

THE ARCTIC BEAR WHISPERER

- FINLAND AS AN ARCTIC AMBASSADOR IN 1986–1989

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Master's Thesis

Political History

Master's Programme in European Studies

Faculty of Social Sciences

University of Helsinki

October 2019



HELSINGIN YLIOPISTO
HELSINGFORS UNIVERSITET
UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI

Tiedekunta/Osasto – Fakultet/Sektion – Faculty

Faculty of Social Sciences

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Työn nimi – Arbetets titel – Title

The Arctic Bear Whisperer – Finland as an Arctic Ambassador in 1986–1989

Oppiaine – Läroämne – Subject

Political History

Työn laji – Arbetets art – Level

Master's Thesis

Aika – Datum – Month and year

October 2019

Sivumäärä – Sidoantal – Number of pages

96

Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract

During the Cold War, the Arctic became a stage for the superpowers' rivalry. The more ballistical armament was developed further, the more the Arctic armament increased. In the 1980s, the Arctic region was a region where the Cold War's escalation was a real fear. Simultaneously the environmental questions started to concern more and more. Furthermore, although international agreements to protect nature had been negotiated and bilateral ones were being accelerated, there was no organisation for the Arctic dealing region as a whole. This lack of cooperation encountered with détente, the US and the Soviet Union's leaders converged with rhetoric about restrictions on armaments. When Gorbachev gave a speech on October 1987 in Murmansk and longed for further cooperation in the Arctic region, a situation arose, which enabled the opening of cooperation negotiations. Eventually, Finland was the first to seize the moment, and this led to Finland's initiative. The initiative aimed to arrange a Conference on the Protection of the Environment in Finland.

This master's thesis examines Finland's Arctic diplomacy from September 1986 to October 1989, from The Reykjavik Summit to when the first meeting of Arctic issues with eight Arctic states was kept. More precisely, this thesis research how Finland was performing Arctic diplomacy during the period and if there were a change to Finland's line after the Gorbachev's speech. Hence, the thesis examines what type of reactions and consequences Gorbachev's Murmansk speech affected in Finland's foreign policy. Moreover, this thesis is interested in who was conducting nascent cooperation in the Arctic Region. The primary data used in this thesis are Finland's Foreign Minister's archives documents.

The study shows that Finland's Arctic diplomacy was at first in 1986, observative and reactionary. However, after Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk, Finland took the lead and worked actively to start cooperation. In this role, Finland needed to act as a balancer between the Arctic countries' boundary conditions. Especially the US was hesitating and by this stretched Finland's negotiator skills. Eventually, Finland achieved in arranging a consultative meeting in Finland in September 1989. This meeting became to be the first of two preparative meetings before the actual ministerial conference. Notably, Finland gained the leading force and was mainly conducting cooperation during the years examined. Nevertheless, the Gorbachev's speech had a high impact on the momentum, but, significantly, Finland was the one who succeeded seize the moment.

Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords

Arctic; arctic region; Finland; diplomacy; foreign policy; Cold War

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“The Soviet Union is in favour of a radical lowering of the level of military confrontation in the region. Let the North of the globe, the Arctic, become a zone of peace. Let the North Pole be a pole of peace. We suggest that all interested states start talks on the limitation and scaling down of military activity in the North as a whole, in both the Eastern and Western Hemispheres.”¹

– Mikhail Gorbachev, 1987

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

The Reykjavik Summit between the President of the United States (US) Ronald Reagan and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1986, one year before the Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk, can be seen as a breakthrough for the Arctic cooperation. At that time, the leaders of the world's two superpowers negotiated about the massive reduction of nuclear weapons in the era, where military-political tension and confrontation of superpowers were normality². However, Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk was the actual turning point for the Arctic. Thus, the progress of the cooperation in the Arctic area can be seen started when the Soviet Union underwent severe internal political changes in the 1980s, from where the speech was also a result of.³ The speech was followed by a series of proposals for Arctic cooperation, where Finland was first to seize the moment at the beginning of 1989⁴.

Before the events in Murmansk in 1987, most of the agreements dealing, way or another, the Arctic region were bilateral and concentrated only one or two issues, for example, trading or exploitation of natural resources. There was no organisation for the Arctic

¹ Gorbachev's Speech in Murmansk on October 1987.

[https://www.barentsinfo.fi/docs/Gorbachev_speech.pdf]

² Heikkilä, Markku (2006) *Pohjoinen ulottuvuus*. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Europe Information 188/2006, 11–12.

³ Lähteenmäki, Maria (2017) *Footprints in the Snow. The Long History of Arctic Finland*. The Prime Minister's Office: Prime Minister's Office Publications 8/2017, 160.

⁴ Heikkilä 2006, 12.

dealing region as a whole, and countries had not been in the same table negotiating issues concerning the Arctic region, even though many Arctic states had membership in other international organisations.⁵ Similarly, agreements dealing the Arctic nature were fragmented, and the Arctic nature as an entity was not dealt in any agreements⁶. Hence, when Finland proposed the other Arctic states to arrange a conference on the protection of the Arctic environment in January 1989, the event was unparalleled. Ultimately, as a result of these events, in September 1989, officials from the eight Arctic countries met in Rovaniemi, Finland, to discuss collaborative means to save the Arctic environment. The conference established the process of Rovaniemi-declaration. Finland's proposition and the meeting in Rovaniemi was followed by the Canadian Prime Minister's proposal for even more broader cooperation between the Arctic countries in late 1989.⁷ As a conclusion, in Rovaniemi, states agreed to work towards a meeting of circumpolar Ministers responsible for the Arctic environmental issues⁸. Thus, negotiations established by Finland can be seen as very proactive. For one instance more, when acting, the European Community was not interested in the Arctic area. Only when Finland and Sweden joined the European Union, areas behind the Arctic Circle came to discussion.⁹ Besides, the turn of the 1980s and 1990s meant a change from traditional security to wider security, where, for instance, environmental issues matters as well as military issues¹⁰.

Climate change and globalisation extend to all parts of the world, and the Arctic area does not make an exception to these facts. Arctic nature is more vulnerable than other parts of the world, and the melting sea ice is affecting the whole world. Economic opportunities are growing when the polar ice is melting. The northern part of the world has a significant amount of different kinds of natural resources, and due to mineral resources, mining is

⁵ Archer, Clive (1990) *Arctic Cooperation: A Nordic Model*. An article in *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 1990 Jun, Vol.21(2), 168.

⁶ Heininen, Lassi (1991) *Sotilaallisen läsnäolon ympäristöriskit Arktiksessa. Kohti Arktiksen säätelyjärjestelmiä*. Licentiate thesis. Tampere Peace Research Institute. Research No. 43. 1991, Tampere, 171.

⁷ Lähteenmäki 2017, 160–161; Heikkilä, Markku (1998) *Arktiset visiot*. Pohjoinen, Oulu, 66–67.

⁸ Heikkilä 1998, 67–68.

⁹ Lähteenmäki 2017, 161–162.

¹⁰ Heininen, Lassi (2011) *Arktisen alueen muuttuva geopolitiikka ja valtioiden arktiset/pohjoiset strategiat ja politiikat*. An article in Heininen, Lassi & Palosaari Teemu (ed.): *Jäätä poltellessa. Suomi ja Arktisen alueen tulevaisuus*. Tutkimuksia/Tapri. No 97, 2011. Tampere University Press, Tampere, 38.

common. At the bottom of the Arctic Sea lies a massive amount of oil and gas reserves, and climate change enables the use of these valuable resources. Moreover, sea ice dodges year after year more, making new routes for ships possible.¹¹ Thus, these facts mean that the cooperation in Arctic issues started in the late 1980s is needed even more now. In 2009, the University of Lapland arranged a first expert seminar on Policy and Security Research on Arctic Issues. In the seminar, Docent Lassi Heininen argued in a press release that Arctic areas were confronting with new geopolitical, geoeconomic, and environmental situations. This rapid change needed analysis, new indicators, and, above all, new academic research on spheres of politics and security. Furthermore, Lassi Heininen & Teemu Palosaari concluded that as an Arctic state, Finland has its responsibility to do actively scientific research on Arctic issues. This thesis responds to these challenges posed by adding information about the starting points of Arctic cooperation.¹²

Furthermore, the topic is worth studying, at least, because of three reasons. Firstly, the history of Arctic cooperation has been researched as a widespread phenomenon, and the literature from this point is comprehensive. Former Prime Minister of Finland announced the importance of the ‘Northern Dimension’ in the late 1990s, and that triggered research as well – prevailing political conditions raises topics for research¹³. However, there is no research on Finland’s Arctic diplomacy during 1986-1989; Finland’s Foreign Minister’s archives have only recently opened due to the 25 years encryption rule. Thus, this thesis will bring new knowledge about the early years of Finland’s Arctic Diplomacy when most of the research has been timed to years after 1990.

¹¹ Numminen, Lotta (2011) Arktisen alueen muuttuva kansainvälinen yhteistyö. An article in Heininen, Lassi & Palosaari Teemu (ed.): *Jäitä poltellessa. Suomi ja Arktisen alueen tulevaisuus*. Tutkimuksia/Tapri. No 97, 2011. Tampere University Press, Tampere, 15–16.

¹² Heininen, L. & Palosaari, T. (2011). Johdanto. An article in Heininen, Lassi & Palosaari Teemu (ed.): *Jäitä poltellessa. Suomi ja Arktisen alueen tulevaisuus*. Tutkimuksia/Tapri. No 97, 2011. Tampere University Press, Tampere, 9; University of Lapland. 29.9.2009. *Pohjoisen politiikan ja turvallisuuden tutkimuksen seminaari*. [<https://www.ulapland.fi/news/Pohjoisen-politiikan-ja-turvallisuuden-tutkimuksen-seminaari/mahebd4d/0d2e8f1b-f44a-4832-a607-20e29844acbc>]

¹³ Lähteenmäki, Maria (2007) Introduction: The Revival of Regional History. An article in Maria Lähteenmäki (ed.) *The Flexible Frontier: Change and Continuity in Finnish-Russian Relations*. Aleksanteri Series 5/2007. University of Helsinki, 16.

Secondly, the diplomacy between Finland and Russia has been, for centuries, a unique case. Therefore, Finland's enthusiasm for the Arctic and Russia's undisputed superpower status in the Arctic region is a fascinating combination to research in the years before the Rovaniemi declaration and the establishment of the Arctic Council. Finland's role as a balancer has not been researched during the early years of the process of the Arctic cooperation in the late 1980s.

Thirdly, the general question in Arctic regional studies has been whether the Arctic has an identity to be an internationally relevant region¹⁴. This question popped up the late 1980s and during the 1990s, amid the rapid rise of the cooperation organs. After this research dilemma, social sciences research of the Arctic cooperation accelerated. Therefore, one might say that this thesis deals with a fundamental base of the Arctic dilemma when reviewing the collaborative period of the late 1980s. As a result of this, it might even be argued that this thesis deals with the origins of Arctic research in the field of social sciences.

1.2 The Arctic and the Arctic Eight

The Arctic area's definition varies. The boundary is considered to be north of the Arctic Circle (66° 33'N), where Finland has the Finnish Arctic region, which consists of the northern part of the Province of Lapland above the Arctic Circle.¹⁵ Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) of the Arctic Council defines the Arctic area with multiple meters, and Finland meets most of the criteria¹⁶. Nevertheless, Finland is one of the northernmost countries in the world, even though the country is lacking the Arctic Ocean seashore, which Finland lost in the Continuation War to the Soviet Union. Finland has a large population in Lapland, which partially consists of the indigenous Sámi people. After the rapid out-migration from Lapland to Southern-Finland in the 1960s, Finland

¹⁴ Tennberg, Monica (1998) *The Arctic Council. A Study in Governmentality*. Acta Universitatis Lapponiensis 19. University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, 15.

¹⁵ Arctic Centre (2017) *Arctic Region*.

[<http://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/communications/arcticregion>]

¹⁶ AMAP (2009) *Definitions of the Arctic region*.

[<https://www.amap.no/documents/download/432>]

established four universities in northern Finland.¹⁷ This northern education has been, and it is still today, highly considered, and, for example, Arctic Council admits that Finland has much Arctic-related expertise to offer to the regional cooperation¹⁸. From the 1980s to the 1990s, the Arctic direction can be clearly found from Finland's foreign policy. In that era, the northern dimension in foreign policy never formed into a clear strategy; instead, it was involved in many different policy sectors.¹⁹ Eventually, Finland's government announced its first Arctic Strategy in 2010, and all political parties were involved in the preparation. The process of the strategy revealed that the growing significance of the Arctic region was understood over party boundaries.²⁰

Even though the Arctic is nowadays quite merely defined as an area which is northern from the Arctic Circle, defining was not clear when the negotiations in the 1980s started. Since there was no transparent definition for the Arctic, the project of cooperation in the Arctic area had, as well, been a question of a creating regime. During the Cold War, the Arctic was mostly the playground for two superpowers, not an area for multiple countries.²¹ The Arctic states -concept rose to a discussion in the 1970s, then discussion included for the Arctic states only five rim-countries with Arctic Ocean shoreline²². The Arctic Rim -countries were the US, Canada, the Soviet Union, Norway, Iceland, and Denmark due to Greenland's shore²³. This eventually changed in the 1980s, and the concept of 'the Arctic Eight' developed quite soon after Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk 1987. Then Gorbachev drew the Arctic area in his speech more south than it usually had been thought, even though he did not mention any exact list of Arctic

¹⁷ Lähteenmäki 2017, 88 & 99–100.

¹⁸ Arctic Council (2015) *Member States*.

[<https://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/member-states>]

¹⁹ Heininen, Lassi (1999) *Euroopan pohjoinen 1990-luvulla. Moniulotteisten ja ristiriitaisten intressien alue*. Doctoral thesis. Acta Universitatis Lapponiensis 21. Arctic Centre Reports 30. University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, 304.

²⁰ Halinen, Heikki (2011) Esipuhe. An article in Heininen, Lassi & Palosaari Teemu (ed.): *Jäitä poltellessa. Suomi ja Arktisen alueen tulevaisuus. Tutkimuksia/Tapri*. No 97, 2011. Tampere University Press, Tampere, 8.

²¹ Young, Oran R. (1998) *Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance*. Cornell

University Press, New York, vii.

²² Keskitalo, E. C. H. (2004) *Negotiating the Arctic. The Construction of an International Region*. Routledge, New York, 45–46.

²³ Rotkirch, Holger. 14.9.1987. *Etelämannerta ja napa-alueita koskevien kysymysten käsittely ulkoasiainministeriössä*. Memo 90. Signum 13.40 Arktiset alueet (FIN-AMFA 13.40-1), 3.

countries. The only country he mentioned in as an Arctic context was, in fact, Finland.²⁴ However, he did repeatedly mentioned seven countries in his speech, the US, Canada, Iceland, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Norway²⁵. Moreover, after the Murmansk momentum in 1987, all countries being before actively interested in Arctic issues, for example, in scientific cooperation, were included. Thus, the concept ‘Arctic Eight’ was developed, which included all the countries mentioned in Gorbachev's speech.²⁶ They all are countries having land up north from the Arctic Circle, as well.

1.3 Previous Research

Lassi Heininen has written numerous articles and other works about arctic cooperation, and his doctoral dissertation in 1999 “*Euroopan pohjoinen 1990-luvulla – Moniulotteisten ja ristiriitaisten intressien alue*²⁷” was also from this theme. In his doctoral dissertation, Heininen analysed the region of the European North in general, as well as, from the point of Finland and Norway's view. Heininen analysed the new Era in Europe, from the collapse of the Soviet Union and continued to the late 1990s. He concentrated on the transition, in where the whole international political system was in change after the situation in Russia, but his dissertation examined this transition in the Arctic areas. Heininen asked in his dissertation “*What kind of a region in the European North: Is it still a geostrategically important security area from the point of view of the superpowers --?*” Heininen concludes that the region was in the late 1990s still in transition: many cooperation projects had been established, but those were still a very early stage. However, cooperation organs, for instance, the BEAR, were still in operation, and to some extent, those were ruling the international policies in the Arctic. In addition to multinational cooperation, smaller scale, regional cooperations started to emerge. Finally, Heininen summed up that the situation in the North had been changed totally from the years of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the area was not yet a regionalised global region and was struggling under the external, for example, economic pressures.²⁸

²⁴ Keskitalo 2004, 45–46.

²⁵ Gorbachev's Speech in Murmansk on October 1987.

²⁶ Keskitalo 2004, 45–46.

²⁷ In English, The European North in the 1990s – A Region of Multifunctional and Conflicting Interests.

²⁸ Heininen 1999, 373–407.

As mentioned before, research of the Arctic cooperation has concentrated on the time after the Soviet Union collapse in 1991, there is one doctoral dissertation covering the period of the late 1980s as well. Carina Keskitalo's doctoral dissertation "*Constructing 'the Arctic' – Discourses of international region-building*" in 2002 has examined organisational developments from the late 1970s to the early 1990s and the development of environment-based cooperation which eventually led to the establishment of the Arctic Council. Keskitalo concluded that Arctic discourse is a complex mixture of natural and social relations of the environment, and in the Arctic region's discourse, the environment and both indigenous and traditional entities are critical. However, according to Keskitalo, the human-made constructed region "the Arctic" was an illusion, and the Arctic would not have been able to be defined as a homogenous region. Keskitalo ended his dissertation on the observation that, while the Arctic cooperation has all the way from the outset been focused on protecting the environment, the homogeneous thinking of the Arctic region does not recognise the distinct needs and problems of the Arctic and the uniqueness of its individual components. Therefore, multiple Arctic cooperation projects in the field of environmental protection may not succeed in goals made. Besides, the strict border what the Arctic is and what is not, closes the rest of the world out. Furthermore, since the problems outside the Arctic also have consequences for the North, the environmental protection cooperation in the Arctic has even worse possibilities to succeed.²⁹ Keskitalo's doctoral dissertation is done at the University of Lapland, where research on the Arctic Council related issues are prevalent and widely used in this thesis as well.

In turn, Sinevaara-Niskanen Heidi has researched in her doctoral thesis "*Setting the Stage for Arctic Development. Politics of Knowledge and the Power of Presence*" in 2015, the usage of politics of knowledge in the Arctic Council, as well as how different agendas and agents are becoming present in Arctic politics. Although the dissertation is done under Social Sciences, it is very much relating to Gender Studies instead of political history.³⁰

²⁹ Keskitalo, E. Carina H. (2002) *Constructing 'the Arctic' Discourses of international region-building*. Doctoral thesis. Acta Universitatis Lapponiensis 47. University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, Abstract.

³⁰ Sinevaara-Niskanen, Heidi (2015) *Setting the Stage for Arctic Development. Politics of Knowledge and the Power of Presence*. Doctoral thesis. Acta Universitatis Lapponiensis 304. University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, Abstract.

The last doctoral dissertation from the University of Lapland mentioned here is Monica Tennberg's "*The Arctic Council. A Study in Governmentality*". In her dissertation, Tennberg answered to problem what is the meaning of the Arctic cooperation, especially in the Arctic Council. She reviewed the theme through the discourse of sovereignty, knowledge, and development. The researched period was from the late 1980s to the end of the 1990s. To this thesis, Tennberg's dissertation provides points of contact when dealing discourses from the end of the 1980s and when dealing with the question of power, in other words, who had the power to conduct the Arctic cooperation. Tennberg argued through Michel Foucault's definition of the exercise of power, where power in action means to conduct others. Who was conducting, had the power as well, and then power did not have any formal and written rules; in this, the exercise of power consists in directing opportunities for action and arranging for a possible outcome. Moreover, Tennberg argued that Foucault's idea of that who can seize momentum, replace, and take authority from previously prevailing actors and redirect them to the desired way has the means to change prevailing order successfully.³¹

Researcher Teemu Palosaari from The Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) has many publications related to Arctic issues. In 2012, he published an article in Nordia Geographical Publications "*The amazing race. On resources, conflict, and cooperation in the Arctic*". Even though he admits that the Arctic cooperation began in the late 1980s and that Finland was a crucial part of it, he concentrated on the time after the Cold War.³²

With a regional theme of cooperation in the North, in Laura Arho's masters' thesis "*Barentsin euroarktinen alue (BEAR): alueellinen yhteistyö ydinturvallisuuden parantamiseksi*" regionalism and cooperation has been examined through the Barent's Euro-Arctic Region, which is a region made for to discuss its regional issues. Furthermore, Region has a council, The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), which is the forum for intergovernmental cooperation on issues concerning the Barents region. Arho's thesis dealt with international cooperation to improve nuclear safety in the region, and the main objective of the study was to find out what had been done to improve nuclear

³¹ Tennberg 1998, 21, 55, 84 & 90–93.

³² Palosaari, Teemu (2011) *The amazing race. On resources, conflict, and cooperation in the Arctic*. Nordia Geographical Publications, 40(4), pp. 13-30.

safety in the area. The thesis concluded that the co-operation in the region had been efficient with low-policy areas. However, high politics related to security issues had been excluded from cooperation. Since the BEAR was established in 1993, Arho's thesis dealt with regionalism and cooperation in the post-Cold War era.³³

Jasmin Repo focused on her master thesis on the views expressed by political decision-makers on Finland's arcticness. The thesis used a critical geopolitical view of geography as a political and socially produced concept and applied this to the conception of Finland's arcticness. The material Repo used revealed that the geopolitical construction of Finland's arcticness was based on four types of understanding: Finland's geographical position as an Arctic country, Finland's special expertise, Finland's participation in the creation of institutions in the region, and Arctic characteristics based on Finnish history and culture. In particular, the political and cultural definitions were the most clearly conceive of Finland as an Arctic country. Furthermore, Repo found out that Finland's arcticness had been a generally accepted political structure among decision-makers, although the content of Arctic politics itself had sometimes divided.³⁴

In master thesis, Johanna Rätty examined how Finland reacted to the Soviet plans to transfer all its nuclear tests to the Novaja Zemlya experimental area near Finland and to the nuclear test conducted in the area in October 1990. The central question was how Finland sought to influence the Soviet Union. The following question was how Finland tried to affect the Soviet Union's politics even though the issue was strongly related to the interests of the great powers. Rätty sought answers to what kind of perceptions formed the basis of Finnish politics. The purpose was to find out how Finland's foreign policy and its practical implementation changed in the later years of the Cold War and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As a result, used material showed that the issue of Novaja Zemlia's nuclear test was raised by Nordic co-operation with the initiative of Finland: Finland proposed a common position to the Nordic countries and actively contributed to the development of a standard Nordic policy. The Nordic statements emphasised the danger posed by nuclear testing to the vulnerable Arctic environment, even though

³³ Barents Euro-Arctic Council official website 2019. *About Us. Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region*. [<https://www.barentscooperation.org/en/About>]

³⁴ Repo, Jasmin (2015) *Suomen arktisuus geopolitiittisena konstruktiona*. Master's Thesis. The University of Helsinki. Abstract.

experts in the field considered nuclear testing to be of low risk. By emphasising the environmental safety of nuclear testing thus appears to be a deliberately chosen approach that avoided addressing the security policy issues that were inevitably linked to nuclear testing. Typical abstentions in Finland's neutrality policy were manifested, for example, in the attempt to avoid strong statements on the nuclear test ban, which were known to irritate both the United States and the Soviet Union. Illustratively, the United States, in particular, sought approval for Finland's activism.³⁵

Professor Oran R. Young has written a comprehensive number of publications about institutional and international governance and environmental institutions. He has written a lot about Arctic cooperation, as well. His work “*Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance*” concentrate on the cooperation in the Arctic region from the 1980s to the late 1990s. He summed up that successful regime formation consists of three stages: successful agenda formation, successful negotiation, and finally, successful operationalization. Young describes that in the late eighties, Finland was, among others, one of the most remarkable negotiators in the Arctic issues.³⁶

1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses

This master's thesis aims to find out Finland's Arctic diplomacy at the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, this thesis examines what type of reactions and consequences Gorbachev's Murmansk speech affected in Finland's foreign policy. The thesis analyses the situation before the speech and the reactions afterward, and the time frame is from September 1986 to October 1989, from The Reykjavik Summit to when the first meeting of Arctic issues with eight Arctic states was kept. Thus, this thesis is focusing on the path of Arctic cooperation during these significant years. From this period, this thesis will try to find out what Finland tried to say and achieve with the proactive line in Arctic cooperation, and how was the setting behind the public scenes? Along with these questions, the thesis investigates how Arctic policy was made in the Finland's Foreign

³⁵ Rätty, Johanna (2018) ”*Suurvaltojen valitsemien turvallisuuspolitiikan keskeisiin ainesosiin pienillä mailla ei ole mahdollisuuksia vaikuttaa*” – *Novaja Zemljan ydinkokeet Suomen ulkopoliitikassa 1990–1993*. Master's Thesis. The University of Helsinki. Abstract.

³⁶ Young 1998, 35–62 and 168–170.

Ministry. This particular speech of Gorbachev's was selected because it has been seen as the icebreaker for deeper and multi-governmental cooperation. The point of view is Finnish throughout the thesis, due to the fact that all sources are about Finland's foreign policy. Since the thesis also examines the last years of the Cold War, how the Cold War scene influenced Finland's Arctic policy is studied. Hence, this thesis is in the field of political history and, more specifically, the thesis examines the history of the Cold War.

This thesis, thus, differs from the previous research mainly by timescape and from the point of view. Even though Keskitalo's dissertation dealt with similar themes with this thesis, the angle to events was different; Keskitalo reviewed cooperation as a broad, international phenomenon and through discourse analysis, and this thesis is concentrating on Finland's point of view and the actions what Finland made as an Arctic state. What comes to Heininen's dissertation, it examined, as well, a different period than this thesis. Furthermore, Tennberg's question of power and conducting is very intriguing and gives an interesting perspective to this thesis: who led the nascent collaboration in the desired direction in late 1980?

The main research question of this thesis is

- *How was Finland performing Arctic diplomacy during the years 1986 – 1989?*

Furthermore, the two clarifying questions are the following:

- *How did the Finland's Foreign Service relate and act to the Arctic issues before the Murmansk Momentum, from September 1986 to October 1987, and did this line change after Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk October 1987?*
- *Based on the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland's Archive, who was conducting the Arctic cooperation?*

This thesis hypothesises that the internal changes in the Soviet Union, for example, glasnost, made the discussion on the Arctic issues possible and more open. Furthermore, this thesis assumes that Finland was a kind of an arbitrator between the superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, and used much effort to bring these superpowers

around the same table on Arctic issues. Due to this role of arbitrator, the thesis hypothesises that Finland had the power to bring together Arctic states and therefore was the conductor. Moreover, the thesis hypothesises that the long and unique history of Finland and Russia made Finland's diplomacy particularly sensitive towards Russia, and this helped Finland to take the lead in the debate. In addition, this sensitivity helped Finland to act immediately to Gorbachev's speech on October 1987. Finland's proposal, as well as the fact to be the hosting country, was crucial to the successfulness of The Commission on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) meeting in 1975 – could it be a similar case in the Arctic process?

1.5 Sources and Methodology

The primary source for this thesis is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland's Archive documents. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland's Archive (FIN-AMFA) has a comprehensive collection of documents concerning Arctic issues. These files begin with the year 1983 and are researched in this thesis from the year 1986 to September 1989. It is notable that the Archive has files about Arctic issues from 1983 onwards, even though Finland's activity started only in 1986. The documents are memorandums, telegrams from Finland's embassies abroad to Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and vice versa, conversation memos, meeting memos, and all documents concerned Arctic issues in a way or another. The two most active authors are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Adviser and diplomat Esko Rajakoski and Ambassador of Finland to Canada and Head of Political Department in Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland Jaakko Blomberg. These documents have been top-secret and under the 25-year encryption rule, so the documents of the year have been released in 2014. Moreover, this thesis has used leading newspaper articles about Arctic negotiations. The articles have been saved in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland's archive. Moreover, the context includes an extensive literature review listed in the References chapter – for instance, Heininen's comprehensive production has been widely used in this thesis. Moreover, Markku Heikkilä, journalist and researcher from the University of the Lapland, has published numerous articles, essays, and books from the Arctic region and Arctic cooperation. His works are also used as a reference in this thesis many times.

For background information and building the context, in thesis has been used contemporary memoirs. Furthermore, for deepening experiences of contemporaries, the materials of the two Summer Academy for Security Policy arranged by Rauhanpuolustajat ry in the middle of July 1987 and 1988 have been used.³⁷ Area of Academies' interest was Northern Europe and the Arctic area. These events consisted of high-class speeches, for instance, speech keepers were professors, MP's and docents, and reflection on experiences and opportunities for cooperation. Thematic issues were security policy situation, indigenous people, environmental protection, and regional cooperation.³⁸

The research is qualitative. For the first two questions, data is analysed with the traditional approach, whereby the chronology of events is reviewed – the interplay of political dynamics helps to understand the insight in Finland's Arctic diplomacy in the late Cold War. More straightforwardly, the thesis uses content analysis: firstly, the relevant documents have been carefully gone through and then explained how the decision-makers justified the accessions behind closed doors.³⁹

The examination of the previous research had led to hypotheses and research questions to this thesis. These questions are being answered by using the data from archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The archive material is described chronologically and narratively. To this description, the thesis reflects the research questions and hypotheses and draws conclusions via this procedure. By this, the data is analysed from a particular predefined perspective, which is common in qualitative research.⁴⁰

³⁷ in English 'Registered Association of Peace Defenders'

³⁸ Heininen, Lassi (ed.) (1987a). *Kuhmon henki 1987: Turvallisuuspoliittisen kesäakatemian aineisto*. Hki: Suomen rauhanpuolustajat, 7.

³⁹ Eskola, J. (1998). *Johdatus laadulliseen tutkimukseen*. Vastapaino, Tampere, 7–12 ja 153–154.

⁴⁰ Eskola 1998, 154.

2 The Rise of Arctic Politics

2.1 Overall International Situation

The 1980s meant for the Cold War a growing confrontation; the détente of the 1970s were gone, and low-tense coexistence was displaced by psychological warfare and armaments race⁴¹. The power balance has been said to have turned to favor the West and the US during the 1980s. It has been argued that after realising this, the Soviet Union had no choice but started to engage with the mighty West⁴². However, the development that led to the Arctic cooperation would not have been possible without significant political changes in the 1980s Soviet as well⁴³. At the beginning of the 1980s, previous Soviet leaders Dmitri Ustinov and Konstantin Chernenko passed away, and after a short leader bargain, the youngest Politburo member Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power. Gorbachev started to remove corrupted bureaucrats and started a transparency campaign.⁴⁴ The Glasnost, presented by Gorbachev in 1986 within the slogan of perestroika, was a brief and distinctive period that ended to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.⁴⁵ Glasnost was a term widely used, meaning a new way of openness of the state and can be seen as a weak attempt to answer to the global trend of transparency. Ultimately, glasnost meant to collapse for the Soviet Union; the country was not able to survive with the public dealing with its incongruencies in governance.⁴⁶

The Soviet Union changed its international role in 1987 and started to negotiate actively with western countries. Gorbachev wrote the book '*Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*' where he created an image of the Soviet Union as an active actor in international relations and one natural part in the democratic world. Furthermore, Gorbachev had a style called 'Gorbachev's Westernism'. This westernism included

⁴¹ Zubok, Vladislav M. (2009) *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*. The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 265.

⁴² Zubok 2009, 305.

⁴³ Heikkilä 2006, 11.

⁴⁴ Zubok 2009, 277–279.

⁴⁵ Brown, Archie (2006) The Gorbachev era. Article in Suny, R. G. (ed.): *The Cambridge History of Russia: Volume 3, The Twentieth Century*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, 316–317 & 323.

⁴⁶ Michener, G. & Bersch, K. (2013) *Identifying transparency*. *Information Polity*, 18(3), 235 & 240.

behavior similar to Western politicians and deep connections outside the Eastern side. However, the most reason for this was the aim to get the Soviet Union's return to Europe'; Gorbachev wanted the Soviet Union to be an open society in Europe, not Stalin-like closed society outside Europe. Furthermore, the newly warmed relations between the Soviet Union and the US created in the US a phenomenon called 'Gorbymania.' According to Vladislav Zubok, Gorbachev had a personal urge to unify North America, Europe, and the Soviet Union.⁴⁷ Zubok, however, did not mention the cooperation for the Arctic area at all.

The winds of change in the Soviet Union were not the only triggering event for the need for multilateral cooperation in the Arctic. The weapon technology improved year after year since World War II, and, for example, nuclear submarines and missile technology raised the importance of the Arctic Ocean as well. Thus, the Arctic Ocean became a significant area for the Cold War parties. Also, even though the East-West –tension lowered within the end of the Cold War, the Arctic armament was a still valid question at the end of the 1980s. Both superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, had updated their maritime strategies, and accordingly, they started to direct military power to the Arctic. Moreover, the presence of nuclear weapons in the Arctic region brought the question of environmental safety into daylight. Environmental pollution and the risk of nuclear accidents demanded negotiations on the multilateral level. In other words, the security and operational environment in the Arctic region changed significantly at the turn of the 1980s and the 1990s. However, the region's geopolitical position was still at the intersection of several countries' interests, and this makes the area sensitive to fluctuations in international relations. Furthermore, the geopolitical position became more complicated due to the identification of environmental problems.⁴⁸

In one of the very first agreements in the Arctic, in the Svalbard Treaty, signed 1920 by nine countries including, for example, the US, gave to Norway sovereignty over Svalbard, group of islands between the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The Soviet Union refused to sign the treaty first but eventually joined in 1935. The archipelago around Svalbard was under Norway's control as well, but the Treaty left loopholes for sea-areas.

⁴⁷ Zubok 2009, 308–309, 316–317 & 322.

⁴⁸ Heininen 1999, 9, 56–57, 92–93 & 295–296.

Furthermore, the sea areas were affluent in fish, the area had been decades a fishing area of disharmony, especially between Soviet and Norway.⁴⁹

For Denmark, Greenland was the main factor for the Arctic Identity: Without Greenland, Denmark would not have met the criteria for being an Arctic state. Greenland was an autonomous country within the Kingdom of Denmark. Greenland's era under Danish power began in 1775.⁵⁰ Greenland gained its autonomy in 1979, and before that, Denmark used a rather tight colonial policy in the area, and therefore, the United Nations gave notice to Denmark about this policy. After autonomy status, Greenland has had its own policy lines, which has, from time to time, been separated from the Danish line. The foremost example was from 1985 when Greenland decided to leave the European Community due to the disagreements with fishery policies. Separate policy lines, even in the foreign policy, were made possible in 1979 autonomy status, where the Greenlandic nation was given full legitimacy, for example, for its juridical, foreign, and security policy.⁵¹

Since autonomy, the Soviet was interested in Greenland, and the policy of friendship was apparent⁵². However, during the Cold War, Greenland's geological location made it very interesting for both the West and East. The reason for interest was that the sea area called Greenland-Iceland-the UK Gap was the main outlet to the open waters for Soviet vessels.⁵³ According to Annika Bergman Rosamond, Denmark is and has been a more significant player than its size suggests⁵⁴. This might be explained that Denmark has always had a robust military point of view in the Arctic issues, perhaps since it was a NATO member state and was, in fact, a founder country⁵⁵. In the Cold War era, Denmark was, alongside other Scandinavian countries, promoting justice, peace, and international

⁴⁹ Hønneland, G. & Jensen, L. C. (2015) Norway's approach to the Arctic: policies and discourse. An article in Jensen Leif Christian & Hønneland Geir (ed.): *Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic*. Edwar Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, 465–464.

⁵⁰ Rosamond Bergman Annika (2015) The Kingdom of Denmark and the Arctic. An article in Jensen Leif Christian & Hønneland Geir (ed.): *Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic*. Edwar Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, 505–506 and 508.

⁵¹ Rosamond 2015, 508–509.

⁵² Hulden, Anders. 13.1.1986. *Grönlanti-Neuvostoliitto-Tanska-Yhdysvallat-Islanti*. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

⁵³ Young, Oran B. (1985) *The Age of the Arctic*. Article in Foreign Policy. Winter 1985/86, 161.

⁵⁴ Rosamond 2015, 501.

⁵⁵ Rosamond 2015, 502 and 509.

laws, and this made a mark for Denmark's role in the early years of Arctic cooperation as well. Denmark's line in Arctic cooperation has been based on military issues, institutionalism, and indigenous rights.⁵⁶

For the US, the Arctic region appeared as a playing field for foreign policy and natural resources. When the Soviet Union was arming the Arctic, the US could not only watch at the situation if it wanted to keep the balance of power policy, and vice versa. What comes to natural resources, oil and gas were the most wanted, and the Arctic area was a suitable place to exploit those both. The race after oil began in the late 1960s when a significant oil discovery occurred in Alaska. After that, nothing was unchanged; the discovery led countries, industry, companies, environmental organisations, and aboriginals to protect their interest in the Arctic. However, the situation was not unique in the US; Canada had a similar trend in its Arctic islands. Furthermore, this race after natural resources led to a situation where nations, mainly the US, Canada, and the Soviet Union, brought their research stations to the Arctic areas and seas occurring tensions due to the uncertainty which country owns which area. When the situation of the revival of indigenous peoples' demands for their land was added to the rivalry of the natural resources, the regional problem became complex. There were demands in the land, shore, and sea areas.⁵⁷

Ultimately, the complex regional disputes created a constant need for negotiations, agreements, new legislation, and establishment of interest groups. For instance, the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea was modified multiple times between the years 1950–1980. Especially the indigenous people woke up to the environmental and regional damage caused by the usage and exploitation of natural resources. For instance, in 1973, the Arctic Peoples' Conference aboriginals discussed how to provide a solid voice against the misusages of the southern countries. Furthermore, when the Inuit Circumpolar Conference was held by Canadians, Greenland's, and Alaska's aboriginals in 1977, they declared the establishment of the new organisation, The Inuit Circumpolar Organisation, by arguing that it was

*“the only means whereby we can secure an efficient and successful protection of our common Arctic environment”*⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Rosamond 2015, 501–502.

⁵⁷ Grant D. Sheland (2011) *Polar Imperative. A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America*. Douglas & McIntyre, Vancouver, 339–343.

⁵⁸ Grant 2011, 368–376.

When looking at this intertwined and tense situation, it is no wonder that among Arctic countries began to have profound and long-lasting hopes for Arctic cooperation in the 1980s. As a summary, it could be said that countries were indirectly forced to work together even before the Arctic Council. The US and the Soviet Union had Arctic countries between leading to a situation where partners were needed: for example, the US confederated via NATO to Norway and bilaterally with Canada and Denmark. However, the cooperation was not always favorable, and the warmth of friendships varied considerably during the Cold War. The relationship between America and Canada, in particular, was sometimes cold, but sometimes the ties were neutral. Thus, at the end of the Cold War, the countries were linked to each other, to world politics, to regional pressure organisations, and environmental pressures. Finally, in the 1980s, the Arctic region was an actual net of linkages and different areal agreements.

2.2 Finland in the Turmoil of the Cold War

Even though the Arctic cooperation did not start to warm up until the 1980s, Finland's acts and reactions cannot be understood without looking at Finland's path to the 1980s all way from the beginning of the Cold War. Finland had a unique location in the East-West –tensions being between the border of the NATO and the Soviet Union.

Finland has remained militarily neutral since World War II. Reid Standish described Finland's role as a balancer between east and west as '*Europe's Bear Whisperer*'⁵⁹. In the role of a balancer during the Cold War, Finland had an urge to join as fast it could to the West, simultaneously having in-depth knowledge about the fact that Finland's foreign policy always had as a number one priority good relationship to the Soviet Union. Finland's foreign policy was more or less passive and defensive. Hopes were not high; an almost only clear trend was to keep excellent and confidential relations with the Soviet Union. At late as the 1980s, a most foreign policy program of Finnish parties' objective

⁵⁹ Standish, R. 7.3.2016. Article in Foreign Policy: *How Finland Became Europe's Bear Whisperer*. [<http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/07/how-finland-became-europes-bear-whisperer-russia-putin/>]

was to retain independence and preservation of the Finland's social system instead of big visions of internationalisation. The main target in foreign policy was, thus, to keep Finland out of any war.⁶⁰ This had been the case from the beginning of the Cold War: The Prime Minister of Finland defined Finland's role in the late 1940s. This so-called Paasikivi Line consisted of adapting to the vital strategic interests of the Soviet Union and striving to preserve its social system and sovereignty for as long as possible, bearing in mind that the Soviet Union was able at any time to come and take these targets away.⁶¹

Moreover, in the 1980s, war-scenario was still an actual cause for anxiety, rapid armament race in the North had caused fears even among neutral states. Nevertheless, Finland did not act like federal programs spoke: a decade after decade, Finland connected itself more and more to different Western unions. Finland warmed diplomatic relations with Western countries, and if some explanations were needed, Finland always invoked economic reasons instead of political ones.⁶²

Finland retained independence, and the Paris Peace Treaty was made in 1947. Soon after the Treaty, the Soviet Union started to propose security guarantees from Finland. So, eventually, this led to an agreement on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance, the Finno-Soviet Treaty⁶³, which was renewed three times and it lasted to the collapse of the Soviet Union, to the year 1992.⁶⁴ Thus, the agreement was still in force when the Arctic negotiations were going on in the late 1980s. The Soviet Union made economic agreements with Finland as well, and the first five-year trade agreement with the Soviet Union was signed in 1950⁶⁵. After, and somewhat simultaneously, these agreements with the Soviet Union, Finland started to make agreements and join different unions with the West. At first, Finland started to join international economic associations which were under the United Nations (UN), for example, Finland joined in the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. When the

⁶⁰ Railo, Erkka (2010) Pienen valtion kansallinen selviytymisstrategia. An Article in Erkka Railo & Ville Laamanen (ed.) *Suomi muuttuvassa maailmassa*. Edita Publishing Oy, Helsinki, 411.

⁶¹ Rentola, Kimmo (2010) Suomi kylmässä sodassa. An Article in Erkka Railo & Ville Laamanen (ed.) *Suomi muuttuvassa maailmassa*. Edita Publishing Oy, Helsinki, 285.

⁶² Railo, 2010, 411.

⁶³ In Finnish, YYA-sopimus.

⁶⁴ Rentola 2010, 290–291.

⁶⁵ Rentola 2010, 295.

European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established in 1951 and eventually developed to the European Community (EC) in 1967, Finland did not join due to the relationship with the Soviet Union. However, step by step, Finland was able to make association agreements with the Western unions, usually after when negotiated similar conditions to the Soviet Union. In short, Finland made an association agreement with European Free Trade Association in 1961, joined in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1969, made a free trade agreement with EEC in 1974 and with the ECSC in 1975.⁶⁶

In addition, or even as a basis, to the Western trend, Finland had a close relationship with Nordic countries. This Nordic cooperation was quite well-tolerated from the Soviet Union's side, and alignments with Nordic countries were a good starting point for the Western trend. These Finland's connections with Nordic countries had been described as 'Finland's window to the West.' The first step was The Nordic Passport Union in 1952, followed by the Common Nordic Labor Market in 1954 and the Nordic Convention on Social Security in 1955. Nevertheless, some collaborations were tense, and then Finland needed to balance between the Soviet Union and Nordic countries.⁶⁷ Thus, when the Nordic Council was established in 1952, but the tense situation in the world's politics was estimated in Finland so that Finland was not possible to join Council without the Soviet Union's reactions, and therefore, Finland decided not to even apply for the Council.⁶⁸

After the death of the Soviet Union's President Josef Stalin, the tight world situation changed to détente. To the head of the Soviet Union rose Nikita Khrushchev, and under his leadership, the Soviet Union saw Finland's neutrality more positively.⁶⁹ Détente gave Finland new possibilities, and eventually, Finland joined the Nordic Council in 1955⁷⁰. The next sensitive subject was the Nordek, which was negotiated during the years 1968–1970. It would have had new regulations for the Nordic customs union and economic

⁶⁶ Paavonen Tapani (2010) Eristäytyneestä rajamaasta eurooppalaisen yhteisön ytimeen. An Article in Erkkä Railo & Ville Laamanen (ed.) *Suomi muuttuvassa maailmassa*. Edita Publishing Oy, Helsinki, 384,387–389 and 390–393.

⁶⁷ Paavonen 2010, 389–390.

⁶⁸ Eduskunta 2016. *Suomi 60 vuotta Pohjoismaiden neuvostossa*.

[<https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/tietoeduskunnasta/kirjasto/tietoakirjastosta/toiminta/Documents/PN%20nayttelyesite-fi.pdf>]; Paavonen 2010, 390; Rentola 2010, 300.

⁶⁹ Rentola 2010, 299–300.

⁷⁰ Eduskunta 2016.

community, which would have led to close cooperation among Nordic countries. However, the Soviet Union saw the Nordek as a threat and pressured Finland to abandon the project.⁷¹

As an example of Finland's East-West -balancing, in the 1970s, Finland had a significant role in Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) negotiations. The process started in the early 1970s when Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev proposed international negotiations for these sensitive issues.⁷² Finland's role as an organiser and host in the CSCE created an image of Finland as a neutral country between two superpowers. Moreover, eventually, the conference made Finland's position as an independent player stronger even though the Soviet Union did not give any neutral recognition. This role as the independent player was much needed: On the other hand, Finland had to convince the West that Finland is a sovereign country having its own will. On another hand, the Soviet Union needed proof that Finland's belonging to Western unions was not a threat to them.⁷³ However, Finland being a host for the CSCE could not have been possible without the change in world politics, as it has been in many other cases in the Cold War as well. Furthermore, Finland's role as a host was made possible by the settlement of the question of two Germanys. This settlement made Finland's position easier because Finland was the only country in Europe that had not established relationships with either one. When this tricky question was solved, and Finland was out of the compression: this made the possibility for Finland to be able for a potential impartial host for negotiations. One cannot underestimate the importance of the CSCE to the world: Conference confirmed the borders for European countries and regulated a rule that borders could be changed only by peaceful means.⁷⁴

Furthermore, the Conference regulated many rules for human rights and civil liberties. Therefore, Finland was momentarily an unbound stage for the whole world, and this opportunity had tremendous meaning to Finland's position.⁷⁵ It might be that without the role of a host for the CSCE, Finland would not have been seen as a potential host country

⁷¹ Paavonen 2010, 390.

⁷² Young 1998, 58.

⁷³ Railo 2010, 412–413.

⁷⁴ Rentola 2010, 310.

⁷⁵ Rentola 2010, 310.

for the Arctic negotiations. However, despite the peaceful acts in the CSCE, the détente period was starting to fade away, and the tensions in world politics begun to tighten again⁷⁶.

In the 1980s, Finland's foreign policy primarily belonged to the President, together with the Foreign Minister. During the President Mauno Koivisto's (1982–1994) season, foreign policy changed from the previous line. Beforehand Finland's foreign policy was firmly policy of neutrality. Koivisto shifted this towards the line: "*Finland emphasises the importance of maintaining good relations with neighbouring countries, but also with all other countries in the world.*"⁷⁷

Finland's Prime minister in 1983–1987, Kalevi Sorsa, had described the times of the 1980s and early 1990s as a time when Finland's foreign policy needed total revise. Only the fundamental pillars could be left unchanged, but otherwise, all was needed to be changed. Change in world order was a significant turn for Finland located next to the former superpower. Western Europe was further integrating, and Eastern Europe was breaking into smaller units. Europe had not had any wars since World War II, and due to the collapse of the East, there was a sense of crisis in the air. The situation was tense. Agreements concluded after the world wars, and the CSCE seemed toothless in the battlefield of nationalistic movements. When the Soviet was seemingly falling apart, Sorsa argued that Finland should concentrate on the Baltic Sea, the Baltic countries and into converging Europe. Sorsa promoted cooperation in the Baltic Sea region and was pro-active in European integration, in the European Community, but not, however, mentioning at all the Arctic cooperation.⁷⁸ Interesting is that Sorsa did mention many other global cooperation projects, issues, and problems where Finland played a role as well countries, for example, in environmental issues⁷⁹. Furthermore, Sorsa mentioned only once that Finland's location in Europe's North could be in the future turn into economic prosperity instead of being an encumbrance, as seen at the end of the Cold

⁷⁶ Rentola 2010, 310.

⁷⁷ Kallenautio, Jorma (2005) *Suomi kylmän rauhan maailmassa — Suomen ulkopoliittikka Porkkalan palautuksesta 1955 Euroopan Unionin jäsenyyteen 1995*. Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, Helsinki, 438.

⁷⁸ Sorsa, Kalevi (1992) *Uusi itsenäisyys*. Otava, Helsinki, 11–12,21–22,24–25 and 18.

⁷⁹ F.e. Sorsa 1992, 74–75.

War⁸⁰. Despite the lack of mention, Sorsa's thought that Finland's foreign policy needed total revise suits well to Finland's new opening to the Arctic. Moreover, even though Sorsa had not mentioned the northern dimension on his books, during the times when working as a Prime Minister, he encouraged Finland to be active in discussions of the usage of the northern natural resources and environmental protection. He saw that as a northern country, Finland had a crucial foreign policy mission to observe and solve challenges in its immediate vicinity.⁸¹

Not only foreign policy was in a situation to total revise, economy and trade, mainly export, were afraid. Finland's export still relied in the 1980s mainly on forest products. In fact, 36% of Finland's exports in 1988 was from forest products.⁸² Moreover, these were combined with the fact that Finland's largest trade partner was, still, the Soviet Union. In fact, the whole Cold War period was a Golden Age for the Finland's economy, and the Soviet Union had been a crucial part of this success as a buyer. Furthermore, the Soviet Union bought exactly those forest products what were Finland's concerns. During the 1980s, an acute fear was born after the Chernobyl accident in 1986, which raised many questions about forests' future. Furthermore, green parties started to pop up in many countries, in Finland as well. This combination raised new discussion about forestry, and when topics about pollution-related tree deaths rose concurrently with demands on lowering forest cutting, Finland saw forest opportunities in the northern forests and in the international cooperation in lowering environmental damages.⁸³ Thus, one can say that the Soviet Union was a root for the concern, but at the same time, the buyer for the forests products and it is not a wonder that Finland became concerned about the environmental and economic situation, in addition to the overall security atmosphere, and started to act.

⁸⁰ Sorsa 1992, 119.

⁸¹ Heininen, Lassi (1998) *Inventaario: Suomalaisia puheenvuoroja pohjoisesta ja arktisesta yhteistyöstä sekä pohjoisesta ulottuvuudesta vuosilta 1987–1997*. Arktinen keskus. Lapin yliopisto, Rovaniemi, 6.

⁸² Keskitalo 2004, 56–57; Androsova, Tatiana (2007) Economic Interests in Soviet-Finnish Relations. An article in Maria Lähteenmäki (ed.) *The Flexible Frontier: Change and Continuity in Finnish-Russian Relations*. Aleksanteri Series 5/2007. University of Helsinki, 141.

⁸³ Keskitalo 2004, 56–57.

2.3 Gorbachev's Speech in Murmansk in October 1987

The Soviet Union was geographically the largest country in the world, and it had an extensive coastline along the Arctic Ocean. Indeed, under the Soviet Union's rule was almost half of the Arctic Ocean's coastal areas.⁸⁴ Furthermore, the Soviet Union was, and had been for decades, dependent on the Arctic area for its economic development⁸⁵. During Soviet times, these northern parts of the Soviet Arctic were in a significant role with natural resources and optimal geostrategic location⁸⁶. For instance, the world's only fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers had advanced the economic exploitation and militaristic aims of the Arctic continental shelf of the Soviet Union's territories for many decades.⁸⁷ The scientific development and exploration, however, accelerated in the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. At first, the Arctic was an essential symbolic sphere for colonial and imperial conquest. However, the Soviet Union was not alone with this; the British and Norwegian fleets were doing the very same in other parts of the Arctic Ocean to gain more control. Natural resources, land, and sea control were in their all minds, but it could also be said that the indigenous people were seen as a resource as well.⁸⁸ Thus, when Gorbachev's speech shook the Arctic world, it is no wonder: the fact that as much as one-fifth of the Soviet's land was beyond the Arctic Circle made the Gorbachev worth consulting.

Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk in October 1987 started with a counterreaction: Gorbachev claimed that the West has been accusing the Soviet Union with outdated information when discussing Arctic issues:

“everything would seem to be as it was before: the same anti-Soviet attacks, the same demands that we show our commitment to peace by renouncing our order and principles, the same confrontational language: ‘totalitarianism’, ‘communist expansion’, and so on.”

⁸⁴ Heininen 1999, 304.

⁸⁵ Laruelle, Marlene (2014) *Resource, state reassertion and international recognition: Locating the drivers of Russia's Arctic policy*. The Polar Journal, 4(2), 253–254.

⁸⁶ Heininen 1999, 304.

⁸⁷ Josephson, Paul R. (2014) *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2.

⁸⁸ Josephson 2014, 3–5.

Gorbachev argued that the Soviet Union has changed from the Soviet past.⁸⁹ From this thesis point of view, the Soviet Union needed a break with the past if longing for further cooperation. The northern part of the Soviet Union had a very questionable past, and if the Soviet Union wanted to be a credible partner in the arctic cooperation, it had no choice than to take a step forward from the previous misdemeanors.

The Russian strive for the Arctic areas begun already in Russia's tsarist years. The first network of inhabitants started to settle to the northern part of Russia as early as from the 14th century onwards. However, agriculture never occurred in the Arctic areas of Russia in the same way as in the Scandinavian region; the density of the population stayed low and did not satisfy tsars. That insight was the first step towards a rigid policy for growing the population density by forced settlement in the Russian North.⁹⁰ After the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Soviets started to implement a Marxian, urban, and industrial development to the distant areas of North⁹¹.

On the other hand, this development is not exceptional; the whole empire went through a similar experiment — decision-maker after another applied Marxist socialism to remote Russian areas from their starting points and aspirations. The primary line was, however, the revolution of the working class, along with heavy industrial and technological development. “*Economy on the taiga and tundra*” was mainline from Stalin to Brezhnev.⁹² And the policy line has changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union very little, and even currently, Arctic areas have been very highly promoted by Putin and Medvedev.⁹³

When the Soviet Union started to give special attention to the Arctic areas, the assumption was to create new cities and industries into emptiness – native people were too underdeveloped to be taken even account. The aim to industrialise and modernise rapidly

⁸⁹ Gorbachev's Speech in Murmansk on October 1987.

⁹⁰ Kauppala, Pekka (1998) *Venäjän Pohjola. Valtiollisen asutustoiminnan synty, kukoistus ja nykytila*. Studies on the Northern Dimension. No.1. Venäjän ja Itä-Euroopan Instituutti, Helsinki, 9 & 13.

⁹¹ Josephson 2014, 2–3.

⁹² Josephson 2014, 4–5; Kaiser, Robert J. (1994) *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and in the USSR*. Princetown University Press, Princetown, 96–97.

⁹³ Josephson 2014, 2–3 and 10–11.

during the times of the Soviet Union meant that the whole Arctic region was dealt according to the state's central plan. Nature, humans, and natural resources were altogether controlled and valued as a resource for political, economic, and military power.⁹⁴ At the end of the 1920s, the unlimited power by Stalin and his supporters meant the policy of economic colonisation of the Arctic region. The first Five Year Plan began in 1928 with the aim of massive industrialisation and militarisation. Concurrently, the state started a much higher penetration into the region, and a new period of rigid centralised planning was initiated. This meant even the collectivisation of Siberian reindeer and fishing, but as well fur and other industries. These in the 1920s begun events have been crucial for the northern part of Russia; those built-up administrative systems lasted through the Soviet times. By the beginning of the 1930s, vast deposits of natural minerals, like copper, nickel, and other iron ores, were discovered in the Arctic region.⁹⁵

Simultaneously, Stalin and his administrators realised that the exploitation of natural resources would be extremely expensive, for example, due to the need for a high salary for getting workers to move to remote areas. These costs meant forced collectivisation of peasants, as well, because of the requirement of a significant amount of 'free labor,' which was not available in the North. However, one of Stalin's aim was to push the Siberian peoples out of their primitivism, hence working in an industrial concern became a real possibility for indigenous Siberians. However, the Siberians were not enough; vast amounts of forced labor was needed. Therefore, the socialisation of Arctic was made through compulsory collectivisation, as well as with the prisoners from labor camps. These gulag prisoners, along with deported urban residents and, for example, political prisoners, were forcibly removed to remote regions of Siberia and the North. These cruel deportations enabled the phenomena leading to the rapid growth of the population in the remote Arctic areas. The amount people deported to Arctic areas yearly, 1–1 ½ million, was approximately the same amount that was population there originally.⁹⁶

One spectacular remark of this Soviet's slave economy was the cities risen from emptiness, for instance, cities of Norilsk and Vorkuta. Other massive projects were

⁹⁴ Josephson 2014, 1 & 16.

⁹⁵ Kauppala 1998, 19–20.

⁹⁶ Kauppala 1998, 19–20.

several railroads in the harsh nature of the North, as well as the very striking project: The Canal of the White Sea. However, the insanity of the plans shows in the project where more than 700 km of a railway was drawn to Siberia, only for left it be unfinished and revert to forest.⁹⁷

This rapid need for industrialisation and urbanisation meant a little attention to the environmental questions, and therefore this Soviet industry had a long-term impact on the region's, for example, natural specie⁹⁸. The massive industrialisation was made possible with recently developed hydropower. However, indigenous people's need for fishing was not taken into account when hydropower stations were planned. Furthermore, over time, the heavy industry had polluted rives widely and caused many troubles for fishing tradition.⁹⁹ These events, forced industrialisation and urbanisation, gulags, and other state-driven systems, lead to the military culture. Cities formed to islets without contact with other centers or regions. Relation to agriculture broke competently, partly because there was no agriculture, and the security of supply was based on supplies from other areas. Urban centers were specialised in one production area, and the equity ratio was weak; the northern settlement in Russia became unbalanced. When the forced labor force was mainly abandoned, the area required massive subsidies, and the Arctic became to the Soviet Union an expensive area.¹⁰⁰ Thus, taken this nature and human abused past to account, it is not any wonder why President Gorbachev's speech included a part where he made a strict distinction from the past.

After this detachment, President Gorbachev had a chapter where he stressed the importance of the Reykjavik Summit in 1986. He even saw it as a turning point in world history: It confirmed the Soviet Union to act towards cooperation in many spheres and one of the essential levels in the Arctic cooperation. Gorbachev mentions that the superpowers have recently made good progress in their relations, but much more could be done. Then he continues to the Arctic region and is suggesting a radical lowering of the level of military confrontation in the region. He mentions countries that had done

⁹⁷ Kauppala 1998, 19–20 and 23.

⁹⁸ Kauppala 1998, 26.

⁹⁹ Snellman, Hanna (2001) *Khants' Time*. Serie B:23. Kikimora Publications, Helsinki, 10 and 12.

¹⁰⁰ Kauppala 1998, 9–10.

good work with these issues, and among others, he mentions Finland, President Urho Kekkonen, President Koivisto, and Sorsa as well.¹⁰¹ President Kekkonen was mentioned due to his proposal for the Northern Nuclear-Free Zone, which Kekkonen renewed in 1978.¹⁰² Furthermore, Gorbachev mentions the CSCE in Helsinki 1975:

“It is significant that the historic Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was held in one of the northern capitals - Helsinki. --- Major initiatives in the sphere of international security and disarmament are associated with the names of famous political figures of Northern Europe. One is Urho Kekkonen. Another is Olof Palme, whose death at the hand of a vile assassin shocked Soviet people. Then there is Kalevi Sorsa, who has headed the Socialist International Advisory Council for many years now. -- we welcome the initiative of Finland's President Mauno Koivisto on restricting naval activity in the seas washing the shores of Northern Europe.”¹⁰³

Thus, Gorbachev mentioned Finland in many parts of the speech. However, he had no apparent order, or he did not wish for Finland to start act towards further cooperation in the Arctic. On the contrary, an exciting line in the speech is when Gorbachev is inviting Arctic nations to join the same table and discuss cooperation in the Arctic.

“Therefore, while in Murmansk, and standing on the threshold of the Arctic and the North Atlantic, I would like to invite, first of all, the countries of the region to a discussion on the burning security issues.”¹⁰⁴

In this paragraph, Gorbachev proposed *the countries of the region* to gather together to solve Arctic issues. He did not mention any list of countries that would have revealed his thoughts about the participants. However, countries mentioned in different parts of the speech are Finland, Canada, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Denmark, the US. Therefore, one could think that these eight Arctic countries, which were going to be asked for deepen cooperation, were the ones the Soviet leader was thinking. Thus, if this is a crucial aspect because then Gorbachev made demarcation where the Arctic sea shoreline was not a crucial criterion.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Gorbachev's Speech in Murmansk on October 1987.

¹⁰² Kallenautio 2005, 400.

¹⁰³ Gorbachev's Speech in Murmansk on October 1987.

¹⁰⁴ Gorbachev's Speech in Murmansk on October 1987.

¹⁰⁵ Gorbachev's Speech in Murmansk on October 1987.

Furthermore, in his speech, Gorbachev listed six proposals for the Arctic: a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe, restricting naval activity in the Arctic seas, peaceful cooperation in developing the resources of the North, cooperation in the scientific exploration of the Arctic, the cooperation of the northern countries in environmental protection and lastly, normalisation of international relations due to opening the North Sea Route to foreign ships.¹⁰⁶ Gorbachev was known to have a repulsion for the usage of military power, and the speech in Murmansk had many aims toward this. This turn to the idea of nonviolence was gratefully received on the Western side, but on the contrary, it was an extraordinary idea among the people in the Soviet Union. The non-use of the force seemed like a weakness instead of seeing it as ideal thinking from the head of state. Moreover, according to Zubok, Gorbachev had a personal urge to unify North America, Europe, and the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁷ Zubok, however, did not mention at all the cooperation for the Arctic area, but still, the Murmansk speech illustrates well the urge to cooperate and lower military power, argued by Zubok. As a result of these sides of Gorbachev, he got much negative feedback in the late 1980s; his diplomats blamed him for negotiating bad contracts for the Soviet Union. Even though Arctic cooperation is not mentioned, it occurred in the same period: Gorbachev has been said to make his worst deals after 1988 because he was obsessed with the will to end the Cold War.¹⁰⁸

Even though the Gorbachev's speech had been said surprised many, primarily due to the arms reduction parts, diplomat and historian Krister Wahlbäck argued in materials of Kuhmo Summer Academy 1988 that President Gorbachev's speech could have been foreseen after the member of the Soviet Politburo Jegor Ligatshov's visit in November 1986. Ligatshov visited Finnish Social Democratic Party in Helsinki and gave a statement about measures, which were underway in the military district of Leningrad and the Baltic Sea. With these measures, the Soviet Union had unilaterally embarked on a reduction of nuclear weapons in the Northern regions.¹⁰⁹ However, with the data of this thesis, Wahlbäck's argument remains unique.

¹⁰⁶ Gorbachev's Speech in Murmansk on October 1987.

¹⁰⁷ Zubok 2009, 318–319 and 321.

¹⁰⁸ Zubok 2009, 317.

¹⁰⁹ Wahlbäck, Krister (1989) Pohjolan turvallisuuspolitiikan tilanne ja yhteistyönäkymät. Article in Heininen, L. (ed.) *Kuhmon henki 1988: Turvallisuuspoliittisen kesäakatemian aineisto*. Hki: Suomen rauhanpuolustajat, 18–20.

3 First Steps from Arctic Tensions to Arctic Convention

3.1 Finland's Security and Environmental Policies Compounded

Even though the Gorbachev's speech was a valid starting point as well to the international level of Arctic cooperation but as well to Finland's activity, Finland had had Arctic policy before the speech. The first document in Finland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Arctic files reveals the urge that Finland had to cooperate on Arctic issues internationally is from late 1986. Prime Minister Sorsa was going to negotiate with Sweden's Prime Minister Carlsson, and MFA sent background information for the upcoming meeting. The message of the memo was that Finland had heard about the plans of building a forum for scientific cooperation and was wondering why Finland, Iceland, and Sweden had been left outside of the planning process hosted by Norway. Furthermore, the memo stresses that Finland and Sweden were willing to join in cooperation.¹¹⁰ Thus, even though Norway had been the one to set up the cooperation, instead of Norway, the memo was addressed to Finland's Prime Minister. Finland's Prime Minister was heading to meet Sweden's Prime minister, and for this reason, it could be said that Finland tried to join in by acting in cooperation with Sweden. Finland was not only trying to get in but was also informing other outsiders as well: Finland ambassador in Reykjavik told about the cooperation plans to Iceland's Foreign Ministry, which did not know about the plans. As a result of this, Iceland hoped that all three, Finland, Sweden, and Iceland, would start together negotiations with Norway about this scientific cooperation.¹¹¹

Simultaneously, the Finland's ambassador in Canada was inquiring about Canada's attitude toward to plan; Canada committed to promoting Finland and Sweden to the cooperation. For Canada, Iceland was not so crucial than Finland and Sweden were. However, Canada did not have anything against Iceland to join in the cooperation.¹¹² Canada was so keen to have Finland included in the Arctic cooperation that Canada handed over to Finland documents about cooperation sent from Norway to Canada¹¹³.

¹¹⁰ From Rotkirch, MFA to Copenhagen embassy 26.11.1986. *Pohjoisen napaseudun tieteellisen tutkimusyhteistyökomitean perustaminen*. No.344. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

¹¹¹ From Huldén Anders, Reykjavik to MFA 19.12.1986. *Pohjoisen napaseudun tieteellisen tutkimusyhteistyö; yhteistyökomitean perustaminen*. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

¹¹² From Blomberg, Jaakko Ottawa to Rotkirch, MFA 19.12.1986. *Tieteellinen yhteistyö arktisilla alueilla*. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

¹¹³ From Blomberg, Ottawa to Rotkirch, MFA 19.12.1986. No. 1311. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

Norsk Polarinstitut wrote those files, and files revealed that participants for the Arctic Science Committee were initially planned to be an organisation with Arctic rim nations only, even though it is interesting why Iceland was not invited. However, after the US suggestion about nations within territories beyond Arctic Circle, Finland, Sweden, and Iceland would be included, and Norway was asking from other Arctic rim nations what they were thinking about including the three nations mentioned. The document reveals, as well, that, for instance, goals and mode of operation, were yet to be decided. Furthermore, it confirms that the Soviet Union had not yet responded to Norway's proposal.¹¹⁴

Only a few days after, Finland, as well as Sweden, got an invitation letter to join and discuss plans to establish a new organisation. However, Iceland did not get an invitation.¹¹⁵ Finland got an invitation without the need to ask invitation from Norway. Finland promised to Iceland to support Iceland's invitation. About the theme of Committee Holger Rotkirch wrote that the West and the East did not have any cooperation in the scientific arena, and the committee aimed to prevent duplication in the Arctic studies. However, the response from the Soviet Union was still missing.¹¹⁶ When Finland told its support for Iceland, Iceland asked Finland to get more information about the Committee¹¹⁷. As a consequence, it can be argued that Finland served as a link in the emerging scientific cooperation. However, within some route, Iceland's enthusiasm got in the ears of Norway, and after Iceland got further information, it was eventually asked to join the meeting¹¹⁸. The meeting was held in February 1987, and Arctic Science Committee plans were decided to take further, but only if the Soviet Union is also coming to Committee¹¹⁹; the Soviet had sent only an observer to the meeting. Tuomo Kärnä, who attended the meeting, wrote in the memo that "*Finland's representation should be*

¹¹⁴ From Rogne, Norsk Polarinstitut, Norway to Roots, Ministry of Environment, Canada 12.11.1986. *Arctic Science Committee*. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

¹¹⁵ From Rotkirch, MFA to Blomberg, Ottawa 22.12.1986. *Tieteellinen yhteistyö arktisilla alueilla*. No. 310. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

¹¹⁶ From Rotkirch, MFA to Embassy of Finland in Reykjavik 29.12.1986. *Tieteellinen yhteistyö arktisilla alueilla*. No. 181. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

¹¹⁷ From Embassy of Finland in Reykjavik to MFA 8.1.1987. *Pohjoisen napa-alueen tieteellinen tutkimusyhteistyö: Islannin kanta*. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

¹¹⁸ From Embassy of Finland in Reykjavik to MFA 22.1.1987. *Pohjoisen napa-alueen tieteellinen tutkimusyhteistyö: Islannin osallistuminen*. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

¹¹⁹ Rotkirch 4.3.1987. *Tieteellinen yhteistyö arktisilla alueilla*. Memo nr 32. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

sufficiently credible” for getting the Soviet Union to join.¹²⁰ That underlines the assumption that Finns thought that Finland played an essential role in gaining the Soviet Union with Committee.

Finland was an active host for different levels of seminars and meetings. In September 1987, Helsinki hosted a Round table seminar on Canadian and Nordic approaches and policies toward Arctic Security. The US and the Soviet Union were not invited to this seminar.¹²¹ In the Round table seminar, the topic was Canadian and Nordic approaches and policies toward Arctic Security. This seminar dared to take on its agenda tense issues, for example, the impact of naval competition between the US and the Soviet Union. However, it should bear in mind that the US or the Soviet Union were not participants in this seminar. The seminar was concerned about the Arctic arms race, and the countries included, Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, were described

“they [countries] are ‘sandwiched’ between the United States and the Soviet Union in the offensive-reactive strategic game.”¹²²

The Director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) Kari Möttölä has gathered the discussions from the seminar to a book *“The Arctic Challenge – Nordic and Canadian Approaches to Security and Cooperation in an Emerging International Region”*. In the book, professors or state’s high representatives commented security and cooperation issues in the Arctic from their own nation’s viewpoint. Finland’s position on the matter gave Senior Research Fellow from Institute of Military Science Kalevi Ruhala, Researcher Olli-Pekka Jalonen from the FIIA, Senior Research Fellow Pertti Joenniemi and the editor of the book, Kari Möttölä. Thus, from Finland, there was no state representative present.¹²³

¹²⁰ Kärnä, Tuomo 30.3.1987. *Arctic Science Committee*. Memo. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

¹²¹ The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. 15.6.1987. *Round table seminar on Canadian and Nordic approaches and policies towards ARCTIC SECURITY AND COOPERATION*. Circular letter 1. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1; Rusi, Alpo 24.6.1987. *Arktisten alueiden turvallisuus ja yhteistö; kanadalais-pohjoismainen pyöreän pöydän seminaari 1.–2.9.1987*. Memo. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

¹²² The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. 15.6.1987. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

¹²³ Möttölä, Kari (ed.) *The Arctic Challenge – Nordic and Canadian Approaches to Security and Cooperation in an Emerging International Region*. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Westview Press, 1988, X & XV–XVI.

Ruhala discussed the Arctic dimension as a part of Finland's security policy. Finland had the Northern dimension included to the Finnish Parliamentary Defence Committee from the year 1975 onwards, and Finland had stressed three main things in there: The Soviet Union's strategic position in the Northern Europe, the Northern NATO states, Iceland, Norway and Denmark, and finally, the neutrality of Finland and Sweden. The neutral states, Finland and Sweden, separated the NATO and the Soviet Union geographically from each other. However, Finland's aim was to work actively for the friendly relations between Norway's and the Soviet Union's due to the north Norway-Soviet border, which was partially shared with Finland. According to Ruhala, geographically, Finland did not pose any threat to other nations, not even towards the two superpowers. However, Finland recognised tensions between the superpowers and therefore admitted if escalating to war, Finland would be in between the NATO and the Soviet Union. This might have then meant that Finland's airspace could have been the route for missiles to fly, and then Finland would have been a part of war even though it would not have been an active participant.¹²⁴

So due to, for instance, this airspace situation, previous less interest aroused states, such as Finland, was in the middle of the area that had achieved the world's attention. Nordic countries, neutral or not, were dragged to a great-power rivalry, whether they wanted it or not. Therefore, Möttölä and Joenniemi were discussing in their article what are the odds to small states gain a stricter arms control for their safety and what are the means. Möttölä and Joenniemi aptly asked: what is the most efficient way for the Nordic countries themselves to contribute to the process? As a conclusion, Möttölä and Joenniemi argued that a more complex compound of political administration was needed for the Arctic to enable security and cooperation between all parties. Countries needed to articulate better than before, for example, in the questions of the resource-related cooperations, and for this, standard policies would be much needed. Möttölä and Joenniemi

¹²⁴ Ruhala, Kalevi. Finland's Security Policy: The Arctic Dimension. An article in Möttölä, Kari (ed.) *The Arctic Challenge – Nordic and Canadian Approaches to Security and Cooperation in an Emerging International Region*. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Westview Press, 1988, 118–120 & 128.

predicted that these standard policies would be sooner or later lead to an Arctic model of new multinational and regional political administration.¹²⁵

The round-table discussion was two months before the Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk. Slightly earlier, only a few weeks before Gorbachev's speech, Finland's foreign ministry and the Ministry of Trade and Industry started to work together with arctic issues. In the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland's (MFA) political department, Esko Rajakoski was named to be the head of arctic issues in the MFA, and he joined to Polar-committee established by the Ministry of Trade and Industry's. This cooperation concentrated on trading: Finland's unique skills and knowledge in arctic circumstances was commonly known, and, for example, Finnish ice breakers were a popular commodity. However, due to the fact that all arctic issues, trade, and the industry as well, were highly political issues because of the tension between two superpowers, all Finland's international activities in Arctic issues were submitted to the MFA's political department.¹²⁶

This mixture of environmental and foreign policies suited very well to Finland's two high-level politicians: their wish was to drive environmental protection cooperation as a foreign policy dimension. Foreign minister Paavo Väyrynen had expressed his will to use environmental policies together with foreign policy aims, and he had the support from the Chairman of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, Member of Parliament Pertti Paasio. The dream was to build "an environmental OSCE", which had born after the successful Baltic Sea region cooperation in the 1970s.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Möttölä, Kari & Joenniemi, Pertti. Arctic Security Challenges and Prospects for Arms Control – Building on the Nordic Experience in a New Setting. An article in Möttölä, Kari (ed.) *The Arctic Challenge – Nordic and Canadian Approaches to Security and Cooperation in an Emerging International Region*. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Westview Press, 1988, 248–249.

¹²⁶ Rotkirch 14.9.1987. *Etelämannerta ja napa-alueita koskevien kysymysten käsittely ulkoasiainministeriössä*. Memo nr. 90. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

¹²⁷ Heininen 1999, 152.

3.2 Murmansk Momentum: Finland Invites Itself to Cooperation

“Finland should not wait for an invitation, which may not come at all¹²⁸.”
– Jaakko Blomberg, 1988

A very soon after Gorbachev’s speech, Finland’s Foreign Ministry made Finnish translation from the speech’s foreign policy part. There is a few underlining made in the document. Firstly, the translator has noticed that the Soviet Union suggests the radical reduction of military confrontation. Secondly, there is underlining in the chapter where Gorbachev speaks about the nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. Thirdly, Mauno Koivisto’s proposal for limiting military action was mentioned in speech and underlined in the archive’s document. Fourthly, the part where Gorbachev spoke about peaceful usage of natural resources has been noticed. Fifthly, the scientific research and Scandinavian co-operation in environmental protection in the Arctic were mentioned and marked in Finland. Lastly, the possibility of the Soviet Union’s permit for the Northern sea route was highlighted.¹²⁹

President Koivisto had an official visit in the Soviet Union on 6th October 1987 and commented the Gorbachev’s speech by saying that speech included support for Finland’s aim for the Nordic nuclear-free zone. Furthermore, Koivisto argued that the speech aimed to reduce military confrontation by having cooperation with a broad perspective in scientific and environmental issues. Former foreign minister Väyrynen commented on 17th October that due to Gorbachev’s speech, Finland should raise cooperation in the field of environmental protection to one of Finland’s main aims in its foreign policy.¹³⁰

In November 1987, Finland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Political Department had a meeting called ‘Arctic Cooperation in Multilateral Institutionalized Nordic Cooperation.’ As the topic says, the meeting was mostly a discussion about how Nordic countries could cooperate within Arctic issues, for example, in the sphere of economic and environmental research. Research should focus on the sustainable use of natural resources. As a last issue

¹²⁸ Blomberg 5.1.1988. *Aineksia Suomen arktiseen diplomatiaan*. P.M. Signum 13.60-1 Arktiset alueet (FIN-AMFA 13.60-1).

¹²⁹ Gorbachev’s speech, Finnish translation. Foreign policy part. 7.10.1987. 1983/395. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

¹³⁰ Heininen 1998, 6; Heininen 1999, 151.

at the meeting is a note that the leftist party 'Democratic Alternative' had expressed a wish for Finland's delegation in the Nordic Council to show obedience to Gorbachev's speech and be proactive.¹³¹

Finland's diplomats had many private meetings with other diplomats from the Arctic Eight. Among private meetings, there were meetings with diplomats and experts in arctic issues, usually after an invitation from a foreign ambassador. In December 1987, ambassador Rajakoski received an invitation from Swedish ambassador Bo Johnson Teutenberg and visited Swedish Polar Research Secretariat. The meeting was about both poles, Arctic and Antarctica. Negotiating official Rajakoski explained the discussion in the memo, and according to him, there were two levels of Arctic cooperation going on. Rajakoski made a clear border to those two; on the other hand, there was intended to deepen academic research cooperation, and this process had been going on for a while already. On the other hand, there was newly risen intend to create an Intergovernmental Forum on Arctic Science Issues, which was planning to proceed to the political aspects of the research cooperation. The scientific cooperation was planned to be open for all scientists, but the intergovernmental forum was planned to be only for the Arctic Eight. These both intend got new wind to the sails from Gorbachev's speech, but some doubts about the intergovernmental cooperation had been heard.

Sweden and Finland agreed to keep each other up to date about Arctic issues.¹³² There were no allusions about that Sweden or Finland would have been alone or together, making the next step for the Arctic cooperation. In addition to Rajakoski, a scientist Erkki Leppävuori from the Technical Research Centre of Finland, took part in the meeting since the meeting was more scientific than political. Even though he wrote that his memo is more scientific than political, he has an interesting point in his memo: the plan for Arctic Science Committee had been quickly modified after Gorbachev's speech, and the plan included thoughts from the speech. Leppävuori wrote that the Soviet Union had not taken a stance at this point yet. Leppävuori ended up with the comment that he strongly

¹³¹ Rosengren, J-H. 20.11.1987. *Arktinen yhteistyö monenkeskisessä institutionalisoidussa pohjoismaisessa yhteistyössä*. Memo. No. 1044. 1985/1473. FIN-AMFA 13.40-2.

¹³² Rajakoski, Esko 30.12.1987. *Polar-alueita koskevat keskustelut Ruotsin UD:ssä*. Memo. No. 1155. 1985/1473. FIN-AMFA 13.40-2.

supported that Finland joins the Arctic Science Committee.¹³³ This meeting highlights the fact that even though the Arctic policy burst out after Gorbachev's speech, political science in Finland had dealt the issue slightly in advance. Kuhmo had its first summer academy for searching for ways to relieve tension and developed cooperation on July 1987. Furthermore, the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) established a research program for the Arctic in the same summer. Moreover, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) arranged Nordic-Canadian round-table meeting in Helsinki on September 1987.¹³⁴ Moreover, this reflects the broader Nordic phenomenon of scientific community concern and interest in the Arctic even before Gorbachev's speech.

Finland actively followed what other Arctic states were doing and reacting; for example, Finland followed closely when Canada and the Soviet Union renewed the Arctic Exchange Programme in February 1987¹³⁵. When this cooperation deepened after the Soviet Union made a proposal for Canada about further cooperation in the Arctic issues, Finland was even more interested. In the MFA's archives, there are articles about Canada-USSR -negotiations as well as political review made by Finland's ambassador in Ottawa.¹³⁶ This new cooperation attempt, as well as, Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk, affected to the negotiations of the International Arctic Science Committee: Committee decided to speed up its establishment and to bring forward publication¹³⁷. Finland noticed these winds carefully, and when Canada and Norway made a bilateral conference on Arctic issues, Finland was again interested¹³⁸.

One crucial turning point was in December 1987, when Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark made a speech where he drew a line for the valid Arctic countries. He defined the border for the Arctic to Arctic Circle and included seven countries to the Arctic area, eight when including Canada. The speech was full of aims for international cooperation and seems like a natural continuum after Gorbachev's

¹³³ Leppävuori, Erkki 29.12.1987. *Keskustelu ruotsalais-suomalaisesta yhteistyöstä polar-alueiden tutkimuksessa*. Memo. 1983/395. FIN-AMFA 13.40.

¹³⁴ Heininen 1998, 6–7.

¹³⁵ Renewal of Canada–USSR Arctic Science Programme. 26.2.1987. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

¹³⁶ From Blomberg, Ottawa to MFA. 13.10.1987. *Kanadan ja Neuvostoliiton yhteistyö arktisissa kysymyksissä*. No. 153. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

¹³⁷ From Blomberg, Ottawa to MFA. 4.12.1987. No. 507. *Kansainvälinen arktinen tutkimusyhteistyö*. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

¹³⁸ From Embassy of Finland in Ottawa to MFA 10.12.1987. No.510. *Kanada ja Norja keskustelevat pohjoisista kysymyksistä*. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

speech. Canada made clear proposals for further cooperation and planned the first meetings to be kept already in 1988. Ambassador Jaakko Blomberg's review from Clark's speech stress Canadian initiative for the 'Arctic Basin Council,' a government-level co-operation organisation. According to Blomberg, this 'Arctic Basin Council' project had been planned for years in Canada with a unique research team. The basis for this project was dissatisfaction with bilateral cooperation favored by the Soviet Union in Arctic issues, and Canadians saw a multilateral level in cooperation more fruitful. After Gorbachev's speech, this initiative was more contemporary than ever. In his memo, Blomberg estimated that the question of Northwest passage had been one big obstacle for Canada in bilateral cooperation in the Arctic. Finally, ambassador Blomberg wrote that Clark had many allusions that may lead to projects that may interest Finland as well.¹³⁹

Clark's speech underlines the fact that almost every nation was keen to formulate some cooperation levels for the Arctic. However, Canadians were very active, they had their own plans for initiative as well¹⁴⁰, and it could be said that the establishment of the multinational cooperation in the Arctic was traded between two nations, Canada and Finland. Canada's situation, however, differed from Finland's – it can be considered to be in Finland's favor that Finland did not have significant controversial issues in the Arctic. The Canadians unofficial initiative for wide cooperation in the Arctic did not proceed until the 1990, when the Finland's initiative seemed to slow down¹⁴¹. Therefore, the Arctic Council, even though the process started from the Finland's initiative, is sometimes said to be Canada's Initiative.

This was, as well, the case with other Arctic eight nations. Canadians had the question of the Northwest passage; the Soviet Union had grip from the Northern sea route as well as the bilateral rivalry with the US, and besides that, the US was keen to natural resources in the Arctic. Norway and Iceland had intense interests in the fishery policies in the Arctic area, and Denmark has the question of autonomous Greenland¹⁴². Only Sweden and Finland were countries that did not have any very urgent and tense issues in the area –

¹³⁹ From Blomberg, Ottawa to MFA 15.12.1987. *PK-R Kanadan ulkoministeri arktisesta yhteistyöstä ja turvallisuudesta*. No. OTT-183. FIN-AMFA 13.40-1.

¹⁴⁰ Heikkilä 2006, 12.

¹⁴¹ Heikkilä 2006, 12; Heininen 1999, 78.

¹⁴² Heininen 1991, 176.

they were moreover securing themselves being in. Naturally, Sweden and Finland had forestry and environmental issues in the area, but compared to the issues of who is controlling the Arctic Sea's area and oil and gas in the Arctic, Finland had very much less tense issues. However, especially to small nations like Sweden and Finland, the being in was a very crucial security policy line¹⁴³ and therefore, it is not a surprise that they both were very interested in Arctic issues during the 1980s. Nevertheless, there had been arguments against Sweden's arcticness, due to the situation in the 1980s, when Sweden did have almost any excuse for being an Arctic state; Sweden was speech after speech only stressing the global importance of the Arctic but was not usually at all explained why this was touching specifically Sweden¹⁴⁴.

The High North of Norway had lots of raw materials, but all the benefits leaked to the south, where economic and political centers were, and potential local markets did not evolve to the North¹⁴⁵. Further, fishing was one of the primary sources of livelihood, and again, the industry was shared with the Soviets; the Barents Sea had abundant fish resources¹⁴⁶. In 1976, after ten years of negotiations, Norway and the Soviet Union made bilateral arrangements for the fishery policy in the Barents Sea Region¹⁴⁷. However, bilateral relations with Russia were not in favor due to the assumption of dictation policy from the Soviet side. Instead of bilateral ties, Norway tended to prefer multilateral cooperation. When Arctic cooperation emerged to BEAC, Norway considered the European-wide collaboration as a safeguard against Russia.¹⁴⁸ What comes to other Arctic countries, Norway assigned bilateral fishing agreements with Iceland in 1980–1981¹⁴⁹.

In addition, Norway and Denmark differed from other Scandinavian countries due to countries' commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as a founding

¹⁴³ Heininen 1991, 176.

¹⁴⁴ Tennberg 1998, 37.

¹⁴⁵ Kjøllberg Anders (1994) A European Security-Building Concept. An article in Stokke Olav Schram & Tunander Ola (ed.): *The Barents Region. Cooperation in Arctic Europe*. The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker. International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. Sage Publications, London, 191–192.

¹⁴⁶ Hønneland & Jensen 2015, 463.

¹⁴⁷ Young, 1998, 33; Hønneland & Jensen 2015, 463.

¹⁴⁸ Kjøllberg A. 1994. 191–192

¹⁴⁹ Young 1998, 33.

member. Furthermore, the Russian-Norway border belonged to the Iron Curtain, the line separating West and East. Even though there was no conflict on that borderline, strict control made connections over the border impossible, affecting to the economics as well. On the Soviet side, the North was heavily armed, and Norway took a similar approach but only a lesser degree. Russia was almost solely, but a huge one, threat to Norway and that fact were taken seriously throughout the Cold War.¹⁵⁰ Especially in the 1950s, Soviet significantly increased the northern armament equipment. In that era, nuclear weapons were more developed, and the Soviet's first nuclear weapon was stationed next to Norway, to the Kola Peninsula.¹⁵¹ However, the threat from Russia had been present since WWII, and Norway reacted to the threat by joining NATO in 1949¹⁵².

In 1988, the intention for Arctic cooperation and Finland's active role in it started. Finland's ambassador Blomberg in Ottawa followed Arctic issues carefully and reported regularly changing tendencies to Finnish representatives. When Canadians activated in Arctic issues after Gorbachev's speech, Blomberg quickly reacted and wrote a memo in January 1988, where he drew lines for Finland's Arctic diplomacy. As seen from the future, all Blomberg's points have more or less occurred, and his memo seems almost like a prediction.¹⁵³ Not having a shoreline on the Arctic Ocean, and without a prominent role in negotiations of the Arctic cooperation, it is questionable if Finland would have been included around a table when states are negotiating about, for example, natural resources, if not acted actively¹⁵⁴.

Blomberg wrote that Finland should not wait for an invitation to the emerging Arctic cooperation. Boundaries for the Arctic area were still unclear, and if those had been defined, for example, within shoreline, Finland would have been left out from the cooperating area. According to Blomberg, Finland was in a situation where it should be proactive in creating a comprehensive political framework for the Arctic. Blomberg

¹⁵⁰ Kjølberg A. 1994. 191; Hønneland & Jensen 2015, 463.

¹⁵¹ Hønneland & Jensen 2015, 463.

¹⁵² Sörlin, Sverker (2013) Introduction: Polar Extensions – Nordic States and their Polar Strategies. An article in Sörlin Sverker (ed.) *Science, Geopolitics and Culture in the Polar Region*. Ashgate, Farnham, p. 11–12.

¹⁵³ Blomberg 5.1.1988. *Aineksia Suomen arktiseen diplomatiaan*. P.M. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1.

¹⁵⁴ Numminen 2011, 29.

argued that the cooperation in non-military issues would have created an atmosphere where the arms race adjustment and the nuclear-free zone would have been gradually possible. He also mentioned that time was not yet suitable for the reduction of military activities, but the collaboration with other issues would have created trust between superpowers, as well as, between other countries and thereby relieve the tensions.¹⁵⁵

Blomberg described processes that were going on in the Arctic; armament race, exploitation of natural resources, scientific-technical research and development, environmental protection, and preserving the culture of the northern indigenous peoples and improving their living conditions. He feared that those last four peaceful processes, unfortunately, had come across the first, non-peaceful, one: with the armament race. Therefore, according to Blomberg, the cooperation was very needed. So, for the cooperation, he warmly recommended that Finland would start to promote the multilateral, international cooperation and leniency in security policy issues with the eight Arctic nations.¹⁵⁶

For the question, how did Finland become a key negotiator in launching Arctic cooperation at the end of the Cold War, academic Oran. B. Young has few reasons to introduce. Firstly, Finland reacted early enough to the Murmansk momentum. Secondly, Young claims that Finland managed as a first country wisely to respond to topics straight taken from Gorbachev's speech. Thirdly, Finland realised its potential neutral role as an arbitrator between East and West. Young claims that other Northern policymakers saw the situation as similar to the 1975 Helsinki Accord and realised that, individually, Finland could negotiate the Arctic cooperation process best.¹⁵⁷ Young's claims are consistent with the hypothesis of this thesis; however, the conscious choice of Nordic makers to let Finland lead the process is not visible in the Finland's archive materials.

Young argues that the growing concern of environmental issues was fertile soil for Arctic discussions: ecological questions were tremendous or even fashionable topics, but for the

¹⁵⁵ Blomberg 5.1.1988. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1.

¹⁵⁶ Blomberg 5.1.1988. P.M. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1.

¹⁵⁷ Young 1998, 57–58.

success of negotiations where two superpowers were included, the environment was a topic not too contentious.¹⁵⁸

Quite similarly argued Senior Research Fellow at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Steven E. Miller in Kuhmo Academy in 1988: Miller discussed the Arctic maritime arms control. During the speech, it was noted that this issue had gained much-growing concern, in particular, in Norway, Finland, and the Soviet Union. It was highlighted that there was considerable naval power in the northern sea areas, even during peacetime, and if times of crisis had occurred, more military equipment would have been deployed there. Any escalation of the situation would have, thus, mean a significant sea battle in the Arctic. Maritime confidence-building measures, such as restricting military exercises and exchanging information, were proposed as a solution. However, operational constraints were considered too difficult to achieve in the context of contemporary superpower relations. In the article, there are note that Miller's proposals for arms control are not included in the Academy's material. There was no specific reason mentioned to this.¹⁵⁹ That issue might have been too risky to say aloud.

3.3 Finland's Tentative Tour for Convention

In his memo, Ambassador Blomberg stressed the urgency of the matter on January 1988, but on paper, the acts towards Finland's initiative started only in autumn when the MFA decided to arrange a meeting with the Arctic ambassadors in Helsinki. However, the document dated in late September reveals that there had been discussions between the Arctic eight in scientific issues: International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) was genuinely starting to operate.¹⁶⁰

Even though officially there are no archive documents about discussions on the Arctic issue during spring 1988, the nascent cooperation also arose in the speeches of Finnish politicians. The Finno–Soviet Treaty turned 40 years during spring 1988, and at its

¹⁵⁸ Young 1998, 58–59.

¹⁵⁹ Miller, Steven E. Asevalvonnann ja aseidenriisunnan mahdollisuudet pohjoisilla merialueilla. Article in Heininen, L. (ed.) (1989). *Kuhmon henki 1988: Turvallisuuspoliittisen kesäakatemian aineisto*. Hki: Suomen rauhanpuolustajat, 10–13.

¹⁶⁰ Rajakoski 30.9.1988. P.M. No. 749. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1.

Anniversary Seminar Minister, Toivo T. Pohjola had a keynote speech, where he highlighted the initiative nature of Gorbachev's speech. Pohjola concentrated on the security aspect of the speech, and he was optimistic that in cooperative organs, problems in the security sphere could be possible to be solved. He suggested that an excellent platform for the new collaboration would be previous cooperation organs, for instance, the Arctic task force of the Finland-USSR Scientific and Technical Cooperation Committee, which was established in 1981.¹⁶¹ This suggestion was impressive due to its bilateral character instead of the international form. Finland's Prime Minister Harri Holkeri had a similar message when he visited the Soviet Union; he brought up the bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and Finland concerning the usage of the natural resources in the North¹⁶².

The Members of the Parliament from Finland and the Soviet Union had a conference in Helsinki on April 1988. The topic was The Safety, and Peaceful Means for Cooperation in the North, and the event was a result of Gorbachev's speech. The speaker of the Parliament of Finland, Matti Ahde, had the opening speech, where he raised the topicality of the Arctic areas and the newly risen activity in the issues of international politics among the members of the parliament. The environmental issues in the North came to the discussion, and the representatives of Finland expressed their concern about the situation of air pollution in the Kola Peninsula, especially the threat of pollution to Lapland was discussed.¹⁶³

The Kola Peninsula was mentioned only by its environmental problems; however, in the 1970s and 1980s, the main concern was usually the fact that the Kola Peninsula represented one of the Soviet Union's remarkable military basement areas. There were naval ports and a significant number of land-based intercontinental missiles. As being a prominent nuclear armament region, it was naturally a security threat as well as an environmental risk. But being a crucial target to NATO, the security concern for Finland was actual, even though it was easily shimmered behind ecological concerns.

¹⁶¹ Heininen 1998, 7.

¹⁶² Heininen 1998, 8.

¹⁶³ Heininen 1998, 7.

Furthermore, this did not fade the fact out that there were real environmental problems as well.¹⁶⁴

In addition, Kuhmo Summer Academy for Security in the July 1988 discussed issues concerning the Arctic and Finland's position widely. The Kuhmo Summer Academy 1988 was a first public, official discussion about Finland's arctic policies discussed by government officials and researchers. The official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pertti Torstila, was representing Finland's thoughts about the safety and security of the Arctic and stressed the need for confidence-building measures. Furthermore, he argued that Gorbachev's speech had given possibilities for large-scale international cooperation in Arctic issues.¹⁶⁵

Researcher Lassi Heininen discussed deeply on an issue if Finland is an Arctic state or not. Arguments for and against were the same discussed in this thesis previously: Finland does not have an Arctic shoreline, but instead, a big part of Finland locates above the 60 degrees Northern latitude. Lehtonen argued Finland's arctic nature with a long history in the North: Finland had been an Arctic shoreline-nation until 1920, and in the Lapland, there had always been Finns or Finland's Sami people. Heininen highlighted that even in the 1980s, Finland had a strong foothold in the North. He admitted that Finland has reacted only in the 1980s to northern security issues, regardless that many other from the Arctic Eight was reacted politically to the Northern issues much before.¹⁶⁶

Further, Heininen added that Finland had not a particular program for Arctic policy, but Finland had awakened to the situation, reacting to the Arctic issues and developing its national perspective on northern issues¹⁶⁷. Indeed, Finland's Arctic politics had been scattered across different areas of foreign and internal policy, without having been previously assembled¹⁶⁸. Based on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archive material, it must be admitted that Finland did seriously start to think Arctic issues only after the year

¹⁶⁴ Kallenautio 2005, 402.

¹⁶⁵ Heininen 1998, 7–8.

¹⁶⁶ Heininen, Lassi (1987b) Suomen reaktiot Arktiksen haasteisiin. Article in Heininen, L. (ed.) *Kuhmon henki 1987: Turvallisuuspoliittisen kesäakatemian aineisto*. Hki: Suomen rauhanpuolustajat, 58–61.

¹⁶⁷ Heininen 1998, 8.

¹⁶⁸ Heininen 1999, 168.

1983, likewise Heininen mentioned in the Academy. However, technological cooperation was, at least on a small scale, going on already in the 1970s. Despite this, even after the will from 1983 onwards, the actual push to cooperate was mild until the Gorbachev's speech.¹⁶⁹

Negotiating official Rajakoski and researcher Lassi Heininen had a private conversation in September 1988, where Rajakoski described the current situation. Rajakoski introduced that Finland was going for peaceful cooperation in the Arctic, and that was going to be Finland's new foreign policy framework. Furthermore, Rajakoski said that at first, the aim was to start from the academic level, then quickly continue towards environmental protection, and then aim towards economic cooperation. However, according to Rajakoski, Finland was aiming a lot further than these mentioned targets: he argued that the cooperation should go much further than the Western countries were willing to go in the name of the success of the Arctic cooperation.¹⁷⁰ Even though Rajakoski did not explain with details how far Finland would have wanted to go, the message is quite clear, and the statement was reliable: Finland had a vision, targets, and Finland wanted an intense cooperation organ.

At the end of October 1988, Arctic Science Committee was developed further, and the basic guidelines for the organisation were created. The Committee consisted of 8 member states, and it was open for those countries' scientists and individually invited persons. The Committee's role was to be an advisory body in scientific questions concerning the Arctic.¹⁷¹

However, if the first half of the year 1988 was uneventful, the rest of the year was full of meetings, journeys, and negotiations — Finland began journeys with its proposal quite precisely one year after the Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk. The tentative journey started from the Soviet Union, and the very first proposal trip for the International Conference on Arctic Environmental Protection was made in the early days of October. Finland introduced the idea of keeping an international environmental conference in

¹⁶⁹ Heininen 1987b, 61.

¹⁷⁰ Heininen 1998, 8.

¹⁷¹ From Kaarlo Yrjö-Koskinen to Blomberg 25.10.1988. *Arctic Science Committee: Tukholmassa 23.10 pidetyn työryhmän kokouksentulokset*. OSLB056. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1.

Helsinki to the Soviet Union's Environmental Minister Fjodor Morgun. Finland's messenger was Minister Kaj Bärlund, and he met Morgun within the meeting of the Environmental Ministries in the Kola Peninsula. Minister Morgun's reaction was, regarded to Bärlund's memo, surprisingly positive.¹⁷²

Finland had four reasons why cooperation would be fruitful to the Soviet Union, as well to the other Arctic states. Firstly, Finland stressed the deep concern of environmental issues, mostly in the sphere of usage of natural resources. Secondly, Finland reminded that all the proposals points are just a natural continuation to the Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk and that Finland's proposal only answered to the Gorbachev's suggestion of multilateral cooperation. Thirdly, Finland argued that the timing was quite right, and fourthly, Finland stressed that every nation that had land northern than the Arctic Circle had the right to join this new level of cooperation, including the US and Canada. Furthermore, the memo reveals that Finland has had consultations within other countries about the proposal, and this was let to the Soviet Union's consciousness. However, the countries concerned are not identified in the memo.¹⁷³ Soon after this memo, the MFA sent a secret message widely to Finland's highest representatives, for instance, Embassies, President Koivisto and Prime Minister Holkeri. In the message, MFA told about its intentions to start negotiations with the eight Arctic countries for extensive international environmental cooperation in Arctic issues.¹⁷⁴

It is not clear if the memo about Bärlund's visit to Kola refers to discussions Finland had made about the idea of being invitatory before the visit to the Soviet Union or was memo referring to some other non-mentioned discussions during the spring and summer 1988. However, if Finland had had discussions with other countries about Finland's proposal before discussion with Minister Mogun without documentary, it is, thus, very interesting why there are no memos about those. The MFA's archives documents reveal only the negotiations after discussion with the Soviet Union's Morgun.

¹⁷² Rajakoski 9.11.1988. P.M. No. 867. *Suomen aloite arktisen ympäristöyhteistyön järjestämiseksi; tilanne 8.11.1988*. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 3.

¹⁷³ Blomberg 6.10.1988. *Kansainvälinen arktinen ympäristöyhteistyö*. P.M. 769. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 1-2.

¹⁷⁴ Blomberg 13.10.1988. *Kansainvälinen arktinen ympäristöyhteistyö*. CCCB212. Telegram. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1.

In November, the USSR's Directorate's First Secretary, Grigory Rapota, visited Finland. The main topic for the visit was the situation of the IASC's establishment, but right away, at the beginning of the meeting, Rapota told the Finnish representative, Rajakoski, that the most crucial issue was, however, the Finland's initiative for the cooperation in Arctic issues. Rapota told Finland that there was planned to keep two meetings in Leningrad about Arctic issues. The first one was a conference open widely for academics about the Arctic and the other more small-scale for the Arctic Eight about the establishment of the IASC. Rapota told that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union was going to follow those two meetings. Rapota was wondering if the Nordic countries had any mutual disputes about the IASC. The question surprised Finland, and disputes were denied. In turn, Rajakoski told that Finland had had discussions in Ottawa and Washington and that the reactions had been cautiously positive. Furthermore, Rajakoski announced that he was going to continue discussions and visit Moscow, Copenhagen, and Stockholm. Rajakoski continued and said that if the reactions continue to be positive, Finland will write a formal invitation with working paper attachment. Moreover, again, Rajakoski explained the difference between Finland's aim of keeping the International Conference on Arctic Environmental Protection and the IASC by saying that the Conference would only be an instrument for a mean to build the final solution, for example, an intergovernmental convention for the Arctic issues. Rajakoski stressed that the cooperation organ should be political by nature.¹⁷⁵

Rajakoski continued Finland's proposal journey in October 1988 to Reykjavik, Iceland, where Nordic polar officials and scientists were having a meeting. The meeting was arranged for the upcoming IASC. In the meeting, Finland had to explain continuously how Finland's proposal was differing from the basis of the IASC. Finland stressed that the new proposal aimed to intergovernmental cooperation, which the IASC was not seeking. The proposal was only taken for information as the high representatives from each county were not participants of the meeting. Finland planned to visit each Nordic state separately.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ Rautiainen, Risto 23.11.1988. *Poliittisen osaston virkamiesten keskustelut ulkovaltojen edustajien kanssa; Rapota – Rajakoski 14.11.1988*. Memo. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1.

¹⁷⁶ Rajakoski 9.11.1988. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 3.

Rajakoski continued to propose Nordic countries, and the next partner was Sweden; Rajakoski met Ambassador for the Environment Göte Svensson and Counselor for the Embassy Ulf Svensson at New York at the beginning of the November 1988. Both Svenssons reacted very positively, Rajakoski argued that the reaction was almost overwhelming: Swedes commented that Finland's proposal was a first reasonable answer to the Gorbachev's speech. The two Swedish representatives promised to introduce Finland's proposal to related officials in Sweden and invited Rajakoski to Sweden to introduce ideas further.¹⁷⁷

In late November, Ambassador Eva-Christina Mäkeläinen sent a message to Rajakoski, where she informed that she had had discussions with Secretary of State for Danish Foreign Affairs Otto Möller about Finland's aim to arrange International Conference on Arctic Environmental Protection. Möller had argued that the issue was most political in Denmark and need further discussions. Therefore, Mäkeläinen had arranged for Rajakoski a meeting with Denmark's representatives.¹⁷⁸

The meeting between Rajakoski and Danish representatives, included Möller, was held at the beginning of December. The meeting gave an impression of a high level of commitment to the Finland's proposal. Denmark highlighted again that the initiative had a profound political connotation. Denmark granted support for the initiative but pointed out that due to its politically sensitive nature, the issue should proceed with high sensitivity.¹⁷⁹

In 20.10.1988, the US answered to Finland that it was interested in multilateral cooperation, but wanted high-level discussions with Finland before answering 'yes'¹⁸⁰. Negotiating official Rajakoski visited Washington in 27.10.1988 for to find out the US's

¹⁷⁷ Rajakoski 9.11.1988. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 5.

¹⁷⁸ From Eva-Christina Mäkeläinen to Rajakoski. 22.11.1988. *Suomen aloite ympäristö koskevaksi yhteistyöksi*. KOB0471. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1.

¹⁷⁹ From Rajakoski to Blomberg and Torstila 8.12.1988. *Arktista ympäristönsuojelua koskeva Suomen aloite; keskustelut Tanskan ulkoministeriössä* 8.12.1988. KOB071. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1.

¹⁸⁰ From Aira Kalela Ministry of the Environment to MFA. 21.10.1988. *Pohjoisten (Circumpolaristen) alueiden ympäristönsuojelua koskeva yhteistyö. Keskustelut Yhdysvaltain vara-apulaisulkoministeri William Nitzen kanssa 20.10.1988*. Memo No. 45. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1.

reactions for Finland's initiative. This meeting was third after the Nordic states in stock and the Soviet Union. Due to the facts of environmental hazards in the Kola Peninsula and other areas in the Arctic, the US took the need for cooperation in environmental issues very seriously. However, the US wanted cooperation's leading role in the hands of the Nordic countries, the US, and Canada, instead of being in the hands of the Soviet Union. The US officials argued that '*Finland is on the right track*' with its initiative. Furthermore, officials said that Finland's initiative had a good chance to succeed.¹⁸¹ One interesting point here is that Rajakoski admitted to the US representatives that Finland has its selfish ambitions behind the willingness of cooperation; Finland has an urge to protect its nature in addition to the generous concern of the global environment.¹⁸² This humble approach of Finland may have inspired confidence among other negotiating partners.

Canada's representative welcomed the initiative well, and it was considered ideally timed: one or two years before the year 1988 that kind of an initiative would not have been even thinkable, the rise of the environmental issues had changed the negotiation atmosphere. Therefore, according to Canadians, the multilateral forum of the Arctic, when concentrated on environmental issues, was possible. The initiative was seen as an essential step towards further cooperation, and Canadians promised to answer quickly.¹⁸³

Furthermore, Canadians saw the multilateral approach as most fruitful with Arctic issues, as it had been with the case of the IASC. Canadians strongly emphasised that the Soviet Union had to be involved as much as possible, and they saw that the non-military issues would help with this. Canadians had recognised the change in the Soviet Union, it was oncoming, and Canadians hoped that Finland would push the Soviet move even more towards other Arctic nations.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸¹ Lindroos-Binham, Merja 29.10.1988. *Neuvotteleva virkamies Esko Rajakosken keskustelut Washingtonissa 27.10.1988*. P.M. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1.

¹⁸² Rajakoski to MFA. 2.11.1988. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1.

¹⁸³ Rajakoski 9.11.1988. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 5.

¹⁸⁴ Mäentakanen, Erkki 4.11.1988. *Arktisen ympäristön suojele*. P.M. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1.

4 Finland in a Hurry

4.1 From Idea to Proposal

After the exploratory discussions, Finland held an extensive meeting at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs Political Department about the Finland's initiative. Rajakoski introduced the current situation in negotiations: he told about positive reception and the fact that political will was in the air. Finland planned that when every country had reacted positively to the initiative, then Finland will send a formal invitation. And after the commitment of the countries, the plan was that Conference might declare a framework convention. Furthermore, for the declaration, the aim was that there could be separate records to supplement the declaration. The memo reveals that the initiative had not yet been debated in the Parliament of Finland. The working paper was discussed before Christmas by the Government and the Committee on Foreign Affairs; the working paper was about to send after meeting to the governments of the Arctic Eight.¹⁸⁵

Even though, as a whole, the initiative was in the upswing, Finland was concerned about choosing the primary approach from two options. The first approach was geographical, which would have been good, for instance, dealing with the exploitation of natural resources. The second was an impact-based approach, which would have worked well with cross-border environmental problems, such as ozone protection. The meeting thought that dealing with first would be more comfortable. However, after discussion, the meeting stated that approaches were not excluding each other, but decided that the questions could be combined. Furthermore, the meeting expressed that if looking at problems only from the geographical approach, Finland could be easily played out from the cooperation due to the lack of the Arctic shoreline and that the impact-based approach suited better for Finland. The meeting closed with a list of topics for sectoral surveys. Topics were air protection, marine and river environments, nuclear radiation issues, fauna and flora, and forest areas. These surveys were decided to be ready after a few weeks, before Christmas, for the next task force meeting.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ Hämälä, Hannu. 7.12.1988. *Arktisen ympäristökongferenssin valmistelut; kokous ulkoasiainministeriössä 5.12.1988*. Memo. No. 947. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 1–2.

¹⁸⁶ Hämälä 1988. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 2–3.

The meeting in the Political Department continued with a meeting in the MFA's Legal Department, where the legal background work for the International Conference on Arctic Environmental Protection and its possible Declaration begun. The Legal Department went through existing agreements relating to the Arctic, and the aim was to find out where the Conference could make openings and progress. After the review of the international environmental agreements, the meeting addressed two specific issues: Finland's position and the fairness of the initiative. Finland's position caused uncertainty because Finland was one of the few without any Arctic sea areas. From environmental issues, topics related to long-distance transport were the only ones which touched Finland. The meeting was worried that this weakens Finland's ability to include restrictions in the contract because those would not have touched Finland. The second concern was fairness: how the Conference could avoid a situation where one country feels that all the topics and concerns are directed at it. This concern was almost entirely about the Soviet Union, where, for example, the questions of forestry and forest protection were the most critical topics to solve in the Conference. However, the scientific information about each country's environmental state was incomplete, and therefore the making of the conclusions was too early. The information-gathering was considered unusually important to achieve equity.¹⁸⁷ However, there were no mentions on how to guarantee equity if data shows that, for example, the Soviet Union had the most massive burden to solve.

The Legal Department discussed the two main approaches, which were the Political Department's concerns as well. For the usage of natural resources in the sea areas, the geographical approach, the Legal Department saw that there was a wide variety of regulations already, and the only question is if the countries was willing to go further than the international Law of the Sea goes. Furthermore, the meeting recalled that the division of continental shelf and marine areas were almost unsolved in the Arctic areas. For the second concern, impact-based approach, the Legal Department saw as the main problem that the Arctic area suffered almost identical problems to other parts of the world, for example, as regards air pollution and there were already world-wide regulations for those. If the convention was seeking more ambitious solutions, they could not do that without

¹⁸⁷ Koskenniemi, M. 8.12.1988. *Arktisiin alueisiin soveltuvat kansainväliset ympäristönsuojelusopimukset: Suomen aloite arktisen ympäristöyhteisön järjestämiseksi*. Memo nro 200. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 1 & 8-10.

taking into account existing agreements. Also, if the target was to negotiate regional limits for pollution rates, it must bear in mind, that the Soviet Union was most probably the one to bear the most significant burden – how this was planned to deal without fear of the Soviet withdrawal from the project?¹⁸⁸

As a conclusion, the Legal Department's meeting argued that there was no one size, fits all –solutions to the environmental issues of the Arctic. There were many conflicting goals and interests, and a number of external boundaries, such as various international environmental laws. In addition, there were many disputes in the Arctic about different regional areas, which the Legal Department considered unlikely to be resolved in the short term. Finally, the meeting suggested that Finland would not seek binding environmental standards at the Conference, but would instead focus on taking the initiative to start coordinating the gathering of the necessary information.¹⁸⁹

After the meetings with the Arctic countries had been mostly positive, and Finland's plan was made up, Finland's initiative came to the public. Minister Bärund gave an interview at the beginning of December, where he informed that international environmental cooperation with Arctic issues had been launched, and the first meeting was planned to arrange during summer 1989.¹⁹⁰

At the end of November, Rajakoski begun to travel formally with the Finland's initiative, and the first destination was Moscow, where he first met the USSR's Directorate's Head of the International Law Department Ju Viktorovich Rybakov with other Department officials. Rajakoski started the meeting by stressing the environmental issues and presenting the scope of international environmental legislation. Then he moved to the fact that despite the full range of regulations, there was a lack of the regulations in the Arctic and, and therefore Finland had started to seek subjects that could have been sorted by agreement. Rajakoski highlighted that Finland realised the need for the initiative from Gorbachev's speech, and Finland's proposal had been modeled straight from the speech and Gorbachev's message. Rajakoski explained that the visit to Moscow was part of the

¹⁸⁸ Koskenniemi 8.12.1988. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 9–10.

¹⁸⁹ Koskenniemi 8.12.1988. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 8–10.

¹⁹⁰ Heininen 1998, 8.

consultations with eight Arctic states and introduced the previous meetings, for example, in Washington and Ottawa, and the aim was to arrange a conference in where the further convention would be formed.¹⁹¹

Rajakoski explained the project in great detail. Rajakoski told that within the framework of the Convention, the participating countries could first make their declarations, which would be assembled into an umbrella convention. Rajakoski continued that the umbrella convention would be followed by the negotiation of protocols on concrete environmental protection measures and consideration of monitoring mechanisms. Rajakoski introduced Finland's thoughts about the following entities: air protection, protection of marine areas, protection of land areas, and protection of flora and fauna. Rajakoski, however, stressed that Finland was open for other openings as well, more crucial was, according to Rajakoski, that the Convention could get started quickly due to the apparent momentum. Rajakoski further stressed that the purpose was to have intergovernmental cooperation as opposed to the IASC, although the IASC could support the Convention's work. Finally, Rajakoski wished to hear the Soviet's thoughts about Finland's proposal.¹⁹²

In turn, Rybakov started commenting with a question; he wanted to hear what the US State Department had said about Finland's proposal. Rajakoski told that the State Department's reception had been surprisingly positive, and they had emphasised the aim to have environmental issues as the tip of the idea. Rybakov admitted that environmental issues had gained importance in the Soviet Union as well. Rybakov even mentioned that environmental issues was the second primary concern after the threat of the nuclear war. He reminded that President Gorbachev had stressed that tensions must be eased in the Arctic. Rybakov continued that Finland's proposal was the very first of its kind and that the Soviet felt sympathy toward Finland's proposal. He admitted that in Finland's proposal, there were lots of potentials. The only problem he rose was the question of dividing the states' roles in the Conference as well as in the Convention.¹⁹³

¹⁹¹ Sareva, Jarmo. 8.12.1988. *Nvm. Esko Rajakosken keskustelut MIDIn kansainvälisoikeudellisessa hallinossa 29.11.1988*. Memo. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 1.

¹⁹² Sareva 8.12.1988. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 2-3.

¹⁹³ Sareva 8.12.1988. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 3.

In the end, Rajakoski iterated Finland's idea of the course of events: first round of consultation would continue, then Finland creates a detailed presentation followed by a new round of consultation and finally a conference in the next year. For this, Rybakov answered, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, that the IASC's role might be problematic, and Finland should consider leaving the connection between the IASC and the Convention. When Rajakoski inquired the reason, Rybakov told that the Soviet would appreciate more if the state and the non-state body were kept separate. Again, Rajakoski stressed the intergovernmental character of the proposal and told that naturally, academics could have only an assistant role, and decisions would be made within nations. Rybakov maintained his position that the two bodies to be established should be separate. Before leaving, Rajakoski gave the non-paper to Rybakov.¹⁹⁴

Day after the meeting with Rybakov, Rajakoski had a meeting with Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Committee on Environmental Protection V.G.Sokolovski with members from his staff. Rajakoski started again by explaining the very root of the proposal, similar to a day before to Rybakov. Sokolovski was interested in if the Nordic countries, especially Denmark, had emphasised new attitudes towards Finland's proposal. Rajakoski told that he was not visited there yet during this first consultation round but was going soon. Sokolovski said that he had heard Denmark's negative attitudes towards Finland's proposal. As an answer to this claim, but in contrast to talks with Rybakov, Rajakoski emphasised that Finland's neutral position was essential, making it difficult for other countries to take a negative stance on the initiative. Sokolovski opinion was, however, that it does not matter who was the one with initiative; more critical was to seize the momentum. Nevertheless, he admitted that Finland had more potential for this than the Soviet Union; other countries was more willing to cooperate when Finland was the one to propose. According to Sokolovski, the Soviet Union was willing to help Finland with the initiative; however, the Soviet wanted to be up to date with the consultations with other Arctic countries. Before leaving, Rajakoski gave, again, the non-paper to Sokolovski.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ Sareva 8.12.1988. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 3.

¹⁹⁵ Sareva 12.12.1988. *Nvm. Esko Rajakosken keskustelut SNTL:n ympäristönsuojelun valtionkomitean puheenjohtajan I.sijaisen V.G.Sokolovskin kanssa 30.11.1988*. Memo. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 1–3.

In December 1988, Rajakoski had a meeting in Oslo with the Head of Department Dagfinn Stenseth and Special Adviser Rolf Trolle Andersen. The Finland's Ambassador Kaarlo Yrjö-Koskinen was, as well, present. Rajakoski introduced the proposal, however, shorter than to the Soviet Union. Stenseth asked about the negotiations with other countries, Rajakoski introduced the situation in negotiations. Rajakoski estimated that a formal invitation was about to send in January 1989. He expressed the wish that countries would comment on non-paper before the invitation and gave, as well, one to the Norwegians.¹⁹⁶

Stenseth argued that Norway was pleased to be able to comment on Finland's initiative: the Arctic issues were essential and subjective for Norway. Norway reminded that the Soviet Union had not joined to all environmental regulations and treaties. However, to make the situation better, Norway and the Soviet Union had started to build bilateral cooperation. Stenseth commented that there were few issues related to Finland's initiative, as well. Andersen asked Rajakoski to explain initiative's aims more, and Rajakoski told that the initiative had three main lines: declarative function, it needed to be useful for scientific research, and it had to target to concrete results. Norwegians were quite critical towards Finland's initiative. They claimed that it was too high-flying; the issues were too complicated, and there was too much duplication with existing or ongoing projects. Andersen stressed that there were too many very long-standing controversies, which had been on the way before, and there was minimal signs that the situation had changed dramatically. For example, Andersen explained the argue about the question of dividing the Barents Sea, which was still a frosty issue between Norway and the Soviet Union. Therefore, Norwegians asked more time to react and comment on the non-paper. They argued that it was too dangerous to proceed too fast; it would only break the goodwill. They feared that the excellent start for bilateral cooperation with the Soviet Union would be under threat due to Finland's proposal. Finally, Andersen added that also the regulations and issues in oil industries were essential to Norway, and they were satisfied with the current situation and did not want any distractions for that industry.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶ Laamanen, Anu. 14.12.1988. *Suomen aloite arktisen ympäristöyhteistyön järjestämiseksi; neuvotteleva virkamies Esko Rajakosken keskustelut osastopäällikkö Dagfinn Stensethin ja erityisneuvontantaja Rolf Trolle Andersenin kanssa*. Memo. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 1.

¹⁹⁷ Laamanen 1988. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 2-3.

Whether Norway's reaction was surprisingly reserved, Denmark, in turn, astounded with a positive reaction. Denmark was pleased that environmental protection was the main issue and requested to be sensitive due to the tensions that the Arctic region raises, especially among the two superpowers. However, Denmark saw that the détente was in a good position towards far-reaching cooperation, and Denmark hoped that this would promote dialogue. Unlike other countries, Denmark asked if the countries outside of the Arctic eight could be along in cooperation. Rajakoski argued that more extensive cooperation could be possible, especially among European countries.¹⁹⁸

Rajakoski wrote a memo to a broad and high-level audience, for instance, to Minister for Foreign Affairs, about the status of Finland's initiative just before 1988's Christmas. Rajakoski introduced all means that had been done during the autumn for Finland's initiative. He continued and explained country by country what kind of response Finland's initiative had received. The Soviet Union's reactions had been unlimitedly positive, Denmark cautiously positive, Sweden was ready to support the initiative, only waiting for the main substances, and, for Rajakoski's surprise, Norway had taken a cautious attitude.¹⁹⁹

The MFA started the year 1989 with a meeting, where the current situation in Finland's Arctic initiative was throughout discussed. Rajakoski told that the initiative was meant to introduce to President Koivisto on 13th January, and right away after the meeting with the President, the press briefing was held. The parliamentary Foreign Affairs committee was getting informed afterward. It was decided to exclude the fishing issue from the invitation's agenda. Otherwise, the agenda was kept as planned before. The next consultative round was planned to arrange in March and April 1989. Consultations were hoped to have deep substance. After consultations, a preparatory meeting of experts would be arranged, and the estimated timing would be the autumn of 1989. What comes to the actual Conference, the place was planned to be Rovaniemi.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁸ Hakanen, O. 9.1.1989. *Suomen aloite arktisen ympäristöyhteistyön järjestämiseksi; Neuvotteleva virkamies Esko Rajakosken keskustelut Tanskan ulkoministeriön valtiosihteeri Otto Møllerin kanssa 8.12.1988.* KOB0055. Memo. FIN-AMFA 13.60-2, 1–2.

¹⁹⁹ Rajakoski 21.12.1988. II *Suomen aloite arktisen ympäristöyhteistyön järjestämiseksi; tilanne 19.12.1988.* P.M. No.1000. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 1.

²⁰⁰ Ellmen-Parmala, Sari 19.1.1989. *Arktisen ympäristökonferenssin valmistelut; kokous ulkoasiainministeriössä 6.1.1989.* Memo 48. FIN-AMFA 13.60-2, 1.

The meeting continued with a press release, where Finland's acts towards Arctic cooperation were told to the public. Finland's government impressed deep concern for environmental problems in the Arctic and said that means for environmental protection should be started immediately. Due to these environmental threats, Finland was going to propose Arctic countries for a multilateral conference that would aim to negotiate solutions and conventional means to protect the Arctic environment. Simultaneously, the Ministry of the Environment and Minister Bärnlund gave a statement, where they highlighted that because there was no environmental protection cooperation in the Arctic, Finland's initiative was much needed. Bärnlund continued that there was also a lack of research data and assessment methods, and those were mainly needed to study further the state of the Arctic Ocean. A few months later, in March, Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio stated alike about the importance of environmental protection in the Arctic. He also argued as a very north country, Finland should carry responsibility for the cooperation.²⁰¹

4.2 The Post-Invitation Consensus

The official invitation was sent to seven other Arctic country's embassies of Finland on 12th January 1989. The invitations were transferred via Finland's representatives to the authorities of countries concerned.²⁰² The invitation was signed by Minister for Foreign Affairs Kalevi Sorsa and Minister of the Environment Kaj Bärnlund, and it included a working paper on the subject. The invitation and idea were justified by the rapid deterioration of the environment in the Arctic region and the fact that Arctic countries had the primary responsibility to solve the problems of protecting the Arctic nature. Finland explained the consulting round made in late 1988 and that the response had been 'extremely encouraging.' Therefore, Finland had decided to suggest a Conference on the Protection of the Environment of the Arctic in Helsinki.²⁰³

²⁰¹ Heininen 1998, 9; Halonen, Anneli 12.1.1989 *Lehdistötiedote numero 3/1989 julkistaminen "Arktiksen ympäristönsuojeluun tähtäävä Suomen ehdotus"*. Memo No. 10. FIN-AMFA 13.60-2.

²⁰² From Washington to Rajakoski. 13.1.1989. *Arktiseen ympäristöön tähtäävä Suomen aloite*. Telegram. WASB012. FIN-AMFA 13.60-2, 1.

²⁰³ From MFA to George P. Shultz, Washington. 12.1.1989. *Arktiseen ympäristönsuojeluun tähtäävä Suomen aloite*. Telegram, WAS0031. FIN-AMFA 13.60-2.

The working paper attached to the invitation had four pages and had seven topics. Firstly, Finland wrote about the Arctic fragile ecosystem, secondly about the threats to the environment, for instance, climate change, pollution of the marine environment, and exploitation of living and non-renewable resources. Thirdly, Finland stressed that adequate environmental protection needed intergovernmental cooperation, scientific research, and monitoring of the ecosystem of the Arctic region. Fourthly, Finland listed global and regional conventions, agreements of protection Arctic Wildlife, and agreements regulating fisheries, which all, according to Finland, were essential to take consider. Fifthly, Finland wrote its statement of the importance of initiating an intergovernmental process that should lead to a declaration, convention, or other multilateral arrangements. Sixthly, Finland proposed more straightforwardly that all Arctic eight nations should take action, and it should not contradict the prevailing agreements. Furthermore, the action was not allowed to jeopardise possible ongoing negotiations. Seventhly and lastly, Finland introduced the idea to arrange the Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment and that it was planned to be held soon. Before that, Finland hoped to discuss working paper with countries involved, and Finland explained that the invitation and working paper were sent to Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Soviet Union, and the US. Finland welcomed all opinions to the matter proposed.²⁰⁴

Since Finland's representatives went the invitations personally, they got preliminary reactions comments right way. In Washington, Jaakko Laajava handed over the invitation to Edwar J. Wolfe, who argued that the US was supportive in principle, and the enthusiasm toward Finland's initiative has been growing as time and knowledge had grown. He did not feel able to comment topic further but promised to return to the issue after discussions between the US authorities had done. The US said that they were interested to hear what other countries were going to comment on, especially the Soviet Union's opinion was an urgent matter.²⁰⁵

In Moscow, Finland's invitation received Sergei Zhuravljov, who was interested to hear if Finland had already a more specific idea about the timing of the Conference or was this

²⁰⁴ MFA 12.1.1989. *Working Paper*. MOS0025 2/5. FIN-AMFA 13.60-2, 1-4.

²⁰⁵ From Washington to Rajakoski. 13.1.1989. FIN-AMFA 13.60-2, 1-2.

dependent on the reactions of the other countries. Furthermore, he asked if Finland was waiting for concrete and official answers to the working paper. Finland's answer, nor the person who was transferring the invitation, was not mentioned in the MFA's archive's document. Any other reactions were not mentioned, which is understandable since Zhuravljov stressed the informal nature of the discussion.²⁰⁶

Reykjavik was overwhelmingly positive towards invitation, and they had already established a particular group of politicians and academics concerning questions on the Arctic environment. Further, Reykjavik promised quite soon to have a meeting with this group, then they will inform Finland their official statement.²⁰⁷ Norway was, however, a much more restrained. Stoltenberg commented that Finland's proposal was concerning susceptible issues, and therefore Norway needed time to concern official answers to Finland's working paper.²⁰⁸ Canada became aware of the Norwegian's hesitation and raised this when they commented on their thoughts about the invitation. Canadians kept a more specific timeline necessary because open situation caused uncertainty to another bi- and multilateral negotiations.²⁰⁹

Canadian Science Advisor Fred Roots were asked to comment on Finland's working paper to Canadian Environmental Advisory Council, and Roots informally told Finland how he had said. Roots argued that his main message was that Finland's initiative was not “*a hasty or impulsive one, but has a consistent history and careful preparation.*” Roots continued

“In 1987, when it appeared for a while that the Soviet Union might push hard for the future committee to include only states touching the Arctic Ocean, Finland reacted strongly. The Finnish Ambassador to Canada came to see me in my office, and also spoke to Mr. Clark, and made strong statements about Finland’s concern, and right, to be involved in circumpolar environmental affairs. Finland took the lead and supported by

²⁰⁶ From Moscow to Rajakoski 13.1.1989. *Arktiseen ympäristönsuojeluun tähtäävä Suomen aloite*. MOS0025. FIN-AMFA 13.60-2.

²⁰⁷ From Reykjavik to Rajakoski 13.1.1989. *Arktiseen ympäristönsuojeluun tähtäävä aloite*. REY 0012. Telegram. FIN-AMFA 13.60-2.

²⁰⁸ From Yrjö-Koskinen to Rajakoski 13.1.1989. *Arktiseen ympäristönsuojeluun tähtäävä Suomen aloite: Norja*. OSLB005. Telegram. FIN-AMFA 13.60-2.

²⁰⁹ From Ottawa to Rajakoski 13.1.1989. *Arktiseen ympäristönsuojeluun tähtäävä Suomen aloite*. OTT0017. Telegram. FIN-AMFA 13.60-2.

*Sweden and Iceland, got agreement from the 'arctic rim five' that International arctic matters should henceforth become the 'Arctic 8'.*²¹⁰

There are three remarks to do: Firstly, Canadians had made openings for the Arctic cooperation, but regarded to Roots, Canada was handing over the leading role to Finland. Secondly, Roots admitted that Finland held a strong position in the Arctic issues. Thirdly, Finland's long-term work with consulting rounds was seen as the right way to deal with this nascent cooperation.

French Embassy's temporary secretary Bertrand Lavezzari informally came to visit MFA because of the uncertainties of Finland's initiative. The memo reveals that other countries than Arctic Eight were dependent only on Finland's press release. Lavezzari was especially interested in how Finland's initiative differs from the IASC, how the Arctic countries were defined and were other countries possible to join to the cooperation. Counselor Risto Rautiainen answered to Lavezzari that the IASC was a separate organ from Finland's initiative and that the Arctic countries were defined with the Arctic Circle – a country which had land northern than the Arctic Circle was included. Rautiainen answered that other countries than the Arctic Eight were at least that point not taken into the cooperation. Lavezzari was amazed that the Arctic Eight was trying to solve world-wide environmental problems since pollution and other environmental problems were not following nations' or regions' borders. Lavezzari wondered if a separate organ was needed since the cooperation in the Arctic could have been arranged similar to the Antarctic. Rautiainen explained that the situation was quite different because the Antarctic was a continent, and the Arctic was mostly ice and sea. Furthermore, Rautiainen argued that the Antarctic did not belong to any nation-states, and the Arctic, instead, belonged mostly to the Arctic Eight countries. Lastly, Lavezzari asked if other than environmental issues were going to rise to discussion, for example, issues concerning military strategy, and was the initiative under Finland's MFA or Ministry of Environment of Finland. Rautiainen answered that the Conference was concentrating only on environmental questions, and those two ministry's asked were both involved in the Conference.²¹¹

²¹⁰ E.F. Roots via Mäentakanen to MFA. 17.1.1989. *Arktinen ympäristönsuojelukonferenssi*. OTT0023. FIN-AMFA 13.60-2, 2–3.

²¹¹ Ellmen-Parmala 30.1.1989. *Poliittisen osaston virkamiesten keskustelut ulkovaltojen edustajien kanssa 25.1.1989*. Memo. 3499. FIN-AMFA 13.60-2, 1–3; Rautiainen 27.1.1989. *Arktinen ympäristönsuojelu, Suomen aloite. Tilanne 27.1.1989*. Memo 79. FIN-AMFA 13.60-2.

At the end of January, the MFA got a telegram from Finland's embassy in Ottawa, where they had heard from Clark, that Canada was concerned about how to react to two non-Arctic states, that had been asking if they could have joined to the Arctic cooperation. The two non-Arctic states were not named in the telegram.²¹² Furthermore, in the last days of January, Finland's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sorsa, got a letter from Norway's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jens Stoltenberg, which included positive sound from Norway to Finland's initiative. Norway was slightly worried still about how the prevailed bi- and transnational agreements were going to put together with the new initiative. Otherwise, the Norwegians were positive and promised to send their comments to Finland's working paper after careful preparation.²¹³ This positive sound was a little surprise since the official statements to Finland's MFA had been cautious.

In fact, still in February 1989, Rajakoski visited Norway and reported the current situation and the working paper. Rajakoski introduced the plan: the first preparatory meeting was planned to keep before the summer and the ministerial Conference during autumn 1989. Norway reminded Finland that it had significant national interests, and therefore they wanted to exact substance and to have enough time for the commentary. The message was quite similar to the previous meeting in December 1988. Norwegians thought that the timetable was still too tight, taking into account the ambitious target. Finally, Norwegians wished that the IASC would be separate organ from Finland's proposal's convention.²¹⁴

February 1989 was a busy month to the MFA when invited countries were sending their answers. Furthermore, Finland had inquiries and visits from non-member countries and associations. Moreover, Rajakoski had a journey to the US, Alaska, and Canada. At first, Finland heard that even though Sweden was mostly welcoming Finland's initiative positively, the scientific field was, however, slightly skeptical of Finland's idea. This

²¹² From Ottawa to the MFA 28.1.1989. *Arktinen ympäristönsuojelukonferenssi*. Telegram. OTT0035. FIN-AMFA 13.60-2.

²¹³ From Stoltenberg, Jens to Sorsa, Kalevi 25.1.1989. Letter. OSL0045. FIN-AMFA 13.60-2.

²¹⁴ Laamanen 15.2.1989. *Neuvotteleva virkamiehen Rajakosken Suomen arktista ympäristöaloitetta koskevat neuvottelut osastopäällikkö Stensethin kanssa 9.2.1989*. Memo. FIN-AMFA 13.60-1, 1-3.

hesitating, according to Swedish Polar Ambassador Göte Svensson, was only stemming from the fear that the next cooperation organ would step to their academic field.²¹⁵

When Canadians were concerned about the two non-Arctic states' interest to join Arctic cooperation, they might have meant previously in MFA visited France and Great Britain, which sent Ambassador Justin Stables to visit Rajakoski at 1.2.1989. Stables conveyed the upheaval message since it was difficult for Britain to understand why they were excluded from the "Arctic Club" even though the British had, among other things, invested heavily in Arctic research. Rajakoski did not deny that the Arctic problems affect a much broader amount of nations than just the Arctic eight. Nevertheless, Rajakoski continued that the Arctic Eight was, however, mostly responsible for the condition in the Arctic, and therefore, at least in the beginning, the Arctic countries were going to establish the cooperation organ. Rajakoski tried to invoke the newly established scientific cooperation, the IASC, where all affected countries were welcomed. In the end, Rajakoski permitted Staples that he was allowed to tell the situation to the other members of the European Community.²¹⁶

Two organisations contacted the MFA as well in addition to two non-Arctic countries. At first, the International Juridical Organisation was proposing to be informed about the Conference and the actions to come after the Conference's decisions²¹⁷. Secondly, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation, Unesco, sent a letter, where Unesco emphasised willingness to collaborate with new means to protect the Arctic environment. Many of Finland's working paper issues were included in Unesco's program activities.²¹⁸

Canadian authorities, Ambassador Mary Vanderhoff and a polar official Peter Burnet, visited Rajakoski at the beginning of February. Burnet told that he had visited the Soviet Union, and the Soviet's attitude was favorable towards Finland's initiative. Rajakoski thanked Canadians for a positive attitude for Finland's initiative and told that Norwegians

²¹⁵ From Stockholm to MFA 2.2.1989. *Arktiseen ympäristönsuojeluun tähtäävä Suomen aloite*. TUK0123. Telegram. FIN-AMFA 13.60-3.

²¹⁶ Rautiainen 3.2.1989. *Britannian suurlähetystön Justin Staplesin ja 1.lähetystösihteerin Graham Handin käynti nym Rajakosken luona 1.2.1989*. Memo. FIN-AMFA 13.60-3.

²¹⁷ Debeucklaere, K. to MFA. 10.2.1989. Letter. FIN-AMFA 13.60-3.

²¹⁸ Dumitrescu, S. to Karhilo, A. 6.3.1989. Letter. FIN-AMFA 13.60.

had also moved more to the positive side for the initiative and were at least interested. Rajakoski told that Norwegians were worried about the political aspects of the initiative, but Finland promised that it was going to focus only on environmental issues. Denmark had some hesitations, as well, because of Greenland, Rajakoski continued and told that the Soviet Union was keen on the operative aspects of the initiative. Canadians were still doubtful if the right amount of countries were invited, and Rajakoski answered that he had had negotiations with non-Arctic states, but because the primary responsibility for the Arctic problems was with the Arctic Eight, they should be the primary members. However, Rajakoski flashed the idea of observers due to the high interest shown. Rajakoski told that the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, and France had been interested in joining or follow Finland's initiative. Burnet told that Canada was not supporting the limitations of participant countries. Rajakoski answered and concluded that the Soviet Union was strictly behind the eight member states.²¹⁹

The question of non-Arctic participants raised repeatedly; the next questioner was Iceland, from whom Great Britain had asked their opinion if they participate as an observer. Iceland had heard that the Federal Republic of Germany was, as well, interested. However, Iceland had another message, as well; they had answered 'yes' to Finland's initiative and were looking forward to upcoming events, a preparatory meeting of officials as well as the Conference.²²⁰ Furthermore, the unreserved consent of Sweden followed the consent of Iceland²²¹.

At the beginning of March, Denmark inquired how other Arctic countries had responded to Finland's initiative. Finland told Denmark that reactions had been decisive in principle, some had responded very positively. Greenland's consult Finn Lyngø informed Finland's Ambassador Mäkeläinen that he had noticed that the attitude of Canadians had turned positive after the change of US President. Under Ronald Reagan, the attitude of Canadians

²¹⁹ Rotinen, Eija 17.2.1989. *Kanadan edustajien käynti neuvottelevan virkamiehen Esko Rajakosken luona 6.2.1989*. Memo 152. FIN-AMFA 13.60-3, 1-2.

²²⁰ Reykjavik to Rajakoski. 3.3.1989. *Arktiseen ympäristönsuojeluun tähtäävä Suomen aloite; Islannin vastaus*. REY0074. FIN-AMFA 13.60-3.

²²¹ Sten Andersson to Pertti Paasio. 6.3.1989. Letter. FIN-AMFA 13.60-3, 1-2.

had been more reserved than it was under George H. W. Bush. However, the official agreement gave another wait.²²²

Rajakoski made a journey to The True North Strong and Free Conference to Canada in the middle of March. Rajakoski had a presentation listened to by 1300 listeners.²²³ In his speaking notes, Rajakoski dealt with factors affecting the cooperation in the Arctic. At first, Rajakoski wrote about the military situation, which is interesting, because there had been a minimal amount of military issues throughout the negotiations about Finland's initiative. Rajakoski explained that military activities had been and was still affecting negatively to the possibilities of cooperating in the field of environment. However, Rajakoski stressed that the new situation with less tension in East-West relations had made it possible to negotiate environmental cooperation, but, as well, disarmament. In this topic, Rajakoski concluded that military factor, unfortunately, remains, at least to some extent, and affects negatively to every aspect of cooperation in the Arctic Region.²²⁴

Secondly, Rajakoski noted that the network of bilateral or other agreements and treaties concerning the Arctic area was too confusing and that cooperation was much needed in this area. Thirdly, Rajakoski wrote that the exploitation of natural resources was growing, and sooner or later, it was needing forcing factors to protect the environment. Fourthly, Rajakoski highlighted the IASC and the possibility to use it as a supportive factor to the Conference and future cooperation. With these four points, Rajakoski wanted to explain the apparent need for cooperation, which had been lacking because of the military tensions in the region. Rajakoski concluded that the time was suitable, momentum was there; scientific cooperation had already begun, and countries had been discussing with each other about these, previously too sensitive, issues.²²⁵

²²² Mäkeläinen to Rajakoski. 2.3.1989. *Arktiseen ympäristönsuojeluun tähtäävä Suomen aloite; Tanska*. KOB0130. FIN-AMFA 13.60-3, 1–2.

²²³ Rajakoski 31.3.1989. *III Suomen aloite arktisen ympäristöyhteistyön järjestämiseksi; tilannearvio 31.3.1989 Alaskaan ja Kanadaan tekemäni matkan valossa*. P.M. FIN-AMFA 13.60-3, 5.

²²⁴ Rajakoski 18.3.1989. *Speaking Notes by Mr. Esko Rajakoski, Consultative Ambassador, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Helsinki*. FIN-AMFA 13.60-3, 1.

²²⁵ Rajakoski 18.3.1989. FIN-AMFA 13.60-3, 1–2.

In addition to the Conference in Edmonton, Rajakoski visited several oil companies and Canadian state representatives in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Canada. Rajakoski met academics, as well. Furthermore, Rajakoski visited Alaska in the US and visited the US Arctic Research Commission. In there, Rajakoski heard that lack of information from other countries limited research activity. In Alaska Rajakoski found out that the Alaskans were definitely behind the Finland's initiative. During Rajakoski's journey, Finland's initiative received widespread media attention.²²⁶ In addition, in discussions with representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Canada, it began apparent that the non-Arctic countries should argued by Canadians, be involved at a later stage, but only eight Arctic countries should swiftly initiate the launch itself.²²⁷

When summing up the journey to Finland's high representatives, for instance to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rajakoski wrote that during the trip in the North America's Arctic areas he had realised how big, or even giant, task Finland had taken over. He continued that humankind was at the forefront of huge, ever-growing nature conservation issues, when similarly meeting the growing energy demand increasingly require invading in the Arctic.²²⁸

Right after Rajakoski's journey to Canada and Alaska, the US sent a note about joining Finland's initiative. However, the US was not unconditional; the US wanted that the discussion of environmental pollution, sources, or problems should be open to all parties, including non-Arctic countries.²²⁹ Canadians had heard one concerned country more, Netherlands²³⁰. This was the first definite distinguishing factor between the superpowers during the negotiations of Finland's initiative, and the message was similar to Canadians had, as well, emphasised.

Eight days later came the Soviet Union's response. The Soviet Union agreed with Finland's views of the state of the Arctic environment. The Soviet Union reminded in its

²²⁶ Rajakoski 31.3.1989. FIN-AMFA 13.60-3. 1–6.

²²⁷ Rajakoski 31.3.1989. FIN-AMFA 13.60-3, 5–6.

²²⁸ Rajakoski 31.3.1989. FIN-AMFA 13.60-3, 1.

²²⁹ Department of State, Washington to Jukka Valtasaari 20.3.1989. Note. FIN-AMFA 13.60-3.

²³⁰ Siltanen, M. 31.3.1989. *Suomen aloite arktisen ympäristöyhteistyön järjestämiseksi; Neuvottelut Ottawassa 23.3.1989.* FIN-AMFA 13.60-3.

response that the first one to suggest cooperation in the Arctic with environmental issues was the Soviet Union, and kept Finland's initiative as a natural continuation to the Gorbachev's proposal. Furthermore, the Soviet Union agreed that eight Arctic states should take responsibility for the Arctic areas. The Soviet Union was coming to join the initiative with high activity.²³¹

Rajakoski suggested in a letter further action to Minister of Foreign Affairs Paasio and Finland's foreign policy officers in April 1989, when the tailwind of Finland's initiative was visible. Rajakoski's idea was to start with a preparatory ministerial meeting where the needs and problems in the Arctic of each country would be discussed. The final document should be drafted almost to a final phase at the preparatory meeting. Rajakoski continued that the aim of Finland's initiative should be to establish a comprehensive regulatory framework for environmental protection. The regime should cover, firstly, conventions, and other international legal arrangements, and, secondly, new agreements or other Arctic-related arrangements. Thirdly, Rajakoski summed, all existing Arctic treaties should be enforced in all Arctic countries. In the preparatory meeting, the substance areas planned by Finland should be divided among the countries in order to reduce the burden on Finland. Rajakoski concluded his memo by stating that, with such contractual arrangements, a permanent organisation could not be avoided.²³²

Rajakoski travelled to the Soviet Union to discuss about the situation with Finland's initiative and he began the meeting by emphasising the great importance of Gorbachev regarding the new-born cooperation in Arctic issues, as well as in the progress of détente. In turn, Zhuravljov argued that President Koivisto made the first steps to cooperation when he popped the issue of security in the Arctic area in 1986 up. After the pleasantries, Zhuravljov commented that the Soviet Union was mostly interested in military-political issues in the Arctic, but at almost the same level were environmental issues. Rajakoski and Zhuravljov compared Finland's initiative to the OSCE and considered it as a mini-OSCE; at the time, confidence-building also contributed to the alleviation of the armed situation, and a similar passage was hoped in the Arctic. Thus, the military-political questions did not have to be high on the agenda, but they eventually will come to a

²³¹ Shevardnadze, Eduard to Paasio and Bärlund 28.3.1989. Note. FIN-AMFA 13.60-3.

²³² Rajakoski 4.4.1989. *IV Suomen aloite arktisen ympäristöyhteistyön järjestämiseksi, ehdotus jatkoktoimiksi*. P.M. 326. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4.

discussion on time when the debate on other issues had built mutual trust between all parties. Zhuravljov closed the meeting by stating Finland to be always on the right track and using it well for building a path where everyone can journey even with most tense issues to the peaceful conclusion. He repeated the official state statement that the Soviet Union seeks to contribute to its progress.²³³

Otherwise, during April, Norway was going to negotiate bilaterally about environmental issues with the Soviet Union²³⁴. Norway was still hesitating whether to be positive or not to Finland's initiative; the threshold issue was the status of the continental shelf between Norway's Svalbard and the Norwegian mainland. Status negotiations were still ongoing, and the situation remained unresolved, and so the Norwegians feared that Finland's initiative would harm Norway within the issue, as well, the issue of using natural resources in Svalbard. Norway was waiting for more detailed information from Finland's plans for the Arctic cooperation to be able to comment on it.²³⁵ Further, in April, Canada visited Finland's Embassy in Ottawa and expressed that Canada was willing to assist Finland in the preparation of the documents for the preparatory meeting and hoped it could start immediately. According to the telegram, Canada's enthusiasm was explained by the fact that Canada itself had been striving to organise the initiative, but was adapting to the realisation of Finland's initiative.²³⁶

Denmark's official consent arrived in mid-May. Denmark waited from the cooperation discussions in more detail about the framework how adequately tackle the challenges of environmental degradation in different parts of the Arctic. Denmark did not have any threshold questions or limitations in their agreement.²³⁷

²³³ Korhonen, K. 10.4.1989. *NVM. Esko Rajakosken keskustelut Moskovassa 6.–7.4.1989; 1) Keskustelu MIDIn II Euroopan osastolla 6.4.1989*. Memo. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4, 1–9.

²³⁴ Yrjö-Koskinen 31.3.1989. *Arktinen ympäristönsuojelu; Suomen aloite*. Telegram. OSL0203. FIN-AMFA 13.60-3.

²³⁵ Yrjö-Koskinen 12.5.1989. *PRT- Suomen aloite arktisen ympäristöyhteistyön järjestämiseksi; Norjan suhtautuminen*. OSLB030. Telegram. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4.

²³⁶ From Ottawa to MFA 17.4.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristöaloite*. Telegram. OTTB017. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4.

²³⁷ Ellemann-Jensen, U. 17.5.1989. Letter to Paasio. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4.

4.3 The Consensus Melts: The Question of the Nature of The Preparatory Meeting

Finland decided to apply to the European Council on April 1989, and during May, Finland's application was approved. Furthermore, during 1989, especially in the summer, Finland negotiated simultaneously for Arctic cooperation and more intense integration to the European free-trade area. Finland had been a full member of the European Free Trade Association from 1986, and during the 1989 negotiations for extending EFTA to the whole region of the European Community were running feverishly. President Koivisto saw this development as essential and linked to Finland's plans to join eventually to the European Economic Area. This development was a direct result of the Soviet Union; the East-trade between Finland and the Soviet Union had decreased heavily. Finland was forced to seek partners and new trade ways from the West.²³⁸

Similarly, when the high-level of Finland's foreign policy was in a hurry for new economic and integrational openings to West, for the process of the Arctic cooperation, Finland sketched non-paper for the note to invite the Arctic Eight to Preparatory Meeting in Rovaniemi during spring 1989 behind diplomatic letters and meetings. The second and final non-paper before the note sent was ready at the end of May. Finland's ambassadors' correspondence reveals that Canadians had sent a letter to influence the non-paper; Canadians wanted as one topic to take into deep consideration the Arctic indigenous population.²³⁹ After consideration, the topic "*the indigenous peoples*" was added as a seventh point to non-paper. The other topics for discussion were: 1. the air, 2. the seas, 3. the land and forests, 4. the radioactive contamination, 5. the lakes, rivers and water courses and 6. flora, fauna, the accumulation of contaminants in the Arctic food chain. In conclusion, the non-paper included a deep emphasising on the crucial role of the Preparatory meeting due to the aim of creating the final results of the Arctic Conference on ministerial level. In the last lines of the text, Finland warmly invited the Meeting in Rovaniemi, the participating countries, academics, members of regional governments, indigenous people as well as academics, and followers from non-Arctic countries. Finland

²³⁸ Kallenautio 2005, 458–459 & 460–463.

²³⁹ Rautiainen 22.5.1989. *Suomen arktinen aloite*. Telegram. NAI0316. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4; From Clark to Paasio 15.5.1989. Letter. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4; From Nairobi to MFA 23.5.1989. *Arktinen ympäristöyhteistyö; kokousvalmistelut Suomessa*. Telegram. NAI0318. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4.

requested non-paper responses by June 25th.²⁴⁰ The note included non-paper and an invitation to Rovaniemi and was sent on 13th June. The Preparatory meeting was summoned to be held on 14th – 22nd August in 1989.²⁴¹

The first reactions came quickly, and a positive response, according to Finland's representatives, was received from all eight invited countries as early as 22nd June. The meeting's participants were expected to be ambassadors and heads of departments.²⁴² Denmark hoped to hear further information about other countries' reactions²⁴³, as well as the Soviet Union²⁴⁴. Norway was delighted to notice that between lines of the non-paper, there was a hint for the Soviet Union to join more international agreements²⁴⁵. The paragraph in non-paper stated

“The environmental protection of the Arctic region is already covered by a number of global, regional and bilateral agreements. As the region is particularly vulnerable, the existing arrangements are, however, not sufficient.”²⁴⁶

Additionally, Canadians said they were already waiting for the invitation and were happy about it. Canada desired to bring to the meeting their papers they had in preparation and asked if that was allowed to do.²⁴⁷ Finland responded that papers and documents from all participating countries were welcome²⁴⁸. Differing from others, the US had a critical tone in its response; the US stated that the timetable was far too tight, and the US was wondering if Finland had informed other participants more than the US. The US still wanted to make sure that non-Arctic countries were welcome to the Preparatory Meeting. The US said that they will answer to the note after deeper reading.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁰ Rautiainen 22.5.1989. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4.

²⁴¹ Granholm 13.6.1986 *Suomen arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoite*. Telegram. CCC1430. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4.

²⁴² Vasara, Anne 22.6.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoite, valmisteleva kokous*. CCC1506. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4, 1.

²⁴³ From Copenhagen to MFA. 20.6.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristönsuojelu-aloite; Tanska*. KOB0359. Telegram. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4.

²⁴⁴ From Moscow to MFA. 16.6.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoite*. Telegram. MOS0731. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4.

²⁴⁵ Yrjö-Koskinen 16.6.1989. *Arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoite*. OSL0370. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4.

²⁴⁶ Granholm 13.6.1989. Attachment: non-paper. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4, 1.

²⁴⁷ From Ottawa to MFA. 16.6.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristöaloite*. OTT-018Y. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4.

²⁴⁸ Vasara 22.6.1989. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4, 2.

²⁴⁹ From Washington to MFA. 16.6.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoite; nootti*. Telegram. WAS0760. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4.

Consequently, the US continued with a firm and precise grip and pointed out sternly that Finland had misunderstood the US answer; the US had not responded 'yes' to Finland's invitation, even though Finland was so announced to the Arctic Eight. However, the factor behind this upset message and announcement was, at least to some extent, Finland's fault, because Finland had not answered to the US previous questions sent on March and June about the cooperation. The US stated that they were still doubtful to answer in the affirmative, as Finland's background paper had not yet been distributed to the participating countries. Furthermore, the US said that if the preparation time were not going to change, the US threatened that they were sending only an observer to the Preparatory Meeting. Moreover, the US required that non-Arctic countries would be invited as participants, especially the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain. Otherwise, if Finland's government was against the US viewpoint, the US was going to negotiate with other participants. As a conclusion, the US presented that Finland moved the date half a year forward and asked Finland to inform other participants that the US had not yet said yes.²⁵⁰

Finland naturally reacted quickly to the US unexpected statement. Finland did not hide its amazement and commented that the situation was shocking because, from the end of 1988 onwards, the attitude of the US had been very positive towards Finland's initiative. Finland tried to argue that the Preparatory Meeting was planned to start from point zero, whereby the background material had only a little importance. Similarly, the role of other non-Arctic countries was to be agreed at the preliminary meeting. The tone of the instructional message from Finland to Finland's Embassy in Washington was slightly ironic, and Finland was seemingly annoyed. However, Finland suggested a later date, but only a month later.²⁵¹

As a result of Finland's reaction, the US promised to consider the new date. It seemed that the lack of time was not the main issue but instead the uncertainty about the goal. Furthermore, the US wanted to know if there was possible to leave from the initiative if the Preparatory Meeting feels inappropriate; the US did not want to commit to a project

²⁵⁰ From Washington to MFA. 27.6.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoite, valmistelevala kokous*. Telegram. WAS-0799. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4.

²⁵¹ Vasara 30.6.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoite, valmistelevala kokous*. WAS0389. FIN-AMFA 13.60-4.

without exit opportunities.²⁵² This fear of no retreat seems a bit special when it comes to being one of the world's superpowers. However, the US strict attitude forced Finland to answer to question: what were questions which were particularly special for Finland and which were not covered in other forums. From the point of the US, the aim and nature of the Preparatory Meeting had to be precisely known to send the right kind of delegation to the event.²⁵³

Finland sent answers to the US, but the answer to the question that what were the crucial questions to Finland, there were no exact answer, only description of the state of the Arctic environment and a statement that the “*efficient management, use and protection of the environment requires extensive international cooperation.*” For the other question, Finland stressed that attending to the Preparatory Meeting did not imply a commitment to follow-up.²⁵⁴

Eventually, Finland sent a telegram to the Arctic Eight on 7th July, where the situation was open to all participants; Finland told that the hesitating attitude of the US had forced to move the Preparatory Meeting and the new timing was 20th – 28th September 1989.²⁵⁵ Reactions were positive; for example, the Soviet Union was delighted about the extra time and stated that it does not intend to oppose the proposal²⁵⁶. After the telegram about the changed date, Finland sent the background information to all on 13th July²⁵⁷. However, even after the work made for the US, Washington sent a telegram that the US

²⁵² Valtasaari to MFA. 6.7.1989. Telegram. WAS-0842. FIN-AMFA 13.60-5.

²⁵³ From Washington to MFA. 7.7.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoite; USAn kanta*. WAS-0842. FIN-AMFA 13.60-5; From Washington to MFA. 8.7.1989. *Arktinen ympäristöaloite; valmisteleva kokous*. Telegram. WAS-0851. FIN-AMFA 13.60-5.

²⁵⁴ Ministry of the Environment. 12.7.1989. *International Conference on Environmental Protection in the Arctic. Preparatory meeting, Rovaniemi, Finland 1989. Background Information*. FIN-AMFA 13.60-5, 15–17; Tarasti, L. & Paasivirta, O. 12.7.1989. *Vastaus Sanomassa [WAS-0842] esitettyihin Suomen arktista aloitetta koskeviin kysymyksiin*. FIN-AMFA 13.60-5; Rajakoski 13.7.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristöaloite, valmisteleva kokous*. Telegram. WAS0423. FIN-AMFA 13.60-5.

²⁵⁵ Vasara 7.7.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoite, valmisteleva kokous*. Telegram. CCC1617. FIN-AMFA 13.60-5.

²⁵⁶ Talvitie 12.7.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoite, valmisteleva kokous*. Telegram. MOS0808. FIN-AMFA 13.60-5.

²⁵⁷ Rautiainen 13.7.1989. *Suomen arktinen aloite, Rovaniemen kokouksen tausta-aineisto*. FIN-AMFA 13.60-5.

was not sure about yes and wanted to negotiate about Finland's new proposal in the State Department²⁵⁸.

At the end of July, Finland sent a telegram to the Arctic Eight, where Finland inquired about the size and status of the delegations. In the process, Finland was informing the overall situation of the preparations for the meeting. The US was still unsure. However, The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) had expressed its wish to be an observatory, and this was supported by the fact that all countries were members of the ECE. Furthermore, the ECE asked to submit its working paper to the conference.²⁵⁹ Sweden, Canada and Iceland commented positively for the ECE's role, Norway was more cautiously; Norway's opinion was that the Arctic Eight negotiate other participants' roles during the Preparatory Meeting²⁶⁰. The Soviet Union was also allowing the ECE to join; however, the Soviet Union wanted to ensure that other than the Arctic Eight were observers and not otherwise attending to work of the meeting²⁶¹.

Day after Finland's telegram, the Soviet Union asked for moving the Preparatory meeting to the beginning of October, no reason was mentioned²⁶². A few days later, the Soviets repeated their wish to move the Meeting, but with comment that they will participate if the days were suitable for others. The Soviet Union continued that they were waiting for the US and Denmark's answers. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was, again, asking if the aim was to prepare a political document.²⁶³

²⁵⁸ From Washington to MFA. 14.7.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristöaloite; valmisteleva kokous. Telegram.* WAS0888. FIN-AMFA 13.60-6.

²⁵⁹ Vasara 27.7.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoite, valmisteleva kokous. Telegram.* CCC1721. FIN-AMFA 13.60-6.

²⁶⁰ Schaumann 31.7.1989. *Suomen Arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoite, valmisteleva kokous. Telegram.* REY0214. FIN-AMFA 13.60-6; From Oslo to MFA. 1.8.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoite; Norjan näkemyksiä ennen Rovaniemen valmistelevaa kokousta. Telegram.* OSL0452. FIN-AMFA 13.60-6; From Ottawa to MFA. 15.8.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoite; valmisteleva kokous. Telegram.* OTT0245. FIN-AMFA 13.60-6.

²⁶¹ From Moscow to MFA. 3.8.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoita: valmisteleva kokous. Telegram.* MOS0870. FIN-AMFA 13.60-6.

²⁶² From Moscow to MFA. 28.7.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoite, valmisteleva kokous. Telegram.* MOS0860. FIN-AMFA 13.60-6.

²⁶³ From Moscow to MFA 3.8.1989. FIN-AMFA 13.60-6.

Similar doubts than the Soviet Union had, had the US as well. At the beginning of August came apparent that the US was only sending an observer to the Preparatory Meeting in Rovaniemi: The US reported that it was still unclear what the engagement would be by joining the Meeting. The other official reasoning was a doubt about the meaningfulness of a separate regime based on environmental issues; the US wanted all interested and affected countries -principle rather than an exclusive Arctic club. Furthermore, the US stressed the importance and priority of existing agreements over the new cooperation. However, to conclude, the US agreed that it was interested in following the continuation of Finland's initiative and was not strictly against it, only was monitoring the situation with caution.²⁶⁴ Right after the US answer, Denmark sent a telegram where participation was confirmed. Denmark was interested in the Soviet Union's comments about Finland's initiative.²⁶⁵ Finland decided to keep the Preparatory Meeting in September, even though Finland regretted the US reluctance²⁶⁶.

Nevertheless, if the other seven Arctic states were unsure about the agenda and level of the Preparatory Meeting, the memo from the Foreign Ministry meeting was in the same direction; Finland had not decided Finland's delegation for the Meeting and the Ministry of Environment's and Ministry of Foreign Affairs' officials were clearly uncertain about the ultimate purpose of the meeting. Furthermore, Finland's officials, like the other Arctic states, complained about the timetable being set too rapid. Officials proposed to modify both the agenda and the timetable of the meeting. Rajakoski and Blomberg, however, convinced others that the transfer was not worthwhile because the US had other reasons than the schedule as well, and participation would still be uncertain in the future. What came to the agenda, Rajakoski said that it was only a proposal. However, as a conclusion, the meeting decided to modify the agenda slightly to the direction where it would be accessible to the US to join at any stage; it was not purposeful to made agenda sound as everything had been decided beforehand and without high-level participant, it was impossible to join afterward.²⁶⁷ Consequently, Finland made a supplemented draft agenda

²⁶⁴ From Washington to MFA. 13.8.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoite; Yhdysvaltojen vastaus*. Telegram. WASB095. FIN-AMFA 13.60-6.

²⁶⁵ From Copenhagen to MFA. 14.8.1989. *Suomen arktinen ympäristönsuojelualoite; valmisteleva kokous Rovaniemellä 20.-28.9.1989*. Telegram. KOB0429. FIN-AMFA 13.60-6.

²⁶⁶ Vasara 15.8.1989. *Suomen arktinen aloite, Rovaniemen valmisteleva kokous 20.-28.9.89*. Telegram. CCCB353. FIN-AMFA 13.60-6.

²⁶⁷ Vasara 22.8.1989. *Arktinen aivoriishi 17.8.1989*. Discussion Memo. FIN-AMFA 13.60-7.

where the nature of cooperation, as well as the target level of the meeting, had been left out. The profile of the meeting was consciously decided lower slightly. Within own ambassadors, Finland speculated that might come a need for several preparatory meetings before the ministerial Conference.²⁶⁸

However, when the supplemented draft agenda was ready, Rajakoski made a call to the US and Canada, before sending it more widely. Rajakoski explained Finland's thoughts, again, throughout to Assistant Secretary of States Frederick Bernthal. Rajakoski especially stressed that the participation in this meeting did not automatically bind to any follow-up or attendance at the ministerial meeting. After Rajakoski's explanations, Bernthal promised to retake the issue to the discussion, and he promised to try his best to get the US to join with a high-level delegation, like the other participating countries.²⁶⁹ In his call to Canada, Rajakoski heard Canadians worry about the US attitude towards the meeting. Canada promised to have bilateral conversations about the meeting and try sure the US to join the meeting with the delegation.²⁷⁰

After Rajakoski's success phone calls to North America, Finland made a press release and sent the supplemented draft agenda to the Arctic states. In a press release about the Draft Agenda, the main goal was said to be

“It is hoped that at the Rovaniemi meeting a common political understanding on the urgent necessity of international cooperation in the protection of the Arctic environment will be reached. -- the first task would be on one hand an overview of the environmental problems in the Arctic and on the other consideration of the existing cooperation and treaty arrangements having an impact on the Arctic environment.”²⁷¹

Furthermore, about the future and third participants the press release told

“Among the possibilities of future cooperation are a negotiation process leading towards a high level conference and a Final Act adopted by it -- or

²⁶⁸ Vasara 21.8.1989. *Suomen arktinen aloite, Rovaniemen valmisteleva kokous 20.-28.9.89.* Telegram. CCCB361. FIN-AMFA 13.60-7; Vasara 22.8.1989. *Arktinen aivorihi 17.8.1989. Yhteenveto keskusteluista.* Memo 693. FIN-AMFA 13.60-7, 5.

²⁶⁹ Rajakoski 28.8.1989. *USA:n asenne Suomen arktiseen aloitteeseen; keskustelu apulaisulkoministeri (Assistant Secretary of States) Frederick Bernthalin kanssa.* P.M. 675. FIN-AMFA 13.60-7.

²⁷⁰ Rajakoski 28.8.1989. *Suomen arktinen aloite; Kanadan asennoituminen.* P.M. 676. FIN-AMFA 13.60-7.

²⁷¹ UM 30.8.1989. *Time Runs out in the Protection of the Arctic Environment.* Press release 180. FIN-AMFA 13.60-7, 2.

*some other form of cooperation for the protection of the Arctic environment decided upon at the meeting. -- One of the main topics at the Rovaniemi meeting will thus be, which countries and organisations and in which form would take part in the future process of cooperation--.*²⁷²

After this press release, Rajakoski instructed Finland's ambassadors and officials that if the question about non-Arctic participants occurs, should answer be that that question was meant to discuss in September in the Rovaniemi meeting. Rajakoski wrote that Canada and the Soviet Union were strictly against third parties when the US wanted non-Arctic states as fast as possible along. Finland itself had an open mind to this question and was not against the participant of the non-Arctic states or NGOs.²⁷³

After consultation with the US about supplemented draft agenda, the press release, and briefing, the US was once again on their toes. The US had not liked the way how Finland had impressed itself in the briefing. Finland had, according to the US, said that in the Rovaniemi meeting, every country should participate with a level of decision-making due to the possibility to enclose a political paper. That was a complicated issue because Finland had let the US understand before the press briefing that the meeting was informal preparatory by nature. Secondly, Finland had given a strong expression that follow-ups are planned to be very soon after the meeting in the Rovaniemi. The US complained that the statement was inconsistent with the fact that the end might be that there are no follow-ups at all.²⁷⁴

The sensitive situation with the US made preparations for the meeting more complicated: the issue of the presidium made Canadians cautious. Finland suggested that Rajakoski would be the first chairman; the second chairman position would be divided into two: to the Soviet Union and Canada. Furthermore, the first committee chairman position was suggested to Canada's John Beesley, and the chairman for the second committee was planned to be the Soviet Union's position. The suggestion was, however, hard decision for Canada; they thought that the US would not like it if Canadians took a significant role

²⁷² UM 30.8.1989. FIN-AMFA 13.60-7, 2.

²⁷³ Rajakoski 31.8.1989. *Suomen arktinen aloite; ei-arktisten hallitusten osallistuminen*. P.M. 709. FIN-AMFA 13.60-7, 1-2.

²⁷⁴ From Washington to MFA. 6.9.1989. *Suomen arktinen aloite, Rovaniemen valmisteleva kokous 20.-28.9.89*. Telegram. WASBB117. FIN-AMFA 13.60-8.

in the meeting and suggested if Canada would have the Soviet Union's position instead of the prime place.²⁷⁵

Simultaneously with Finland's struggle times with the arrangements, during summer 1989, Kuhmo Academy was again arranged. Tapani Vaahtoranta was discussing the theme of national security and environmental protection and if they were possible to synchronise. He aptly claimed that there was a massive discrepancy between the structure of the international system and environmental protection: the environment did not follow the borders of the nation-states, and therefore the standard system does not support the environment's need. Vaahtovaara leaned to Bruntland's²⁷⁶ report, where it was stated that the nation-states could never be enough to handle environmental issues, not even when they were in extensive cooperation. The deficiency was because nation-states have, after all, always their benefits that matter the most. However, Vaahtovaara wrote that in the 1970s and 1980s, there had been good wind: two international environmental treaties were established. Successful treaties mentioned here were the Agreement on the Conservation of the Polar Bear in 1976, the Agreement concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas in 1989.²⁷⁷

The most exciting aspect of the Kuhmo Academy 1989 is that there were almost none mentions about Finland's initiative, even though it was at that point in public, and the first exploratory meeting had been in June 1989. For example, Leo Voronkov did not mention Finland's initiative at all, even though he wrote about cooperation projects in the Arctic.

²⁷⁵ From Ottawa to MFA 6.9.1989. *Suomen arktinen aloite, Rovaniemen valmisteleva kokous 20.-28.9.89*. Telegram. OTTB028. FIN-AMFA 13.60-8; From Moscow to MFA 6.9.1989. *Nimetön*. Telegram. MOS0989. FIN-AMFA 13.60-8.

²⁷⁶ Bruntland report, also called Our Common Future report, was a final report from a project established by the UN General Assembly in 1987 and edited by Norwegian Gro Harlem Brundtland. The report aimed to discuss the environment and development. Also, the report was seeking a sustainable development path to nations inevitably linked to each other. (Brundtland, G.H. (1987) *Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development 1987*. [<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5987our-common-future.pdf>])

²⁷⁷ Roginko, Alexei (1989) *Ympäristöyhteistyön mahdollisuudet arktisilla alueilla*. An article in Lassi Heininen (ed.) *Arktiksen ristiriitoja – turvallisuus, kehitys, ympäristö?* Suomen Rauhanpuolustajat, Helsinki ja Kuhmon Kansalaisopisto, Kuhmo, 95; Vaahtovaara, Tapani (1989) *Kansallinen turvallisuus ja ympäristönsuojelu – uhka vai mahdollisuus?* An article in Lassi Heininen (ed.) *Arktiksen ristiriitoja – turvallisuus, kehitys, ympäristö?* Suomen Rauhanpuolustajat, Helsinki ja Kuhmon Kansalaisopisto, Kuhmo, 28–30.

He, however, mainly wrote about disarmament and not from an environmental aspect, but it tells the signal that Finland's initiative was not thought any other way than environmental. This is interesting, due to that the in the same publishing, the Vaahtovaara claimed that security issues could not be separated from environmental aspects. Only Alexei Roginko, when wrote about cooperation among environmental issues, mentioned Finland's initiative as a potential opening.²⁷⁸

4.4 Consultative Meeting on the Protection of the Arctic Environment in Rovaniemi

Finally, the Consultative Meeting in Rovaniemi begun on 20th September 1989 in Rovaniemi. After the trouble with the chairman board, eventually, Rajakoski worked as the main chairman, and Beesley from Canada and Desiree Edmar from Sweden were chosen for vice-chairmen.²⁷⁹ No explanations are found from the documents for the reason why the Soviet Union did not have a seat.

In their opening speeches, the Arctic countries were mostly optimistic and positive for Finland's Initiative; however, the US was neutral and only described acts for the Arctic that the US had solemnly made. Nevertheless, the US did not have any critical points toward Finland's initiative, either. Already on the first day, it came apparent that most of the countries' opinion was that since the environmental harm in the Arctic was not only a result from the acts of the Arctic Eight, the other countries should be committed to the cooperation as soon as possible.²⁸⁰

Sweden expressed that the Arctic cooperation was needed, but it could be done within already existing organs. Sweden stressed the role of the ECE and used it as an excellent example for a platform to the Arctic issues. Canada argued that they were ready to commit to a new high-level organ to protect the vulnerable Arctic. Canada raised the important

²⁷⁸ Voronkov Leo (1989) Pohjolan vyöhykehanke ja meineilläään olevat aseidenriisuntaprosessit. An article in Lassi Heininen (ed.) *Arktiksen ristiriitoja – turvallisuus, kehitys, ympäristö?* Suomen Rauhanpuolustajat, Helsinki ja Kuhmon Kansalaisopisto, Kuhmo, 129–135; Rodinko 1989, 96; Vaahtovaara 1989, 28–30.

²⁷⁹ From MFA to Paasio. 20.9.1989. *Arktisen ympäristön suojele. Konsultatiivinen kokous. Rovaniemi 20.-26.9.1989.* Telegram. FIN-AMFA 13.60-9, 1.

²⁸⁰ From MFA to Paasio. 20.9.1989. FIN-AMFA 13.60-9, 1.

question of aboriginals and their livelihood, which should be ensured. Norway was concerned about tense juridical-issues which could cripple the nascent project for the Arctic. Denmark was ready for new, Arctic organ and regime without doubts if others were committing that as well. The Soviet Union reminded that the Arctic was still militarily and strategically active area, the time was right for a change and cooperation, at least within the sphere of environmental protection.²⁸¹

At the end of the Consultative Meeting, Minister Paasio was informed that the Meeting had a good atmosphere, and negotiations are ending with a decision of continuation; the next preparatory meeting was planned to be held in April 1990. The Ministerial Conference was dated to August-September 1990 in Finland. In the report draft, the proceedings of the meeting were described; two working groups were established. First one was for “*a review of state of the environment in the Arctic and the need for further action*”, and second for “*consideration of existing international legal instruments for the protection of the Arctic environment and organisation of future co-operation.*” These two working groups were decided to be politico-diplomatic, and groups were bound to report to all participants. The process was decided to lead to a Ministerial Conference, as Finland’s initiative suggested.²⁸²

In October 1989, Gorbachev visited Finland. The main reason for the meeting was the signing of the Finno-Soviet cooperation in the Kola Peninsula, which was planned to be mainly economic and scientific. However, for the mainstream, issue what came to prominence was the Soviet Union's official recognition of Finland's neutrality.²⁸³

As a summary, one could say that Finland’s situation in international politics was in a great tailwind; Finland’s Arctic Initiative was a success even though the summer prior it had been exiting under the superpower pressure, Finland’s dreams to integrate more to the West was coming true, for example, via applying for the European Council, and the Soviet Union, at last, gave Finland recognition of neutrality. During the Consultative

²⁸¹ From MFA to Paasio. 20.9.1989. FIN-AMFA 13.60-9, 2.

²⁸² Laine, Kim to Paasio. 25.9.1989. *Arktisen ympäristön suojelua koskeva konsultatiivinen kokous Rovaniemellä 20.–26.9.89.* YKE0935. FIN-AMFA 13.60-9, 2–4.

²⁸³ Heininen 1998, 9.

Meeting, Finland was on the eyes of international press²⁸⁴, and the foreign participants spoke in the streets of Rovaniemi that meeting had “*The Spirit of Rovaniemi*”²⁸⁵. This recognition must have been a warming tribute after all work done to achieve all Arctic Eight countries around the same table to work together for the Arctic.

²⁸⁴ Ottelin Hans 28.9.1989. *Arktisen ympäristösuojeluyhteistön valmisteleva kokous Rovaniemellä 20.–26.9.1989; yhteenveto lehdistökommenteista*. P.M. 174. FIN-AMFA 13.60-9, 3.

²⁸⁵ Ottelin n.d. *Arktinen ympäristösuojeluyhteistyö, valmisteleva kokous Rovaniemellä 20–26.9.89; Pohjois-Suomen lehtien kirjoitukset*. FIN-AMFA 13.60-9.

5 Conclusion: Finland as a Balancing Consultant

Heikkilä argued in 1988 that the areas in the Arctic region were the main stage during the Cold War. Furthermore, that if any change in tensions of Arctic was hoped in the eighties, the change was absolutely needed to begin from the Soviet Union because of the Arctic's crucial geographical meaning to the Soviets.²⁸⁶ Based on the data of this thesis, the change actually started to happen after the Soviet Union's action through the Gorbachev's speech. For the hypothesis where the Soviet Union's glasnost made the cooperation with the Arctic issues easier, this is also a confirmation: the new Soviet, which was open and more willing to cooperate with West, might have been behind Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk. Furthermore, based on the material of this thesis, it seems clear that Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk was a triggering point for Finland as well to start act as a head negotiator. The speech did not include any straight order or invitation, not even an indirect hint, for Finland to act as the leading convener, but still, Finland interpreted it like that.

Consequently, the Murmansk Momentum was a watershed for Finland's acts on behalf of the Arctic cooperation; Finland realised as a first the momentum and started to create a cooperation organ by organising Finland's initiative. Thus, to the clarifying research question, if Finland's line in Arctic issues changed after Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk in October 1987, the answer is yes, it did change.

The cooperation in the Arctic has usually being said to be Finland's or Canadian's proposal. In addition, the Gorbachev's speech has said to be one of the crucial moments for further cooperation, but in the material of this thesis, there was no mention about "Russian initiative", but many mentions about "Finland's initiative" or "Canadian initiative". Initiative have sometimes been said to be Canadian, because Canada's role was crucial after the year 1991 within the Arctic Council²⁸⁷.

Despite the question which country was the first to propose further cooperation, the establishment of the cooperation in the Arctic region can be said to be started from the

²⁸⁶ Heikkilä 1988, 59.

²⁸⁷ Heininen 1999, 219.

academic level; for example, in Finland, the FIIA had been active before Finland's politicians or state officials. The mid-eighties created the International Arctic Science Committee, and because the IASC was almost ready to establish, based on the data of this thesis, Finland needed to explain again and again, very carefully, the differences between Finland's initiative and the IASC. Thus, Finland needed to make clear dividing principles from the IASC. During the first demonstrations of the initiative to other nations, Finland was repeatedly asked how Finland's proposal differed from the IASC. The answer was, after all, quite easy: the IASC was concentrating on scientific matters and was assembled of researchers and other seniors from different universities all over the world, when Finland's target, the International Conference on Arctic Environmental Protection, was political and had states officials, politicians, and other official representatives included.

To the main research question, how was Finland performing Arctic diplomacy during the years 1986–1989, the concise answer would be that according to the data of this thesis, Finland's acts were highly variable. More broadly, at first, Finland was an observer and responder during 1986. This does not mean that Finland was uninterested, vice versa, Finland actively followed Arctic issues. The second phase started in January 1987, when the MFA's first memo about being an actor in the cooperation can be found. Even though the second phase started from an individual official, Jaakko Blomberg, who wrote his thoughts on Gorbachev's speech to the memo, it was followed by an evident change: Finland's attitude towards the Arctic changed utterly. However, between the first memo and first actions, over half a year passed without reactions. If there have been consultations, discussions, or any other brainstorming after the Blomberg's memo about Finland's Arctic Initiative, the documents from the MFA's documents do not reveal those. For some reason, however, Finland was grabbing the predominance, mainly by Blomberg and Rajakoski, in autumn 1988, and started active work to enable cooperation. This co-hunting started the third and last phase in Arctic diplomacy during 1986–1989. In that period, Finland took the initiative, acted as a mediator and guide, and led the countries to a compromise that suited everyone. However, the compromise was not entirely what Finland was sought, but through mediation, it was possible to bring the initiative close to the desired goal.

During 1989 Finland was obviously in a hurry. As said before, in 1988, there was a long pause before Finland's acts began. After October 1988, however, Finland's pace was breathless: two rounds of meetings with the other Arctic states, multiple sessions in Foreign Minister, and an endless amount of telegrams between countries. From the documents came visible that behind Finland, other Arctic countries negotiated about Finland's initiative. These bilateral negotiations were, however, quite natural phenomena. The end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989 was full of meetings and journeys to Arctic Eight states, but during spring 1989, communication changed mostly to telegrams and letters.

Finland's hurry was also noticed in other Arctic countries; others did not react to the rush, but a few countries gave direct criticism. During summer 1989, reactions escalated, mainly from the US's side. Even though the US might have had some other reasons in addition to the timetable for hesitating, it was true that Finland had given a short time for familiarising the documents. Especially considering the heavy machinery of superpowers, Finland's aims were somewhat unrealistic. However, the documents revealed that Finland did realise that the momentum was just then, and the fear of losing the opportunity could have been veritable. The Cold War had had so many quick changes between tensions and *détentes* that the trust to the smooth continuation could have been fragile.

Additionally, Finland did have anxiety about being in the Arctic states, this was a critical security issue, and that might be caused a situation where the hurry was seen as a must. The Finland's intense must to integrate in 1989 might have affected to the rush in the Arctic cooperation. Finland's foreign policy was in the heat of integration, the Cold War *détente's* lasting was hard to foresee, and the Arctic's security aspect was real for Finland – these all aspects might have created a Finland's own momentum inside to the Murmansk momentum.

Nevertheless, the rush had some impacts on the construction of the cooperation: for example, Finland did not answer to the US's questions and this might been one reason for the US's hesitating. Moreover, Finland informed its politicians and officials a little lightly; meeting notes from the Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland reveal that not all officials followed events or the Finnish aspiration. There may not have been more time to communicate further. In addition, other urgencies in

Finland's foreign policy should be taken into account: 1989 was a very eventful year in foreign policy. This could also have had an impact on Arctic cooperation and put pressure on it.

However, when the US started to hesitate during spring 1989, Finland had tight times to conduct. One might even argue that was a turning point where Finland did not entirely lose, but at least fade, from the driver's seat. The other seven Arctic countries wanted the US to join the cooperation, and at that point, the power shifted slightly from Finland to the US. The US had demands, and the other seven tried to handle the situation where the US started to dictate new conditions for the cooperation. But again, Finland followed its line and listened to the US, interpreted answers, and concluded a solution, which was suitable for other Arctic countries as well. Even though the US did not send high-representatives to Rovaniemi, the US joined the final paper and, more importantly, to the cooperation process. End well, all well at the initiative of Finland, one could say. And even though if the process did not raise to the same level as the OSCE, the Rovaniemi consultative meeting had a lasting impact, which is still visible today in the actions of the Arctic Council.

Sinevaara-Niskanen argued aptly in her doctoral thesis that who possesses the web of power and knowledge, which includes the social, economic, and environmental processes of the Arctic, also has the power to administer the develop in the Arctic area²⁸⁸. According to this thesis results, at one point, Finland was a spider weaving a net for the Arctic cooperation and had the power to administer. Based on the data of this thesis, Finland acted differently to different countries and had the talent to deal with different countries in ways that were appropriate to them. For example, Finland explained much more with details of the Initiative to the Soviet Union than to Nordic countries. Norway longed for a listener to their worries in the Arctic area, and Finland made time to listen. Finland had a tentative touch to the issue, made lots of consultations starting from lower levels processing higher-representatives. Thus, after the Gorbachev's speech, Finland acted as the conductor.

²⁸⁸ Sinevaara-Niskanen, H. 2015. 70

However, the true power might have been totally somewhere else, in the hands of the state who had the actual launch for the cooperation: The Soviet Union. If power is defined as an ability to achieve the desired outcome through a relationship: as an ability to influence the behavior of others²⁸⁹, then the answer to the question, who has power should be sought from every nation's desired outcome and from the influence to achieve that. This thesis has not used other Arctic eight countries archives, and therefore, the analysis is impossible to do to that extent. However, based on this thesis data, three true impactors rose above others: The Soviet Union, the US, and Finland. Besides, they all had a different part of the timeline in October 1987 – September 1989. Even though there had been openings for Arctic cooperation, for example, from Canada's side, and the scientific cooperation had begun, the real launch was after Gorbachev's speech. When taken account President Gorbachev's unexceptional keen to take part and to join to Western cooperations and the fact that Soviet Union's arctic ports were the target of NATO, the Soviet Union might have had a genuine aim to lead Arctic Countries to cooperation, Furthermore, due to the Gorbachev's list of Arctic nations, one might argue that the Soviet Union defined which countries were Arctic and which were not — and taken these facts to account highlights that the first impactor was the Soviet Union. After the speech, Finland acted and took the conductor's role. Finally, Finland's initiative succeeded, but just before that, the US's hesitating shifted the power momentarily to the US.

Tennberg used Foucault's definition of power, where "*power should be understood as a way to conduct*"²⁹⁰. Relating to the second clarifying research question of this thesis, Foucault's definition popped up a question if Finland was using power in a Foucauldian way? Based on the material of this thesis, Finland made compromises and listened, and one might say Finland was even only a humble servant for the superpowers. But was Finland, instead of being a kind negotiator, actually having power? Canadian Science Advisor Fred Roots admitted in January 1989 that Finland had taken the leading role²⁹¹. Young suggested that Finland was leading²⁹². The data of this thesis spoke a similar pattern, and therefore it could be said that Finland had the power to conduct, if not merely alone or all the time in the process, at least some parts of the process.

²⁸⁹ Heywood, Andrew (2007) *The Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 7.

²⁹⁰ Tennberg 1998, 93.

²⁹¹ E.F. Roots via Mäentakanen to MFA. 17.1.1989. FIN-AMFA 13.60-2, 2-3.

²⁹² Young 1998, 57.

Young argued that Arctic cooperation occurred in a time where the whole world order was changing, and countries and even continents were searching for their place and allies in the world. Nordics needed a way to deal with changing the USSR, and in turn, it needed a way to deal with everyone. In this confusing world order, Finland wisely chose the right topics to drive, topics that even the superpowers could be working together. Finland removed difficult topics and concentrated only on the easier ones within the Arctic. Sustainable development was a real model concept at that time, and that one was able to sell for anyone in the Arctic.²⁹³ And as Tennberg aptly has argued in her doctoral thesis; global environmental problems affect even more harm than disadvantages for the environment; environmental problems are diplomatic problems, as well²⁹⁴. Finland wisely used this when was leading the Arctic Eight to cooperation.

To the fair question, was Finland truly the Arctic key negotiator in the end of the Cold war, Young described well the role of Finland in the book *Creating regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance*:

*“The Rovaniemi Declaration is often characterized as the Finnish Initiative due to the vigorous backing of Finland and, more specifically, senior officials in the Finnish Foreign Ministry coupled with the entrepreneurial activities of Esko Rajakoski, the Foreign Ministry official who spearheaded the drive to persuade others to join in creating this arrangement.”*²⁹⁵

Thus, Young’s answer is clear; the Rovaniemi Declaration and the Arctic diplomacy preceded this was Finland’s initiative. Furthermore, Young argued that Finland not only rose to be a driving force for negotiations after Gorbachev’s speech but did not let the subject go out when disinterest and antagonism popped up.²⁹⁶ However, one must bear in mind, that before or simultaneously with Finland’s acts, there were Canadian proposals and Gorbachev’s speech, which included an invitation to come and discuss the Arctic. Therefore, the road from the Rovaniemi Preparatory Meeting to the Arctic Council was not merely Finland’s achievement, but as this thesis shows, Finland had a significant role in it. Furthermore, Finland’s initiative cannot be said to be one man's work, but it is surprising how much Esko Rajakoski’s effort affected the project. This thesis is in line

²⁹³ Young 1998, 61 and 63.

²⁹⁴ Tennberg, Monica (1992) *Gloaalit ympäristöongelmat ja niiden asettamat haasteet Suomelle*. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Valtimo, Helsinki, 7.

²⁹⁵ Young 1998, 35.

²⁹⁶ Young 1998, 57.

with Young's notice. He argued this well by saying that the Arctic cooperation started from Finland's initiative, thanks to Rajakoski.²⁹⁷

Moreover, the Rajakoski was not alone. Finland's initiative begun after Blomberg's memo in January 1988. From the documents of MFA's, it remains unclear, if Finland's active role was planned before Blomberg created the memo. However, Heininen argues that the Gorbachev's speech challenged Finland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Government to reflect on the new situation²⁹⁸. Similarly, Torstila argued in Kuhmo Summer Academy in 1988²⁹⁹. Nevertheless, retrospectively, when the data from the MFA is open, the Blomberg's memo seems very relevant, even though Heininen and Torstila commented nothing about that. That is, as said, very natural because Blomberg's memo was classified top secret, and Heininen and Torstila did not have access to that when commented or wrote about the situation.

What comes to limitations concerning especially this thesis, one must admit that when concentrating mainly on one particular theme of the foreign policy, it creates a skewed bubble, where everything is being viewed from just one perspective, in this case, from the Arctic perspective. This somewhat narrow-mindedness brings limitations to research work, and even though these constraints are recognised, those can still affect the narrative.

Moreover, one must bear in mind that the data from this thesis is from Finland's archives and totally from Finland's point of view. Therefore the agency might be appearing more positive to Finland than it would be if taking other nation's viewpoints, through their data, into account. In any case, Young had similar arguments. Tennberg had not any conclusion on the conductor due to the character of the research. She had concentrated reviewing the governmental structure and how power is present in the Arctic Council. Therefore, research on who actually had power in the Arctic initiative during the late 1980s from other countries documents in addition to only Finland's documents might be a relevant issue for further investigation.

²⁹⁷ Young 1998, 35 and 62.

²⁹⁸ Heininen 199, 151.

²⁹⁹ Torstila, Pertti (1989) Suomen näkökantoja Arktiksen turvallisuuteen ja yhteistyöhön. Article in Heininen, L. (ed.) (1989). *Kuhmon henki 1988: Turvallisuuspoliittisen kesäakatemian aineisto*. Hki: Suomen rauhanpuolustajat, 21–25.

This thesis examined only the documents from MFA's Archive's "*Arktiset alueet*" files from 1986 onwards, but the "*Arktiset alueet*" data starts already from the year 1983. Naturally, Finland has had Arctic politics before 1983, but before that, there was no own file for that: Arctic issues are inside other MFA's files. Therefore, it would be interesting to find out why Arctic files were established just in 1983. Furthermore, of course, the history of Finland's Arctic politics is somewhat undone and would be a fascinating topic to research more widely. Moreover, due to Finland's viewpoint and usage of Finland's documents, the topic could be researched more comprehensively by taking other countries' official documents from the Arctic issues into account.

Retrospectively it is easy to say that the year 1989 and Finland's act towards Arctic cooperation was significant, but at that time, it might have been a slight disappointment for Finland when they needed to lower level of the Preparatory Meeting and to submit to the fact that the timetable was tight and the ministerial conference for Arctic Act would require several preparatory meetings. However, that was precisely a field where Finland as an Arctic Ambassador was good: balancing between the superpowers like a bear whisperer. Eventually, two more meetings were needed but, after all, it all ended up to Finland's dream: to Rovaniemi Conference in 1991, which made an official paper for further cooperation, the Rovaniemi Declaration, which in turn, led to the Arctic Council in 1996. This process was largely due to Finland's strong Arctic policy during the 1986–1989.

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