasse, kuust kuusse. Kellel siis veel kui mitte neil peaks olema kindel seisukoht, mis julgetaks ka välja käia.

politicians' victims. In relation to Estonia's foreign political year 1997, the article writes about EU related brainwash from the political decision makers that some media believe and reinforce (Journalist article, PM, 29.12.1997a). Similarly, towards the end of the accession process a Cultural Elite article writes after the People's Union of Estonia (*Eestimaa Rahvaliid*) exited from the coalition that in reality one needed the party only to guarantee success of the EU accession referendum (PM, 19.11.2003). Another Cultural Elite article claims that since Estonian leaders ask for permission to change the constitution after it has already been done and *we* are already in the domain of the EU, this referendum cheats the nation (PM, 13.08.2003a). In the same spirit, following the assumption that despite official claims, the accession referendum is not a confidential event, a Readers article suggests humorously that instead of spending money on the referendum people should be invited to Tallinn song festival grounds where an instrument for measuring decibels had been installed: the one who screams loudest is the winner (PM, 13.09.2003b).

SUMMARY

While the necessity to be informed operated at the level of rhetoric and made a distinction between proper and improper information as well as being or not being informed; in *Becoming realist* the emphasis is on a difference between rhetoric and reality. As an ideal, the articles aim at bringing these two together.

In this discourse *Being realist* focuses on the end of the accession process, whereas in the context of *becoming*, no remarkable difference between the beginning and the end can be found. In this section of the discourse, the Journalist articles and the Cultural Elite articles are the most represented.

At the beginning of the accession process being naïve is seen as a common worry one should get rid of whereas by the end, faking had turned out to be the worst option. Both naivety and faking are used to accuse mostly politicians either for unrealistic expectations or their hypo criticism. Since hesitation is seen to be based on insincere behavior, hesitators are not seen as a resource that could still be used by the *Yes*-side and therefore no gunpowder is wasted in 'converting' them. Instead, the *Yes*-campaign is seen to be in danger due to the unpredictability of those who hesitate.

A clear distinction between reality and illusion, as well as equality of hesitations and faking, shows that this discourse is also based on the logic of the transmission model. More concretely, certain statements are seen to bring along particular effects. Since hesitation is supposedly followed by unclear effect it can be seen as an example of dysfunctional communication.

7. CONCLUSIONS

Since most of the studies that deal with Estonia's EU integration were published at the time when the final result of country's accession process was anything but certain, the studies inevitably contributed to the accession process in a form of supporting or opposing the country's membership. Similarly, the criticism expressed in the studies was aimed at removing the problems Estonia was facing from the *Yes/No* perspectives.

Returning to Estonia's EU accession process more than ten years after the country has joined the EU makes the general approach of this study different of those mentioned in the previous paragraph, since it is no longer neither necessary nor possible to contribute to the actual accession process. Consequently, the current study can be criticized as hindsight that ignores that Estonia's accession process was guided by Estonian elites whose mission was to secure the country's future as a sovereign state as quickly as possible, since the lessons of the past hold that the 'windows of opportunity' are open for only a short time (Pettai 2005, 53-54). On the other hand, the current research can also be seen as an interpretation made without any hidden agenda related to the actual accession process.

The study is based on the assumption that national identity is constructed in societal texts, including media, of which the study's chosen paradigm, *Postimees*, was and is Estonia's oldest and most stable daily newspaper. I claim that during Estonia's EU accession process, viewed as a formative moment, the EU became 'the new official Other' in relation to whom Estonian identity was constructed in *Postimees* with certain consequences. On that basis, this interdisciplinary case study combines media studies with political science, EU studies and nationalism studies to analyze the construction of Estonian national identity in the discourses.

On the basis of the analysis of the three discourses: *European Estonia*, *Independent Estonia* and *Humble Estonia*, conclusions can be drawn about Estonia's rather reactive position in relation to the EU by either following EU guidance (*European Estonia* and *Humble Estonia*) or rejecting it (*Independent Estonia*). At the same time, ideas about Estonian contribution to develop the EU were rather absent from *Postimees*. Sometimes these were also expressed in a humoristic way pointing out the minor issues with little importance¹⁵⁷. This shows the connection between the foreign political and the journalistic practice: while the official accession process was mostly based on preparing Estonia for membership, the same was also present in the newspaper articles. For the future research this leaves an intriguing issue: has

¹⁵⁷ Kristi Raik (2003, 174) concludes on the basis of analyzing the EU debate that EU membership was mostly framed in terms of how Estonia could profit from it whereas less mentions was made of the broader values related to European integration.

the reactive approach in the media turned pro-active in the context of Estonian membership and self-positioning as an active EU member country.

Although the discourse of *Independent Estonia* is based on equal partnership between Estonia and the EU and in the other two discourses the EU's superiority over Estonia is accepted, a distinction on the basis of what has been called "thick" or "thin" Europeanisation (Flockhart 2008, 6) can be made concerning the superiority. While Flockhart has defined 'thin' Europeanisation by referring to the changes in behavior and rhetoric and 'thick' one as internalization of the rules and norms to the structures of consciousness of a certain group; the current study interpreted both terms in a different manner. Namely, instead of measuring the actual index of Estonian Europeanisation on the basis of certain criteria, I have applied both to media analysis. The notion of 'thick' Europeanisation is based on the sincere admiration of the EU and its practice in *Postimees*, whereas the notion of 'thin' Europeanisation, is based on admitting formal superiority of the EU and the rules of the game that Estonia is incapable of changing. Thus, the need to follow the EU's guidance may be accepted as a formality necessary for pleasing the EU (similar also Kuus 2008, 260-262).

In order to analyze the daily construction of national identity in *Postimees*, I have approached it in terms of Fairclough's discourse analysis that occurs simultaneously at the level of text, discourse practice and sociocultural practice. In this framework I have combined international relations theories with the studies of Europeanisation to analyze the public discussion. While *European Estonia* communicated support for Estonia's EU accession, in the other two discourses the relationship between the explicit *Yes/No* debate concerning EU membership and the basis for forming the discourse are less clearly interlinked. Precisely, the *Yes/No* attitudes did not reflect the borders of the discourses but both opinions could be represented in the same discourses. One method of doing this is through denial or criticism towards the content (for example EU norms) or actors (for example political elite) without however, being able to escape and/or criticize the discourse. This is an example of how discourses as systems of meaning reproduce social structure and condition our ways of thinking (see Fairclough [1989]2001, 32; Raik 2003, 24-25).

At the same time, the example shows the opacity of discourse, since people can legitimize particular power relations without being aware of doing so (Fairclough [1989]2001, 33). From the article writers' points of view, participation in the *Yes/No* discussion cannot be equated to participation in a certain discourse even within *European Estonia*. The writer of a letter to the editor or an editorial for instance about the regulation of playgrounds in the EU, probably does not think that at the same time they write an Estonian national identity story or contribute to identity construction in relation to the EU as the Other. Rather, the question is of what Agnew and Corgridge (1995) have depicted as an unconscious adoption of the often implicit rules of living, thinking and speaking (cited in Berg 2003, 103), of which the credible political

language necessary for entering the discussion is an example (Moisio 2006, 460). In this process the writers of the newspaper articles unconsciously position themselves as subjects in the framework of the discourses. As a result, the variety of writers (as discourse practice) does not necessarily increase the variety in the content of the articles (text level).

However, especially in connection with societal changes the role of actors in connection with discourses still acquires importance (see also Raik 2003, 27). The opinion articles were, especially in 1997 and 1998, largely dedicated to the issues that were dealt with in the official accession process and presented by those who were familiar with or involved in this process. This way only a very limited group of people had legitimacy to write about the EU issues and imagine Estonia as a candidate country (a new community) in the discourse of *Postimees*. At the same time, they were also forming a credible way of talking about the accession process with the probable consequence that those incapable of using the same language would be marginalized from the discussion (see also Moisio 2006, 460). Since the main categories of writers in the initial years of the accession process were Staff Journalists and Political Elite, the process is also an example of the general closeness of the media and the political elite of the country (see for example Kivikuru 1996a, 396).

Apart from the text level, discourse practice is linked to sociocultural practice. In Fairclough's (1995, 60) terms one would expect a creative discourse practice in connection with fluid and shifting sociocultural practice and a conventional discourse practice in relatively stable and fixed sociocultural practice. In the current study fluid and shifting although disciplining sociocultural practice is applicable to the formative moment. In this context Estonia as a candidate country is imagined and recognized by societal actors (creativity of discourse practice).

In *Postimees*, instead of a clearly dominant discourse in the Foucauldian sense (for example Harle and Moisio 2002, 45), a struggle between and inside three discourses can be depicted from the empirical data. Harle and Moisio (2002, 45) explain that giving up the idea of a dominant discourse could also mean that the political context of the discourses is forgotten. In the current case, however, the political context is communicated exactly by the struggle between the three rather equal discourses as well as inside each of them.

While understanding national identity as a normative process where the distinction between *us* and the internal as well as external Others is made, the struggle inside the discourses means that the norms, ordinarily taken for granted as truth become openly visible. More concretely, the question of 'who *we* are' is challenged both internally and externally by 'who *we* should become'. Internally, the question is about aiming to socialize readers into becoming rational, realist and informed citizens of the candidate country (see Chapter 6). Externally, in relation to the EU, the necessity to become European, independent or humble is emphasized in the pertinent discourses. A common aspect to both the internal and external construction is the open normativity in *Postimees*' articles that criticized the then state of order and

emphasized what should be done. As a result, the implicit claim of co-membership with the audience based on the solidarity between the paper and the audience (see Chapter 6) was flavored by the necessity to improve *us* and become someone else. It was accompanied by exclusion of the uninformed, emotional and illusionist citizens.

Nevertheless, while locating the discourse of *Postimees* as one but not the only discourse that maps Estonian EU accession process in the society, the strength of the discourses *in Postimees* can be connected to their institutionalization as well as appearance on the other societal forums (Fairclough [1989]2001, 33). As an example of intertextuality, *European Estonia* has the clearest links of the three discourses to the official accession process constructed by the decision makers of Estonia and the EU in official documents.

The usage of identity for legitimizing political decisions related to Estonia's EU accession process (Lagerspetz 1999, 388, see also Raik 2003, 64) is paradoxical in the case of media analysis. The presupposition that identity is constructed in the media texts (Billig 1995) means that the national identity stories and the EU accession as a political process are tightly interrelated in the analyzed articles. Therefore, the EU 'to do-lists' are present in the stories of *us* and consequently it is rather questionable, if the accession process can be legitimized by the same stories.

However, the idea of legitimation brings us to the question of how the public discussion and the public opinion are interlinked to each other at the everyday level. According to the opinion polls, most Estonians saw themselves in a more or less equal numbers as the carriers of Estonian as well as European identity (Kirch 2002, 94-95). Thus the idea of Estonia being European in a general sense is widely accepted. However, the attitude towards the EU was rather heterogeneous as well as contradictory during the accession process. This resulted in low public support towards Estonia's accession despite society in general recognizing the benefits of membership (Vetik 2003, 262 and Raik 2003, 166). Several studies have emphasized the responsibility of Estonia's political elite for this low level of public support whereas the current study points out the communication process between *Postimees* and its readers.

First, the connections between communication process and public opinion can be interpreted on the basis of the sequence of informing, explaining and listening. As the surveys conducted during the accession process show, the Estonian public's knowledge about the EU was rather weak (Pettai 2005, 48). Simultaneously, those who were more informed about the EU supported Estonia's membership (for example Kaasik 2001; Vetik 2003, 265 and Raik 2003, 153-154, 178). Therefore, in order to raise the level of support to join the EU, the logical conclusion was to inform people through the media, which was the most important information channel in EU issues (Kaasik 2001). There is no evidence *Postimees* consciously followed the guidance to get public informed. Nevertheless, the current study shows that in the articles the necessity of giving people information as well as avoiding irrelevant noise that

might just confuse them is emphasized. While the whole accession process was aiming at efficiency at the expense of politics (Raik 2003, 117-135), the idea of efficient informing was present also in the paper.

From the perspective of the “ideal audiences” (Fairclough 1995, 40) constructed by *Postimees*, subject position of responsible citizens rather than audience as consumers are formed (see also Fairclough [1989]2001, 41). On one hand it can be reasoned by the characteristic features of the newspaper as a medium whose entertainment capability is rather limited for instance, in comparison to the television. On the other hand, the EU accession process as a ‘national priority’ both in the official as well as in *Postimees* discourse minimizes the entertainment dimension.

In this process, however, the question is not just about constructing an audience for the newspaper on the basis of knowledge held about the readership (ideal drawn on the basis of what is known about the readers and their preferences) but also about consciously affecting the audience to make them ‘ideal’ subjects. The top-down strategy by *Postimees* in the EU accession process was to go beyond the norm of ensuring the audience followed the newspaper to ensuring the readers ‘lived up to the ideal’, which the newspaper defined as citizens who would vote in favour of EU membership. As with any top-down strategy the outcome implied the readership would read about as well as understand the EU issues (see also Kivikuru 1996 a, 394-395, 398, 403) and talk about the topics guided by the paper in the framework of the discourses. As Moisio (2006, 460) suggests criticism of top down processes that do not reflect the daily life practices of the people is justified.

Although in the EU referendum, called also a “test of domestic democracy” (Pettai and Ehin 2005, 9), the ‘correct’ outcome was achieved with (or despite) this kind of communication it is still important to note the inherent problems. The point that it was difficult to combine the ideal of effectiveness to the ideal of participatory citizens that slow down the accession process has been made in relation to the Estonia (Raik 2003, 117-135). However, apart from the problems related to the ideal of citizens’ participation, the efficiency of this kind of communication at a pragmatic level is open to doubt: might it simply lead to a sense of frustration. For example, Vetik et al. (2006) contend Euroscepticism is a reactive identity to the wholesale adoption of EU legislation without further dialogue between *us* and the Other. Similarly, the lack of dialogue between Eastern and Western Europe has been pointed out by Maria Mälksoo (2006). This study indicates similar lack of dialogue in the internal public discussion. One of the reasons is that also in general the messages of mass communication have been characterized as monologic to which the audience cannot directly contribute (Fairclough 1995, 40). However, current case highlights the differences between effective administering of the official EU accession process and the problems of applying the same efficiency to informing the public about the process (see Kivikuru (1996a, 393-394) for similar results in Finland’s EU accession process). Although Fairclough ([1989]2001, 171-172) argues that if people are daily obliged to occupy the

subject position of consumer, they will probably become consumers, the issue is not about actively informing people that they are now supposed to become consumers. Therefore, in this context, low EU support can be interpreted as an example of how people negotiate and also struggle their relationship with ideal subject positions. In terms of a power struggle, the imposition of power in the discourses (what should be done) leads to resistance (in the form of disagreement) (see also Fairclough [1989]2001, 57, 171-172).

The necessity to “bring the Union closer to its citizens” (Raik 2003, 150) was realized and debated in *Postimees* during the accession process. Therefore, it is not fair to talk about the intentional disregard of the citizens. Also in this “good old campaign”, as Kivikuru (1996a, 395) characterizes campaigns based on clear divisions between senders and recipients, discourses in the political agenda are easily taken as the basis for top-down media discussions. In the current study, however, the need to ‘bring the EU closer to the people’ was accompanied by downplaying everyday problems and labeling certain groups of people. Thus, even though the newspaper tried to deal with the questions that could presumably interest people it also let them know occasionally they could not be taken seriously.

Second, in the context of *Postimees*’ construction of Estonian national identity and its links to public opinion, the study shows that the paper communicated the same message in all three discourses. The current state (*being*) of the national identity is sufficiently flawed to be worthy of improvement (*becoming*), before the EU will welcome the nation into the club. According to Vetik (2003, 259-260) key topics dealt with in the EU related public discussion were economic development through market diversification and foreign investment as well as external security. The impact of ‘to do’ issues in these spheres on everyday life promoted the *No* vote (see Vetik 2003, 264).

The current study opened an alternative perspective on identity related to *being* (‘who we are’) and *becoming* (‘who we should become’). Emphasizing the notion of *becoming* over the notion of *being* does not give confidence and security and moreover undermines self-understanding. The study also shows the paradox in constructing a national identity requiring significant development in parallel to claiming that ‘Estonia as an EU member does not have to change much’.

The paradox indicates that in connection with ‘imagining’ Estonia as a candidate country the question about national vs. candidate country identity also deserves attention. More precisely, the issue is not a clear case, since neither the idea of imagining and establishing a community, nor of maintaining an existing one (see Edensor 2002) is directly applicable in current case. Rather the process can be depicted as a mixture of these two ideas, in which the national identity is challenged by the identity of a candidate country.

In this context, the temporality of the new community as a candidate country has to be emphasized since the main aim of Estonia was full permanent membership in the EU. Therefore, from the perspectives of both

Estonia and the EU as well as logic of the enlargement process, hastening the rate of development towards membership is eminently understandable. The key topics of this issue are the integration/enlargement discourses (Raik 2003, 112), the logic of enlargement/integration¹⁵⁸ (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009, 21) as a framework that conditions, constrains and enables democratic practices (Raik 2003, 112).

However, while scrutinizing the same process in the media from the identity perspective, the picture becomes more complicated. In the articles, in which the *us-versus-the Other* setting is formed, Estonia is dealt with as a candidate country that has to follow EU norms to become acceptable as quickly as possible. At the same time, 'Estonia' is not understood in the texts as a temporary community. Since no explicit distinction between these communities (Estonia, and Estonia as a candidate country) is made in *Postimees*, the contradiction between the national identity and the temporal identity of a candidate country becomes visible as tension between *being* and *becoming*. The idea that change is a pre-requisite for being accepted (*becoming*) as well as the temporality of the whole process (Estonia would not always be a candidate country), is incompatible to the general understanding of the national identity as a stable and durable concept. From the citizens' perspective it is rather difficult to identify oneself with something that is seen as both not good enough as well as temporary.

In order to evaluate the results of the research, the contra-arguments to, as well as the limitations of the study have to be recognized. The initial point is that I designed the study process to be as transparent as possible. Transparency is achieved by profound explaining of how the empirical data has been selected, and the discourses formed and analyzed.

Concerning the limitations of the study, I have considered alternative interpretations and defined the grounds for the preferred interpretations. Apart from that the study can be submitted for critical assessment (see also Raik 2003, 32). Even though a national daily paper offers a good possibility to analyze mainstream discourses, the nature of the paper excludes marginal discourses. Therefore, in the context with the conclusions drawn here, from the societal perspective the discourses are not exhaustive, since not everything and everybody is represented. The discourse analysis has focused on the meanings made possible by and present in *Postimees*, and not the alternative ones, which the same process excluded (see Foucault [1969]1972, 28).

In relation to the grounds for the preferred interpretations, as well as possible alternatives, choices were made during the phases of the study, such as the decision to focus on daily stories and not the master narratives as well as the EU as the Other instead of various Others. The empirical analysis' foci on the normativity of identity as well as the usage of IR theories are examples

¹⁵⁸ The "logic of enlargement/integration" is used also by Kristi Raik (2003, 117), however, not as a synonym to the discourse of enlargement/integration but as an applicant country's perspective of the EU and integration.

of preferred interpretation. In connection with sociocultural practice, the formative moment could have been replaced with a more concrete practice or analyzed on the basis of some other societal sources.

On that basis, the same study could have also been made from alternative perspectives. Instead of focusing on the relations between Estonia and the EU, the main focus could have been on the topics of the articles. Also if the theoretical basis (combination of international relations theories and understandings of Europeanisation) had been replaced by some other theoretical framework the focus of the study would have changed. For instance, if I had focused on a variety of spatial entities present in the articles, Estonia as Finno-Ugric or Estonia as Nordic identity stories (Feldman 2000, 416-418) could also have been found. Another example concerning all the Baltic countries, Miniotaite (2003, 210) writes that the political reality of the Baltic States may have been conceptualized on the basis of at least two competing discourses: the discourse of sovereignty and the integration discourse that both reflected distinct discursive practices. In her analysis, the integration discourse is tied to globalization, integration processes in the Baltic States and the politics of inclusion whereas the sovereignty discourse is related to the construction of nation-state identity and to the politics of exclusion. Therefore, her setting based on *Yes/No* division makes the basis of the discourses distinct from these of *European Estonia* and *Independent Estonia*.

Also the way national identity as a process is analyzed in the current study can be criticized. First, it can be asked if the results would have changed, had the data for 1999, 2000 and 2001 been included. Although, a more detailed picture of Estonian accession process would have been depicted, the added value of this more detailed picture is not that clear, since no great differences between the beginning and the end of the accession process were depicted in the current study. Therefore, taking into account the work-economic aspect, inclusion of the articles from all years of the accession process did not seem an optimal solution.

Second, focusing on the process means that the aspects of the national identity, in the form of what the identity is made of with a potential focus on ethnic and civic side (see Section 2.1) is given less attention, partly because the stories of *us* formed on a daily basis do not necessarily focus on what have been characterized as aspects of the national identity (Pääbo 2011). This enables the question to be asked if media texts are necessarily the best empirical data for scrutinizing national identity aspects. Additionally, the aspects of Estonian national identity have been analyzed in other studies that all have emphasized largely the same issues (for example Kirch and Kirch 2001; Pääbo 2011).

At the same time the current study did manage to deal with the topic that has received less attention, the relationship between the aspects of national identity and the banal everyday stories present in the media texts. Even though the newspaper focuses on the everyday issues and does not explicitly deal with the national identity, at a more general level the EU accession topics in the

paper fairly closely followed the line of Estonian national identity aspects. In some cases, mutual understanding of the topics prevailed whereas some other issues were heavily debated. For example, educational issues were mostly dealt with by the representatives of universities and the general understanding about their importance was clear. Also in the context of language, citizenship and foreign policy issues a strong internal consensus can be depicted against external pressure. Rural issues, on the other hand, focused on agriculture and in the beginning of the accession process also internal confrontation. Therefore, the notion that competitions between the political constructions of state and national identity typically play themselves out through debates on 'Europe' is rather suitable also to the current situation (Wæver 2002).

Additionally, one can ask if the relationship between the daily debate and national narratives can be seen as an interaction between the more stable 'core' and the flexible 'outer sphere' of identity issues (Kivikuru 2004, 26). On the basis of this logic, variety of 'core issues' were discussed in the 'outer sphere'. It is possible that as a result of these debates, 'core issues' do, occasionally, get updated. It is also possible that the same 'core issue' lies behind a variety of daily stories between *us* and Others.

Third, while focusing on the construction of the national identity that appeared in *Postimees*, two important aspects, those of recognition and reception have been omitted from the direct scope of this research, since the media texts offer only an indirect access to both. Analyzing how the EU as the Other recognizes Estonia on the basis of Estonian media texts gives access to the perception of the EU's recognition, which is included in this study. Similarly, I find it problematic to draw any causal conclusions about the identity constructed in the media texts and the reception of this story by the people (see also Madianou 2005). Thus, instead of causal connections, I have linked these two together on the basis of wider societal framework that includes public opinion about the EU during the accession process.

Fourth, one more issue to be reflected on is the choice of discourse analysis not quantitative content analysis or a combination of both for a substantial corpus of empirical data (1780 articles)¹⁵⁹. In this context the question if and how the results of this study can be generalized is relevant. Since the sample included all the opinion articles from four years, the three discourses and the internal struggle found in the texts are indeed characteristic to the public discussion held in *Postimees* at that time. Apart from that I claim that due to the small size and homogeneity of the Estonian media market the results fairly characterize the general public discussion held in Estonian language national media during the EU accession process.

Since the literature review of this study has first and foremost focused on 'case Estonia', a question about the wider framework can be asked. Over the course of the EU's existence over twenty new member countries have passed through one form or another of the continually developing accession process.

¹⁵⁹ See Lotta Lounasmeri (2010) doctoral dissertation for a similar example.

Consequently, analyses similar to the current study have been conducted amongst member states. Logically there are aspects universal to the process. For example, the media and public opinion during Finland's EU accession process indicates rather similar results: the media's clear support towards the EU accession process; concern that people are capable of making 'right' decision; the necessity to inform the public; and as a result a mass media monologue to ensure the efficiency of the process and to keep it under control (see Kivikuru 1996a). Media trends are not, however, the only aspect that are universal in the EU's accession process. The setting of being for or against membership as the main issue during the process is the basis for what Daniel Esparza (2010) has depicted as the EU being both a positive and negative Other on the basis of Czech example. Also the three discourses of this study emphasize the ambivalence of the EU.

A common trend in the EU accession process of the Central and Eastern European countries can be depicted also when comparing the results of this study to those made, for example about Slovenia or Croatia who 'left the Balkans to rejoin Europe' (Lindstrom 2003). Also, similar to Estonia, Poland's accession to the EU was regarded as a 'return to Europe', not only in the geographical sense, but also in the sense that it served to reaffirm Poland's European identity (Killingsworth et al. 2010, 358). Simultaneously, the semi-Europeaness of the Central and Eastern European countries communicated by the EU is seen to challenge the idea of 'return' (see Section 3.1).

In the current study, depicting the EU accession as an example of the formative moment enables the researcher to see the link between the actual accession process that ended with EU membership and the construction of the identity in relation to the EU as wider process that did not end at the point when membership was gained. Here it is also important to note that formative moments do not exist independently of the societal actors because media have an important role in mapping certain periods as special ones for being able to deal with certain developments in this particular framework.

For the further analysis, this study offers interesting starting points. In addition to the qualitative analysis used in the current study, the data gathered can be analyzed quantitatively for being able to statistically show the trends and developments during the accession process. This thesis also provides a good foundation for a broader study to investigate identity construction across other national titles during the accession process. Last but not least, a worthy topic for future analysis is a comparison of the 'Other' group of writers (see Section 3.2) with the four categories involved in this study: Journalists, Political and Cultural Elite and Readers.

The results of the thesis can also be compared to the post-accession period. For example the question, what happened to the open normativity in the public discussion after Estonia gained membership deserves further attention. One can also ask about the development of the discourses during Estonian membership: since the official goal to become European in a form of EU

membership has been achieved, its impact on the discourses in the media can be scrutinized.

REFERENCES

- Aalto, P. & Berg, E. (2002) "Spatial Practices and Time in Estonia: From Post-Soviet Geopolitics to European Governance." *Space and Polity* 6: 253–270.
- Aalto, P. (2006) *European Union and the Making of a Wider Northern Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Abdelal, R., Herrera, Y. M., Johnston, A. I. & McDermott, R. (2009) *Measuring Identity: a Guide for Social Scientist*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Agnew J. & Corgridge S. (1995) *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*. London: Routledge.
- Alasuutari, P. & Ruuska, P. (1999) "Johdanto [Introduction]." In P. Alasuutari & P. Ruuska (Eds) *Post-Patria? Globalisaation kulttuuri Suomessa* [Post-Patria? Culture of Globalization in Finland], pp. 11-30; Tampere: Vastapaino.
- Anderson, B. [1983](2006) *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso.
- Anttonen, V. (1993) "Pysy Suomessa Pyhänä – Onko Suomi uskonto? [Stay Holy in Finland – is Finland Religious?]" In T. Korhonen (Ed.) *Mitä on suomalaisuus?* [What is Finnishness?], pp. 33-67; Helsinki: Suomen Antropologinen Seura.
- Bakhtin, M. (1986) *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Balčytienė, A., Raeymaeckers, K. & Vartanova, E. (2011) "Changing Practices of Journalism." In J. Trappel, W. A. Meier, A. Werner, L. d'Haenes, J. Steemes & B. Thomass (Eds) *Media in Europe Today*, pp. 221-233; Chicago: Intellect.
- Bauman, Z. (1993) *Postmodern ethics*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bauman, Z. (1997) *Sosiologinen ajattelu* [Thinking Sociologically]. Tampere: Vastapaino.
- Bennington, G. (1990) "Postal Politics and the Institution of the Nation." In H. K. Bhabha (Ed.) *Nation and Narration*, pp. 121- 137; London and New York: Routledge.
- Berg, E. (2002) "Local Resistance, National Identity and Global Swings in Post-Soviet Estonia." *Europe-Asia Studies* 54: 109–122.
- Berg, E. & Oras, S. (2002) "Eesti mõttelise asendi kaardistamisest. [Mapping Mental Location of Estonia]" In E. Berg (Ed.) *Eesti tähendusel, piirid ja kontekstid* [Estonian Meanings, Borders and Contexts], pp. 19-65; Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli kirjastus.
- Berg, E. & Oras, S. (2000) "Writing Post-Soviet Estonia onto the World Map." *Political Geography* 19: 601-625.
- Berg, E. (2003) "Some Unintended Consequences of Geopolitical Reasoning in Post-Soviet Estonia: Texts and Policy Streams, Maps and Cartoons." *Geopolitics* 8: 101-120.

- Berg, E. (2007) "Where East Meets the West? Baltic States in Search of New Identity." In T. Hayashi, & H. Fukuda (Eds) *Regions in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present*, pp. 49-67; Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University.
- Bhabha, H. K. (1990) "DissemiNation: time, narrative, and the margins of modern nation'." In H. K. Bhabha (Ed.) *Nation and Narration*, pp. 291-322; London and New York: Routledge.
- Billig, M. (1995) *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage Publications.
- Bishop, H. & Jaworski, A. (2003) "We beat 'em': Nationalism and the Hegemony of Homogeneity in the British Press Reportage of Germany Versus England during Euro 2000." *Discourse & Society* 14: 243-271.
- Bolcu, C. A. (2012) "Global NATO: An Identity Based Account of the Alliance in the 21st Century." *Romanian Review of International Studies* IV: 17-46.
- Browning, C. S. (2008) *Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis: A Case Study of Finland*. Peter Lang: Switzerland.
- Browning, C. S. (2005) "Introduction: Remaking Europe in the Margins." In C. S. Browning (Ed.) *Remaking Europe in the Margins: Northern Europe After the Enlargements*, pp. 1-12; Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Browning, C. & Joenniemi, P. (2004) "Introduction. The Challenges of EU and NATO Enlargement." *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association* 39: 227-231.
- Brubaker, R. & Frederick C. (2000) "Beyond Identity." *Theory and Society* 29: 1-47.
- Calhoun, C. (1994) "Nationalism and Civil Society: Democracy, Diversity and Self-Determination." In C. Calhoun (Ed.) *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*, pp. 304-336; Oxford, UK and Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1994.
- Carey, J. (1989) *Communication as Culture. Essays on Media and Society*. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Chouliaraki, L. & Fairclough, N. (1999) *Discourse in Late Modernity. Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Citrin, J., Wong, C. & Duff, B. (2001) "The Meaning of American National Identity'." In R.D. Ashmore, L. Jussim & D. Wilder (Eds) *Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict and Conflict Resolution*, pp. 71-101; Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Connor, W. (1993) "Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethno-National Bond." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 163: 373-389.
- Dayan D. & Katz, E. (1992) *Media Events: the Live Broadcasting of History*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- De Cillia, R., Reisgl, M. & Wodak R. (1999) "The Discursive Construction of National Identities." *Discourse and Society* 10: 149-173.
- De Levita, D. J. (1965) *The Concept of Identity*. Paris and the Hague: Mouton & Co.
- Edensor, T. (2002) *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life*. Oxford: Berg Publishers.

- Ehin, P. & Berg, E. (2009) "Incompatible Identities? Baltic-Russian Relations and the EU as an Arena for Identity Conflict." In E. Berg & Ehin P. (Eds) *Identity and Foreign Policy. Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration*, pp. 1-14; Farnham: Ashgate.
- Eide, M. & Hernes, G. (1987) *Dod og pine! Om massemedia og helsepolitikk* [Death and Suffering: On Mass Media and the Politics of Health]. Oslo: Fafo.
- Esparza, D. (2010) "National Identity and the Other: Imagining the EU from the Czech Lands." *Nationalities Papers* 38: 413-436.
- Fairclough, N. (2010) *Critical Discourse Analysis. The Critical Study of Language*. Harlow: Pearson Education.
- Fairclough, N. [1992](2003) *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Fairclough, N. (2006) *Language and Globalization*. London: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. [1989](2001) *Language and Power*. Harlow: Longman.
- Fairclough, N. (1995) *Media Discourse*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Feldman, G. (2000) "Shifting the Perspective on Identity Discourse in Estonia." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 31: 406-428.
- Feldman, M. (2001) "European Integration and the Discourse of National Identity in Estonia." *National Identities* 3: 5-21.
- Ferreira, M. F. (2006) "Nation as Narration: the (De)Construction of "Yugostalgia" through Kusturica's Cinematic Eye." *Comunicação and Cultura* 1: 135-155.
- Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K. (1998) "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organisation* 52: 887-917.
- Fiske, J. [1982](1990) *Introduction to Communication Studies*. London: Routledge.
- Flockhart, T. (2008) "The Europeanisation of Europe: the Transfer of Norms to Europe, in Europe and from Europe." *DIIS Working Paper* no 7.
- Foucault, M. [1969](1972) *The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. [1975](1979) *Discipline and Punish*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Foucault, M. (1981) *History of Sexuality*, Vol. 1. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Foucault, M. [1976](1980) *Two lectures*. In C. Gordon (Ed.) *Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 by Michel Foucault*, pp. 78-108; New York: Pantheon Books.
- Friis, K. (2000) "From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths." *Peace and Conflict Studies* 7: 1-16.
- Galbreath, D. (2005) *Nation-Building and Minority Politics in Post-Socialist States: Interests, Influence and Identities in Estonia and Latvia*. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag.
- Gellner, E. (1996) "The Coming of Nationalism and its Interpretation." In G. Balakrishnan (Ed.) *Mapping the Nation*, pp. 98-145; London: Verso.
- Gellner, E. (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.

- Groeneveld, M. (2012) *The Role of the State and Society Relationship in the Foreign Policy Making Process*. PhD diss., University of Tartu.
- Guibernau, M. (2004) "Anthony D. Smith on nations and national identity: a critical assessment." *Nations and Nationalism*, 10: 125-141.
- Haavisto, C. (2011) "Conditionally One of 'Us' : A Study of Print Media, Minorities and Positioning Practices." PhD diss., University of Helsinki.
- d'Haenens, L. and Mattelart, T. (2011) "Media and Ethnic Minorities." In J. Trappel, W. A. Meier, L. d'Haenes, J. Steems & B. Thomass (Eds) *Media in Europe Today*, pp. 235-250; Chicago: Intellect.
- Hall, S. (1996) "Introduction: Who needs 'Identity'?" In S. Hall & P. du Gay (Eds) *Questions of Cultural Identity*, pp. 1-17; London: Sage Publications.
- Hall S. (1992) "The Question of Cultural Identity." In T. McGrew, S. Hall & D. Held (Eds) *Modernity and Its Futures*, pp. 273-326; Polity Press and Open University.
- Hall, S. [1997](2003) "The Spectacle of the 'Other'". In S. Hall (Ed.) *Representation. Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*. pp. 225-279; London: Sage Publications.
- Halliday, M. A. K. (1978) *Language as a Social Semiotic. The Social Interpretation of Language and Meaning*. Edward Arnold.
- Hansen, L. (2002) "Introduction." In L. Hansen & O. Wæver (Eds) *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States*, pp. 1-19; London: Routledge.
- Harle, V. & Moisio, S. (2002) "Kansallisen identiteettiprojektin teoria odottaa haastajaansa: vastine Joni Virkkuselle [Theory of National Identity Project Waits for a Challenger: Reply to Joni Virkkunen]." *Terra* 114: 44-46.
- Harle, V. & Moisio, S. (2000) *Missä on Suomi? Kansallisen identiteettipolitiikan historia ja geopolitiikka* [Where is Finland? History and Geopolitics of National Identity Policy]. Vastapaino: Tampere.
- Harle, V. (1991) "The Role of the "Enemy" in the European Idea and Cultural Legacy." In U. Vesa & I.S. Andreeva (Eds) *European Security and Cultural Values*, pp. 106-130; Tampere: Tapri.
- Haukenes, K. & Freyberg-Inan, A. (2013) "Enforcing Consensus? The Hidden Bias in EU Democracy Promotion in Central and Eastern Europe." *Democratization* 20: 1268-1296.
- Heikkilä, H. & Kunelius, R. (2006) "Journalists Imagining the European Public Sphere. Professional Discourses about the EU News. Practices in Ten Countries." *Javnost/The Public* 13: 63-80.
- Herd, G. P. & Löfgren, J. (2001) "'Societal Security', the Baltic States and EU Integration." *Cooperation and Conflict* 36: 273-396.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1992) *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. Cambridge: Canto.
- Hobson, J. M. (2004) *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hopf, T. (2009) "Identity Relations and the Sino-Soviet Split." In R. Abdelal, Y.M. Herrera, A.I. Johnston & R. McDermott (Eds) *Measuring Identity: A*

- Guide for Social Scientists*, pp. 279-315; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hörschelmann, K. (2001) "Breaking Ground—Marginality and Resistance in (Post)-Unification Germany." *Political Geography* 20: 981–1004.
- Horelt, M-A. & Renner, J. (2008) "Denting a Heroic Picture. A Narrative Analysis of Collective Memory in Post-War Croatia." *Perspectives* 16: 5-27.
- Høyer, S., Lauk, E. & Vihalemm, P. (1993) *Towards a Civic Society. The Baltic Media's Long Road to Freedom. Perspectives on History, Ethnicity and Journalism*. Tartu: Nota Baltica.
- Hroch, M. (1985) *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Huntington, S. P. (1993) "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* Summer: 22-49.
- Jaanson, K. (1999) "Eesti asend riikidevahelistes suhetes [Estonian Location in Interstate Relations]." In R. Vetik (Ed.) *Eesti inimarengu aruanne [Estonian Human Development Report]*, pp. 16-19; Tallinn.
- Jakniūnaitė, D. (2009) "Neighbourhood politics of Baltic States: between the EU and Russia." In E. Berg & P. Ehin (Eds) *Identity and foreign policy: Baltic-Russian relations and European integration*, pp. 117-131; Farnham: Ashgate.
- Jakubowicz, K. & Sükösd, M. (2008) "Twelve Concepts Regarding Media System Evolution and Democratization in Post-Communist Societies." In K. Jakubowicz & M. Sükösd (Eds) *Finding the Right Place on the Map. Central and Eastern European Media Change in a Global Perspective*, pp. 9-40; Bristol, UK/Chicago: Intellect Books.
- Jansen, S. C. (2012) "Redesigning a Nation: Welcome to Estonia 2001-2018." In N. Kaneva (Ed.) *Branding Post-Communist Nations: Marketizing National Identities in the 'New' Europe*, pp. 79-98; London: Routledge.
- Jenkins, B. & Sofos, S. A. (1996) *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Jokinen, A. & Juhila, K. (1991) *Diskursseja rakentamassa: Näkökulmia sosiaalisten käytäntöjen tutkimukseen [Building the Discourses: Perspectives to the Research of Social Practices]*. Tampere: Tampereen yliopisto.
- Jokinen, K. & Saaristo, K. (2002) *Suomalainen yhteiskunta [Finnish Society]*. Helsinki: WSOY.
- Jonsson, D. K. (2006) *Situations of Opportunity for Infrasystems. Understanding and pursuing change towards environmental sustainability*. Stockholm: US AB.
- Kaasik, S. (2001) "Ajakirjanduse võim ja vastutus [Power and Responsibility of Journalism]." In R. Vetik (Ed.) *Euroopa Liit ja Eesti avalik arvamus [European Union and Public Opinion in Estonia]*, pp. 82-96; Tartu, Tartu University Press.
- Kaasik-Krogerus, S. (2007) "Muutuste ja jätkuvuse aeg. Euroopa Liidu teemalise diskussiooni võrdlev analüüs ajalehtedes Postimees ja Helsingin

- Sanomat [Time of Changes and Continuity. Comparative Study of European Union Related Discussion in Newspapers Postimees and Helsingin Sanomat].” In A. Pulver (Ed.) *Interdistsiplinaarsus sotsiaalteadustes II: Eesti sotsiaalteaduste VI aastakonverents: 4.-5. november 2005 Tallinna Ülikoolis: artiklite kogumik* [Interdisciplinary in Social Sciences II: VI Annual Conference of Estonian Social Sciences, November 4-5, 2005, University of Tallinn: Reader], pp. 355-367; Tallinn: TLÜ Kirjastus.
- Kangas, A. (2008) “Chivalry, Mimesis and “Machiavellianism”: Inquiry into the Interwar Finnish Political Imaginary on Russia.” *International Political Anthropology* 1: 231-254.
- Kantola, A. (2010) “The Disciplined Imaginary. The Nation Rejuvenated for the Global Condition.” In A. Roosvall & I. Salovaara-Moring (Eds) *Communicating the Nation. National Topographies of Global Media Landscapes*, pp. 230-251; Nordicom: Göteborg.
- Kantola, A., Moring, I. & Väliverronen, E. (1998) ”Miten mediaa luetaan? [How to read a Media?]” In A. Kantola, I. Moring & E. Väliverronen (Eds) *Media-analyysi - tekstistä tulkintaan* [Media Analysis: from Text to Interpretation], pp. 5-12; Lahti: Helsingin yliopiston Lahden tutkimus- ja koulutuskeskus.
- Kantola, A. (2007) “On the Dark Side of Democracy: the Global Imaginary of Financial Journalism”. In B. Cammaerts & N. Carpentier (Eds) *Reclaiming the media. Communication rights and democratic media roles*, pp. 192-215; Bristol: Intellect.
- Kantola, A. (1998) ”Vaara sisällämme. Historiallinen dokumentti hallinnan tekstinä [Danger within Us. Historical Documentary as a Text of Control]” In M. Keränen (Ed.) *Kansallisvaltion kielioppi* [Grammar of the Nation State], pp. 49-63; Jyväskylä: Sphi.
- Kasekamp, A. (2013) “Estonia. Eager to Set an Example in Europe.” In M. Baun & D. Marek (Eds) *The New Member States and the European Union Foreign Policy and Europeanisation*, pp. 99-111; London and New York: Routledge.
- Katz, E. & Tamar, L. (2007) “‘No More Peace!’: How Disaster, Terror and War Have Upstaged Media Events.” *International Journal of Communication* 1: 157-166.
- Katzenstein, P. J. (1997) “The Smaller European States, Germany and Europe.” In P.J. Katzenstein (Ed.) *Tamed Power. Germany in Europe*, pp. 251-304; Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Keohane, R. (1996) “International Relations, Old and New.” In R. E. Goodin & H-D. Klingemann (Eds) *A New Handbook of Political Science*, pp. 462-478; Oxford University Press.
- Killingsworth, M., Malgorzata, K. & Auer, S. (2010) “Where Does Poland Fit in Europe? How Political Memory Influences Polish MEPs’ Perceptions of Poland’s Place in Europe.” *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 11: 358–375.
- Kirch, A. & Kirch, M. (2001) “National and European Identities: The View from Estonia.” In P. Drulak (Ed.) *National and European Identities in EU Enlargement. Views from Central and Eastern Europe*, pp. 129-144; Institute of International Relations: Prague.

- Kirch, M. (2002) "Eesti ja Euroopa identiteet [Estonia and European Identity]." In A. Valk (Ed.) *Eesti ja eestlased võrdlevas perspektiivis. Kultuuridevahelisi uurimusi 20. sajandi lõpust* [Estonia and Estonians in Comparative Perspective. Intercultural Studies from the End of 20th century], pp. 87-101; Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus.
- Kivikuru, U. (2004) "Identities. An Apparatus for Re-membering and Dis-membering." In K. Riegert (Ed.) *News of the Other: Tracing Identity in Scandinavian Constructions of the Eastern Baltic Sea Region*, pp. 19-41; Göteborg: Nordicom.
- Kivikuru, U. (1996a) "Epilogi. Uutta ja vanhaa, vähän sinistä ja vähän lainattua... [Epilogue. Old and New, a Bit of Blue and a Bit of Borrowed...]" In U. Kivikuru (Ed.) *Kansa euromyllyssä* [Nation in Euro-Mill], pp. 393-403; Helsinki: Yliopistopaino.
- Kivikuru, U. (1996b) "Suomalaisen kansalaisyhteiskunnan premissit [Premises of Finnish Civic Society]." In U. Kivikuru (Ed.) *Kansa euromyllyssä* [Nation in Euro-Mill], pp. 5-26; Helsinki: Yliopistopaino.
- Knudsen, B. T. (2010) "The Nation as Media Event." In A. Roosvall & I. Salovaara-Moring (Eds) *Communicating the Nation. National Topographies of Global Media Landscapes*, pp. 41-58; Nordicom: Göteborg.
- Kohn, H. (1965) *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*. Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand.
- Korhonen, P. (1999) "Naming Spaces." *Fennia* 177: 123-136.
- Kunelius, R. (1996) "The News, Textually Speaking. Writings on News Journalism and Journalism Research." PhD diss., University of Tampere.
- Kuus, M. (2002a) "European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia: A Quest for Security." *Journal of Peace Research* 39: 91-108.
- Kuus, M. (2004a) "Europe's Eastern Expansion and the Reinscription of Otherness in East-Central Europe." *Progress in Human Geography* 28: 472-489.
- Kuus, M. (2007a) *Geopolitics Reframed. Security and Identity in Europe's Eastern Enlargement*. Palgrave MacMillan.
- Kuus, M. (2007b) "Intellectuals and Geopolitics: The 'Cultural Politicians' of Central Europe." *Geoforum* 38: 241-251.
- Kuus, M. (2003) "Security in Flux: International Integration and the Transformations of Threat in Estonia." *Demokratizatsiya* 11: 573-595.
- Kuus, M. (2002b) "Sovereignty for Security?: The Discourse of Sovereignty in Estonia." *Political Geography* 21: 393-412.
- Kuus, M. (2008) "Svejkian Geopolitics: Subversive Obedience in Central Europe." *Geopolitics* 13: 257-277.
- Kuus, M. (2004b) "Those Goody-Goody Estonians!: Toward Rethinking Security in the European Union Applicant States". *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 22: 191-207.
- Kuus, M. (2002c) "Toward Cooperative Security? International Integration and the Construction of Security in Estonia". *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 31: 297-317.

- Laclau, E. (1996) *Emancipation(s)*. London: Verso.
- Lagerspetz, M. (1996) "Constructing Post-Communism: a Study in the Estonian Social Problems Discourse." PhD diss., University of Turku.
- Lagerspetz, M. (1999) "Postsocialism as a Return: Notes on a Discursive Strategy." *East European Politics and Societies* 13: 377-390.
- Lagerspetz, M. & Vogt, H. (2004) "Estonia." In S. Berglund, J. Ekman & F. H. Aarebrot (Eds) *The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe*, pp. 57-93; Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Laitin, D. D. (1998) *Identity in Formation: the Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Lasswell, H. (1948) "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society", In B. Lyman (Ed.) *The Communication of Ideas*, pp. 37-51; New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies.
- Lauk, E. (1996) "Estonian Journalists in Search of New Professional Identity." *Javnost/The Public*, 3, 4: 93-106.
- Lauk, E. (2008) "How Will It All Unfold? Media Systems and Journalism Cultures in Post-Communist Countries." In K. Jakubowicz & M. Sükösd (Eds) *Finding the Right Place on the Map. Central and Eastern European Media Change in a Global Perspective*, pp. 193-212; UK/Chicago: Intellect Books.
- Lauristin, M. (1997) "Contexts of Transition." In M. Lauristin, P. Vihalemm, K. E. Rosengren & L. Weibull (Eds) *Return to the Western World. Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transition*, pp. 25-40; Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Lauristin, M. (2003) "Social Contradictions Shadowing Estonia's "Success Story"". *Democratizatsiya* 11: 601-616.
- Lauristin, M. & Vihalemm, P. (2009) "The Political Agenda During Different Periods of Estonian Transformation: External and Internal Factors." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 40: 1-28.
- Lauristin, M. & Vihalemm, P. (1997a) "Recent Historical Developments in Estonia: Three Stages of Transition (1987-1997)." In M. Lauristin, P. Vihalemm, K. E. Rosengren & L. Weibull (Eds) *Return to the Western World. Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transition*, pp. 73-126; Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Lauristin, M. & Vihalemm, P. (1997b) *Return to the Western World. Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transition*. Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Lauristin, M. & Vihalemm, P. (2002) "The Transformation of Estonian Media and Society: 1987-2001." In P. Vihalemm (Ed.) *Baltic Media in Transition*, pp. 17-64; Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Lehti, M. (1998) "The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads. Political, Economic, and Legal Problems in the Context of International Cooperation on the Doorstep of the 21st Century." In T. Jundzis (Ed.) *A collection of scholarly articles*, pp. 391-404; Academy of Sciences of Latvia: Riga.
- Lehti, M. (2006) "Eastern or Western, New or False? Classifying the Balts in the Post-Cold War Era." In F. Tassinari, P. Joenniemi & U. Jakobsen (Eds)

- Wider Europe: Nordic and Baltic Lessons to Post-Enlargement Europe*, pp. 69-88; København: C. A. Reitzel.
- Lehti, M. (2003a) "Geopoliittisen mielikuvituksen tutkimus: tilan ja ajan hallinnan politiikka [Study of Geopolitical Imagination: the Politics of Controlling Space and Time]." In V. Harle & S. Moisio (Eds) *Muuttuva geopoliittikka* [Changing Geopolitics], pp. 110-129; Tampere: Gaudeamus.
- Lehti, M. (2003b) "Possessing a Baltic Europe. Retold National Narratives in the European North." In M. Lehti & D. J. Smith (Eds) *Post-Cold War Identity Politics. Northern and Baltic Experiences*, pp. 11-48; London and Portland: Frank Cass.
- Lehti, M. (1999) "Sovereignty Redefined: Baltic Co-operation and the Limits of National Self-Determination." *Working Papers 12*, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute.
- Lehtonen, M. & Koivunen, A. (2010) "Kansalainen minä: median ihannesubjektit ja suostumuksen tuottaminen [Citizen Me: Ideal Subjects of the Media and the Production of Consent]." In P. Pietikäinen (Ed.) *Valta Suomessa* [Power in Finland], pp. 231-252; Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Light, D. (2001) "Facing the Future: Tourism and Identity Building in Post-Socialist Romania." *Political Geography* 20: 1053-1074.
- Lindstrom, N. (2003) "Between Europe and the Balkans: Mapping Slovenia and Croatia's "Return to Europe" in the 1990s." *Dialectical Anthropology* 27: 313-329.
- Lounasmeri, L. (2010) "Kansallisen konsensuskulttuurin jäljillä: Globalisaatioajan Suomi Helsingin Sanomissa [On the Trail of National Consensus Culture: Finland of the Time of Globalization in Helsingin Sanomat]." PhD diss., University of Helsinki.
- Lund, A. B., Raeymaeckers, K. & Trappel, J. (2011) "Newspapers: Adapting and Experiencing." In J. Trappel, W. A. Meier, L. d'Haenes, J. Steemes & B. Thomass (Eds) *Media in Europe Today*, pp. 43-60; Chicago: Intellect.
- Made, V. (2003) "Estonia and Europe: A Common Identity or an Identity Crisis?." In M. Lehti & D. J. Smith (Eds) *Post-Cold War Identity Politics. Northern and Baltic Experiences*, pp. 183-198; London: Frank Cass.
- Madianou, M. (2005) *Mediating the Nation. News, Audiences and the Politics of Identity*. UCL Press.
- Mälksoo, M. (2004) "Enabling NATO Enlargement: Changing Constructions of the Baltic States". *Trames: Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 8: 284-298.
- Mälksoo, M. (2006) "From Existential Politics Towards Normal Politics? The Baltic States in the Enlarged Europe." *Security Dialogue* 37: 275-297.
- Mälksoo, M. (2009) "Liminality and Contested Europeaness: Conflicting Memory Politics in the Baltic Space." In E. Berg & P. Ehin (Eds) *Identity and Foreign Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations in the Context of European Integration*, Aldershot: Ashgate: Ashgate Publishing.
- Manners, I. (2008) "The Normative Ethics of the European Union." *International Affairs* 84: 45-60.
- Manners, I. (2002) "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *JCMS* 40: 235-258.

- Manners, I. (2006) "Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads." *Journal of European Public Policy* 13: 182–199.
- McIntosh, I., Sim, D. & Robertson, D. (2004) "We Hate the English, Except for You, Cos You're Our Pal' : Identification of the 'English' in Scotland." *Sociology* 38: 43-59.
- Merritt, M. (2000) "A Geopolitics of Identity: Drawing the Line Between Russia and Estonia." *Nationalities Papers* 28: 243-262.
- Michaels, D. L. & E. D. Stevick (2009) "Europeanisation in the 'Other' Europe: Writing the Nation into 'Europe' Education in Slovakia and Estonia." *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 41: 225-245.
- Mihelj, S. (2011) *Media Nations. Communicating Belonging and Exclusion in the Modern World*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Miniotaite, G. (2003) "Convergent Geography and Divergent Identities: A Decade of Transformation in the Baltic States." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 16: 209-222.
- Moisio, S. (2006) "Competing Geographies of Sovereignty, Regionality and Globalisation: The Politics of EU Resistance in Finland 1991–1994." *Geopolitics* 11: 439–464.
- Moisio, S. (2002) "EU Eligibility, Central Europe, and the Invention of Applicant State Narrative." *Geopolitics* 7: 89–116.
- Moisio, S. (2009) "Europe's Enlargements: Security, Identity and the New Politicogeographical Constellations." *Cooperation and Conflict* 44: 99–107.
- Moisio, S. (2008) "From Enmity to Rivalry? Notes on National Identity Politics in Competition States." *Scottish Geographical Journal* 124: 78-95.
- Moisio, S. (2003a) "Geopoliittinen kamppailu Suomen EU-jäsenyydestä [Geopolitical Struggle for Finnish EU Membership]." PhD diss., University of Turku.
- Moisio, S. (2003b) "Geopolitiikka kamppailuna [Geopolitics as Struggle]." In V. Harle & S. Moisio (Eds) *Muuttuva geopolitiikka [Changing Geopolitics]*, Tampere: Gaudeamus.
- Mole, R. (2012) *The Baltic States from the Soviet Union to the European Union: Identity, Discourse and Power in the Post-Communist Transition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*. London: Routledge.
- Mole, R. C. M. (2007a) "Discursive identities/Identity Discourses and Political Power." In R. C. M. Mole (Ed.) *Discursive constructions of identity in European politics*, pp. 1-24; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mole, R. C. M. (2007b) "Talking Security? The Discourse of European Identity in the Baltic States." In R. C. M. Mole (Ed.) *Discursive constructions of identity in European politics*, pp. 149-169; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Mörä, T. (1999) "EU- journalismin anatomia: Mediasisältöjä muokanneet tekijät ennen kansanäänestystä 1994 [Anatomy of EU-journalism: the Factors that Influenced the Content of the Media at the Time Preceding to the Referendum 1994]." PhD diss., University of Helsinki.

- Musial, K. (2009) "Reconstructing Nordic Significance in Europe on the Threshold of the 21st Century." *Scandinavian Journal of History* 34: 286-306.
- Nairn, T. (1977) *The Break up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism*. London: New Left Books.
- Neumann, I. B. (1999) *Uses of the Other. "The East" in European Identity Formation*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Nielsen, K. L., Berg, E. & Roll, G. (2009) "Undiscovered Avenues? Estonian Civil Society Organizations as Agents of Europeanisation." *Trames* 13: 248-264.
- Nyman-Metcalf, K. (2006) "Common Values as a Basis for Integration: Is there an End to Europe? The Baltic States as a Bridge Between Europe and Beyond." In A. Kasekamp & H. Pääbo (Eds) *Promoting Democratic Values in the Enlarging Europe: The Changing Role of the Baltic States from Importers to Exporters*, pp. 110-120; Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- O'Connor, B. (1993) "Myths and Mirrors: Tourist Images and National Identity." In B. O'Connor & M. Cronin (Eds) *Tourism in Ireland: A Critical Analysis*, pp. 68-85; Cork: Cork University Press.
- Pääbo, H. (2011) "Potential of Collective Memory Based International Identity Conflicts in Post-Imperial Space. Comparison of Russian Master Narratives with Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian Master Narratives." PhD diss., University of Tartu.
- Paju, T. (2004) "15 aastat Eesti meediaettevõtlast: meediaettevõtete teke ja meediaturu areng 1989-2004 [15 Years of Estonian Media Entrepreneurship: Emergence of Media Enterprises and the Development of Media Market 1989-2004]." In P. Vihalemm (Ed.) *Meediasüsteem ja meediakasutus Eestis 1965-2004 [Media System and Usage of the Media in Estonia 1965-2004]*, pp. 23-47; Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus.
- Pakkasvirta, J. & Saukkonen, P. (2005) "Nationalismi teoreetisen tutkimuksen kohteena [Nationalism as an Object of Theoretical Research]." In J. Pakkasvirta & P. Saukkonen (Eds) *Nationalismit [Nationalisms]*, pp. 13-46; WSOY: Helsinki.
- Palonen, K. (1997) *Kootut retoriikat. Esimerkkejä politiikan luennasta [Gathered Rhetorics. Examples of Reading Politics]*. SoPhi: Jyväskylä.
- Past, L. & Palk, P. (2005) "The referendum campaign: innovation and mobilization." In V. Pettai & P. Ehin (Eds) *Deciding on Europe. The EU referendum in Estonia*, pp. 63-88; Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Pavlovaite, I. (2003) "Being European by Joining Europe: Accession and Identity Politics in Lithuania." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 16: 239-255.
- Petersoo, P. (2007) "Reconsidering Otherness: Constructing Estonian identity." *Nations and Nationalism* 13: 117-133.
- Pettai, V. & Ehin, P. (2005) "Introduction: the Estonian EU referendum in context". In V. Pettai & P. Ehin (Eds) *Deciding on Europe: The EU referendum in Estonia*, pp. 7-21; Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Pettai, V. (2005) "Unfounded worries? Euroscepticism prior to the referendum." In V. Pettai & P. Ehin (Eds) *Deciding on Europe. The EU referendum in Estonia*, pp. 41-61; Tartu: Tartu University Press.

- Piirimäe, E. (2009) "Patriotism, rahvuslus, liberalism. Sissejuhatus [Patriotism, Nationalism, Liberalism. An Introduction]." In E. Piirimäe (Ed.) *Rahvuslus ja patriotism. Valik kaasaegseid filosoofilisi võtmetekste* [Nationalism and Patriotism. A Selection of Contemporary Philosophical Key Texts], pp. 9-53; Tartu: Eesti Keele Sihtasutus.
- Proedrou, F. (2010) "Ukraine's Foreign Policy: Accounting for Ukraine's Indeterminate Stance Between Russia and the West." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 10: 443-456.
- Pursiainen, C. (1998) *Beyond Sovietology. International Relations Theory and the Study of Soviet/Russian Foreign and Security Policy*. Ulkopoliittinen Instituutti: Helsinki.
- Radaelli, C. M. (2000) "Whither Europeanisation? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change." *European Integration Online Papers* (EIoP) 4: 8.
- Raik K. (2003) *Democratic Politics or the Implementation of Inevitabilities? Estonia's Democracy and Integration into the European Union*. Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Raik, K. (2006) "From Conditionality to Convergence?: EU Enlargement as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion." In A. Kasekamp & H. Pääbo (Eds) *Promoting Democratic Values in the Enlarging Europe: The Changing Role of the Baltic States from Importers to Exporters*, pp. 55-66; Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Raik, K. (2001) "Usaldamatus, sotsiaalsed raskused ja euroapaatia [Distrust, Social Hardship and Euro-Apathy]." In R. Vetik (Ed.) *Euroopa Liit ja Eesti avalik arvamus* [European Union and Public Opinion in Estonia], pp. 49-65; Tartu Ülikooli kirjastus: Tartu.
- Rantanen, P. (1997) *Suolatut säkeet: Suomen ja suomalaisten diskursiivinen muotoutuminen 1600-luvulta Topeliukseen* [Salted Strains: A Discursive Formation of Finland and Finns from 1600s until Topelius]. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura.
- Remy, J. (2005) "Onko modernisaatio vai etnisuus kansakuntien perusta? [Is Modernization or Ethnicity a Basis of Nations]" In J. Pakkasvirta & P. Saukkonen (Eds) *Nationalismit* [Nationalisms], pp. 48-69; WSOY: Helsinki.
- Richardson, J. E. (2007) *Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Riegert, K. (2004) "Introduction." In K. Riegert (Ed.) *News of the Other: Tracing Identity in Scandinavian Constructions of the Eastern Baltic Sea Region*, pp. 9-16; Göteborg: Nordicom.
- Riegert, K. (2010) "National Television News of the World. Challenges and Consequences." In A. Roosvall & I. Salovaara-Moring (Eds) *Communicating the Nation. National Topographies of Global Media Landscapes*, pp. 195-213; Nordicom: Göteborg.
- Ringmar, E. (1996) *Identity, Interest and Action. A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Robins, K. & Morley, D. (1993) "Euroculture: Communications, Community and Identity in Europe." *Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal* 11: 387-410.

- Robinson, G. M., Engelstoft, S. & Pobric, A. (2001) "Remaking Sarajevo: Bosnian Nationalism After the Dayton Accord." *Political Geography* 20: 957-980.
- Rothstein, B. (1992) "Explaining Swedish Corporatism. The Formative Moment." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 15: 173-191.
- Roosvall, A. & Salovaara-Moring, I. (2010) "Introduction." In A. Roosvall & I. Salovaara-Moring (Eds) *Communicating the Nation. National Topographies of Global Media Landscapes*, pp. 9-21; Nordicom: Göteborg.
- Rosie, M., Petersoo, P., MacInnes, J., Condor, S. & Kennedy, J. (2006) "Mediating Which Nation? Citizenship and National Identities in the British Press." *Social Semiotics* 16: 327-344.
- Saks, K. (2002) "From Soviet to Market-Oriented: Organisational and Product Changes in Estonian Newspapers, 1988-2001." In P. Vihalemm (Ed.) *Baltic Media in Transition*, pp. 187-206; Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Salovaara-Moring, I. (2009) "Beyond East and West. Alternative Spheres of Journalism, Capitalism and Public." In I. Salovaara-Moring (Ed.) *Manufacturing Europe. Spaces of Democracy, Diversity and Communication*, pp. 97-116; Nordicom.
- Salovaara-Moring, I. (2006) "'Fortress Europe'. Ideological Metaphors of Media Geographies." In J. Falkheimer & A. Jansson (Eds) *Geographies of Communication. The Spatial Turn in Media Studies*, pp. 107-123; Göteborg: Nordicom.
- Salovaara-Moring, I. (2010a) "The Future is a Foreign Place. Topographies of Post-Communism, Nation and Media." In A. Roosvall & I. Salovaara-Moring (Eds) *Communicating the Nation. National Topographies of Global Media Landscapes*, pp. 105-123; Nordicom: Göteborg.
- Salovaara-Moring, I. (2010b) "What is Europe? Geographies of Journalism." In M. Sükösd & K. Jakubowicz (Eds) *Media, Nationalism, and European Identities*, pp. 49-71; Budapest, New York: Central European University Press.
- Saukkonen, P. (1996) "Identiteetti ja kansallinen identiteetti [Identity and National Identity]." *Kosmopolis* 26: 5-19.
- Saukkonen, P. (1999) *Suomi, Alankomaat ja kansallisvaltion identiteettipoliittikka. Tutkimus kansallisen identiteetin poliittisuudesta, empiirinen sovellutus suomalaisiin ja hollantilaisiin teksteihin* [Finland, the Netherlands and an Identity Policy of Nation State. Research about the Politics of National Identity, Empirical Implementation to Finnish and Dutch texts]. Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura: Helsinki.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2000) "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment." *European Journal of International Relations* 5: 109-139.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (1998) "NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation." *Security Studies*, 8: 198-234.
- Schimmelfennig, F. & Sedelmeier, U. (2005) "Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe." In F. Schimmelfennig & U. Sedelmeier (Eds) *The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe*, pp. 1-28; Ithaca, USA: Cornell University Press.

- Schimmelfennig, F. & Sedelmeier, U. (2002) "Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research Focus, Hypotheses, and the State of Research." *Journal of European Public Policy* 9: 500–528.
- Schlesinger, P. (1996) "Europeanisation and the Media. National identity and the Public sphere." In T. Slaatta (Eds) *Media and the Transition of Collective Identities: Papers from Research Symposium in Oslo 12-14 January, 1995*, pp. 163-205; Oslo: University of Oslo.
- Schlesinger, P. (1991) *Media, State and Nation: Political Violence and Collective Identities*. London: Sage Publications.
- Schlesinger, P. (2000) "The Nation and Communicative Space." In H. Tumber (Ed.) *Media Power, Professionals and Politics*, pp. 99-115; London: Routledge.
- Schmitt, C. (1996) *The Concept of the Political*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Šein, H. (2004) "Televisioon Eestis [Television in Estonia]." In P. Vihalemm (Ed.) *Meediasüsteem ja meediakasutus Eestis 1965-2004* [Media System and Usage of the Media in Estonia 1965-2004], pp. 121-208; Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2004.
- Sikk, A. & Ehin, P. (2005) "Explaining referendum votes: The results of an exit poll." In V. Pettai & P. Ehin (Eds) *Deciding on Europe. The EU referendum in Estonia*, pp. 23-38; Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Silverstein, B. (1989) "Enemy Images." *American Psychologist* 44: 903-913.
- Smith, A.D. (1991) *National Identity*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Smith, A. D. (1998) *Nationalism and Modernism: a Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*. London: Routledge.
- Smith, A. D. (1995) *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Smith, A.D. (2002) "When is a Nation?" *Geopolitics* 7:5-32.
- Smith, D. J. (2002) "One day there will be an Estonian state" In D. J. Smith, A. Pabriks, A. Purs & T. Lane (Eds) (Ed.) *The Baltic States. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*, pp. 1-32; London and New York: Routledge.
- Smith, F. M. (2001) "Refiguring the Geopolitical Landscape: Nation, 'Transition' and Gendered Subjects in Post-Cold War Germany." *Space and Polity* 5: 213–235.
- Smith, G. (1998) "Nation-Building and Political Discourses of Identity Politics in the Baltic States." In G. Smith, V. Law, A. Wilson, A. Bohr & E. All-Worth (Eds) *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities*, pp. 93-118; New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Snead, J. (1990) "European pedigrees/African contagions: nationality, narrative and communality in Tutuola, Achebe, and Reed." In H. K. Bhabha (Ed.) *Nation and Narration*, pp. 231-249; London and New York: Routledge.
- Soja, E. & Hooper, B. (1993) "The Spaces that Difference Makes. Some Notes on the Geographical Margins of the New Cultural Politics." In M. Keith & S. Pile (Eds) *Place and the Politics of Identity*, pp. 183-205; Routledge: London and New York.

- Stewart, S. (2006) "EU Support for Civil Society in the Baltic States." In A. Kasekamp & H. Pääbo (Eds) *Promoting Democratic Values in the Enlarging Europe: The Changing Role of the Baltic States from Importers to Exporters*, pp. 13-27; Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Suhonen, P. (1994) *Mediat, me ja ympäristö* [Media, Us and Environment]. Hanki ja jää: Helsinki.
- Sullivan, J. L., Fried, A. & Dietz, M. G. (1992) "Patriotism, Politics and the Presidential Election of 1988." *American Journal of Political Science* 36: 200-234.
- Tajfel, H. (1978) "The Achievement of Group Differentiation." In H. Tajfel (Ed.) *Differentiation Between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, pp. 268-287; London: Academic Press.
- Talts, M. (2000) "Eurodebatist Eesti meedias: probleemid ja osalejad [About the EU Debate in Esotnian Media: Problems and Participants]." *Riigikogu Toimetised* 2: 151-162.
- Talts, M. (2002) *Euroopa Liidu teemalise debati areng ja probleemid Eesti ajakirjanduses* [The Development and Problems of the EU Debate in Estonian Journalism]. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Euroopa Kolledž.
- Talts, M. & Kirch, A. (1998) "Eesti ja Euroopa Liit: poolt ja vastu eesti ajakirjanduses [Estonia and European Union: For and Against in Estonian Journalism]." *Akadeemia* 1-2: 3-21 and 227-245.
- Tamm, M. (2008) "History as Cultural Memory: Mnemohistory and the Construction of the Estonian nation." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 39: 499-516.
- Therborn, G. (1995) *European Modernity and Beyond. The Trayjectory of European Societies 1945-2000*. Sage Publications: London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi.
- Tönnies, F. [1887] (2001) "Community and Civil Society." In J. Harris (Ed.) *Tönnies Community and Civil Society*, pp. 3-261; Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Trenz, H-J. (2007) "'Quo vadis Europe?' Quality newspapers struggling for European unity." In J. E. Fossum & P. Schlesinger (Eds) *The European Union and the Public Sphere. A Communicative Space in the Making?*, pp. 89-109; London and New York: Routledge.
- Trenz, H-J (2009) "United and Dividing. The European Public Sphere as an Unfinished Project." In I. Salovaara-Moring (Ed.) *Manufacturing Europe. Spaces of Democracy, Diversity and Communication*, pp. 35-52; Nordicom.
- Triandafyllidou, A. (1998) "National Identity and the 'other'." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21: 593-612.
- Trouillot, M-R. (1995) *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*. Boston, Mass: Beacon Press.
- Turner, V. W. [1969](1991) *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Vallaste, K. (2013) *Eurocepticism: Problem or Solution? Framing Eurocepticism in Mainstream Media and Writings by Euroceptics in*

- Sweden, Finland and Estonia 2000-2006*. PhD diss., University of Helsinki.
- Valtonen, S. (1998) "Hyvä, paha media. Diskurssianalyysi kriittisen mediatutkimuksen menetelmänä [Good, Bad Media. Discourse Analysis as a Method of Critical Media Research]." In A. Kantola, I. Moring & E. Väliverronen (Eds) *Media-analyysi - tekstistä tulkintaan* [Media Analysis – from Text to Interpretation], pp. 93-121; Lahti: Helsingin yliopiston Lahden tutkimus- ja koulutuskeskus.
- Van Elsuwege, P. (2006) "Promoting Democracy in the EU's Neighbourhood: Lessons from the Pre-Accession Strategy." In A. Kasekamp & H. Pääbo (Eds) *Promoting Democratic Values in the Enlarging Europe: The Changing Role of the Baltic States from Importers to Exporters*, pp. 40-51; Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Veemaa, J. (2002) "Eesti sotsiaalruumilise teadvuse kujundamine [Forming Estonian Sociospatial Consciousness]." In E. Berg (Ed.) *Eesti tähendused, piirid ja kontekstid* [Estonian Meanings, Borders and Contexts], pp. 136-176; Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus.
- Verdery, K. (1996) *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?* Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
- Vetik, R. (2003) "Élite vs. People? Eurosceptic Public Opinion in Estonia." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 16: 257-271.
- Vetik, R., Nimmerfeldt, G., & Taru, M. (2006) "Reactive Identity versus EU Integration." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44: 1079-1102.
- Vihalemm, P. (1999) "Changing Baltic Space: Estonia and its Neighbours." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 30: 250-269.
- Vihalemm, P. (2003) "Changing Media in a Changing Society." *Demokratizatsiya* 11: 587-600.
- Vihalemm, P. (1997) "Changing National Spaces in the Baltic Area." In M. Lauristin, P. Vihalemm, K. E. Rosengren & L. Weibull (Eds) *Return to the Western World. Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transition*, pp. 129-162; Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Vihalemm, P. (2007) "Changing Spatial Relations in the Baltic Region and the Role of the Media. An Estonian Perspective." *European Societies* 9: 777-796.
- Vihalemm, P. (2005) "How Integrated is the Baltic Sea Region?" In G. Bolin, M. Hammer, F-M. Kirsch & W. Szrubka (Eds) *The Challenge of the Baltic Sea Region*, Södertörn Academic Studies 29, pp. 75-93; Stockholm: Södertörn University College.
- Vihalemm, P. & Kõuts, R. (2004) "Trükisõna lugejaskond Eestis 1965-2004 [The Press and its Readership in Estonia 1965-2004]." In P. Vihalemm (Ed.) *Meediasüsteem ja meediakasutus Eestis 1965-2004* [Media System and Usage of the Media in Estonia 1965-2004], pp. 61-90; Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus.
- Vihalemm, P., Lauk, E., & Lauristin, M. (1997) "Estonian Media in the Process of Change." In M. Lauristin, P. Vihalemm, K. E. Rosengren & L. Weibull (Eds) *Return to the Western World. Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transition*, pp. 227-240; Tartu: Tartu University Press.

- Vihalemm, P. & Lauristin, M. (2004) "Eesti ühiskonna ja meedia muutumine 1965-2004 [The Changes of Estonian Society and Media 1965-2004]." In P. Vihalemm (Ed.) *Meediasüsteem ja meediakasutus Eestis 1965-2004* [Media System and Usage of the Media in Estonia 1965-2004], pp. 1-22; Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus.
- Vihalemm, P., Lauristin, M. & Kõuts, R. (2012) "Trends in Estonian Media Landscape in 2000-2012." *Media transformations* 6: 12-63.
- Vihalemm, P. (2006) "Media Use in Estonia. Trends and Patterns." *Nordicom Review* 27: 17-29.
- Vogt, H. (2005). *Between Utopia and Disillusionment: A Narrative of the Political Transformation in Eastern Europe*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- Wæver, O. (2002) "Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory." In L. Hansen & O. Wæver (Eds) *European Integration and National Identity. The Challenge of the Nordic States*, pp. 20-49; Routledge: London and New York.
- Waltz, K. N. (1990) "Realist Thought and Neo-Realist Theory." *Journal of International Affairs* 44: 21-37.
- Wendt, A. (1992) "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46: 391-425.
- Wendt, A. (1994) "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *American Political Science Review* 88: 384-96.
- Wendt, A. (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wolff, L. (1994) *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization in the Mind of the Enlightenment*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Young, C. & Light, D. (2001) "Place, National identity and Post-Socialist Transformations: An Introduction." *Political Geography* 20: 941-955.
- Zerubavel, Y. (1995) *Recovered roots: collective memory and the making of Israeli national tradition*. Chicago (IL): University of Chicago Press.
- Zucker, H. G. (1978) "The Variable Nature of News Media Influence." In B.D. Ruben (Ed.) *Communication Yearbook* 2., pp. 225-245; New Brunswick: Transaction.
- Zur, O. (1991) "The Love of Hating." *History of European Ideas* 13: 345-369.

WEBSITES AND ELECTRONIC SOURCES

- Bolcu, C. A. (2011) "Global NATO: An Identity Based Account of the Alliance in the 21st Century." Accessed January 3, 2016. <http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOID=1975688&fileOID=1975692>
- Eesti Ajalehtede Liit (1998) "EALL liikmeslehtede keskmised tiraazid 1998 [Average Printouts of the Papers of EALL in 1998]." Accessed January 7, 2016. <http://www.eall.ee/tiraazhid/1998.html>
- Eesti statistika (2015) "Täpsustatud rahvaarv." Accessed January 3, 2016. <http://www.stat.ee/12808>

- Kross, E.-N. (2015) "Estland, Estland über alles." *Eesti Päevaleht*, November 12, 2001. Accessed January 3, 2016. <http://epl.delfi.ee/news/arvamus/eerik-niiles-kross-estland-estland-uber-alles?id=50811505>
- Sengueler, A. E. (2009/2010) Identity, Interest and International Structure in Foreign Policy: Security and reconciliation in Germany's Ostpolitik. University Honors in International Studies Capstone Project: Fall 2009 and Spring 2010. Accessed January 3, 2016. <http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/9416/Sengueler,%20Ays%20Eren%20-%20Spring%20%2710.pdf?sequence=1>
- Statistics Estonia (2013) "PHC 2011: over a quarter of the population are affiliated with a particular religion". Accessed January 4, 2016. <http://www.stat.ee/65352/?highlight=religion>
- Tarand, K. (2001) "Lippude vahetusel [Changing the Flags]." *Eesti Päevaleht*, December 3, 2001. Accessed January 3, 2016. <http://www.epl.ee/artikkel.php?ID=92271>
- Välisministeeriumi pressitalitus (1999) "Estonia as a Nordic country". Accessed January 8, 2016. <http://vm.ee/en/news/estonia-nordic-country>.

ARTICLES OF *POSTIMEES*

The *Postimees* articles published in 1997, 1998, 2002 and 2003 that formed the data for my research are stored in the newspaper's digital archives. When I was collecting the data, in 2001-2012, the archives were publicly accessible. This is no longer the case. Google Search enables researchers to check the validity of the articles with the caveat that in December 2015 the publishing dates of the articles of 2002 and 2003 had been systematically advanced by one day. In the list of the articles below I will give the original dates as they appear in *Postimees* digital archive and thus also in the body text of this dissertation.

REFERRED TO IN II CHAPTER (LISTED IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

- PM, 07.01.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Eesti välispoliitilised võimalused 1997. aastal
- PM, 11.01.1997 - Mihkelson, Marko: Venemaa autu käitumine õhutab ohtlikku vastasseisu
- PM, 14.04.1997 - Mihkelson, Marko: Venemaa tahab Eestit tagasi võita
- PM, 05.05.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: President siseministreid vahetamas
- PM, 10.05.1997 - Juhtkiri: Rahapesu on näpuga näidata
- PM, 09.06.1997 - Juhtkiri: Kiuslik riik
- PM, 12.07.1997 - Juhtkiri: Jalg on ukse vahel
- PM, 21.11.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Oppetund vähemusvalitsusele
- PM, 14.12.1997 - Juhtkiri: Vahejaam Luksemburg
- PM, 22.12.1997 - Juhtkiri: Murranguaasta välispoliitikas
- PM, 03.04.1998 - Mikko, Madis: Liitumisläbirääkimiste sujuv algus
- PM, 03.11.1998 - Bahovski, Erkki: Euroreferendumi vastused puudu. Eestis euroreferendumi kiire korraldamine on nonsens
- PM, 26.10.2002 - Bahovski, Erkki: Laienemise kiire lõppmäng
- PM, 19.11.2002 - Juhtkiri: Mida teha Euroopaga. Eesti peab Euroopa Liidu tulevikudebatis oma huve kaitsma

- PM, 14.12.2002 - Juhtkiri: Joon alla. Eesti liitumiskõneluste lõpp ELiga tähendab terve ajajärgu lõppemist
- PM, 31.12.2002 - Juhtkiri: Lehekülge keerates. Hoidkem üksteist, seeläbi hoiame ka Eestit!
- PM, 03.01.2003 - Juhtkiri: Suursaadikuks leti alt? Sisepoliitiline kemplus ei tohi ohustada välispoliitikat
- PM, 31.03.2003 - Juhtkiri: Ootame tarku tegusid. Noorenenud Riigikogule õpipoisiaega ei anta
- PM, 18.06.2003 - Bahovski, Erkki: Aega ei ole
- PM, 26.06.2003 - Klaas, Urmas: Aeg teha õige valik
- PM, 04.07.2003 - Juhtkiri: Enam ausust ja selget juttu! Hämamine ja pooltõed toovad kaasa euroskepsise tõusu
- PM, 17.07.2003 - Veidemann, Rein: Sada päeva tuulte pöörises
- PM, 15.09.2003 - Juhtkiri: Euroopalik enesemääratlus. Euroopa Liidu liikmelisus väärtustab solidaarsusele rajatud iseseisvust
- PM, 04.11.2005 - Postimees: Ajaleht Postimees hakkab ilmuma ka venekeelsena

ARTICLES OF POSTIMEES REFERRED TO IN III CHAPTER (IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

- PM, 26.05.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Uue Euroopa koidik
- PM, 27.05.1997 - Juhtkiri: Millal sulgub uks?
- PM, 02.06.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Eurotoetus kaob käest
- PM, 28.06.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Kahepalgeline eurotormakus
- PM, 12.07.1997 - Juhtkiri: Jalg on ukse vahel
- PM, 19.07.1997 - Juhtkiri: Tants euroliidu raporti ümber
- PM, 24.07.1997a - Alaküla, Allan: Eurodiagnoos on karm kuid õiglane
- PM, 24.07.1997b - Jarne, Aivar: Eurovaidlus alles algab
- PM, 28.07.1997 - Zartes, Urmas: Tartu linna akadeemiline eripära
- PM, 14.08.1997 - Kivine, Märt: Europrovokaator
- PM, 05.09.1997 - Juhtkiri: Eurosügise stardipauk
- PM, 11.09.1997 - Floren, Kaido: Eurodiskussioon: mäng ühte väravasse
- PM, 13.09.1997 - Müntel, Jüri: Kolm suurt ja rasket teemat
- PM, 22.10.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Vanem õde Soomest
- PM, 31.10.1997 - Tarto, Enn: Politseiriik ilusa eurokesta sees
- PM, 12.11.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Palanga manöövrid
- PM, 13.11.1997 - Bahovski, Erkki: Liigne uudishimu tapab
- PM, 17.11.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Eurokummardus muulastele
- PM, 26.11.1997 - Simpson, Erik: Euroliit toob positiivse diskrimineerimise
- PM, 09.02.1998 - Olesk, Peeter: Haridus ees, arusaamatused taga
- PM, 18.03.1998 - Juhtkiri: Raske otsus
- PM, 26.05.1998 - Püvi, Jüri: Euroturvakodud vanglate asemele
- PM, 18.06.1998 - Lepp, Toomas: Kas telesõjad on veel võimalikud?
Telekanalid peavad reklaami suhtes uuesti kokku leppima
- PM, 31.07.1998 - Tallo, Ivar: Usalduse defitsiit ja Eesti. Usalduse taastamiseks tuleks loobuda loosungitest
- PM, 04.01.2003 - Kivirähk, Juhan: Rahvahääletuse mõistetav tulemus
- PM, 10.10.2002 - Juhtkiri: Aeg on küps. Soodus õhkkond liitumiskõneluste lõpetamiseks
- PM, 12.11.2003 - Kõnnusaar, Tiia: Vanemahüvitis: võrdne või palga järgi?

ARTICLES OF POSTIMEES REFERRED TO IN IV AND V CHAPTER (LISTED IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

1997

- PM, 04.01.1997 - Laar, Mart: Õnne uueks aastaks
PM, 07.01.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Eesti välispoliitilised võimalused 1997. aastal
PM, 09.01.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Udutamise Euroopa Liiduga põllumajandustollide ümber
PM, 11.01.1997 - Mihkelson, Marko: Venemaa autu käitumine õhutab ohtlikku vastasseisu
PM, 13.01.1997 - Juhtkiri: Euroopa Euroopa vastu
PM, 15.01.1997 - Aaloe, Mati: Elu 1000 krooniga kuus
PM, 16.01.1997 - Nutt, Mart: Kas Venemaad saab positiivselt hõlmata
PM, 25.01.1997 - Juvakka, Kai: Ametnike moraal ja riigi maine
PM, 27.01.1997 - Treial, M.: Eetika – retooriline sõnakõlks
PM, 29.01.1997 - Lodjak, Bernhard: Kingitus maarahvale
PM, 03.02.1997a - Betlem, Jaanus: Proovikivil on Eesti demokraatia
PM, 03.02.1997b - Jarne, Aivar: Euroopa Liit ei taha meid?
PM, 06.02.1997 - Raik-Hiio Mikelsaar: Teaduskorraldusest ja seadustest
PM, 07.02.1997 - Betlem, Jaanus: Luukere koalitsioon
PM, 10.02.1997 - Junti, Arvo, Kangur, Oleg & Tamme, Rein: Poliitika – kelle jaoks ja mille nimel?
PM, 12.02.1997 - Metsmägi, L.: Eetiline Eestimaa
PM, 13.02.1997 - Kask, Ahto: Kontrolljoon ajutiseks riigipiiriks
PM, 14.02.1997 - Leetjärv, Laurits: Lendobjektidest Euroopa Liiduni
PM, 17.02.1997 - Juhtkiri: Prantsusmaa hea toon
PM, 20.02.1997 - Korrovits Viktor: Piirilepingut on vaja Venemaale
PM, 22.02.1997 - Vald, Jüri: Üksikisiku tulumaksust
PM, 01.03.1997 - Leetsaar, Jaan: Maarahva kongressile mõeldes
PM, 04.03.1997 - Laar, Mart: Millist valitsust vajame
PM, 05.03.1997 - Mäemets, Aare: Kas Eesti säilib Euroopa Liidus?
PM, 17.03.1997a - Kari, Mairo: Iga nurga taga Jalta tont
PM, 17.03.1997b - Leps, Ando: Maarahva ainus ellujäämise võimalus
PM, 18.03.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Eesti jääb Euroopa eeskotta?
PM, 19.03.1997 - Frey, Toomas: Riigikogu andis hinnangu keskkonnastrateegiale
PM, 20.03.1997a - Jarne, Aivar: Eurointegratsiooni tagasilöögid
PM, 20.03.1997b - Neljas, Aap: Eesti enne NATO laienemist
PM, 24.03.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Kaitseühendus kaitsevaliks
PM, 26.03.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Euroopa Liidu lauast minema
PM, 02.04.1997 - Laar, Mart: Rahu, ainult rahu
PM, 03.04.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Jälle Tootsi taskud
PM, 04.04.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: USA julgeolekupakt Eestiga tekitab küsimusi
PM, 05.04.1997 - Veidemann, Andra: Euroopa Liit mõjutab Eestit igal juhul
PM, 08.04.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Tollipealetung
PM, 10.04.1997a - Jarne, Aivar: Eurohäirekellad
PM, 10.04.1997b - Kivine, Märt: Pidulik paigalmarss
PM, 11.04.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Maakondadele ei meeldi Tallinna-Brüsseli telg
PM, 14.04.1997 - Mihkelson, Marko: Venemaa tahab Eestit tagasi võita
PM, 15.04.1997a - Andla, Enn: Tolle pole vaja
PM, 15.04.1997b - Kuusmann, Arne: Bensinist ja pensionist
PM, 15.04.1997c - Nutt, Mart: Üleminekuperiood jätkub
PM, 16.04.1997a - Jarne, Aivar: Van den Broeki sõnad pole kuld
PM, 16.04.1997b - Margus, Sulev: Kes igatseb Euroopa Liitu

PM, 19.04.1997 - Varik, Andres: Tollid pole kuradist
 PM, 23.04.1997 - Betlem, Jaanus: Opositsioon riigikaitse eesotsas
 PM, 24.04.1997 - Tereping, Avo-Rein: Igasugune karistus on kättemaks
 PM, 29.04.1997 - Kont, Vambola: Minister ei oska matemaatikat
 PM, 05.05.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: President siseministreid vahetamas
 PM, 06.05.1997 - Luts, L.: Muudkui saherda
 PM, 08.05.1997 - Juhtkiri: Sammaste otsa ronimine
 PM, 09.05.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Eesti advokaadi seljapööramine
 PM, 13.05.1997 - Jakobson, Lembit: Haritlaste lastel pole tulevikus enam
 ülikooli asja
 PM, 15.05.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Tabamata eurominister
 PM, 16.05.1997 - Uibu, Jaak: Sündimata lastest välditavate surmadeni
 PM, 17.05.1997 - Nutt, Mart: NSV Liidu ja Euroopa Liidu kodakondsus
 PM, 20.05.1997 - Tarand, Kaarel: Tsunft seljatas riigi
 PM, 21.05.1997 - Juhtkiri: Väheviljakas eurosuvetöö
 PM, 22.05.1997 - Vetka, Alvar: Matemaatikaga raskusi
 PM, 23.05.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Euroliit Noordwijkis raskustes
 PM, 26.05.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Uue Euroopa koidik
 PM, 28.05.1997 - Floren, Kaido: Poola riigi uus alus
 PM, 29.05.1997 - Varik, Andres: Analüüsi asemel endiselt vee segamine
 PM, 30.05.1997 - Peedu, B.: Kokku hoida on tõesti vaja
 PM, 31.05.1997 - Jaeger, Andres: Kas oleme ikka tõelised eurooplased?
 PM, 02.06.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Eurotoetus kaob käest
 PM, 03.06.1997 - Kivine, Märt: Euroopa diiva
 PM, 04.06.1997 - Juhtkiri: Abortide keelamise vastu
 PM, 06.06.1997 - Tamm, Eino: Kas Eesti neutraliteet tänapäeval on
 võimalik?
 PM, 09.06.1997 - Jürgenson, Kalle: Surmanuhtlus – surmamine või
 nuhtlemine?
 PM, 12.06.1997 - Jakobson, Lembit: Tuld õpetaja pihta
 PM, 16.06.1997 - Nutt, Mart: EL – geopoliitilised eelistused või võrdsed
 võimalused?
 PM, 17.06.1997 - Juhtkiri: Eesti ja Leedu eurotülis
 PM, 18.06.1997 - Alatalu, Toomas: Palju välispoliitikuid, vähe villa
 PM, 20.06.1997 - Andla, Enn: Tollitaotlejate pentsikud argumendid
 PM, 03.07.1997 - Alatalu, Toomas: Täienduseks kahele kommentaarile
 PM, 04.07.1997 - Jaanson, Kaido: Eesti ja Ameerika Ühendriigid
 PM, 05.07.1997a - Kallas, Siim: See ebamugav demokraatia
 PM, 05.07.1997b - Lahe, Jaan: Ka suvel loetakse
 PM, 07.07.1997 - Junti, Arvo: Muutuv NATO Madridi istungi eel
 PM, 10.07.1997a - Juhtkiri: Suurepärase toetus Eestile
 PM, 10.07.1997b - Made, Vahur: Konstantinoopol tungib tasahilju peale
 PM, 12.07.1997a - Jaanson, Kaido: Eesti ja Euroopa Liit
 PM, 12.07.1997b - Juhtkiri: Jalg on ukse vahel
 PM, 15.07.1997a - Aus, T.: Euroskeptikutel läheb kiireks
 PM, 15.07.1997b - Kari, Maido: Poliitikute enesepett?
 PM, 17.07.1997 - Nutt, Mart: Eesti Euroopa Liidu ukse ees
 PM, 18.07.1997a - Kari, Vello: Võidutseda on veel vara
 PM, 18.07.1997b - Made, Vahur: Pärast Euroopa Komisjoni arvamust
 PM, 18.07.1997c - Postimees: Majandus paneb mõtlema
 PM, 19.07.1997a - Juhtkiri: Tants euroliidu raporti ümber
 PM, 19.07.1997b - Loo, Arne: Hurraaga Euroopa Liitu
 PM, 21.07.1997 - Jaanson, Kaido: Eesti alternatiividest
 PM, 22.07.1997 - Kaasik, Maia: Miks mitte Euroopasse?
 PM, 23.07.1997 - Aaloe, M.: Riigimeeste eufooriapuhangud
 PM, 24.07.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Eurovaidlus alles algab

PM, 25.07.1997a - Ojuland, Kristiina: Parem euroliidus sees kui väljas
 PM, 25.07.1997b - Salupere, Malle: Kuhu jääb inimene?
 PM, 26.07.1997a - Ploom, Urmas: Alternatiivid puuduvad
 PM, 26.07.1997b - Valge, Kristjan: Euroopa Liit on liiast
 PM, 29.07.1997 - Nõmm, Eha: Vene turg ja Eesti kurgid
 PM, 30.07.1997 - Tarand, Andres: Eesti ja edetabelid
 PM, 01.08.1997a - Made, Vahur: Kes pääsevad, kes ei pääse ELi pildile
 PM, 01.08.1997b - Varik, Andres: Libaliberalism ohustab maaelu arengut
 PM, 02.08.1997 - Kallas, Siim: Millele teeme panuse?
 PM, 04.08.1997a - Mäeltsemees, Sulev: Vallad ja linnad ühinevas Euroopas
 PM, 04.08.1997b - Telgmaa, Juhan: Mis lahti, Reformierakond?
 PM, 06.08.1997 - Jaanson, Kaido: Eurodiskussioon on hädavajalik
 PM, 07.08.1997 - Ojuland, Kristiina: Eesti muutuvasse Euroopa Liitu
 PM, 08.08.1997a - Alatalu, Toomas: Uus hämamine surmanuhtlusega
 PM, 08.08.1997b - Jarne, Aivar: Donner wetter!
 PM, 08.08.1997c - Rahman, Jan: Vabatahtlikult kolhoosidesse
 PM, 11.08.1997 - Välja, Ari: Absurdne idee
 PM, 12.08.1997a - Taimla, Andres: Maaerakondade pealetung valitsuses
 PM, 12.08.1997b - Saarpuu, Hannes: Mõttetu mudamaadlus ELi ümber
 PM, 13.08.1997 - Merendi, K.: Vangid elagu töötü abirahast
 PM, 14.08.1997 - Kivine, Märt: Europrovokaator
 PM, 16.08.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Valitsuse europettus
 PM, 21.08.1997a - Enn U.: Kui piiluks Euroopa Liidu rahakotti?
 PM, 21.08.1997b - Saatpalu, Vello: EL: Teabepuudust ei tohiks kurta
 PM, 23.08.1997 - Maripuu, Maret: Euroopa Liitu: mitte kas, vaid kuidas
 PM, 26.08.1997a - Jarne, Aivar: Stagnatsioon keskerakonnas
 PM, 26.08.1997b - Kaasik, Marko: Eesti ja Euroopa Liit: üheksa korda
 mööda
 PM, 26.08.1997c - Thomasson, Kuno: Üks halvakolaline lühend
 PM, 28.08.1997 - Ruutsoo, Rein: Omavahel ühte, rahvale teist, Euroopale
 kolmandat
 PM, 30.08.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Meri Lukashenko jahil
 PM, 02.09.1997 - Luksep, Peeter: Alusetud hirmud
 PM, 05.09.1997 - Juhtkiri: Eurosügise stardipauk
 PM, 08.09.1997 - Jaanson, Kaido: Miks erakorralised valimised on parem kui
 õlu
 PM, 11.09.1997a - Floren, Kaido: Eurodiskussioon: mäng ühte värvasse
 PM, 11.09.1997b - Hansen, Vootele: Tollid stabiliseerijana
 PM, 13.09.1997 - Välja, Ari: Kakskeelsus küll, aga milline?
 PM, 17.10.1997 - Reiljan, Janno: Tollivõhiklikkusest
 PM, 20.10.1997 - Juhtkiri: Nuhtlus surmanuhtlusega
 PM, 21.10.1997 - Liblik, M.: Kiiret pole kuhugi
 PM, 22.10.1997a - Jarne, Aivar: Vanem õde Soomest
 PM, 22.10.1997b - Ojuland, Kristiina: Haridusprobleem
 PM, 23.10.1997 - Alatalu, Toomas: Surmanuhtlus kaob...öösel
 PM, 24.10.1997 - Made, Vahur: Sotsialism tuleb tagasi
 PM, 25.10.1997 - Simpson, Erik: Poliitilise eliidi pärusmaa
 PM, 28.10.1997 - Stolovitsh, Anu: Kas diferentseerida kooliharidus?
 PM, 31.10.1997a - Laar, Mart: Eesti jäägu Eestiks
 PM, 31.10.1997b - Raudsepp, R.: Tehkem maanteed korda!
 PM, 04.11.1997 - Palk, Paavo: Venemaa Balti-poliitika on endiselt ummikus
 PM, 06.11.1997 - Pettai, Vello: Naturaliseerimine käiku!
 PM, 10.11.1997 - Simpson, Erik: Piibliga vaidlemise aeg
 PM, 11.11.1997a - Palk, Paavo: Kas doominoteooria võib olla õige?
 PM, 11.11.1997b - Ruutsoo, Rein: Halvad ajakirjanikud ja head diplomaadid
 PM, 12.11.1997 - Kukk, Kalev: Hoiuste tagamise seadusega ei tohi venitada

PM, 13.11.1997 - Bahovski, Erkki: Liigne uudishimu tapab
 PM, 18.11.1997 - Made, Vahur: Euroopa Liit toob Eestisse ametiühingud
 PM, 19.11.1997 - Suurmaa, Aigar: Nii palju halba?
 PM, 21.11.1997 - Simpson, Erik: Euroametnike dilemma
 PM, 22.11.1997 - Savisaar, Edgar: Rahanduskriisist ja Tiit Vähi mõtteavaldustest
 PM, 25.11.1997 - Siimann, Mart: Eesti tahab olla usaldusväärne
 PM, 26.11.1997 - Simpson, Erik: Euroliit toob positiivse diskrimineerimise
 PM, 27.11.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Luxembourg'is sikud ja lambad taas kokku
 PM, 28.11.1997 - Palk, Paavo: Suhted Venemaaga paranevad
 PM, 29.11.1997a - Made, Vahur: Gluhhovi uued lubadused
 PM, 29.11.1997b - Savisaar, Edgar: Kas osa standardsest euroomletist voi euromuna Eesti moodi?
 PM, 01.12.1997a - Klaas, Urmas: Euroopa Liit, kõikvõimas ratsu
 PM, 01.12.1997b - Palk, Paavo: Euroopa Liit otsib sõnu
 PM, 04.12.1997a - Junti, Arvo: Meil puudub riigi arendamiseks kontseptsioon
 PM, 04.12.1997b - Laar, Mart: Kas teame, kuhu läheme?
 PM, 04.12.1997c - Raidal, Jaanus: Eesti majandus vajab investeringuid
 PM, 05.12.1997a - Niitsoo, Viktor: Eurointegratsioon kui topeltlõks
 PM, 05.12.1997b - Palk, Paavo: Euroopa Liidu laienemine on seni ebaselge
 PM, 09.12.1997 - Palk, Paavo: Euroopa Liit ja raha
 PM, 10.12.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Euroliidu helde käsi
 PM, 11.12.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Kuidas Euroopa Liit laieneb
 PM, 12.12.1997 - Made, Vahur: Integratsioon vales otsast
 PM, 13.12.1997 - Klaas, Urmas: Euroopa Liit ei ole Punane Rist
 PM, 14.12.1997 - Juhtkiri: Vahejaam Luksemburg
 PM, 15.12.1997 - Kalmre, Vahur: Liiga enesekindel välisminister
 PM, 16.12.1997 - Olesk, Peeter: Miks me kardame teisitimõtlemist?
 PM, 17.12.1997a - Made, Vahur: Eesti võimalustest tingida
 PM, 17.12.1997b - Palk, Paavo: Peaminister loobus ametlikust optimismist
 PM, 17.12.1997c - Põder, M.: Kaks suhtumist
 PM, 18.12.1997a - Kaplinski, Jaan: Illusoorne Euroopa identiteet
 PM, 18.12.1997b - Tipp, Toomas: Ühinemise otsustavad ikkagi kodanikud
 PM, 19.12.1997a - Aaloe, M.: Miks oleme umbusklikud
 PM, 19.12.1997b - Jürgenson, Kalle: Kes suudab ainult nina ette vaadata?
 PM, 19.12.1997c - Sild, Tarmo: Eurostandardeid pole olemas
 PM, 20.12.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Moskva-Brüssel-Tallinn
 PM, 22.12.1997 - Aasma, Viive: Kummaline koostöö
 PM, 23.12.1997 - Made, Vahur: Euroopa Liit lõhestab valitsust
 PM, 24.12.1997a - Juhtkiri: Eesti piim ei kõlba juua
 PM, 24.12.1997b - Ots, Heido: Usust sõna maagiasse
 PM, 24.12.1997c - Tallo, Ivar: Potjomkini küla Euroopa moodi
 PM, 29.12.1997a - Jarne, Aivar: Ajuloputus Euroopa Liiduga
 PM, 29.12.1997b - Kallas, Siim: Mõtlemise aeg
 PM, 29.12.1997c - Palk, Paavo: Eesti viisasüsteem täiustab
 PM, 30.12.1997a - Savi, Toomas: Riigikogu vaatega uude aastasse
 PM, 30.12.1997b - Tamman, Tiina: Eesti huvid Euroopa Liidus

1998

PM, 04.01.1998 - Kaplinski, Jaan: Eesti välispoliitika usk ja keel
 PM, 05.01.1998a - Cook, Robin: Väljakutse Suurbritannia eesistumisele euroliidus
 PM, 05.01.1998b - Kikas, M.: Kellele on vaja erakorralisi valimisi?

PM, 06.01.1998a - Made, Vahur: Eesti-Vene suhted ei muutu?
 PM, 06.01.1998b - Otsing, E.: Asi pole piimas
 PM, 07.01.1998a - Andla, Enn: Tollidest pole mingit abi
 PM, 07.01.1998b - Jarne, Aivar: Toompea põllumeeste pealetung
 PM, 08.01.1998 - Leetsaar, Jaan: Hobuseliha, kvoodid ja tollid
 PM, 12.01.1998 - Parve, Valdar: Professor ju ongi ülikoolis dotsent!
 PM, 15.01.1998 - Tammsaar, Tiit: Ilvese nahk on antud jagamisele
 PM, 19.01.1998 - Jänes, K.: Enne kui on liiga hilja
 PM, 23.01.1998 - Kõre, Jüri: Eestlased teel euroliitu
 PM, 31.01.1998 - Made, Vahur: Valitsusliit tahab valimistel kaotada
 PM, 03.02.1998 - Jürgenson, Kalle: Kust otsida euroskeptitsismi?
 PM, 04.02.1998 - Saar, Jüri: Balti ühtsus – kas sõnakõlks?
 PM, 07.02.1998a - Aasmäe, Hardo: Tollisõja neli õppetundi
 PM, 07.02.1998b - Raudsepp, K.: Euroopa asemel Ameerikasse
 PM, 09.02.1998 - Tamman, Tiina: Sularaha ei jäta jälgi
 PM, 10.02.1998 - Neljas, Aap: Kodakondsuse seadus eurotuules
 PM, 13.02.1998 - Önnepalu, Tõnu: Pax Americana: rahu läbi ülekaalu
 PM, 17.02.1998 - Mälksoo, Lauri: Euroopa Liidu ja Eesti läbirääkimised: kas mäng ühte väravasse?
 PM, 19.02.1998 - Tulvite, Peeter: Ülikooli arstiteaduskond hädas
 PM, 21.02.1998 - Metsis, Toivo: Vene keele jätkuv soosimine
 PM, 28.02.1998a - Pullerits, Priit: Pea ees läppunud Euroopasse
 PM, 28.02.1998b - Tallo, Ivar: Saun ehk presidentaalne äratuskell
 PM, 03.03.1998 - Juhtkiri: Surmanuhtlust kaotamata ei saa
 PM, 04.03.1998 - Vesiroos, Merle: Kooliõpilane ja Euroopa Liit
 PM, 06.03.1998a - Erson, P.: Skandaaliderohke poliitika on Eestile hukutav
 PM, 06.03.1998b - Gross, Villem: Mis mind erutas
 PM, 06.03.1998c - Jarne, Aivar: Euroopa Liidus ei teenita kahte isandat korraga
 PM, 06.03.1998d - Kuurme, Tiiu: Akadeemilise rahva turuväärtusest
 PM, 10.03.1998 - Varik, Andres: Hurraaga pea ees illusioonidesse!
 PM, 11.03.1998 - Juhtkiri: Alustada tuleb arutelust
 PM, 13.03.1998 - Alatalu, Toomas: Las laps ise valib kodakondsuse
 PM, 14.03.1998 - Made, Vahur: Eesti, Läti ja Leedu vajavad koostööd
 PM, 16.03.1998 - Juhtkiri: Moskva taastab Balti üksmeelt
 PM, 18.03.1998a - Juhtkiri: Raske otsus
 PM, 18.03.1998b - Kallas, Siim: Uinutav rahu
 PM, 19.03.1998 - Made, Vahur: Kas Sõssujevi antud lootus kestab?
 PM, 25.03.1998 - Hänni, Liia: Vaade ühiskonnale läbi soolise prisma
 PM, 26.03.1998 - Ennet, Priit: Hüpped (euro)rõngile
 PM, 28.03.1998a - Gräzin, Igor: Mida näitab üks parandamata aken
 PM, 28.03.1998b - Palk, Paavo: Õiget aega otsides
 PM, 30.03.1998 - Raagma, Garri: Kütuseaktsiis ja regionaalne areng
 PM, 31.03.1998a - Betlem, Jaanus: Eesti talu võimalused Euroopa Liidus
 PM, 31.03.1998b - Juhtkiri: Läheb lahti
 PM, 01.04.1998 - Vitsur, Heido: Ohu märgid
 PM, 02.04.1998a - Palk, Paavo: Ameeriklased rääkisid Euroopast
 PM, 02.04.1998b - Riibe, Marmelt: Keelame hundijahi?
 PM, 03.04.1998 - Mikko, Madis: Liitumisläbirääkimiste sujuv algus
 PM, 06.04.1998a - Stolovich, Anu: Millist diferentseerimist me vajame?
 PM, 06.04.1998b - Sutrop, Margit: Ebaõiglusest Eesti haridussüsteemis
 PM, 08.04.1998 - Tarand, Kaarel: Valitsus põlvili pedagoogide ees
 PM, 13.04.1998a - Männik, Jaanus: Tollid tulevad
 PM, 13.04.1998b - Tarand, Andres: Valitsuse kolmekordne viga
 PM, 14.04.1998 - Palk, Paavo: Kui Brüsselis naerdakse Eesti üle
 PM, 16.04.1998 - Kulbok, Kalle: Varastatud raha

PM, 17.04.1998 - Nestor, Eiki: Raamatute käibemaks tuleb nullida

PM, 18.04.1998 - Jarne, Aivar: Maa tuleb täita autodega

PM, 20.04.1998 - Juhtkiri: The Economist Eestit avastamas

PM, 27.04.1998 - Niidas, Hando: Jüriöölaste kavatsustest

PM, 02.05.1998 - Juhtkiri: Leedu president klaaris apsud

PM, 12.05.1998a - Juhtkiri: Kommünikeede kolmik Riias. Balti presidentide viisakuskohtumistele tuleb leida tõine eesmärk

PM, 12.05.1998b - Palk, Paavo: Viisavabadus ja maine – ainult üks, kumb?

PM, 15.05.1998 - Jarne, Aivar: Lillkapsaste reguleerimise vastu. Mõned tähelepanekud Eesti euroskeptikute tarvis

PM, 18.05.1998 - Varik, Andres: Mida maaga ette võtta. Maakasutusest ja põllumaade metsastamisest

PM, 22.05.1998 - Siimann, Mart: Miks ühineme Euroopa Liiduga? Naabrid ei lase Eestil üksinda jätkata

PM, 25.05.1998a - Rummo, Paul-Erik: Ringhäälinguseaduse uuendamine käib üle kivide ja kändude

PM, 25.05.1998b - Tarand, Andres: Valitsemise vastutus. Eesti sisepoliitiline areng edeneb vintselt

PM, 28.05.1998 - Tallo, Ivar: Eetika ja erasektor

PM, 29.05.1998a - Ojuland, Kristiina: Euroopa Liidu laienemise hind. Suveräänsusega maksame kinni majandusliku ja julgeolekualase kindluse

PM, 29.05.1998b - Palk, Paavo: Isemõtlejatest sõltuv referendum. Rahaasjad olulised ka euroküsimuste otsustamisel Taanis

PM, 01.06.1998 - Jaanson, Kaido: Eesti tee Euroopa Liitu. Lähedus Läänemere piirkonnale tähendab kiiremat arengut kui side Kesk-Euroopaga

PM, 02.06.1998 - Silberg, Uno: Majandus lapsekingades. Euroopa Liiduga ühinemine on kitsaste gruppide huvides

PM, 03.06.1998a - Betlem, Jaanus: Parteid Eestis ja Euroopas. Erakondade paljus on normaalne nähe

PM, 03.06.1998b - Ilves, Toomas Hendrik: Regionaalpoliitika ja Euroopa Liit. Eesti peaks oskama Euroopa Liidu regionaalpoliitikat ära kasutada

PM, 05.06.1998a - Juhtkiri: Igal asjal on piir. Euroasjadest teavitamisega ei maksa liiale minna

PM, 05.06.1998b - Kirch, Aksel: Eesti eurovalmidus on tõusnud. Eurobaromeetri uuring näitab, et Euroopa Liidu maine Eestis paraneb

PM, 09.06.1998 - Mereste, Uno: Miljonid sekeldamise kuludeks. Himu käsumajanduslikke noorusunistusi teostada ei raue

PM, 16.06.1998 - Kirch, Aksel & Talts, Mait: Võitjad ja kaotajad. Kas eurointegratsiooniprotsess on kasulik Eestile või Euroopa Liidule?

PM, 20.06.1998a - Aru, Peep: Maapank ei vii Puhjat pankrotti. Monofunktsionaalne Puhja ja poliifunktsiooniline minister

PM, 20.06.1998b - Talts, Mait: NATO ja EL soosing Eestis. NATO populaarsus langes Madriidi tippkohtumise mõjul

PM, 22.06.1998 - Ennuste, Ülo: Eesti majandus üle ELi lävepaku. Kõigile küsimustele ei saa anda ühest ja täpset vastust

PM, 26.06.1998 - Made, Vahur: Eesti välispoliitika on muutumas. Euroopa Liit kallutab Eestit järeleandmistele Venemaa suhtes

PM, 27.06.1998a - Tereping, Avo-Rein: Miks mulle ei meeldi europiim. Steriliseeritud piim võib põhjustada allergiat

PM, 27.06.1998b - Tõnission, Liina: Avameelselt astmelisest maksust. Ohud ja hirmud, mis seostuvad astmelise tulumaksuga, on liialdatud Maapanga languse põhjused ja vajalikud järelused

PM, 01.07.1998 - Lukas, Tõnis: Üksi me sureme välja. Enne ELi kritiseerimist peame oma majanduse jalule saama

PM, 02.07.1998 - Tuisk, Jarmo: Iseseisvuse võlu ja valu. Eesti ei tohi oma iseseisvust Brüsselile odavalt müüa

PM, 03.07.1998 - Juhtkiri: Seljakotid selga! Reisimine on muutumas eestlaste rahvushobiks

PM, 04.07.1998 - Juhtkiri: Euroametnikud saavad higistada. Austria paljulubav algus Euroliidu juhtriigina

PM, 09.07.1998 - Riiütel, Arnold: Külma ja närvilise suvi. Panganduse stabiilsus peaks huvitama kõiki

PM, 15.07.1998 - Pohl, Tiiu: Eesti ajaloolise paratamatuse ees. Üksiküritajatest riikidel on vähe võimalusi

PM, 16.07.1998 - Juhtkiri: Advokaadi teosammud. Saksamaa lahendab viisavabaduse küsimust aeglaselt

PM, 17.07.1998 - Jaanson, Kaido: Euroskeptitsism. Võrreldes Eestit ja Euroopa Liitu

PM, 21.07.1998 - Neljas, Aap: NATO ja Euroopa Liidu maine. NATO ja Euroopa Liit turvalisuse pakkujatena

PM, 25.07.1998 - Rimmel, Mart: Hakkame huulde hammustama. Millisena paistavad euroläbirääkimised mänguteooria valguses

PM, 27.07.1998 - Silberg, Uno: Integratsioon tagantvaates. Erinevusest konföderaalse ja föderaalse liidu vahel

PM, 28.07.1998 - Savi, Toomas: Riigikogu vajab sisemisi muutusi. Kuidas tõsta parlamendi langema kippuvat mainet

PM, 01.08.1998a - Juhtkiri: Põllumajanduse kevad paevad. Valitsuse ja põllumajandustootjate kõnelused lõppesid tulemuseta

PM, 01.08.1998b - Tammsaar, Tiit: Kõikehõlmav Rahvaerakond. End universaalsena reklaamiv partei pole suutnud midagi ära teha

PM, 06.08.1998 - Kulbok, Kalle: Eurodebatt vindub endiselt

PM, 08.08.1998 - Juhtkiri: Brüsselit tuleb võtta tõsiselt. Tollid Eesti tootjatele tõestavad meie konkurentsivõimet

PM, 10.08.1998 - Talts, Mait: Eesti vajab eurodiskussiooni. Euroopa Liidu üle vaieldes on vähe argumente

PM, 14.08.1998 - Raudsaar, Mart: Eesti NSV kaart teeb endiselt ilma

PM, 15.08.1998 - Männik, Jaanus: Tollipoliitika apsud ja võimalused. Ilma kindla tollipoliitikata jääme maha isegi Lätist

PM, 22.08.1998 - Klaassen, Mait: Koolide tühjenemise aegu. Maksukoormus tuleb siduda laste olemasolu ja arvuga

PM, 25.08.1998 - Jarne, Aivar: Kahe isanda teener

PM, 28.08.1998 - Cook, Robin: Ehitades uut ühinenud Euroopat, Suurbritannia ettekujutuses on Eestil uues Euroopas oluline koht

PM, 29.08.1998 - Jarne, Aivar: Näpuviibutusest ei piisa

PM, 01.09.1998 - Made, Vahur: Lätist tuleb häid uudiseid. Läti referendum loob pretsedendi

PM, 06.09.1998 - Juhtkiri: Miks nad kinki ei toonud. NATO juhtide visiitide rohkus lisab Eesti turvalisust

PM, 07.09.1998a - Haug, Arvo: Tarbijakaitseta Euroopasse ei saa. Eestis on tarbijakaitse veel lapsekingades

PM, 07.09.1998b - Villem, Andrus: Läti vajab toetust. Venemaal pole adekvaatset pilti Balti riikidest

PM, 10.09.1998 - Juhtkiri: Euroopa mõõdud sobivad. Eesti ei ole leidnud Euroopa Liiduga ühinemist takistavaid probleeme

PM, 15.09.1998a - Mõttus, A.: Alternatiivi ei ole

PM, 15.09.1998b - Nutt, Mart: Kas Euroopa Liit tagab julgeoleku. Brüsseli kodakondsussoovitused on võrreldavad Trooja hobusega

PM, 15.09.1998c - Saatpalu, Vello: Tulumaksuskaala astmestamisest

PM, 16.09.1998 - Saluäär, Hille: Eesti keele jäämisvõimalus. Eurooreeglite tõlkimine suurendab huvi eesti keele vastu

PM, 17.09.1998 - Talts, Mait: Eesti eurodiskussioon. Sissetulekud on isemõtlemise soovist olulisemad

PM, 23.09.1998 - Reiljan, Janno: Mõõdutundetu ebamaine itk

PM, 24.09.1998 - Vahtre, Lauri: Astmeline tulumaks ei tarvitse tulla

PM, 25.09.1998 - Made, Vahur: Oli kord suur Vene turg. Ärimeeste ida-lobby viinuks Eesti katastroofini

PM, 30.09.1998 - Juhtkiri: NRG sai etapivõidu Valitsus otsustas jätkata NRG Energyga läbirääkimisi

PM, 01.10.1998 - Ilves, Toomas Hendrik: Et kinnistada Eesti Läände. Põhjustest, miks lahkun välisministri kohalt

PM, 02.10.1998a - Jarne, Aivar: Kuhu küll kõik lilled jäid? Välisminister Ilvese lahkumisel olid ka välispoliitilised põhjused

PM, 02.10.1998b - Tamm, Eino: Vildakas kodakondsusloogika. Eesti ja Läti on kodakondsusküsimustes taas paarisrakendis

PM, 03.10.1998 - Unt, Arnold: Vivat Latvia!

PM, 07.10.1998 - Varik, Andres: Põllumees krediidikõlblikuks. Maareform peab avama tee ettevõtluse arengule

PM, 08.10.1998a - Metsaveer, Jaan: Tulumaks piiraku ülemaksmist

PM, 08.10.1998b - Mikko, Madis: Horoskoop või pühakiri. 80 000 lehekülge ELi seadusi on vastuvaidlematuks täitmiseks

PM, 09.10.1998 - Hansson, Ardo: Pangandus vajab ikka konkurentsi. Välismaalaste pessimism häirib pangandust muust majandusest enam

PM, 12.10.1998 - Palk, Paavo: Usk levib kiiresti

PM, 13.10.1998 - Varik, Andres: Populistliku kriitikaga riiki ei ehita. Raske majandusaasta ärakasutamine valimiskampanias on vastutustundetu

PM, 20.10.1998 - Rüütel, Arnold: Maarahvas välistuulte keerises. IMFi memorandum pärsib integreerumist Euroopa Liiduga

PM, 21.10.1998 - Neljas, Aap: Eesti konarlik tee WTOsse Meie suureks üllatuseks on Läti selle edukalt läbinud

PM, 22.10.1998a - Hansen, Vootele: Veest algab kõik. Kvaliteetse elu eeltingimus on kvaliteetne joogivesi

PM, 22.10.1998b - Juhtkiri: Kodakondsus surve all. Eesti ei pääse kodakondsuspoliitika liberaliseerimisest

PM, 27.10.1998a - Jarne, Aivar: ELi poliitiline piknik. ELi laienemist pidurdab liidu otsustamisvõimetus

PM, 27.10.1998b - Palmaru, Raivo: Asjatundmatuse karuteene. Inimesi õnnistatakse päevast päeva üsna kummalise informatsiooniga

PM, 29.10.1998 - Ojuland, Kristiina: Pimesi Euroopa Liidu poole. Liitumisläbirääkimiste alustamine novembris on ennatlik

PM, 31.10.1998a - Leetsaar, Jaan: Põllumajanduse kindlad reeglid Eesti lubab ELil kasutada enda suhtes kõlvatut konkurentsi

PM, 31.10.1998b - Tamm, Eino: Konarused teel WTOsse. Eesti on absoluutse kaubandusliberalismiga jõudnud ummikusse

PM, 01.11.1998 - Juhtkiri: Ikka veel pailapse osas. Liitumiskõneluste alguses ei taotle vaid Eesti Euroopa Liidult üleminekuperioode

PM, 03.11.1998 - Tamm, Eino: Pilk võõrasse peeglis. Poola ja Eesti tee ELi on sarnasem kui üldiselt arvatakse

PM, 06.11.1998a - Järvan, Aare: Põllumees ei vaja propagandiste. Valitsusel puudub põllumajanduspoliitika kujundamisel partner

PM, 06.11.1998b - Kortspärn, Heiki: Olematu turvalisus

PM, 06.11.1998c - Raud, Rein: Eurovari Eesti kohal. ELile alternatiivi otsijad ei tunnista sattumist halli tsooni

PM, 08.11.1998 - Juhtkiri: Ootame eurodetaille. On aeg hakata ka laiemat üldsust tutvustama Brüsseli tuhandete direktiividega

PM, 09.11.1998a - Buisson, Marie-Laurence: Uued tuuled Eesti ja ELi suhetes. Eestit kiitnud Euroopa Komisjoni raport osutas ka probleemidele

PM, 09.11.1998b - Piirimäe, Kristjan: Alatalu alusetud süüdistused

PM, 12.11.1998a - Lahe, Virge: Saksa keele oskus – on see vajalik?

PM, 12.11.1998b - Männik Jaanus: Brüsselis läheb Paunvere meelest.
Põllumees ootab euroopalikku suhtumist ja kohtlemist

PM, 14.11.1998 - Raud, Rein: Pilk kõverpeeglisse ristteel. Eurooliitu astumiseks võiks igauks leida ka isikliku põhjuse

PM, 17.11.1998a - Herkel, Andres: Karaganovi doktriini tulek. Riigikogul pole mandaati sisulise nullvariandi kehtestamiseks

PM, 17.11.1998b - Kortspärn, Heikj: Milleks Eestile piirileping?

PM, 17.11.1998c - Mikiver, Ilmar: Ühinemine ELiga - hüpe tundmatusse

PM, 17.11.1998d - Palk, Paavo: Hoolekanne või majandus

PM, 18.11.1998 - Tammsaar, Tiit: Vaade hääletustabloole - 66 : 5 : 5.
Sündmuse võtit tuleks otsida EME kongressilt

PM, 19.11.1998 - Juhtkiri: Kodakondsus jõulukingiks. Rahvusvaheline arvamus sunnib kodakondsuseadust muutma

PM, 21.11.1998 - Vetik, Raivo: Tasub õppida teiste riikide vigadest

PM, 23.11.1998 - Nutt, Mart: Veel lihtsustatud piiriületuskorras. Hirm Venemaa ees halvab välisministeeriumi ametnikke

PM, 27.11.1998 - Kuks, Jaak-Hans: Murelaps põllumajandus. Maaelu küsimuste lahendamiseks vajame rohkem analüüsi

PM, 28.11.1998 - Jarne, Aivar: NATO lipsunõel särab taas. Eesti välispoliitikas on taas tähtsaimaks pürgimine Põhja-Atlandi allianssi

PM, 02.12.1998 - Eamets, Raul: Nõrk tööpoliitika. Tööpuudusega peaks tegelema eraldi ministeerium

PM, 03.12.1998 - Bahovski, Erkki: Kaugemale N Liidust

PM, 06.12.1998 - Juhtkiri: Jõnksutav eurovedur. Euroopa Liidu laienemine peab jätkuma praeguses tempos

PM, 07.12.1998 - Palmaru, Raivo: Tere tulemast stagnariiki. Stagnatsioon ja tõusutee: uued mõisted uudis- ja unarsõnade leksikonis

PM, 10.12.1998 - Krittell, Toomas: Lubamatu vale

PM, 11.12.1998a - Valton-Vallikivi, Arvo: Mis asi on euro-ökk. Euroopa Liit on Eestile vajalik euroküllastumisest hoolimata

PM, 11.12.1998b - Varik, Andres: Lunastagem võlg maarahva ees.
Põllumajanduse toetamine eeldab süsteemset lähenemist

PM, 12.12.1998a - Juhtkiri: Kui lehmad õpivad arvutama. Uus toetuskeem muudab maaelu keeruliseks

PM, 12.12.1998b - Palk, Paavo: Peaministril pole naelkumme. Kas Mart Siimann tuleb libedal teel juhtimisega toime?

PM, 14.12.1998a - Erson, P.: Murelikud poliitikud

PM, 14.12.1998b - Juhtkiri: Aeglane Viini valss. Euroopa Liidu tippkohtumine lükkas laienemisotsused tulevikku

PM, 18.12.1998a - Fogel, Rainer & Prikk, Kristjan: Põllumajanduspoliitika eilne päev

PM, 18.12.1998b - Önnepalu, Tõnu: Vürtspoodnik, pankrotmeister ja EL. Keegi pole märganud, et Euroopa Liitu juhivad jäneseid

PM, 20.12.1998 - Juhtkiri: Küpsustunnistus on käes. Viisavabadus Euroopaga lõpetab ühe etapi Eesti suhetes välisriikidega

PM, 21.12.1998 - Junti, Arvo: Kuritegevus ühiskonna peegliks. Kas leebe karistus ja madal elatustase määravad kuritegevust?

PM, 22.12.1998 - Aasmäe, Hardo: Mõtleme veel turumajanduse üle. Eestit aitavad vaid enda targad otsused

PM, 28.12.1998 - Jarne, Aivar: Viisavabaduse aasta

PM, 29.12.1998a - Mikiver, Ilmar: Pöörates palge uue aasta poole

PM, 29.12.1998b - Tallo, Ivar: Aasta Eesti riiki. Riigivalitsemise süsteemi peab ümber korraldama

2002

- PM, 04.01.2002 - Lukas, Tõnis: Teaduspoliitika tähendab valikut
PM, 11.01.2002 - Krusel, Siim: Pooltühjalt töötav haridussüsteem
PM, 16.01.2002 - Mihkelson, Marko: Püha lehma ootuses
PM, 17.01.2002 - Bahovski, Erkki: Eurotasalulitamine
PM, 22.01.2002a - Hänni, Liia: Jah, härra justiitsminister!
PM, 22.01.2002b - Pääsuke, Ants: Kahe krooni eest miljonäriks!
PM, 26.01.2002 - Bahovski, Erkki: Leedu maadilemma
PM, 28.01.2002 - Laurson, Jüri: Majaomanik vajab inimväärikat kohtlemist ja kaitset
PM, 30.01.2002 - Juhtkiri: Suu puhtaks! Euroopa Komisjon rikub põllumajanduspiirangute kavaga oma põhimõtteid
PM, 31.01.2002 - Altmäe, Arvi: Kutseharidus väärib tulevikku
PM, 01.02.2002 - Männik, Jaanus: Täpsemalt põllumeeste toetustest
PM, 04.02.2002 - Bahovski, Erkki: Vahe sisse
PM, 09.02.2002 - Veidemann, Rein: Eesti vaimu lahkumine
PM, 11.02.2002 - Ilves, Toomas Hendrik: Euroopa tulevik ja meie valikud
PM, 13.02.2002 - Õunapuu, Harri: Maksud ehk aus äri ausse
PM, 14.02.2002 - Susi, Mart: Riiklikud huvid ja haridusosak
PM, 16.02.2002 - Helme, Mart: Visegradi teeviit
PM, 19.02.2002 - Tallo, Ivar: Vorst ja poliitika
PM, 20.02.2002 - Bahovski, Erkki: Eesti huvid lihaletil
PM, 22.02.2002 - Veteallik, Jüri: Jätke Ilves rahule!
PM, 23.02.2002 - Juhtkiri: Omariiklus kohustab. Riik on nii tugev, kui tugev on ühiskond
PM, 08.03.2002a - Bahovski, Erkki: Kust saab Ilves veel kabelimatsu?
PM, 08.03.2002b - Laar, Mart: Rahu, ainult rahu
PM, 09.03.2002a - Juhtkiri: Vaidlused Brüsselis. Eesti peab Euroopa Liidult nõudma oma seisukohtadega arvestamist
PM, 09.03.2002b - Mõistlik, A.: Miks nii?
PM, 11.03.2002 - Sokk, Arvi: Liigume Aafrikasse
PM, 14.03.2002 - Allik, Jaak: Ühiskondliku leppe miraazh
PM, 16.03.2002 - Viikberg, Jüri: Ei saa me võru keeleta
PM, 18.03.2002 - Õunapuu, Harri: Head seadused ja paha eelarve.
Politseinike eripensionid pole ainuke rahata jäänud vääramatu kulu
PM, 19.03.2002 - Mikiver, Monika: Suuremad õigused suhtlemisel ametnikega
PM, 20.03.2002 - Juhtkiri: Pudrumägede ootuses. Kas ühine põllumajanduspoliitika on ka pärast teisenemist Eestile kasulik?
PM, 23.03.2002 - Männik, E.: Ametiühingute tulumaksuvabastus
PM, 27.03.2002 - Raun, Mait: Et mees püsiks kauem värske
PM, 28.03.2002 - Sundelevitsh, Ilja: Elu ja seadus
PM, 30.03.2002a - Helme, Mart: Migratsioonituul puhub vaid idast
PM, 30.03.2002b - Mattson, Toomas: Klantspilt purunes
PM, 01.04.2002 - Kranich, Heiki: Hoia, mida armastad! Natura 2000 sihtidest Euroopas ja Eestis
PM, 02.04.2002a - d'Éstaing, Valéry Giscard: Avalik kiri
PM, 02.04.2002b - Juske, Ants: Berliini müür püsib
PM, 02.04.2002c - Varik, Andres: Mitmekäiguline Euroopa
PM, 17.04.2002 - Juhtkiri: Tühjenev maa. Eestis puudub siiani selge arusaam maaelu tulevikust
PM, 18.04.2002a - Aaviksoo, Jaak: Haridus kui prioriteet
PM, 18.04.2002b - Juhtkiri: Kõik valimisvõidu nimel! Keskerakonna soov teha riigiametitest oma propagandaasutused on lubamatu
PM, 18.04.2002c - Maitse, Meelis: Sotsiaalmonoloog Eesti meele

PM, 19.04.2002 - Juhtkiri: Valitsuse dilemma. Kauplemisruum Euroopa Liiduga on kitsuke

PM, 23.04.2002 - Savi, Toomas: Riigikogu lahtised ukсед

PM, 30.04.2002 - Kallis, Ain: Kompleksideta EU roopasse!

PM, 06.05.2002 - Tepandi, Jaan: Tabamused väljaspool märklauda

PM, 13.05.2002a - Mälksoo, Lauri: Kuidas muuta põhiseadust?

PM, 13.05.2002b - Sildam, Toomas: Ustimenko näitas piiriauku

PM, 16.05.2002 - Juhtkiri: Selge sõnum Eesti peab jätkama NATO suunal siseriiklikku ettevalmistustöö

PM, 17.05.2002 - Ubar, Raimund: Lühinägelik rahastamislahendus

PM, 28.05.2002a - Juhtkiri: Loosungid seadusteks. Valimiskampaaniale pühendunud Riigikogu peab jääma suvetööle

PM, 28.05.2002b - Suija, E.: Ignar Fjukil on õigus

PM, 30.05.2002 - Aunin, Urmas: Sallimatu eestlane

PM, 01.06.2002a - Bahovski, Erkki: Ei juudi vandenõu ega sotsialism

PM, 01.06.2002b - Virmavirta, Jarmo: Põhjala päikeserannik Eestisse!

PM, 06.06.2002 - Parve, Ralf R.: Uus ajalugu

PM, 07.06.2002 - Juhtkiri: Ohutus eelkõige. Mängu- ja spordiväljakud peavad vastama euronormidele

PM, 11.06.2002a - Juhtkiri: Peatükkide sulgemise vaevad. Poliitilised vaidlused Brüsselis kipuvad varjutama Eesti eurokõnelusi

PM, 11.06.2002b - Varul, Paul: Põhiseadust muudab rahvas

PM, 12.06.2002a - Barkalaja, Anzori: Kivikuningamängust, kukepoksist ja jalgpallist

PM, 12.06.2002b - Kallas, Siim: Kümme aastat Eesti krooni

PM, 15.06.2002a - Soone, Ivar: Identiteedi kriis või identiteedikriis?

PM, 15.06.2002b - Suits, Maimu: Puhtus eelkõige!

PM, 17.06.2002a - Juhtkiri: Raha paneb rattad käima. Paljuräägitud haldussuutlikkus pole sõnakõlks

PM, 17.06.2002b - Siim, Tõnis: Liitumise paratamatusest

PM, 21.06.2002 - Laar, Mart: Valitsusel napib otsustusjulgust

PM, 01.07.2002 - Müller, Per Stig: Euroopa unistus täitub

PM, 05.07.2002a - Bronshtein, Mihhail: Idapoliitika on tundeline teema

PM, 05.07.2002b - Juhtkiri: Eelista eestimaist!

PM, 15.07.2002 - Reiljan, Janno: Rahvas põhiseaduse kaitsjana

PM, 16.07.2002 - Reinap, Aivar: Tugiostud kapsaturul

PM, 19.07.2002a - Juhtkiri: Kõdu läikiva fassaadi taga. Lagunevad politseimajad ja lääpas piirivalvekordonid häbistavad Eesti riiki

PM, 19.07.2002b - Reiljan, Villu: Kelle oma on maa?

PM, 27.07.2002a - Juhtkiri: Kaheldavad trahvid. Euroliidu kavandatav karistusmehhanism sisaldaks endas küsimärke

PM, 27.07.2002b - Ruutsoo, Rein: Kuidas saada eurooplaseks

PM, 30.07.2002 - Jaeger, Andres: Reisijateta rong

PM, 02.08.2002 - Tiit, Valdur: Eesti tuulikud talupõllul

PM, 05.08.2002a - Marrandi, Jaanus: Maa vajab harijaid. Tugevad kannapöörded maa müügil näitaksid Eestit ebastabiilse riigina

PM, 05.08.2002b - Reinap, Aivar: Rukki saatus

PM, 06.08.2002 - Aaloe, Mati: Vaeste appikarje

PM, 12.08.2002 - Reiljan, Villu: Valitsus teenigu rahva ühishuve

PM, 14.08.2002a - Juhtkiri: Tundlik küsimus. Puutumatusleping USA sõduritele paneb Eesti raske välispoliitilise valiku ette

PM, 14.08.2002b - Luik, Jüri: Eesti ja tema liitlased

PM, 15.08.2002 - Soosaar, Enn: Pudrumäed ja piimajõed

PM, 23.08.2002 - Juhtkiri: Küpsuseksam. USA kompab Eestit kui tulevast liitlast

PM, 22.08.2002 - Lerman, Jonna: Kes aitab?

PM, 29.08.2002 - Juhtkiri: Püssid palge? Piiratud jahipidamise jätkumine Eestis sõltub läbirääkimisoskustest

PM, 30.08.2002 - Gross, J.: Eesti kutseharidusest - vaadatuna Saksamaalt

PM, 31.08.2002 - Juhtkiri: Jälle must päev. Tööõnnetuste arv Eestis kasvab iga aastaga

PM, 02.09.2002 - Heidmets, Mati: Milline on Eesti laiem eesmärk

PM, 04.09.2002 - Tallo, Ivar: Avatud riik ja suletud erakonnad

PM, 05.09.2002 - Tanner, Risto: Miks me oma võimalusi ei kasuta?

PM, 06.09.2002 - Buitter, Willem & Michell-Thompson, Vanessa: Kuidas Eesti saavutab ELi jõukuse

PM, 12.09.2002a - Juhtkiri: Tootsi rehkendus. Endale võetud kohustused tuleb täita

PM, 12.09.2002b - Taagepera, Rein: Riigikogu praegune suurus on hea

PM, 14.09.2002 - Kuusk, M.: Lõpp lõmitamisele!

PM, 18.09.2002 - Juhtkiri: Alati väike eelarve. Riigieelarvet pole vaja defitsiitseks jätta

PM, 25.09.2002 - Luiker, Lauri: Rahast mitme kandi pealt

PM, 26.09.2002 - Ideon, Argo: Kui ei oska, siis õpi

PM, 02.10.2002 - Bahovski, Erkki: Kriips peale ideaalidele?

PM, 09.10.2002a - Ojuland, Kristiina & Tuomioja, Erkki: Oleme muutuste künnisel

PM, 09.10.2002b - Virmavirta, Jarmo: Suur maa, suur silk

PM, 10.10.2002a - Juhtkiri: Aeg on küps. Soodus õhkkond liitumiskõneluste lõpetamiseks

PM, 10.10.2002b - Ilves, Toomas Hendrik: Soo-inimesed ja demokraatia

PM, 11.10.2002 - Berg, Eiki: Eesti välispoliitika küsimärgid

PM, 14.10.2002 - Soosaar, Enn: Võimaluste ja valikute raamid

PM, 15.10.2002a - Maimets, Toivo: Tuba ei jää tühjaks

PM, 15.10.2002b - Soosaar, Enn: Võimaluste ja valikute raamid

PM, 16.10.2002 - Eesti Heliloojate Liit, Eesti Kinoliit, Eesti Kirjanike Liit et al.: Riigikogule ja Riigikogu kultuurikomisjonile

PM, 21.10.2002 - Bahovski, Erkki: Iiri oluline impulss

PM, 24.10.2002 - Õunapuu, Harri: Ka vähesega saab teha palju

PM, 25.10.2002a - Leetsaar, Jaan: Heade kavatsustega sillutatud põrgutee

PM, 25.10.2002b - Siim, Tõnis: Intellektuaalse dialoogi tähtsusest

PM, 28.10.2002 - Kurs, Kalmar: Eesti valikud: inimesed või asfalt

PM, 29.10.2002 - Juhtkiri: Laienemine ukse ees. Kopenhaageni kohtumine kinnitas jälle ELi laienemist õigel ajal

PM, 30.10.2002 - Valm, Tiiu: Raamatukogu kui sfinks

PM, 01.11.2002 - Metsaveer, Jaan: Kuidas saada rikkaks?

PM, 02.11.2002 - Kriis, Mare: Kuidas karud tantsima pannakse

PM, 06.11.2002 - Männik, Jaanus: Kas demokraatiast ametnike riiki?

PM, 07.11.2002 - Helme, Mart: Matvijenko mõrud präänikud

PM, 09.11.2002 - Önnepalu, Tõnu: Ideaal ja spliin

PM, 11.11.2002 - Sildam, Toomas: Tundmatu Venemaa

PM, 12.11.2002 - Eesti Teadlaste Liidu juhatus: Eesti kavatseb ELiga ühineda vähesuutliku inimkapitaliga

PM, 13.11.2002 - Kauba, Tõnu: Eluasemepoliitikast Eestis

PM, 16.11.2002 - Virmavirta, Jarmo: Revolutsioon pole eksportkaup

PM, 18.11.2002a - Raig, Ivar: Millise ELiga on kasulik liituda?

PM, 18.11.2002b - Soone, Jüri, Rudi, Ülo & Adamson, Alo: Peidetud energia põlevkivis

PM, 19.11.2002a - Juhtkiri: Mida teha Euroopaga. Eesti peab Euroopa Liidu tulevikudebatis oma huve kaitsma

PM, 19.11.2002b - Vöörmann, Mai: Opetlik lugu

PM, 26.11.2002 - Soosaar, Enn: Koduvillast väitlust NATO ümber

PM, 27.11.2002a - Mälksoo, Lauri: Eesti välispoliitika idealismi ja realismi vahel
 PM, 27.11.2002b - Nõmm, Eha: Õigus elule
 PM, 29.11.2002 - Aava, Katrin: Inimesed otsivad müüti
 PM, 02.12.2002 - Lang, Rein: Avameelselt haridusest. Haridusreform ei ole sisuliselt veel alanudki
 PM, 06.12.2002a - Kelam, Tunne: Rahvusliku aate jõud
 PM, 07.12.2002 - Saat, Mari: Uks laps
 PM, 09.12.2002a - Aarna, Olav: Haridusreformi unutatud eesmärk. Tähelepanuta on jäänud keskne probleem: muutused hariduse sisus
 PM, 09.12.2002b - Ilves, Toomas Hendrik, Lauristin, Marju & Tarand, Andres: Euroopa Liidu raha saab paremini kasutada
 PM, 10.12.2002 - Taal, Olari: Gladiaatorid ja vangid
 PM, 11.12.2002a - Juhtkiri: Soodsad numbrid. Eesti peab suutma liitumiskõnelustel saavutatud raha ära
 PM, 11.12.2002b - Susi, Mart: Lõpetage segadused kõrghariduses
 PM, 13.12.2002 - Kallas, Siim: Euroopa läbirääkimiste lõpp
 PM, 14.12.2002 - Juhtkiri: Joon alla. Eesti liitumiskõneluste lõpp ELiga tähendab terve ajajärgu lõppemist
 PM, 16.12.2002a - Bahovski, Erkki: Sõnum Kopenhaagenist
 PM, 16.12.2002b - Salupere, Malle: Millega mõtlevad bürokraadid?
 PM, 19.12.2002a - Helemäe, Jelena & Võormann, Rein: Tööpoliitikaga tagasi Euroopasse?
 PM, 19.12.2002b - Juhtkiri: Oskus küsida. Küsida ELi rahvahääletusel ühes küsimuses kahte asja ei ole mõttekas
 PM, 23.12.2002a - Laane, Marek: Sõda hakkab, sõda hakkab...
 PM, 23.12.2002b - Rast, Aadu: Saagu valitsejad targemaks

2003

PM, 04.01.2003 - Kivirähk, Juhan: Rahvahääletuselt mõistetav tulemus
 PM, 06.01.2003a - A.M.: Meie sisemisest küpsusest
 PM, 06.01.2003b - Ost, Imbi: Naised müügiks?!
 PM, 07.01.2003 - Öunapuu, Harri: Ootame pensionitõusuga kevadeni
 PM, 09.01.2003 - Berg, Maimu: Miks eesti naine ei sünnita?
 PM, 11.01.2003 - Virmavirta, Jarmo: Kas Eesti liitub ikka õige NATOga?
 PM, 13.01.2003 - Heidmets, Mati: Haritus ja professionaalsus. Vajame kokkulepet nii rahastamisalustes kui riigitellimuse loogikas
 PM, 15.01.2003a - Kreitzberg, Peeter: Haridusfoorum: kas õitseng või hääbumine
 PM, 15.01.2003b - Raig, Ivar: Raha eurovastastele, aga kui palju?
 PM, 17.01.2003 - Juhtkiri: Kõhides Euroopa Liitu. Kompleksivaba arutelu ELi üle
 PM, 18.01.2003a - Allaste, Airi-Alina: Millist uimastipoliitikat vajame?
 PM, 18.01.2003b - Mutt, Mihkel: Kas Euroopa Liidus tohib kõhida?
 PM, 22.01.2003 - Riikoja, Hindrek: Kindlustuse kaks külge
 PM, 23.01.2003 - Berg, Eiki: Eesti otsus või matus?
 PM, 27.01.2003 - Kreitzberg, Peeter: Raskesti hoomatav Euroopa Liit. Paljud tähtsad asjad on kaalul ELi uues aluslepingus
 PM, 29.01.2003 - Einasto, Jaan & Leedjärv, Laurits: Võimu ja vaimu tüli
 PM, 30.01.2003 - Oviir, Siiri: Kas ühekordne pensionitõus enne valimisi on õige?
 PM, 01.02.2003 - Juhtkiri: Kui palju ust avada. Võõrtööjõu sissetoomisega ei tohi kiirustada
 PM, 04.02.2003 - Monticelli, Daniele: Eurooplased sõja vastu

PM, 06.02.2003 - Mihkelson, Marko: Ohtliku pretsedendi lävel
 PM, 08.02.2003a - Engelbrecht, Jüri, Haller, Kristjan, Harro, Jaanus et al.:
 Teaduse tippkeskuste ühine tegevus
 PM, 08.02.2003b - Kelam, Tunne: Millised on Eesti rahvuslikud huvid?
 PM, 12.02.2003 - Mölder, Leevi: Uus (vana) kord
 PM, 15.02.2003 - Ilves, Toomas Hendrik: Kas Eesti võitleb Eesti eest
 PM, 18.02.2003 - Tonsiver, Krister: Miks meile Euroopa Liit
 PM, 19.02.2003 - Juhtkiri: Selg sirgu. Mart Laari vastus Jacques Chiracile
 lisab Eesti välispoliitikale selgust
 PM, 21.02.2003 - Kolga, Voldemar: Uusi värve poliitmaastikule
 PM, 25.02.2003a - Kallas, Siim: Peame mõtlema 85 aastat ette!
 PM, 25.02.2003b - Rüütel, Arnold: Riik tähendab ühisvastutust
 PM, 26.02.2003 - Tammert, Paul: Reformida või mitte
 PM, 27.02.2003 - Annus, Tiina: Sarnased hariduslubadused
 PM, 01.03.2003 - Mut, Mihkel: Mammukesed ja kruusikesed
 PM, 03.03.2003 - Remsu, Olev: Ülepolitiseeritud. Depolitiseerida!
 PM, 04.03.2003 - Klaas, Urmas: Ülesoolatud kurgid
 PM, 05.03.2003a - Kelam, Tunne: Valimiste peaesmärk täitus
 PM, 05.03.2003b - Rooba, Jaanus: Lihtsas keeles
 PM, 08.03.2003 - Raag, Ilmar: Elu pärast eestlust
 PM, 10.03.2003a - Juhtkiri: Esimene pääsuke. Malta «jah» ELile loob
 meilegi soodsama rahvusvahelise õhkkonna
 PM, 10.03.2003b - Parts, Juhan: Koosmeele koalitsioon. Miks eelistame
 nelja erakonna liitu
 PM, 11.03.2003 - Ideon, Argo: Keskerakonna valik
 PM, 14.03.2003 - Hammer, J.: Tsivilisatsiooni ohvrid
 PM, 15.03.2003 - Riikoja, Hindrek: Põllumees vajab kaitset
 PM, 20.03.2003 - Virnavirta, Jarmo: Tõde varjub eesriide taha
 PM, 21.03.2003 - Tarand, Indrek: Kaotatud võimalus ja võimalus kaotada
 PM, 22.03.2003 - Sirg, Veera: Emapalga karid
 PM, 24.03.2003 - Tamman, Tiina: Eesti maailmas
 PM, 28.03.2003 - Raagmaa, Garri: Maakond vajab maavanenmat
 PM, 29.03.2003 - Aaviksoo: Õhku kirjutatud haridus
 PM, 31.03.2003 - Juhtkiri: Ootame tarku tegusid. Noorenenud Riigikogule
 õpipoisiaega ei anta
 PM, 01.04.2003 - Tallo, Ivar: Kas uus teerull või uus poliitika?
 PM, 02.04.2003a - Marrandi, Jaanus: Eesti põllumees vajab võrdseid
 tingimusi
 PM, 02.04.2003b - Sillaste, Juhan: Väljakutsed Venemaa suunal
 PM, 08.04.2003a - Luiker, Lauri: Majanduskasvust tähtsam on heaolu
 PM, 08.04.2003b - Reinap, Aivar: Hindadega Euroopas
 PM, 14.04.2003 - Bahovski, Erkki: Väljakutse Doonau kallastelt
 PM, 15.04.2003a - Juhtkiri: Erastamispähkel. Koalitsioonipartnerid on
 edasise erastamise suhtes eri meelt
 PM, 15.04.2003b - Virnavirta, Jarmo: Rünnak, millest on raske aru saada
 PM, 16.04.2003a - Ilves, Toomas Hendrik: Samm eurolliidule lähemale
 PM, 16.04.2003b - Juhtkiri: Õpipoisiaeg on käes. Eesti ühinemisleping ELiga
 viib Eesti senisest rohkem Euroopasse
 PM, 16.04.2003c - Raju, Olev: Koalitsioonilepet on võimatu täita
 PM, 19.04.2003 - Arjakas, Küllö: Eesti ajalugu pole peenraha
 PM, 21.04.2003 - Dreving, Marek: Võitlev võrdsus
 PM, 23.04.2003 - Ergma, Ene: Uued väljakutsed riigikogu ees
 PM, 24.04.2003 - Reinap, Aivar: Erastada või taasriigistada?
 PM, 02.05.2003a - Allikas, Rein: Politrukid uuesti tegevusse
 PM, 02.05.2003b - Laffranque, Rodolphe: Euroopa Liit pole NSV Liit
 PM, 02.05.2003c - M.M.: Mõttetu ID-kaart

PM, 03.05.2003a - Aas Elmu: Mida teha 14. septembril?
 PM, 03.05.2003b - Mikelsaar, Raik-Hiio, Rosenberg, Tiit, Piirimäe, Helmut et al.: Avalik kiri kultuuriministrile
 PM, 05.05.2003 - Ojuland, Kristiina: ÜRO roll muutuvast maailmas
 PM, 07.05.2003 - Erilaid, Erkki: Eesti minetab konkurentsieeliseid
 PM, 12.05.2003 - Juhtkiri: Leedu ütles "jah". Eestil oleks Leedu eurokampaaniast üht-teist õppida
 PM, 16.05.2003 - I.S.: Paljude noorte mure
 PM, 17.05.2003 - Juhtkiri: Euroummik. Eesti peab seisma riikide võrdõiguslikkuse eest ELis
 PM, 19.05.2003 - Juhtkiri: Pilved tervishoiu kohal. Arstide streik looks siinmail pretsedendi ja tõstataks palju küsimusi
 PM, 21.05.2003a - Juhtkiri: Rääkigem inimestega. Eurokampaania peab keskendumast inimlähedusele
 PM, 21.05.2003b - Saar, Andrus: Sotsiaalne kurtus ruulib. Kui poliitik lubab endale piiride tõmbamist, on tegu kaksikmoraaliga
 PM, 23.05.2003a - Juhtkiri: Selgust häma asemele. Viivitamine ELi asjus ei too keskparteile kasu
 PM, 23.05.2003b - Vetik, Raivo: Eduviljad kuuluvad kogu ühiskonnale
 PM, 24.05.2003 - Kender, Kaur: Vali kord, vaestemaja ja preestrid
 PM, 27.05.2003 - Kortspärn, Heiki: Eestlane Eedeni aias
 PM, 31.05.2003 - Juhtkiri: Abitud abiministrid. Põhiseadus annab abiministrile sisuliselt nõuniku staatuset
 PM, 02.06.2003a - Cannon-Jõe, Ilvi: Ühiskonnale vajalik seadus
 PM, 02.06.2003b - Juhtkiri: Euroopasse tööle. Euroopa Liidu personalipoliitika pakub uutele riikidele eeliseid
 PM, 02.06.2003c - Siim, Tõnis & Vanja, Rein: Eesti pole Leedu
 PM, 05.06.2003 - I.S.: Kuidas jääda ausaks?
 PM, 10.06.2003 - Lääts, A.: Kuidas saada miinimumpalka?
 PM, 14.06.2003a - Allikas, Rein: Euroliidu invasioon
 PM, 14.06.2003b - Virnavirta, Jarmo: Suurte muutuste keerises
 PM, 16.06.2003a - Juhtkiri: Aeg selgeks seisukohaks. Keskerakond tahab olla peigmees mitmes pulmas korraga
 PM, 16.06.2003b - Ostrat, E.: Milleks tormata?
 PM, 17.06.2003a - Olesk, Arko: Suured on inimesed, mitte riigid
 PM, 17.06.2003b - Uusen, Enn: Peatagem pahupoolsust!
 PM, 18.06.2003a - Bahovski, Erkki: Aega ei ole
 PM, 18.06.2003b - Juhtkiri: Eurolaienemine kabinetides. ELi toetustest kasusaamiseks tuleb ka endal kulutusi teha
 PM, 20.06.2003a - Parts, Juhan: Valija ei pea pettuma
 PM, 20.06.2003b - Pikko, Ain: EL - ametnike paradiis
 PM, 20.06.2003c - Polikarpus, Viido: Naabri valik
 PM, 26.06.2003 - Klaas, Urmas: Aeg teha õige valik
 PM, 27.06.2003 - Kaevats, Ülo: Arengukiirendus või ääremaastumine
 PM, 28.06.2003 - Vseviov, David: Eesti valib Lääne ja Ida vahel
 PM, 02.07.2003a - Jaeger, Andres: Tundkem ajalugu
 PM, 02.07.2003b - Repliik: Patt infolt kokku hoida
 PM, 03.07.2003a - Karuks, Tiit: Kuum kartul
 PM, 03.07.2003b - Raidväli, Jüri: Salu-Vilosiuse sündroom ja EL
 PM, 04.07.2003a - Juhtkiri: Enam ausust ja selget juttu! Hämamine ja pooltõed toovad kaasa euroskepsise tõusu
 PM, 04.07.2003b - Kreitzberg, Peeter: Parlamentaarse demokraatia katsekivi
 PM, 04.07.2003c - Renno, Olav: Vastutustundetud vastalised
 PM, 05.07.2003a - Merekülski, Maret: Noortes on potentsiaali
 PM, 05.07.2003b - Reinap, Aivar: Ei või jah?
 PM, 08.07.2003 - Lauri, Maris: Hääletad «ei», valid majanduskriisi

PM, 09.07.2003 - Raun, Mait: Eesti küsib, mis on Lääs
 PM, 10.07.2003 - Savisaar, Edgar: Tehkem põhjendatud valik
 PM, 11.07.2003a - Langemets, Andres: Uue valitsuse sõnadeta laul
 PM, 11.07.2003b - Lang, Rein: Pealiskaudsuse viljad
 PM, 11.07.2003c - Pere, Aare: Noorte võimalused
 PM, 12.07.2003a - Berg, Eiki: Mineviku õppetunde tuleviku tarvis
 PM, 12.07.2003b - Ehlvest, Jüri: Ostan nurga taga eurosid
 PM, 12.07.2003c - Venden, Hermann: Savisaare uus mäng
 PM, 14.07.2003a - Repliik: Kuulakem Klasi
 PM, 14.07.2003b - Roostal, Ilmar: EL ja Eesti identiteet
 PM, 16.07.2003a - Jaeger, Andres: Aeg selgeteks sõnadeks
 PM, 16.07.2003b - Juhtkiri: Kultuurkeel kohustab. Euroseaduste eesti keelde tõlkimine seab eeskätt nõud Eesti riigile
 PM, 17.07.2003a - Juhtkiri: Majandus kaalukausil. Euroopa Liit tagab inimeste ja majanduse heaolu kasvu
 PM, 17.07.2003b - Veidemann, Rein: Sada päeva tuulte pöörises
 PM, 19.07.2003a - Kolga, Voldemar: Eesti erinevad elumaailmad
 PM, 19.07.2003b - Pullerits, Priit: Masendav eurotee
 PM, 21.07.2003a - Made, Vahur: Elitaarne euroreferendum. 14. septembril võivad ei-hääled võita
 PM, 21.07.2003b - Maimets, Toivo: Meie lapsed väärivad parimat haridust
 PM, 21.07.2003c - T. P.: Eesti 21. sajandi maailmas
 PM, 23.07.2003 - Gräzin, Igor: Vajame euroaktivismi
 PM, 24.07.2003a - Krüger, Andreas: Eestlaste asjatud kartused
 PM, 24.07.2003b - Pomerants, Marko: Milano kingsepa sõnum
 PM, 24.07.2003c - Silberg, Uno: Kas meie põhiseadus on müüt?
 PM, 25.07.2003a - Kaplinski, Jaan: Impeerium ja riikide liit
 PM, 25.07.2003b - Soodla, Vello: Lurnitsemisest
 PM, 26.07.2003 - Juhtkiri: Personalikarusel. Ametnike selgitusteta tagandamised vähendavad riigi usaldusväärust
 PM, 28.07.2003 - M.P.: Unustatud osa rahvast
 PM, 29.07.2003 - Seppik, Ain: Selgelt poliitiline probleem
 PM, 30.07.2003 - Kask, Rein: Sapakas või mersu
 PM, 31.07.2003 - Korv, Neeme: Ratastel instituut
 PM, 01.08.2003a - Otsmann, Kristjan: Jah-hää! hakkab värisema
 PM, 01.08.2003b - Tamm, Milja: Häving versus vaba valik
 PM, 01.08.2003c - Trulli, Karita: Mul on kurb
 PM, 01.08.2003d - Tulviste, Peeter: Muutuv maailm, muutuv Euroopa
 PM, 04.08.2003 - Oras, Maarja: Euroopa-kogemus
 PM, 05.08.2003a - Bahovski, Erkki: Hirmul on suured silmad
 PM, 05.08.2003b - Juhtkiri: Riik eestlastele liiga suur. IMFi mure Eesti paisuva eelarve üle on arusaadav
 PM, 05.08.2003c - Pajula, Ene: Konnatiigistumise oht
 PM, 06.08.2003a - Aaviksoo, Jaak: Ülikool, Eesti teadus ja Euroopa
 PM, 06.08.2003b - Bahovski, Erkki: Paradigmade heitlus
 PM, 08.08.2003a - Viivi Luik, Elmo Nüganen, Jüri Arrak, Jüri Engelbrecht, Hirvo Surva & Andrus Kivirähk: Eestlaseks saab jääda vaid eurooplasena
 PM, 08.08.2003b - Muuli, Kalle: Euroruletis terendub peaministritool
 PM, 09.08.2003a - Eintalu, Jüri: Tulevikku on raske prognoosida
 PM, 09.08.2003b - Leppikson, Robert: Tulevikuotsuseid tehes mõelgem oma lastele
 PM, 09.08.2003c - Mäe, Ülo: Mõtlemiseks Keskerakonna juhile
 PM, 11.08.2003a - Juhtkiri: Keskerakond ütles «ei». Keskerakond vastandub euroküsimumes teistele parlamendierakondadele
 PM, 11.08.2003b - Salupere, Malle: Eesti alkoholiseerumine

PM, 12.08.2003a - Eamets, Raul: Mis juhtub Eesti tööturul pärast ELiga ühinemist

PM, 12.08.2003b - Kallas, Siim: Eurokampaania ei tohi olla palagan

PM, 12.08.2003c - Kivirähk, Juhan: Rahu, ainult rahu! Rahvahääletuseni jäävat perioodi ei tohiks muuta poliitiliseks poriloopimiseks

PM, 13.08.2003a - Bauman, Riho, Kivisildnik, Lepa, Margus et al.: Eesti rahvale

PM, 13.08.2003b - Kangur, U.: Keskerakonna eestkõneleja

PM, 13.08.2003c - Sepp, Evelyn: Keskerakonna südametunnistuse päev

PM, 13.08.2003d - Veidemann, Rein: Tsirkus Barcelonas

PM, 14.08.2003a - Erilaid, Erkki: Ähvardav mull

PM, 14.08.2003b - Jokiniemi, Rauno: Savisaare kahepalgelisus

PM, 14.08.2003c - Peterson, Aleksei: Eestlaseks saab jääda vaid eestlasena

PM, 14.08.2003d - Önnepalu, Tõnu: Hoia hoogu, suur Eesti!

PM, 15.08.2003 - Haavel, Tõnis: Eesti ja EL aastal 2020

PM, 16.08.2003a - Praks, Rein: Toetan Kallast

PM, 16.08.2003b - Raig, Ivar, Helme, Mart & Gräzin, Igor: Eesti juhid ei soovi demokraatiat

PM, 18.08.2003 - T.N.: Mõelge noortele

PM, 19.08.2003a - Juhtkiri: Tubli tulemus «eurorindel». Augusti esimesel poolel oli toetus Euroopa Liidule selle aasta kõrgeim

PM, 19.08.2003b - Ojuland, Kristiina: Lõikusaeg on käes

PM, 21.08.2003 - Heidmets, Mati: Eesti tulevikuarmastus

PM, 22.08.2003 - Sooäär, Imre: «Ei» öeldes kaotame ajud ja kapitali

PM, 23.08.2003a - Juhtkiri: Ei Rehepaplale! «Ei» euroreferendumil tugevdaks sotsiaalseid vastuolusid

PM, 23.08.2003b - Lepp, T.: Oh seda edevust!

PM, 23.08.2003c - Teder, Tarmo: Augustileitsakuline Euroopa 2020

PM, 25.08.2003a - Keskküla, Ando: Karu peied

PM, 25.08.2003b - Wallace, Jim: Siim Kallasel on tuline õigus

PM, 26.08.2003a - Kallas, Siim: Lõpp nõukogudele!

PM, 26.08.2003b - Mihkelson, Marko: Euroopa Liit kasvatab Eesti mõjujõudu

PM, 27.08.2003 - Keha, Anti: Salapärane Euroopa Liit

PM, 28.08.2003 - Veri, Margus: Kas haridus on prioriteet?

PM, 29.08.2003a - Kender, Kaur: Isiklikud asjad

PM, 29.08.2003b - Viies, Tiiu: Kuidas müüa ideed euroliidust

PM, 30.08.2003 - Taagepera, Mare: Veel üks Nõukogude Liidu igand

PM, 01.09.2003 - Russak, Ülo: Tagasi maale, vanaema juurde

PM, 02.09.2003a - Erelt, Mati, Klaas, Birute, Külmoja, Irina et al.: Keelenõukogu avaldus

PM, 02.09.2003b - Lapin, Leonhard: Rahu tagatis

PM, 02.09.2003c - Teesalu, M.: Kuri rahvas

PM, 03.09.2003a - Allikas, Rein: Vene kaart teostub ELi kaudu

PM, 03.09.2003b - Engelbrecht, Jüri, Ergma, Ene, Jaaksoo Ülo et al.: Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia avaldus

PM, 04.09.2003 - Treier, Märt: Arukuse aeg

PM, 05.09.2003 - Broch, Lave K.: Kes tegelikult rahu tagab

PM, 06.09.2003a - Allik, Jüri: Eesti asend maailmakaardil

PM, 06.09.2003b - Mõtsnik, Harri: Pidagem veel aru

PM, 08.09.2003 - K.K.: Hirm

PM, 10.09.2003a - Juhtkiri: Ootamatu küsitlustulemus. Integratsioonipoliitikas tuleb mängumaad avardada

PM, 10.09.2003b - Strandberg, Marek: Kobrutav eliidipsühhoos

PM, 11.09.2003a - Nõmm, Eha: Seenespõrslased

PM, 11.09.2003b - Poll, Liisi: Lumivalgeke tegi karuteene

PM, 12.09.2003 - Jakobson, Max: Paisuvalt arenev Euroopa Liit
 PM, 13.09.2003a - Kaska, Valev: Eurovangla
 PM, 13.09.2003b - Kundla, Rene: Kas eurohääletus on salajane?
 PM, 13.09.2003c - Lippmaa, Endel: Kuulume Euroopasse
 PM, 13.09.2003d - Raun, Mait: Paabeli segaduse anatoomia
 PM, 13.09.2003e - Virnavirta, Jarmo: Sarnased hirmud
 PM, 15.09.2003 - Kivirähk, Juhan: Euroskeptilise Eesti «jah»-sõna
 PM, 16.09.2003a - Juhtkiri: Rootsi ütles «ei». «Ei» eurole soodustab kahekiiruselise Euroopa teket
 PM, 16.09.2003b - Truve, Erkki: Geneetiliselt muundatud toit eestlase toidulaual
 PM, 17.09.2003 - Poll, Liis: Eurovastased ei esinda kedagi
 PM, 20.09.2003 - Veidemann, Rein: Eesti Vabariik kuubis
 PM, 22.09.2003 - Juhtkiri: Läti kopeeriv «jah». Eesti saab Läti näol laienenud Euroopa Liidus juurde kindla liitlase
 PM, 02.10.2003a - Kaalep, Ain: Eiardid on ohtlikud
 PM, 02.10.2003b - Metsaveer, Jaan: Kas tõesti muutus?
 PM, 02.10.2003c - Pily, Mihkel: E-kooli uued suunad
 PM, 03.10.2003 - Bahovski, Erkki: Eesti sõna kaalukam
 PM, 06.10.2003a - Juhtkiri: Kaua tehtud, kaunikene. Eesti kaitsku oma huve ja seisku toimiva ELi eest
 PM, 06.10.2003b - Raun, Eero: Ohtlik suhtumine
 PM, 09.10.2003 - Priimägi, Linnart: Hobuseraua lõgin
 PM, 15.10.2003 - Priimägi, Linnar: Mittesöödav paber
 PM, 27.10.2003 - Soosaar, Enn: Kaitsevael on mitu tahku
 PM, 31.10.2003 - Juhtkiri: Vajalik pensionitõus. Valitsus kaalub erakorralist pensionitõusu
 PM, 03.11.2003a - Juhtkiri: Vangerdused Euroopa Liidus. Eesti peab Euroopas endale liitlasi leidma
 PM, 03.11.2003b - Kaljulaid, Kersti: TALO kahjustab haritlaste huve
 PM, 05.11.2003 - Juhtkiri: Ohud raudteel. Raudtee minek Vene investorite kontrolli alla pole riigi huvides
 PM, 06.11.2003a - Juhtkiri: Keerukas lõimumine
 PM, 06.11.2003b - Reinap, Aivar: Statistiline võlunust
 PM, 10.11.2003a - Juhtkiri: Pilg tagasi on pilk edasi
 PM, 10.11.2003b - Sildam, Toomas: Kordoni lugu
 PM, 11.11.2003 - Virnavirta, Jarmo: Vaid jalgpall on tähtis
 PM, 12.11.2003a - Juhtkiri: Inglise keel päästab. Välisstudengite õppemaksu alandamine lööb TÜ eelarvesse augu
 PM, 12.11.2003b - Luiker, Lauri: Haug, luik ja vähk riiki juhtimas
 PM, 13.11.2003a - Juhtkiri: Vigade parandus. Naiste ja meeste võrdõiguslikkuse seaduse eelnõu püüab eksimusi vältida
 PM, 13.11.2003b - Tiit, Ene-Margit: Rahvastikupoliitika võimalused
 PM, 14.11.2003 - Jõesaar, Andres: Panus avalik-õiguslikku ringhäälingusse
 PM, 19.11.2003 - Kivirähk, Juhan: Rahvaliidu uus poliitika
 PM, 20.11.2003 - Raun, Mait: Milleks võrdõiguslikkus?
 PM, 21.11.2003 - Vetik, Raivo: Sotsiaalteaduse seosed poliitikaga
 PM, 28.11.2003 - Lill, Märt-Matis: Kas soomlased on lollid?
 PM, 03.12.2003 - Koslov, Vladimir: Nõudmised reaalseks
 PM, 05.12.2003 - Langemets, Andres: Milleks meile riik ja rahvas
 PM, 06.12.2003 - Heidmets, Mati: Vedajad ja pingutajad
 PM, 08.12.2003 - Normet, Ingo: Väike Venemaa
 PM, 15.12.2003 - Allik, Jüri: Teadusraha ülikoolidele?
 PM, 22.12.2003 - Runnel, Hando: Aasta murelikud palgejooned