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Egophoricity and evidentiality: Different categories, similar discourse functions

Insights on conversational data from the Tibetan Plateau and the Amazonian Foothills

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This article discusses how evidential and egophoric making is used to manage knowledge in interaction. To this end, it analyzes interactional data from Wutun (mixed Sinitic, Northwest China) and Upper Napo Kichwa (Quechuan, Ecuador). Wutun has an egophoric marking system, which, according to the definition of egophoricity, encodes involvement/lack of involvement in the described event. Upper Napo Kichwa has a set of evidentials, which, according to theory, encode the source of evidence for a given proposition. The two languages are typologically unrelated. However, when we look closely at how speakers of Wutun and Kichwa use epistemic markers, we discover functional similarities not predicted by the dominant definitions of epistemicity and evidentiality. In both languages, the use of the markers is conditioned by the interpersonal context of the interaction, and speakers use egophoric and evidential marking to signal their epistemic rights and responsibilities with respect to other speech-act participants.

Keywords: epistemicity, Conversation Analysis, Kichwa, Wutun, stance

1. Introduction

The aim of our paper is to discuss how evidential and egophoric markers are used to manage knowledge states and asymmetries in moment-by-moment social interaction. We draw on analytical concepts of epistemicity developed in Conversation Analysis (e.g., Stivers et al. 2011a; Heritage 2012a; Heritage & Raymond 2005) and Interactional Linguistics (Couper-Kuhlen & Selting 2017) and apply these concepts to first-hand field data from two lesser-studied languages. We discuss how to establish and analyse comparative contexts in unrelated languages, using data

from spoken interaction. Our paper contributes to research on epistemicity by comparing discourse functions of epistemic marking in the two less-studied languages.

Wutun (mixed Sinitic language, Northwest China) and Upper Napo Kichwa (Quechuan, Ecuador) are two unrelated, typologically distinct languages, spoken in different parts of the world. Wutun is spoken by ca. 4000 people in Qinghai Province, Northwest China, in the context of a linguistic area known as *Amdo Sprachbund* or *Qinghai-Gansu Sprachbund* (see Janhunen 2007; Slater 2021). In terms of phonology, lexicon, and grammar it represents a unique combination of Chinese and Tibetan features that are due to long-term language contact between Northwest Mandarin and Amdo Tibetan (Sandman 2016). While most of the Wutun basic vocabulary and grammatical morphemes have cognates in other varieties of Mandarin Chinese, the morphosyntax is very un-Chinese and replicates structural features of Tibetic languages. Typologically, Wutun is a head-final SOV-language with agglutinative, mainly suffixing morphology.

Upper Napo Kichwa (henceforth UNK) is a Quechuan language spoken by ca. 46000 people (INEC 2010) in the Ecuadorian Amazon. According to the widely-used classification of Quechuan languages (Torero 1964) it belongs to the Quechua IIB branch. Most Quechuan languages are spoken in the Andes, but UNK is one of a few Quechuan varieties spoken in the Amazon. The culture of UNK speakers resembles other Amazonian cultures from the region, but the structure of the language is typical of the Quechuan family. UNK is agglutinative, almost exclusively suffixing, and verbal morphology is the most complex part of its morphosyntax.

Both Wutun and UNK exhibit epistemic marking systems, and we look at the two languages jointly because of functional similarities between these systems. Wutun marks egophoricity (i.e., ‘personal involvement or privileged access of a speaker’, San Roque et al. 2018: 2), while UNK features markers that are cognates of evidentials (i.e., marking of ‘the source of information’, e.g., Aikhenvald 2004) in other Quechuan varieties. However, interactional analysis of the two languages points to marked similarities between how these two categories are used; both are connected to the expression of epistemic status and stance (Heritage 2012a; 2012b), as well the assignment of epistemic authority (Heritage & Raymond 2005; Stivers et al. 2011b).

Most studies on epistemicity in social interaction are based on European languages, which lack highly grammaticalized epistemic systems and mainly express evidential-like functions with evidential verbs, adverbs, or reported speech constructions (cf. Floyd 2019). While a number of studies on evidentiality in non-European languages look at evidentials in their discourse contexts and consider the pragmatics of evidentials (Mushin 2001; San Roque 2015; Schultze-Berndt

2017; Michael 2008, 2020; Nuckolls & Michael 2014 amongst others), studies on under-documented languages with highly grammaticalized evidential systems are rarely conducted by using methods informed by findings from Conversation Analysis (but see Gipper 2014; 2015; 2019; Grzech 2021) or Interactional Linguistics.

Our article highlights the relevance of stance to the use of evidential expressions in interaction (see Section 3). Non-grammaticalized and grammaticalized evidentials have been studied within different research traditions, and this might be the reason why some authors working on evidentiality claim that stance would be more important for the use of non-grammaticalized evidentials. For example, Aikhenvald (2004) analyses grammaticalized evidentials in terms of information source and clearly distinguishes them from non-grammaticalized ‘evidential strategies’. This approach has influenced many descriptions of evidential systems. For instance, Clift (2006) has shown that reported speech in English conversation has an important role in indexing stance in specific sequential contexts, as in case of competing assessments in which speakers use reported speech to make their own assessments more powerful. Clift labels this non-grammaticalized evidential expressions with a stance-taking function as ‘interactional evidentials’ to distinguish it from grammaticalized ‘stand-alone evidentials’, which indicate information source (Clift 2006: 569–570). However, our study provides further evidence to the point already made by Mushin (2013) that stance is also relevant in languages that have highly grammaticalized epistemic systems, and that – even in those cases – the choice of an epistemic marker in spoken interaction cannot be explained exclusively in terms of information source.

Our paper also touches on the question of the relationship between evidentiality and egophoricity, which has been a matter of debate during the last decades. In typological literature, egophoricity and evidentiality are often treated as conceptually distinct categories (Aikhenvald 2004, 2018; Aikhenvald & Dixon 2014; Aikhenvald & LaPolla 2007; Widmer 2017), and their established definitions point to involvement (in case of egophoricity) and access to evidence (in case of evidentiality). However, the complexity found in the descriptive data is not reflected in how egophoricity and evidentiality are defined (cf. Bergqvist & Grzech in press). We demonstrate that taking the interactional workings of epistemic markers as a point of comparison makes it possible to compare languages analysed with evidential and egophoric marking systems in a meaningful way, and sheds new light on the relationship between evidentiality and egophoricity. The paper focusses on the Wutun EGO marker and UNK ‘direct evidential’, showing that they are used to achieve similar purposes in discourse.

The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we review the existing definitions of evidentiality and egophoricity, and discuss their relevance to our

analysis. In Section 3 we define the relevant interactional concepts used in this study. In Sections 4 and 5 we present a detailed analysis of Wutun and UNK epistemic marking based on data drawn from spoken interaction. Finally, we discuss our findings in Section 6 and provide some concluding remarks in Section 7.

2. Evidentiality and egophoricity

The conceptualization of evidentiality as ‘source of information’ (Aikhenvald 2004, 2018; Aikhenvald & Dixon 2014; Willett 1988) indicates that evidential marking indexes a link between the speaker’s utterance and the objective, language-external reality. The conceptualization focusing on ‘mode of access’ (Michael 2008; Cornillie 2009) brings to the fore the speaker’s subjective conceptualization of evidence, which allows for the possibility that interlocutors might access and interpret the same language-external reality in different ways, or that different ways of accessing an event are possible even in case of the same ‘source of information’. At the same time, the ‘source of information’ and ‘mode of access’ definitions share the assumption that evidentiality indexes a relationship between the text-external world and the speaker, implicitly assuming other speech-act participants are not relevant.

As more and more languages featuring dedicated evidential systems are being described, it becomes apparent that evidential marking indexes not only the source of evidence/mode of access, but also the distribution of knowledge between speech-act participants, and, in many cases, knowledge-related rights and responsibilities (cf. e.g., Nuckolls & Michael 2014; Grzech 2020a). Evidentials including intersubjective meaning components have also been described, for example, in Kogi (Arawako-Chibchan, Colombia, Bergqvist 2016), Yurakaré (isolate, Bolivia, Gipper 2011; 2015) or, beyond South America, in Jamingjung/Ngaliwurru (Mirndi, Australia, Schultze-Berndt 2017). The currently available descriptive data indicates that, in order to be empirically-grounded, the conceptualization of evidentiality needs to go beyond the relationship between the speaker and the text-external world, and to also include the intersubjective component: how knowledge, or access to knowledge, is distributed between the speaker and the addressee (cf. e.g., Bergqvist & Kittilä 2020). This links evidentiality to egophoricity.

Egophoricity is usually defined as grammatical encoding of personal involvement or privileged access of a speaker in a represented event or situation (Bergqvist & Knuchel 2017; San Roque et al. 2018: 2). Markers in egophoric systems interface with the speech-act roles of the speaker (first person), the addressee (second person), and the other (third person). In canonical egophoric marking

systems, the same marker (EGO) is associated with first person in statements, second person in questions, and with the reported speaker in reported speech. The other marker (NON-EGO) is used elsewhere. This shiftability of egophoric marking is connected to the principle of privileged epistemic access, whereby the role of the primary knower is associated with different speech act roles in different contexts. In statements, the primary knower is usually the speaker; in questions, the privileged epistemic access shifts to an addressee. In reported speech, authority is indexed to the reported speaker.

Many Tibetic languages (Garrett 2001; Tournadre & LaPolla 2014; DeLancey 2018) and egophoric-marking languages of Western China (Slater 2003; Sandman 2018) have highly flexible systems in which egophoric marking is not tied to person or sentence type and can express a wide range of interpersonal stances, such as intentionality, certainty, assertiveness, agency, annoyance, and irony. This is also the case in Wutun, the egophoric marking system of which is very flexible and often deviates from canonical egophoric marking pattern, especially in everyday conversations.

The core defining parameter relevant to egophoric systems – personal involvement – can also be understood as a mode of access to information, and according to this perspective, egophoricity fits within the evidential framework (see Section 6). This is recognized in many studies on evidentiality, in which markers of personal involvement are labelled as participatory or performative evidentials (e.g., Oswalt 1986; Mithun 1999; Loughnane 2009). Despite that, Aikhenvald (2004, 2018:24) denounces ‘participatory’ or ‘performative’ marking as quasi-evidentials, claiming that their descriptions result from a confusion between evidentiality and egophoricity (information source and access to information).

As markers of epistemic access, both evidential and egophoric systems can have very similar functions when used in interaction. Both types of systems are used to signal epistemic authority and distribution of knowledge, and both can participate in the discursive construction of the epistemic stance and status of the speaker or the addressee.

3. Definitions of the relevant interactional concepts

Two concepts used throughout our analysis are *epistemic status* and *epistemic stance*. Epistemic status refers to the knowledge accumulated by the speech-act participant on the matter at hand. It is influenced by factors such as relevant personal experience, the certainty of information, the time when it was acquired, or the person’s position in the social structure (Heritage 2012b: 5). Epistemic status is

relatively stable and does not depend on a communicative situation. The speaker who has personal experience or more recent information on the topic has a privileged epistemic status in relation to other participants. Epistemic stance, on the other hand, is more situation-dependent. The speaker with a given epistemic status can adopt different epistemic stances: either knowledgeable or ignorant, depending on who they are talking to (e.g., a fellow expert, a layperson), or their interactional goal (being polite, convincing the interlocutor). Another term related to epistemic status and stance, and intersecting with them, is *epistemic authority*. It can be defined as “the primary right to evaluate the matter assessed” (Heritage & Raymond 2005:16) or the “right to know” (Stivers et al. 2011b:13). Speech-act participants generally treat each other as having primary rights to talk about their professional and personal experiences (Heritage & Raymond 2005:16).

The concepts discussed above all concern epistemic (i.e., knowledge-related) rights. Epistemic rights are closely related to *epistemic responsibilities*, the obligations of the speakers to have certain information (Stivers et al. 2011b:13). For instance, it is expected of everyone to know his or her own name, etc. On the other hand, there is information about other people, their internal states and experiences, or private affairs, about which their interlocutors do not have a responsibility, or even a right, to possess knowledge. The domain of epistemic rights and responsibilities is akin to Kamio’s (1997) ‘Territory of Information’ (henceforth ToI). According to this theory, every person has his or her own territory of knowledge. The types of information which fall within one’s default ToI are (i) internal direct experience, (ii) information within one’s professional expertise, (iii) information obtained through external direct experience including verbal reports, and considered reliable, (iv) information about persons, object, events and facts in one’s close environment, and (v) information about oneself (Kamio 1997:18). In terms of domains of knowledge, one has a right to all the information listed above, but also a responsibility to be familiar with them. Other types of information can also become part of one’s ToI when, as Kamio (1997: 11–2) puts it, when they are ‘digested and absorbed’ into one’s system of knowledge. The pace of this process might depend on the type of information – according to Kamio, more personal information tends to be absorbed sooner.

4. Egophoric marking and epistemic authority: The case study of Wutun

This section discusses the interactional functions of egophoric marking in Wutun. First, the paradigm of egophoric markers is introduced, followed by detailed examples of their use in spoken interaction. The Wutun egophoric marking has

most probably emerged due to language contact with Amdo Tibetan (see Sandman 2016), and it shows clear resemblance to egophoric marking systems in Tibetic languages, which usually contrast ego markers with markers of factual and sensory information (see e.g., Sun 1993; Garrett 2001; Tournadre 2008; Tournadre & LaPolla 2014; Hill & Gawne 2017; DeLancey 2018). In Wutun and in Tibetic languages, egophoric marking does not always mark the actual involvement in the event under discussion. Instead, expressing personal involvement is often used as a tool of negotiating the epistemic rights of the speech act participants. For example, the EGO marker can be used metaphorically to give the hearer the impression that the speaker was present although s/he was not, and therefore the speaker may use it to claim the primary right to talk about the matter assessed (e.g. DeLancey 2018). The data discussed in the following sections comes from a 10h corpus of Wutun, collected by Erika Sandman in 2010, 2013, and 2018 during 9 months of fieldwork in the Qinghai province in P.R. China. The corpus features roughly 20 speakers of Wutun, and comprises naturalistic interactions, including the ones analysed in Examples (6) and (7), as well as descriptive and narrative texts and elicited data, including the Examples (1)–(5).

4.1 The paradigm of egophoric markers in Wutun

Egophoric marking in Wutun is obligatory in all finite clauses, except imperatives and clauses with prospective aspect marker *-zhe*, which cannot be combined with egophoric morphology. Table 1 summarizes the egophoric morphology in Wutun.

Table 1. Egophoric marking morphology in Wutun

Ego markers	<i>-yek</i>	EGO	ego marker, indicates epistemic authority of the speaker
	<i>yek</i>	EXIST	ego existential copula
	<i>-lio</i>	PFV	ego perfective
Non-ego markers	<i>-li</i>	SEN.INF	sensory-inferential marker, displays the speaker as an observer of the event and indicates lack of epistemic authority
	<i>re</i>	FACT	factual evidential auxiliary, is associated with knowledge shared by the community members

Examples (1)–(5) illustrate the Wutun egophoric marking system. The ego marker *-yek* is associated with a high degree of epistemic authority of the speaker, such as personal involvement in events or states. This explains why an ego marker is common in first-person statements (as in 1) and second-person questions (as in 2); Speech-act participants generally treat each other as having privileged epistemic access to their own experiences, and therefore having primary rights to talk

about them (Heritage & Raymond 2005: 16). The sensory-inferential marker *-li* is used when the speaker is observing or inferring actions or states of others, as in (3) and (4), and it is associated with a lower degree of epistemic authority than the ego marker *-yek*. Finally, the factual marker *re* is used when the speaker is talking about the knowledge shared by the speech-act participants (as in 5), and there is no need to attribute the epistemic authority to the speaker or to the addressee.

- (1) Ego marker in statements
 ngu huan xhe-di-yek
 1SG food drink-PROG-EGO
 'I am eating.' (high degree of personal involvement/epistemic authority)
 (Elicited)
- (2) Ego marker in questions
 ni ma-ge nian-di-yek
 2SG what-REF read-PROG-EGO
 'What are you reading?' (addressee's personal involvement/epistemic authority)
 (Elicited)
- (3) Sensory-inferential marker with second person
 ni huan xhe-di-li
 2SG food drink-PROG-SEN.INF
 'You are eating.' (as I see/infer)
 (Elicited)
- (4) Sensory-inferential marker with third person
 gu huan xhe-di-li
 3SG food drink-PROG-SEN.INF
 'S/he is eating.' (as I see/infer)
 (Elicited)
- (5) Factual marker
 nianha she-wu tian yek-de re
 blind eye ten-five day EXIST-NMLZ FACT
 'The Losar festival lasts for fifteen days.' (as we all know)
 (Wutun narratives 5_Festivals)

While the ego and sensory-inferential markers are suffixes, the factual marker is grammatically an auxiliary connected to the preceding verb with the nominalizer *-de*. Examples (1)–(5) illustrating Wutun egophoric morphology all come from elicited sentences or descriptive texts that involve no dialogue between the speech act participants. Section 4.2. illustrates the use of egophoric marking in naturally occurring everyday conversation, in which speakers use them to construct their epistemic authority.

4.2 Interactional analysis of Wutun egophoric markers

This section illustrates the interactive uses of Wutun egophoric marking in everyday conversation, with a special focus on the ego marker *-yek*, as a way of indexing epistemic stance. We show that speakers often use the ego marker *-yek* in claiming epistemic authority in conversation. The ego marker can be used in claiming the primary right to assess the matter at hand or adopting the role of a caregiver in a particular situation. Conversely, speakers use the sensory-inferential marker *-li* to defeat the implicature that they are claiming the primary right epistemic rights in conversation.

Examples (6) and (7) are excerpts from a conversation between four adults. NZ and her husband DU are a young couple in their twenties, while uncle DH and aunt ZJ are one generation older and the members of the same extended family. In addition, there are two small children involved in the situation: NZ's and DU's 10-month-old baby boy and an 8-month-old baby girl, aunt NZ's granddaughter. Example (6) is uttered when DU is holding the baby girl and uncle DH is holding NZ's and DU's son. The baby boy is cranky and starts crying, and the adults are discussing that he must be jealous because his father is holding another baby instead of him.

- (6) 01 DH: je yize kan-la¹ qhi shang-di-li
 this appearance look-COND vital force rise-PROG-SEN-INF
 'Looks like (the baby boy) is angry (lit. his vital force is rising).'²
 holding the baby boy----->
- 02 NZ: jelanba gek-ge sha-ze ↑hai-yek
 jealous dog-REF PRT EQU-EGO
 '(I am) so jealous.'
- 03 DU "takes the baby girl LY"
- 04 NZ: £ano: (.) aba ni kan£
 INTER father 2SG look
 'Oh, father, look!
 +points+ +points+
- 05 £ano: (.) ano: (.) aba ni kan£
 INTER INTER father 2SG look
 'Oh no, father, look!'

1. The construction *kan-la* consists of the verb *kan*, 'to see, to look at' and the conditional marker *-la*. It means 'in view of, looking at' and is used to express speaker's observations or inference. It is also used in forming comparative constructions in Wutun.

2. The bodily actions of the speakers are transcribed using conventions developed by Lorenza Mondada (<https://www.lorenzamondada.net/multimodal-transcription>).

- 06 DH: *ano: (.) aba ga-mize-ha bo-she-li-a gu-a*
 INTER father little-sister-ACC hold-RES.AO-SEN.INF-Q PRT
 'Oh, the father is holding the little sister.'
 (5 lines omitted)
- 07 (the baby boy cries out loud)
- 08 NZ: *@lanba-ma-da qhe-la-li*
 jealous-RES.PO-CONSEQ start-INCOMPL-SEN.INF
 '(He) is getting more and more jealous.'
 +turns around+
- 09 *bai-kuu-ge³ ya@*
 PROH-CRY-CAUS EMPH
 'Don't let (him) cry.'
- 10 DH: *gu bai-jhan-ge-da be-kuu-yek*
 3SG PROH-see-CAUS-CONSEQ NEG-cry-EGO
 '(I) will not let him see, then (he) will not cry.'
 turns around with the baby boy
- 11 *sits on a bench*
- 12 *guda ga-qhichai ga-qhichai yek-li*
 there small-car small-car EXIST-SEN.INF
 'There is a toy car over there, a toy car.'
 points at the toy car on the floor

In line 01 DH proffers the first assessment of the baby boy's state of mind (*je yize kanla qhi shangdili*, 'looks like he is angry') while holding the child in his arms. He uses the construction *kan-la*, 'in view of, looking at' and the sensory-inferential marker *-li* in his assessment, showing affiliation with the baby boy and proclaiming that his evaluation of the matter at hand is based on his observations of the child's behavior. The mother NZ is responding with a second assessment⁴ in line 02, using the ego marker *-yek*. NZ's second assessment (*jelanba gekge shaze haiyek*, 'I am so jealous') can be considered an example of reported speech.⁵ NZ

3. The imperative clause here is formed by using the causative marker *-ge*; in Wutun, third person imperatives (e.g., Let him see!) are formally causative constructions.

4. Following Pomerantz (1984: 59), we define second assessments as assessments that are produced by recipients of prior assessment, and which have the same referents as prior assessments.

5. As in other languages with egophoricity, in Wutun the ego marker *-yek* in reported clauses indicates that the person who is the source of the reported information and the person whose speech is quoted are co-referential, while the sensory-inferential marker *-li* indicates that they are not co-referential. Reported speech in Wutun is often marked by the auxiliary *sho*, 'to say, to speak' but it is common to omit this auxiliary in naturalistic interactions as in (6).

is attributing her speech to his 10-month old son, who still cannot talk himself. Her response is multifaceted; it voices the baby and projects agreement and affiliation with DH. At the same time, she claims the primary right to assess her son's state of mind by formulating her response like a direct quote from her son and by using the ego marker *-yek*, which is a stronger evaluative term than the sensory-inferential marker *-li*; indeed, she is the mother. This is in line with some earlier research on egophoric marking in child-caregiver interactions, which has demonstrated that in such interactions the mother or a caregiver often adopts a role of primary epistemic authority in relation to the child's actions (see San Roque & Schieffelin 2018: 451). NZ's response to DH can be considered as an example of upgraded second assessment (see Pomerantz 1984: 65); it incorporates stronger evaluative term than the prior assessment (the ego marker *-yek* instead of sensory-inferential marker *-li*). While NZ is uttering her response in line 02, the father DU is taking the baby girl in line 03. NZ continues with two direct quotes attributed to his son in lines 04 and 05 while pointing at DU, who is holding the baby girl. The use of reported speech, as well as the interjection *anoo* which has an affective meaning, imply strong affiliation with her son. DH responds with a statement (*ano aba gamizeha boshelia gua*, 'oh, the father is holding the little sister') in lines 06, using the sensory-inferential marker *-li*. His statement with the sensory-inferential marker *-li* shows affiliation with the baby boy and, but by using *-li* he denies the privileged access to information necessary for claiming primary right over the mother NZ to evaluate the baby boy's behaviour.

Lines 07–12 illustrate how the ego marker *-yek* is used in shifting from the role of an observer to a role of a caregiver. In line 07 the baby boy becomes even more restless and starts to cry out loud. Mother NZ reacts to her son's crying by requesting DH and DU do something to calm the baby in lines 08–09. In line 10 DH responds to NZ's request by turning around with the baby boy and preventing him from seeing his father DU holding the baby girl, as well as responding with the statement *gu baijhangeda bekuuyek*, 'I will not let him see (them), then he will not cry.' While uttering his response, DH is taking the baby boy physically closer to him and turning him around, so his bodily behaviour is aligning with his assertion of authority and addressing the concern of the mother. Finally, DH sits down with the baby boy and starts pointing to the toy cars on the floor to catch the child's attention in lines 11 and 12. We have seen that DH, who has only used the sensory-inferential marker *-li* in commenting on the baby boy's behaviour in lines 01–06, suddenly switches to ego marker *-yek* in line 10. This can be attributed to the fact that in line 10 he takes the role of a caregiver in the situation. The role of a caregiver is intimately linked to epistemic authority; the caregiver is in charge of decisions that affect the person in their care, authorizing that person to assess the other's state of mind (see Section 6).

In Example (7), ego marker *-yek* occurs in a context where the speaker is seeking a more vigorous alignment with his directive and warning another person. The Example (7) is uttered when the aunt ZJ prepares to leave the house with her 8-month old granddaughter and DH instructs her to put enough warm clothes on the child.

- (7) 01 DH: da qhi-zhe ma
 now go-PROSP Q
'Are you going now?'
- 02 ZJ: da qhi-zhe
 now qo-PROSP
'We are going now.'
- 03 DH: ya da ni qhi
 INTER now 2SG go
'Ok, you go now.'
- 04 quandi quan-she-ma rai~rai-de ze-she
 clothes put on-RES.AO-COORD warm~warm-NMLZ do-RES.AO
'Put some clothes (on her) so it will be warm.'
- 05 ZJ: ya
 INTER
ok
- 06 DH: nanqhan lai-gu-yek
 flu come-COMPL-EGO
'Otherwise she will get a flu.'
 coming close to the baby and holding her hand

In lines 01–02, aunt ZJ is preparing to leave the house and take the baby girl with her. Uncle DH reacts by asking about her plans to leave in line 01 and she confirms them in line 02. Then in lines 03–04 DH proceeds with a directive and instructs aunt ZJ to put some warm clothes on the child. Aunt ZJ responds with the affirmative interjection *ya*, 'ok' in line 05. DH treats this as a weak agreement and responds with a warning 'She will get a flu' (literally: 'Flu is coming') in line 06. He uses the ego marker *-yek* in his warning, which can be interpreted as seeking a more vigorous alignment with his directive and adopting a knowing epistemic stance.

5. ‘Evidentials’ as markers of epistemic authority: The case study of Upper Napo Kichwa

UNK has a rich epistemic paradigm, presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Epistemic enclitics attested in Upper Napo Kichwa

marker	meaning
=mi	speaker-exclusive epistemic authority and access; proposition likely to be unexpected to the addressee; contrastive focus
=ma	similar to =mi
=mari	authority/access shared between speaker and addressee, addressee acting as if unaware of this
=chu	polar question/negation marker
=cha	disclaimer of epistemic authority
=chari	similar to =cha
=tá	speaker’s epistemic authority, access shared between speaker and addressee; ‘verum’ focus ⁶
=ta	information question marker

The analysis in this section focuses, above all, on the enclitic =mi, which is the cognate of direct evidentials in other Quechuan varieties (Floyd 1997; Faller 2002; Hintz & Hintz 2017; cf. Grzech 2020a). In UNK, =mi encodes exclusive epistemic authority of the speaker, and is associated with (contrastive) focus (Grzech 2016; 2020a; 2020c). The analysed data comes from a 13h corpus (Grzech 2020b), collected in 2013–2014 during 10 months of fieldwork. The corpus contains data from over 40 speakers, and comprises naturalistic interactions, as well as interactive elicited discourse based on different types of stimuli.

5.1 Meaning and interactional functions of UNK evidentials/epistemic markers

Like evidentials in other Quechuan varieties, UNK epistemic clitics occur on phrasal heads, and are not associated with a particular lexical category. Unlike Wutun egophoric markers, UNK ‘evidentials’ are not obligatory for the gram-

6. While other markers listed in Table 2 are attested in other Quechuan varieties, it is not clear whether =tá has cognates in Quechuan varieties described to date (cf. Grzech 2016: 142, 166–172).

maticity of utterances. The markers =*mi* and =*cha* are cognates of the direct and conjectural evidentials, respectively, in other Quechuan languages. However, source of information is relevant to their meaning only indirectly (see Table 2). They signal epistemic authority or lack thereof, as well as distinctions between individual and shared knowledge. Epistemic markers are used in interaction to construct epistemic stance and status (Heritage 2012a, see Section 2), presenting certain information as pertaining – or not – to the ToI of the speaker (Kamio 1997, see Section 2) and thus conveying the speaker’s claims to epistemic authority (e.g., Heritage & Raymond 2005; Stivers et al. 2011b).

Examples (8) and (9) illustrate the complex epistemic distinctions encoded by the UNK markers. The participants are the same in both examples: KG: Karolina Grzech, and B: KG’s friend and a native speaker of Kichwa. B is an expert in brewing *chicha*, a traditional drink made of manioc, whereas KG has never made *chicha* before. Example (8) is extracted from a spontaneous interaction, which occurred naturally. Example (9) was elicited: The native speaker was asked to encourage a novice to keep making an effort in a context analogous to that of (8).

- (8) A is making *chicha* for the first time, but does not think she is up to the task.

KG: Mana usha-ni.

NEG can-1

‘I can’t [make *chicha*].’

B: [Kan] usha-ngui =**mi**!

[2SG] can -2 =**MI**

‘[Yes, you] can!’

- (9) KG is attempting to make *chicha* for the first time. B wants to encourage her to keep up the effort.

B: [Kan] usha-ngui =**rá**!

[2SG] can -2 =**TÁ**

‘[You] can [do it]!’

In (8), B makes an encouraging, =*mi*-marked statement after KG says she will not manage to make *chicha*. B is the expert *chicha*-brewer, so epistemic authority lies with her. Because KG just said she will not succeed, B also has reasons to believe that her utterance is unexpected to KG. This combination of speaker-exclusive epistemic authority with speaker-exclusive access to the proposition warrants B’s use of =*mi* in (8). In (9), B’s expert status remains unchanged. However, KG does not voice concerns regarding her ability to make *chicha*, and is actively engaged in the task. Thus, B can assume that KG is expecting to succeed. This combination of B’s epistemic authority and KG and B’s shared access to the proposition warrant the use of =*tá* in Example (9).

Example (10) comes from a conversation between two women, SA and LC. They belong to the same extended family – SA is married to LC’s nephew – and live within a few hundred metres of one another. The conversation, which took place when they were working on a land plot,⁷ is divided into shorter stretches, presented in Examples (10) through (14). Line numbers continue across the examples to give a sense of how the original conversation developed.

- (10) 01 LC: *J. {compadre}^{8,9} ima wasi-ra ra-w-n?*
 NAME compadre what house-ACC make-PROG-3
 ‘What building is *compadre* J. going to build?’
- 02 {*Cosina*}?
 kitchen
 ‘[The] kitchen?’
- 03 SA: *Mana, mana ra-w-n=**mari***
 NEG NEG make-PROG-3=**MARI**
 ‘No, he’s not building...’
- 04 LC: *Tsatsa-ra, wasi ra-nga=**cha**, asta-nga ra-w-n*
 sand-ACC house make-PURP=**CHA** load-FUT AUX-PROG-3
 ‘The sand, to make the house, [he] will carry [it]...’

In lines 01 and 02 LC asks about the actions of J.: LC’s nephew and SA’s husband. LC assumes that J. is renovating his house, and particularly the kitchen. LC’s assumes this, because she knows J. borrowed a wheelbarrow from her father (see line 14 in (12) below). In line 03, SA contradicts LC’s assumptions, stating that her husband is not building anything. SA uses the epistemic marker =*mari*, which signals that a given piece of information should be known to the addressee, although the addressee acts/speaks as if it was not (Grzech 2021, see Table 2). By using =*mari*, SA reinforces the statement in line 03. In line 04, LC’s reaction corroborates the semantics of =*mari* explained above. SA’s use of =*mari* indicates LC should know that no building is happening, so LC justifies her assumption by referring to an event she observed: J. came to her house to borrow the wheelbarrow. The utterance in line 04 is a complex sentence. LC claims that J. will bring sand – based on the fact that he came to borrow the wheelbarrow (*tsatsara*

7. This recording and the accompanied files are deposited in the ELAR archive (Grzech 2020b). Recording code: ev_24052013_01, session title: ‘Working in the chagra/*Trabajo en la chagra*.’

8. Following Nikolaeva (2014), words in the regional lingua franca (Spanish) are enclosed in {}.

9. *Compadres* are godparent’s to each other’s children, like family to one another. The cultural practice of *compadrazgo* is extremely important among UNK speakers.

astanga rawn, ‘he will be bringing sand’). This statement is not epistemically qualified. However, in the same line LC also says that J. will use the sand to build the house (*wasi rangacha*, ‘to make the house=CHA’). This statement is marked with =*cha*, signalling the speaker’s lack of epistemic authority (Grzech 2017; 2020c, see Table 2): likely a reaction to SA’s claim from the previous turn (that J. is not building anything). The conversation goes on as shown in (11).

- (11) 05 SA: *Aj, chi-pa-y moto-y puri-sha ni-kpi*
 INTER D.DEM-GEN-LOC motorbike-LOC go-COR say-SWREF
 ‘Ah, [J.] said it’s no good to pass there on the motorbike...’
- 06 *mana {bali}-jpi, chi sanka ni-n yachi-n,*
 NEG be.good-SWREF D.DEM drop say-3 seem-3
 I think (lit. it seems) he said there are holes [in the path],
- 07 *wayku mana {bali}-n ni-n.....*
 fall NEG be.good-3 say-3
 [with] holes it is no good, he says.’
- 08 LC *Mjm*
 INTER
 ‘Yeah...’
- 09 SA *Chi-bi=mi, ishki {caretilla}-ra=mi tsatsa-ra api-sha*
 D.DEM-LOC=MI two wheelbarrow-ACC=MI sand-ACC bring-COR
 ‘There, two wheelbarrows, bringing the sand,
- 10 *shita-nga ra-w-n ni-sha, maña-chi-nga kacha-w yachi-n.*
 throw-FUT AUX-PROG-3 say-COR ask-CAUS-FUT send-PROG seem-3
 saying [he] will throw it there, [he] sent (our son) for (the
 wheelbarrow), it seems.’

After LC’s admission of lack of epistemic authority in line 4 of Example (10), coupled with her justification of the source of information (she saw J. borrowing the wheelbarrow), SA realizes the reason for the misunderstanding. This can be inferred from the beginning of line 05 in Example (11), where SA uses a ‘change of state token’ (cf. Heritage 1985): the interjection ‘ah.’ In lines 05, 06 and 07, SA offers a detailed explanation: J. needs the sand not to build, but to even up the path leading to their house. SA reports her husband’s claim about the path being uneven, using the verb *nin* ‘[he] says’. Moreover, SA reduces her own epistemic authority by using the epistemic verb *yachin* ‘[it] seems’ in line 06. These strategies are instances of epistemic downgrading. In this context, SA has primary epistemic authority, since she speaks about her house and her husband. However, socially she has a lesser epistemic status than LC, who is more ‘senior’ in the family hierarchy. Thus, SA chooses not to exploit her privileged epistemic rights. In

line 08, LC accepts the explanation, but does not offer any new contribution. This prompts SA to offer an additional explanation in lines 09 and 10. Here, she uses the epistemic clitic =*mi* twice: first with the demonstrative which prefaces the turn, and then when reporting a claim made by her husband. The second occurrence of =*mi* in line 09 marks the report of the husband's original utterance, and hence the epistemic authority expressed by =*mi* is indexed to him, and not to SA. Moreover, when SA offers her own observation in line 10, she downgrades her epistemic stance with the verb *yachin* '[it] seems', in what could be a continued effort to attend to LC's superior epistemic status as a senior family member. Given this explanation, LC needs to review her idea about J's plans. Further conversation is presented in Example (12).

(12) 11 LC *Mjm*

INTER

'Yeah'

12 *Sarpundza maña-n tsatsa-ra=mi astanga ra-w-n*
 day.before.yesterday ask-3 sand-ACC=MI carry-FUT AUX-PROG-3
 'The day before yesterday he borrowed (the wheelbarrow), he will
 bring the sand,

13 *shina ni-ka, wasi-ra=chu ra-nga ra-w-n*
 like.this say-3.PST house-ACC=Q/NEG make-FUT AUX-PROG-3
 he said, will he make a house

14 *ima=chari, {cosina} wasi-ra=mi...*
 what=CHARI kitchen house-ACC=MI
 or what, 'the kitchen building...

(1 line omitted, interruption from another speaker)

15 *... ra-nga ra-w-nchi" ni-n, kacha-w-ka ni-n.*
 make-FUT AUX-PROG-1PL say-3 send-PROG-3.PST say-3
 we will build" (he) was going around saying.'

16 SA *Mjm*

INTER

'Yeah'

17 LC *Chi-ta ra-nga minishti-shka a-nga, shina ni-w-ka*
 D.DEM-ACC make-PURP need-ANT COP-FUT like.this say-PROG-PST
 '[It is] to do this [that] he will be needing [the wheelbarrow], he was
 saying this.'

18 SA *Mana*

NEG

'No'

In line 11, LC accepts SA's previous contribution with an interjection. In lines 12 and 13, LC recognizes she was mistaken, and uses epistemic markers and other stance-constructing strategies to justify her prior position. In line 12, LC reports what J. said, marking the report with *=mi*. Immediately after, she offers her own statement, marked with the polar question/negation marker *=chu* (line 13), and the marker *=chari*, which, like *=cha*, is a disclaimer of epistemic authority (line 14). Thus, LC re-frames the statement about J. building something as a supposition, deferring her own epistemic authority over the interpretation of J.'s words. In line 14 and 15, LC provides another quote from J., claiming that he said he would build the house. By quoting J. and constructing him as the authority, LC frees herself of epistemic responsibility for the statement which turned out to be problematic in prior conversation (that J. is building something). Whether or not LC has really heard from J. that he was going to build the house is uncertain – the transcriber, who happened to be J. himself, observed that LC did not have the correct information. In line 16, SA responds with just an interjection. LC follows in line 17, re-confirming what she said previously, again with a report of J.'s words. In line 18, SA responds with the negative particle *mana*. This is a direct disagreement with LC's previous turns, but, since they were framed as reports and quotations, direct negation is not face-threatening – it does not target the epistemic status of LC, as she cannot be held responsible for the veracity of the reported statements.

Throughout the conversation, the construction of stance through the use of epistemic clitics intersects with other tools, such as introducing reported discourse. The interlocutors' use of linguistic strategies show their awareness of each other's status of the interlocutors, which can be derived from a variety of sources: age, family seniority, proximity to the talked-about events, etc. In the society of intimates, of which the UNK speaker community is an example, there can be multiple sources of epistemic rights and responsibilities relative to one piece of information (Mushin 2022).

Excerpt (13), given below, immediately follows (12), hence the continuing numbering of the lines. In this example, epistemic authority is tied specifically to adopting a particular discursive role: that of a caregiver. The new topic of conversation is Grzech: the linguist who arrived in the community ten days previously, and who is staying at LC's house. LC is now talking to YC, who is her peer in the family structure, as they are of the same generation. YC has offered Grzech the *chicha*, which prompted the following exchange:

- (13) 19 LC [whispers] *Apama upi-shita-n=lla=ma asa-ra.*
 woman drink-throw-3=LIM=MA chicha-ACC
 ‘That girl, how she just throws *chicha* in herself’
- 20 YC [in Spanish] *Tome, tome, tiene que emborrachar...*
 ‘Drink, drink, you have to get drunk...’
- 21 LC [whispers] *Mana, macha-nga=mi, Y!*
 NEG get.drunk-FUT=MI NAME
 ‘No, Y., she’ll get drunk!’
- (4 lines omitted)
- 22 LC [whispers] *Mana kikin-da upi-n=dá, upi upi,*
 NEG our.OWN-ACC drink-3=TÁ drink drink
- 23 *shinallara mana ashka-ra upi-n.*
 like.this NEG much-ACC drink-3
 ‘She does not drink like a local, she drinks a little, but not much.’
- (7 lines omitted)

In line 19, LC makes a comment about Grzech’s drinking capacities, marked with =*ma*, most likely indexing the speaker’s epistemic authority (see Table 2). LC whispers, which confirms that she sees her statement as infringing on Grzech’s ToI by evaluating her actions. In line 20, YC exploits LC’s worry and Grzech’s newness to the community for the purpose of a joke: she tells Grzech in Spanish that she should get drunk, which, in fact, is not socially acceptable. Line 21 shows that LC suspects Grzech will take YC’s joke at face value. LC whispers again, because she is infringing on Grzech’s ToI by evaluating her bodily capacity, but she also uses =*mi*, thus claiming epistemic primacy with respect to what she is assessing. Assuming epistemic primacy with respect to somebody else’s internal states or future actions is not customary. Thus, it can be analysed as indicating that LC assumes a caregiver position with respect to Grzech, treating her as if she was a child (see Section 4.2 on Wutun). This parallels the use of =*mi* in speech acts of admonition or warning, usually issued from the same caregiver position. That LC does assume a caregiver role with respect to Grzech becomes more evident as the conversation develops. In line 24, LC reasons with YC, using the epistemic marker =*tá*, which indexes the epistemic authority of the speaker, but also acknowledges shared epistemic access (see Table 2). YC also got to know Grzech as soon as she arrived in the village. LC now explicitly draws on their shared experience, while maintaining epistemic primacy as Grzech’s ‘host mother.’ The latter is evidenced through the choice of =*tá* over =*mari*, which would have indexed YC’s responsibility to know about the Grzech’s *chicha*-drinking capabilities (see Example (10)).

That LC does wish to adopt a caregiver role is further evidenced in how the conversation develops in Example (14).

- (14) 26 LC [whispers] *Macha-nga=mi*
 get.drunk-FUT=**MI**
 ‘[She]’ll get drunk’
- 27 *Sarpundza angu llaki lluta-ri-shka apama-ra*
 day.before.yesterday sand.mite AUG stick-ANTIC-ANT woman-ACC
 ‘The day before yesterday, loads of sand mites stuck to the girl!’
- (2 lines omitted)
- 30 LC *Shina llushpi-chi-sha riku-chi-ni.*
 like.this peel-CAUS-COR see-CAUS-I
 ‘Like this, peeling them off, I showed (her).’

In line 26 LC whispers again, while also reinforcing her =*mi*-marked evaluation of Grzech’s capacity to drink. In the following lines, LC no longer whispers or uses epistemic marking when recounting how she helps Grzech adjust to the local life. This signals that LC views this content as more neutral, possibly because it does not infringe on Grzech’s capacity to evaluate her own actions. In these final lines, LC reinforces her caregiver role not through explicit claims of epistemic authority, but through supplying additional evidence of how she looks after Grzech, performing actions characteristic of a caregiver. This shows that discursively constructing oneself as a caregiver can be achieved through a combination of strategies. Similarly to what we have seen for Wutun, in UNK epistemic marking features prominently among these strategies.

6. Discussion

In the previous sections, we have highlighted the functional similarities between Wutun and UNK epistemic systems in interaction. Similar interactional uses suggest, in line with observations made in the literature, that epistemic systems are flexible: How they are used depends on the epistemic stance speakers want to project, rather than on the discourse-external reality (cf. e.g., Mushin 2013; Hintz & Hintz 2017; Sun 2018). The discussion in this section focuses on this flexibility with particular reference to the Wutun ego marker *-yek* and the UNK ‘direct evidential’ =*mi*.

As mentioned in Section 1, literature on epistemicity often assumes that more grammaticalized epistemic systems are less flexible in terms of encoding meanings which are – from the theoretical standpoint – not at the core of their epistemic semantics. However, the Wutun data discussed in Section 4 clearly shows that even though egophoricity in Wutun is obligatory for the grammaticality of utterances, it can still be used flexibly, not to encode speaker involvement, but

rather epistemic authority and the knowing or privileged epistemic stance of the speaker. This is shown acutely in Example (6) in Section 4.2, where the same speaker (DH) first talks about the same situation with the sensory-inferential marker *-li*, and then, once he assumes a different role in the interaction, switches to the EGO *-yek*. For UNK ‘evidentials’, this flexibility is shown in Examples (8) and (9) in Section 5.2, where the marker is chosen depending on the speaker’s assumption about the addressee’s knowledge, and not because of the source of evidence for the conveyed proposition. Sections 4 and 5 show that the Wutun *-yek* and the UNK *=mi* fulfil similar interactional functions: They are used when the speaker wishes to assert epistemic authority and project a knowing epistemic stance. Similar observations have been made by many authors who acknowledge that speakers use evidentials depending on their interactional goals, e.g., to negotiate responsibility for events (cf. e.g., Michael 2008 for Nanti) or ownership of knowledge (cf. e.g., Hintz & Hintz 2017 for varieties of Peruvian Quechua).

The flexibility discussed above is shown acutely for both Wutun and UNK in how their speakers use epistemic markers when adopting the role of caregiver. As a caregiver, one can make claims regarding the Territory of Information (see Section 3) of the people one looks after, as if the ToI of the guardian encompassed the ToI of their ward. When acting as caregivers, we assume primary access to information concerning others, and treat the knowledge regarding our ward as if it was self-knowledge, even though in other discursive contexts we distinguish between self-knowledge and knowledge of others, given that they are acquired in fundamentally different way (cf. Garrett 2001, cited in Norcliffe 2018: 326).

In Wutun Examples (6) and (7), when adopting the caregiver role, speakers choose to use the EGO marker *-yek*, even if the degree of involvement in the described action does not license it. The same is true for UNK Examples (13) and (14), where the speaker uses the ‘direct evidential’ *=mi* when talking about the linguist, who, as a novice in the community, has a child-like status in many respects. In UNK conversation between two equals, it would not be felicitous for one speaker to talk about the other’s actions, thoughts, or intentions, using *=mi*. Thus, the Wutun and UNK data can be treated as parallel, even though the conversations occurred in different interactional contexts.

It can safely be assumed that the role of caregiver is both socially and discursively universal. The prototypical example of a caregiver role, which occurs across all human societies, is someone taking care of an infant: a parent, grandparent, older sibling, etc.. The boundaries of who can assume such a role vary across communities, and different societies allow people in other social roles – elders, leaders, preachers, teachers, etc. – to discursively adopt a caregiver-like role by assuming superior epistemic rights. Despite these differences, caregiver can be considered a universal social and discursive macro-role, involving a family of dis-

cursive actions (cf. Sacks 1992), such as issuing warnings, giving advice, or speaking on behalf of others. We are not aware of cross-linguistic studies of warnings and advice-giving, but given the social universality of the caregiver role, it can be expected that other languages allow for non-prototypical uses of epistemic marking in such contexts. In fact this is the case for Japanese, where the particle *yo*, indexing epistemic primacy (e.g., Hayano 2011), can be used in these situations, or for Mangghuer (Amdo Sprachbund, China, Fried 2018), where an ego ('subjective') copula is used to express a high degree of concern for the interlocutor, or when speaking to those with lower epistemic status (Fried 2018: 210, 217).

We do not mean to posit any categorical claims regarding the relationship between categories of evidentiality and egophoricity, as attested cross-linguistically. We merely bring together interactional analyses of data from two languages, spoken in the two hotbeds of grammaticalized epistemic marking: South American and the Greater Himalayan region. Our data suggests that the epistemic systems from these two areas share many functional similarities, which have to date been obscured by two different research traditions. Research on languages of the Greater Himalayan region has given us the earliest descriptions of egophoricity (Hale 1980; Bendix 1992), and many studies on epistemic marking in the Himalayan and Tibeto-Burmanist tradition still focus on the relationship between evidentiality and egophoricity (cf. e.g., Tournadre 2008; Widmer 2017; Zemp 2020). While recent research has also focused on pragmatic meanings and interactional uses of epistemic markers (cf. e.g., Tournadre & LaPolla 2014; Zeisler 2018; DeLancey 2018), conversation analytic studies on epistemic marking in the Himalayan languages are still virtually non-existent.

In South America, epistemic marking is largely analysed within the evidential framework influenced by the tenets proposed by Aikhenvald (2004), but in the recent years the interactional uses of the epistemic markers have also been observed and analysed (cf. e.g., Michael 2008; Gipper 2011; Nuckolls & Michael 2014; Bergqvist 2017; Hintz & Hintz 2017; Grzech 2021). Egophoricity is not completely unattested in South America. It has been described for example in the Barbacoan language family, spoken in Colombia and Ecuador. The family encompasses six languages, three of which – Tsafiki, Guambiano/Nam Trik, and Cha'palaa – exhibit both evidential and egophoric marking. Tsafiki (Dickinson 2000; p.c.) evidential and egophoric markers do not occur in paradigmatic distribution. Guambiano/Nam Trik has epistemic markers indexing both speaker involvement and sources of evidence. Unlike in Tsafiki, in Nam-Trik these two types of markers form one paradigm, which Norcliffe (2018) analyses as indicating evidence type (visual *-tre* vs. non-visual *-shi*) and evidence strength (*-an*). In Cha'palaa, egophoric and evidential markers also occur in paradigmatic distribution (Floyd 2018). This observation shows that the relationship between mark-

ers analysed as egophoric and evidential can differ even between closely related languages, and provides additional support for our argument, namely that to better understand the relationship between egophoricity and evidentiality, we should look at the function of these marking systems, rather than assuming that by comparing morphemes which were assigned the same labels we are comparing like with like. This speaks to the need to develop comparative concepts (cf. Haspelmath 2010) also in the more context-sensitive branches of linguistics, such as pragmatics, or Conversation Analysis.

Therefore, this paper also contributes to the incipient enterprise of pragmatic typology (cf. Dingemanse & Floyd 2014; Dingemanse, Blythe & Dirksmeyer 2014; Kendrick et al. 2020; Floyd 2021). Thus far, pragmatic typology is mostly done with a ‘natural control method’ (Stivers et al. 2009), identifying similar structures across languages, or with a ‘sequential control method’ (Dingemanse & Floyd 2014), which consists in identifying particular types of interactional sequences. These methods are employed for cross-linguistic comparisons of discursive actions such as expressions of gratitude or recruitments (cf. Floyd et al. 2018, contributions to Floyd et al. 2020). Our findings suggest that discursive macro-roles adopted by speakers are a potentially important parameter, which could be factored into the pragmatic-typological approach alongside structures or sequence types. Discursive macro-roles can be associated with actions, or families of actions, and these, in turn, are represented by particular discourse units, or sequences of units. Thus, an approach incorporating discursive macro-roles introduces an additional functionally-motivated and intersubjective layer into the pragmatic-typological picture.

A comment is also in order with respect to the importance of interactional linguistics (IL) as an approach for investigating pragmatics comparatively and typologically. Many recent studies on epistemicity, despite using naturalistic data, merely acknowledged the context in which these data occurred (cf. e.g., Grzech 2016). A thorough functional analysis of epistemic marking needs to go beyond this, towards an in-depth and systematic analysis of the principles that shape the interactional context. IL methods are an ideal tool for achieving this goal, and they are increasingly being recognized as applicable not only to the mother tongues of researchers doing IL, but also to minority and endangered languages, even if research on them is done by outsiders (cf. Mushin 2022).¹⁰ By giving researchers tools to systematically describe complex aspects of interaction, it allows for triangulation of results. This, in turn, opens the possibility for comparative research that truly goes beyond different descriptive research traditions or analytical labels.

10. Consider, e.g., the CIARA project, researching conversational style in both Australian English and Australian Aboriginal languages (<https://www.ciaraproject.com/>, PI: Joe Blythe).

7. Conclusions

This paper contributes to the studies of epistemicity in several respects. Firstly, it adds to descriptive studies of epistemic systems, and makes an argument for the need to analyze such expressions in their interactional context. The paper shows that even grammaticalized epistemic marking systems are used in ways which depend primarily on the interpersonal configuration of the interaction, including epistemic stance and discursive roles which speakers wish to project. Secondly, the paper puts forward new data from two under-described languages, adding to the studies of epistemicity within an interactional linguistic framework. Our analysis brings out similarities in the use of egophoric marking in Wutun and evidential/epistemic marking in UNK which can only be appreciated from an IL perspective, and thus makes the case of analysing more data on epistemic systems in lesser-described languages with interactional linguistic methods.

Furthermore, we believe that the functional parallels between Wutun egophoric marking and UNK evidential/epistemic marking that we describe in the paper have both methodological and theoretical implications. In terms of methodology, our study demonstrates the importance of documenting natural interaction and the use of epistemic marking within it. In applying IL method and concepts to lesser-documented languages exhibiting grammaticalized epistemic systems, we show that they can be compared with better-described languages in terms of how they make use of stance-taking. Explorations of this type could contribute new and valuable information to IL studies. In terms of theory, our paper strengthens and substantiates the claims that egophoric and evidential marking can fulfil similar discourse functions. Moreover, our analysis shows that the interactional functions of evidential and egophoric marking can have more to do with epistemic status, stance, and authority, than with involvement or source of information.

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Symbols used in transcripts

(.) brief interval, between 0.08 and 0.2 seconds

Word emphasis

Wo::rd prolonged vowel or consonant

↑ rising pitch

£ smiley voice

@ other change in voice quality

Abbreviations

1	first person	GEN	genitive
2	second person	INCOMPL	incompletive
3	third person	INTER	interjection
ACC	accusative	LIM	limitative
ANT	anterior	LOC	locative
ANTIC	anticausative	NAME	proper name
AUG	augmentative	NEG	negative
AUX	auxiliary	NMLZ	nominalizer
CAUS	causative	PL	plural
COORD	coordinative	PROG	progressive
COM	comitative	PST	past
COMPL	completive	PROG	progressive
COND	conditional	PROH	prohibitive
CONSEQ	consequential	PRT	particle
COP	copula	PURP	purpose
COR	co-reference	Q	question
D.DEM	distal demonstrative	REF	referential
EGO	ego	RES.AO	agent-oriented resultative
EMPH	emphatic	RES.PO	patient-oriented resultative
EQU	equative	SEN.INF	sensory-inferential
EXIST	existential	SG	singular
FACT	factual	SWREF	switch-reference
FUT	future		

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