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Deportation of the Second-Generation Turkish "Migrants" from Germany to Turkey: Reflections on Citizenship and (Non-) Belonging

Nilay Kılınç

Introduction

In 1998, the 14-year-old Mehmet (pseudonym) was deported to Turkey unattended by family members due to his criminal activities in his German hometown.[1] Mehmet was born and raised in Munich, however, he did not hold German citizenship. Hence, according to German law, he could be sent back to his country of origin. Despite the public and legal debates surrounding the question of whether deporting a juvenile to a country that he barely knows from summer vacations serves justice, the result was that the German authorities did not consider him to be their responsibility. This was a highly disputed deportation case in Germany which called attention to the legal and social status of the descendants of the Turkish guestworkers, broadly conceptualised as the second generation.

The above-mentioned example demonstrates how issues of citizenship, belonging, inclusion/exclusion and social responsibility have been dealt with problematically at a socio-political and policy level. The German criminologists' official conceptualisation of the Turkish and other minority groups as 'foreigners' (*Ausländer*) has indicated "a criminology of the alien other which represents criminals as dangerous members of distinct racial and social groups which bear little resemblance to 'us'".[2] This approach has translated into policies of not allowing migrants into the country (*Law of Asylum*) or deporting them after having defined them as criminals (*Alien's Act*). This is especially a problematic process when the second generation is concerned as it points towards an integration dilemma: "[o]n the one hand, it de facto recognizes their inclusion in German society; on the other hand, it serves as an instrument to exclude them as '(un)suitable' foreign subjects within that society."[3]

The flip side of the coin is that, although the deported second-generation Turkish-German individuals are citizens of Turkey, they often lack knowledge about what their Turkish citizenship grants them in terms of civic and social rights. The empirical accounts on deported second-generation Turkish-Germans

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[1] Simon GREEN, The Legal Status of Turks in Germany, *Immigrants & Minorities* 22 (2-3) (2003), 228-246.

[2] David GARLAND, The Limits of the Sovereign States: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society, *The British Journal of Criminology* 36 (4) (1996), 445-471.

[3] Çağatay TOPAL, Surveillance of Immigrants from Turkey in Germany: From the Disciplinary Society to the Society of Control, *International Sociology* 26 (6) (2011), 789-814.

in Turkey reveal that these individuals usually receive limited or no counselling and rehabilitation services.[4] This paper grounds itself on the above-mentioned empirical research which explores the Turkish-German second generation's post-deportation lives in a tourism hub in Southern Turkey, Antalya, concerning their social integration and psychosocial well-being as counter-diasporic subjects who experience stigmatisation and exclusion by their co-nationals. This paper uses the empirical findings of the mentioned research which are non-standard and in-depth interviews with 14 Turkish deportees from Germany who started to live and work in Antalya after their deportation to Turkey (data collected in 2014–2015).

The paper recognises that the academic literature on the second generation's 'return' migration to their ancestral homeland has a gap when it comes to the cases of forced 'return', i.e., deportation. In addition, there are no reports and statistical data publicly available from the Turkish side about the number and living conditions of the deported Turkish citizens from Germany. Subsequently, the paper analyses these understudied phenomena and aims to explore how acquiring or dispossessing citizenship of a nation-state affects second-generation migrants' sense of belonging to their respective wider society. By focusing on the second-generation Turkish 'migrants' from Germany who were deported to Turkey, the paper problematises the nexus between citizenship and (non-)belonging.

In the case of the second generation Turkish-Germans, both Turkey and Germany can be seen as their home, although their citizenship statuses (i.e., Turkish, German or dual citizenship) can also create a sense of belonging based on civic rights and a sense of security.[5] The deportation narratives are directly linked to a lack of German citizenship and life stories that are marked by a sense of contested belonging towards mainstream German society. In addition, life in Turkey after deportation entails other hardships; although holding Turkish citizenship, belonging and integration to the ancestral homeland does not come automatically and the deportees also need to erode the social boundaries related to their criminal identities. The paper pinpoints the second-generation deportees' 'double trauma' evoked by the experience of deportation; on the one hand, they need to adapt to their new lives in Turkey without their parents and social networks, and on the other hand, they are supposed to integrate into civil society as convicted criminals.

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[4] Nilay KILINÇ, Lifestyle Returnees at 'Home': The Second-Generation Turkish-Germans' Search for Self in Antalya. Guildford 2017; Nilay KILINÇ, From Vagabond to Tourist: Second-Generation Turkish-German Deportees' Narratives of Self-Healing and Wellbeing, *Nordic Journal of Migration Research* 9 (2) (2019), 239-255.

[5] Nilay KILINÇ, Revisiting Second-Generation 'Return' Migration to the Ancestral Homeland, in: Russell KING / Katie KUSCHMINDER (eds.), Handbook of Return Migration. Glos, Massachusetts 2002, 283-299.

Historical Background of 'Turkish' Migration to Germany

Due to the labour shortages in its booming post-war economy, the Federal Republic of Germany signed intergovernmental contracts with the following countries: Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961 and 1964), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968).[6] The widely used term *Gastarbeiter* for these labour migrants illustrates the German government's attempt to recognise the contribution of foreigners to the country's economy, while also emphasising the idea of a temporary stay. However, guestworker populations became more permanent, maturing into diasporas.[7]

From today's perspective, Turkish migration to Germany resulted in the emergence of the largest Turkish community within Europe – nearly 3 million Turkish residing in Germany (making up 16% of the total migrant population) and 1.5 million of them retaining Turkish citizenship even though 440.469 of them were born in Germany.[8] It needs to be mentioned, however, 'Turkish' here is a heterogeneous group including different ethnic and religious affiliations such as Kurds, Arabs, Balkan-Turks, Alevis etc., and within the context of this paper, it includes those people who hold or whose parents hold citizenship of the Republic of Turkey.

The Turkish guestworker community has matured into a multi-dimensional diaspora in the last 62 years, due to family reunifications and irregular migration between 1973 and the 1980s, and new migratory flows with refugees, students and highly-skilled migrants during the 1980s due to the political turmoil and the 1980 coup d'état in Turkey.[9] Turkish labour migrants were recruited mainly for factory work, filling the shop-floor jobs that German workers were reluctant to do. Most of the early migrant workers were men, who were given temporary contracts and housed in worker houses. However, some women were also recruited, mainly to work in light industries such as electrical goods and textiles/clothing, and the number of migrant women in the workforce increased when family reunions were allowed in 1972.[10]

In 1965, the conservative-led coalition government under Chancellor Ludwig Erhard responded to the presence of (mostly Muslim) migrant groups,

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[6] Ayhan KAYA / Ferhat KENTEL, Euro-Turks: A Bridge or a Breach between Turkey and the European Union?. Brussels 2005.

[7] Steven MIHALJOVIC, The Yugoslav Gastarbeiter: The Guest who Stayed for Dinner, *Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business* 8 (1) (1987), 181-196.

[8] Nilay KILINÇ, From Vagabond to Tourist, 239-255.

[9] Yaşar AYDIN, The Germany-Turkey Migration Corridor: Refitting Policies for a Transnational Age, in: Transatlantic Council on Migration: A Project of Migration Policy Institute. Washington 2016, 1-22.

[10] Russell KING / Nilay KILINÇ, "Euro-Turks" Return: The Counterdiasporic Migration of German-Born Turks to Turkey, *Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations* 2 (13) (2013), 3-60.

with a 'foreigner law' (*Ausländergesetz*) granting limited rights to 'guestworkers'. The government, at the time, considered the presence of foreigners a temporary problem, which would resolve itself over time. The peak of Turkish labour migration in Europe was between 1971 and 1973, during which more than half a million Turkish workers came to Western Europe and 90% of them were employed by German industries.[11] When Germany was hit by the oil crisis in 1973, it decided to stop the intake of foreign workforce. In the same year, the Federal Republic introduced a 'recruitment ban' (*Anwerbestopp*) to halt the inflow of guestworkers. However, this had the unintended result of convincing many Turkish guestworkers in Germany to stay.[12]

Yet the slowdown in the growth of the number of immigrants was temporary, and the number of new entrants again peaked in the 1980s. Mass migration of refugees was recorded following the 1980 military intervention in Turkey, however, "as only a small percentage of them were granted refugee status, many *de facto* arrived in Germany as guestworkers or as their family members."[13] The second oil crisis resulted in an economic crisis, and long-term unemployment became a serious problem. From that moment on, migration from Turkey almost exclusively existed as family and asylum migration. This was first followed by a steady inflow of asylum seekers and later by clandestine migrants until the 2000s.[14]

Naturalisation rates of Turkish immigrants and their descendants are low in Germany, and in fact, the rate of all naturalised foreigners never went beyond 3%.[15] This is considered a low rate as about one-fifth of Germany's foreign population are not immigrants themselves but the native-born children and grandchildren of immigrants.[16] The German citizenship reform which came into practice from 1 January 2000 established a minimum residency requirement of eight years without any age restrictions and set forth criteria an applicant should

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[11] Ibrahim SIRKECI, Revisiting the Turkish Migration to Germany after Forty Years, *Siirtolaisuus-Migration* 29 (2) (2002), 9-20.
[12] Sule A. ÖZÜEKREN / Ronald VAN KEMPEN, Turks in European Cities: Housing and Urban Segregation, *Comparative Studies in Migration and Ethnic Relations* 4 (1) (1997), 11-29.
[13] Eva ØSTERGAARD-NIELSEN, Transnational Politics: The Case of Turks and Kurds in Germany. London, New York 2003.
[14] Ibrahim SIRKECI / Jeffrey H. COHEN / Pinar YAZGAN, Turkish Culture of Migration: Flows between Turkey and Germany, Socio-Economic Development and Conflict, *Migration Letters* 9 (1) (2012), 33-46.
[15] Meril ANIL, Explaining the Naturalisation Practices of Turks in Germany in the Wake of the Citizenship Reform of 1999, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33 (8) (2007), 1363-1376.
[16] Rainer MÜNZ / Ralf ULRICH, The Ethnic and Demographic Structure of Foreigners and Immigrants in Germany, in: Richard D. ALBA / Peter SCHMIDT / Martina WASMER (eds.), Germans or Foreigners? Attitudes toward Ethnic Minorities in Post-Reunification Germany. New York 2003, 19-44, 21.

meet to be naturalised. When the naturalisation policy was reformed in 1990 and 1993, the naturalisation rate of Turks as well as other groups began to increase steadily.

When the Turkish government introduced the 'pink card' system[17] in 1995, encouraging its nationals to apply for German citizenship, their naturalisation rose to over 40,000, surpassing the total naturalisation for all the other groups.[18] There is a peak in the naturalisation of Turks in 1999, with just over 100,000 naturalisations, the year before the new citizenship law went into effect. After this peak, the naturalisation trend of Turks began to decline dramatically which indicates that the new citizenship law did not have a positive effect on them. Research shows that the reason is that those migrants who were interested in naturalisation applied for it before the introduction of integration tests and other eligibility requirements such as being employed at the time of both application and approval, and having sufficient knowledge of the German language.[19] However, with the changing of the naturalisation system with new preconditions, the right of holding dual citizenship came to an end. The German government has also acknowledged that the new reform with these requirements made it more difficult for the Turkish migrants who were interested in naturalisation, hence they were less likely to apply and be eligible for German citizenship than before.

Given this historical account of the citizenship laws and rights, it would be fair to claim that the German government's strikingly slow and careful approach to recognise that labour migrants and their families were not temporary guests has resulted in 'temporary integration' schemes which then intensified the social marginalisation of these groups, in particular in the areas of housing, employment and education.[20] The immigration and integration policies in the

[17] The pink card (*pembe kart)* system (Law Nr: 4112) introduced by the Turkish government, amended the Turkish Citizenship Law (Nr. 403) in 1995. This system can be considered as the equivalent of the American 'green card' system, but it is only for former Turkish nationals (Official Gazette [*Resmi Gazete*], 6 July 1995). Those who renounce their Turkish citizenship with the permission of the Turkish government can apply for a pink card to keep all their rights in Turkey, except their right to vote, run for public office, and work in government jobs. Later in 2009, the Turkish government introduced the blue card (*mavi kart*) for Turkish migrants who were naturalised in Germany, granting them social privileges (residence, work, investments), however not granting political rights (being elected and voting). Barbara PUSCH, Legal Membership on the Turkish Side of the Transnational German-Turkish Space, in: Ibrahim SIRKECI / Barbara PUSCH (eds.), Turkish Migration Policy. London 2016, 205-226.

[18] Statistisches Bundesamt, Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit: Ausländische Bevölkerung sowie Einbürgerungen. Fachserie 1/Reihe 2. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office), 2005.

[19] Merih ANIL, Explaining the Naturalisation Practices of Turks in Germany in the Wake of the Citizenship Reform of 1999, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33 (8) (2007), 1363-1376.

[20] Tatiana FOGELMAN, Becoming German: Integrationism, Citizenship and Territorialization of Germanness, *Geoforum* 113 (2020), 60-68.

period between 1970 and 1990 remained unsystematic, characterised by a "legislative abstinence"[21] and instead focusing on the ways to reduce the number of the immigrants in the country with the permanence of the ban on immigration and the promotion of return migration (*Gesetz zur befristeten Förderung der Rückkehrbereitschaft von Ausländern).*[22] Deportation was another way to force the immigrants to 'return' to their country of origin. Especially in the period from the 1980s to the mid-1990s, deportation became the direct outcome for migrants of Turkish origin who committed crimes in Germany. The next section will further delve into the legal scheme of deportation in relation to the citizenship status of second-generation migrants in Germany.

Pathways to Deportation to Turkey and the German Legislation

In the late 1990s, the German government took important steps in terms of integration policies for its immigrant populations. The victory of the Social Democrats and the Greens paved the way for a new Nationality Act, which came into force in 2000. With this act, German citizenship which was based upon the principle of *jus sanguinis* was reformed, allowing foreigners to obtain German citizenship through naturalisation. This legislation gave the right of citizenship based on the *jus soli* principle to children born in Germany and whose parents had resided legally in the country for the past 8 years.

Regarding dual citizenship, the German government of 2001 introduced the Immigration Act (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*), a reduced and compromised version of which came into effect on January 1, 2005. The citizenship laws in this act allow foreigners to obtain citizenship in a much more proactive stance towards integration. Since January 2000, immigrant children born in Germany (who have at least one parent who has been in the country continuously for eight years) gain automatic citizenship (*jus soli* principle). They have the right to hold dual citizenship until the age of 23 when they need to decide between German citizenship and the citizenship of the country of origin (*Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen*, 2000). The new law also includes provisions that ease the acquisition of citizenship for first-generation immigrants, by reducing the residency requirement in Germany from 15 to 8 years.[23]

However, German statistics widely use the term "migration background" (*Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund*) to refer to those individuals not born in Germany, foreign nationals (even those born in Germany), and those with at

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[21] Christian JOPPKE, Immigration and The Nation-State: The U.S., Germany and Great Britain. New York 1999.
[22] Klaus J. BADE / Rainer MÜNZ, Einführung: Migration und Integration–Herausforderungen für Deutschland. Frankfurt am Main 2000.
[23] Patricia EHRKAMP / Helga LEITNER, Beyond National Citizenship: Turkish Immigrants and the (Re-)Construction of Citizenship in Germany, *Urban Geography* 24 (2) (2003), 127-146.

least one parent not born in Germany. Hence, second-generation Turkish even though born and raised in Germany, or holding German citizenship are considered migrants. Such conceptualisation and the statistical numbers reveal a problematic situation for the children of migrants in Germany. Hence, some scholars refer to the second-generation Turkish-Germans as "*de facto* citizens" as they have become German residents with a foreign passport but at the same time were demanded to assimilate into the legal, social and economic order and cultural and political values (*Ausländergesetz* of 1991).[24]

In the eyes of the German administration, neither a German passport nor an upbringing inside the German cultural space and the school system was as significant as a non-German ancestry in their evaluation of who is 'Biodeutsch'.[25] This landscape was first and foremost defined by a lack of any proper migration policy and instead an existence of its two proxies, foreigner/*Ausländer* and settler/*Aussiedler*[26] policy and politics.[27] Whilst the first group had to give up on their original citizenship to become naturalised Germans and prove that they are 'German enough' (and this could only occur with the change to *jus soli* law in 2000), the latter group was subject to naturalisation almost automatically upon their arrival in the Federal Republic of Germany, in line with the 1955 legislation stating that such subjects "must be naturalized".[28]

There is another element which makes the case of the Turkish guestworkers and their descendants' case particular: Despite similar conditions of recruitment between the Turkish guestworkers and other groups from the Former Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain, there has been especially strong ethnic and religious labelling for Turkish guestworkers.[29] Whilst the immigrants from these mentioned nation-states have increasingly gained rights due to their countries' membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) (later the European Union), the 'Turkish Question' has been exploited in the political discourse based on cultural, educational and religious differences of Turkish

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[24] Sabine FISCHER / Moray MCGOWAN, From 'Pappkoffer' to Pluralism: Migrant Writing in the German Federal Republic, in: Russell KING / John CONNELL / Paul E. WHITE (eds.), Writing across Worlds: Literature and Migration. London, New York 1995, 39-56.
[25] Term used in the media and populist political discourse, associated with being German by blood.
[26] Ethnically German subjects from the east European territories, occupied previously by the Third Reich, and also from the former USSR.
[27] Tatiana FOGELMAN, Becoming German, 60-68.
[28] Amanda K. VON KOPPENFELS, Politically Minded: The Case of Aussiedler as an Ideologically Defined Category, in: Uwe HUNGER et al. (eds.), Migration in erklärten und "unerklärten" Einwanderungsländern. Analyse und Vergleich. Münster, Hamburg, London 2001, 89-120.
[29] Daniel FAAS, Muslims in Germany, in: Anna TRIANDAFYLLIDOU (ed.), Muslims in 21st Century Europe: Structural and Cultural Perspectives. London, New York 2010, 59-77.

people, as well as their inability to integrate into German society.[30] Since 9/11 and later with attacks in London, Paris, and Madrid, the rhetoric evolved into the justification of discriminating against the 'non-Christian other' which is the strengthening public and political discourse with the recent flows of refugees to Germany (i.e., Palestinians, Syrians). Despite the policy changes in 1999 regarding the citizenship law, the highly criticised political discourse of "*Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland!*" ("Germany is not a country of immigration") remained until the Merkel government agreed to adopt the EU's common principles for immigrant integration policy in 2005.[31]

The Turkish community reacted to the stigmatisation practices throughout the 1970s by mobilising through diaspora organisations, ethnic neighbourhoods and the Turkish government's services (e.g., *imams* – religious leaders – and teachers were sent to Germany to teach religion, Turkish language and history courses).[32] Nevertheless, in the long run, the lack of perspective about their future in Germany in terms of social, economic and political security has harmed the integration of the first and second generation. Most of the second generation inherited the experience of marginalisation, non-recognition, and exclusion as well as the structural non-integration in German institutions (especially in schools).[33]

For instance, some academic literature depicts, throughout the 1980s, how Turkish youth found alternative ways of coping with these integration problems. The birth of Turkish-German hip-hop and the creole language of *Kanak Sprak* reflected their identity struggles.[34] However, some members of the Turkish second generation (predominantly men) were engaged in gang violence as a rebellion against the majority society in which they experienced discrimination, as well as a reaction to racist attacks towards members of the Turkish community.[35] On an individual level, some members of the second generation

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[30] Daniel FAAS, Reconsidering Identity: the Ethnic and Political Dimensions of Hybridity among Majority and Turkish Youth in Germany and England, *The British Journal of Sociology,* 60 (2) (2009), 299-320.

[31] Rogers BRUBAKER, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, London 2009, 174.

[32] Triadafilos TRIADAFILOPOULOS / Karen SCHÖNWÄLDER, How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration Country: Norms, Politics and the Failure of West Germany's Guest Worker System, *German Politics and Society* 24 (3) (2006), 1-19.

[33] Thomas FAIST, The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces. Oxford 2000.

[34] Ayhan KAYA, Aesthetics of Diaspora: Contemporary Minstrels in Turkish Berlin, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* 28 (1) (2002), 43-62.

[35] Hermann TERTILT, Turkish Power Boys: Zur Interpretation einer gewaltbereiten Subkultur, *Zeitschrift fur Sozialisationsforschung und Erziehungssoziologie* 17 (1) (1997), 19-29.

suffered from drug abuse and were involved in drug-related crimes, robbery and vandalism.[36]

Dünkel and Geng's study on ethnic minorities and youth crimes in Germany reveal that individuals of Turkish and former Yugoslavia origin share the highest crime rates, followed by the young naturalised immigrants in the 1990s.[37] This study's empirical findings show that economic difficulties within the family, hopelessness about receiving good education and a professional job, facing refusal and/or discrimination by their German peers and experiencing violence from parents can be reasons for violence-related crimes.

Another study demonstrates that Turkish men committed the highest rate of violent offending compared to Germans, ethnic Germans from the former USSR (*Aussiedler*), former Yugoslavs and southern European minorities.[38] Even when the variables of 'educational level', 'socio-economic status' and 'unemployment' were controlled in multivariate analyses, the significant difference remained in terms of violent offending between the Turkish and ex-Yugoslav male juveniles.

Enzmann and Wetzels evaluate the differences between various migrant/ethnic groups in Germany by utilising a theoretical framework of the 'culture of honour'. The authors argue that violent offending within the Turkish group is "characterised by a greater acceptance of violence as a means of restoring one's reputation and honour as a man" and show the "violence-legitimising norms of masculinity" as the prevalence of the Turkish youth's engagement with violence crimes.[39]

The Turkish offenders who were prosecuted were given the choice of forced return to reduce their imprisonment to half of its initial length or two-thirds of the sentence.[40] Deportation in this case would happen for those Turkish residents in Germany who do not hold German citizenship, hence the Turkish second

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[36] Frieder DÜNKEL, Juvenile Justice in Germany: Between Welfare and Justice, in: Josine JUNGER-TAS / Scott H. DECKER (eds.), International Handbook of Juvenile Justice. Berlin 2006, 225-262.

[37] Frieder DÜNKEL / Bernd GENG, Experiences of Violence, Social Orientations and Risk Factors among Juveniles in the Hanseatic City of Greifswald, 1998-2002: Findings of an Empirical Longitudinal Study about the Conditions of Life and Delinquency of Juveniles, in: Kirstin DRENKHAHN / Frieder DÜNKER (eds.), Youth Violence: New Patterns and Local Responses – Experiences in East and West. Mönchengladbach 2003, 295-315.

[38] Nicola WILMERS et al., Jugendliche in Deutschland zur Jahrtausendwende: Gefährlich oder gefährdet? Baden-Baden 2002.

[39] Dirk ENZMANN / Patricia WETZELS, Ethnic Differences in Juvenile Delinquency: the Role of Violence in Legitimising Norms of Masculinity, in: Kirstin DRENKHAHN / Frieder DÜNKER (eds.), Youth Violence: New Patterns and Local Responses – Experiences in East and West. Mönchengladbach 2003, 316-345, 319.

[40] In the German system, youth prisoners are juveniles (14-17 years old) or young adults (18-21 years old) who are sentenced to a youth prison sentence (from 6 months up to 5 years, in extreme cases up to 10 years). They can stay in youth prison until the age of 25.

generation who were naturalised (i.e., acquired German citizenship) were exempt from the deportation procedure, based on the Alien's Act which was amended in 1997.

Nevertheless, deportation as a forced return migration phenomenon has been overlooked in the literature on 'the second-generation return migration' and there is a lack of empirical research regarding the post-deportation and social integration experiences upon 'return' to Turkey. Although the deported second generation is invisible in empirical research dealing with return migration from Germany to Turkey, it is an integral part of the tourism and hospitality workforce mainly in the Turkish coastal towns and cities in the southern region.[41] Kılınç's and King's study supports this argument, demonstrating that many deported second-generation Turkish from Germany settle in the Mediterranean coastal towns, as the tourism sector prioritises German language skills over educational and criminal background, and the deported 'returnees' believe to lead more 'fulfilling' lives in these relatively affordable, liberal and relaxed touristic towns with naturally beautiful scenery, flexible working hours and the social aspects of tourism work.[42]

Problematising Citizenship and Belonging in Transnational Social Fields

It would be meaningful to start the theoretical discussion by focusing on the 'transnational turn' in migration studies in which migrants are conceptualised as 'transnational agents' sustaining economic, social and political ties across the national borders dividing their 'home' and 'host' countries.[43] The second generation, that was born in the destination country to first-generation migrant parents or was taken there as very young children, was called the "transnational generation"[44] and/or "post-immigrant generation"[45] that leads transnational lives and its ongoing mobility leads to new and searching questions over the nature and complexity of 'identity', belonging' and sense of 'home'. Hence, the second

[41] Ayhan KAYA / Fikret ADAMAN, Impact of Turkish-Origin Returnees/Transmigrants on the Turkish Society, in: Seyda ÖZIL / Michael HOFMANN / Yasemin DAYIOĞLU-YÜCEL (eds.), 50 Jahre Türkische Arbeitsmigration in Deutschland. Paderborn 2011, 37-57.

[42] Nilay KILINÇ / Russell KING, The Quest for a 'Better Life': Second-Generation Turkish-Germans 'Return' to 'Paradise', *Demographic Research* 36 (2017), 1491-1514, 1495.

[43] Nina GLICK SCHILLER / Linda BASCH / Cristina BLANC-SZANTON, Transnationalism: A New Analytic Framework for Understanding Migration, *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 645 (1) (1992), 1-24.

[44] Jasna ČAPO, Zwei Zuhause. Kroatische Arbeitsmigration nach Deutschland als transnationales Phänomen. Berlin 2022, 90-93.

[45] Rubén G. RUMBAUT, Severed or Sustained Attachments? Language, Identity, and Imagined Communities in the Post-Immigrant Generation, in: Peggy LEVITT / Mary C. WATERS (eds.), The Changing Face of Home: The Transnational Lives of the Second Generation. New York 2002, 43-95.

generation, wherever it is located, sustains a multiplicity of connections across 'home' and 'host' societies (the meaning of 'home' and 'host' can be changeable and blurry) thus creating active "transnational social fields"[46] in which the 'home'-identity nexus is especially complicated by the history of residence/attachments in two countries/locales.

This dual frame of cultural reference which has been specially enhanced with the second generation is also studied in the case of various capitals and skills: Meinhof & Triandafyllidou (2006) introduce the notion of 'transcultural capital' which develops as a joint creation of the migrants' encounter with both 'abroad' and 'home' and the transferability of that capital back to the ancestral homeland in case return migration takes place.[47] Kılınç et al. (2022) demonstrate that for the second-generation Turkish-German 'returnees' in Antalya, transcultural capital consists of languages, intercultural communication skills and the ability to move between and mediate different cultural repertoires. This means not only knowledge of 'Turkish' and 'German' cultures but also the cultural needs and expectations of German and other international (predominantly 'European') tourists on holiday in Turkey.[48]

If the second-generation Turkish-Germans dwell in 'transnational social fields', then it is indispensable for the existing institutions of citizenship both in Germany and Turkey to respond to their transnational experiences. Nevertheless, the need to reformulate German and Turkish citizenship regimes has not been addressed by the governments even though academic research recognises that these individuals' civic, social and cultural practices transcend national borders. To put it in more concrete terms, governments need to acknowledge the following six notions of transnationalism suggested by Vertovec (1999) that are prevalent in migrants' lives:

(1) as a *social morphology*, referring to works in the field of diaspora studies;
(2) as a *type of consciousness*, described regarding works in the field of cultural studies;
(3) as a *mode of cultural reproduction*, explicated with regard to works in the field of media studies;
(4) as a *venue of capital* justified by works in the field of political economy;

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[46] Peggy LEVITT / Nina GLICK SCHILLER, Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society, *International Migration Review*, 38 (3) (2004), 1002-1039.
[47] Ulrike H. MEINHOF / Anna TRIANDAFYLLIDOU, Beyond the Diaspora: Transnational Practices and Transcultural Capital, in: Ulrike H. MEINHOF / Anna TRIANDAFYLLIDOU (eds.), Transcultural Europe: Cultural Policy in a Changing Europe. Basingstoke 2006, 200-222.
[48] Nilay KILINÇ / Allan M. WILLIAMS / Paul HANNA, From "Inbetweeners" to "Transcultural Mediators": Turkish-German Second-Generation's Narratives of 'Return' Migration, Third Spaces and Re-Invention of the Self. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 45 (14) (2022), 2726-2748.

(5) as a *site of political engagement* elucidated in relation to works in the field of politics, and
(6) as a *(re)construction of 'place' or locality*, vindicated in relation to works in the field of social anthropology.[49]

Especially with the broad networks of communication and transportation between European countries and Turkey (and the rest of the world), the formation and maintenance of a set of transnational identities are more likely to occur. However, as Bauböck acknowledges, political communities need to respond to perceived challenges and opportunities created by migration, globalisation, mobility and diversity. Then, is it possible for the governments to establish "transnational citizenship?"[50] Bauböck defines transnational citizenship as "a triangular relationship between individuals and two or more independent states in which these individuals are simultaneously assigned membership status and membership-based rights or obligations".[51] Bauböck et al. further suggest that political rights are the most problematic issue, but not the substance, of transnational citizenship. Economics and personal advancement are rather the most essential constituents of transnational citizenship.[52] For this reason, both sending and receiving states have mostly accepted the limits of national citizenship. Both Turkey and Germany went through a democratisation process by introducing the right of dual citizenship (Germany in 2014, Turkey in 1981), however currently, Germany only allows EU and Swiss citizens to have dual citizenship, unless the person was born and raised in Germany has no criminal record, a steady income and is not on state support.

Bauböck further classifies three categories of transnational citizenship: *multiple nationals*, *denizens* and *ethnizens*.[53] Dual citizens enter the first category, *denizenship* refers to a special legal status of long-term resident, foreign nationals who enjoy most of the civil liberties and social welfare rights of resident citizens, often including rights to family reunification, some protection from deportation and voting rights in local elections, as well as quasi-entitlements to naturalisation.[54] In the case of Turkish migrants in Germany, denizenship does not cover protection from deportation. *Ethnizenship* is the converse of denizenship, in a way that creates an external quasi-citizenship for

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[49] Steven VERTOVEC, Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2 (12) (1999), 447-462.
[50] Rainer BAUBÖCK, Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational Political Participation: A Normative Evaluation of External Voting. *Fordham Law Review* 75 (2007), 2393-2447.
[51] Ibid. 2395.
[52] Rainer BAUBÖCK / Bernhard PERCHINIG / Wiebke SIEVERS, Citizenship Policies in the New Europe. Amsterdam 2008.
[53] BAUBÖCK, Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational Political Participation, 2007.
[54] Tomas HAMMAR, Democracy and the Nation State. Aldershot, Avebury 1990.

individuals who are neither citizens nor residents of the country granting that status.[55] For instance, Article 116 of the German Basic Law greatly reduced barriers to the repatriation of ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*) from outside the Reich residing in the former USSR and elsewhere[56] – hence whilst the Turkish citizens who were born and raised in Germany would be deported in case of criminal acts, *Aussiedler* who gained citizenship through 'blood relation' would be exempt from deportation.

In this regard, Mandel favourably interprets how 'German identity' transforms itself in the gaze of the migrants of Turkish origin, who have set up the category of *New Others*.[57] Mandel argues that the doctrine of the "*inconvertibility* of the Turks" continues. Accordingly, it is debated that, *Leitkultur* (mainstream/leading culture), the Citizenship Law of the year 2000, and official reluctance to accept the fact that Germany has become a country of immigration resulted in German policies of citizenship and integration which are far from considering either Jews or Turks as true converts to 'German-ness'. Brubaker argues that citizenship is premised on a notion of 'social closure' which amounts to a cultural and/or political circling of the wagons; a defensive stance that re-inscribes the division between one group and another by using legal frameworks to institutionalize perceived (and often artificially constructed) differences.[58] In Germany, we see that this 'closure' was constructed along national romanticism (Herder's *Blut und Boden*, *das Volk*[59]) based on ethnicity and race rather than political lines. Unlike in France and the US, national values were articulated as outgrowths of a common cultural heritage rather than a common political ideology.

It is also worth mentioning that hyphenated identities – even in semantic terms – do not exist in Germany, hence this paper uses 'Turkish-German' in the American tradition of hyphenated identities. As Turkish-Germans become equally affiliated with their countries of origin and of settlement in a way that constitutes transnational identities, tolerance towards dual citizenship in both Germany and Turkey becomes more inevitable, nevertheless as the findings will illustrate the second-generation Turkish-Germans are not always able to enjoy such transnationalism.

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[55] Ayhan KAYA, Transnational Citizenship: German-Turks and Liberalizing Citizenship Regimes, *Citizenship Studies* 6 (2) (2012), 153-172.

[56] Rogers BRUBAKER, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge 1992.

[57] Ruth MANDEL, Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in Germany. Durham, London 2008.

[58] Rogers BRUBAKER, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge 1992.

[59] Dominic EGGEL / Andre LIEBICH / Deborah MANCINI-GRIFFOLI, Was Herder a Nationalist?, *The Review of Politics* 69 (1) (2007), 48-78.

Methodology and Characteristics of the Sample

Recognising that "migration is also a social and cultural phenomenon bound up with issues of place, identity and subjectivity,"[60] this qualitative research's primary data is non-standard interviews that are semi-structured, open-ended and in-depth. Life-story narratives were chosen as the core research instrument to cover the different time-place stages of the interviewees' lives in Germany and Turkey. The fieldwork took place in the Antalya province, located in the Mediterranean region of Turkey. The research is a cross-sectional study as the data was collected in the framework of two months in 2014 and three months in 2015.

The criteria for the interviews were set as the participants who would be classified as the second generation, based on Thomson and Crul's definition: children of two immigrant parents (first generation) who were either born in the receiving country or brought in before school age (before the age of six).[61] Out of the total of 74 interviews collected in 2014 and 2015, 14 participants had criminal backgrounds and were deported to Turkey when they were in their early 20s. All 14 participants are men, coming from guestworker family backgrounds, mainly in their 30s and 40s. Half of the sample was born in Germany and the other half was born in Turkey and taken to Germany before the age of five. Ten participants have a secondary-level education from Germany (predominantly *Berufsschule* or *Hauptschule*), and four participants had to leave school, either because they were sent to prison, or the schools expelled them due to inappropriate behaviour. All the participants are working in tourism-related businesses, predominantly in the service sector. None of the participants' families is from the Antalya province, hence they had no prior ties to these localities. The sample group of this paper holds only Turkish citizenship, and this was the reason why they could be deported to Turkey. They had a ten-year ban on entering Germany from the date they were sent to Turkey accompanied by the German police and handed over to the airport police in Istanbul.

Certain ethical procedures were respected during the data collection and analysis process such as not giving away participants' personal stories to others, as in the tourism spaces, most of the workers know each other. Secondly, I adopted an 'empathic' approach to interviewing to allow the participants to speak in their voice wherein I have embraced an active role, revealing personal feelings

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[60] Caitrione Ni LAOIRE, Conceptualising Irish Rural Youth Migration: A Biographical Approach, *Population, Space and Place* 6 (3) (2000), 229-243, 232.

[61] Mark THOMSON / Maurice CRUL, The Second Generation in Europe and the United States: How is the Transatlantic Debate Relevant for Further Research on the European Second Generation?, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33 (7) (2007), 1025-1041.

about the issues under discussion.[62] It was important to be ethical in my views and principles regarding certain issues such as violence, drug abuse, vandalism and robbery which I could not be neutral or accepting of, and I believe my honest thoughts and reactions about these stories made my participants trust me more, to evaluate more on the experiences without feeling the need of justifying their past actions. Third, once the interviews were collected, the names of the participants were anonymised by using pseudonyms; also the names of their working places are not used.

During the transcription process of the recordings, I noted all the significant pauses, hesitations and interruptions that took place during the interviews, because in narrative analysis, as much as what people say is important, the way they say it also carries significance.[63] The transcriptions were analysed by following a thematic analysis narrative, putting an emphasis on *what* is said rather than *how* it is said. In addition, I paid close attention to the hermeneutic process involved in my own "activity of making sense"[64] of the narratives whilst reading and re-reading the transcriptions and creating the initial codes and themes. Once themes emerged, I re-arranged them focusing on the issues of citizenship, belonging and transnational mobility.

Mismatch of Citizenship and Belonging After Deportation

The participants narrated their stories of marginalisation and paths that led them to minor and major crimes in Germany. They tied these experiences to their turbulent relationships with their parents, lack of interest in school due to discrimination by peers or/and teachers, negative neighbourhood or 'ghetto' environment with problematic friendships and general identity struggles which put them in a complex and hopeless emotional state. When they were deported to Turkey, they did not have family support as their families remained in Germany and they found themselves in a completely new environment where they did not know how to settle in or how to start a new life in their so-called 'ancestral homeland'. All the participants mentioned that they first tried to live in the small towns their parents were from, hoping to receive support from their relatives there, and some participants also tried to live in Istanbul, expecting that

[62] James A. HOLSTEIN / Jaber F. GUBRIUM, The Self We Live by: Narrative Identity in a Postmodern World. Oxford 2000.
[63] Catherine RIESSMAN / Lee QUINNEY, Narrative in Social Work: A Critical Review, *Qualitative Social Work* 4 (4) (2005), 391-412.
[64] Thomas A. SCHWANDT, Three Epistemological Stances for Qualitative Inquiry: Interpretativism, Hermeneutics and Social Constructionism, in: Norman K. DENZIN / Yvonna S. LINCOLN, (eds.), The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues. Thousand Oaks (CA) 2003, 292-331.

the big city life would offer them jobs and they could socially integrate. However, the findings show that in both cases, the participants were disappointed and their first months or years in Turkey evoked a ‘double trauma’ for them. Davut who is 38 years of age and currently working in a clothing store in Antalya as a salesperson was deported at the age of 30 and he explains this ‘double trauma’ with the following:

> “In Germany, I had a horrible family life, many problems… Then I had a thick criminal record. I became paranoid at some point as if the police were always after me. When you are dark like me, it gets the German police’s attention. Sometimes I would get my ID checked for no reason… Jail time in Germany was tough as well. Then when I got deported to Turkey, I somehow felt I could finally start over in a new place. I went to my parents’ village and tried to work there, but the work was unsatisfying and my relatives there were not supportive either, they were seeing me as the black sheep of the family. *Almancıs* have a bad reputation anyways… Going to the army was traumatic as well. When I got deported here, I got no support from the government, but I’m a Turkish citizen, so I had to do army service!” (Davut, 38, Antalya).

Davut’s narrative has commonalities with the other participants’ narratives in terms of the hopelessness they felt when they were deported to Turkey, as they did not know the country and its places, and they had limited or no social networks. In Davut’s quote, there is a level of an exclusiveness based on his looks, that the police could identify him as a ‘foreigner’ and have the potential to be ‘dangerous’. When he is deported to Turkey, however, this time he is seen as an *Almancı* (a derogatory word, meaning German-like), and he experiences stigmatisation even from his relatives. The last bit of the quote is especially interesting as he reflects on his citizenship – he does not receive support from the government but must do his duty to the country.

The narrative accounts also show that they received information about life in Antalya, mostly through other Turkish people in Germany (especially when they were in jail and discussed what they could do after deportation to Turkey), or their relatives and acquaintances in Turkey. In all cases, the participants were recommended to move to Antalya. As Aziz (46 years old) explains:

> “If you were an *Almancı* with a dark past, everybody would tell you to go to Antalya. Especially in the 1990s. It was tourism’s golden years, so many Germans were coming, they even bought houses here. There were many job opportunities, but there were no people who could speak German and English. It was perfect for people like me. We spoke Turkish, German, and English and we were keen on starting a new phase in life.” (Aziz, 46, Antalya)

Indeed, it was also mentioned by the people in the tourism sector in Antalya that there was a flow of Turkish men from Germany who settled in Antalya from the 1990s onwards and filled most of the job positions in the tourism and hospitality sector. For the deportees, 'return' to Turkey was overall a stressful and at times disappointing experience, however Antalya as the specific locale provided them with new social and economic opportunities. In this framework, the participants' 'transcultural capital' of growing up with both Turkish and German languages, cultures, values etc. has a good fit with Antalya, because the participants were able to adapt to the international environment relatively quickly as their qualities via various types of capitals were valued in the tourism sector.

In terms of how the participants reflect upon their social integration processes, it can be said that finding employment was the first step. All the participants have been employed since they moved to Antalya and some of them even opened their own businesses. Four participants have tourism-related businesses, and the rest mostly works in sales in tourist shops. Hence, the improvement of their economic welfare, living conditions and income enabled them a sense of security. Here, it is important to acknowledge that their 'transcultural capital' played an important role in getting and sustaining these jobs, but also their commitment to a disciplined life was the main reason how they could sustain their economic ventures. Their economic integration was important to boost their social integration, considering that none of the participants had had consistent or legal jobs in Germany, or had been able to build a sustainable career elsewhere in Turkey than in Antalya.

The narratives further showed that living and working in Antalya changed the participants' perception of themselves and the social 'Others'. To start with, all the participants mentioned that they had felt like foreigners both in Germany and Turkey (the common saying of "Being an *Ausländer* in Germany and an *Almancı* in Turkey" was the case) not particularly because they saw themselves as 'different' but were perceived that way by the dominant Others. Irfan who was deported to Turkey in his early 20s explains this in the next paragraph. He now owns a souvenir shop in the Old Town of Antalya area and is happily married with children.

> "I was born and raised in Germany. I was quite good at school. But I had a teacher who didn't like me, he believed that I needed to go to a special school for slow kids. Turkish students experience this sometimes, it's harder for us to go to higher education because we were neglected by our constantly working parents, and teachers. Even though I had many German friends, in these instances I'd feel like a foreigner. Then I had to come to Turkey, thought it'd be different in our motherland. But this time I had to deal with people's judgements. At least in Antalya, people don't care about my background and we

> Turks from Germany have a strong position here, the sector depends on us." (Irfan, 35, Antalya)

Most of the time, as in the case of Irfan, the participants felt disappointed about the German society for excluding them – because they considered Germany as their 'home' where they were born and raised. When they were deported to Turkey, this time they had to face stereotyping from the Turkish society and were dubbed as 'Almancı', denoting that they were Germanised, degenerated people – or that they are not Turkish enough. However, in Antalya, tourism spaces enabled them to go beyond such identity struggles, because even though they had a bad reputation as being Turks from Germany, they were valuable for the tourism sector and the locals could not discourage them with their words. In addition, the participants mentioned that they realised their multiple identities allowed them to interact with different nationalities in Antalya and make friends with especially German-speaking tourists/expats and other Turkish people who returned from Germany. In that sense, through the touristic working environment, they not only gained autonomy, and competency but also rebuilt self-esteem and relatedness with these new social networks. The oldest participant Rüştü (53) who was deported to Turkey 25 years ago reflects on his new life:

> "Since I moved to Antalya almost 20 years ago, I finally stopped thinking about who I am. Doesn't matter. Look around you, in Antalya you see people from all over the world. I've been working in the jewellery sector since I came here, and I made a good career. I enjoy my life, I have good friends here, and many German customers of mine became my friends over the years. During the day I speak Turkish, German, English, Dutch, French… I even forget which country I'm in sometimes (laughing). Calmness, and good people, that's what I care about in life now, and I feel good about myself. The rest is history." (Rüştü, 53, Antalya)

Similar to the narrative above, it is also common in other participants' narratives that they have been constructing identities that "cut across fixed notions of belonging."[65] The youngest participant Demir reflects on this complex relationship to identity, belonging and citizenship with the following words:

> "For us, the second generation, there's always been a paranoia of our families, 'we're Turkish, we're Muslim, we don't do this or that as the Germans do.' We spoke Turkish at home, ate Turkish food, followed all the Turkish radio and TV, met with other Turks, and came to Turkey for the summer holidays. Then we leave home, go to school, go to work and we're expected to be German. At some point, I was

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[65] Claire DWYER, Negotiating Diasporic Identities: Young British South Asian Muslim Women, *Women's Studies International Forum* (23) 4 (2000), 475-486, 475.

> depressed, I wasn't sure where I stood anymore, I wasn't feeling familiar with my parents, I wasn't completely feeling like a part of the group with my German friends… When I got deported to Turkey, I also realised that being Turkish on paper isn't enough to feel Turkish. Everything was different from what I was used to in Germany. And in the end, what did Germany or Turkey do for us? Germany kicked us out and Turkey ignored us. I don't care anymore…" (Demir, 31, Side)

Finally, the participants mentioned that their economic and psychosocial integration allowed them to improve their close relationships. Half of the sample are divorced, two of them are married, and five of them are single. Somehow, even though their marriages did not always go as they wished for, having kids (five participants have children) was a push factor for them to have a sustainable income to support their children's lives. However, the narratives accounts show that having intimate relationships is still the weakest part of their lives; many participants mentioned that they would like to focus on themselves instead of taking bigger responsibilities – for instance, the previously introduced participant Rüştü is divorced three times and has five children in two different countries from three women who have different nationalities. He says he tries to visit his children, but he is mainly interested in keeping up his work discipline and healthy lifestyle in Antalya. He also mentioned that he married these women to live in Europe (which he did in the Netherlands for some years). Other than this, five participants mentioned that, since they moved to Antalya and 'fixed' their lives, they started to be closer to their families so that their parents would come and visit them in Antalya. For example, Idris mentions:

> "My family lost hope in me when I got into jail and when I got deported to Turkey. They stayed in Germany, and they were worried that I was never going to fix my life. Then I came to Antalya and build a life from scratch. I earned well here. My parents started visiting me, and they are impressed… Everybody says I'm a new person now, and I guess I am because I work here with people who're also trying to be better, we support each other, and we work hard." (Idris, 44, Antalya)

As in the case of Idris, they improved some of their previous intimate relationships. The participants pointed out that they get on well with their colleagues, neighbours and customers who are mainly German tourists and expats. Furthermore, they value the friendly and open-minded environment in the tourism spaces, where they feel part of a community of people who think alike. For them, belonging now is more about being a part of an open-minded and international environment.

When the participants were directly asked about citizenship, most of them revealed that their families had the chance to apply for German citizenship for them, but they did not want to, because they wanted to stay Turkish. The

participants commonly mentioned that at the time they did not worry about this, but when they started to deal with authorities due to committing crimes, they regretted not having German citizenship. All participants mentioned that they are happy with their lives in Antalya, and they do not wish to live in Germany in the future. The only problem they see as a part of their Turkish citizenship is the difficulty of obtaining visas to visit other countries. When they were asked about where they would like to live if they had the chance to, almost all participants explained that their life in Antalya is satisfying because “it is not like Turkey, it is a place of its kind,” but countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand were chosen even though the participants have never been in those countries, but associate these countries with beautiful nature, democracy, multiculturalism and work opportunities.

The final narrative summarizes these points nicely, and shows that in the case of restrictions of mobility, touristic environments such as Antalya are nurturing for these transmigrants:

> “I wouldn’t like to live in Germany, it is constantly bad weather there, my relatives and family are still there, they work like robots and they don’t have interesting lives. I love Antalya because it is not like Turkey, I don’t worry about the problems here, like politics… It is getting shittier every day. But sure, I would want to travel more, but getting visas are not easy and very costly. Luckily, the whole world comes to Antalya (laughing), so, I don’t have to leave to meet other cultures. Here’s like a tropical paradise! I feel that this would be my best option as a deported person.” (Nedim, 47, Antalya)

Conclusion

The paper aimed at discussing the ways in which the second-generation Turkish-Germans were marginalised in two countries which they internalised as homelands; Germany where they were born and/or raised, and Turkey which is their ancestral homeland and place of ‘return’. A rather extreme case of return migration, namely deportation, was scrutinised in the light of history of Turkish migration to Germany and the post-World War II immigration policies in Germany. Based on secondary literature on juveniles and crime in Germany and empirical findings, the paper pointed towards certain structural factors which led the Turkish-German youth to the path of crime and later, deportation. The most problematic structural factor was argued to be the citizenship regimes. Citizenship acts as a strong catalyst, helping the second generation to improve their economic, educational, political and social integration into their respective societies. The second-generation Turkish-Germans who could not have birth

right citizenship in Germany had a vulnerable position, and as 'denizens' they were residents of Germany who could be deported.

The paper then turned its attention to the narratives of deportation and 'double trauma', focusing on the experiences of deported men who currently work in the tourism sector in Antalya, Turkey. Holding Turkish citizenship, these deported individuals could work and even start their own businesses in Turkey and had a relatively safer sense of place. Nevertheless, they soon realised that having ancestry in Turkey or having Turkish citizenship would not grant them a sense of belonging naturally. However, as the narratives commonly depicted, Antalya has been an ideal place for the deported Turkish from Germany with the high demand in tourism sectors for workers who can speak German. In this regard, the participants' 'transcultural capital' enabled them to take an active part in the social life and workforce of Antalya regardless of their pasts.

The paper concludes that, belonging and non-belonging are both dynamic processes affected by one's individual journey of making and unmaking homes as well as the external factors such as discrimination, marginalisation and lack of citizenship rights. In the case of second-generation Turkish-Germans, their transnational identities and attachments have not been always understood and supported neither by the governments nor their societies. However, the example of the deportees in Antalya demonstrated that, through finding spaces where they can celebrate and utilise their transnational identities and skills, these individuals are able to flourish and lead more fulfilling lives.