

Sebastian Müller-Klestil

Disarming identities

**Ethnic identities in conflict resolution:
Hindrane or helpful resource?**



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Preface

Introduction

The dissertation argues for considering national or ethnic identity as an important tool for conflict resolution. This is done in two steps:

1. A theoretical argument for the importance of national identity in conflict resolution. The role of national identity is examined and aspects that may have been overlooked are pointed out. This highlights the importance of identity in creating and sustaining conflict, but also its possible role in resolving it.
2. A qualitative analysis of the use of national identity in a particular conflict resolution setting. The analysis was developed alongside the theoretical argument and gives examples of identity use supporting conflict and conflict resolution.

As I have used a grounded theory approach (see section 3.1 on page 51) in my dissertation this split between theory and qualitative research is not very easy. The theories described in chapter 1 and my integration of the theories into a concept of investment of identity in conflict in chapter 2 have developed alongside the analysis described in chapters 3 and 4. This process of mutual influence of analysis and theory development is at the heart of grounded theory. In this sense my dissertation also has two “results”: One is the theoretical view of the role of national identity in conflict resolution, the other is the qualitative finding that national identity is being used in a conflict resolution setting. I have chosen the current format of the dissertation in order to keep with conventions in my field and have separated the two aspects of my dissertation.

Chapter 1 focuses on defining several terms central to the dissertation, such as conflict, ethnicity, essentialism and nationalism. It looks at specific theories in social psychology, foremost social identity theory, that can illuminate the role of identity in conflict resolution.

Chapter 2 investigates what the theories described in chapter 1 can contribute to understanding large-scale conflicts and their resolution. The chapter is the theoretical result of the grounded theory approach.

Chapter 3 describes the methodology employed in my qualitative analysis of conflict resolution workshops. It provides an overview of grounded theory, the interactive problem solving approach and the different methodological steps of my analysis.

Chapter 4 reports the different workshop analyses I produced during the course of the dissertation and ends with prototypical examples for the different uses of identity I found.

Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of both theory development and qualitative analysis. It also provides an outlook on possible improvements of track-two conflict resolution efforts.

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Last, but not least, I would like to thank my wife Silvia for her support and comments on my work. She played a vital role in this dissertation, allowing me to bounce ideas off of her and correcting the manuscript. Thank you for your patience with me. You are the love of my life and it is beautiful to grow together.

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Chapter 1

Theory

The topic and limits of this dissertation, conflict resolution in protracted ethnic conflict, will be defined. In order to achieve this I will draw on knowledge from the fields of social psychology, sociology and international relations. I begin with descriptions and definitions of conflict and ethnicity.

In this chapter I will present important theories in social psychology that form the basis of my theoretical development in the next chapter. One underlying assumption is that protracted ethnic conflict, due to its nature, makes social identities salient as individuals are confronted with different aspects of the conflict in their daily life and especially in conflict resolution settings. I will draw on self-categorization theory to answer the questions: What does this salience imply? (Section 1.2.2) In looking at ethnic conflict one can ask: How do you get from liking your ingroup to hating the outgroup? Both Brewer's optimal distinctiveness theory (section 1.2.3) and theorizing on issues of prototypicality (section 1.2.5) can explain this link. Theories on prejudice and Just World Theory (section 1.3) can give us some answers to the question: Why do people need to believe their leaders or engage in discrimination if the conflict is to be upheld? How do you motivate your group to stay in conflict? In addition I would like to look at the social psychological view that some conflict resolvers have regarding social identity and ethnic conflict. One question that should be answered from a social psychological perspective is: Is the use of national or ethnic identity just coincidental or is there something specific about these identities that other social identities may not provide?

1.1 Definitions

1.1.1 Conflict

The following definition of conflict can be found in the *International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences* (2001) under the heading of *Conflict Sociology*:

When two or more social actors pursue incompatible interests they may be said to be in a relationship of conflict [...] (Crouch, 2001)


Similarly, when I hear the word conflict, I first think about something very easy: Two people want different things and are fighting each other. But then I start thinking that it is also something very complicated. What are they fighting about and why are they in conflict and not just disagreeing or even disinterested in the other? Who is defined as “other” and how does this construction occur? This depends probably on the kind of conflict one is confronted with. At least three interaction levels at which conflict can take place can be distinguished: interpersonal, intragroup and intergroup. My own research is firmly focused on the latter as I study protracted ethnic (i.e. intergroup) conflict.

But first let us consider what these types of conflict have in common and how they may be distinguished from non-conflict situations. Take for example the difference between disagreement and conflict. The aim is not to give an exhaustive distinction between the two but rather to clarify what I mean when I refer to conflict. In my view conflict and disagreement can be distinguished by the degree of involvement of the concerned parties. Conflict describes a high stake that both sides attach to the disagreement and an increased importance (compared to “just” a disagreement) of the outcome of any resolution. In addition conflict necessitates a view on both sides that the goals pursued by the two sides are mutually exclusive. Ongoing or protracted conflict also seems to require a belief in the righteousness of one’s own demand and (as the demands are mutually exclusive) a belief that the other’s demand is somehow wrong. If these conditions are not fulfilled I believe that the parties will not stay in conflict but rather accept that they have a difference of opinions or find a compromise and move on. This suggests that conflict is not a stable state but requires an *investment* on both sides in order to sustain this high-energy state of affairs. In addition the situation is perceived as a *zero-sum* game, meaning that if one side wins the other has to lose.

Let's return to the different levels of social interaction at which conflict may occur. Laursen (2001) gives the following definition of interpersonal and intergroup conflict¹:

Interpersonal conflict describes a social interchange that is marked by opposing goals and that involves two or more persons. [...] Group conflict refers to negative or incompatible attitudes and behaviors directed by members or representatives of one group toward those of another group. (Laursen, 2001)

Both are social interchanges and opposition between two entities defines both. But the difference between the two lies in the fact that the negative behavior directed against another in the case of intergroup conflict is directed at her because of her group membership. In addition the conflict can be fought between representatives of the groups on behalf of the whole group. There is also the possibility of intragroup conflict where the conflict is about who or what should represent the group.



A and B have opposing goals. They want different things or outcomes.


Figure 1.1: Basic conflict

So, in an interpersonal conflict two people are engaged in trying to achieve their goal to the detriment of the other as visualized in Figure 1.1. The investment that has been made can be seen in the way that the conflict situation and the opposing “partner” are described. Usually inflexible terms are being used (e.g. “S/he has always been like this”, “That’s just the way s/he is”). In addition one’s self is seen as trying to mend the situation but being kept from resolving the conflict successfully by the

¹Text in [] throughout the document has been removed or added by the author to facilitate reading.

other, establishing moral superiority (“I have always done these things for him/her”, “I want to resolve this but s/he does not want to do X”, “If s/he did not insist on doing X everything would be fine”, “S/he just cannot see that X is the case”).

Intragroup conflicts add a dimension. Here the conflict participants are members of the same group. Their struggle to win the conflict will involve presenting one’s self as a prototypical member and the other as a deviant member of the ingroup, even going as far as denouncing the other’s right to group membership (“S/he is a traitor” etc.). This kind of conflict will not only be focused on a certain individual goal that one is trying to achieve but also on who is correct in claiming to be representative of a group. One can also imagine how the proposed boundaries between individual and intragroup conflict can be blurred. In an individual conflict situation both parties may try to convince the other of the rightfulness of their claim by referring to a common ingroup and their values to justify one’s own position and to discredit the other’s position. Two people in a relationship who are in conflict can, for example accuse, each other of being a bad parent or a bad spouse, while implicitly or explicitly stating that they are a good parent or spouse, claiming a moral justification (you should try to be a good parent/spouse) for their stance in the conflict.



Groups can afford additional resources
to support and motivate conflict.

Figure 1.2: The influence of the group on conflict

In an intergroup conflict this is drawn out onto an even bigger stage as is demonstrated in Figure 1.2. One can imagine that a couple could engage in a fight with a school about how to raise their child. Here two groups (teachers and parents) are in conflict with each other and these categories can be used for the conflict. This involves stereotyping of a group

(“Parents are neglecting their children” versus “Teachers do not have any idea how to raise children.”). It is important to see that this conflict may very well involve the same mechanism, of claiming superiority for one’s own group on the dimension of being a good influence on children, as in the case of an intragroup conflict. In ethnic conflict the stereotypes about the other group involved, may take the form of “They cannot be trusted”, “They only exist because of us”, “They have always behaved in hostile ways, think of what they did to us in X”. Here it is easy to see how one’s *own* (group) identity also becomes an integral part of the conflict. What “they did to us in X” is part of the construction of one’s own identity as the time X is usually also employed to define what it means to be part of the ingroup. Parties in an individual conflict can also make references to the other’s differing group membership in order to introduce prejudices (or “attributes”) about that group, which aim at undermining the other’s position and legitimacy.

1.1.2 Ethnicity

In order to be able to talk about the influence of national identity on the resolution of protracted ethnic conflict the various elements need to be defined. This is a difficult task as there are many, sometimes opposing, definitions of ethnicity and identity. In addition the definitions vary from discipline to discipline. The previous section concerned my view on conflict. In this section I would like to define the term ethnicity for use in this dissertation. In the *International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences* under the section *Ethnic Conflicts* Williams (2001) defines ethnicity as follows²:

The term [ethnicity] has been used variously to signify ‘nation’, ‘race’, ‘religion’, or ‘people’, but the central generic meaning is that of collective cultural distinctiveness.
(Williams, 2001)

Max Weber (1978/1922) developed an early definition of ethnicity:

[Ethnic groups are] those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities

²Typesetting of quotes such as quotation marks and emphasis are presented as they occur in the original text unless otherwise noted.

of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. (Weber, 1978/1922)

It becomes clear that ethnicity is not easily defined. Even if it is described in terms of a race or a people it is evident that ethnicity is not explainable by blood relationships. But also the definition of ethnicity as a group of people that share a culture is not sufficient. Devreux (1975) called ethnic behavior 'dissociative' as it is not actually prompted by past tradition but is informed by a contrastive and presentist strategy of opposition of one ethnic group against another. Barth (1969) saw the value of ethnicity in the 'ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff it encloses'. So what does this leave us with? A helpful definition of nation is given by Anderson (1983), who defines the nation as being an "imagined political community" (p. 15). This emphasizes the constructed nature of national identity and ethnicity. If identity is constructed to serve a purpose it should not surprise us that there may be different and competing identity versions for the same social group: for example, a liberal versus a conservative view of what a specific nation should look like and stand for.

Ben-Rafael (2001) points out that different versions of the same identity either employ distinct symbols or attach contrasted meanings to the same symbols; although different, they "broadly, though not exclusively, draw these symbols, which are theirs, from the same 'store' — myths of descendancy, time-honored customs, and sanctified objects." (p. 4839) But as Reicher and Hopkins (1996, 2001) have demonstrated, even proponents of the same version of identity, or even the same person, can use the same myths in very different ways depending on the situation and the goal they have within that situation.

Hardin (2001) argues that mystification is required for nationalism, quoting Ernest Renan as saying that "one can be committed to the rightness and purity of a nation only by forgetting its brutal and messy past" (p. 7167).

So what groups are we talking about? One good starting point is what Geertz (1967) calls "candidates of nationhood". In political science the protracted ethnic conflicts I am focusing on are usually assumed to be situated in what has been termed *weak statehoods* or *second and third wave democracies*. These candidates of nationhood can be described as

communalistic groups that share a common culture or identity either by self-definition or definition of others. The groups are usually not restricted with regard to gender, age etc. and show signs of class, status and other stratifications. A common origin or descent is usually claimed by an ethny (Williams, 2001) as mentioned above.

What characterizes ethnicity in relation to protracted conflicts? Bös (2004) gives the following basic characteristics for the content of the identity of these candidates for nationhood. They are a group of people who imagine themselves as having a common descent and (political) fate. The group is characterized by the use of cultural patterns as group markers and a totalizing of that identity, which means that all aspects of life are influenced by that identity. In addition there is also a universalization of identity. The question is if this universality is a consequence of a natural human tendency of essentializing ethnic groups or a process of ingroup projection. Conflict can be deemed (in a broad definition) ethnic if either the actors are defined in ethnic terms and/or the object of the conflict is recognition as an ethnic group and/or the conflict began with ethnic violence and/or the conflict leads to an ethnization of the actors and/or the conflict is being regulated in terms of ethnicity. Kelman (1997b, p. 335) clearly states that “national identity is the psychological underpinning of national self-determination; that is, establishment of an independent state and other forms of self-determination are attempts to give political expression to a group’s national identity.”

Identity reflects the state of mind of an individual toward his or her social community. It represents a process of discovering and generating a consciousness toward one’s environment, a social assertion of the self as being somebody in the world. The function of national identity is described by Kelman (1997b, p. 327) as follows: “Ethnonational identity groups are the primary entities through which basic human needs—the *societal* needs of individuals—are met.” Through such an identity the individual locates and defines him- or herself in the world, acquiring a collective personality based on shared values, experiences and orientations. As with the political culture, subjective orientations of the population give meaning to the overarching structural setting. Images of nations, of one’s own as well as foreign nations, are common and widespread in society and politics. Wuthe (1987) described the national community as the indispensable link between the general mass of human beings and familiar local and regional governments.

Staab (1998) formulates a good definition of national identity, which captures the importance of emotional attachment in the context of forming

a national identity by the two German countries in the recently reunified Germany:

The nation represents a prominent object for people's emotional attachment and provides the scope for the individual's search for definition and location within the world. National identity levels individuality and emphasizes communality, whereas the nation forges common loyalties and emotional attachments out of a heterogeneous mass of individuals. National identity rests on common values that are born out of a shared past and a shared vision of the future. As such, the nation blends two fundamentally different sets of principles. (p. 11)

1.1.3 Ethnicity and Conflict

What do I consider to be an ethnic conflict in this dissertation? It is a conflict in which the aspect of ethnicity has been politicized in order to achieve a political goal. Conflict is different from other group settings. So what makes the use of ethnicity different from using other identities in conflict? It seems that using ethnic or national identity in conflict has specific meaning for the development of conflict and effects on the process of conflict. Williams (2001) states that ethnicity, when rendered highly salient, provides an attractive base for political entrepreneurs. Similarly Gagnon Jr (1994) states that long-ago wrongs are effective instigators of today's conflict only when reactivated and politicized, often as the product of elites' manipulation. Gurr (1993) describes main factors that favor group conflict, including strong identity, inequalities and grievances, political opportunity structures allowing mobilization, provocative state policies, and international contagion and diffusion. Williams (2001) points out that many ethnic conflicts develop into protracted warfare because one party believes that another seeks total and irreversible domination. He concludes that fear of extinction is far more common in protracted ethnic conflicts than previously recognized.

In conflict resolution research on protracted conflict scholars, such as Burton (1987), distinguish between conflicts that focus primarily on resources and those that focus on identity. But Lederach (1997) points out that protracted conflicts tend to become (if they did not already start out as) identity-based, such that two-thirds of the world's conflicts at that time could be defined as identity conflicts. In Coleman's overview in

the *Handbook of conflict resolution* (P. T. Coleman, 2000) these identity-based conflicts end up being experienced as lose-lose conflicts in which the alternative to continued fighting is annihilation. Coleman contrasts what he describes as intractable (or protracted) conflicts with manageable conflicts. The characteristics he lists, which are different for protracted conflicts, include issue centrality (needs or values), pervasiveness of the conflict, hopelessness, motivation to harm, and resistance to resolution. As Burgess and Burgess (1996) put it in their description of three types of issues leading to intractable conflict, irreconcilable moral differences lead to a protracted conflict. Fisher and Keashley (1990) describe that, with the escalation of conflict, issues of conflict become more focused on basic needs or values and ultimately on the very survival of the parties. In their model this is described as the fourth stage of conflict escalation, destruction. Pruitt (2001) states that “another unique aspect of groups is the role of leadership. Leaders and would-be leaders often dramatize frustration at the hands of other groups, exacerbating conflicts while strengthening their position with their constituents.” (p. 2531) J. Z. Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim (1994) observe that escalation is often accompanied by other changes: “issues proliferate, negative attitudes and partisan perceptions develop, distrust sets in, goals change from doing well for one’s self to hurting the other party, and broader communities polarize into hostile camps.” J. S. Coleman (1957) remarks that these kinds of changes outlive the conflict in which they are generated, hurting the broader relationship between the parties and making the next conflict episode more likely to escalate.

In summary in the cited descriptions and definitions ethnic conflict is characterized by a resistance to resolution, a motivation to harm the outgroup and a pervasiveness of conflict in everyday life. In chapter 2 I will give an argument why protracted conflict takes on these properties.

1.1.4 Essentialism and constructionism

Both the essentialist and the constructionist perspective are important for the study of national identity in conflict resolution. I see national identity to be both essentialized and constructed. Essentialism, on the one hand, can explain why many people tend to readily respond to and use ethnic or national markers as group boundaries. Constructionism, on the other hand, is an important perspective in comprehending the changing nature of what nations stand for, believe of themselves and ultimately to make sense of political processes within a nation that may change the outlook of a whole nation. A constructionist perspective also enables us in the

realm of conflict resolution to look for alternative ways of resolving or transforming conflict.

Reicher and Hopkins (2001) impressively demonstrate in the context of Scottish politics the constructed nature of national identity. Opposing political parties and political projects (favoring the Union with Britain or advocating Scottish independence) both use the same myths and heroes and employ them to opposing political ends. Even the same politician in different contexts can use the same myths in opposing ways. They demonstrate that entrepreneurs of identity are able to adapt their construction of national identity to different social situations. In addition it becomes obvious that the so-called “essence of Scottishness” (such as, for example, tolerance) can be constructed as being the essence of independence *and* union with Britain.

But how could one question the reality of suicide attacks being carried out in the name of Palestinians against Israelis and claim that the fear of such attacks and its reminder of the Holocaust are just constructions? Or the other way around, how could one argue that the daily experiences of Palestinians under occupation and the feelings of powerlessness, despair, and injustice to the Palestinian people are just constructed? I believe it is important to have an understanding of how national identity in protracted conflicts is shaped by essentialist views on a day-to-day basis. So how can one make the case for looking at identity as a real-time constructionist process without losing touch with “reality” and failing to take the subjective experience of people belonging to a nation into account?

Gil-White (2001) describes his understanding of what an essentialist view of ethnicity is as the “hypothesis that ethnies (and similar social categories) are processed by the machinery which evolved to deal specifically with “natural living kinds” of the “folk-species” rank-level such as BEAR and MOUSE. Other social categories will typically not be processed in this way.” (p. 516) This implies that humans have an innate tendency to perceive different ethnies as differing from one another in the same way as a mouse is different from a bear. I would not follow this argument as far as this but he makes a good case as to why it is advantageous in everyday life to essentialize ethnies. Perceiving ethnies as more or less natural living kinds gives a good guidance as to whom one should trust immediately in day-to-day interactions. In that sense it is advantageous to our survival if we process individuals as belonging to certain categories. But I am not convinced that this is the only response we can have towards ethnies. Gil-White is also conscious of the tension between the constructed nature of ethnic identity and every day essentialized representations when he states

that “constructivists often appear to confuse the *fact* of ethnic-group construction with a *consciousness* by ethnic actors of such constructive processes.” (p. 516) Again I do not believe that this makes it necessary to assume that the only way humans can perceive ethnic groups is in an essentialized way. Ethnic entrepreneurs, for example, may not always be aware of the constructed nature of ethnicity but that does not make it impossible for actors to become conscious of this fact and integrate it in their actions. Gil-White (2001, p. 518) even gives a very good argument, albeit unintentionally, for a constructionist perspective, when he states that “different equilibria [of interactional norms] are possible because, for many domains, that [sic!] all members follow the same rules is vastly more important than their specific content.” So having an essentialized view of a large social category is advantageous for the establishment of interactional norms but does not necessarily imply that essentialized processing is the only way to view these categories.

Recent research in psychology on essentialism (Haslam, Bastian, Bain, & Kashima, 2006; Demoulin, Leyens, & Yzberbyt, 2006) has focused on the structure and use of lay theories of essentialism. This focus underlines that essentialism is seen as a real-world phenomenon that influences individuals’ perceptions of and behavior toward their environment when confronted with social groups. Demoulin et al. (2006) demonstrate that social categories can vary not only in the degree to which they are essentialized but similarly essential categories can differ in their perceived natural kindness and entitativity. Demoulin et al. demonstrate that forced social categories, which are categories whose membership is imposed upon group members (such as gender), tend to be essentialized by being perceived more as natural kinds, while chosen social groups, where membership is dependent on group members’ personal choice, are essentialized more in terms of entitativity. Haslam et al. (2006) try to integrate research on implicit person theories into a broader concept of essentialism. Haslam et al. give evidence for the importance of essentialism for understanding in- and outgroup attitudes. For the concept of infra-humanization (Leyens et al., 2003) this implies, for example, that infra-humanization of an outgroup only occurs if the ingroup is seen as an essentialized category. Haslam et al. go on to highlight the importance of essentialism as a concept that includes beliefs of immutability, discreteness, informativeness and the existence of a biological basis as characteristic of an essentialized group. In this research it also becomes evident that essentialism is not necessarily negative as it can provide help for low-status or minority groups to support progressive views of social order and change. Research on es-

sentialism has gained momentum over the last years that give us a better understanding of the cognitive, attitudinal and behavioral implications of essentializing social categories. This is different from claiming that a certain social category actually has, for example, a biological foundation that necessarily makes category boundaries immutable. The difference between understanding lay theories of essentialism and reflecting upon the “real” constructionist process of creating social categories is important. Too often the existence of essentialist beliefs is confused with an essential nature in a scientific sense of social categories.

Reicher and Hopkins (2001), in my opinion, demonstrate clearly that social actors are constructing ethnic or national identity on a day to day basis, while Gil-White (2001) rightfully points to the fact that this does not necessarily imply their own consciousness about that construction and even less that of their audiences. He also points out that ethnic identities are “constructed with ideologies of descent-based membership that constrain the constructive process.” (p. 519) This is important as we think about what a change in identity to support conflict resolution could look like. So it may not be necessary to believe that ethnic or national identity is either a constructed or an essential category. It is both. Depending on the perspective it is a constructed identity, which is at the same time essential in everyday use. In fact, I believe that the power of national or ethnic identity lies in the fact that it is both. It is possible to change national identity, which is a constructionist process. The huge impact that this change may have, is based on the essentialist perception of national identity by group members.

I would like to end this section by quoting Kelman (1997b, p. 336) on the duality of the essentialist and constructionist nature of national identity:

Empirically, national identity is a psychological conception, which cannot be dictated or prescribed by outsiders. [...] On the other hand, however, how a group defines itself often has significant consequences for others. The moment a group acts on the self-definition of its nationhood [...] its chosen identity has an impact on the interest, rights, and identity of other groups. [...] The social construction of the identity implies a degree of arbitrariness and flexibility in the way the identity is composed [...]. These choices depend on the opportunities and necessities provided by the elites that are engaged in mobilizing ethnonational consciousness for their political, economic, or religious purposes.

1.1.5 Bad versus good nationalism?

If we only look at nationalism and thus national identity as something bad we may miss the point. Reicher and Hopkins (2001) make this point by showing how different concepts of national identity can be employed by different entrepreneurs of identity or even by the same in different circumstances. Even within the very bad situation of protracted ethnic conflict, nationalism is not in itself evil, only to the extent that it supports sustaining violent conflict at all costs. National identity has a function and is being used to attain the goal of supporting conflict. If one wants to resolve conflict, one has to use the same mechanisms and therefore change national identity to fit the project of conflict resolution. That idea is only feasible if national identity in itself is not viewed as bad. Mummendey, Klink, and Brown (2001) looked at the relation between a positive feeling toward one's ingroup and negative feelings or derogation toward an outgroup. They found that "national identification and ingroup evaluation only show a reliable relationship with outgroup rejection if the judgments are based upon an intergroup comparison but not so if based on temporal comparisons or in control conditions" (p. 168). This means that if a focus is put on comparing the ingroup favorably to an outgroup that outgroup is derogated, while a focus on a positive evaluation of the ingroup through a favorable comparison to the same ingroup in the past does not lead to outgroup derogation but still provides for a positive view of the ingroup. Mummendey et al. (2001) relate this finding to the concepts of blind and constructive patriotism (Staub, 1997), seeing judgments based on intergroup comparisons as blind patriotism and temporal judgments as constructive patriotism. A similar distinction is that between nationalism and patriotism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) with patriotism as a good use of social identity and nationalism as a bad use. I believe that in analyzing protracted ethnic conflict it might be more helpful to consider these different relationships between ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation as a function of the content of national identity that is constructed. Showing different possibilities in imagining national identity can open the door to changing national identity from supporting conflict to supporting conflict resolution. Judging the nationalism one finds in protracted ethnic conflict as immoral or bad does not help to understand the motivational impact the current national identity has on the conflict and can discredit the conflict parties as being bad. This would be contrary to efforts that try to involve conflict parties in order to resolve the conflict.

1.2 Social Identity

The *social identity approach* (see for example Wagner & Zick, 1990) consists of several theories and concepts. The concept of social identities was first developed by Tajfel (1978) and Tajfel and Turner (1979) as an explanation for effects found in studies based on the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Turner (1987a) further expanded social identity theory into self-categorization theory. Additional work by Brewer (1991) on the concept of *optimal distinctiveness* and Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) on *prototypicality* has further elaborated the concept of social identity. These will be covered in the following subsections. Gartner's work on reducing intergroup conflict (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), while linked to social identity theory, will be covered separately in section 1.4.

1.2.1 Social identity theory

One can summarize *Social Identity Theory* (SIT) established by Tajfel & Turner (Tajfel, 1974, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1987a) as follows: an individual wants to establish and uphold positive self-esteem; this self-esteem is in part derived from an individual's social identities; social identity is said to provide positive self-esteem through belonging to a positively valued group; the valuation of the group is achieved by comparing the ingroup to other important groups. SIT posits that there exists a continuum between personal identity and social identity. Depending on context an individual will define himself somewhere along that continuum. In the minimal group paradigm Tajfel et al. (1971) demonstrated that individuals have a tendency to favor their ingroup when allocating resources. Tajfel (1978) argues that this ingroup favoritism occurs because individuals seek to promote their group's status, and through that their own self-esteem, in comparison to an outgroup. The minimal group paradigm also demonstrated that ingroup favoritism already occurs when an individual is *randomly* assigned to one of two groups, is aware of the randomness, does not know any ingroup or outgroup member, and is distributing resources to these anonymous ingroup and outgroup members without any benefit to himself. In other words, individuals may act in terms of their social identity even if that social identity is a random assignment. The minimal group paradigm also implies that there is no strong reason for the individual to act in terms of their individual identity. The relationship between individual and group identity within SIT is

described in terms of *salience*. Turner (1987b) in his *self-categorization theory* further explains the conditions of salience as we will see in section 1.2.2.

Another aspect of social identity is its theorizing on group action. If there are status differences between two groups, these can be described in terms of perceived legitimacy of the difference and the permeability of group boundaries. If the boundaries are perceived to be permeable and the status difference is perceived to be legitimate, individuals who belong to the lower-status group can improve their social status and their self-esteem by trying to move up into the higher-status group. If the group boundaries are not permeable this option is not open to a group member. If the relationship between the two groups is perceived to be legitimate, the status quo will continue to exist. If on the other hand the relationship is perceived to be illegitimate by the lower-status group there is a possibility for group action if the individual members cannot exit the low-status group (impermeable boundaries). One possibility is to change the comparison dimension between the two groups so that the lower-status group compares more favorably with the higher-status group. Lower-status group members call this an act of creativity. If this is not possible or not desirable the lower-status group can engage in a direct confrontation over group status with the higher-status group. This is the case when we deal with protracted identity-based conflict. In order for a low-status group to mobilize, active group members have to perceive a certain degree of group efficacy. They have to believe that collective action has a possibility to change the current relationship between the two groups.

1.2.2 Self-categorization theory

One central assumption of *self-categorization theory* (SCT) is that individuals derive part of their self-concept from their membership in social categories, that is their self-categorization (Turner, 1987b). These self-categories vary in their degree of inclusiveness and are hierarchically related to each other, in that social categories are compared to each other on the basis of their shared next more inclusive category. SCT also assumes that self-categories tend to be positively evaluated. This is equivalent to having or maintaining a positive social identity in *social identity theory*. As Turner (1987b, p. 48) put it “The comparison of different stimuli depends upon their categorization as identical (the same, similar) at a higher level of abstraction, and takes place on dimensions that define their higher level identity”.

Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) stress this point when they state that “the superordinate identity thus implies the relevant dimensions for comparison. It also implies the value connotations of the dimensions” (p. 164). The value connotations are implied in the prototype for the positively valued superordinate category to which both ingroup and outgroup are compared. So the ingroup will be more positively evaluated than an outgroup if it is perceived by the evaluator to be more prototypical of the superordinate category. Ingroup favoritism described in social identity theory can be described as a function of perceived prototypicality of the ingroup in relation to some salient outgroup for the category that contains both the ingroup and the outgroup. As Mummendey and Wenzel put it, “the concept of relative prototypicality on valued dimensions of the inclusive category corresponds to SIT’s concept of positive distinctiveness” (p. 164).

According to Turner’s self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987b), if and when a given social identity becomes salient depends on fit and readiness. Personal variables describe the readiness of an individual to perceive a given situation in terms of a social identity and the situational context describes how well that situation fits or lends itself to a perception in terms of a social identity. Depending on fit and readiness one will perceive certain situations in group terms. Self-categorization theory also postulates that when this happens there is a functional antagonism, which renders other possible identities less salient and influences the perception of a situation in terms of the salient group identity. This means that on a cognitive level we start to process information in terms of group membership accentuating the social categories in a given situation. It also leads us to selective and biased information that helps us support a positive view of our social identity. These mechanisms are important in understanding the pervasiveness of protracted conflict in the identities of conflict parties. It is a circle of information selection and augmented salience of the conflict identity that supports the existence of protracted conflict.

1.2.3 Optimal distinctiveness

Brewer (1991) describes her understanding of social identity as follows:

“[...] social identity derives from a fundamental tension between human needs for validation and similarity to others (on the one hand) and a countervailing need for uniqueness and individuation (on the other) [...] Social identity can be

viewed as a compromise between assimilation and differentiation from others, where the need for deindividuation is satisfied within in-groups, while the need for distinctiveness is met through intergroup comparisons. (p. 477)”

In explaining why individuals may link part of their self-esteem to a group Brewer (1991) posits in her *optimal distinctiveness theory* two social motives, inclusion and differentiation. Social identities are therefore a result of a need for inclusion and differentiation. Social identities fulfill both needs by offering an identity that links an individual to other group members (inclusion) and at the same time provides a differentiation by contrasting the ingroup with a relevant outgroup.

Brewer (2001) argues that the effect of “ingroup love”, that is ingroup favoritism, does not necessarily imply “outgroup hate” or discrimination. As an example she cites Mummendey and colleagues’ (Mummendey et al., 1992; Mummendey & Otten, 1998) findings that a shift from distributing positive outcomes to negative ones reduces the ingroup bias. Mummendey and Otten (1998) stress that the difference may stem from the *normative* difficulty to harm others instead of “just” benefiting the ingroup. Benefiting the ingroup is normative in the sense of being a “good” member, so in distributing positive outcomes favoring the ingroup should be the norm. But harming the other is not in itself normative for a group member as it lacks justification if it does not benefit the ingroup. *If* a justification, as to why harming the other benefits the ingroup, is given a group member should be expected to harm the other in order to help support the ingroup. This harm is then not seen as distributing negative consequences but just(ly) *withholding positive* benefits.

Brewer (2001) argues that in order for outgroup hate to occur interests of ingroup and outgroup first need to be perceived as being in conflict, with each other. This is an important condition for justifying harming the other group. Framing group goals as opposed and mutually exclusive to those of another group serves this purpose. It provides the perception of conflict (opposition of goals) and a justification for harming the other (mutual exclusivity of goals). The goals of both parties are framed in such a way that if one group wants to achieve X the other group will have to give up their goal for it. We will see that reversing this zero-sum perception of conflict is an important goal of the interactive problem solving approach and other conflict resolution efforts.

The content of identity can provide an answer to the question why national identity seems to be such a force in protracted conflict. National

identity seems to be an especially inclusive identity that includes almost everybody one knows as a member and extends a sense of shared identity to many people a person is going to meet in daily life. In addition national identity also includes myths of a shared past and common fate. These myths usually refer to outgroups that are different to the ingroup (“not like us”), have threatened the ingroup in the past or, in the case of conflict, are threatening the ingroup. In this way national identity can also provide distinctiveness. A perceived threat posed by an outgroup can provide the grounds for considering the ingroup to be “good” while allowing for the dehumanization of the other (see also section 1.3.1). As Brewer (2001) argues identification with the group has to be established before a group member will act in a hostile way towards members of an outgroup. This is one explanation for the difficulty to mobilize a large group for political action but also provides a rationale for using nationalism or ethnicity as a political tool as it is a readily available, wide-spread identity, which has a history of discourse in society, and usually is framed in essentialist terms, all important aspects in mobilizing a constituency for political action.

National identity seems to be a prime candidate to serve the purpose of having an identity that is optimally distinctive as it includes a large group with a (constructed) shared fate while being very distinct from other nations. How do you get to perceive a conflict in zero-sum terms? This can only happen if the other can be construed as threatening the very existence of one’s group. So, in terms of SIT, the distinction between the two groups has to be highly valued for both and the group’s status perceived to be illegitimate and changeable, which allows for a perception of group efficacy and collective action. The next section focuses on issues of mobilizing individuals to participate in group action.

1.2.4 Politicized identity

Simon and Klandermans (2001) define the notion of a politicized collective identity as a social identity that revolves around the following triads: an individual must act as a member of a social group, this group needs to be involved in a power struggle, and this power struggle is about control in the wider societal context. To illustrate this process Simon and Klandermans use the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Here politicization of identity means that individuals have to act as *Palestinians* or *Israelis* in a given situation rather than acting as, say, parents or in terms of other identities. The power struggle between the two groups is, among many other things, about being recognized as states, achieving security

for their nation or ethnicity, and changing or maintaining the power balance respectively. In this process both sides appeal (and have appealed) to an overarching notion of nation state, their right to self-determination and self-defense, and involve third parties such as the US, Arab states, UN, and the EU. Ethnicity and national identity are important in getting as much support as possible, in justifying their continued social action, and in appealing to third parties.

Simon and Klandermans (2001) distinguish five functions or needs that collective identity serves: belongingness, distinctiveness, respect, understanding, and agency. Ethnic identity seems to be a very good candidate to fulfill these functions in a protracted conflict. Section 1.2.3 already described the first two needs. Ethnicity can be construed, through the use of myths such as blood ties amongst members, to create a sense of belongingness for a large group of people, while, through using the same idea of different bloodlines, maintaining a strong distinction from other groups. The need for respect from others, served by belonging to a group and being a respected member of that group, is described by Simon and Klandermans as a necessary precondition for self-respect and self-esteem. Understanding is served through social identity by providing a perspective or frame of reference from which the world can be understood. A member's perception of a group's agency is important to achieve the group's goal and a member can also count on social support from other group members. All of these needs combine to form a politicized collective identity. Special about the politicization is that "*politics* is typically defined as the constrained use of power by people over other people" and "that politicized collective identity can be understood as a form of collective identity that underlies group members' explicit motivations to engage in such a power struggle" (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 323). This process unfolds through an awareness of shared grievances, which are then blamed on an external enemy and finally the group seeks the involvement of a third party or the larger society. The creation of a movement for self-determination follows this path by basing the claim of shared grievances in a specific version of history that usually already includes another to be blamed for the group's predicament. A full-fledged national movement appeals to the larger group insofar as they present a "self-evident" right to nationhood just as all the other nations in the world.

In addition Simon and Klandermans (2001) note that there are several psychological processes, which operate in the service of collective identity. Stereotyping and self-stereotyping are employed by individuals at the cognitive level when they process information based on their

collective identity, which has its correspondence in conformity at the behavioral level. Threats to a collective identity entail prejudice processes at the affective level and discrimination at the behavioral level (Duckitt, 2003). Citing work by Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) on prototypicality, Simon and Klandermans point out that in conflict “each group can be expected to strive for hegemony, claiming that their own position is or should be prototypical or normative for that more inclusive “ingroup”, whereas the position of the other group is discredited as beyond the latitude of general acceptance.”

Why do people engage in conflict and stay there? How do they do it? Social identity theory predicts that people engage in collective action if they perceive their group as disadvantaged, group boundaries as non-permeable, and the current structure as illegitimate. In addition a perception of high efficacy of group action compared to individual action can support collective action. But what motivates an individual to participate in a social movement that is getting underway? In several studies on different groups in the US and Germany (Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, & Jörger, 2003; Stürmer & Simon, 2004) Simon and Stürmer have shown that willingness to participate and actual participation is influenced by two *independent* pathways. The first is based on cost–benefit calculations, usually researched in social movement research, the second is based on collective identification. Identification is an independent pathway that predicts participation in social movements in addition to, not in interaction with, cost–benefit calculations. In addition Stürmer and Simon (2004) found that, with the development of a fierce conflict, identification with the broader recruitment category, which had not been a unique predictor for movement participation, can politicize to such an extent that it also becomes a strong predictor. That means that identification with the group in itself can motivate participation in a movement independently of the perceived costs and benefits. If a movement is framed in terms of a group identity that is pervasive and with which individuals can easily identify, such as an ethnic identity, individuals can be motivated to participate in the movement even if the cost–benefit relation is negative, as for example it could be the case for Palestinians. Even more to the point, Stürmer and Simon (2004) found that, with the development of a fierce conflict, identification with the broader recruitment category (in our example all Palestinians, in the case of Stürmer and Simon gays) could politicize identity to such an extent that it becomes a strong predictor in addition to the usual correlation between identification with the movement, for example the PLO, and movement participation. This is

strong evidence for the pervasiveness of conflict, which can turn formerly uninvolved bystanders into active supporters of a movement. Here again we can see how a formerly diverse social identity, such as being Palestinian, can become a rigid identity that supports conflict, such as the PLO as a representative of all Palestinians. This is evidenced by the list of needs and fears, which can be found in section 4.2.2, where the PLO as representatives of the Palestinian people finds its way into the needs stated before the declaration of principles in 1993.

1.2.5 Ingroup projection

Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) describe the process of *ingroup projection* as “pronouncing the positions and attributes of the ingroup to be prototypical for the inclusive category” (p. 164). In doing so the “ingroup claims to be the more prototypical and thus superior subgroup, compared to the relevant outgroup.” (p. 165) Social discrimination implies not only a favoritism of the ingroup by perceiving it to be more prototypical of the superordinate category but differences with regard to the outgroup can also be perceived as a challenge to the ingroup’s position in the inclusive category. If both groups are seen to be included in a more abstract social category the outgroup’s difference challenges the positive value of the ingroup’s norms and will be evaluated negatively. So “differing outgroups in the inclusive category, for whom these norms should also apply, are considered nonnormative and inferior and their positions are deemed false.” (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999, p. 165)

There is a conflict over the adequate social categorization itself; social discrimination is the secondary phenomenon. This disagreement or conflict is essential for the phenomenon of social discrimination. If the groups agree on the relative prototypicality of either group for a consensually evaluated inclusive category, then a different evaluation of the groups is not experienced as social discrimination. Turner (1987b, p. 58):

On the contrary, one’s personal self may compare unfavorably with other ingroup members in terms of a positively valued ingroup self-category, and an ingroup category may be perceived less favorably than an outgroup in terms of one’s definition of ideal human beings.

The important conclusion is that a disagreement on prototypicality between the two groups involved is the essence of social discrimination,

potentially resulting from the reciprocal process of projecting ingroup attributes onto the inclusive category. Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) illustrate the derogation of the outgroup very well using the case of a split in one group and describe derogation as “based on an ethnocentric generalization of ingroup attributes through their projection onto the formerly common ingroup, which remains the inclusive background”.

In order to illustrate the concept of prototypicality and how it concerns intergroup relation we can use Germans and Italians as examples for prototypical Europeans. In comparing their ingroup to a superordinate group, here Europeans for Germans and Italians, both groups tend to project their own ingroup as being prototypical for the superordinate group. What does that do in case of a conflict over what it means to be European? It allows for an upholding of group differences, with both groups claiming to be the better Europeans. This is part of the struggle to define what a social category means. Prototypical members signify the content of the social category. So in this case, Germans might claim that a prototypical European should be well organized, hard working and frugal, attributes on which Germans are more prototypical than Italians, while Italians might claim that the prototypical European should be cultured, have a *savoir vivre*, be passionate and so on. By competing over the definition of a prototypical European the assumed conflict between Germans and Italians would include and express itself through the supraordinate identity.

As Brewer (2001) (see also section 1.2.3) stated, there will be no discrimination unless there is legitimacy. How can ingroup projection provide legitimacy to discriminate against another group? Legitimacy can be derived from the projected prototype for the superordinate category which the ingroup is seen to conform to and the outgroup deviates from. Depending on what is being defined as a prototypical “ought”, rules change within the larger group. This normative aspect makes it possible to legitimize discrimination against the outgroup if the ingroup norm is postulated as prototypical for the superordinate group and the outgroup norm deviates from one’s ingroup position. If a prototypical member is religious and concerned with family values, then any member that wants to or has to belong to the group ought to be a family person and religious. So a struggle to be more prototypical for an inclusive category than the outgroup can also lead to changes in norms for the ingroup as the pressure to conform to ingroup norms is increased for group members, which is something that can be observed in parties to protracted conflict. What is especially important here is that prototypicality also adds a normative aspect to the social identity. If, on the other hand an outgroup is deemed not to be part

of the superordinate category, tolerance should be the result. But the exclusion of an outgroup from a superordinate category, especially if this should be the category of being human, may also lead to a withholding of rights from the outgroup, in the case of being human to a dehumanization of the outgroup.

1.2.6 Critical reflections on SIT

Social identity theory has been criticized from various directions and in various aspects. Brown (2000) summarizes the biggest problems and challenges facing Social Identity Theory. According to Brown, there are four major areas of criticism.

First, the self-esteem hypothesis put forth in SIT can be separated into two parts: first, positive intergroup differentiation should result in elevated self-esteem, and second, people with initially depressed self-esteem should show more differentiation in order to restore it to 'normal' levels. Brown (2000) points out that these two aspects of self-esteem have not received unequivocal support, the first hypothesis fared better than the second (M. Rubin & Hewstone, 1998, reported that 9 out of 12 studies and 3 out of 19 studies supported the assumed relation). Brown argues that the weak and inconsistent correlation between intergroup differentiation and self-esteem may be attributable to social desirability factors. In addition the hypothesized link fared much better when implicit rather than explicit measures of self-esteem were used. Farnham, Greenwald, and Banaji (1999) showed that there was a social desirability not to express too much or too little self-esteem and too much intergroup derogation. Brown (2000) concludes that the motivational role of self-esteem in producing outgroup derogation should be de-emphasized and increased self-esteem should rather be seen as by-product of discrimination. He also proposes that an increase in self-esteem could be due to the reduction of uncertainty associated with outgroup derogation.

The second challenge of concern for SIT focuses on the so-called positive-negative asymmetry. SIT processes may only be applicable to discrimination and favoritism in the positive domain. Mummendey and Otten (1998) advanced three possible explanations for this phenomenon: a normative explanation, a cognitive explanation and an explanation focusing on recategorization. The most influential explanation is recategorization. Mummendey and Otten argue that, when individuals are faced with unusual and undesirable negative distributions this creates a perception of a common fate among them and former outgroup members, recategorizing

them as ingroup members and leading to no discrimination. According to this recategorization account, the reason why discrimination with negative outcomes reappears with minority or low-status ingroups is that such conditions make it more difficult for the recategorization to occur due to the heightened salience usually associated with such groups. Another explanation was provided by Reynolds, Turner, and Haslam (2000). They argue that people may resist seeing themselves in a negative light, which would decrease the 'normative fit' of categories when negative outcomes are to be distributed. The finding that the asymmetry disappeared when fit and valence were controlled for supported this explanation.

Thirdly, the effect of intergroup similarity is ambivalent as similarity can create both less and more bias. The increase in outgroup bias is more consistent with SIT predictions. Brewer's optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991; see also section 1.2.3) holds that there is a trade off between the needs for inclusion and distinction for individuals in choosing and constructing social identities, which may also operate at a group level. This would explain the ambivalent findings with regard to intergroup similarity. In some cases the similarity would be a threat to distinctiveness, increasing intergroup bias, while in other cases an inclusion or assimilation to a positively valued similar outgroup would be more desirable, decreasing outgroup bias.

Fourth, the actual grounds for the choice of a specific identity maintenance strategy are unclear and these choices seem rather unpredictable. One promising avenue in explaining different choices of strategies by different individuals is found in examining the influence of group identification. Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (1997) hypothesized for example that more committed group members would be the least likely to opt for the strategy of individual mobility. Overall there seems to be a negative correlation between individualistic strategies and group identification.

All of these questions about and possible inconsistencies in SIT are important and interesting. My main focus in using SIT in this project, however, is on the existence and possible structure of social identities in conflict resolution. Protracted ethnic conflict seems to be a prime candidate for an analysis that is informed by SIT. The motivational aspects of SIT, while not without questions, seem to be very clear in protracted conflict situations where a self-definition of a group has developed into a strong movement participation that includes many if not all of the group members.

One of the limitations mentioned by Brown (2000) regards the role of the content of a social identity. He concludes that "at present, SIT does

not differentiate between different kinds of groups. With the qualifications just noted, all groups—be they small face-to-face units or large scale societal categories—are thought to be psychologically equivalent for their members, at least as far as the operation of social identity processes are concerned” (Brown, 2000, p. 761). Brown and Torres (1996) have already shown that different kinds of groups had different psychological meanings to participants while the level of identification was similar across groups. The authors also found disparate correlations between identification and ingroup bias, a finding already reported above, supporting the theorized importance of the content of social identity on the effects expected by SIT. This look at the role of national identity in conflict resolution may hopefully inspire a look at the role of content in SIT theorizing.

Brown (2000) also concludes that a “future research agenda for SIT must be to theorize how, when and why groups display dislike, hostility and other forms of negative affect toward one another” (p. 761). He goes on to state that “one important ingredient in that task will be to develop a theoretical account which links identity processes to the formation and dissemination of belief systems that allow group members to justify such treatment of outgroup members or which legitimate inequality” (Brown, 2000, p. 769). In looking at the importance of social identity in creating and supporting a protracted conflict I am trying to bring together different results from SIT and related theories to form a view of national identity that is helpful in explaining its contribution to ethnic conflict and at the same time can give a guide as to how national identity might be employed in resolving conflict.

1.3 Investing in conflict

Research on justice perception, *Just World Theory* and also prejudice finds that people seem to have a need for justice. With regard to justice perception, a certain exchange can be viewed as just in terms of its outcome and/or in the way the outcome is arrived at (which is called distributive and procedural justice respectively). So even if the outcome is unfavorable to me I can perceive it as just if I believe the procedure which led to the decision is just. As stated above, intergroup conflict is not stable. In order to uphold it, I have to see it as justified to continue the conflict. If I believe my demands are unjust, I would actively engage in exiting or resolving the conflict. Assuming a need for justice makes it necessary to frame the conflict in such a way that I have the right to win what I want.

But if I need to forcefully occupy a land, or if people are being killed in the name of my group, or if I cannot freely choose how to live my life because I am being threatened by other group members if I deviate from the group norm, I need a way to justify the status quo to myself, as these instances may be in opposition to other values I hold dear, such as freedom of expression or the right to physical and psychological integrity. How can one achieve that in order for protracted conflict to exist?

One possible explanation lies in just world theory and research on prejudice: The need to see one's conflict position (one's demand) as just can be combined with prejudice in order to afford the creation of an absolute moral standard to which the ingroup complies and the outgroup does not. This use of prejudice while supporting one's moral account of the conflict can justify dehumanization of the other and support the conflict situation.

1.3.1 Prejudice

Prejudice is seen by Duckitt (2000) as a possibility to reduce a perceived threat by an outgroup. Prejudice is defined as an intergroup attitude and as a negative affective-motivational intergroup orientation. This implies that prejudice includes tendencies to act against the outgroup with, for example, aggression or avoidance and that the outgroup elicits negative emotions such as anger, fear or envy. Duckitt proposes that a threat can arise through a perception that a group exists in an uncertain or competitive environment. This threat can be related to different group characteristics, such as a threat to group status or the legitimacy of group characteristics, and can be perceived as a threat to group security or as competition. Duckitt relates responding with prejudice to these two different kinds of threat to two different worldviews: one is the view of the world as a competitive jungle, which he also relates to the individual-level variable of *social dominance orientation* (SDO), the other views the world as dangerous place and is related to the individual-level variable *right wing authoritarianism* (RWA). The use of prejudice is considered to help reduce the perceived threat from an outgroup through either competition with or a challenge to the outgroup. In the first worldview a prejudicial response to a competitive threat can take the extreme form of dehumanizing the other by focusing the prejudice on the inferior status of the outgroup in competition. In the second worldview a perceived threat to security can lead to prejudicial judgment that excludes the outgroup on a moral dimension in order to legitimize actions that ensure the security of the ingroup, which are neg-

ative for the outgroup. I believe that these responses of dehumanization and moral exclusion to a perceived threat by the outgroup are important aspects in turning ingroup love into outgroup hate (see section 1.2.3).

In their test of this dual process model of prejudice Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, and Birum (2002) found significant support for their model. Duckitt et al. demonstrated the mediating effect of RWA and SDO on the two hypothesized worldviews. A belief in a dangerous world increased prejudice, measured as both negative outgroup attitudes and positive ingroup attitudes, through a positive correlation with (that is mediation by) RWA. Similarly the perception of the world as a competitive jungle influenced prejudice through the mediation of SDO. Duckitt et al. also found that individuals' level of social conformity and tough-mindedness predicted the view of the world as a dangerous place and the view of the world as a competitive jungle respectively. They tested an alternative explanation for finding individual level and worldview influences on RWA and SDO. Duckitt et al. proposed that a competitive-jungle worldview might be used only by people high in SDO, as a legitimizing myth through which they might justify holding prejudiced attitudes. But this model did not fit the data and was therefore dismissed.

It is important to note that Duckitt et al. (2002) also emphasize that the intergroup context, in addition to the individual-level variables SDO and RWA, can play an important role in the expression of prejudice. They stated that "these effects [prejudice] varied as hypothesized according to the degree that out-groups seemed to be in directly threatening and competitive relationships with the in-group" (p. 86). Outgroups need to be perceived as threatening in order for prejudice toward them, mediated by worldview and SDO or RWA, to increase. This emphasis on perceived threat is similar to Brewer's argument (Brewer, 2001) that ingroup love only turns to outgroup hate *if* the outgroup is perceived as threatening to or in direct competition with the ingroup. In my current endeavor it seems important to recognize the influence conflict has on worldview. In the case of protracted conflict it seems to be the case that the outgroup one is in conflict with not only threatens the security of the ingroup but is also in direct competition with the ingroup over resources, such as land or water, and self-determination or recognition. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the threat to security can be exemplified in the existence of suicide bombers for the Israelis and army occupation for Palestinians. These are also everyday occurrences and therefore will likely deeply influence the view of the other and the world. Similarly both parties have engaged in direct competition not only over land and borders but also over recog-

nition of the legitimacy of their struggle by the international community. Both of these aspects of competition are also framed in zero-sum terms further underlining the direct competition of both groups. Duckitt et al. (2002, p. 88) summarize this implication of their model as follows: "One implication suggested by the model pertains to social environmental influences on ideological beliefs and prejudice. Social worldviews should be influenced not only by individuals' personalities but also by social reality. Consequently, social environments that are really dangerous and threatening or competitive jungles should both increase prejudice, the former by generating authoritarian attitudes and the latter through generating social dominance." This account underlines the importance of using myths in protracted conflict that make the outgroup responsible for the ingroup's current situation.

1.3.2 Just World Theory

Lerner (1980) developed the idea that people need to believe that the world is just. He asked why we would blame a victim of a crime and why this only occurs sometimes. He stipulated that negative reactions towards a crime, such as anger, derogating and blaming the victim, are motivated by a concern with justice. This concern with justice can explain both helpful and negative behavior towards victims. According to Lerner we develop as children a general justice motive in order to be able to enter into long term contracts and to maximize profits. In order to be able to hold off immediate impulses with the aim of achieving benefits in the future, we need, according to Lerner a belief in a just world. Only a belief in a just world affords us the sentiments of entitlement and deservingness of future gains. Without these sentiments supporting the feeling of a right to future rewards it would not be wise to refrain from fulfilling our impulses now.

Lerner (1980) proposes nine strategies for dealing with threats to a justice motive that are part of the believe in a just world: two are rational, prevention and restitution; four are nonrational, reinterpreting the cause (blaming victim), character (derogating victim), or outcome (suffering builds character), and denial-withdrawal (physical and mental avoidance of injustice and withdrawing from threats when encountered); two are protective of the justice motive, there is an ultimate justice belief, which trumps the threat (everything will be alright), and a view of the environment as two different worlds, one is unjust and one is the one in which we prefer to be. Lerner also points to the option of pretending that one does not believe in a just world, which he characterizes as false cynicism.

In summary one can say that, according to just world theory, virtually all people, as a result of intrinsic developmental forces in combination with a relatively stable environment, develop a commitment to deserving their outcomes and to organizing their lives around principles of deservingness. For this commitment to be maintained, people need to believe in a just world, and, therefore, they are threatened by instances of injustice and motivated to reduce this threat through the above mentioned strategies, and to maintain the appearance that the world provides resources and ill fate as deserved.

Hafer and Bègue (2005) found individual differences in the belief that the world is a just place. This stands in some contrast to the claimed universality of a concern with justice. But even Lerner (1997, p. 129) points out that “the phrase ‘belief in a just world’ originally was intended to provide a useful metaphor rather than a psychological construct”. In keeping with the original theory Hafer (2000) argued that a primary function of a belief in a just world is to allow one to invest in long-term goals and to do so according to society’s rules of deservingness. Hafer and Bègue (2005) therefore supposed that people should have a greater need to believe in a just world if they have a strong focus on long-term investments and a strong desire to obtain goals through socially acceptable means. That is to say, the more people need to believe in a just world, the more they should be motivated to preserve a sense of justice in the face of contradictory evidence. Hafer (2000) provided evidence in this direction as she found evidence for a relation between a long-term goal orientation and a belief in a just world.

Supporting the claims of strategies employed in maintaining a belief in a just world in the face of a grave injustice, Ellard, Miller, Baume, and Olson (2002) demonstrated that the perpetrator is seen as evil and is demonized by participants if he showed no remorse and there was no justification given for the crime. This reaction was correlated to the strength of a belief in a just world, the higher this belief was the more the perpetrator was described as evil. Karuza and Carey (1984) by contrast examined the preferred strategies to *restore* just-world belief: they found that behavioral blame was superior at maintaining or strengthening a belief in a just world compared to characterological blame. They argued that this was due to the fact that behavioral blame provided a more direct explanation of the event, if such an explanation was feasible. Hafer and Bègue (2005) conclude that *innocent* suffering provokes the kind of characterological defenses described by Lerner (1980). They stated that “the injustice of innocent suffering can threaten observers, and, in the absence of reasonable

helping responses, observers of these injustices may deal with the threat in a less prosocial manner, for example, by distancing themselves from the victim or by derogating the victim's character" (p. 149). This seems to be very important in protracted conflict when one group is confronted with the injustices suffered by the other at their own hands. According to this account, the other could be dehumanized to describe their fate as deserved.

Support for this reasoning can also be drawn from Ellard's and Bates's investigation of the effect of unjust benefits (Ellard & Bates, 1990). They randomly assigned participants to a supervisor who either increased (unjust condition) or did not change (just condition) the status of the participant over that of a confederate during the course of the experiment. They reported that participants rated their own character more positively when they were of higher rather than of equal status relative to the other. Additionally, evaluations of participants' own fate and character were positively correlated, as were their ratings of the other's fate and character. Thus, it seemed that individuals rationalized the undeserved benefit bestowed upon them in these studies by the supervisor in order to maintain their notion of a just world. This rationalization was achieved by upgrading one's character to match one's status and linking it to the fate in the experiment.

Social rules of deservingness may function as a way to support conflict. In a conflict situation both sides have to justify their fight for their goal and the negative consequences for the other side as part of that conflict and if the goal is achieved. In order to achieve this goal, blaming the victim, derogating the other and believing in one's own high moral status, which supports one's deservingness of the desired outcome, are all strategies that should be expected to be employed by *both* conflict parties.

1.4 Reducing intergroup conflict

As my theoretical argument in chapter 2 aims at establishing a reconstruction of national identity as a feasible way to reduce intergroup conflict other theories on reducing intergroup conflict should be examined. In the realm of the contact hypothesis, first developed by Allport (1954), there have been many studies that investigate and theorize on the possibilities to reduce intergroup conflict through contact between members of the conflicting parties. A famous field experiment in the study of intergroup conflict has been the experiment conducted by Muzafer Sherif and

colleagues (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961) at a summer camp for boys at Robbers Cave. In this experiment boys were divided into two groups, which developed a strong competition and negative attitudes toward each other during the summer camp. Sherif et al. were able to shift the interaction between members of the two groups from intergroup conflict to cooperation by creating a shared superordinate goal for both groups, which could only be achieved through cooperation of the two groups. This shared goal eliminated the intergroup conflict and the distinction between the two groups and led to a superordinate identity in which all boys belonged to the same group. This is an extraordinary example of the power of categorizing participants into two groups, inducing conflict through competition, and recategorization of these two groups as belonging to the same superordinate group, thus creating a common ingroup and promoting cooperation between the former adversaries. Research on the contact hypothesis has influenced many researchers, including the development of Kelman's interactive problem solving approach. It is practiced in programs such as, for example, the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR). The data I am using in this dissertation (see chapter 3) stem from interactive problem-solving workshops.

Pettigrew (1998) summarized the conditions necessary to develop harmonious group relations through contact between members of conflict parties as follows: "equal status between the groups (optimally within and outside the contact setting), cooperative intergroup interaction, opportunities for personal acquaintance between outgroup members, and norms within and outside of the contact setting that support egalitarian intergroup interaction." But these conditions do not constitute, as Gaertner and Dovidio (2000, p. 71) put it, a "unifying conceptual framework that explains *how* these prerequisite features achieve their effect". Gaertner and Dovidio propose their Common Ingroup Model as such a framework. The model has been developed out of previous work on aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Gaertner and Dovidio found that participants consciously endorsing egalitarian values (that is, rejecting overt racism) still showed discriminatory behavior when this behavior could be justified on the basis of factors other than race. Participants held negative unconscious feelings and beliefs toward a group (in this case African-Americans) and acted in discriminatory ways while at the same time consciously expressing egalitarian values. Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) characterize aversive racism as a tension between feelings and values, which creates an ambivalence of participants toward members of an outgroup.

In the Common Ingroup Model developed out of this research on aversive racism Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) focus on possibilities of reducing intergroup prejudice and conflict. To this effect Gaertner and Dovidio propose that a shift of who is “we” and “they” is helpful in circumventing normal psychological processes involved in categorizing the social world into different groups, such as ingroup favoritism (as is the case in the minimal group paradigm, Tajfel et al., 1971). The Common Ingroup Model proposes different ways in which this can be achieved: decategorization, recategorization of the two groups into two subgroups belonging to a superordinate group and recategorization into a common (superordinate) group. As the title of the model already implies, Gaertner and Dovidio (2000, p. 7) state that “we view the recategorization of different groups into one group as a particularly powerful and pragmatic strategy for combating subtle forms of bias.”

The first strategy, decategorization, emphasizes that members of parties in conflict should view the other as an individual rather than belonging to a certain group. The perception of the other is therefore decategorized by reducing the view of the other in terms of their group membership and by increasing the perception of the other in terms of their individual characteristics. According to Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) ingroup favoritism is reduced in decategorization precisely because ingroup and outgroup members are all seen only as individuals. Another possible approach relies on emphasizing categories that cross ingroup/outgroup boundaries. Here the emphasis is placed on group memberships that some members of the conflict parties may share with members of the other side but not necessarily with members of their own group, for example gender, education or occupation.

Using Sherif et al.’s experiment at Robbers Cave as an example (Sherif et al., 1961), Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) state that *intergroup cooperation*, in the view of the Common Ingroup Model, induces participants to see themselves as one group rather than as two separate groups. This is the recategorization of individuals belonging to the same superordinate group. Gaertner and Dovidio conducted an analysis of which factors might mediate the effect of intergroup cooperation. They showed that a decategorization of individuals in the process of cooperation and a recategorization of the two initial groups into two subgroups reduced the positive effect of cooperation on the outgroup view, while a recategorization of participants as belonging to one inclusive group and the degree of cooperation increased the positive effect of cooperation on the outgroup view. Gaertner and Dovidio thus conclude that in this analysis the posi-

tive effect of cooperation was fully mediated by a recategorization of two formerly competing groups into one inclusive group. They also hypothesize that the perception of a *common fate* of two competing groups may have a positive effect on intergroup attitudes that is independent of cooperative interdependence. The experimental support is not unequivocal but Gaertner and Dovidio found at least less bias in facial expressions in the Common Fate condition, which was independent of a possible recategorization. These findings support the conditions that produce a positive outcome of contact put forth by Pettigrew (1998). The positive effect is explained through the Common Ingroup Model in the form of a “one group” representation as central mediator, a finding that has been reproduced in diverse environments such as in the laboratory, in stepfamilies, in corporate mergers and in the context of ethnic groups. The condition of equal status between parties in contact, however, does not seem to hold in every case. Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) note that an equal status between two groups may induce threats to the groups’ identity. Supporting their argument for the Common Ingroup Model, that is recategorization into one group, Gaertner and Dovidio note that recategorization into dual identities, that is keeping the old identities of both parties while focusing on a superordinate identity, can be a sign of failure if a new common identity is desired, as would be the case in mergers or the creation of a new family. But if two subgroups are seen as constructively working together for a common goal, as would be peace between Israelis and Palestinians, a dual identity predicts more positive intergroup relations in the case of a possible threat to the initial groups’ identity.

Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) conclude that mutual differentiation may be the best option for protracted conflict. This includes positively valuing the similarities and differences between groups in a context of intergroup cooperation. This is the Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model developed by Hewstone and Brown (1986). Gaertner and Dovidio (2000, p. 41) state that “win-win cooperative relationships can initiate mutually favorable feelings and stereotypes toward the members of the other group while emphasizing each group’s positive distinctiveness.” The Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model also has the benefit that the positive effect of contact is more effectively generalized to all members of an outgroup if the distinctiveness of both groups is kept up within the contact setting. With respect to generalizing the positive effects of intergroup contact, Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) propose a trade-off hypothesis between attitude change and generalization. They hypothesize that if group boundaries are erased during contact (complete decategorization or recat-

egorization into one group) a change toward a positive outgroup attitude is most likely and pronounced. However generalization of this effect would be close to zero precisely due to the removal of the initial group boundaries. If the contact situation is seen in terms of two distinct subgroups belonging to a superordinate category, generalization of the contact effects is highest. The strength of the superordinate category is seen as mediating the positive effect of contact, that is the stronger the identification with the superordinate category is the more positive the attitude change is going to be.

Chapter 2

National identity and conflict resolution

Initially I wanted to inform conflict resolution efforts on the role of national identity. In this pursuit it became necessary to first examine the role national identity plays in sustaining conflict. The examination of national identity in conflict provides insight into the role national identity can play in conflict resolution. This is the outcome of theorizing done during my work on interactive problem solving workshops using grounded theory. For the sake of clarity I will only present my theoretical ideas in this chapter. The process that led to these is detailed in chapters 3 and 4. The data I use in this dissertation stems from interactive problem solving workshops between Palestinians and Israelis (see section 3.2.1 for a description of the setting). This particular conflict is the focus of my work and is used most of the time as point of reference in this chapter. The interactive problem solving workshop itself has a specific aim. Its goal is to allow participants to overcome zero-sum perceptions of the conflict and mirror images of both parties in order to find new and innovative solutions for the conflict (see section 3.2 for a detailed description). It is with reference to this goal I examined the role of identity in conflict, trying to generate ideas for further improving the process.

2.1 National identity in conflict

In the last chapter many pieces concerning national or ethnic identity in protracted conflict were covered. They are all part of my reading during the grounded theory process. My aim is to present a view on the *function* of national identity in conflict in this section. Identity seems to play a central role in conflict. In section 1.1.3 we saw that many authors agree that ethnic conflicts have a potential for escalation (J. Z. Rubin et al., 1994; J. S. Coleman, 1957; Pruitt, 2001; Fisher & Keashley, 1990; Burgess & Burgess, 1996). In addition the authors point out that ethnic or national identity is very interesting for leaders as a tool to mobilize support. Social identity theory (section 1.2) provides different ideas on the *motivational* aspects for individuals to use a social identity, such as belonging to a group and being distinct from other groups, maintaining positive self-esteem (either as a byproduct or a goal of categorizing the world into social groups). Research in social identity theory has also shown that outgroup hate does not necessarily materialize easily and prejudice and discrimination are not a necessary outcome of efforts to establish a positive ingroup representation (sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.5). Social identity theory however regards any social identity as equal to another. That does not explain why national or ethnic identity seems to be a very good candidate to mobilize support. The framework of politicized identity (section 1.2.4) tries to explain how individuals decide to take part in social movements. One interesting result was that identification with the group can lead, independently of cost-benefit analyses, to movement participation. National identity is usually perceived as an essentialized category (section 1.1.4). This may be one reason why national identity is more easily used as a politicized identity than other social identities.

One important issue with regard to protracted ethnic conflict is the fact that conflict is an unstable state of affairs (section 1.1.1) that needs constant investment to uphold. Social identity theory (section 1.2.1) proposes several different options for individuals to act upon a perceived negative group identity, such as exiting the group or choosing different groups or dimensions for comparison. These are not necessarily good motivators for a group to stay in a protracted violent conflict. As has been pointed out in section 1.1.3 protracted ethnic conflict is characterized by a very strong moral dimension. How and why does this dimension enter into the initial effort of establishing social action towards self-determination? Two different but not necessarily exclusive explanations have been presented in section 1.3. One is Duckitt's work on prejudice (Duckitt, 2003). He explains prejudice as a reaction to a perceived threat by an outgroup.

Prejudice facilitates aggression toward or avoidance of the outgroup. The research is based upon *individual-level* variables social dominance orientation and right wing authoritarianism, that is to say that individual differences in these two aspects predict the degree to which an individual reacts towards a threat with prejudice toward the threatening outgroup. Duckitt et al. (2002) also note however that prejudiced reactions toward an outgroup also depend on social reality. If for example a conflict is framed in terms of its threatening aspects or a zero-sum competition for resources ingroup members will be more likely to hold prejudices toward the outgroup. A second explanation for the introduction of a moral dimension into conflict comes from just world theory (section 1.3.2). Lerner (1980) postulates a need for justice. A situation of protracted conflict would violate the principle of justice unless there is a justification for sustaining one's demand. If I want something that the other wants as well and we are not finding a compromise I have to have a good reason why I can justly uphold confronting the other on the issue. Individuals and groups should therefore be motivated to actively justify their demand in order to claim that the continued involvement in the conflict is just. It seems easier to achieve this by not only making an argument for one's own position but also by discounting the other's position. Discounting the other is usually associated with stereotyping and prejudice. Prejudice in conjunction with an absolute conception of morality provides the ingroup with a powerful justification for their goals. It also makes it easy for both conflict parties to see the question of just demands as a zero-sum situation. In an effort to sustain conflict it seems that outgroup enmity becomes an integral part of the national identity, which is part of and not just linked to ingroup amity. Both sides claim to have justice on their side and link it with their own absolute moral standard, which they comply with and the other side does not. Expressions of stereotypes and prejudices can easily be found in conflict and illustrate this point: "They cannot be trusted", "They only exist because of us", "They have always behaved in hostile ways, think of what they did to us in X". Here it is also easy to see how one's *own* (group) identity becomes an integral part of the conflict. What "they did to us in X" is part of the construction of one's own identity as the time X is usually also employed to define what it means to be part of the ingroup.

The moral standard can in turn, for example, be used in a process of ingroup projection (section 1.2.5), allowing for ingroup members to perceive themselves as adhering to moral standards while the outgroup is not. This process can lead to the dehumanization of the other and justify violent behavior towards the outgroup, which is usually found in protracted

ethnic conflict. In addition once a clear ingroup / outgroup distinction has been established, self-categorization theory (section 1.2.2) can provide an explanation for the increasing pervasiveness of these distinctions in protracted ethnic conflict. A conflict increases the salience of the categories, which in turn leads to an increased processing by individuals of their environment in terms of the social identity. This means that in the case of protracted conflict most everyday interactions will be perceived by group members in terms of their conflict group membership, discounting other possible perceptions of the world.




Figure 2.1: Identity supporting conflict

Figure 2.1 represents what I see as the process of creating, investing and upholding conflict. As I believe that conflict in itself is not a desired or stable situation, there needs to be an investment (as described above) for protracted conflict to occur. The protracted nature of the conflict brings with it certain properties and functions assigned to national identity that are relevant to consider for conflict resolution efforts. The cycle in Figure 2.1 leading to protracted conflict can be described as follows: A project that challenges the status quo, for example self-determination, is created for various reasons. In order to appeal to as many supporters as possible the project is framed in terms of a national or ethnic identity that has so far been repressed. It seems important that this identity can claim an essentialist nature in order to motivate a large audience for social action. The goal needs justification to motivate a constituency. If opposition is encountered the justification needs to be even stronger in order to form resistance against the opposition. This in turn sharpens the project as the

opponent becomes clearer and leads to an expression of national identity that compares the ingroup favorably to the outgroup. In addition the category becomes more salient as the struggle for self-determination comes to the fore. The salience of the conflict and possibly positive self-esteem derived from comparing to an outgroup can help attract more support from the public and sharpen prejudice toward the outgroup in order to justify the actions taken so far. A continuation of this cycle will move ingroup members to an ever more rigid self-definition. Conflict and identity definitions mutually influence one another.

Why is national or ethnic identity so especially powerful in creating, escalating, and sustaining conflict? Using ethnic identity in order to gain political support from a large group of people is one reason why ethnic identity becomes politicized. Turner (2005) states that power is the ability to have many people *act on one's behalf*. He notes that this is different from the usual perception that power is equal to being able to force as many people as possible to act on one's behalf. Ethnicity or nationalism thus provide the possibility of exerting much power by getting a large group, a nation, to act on one's behalf without having to use repressive force. So if entrepreneurs of identity strive for power they are well advised to do this in terms of nationalism or ethnicity. In addition national identity corresponds to an essentialist view of ethnicity that many group members share. In justifying the goal of prolonged conflict with an outgroup, ethnicity lends itself more readily than other group identities to acquiring a moral dimension. A deviation from the moral standard by the outgroup can support a feeling of belonging to a morally superior group for ingroup members. The deviation is attributed to a very distinct outgroup.

From a different point of view, Druckman (2003) points out that researchers in conflict resolution face a puzzle: The theme that initially motivated a group to take up social action is not the same theme that will continue to motivate that group if the action is being carried out for a period of time. Following the argument above it seems clear that the initial project of self-determination changes over time as a conflict arises and the process of justifying the existence of a protracted conflict adds a moral dimension to the project of self-determination. In protracted conflict national identities create an ingroup that is seen as morally superior to the outgroup in order to motivate and sustain group action. In doing so, national identity shifts from being a recruitment category to being the justification itself ("we are more moral than you"), possibly explaining this puzzle.

2.2 Palestinian/Israeli case

As I work with interactive problem solving workshops between Israelis and Palestinians, I believe it to be useful to examine this conflict more closely. In the Israeli-Palestinian case the Palestinian side is involved in a struggle for self-determination in which the public even tolerates suicide attacks and where social disobedience in the form of the Intifada was (successfully) practiced. This is evidence for a strong belief in a common social or national identity of being Palestinian. On the other side the Israelis are convinced of the legitimacy of the state of Israel and there is a broad consensus that it is in essence a Jewish state, whereby (at least) a Jewish majority of inhabitants is meant. The importance of this national identity can be seen in the fear in Israeli society of being “driven into the sea” by the Palestinians, the perceived necessity of a forceful army and the continued occupation of the West-Bank and Gaza.

Both sides claim that the other is behaving in unacceptable ways (for example: illegitimate occupation and settlements and suicide bombers) and especially that the other is not to be trusted. Take for example the Palestinian point of view of “security issues” as an Israeli excuse for “harassing” Palestinians and the Israeli claim that Palestinians do not accept a state of Israel in the Middle East and will do anything to destroy that state despite any proclamations to the contrary. This may serve as an example for the lack of trust on both sides. In this situation, as is characteristic in ethnic conflicts, the own group identity is being seen as threatened in its existence by the other (see also Kelman, 1987).

The identities of both conflict parties are also in a state of what Kelman (1999) calls *negative interdependence*. One implication is that the “the negative interdependence of the two identities has also burdened the parties with the requirement of maintaining the demonic image of the enemy. Affirming the enemy image is a common feature of conflict norms and indicator of group loyalty in deep-rooted conflict” (p. 591). Kelman points to the investment necessary to sustain a conflict, which I have outlined above:

“Negative interdependence [...] makes it more difficult and costly for each group to establish its own identity. It is not enough for it to demonstrate, to itself and to the rest of the world, its own legitimacy, authenticity, and cohesiveness as a national group; it has the additional burden of demonstrating the illegitimacy, inauthenticity, and lack of cohesiveness of

the other, often in the face of powerful evidence to the contrary. [...] A related indicator of negative interdependence has been the systematic effort to delegitimize the other's movement by placing it outside of the bounds of what the world community can tolerate. The most extreme examples of delegitimization of the other have been the equation of Zionism with racism and of Palestinian nationalism, as represented by the PLO, with terrorism. [...] Since racism and terrorism are morally unacceptable in human society, these designations make the other's national movement as such illegitimate by definition. Delegitimization in these cases verges on dehumanization in that it excludes the other from the moral community shared by all members of the human family. [...] One reason for the emphasis on keeping the demonic image intact is its contribution to the group cohesion that is deemed necessary to sustain the group in its life-and-death struggle. [...] The demonic image of the enemy is considered vital as support for the justice of the group's own cause'" (Kelman, 1999, p. 589–91)

In this description one can find the elements of social identity theory with a nation or national movement presenting itself as a group and contrasting favorably with another group for its constituency. In addition, as the identity has developed under threat from a different group, the national identity has to reflect characteristics of its constituency that make it possible to sustain a conflict with another group in order for the national identity to exist. This implies the negative features mentioned by Kelman (1999), which are evidence of the investment in conflict through claiming moral superiority over the other and denying their right to their identity. The previous section has given us some insight into how and why a group can arrive at the behavior described for the Israeli-Palestinian case above. Kelman's description of the conflict situation highlights the importance of investment into the conflict and the threatening expressions that this investment can take in protracted conflict. Hicks et al. (1995) offer a very useful distinction between three kinds of identity threats that occur in intergroup conflict: the fear of actual, physical annihilation, the fear of social annihilation and the fear of psychological annihilation. In sustaining a protracted ethnic conflict the fear of social and psychological annihilation, through the negative interdependence of identities and investment into the upholding of the conflict, become as important as, if

not more important than, the fear of physical annihilation. These fears are what make protracted conflict so prone to violence and difficult to resolve. Kelman (1999) concludes that “negative interdependence creates the conditions for protracted conflict”. In order to mobilize a constituency to enter into conflict, if that is deemed necessary to achieve one’s goal of self-determination, and to sustain the conflict, a national identity must be created in part through negative interdependence to provide the necessary tools to turn ingroup love into outgroup hate.

With regard to the impact of contact, Gaertner and Dovidio (2000, p. 162) note that “we do not believe that recategorization as one group, *at least by itself*, would be capable of sustaining favorable intergroup relations over the long term. Unless supported and sustained by group norms and the leadership structure, such an ephemeral superordinate connection between groups is unlikely to remain stable over time.” Gaertner and Dovidio cite Kelman’s interactive problem solving approach as a case in which a positive effect of contact is achieved through the use of a subset of members of conflict groups by temporarily creating a common ingroup identity, which, in their view, has significant residual effects for the groups as a whole (see also section 1.4).

2.3 Mirror images

One important aspect in conflict group interactions are mirror images. One goal of the interactive problem solving workshops is to make participants aware of these mirror images and reduce their impact on problem solving. Kelman (1997b) summarizes the impact of national identity in protracted conflict as follows:

“National identity, national self-determination, and the establishment of a state as the political expression of a group’s national identity are in themselves positive concepts [...] Yet, these positive, laudable goals often lead [...] to systematic efforts to destroy other peoples as part of a project of establishing an ethnically pure, homogeneous state or region [...] (p. 330)”

Mirror images are almost always found in protracted conflict and usually lead to a spiral of violence or military buildups, as was the case during the Cold War. They give us a clue that *both* sides are highly invested in

the conflict. In addition to the spiral of violence and investment in conflict, another consequence of mirror images is an increase in the difficulty to believe the other and recognize the similarities between parties and the common strategies used by both parties. This is in part due to cognitive biases that help maintain a positive self- and a negative other-image.

Group B \ Group A	Self-perception	Other-perception
Self-perception	+	-
Other-perception	-	-

Figure 2.2: Mirror images

As can be seen in the Figure above, the relation between one's view of oneself (positive) and the other (negative) is mirrored by how the other perceives himself (positive) and me (negative). That is to say the self-perceptions of both parties are different from how they are seen by the other. One example of mirror images can easily be found in the arms race of the Cold War, where both sides justified their own increase in arms through the threat posed by the other: We have only the best intentions (positive self-image) but the other side is threatening us through their arms increase (negative other-perception), so we have to increase our arms arsenal in order to protect us (morally justifiable action). As both sides mirrored each other in how they perceived themselves and the other an arms race was the consequence. The self-perceptions of both parties are equally positive but cannot coexist at the same time. Why? Because the other's positive self-perception violates my perception of her. As we have a zero-sum perception of the conflict on both sides the parties need to actively frame the outcome they are looking for as just, as it

implies a loss for the other party. This loss would not be a just exchange in terms of just world theory and with it would violate one's own justice motive. Prejudice and the employment of differing social justice norms serve this purpose. So in order to maintain a positive self-image one is contrasting favorably with the other, usually also claiming moral superiority over the other. The investment required to sustain a conflict seems to be achieved at the expense of casting the other group in a negative light and in this way justifying one's own demands. Any compromise or solution in the conflict necessitates the awareness of the mirror images and may threaten one's own self-perception. The positive self-perception and negative other-perception will have to change in order to make a compromise possible and desirable, especially if one's identity (i.e. self-image) is linked to one's other-perception. Otherwise a compromise would seriously threaten one's identity. This is true not only for explicit claims about national identity and character of both parties but includes implicit or even unconscious assumptions about oneself and the other. While interactive problem solving workshops are successful in making mirror images visible to participants, it seems important to go one step further and examine the ingroup's identity that is involved in maintaining conflict.

2.4 National identity in conflict resolution

The main theoretical idea being presented here is that a national or ethnic *identity*, often considered an important and detrimental part in these conflicts, is an important *tool*, not just an obstacle, in conflict resolution. It seems that this goal may require a change in national identity on both sides, so that national identity no longer supports conflict but conflict *resolution* while still performing its functions of inclusion and differentiation (see Figure 2.3 on the facing page).

There have been many attempts to bring the conflicting sides to a peaceful resolution of their conflict. Many different approaches have been developed over the years in order to facilitate or enhance the process. Many agreements have been reached and many of them have been broken or have not been implemented leading to the same result: continued conflict. The Oslo accords, for example, seemed to be a promising step towards ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but failed to produce the hoped-for peace. The situation today might be described as worse than ever before with continued suicide attacks by the Palestinians and retaliations from the Israelis and fighting among Palestinians. Why did such




Figure 2.3: Supporting conflict resolution

a promising process end up in such a discouraging situation? This is not an attempt to analyze the failure of the Oslo accords; others have tried to do so. But it seems that an underlying issue is the question of trust. How can I trust the other? Why is it so difficult to build up a working trust between parties and so easy to destroy it? One possible answer may lie in the national identities of the conflicting parties. As we have seen, national identity is intimately involved in creating and supporting conflict. If one tries to resolve conflict there is an immediate threat to identity for members of the conflict parties. The threat could be described as follows: If “we” give in now and start to compromise (on almost any issue of the conflict), we get dangerously close to giving up our argument for the justice of our demands. This would in effect undermine the whole project by delegitimizing it. But as the group’s identity is linked to the goals pursued in conflict this implies a perceived threat to the very core of one’s national identity. In this vicious circle an investment in the conflict by one side forces the other side to do the same and leads to a concept that if “we” exit the conflict in one form or another we will end up losing ourselves.

One hypothesis is that, in order to build lasting trust necessary for finding a stable solution, the *identities* of the conflicting parties need to change to accommodate a more peaceful and non-threatening view of the other. Therefore a conceptualization of ethnic identity as *constructed* and *changeable* may be helpful in reducing the threat that the resolution of conflict poses for identity. Kelman (1997b) points out the dilemma that

one faces in talking about negotiating national identities. A national identity is inherently “non-negotiable” as it represents the will of a group and its reason for existence that cannot be dictated from the outside. But, if the group takes *action* on the basis of this identity (e.g. pushing for an independent state) it is impacting the interests and identities of other groups. This makes some sort of negotiation necessary. So it is important to keep in mind that national identity (in particular) is a concept that is based upon an *active* self-definition of a group and subject to transmission of shared values, goals and affects. Reicher and Hopkins (2001) demonstrate in the context of Scottish political speech that national identity is constructed, taking into account the audience and the goal of the speaker in framing what “Scottishness” is about. The characterization of the conflict situation and the issues of conflict highlighted at a given time by a given actor correlate to the political project or vision of the future that the actor has at that time, the audience she is addressing and the construction of one’s national identity. The constructed national identity of the “other” is influenced by these factors too and also influences one’s own behavior, goals, and constructions, for example through mirror images. Rendering this constructed nature accessible to participants of interactive problem solving workshops can be an important step in supporting conflict resolution efforts. This can open the path to creating an identity that is more independent of the conflict as before and less threatened by a resolution of the conflict (see top left corner in Figure 2.3 on the preceding page).

The idea of changing national identity in the process of conflict resolution has been brought forward by others. Kelman (1997b, p. 338), for example, writes that “the idea that national identity is a social construction has implications [...] It is the identity that a group, under the leadership of its mobilizing elites, chose to construct. By the same token, since national identity is a social construction, it can also be *reconstructed*.” The possibility to change identity is in my opinion an overlooked *resource* in conflict resolution, given the strength of national identity to sustain and escalate conflict.

Kelman (2001) underlines that in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the identities are based on the negation of the other and have become monolithic. He distinguishes between a peripheral and a core identity in his approach to identity negotiation. Kelman claims that negotiations of peripheral parts of that identity are necessary to achieve sustained conflict resolution. One problem I have with this claim is that, what Kelman sees as peripheral parts of an identity, are perceived by the conflict parties as central. This is because the adaptive back and forth between

different versions of national identity probably has stopped under the influence of conflict and has become rigid and monolithic (Hicks, 1999). In this situation any threat to the existing identity is perceived as a threat to the core of one's being. This dilemma is what first drew my attention in taking part in interactive problem solving workshop in 1999. In contrast to Kelman (1997b, 2001) I argue that it is not only important for both parties to negotiate their identities with the other and accommodate the other on peripheral issues of their own identity but that the self-definition of a group has to change at its core away from supporting the conflict towards independence of the conflict for conflict resolution to be successful in the long run (see Figure 2.4). Despite the opportunity for participants within the workshop to take the other's perspective and understand their needs and fears the possibility of resolving the conflict presented a threat to their own identity. In trying to facilitate conflict resolution it may be more helpful to explicitly acknowledge that the conflict itself has become an integral part of the group's identity. A project of conflict resolution therefore needs a construction of identity that does no longer include the other through negative interdependence *before* the necessary negotiations of identity as described by Kelman (2001) can take place.




Figure 2.4: Disarming identity

Drawing on their experience from conflict resolution workshops between Palestinians and Israelis Rouhana and Kelman (1994) note that it is dangerous for participants to become too supportive of members from the opposing party. If participants are seen to be crossing the established

boundaries between the conflict parties, they are at risk of being labeled as traitors and losing their influence within their own group. This is a difficult dilemma. What do you do if, through intensive trust-building measures during workshops, an Israeli starts to understand the needs and fears of Palestinians and sees ways to ameliorate the situation, but by doing so becomes a traitor to his own group? It would seem important to not only focus on understanding the other side, but, as a second step, to focus on one's own identity and notice in what way it may prevent otherwise willing members of one's group from resolving the conflict. The goal of reflecting on the ingroup's identity would be to provide participants with ideas on how to decouple the identity from the conflict (as depicted in Figure 2.4 on the preceding page).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter is the result of theory building within the process of grounded theory. This chapter examined the role of identity in conflict and conflict resolution. In order to focus on the possibility of identity negotiation it seemed necessary to understand how and why national identity so often supports conflict. The theoretical exposition presented here needs testing. One hypothesis is that dealing with identities explicitly in conflict resolution settings may enhance the quality of the outcome of such efforts. This includes a few suggestions for the interactive problem solving approach, which already provides a unique setting for conflict resolution efforts. Kelman (1997b) describes his vision for identity negotiation:

They [negotiations] should be carried out in a context of give and take based on the principal of reciprocity. With both identities simultaneously on the table, the parties need to engage in a process of jointly thinking about ways in which their respective identities can be accommodated to each other.

But it seems that the current identities of the conflict parties first need to be opened for change. A sustainable conflict resolution seems to require a change in national/social identity. Each party is currently mobilizing its population for their project in the conflict using national history, heroes etc. in such a way that supports the identity and hides its constructed nature.

I believe that the learning aimed at in conflict resolution workshops (see section 3.2.3) includes already the aim to change the participants'

self-perception even if this is not made explicit by Kelman and colleagues or in the workshops. One important aspect in this effort could be a discussion about the traits a prototypical ingroup member possesses with an emphasis on integrating the ability to dissent or challenge the ingroup identity in that prototype. This way members of the ingroup can decide consciously what parts they consider core and periphery or non-negotiable and negotiable. This gives efforts of conflict resolution the opportunity to maybe discuss issues that facilitators might deem non-negotiable. Even though chapter 4 shows that the approach can already produce positive uses of identity, interventions specifically aimed at reflecting on one's identity and political project could enhance the outcome of problem solving workshops. Making the constructed nature visible and presenting the problems inherent in the current identity should be steps included in an interactive problem solving workshop. This would open the possibility for participants to work on a new vision of identity that can replace the current one. The workshop process itself seems to be necessary to lead participants to recognize the difficulties in trying to resolve conflict, such as mirror images and zero-sum perceptions. Adding an additional step that explicitly addresses issues of identity could improve the outcome of conflict resolution workshops. *So, pointing parties in conflict to the link between identity and resolution of the conflict and actively constructing alternative versions of national identity should be important to problem solving.*

A different identity project that includes the resolution of the conflict as a vision for the national group needs to compete with and ultimately replace the current identity project that supports the conflict. I believe that only this kind of change can successfully address all the different fears of annihilation described by Hicks et al. (1995). This makes it necessary to explicitly talk about the self-definition of the conflict parties and to negotiate these identities in addition to other negotiations aimed at resolving the conflict. In trying to resolve protracted ethnic conflict we not only need to find agreement on the distribution of resources, disarming militias, designing a truce or peace agreement but we also need to disarm identities so that any other agreement reached becomes sustainable.

Chapter 3

Methods

In this chapter I present the method, *grounded theory*, I used to develop the theoretical argument in the previous chapter and to investigate the empirical data presented in the next chapter. I will continue with a description of the specifics of my data set and present a detailed description of the steps taken to arrive at the content of this dissertation. This chapter also describes the method I developed to answer my main empirical research questions:

- Is there evidence of identity use in conflict resolution settings?
- What expressions of identity can be found in a particular conflict resolution setting?
- Are there any positive examples of identity use that can support the idea that national identity can be used as a resource for conflict resolution.

Answers to these questions will be presented in chapter 4.

3.1 Grounded Theory

As it forms the core of my approach to this dissertation I will go into some depth in reviewing the *grounded theory approach*. Grounded theory was originally developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). It has since undergone many changes with Glaser and Strauss developing two somewhat different approaches. These differences will be highlighted below.

Glaser (1978) has kept the method more flexible while Strauss and Corbin (1998) have added a more detailed description of processes in grounded theory and developed a more structured procedure. Despite these differences, grounded theory can be described as a “rigorous, orderly guide to theory development” (Glaser, 1978, p. 2). As Heath and Cowley (2004) describe grounded theory, rather demanding details from the researcher in the exploration of a field, parsimony, scope and modifiability are stressed by this approach. Behind this lies the idea that theoretical saturation can be achieved without complex details; indeed these details can strangle the workability of developing a theory. As Glaser (1978) describes this aspect of grounded theory, which was already implicit in Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) original development of the theory:

Our strategies do not insist that the analyst engage in a degree of explicitness and overdrawn explanation in an effort to coerce the theory’s acceptance by drugging the reader’s imagination and beating him into intellectual submission. (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 8)

However, ideas generated during reflection and analysis are subject to further comparisons, which ensure the accuracy of the theory in development. In the original work Glaser and Strauss (1967) described this balance between analytic focus on details and flexibility in the work with data as follows:

Generation of theory through comparative analysis both subsumes and assumes verification and accurate description, but *only* to the extent that the latter are in the service of generation. (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 28)

In their comparison of Glaser’s and Strauss’ approaches to grounded theory Heath and Cowley (2004) point to symbolic interactionism as a root for grounded theory. They cite the founder of symbolic interactionism, Blumer (1956), describing the “importance of concepts that are sensitizing rather than definitive and gain their significance and utility from the pattern of exchanges rather than quantitatively measurable relationships” (cited in Heath & Cowley, 2004, p. 142). Greckhamer and Koro-Ljungberg (2005) describe grounded theory as a methodology that “grounds its analysis in data yet focuses on theory development” (p. 731). Greckhamer and Koro-Ljungberg go on to summarize grounded theory work as follows: “Grounded theory draws from both qualitative and quantitative inquiries by staying open to data while aiming to produce theory

and arguments logically and systematically” (p. 731). Following Greckhamer and Koro-Ljungberg and Heath and Cowley one can reasonably state that most grounded theorists see the systematic generation of theory from data as the general goal of the method.

Burck (2005, p. 245) provides a useful step-by-step description of grounded theory to illustrate the way a researcher using this method proceeds: “A grounded theory analysis begins with a line-by-line coding of written text, identifying descriptive categories which are constantly compared for similarities and differences. These in turn are clustered or merged in order to construct researcher categories at a more conceptual and interpretive level. These categories, in turn, are used to re-examine the data to further elaborate the concepts analyzed. Throughout the analysis the researcher writes memos to clarify and to record emerging theoretical reflections, which help make and keep the process of the analysis transparent, and maintain a self-reflective stance.” She goes on to note that this approach is particularly helpful in developing theory in under-theorized areas of research. Here a grounded theory approach aids the researcher through its methods in generating new theory in a way that is grounded in specific data and includes a conceptual analysis of the area of inquiry. In addition grounded theory, according to Burck, includes instructions to explore initial concepts further through subsequent data gathering and exploring variability through the method of theoretical sampling. Important in this process is Glaser and Strauss’s insistence on staying open to discover new categories until no new categories or concepts are generated (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

Important methods of grounded theory include: coding the data, developing initial data codes and connecting these to theoretical codes. This process needs to be accompanied by memo writing, constant comparison of data and codes, and theoretical sampling of further data to be coded in order to aid the development of theoretical codes while ensuring that these are grounded in data. Strauss and Corbin (1998) and Glaser (1992) have developed different terms for these steps. Strauss and Corbin (1998) differentiate between what they call open coding, axial coding and selective coding. During axial coding the researcher tries to reduce the number of categories and establishes clusters of categories, which then form the basis for selective coding, whose aim it is to integrate the categories into a theory. Glaser (1992) differentiates between substantive and theoretical coding. Substantive coding includes the categorization of the original data and the refinement of these categories through subsequent coding of new data. During theoretical coding the discovered categories are refit-

ted around the emerging core of the categories, as seen by the researcher. The theoretical coding provides the step from categorization of data to the formulation of a theory.

Regarding differences and similarities between Glaser's and Strauss's approaches Heath and Cowley (2004) find that discovery is at the heart of both Glaser's and Strauss' ideas. The researcher enters a field open to realizing new meaning and through cycles of data gathering and analysis focuses on a core problem around which other factors will be integrated. Differences, in addition to the above described differing steps in coding, can be found in Glaser's and Strauss's approaches in the use of prior knowledge in using a grounded theory method. Heath & Cowley describe Glaser's approach to prior understanding (Glaser, 1978) as being based only on the general problem area. According to this view, reading of scientific material should occur on a broad range of topics in order to alert or sensitize the researcher to a wide range of possibilities. Learning "not to know" is seen to be crucial to maintaining sensitivity to data by Glaser (Heath & Cowley, 2004, p. 143). For Strauss (1987) both use of self and the literature are early influences and, while diffuse understandings provide sensitivity, both specific understandings from past experience and literature may be used to stimulate theoretical sensitivity and generate hypotheses. Furthermore, he recommends (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) that a research question should take the form of identifying the phenomenon to be studied and include what is known about the subject.

In Heath and Cowley's view (Heath & Cowley, 2004), Glaser (1978, 1992) has remained true to the initial commitment (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) of emphasizing the modifiability and openness of a grounded theory approach. In symbolic interactionism, on whose conceptions grounded theory was original based, induction is viewed as the key process, with the researcher moving from the data to empirical generalization and on to theory (Bulmer, 1979). In this view of grounded theory, according to Heath and Cowley (2004, p. 144), as the data are analyzed and coded, ideas and potential insights will begin to develop which are recorded in theoretical memos. It is the data that develops theoretical sensitivity, giving induction a key position in grounded theory. Following this view of grounded theory, selection of data and categories to fit preconceived or prematurely developed ideas is to be avoided, however creative these may appear. Glaser (1999) stresses that "the researcher must be able to tolerate confusion, hard work and tedium of the constant comparative method and wait for concepts to emerge." In contrast, Heath and Cowley (2004)

claim that deduction and verification dominate analysis in the approach described by Strauss and Corbin (1998), even if Strauss and Corbin again modify their position in relation to coding and theory construction. As Heath and Cowley (2004) put it “stages and analysis do appear less contrived” (p. 147).

In my research I followed Glaser’s approach more than Strauss’s. Over time my initial theme of “identity negotiation” as conflict resolution changed through the influence of open coding to a focus on the use of national identity in a conflict resolution setting and the theoretical question if a social identity could be a positive resource for conflict resolution. My own experiences in the workshop in 1999 were marked by a very open and rather uninformed stance toward the field of conflict resolution. My master’s thesis (Kraus, 1998) had concerned the relation between a European identity and several national identities, which probably had sensitized me to the issue of national identity when I participated in the workshop. After my initial experience and writing a class paper on the topic, I began reading transcripts of other workshops. Through this reading I explored different categories, which influenced my reading and through writing memos developed into the results presented in chapter 4. This work developed the focus of my theoretical considerations reflected in chapter 2. In keeping with a grounded theory approach I used selective coding on the one hand and theoretical sampling on the other. In order to control for my own biases I sampled most of my data from three workshops, which were all three years apart (1989, 1992, 1995) and chose the same times in these workshops. I selected two different points of time as I expected from the setup of the workshops (see section 3.2.3) that they might contain different uses of identity. I did, as Glaser (1999) (quoted above) stressed, endure quite a bit of confusion before I arrived at the current work.

Greckhamer and Koro-Ljungberg (2005) examine the epistemological foundations of grounded theory. They describe the original theory as anchored in positivism and cite Glaser (1978) with this description of grounded theory in which he underlines the importance of logical analysis: “Grounded theory is based on systematic generation of theory from data, that itself is systematically obtained from social research” (Glaser, 1978, p. 2). The positivist stance becomes very clear in the following quote from Strauss and Corbin (1998): “Although we are studying objects more worldly than, yet often just as elusive as, the sun and the stars, we, like Galileo, believe that we have an effective method for discovery” (p. 1). According to Greckhamer and Koro-Ljungberg (2005, p.

742) “Glaser, Strauss and Corbin propose that coding procedures take researchers beyond description and put them “into a conceptual mode of analysis” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 66)”. Greckhamer and Koro-Ljungberg go on to conclude that “analytical procedures such as those to identify concepts and discover their dimensions (open coding), procedures to relate categories to their subcategories (axial coding), and procedures to integrate and refine those discovered categories (selective coding) are consistent with the embedded epistemology and theoretical stance” (Greckhamer & Koro-Ljungberg, 2005, p. 742). Greckhamer and Koro-Ljungberg also point to the importance of controlling the sampling process. They make the point that “it makes a difference if random, situated, experienced data are used to produce a generalizable theory or if controlled and objectified data lead to a generalizable theory” (Greckhamer & Koro-Ljungberg, 2005, p. 741).

I believe this to be an important point, as, from my own experience, the controlled selection of data from different workshops at the same times, helped me control for my own biases in selecting material and kept my inquiry open to alternative explanation of the data. Greckhamer and Koro-Ljungberg (2005) write in part a response to the development of a “constructivist” grounded theory by Charmaz (2002). For my personal research a positivist stance with regard to grounded theory makes a lot of sense. In my view it does not conflict with the constructionist approach to national identity, which I have argued for earlier (see section 1.1.4). I believe that grounding my work in a positivist view of the theory constructed is plausible, as I have treated the data as existing expressions of identity use in a conflict resolution setting. As I did not conduct interviews or collect data for subsequent coding directly myself, but used transcripts from workshops that already existed, the question of how much I constructed the data together with my subjects is not as pressing as it might be in a different setting. In addition I believe that, though self-reflection is an important part of a grounded theory process, within the thematic world of “conflict” and “conflict resolution” it may be difficult enough to propose a new point of view in this arena without questioning my own project through a constructionist perspective.

But Greckhamer and Koro-Ljungberg (2005) also find conceptual inconsistencies in the work of Glaser and Strauss. Especially the role of verification in the process of grounded theory is questioned. For their argument Greckhamer and Koro-Ljungberg oppose the following two quotes: “Although our emphasis is on generating theory rather than verifying it,

we take special pains not to divorce those two activities, both necessary for the scientific enterprise” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. viii). “These hypotheses are probability statements, not facts that are verified. Grounded theory is not verificational” (Glaser, 1992, p. 29). While Greckhamer and Koro-Ljungberg do not take a position on which of these two statements is correct or better, they note that “we believe that any method is considerably altered if verification appears or does not appear as part of the epistemological aims even if verification itself does not form the focus of the method” (Greckhamer & Koro-Ljungberg, 2005, p. 740).

From my own experience in working with grounded theory I believe that a different conclusion can be more helpful. Even if a grounded theory process itself cannot verify a theory developed as part of its *own* process, the theory generated by this method should be subject to verification in another step. The claim that a theory generated by a grounded theory process needs to be verified, or better attempted to be falsified, is, in my view, not a claim made in the first quote either. Grounded theory should produce a theory that lends itself easily to hypothesis generation, which can and should be verified/falsified in subsequent (quasi-)experiments. The described procedure *should* ensure, that the theory generated is not (just) a theory to back a researcher’s belief system but grounded in and altered by data taking into consideration by the researcher. In my own experience the grounded theory approach was helpful in developing the theoretical ideas presented in chapter 2. As can be seen in section 3.3 in this chapter and in chapter 4 the process I went through helped to change and sharpen my focus in dealing with the broad question of the relationship between national identity and protracted ethnic conflict. It was not possible for me to verify any of the theoretical claims made in chapter 2 in an experimental way and I believe from my own experience that it would have been counterproductive to attempt such a step simultaneously with the current endeavor. In contrast to other arenas of public life, scientists and especially social scientists should try to avoid theory construction that is only done for purely ideological reasons or could be misused in such a way. That is what, in my view, grounded theory should and can provide to research and I believe it has done for my research project.

My overall aim has been to generate a different point of view on conflict and its resolution, that is a possibility for a different reality. To quote Heath and Cowley (2004), I believe that it is important to keep in mind “that grounded theory aims at discovering not *the* theory but *a* theory” (p. 149).

3.2 Description of material

The material used here in the analysis of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict resolution efforts is set within the framework of *interactive problem solving* as developed by Prof. Herbert C. Kelman at Harvard University (see for example Kelman, 1986, 1992). This approach has been practiced by Kelman and members of PICAR (*Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution*) at Harvard University in the form of conflict resolution workshops. Kelman (1997a) describes his work in the following way:

For over 20 years, politically influential Israelis and Palestinians have met in private, unofficial, academically based, problem-solving workshops designed to enable the parties to explore each other's perspective, generate joint ideas for mutually satisfactory solutions to their conflict, and transfer insights and ideas derived from their interaction into the policy process. (Kelman, 1997a, p. 212)

These workshops are often described as instances of *track-two diplomacy*. This means that they are not official negotiations but intensive meetings between politically involved but "entirely unofficial representatives of conflicting parties" (Kelman, 1997a, p. 214), convened by a third party and designed to develop new ideas about a conflict, which should eventually influence all parties. One advantage of a track-two diplomacy effort is that the discussions are not immediately limited by the binding character of official negotiations and allow participants to explore possible avenues of agreement. The basic idea of an interactive problem-solving workshop is to provide a space, situated in an academic environment, that allows the participants to better understand the other's needs and fears and to develop ideas, through interaction with participants from the opposing parties, that may lead to new and creative solutions to certain aspects of the conflict or the conflict as a whole. Kelman (1996, p. 110) describes the workshop as:

a place devoted to the free exchange of ideas and non-committal, "purely academic" discussions. It is also largely governed by its own alternative set of norms favoring "open discussion, attentive listening to opposing views, and an analytical approach," to counteract "the polemical, accusatory, and legalistic approach that conflict norms tend to promote" (Kelman, 1992, p. 74). [...] (Kelman, 1996, p. 110)

In the history of interactive problem-solving workshops there have been one-time workshops and, more recently, three continuing workshops. The first continuing workshop took place from November 1990 to August 1993 (see Kelman (1997a, p. 215) and Rouhana and Kelman (1994) for details). The second was set up after the Oslo agreement was signed with the intention of publishing joint papers on issues, which had been deferred to the final status negotiations and began meeting in May 1994 (see for example the paper published by Alpher and Shikaki (1999) on the issue of the right of return). For a more exhaustive description of the history of interactive problem-solving workshops between Palestinians and Israelis by Kelman and colleagues see Rouhana and Kelman (1994, p. 161).

As part of his class “International conflict: social–psychological approaches” Kelman has conducted many one-time workshops. The participants at these workshops were different ones in each workshop. It also included the participation of all students of the class as members of the third party (see the next section below for a more detailed description). In addition to these workshops there have been many other, usually weekend-long, workshops on the Israeli-Palestinian and other conflicts. In the current study I am using data from problem-solving workshops between Israelis and Palestinians held between 1982 and 1999 that were conducted as part of the above mentioned class.

3.2.1 Setting

The description of the workshops in this and the following sections refers to the workshops held as part of Kelman’s class. The workshops are held over a weekend and include 10 sessions of approximately 1.5 hours in length. In addition the third party meets with both parties separately in 3 hour pre-workshop sessions. A workshop usually brings together 4 Israelis and 4 Palestinians. They are joined by 8 members of the third party at the table. Two to four senior facilitators are present at the table throughout the whole weekend and are joined by student members of the third party on a rotating basis. All students not at the table sit behind a one-way mirror and observe the proceedings. This is known to all participants of the workshop and both parties have met all students in pre-workshop sessions held before the weekend. This setup allows for a system of verbatim note taking, with two students taking notes as faithfully to the proceedings as possible for half-hour intervals. This is the material I am using in the next chapter. The necessity to take verbatim notes stems from the participants’ concern with confidentiality and creating a record, which made it

impossible to record the workshops. I believe that it is necessary to stress the fact that due to the nature of the note taking procedure all of the quotes from the workshops in the following chapter are not actual utterances by participants. The texts I am using can be considered good representations of the interactions between the participants of a given workshop. As part of Kelman's Psychology class, the workshops were usually conducted in April of each year.

The framework set forth by the convening third party emphasizes the confidentiality of all interactions and the impartial position of the third party, whose role it is to facilitate the process but not to offer solutions:

The discussions are completely private and confidential. There is no audience, no publicity, and no record, and one of the central ground rules specifies that statements made in the course of a workshop cannot be cited with attribution outside of the workshop setting. [...] The third party creates an atmosphere, establishes norms, and makes occasional interventions, all conducive to free and open discussion. [...] [Participants] are encouraged to deal with the conflict analytically rather than polemically—to explore the ways in which their interaction helps to exacerbate and perpetuate the conflict, rather than to assign blame to the other side while justifying their own. (Kelman, 1997a, p. 214)

The goals, which are set forth at the beginning of a workshop, are to move toward a problem-solving mode, to share perspectives, to gain an understanding of the concerns and constraints of both parties and to develop new ideas and insights into the conflict and creative new ways of looking at the conflict, which may enable participants to find solutions that meet the needs of both parties. It is stressed that the workshop is not an official negotiation, a debate, an academic seminar or a place to give speeches. Emphasis is also placed on the equality of both parties within the workshop setting. Kelman (1996, p. 107) explains what is intended by this stated equality between parties: "Within the workshop, the parties are equal in the sense that both parties' needs and fears are addressed and given equal weight in the deliberations, regardless of whatever asymmetries of power or moral standing may characterize their relationship at the macro-level."

This way of perceiving conflict suggests two important goals for a dialog project or mediation: Reframe the conflict in non-zero-sum terms and overcome mirror images. In order to achieve this the interactive

problem-solving method developed by Kelman employs a technique that focuses both parties' attention on analyzing their needs and fears. Becoming aware of and expressing one's own needs and fears vis-à-vis the other makes it possible to find non-zero-sum solutions to the conflict. The opposing demands may be based on very different motivations and alternative solutions may be found to satisfy what is needed and provide safety in relation to what is feared. This also has the benefit that alternative solutions are developed by the participants themselves, creating a feeling of ownership instead of having a solution imposed by a third party. The technique also includes an exercise in which the other party repeats what the first has expressed as being their needs and fears. This is very difficult for participants but important, as it is a considerable step towards recognizing the mirror images in the conflict, which are usually obscured by one's own self- and other-perception (see section 2.3).

3.2.2 Participants

The goal to invite influential members of both communities is based on the idea that the micro-processes and the learning that occurs during a workshop can and should be transferred to the macro-level by participants (see Rouhana, 2000 for more details). The participants that have taken part in these workshops over the years have included scientists, journalists, army personnel, students and others from both sides. Kelman (1997a) states that "in our Israeli-Palestinian work, participants have included parliamentarians; leading figures in political parties or movements; former military officers or government officials; journalists or editors specializing in the Middle East; and academic scholars who are major analysts of the conflict for their societies and some of whom have served in advisory, official, or diplomatic positions" (p. 214). Participants were mainly recruited through personal contacts of the senior third party facilitators and references from former participants. The selection of participants is aimed at providing a representation of the political mainstream on both sides that is as broad as possible. "Within the broad mainstream, it is useful to have a range of political views represented in the workshop. The diversity of views provides a broader base for assessing the realism and acceptability of ideas developed in the workshop" (Rouhana & Kelman, 1994, p. 168). At the same time one has to be mindful of the problem of self-selection. People who were willing, particularly before the Oslo accords, to talk to the other side in the first place were more likely to represent a moderate political point of view and many were close to the peace camp on both sides. The

following quotes from Kelman and Rouhana and Kelman represent a very good summary of the participant selection process and its aim:

“The composition of the workshop is crucial in this context: Great care must be taken to select participants who, on the one hand, have the interest and capacity to engage in the kind of learning process that workshops provide and, on the other hand, have positions and credibility in their own communities that enable them to influence the thinking of political leaders, political constituencies, or the general public” (Kelman, 1997a, p. 215).

“Credibility should be based not only on expertise, rank, and experience, but also on the participants’ legitimacy and trustworthiness in the eyes of their communities” (Rouhana & Kelman, 1994, p. 168).

“A major consideration in the selection of participants is that they be close enough to the centers of power to have some influence on decision makers, political elites, and public opinion, yet sufficiently removed from power so as not to be constrained by official positions of their governments or other political institutions. Ideal participants might include individuals who do not currently hold political office but who have done so in the past and/or are likely to become involved in decision making and strategy planning in the near future, or who are politically influential by occupying positions—in academia, the media, political parties or movements—that enable them to have an impact on the framing of the issues and the perception of available options by decision makers, opinion leaders, and the general public. Selection of the individual participants who meet these and other requirements is based on intimate knowledge of both societies and the political forces and dynamics in each, as well as personal acquaintance with at least some individuals who fit the general criteria for workshop participation” (Rouhana & Kelman, 1994, p. 167).

3.2.3 Workshop structure

A workshop can lend itself to many issues: meeting the other side; floating ideas; personal healing; developing new ideas to resolve the conflict.

The main focus in the framework of a workshop lies on learning. “A basic assumption of our approach is that solutions emerging out of the interaction between the conflicting parties are most likely to be responsive to their needs and to engender their commitment” (Kelman, 1997a, p. 215). The *interactive problem solving* part of the workshop is the main goal of the workshop itself. Interventions and ground-rules are geared towards promoting an environment, which allows participants to develop and explore new and alternative ways to resolving the conflict. The learning experience focuses on this interaction. Learning consists of acquiring new information, changes in perception of the other and the development of new approaches to resolving conflict issues, which are supported by both sides. The purpose of the workshop is to understand assumptions and preconceptions by which people operate through experiencing the interaction with members of the other side, to jointly develop new approaches to and new ways of defining the problem, and to communicate these new ideas to one’s constituency. As Kelman (1997a) states, “workshops have a dual purpose. First, they are designed to produce changes in the workshop participants themselves. [...] the second purpose of workshops is to maximize the likelihood that the new insights, ideas, and proposals developed in the course of the interactions are fed back into the political debate” (p. 214). In my words this could be described as an effort to create new visions for the self or national identity that can compete with the current national identity invested in the conflict.

The role of the third party is geared towards supporting this learning. The third party establishes ground rules, focuses on facilitating, refrains from involvement in substantive negotiations, gives structure to the workshop, keeps time, and tries to balance the interactions while guarding the ground rules. Techniques used to achieve these goals includes: rephrasing, summarizing, and reframing issues. The ground rules established by the third party include securing privacy, confidentiality, and no accountability in order to protect participants and the process and enable new learning. This is achieved by the absence of observers. Any person present during the workshop is either a member of the conflict parties or the third party and bound by the ground rules. The discourse is supposed to be analytical and should not include discussions about right or wrong but process and causes. There is no expectation to reach agreement between the conflict parties and the third party only facilitates the process of interactive problem solving and neither offers solutions nor is part of substantive discussions. For a detailed list and explanation of ground rules see Rouhana and Kelman (1994, p. 171).

The main tools of the third party, in directing the process, are framing and structuring the process. In framing the workshop and setting an agenda the third party aims at a move towards problem solving. The workshop is framed as an unofficial space, which is not a space to debate or give speeches but a space to be open to the other and new ideas. The focus of interaction in a problem-solving workshop can adapt to the particular stage of the conflict. One usually distinguishes here between the prenegotiation, negotiation or postnegotiation phase of the conflict. The focus in a prenegotiation phase of conflict is finding ways to move toward negotiation, answering questions such as: How can we overcome barriers to negotiation? In a negotiation phase the focus shifts towards finding alternative solutions to problems, that may occur in the official negotiation process. In a postnegotiation phase of the conflict, issues that might hinder the implementation of a negotiated settlement come to the fore.

The agenda set forth by the third party usually begins with asking the participants to give an overview of the themes that bring them together and also existing barriers that may be hoped to overcome during the workshops. This may include a description of the current situation, the relationship between sides, and participants' initial understanding of and view on the conflict. The third party then asks participants to express the concerns and needs that a solution to the conflict has to address in order to be acceptable to their side. After both sides have restated the other's needs and fears, to show and ensure understanding, the shape of solutions that would be responsive to the needs and concerns is sought out. Only after steps towards a solution have been found does the agenda cover psychological and political constraints to this solution. Lastly participants are encouraged to engage in joint problem solving to find ways to overcome these constraints and develop parallel or joint actions that could be undertaken to work towards a solution. The following quotes from Kelman (1997a, 1996) best explain the agenda setting and its purpose:

“As the first step in the typical agenda of problem-solving workshops, we ask the parties to talk about “the fundamental needs that an agreement would have to satisfy and the fundamental fears that it would have to allay in order be acceptable to their communities” (Kelman, 1992, p. 73). We urge the parties not to debate these needs and fears, but to try to understand them from the others' perspective” (Kelman, 1996, p. 109).

“Once both sets of concerns are on the table and have been understood and acknowledged, the parties are encouraged to engage in a process of joint problem solving. They are asked to work together in developing new ideas for resolving the conflict in ways that would satisfy the fundamental needs and allay the existential fears of both parties. They are then asked to explore the political and psychological constraints that stand in the way of such integrative, win–win solutions and that, in fact, have prevented the parties from moving to (or staying at) the negotiating table. Again, they are asked to engage in a process of joint problem solving, designed to generate ideas for “getting from here to there.” A central feature of this process is the identification of steps of mutual reassurance—in the form of acknowledgments, symbolic gestures, or confidence-building measures—that would help reduce the parties’ fears of engaging in negotiations in which the outcome is uncertain and risky” (Kelman, 1997a, p. 214).

Time line

To translate the agenda outlined above into the actual time line of the workshops I am using as data here I created the following overview:

1. Pre-workshop sessions: One party at a time for 3 hours; getting to know other members of one’s party and all members of the third party, senior facilitators and students. Explanation of ground rules. Addressing the audience to state their point of view of the conflict.
2. Friday: Meeting of Palestinians and Israelis, getting to know each other. Explanation of the ground rules. Defining important issues in the conflict.
3. Saturday AM: Needs and fears analysis by both sides. Only questions of clarification are allowed.
4. Saturday AM/PM: Each party describes what the other side has mentioned as needs and fears. The aim is to ensure understanding on both sides of the other’s needs.
5. Saturday PM/Sunday AM: Joint problem solving. How could a solution of a specific issue look like? What can one party do for the

other? It is important to try and limit the impact of possible constraints in order to suspend these issues for a little while.

6. Sunday AM/PM: Addressing constraints, hindrances, restrictions to the ideas and solutions found.
7. Sunday PM: Creative ideas to deal with these obstacles, wrap up.

3.3 Steps in the qualitative research process

During my work on the role of identity in conflict resolution 5 steps can be identified. I will describe them in the following sections.

3.3.1 Development of the research question

Taking part in the workshop in 1999 I was surprised by the agreement between Israelis and Palestinians about what a settlement should look like and their inability to accept the other's vision as substantial. On the one hand, participants in this particular workshop seemed genuinely interested in finding ways to resolve conflict. On the other hand, both sides were deeply convinced that "we have given you everything and you have given us nothing."

In an initial step I investigated this feeling and developed the idea that identity issues could explain the apparent dilemma (see section 4.1 on page 74). My first "conclusion" was that identity needed to be negotiated for successful conflict resolution.

Using a grounded theory approach, I started out with the question: What role does identity play in the interactive problem-solving workshops? While keeping a journal I started reading the workshop transcripts. The first difficulty I had with the texts was that the focus on identity kept slipping as I got drawn into the discussions about the problems and issues of the day. Both sides presented arguments that were convincing in their own right and the topics of discussion intrigued me. Reading the next workshops was really captivating but the focus on a social-psychological view of the exchanges slipped time and again. But there also was a sense of a pattern that kept repeating rather independently of the substance that was discussed, which changed over time (from Sadat to Intifada to Oslo to the transitional period). How could I capture this pattern? What could it be about? I began looking at different workshops.

3.3.2 Expanding the data set

With access to more workshop transcripts I began to compare the impressions I had from my initial reading of different workshops. The main comparisons I used can be found in sections 4.2.1 on page 77 and 4.2.2 on page 82. The issue of identity was not as evident to me in reading the other workshops as it was participating in the 1999 workshop. In addition the conflict issues presented in the workshops seemed to make it difficult for me to focus on identity use. The idea of identity negotiation as a tool for conflict resolution was not as clear to me anymore. Nonetheless impasses in the workshops still had a characteristic of identity issues to them. In order to see if there was any substantial identity use I began coding one workshop in more depth (see section 4.2.3 on page 83). This work supported my idea of a significant use of identity negotiation in this conflict resolution setting. Still focusing on identity use in individual exchanges was difficult.

3.3.3 Qualitative analysis

In order to address my problem of keeping a focus on identity I decided to write a hermeneutical exposition, which can be found in section 4.3 on page 89, in order to allow myself to make identity use more explicit. I looked for discussions of Palestinian and Israeli identity and themes elsewhere to help me keep my focus on identity. Two authors captured identity themes very well, namely Khalidi (1997) and Ellis (2002). Khalidi (1997) points to important themes of Palestinian identity: the fight against the “recent” nature of their identity, with the implication that Palestinians were created by Zionism and did not exist before; the ability to present various failures of acquiring self-determination as unlikely successes against powerful opponents. Drawing upon research on politicized identity (Simon & Klandermans, 2001) one could say that this framing of failures as successes serves to uphold a sense of group efficacy, which is needed to mobilize the constituency for a project of self-determination. At the same time this framing also supports an adversarial attribution of the current and historical unjust situation to the larger powers (such as the Ottoman Empire and Israel), which in turn also supports the mobilization process. Ellis (2002) proposes three distinct dialectics that emerged from “Holocaust theology” (p. 53): suffering and empowerment; innocence and redemption; specialness and normalization. In this view Israel represents the empowerment that prevents another Holocaust. The 1967

war can be seen as a victory that brought Jews close to redemption and manifested the idea that a threat to Israel is a threat to all Jewish life, another Holocaust waiting to happen. Israeli empowerment can be seen in this line of thought as innocent, as it is a reaction to the great disaster in Europe. Empowerment through the state of Israel is special in the sense that it reunifies Jews with Jerusalem, reconnecting them to the specialness of 2000 years ago, and that the horror experienced by Jews in Europe is special in its own right. The Lebanon war and the Palestinian uprising on the other hand pose the question of normalization and make Israel a nation state similar to others, hence questioning the innocence of empowerment. While controversial, Ellis' thoughts describe the tensions found in Israeli identity very well.

These thoughts helped me in formulating the underlying identity struggles and conflicts within the workshops, which led me to writing longer analyses on excerpts from the 1992 workshop (see section 4.3). After this analysis I was surprised by the amount of identity issues involved in what had looked to me before as purely a discussion about facts on the ground. With the notion of identity being used in the conflict resolution setting established, I turned towards developing codes and selecting workshops for a final, structured analysis.

3.3.4 Selecting data sets

For the next and last step of coding different workshops I wanted to get an overview of what might happen in workshops and find a way to select from the large number of workshops at my disposal. I looked for different keywords and their frequency of mention in the workshops I had access to. These frequencies can be found in appendix A. I do not include them here, as I did not aim at producing an exhaustive list of keywords nor treat them statistically. I used these frequencies as a guide for selection. There are several interesting issues in table A.1 on page 139, but the overall impression that one can get from these frequencies is that the workshops did not differ very greatly in their content across time. From this short descriptive overview I was quite comfortable that I would not make any systematic errors in choosing particular workshops over others, as they were all dealing with similar issues. For further investigation I decided to select three workshops in order to keep the data size manageable. I also decided to keep an equal amount of time between workshops in order not to bias my selection too much by choosing workshops that had especially appealed to me in my first reading. With the goal of keeping some objec-

tivity in my procedure I settled upon the workshops from 1989, 1992 and 1995.

3.3.5 Coding procedure

After having achieved a clearer focus on identity I turned towards the question of what I expect to happen, with regard to identity, when Palestinians and Israelis meet. I wanted to develop a more structured approach to the identity question, based on my knowledge in social psychology, for my analysis. Using different frameworks that deal with identity in discourse/group settings I began developing a coding scheme. This coding scheme is not designed to be exhaustive but it is meant to be a more structured and helpful guide to reading and analyzing the texts. The coding scheme helped me to condense my findings and made it possible to report prototypical representations of certain identity-related issues I encountered in the texts (see sections 4.4). Together with the help of two undergraduate students from the department of Social Psychology at Helsinki University, the codes were refined until we achieved a reasonable degree of agreement. In addition to the final codes found in step 7 below, I had to include several other steps from first reading the text to finally coding it, to make the process clear to my students and achieve a good degree of reliability in the use of codes. These steps are based on the work done before arriving at this coding scheme and includes the results presented in sections 4.1 to 4.3 on pages 74–89. This is what the final coding instructions, we used to code the 1989 workshop and I used to code the 1992 and 1995 workshops, looked like:

In coding the exchanges between Israelis and Palestinians in conflict resolution workshops I would like us to follow 7 steps:

1. Segment the text into small logical units.
2. Group segments into intelligible units (i.e. one Palestinian sentence only makes sense if it is read together with the preceding question by an Israeli)
3. Determine the frame of reference, i.e. is the talk about the Palestinians, Israelis or their relationship (ingroup, outgroup, us)

4. Define the content (or function) of the exchange, possible content can include: statement of fact or status quo; proposition; demand; conditions
5. Ascribe a goal to the exchange (use the themes outlined for Palestinians and Israelis), for example: undermining the other; upholding status quo; challenging the other; reducing one's insecurity; displaying power; increasing power
6. Define a large piece of text as a unit and describe what it is dealing with, e.g. this passage deals with elections which represent a struggle between the two groups to define reality favorably in their own terms...
7. Return to the text and mark segments according to the categories we have used so far:
 - (a) Characteristics are ascribed to ingroup
 - (b) Characteristics are ascribed to outgroup
 - (c) Statement about what ingroup is not (e.g. "we are not murderers")
 - (d) Statement about what outgroup is not (e.g. "you are not peace loving, as you claim")
 - (e) Statement about what the intergroup relation (for example conflict) is about
 - (f) Statement about what the intergroup relation (for example conflict) is not about
 - (g) Expressions of group loyalty (aimed at one's ingroup)
 - (h) Emphasizing group cohesion (usually directed toward outgroup)
 - (i) Challenging the credibility of another person
 - (j) Statements lending credibility to oneself
 - (k) Disagreeing with ingroup member
 - (l) Expressions of one's own guilt or responsibility
 - (m) Expressions of the other's guilt or responsibility
 - (n) Denying guilt or responsibility
 - (o) Talk about/of (proposed or effectuated) divisive collective action (escalating conflict)

- (p) Talk about/of (proposed or effectuated) positive collective action (resolving conflict)
- (q) Derogating the other (using sensitive topics to attack, prejudicial statements, hostility)
- (r) Self-stereotyping (for example: we as X)
- (s) Other-stereotyping
- (t) Contrasting between self and other (stereotypes); emphasis is being placed on differences between groups
- (u) Expression of attributes shared between (members of) groups (for example: Palestinian who says that s/he speaks Hebrew)
- (v) Statements taking into consideration (or integrating) both points of view (can be definitions of the relation or the other. . .)

These steps are concerned with different questions asked of the text:

- Steps 3 to 5 try to give an answer to the question: **What is the psychological function of this (these) segment(s)?**
- Step 6 is asking the question: **What is the theme of this (larger) passage?**
- Step 7 still asks the question: **How is identity being used in this (these) segment(s) (given the context developed so far)?**

In steps 3 to 6 we moved to a broader scale of analysis and tried to develop a process that makes clearer the kind of steps that have gone into my own categorization. We started out the coding process at the sentence or even sub-sentence level and proceeded from there with an analysis that should end on the level of a page or more and make a statement about the content of the passage and how it relates to the positions of both parties in the conflict (themes) or within the workshop. Only then did we proceed to using the categories we had initially developed and applied them to sentence and sub-sentence structures identified in the first two steps. It was also the case that one had to go through the process more than once in case, for example, the use of the categories in step 7 changed the understanding of the text and therefore the steps before. This in turn did in a few instances change the assignment of labels.

My prior work, using a grounded theory approach, provided me with the overall theme of codes and I wanted to employ my social psychological knowledge to provide more theoretical codes. To give a few examples how theory informed the development of codes I want to refer to Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (2002) matrix of possible intergroup situations (no-threat to threat and high and low commitment) with regard to social identity theory. Within this framework one would expect interactions in the workshop to be located in the high commitment category as the presence of representatives from the other party make one's own category salient. The intensity of the conflict also renders commitment high, as a protracted conflict necessitates a commitment to uphold the conflict. Regarding a workshop, interactions can vary from a no threat condition to individual- and group-directed threat conditions. Accordingly concerns for social meaning, exclusion and distinctiveness should be observable in the interaction. So what constitutes identity use in this sense? One would expect statements that affirm one's group membership (in an individual-threat condition), that create a positive distinctiveness (given a group-threat condition) with regard to the outgroup, and that are free expressions of identity (in a non-threat condition). What forms can these statements take? Expressions of group loyalty (code g), and reassurance of group membership (for an individual-threat condition; codes h, n, r), of prejudice, stereotype, absolute moral standards to which the ingroup conforms, and assigning blame to the outgroup (in a group-threat condition; codes i, m, q, s, t), and free expression of self- and other-image without these functions come to mind (codes u, v).

Another identity use to be expected in conflict resolution workshops should deal with defining both groups in interaction with the other¹. Descriptions of what the ingroup and the outgroup is like (codes a and b) will be a first step towards creating a shared meaning of "Israeli" and "Palestinian" within a workshop, as this kind of interaction is most likely very new to participants. In addition the relationship between parties will be discussed (codes d and e). An analysis of the exchanges as "norm-in-action" (Housley & Fitzgerald, 2002) helps to focus on the use of identity to "win" the conflict (codes c and d). When the two parties engage in a discussion about who represents or should represent them it may be a struggle over who has the power or right to define the conflict and the parties identities.

¹For a use of the symbolic interactionist approach, which promotes this view of interactions, see, for example, Jeon (2004).

Chapter 4

Workshop analysis

In this chapter I will walk through the various stages of my analysis of interactive problem-solving workshops as outlined in section 3.3. I will first present material from the early stages of working with the workshops, including initial reflections after participating in the 1999 workshop, proceeding through the stages of focusing on the use of identity within the workshops and ending with a formal analysis using the category system explained in the last chapter to show the mostly indirect use of national identity in workshops. Comments on the progression and change in my work will be made in the concluding section (4.5) of this chapter. In this I will compare workshops from different years and different points in time within the workshops. In addition I will present some prototypes of positive identity use in these workshops as a guide to creating a new intervention that will focus more explicit attention on the constructionist aspects of identity.

All quotations in this chapter are from near-verbatim notes of the workshops, which were taken by students of Prof. Kelman's class (see section 3.2.1). Comments by Israeli participants can be identified by initials beginning with an I (e.g. IE) and by Palestinian participants beginning with a P (e.g. PZ). Third party interventions are characterized by initials other than the naming principle described above. Any text in “[]” has been edited or added by me, other brackets have been created by the note takers. It is important to again stress that these “quotes” are not actual utterances by participants as all text has been produced by students taking notes (see section 3.2.1). As the students' aim was to take verbatim notes these are nonetheless good representations of the interactions between participants.

4.1 Development of the research question

In this section I am presenting my first impressions and ideas generated by participating in the interactive problem-solving workshop in 1999. This was the first time I encountered the workshop setting I am using in this analysis. What struck me in the workshop was that participants on both sides seemed to agree upon the shape of a solution, namely a Palestinian state, but very much felt threatened by the other. Drawing on my previous work on identity (Kraus, 1998) I framed these seemingly opposing tendencies in the workshop as an expression of identities in conflict. The remainder of this section is very much a reproduction of my initial ideas that I wrote as a paper for Kelman's class:

The first questions were: How can social identity be represented in the workshop? What does it look like? Going back to Brewer's analysis of the needs for differentiation and inclusion, which national identity serves (Brewer, 1991; see section 1.2.3), one could say that the identity-based conflict that took place in the workshop was characterized by the need for the outgroup to acknowledge the legitimacy of the ingroup deindividuation process, which represents the need for inclusion. At the same time the need for differentiation was expressed through the insistence on two separate states with the emphasis on the *Jewishness* of the state respectively the *Palestinian* state.

One can demonstrate the importance of the two needs for both parties through the following content of the workshop. Both the need for differentiation and inclusion were present on the Israeli and the Palestinian list of needs, produced during the workshop, and were placed at the same position of importance:

- The most important need for the Israelis was a *state of Jews*, as was an *independent state* for the Palestinians. This reflects the need for differentiation.
- As the third most important need both sides listed what can be called a need for acknowledgement, which can be linked to the need for inclusion. The Israelis mentioned their need for the *finality* of an agreement on the Palestinian side and the *acceptance* by the Palestinians. The Palestinians worded this need for acknowledgement as a need for the *admission of responsibility* by the Israelis for the Palestinian suffering.

The dialectic of security and vulnerability came into focus as the Israelis addressed the issue of the right of return for Palestinian refugees and the admission of responsibility raised by the Palestinians as part of their needs. The intervention by the Israeli participant IE clearly makes the point of diffusing identity vulnerability:

IE: "I hear two demands [. . .] You need us to make a declarative statement. The one I can make is that in the process of establishing the state of Israel . . . that things happened to other people and act in accordance of this responsibility. I can't say in the process of the illegitimate establishment of the state."

The last sentence expresses IE's representation of Israel as vulnerable. In order to achieve a degree of security, he seems willing to acknowledge some responsibility of Israel for Palestinian suffering. But the creation of Israel needs to be a legitimate act and, as was clear in different interactions in the workshop, Israeli participants need this legitimacy acknowledged by the Palestinians, in order to reduce the perceived vulnerability of Israeli identity.

That identity issues were addressed and that identity negotiation was in fact tackled can be seen in the closing remarks from both sides. PV said that she and the Palestinian people did not hate the Israelis, which in her impression was the image the Israelis might have had. PM said he learned that "this mighty Israel, this nuclear power that threatens the security of even Russia, still needs reassurance of Palestinians". The Israelis were surprised, even shocked, that for the Palestinians a state of their own was nothing they took for granted but that instead the issue of being acknowledged by Israel was a fundamental concern to them.

In my view, both sides addressed the identity needs they had in terms of preventing what Hicks et al. (1995) call psychological and social annihilation. The Palestinian focus on their right and need for admission of responsibility from the Israelis can be characterized as an attempt to reduce their own fear of annihilation. Interestingly, this focus triggered for the Israelis (as the quote from IE shows) their own fear of *physical* annihilation rather than a surprise about the Palestinians "lack of faith" in the peace process. Both sides seemed to acknowledge the other's fundamental right of existence during the pre-workshop session, something that was lost during parts of the workshop. This was a mirror situation: We, the Israelis, need acknowledgement for our right to exist and we have

already acknowledged you (with the Oslo agreement) vs. We, the Palestinians, are the victims who have lost everything and we have to fight for our own state but we acknowledge that Israel is a reality and (maybe) has the right to exist. But both sides seemed unable to perceive the others acknowledgement as valid or sufficient due to a fundamental distrust.

This distrust surfaced when the Israelis felt threatened in their legitimacy to have a Jewish state and was echoed in the Palestinian feeling that the Israelis did not acknowledge their (rightful) claim to Palestine. In this situation identity negotiation started to take place.

There are two instances in which the negotiation of identities became especially apparent. The Israelis stated, and were somewhat perplexed that the Palestinians were not of the same opinion, that with the Oslo agreement they made the most important step towards accepting a Palestinian state: Most Israelis and definitely the participants gave up their dream of the “Greater Israel”.

IL: “For the Israelis, their decision in giving up the dream of Greater Israel was a turning point. It changed their intentions. (...) For the Palestinians – the decision didn’t change anything.” (...)

IE: “Now it’s in a different phase of logistics and minutia...”

The Palestinian reaction to this showed that for them the impact of this decision was not yet real. They were able to acknowledge the Israeli notion of an important turning point but insisted on the omission of the pejorative use of “giving up” the land/dream. Clearly, at this point one can see how the way the parties talk about the issue is *negotiated*. This negotiation revolves around the Palestinian need to feel that the Israelis gave up their dream not out of goodwill but because they acknowledge the right for a Palestinian state and involves also negotiating what words are used in describing specific situations. A similar event took place concerning the Palestinian need (especially voiced by PF) for admission of responsibility. The first stance was that the Palestinian needed an admission of full responsibility and later on PF would probably have been willing to accept a partial admission of guilt. He said: “They have been waiting for the last 50 years for you to say ‘sorry’.”

In summary, in my view the interactive problem-solving framework kept its promise that conflict issues can be addressed in a rather non-confrontational manner, given the strong emotions involved in an identity-based conflict. One strength of the approach was the possibility to come

back together and to acknowledge the other as a partner in negotiations who shares some common ground with oneself.

What caught my attention in the workshop was, on the one hand, the possibility of negotiating identity and its promising impact on conflict resolution. My first hypothesis was that the workshops might give a researcher an idea of how identity was negotiated in the workshop setting. On the other hand it was surprising that participants were so afraid of the other. I was able to receive access to transcripts of previous interactive problem-solving workshops and proceeded to write short characterizations of the events of this and other workshops.

4.2 Expanding the data set

4.2.1 Characterizing different workshops

My initial focus in this section was on summarizing the main aspects of these workshops. I tried to focus on issues that related to identity in order to develop my understanding of whether and how identity was being used in these workshops.

1999

In this workshop a main theme for Palestinians was *sovereignty*. This was expressed through a need for a Palestinian state and included the need for occupation to end, the right of return as the sovereignty to control immigration, and an acknowledgement of the Palestinians plight as a people as part of a sovereign history. *Security* was an important theme for Israeli identity. This was reflected in the need for a Jewish state, that is a secure Jewish majority in Israel, and the need for strategic strength in the region as providing physical security. This need was questioned by the Palestinians as they claimed that they were the ones who needed security not Israel, which has, in the Palestinians opinion, the power on the ground. The differentiation made above by the Israelis between physical and identity security did not make sense to the Palestinians. Similarly the Israeli participants did not trust the Palestinians to forgo demands for more territory once they had established a Palestinian state. This mirror image in distrust could be described as an expression of the insecure identity of both parties.

Another important issue in the workshop was the question of representation and the shape of a process that might lead to conflict resolution. The perceived dynamic of the current process was discussed in the workshop with the Palestinians stating that a bilateral deal would produce the least extreme result while the Israeli insisted that the best way forward was through the involvement of the US and a change in the dialog between the US and the PLO. The Intifada was seen by both sides as having rendered the Palestinian youth more militant. The Palestinians pointed out that this allowed for an unholy alliance of hardliners on both sides. But the Intifada was also perceived as having provided the needed opening for negotiations, as, from the point of view of the Israeli participants, it took the Palestinians out of their victim position and handed them the initiative.

On the semantic level there were many contentious issues such as the Israeli description of Palestinian escalation during the Intifada as equal to a military aggression. This was seen by the Palestinians as a necessary and restrained act of self-defense. Similarly suicide bomb attacks and other attacks on Israeli soldiers were seen as a people's resistance to occupation by Palestinians while they were described as acts of terrorism by the Israelis. Palestinian insisted in these discussions on their point of view, not as a matter of semantics but as a matter of identity. This reflects the struggle over identity definitions during the workshop, as one Israeli participant said: "Saying 16 year-old [Palestinian youth] was killed, I am ashamed, but [an Israeli] soldier acting in self-defense is different!". Another semantic issue that stirred many emotions, as it related to the national self-definition, was the use of "Judea and Samaria" by Israeli participants to refer to the West Bank.

1983

In this workshop there was an early agreement on the goal for both sides: mutual recognition and peace. But both sides characterized themselves as somewhat powerless, mirroring each other. That raised the question of how to achieve the common goal. This question led to an impasse, which revolved around the issue of "which foot to put forth first and by whom". There was discussion about a step-by-step process, favored by some, and unilateral declarations, favored by others. The discussion was very much focused on and limited by barriers and constraints for the two options on both sides. These limitations carried over into the needs and fears analysis, which was characterized by a great difficulty to relate to the needs and constraints of the other side. The needs and fears analysis was dismissed

as mere “role playing” and seen as either not possible or of very limited use. The major constraints that surfaced were described as the inability of the Israeli participants to directly influence the political process, referring to the democratic process in Israel as the reason for the inability, while the Palestinian participants expressed their helplessness in pushing for recognition of Israel as they felt they lacked any gesture from the Israelis that would allow them to do so. This raised the question on both sides if this reflected an insincerity (of the other side) in the early agreement on the common goal. The Palestinian participants also stressed their feeling of immediacy for action to resolve the conflict. The participants came up with the following ideas and helpful actions that both sides could take to achieve the common goal and support peace parties on the other side: the recognition of Israel by the Palestinians, the refusal to serve in the West Bank as soldiers for the Israelis, and the creation of a joint newspaper that could support dialogue.

1984

The workshop started with a search for commonalities. Suffering, the loss of identity and land were identified as common themes in Palestinian and Israeli history. This led to a discussion of differences. Palestinians made clear that they were suffering at the hands of the Israelis *now* and that a solution was of immediate concern to them. They went on to point out that the Holocaust was perpetrated by Western societies, not the Palestinians. Israel was described as being European and Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza as an extension of European colonialism. This argument ended with the conclusion that Israeli suffering did not come at the hand of Palestinians or other Arabs and is therefore not comparable to Palestinian suffering.

The Israelis expressed their great fear of annihilation by the Arab world, despite Israel’s military power, and the need for recognition to allay this fear. The peace treaty with Egypt and Sadat’s visit to Israel were cited as an example where territorial security was exchanged for peace, which was described as “emotional” security in contrast to military security. This particular Israeli fear was very surprising for the Palestinians.

1992

One contentious issue in this workshop was the Israeli need for security. The Palestinian participants questioned the Israelis’ definition of security

and suggested it might be an excuse to revoke any concessions given. This brought out the following clarification:

- Security as *ability*: Strong army for defensive purposes and demilitarization of a Palestinian entity
- *Willingness* of the other side to enter into conflict
- *Intention* of the other side to enter into conflict

The return of the Sinai to Egypt and the peace treaty with Egypt were presented as an example where the *willingness* and *intention* were perceived as very low or non-existent and allowed the Israelis a sense of security that led to an exchange of land for peace even though it reduced the *ability* to defend Israel.

Closely related to security, the issue of the need to involve other Arab countries in peace negotiations (part of a *comprehensive peace*) was discussed. The Palestinians argued that the solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would eliminate any other conflict between the Arab world and Israel, especially if the Palestinians would speak out for the Israelis. This view was not shared by the Israelis. Israeli participants' fear of other Arab countries and Palestinian participants' skepticism toward Israel's security concerns, reflect the distrust between the conflict parties and also the perceived insecurity of both sides. The following quote may help to illustrate the main issues of this workshop, namely identity, trust and security:

PW: Why do you feel the Arabs want to fight Israel?

IC: ... Arabs simply don't want Israel there on any terms ... this is why Israel doesn't feel that Palestine is the only issue ... your sense of urgency parallels our need to delay ... we see our acquiescing to you as ... for you it is the end of your struggle ... for us it is another stage in the struggle for our survival ... Some of us see the Palestinian state as just one more stage in the struggle of Arabs to get rid of us ... just one more stepping stone ... I agree with you ... we have the physical power ... but you have everything to gain... we have only to lose except we have peace to gain ... we need to explain to the Israeli public what peace means in political terms ... if you want to live with us in peace ... you have to prove that to us ... we can deal with the present lack of peace because we have a strong army ...

1993

Describing the current situation in this workshop, the Palestinian participants equated the territories (West Bank and Gaza) to a prison after the recent closure. The Palestinians were also concerned that the current situation and Israel's refusal to negotiate with the PLO might bring Hamas to power. This would in their view not only jeopardize the current negotiations but could mean losing the (moderate) Palestinian national movement. Describing the current situation the Israeli participants perceived the settlers (in West Bank and Gaza) as weakened but cautioned that it would be a long process until settlements would be dismantled. They stated that Israel would need a period of Palestinian autonomy without dismantlement of all settlements.

This was followed by a discussion about the importance and the timing of concessions on both sides. Each side perceived their own concessions as huge, even if they may have been late, but characterized the other's concessions as "mere crumbs". The mirror image of the other perception became very clear. It was very difficult for both sides to feel that they adequately communicated what gestures meant and how they affected a position in negotiations and to feel correctly understood, as the following quote illustrates:

PR: The main question for us is what do the Palestinians have to offer? There are two concessions to make: recognition of Israel and territorial concessions. Basically when the delegation goes to the negotiations, these are made. Once they accept the idea of going to the negotiations both of these are on the table. So, what do the Palestinians have left to gain? National identity recognition and the right to self-determination
[...]

IG: ... we negotiate for a Palestinian state.. have to negotiate.. let's discuss and see.. as much as you said, by walking into negotiations, we have given a lot.

PR: .. not given a lot. I have to emphasize we have given everything...

IG: This is why radical right wing doesn't want negotiations because they realize [it] is moving to a Palestinian state.

During the discussion both sides attempted to lower the threshold of recognizing the other's legitimacy, away from recognizing Zionism and

a Palestinian nation, towards both parties rights to a state. It is not clear but seems unlikely that every participant supported this idea and it did not seem to “stick”. The following quotes illustrate the deep fears related to this discussion and the perceived threat to identity through a “limited” recognition:

IG: [...] But in all Israelis I think it is deeply ingrained to fight being pushed into the Sea. Some of us-a few-realize that this is not the case, that we can operate from a position of strength, to think politically. I can live with Palestinians. As long as my security is ensured, I can be generous with Palestinians. (p. 53)

PL: [...] We also fear that in the Israeli mind Palestinians shouldn't even be here [...] (p. 59)

PL: [...] but I don't think there will be a day that we will say that we understand that Israel was created to save the Jews and that we should accept that - the Palestinians won't say “now I understand the Jewish tragedy...” I'm trying to work out how much understanding is crucial... (p. 80)

IG: [...] by saying we won't accept the morality it's almost saying you don't accept the right of Israel to exist. [...] (p. 82)

4.2.2 Needs and fears

To look at similarities and differences across time I collected the lists of needs and fears that the participants produced in some of the workshops during the Saturday sessions. The original lists can be found in appendix B on page 140. Here, I only want to summarize the needs and fears expressed by participants in the workshops from 1984, 1992, 1993 and 1999 where these lists were part of my data set.

The Israelis mentioned the need for the recognition of Israel, their fear of annihilation, the need for security and the need for a Jewish state in all four workshops. The need for a Jewish state increased in its position on the list from fifth¹ place in 1984 to first in 1999 (fifth in 1992 and third in 1993). The recognition of Israel was the first concern in 1984 and 1999,

¹The position is taken from the actual lists produced by participants, which sometimes included several issues at the same position; see the reproduction in appendix B on page 140 for the original lists

while it was fourth in 1993, the first workshop to follow the Oslo accords and the declaration of principles (this need was second 1992). The need for security was third in 1984 but was first in 1992 and 1993 and second in 1999. The fear of annihilation was mentioned second, fourth, second and third respectively. The need for Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was mentioned sixth in 1984 and 1992, but was no longer mentioned in 1993 and 1999. This was replaced in 1993 and 1999 with concerns relating to the relationship with and well-being of Palestinians (needs 5 and 6 and 4 respectively).

For Palestinians the need for an independent state was the first listed in all four workshops. The acknowledgement of Palestinian suffering (3, 3, 1, 1²), the perception of Israel as a threat to security (7, 4, 2, 2) and the threat posed by the expansion of Israeli settlements (4, 5, 3, 1) were also mentioned in all four workshops. The need for recognition by Israel of the PLO as representing the Palestinian people was the first, second and sixth item on the list in 1984, 1992 and 1993 respectively, but no longer an issue in 1999. The need for (East) Jerusalem as a capital of a Palestinian state was fifth, seventh and first in 1984, 1992 and 1999, but not listed in 1993. Similarly, the right of return was not listed as a need in 1993 but as fifth, seventh and first need in 1984, 1992 and 1999. In 1993 and 1999 there was a concern that Israel was not keeping to its promises (5 and 5).

Overall the needs and fears expressed by different participants at different times were very similar. On both sides the sovereign state for Palestinians and Israelis (expressed in the Jewishness of Israel) was a major need. The issue of recognition was also important on both sides. For Israeli participants the emphasis was on the recognition of the legitimacy of the Israeli state while it was on the recognition of their suffering for Palestinians. The fear of annihilation by the other was also expressed by both sides. In all, the needs seemed to mirror each other and remained rather stable over time. It is important to note the presence of issues of identity, acknowledgement and insecurity in the needs and fears on *both* sides.

4.2.3 Codes for 1992

After this summary of needs and fears for different workshops I turned back to a more detailed coding of one workshop. I chose the 1992 work-

²The numbers indicate the position in the list the need or fear had in the years 1984, 1992, 1993 and 1999.

shop because, except for summarizing it, I had not worked with it very much up to that point. Judging from the frequencies of different key words from the different workshops there did not seem to be great differences between the workshops (see A.1 on page 139). So it seemed to be a “neutral” workshop to continue my work with that would not bias my observations too much. The main codes, using a grounded theory approach (see section 3.1), that emerged with regard to national identity concerned the following issues³:

- Palestinian state:
 - Israeli statements included: “Accepting a Palestinian state is acquiescing to you.”; “For you it is the end of your struggle.”; “You have everything to gain... we have only to lose except we have peace to gain.”
 - Palestinian statements included: “Give me an example of who acknowledges Palestinian national rights.”; “There is no political organization that acknowledges our national existence.”
- Power:
 - Israeli statement: “We can deal with the present lack of peace because we have a strong army.”
 - Palestinian statement: “Palestinians feel that we are not able to speak or act for all the Arab states.”
- Time
 - Israeli statement: “Your sense of urgency parallels our need to delay.”
 - Palestinian statements: “We are losing everyday.”; “We have little time.”
- Threat:
 - Israeli statements: “Israel[is] feel they will never be acknowledged as part of the area.”; “If you want to live with us in peace... you have to prove that to us.”; “[Palestinians] is another element in hostile environment.”

³More examples can be found in appendix C on page 146.

- Palestinian statements: “I don’t deny the Palestinian hostility.”; “...at the same time Palestinians feel terribly victimized.”; “The only thing we get from you is occupation.”
- Peace:
 - Israeli statements: “If peace with Palestinians will bring us peace with all other Arab nations then this is what we have to gain from it... this is all we have to gain.”; “We acknowledge your right [to land].”
 - Palestinian statements: “Maybe Palestinians will be willing to work with you if there is land.”; “We don’t have to hug each other to recognize our rights.”
- Responsibility:
 - Israeli statements: “People say in different degrees that we have done injustices.”; “I think there are a lot of Israelis who... feel guilt, shame, a sense of wanting to repose or help...”; “If you want us to go beyond pragmatism this will lead us beyond it more toward apology.”
 - Palestinian statements: “I do not understand why you want me to tell you that I feel good about you [existence of Israel].”; “If we hear talk like that [apology] both publicly and privately... that will go a long way to decrease the hostility among Palestinians.”
- Arabs, being part of the Middle East:
 - Israeli statements: “Israel doesn’t feel that Palestine is only issue.”; “Some of us see the Palestinian state as just one more stage in the struggle of Arabs to get rid of us.”; “Our enemies have always been the Arabs.”
 - Palestinian statements: “Palestinians feel that we are not able to speak or act for all the Arab states.”; “Without solving this issue [Palestinians], you cannot be part of the region.”

The issues described by these codes were important to both Israelis and Palestinians. They were issues of discussion and are represented in the lists of needs and fears shown above. In coding I differentiated between self- and other-descriptions. In the following subsections I would like to summarize the view of self and other in this particular workshop with example quotes from the participants.

Israeli self-descriptions

The Israeli self-description seems to be characterized by an ambivalence toward the strength and security of Israel (“We have the physical power.”) and distrust towards a lack of respect for Israel on the Palestinian side (“Our recognition is part of the deal.”). It is not a very strong or secure self-image. This is reflected in the description of efforts to belong and wanting to “reorientalize” Israel (“I am saying we have a historical connection to you and the Arab people. It is not a new relationship.”) while acknowledging wrongdoings in the region (“I think of myself as someone on the left, who would like to see justice done.”). Similarly the expressed fear of annihilation characterizing Jewish self-descriptions contrasts with acknowledgement of guilt. Even though this acknowledgement was expressed by the Israeli participants (and received positive feedback from the Palestinians) it does not seem to ease the fear or pave the way for peace but rather to be a barrier towards peace.

Israeli other-descriptions

Israelis describe Palestinians mainly as a *part* of the larger Arab threat, not as an independent group (“[Palestinians] never address bringing in the other Arab states. . . they do not seem to face the feeling in Israel that this will not solve our problems.”). Palestinians are also seen as having everything to gain and, in contrast to the Israelis, nothing to lose (“For you it is the end of your struggle.”). This creates the Palestinian as a powerful opponent. The claim of injustice done to Palestinians is only mentioned in relation to the injustice suffered by and threat posed to the Israelis, not as a description of Palestinians in itself. Palestinians are also implied to be blind to the sufferings and fears of the Israelis (“A lot of Israelis feel that they are the ones who should be apologized to not the Palestinians. This [injustice done] is not in dispute, what comes through to us is that you want to get rid of us.”).

Palestinian self-descriptions

Palestinians see themselves as victims in the conflict (“. . . at the same time Palestinians feel terribly victimized.”). They also perceive themselves in need of an acknowledgement of their suffering by the Israelis (“We don’t feel [our feelings] acknowledged by the Israelis. . .”). There is ambivalence towards Israel as the source for Palestinian suffering (“Until such

guilt is dealt with Palestinians will remain hostile.”) and the reality of Israel’s present day existence (“Among the Palestinians, despite all animosity in history, there is a humane belief that people born in Israel belongs to these people.”). This ambivalence translates to the question of how a Palestinian entity that represents the Palestinian people could and should look like. Palestinians define their suffering and the conflict they are in with relation to Israel and try to keep other Arab states out of their conflict (“Palestinians feel that we are not able to speak or act for all the Arab states.”). But this is also ambivalent. Palestinians do refer to other Arab states’ opinion when they try to support the claim of Israel’s injustice done to Palestinians (“There is no acknowledgement [of the Israeli right to the land]. I don’t see any Palestinian or Arab who sees it as a right.”; “There is no acknowledgement among Arabs your right to take over Palestine.”).

Palestinian other-descriptions

The Palestinian view of Israel is very clear: Israel is the enemy responsible for all the suffering of Palestinians (“You are the enemy.”; “There are planes over our camps... you came to our land.”). Israel has taken the Palestinians’ land and came as a foreign entity not native to the land (“Jewish immigrants were not wanted from the start.”). But there is also admiration for the achievement of Israel to establish itself as a state in a hostile environment (“You are a reality.”; “You made the reality [through] your hard work.”).

Coding summary

Palestinians and Israelis mirror their needs. Both need to be acknowledged by the other in their right to exist, to have their homeland. Once they are close to an agreement on acknowledging each other, the Israelis withdraw by saying that they cannot do that and need Palestinians to fulfill preconditions. The same withdrawal works the other way as well, when Israelis talk about their need to be accepted by the larger Arab community, not “just” the Palestinians. Palestinians claim not to be able to speak for other Arab nations while mentioning Arab support for the Palestinian cause and threat to Israel. The other side’s general acceptance of their own responsibility or concessions usually does not get noticed or gets weakened by members of the same party.

Palestinians are creating themselves partly as a reflection of Israel (“Nobody gave you a state except yourself (you struggled). . . nobody else. Nobody else can tell us except us.”). Their stance is: We must do as you did and you should like it, but you are making it impossible for us and do not want to see how damaging that is.

Israelis have, by their own admonition, accepted the fact that there will be a Palestinian state. In their view this should be enough for the Palestinians to end all violence and deliver a promise of Israel’s acceptance in the region. This basic acceptance of a state-to-be will only crystallize in the Israeli public if the Palestinians start acting as if they already had a state and the Israeli public sees the fruits this will bear. The Palestinians on the other hand do not believe that Israel will grant them a state unless a government says so, which is impossible for the Israelis to do as that decision depends on public support which will only grow once the Palestinians have accepted the Israeli claim above. Similarly, Palestinians claim that they cannot “deliver” the rest of the Arab world, but that it is only a logical conclusion, based on Arab sentiments/culture, that the creation of a Palestinian state is the end to the conflict, as the resolution of the Palestinian “problem” will trigger a resolution of all other outstanding conflicts. How can other Arab states reject an Israel that has made peace with the Palestinians? The Palestinians cannot comply with Israeli demands to act as if Israel had recognized a Palestinian state, as that would leave Israel with all the positive effects without a need to deliver on their own promises. Such a situation would be fatal from the Palestinian point of view as the state is the only thing the Palestinians will get out of this and the only leverage they have is to withhold recognition of Israel until they get their wish.

It feels like every time something hits too close to home it is tossed back with a (legitimate?) demand to the other side, sometimes switching context/subject in the middle of a thought. Overall it is sometimes difficult to separate identity issues from factual discussions. This seems partly due to the possibility of using identity to support a factual dispute and vice versa using a factual dispute to support one’s moral superiority.

I was left with the question: How can I structure this and make it manageable? The texts appeared rather difficult to decipher as thoughts were not linear and the transcriptions were not complete. As the above comments show, the content of the particular workshop had a great impact on my reading and made it difficult to keep my focus on identity issues.

4.3 Qualitative analysis

In this section I present three hermeneutical expositions of exchanges between Israelis and Palestinians from the conflict resolution workshop held in April 1992. These are steps towards making identity use explicit and formalizing theoretical categories into codes. The analyses became shorter and more focused on identity as my work progressed.

4.3.1 Saturday 9:45 am

- 1 IE: Why are you fighting us? There was fighting before 1967.
 PZ: Jewish immigrants were not wanted from the start. It was seen as an extension of the supremacy of the Europeans. We might learn to live with the reality but to neutralize emotions takes two generations at least.
- 5 IE: This is an important point that it will take generations. We are still cautious about that. That still you don't respect us. It will take some generations to accept us. The idea that Jews arrived from Europe as crusaders.
- 10 IC: The large perception among the Israelis is that if we were in your position we had feel the same. How do you think would feel?
 PW: The only thing we get from you is occupation. There are planes over our camps ... you came to our land. You took our land, Palestine, and want to build trust over generations without giving the Palestinians stake in that trust? Maybe Palestinians will be willing to work with you if there is land. Building settlements on this land will lead to more frustration.
- 20 IM: A question for clarification ... you do not acknowledge any rights beyond colonialists...
 IC: That is not what Israelis would accept. Have you been saying that Palestinians do not see settlements as anything beyond colonialism?
- 25 PW: You are a reality. I do not understand why you want me to tell you that I feel good about you. You made the reality with your hard work. You won't include Palestinians in it.
 PM: Palestinians accept the reality. This is an important point. I find it difficult to answer questions like about psychological fears and things like that but they will always come up.
- 30 IM: What I understood is the right for Jews to that land is no more than the colonialists rights to that land. Do you recognize anything more?
 PZ: No. There is no acknowledgement. I don't see any Palestinian or Arab who sees it as a right.
 IE: We acknowledge your right. On your side nobody acknow-

- ledges our right as a national movement, to live there.
- 40 PW: Give me an example of who acknowledges Palestinian national rights.
IE: The Labor party acknowledges it. It is on their platform.
PZ: When did this happen? Before the intifada?
- 45 IE: Just to remind you in 1986 there was a meeting between Peres and Hussein ... the London document ... read it and you will see...
PM: There is no political organization that acknowledges our national existence.

This interaction contains important fears and needs of both parties. It can also serve to illustrate how they may remain implicit and make the conversation difficult to understand. An expansive analysis of this text tries to “explain” the exchanges that may at first appear to be rather incoherent. It can be shown that this interaction contains the expression of:

- important elements of the narrative of both parties,
- a mutual need for recognition (based at least in part on one’s own narrative),
- mutual assurances of recognition (though they appear somewhat ambivalent),
- and “triggers” or themes that allow both parties to doubt the honesty of the other side or not to listen to the other’s recognition.

The exchange begins with an Israeli question with regard to Palestinian violence. The phrase “There was fighting before 1967.” in line 1⁴ refers to the fact that the now Israeli occupied West Bank belonged to Jordan before ‘67 and Palestinians already struggled for independence and against Israel at that time. The implication is that today’s “fighting” is not just related to the fact that Israel now occupies the West Bank but has a deeper motivation. So, what deeper meaning does the Israeli want to express with the combination of question and statement? It seems that the Israelis at the table feel threatened by the Palestinian struggle for independence in a way that goes beyond giving up control over the occupied

⁴Line references are always in relation to the numbering of the preceding transcript, mark the first line if the content, being referred to, extends across multiple lines, and shall be abbreviated with (l. 1).

territories and with that the possibility to curb suicide attacks. The question and statement may imply the assumption that the current Palestinian violence serves more than the struggle to create a Palestinian state alongside Israel. So this question/statement by the Israeli participant may not only be a question out of interest or concern but trying to make a point that Palestinians have the intention to destroy the state of Israel.

The Palestinian reaction seems to support that assumption and the fear underneath. The Palestinian reaction basically says that Israelis are seen as a foreign entity, an extension of Europe, not wanted (l. 2). However the Palestinian participant clearly states that this is a sentiment, not necessarily a motivation for action (l. 4). Israeli independence is linked to negative emotions on the Palestinian side. What role does the reference to the “supremacy of Europeans” play? It seems that in part it is a justification for the negative attitudes of Palestinians towards the state of Israel. One question that needs to be raised is the question if these attitudes concern the *creation* or the current *existence* of Israel. The Palestinian statement is very ambivalent on this point. On the one hand it is very clear that Palestinian sentiment for Israel is that of an occupying crusader. On the other hand Israel is referred to as being a reality that “we might learn to live with”. So the reference to Israel as being an extension of Europe may also be an explanation for an old struggle and the current difficulties. So the Palestinian participant picks up on the suggestion in the Israeli statement that Palestinians might in a way deny Israel a rightful existence.

Why is the response to this implicit statement so ambivalent? How could the Palestinian have been responding differently? First he could have made the implicit explicit, asking or stating that Israelis are still today afraid that the Palestinians aim at destroying the state of Israel. In his statement he could have made it clear that he or Palestinians in general see the creation of Israel as unjust and maybe even illegal but that Palestinians do not per se deny the current Israeli state the right to exist (Israel being a “reality”). The statement may be ambivalent because of an underlying ambivalence in the Palestinians’ attitudes toward Israel. Israel as a force that has committed injustices and as a successful movement for self-determination that the Palestinians may even admire and would like to emulate.

How do the Israelis react to this ambivalent statement? There are two different reactions from two participants. The first (l. 6) shows that the Palestinian statement has hit a nerve with the Israelis that relates to the fear implicit in the first Israeli statement. This reaction does not clearly state that the Israelis are very afraid that the Palestinian side still aims at

destroying Israel but it implies it. The sentences: “We are still cautious about that. That you still don’t respect us.” (l. 7) exemplify the distrust of Israelis for the Palestinian motives in their struggle for independence. There is a focus on the negative emotions and the view of Israelis as crusaders, not the importance of the “reality” of Israel. It seems that the Israeli speaker has found a confirmation for his hypothesis that Palestinians are intending to destroy Israel. The second reaction is one of empathy (l. 10). What purpose can this statement serve? It is combined with a wish for the Palestinians to do the same. So as this statement may acknowledge the injustice done to Palestinians and the resulting negative attitude towards Israel, it is also a demand towards the Palestinians to acknowledge the motivation for the creation of Israel and the difficulties in achieving this goal.

The Palestinian response (l. 13) only addresses the Israeli surprise or unease with Palestinians ambivalence towards Israel and does not contain an empathic statement. It is a very explicit statement about the violence, terror and injustice done by Israel. It responds to both Israeli reactions. First (l. 13) by saying, why are you surprised by our disdain of Israel if we experience the cruelty of occupation every day and secondly (l. 15), how can you expect us to feel for you if you are doing all these things to us? It also puts full responsibility for solving the conflict on the Israelis. The statement also makes an implicit demand by the Israelis explicit: “[You] want to build trust over generations without giving the Palestinians [a] stake in that trust?” The Israeli demand being that Palestinians have to change their attitude towards Israel into an accepting one for a resolution of the conflict. The Palestinian response is a counter-demand from the Israelis to change the treatment of Palestinians and to give them a state of their own, this being a goal rather than a step in the resolution of the conflict. So, on the one hand the Palestinian statement contains a threat towards the Israelis (we will have to continue the violence) while presenting the powerlessness of Palestinians in the resolution of the conflict. It does not take Israeli fears and needs for the resolution of the conflict into account.

This is evident in the Israeli reaction to the comment. First (l. 20) phrased as a question of clarification, to appear non-threatened or non-aggressive. The second statement (l. 22) is much more direct: “That is not what Israelis would accept.” The talks seem to be at an impasse. The Israeli side restates their need for acknowledgement of their own struggle that justifies the creation of Israel by the Palestinians in form of a question: “. . . Palestinians do not see settlements as anything beyond colonial-

ism?” Both sides perceive themselves as persecuted, suppressed and this is in turn the justification for occupation and fighting respectively. Being seen as colonialists seems to be very hurtful for Israelis. Why? It may be because it puts them in the same category as the perpetrators that Jews tried to escape from by creating the state of Israel. Colonialists are characterized as having no moral right to occupy a territory. By implication Israelis are also denied a moral right to the state of Israel. Recognition of the Palestinian struggle seems to depend on reciprocity in recognizing the struggle of Jews for the Israeli participants. In contrast it seems that for the Palestinians recognition of their struggle is a *condition* for recognizing Israeli fears and needs. This gives the Palestinians also some sort of leverage, as they may withhold that recognition after all. Why would the Palestinians try to gain that kind of leverage? It seems to be a reaction to the military power and structural control that Israel exerts over Palestinians and as a reaction to the powerlessness of the Palestinians in the current condition.

How do the Palestinians react to the Israelis? I think the ambivalence becomes clearer. And the Palestinians seem somewhat baffled by the Israeli need for acknowledgement (l. 25). Israel is seen as a reality and as a reality that will not change through Palestinian actions. At the same time the anger or disdain over this reality is expressed. The first Palestinian statement also shows the Palestinian need for acknowledgement and for an Israeli commitment to change things for the better for the Palestinians. The second Palestinian comment (l. 29) shows some awareness of the reality of Israeli fears, stating that the participant finds it very difficult to address psychological fears. So there seems to be an awareness of the Israeli needs implicit in this exchange. The second speaker also tries to address those, by restating the “reality” of Israel for Palestinians. This statement seems to imply that even though the creation of Israel caused severe hardship to Palestinians there is a willingness to accept Israel as a legitimate entity. The ambivalence though still remains. The second statement may also be dangerous to the Palestinian side as it may undercut the power that Palestinians have at the bargaining table with the ability to withhold the acceptance of Israel. Still both sides seem to fight for acknowledgement of their predicaments by the other, very dependent on one another in order to justify the actions taken in the name of both parties.

The next Israeli statement makes this very clear (l. 33). Jews, in what the Palestinians have been saying, do not have any more right to the land than the colonialists did. It has already been stated that this point of view is unacceptable to Israelis. So the speaker explicitly asks: “Do you rec-

ognize anything more?” The answer to this question is probably very important to the speaker and there may even be the hope for a different answer than the one to be expected after the preceding exchange. It seems that Israeli self-definition requires that the creation of Israel is justified and justified especially from the historic atrocities, namely the holocaust, committed against Jews. It is probably also important for the Israeli identity to show that the place in which Israel was created is not arbitrary. These two issues seem to be central to Israeli identity and maybe through their centrality they need to be acknowledged by the other side in order for Israelis to be able to trust and feel safe or understood. So it may be the case that a questioning of the legitimacy of the Israeli state calls into question the self-definition of Israelis. Why does it seem to be so important for the Israelis to receive an acknowledgement from the Palestinians? It seems to be that both parties perceive themselves to be in a position of powerlessness, one defined by being occupied, the other by having been persecuted for centuries and threatened by neighboring countries in a way similar to previous persecution (threat of annihilation).

The Palestinian response to the question is clear and expected: “No.” (l. 36). And the statement is very strong as it states that no Palestinian or *Arab* would see a right for Israel to the land. This plays right into the fears of the Israelis, that Palestinians see no justification or recognize the right for their existence and by deduction every right for Arab nations to destroy Israel. For Israelis the situation is very difficult as the Palestinians continue to demand a state, which they already have at least partly acknowledged as being a rightful demand. This is reflected in the Israeli statement (l. 38), saying ‘we acknowledge your right but you don’t acknowledge us’. This implies injustice, a situation that is not reciprocal and therefore untenable. Also on a moral level it seems wrong for one side to acknowledge the other without being acknowledged themselves. The Palestinian response seems to be a direct reaction to this ‘accusation’. It questions the truthfulness of the statement, implying that Israel has never acknowledged the right of Palestinians to a state (l. 40). So a short discussion ensues about who acknowledges the Palestinians and when this happened. The Palestinian statement: “There is no political organization that acknowledges our national existence.” (l. 48) clearly shows the difficulties that the Israeli statement provides for the Palestinian side. It seems that a mutual acknowledgement threatens the pre-existing conceptions of self and other on both sides and with it the existing mirror images (see section 2.3). ‘If they really accept us how can we deny the same to them? So they must not be truthful when they claim to accept us.’ might be an implicit reasoning underlying the exchange. Why else

would it be a point of discussion, characterized by Palestinian disbelief, who acknowledges Palestinians? The same is true for the Palestinian ambivalence towards Israel. It seems almost impossible for Israelis to hear the Palestinians talk about the reality of Israel. They cannot recognize the implicit acknowledgement of at least the existence of Israel present in the Palestinian statement. The Palestinian statement accepts the reality of Israel and implies that this reality is acceptable to Palestinians, especially if Israel should become more accepting of the Palestinian longing for some sort of self-determination.

‘Fortunately’ the Palestinian position remains ambivalent, which allows for the Israelis to keep their fears alive and continue to demand recognition from Palestinians, which in turn leads the Palestinians to question the sincerity of Israeli statements supporting the creation of a Palestinian state. In summary, the involvement of identity in conflict becomes clear to me in this passage. It is also apparent that the conflict is also fought on the level of identity.

4.3.2 Saturday 2:50 pm

- 1 II: Inherent logic in separating between government position and other (i.e., that of Israelis here). If follow government position that autonomy is the end, i.e., final step, why deal with (diaspora?) Logic follows(??). (There is a range of ideas in Israel regarding the autonomy. I don't think that all the Likud people believe that this would be the final arrangement. Some Israelis oppose the idea of the diaspora because they don't want to see the PLO in the negotiations. I myself don't want to see the PLO at the negotiation table. There are people in Israel who do not buy your position that the PLO stopped terrorism ... I don't see a problem with the Palestinian diaspora if the issue of the PLO is no longer on the agenda)
- 5
- 10 II: (?) You're talking about the problem of us ... what we tried to do is... what you tried to do is bring in whoever you wanted to bring in.(???) I think that you are represented... you are simply channeling your voice through(??)
- 15 PI: (Israel not willing to deal with the Palestinian entity separately) ... we are treated as a local concern...
- 20 IC: ... related less to the general ...
IC: ... from a general point of view I agree that there is some agreement as to whether to do it or not. I (?)
PI: ... I mean I think that contradicts what you are saying in a way...
- 25 IC: Because in our minds the Palestinian problem arose after (notes indicate something about "taken by Jordan in 1967," which appears to make little sense)

This exchange touches upon the question of who Palestinians are and who should represent them. In contrast to the previous interpretation this one tries to summarize the underlying themes. It becomes clear that the Israelis perceive the PLO as a threat (l. 10) and not a legitimate representative of Palestinians (l. 9). The discussion revolves around the status of so called “diaspora Palestinians” (interesting loan from Jewish self-description?). Palestinians clearly perceive a group of people belonging to a nation relatively independent of the place they are living in now. This is alluded to by the assertion (l. 18) that “Israel (is) not willing to deal with the Palestinian entity separately”, e.g. regarding it as a national movement independent of other Arab countries, and reflected in the Israeli comments about diaspora Palestinians and the difficulty to have Palestinians represented in negotiations who are not living in the occupied territories. Palestinians are concerned that the Israelis have no intentions of viewing Palestinians in the same way, one Palestinian refers to this as being “treated as a local concern” (in the West-Bank and Gaza, l. 19). That this is not far from the position of Israeli participants becomes clear in the last statement (l. 25) of this quotation constructing the “Palestinian problem” as a recent one, created in 1967. I do not agree with the notetaker’s comment that the phrase “taken by Jordan in 1967” (l. 26) does not make sense in this context. To the contrary this speaks directly to the problem that Khalidi (1997) addresses in his analysis of the genesis of Palestinian identity as predating Zionism and not just being a product of Israel. Indirectly the Palestinians are fighting the same perception of being ‘only’ a product of Zionism by insisting on the importance of the PLO and the representation of Palestinians outside the occupied territories in any agreement.

II: I agree with the fact that you used correctly... the
idea of autonomy... I said that I personally, disagree with
30 that feeling...the other thing that I said is that the
other part of the diaspora (issue) has been happening
because (they know that they) have to bypass the Israeli’s
objection to that... We are really trying to limit the idea
of nationhood and that became very clear to me during the
35 discussion.

This subsequent statement (a couple of minutes later) by an Israeli participant clearly spells out the issue underlying the discussion above of the diaspora Palestinians. He clearly points to Israel’s effort to limit the idea of Palestinian nationhood (l. 33) when dealing with the diaspora Palestinians, challenging the self-perception of Palestinians as a national movement. He also implies that the Palestinians are aware of this (l. 29).

4.3.3 Saturday 4:45 pm

- 1 IM: He is partially answering you by saying that we can't separate security from psychological issues. Even Mota Gur believed until the last moment that Sadat's plane will land and a bunch of guys with uzis would jump out (laughter)...
- 5 (it illustrates what you may consider paranoia but this has been experience for 40 years, it is a real feeling - Israel came close in 1973) Palestinians will have to make some separate concessions during negotiations regarding security. Palestinians will have to make concessions regarding having
- 10 arms in a Palestinian state. Not only security but psychological mentality beneath all of this.
- PZ: I'd like to separate what Palestinians can do and what () and more wide concern regarding threats coming from other states in the region. This is a legitimacy concern.
- 15 Maybe a constructive way of looking at that concern given extremes of Israelis is psychological aspect. Israelis because of history used to hostility because of who they are. Our hostility to Israel is specific for things they did. Behavior vis-a-vis the Palestinians. If that were to fixed
- 20 - no other Arab state would have an interest in threatening Israel. It is a different analysis. When I listen to this I want to ask - why would Iraq want to harm Israel? You see a peace process concluding with a treaty - with an Iraq threat down the road. And they won't want to.
- 25 IC: We discussed earlier why Arabs want to hurt us, fight us - and we didn't come to conclusions. I think that there is a wider feeling. Palestinian problem may be solved and still for reasons of their own, other Arab states may want to pick on Israel.
- 30 IM: Does this have something to do with antisemitism?
PS: This is not because of your identity, this is because of what happened. Distinct from historic antisemitism.
IC: I'm not talking as a Jew, I'm talking as an Israeli.
- 35 As an Israeli, I am not concerned with antisemitism, I didn't yet get an answer before if this is the issue. Why can't you get together and do it ... we saw this morning that resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will not solve the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- PZ: Hostility exists because of the Palestinian issue. My argument is that the hostility exists because of tangible conditions. If they were fixed, I find it unlikely that an Arab state would like to bother with Israel (threaten it) if Palestinians were living happily ever after.
- 40 IC: If you are saying this - it could reassure the Israeli public, this is important - but your saying so is not enough for me. I don't trust Qaddafi, etc. I wouldn't trust them even if they did say that the Palestinian problem would be solved then all Arab problems would be solved. I need to be
- 45

- able to do for myself. PZ: This is widely understood by
50 Palestinians. We can argue here that you don't need to feel
this way ... but it is a reality. Maybe we can move on. If
not, the word of this leader or that leader ... what will
it take.
- IE: Before getting into technical issues of demilitariza-
55 tion. You just said something I totally disagree with and
its importance for you to fully understand it. Arab coun-
tries say Palestinian issues is heart of problem and the
moment its solved - we'll live happily ever after. But from
60 our experience - and also probably from your experience -
we have historical experience that Arab countries really
don't give a damn about Palestinian problem and use your
issue to maneuver to their advantage. That's our concern.
As you know there are different groups not only Fatah but
65 other groups who are heavily influenced by other Arab coun-
tries. Iranian, Iraqis have their ... It will be in a way
artificial to say "let's forget about other Arab countries
- they're only here to help us because they're our brothers.
PZ: I was talking about a mood, an attitude, a state of
70 hostility not a state of behavior. Mindset. It is true that
Arab states have a problems. They have probably manipulated
Palestinian question and used Palestinian ... but they
weren't widespread hostility to Israel as a result of a
fixable problem. This will go on forever with no one to fix
75 it. On the other point that you raised regarding Palestin-
ian groups being extensions of Arab states - that is
largely myth. They're marginal, practically nonexistent.
They exist outside the PLO. One of the reasons why Pales-
tinians support of the PLO is because it represents inde-
80 pendence from Arab state positions.
- II: I want to get two messages across. One sense is the
sense of vulnerability in Israel. In many people, its un-
conceivable that Israelis perceive themselves as vulnerable
- mighty army, etc. Still and all, Israel needs the secu-
85 rity because of sense of vulnerability. I find it comfort-
ing to have my vulnerability acknowledged by you.
- PI: You know why they couldn't understand because ...
- II: I know, but once this is acknowledged this would help
... you try to get a formula for security which will
90 satisfy us ... when we look at other countries we look at
intention, willingness, and capability of attacking us. So,
even with Egypt's capability, they don't have willingness
or intention. With Palestinian demilitarized, you can have
willingness and intention but no capability. There is no
95 straight line, no formula for security. If you had a regime
that you can rely upon in terms of long term peace, that
can help secure Israel. If you don't have military power,
that secures Israel. We can work up a formula which can

- secure Israel, which entails ... some part of the three elements. There is no single answer to peace.
- 100 PI: Do you realize that Palestinians are hostages to your fear regarding security. Even though you acknowledge that its a bit meaningless. We feel that its sort of defacto acceptance of Israel by Arab countries if not secret ties.
- 105 There are some exceptions and will always be. We realize that this is the case and to us, if you talk about destabilized region - I may disagree with Syria but he's been there for 25 years, Hussein for 20 years ... more possible for changes in Israel than in Syria. I see a different
- 110 Israeli society from 1977 than today. More a shift to ideological right.

In this exchange, quoted in length, important issues regarding Palestinian and Israeli identity are raised. The exchange can also provide an idea about the other-perception of both sides and possible areas of conflict between self- and other-definition. The first comment by an Israeli participant very clearly illustrates the fears of the Israeli side. In the beginning of his comment the use of "he" (l. 1) is referring to a statement by a fellow Israeli participant just preceding this passage that was questioned by Palestinian participants. The fear expressed shows sign of the ambivalence of empowerment and post-Holocaust thinking in Israeli identity ("we can't separate security from psychological issues", l. 2). The fear of annihilation (e.g. l. 3 & 6) is very present. The ambivalence between Israel's military power and the fear of annihilation is present in the expression of the Israeli participant that this may seem like "paranoia" (l. 5). It is also clearly expressed that there are psychological factors on the Israeli side and that the Israelis would like to have them acknowledged by the Palestinian participants (l. 10). The Palestinian reaction is very clear and rephrases the concern ("Israelis because of history used to hostility because of who they are.", l. 16). It is also clear that the Israeli ambivalence is trapping the Palestinians in a bad place where they are subjects of reactions based on fears that they cannot reduce through their behavior (e.g. above quote and l. 20–24). The Palestinian participant points this out by explicitly saying that Palestinian hostility is not linked to historical experiences of Jews (i.e. anti-Semitism) but to specific actions of Israel (l. 18). He continues this argument to relate other Arab hostility to the Palestinians.

The Israeli response clearly shows the ingrained fear of Arab countries (l. 25), allowing the Israeli participant to keep up a generalized fear in the face of an argument linking hostility to specific actions by Israel (l. 26–29). The next intervention (l. 30), phrased as a question, by an Israeli

participant makes the underlying perceived threat explicit and names it “antisemitism”. The Palestinian participant is quick to try and disentangle Israel’s problems from that fear of anti-Semitism by stating: “This is not because of your identity, this is because of what happened.” (l. 31). The Israeli response is to differentiate between a Jewish and an Israeli identity (l. 33). This is somewhat surprising as there had been discussion in this workshop at a prior point of the importance of Israel being a Jewish state. Why does the Israeli participant make this distinction? He tries to disassociate the perception of a wider Arab threat from the implied accusation that this is only an expression of misplaced and irrational fear of anti-Semitism. The Israeli participant states that he “as an Israeli” is “not concerned with anti-Semitism”. At the same time he continues to uphold the perception of a wider Arab-Israeli conflict that the Palestinian participant tried to dispel with the distinction.

The next Israeli statement reiterates the fear forcefully: “I wouldn’t trust them even if they did say that the Palestinian problem would be solved then all Arab problems would be solved.” (l. 46) and he goes on to say: “I need to be able to do for myself.” (l. 48). These statements express for me the fear of annihilation linked to the lessons drawn from the Holocaust experience. IC feels that Israel needs to be able to provide for its own survival as there is nobody else who will do it. This can be linked to the experience of the Jewish people during the Holocaust and the focus on physical security in the creation of the state of Israel.

The Palestinian participant is able to acknowledge this fear as an Israeli reality and as one that the Palestinians will not be able to change through their actions. This seems to leave the Palestinian feeling pretty helpless. What can Palestinians do to get out of this situation? And he asks: “what will it take?” (to reduce your fear, l. 52).

The Israeli seems to evade this question by trying to break the proposed link between Arab hostility and the Palestinian problem (l. 56). He states that the other Arabs do not really care about the Palestinians and just use the issue for their own agenda (l. 60). He implies that the Arab states will continue to pursue this proposed agenda even after the Palestinian problem has been solved. In addition he also implicitly questions the Palestinian self-definition as a people by suggesting that radical Palestinian organizations are “heavily influenced by other Arab countries” (l. 64). This puts these elements out of the control of the Palestinians and also questions the idea of a specific Palestinian resistance to Israel (l. 66). It seems to identify the Palestinians as part of other humans belonging to a shared Arab identity and not a specific people under occupation. The Pa-

lestinian participant responds to this by bringing up the importance of the PLO, explicitly stating that “it represents independence from Arab state positions” (l. 79) and defines the Palestinian as a people in their own right.

Finally the Israeli participant seems to focus on his own fear and explicitly addresses the Israeli “sense of vulnerability” (l. 81) and he explains it as a psychological phenomenon that exists despite Israel’s military power (l. 83). The Israeli security concern is now explained as one that has to deal with this fear and not “only” with a real threat on the ground. The Palestinian intervention (l. 87) and the assurance of understanding by the Israeli before the Palestinian has finished make it clear that for both sides this sense of vulnerability based upon an Israeli identity is difficult to manage. The Israeli goes on to state clearly that perceived intentions of other parties to the conflict play an important role in the assessment of security (e.g. l. 92–94). The Palestinian response is clear in focusing on the impossibility for Palestinians to satisfy Israeli security concerns as a pre-condition for a state (l. 101–103). In this way Palestinians again depict their opponent as all powerful and put the responsibility for movement and the current condition squarely on the Israelis’ shoulders (l. 108–111).

4.3.4 Summary

These expositions clarified the overall importance of identity in the workshop setting for me. I was also able to deal with the complexity of interactions. Identity issues showed up in every facet of the analyzed discussions. The interpretations helped me develop categories by exploring the different aspects of identity use in the passages. Many uses of identity are rather difficult to detect at first glance as they are intertwined with the content being discussed. As developed in chapter 2, identity is involved in supporting conflict and the argument for one’s goal in the conflict. This can be seen in the use of identity as described above. The next step was to create categories that helped detect identity uses more quickly and efficiently. This led to the categories described in section 3.3.5. The results from the coding procedure are described in the next section.

4.4 Coding: Prototypical use of identity

The coding scheme helped in covering a lot of material more quickly and in a more structured way than before. First I would like to present how my students and I anchored one passage from the 1989 workshop we were

coding with the help of steps 3 to 6 in the coding procedure described in section 3.3.5. In this section I am now presenting important aspects of our coding results. I begin with an anchoring result to show what the students and I produced after the initial reading of an interaction of approximately ten minutes. After that I present selected examples of typical identity use in conflict. I chose these examples from the many interactions we coded as they are prototypical for our interpretations. The third part of the section focuses on positive uses of identity as these are the most interesting for advancing conflict resolution work (see also section 2.4).

4.4.1 Anchoring a theme of an exchange

In anchoring the passage we coded, we asked ourselves the question: How does this text relate to identity and why is it not just a discussion about some issues? As an answer we had the following to say about the text, which covered approximately 4 pages:

National identity is not only a condition that gives meaning to the world and who one is, but also a tool to create a certain world: a project for the future, if you will. National identity, being Israeli or Palestinian, is a category that justifies certain demands, for example, an independent Palestinian state, and certain behaviors, for example, Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The question is not so much about who is right but who gets to create the conflict reality. So questions in this passage about elections, the US, and the PLO are not only about practical issues, but part of a negotiation about who represents the Palestinians and who gets to decide that representation. It is, at least in part, about defining who the Palestinians are as a group, a nation. The Palestinians are arguing that the PLO needs to be included. The Israelis may not understand the difficulties that the Palestinians have with the proposed elections or why they are reluctant to give up the power to define who represents the Palestinians. For the Palestinians it seems to be an issue of being able to define who represents them, while Israeli politics (at least in their view) seems to be geared towards defining Palestinian representation to their own (Israeli) liking. In this context who I am (as a group member) seems to be at the forefront and actually leads to some arguing ("Without the PLO today, I wouldn't be a Palestinian.", "We refuse to be treated like a toddler.")

and acts that try to emphasize legitimacy. Themes of identity are being used as arguments and justifications. So seeing the other in a certain way and ascribing characteristics to them has as a benefit to make one's own argument for something stronger and more coherent.

This helped us to focus on the use of identity, the use of defining "who I am" or "who the other is", in the subsequent coding of the text. This story formed a backdrop against which we were able to code the text in detail.

4.4.2 Different uses of identity

The superscripts in this section identify the codes assigned to the statements according to the coding scheme from section 3.3.5. The conventions for the quotes are the same as noted at the beginning of this chapter on page 73. The individual quotes are always taken only from one workshop (even if they contain editing by the author), the year of and time within the workshop are noted at the end of the quote. These are all examples I found to be prototypical of the different aspects of identity use. The first few examples relate to general conflict issues. They present an insight into how identity is used to support conflict. This will be followed by examples relating to specific issues such as suffering, negative interdependence and the Israeli-Palestinian issue of Jerusalem.

This first quote is prototypical of the way the other's identity is attacked and used to justify one's own cause or undermine the other. Not only does the Palestinian equate the Israelis with imperialists (or colonialists as analyzed in section 4.3.1), but he also accuses the Israelis of treating Palestinians as inferior:

PM: We have been [u]sing the word violence, violence against people, killing and hurting^M but for me, personally, if someone treats me as if I'm inferior this is another form of violence. Taking land from people you are not killing people but [t]his is another form of violence.^M You cannot take land from Israelis but Israelis can come and take my land.^T [...] For many Palestinians, the way they perceive it^A is Israel as the forefront of the British imperialism, the US imperialism.^B

In a different workshop a similar attack on Israeli identity can be found. Here Israel is accused of treating Palestinians inhumanely. In addition the ingroup's actions (Intifada, but also implicitly suicide bombers etc.) are presented as a morally acceptable and necessary defense against Israeli aggression. At the same time a Palestinian need to reciprocate the Israeli strength is mentioned as well:

PZ: I disagree. That Israelis a[re] model on human rights makes me shudder.^{D,Q} For a Palestinian in Saudi Arabia, they might admire Israel's ways.^Q

[...]

PZ: It is an untruth not an exaggeration.^{I,K} Palestinians were not Bedouin out in the desert.^{C,K} Highly developed, but not comparable to Europe.^A It is difficult to acknowledge that the Israeli system is such a positive one^E, with the exception of the political system.^B

[...]

PW: We admire/learn that you beat us on the battlefield.^{A,T} That is why the intifada is so important, shifted tactics.^U Built us up. We took control of our own destiny.^{A,U} Put us on the map.

1992, time 1

One can also find examples in which certain aspects of one's group are excluded as not representative for the whole group. The following quote is a very good example for this sort of argument and it follows as a way to counter the thematic attack on Israeli identity shown above⁵:

IM: The second concern^A is about how Zionism is viewed not only by Arabs but by the whole world.^E Like for example the UN resolution equating Zionism with racism, when it is not so.^C Israel just wants to be a Jewish state.^A This has nothing to do with racism.^C People are distorting the idea in their own political aspirations. In the *best* case, this is a misunderstanding of the Jewish cause.^B In the worst case, it is a subversion of (our) political goals.^Q

⁵The first code is *A* as IM is referring to a concern that the Israeli participants previously brought up. Here one can see the difficulty of removing quotes from their context, as some codes attributed to the text may seem to be questionable without the context.

[...]

IE: It is Jewish slash Nationalism^A, not Jewish slash Religious.^C
 When one speaks of an Islamic country, it is obviously religious.^T
 But when we speak of the Jewish concept, we mean nationalist.^A

1992, time 2

This quote additionally shows the retaliation on the level of identity that the Israelis bring against the Palestinians. The equation of Zionism with racism is characterized as a subversion of the political goals of Israel implying an unjustified, intentional denial of moral standing for Israel.

The opposing points of view and the struggle to define Israeli identity to one's advantage can be explicitly observed in this passage:

PI: (Regarding Zionism) Palestinians see it legally speaking^A, on the ground, as a serious discrimination.^Q Especially permits, and land confiscation. What about travel? You can visit, I cannot even visit Jerusalem, it's for purely Jewish use.^T So on all sorts of practical levels, there are two rules applied.^T You can for example get a ticket if you have West Bank license plates, when an Israeli won't get it for the same thing.^T This could get as sophisticated as access to everything in a Jewish state. We have a problem with the exclusiveness of the Jewish state.^{A,O}

IM: Let's talk about the Israeli-Palestinian issues. You are not citizens^B ... (the occupied territories) have nothing to do with Zionism.^F

[...]

II: You perceive it as discrimination.^B For me, us Judaism is not a religion.^A Our nation lived in this area for many years^R, then we left the area not because of free choice.^A We took our Jewish passports with us.^R [...] Many years ago Jews were forced to leave.^A But they still carry their Jewishness as passports.^A

PI: We think of us in the same way^U (other Palestinians agree).

1992, time 2

The threat that the other can pose to one's own identity is captured in the following quote. Here it becomes clear what costs can be associated with accepting the other's point of view and justification for the conflict. The threat expressed by the Israeli here is of a moral dimension, one of justice:

IR: My primary worry about occupation is the toll on our society, all the bad reasons we know of occupation.^A Everything the Palestinian feels is wrong done to him, the Israeli feels he is doing wrong.^U If Israelis don't feel wrong, then something is even worse.^E Something has slipped in Jewish values, which is even worse.^A

1995, time 1

Palestinians have a similar struggle with their identity. As the following statements highlight, Palestinians are struggling to present themselves as a nation or national movement that has existed independently of the creation of the state of Israel. As the Israeli statement makes clear, it is in this conflict not self-evident that the main parties to the conflict should be Israelis and Palestinians. In addition to claims of Palestinian national identity as a recent phenomenon, Israeli participants also often point to their perception of a wider conflict between Arabs and Israelis in which Palestinians may only be a negligible piece:

PS: The thing is, that Arab nationalism was a reaction to colonialism.^A Each nation, or each country, at that time wanted to get rid of the colonialization.^{A,R}

[...]

PZ: Arab nationalism is not new^C... so Arab nationalism is a much more diffuse idea, and I would suggest that it is alive and well... so Pan-Arabism is only a variety of this Arab nationalism^A... specifically, when the Arab nationalists demanded independence from the Ottoman empire they demanded two separate Arab states^A, one in Syria and one in Iraq.

[...]

II: Israel has had a very different experience.^{R,T} First of all, what happened in 1948, when 7 nations came together... so

the idea of Arab nations coming together and doing things together was very real to us^{T,A} [...] what happened is that we occupied part of Jordan and created a new national existence.^D

1992, time 1

The next passage again highlights the Israeli challenge to Palestinian identity in a different workshop⁶:

PG: [...] Palestinians were entrusted Jerusalem as an Arab/Muslim place. So it's a symbol to us.^A

IR: When was it placed in the hand of the Palestinians?^D
Before the Jordanians took it?^Q

[...]

IR: As far as I understand Jerusalem is a symbol for Islam not only for the Palestinians.^D It is also a symbol for Judaism and Christianity. This is where a solution has to be found.^E Palestinians were entrusted with an international city.^B Jerusalem is Arab and Moslem at least as much as it is Jewish.^E I always laugh when I hear them argue about whose capit[a]l it is.^U Like children fighting over a flag on a hill.^{S,R}

1995, time 1

Suffering

One important and frequent issue relating to identity is the Palestinian presentation of their suffering at the hands of Israel. This is an indication of the power distribution on the ground where Israel occupies the Palestinian territories and is the powerful party in this conflict:

PW: The way you try to control us.^B Try to control us because it is easier for you to (oppress us).^{B,O} The more you try, the more we will resist/stronger we get.^{T,A} This is important.

PM: ??depersonalize their national identity. Include suppression of national symbols, flags, national culture.^{O,B} Obvious.

⁶As it is a challenge to Palestinian identity the code *D* was employed rather than *B* in IR's statements. The judgement that it is a challenge was made from the wider context of the exchange.

PZ: It is a lot more. It's not so abstract. It is prevention of economic development in the territories and entrepreneurial efforts.^{E,O} It's the creation of an economy that is dependent on Israelis.^{B,E} Growth of classrooms are strictly controlled in the territories, partly because of finances.^{A,E} Question of curricular controls. Generations that are coming out badly equipped to handle learning. It is appalling to see settlements with pools when Palestinians are rationing water for bathing.^{A,E,T}

1992, time 1

However it is also interesting and surprising that this description of suffering does not have to be countered by Israeli participants by descriptions of their own suffering at the hands of Palestinians in this particular instance. Often Israelis point to the attacks by Palestinian suicide bombers as their suffering at the hands of Palestinians. The following quote is the continuation of the above discussion and shows the Israeli difficulty in responding to the sufferings described. By describing the justification for Israeli actions with an acknowledgement of Palestinian suffering, the Israeli participants can open an avenue to understanding. An interim period emerges as an important step towards the solution of the conflict:

PW: In terms of the immediacy of how things are being handled in the West Bank day in and day out, land confiscated, not just water.^E Every day the systematic process by which Palestinians are put under the gun.^{B,Q} Settlements being built^B, a lot of frustration/anger/insecurity. You deal with the intifada as if it is a security concern to you.^S It's not to destroy you, it's to create a Palestinian nation and you are stifling it.^{A,T,B} Pushing Palestinians to the limit. Push, push, push every time we do something negative or positive.^{Q,B} This is what the occupation means to us.^{A,E} That is why you were always one face to us,^S all we saw was the occupation.^S Certain stance will never move from. Now we see there are other faces, people we can talk to.^{B,U}

IC: Most Israelis feel that life in the West Bank is insufferable.^{A,V} (there are some groups who don't care) It is a function of military occupation.^E It will cease as soon as we sign an agreement.^{E,P} It will end. We don't get anything out of it.^A

PW: Yes, you don't get anything out of it, but we are constantly suffering.^T

IC: I think they react as you would.^U

PW: We tell you we need a way out and you need the key.^E (you have control of us) So - frustrating when we go to the table and you still say no.^{E,O}

IS: We lack the incentive necessary to respond to that need.^{A,E} It's our need too.^U It is difficult to live with.^U There are groups in Israel who do quite a lot^A - for humanity - maybe important to remember.

PM: You are not doing anything about it.^Q

PM: What do you mean incentives?

IC: We have to give^A, I agree, but we have to get something for the negotiation.^E I'm not sure the Palestinians want us to walk out tomorrow.

PZ: Interim period is in the interest of both sides.^U

1992, time 1

The difficulties after the Declaration Of Principles and the Palestinian frustration with the continued suffering find their way into the 1995 workshop. The importance of identity, definitions of the Palestinian Authority etc. become evident here:

PN: Every time we are rejected and don't get a permit we get mad at Palestinians, not at Israelis.^A It's not the Peace we were looking for. I didn't want it to be like this. These are not things people sacrificed their lives for. It's sad, because it's not what we were looking for.^O

IR: What's your problem? Do you want us to come back?^N

IM: We have been delegating to the new entity and we are outside.^A

PN: It's not outside, it's more inside now.^M It's not a physical thing, it's a psychological thing. You're not outside, because we have to get a permit from you to leave Gaza.^B

1995, time 1

The discrepant self- and other-definitions of both parties can be seen in this quote. Here the Israeli definition for a just procedure does not at all correspond to the Palestinian perception. Both identities seem challenged in this exchange. The Israeli self-perception of a democratic nation is questioned as is the Palestinian self-image of a national movement and its right to an independent nation:

IM: The government doesn't have the power to overrule the court.^A I know of a case in which people went to the supreme court over a land taking and they won. You said you respect democracy, and the courts ruled, so it is legal.^B

PJ: Your laws cannot apply to the people in the West Bank and Gaza.^B There is no democracy with regard to the Palestinians in the Israeli supreme court.^T There is a power asymmetry here, and the supreme court serves the government of Israel, not the Palestinians.^T

PG: The laws in the territories are not the same as the laws in the rest of Israel.^{A,T}

1995, time 2

Jerusalem

The issue of access to Jerusalem, and Jerusalem as a capital for Israelis and Palestinians is a very contentious issue. One of the Palestinian issues with Jerusalem is Israel's decision to have West Jerusalem as their capital, which seems to force Palestinians to claim the same status for East Jerusalem for their nation to be. This type of reciprocal claims is a common occurrence in the workshops. The following quote can be seen as prototypical of the Palestinian position on Jerusalem and the role it plays with regard to Palestinian identity:

PG: They were opposed but accepted decisions of the Palestinian majority.^A It was not a model of democratic interactions, but in a Palestinian context, it was a decision supported by the majority, and there was a sizable opposition but it was accepted^A: an independent Palestinian state to be established on borders before the 1967 conflict, with the capit[a] being East Jerusalem.^O This decision was made only because Israel considers West Jerusalem as its capit[a].^E [...] The context of that is internationalizing Jerusalem^P, but not only

East Jerusalem. Israelis have never agreed to have any UN observation forces on their side of the border^T: in that case we will not play.^F

1995, time 1

The next quote is a prototypical example for the zero-sum view of conflict issues. Claims to Jerusalem have to be superior to the opponent's in order to "win" in the conflict. The other's national narratives is being challenged in order to undermine the legitimacy of an exclusive claim to Jerusalem:

IC: I think that the sense that the Jews claim to Jerusalem is pretty well understood.^A For Israelis the Palestinian claim is not as clear.^A

[...]

IC: What I don't understand is your concerns aren't Palestinians? Because Palestinians aren't exclusive representatives of Christians and Muslims, where as Jews are representative of Jews.^T

[...]

IC: But before the mandate - what was Jerusalem to you?

PZ: Mandate Palestinian has taken on character of its own. Once Britain made borders - stuck. When Palestinian nationalism emerged - at the time Zionist movement emerged^U - that was what Palestine was. Religion is also important.^U Don't underestimate it. It is also guardianship for us. Saudi acts as guardians of holy places. Muslims also Christians regard themselves as having some sort of duty as guardians to these holy places for the entire Muslim and Christian populations. You can't shirk this duty^D, it is pride, identity ... God placed Palestinians there to be guardians.^A

[...]

IC: I hear what your saying but I just want to point out that you'll have trouble translating this to Israeli population. Even I who feel reasonable^J have trouble seeing your claim as superior to ours^D ... even many non-Jews will see Palestine claim to Jerusalem as incomprehensible.^J

1992, time 2

Negative interdependence

As described in section 2.2 Palestinian and Israeli identity can be characterized by negative interdependence. In this section I want to show different quotes that highlight aspects of this state of negative interdependence. The power distribution on the ground is reflected here by the weaker party (Palestinians) arguing often for the need for reciprocity in response to demands or needs of the more powerful party (Israelis).

This quote clearly shows the Palestinian need for acknowledgement of their own legitimacy by Israel. It is an expression of the interdependence of both parties but also includes a hint that a change in Israel's perception or treatment of Palestinians would be helpful in resolving the conflict:

PN: It seems now that they (Israelis) are a superior power^B and they are giving something up if they give us some land and some freedom.^B They should believe that Palestinians h[av]e some rights.^P That they have equal rights to live there.^A

1995, time 1

Despite Israel's greater power on the ground, this quote from an Israeli participant shows that the need for acceptance and acknowledgement is present on the Israeli side as well. He does not believe that the Palestinians have accepted Israel and acknowledge Israel's right to exist:

IM: I'm still asking about where it's going to stop. Borders, everything. [...] It's not clear where you [are] going to stop demanding for more and more territories.^M If it was very clear that it was going to stop for example here, on the green line, I don't know, it will be very easy to get a decision. Israelis think^A it will take ten years with Palestinians^B and they are sick of it. The main point is that we are very suspicious about future demands.^T

1995, time 1

How vulnerable Israelis feel, despite their power on the ground, is exemplified in this quote:

IJ: Security issues come very close to home.^A It touches people.^O It's not something happening only over the border in the territories, but next to where I live, next door. This is a possible basis for a coalition among peace-striving elements.^P

1989, time 2

The interdependence of the two sides and the need for reciprocity is evident in this exchange:

IM: I believe that most Israelis would accept the Palestinian state.^A You ask us, where it's going to stop ... by demanding more and more territory at the Green Line.^E People have been thinking of a Palestinian state for ten years ... but with every polarization of views, the main point is they are very suspicious of future demands by Palestinians.^A Left parties in Israel are living near Jerusalem on Arab land.

PJ: What do you think about that? It's very interesting ... I never got a response from any of you about the right of return. If we were to get a kind of recognition, such as the right of return or compensation, that would help.^P That we have a place like you do^U, a right to breathe that air, feel the dun[e], hear the sounds of the place.^B [...] For me, to hear Israelis say there was injustice done, when the state of Israel was established, Palestinians paid the price for dispossessing you.^M Both wish to live alone, to not intrude. It's the same issue on either side.^U

1995, time 1

In this example the problem of mirror images that are built up in conflict and embedded in the negative interdependence of identity, can be seen:

IR: There must be some issues we don't know. We can't say just let it go. I'd agree with the principle. Whoever wants to participate because it's also important for us to see the result.^P If 80% (votes) Hamas or Islamic Jihad, we'll know that we are not moving forward since they are not for peace with Israel.^B Is Arafat what he says or what you say ... this is a red line for us. It's important now to do it, not when we take out settlements and withdraw from the area.^E I have a suspicion, Yassir Arafat is trying to get us to stop the participation of the opposition elements to his regime.^{B,M} We could be playing into his hands.^O

PG: In a way, I hope for ... we're going in circles. IJ is saying moratorium to violence. Violence is reaction to something Israel is doing.^C I think once Israel stops doing it, it

will decrease.^{E,T} You're saying something should be done, to stop. IR made a point that is interesting but it is also dangerous. What we want is free and open elections.^A (...) Benjamin N[e]anyahu who according to yesterday is my namesake, if he is elected (in Israeli elections) this is all down the trash can.^{B,O} Is this a red line for us? We ought to respect the results of free democratic elections.^Q If Israelis want Likud I would feel sad about it as a person, as an Israeli as a Palestinian. If Palestinians vote to elect (...) ^U

1995, time 2

One aspect of mirror images is that both sides claim to have given everything while having received nothing. This Palestinian statement is prototypical of such a view:

PN: But Arafat has already done this, he has already denounced and condemned violence and terrorism.^A What more do you want from him? Why haven't Israel condemned their own violence?^M It seems that the more Palestinians give, the more Israeli[s] demand.^N

1995, time 2

Both sides claim a need for reciprocity, for example that they should be acknowledged when they acknowledge the other. At the same time they accuse each other of not reciprocating one's own good deeds or of claiming reciprocity when there is no apparent reciprocal gesture that is supposed to make sense. How this denial of reciprocity fuels mirror images can be seen in this quote where the Israeli need for a presence of Israeli military in a Palestinian state is used to highlight the unacceptable nature of this need for the Palestinian side and the Palestinians' need for reciprocity in this matter:

IY: But you're adding here a problematic element, that there will be reciprocity by the Palestinians who would be in Israel, from its center, totally unacceptable by the army professionals.^{A,F,O,T}

PB: But this tells you what the Palestinians find hard to accept, foreign presence in the land.^{A,O}

1989, time 2

In this quote the Palestinian participant expresses that the Palestinian participants are more prototypical of the Palestinian society than the Israeli participants are for their society. This is used to demonstrate a higher moral position of Palestinians compared to the Israeli public against which the Israeli participant is trying to defend him- or herself:

PB: The majority reaction (Palestinian) seems to be along realistic path.^A I see a difference between your reactions and those of a majority of the Israeli public.^B You are willing to make political concessions, yet the Israeli public^B is not yet ready to deal with these issues in the way you have.^S I believe the positions presented by the Palestinians do represent the majority approach.^{A,R} What we have here is a situation. . .

IM: It's not fair to say this^I. . .

PB: But it's the way we react^{R,N}. . .

IM: You say majority. . . the three of you?

1989, time 2

Self-determination

The issues of Palestinian self-determination and especially the right to define who represents the Palestinians have been discussed contentiously in workshops. The issue of Palestinian elections in its variations over the years have been a way for Israelis to try to control Palestinian self-definition. This theme is very well reflected in the following exchange:

PN: Elections are not just for the good of Palestinians.^E It is also good for Israelis.^B You want to be able to pick a target to be your next enemy.^Q

IR: The elections are an outcome of the Palestinian demands.^N

1995, time 2

The next quote underlines this conflict over Palestinian self-definition:

IY: If it's only one day, why can't you go with confederation with Jordan?^E

PN: We won't go into agreement with Jordan unless we're an independent state^A, it's our choice of confederation between respected independent states.^A

1989, time 2

Another aspect of self-determination is reflected in the demand for acknowledgement of equality between the two sides in the following quote:

PN: Israel is unwilling to do anything right now.^B Israel perceives^B any positive action from the Palestinians as the result of their pushing rather than as a sincere action from them.^T You know there are internal constraints for us too.^{A,U} Maybe have already reached the limit on further concessions.^A So, we have reached the point where we can't give anymore.^E

1989, time 2

4.4.3 Positive prototypes of using identity in workshops

There are also positive uses of identity. Identity is not only involved in justifying one's position and challenging the other's. One of the explicit aims of an interactive problem-solving workshop is to enable both parties to understand the other's needs and fears and state them back to the other. The lists of needs and fears developed during the workshops have already been covered in section 4.2.2. Here are just a few quotes to illustrate how this is expressed in interaction. As can be seen from the superscript *B*, the statements ascribe something to the outgroup, that is, the speaker is describing the other group:

IN: Empowerment of the PLO is a concern. To include Palestinians in the political arena.^B

IM: And of course the right of return.^B

IJ: And compensation.^B

IM: Economic constraints, restrictions in the territories.^B

[...]

PG: Security.^B Borders.^B Right of return are concerns for Israelis.^B

[...]

PJ: To retain a state as a neighbor, and Israel as a whole entity.^B To alleviate the guilt feelings, to assure, lessen the damage of what it means to be an occupier^E ... To be free of guilt.^V

IR: We're still waiting to hear recognition of us.^{A,E}

1995, time 1

The last statement also shows how the interaction enables both sides to make sure that their needs are understood. Difficulties in understanding or rephrasing can provide an avenue to contentious issues between the participants present.

In the following quote one can see the importance of this process for the participants:

IL: I disagree.^K It is important for me to hear your approach to us.^E It is important to hear you not only as occupiers.^U I thank you.

PW: We are not doing this for you.

IL: That makes it even more important.

1992, time 1

Jerusalem has been a contentious issue in many workshops. This quotes shows how the workshop has enabled the participants to reflect on the significance of Jerusalem for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The following statements are extraordinary given the conflict context and highlights how important an arena to float ideas is for creative problem solving:

IR: [...] But what people have to realize is that Jerusalem is a spiritual capit[a]l for all people of the world. If they [Palestinians] find a way to do that, the whole mysticism of Jerusalem will evaporate, leaving us with just simple problems.^V

PG: IR is making significant grounds here.^U I don't think any Israeli officials have said this. It is a good way of presenting the issue to Palestinians.^V

1995, time 1

A similar opening in perception of the other and the conflict can be seen in the next quote. While the Palestinian begins with a description of the Israelis as a common enemy, he continues by saying how different the current interaction is. In this he can see a possibility for future dialogue:

PW: Part of the cohesion behind the Pan-Arabist movement is this idea of the common enemy.^B This is very different from what we're talking about.^P Now we talk about independent nations coming together as equals^U, not as an ideology. But this is for the future.

1992, time 1

Understanding the other's needs and fears in combination with a softening of the view of the other can provide an important tool to reduce mirror images on the way to interactive problem solving. In the following quote identity seems to be more flexible and statements about the concrete issues begin to take the other's perspective into account (superscript *V*) while focusing on commonalities (superscript *U*):

II: There's a linkage between needs and compromise to these needs. So let's talk about needs for a moment.^U Now what I heard you say, is that if need number two is met^A, you're willing to (put off) need number one.^V That gets on into the issue of future relations. Now you stated that you had dependence on the Israeli economy... wouldn't that bring about trust.^E I like what I hear, because... while Israelis agreeing in these issues... (urgent demands). What about economic cooperation and mutual security? Addressing needs we can reach some compromise (i.e., statehood).^U

1992, time 1

The following quote clearly shows how the forum can help to float ideas and judge the reaction of the other. This is a very important step in finding actions that frame the resolution of the conflict as a win-win situation leading to creative solutions:

PZ: Specific steps Israelis can take: immediate stop to settlement activities and declaration (?), if not stop slow down or step in that direction.^P Immediate halt of land confiscation. Stopping these two things will go a long way in encouraging

Palestinians to make concessions.^{E,P} Specific steps in allowing Palestinians to produce a local political structure^P that military withdrawal doesn't satisfy: elections, military withdrawal from populated areas^P, will make Israeli life better.^U

1992, time 1

This can lead to concrete efforts to define creative solutions such as the following statement:

PJ: I feel I have a good sense of your constraints and I hope you have a sense of what some of our constraints are.^{B,V} I want to turn the question a bit. What could we do to remove the constraints on your part (and vice versa) here?^P I'm more fuzzy on what would count as something that we could do, whereas I think that we are clear about particular actions that would remove constraints on our side.^E Captured in one sentence: to end occupation, troop withdrawal, dismantle the settlements, redeployment, make possible for elections and a move to final status talks now, before the facts on the ground are established.^{E,P,B} Is there some concrete actions you can suggest that Palestinians could take that would count to remove constraints?^P

1995, time 2

The unofficial character of the workshops can also encourage the sharing of personal experiences (positive and negative) that help anchor the conflict and its resolution in everyday life. This quote is a very good example of this:

PM: What can we do so that the children and the youth will be able to see Jews beyond the front that they are exposed to? This is a serious problem for me.^E Because I have known Jews^J I have been in their homes, they have been in my home.^U It is in a sense I am lucky to have known that dimension since it is impossible for me to be labeling Jews or labeling Israelis only in one way.^V [...] We have to work with concrete things that allow people to (interact).^P This is what we are trying to do for the children of Palestine.^A The youth of Palestine, to regain their voice, regain their sense of

responsibility for constructing their own society, their ability to learn.^P Since the British came to Palestine, and then the Jews then the Israelis this is robbing us^M and we have to regain this to feel human to act human, and relate to humans.^A

1995, time 2

Real-world constraints are important issues when the discussion focuses on possibilities to resolve conflict. But instead of being used as a way to avoid conflict resolution these constraints can help to better define ways to support conflict resolution. This effort is reflected in the following quote:

IB: It may be a desirable solution to us here, but we must realize that we are far beyond^F what is agreed upon by the real participants. We must try to express our own opinions and desires with a view to reach accommodation. On the other hand, we must try to appreciate and recognize what is going on in the real world in order to reach a real agreement.^E In that world, some of these elements are not still widely accepted. We must appreciate this constraint first.^E One element that the seven of us here (agree on arrangements?) The other level is how to make this idea relevant, sell to our own respective communities. When I think of what's going on in Israel I find it a very problematic conflict to reconcile these two dimensions^A... go much beyond what is expected in these roles^F... ("Inherent tension")

1989, time 2

The next passage illustrates the process of reducing mirror images and the chance that this provides in developing solutions to the conflict. While I have omitted some interventions for the sake of clarity of the example, this exchange took place within approximately five minutes. It also illustrates the difficulties the participants encounter on their way to finding solutions:

PS: Let me continue. I think there would be other areas of continuous concern for Palestinians and Israelis.^E These areas could be solved by joint committees of Israelis and Palestinians which will discuss the issues regularly.^P We can both

monitor what's going on.^P If this is your vision, you stress less military aspects, you stress more actual facts and steps of working together in the field that stress cooperation rather than watching and wondering what am I going to do.^{V,P} The point of Jerusalem is a good example, Israel says there should be a united Jerusalem^B, but there are 145-150,000 Palestinians who don't want Jerusalem united, and they did not participate in the democratic process.^{A,E} To make Jerusalem a model situation, there should be arrangements in Jerusalem that would ensure that Arabs, Palestinians, in Jerusalem would have their own institutions within Jerusalem, and with Israel, joint maintenance of utilities, events, management.^P Some may say too, this is naive view of the future but if there will be willingness by Israelis to have negotiation, I wouldn't be surprised, knowing Palestinian community now^A, that these ideas would start moving up among Palestinians.^A [...] If we can get people to move toward this idea, we'll have the beginning of a new relationship between Palestinians and Israelis.^P

[...]

IY: [...] Economic profit and increased comfort for the people is the main recipe for success.^P Problem of Jerusalem is crucial and Jerusalem should not be divided. If jointly managed, then the idea of independent states is unworkable. Then we both have problems with extremists that will enter.^O

PS: That's why we have joint administration, extremists. There will be extremists on your side and our side^U, but I object that the city would be divided and this is the difficult part, but it can serve as a model for the whole situation.

[...]

PS: There is mistrust^E and that is why you^B always^S press on security, as if there are always Palestinians that want to destroy you.^Q

IY: You're^B always^S hopeful.^T

[...]

IJ: I completely share your image of Jerusalem^U, and I don't say it cynically, and hope it's not naive, economic cooperation, joint committees, could be a reality.^E I like the way you

formalize it, and if Arafat joins, so much the better^P [...] The real ideas are not realizable from the Israeli point of view^A unless simultaneous means dealing with the security issue.^E

1989, time 2

The next quote not only illustrates the concessions participants are willing to make for peace but also the influence of the identity structures on the interaction. The Palestinian response clearly follows the theme of representing failures as successes against all odds (as described by Khalidi, 1997):

IN: But we are proposing that we would give something and the question is what would the response be, if we made a change? So we were really giving more stuff for immediate needs to be satisfied.^P What would the response be?

PN: Palestinians could do things to improve our situation^A [i]f we were given a chance to do it^P, if there weren't so many restrictions placed on us.^M

IN: But what I am proposing is some kind of step ahead, whatever the reason that Palestinians now are having trouble paying the bill, the suggestion is that we help with it.^P I agree though^A, we should not be asking for receipts when people try to leave Gaza.^L

1995, time 2

In the next quote the Israeli participant states the agreement both sides have reached. The Palestinian's response demonstrates how influential the threat to national identity posed by the resolution of conflict can be for participants and how difficult it is for both sides to support and acknowledge the other:

IJ: I personally feel I understand the desire for the right to return and that everyone needs an identity, a passport.^U But if there was a Palestinian state alongside an Israeli state agreement, with the right of return, would that satisfy?^P

PJ: That's the same thing as a guarantee. I can't say. I can't promise what will happen when you close the door.^F

1995, time 1

Coming back to the issue of Jerusalem this last quote shows, how the workshop has helped participants to deal even with strong emotions (“Wailing Wall not negotiable”) and still focus on finding a solution that is acceptable for both sides. The amount of learning and change in perception this requires can be seen in II’s statement when he paraphrases the concept of Jerusalem as a capital of both states and ends with commenting *interesting*. This, to me, is a clear sign that this was an idea not expected to be talked about or agreed upon in this workshop:

II: Sense in Israel that we’re not willing to negotiate^A, Wailing Wall not negotiable.^S We emphasize the indivisibility of the city.^A We aren’t willing to negotiate that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel but we can negotiate regarding equal access.^E Can one city be capital of two states? No precedent, very different. Emphasis on it being capital of Israel. Can we share a capital with another state?^P

[...]

PW: ... we could work together.^P If there was a united city council, who would pick up garbage, pay taxes ... challenge for both of us.^U

[...]

II: If we agree that Jerusalem is capital of Jewish state ... (?). If we both agree that city shouldn’t be divided, concept of Jerusalem as capital of both states, *interesting*⁷.^P

[...]

IC: Lets say there is no sovereignty. Sovereignty is separate. We both have our capitals there and it belongs to nobody.^U

[...]

II: It’s a simple issue because both sides feel the same way^U - religion, historical roots ... identity^U ... Palestinians have lived there and seen it as capital^B, Israelis have lived there^A ... we share many needs.^U That’s why we went ahead to solve problems because we did it as same needs.^V

1992, time 2

⁷Highlighted by the author.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I retraced the steps that I took in exploring the role of national identity in conflict resolution. In parallel with the development of the theoretical argument for the importance of national identity in resolving conflict, made in chapter 2, I examined the actual use of identity in a particular conflict. As noted in section 3.2.1, the data used here has its limits. These are notes taken by members of the third party and not the actual utterances of participants. This does preclude certain kinds of analyses. The qualitative analysis done here has its obvious limitations too. It can illustrate that identity is being used in interactive problem-solving workshops. It does not however allow for a definitive claim that interactive problem-solving workshops provide a space for identity negotiation. Given the kind of analysis I did, a null hypothesis that identity is not used in this particular conflict resolution setting cannot be rejected even if it might seem plausible given the examples of identity use in this chapter.

The following results have therefore the status of suggestions. Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2 illustrate that issues relating to identity in the protracted conflict between Palestinians and Israelis remained relatively stable over time. Acknowledgment from the other side, need for security and reassurances from the other were all needs that were important throughout the workshops between 1984 and 1999. Section 4.2.3 highlighted the difficulty of focusing on the use of identity. The quotes in section 4.4.2 illustrate that the discussions about issues on the ground were strongly linked to uses of identity that were designed (in the most part) to support one's claim in the conflict. In order for each party to stay in conflict, its current national identity has to provide the possibility to delegitimize the other and to legitimize its own position in the conflict. This can be seen in quotes in sections 4.3 and 4.4.2 and especially in exchanges marked with codes *M*, *N*, *Q* and *T*. Identity was used as a way to challenge the self-definition of the other, to undermine the legitimacy of their claim in the conflict, and to present the moral superiority of the ingroup, supporting the ingroup's claim in the conflict. The negative uses of identity illustrate the hypothesized investment of national identity in conflict as described in section 2.1. This chapter thus provides examples of strategic use of national identity and its construction in interaction supporting one's conflict stance.

In section 2.4 I went on to argue that the negative use of identity needs to be replaced with a use that is more favorable to conflict resolution in order to reduce the threat of annihilation. Section 4.4.3 illustrates that

the interactive problem-solving workshop allows for an environment that is favorable to positive uses of identity in the face of a protracted ethnic conflict. The examples, such as understanding the other's needs and acknowledging shared needs or fears, point to the possibility of constructing a different kind of national identity that can support conflict resolution. The interaction with the other side also provided some relief from the fear of annihilation, even though this fear reoccurred after having been alleviated. This could be due to the threat posed to identity by the possibility of resolving conflict. One major step in the interactive problem-solving workshops was the reduction of mirror images reflected in the understanding of the other's needs and fears. This is in essence a change in the self- and other-perception to include the other's self-perception in judging the other. The examples are however rather weak. They do not contain any direct negotiation of identity. This can, on the one hand, be interpreted as evidence against the possibility or even necessity of identity negotiation. Given the investment in conflict illustrated in section 4.4.2, on the other hand, it may not be very surprising. The goal of conflict resolution efforts is the sustained resolution of conflict. Judging by the history of many protracted ethnic conflicts and the identity use found here the question how identity issues can and should be addressed in conflict resolution efforts seems legitimate. I will present some suggestions in the next chapter.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Social scientists can contribute significantly through the reconceptualization of national identity and the development of a methodology for negotiating identity.

(Kelman, 1997b, p. 340)

My initial goal was very different from the results presented here. I wanted to measure identity negotiation in a conflict resolution setting and relate it to the quality of the outcome. I encountered several problems. First, making the outcomes of conflict resolution measurable is difficult, especially in the field of track-two diplomacy. As the workshops and similar efforts are confidential meetings there is no direct reference to the outcome of workshops in the “outside world”. Defining an outcome of interactive problem-solving workshops was also not easy as many learning experiences happen during the process but do not translate directly into a specific outcome. This is reflected in the fact that the positive uses of identity found in section 4.4.3 occur both at the relative beginning and end of workshops. This can be related on the one hand to the protracted nature of the conflict, which makes any kind of conflict resolution effort difficult. On the other hand, the setting itself does not endorse finding a specific solution but rather aims at providing a space that allows participants to explore new avenues of thinking. Second, it was not clear to me how to evaluate the identity uses within the workshop settings (see sections 2.5, 3.3 and 4.2.3). Looking back, this is partly due to the lack of

theoretical clarity in the existing literature on the role of identity in conflict and conflict resolution. On the one hand, national identity in protracted conflict, while considered to be very important, is mostly regarded as non-negotiable by the conflict parties. On the other hand, national identity in the experimental tradition of social identity theory, which focuses on the use of identity, is considered just one of many possibly salient identities as Brown (2000, p. 761) acknowledges when stating: "It seems to me that an important step for SIT to take is to incorporate these central dimensions of group diversity and no longer assume that a group is a group as far as key social psychological mechanisms are concerned." Influenced by my experience in participating in a problem-solving workshop I also intended to conduct my own workshops to test the outcome of interactive problem-solving workshops and test the usefulness of different interventions. This focus on applying theory to further conflict resolution may explain the focus in the dissertation on possible useful interventions. This project proved to be too ambitious however, given the difficulties mentioned above.

To tackle the problems while using the data from interactive problem-solving workshops at hand I decided to follow a grounded theory approach in analyzing identity negotiation. This methodology itself has had an important impact on the results of this study. Grounded theory is not primarily concerned with testing hypotheses. The goal is to develop a new theoretical understanding while keeping that understanding grounded in the analysis of data. This dissertation does therefore not provide empirical evidence that identity negotiation is necessary for successful conflict resolution. Nor does it show that an explicit focus on national identity in an interactive problem-solving setting improves the outcome of conflict resolution efforts. In the process of theory development grounded in data the biggest hurdle was the separation between functional use of identity and the (important) content of the discussions. This seemed to be necessary in order to present a clear picture of the role of identity in conflict resolution. The interactions between Israelis and Palestinians (presented in sections 4.1 to 4.3) informed me in developing my theoretical view on the role of identity in conflict (as presented in chapter 2) and that view in turn helped me provide examples of identity use in interactive problem-solving workshops (see section 4.4).

National identity or nationalism is usually seen as an evil that may partly be responsible for the existence of conflict and should by all means be avoided in conflict resolution. Kelman (1997a, p. 216), while repeating this position, also points to another aspect of identity that becomes

visible in conflict resolution workshops: “Participants’ interactions in the group context often reflect the nature of the relationship between their communities—their mutual distrust, their special sensitivities and vulnerabilities, their differences in power and minority–majority status—and demonstrate the self-perpetuating character of interactions among conflicting societies.” I have provided examples from workshops that support the observation that identity is in use during the interactive problem-solving workshops in section 4.4. In addition I have provided a theoretical argument in chapter 2 why the typical adversarial interactions seem to be self-perpetuating. The adversarial interactions can be related to the investment described in sections 2.1 to 2.3 that conflict requires. In order to sustain conflict both parties have developed negatively interdependent identities that allow the derogation of the other and the legitimization of the ingroup’s claim in the conflict. The examples in section 4.4.2 highlight the negative interdependence. One can see the derogation of the other and the moral justification for one’s claims.

Following the theoretical ideas presented in chapter 2 a resolution effort without a change in identity will threaten the very existence of the national group as important aspects of the current identity directly contradict conflict resolution. Kelman (1999, p. 591) highlights this point when he states that “the long history of systematic nonrecognition makes it clear why the Oslo agreement, despite its many limitations, represented an important turning point in the conflict”. While the Oslo agreement was a positive step, the question remains why the agreement has more or less failed to ameliorate the current situation between Israelis and Palestinians. Among many other reasons, which relate to the specific nature of the agreement, I believe that there has not been sufficient work on changing the national identities of both parties. Identities still support conflict and not conflict resolution. While the investment of identity in conflict is clearly visible in chapter 4, the interactive problem solving approach does allow for positive uses of identity to develop. Those positive uses include, among others, focusing on commonalities, the expression of shared needs and disagreeing with ingroup members. As can be seen from the results a focus on identity provides an important point of view on conflict resolution efforts. Identity can be regarded as a big obstacle in resolving conflict. However trying to remove identity from a conflict resolution equation does not seem to be helpful either. The interactive problem-solving workshops are a positive framework for conflict resolution but it seems that the approach has currently limitations when dealing with the

solutions developed by participants and the perceived threat to the core of identity that these can present.

The theoretical ideas developed, also have some implications for track-two diplomacy efforts: If identity is involved in supporting conflict, why do we not directly challenge participants' self-perception in order to bring out the role of identity? What is the potential harm of such an action? It may increase the reluctance of participants to sit down with the other side and therefore jeopardize the conflict resolution effort. But a direct or implicit threat to a participant's national identity within a workshop may go unaddressed and especially unresolved in the current framework. This threat may also jeopardize the process. The third party should be mindful of identity issues and use their knowledge to reduce threats to identity by directly addressing self-perceptions. This involves the risk that both sides begin arguing about who is "right" and whose historical narrative is "correct". Such a discussion could be reframed by the third party as a possible departure point of reconciliation. I believe that the addition of a process of explicit identity negotiation, while posing risks, may facilitate changing one's own self-perception towards an identity that is less dependent on the other. One may think of this as a process of "disarming" the respective identities of the parties that have been put into place in order to sustain the conflict up to now. But as with other disarmaments it is very helpful to synchronize the process with the opposing side. This is why I propose such a focus on identity to be included in the framework of interactive problem-solving workshops. Kelman (1997a, 1999) has already argued that the interactive problem solving approach aims at facilitating changes in peripheral parts of the participants' identity. I believe that, while accommodating the other on the periphery of one's identity is an important step in building a working trust between participants, addressing the national identities directly can provide a very different push for conflict resolution. Such an intervention could take the form of a step in the agenda that focuses explicitly on self- and other-perception at the table. It could also be framed as an intervention that takes place in a caucus of both groups during the weekend from which both groups present their findings to the other side. This would make it possible for both parties to see the changes in self-perception on the other side and facilitate their own process. In addition the framework of the workshop would provide an opportunity for the initial change in identity to bear fruits in creative solutions to the conflict.

This brings me to future research that should be conducted. As the current study is based solely on data from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict other

conflicts should be examined to test the applicability of my suggestions to protracted ethnic conflicts in general. An analysis of different conflicts with regard to the uses of identity, presented here with examples, could be a first step. Measuring different identity uses and comparing quantitative data will also provide a clearer picture for further studies. There are, in my view, two distinctly different avenues for further research. The first avenue focuses on experimental research to evaluate the theoretical ideas developed in chapter 2. To test the argument that conflict leads, through the necessary investment, to a rigid identity, one should test the rigidity of national identities in societies involved in protracted ethnic conflict (“conflict societies”) and compare it to national identities in societies not involved in protracted ethnic conflict (“non-conflict societies”). A comparison of the inclusion of self- and other-stereotypes, derogation of the outgroup and moral justifications in the description of national identity by members of “conflict societies” and “non-conflict societies” would be an indicator if conflict requires the kind of investment outlined in section 2.1. A comparison of uses of social identity in protracted ethnic conflict to the use of social identity in other group conflicts would be useful to determine the importance of the content of social identity with regard to its effects on group members. The second avenue focuses on the improvement of conflict resolution efforts, specifically the interactive problem solving approach. The most important step seems to be the development of outcome measures for conflict resolution efforts. One possible way to achieve this could be through the use of questionnaires asking participants to describe and judge the outcome of a conflict resolution effort. This should probably occur directly, 6 months and a year after the workshops, as the judgement may change over time. A difficulty in this endeavor is clearly the confidentiality of the workshops and the different status of the conflict groups. While it may be relatively easy to get feedback from the high status group, the low status group is more likely to refuse to participate in this kind of study. A second step would be testing different interventions as described above. These interventions should take the form of creating a caucus for the discussion of national identity and directly addressing the issue in the presence of both conflict parties. Given the hypothesized risks associated with the interventions specific safeguards need to be developed and put into place. A method to judge differences in outcome and identity use also needs to be developed. The theoretical ideas in chapter 2 can provide guidance here. In addition it could be informative to compare the national identity expressions in protracted conflicts with the current identity expressions in successful conflict resolution efforts, such as South Africa.

An analysis of change of national identity expression during the resolution of conflict could also provide important theoretical insight into the role of identity in conflict and an indicator for the relationship between identity change and conflict resolution.

One last aspect, absent from the theoretical analysis, I would like to mention is the role of leaders in conflict. The above ideas on the role of identity in conflict do suggest implications for leaders' use of national identity. First, national identity is a powerful tool as it allows leaders to exert a lot of power. Second, the essentialized perception of national identity is helpful in claiming legitimacy and self-evidence for a political agenda. Third, conflict has a strong impact on the flexibility of national identity. As easy as it may be to lead a group into a protracted conflict, as difficult it may be to lead a group into conflict resolution. The, mostly unconscious, options for linking a political project to national identity have been drastically reduced by conflict. This may go as far as effectively associating any kind of sustained conflict resolution with a threat to the core of a national identity. Any leader attempting to mobilize support for conflict resolution would therefore be well advised to critically reflect on the constraints that the current national identity imposes on thinking about conflict resolution. This kind of reflection can provide new and creative ideas on how to use the power and legitimacy associated with national identity for conflict resolution. As the interactive problem solving approach addresses influential members and would-be leaders of conflict groups it seems to be an ideal place to inform participants about the constraints identity can put on their thinking. The group of participants selected for interactive problem-solving workshops seems to be at an interface between the general ideas on identity in conflict societies and the specific role of leaders in developing identity projects. Their actions and thoughts on the issue may be of interest to researchers studying the role of leadership in conflict or conflict resolution.

Appendix A

Frequencies

In order to get an overview of what might happen in workshops and to get some way to select from the large number of workshops at my disposal I looked for different keywords and their frequency of mention in the workshops I had access to. The first three items in table A.1 on page 139 refer to United Nations Security Council's resolutions 181, 242 and 338. These are UN resolutions with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. UN resolution 181 is the partition plan for the British mandate territory of Palestine. It was adopted in 1947. UN resolution 242 was adopted in 1967 after the Six Day war. It calls for "the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" (*Resolution 242, 1967*) and the termination of all hostilities. It also calls for the recognition of Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan by each other and it calls for the establishment of peace and secure and recognized boundaries for all parties. UN resolution 338 was adopted in 1973 and called for the end of the Yom Kippur war and the implementation of resolution 242. It also called for an immediate beginning of negotiations between "the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East" (*Resolution 338, 1973*). Similarly, the other keywords were selected on the basis of my understanding of and experience with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I selected keywords that could reflect different facets of the conflict that might surface in problem-solving workshops, such as, for example, discussions of nationalism, a two-state solution, the role of Jerusalem, the involvement of Arab nations in the conflict, the role of security concerns and issues of peace and perceived threat.

A few words should explain some notations in table A.1. For the entry “arabi*” any word beginning with this string was counted. Numbers in parentheses specify the count of the keyword version mentioned in parentheses at the beginning of the line, while the regular count includes this version and all others. When comparing frequencies across workshops one needs to take into account the total number of keywords for a workshop as these differ widely between workshops (within a range of 1297 – 2135 words). Distributions of keywords differ across the workshops. “Intifada” is one keyword which could only occur beginning in the 1989 workshop as this was the first year in which this phenomenon existed on the ground. Similarly “Oslo” was mentioned only beginning in the 1995 workshop, which was the first workshop that took place after the Oslo accords of 1993. Looking at the frequencies the choice of the workshops from 1989, 1992 and 1995 as material for further analysis seems to adequately represent the diversity contained in the workshops, even if “Zionism” seems to be somewhat underrepresented in these workshops compared to the workshops not chosen for further analysis. Also noteworthy is the frequent use of “Holocaust” in the 1988 workshop. But the overall count of the three chosen workshops is comparable to the other workshops and keeping to a three year rhythm between workshops should also somewhat reduce a selection bias. This selection bias would probably have been larger if I had chosen workshops to code further solely on the basis of the frequencies of certain keywords or solely on my first impression after reading them.

Table A.1: Frequencies of keywords in Israeli-Palestinian workshops

	1983	1984	1986	1987	1988	1989	1992	1993	1995	1996	1999
181	0	0	2	4	1	0	0	1	0	0	3
242	0	0	0	19	12	7	0	1	3	0	8
338	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	4
Jerusalem	18	36	31	6	3	21	40	42	153	24	68
security	7	9	49	38	18	55	156	53	28	26	59
settlement	1	20	12	12	6	16	18	11	5	4	21
settlements	12	17	8	12	8	5	37	12	22	10	79
refugee	14	2	2	3	8	14	6	7	18	40	51
Intifada	0	0	0	0	0	59	16	12	6	6	5
right of return	0	0	2	1	0	12	10	7	41	1	14
law of return	3	0	1	1	6	0	2	9	0	0	2
jewish	22	38	16	17	37	14	37	36	31	6	54
jewishness	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3
Zionism	33	6	5	25	21	0	9	22	0	0	3
Zionist	33	9	12	11	11	4	3	12	3	4	5
Arafat	16	17	78	49	15	46	1	27	68	58	35
non-starter	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	4
occupied	8	2	16	1	11	23	14	17	7	7	8
threat	1	19	1	13	18	7	21	8	5	1	3
threaten	2	7	5	3	6	7	7	2	3	0	4
peace	132	85	136	113	47	51	54	51	72	166	110
peaceful	4	11	20	6	1	4	20	0	3	2	3

Table A.1: Frequencies of keywords in Israeli-Palestinian workshops

	1983	1984	1986	1987	1988	1989	1992	1993	1995	1996	1999
identity	9	10	16	5	9	8	22	31	7	13	9
identify	6	2	2	2	4	7	8	8	2	5	3
nation	3	20	28	8	29	7	25	19	7	26	5
national	9	26	14	14	12	6	42	41	8	4	7
bi-national	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3
nationalism	2	5	19	8	3	8	14	18	1	2	3
nationalistic	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
state	110	82	80	145	204	122	134	189	86	141	209
statehood	0	4	9	9	2	0	13	7	0	0	2
Arab states	2	3	0	1	6	4	16	11	0	3	0
Arab	70	70	40	50	79	75	131	71	36	51	14
Palestinian state	47	15	15	29	23	39	35	78	20	20	25
jewish state	2	10	1	2	9	5	12	0	5	0	28
Israel	275	136	201	170	213	212	178	206	160	117	183
Israeli	194	87	95	72	129	172	140	176	143	156	154
Israelis	131	73	55	96	156	168	141	154	129	113	135
Palestinian	164	97	153	114	105	160	147	258	161	146	211
Palestinians	182	142	115	133	182	239	256	177	269	173	250
Holocaust	0	6	0	7	43	3	0	8	3	7	16
blame	6	1	1	4	4	0	1	1	4	3	6
hate	0	5	0	1	3	7	0	3	4	13	15
Samaria	0	0	1	1	1	3	1	0	0	0	6

Table A.1: Frequencies of keywords in Israeli-Palestinian workshops

	1983	1984	1986	1987	1988	1989	1992	1993	1995	1996	1999
suicide	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	1	2	1	6
freedom	12	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	8	4	2
fighter	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
resist	0	1	0	1	2	0	2	0	1	0	1
resistance	2	4	0	1	1	2	1	2	3	2	0
safe passage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	6
militarize	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
demilitarize	1	1	2	1	1	7	1	4	0	0	0
Accord	0	1	4	0	0	0	2	1	3	0	0
agreement (pl.)	41 (1)	23 (1)	69 (5)	24 (1)	31 (1)	34 (3)	36 (3)	61 (3)	111 (1)	107 (4)	74 (12)
disagreement	12	1	14	2	1	3	1	1	3	5	9
brake/broke	3	4	1	0	8	2	1	2	1	0	2
into the sea	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	1
trust	20	12	8	11	1	21	26	12	19	29	58
mistrust	4	3	1	2	0	9	1	6	1	4	8
distrust	0	0	1	6	0	6	0	1	6	3	0
insecurity	2	2	0	2	1	0	1	3	0	1	1
identification	2	0	1	2	0	0	0	2	1	1	0
resettlement	0	0	0	1	0	5	1	0	0	0	0
nationalist	0	0	2	0	0	1	2	4	0	1	0
broker(age)	0	2	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0

Table A.1: Frequencies of keywords in Israeli-Palestinian workshops

	1983	1984	1986	1987	1988	1989	1992	1993	1995	1996	1999
Σ^1	1884	1297	1619	1519	1689	1922	1945	2107	1972	1634	2135

¹ Does not include the items “Palestinian state”, “jewish state” and “Arab states” as their count is already contained in the items “state”, “Palestinian”, “Jewish” and “Arab”; it also does not include the item “Samaria” as it only occurs in conjunction with “Judea”.

Appendix B

Needs and fears

To look at similarities and differences across time I collected the lists of needs and fears that the participants produced in some of the workshops during the Saturday sessions. The same superscript (e.g. ^a) for one of the groups corresponds to the same need in different workshops in order to facilitate understanding the explanation given in section 4.2.2 on page 82. The superscripts are not directly comparable between groups. All lists have been produced by the participants of the workshops and have been preserved in their original formatting.

B.1 1984

Israeli needs/concerns 1984:

1. Recognition of Israel^a (as a legitimate state)
2. Fear of annihilation^b (which is not sufficiently dealt with by military security and can only be addressed by point 1)
3. Security^c: strong military as a defense against Arab states (which raised the question of who needs to be involved in peace talks: Palestinians only or other Arab states, too) and need for a demilitarized West Bank (which might also serve as a “psychological proof” for point 1 if things were to be stable in a demilitarized W-B during an interim autonomy period)

4. Feeling of urgency as the establishment of settlements is creating dangerous facts on the ground
5. Need for a Jewish state^d; seen as possibly opposed to a democratic state due to the “demographic issue” (need to find solution)
6. Jerusalem as the capital^e of Israel.

Palestinian needs/concerns:

1. Nationhood^a and statehood; closely related to a fear of and concern about statelessness and its practical implications; PLO as representative^b of Palestinians
2. Fear of extinction (related to statelessness, being absorbed or dispersed. . .)
3. Urgency in solving the conflict because of the day-to-day suffering^c
4. Concerned with the expansion/building of settlements^d; West Bank is becoming an extension of urban Israel; Settlements need to go
5. East Jerusalem^e must be the Palestinian capital
6. Ability to allow immigration (i.e. right of return)^f, also for Israeli settlers who would like to stay in/return to their settlements in a Palestinian state
7. Need for security^g (this is linked to recognition by the Israelis)

B.2 1992

Palestinian needs/concerns 1992:

1. Right for existence, recognition, nationhood^a
2. The issue of the Palestinian diaspora must be addressed (defining the “right of return”^f); in this context the need for the acceptance of the PLO as representatives^b of the Palestinian people by Israel was brought up
3. Occupation needs to end, establish security for Palestinians; “civil human rights”^c

4. Israel's nuclear weapons^g were perceived as special threat to Palestinians
5. The building of settlements^d and land exploration need to be halted
6. There needs to be a link between the West Bank and Gaza, but this illuminates the fear of Palestinian dependency on Israel.
7. Jerusalem^e: capital of a Palestinian state, access from the West Bank without dependency on Israel
8. "Long-term" concerns: distribution of water, great economic dependence on Israel, tax system, demographic issues such as too few and underfunded schools and universities

Israeli needs/concerns:

1. Security^c (Palestinian question what does it mean? Example Sadat's acknowledgment of Israel's right to exist and return of Sinai; see below):
 - Military security: to be strong enough to defend oneself against aggressors
 - Political security: safety from terrorist attacks (not only Palestinian but Lebanon, Syria...)
2. Acknowledgement^a, acceptance, inclusion in the region, relates to
3. Comprehensive peace
4. Fear of and need to deal with internal strife^b
5. Need for Israel to be a Jewish state^d; includes the "demographic issue" and the need for a more positive view of Zionism (no longer equated to racism) from the outside (i.e. Arab countries)
6. Jerusalem as the capital^e of Israel; "non-negotiable", no possibility of division, maybe joint sovereignty in East Jerusalem; Internationalization of Jerusalem seems contradictory to the idea of being the capital of Israel

B.3 1993

Israeli needs/concerns 1993:

1. Security^c:
 - (a) Objective: Need for a strong army (protection against Iran and others...)
 - (b) Subjective: Linked to the Holocaust experience, "Israel was created by people escaping persecution", importance of Sadat's visit enabling Israel to return Sinai
2. Fear of losing security^b, homeland, everything (concerned about "pure" survival)
3. Need to preserve national identity/ability to live as a Jew^d
4. Need for recognition^a of Israel and Zionism as legitimate not only by Palestinians but by all Arab countries
5. Concern about monetary support of a possible Palestinian state
6. Concerned with the territorial split between the West Bank and Gaza (how to deal with it, where and how will a Palestinian state exist?)

Palestinian needs/concerns:

1. Israeli state was established at the expense of the Palestinian people:
 - (a) no place for Zionism
 - (b) Palestinian suffering^c needs to be acknowledged
2. Concerned about the asymmetry in the relationship: perception of Israel as very powerful^g and backed by the West, not as a small state surrounded by enemies (as Israelis point out)
3. Fear that Israel has no intention of giving up the territories (reinforced by settlements)^d
4. Fear that Israelis think that Palestinians should not be "here" and will disappear over time (need for recognition, legitimacy; also urgency)^a

5. Concerned that there is no international pressure to hold Israel to any promise given (US as pro-Israel); may lead to token autonomy, taken away by Israel after the first disturbance
6. Need for Israel to recognize the PLO as representing the Palestinians^b

B.4 1999

Israeli needs/concerns:

1. State for Jews^d
 - (a) No return of Palestinian refugees to Israel proper
 - (b) Politically separated entity^a
 - (c) Right of return for Jews
2. Security^c
 - Personal
 - Of the state
3. Long term/strategic commitment to peace from the Palestinian's side
 - Finality and acceptance
 - Concern regarding the lack of trust in Palestine^b
4. Cooperation with Palestinians across boundaries
 - Quick response to acts of terrorism
 - Vocal non-partisan Palestinians

Palestinian needs/concerns:

1. Independent state^a
 - Abolishment of all settlements^d in West Bank and Gaza
 - Withdrawal from occupied territories^c
 - Unity of Land: territorial continuity between West Bank and Gaza
 - Metropolitan Jerusalem^e: religious/political

2. Security^g
 - On a personal level
 - For the state
3. Admission of responsibility and compensation for wrongdoing to Palestinians, including 1948 to present.
 - Right of return^f for all refugees with compensation
4. Economic viability
5. Trust that the Israeli Government will fulfill political agreements
 - That Israel gives up claim to Palestine land
 - Assurance of long term/Finality
 - Change of terminology (“giving up”)
 - Release of prisoners of war

Appendix C

Codes for 1992

The following statements are further examples of text passages that developed into theoretical codes as described in section 4.2.3 on page 83. Annotations in brackets after the quotation such as “(ARABS)” signify that this statement can also be attributed to a second code, in this case “Arabs, being part of the Middle East”.

C.1 Examples of Israeli statements

With regard to a Palestinian state:

- Self:
 - “Accepting a Palestinian state is acquiescing to you.”
 - “For us it is another stage in the struggle for our survival.”
 - “Much less opposition that you would imagine. . . many Israelis agree to some kind of Palestinian entity.”
 - “The Labor party acknowledges it [Palestinian national rights]”.
- Other:
 - “For you it is the end of your struggle.”
 - “[Palestinians] never address bringing in the other Arab states. . . they do not seem to face the feeling in Israel that this will not solve our problems.” (ARABS)
- Relations to each other:
 - “You have everything to gain. . . we have only to lose except we have peace to gain.” (POWER)

Power:

- Self:
 - “We have the physical power.”
 - “We have only to lose except we have peace to gain.”
 - “We can deal with the present lack of peace because we have a strong army.”
- Other:
 - “You have everything to gain.”

Time:

- Relations to each other:
 - “Your sense of urgency parallels our need to delay.” (STATE)

Threat:

- Self:
 - “This is an important point that it will take generations (to neutralize emotions). We are still cautious about that. That still you don’t respect us.”
 - “Israel feel they will never be acknowledged as part of the area.”
 - “We would like you to see us. Not as an European extension.”
- Other:
 - “Arabs simply don’t want Israel there on any terms.”
 - “If you want to live with us in peace... you have to prove that to us.”
 - “[Palestinians] is another element in hostile environment.”
 - “[Palestinians] never address brining in the other Arab states... they do not seem to face the feeling in Israel that this will not solve our problems.”
 - “Is it not true that you want to get rid of us?”
 - “Have you been saying that Palestinians do not see settlements as anything beyond colonialism?”
 - “On your side nobody acknowledges our right as a national movement, to live there.”
 - “If you could stop seeing us as foreign...”
 - “You have to acknowledge our roots are in the same region.”
 - “You have gotten back your pride...” (with regard to the Intifada)

- Relations to each other:
 - “... we are Jews who created our own homeland because we think we have the right. It is the same for you.”
 - “You can argue till the 21st century that we are Europeans. But we are not European from our point of view.”

Peace:

- Self:
 - “If peace with Palestinians will bring us peace with all other Arab nations then this is what we have to gain from it...this is all we have to gain.” (ALSO ARABS)
 - “We acknowledge your right [to land].”
 - “Our recognition is part of the deal.”
- Other:
 - “What I understood is the right for Jews to that land is no more than the colonialists rights to that land. Do you recognize anything more?”

Responsibility:

- Self:
 - “People say in different degrees that we have done injustices.”
 - “I think of myself as someone on the left, who would like to see justice done.”
 - “We must apologize and it is not pragmatic...it is not viable...in terms of the Israeli public.”
 - “I think there are a lot of Israelis who... feel guilt, shame, a sense of wanting to repose or help...”
- Other:
 - “Arab nations will have to be responsible. This is fundamental issue.”
 - “A lot of Israelis feel that they are the ones who should be apologized to not the Palestinians.”
- Relations to each other:
 - “This [injustice done] is not in dispute, what comes through to us is that you want to get rid of us.” (THREAT)
 - “If you want us to go beyond pragmatism this will lead us beyond it more toward apology.” (to third party)

Arabs, being part of the Middle East:

- Self:
 - “Israel doesn’t feel that Palestine is only issue.”
 - “Some of us see the Palestinian state as just one more stage in the struggle of Arabs to get rid of us.”
 - “We are trying to reorientalize ourselves.”
 - “Israel feel they will never be acknowledged as part of the area.”
 - “I am saying we have a historical connection to you and the Arab people. It is not a new relationship.”
- Other:
 - “Our enemies have always been the Arabs.”
 - “The main hindrance is the state of Israel not being a part of the Middle East.”

For Israelis there is a strong link of the Palestinian issue with Arabs.

C.2 Palestinian statements

With regard to a Palestinian state:

- Self:
 - “Nobody gave you a state except yourself [you struggled]. . . nobody else. Nobody else can tell us except us.”
- Other:
 - “Give me an example of who acknowledges Palestinian national rights.”
 - “There is no political organization that acknowledges our national existence.”

Power:

- Self:
 - “Palestinians feel that we are not able to speak or act for all the Arab states.”
- Other:
 - “Is it Israeli public opinion that we have this kind of power?”

Time:

- Self:
 - “There is no acknowledgment among Arabs your right to take over Palestine. This is the past.”
 - “Now the reality is, Israelis are there.”
 - “We are losing everyday.”
 - “We have little time.”

Threat:

- Self:
 - “Until such guilt is dealt with Palestinians will remain hostile.”
 - “I don’t deny the Palestinian hostility.”
 - “... at the same time Palestinians feel terribly victimized.”
 - “If we hear talk like that [apology] both publicly and privately. . . that will go a long way to decrease the hostility among Palestinians.”
 - “Jewish immigrants were not wanted from the start.”
 - “It was seen as an extension of the supremacy of Europe.”
 - “There is no acknowledgment among Arabs your right to take over Palestine.”
 - “When you talk about the population and their rights it is different [from above]. Among the Palestinians, despite all animosity in history, there is a humane belief that people born in Israel belongs to these people.”
 - “Israelis who have been born and raised there, it is a different story.”
 - “It does not mean that they are accepted as a desirable presence.”
 - “The point is a different attitude from the past it is more than an acknowledgement of the reality but a right we do not like to see but it is there.”
- Other:
 - “Why do you feel the Arabs want to fight Israel?”
 - “Israel feel threatened, this is a genuine feeling. . .”
 - “The only thing we get from you is occupation.”
 - “There are planes over our camps. . . you came to our land.”
 - “Building settlements on this land will lead to more frustration.”
 - “Without solving this issue [Palestinians], you cannot be part of the region.”
 - “You are the enemy.”
 - “What have Arabs seen coming from you? What have you contributed [to the region]?”

- Relations to each other:
 “Israel feel threatened, this is a genuine feeling, at the same time Palestinians feel terribly victimized.”
 “The only thing we get from you is occupation.” (PEACE, RESPONSIBILITY)
 “Building settlements on this land will lead to more frustration.” (RESPONSIBILITY)

Peace:

- Self:
 “We might learn to live with reality but to neutralize emotions [with regard to the supremacy of Europe] takes two generations at least.”
 “Maybe Palestinians will be willing to work with you if there is land.”
 “There is no acknowledgement [of the Israeli right to the land]. I don’t see any Palestinian or Arab who sees it as a right.”
 “I feel it is not really important our historic rights or to analyze history, but to be able to live with each other.”
 “Options are really only two, first is killing each other or hugging each other.”
 “We don’t have to hug each other to recognize our rights.”
- Other:
 “You are a reality.”
 “You made the reality your hard work. You won’t include the Palestinians in it.”
 “Palestinians accept that reality.”

Responsibility:

- Self:
 “We don’t feel [our feelings] acknowledged by the Israelis. . .”
 “I do not understand why you want me to tell you that I feel good about you [existence of Israel].”
- Other:
 “Is there any sense in Israel that they owe an apology to the Palestinian people?”
 “Until such guilt is dealt with Palestinians will remain hostile.”
 “. . . to acknowledge that Palestinians lost in a very real human sense. . .”

“If we hear talk like that [apology] both publicly and privately. . . that will go a long way to decrease the hostility among Palestinians.”

“You took our land, Palestine, and want to build trust without giving the Palestinians a stake in that trust?”

Arabs, being part of the Middle East:

- Self:

“Palestinians feel that we are not able to speak or act for all the Arab states.”

“There is no acknowledgment among Arabs your right to take over Palestine. This is the past.”

“Jewish immigrants were not wanted from the start.”

“It was seen as an extension of the supremacy of Europe.”

“There is no acknowledgement [of the Israeli right to the land]. I don't see any Palestinian or Arab who sees it as a right.”

- Other:

“Without solving this issue [Palestinians], you cannot be part of the region.”

“You are the enemy.”

“What have Arabs seen coming from you? What have you contributed [to the region]?”

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Disarming identities

This book proposes that national or ethnic identity is an important and overlooked resource in conflict resolution. Using grounded theory to analyze data from interactive problem-solving workshops between Palestinians and Israelis a theory about the role of national identity in turning conflict into protracted conflict is developed.

Drawing upon research from social psychology and international relations the study provides insight as to why the possibility of resolving conflict seems to trigger fears of annihilation in parties to the conflict. From this understanding it becomes clear why national identity needs to change, i.e. be disarmed, if conflict resolution is to be successful.

What shape and function this change should have is explored from the understanding of the role of national identity in supporting conflict.

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