

EKONOMI OCH SAMHÄLLE

Skrifter utgivna vid Svenska handelshögskolan
Publications of the Swedish School of Economics
and Business Administration

Nr 121

KLAUS HARJU

WHAT IS ORGANISING?
INTERLUDES IN RESEARCHING

Towards Problematisation

Helsingfors 2004

What is Organising? Interludes in Researching - Towards Problematisation

© Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration & Klaus Harju

Klaus Harju
Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration
Department of Management and Organization
P.O.Box 479
00101 Helsinki, Finland

Distributor:

Library
Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration
P.O.Box 479
00101 Helsinki, Finland

Telephone: +358-9-431 33 376, +358-9-431 33 265
Fax: +358-9-431 33 425
E-mail: publ@hanken.fi
<http://www.hanken.fi>

ISBN 951-555-804-2 (printed)
ISBN 951-555-805-0 (PDF)
ISSN 0424-7256

Yliopistopaino, Helsingfors 2004

To Maria

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SYNOPSIS	3
THE INTERLUDES	9
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	12
1.WHAT IS ORGANISING?	16
<i>What is organising today?</i>	16
<i>Defining organising</i>	20
<i>The microscopic programme</i>	23
<i>What is researching/organising in principle?</i>	25
2.RESEARCHING ORGANISING - ORGANISING RESEARCHING	33
<i>Beyond security</i>	33
<i>Towards destruction and reconstruction of organising</i>	39
3.ORGANISING, OECONOMY AND POLITICS	43
<i>Current transgressions</i>	43
<i>Organising as performance</i>	45
<i>Actualising organising</i>	48
<i>Organising as production</i>	50
<i>The minimal concepts</i>	65
4.INTRODUCTORY LEXICON	68
<i>Conjugative architecture</i>	70
<i>Systagmus</i>	73
<i>2003 Metropolis</i>	76
<i>What is the problem with organising?</i>	77
<i>Producing, organising</i>	82
ON GENEALOGY	86
5.SUMMARY	97
TOWARDS A GENERAL INTELLECT OR IS IT GENERAL ECONOMY?	103
LIST OF REFERENCES.....	105

What is organising? interludes in researching

- towards problematisation

These judgments should lead to silence yet I write.
Georges Bataille

Does not the best start from sickness everywhere?
Novalis

What obliges me to write, I imagine, is the fear of going mad.
Georges Bataille

SYNOPSIS¹

This dissertation is an essay at confronting the question: What is organising? It is treated by means of interludes into researching organising. What is proposed is a reconceptualisation of the subject. This is an attempt at demonstrating that organising is beyond conventional (as well as ‘critical’) approaches to this fragmented and colourful area.

What is presented in the following is that both organising and researching are no different neither as potentialities nor as actualised. The above holds if one accepts that organising as well as researching are durations and that interbeingness is their inherent feature. In problematising researching/organising it is assumed that the singular virtual principle is care and will regarding the subject at hand. When something is in the state of problematisation potentiality and reality are seen as synonymous. Contrary to conventional thinking this project asserts that potentiality is no precondition for reality. Potentiality cannot be “better than” reality. The philosophies that lie behind this thinking are primarily derived from works by Friedrich Nietzsche, Gilles Deleuze and Deleuze and Félix Guattari, but are also influenced by the works of Michel Foucault, Martin Heidegger, Georges Bataille and Jacques Derrida. In the following the minor interplays of the enterprise are presented.

¹ This term per se is an introduction to the aesthetics that the entire essay professes. It is attracted towards complexity, in the fold itself, as in its original Latin meaning *com* (together) + *plectere* (to fold), i.e. to fold together versus its modern sense of being a strange mixture. Synopsis, in its original late Latin (derived from Greek) sense derived from *syn* (together) and *opsesthai* (to be going to see)

1) The singular minimal ethics that is brought forth is exactly the ideal of problematisation.

This entails that the ethos of knowing is that of being attracted towards a vulgar morale. In other words knowing is regarded as an arena for discussion rather than for repetition. Knowledge or ethics are actually nothing but inventions just like any particular organised organisation. This signifies that problematisation per se is the paramount virtue of both organising and researching. It also means that when something no longer is in a state of 'as perhaps' it no longer belongs to the realm of potentiality. Upon actualisation 'as such' research and organisation alike belong to the realm of the organised. It no longer has a truly creative character. To point out this is the main aim of this enterprise. The above framework leads to a quite different view of what is at hand. **Organising 'as perhaps' is defined as:**

The interbeing orchestration of a geopolitical multiplicity, where the milieu, with its genealogies, constitutes, the in principle infinitely interconnected, potentiality/reality of actualisation, which occurs through the intensity of the contextual will/care (or saudade)² which is the simultaneous interplay and transgression of desires of becoming/producing, structuring, searching and performing.

2) When describing organising as belonging to a world that is marked by interbeingness and duration, as being and becoming and simultaneously producing and being produced one realises that many of the orthodox problematisations³ within the literature in organisation and management are nothing but politically constructed phenomena. It is held that:

- a) There is no such thing as an objective reality. Reality is intersubjective. Reality *may be* socially constructed but it does not merely involve the individuals in a given time and place, and a 'given social order' is in no elite position regarding the actualisation of a social process. That what is viewed as reality can always be escaped into a novel reality

literally meant a comprehensive view. Today it has the quite opposite connotation of abstract or abridgement.

² The ideal of will/care as 'saudade' is a novel conceptualisation or a neologism of the term in this text. It is defined as a longing for the unattainable, or a homesickness without a home beyond the eternal return of the will/care of searching/organising and is thus, beyond (wo)man.

³ This reconceptualisation wants to discuss the matrixes and dichotomies set forth by e.g. Berger and Luckmann (1962) regarding subjective versus objective; Burrell and Morgan (1979), Pfeffer (1982), Astley and Van den Ven (1983), Alvesson and Deetz (1996) and Reed (1996) all regarding individualism versus collectivism and voluntarism and determinism; the two latest also on global versus local and constructivist versus positivist; and eventually e.g. Mintzberg (1994) and Beer and Nohria Eds. (2000) regarding dichotomies of change.

or a novel definition. This project views 'social process' as durations, as a multiplicity, as being simultaneously one and many.⁴

- b) There is no such thing as rationality versus irrationality or in other words order and chaos in a social world. If something is communicated, and thus belonging to language, it cannot be chaotic or irrational. Language is always subject to an economy or a rationality. Thus we can merely speak about different rationalities. The mere existence of the potentiality of different rationalities may make the world appear as chaotic or irrational.
- c) The problem of individualism versus collectivism is no so called fundamental problem at all in organising/organisation. This holds if one accepts that every individual is a collective of texts, organising, being organised. In this vein an individual can be seen as an 'organised institution' in a similar fashion as a collective of individuals.
- d) The dilemma of stability versus change is basically an oxymoron. When asserting that being-in-the-world is a question of a process in-between-things, there is no such thing as pure stability. Planned organisational change can also on the other hand be seen as merely inventing a new order.
- e) The final major dichotomy in organising, that is, the question of voluntarism versus determinism, is not a pure binary opposition either. Organising is not subject to a given preconditioned code. One may claim that organising in its circumstantial milieu is obviously constituted by its contextual genealogies. In a given time/space/place organising can only unfold through texts that are geopoliticalised exactly there. These texts are nevertheless nothing but superjections under which the contextual organising has as problematised a real potential of its own creation. Because of the contemporary virtual nature of infinite connectedness, the traditional question of local versus global is neither free nor determined by each other. This dilemma remains however unsolved, but for defying an a priori, preconditioning, given ethics.
- f) The entire question of theory versus praxis becomes uninteresting with the introduction of problematisation and creation as the singular ethos of organising and researching. Theory and practise as such are inseparable when it comes to researching organising. In actuality praxis is more complex than theorising, but upon textualisation it is just as abstract as

⁴ Cf Deleuze (1997/1966: 91ff)

theory⁵. They are actualisations or inventions ‘as such’. They serve knowledge as truth. From the above distinctions one arrives at the following ports⁶.

- 3) Organising is in many senses, to a certain extent a genre of utopian literature. It attempts to exactly organise things into a given form or looks for specific results or objectives. It is also utopic in the sense that many students in organisations tend to paint heavenly pictures in an almost religious manner, stating that as long as one follows given codes, one shall find excellence and prosperity. This means that the ones who organise are supposed to know how to organise according to the pre-defined knowledge of the authors of these “Brave New Worlds”.

Organising is atopic⁷ to a great degree in theorising to the extent that it craves for being and becoming beyond the interbeingness of being-in-the-world. Basically everything that is expressed about the social is atopic, following the central notions in Heidegger (1926/1962). Everything that is expressed is limited by language, and the horizons of being and time. This does not imply that non-sense is what one is supposed to strive for. On the contrary the mere knowledge of the nonsensical and what could be labelled as not-knowledge is exactly why one should pay attention to various problems related to the subject, beyond order and simplicity. Security and askesis are however sought for, although both are actually against life.⁸ Both ideas per se are concerned about undermining first of all *care* but also *will*.⁹ This view is also imported because much of the literature in this so called branch of knowledge is based on quite superficial scrutiny regarding not only theorising but also regarding

⁵ This claim by no means disclaims theory nor praxis by virtue. This text only discusses the nature of theory and practise versus the nature of problematisation especially regarding the difference between an ideal ethos and the ethos of problematisation. In other words this means the difference between preconditioning morale versus the principle of a vulgar morale.

⁶ Port, here, refers to a gate or an opening and not a haven or harbour.

⁷ The difference between utopia and atopia is here defined as follows: utopia is derived from Greek *ou topos* meaning literally ‘no place’. It refers to an ideal and this expression did not exist until its invention by Sir Thomas More in 1516. Atopia, on the other hand is an ancient Greek expression for something uncommon. It is defined here as something which is non-placable or unnattachable to life, like atopic allergy.

⁸ Security can be derived from Latin *secura* (from sine cura) = without care. Askesis comes on the other hand from Greek *asketikos*, meaning laborious, or one who exercises. In this text it is referred to as a devotion to the exercise, meaning that one has to leave oneself out of the exercise. In this sense it is very similar to the concept of *se cura* in a Heideggerian sense because *Cura* or *Sorge* for Heidegger (1926/1962) is the essence of being.

⁹ The latter is one of the main arguments in Nietzsche, especially (1882/1987). In *Gay Science* he claims that ascetism is against not only the will, but also in particular towards the will to know. It must be pointed out that for Nietzsche the will to know is of the nature of problematisation. Thus when this text refers to knowledge, it signifies knowledge with a connotation of security and certainty. In general this entire work prefers verbs to nouns, just like Weick (1979), and Bateson (1980). Nouns have a static nature. Stat(ist)ics is beyond the nature of life. Verbs are more in-line with the thinking here since they describe an action and thus a process. Such is the essential being of a living organism. *Organon*, i.e. instrument, is in this text no heavenly organ, which in a Bachian way echoes divine voice.

methodologies.¹⁰ The problem with much of the literature in the field of management and organisation is exactly that it has been contaminated by all kinds of other areas of science, that it is marked by a dilettante attitude towards everything. This is in a sense very ‘sound and reasonable’ since no-one can master everything, not even one discipline. However, it still is remarkable how little intensity there is regarding *saudade*. Eventually another a-topic feature of much of the literature in this fragmented area is that it is predominantly very silent of its own politics/economy. This research attempts therefore to summarise how this state-of-the-art of organising is possible in actuality. This entails bringing in aspects of time on the stage in the final opening of the essay which is attracted towards *synolon*.¹¹

4) Derived from Western, primarily monist, Judeo-Christian genealogies, a further aim of the essay is to superficially demonstrate how it has become possible that organising (as such) is what it is today. This is based mainly on derivations from accounting, language, representation, politics and religion. Though they are rarely seen together the enterprise of this work is to illustrate that they are transgressive, almost replacable, notions of organising. In order to understand the surreal and tragic¹² actuality, in juxtaposition to trendy contemporary theorising, with its proper property rights, craving for immediate prosperity, this text tends to be more attracted to thousands of years of civilisation than to evangelisations of ‘innovations’ from the last decade. The love of the new is what our ‘decade-nce’ is marked by beside the ‘aesthetic of speed’.¹³ This comes especially to naming. The above is also why this project results¹⁴ in this kind of fashion. It has little interest in being thetical¹⁵ as a given thesis, while equally and paradoxically being descriptive of the identifiable character of organising/researching. The pathos of novelty advances fragmentation and gives room for a progression of new oeconomies as theories/practices of knowledge. On top and inside everything we find ourselves in a time in which ‘the product’ organisation has to be managed in its being/becoming as a transgression of the private and public sense of householding, or being oeconomical. Organising must be utile. It has to be accountable. Thus it has to constantly re-evaluate

¹⁰ Regarding utopia and atopia and professing ‘organisation science’ see e.g. March and Sutton (1997) and Ehnrooth (2002).

¹¹ Synolon is Greek for ‘the whole’. The endeavour of this research project is however by no means to reach ends or sovereign totalities. This is an essay at discussion and conjugations.

¹² By ‘surreal and tragic’ the text refers to the very real, omnipresent, omnipotent, and dramatic multiplitious position of organising in actuality. Sur-real, signifies exactly the more-than-real omnitude of organising. On the other hand it is surreal (with kinship to the dadaist movement) also in the sense that there is so little interest in the subject. Tragedy refers obviously also to the latter connotation.

¹³ See Virilio e.g. (1980/1994).

¹⁴ Project can be derived from pro (forward) and jacere (throw) whereas result can be derived from re (again) and saltare jump or leap, meaning to rebound.

and re-invent itself. It has to be identifiable and legitimate as bearing a passport through the (seemingly unbearable) anarchic insecurity of interbeingness. Accountability in its significance as continuous re-assessment¹⁶ means that organising has to do with being/becoming, but also with knowledge not merely as knowledge of production (as organising) but also as production of self-knowledge. This is in line with the (not necessarily classical) ‘iron-collars’¹⁷ of representation. Once something is identified it simultaneously is a predicate for something, and as it is supposed to be analogous, it is a potential production of becoming a way of being and a way of knowing, which in turn may resemble religion.¹⁸ This is the sovereign, dominant, ordering voice that is speaking. It has a lot to do with our time especially in the connotation of time as *a measure*. Time, however, if we believe in Heidegger and Derrida, as well as Nietzsche, is to be regarded primarily as a horizon. That what comes out into the being in the now-ness is always limited¹⁹. This could be bluntly described as ‘appearance in temporality’. Nevertheless organising, is in the centre of society today. It is the metropolis, as mother-place and as capital as well as where the ‘politics of today’ takes place/identifies/shapes. And not the least because at the womb of this capital is capital. **Though difficult to define ‘as such’ organising may be illustrated as:**

That what actualises orchestration, identification and legitimisation of multiplicities into account. It is a transgressive mechanism of oeconomy/politics of knowledge/being as the prime productive force in becoming of any given occurrence/duration which is actualised in the extended event.

¹⁵ For the ‘thetical’ nature of our times see Derrida (1987).

¹⁶ Cf Deleuze (1990/1994:177-182).

¹⁷ Deleuze (1968/1994:262).

- 1) Identity in the concept
- 2) Opposition in the predicate
- 3) Analogy in judgement
- 4) Resemblance in perception

¹⁸ This may be superficially related to Morgan (1987). This text nonetheless owes much to *ibid.* because it has been infected by it at an early stage of its development. Besides Morgan’s book is an unusually entertainingly, well-written review of literature in organising.

¹⁹ These limits, limitations and delimitations are potentialities of the ‘as perhaps’.

THE INTERLUDES

-towards problematisation

As we once suffered from crimes, we now suffer from laws.

Tacitus

Outline of the dissertation

This essay is structured in such a manner that it attempts to explain the antecedent synopsis. This dissertation is officially labeled as a 'collection of articles'. They should according to stipulations 'make a coherent entity'. De facto they are quite the opposite. Just like literature in organising, they are fragmented in nature. Their common denominator, however, is, that they hopefully all demonstrate *saudade* and a will/care for problematisation. The introduction/summary called 'What is Organising?' has a weakness at trying to tie the whole together.

The acknowledgements are part of the text as to import their relevance for the interbeingness of research as a social process. These recognitions simultaneously treat some of the geopoliticalisations of the essay. Those named, beside the obvious list of references, have had the major impact on the shaping and coming into the open of this project. They are interbeing as durations in the text. Without the particular names the project would be different from this pastiche/original. Naming, is drawing maps, territorialisation. These are genealogies of these particular and contingent words.

The introduction in itself begins with a general problematisation of the area, followed by a brief review of mainly the (un)problematical literature. The latter is a summary with comments and supplements of Article I *Theorising in organising – Utopia, atopia and metropolis*.²⁰ This is followed by ideas of the main arguments articles 2, 3, and, 4; descriptions or interlocutions into the interchangability and transgressive nature of production/representation/researching/organising.

Article II *Images of Madonna and fugue*²¹ is an ambiguous symphony of various different ways of representing organising as well as an intermezzo regarding the empty spaces of

²⁰ Harju (forthcoming a). Translation of the forthcoming book chapter in Heiskala and Virtanen Eds. *Talous ja yhteiskuntateoria*. (Economy and social theory). Gaudeamus. Helsinki.

²¹ Harju (2002). Book chapter in Höpfl and Kostera Eds. *Interpreting the Maternal Organisation*. Routledge. London: 137-154.

organising. But it also attempts to emphasise the symbolical nature of organising especially as a representation of an architecture both in the concrete and abstract meanings of the word. Especially in relation to Medieval architecture where the Gothic cathedral was the core or the centre of the town, where truth was to be found, in a very similar fashion as knowledge and the organisation, today, have taken that very same location in terms of universities, and yes, office (twin) towers.

Article III *Protect: The Morphoses of Identity, Heterogeneity and Synolon*²² focuses on aspects of representation regarding the production of research. It is an essay at demonstrating the heterogeneous nature of organising/researching. It is also (a quite futile) attempt at overcoming the problem of self-reflexivity. But it has an emphasis on the pro-logical nature, of production. This means that it wants to stress the interbeing character of the production process, as well as aspects of being amongst the superjection of ethics, juxtaposed with the preconditioning of ethics.

Article IV *Organizational Texts Lost and Found in the Architecture of Organizing*²³ further discusses absences in organisational discourse (as such) as well as some of the fundamentals in organising (as perhaps). It defines organising as consisting of simultaneous interactive 'abstract machines' which constitute what organising is about, namely the desires for production, structure, search and performance. The article ends with a point that the author has never accepted regarding the editing of the text. The text in its final (revised) version was pointless.

Article V *Inside Metropolis: Knowledge/Power – Who Cares?*²⁴ is about the state-of-the-art within academia in organising vis-à-vis the central role of organising in society today. It consists of explanatory genealogies into the actuality of the whats and hows of organising. This is the temporal and interbeing horizon. The introduction/summary treats all texts critically with supplements and liminal texts. This article sums up the main arguments of the entire work.

The articles do not follow a chronological order. The order as described is closest to orthodox logic in terms of in terms of introduction – what has been said – what is said differently – summary – and conclusions. Within the process of writing a dozen doctoral theses from the area of management and organisation during a span of ten years were scrutinised regarding

²² Harju (1999). *Studies In Cultures, Organizations and Societies*. Vol. 5: 131-149.

²³ Harju (2000). *Studies in Cultures, Organizations and Societies*. Vol 6: 101-115.

structure. Although no two essays were even bluntly on the same subject, and although the essays had very different methodologies, the variance regarding the relations between the divisions: Introduction, theory, methodology, empiry and summary was close to none. Knowing that authors have written parts regarding epistemology and ontology as their final duty one might wonder whether structure precedes content or otherwise.

This thesis which principally attempts to escape thetic logic contains hardly any field-studies. It does anything but follow the advise of ethnographers and anthropologists. Since what is said is mainly small scribbles in the outskirts of literature in this area which resembles a patchwork quilt it could never be labeled as 'tales from the field'. The archeology, that is being accounted for, is still exactly that. The digging has not extended to the depths of the earth, perhaps because the shovel has hit so many problems on the way. Since this essay is about organising/organisation in general the literature review is obviously 'superficial'. This project has primarily been concerned about some of the most central and most widely discussed themes within what some dare call 'organisation theory'. Yet, it has been interesting to realise how much devotion and passion has been put into the study of social phenomena in organisations.

²⁴ Harju (forthcoming b) Book chapter in Fuglsang and Sørensen Eds. *Gilles Deleuze and the Social*. The University of Edinburgh Press. Edinburgh.

Acknowledgements²⁵

parlez de moi ya que m'interesse²⁶

Ben

This opus is merely a text amongst texts²⁷. It advances from the middle as a minor conjugation amongst other subjects/objects/texts. It owes a lot to those who have invited it for discussions and especially to those who have given it the avenues for search and research. In a strictly intertextual sense the subject, both as text and author(ity) is insignificant. What matters is where it is located and which other collectives of texts or voices have touched upon it.

This work is an actualisation that is a process of a genealogy of absences and presences that in this particular milieu have flourished into weed. What happens to it in the mouths or under the feet of others is beyond interest. What this prologue cares about are its rhizomes it recognises to prosper. The text has been pre-read by Pierre Guillet de Monthoux and Ole Fogh Kirkeby, it thus owes much to both of them in multiple ways.

Every project has to be seen as an extended event. The eventualisation of this text is naturally greatly indebted to predecessors, especially the strict but loving guidance of Consul General Martti Harju. Without his immense will/care for learning and knowing this would not exist. Although he has not been actively involved in the coming about of this very text, his absent

²⁵ This work has been funded by Stiftelsen Svenska Handelshögskolan, The Academy of Finland; The Graduate School of Management and Information Systems Studies, Liikesivistysrahasto, Svenska handelshögskolans fonder, Bergsrådet tekn. och ekon. dr h.c. Marcus Wallenbergs stiftelse för företagsekonomisk forskning, Waldemar von Frenckells stiftelse, the Research Institute of the Swedish School of Economics, Helsinki, as well, and above all, its Department of Management and Organisation with particular gratitude extended towards Ingmar Björkman, who was of great support regarding finding abort, rest, a port.

²⁶ Text on a t-shirt designed by the Nicoise dada-artist Ben.

²⁷ IF one accepts even hints of the points in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* that professing philosophy is a tautological (futile) language-game, THEN perhaps one may have to bother about language per se. The quite extensive use of etymology and linguistic references throughout this piece of work holds that IF, as Foucault (quite freely) interprets Nietzsche's *first* edition of *Gay Science*, in that he asserts that knowledge is an invention, and IF we assert that professing knowledge is a continuity of a discussion (or in other words a continuum of a language game) THEN it might be worthwhile to look at the archeology of this bricolage. AND especially as the so called branch of knowledge that could be labeled as 'organisation theory' has existed for less than half a century, more than two thousand years of (Western) discussions regarding knowledge, ex communicatio in language, just might THEN give us more insights in these in(ter)ventions than merely a superficial glance at our times. IF THEN the signifier/signified play today relates meanings to this (passing) era of ours THEN it just may be fruitful to treat our terminologies along two lines a) the genealogical and b) the local/contextual. HOWEVER this text is not interested in origins or ends, beyond the telos of interbeingness. But what is interesting is that origin, project and result have a similar etymology, which brings us back to tautology and invention. (For a brief 'analytical' discussion of *Tractatus* see Ayer (1984: 108ff).

presence has constantly reminded the text to, in a modern sense, attempt to progress. The actual absence of Margit Harju has also in more than many ways²⁸ contributed to the result.

This project has been produced in several milieux. Space for thinking has been provided by Marta Calás and Linda Smircich, who smeared confidence in writing in this non-orthodox manner. The interlocutions in and around the University of Massachusetts in Amherst was particularly fruitful because of being impeccably co-hosted by Raza Mir. Especially the third article (*Protect*) owes much to that space.

P.O. Berg gave the opportunity for visiting SAMS in Copenhagen, where the fourth article (*The Architecture*) was completed. Nyhavn brought some of the thoughts into haven because of the chance of sharing the friendship of the polis with Martin Fuglsang, in particular with reference to the friendship of *sophos*.²⁹ Martin has also concretely, as an editor for *Gilles Deleuze and the Social*, actualised the contribution in that book. A privileged addition was a stay at the Scandinavian Research Consortium of Organisation Research at Stanford University and to experience the humble generosity of its chair James March in 1996. This text copies him for his description of the supervisor of this work, Guje Sevón, in simply stating that she is a *mensch*³⁰.

Guje, more than anybody, has provided this becoming with the space for thinking. She did initiate this project in practise and has beautifully beared with the formation of this text with its unconditional (adolescent) resistance towards the sovereign forces in academia. Guje was initially the one who gave the work its spirit. The *urtheilskraft*³¹ of the aesthetic of this work owes much to Pierre Guillet de Monthoux and Claes Gustafsson, who were both sources of inspiration in the very beginning. Especially the fourth article (*Images of Madonna*) hence owes much to the curly hair of Pierre. This writing is also in great debt to Barbara Czarniawska, Heather Höpfl and Monika Kostera for their support and encouragement. Barbara was of paramount support regarding the publication of *Protect*, Monika edited *The Architecture* as well as (together with Heather) *Images of Madonna*. The transfusion of ideas from all those previously mentioned has worked as an *orexis*,³² both in the sense that the

²⁸ For an extensive explanation of this, as well as the entire politics of this work, see the introduction to Gilles Deleuze's and Félix Guattari's (1984/1972) first part of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, named *Anti-Oedipus* and also its preface by Michel Foucault.

²⁹ Sophos is Greek and means wisdom. Philos means friend or lover. Philosophy thus means a love or friendship of wisdom as knowledge/experience. (The 'mistakes' of all the translations in this opus minimus rest on the thin shoulders of the signer of this work unless there is a reference to a given dictionary, author(s) or translator(s).

³⁰ Mensch is a Jiddish expression. It means a great human being. Someone to respect.

³¹ Ur+theil+kraft in Kant means pure reason but literally "theil" means division or judgement whereas ur- means of or from like in origin ur-sprung, (literally leap from, jump from). Cf pro-ject and re-sult.

³² Orexis is appetite, passion and recipe. Since this text is in tune with melody (tautology) *au lieu de* desire, intent, feeling will and care as passion/attraction it seeks Heideggerian/classical '*Blues on Bach*' (title of a record by The

ground for the text was primarily attracted to complexity and gave thus a *passion* for the problematic, which became the *recipe* for the entire work.

This work is somewhat unorthodox not the least because it has taken very long to come forth. The paradox of the orthodox is however that members of academia claim that they never have time to research, yet the the dominant professoral³³ doxa is that one has to become a doctor as fast as possible and then do whatever one finds is interesting (when there is no time). Time today follows primarily an aesthetic of escape. Time, in its broad sense *aion*, in particular in terms of knowing and experience ideally calls for time to search and time to absorb that which is under scrutiny. The concept of *chronos* as a measure has nothing to do with it. Moreover the dominant discourse regarding doctoral dissertations is in the vicinity of bacteria³⁴. "It's only a doctoral dissertation." "Just do it." "Nobody reads doctoral dissertations anyway." Politics of actuality pre-condition researching beyond the content of the act of researching, finding out and learning.

Acknowledgements usually involve merely happy and exaggerative remarks regarding IOU:s. This text hopes it has not been too pathetic. On the other hand it wants to above all hail all those voices that have tried to kill it with ascetic virtues of following simple rules. Those who do not possess the will to knowledge and call themselves researchers are not pathetic - they belong to the realm of pathological experimentation. Fortunately the world is not a boring utopia. The mere existence of the deathwish of will/care regarding knowledge, knowing, finding out, has been a major source of inspiration.

Conducting research with a will is often a very painful exercise. However, unless one wants to experience pain there is no potential for experiencing the joy of merely finding a small fragmentary detail that has not been previously been brought forth. The *jouissance* of searching, exactly, is the paramount affirmative essence in researching. During six years of mat(t)erialisation of this writing has been the joy of being constantly reminded of the joy of being-in-the-world with the childlike will/care in actuality, in the (nomen est omen) father of peace, Axel.

Modern Jazz Quartet, 1974) or rather the melancholy of the new 'knack' of a bossa nova and its essential longing *saudade*.

³³ profession comes from Latin *pro + fateri* i.e. for speaking, *professio*-vow, to declare openly, publicly, act of sworn faith, commitment, to declare out loud in what one believes.

³⁴ Please note that bacterium, in Rome, was a small office (as well as *bacillum*) which brings us to the pejorative nature of the word organisation – as a bureaucracy.

The *durée* of the shaping of this text is nevertheless mainly been a classical politicalisation in the spirit Vernant describes the friendship and rivalry of the free men in Athens. This companionship has been shared with two very different characters, Mats Ehrnrooth and Akseli Virtanen. Much due to Akseli and Risto Heiskala, this project started seeing its actualisation with their excellent *Talous ja yhteiskuntateoria* (Economy and Social Theory) book. The first article *Organisation theory* provided a framework for the completion of this essay. Discussions around the topic further added to the discussion in this oeuvre. Mats, on the other hand, is the one, who has kept this project alive. He has been the par excellence best discussant in the making of this work. The effort he has put into his companionship is beyond words. Both Akseli and Mats have been excellent balling partners on and around tables, table tennis and tennis courts. I sincerely hope the spirit of the games will live on. Tenez!³⁵

Tennis is an elitist sport. This text does by no means want to conceal its politics. It admits willingly that it comes from the vicinity of Acropolis in the sense that it comes from an extremely privileged position beyond politesse. It comes from a first world white protestant milieu of (predominantly socialdemocrat/capitalist) free men. This text would not exist without having traveled around the world in a 'Royal Viking Class' seat with all the social securities it has brought along. It is easy to pretend to be courageous (wearing the mask of the one who problematises) when one can escape the insecurity of the world in security. Se cura.

Helsinki, December 2003

Klaus Harju

³⁵ Merci aussi aux: Guy Ahonen, Wilhelm Barner-Rasmussen, Peter Case, Barbara Cavonius, Karin Fernler, Ranja Frommer, Simon Hallqvist, Marianna Harju, Maj-Britt Hedvall, Max Holm, Jakke Holvas, Marjut Jyrkinen, Raoul Lardot, Emmi Lattu, Hugo Letiche, Jaakko Leskinen, Irma Levomäki, Simon Lilley, Martin Lindell, Ali Mir, Harri Otila, Peter Pelzer, Pekka Piironen, Hans von Rettig, Denise Salin, Matti Sanaksenaho, Pirjo Sanaksenaho, Teemu Tallberg, Joonas Tena, Hanna Toivanen, Tiina Vainio, Jussi Vähämäki, Annika Åkerberg and Michael Ålenius. Others have mercy.

What is organising?

microscopic interludes

Segui il tuo corso e lascia dir le genti

Dante

1. WHAT IS ORGANISING?

Abstract and very practical

What is organising today?

This essay is about organising. It questions some of the so called main problems within the area of research usually labelled as ‘management and organisation’ and it attempts to illustrate what is *actually* dilemmatic in researching organising. The purpose of the enterprise is to problematise organising and to demonstrate why such a problematisation is relevant especially regarding organising researching. In trying to answer the question ‘what is organising?’ in a broad sense, the text is especially interested in developing an understanding for the particular question ‘what is organisation *today*?’ Perhaps, one day, as noted by Smircich (1985) future archeologists will call our times the era of organising.

The emphasis on today lies in some of the basic conceptualisations of the entire work. This line of thought stresses interbeingness, the process, being and becoming. The idea is kin with Foucault’s (1997) famous analysis of Kant’s *Was ist Aufklärung?* In the article Foucault discusses the contingent temporality of Kant’s text, as an early example of such writing, appearing in *Berlinsche Monatschrift* in November 1784 vis-à-vis philosophers’ attempts at using universal/eternal frames of reference. Although Foucault is partly critical of Kant’s text he asserts that:

This entails an obvious consequence: that criticism is no longer to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value but, rather, as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and archeological in its method. Archeological-and not transcendental-in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge [*connaissance*] or of

all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events. And this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are, what it is impossible for us to do and know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing or thinking what we are do and think. It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has finally become science; it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom. Ibid. (315-16).

Organising is of course a very broad concept. This claim, however, is no reason for trying to avoid to confront it. Today, perhaps more than ever before, it is of utmost relevance as we live in a time with a remarkable shift in ideologies at large. Utopian literature in general is all but popular today. Yet the vast majority of literature in organising is of utopian character in that it hails ideologies in such a manner that it transfuses divine promises with knowledge (as truth) with given structures or oeconomies. Simultaneously organising tends to inject almost every other area of research into itself in a more than superficial manner. One could perhaps ask what is the purpose of an injection that does not find a vein or is it more in vain to actually inject merely placebo. In dealing with this contemporary issue, a significant part of the question defined above, is what it is not or what is a-topical in the current geopoliticalisation. It is evident that there is a multitude of debates going on regarding the market economy, neo-liberalism, and globalisation. Politicians, shareholders and economists take part in the debate together with a fragmented group of reddish-green attackers and had-enoughers. Ideologies aside, *ya basta*, the actual realisation of this becoming, does not lie in the hands of economic theorists. The socio-political impact on individuals and societies alike is orchestrated to a quite significant degree through power/knowledge in management and organisation. *The social and political actuality is organised through ideas of organising.*

The above line just simply has to be underlined. It is beyond sanity that this field of ours is so silent regarding its central position in society. It is even more confusing when Nobel laureates, like Herbert A. Simon and Daniel Kahnemann have been more widely read by students in organising than by students in economics. Theories in social sciences have for long professed the non-existence of the neo-classical *homo oeconomicus*. It begins to be widely acceptable that no such rational actor exists with the exceptions of utopian literature, fairy tales, and religion. What is more remarkable is that although this 'knowledge' exists, students in management and organisation are still (mainly uncritical) servants of utility. This is not even what this text is attempting to explain. It is merely a detail of the entire question about organising.

The perhaps most interesting thing to say about the thing itself (id est organising) is that thinking organising today seems to be so afraid of its potentia that it is impotent to pronounce its own name³⁶. There is a vast array of fragmented definitions but 'organising the organising' is basically non-existent in a deeper sense. There are many explanations for the interbeing status quo state-of-affairs although many modern theorists realise the impotency of the existing literature. This realisation or rather surrendering mentality may be caused by recent trends in Western thinking that questions classical and modernist thought. In fact during the past two decades this colorful branch has been marked by various attempts at rethinking organisation. The results despite goodwill have been quite meager. The prevailing somewhat post-something literature in management and organisation, or more correctly pseudo-post-modern literature has at its best captured the problems of modernity but has not had the will or the courage to confront the polemics. The current trend is predominantly 'critical' in nature coming mainly from a marxist or post-marxist point-of-view, that has had difficulties of leaving Karl lying in peace in Highgate³⁷. In an allegorical sense Foucault, Derrida and company have so to speak been at sale with pinches (marks) of Marx.

Since organising is such a vast field involving elements from all possible fields of knowledge it is intelligible that there are not many treatises on the whats and hows of organising. As the field still in the sixties was concerned about variance between organisations as well as formal aspects of organising as presented in the first *Handbook of Organizations* edited by James March in 1965, whereas the *Handbook of Organization Studies* edited by Clegg, Hardy and Nord in 1996 could be summed as an anthology on diversity especially regarding divergent perspectives in organisation. What must be said is that 'marginalised' aspects of organisation have come to the surface, i.e. feminism and post-colonialism. These are also often interconnected with contemporary thinkers à la Foucault e.g. Calás and Smircich (1991) and (1996), Mir, Calás and Smircich (1995).

A sovereign reading of Foucault e.g. Deleuze (1988) is that Foucault is more modern than the modernists. A similar statement could be said of Deleuze and the majority of the works of Derrida. The primus inter pares mistake that (the predominantly Anglo-Saxon) organisation theorists have in their readings of the above is that, although critical of orthodox conceptualisations, they were their building/reconstructional tectonic fundamentals. What the above then have in different ways done is traced back, done genealogies and archeology as a bricolage, muchly working from difference, the outside and the other. It sounds quite

³⁶ De mortuis nil nisi bonum.

abstract but it *really* is very practical in *actuality*. These enterprises are everything but simple since one has not only to have knowledge of what has been said but utmost because what unites Bataille and Nietzsche with the above is thinking the unthinkable as an inherent, Heideggerian part of thinking thinking.

In order to understand organising and its possibilities one has to have a different starting point. An order of understanding is standing in a given position. One should rather discuss it and think of not understanding, not standing below a given. This starting point is forgetting and not yet knowing. First, the proto-critical attitude of thinking organising especially regarding researching organising ideally involves forgetting about preconditioning ethics. This does not mean there is no subjectivity. On the contrary exactly because there is subjectivity, the starting point should rather be about forgetting than about remembering. One cannot of course avoid the multiple positions one is having both as a hexis and a becoming. In any case the paramount interbeing polis is about seeing history primarily as potentiality.

This thus means that thinking about thinking itself is about thinking about the unwritten and the not-yet as well as the not-thought. This *saudade* means being beyond goals and includes not thinking, especially not thinking about something that is given or already known. Organising the already organised as such is equal to repetition. Repetition is nothing but the banale. When potentiality is seen as the same as actuality, meaning that everything that is real is potential and vice versa, thinking thinking and organising organising takes on different dimensions³⁸.

³⁷ Ironically the only other well-known figure resting at Highgate cemetery in London is the organic-liberalist-egoist philosopher Herbert Spencer. The cemetery thus carries the pseudonym “Marx and Spencer’s”.

³⁸ On virtuality and potentiality see also Lehtonen (2000) and Agamben (1999).

Defining organising

The problem in organising, given the conceptualisation posited in the beginning, is what organising potentially is and what it is as an actual activity. In section 1. of the synopsis it was posited that organising as a real potentiality, that is, 'as perhaps' is:

The interbeing orchestration of a geopolitical multiplicity, where the milieu, with its genealogies, constitutes, the in principle infinitely interconnected, potentiality/reality of actualisation, which occurs through the intensity of the contextual will/care (or saudade) which is the simultaneous interplay and transgression of desires of becoming/producing, structuring, searching and performing.

In addition in section 5 (of the synopsis) it was added that organising in actuality, after it has been actualised, as a geopolitical multiplicity in its milieu 'as such' is:

That what actualises orchestration, identification and legitimisation of multiplicities into account. It is a transgressive mechanism of oeconomy/politics of knowledge/being as the prime productive force in becoming of any given occurrence/duration which is actualised in extended events.

The *real* difference between 'as perhaps' and 'as such' is what is of interest. The difference is difference in the will/care. It can be accounted for as intuition (Bergson) or as intensity (Deleuze). Here it is called saudade. Everything else is repetition.

Organising as perhaps is unattainable. It works out of Plato's *khôra*, and it lives in friendship with *never*. Once it comes out into the open it becomes subject to (sovereign) order and no longer escapes. Nevertheless, organising continually, in its interbeingness and infinite interconnectedness, constantly escapes its economies, which bluntly attempt to force order on something that already is different. Economy and politics alike try to force given territories upon the sociopolitical, id est, positionings. Following Giorgio Agamben's logic of *Mezza senza fine*, (means without ends) the concern of sociopolitical stratification is to create an *omnitude*, that is restricted in one sense or another. If we nevertheless and hopefully believe in liberty neither (wo)man nor (wo)men can be ordered according to a historical *telos* or the *archê* of a given organisation (state). The same problem lies with postmodernists, who believe in the end of history without the end of the state, in other words in a fulfillment of a humanist project. Whereas many so called progressive thinkers believe in the end of the state but cling to historicity. Organisation, as such, can be seen as a product of either realm.

The conceptual difference is that once something has been organised as such, it now belongs to the world (of order). It thus is

- a) identifiable
- b) legitimate (sensible)
- c) accountable

It can now be seen as

- d) an arrangement or an oeconomy
- e) knowledge (or religion)
- f) politics
- g) an interbeing product of becoming

With all seven from a) to g) put together with a focus on the interbeing product, which in itself is a multiplicity of beings/becomings as extended durations, the identification, sense-making and sense-giving accountability is a superjection of ethics upon the actualised organising. The superjected ethics of the subject are naturally found in the milieu of the specific organising. But they are *not* conditions, as given preconditions. They act (in principle) as an umbrella onto which the subject can cut fissures or paint heavens, whatever is her concern. It is a creative enterprise Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1993: 206-233.) that is concerned about liberty. It is problematising in an optimistic way. Wallgren (1996:177-181) although partly (and perhaps because of his pragmatist position) critical, nevertheless hails the former duos "avant-gardism" in philosophy, which is the pure will of the act of creation.³⁹

That is part of the story. The remaining part is basically about the question why is there so little care for this creation? And why is the contemporary as it is? What lies beneath organising as such as it is today? This remainder or supplement to the question of the problem of organising cannot within the space of this dissertation be but superficially treated. As such, as being of a thetical nature, it is questionable whether such thin linings belong here at all. Be as it may, it is evident that these supplementary questions are of paramount import, and cannot therefore be (completely) neglected. The complex question of the extended event, the time/space where organising is actualised is beyond grasp within this minimal essay. One may simply add that in each real and potential organising it is rather a question of many durations than merely a given organising as the subject/object under scrutiny. Upon investigation, upon reflection,

³⁹ This text disagrees with Wallgren's understanding of what he calls Deleuze and Guattari's refusal of discussion. Deleuze, in particular would not have critically studied and written books about a dozen philosophers had he not had the will to discuss.

upon the very idea of *carpe diem*, without discussing this latter absurd idea, when imaginary doors are opened towards organising itself, id est, when one is attempting at subtracting oneself from the world – breaking through to the other side à la Morrison, one may and hopefully does, extract singular features, which may refer to originals and mimesis. Although this is not attempting to be the mimetic express, and the question of mimesis will not be dealt beyond laissez-faire politics, the creation of topography, geopoliticalisations and even 'unreal' laboratory conditions is by no means futile in itself. The issue, regardless of their inherent logic, the measures of organising, in themselves, should have a more comprehensive attitude towards (not merely the hows) but foremost the whats and whys of their wills. And the paramount question is that the chefs of these recipes could add anything but minute-made spices to the issues at stake in order to comprehend that there just might be something beyond totalising avenues of knowledge.

The problem with organising as such today is exactly that there is no in-depth problematisation. In a recent article Hinings and Greenwood (2002:411) question: "What are the consequences of the existence of organizations?" It is of course a relevant question but it does not reach the depth of the question: "What are the consequences of organising?" The latter goes beyond the topology of "the organisation". Although this text is open to discussion, what Hinings and Greenwood raise, and is responded by Bartunek (2002) and Clegg (2002), is partly and old discussion of capitalism versus marxism, that is somewhat out-of-date. What participants who take part in such conversations do not seem to understand is that there is no inherent value in neither organisation nor power. Values are derived from how organising is represented and ethics ejected upon the particular multitudes 'as such'. It is therefore more *al dente* to ask what organising is and is becoming, as well as what it produces and is producing.

Organising as a *medium* carries along not only the making and producing of social identity and knowledge, the 'knowledge' of organising is a kind of social intelligence that involves such concepts as 'social capital'. Contemporary views tend to define this as either a useful tool or as an instrument of domination. This dialogue may have certain relevance. A more subtle question, following the logic of Georges Bataille, is what is its excess. Why precondition causal inference? Why not simply ask what is it not as it is? What does it not know, as non-knowledge. What is it not able to grasp? What is beyond account? Eventually, why is there such an urge towards certainty or separation from the world? Certus is to cut or separate. What is of interest is to see reality beyond measures and ends. It is obvious that organising is produced through the milieu – it is less obvious that 'it had to go like this'.

A point that Hinings and Greenwood (2002) exactly come with is the recognition of theorising organising as a historical process. While leaning onto interbeingness, it would also be strange not to pay attention to genealogies of organising. In a genealogical enterprise of a Nietzschean kind one has to understand however, that there is no such thing as a given, predefined "historical reason" for the current interbeing affairs. What is happening is rather a historical contingency or differently put a 'mistake' of sorts. And in order to picture today one has to go to the origins, not to the originals, but to the rhizomic lines that have brought organising to what it is today, as origins, containing the difference to the original. The pathos of ethics is according to Nietzsche (1887/1989:26) primarily a *pathos of distance*. This position is above all that of elitism, but having a will/care must necessarily contain that positioning. One must point out that this "aristocratic" or "noble" attitude is not a question of anything beyond the will/care, which ideally is about not-knowing. It is a paradoxical project in that it does not aim at anything but silence. Yet it is anything but futile.⁴⁰ In a broader sense of distancing, a project of organising, has distance as its inherent matter, because without distance or without otherness towards the all and the same alike no identification of organising could not take place.

The microscopic programme

The work and the genealogies that are presented at the end of this oeuvre as well as in articles 1 and 5 have three different programs:

- 1) To demonstrate that economy in reality would be pataphysical⁴¹ without its various politics/techniques derived from something called management science. Students of in particular 'management and organisation' in theory/praxis are shaping societies, through their ethics or so called knowledge/power regarding the positioning, identification, legitimisation, sense-making, production, and accountability of the beings of the individuals who live in them. This is a fairly reasonable argument for the very idea of problematising the multiplitious area of organising, in general and in particular as an arena for performing the art of researching organising. The basic question regarding this oeconomy that remains is why there are no discussions regarding the fundamentals of organising beyond utility/exploitation. There is no care for house-holding (*oiko-nomia*) in the house. *Se cura*.⁴²

⁴⁰ Cf the first citations of this dissertation.

⁴¹ Pataphysics is Alfred Jarry's metaphysics of the absurd.

⁴² The word *secura*, which is one of the main questions in organising originally literally in Latin meant without care derived from *sine cura*. Still in the late 18th century Pomay (1768) it is defined as something nonchalante although it by that time had also received a comparable definition to our contemporary notion as "something you do not need to care about as assured" (Ibid). An interesting parallel is the etymology of the word ascetism, which is derived from Greek *asketikos* meaning

- 2) Management and organising can be seen as the absurd (but very real) tekhné or technology⁴³ of something Karl Marx would have called 'a general intellect' or what Paolo Virno calls 'multitudo'.
- 3) To illustrate how different inherent notions in organising are rooted in a transfusion of ideas from:
 - a) Babylon
 - b) Ancient Greece
 - c) Pre-Christian thought
 - d) Medieval thought
 - e) The Renaissance and the Reformation
 - f) Modernism
 - g) Materialism
 - h) Postmodernism

The above is to demonstrate why organising has a given reason (*vernunft*) as 'knowledge' and as theory/praxis and to simultaneously illustrate why and how this 'science' is beyond the real. This professes philosophising organising. Without understanding fundamental problems in thinking one cannot understand why organising is so problematic. It is also fairly evident that thousands of years of human civilisation has more to offer than a superficial glance at the last ten years of development within for instance such a dilettante area as organisational science. On the other hand one may argue that a superficial glance at the story of philosophy is just as unfruitful. That holds of course if the idea is to reach ends or create scientific truths. Those lines of thought, however, do not exist in this project. This is merely an interlocution. This is not an attempt at uniting philosophy with organising - this is an enterprise concerned with opening avenues between the two, focusing on problematisation. The point is that although organising, when dealt with in this manner, may *appear* to be something abstract – it is the opposite. If one really problematises anything in terms of being-at-home-with-something (*att vara hemmastadd*) and in terms of having journeyed (*att vara bevandrad*) and both simultaneously, that is what intensity is about, and one cannot describe intensity in terms of banalising form. The 'practical' thinkers who picture organising in terms of numbers, arrows, and boxes are the truly abstract ones.

laborious, as beautifully pictured in Vähämäki's (2002) interesting synthesis of Lévinas and Heidegger. The concept of ascetism is of course dealt with at length in Nietzsche's *Gay Science*.

⁴³ This is stolen from Piironen (2003).

What is researching/organising in principle?

I myself have attempted an *aesthetic* justification: how is the ugliness of the world possible? – I took the will to beauty, to persist in like forms, for a temporary means of preservation and recuperation: fundamentally, however, the eternally-creative appeared to me to be, as the eternal compulsion to destroy, associated with pain. The ugly is the form things assume when we view them with the will to implant a meaning, a new meaning, into what has become meaningless: the accumulated force which compels the creator to consider all that has been created hitherto as unacceptable, ill-constituted, worthy of being denied, ugly!

Friedrich Nietzsche

An obvious element of problematising organising is the import of problematisation itself. It is its sublime ugliness.⁴⁴ The paramount epistemological claim of this essay is the virtue of problematisation. The singular ideal that this essay rests on is the principle of vulgar morale which paradoxically basically means the ethics of the attempt to escape ethics. This conceptualisation cares about a will to know or a will to be able to without ever anchoring. It is having an admiration of Leibniz' words:

Having established these things, I thought I was coming into port, but when I started to mediate upon the union of the soul with the body, I was as it were thrown back onto the open sea.

Leibniz, as quoted in Deleuze (1991/1995:104).

This text is of course more than uninterested in questions of body and soul. It is the continuous struggle, or the passionate tango between monism and dissemination, which is seen as the beauty of researching/organising. What would the will to know be without the above? The love of uncertainty is an active affirmation of the will. The will is courageous. It defies death as it does not desire stopping. It does simultaneously not have any Beckerian (1973) desires of denying death. This text is of the opposite nature. Sticking to codes is exactly a form of the will to immortality beyond the *wesen* of the tragic nature of life as we know it. But, then of course this text has no idealism or idols except for the will/care.

Critique is never conceived by Nietzsche as a *reaction* but as an *action*. Nietzsche contrasts the activity of critique with revenge, grudge or *ressentiment*....Critique is not a re-action of *re-sentiment* but the active expression of an active mode of existence; attack and not revenge, the natural aggression of a way of being, the divine wickedness...

Deleuze (1983:2-3) [Emphasis and spelling in the original.]⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Gratitude is extended towards an anonymous professor for his comforting words “the world is such a damned terrible place that it is interesting” during an abyssal intermezzo in the becoming of this text.

⁴⁵ See e.g. Nietzsche (1967/1888: 229-233).

Arriving to the security of a haven is equal to the end of research. In actuality, one has to now and then come to a harbour, or a port, but the port should merely be experienced and understood as a gate or a passage. This calls for the will/care which in this project is also defined as *saudade* or homesickness. But it is a longing beyond place. It is beyond lack, as in Freud or manque as in Lacan. It is also beyond Kristeva's (1995) notions of simultaneously belonging and not belonging. It comes close to Deleuze and Guattari's desire:

Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is rather the *subject* that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject unless there is repression. Desire and its object are one and the same thing: the machine, as a machine of a machine.

Deleuze & Guattari (1972/1984: 26) emphasis in the original.

But it is even beyond desire as subject/object or the 'body without organs'. By *saudade* this text refers to something as a minimal ideal which simultaneously is beyond man, and which principally should be seen as a *knowingly* utopian project. It comes close to something like delonging.

It is attraction to no-where as no-know-ware. Its assertion is that knowledge is merely an invention. This is exactly why the craving for knowing must entail the craving for escape. This Deleuzian line of flight is not a matter of negation except in the constructive, destructive sense of negation. This *saudade* is of affirmative nature. It affirms being as will/care. It is beyond the concept of death but it consents with the death of God. It hails Nietzsche's *superman*. This signifies the impossibility of superman in reality, because of the very nature of being-in-the-world as a social animal. One cannot fulfil the ideal of the vulgar morale. It can just be served as a principle, as an abstract guide or a lighthouse beyond place and time. What it calls for is *intensity* as a practise, which in an abstract (but very real) manner, is dynamics without the movement itself. This is the orexis of the essay. It is the passion and recipe in the same package. It has a will to discuss. This is an explanation for this schizophrenic style. This is an extension of the above (aesth)ethics.

The point with *saudade* is that only by 'delonging', by having a homesickness that is homeless one can be beyond that which is servile of sovereignty. In Nietzschean terms this means that one should not have the slave's logic. There is of course no 'total liberty'. We are bound by the traces in our milieux. Organising is a product of its own history, of its own subjectivity and identity. There is no question about that. However, the main point is that the history should not be seen as a given order or a preconditioning order. The milieux in which

one is being and becoming has no predestination. The journeys have not yet been traveled – fortunately. As long as one does not find a home one is receptive towards everything and one is ready to go anywhere. The ideal is to be in a state of not yet.

What is also brought out into the open as important and as *aletheia*⁴⁶, as in Heidegger (1926/1962) is its central concept of care. *Cura* or *Sorge* was after all for Heidegger one of the most important notions in *Dasein*. This is of course in much controversy and atypical with what much of the literature and organising *cares* for – *security*. The latter is problematised by Heidegger, as a representational problem involving the angst of existence or its unsatisfactory nature. But one does not bring anything into the open without care.

Kristeva (1984/1974:130) elaborating on Kosík, says that care is merely the repression of social practice as objective practice. Kosík (1976:38) claims that the subject of activity, caring and procuring, appears as anonymity and differentiation. In relation to *homo oeconomicus* he states:

Man as care is the pure subjectivity in which the world is submerged...(…)...In order to understand who he is, the subject becomes objectual (*objektální*)*⁴⁷. The subject is no longer mere involvement and activity that forms the world: now he becomes integrated in a transindividual lawlike whole as one of its components. However, this incorporation transforms the subject. He seeks to comprehend himself by abstracting from his subjectivity, and turns into an objectual being. the purely intellectual process of science transforms man into an abstract unit integrated in a scientifically analysable and mathematically describable system. This reflects the *real* metamorphosis of man performed by capitalism. Only under capitalism did economics develop as a *science*. Antiquity and the Middle Ages knew an economy, and a few scattered facts of economics, but not economics as science.

The foremost question of modern science is, 'What is reality and how is it cognizable?' Galileo answered: All that is real that can be described mathematically. To create a *science* of economics which would express the laws of economic phenomena, it was necessary to establish the turning point at which the individual becomes the general, the arbitrary the lawlike. The inception of political economy as a *science* fell in a period when the individual, the arbitrary and the random acquired the form of the necessary and the lawlike, when the totality of social movement arose 'from the conscious will and particular purposes of individuals', when it became *independent* of these purposes, and when 'the social relations of individuals to one another [appeared] as a power over the individuals that [had] become autonomous, whether conceived as a natural force, as chance or in whatever other form'.⁴⁸

Kosík (1976:50) [Emphases and footnotes in the original.]

⁴⁶ Truth, or reality in Greek. Heidegger defines it as bring out into the open. For Heidegger the a- prefix is similar to its connotation in a-topic, as reality reveals itself "out in the open" only as "appearance" along the horizons of being and time.

⁴⁷ * *objektální* is a Czech neologism of Kosík. The German translation renders it as *objekthaft*. –Tr.

Bataille on the other hand claims that any communication is death merely because it is beyond "the self". Bataille (1954/1988: 68) (after having tried it) came forward with the futility of expressing 'Inner Experience'. On the other hand everything that is left out of sense-making or legitimate projections cannot be anything else but non-sense. Against Kristeva and Kosík, subjectivity is not of concern. The subject is unimportant. It is the real and the potential, which is of interest. It is a question of what lies beyond. Research in management attempts sort of calculate how Picasso painted - whereas the virtuosos in management are already on their next assignments.

But both senses of the 'objectual being'⁴⁹ come close to the ideas presented in the discussion. This text cares for care primarily in the Heideggerian sense:

Care as a primordial structural totality lies 'before' every factual 'attitude' and 'situation' of Dasein, and does so existentially a priori; this means that it always lies *in* them.

Heidegger (1962/1926:238).

Sorge has sorrow built within the architecture of the word. It is as if it would care about its own destiny. Caring about not being able to 'totally' take care. In other words one could describe it as taking care in an insecure fashion, that is knowingly insecure, having limits, being limited and liminal. It relates to Heideggerian thinking with anxiety also playing a major part in his magnum opus *Being and Time*. One can perhaps in some sense relate it to the tragic nature of being, not the least because Heidegger was a Grecophile. But *Cura* actually comes from a Roman fable:

*Cura cum fluvium transiret, vidit cretosum lutum
sustulitque cogitabunda atque coepit fingere.
dum deliberat quid iam fecisset, Jovis intervenit.
rogat eum Cura ut det illi spiritum, et facile imperat.*

⁴⁸ Karl Marx *Grundrisse*, New York, 1973, pp. 196-97. [Emphasis by Karel Kosík. – Tr.]

⁴⁹ This comes close to Virtanen's (forthcoming) Finnish neologism *hyötynen*, meaning a (small) utile being. Virtanen has derived it from *hyöty* = utility + the suffix *-nen* = small. The suffix also refers to a person, because it is the most common suffix in Finnish surnames as in e.g. Virtanen per se which means a small stream = *virta*. The latter term is extremely Nietzschean because of the closeness to Finnish 'hyönteinen' id est insect.

*cui cum vellet Cura nomen ex sese ipsa imponere,
 Jovis prohibuit suumque nomen ei dandum esse dicitat.
 dum Cura et Jovis disceptant, Tellus surrexit simul
 suumque nomen esse volt cui corpus praebuerit suum.
 sumpserunt Saturnum iudicem, is sic aecus iudicat:
 'tu Jovis quia spiritum dedisti, in morte spiritum,
 tuque Tellus, quia dedisti corpus, corpus recipito,
 Cura eum quia prima finxit, teneat quamdiu vixerit.
 sed quae nunc de nomine eius vobis controversia est,
 homo vocetur, quia videtur esse factus ex humo.'*

'Once when Cura was crossing a river, she saw some clay; she thoughtfully took up a piece and began to shape it. While she was meditating on what she had made, Jupiter came by. Cura asked him to give it spirit, and this he gladly granted. But when she wanted her name to be bestowed upon it, he forbade this, and demanded that it be given his name instead. While Cura and Jupiter were disputing, Earth arose and desired that her own name be conferred to the creature, since she had furnished it with part of her body. They asked Saturn to be their arbiter, and he made the following decision, which seemed to be a just one: 'Since you, Jupiter, have given its spirit, you shall receive that spirit at its death; and since you, Earth, have given it its body, you shall receive its body. But since Cura first shaped this creature, she shall possess it as long as it lives. And because there is now a dispute among you as to its name, let it be called '*homo*', for it is made out of *humus*'⁵⁰ Heidegger (1962/1926:242).

Now, please notice, that as posited earlier, this project is not about the subject, and especially not about the subject turned towards herself. Above all this text has nothing to do with conscience as something related with being-guilty in the Heideggerian sense. Care, in this work, is something that is basically neutral. It is kin with terms like intuition and *élan vitale*. Care is foremost closely knit with Nietzsche's notion of will to power, or the will to be able. That is why this text prefers to use the term *saudade* instead of either will or care in order to avoid the Heideggerian connotation of the self and the Nietzschean connotation to power, the latter mainly because *saudade* may have a will, but that will may seek something different from power. Seeking love, for instance, although it may entail power, does not necessarily have anything to do with it.

⁵⁰ The original text in Latin Heidegger found in Burdach (1923): "Faust und die Sorge". In *Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*. Vol I pp.1. According to Heidegger, *ibid.* 492n he calls it a "pre-ontological illustration of the Interpretation of Dasein as care... the fable of Cura (which has come to us as No. 220 of the fables of Hygiunus) was taken over from Herder by Goethe and worked up for the second part of his *Faust*. Cf. especially pp. 40 ff. The text given above is taken from F. Böhler (*Rheinisches Museum*, vol 41, 1886, p. 5); the translation is from Burdach, *ibid.*, pp. 41 ff." See also the translators' Macquarrie and Robinson note, *ibid.* 283-284 regarding the originals and their translation. The English translation is also slightly amended by the author.

In a similar fashion in organising saudade is in itself free of value. It is the contingent ethics that lie behind its intensity that define it when it is actualised. More precisely it is the local milieux in which the ethics are superjected and choosen, where the eventual saudade becomes actualised upon production. In an environment where precision is at premium, organising has a strong saudade towards form. In an environment attracted towards production in terms of quantity saudade is focused towards production and performance. In milieux attracted to creation and freedom, saudade is turned towards search and the other. 'The other' signifying difference, as not-yet-experienced and most of all as not-knowledge. This brings us to the PROSSPERous forms of organising: PROduction, Structure, Search and PERformance⁵¹. (See also Article II.)

Saudade has an eternal return, but within the will/care there are coexistent desires that love and hate each other. Nevertheless they are omnipresent and function simultaneously. The desires function as assemblages, as desiring-machines of an abstract nature. They could thus be called abstract machines⁵². They are titled abstract machines because they are not machines in the conventional sense of a machine. They are not visible or tangible. They are just interbeing on a plane of immanence. Yet they are machinic in the sense that they are constantly present and active. These assemblages are always amidst other assemblages. And there are always machines upon machines upon machines. At the university, for instance, there are machines such as the knowing-machine, the organising-machine, the researching-machine, the educating-machine, the departmentalising-machine, the sociologicalising-machine, the textualising-machine...

No matter what is mapped the desiring-machines are immanent and inherent. Their forces depend on their internal qualities and their interrelationships in the particular area of scrutiny. Other assemblages do not operate at the level of immanence but may affect and change the qualities of the desiring-machines at the local, specific plane. The local milieu of any particular knowing, organising, or researching constitutes the basic contours or the plateau for the contextual rhizomes. It demonstrates the time and space as interbeingness.

There are four different desiring-machines in organising itself with different attractions. There is a *prological* machine, whose desire is pro-something, working out of distance towards

⁵¹ PROPER indicates what our era is about – anchoring itself in historicity and/or proper forms (restricted). Prosper (search included) is a question of durations and creation.

⁵² The terms 'desiring-machine' and 'abstract machine' that are used here escape the definitions given by Deleuze&Guattari. See for instance (1984:1-42) and (1988:510-514).

producing-something without necessarily knowing the whats, whens and hows of production. It is however by no means the same thing as rhizomes of production. This abstract assemblage is pro-something. It actually wants to be able to as a plan(e). Prology is man who wants to fly, hesitating, knowing of all previous lines and maps, knowing it is in-between-lines. Anteceding, abstractly present and preceding lines all in mind it draws intensities of a desire to lead forward *producere* (Latin = to lead forward, tow). It wishes to pull away to fill a void. It works of its attraction to production. It works always out of a distance, as if there were a carrot on a stick it cannot ever attain. It leans towards tomorrow and tomorrow tends to have a weakness to escape. Ideally it is like an arrow or a multiplicity of arrows that do not want to find targets but as weak sketches. The milieu of the prological abstract machine is in the center of producing. It is the intermezzo of the intermezzo.

On the other hand there is a *synological*⁵³ desiring-machine which is attracted to completion, decisions, performance and closure. It has a death wish of sorts. It prefers nouns to verbs. It likes cutting off and acts as a multitude of off-buttons. The synological machine wants to halt. It seeks answers. It is easily seduced by local circumstances. It has a weakness toward pressure. In this manner it could be seen as guilt and bad consciousness, but it is also a question of going onto new journeys and new crises. The synological machine is the one that ultimately brings things into the open. Completion and achieving synolon by no means actually implies that something dies. Becoming-visible, becoming-tangible, becoming-textual is rather, strangely enough the major means of anything becoming talkative. The so called death of whatever enterprise fosters discussion. Every death becomes a multitude of births. In achieving synolon, this abstract machine has made decisions-in-between-decisions.

Every decision, as its original Latin meaning *decidere* (to cut off) implies, has left out many lines that have been drawn before the synological machine has abstractly signed off the drawings of a particular enterprise. Abstractly, that is, because the drawings nevertheless are still a part of that very same enterprise no matter the force of shredders and the amounts of scissors employed. That is the principle of asignyfyng rupture. And, and, and, when the enterprise becomes visible and talkative it discusses, is shaken apart, Latin *discutere* being derived from *dis-* (apart) + *quatere* (shake). In this manner synolon is just new beginnings, another interbeingness. Much of what once was cut off is now revealed and beyond. And beyond there are durations that co-exist without coming out into the light.

⁵³ Derived from Greek *synolon* which according to Heidegger (1995/1935-6:85) is where *morfe* (form) and *hyle* (matter) are united.

On another level we have an *archeological* machine that desires structure. It is attracted to forms, building and combining. This machine has a weakness toward organising per se. It wants to play with other machines. It desires legitimation through reterritorialisations of representations and translations. The archeological abstract machine likes to put things into places, but just by skissing, molding, forming. It is fond of relations and compositions. The lines drawn by other machines are intervened by its urge to shape them somehow. This does not mean predetermined structures or logics. It re-cognizes, constantly re-cognizing in-between. Although all the lines that are drawn are subject to an interplay with the constructions of the archeological machine all its compositions are highly dependable on its local, contextual relations, the interbeing intercrossings of rhizomes.

The *nomadological* abstract machine is the mechanism of search. This machine works out of a longing for difference and the other. If one would label the entire conceptualisation a nomadic project, this is where the core of nomadism rests. It means that the nomadological machine is inclined to become restless. It is devoted to motion, it is attracted to the notion of interbeingness more than anything else. It wants to search over and over again constantly re-searching. This desiring-machine is the primus inter pares architectural mechanism of researching. It likes to take distance, distance to what is already mapped, but it lives out of the notion of nothing ever being mapped completely - thinking also of Mandelbrot (1977).

First of all anyhow this machine is friends with Nietzsche. It is related to rebelliousness, but only in an active, creative manner. It lives out of polyphony and is nourished by conflicts and questions that arise when its lines intersect other mechanisms. Nomadology lives in symbiosis with ambiguity and insecurity. This machine questions. With its desire for “the other”, it evidently works well together with the other machines, providing them with novel fabric. The nomadological machine never willing to stop, is constantly looking for new lines before the synological machine has a chance of putting an abstract end to the enterprise like this. And this, and this⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Article 4 (*Organizational texts lost and found*) has found a point at the end, which the authorities never have consented with. The symbol did not exist after having accepted the final proofs of the article.

2. Researching Organising - Organising Researching

Beyond security

The lines above attempting at describing the will to be able to merely map the will in a utopian manner by itself. With its principle of infinite connectedness it is innumerable connected to economic rationality and its techniques. In our contexts of organising and researching, intersections with other machines alter the interrelationships of the desiring-machines, and their intensities change. These machines are connected to the absurd utilitarian rhizome. It is absurd because it is unable to operate by itself in the sense of a desiring machine with attraction to a milieu or for instance the organising-machine, that has a distinct will to organise. The utilitarian rhizome, craves utility, but utility is actually something *too abstract* to even be thought of without pataphysics⁵⁵. Utility seeks security which per se is out of this world as the Romans already knew it as *secura* derived from *sine cura*, meaning without cure or care. Security defies the most minor concepts of the will to be able to. As it defies insecurity, it simultaneously defies the principle of infinite connectedness and interbeingness. This is particularly interesting as the managing rhizome - it's kin - when drawn together with rhizomes of knowing actually draws lines of bounded rationality, ambiguity and imperfection. Lines when crossing lines of utility are immediately deterritorialized. What the crossing of these lines together with lines of management produce are new lines of deception. Longing for vulgar utility produces reactive forces. The slaves of utility disguised as masters of sorts distance themselves from nomadologies. New lines are defied in the name of production, structure and synolon. Without nomadology, however, the will to be able cannot be accomplished. Since reactive forces prevail over active forces, they triumph without forming a greater force (but seldom when nomadology is not totally isolated). They bear resentment, bad consciousness and ascetic ideals in their milieux. Their mechanisms are consequently; displacement; alteration of direction; and at its worst asceticism – in the sense of a will to nothingness.

Asceticism, which basically (*asketikos*) means work, is of course a complex notion. In ancient Greece it meant exercise, practice even curiously (in a devoted manner). It meant also a skilful art of the practise especially athletics but could also be connected to the practise of philosophy. What it on the other hand also curiously enough meant was leaving oneself so to say outside the exercise. It is this last connotation in which the term is used in this piece of work.

⁵⁵ The term comes from Alfred Jarry meaning metaphysics of the absurd. See also Baudrillard (1995/1992).

Rhizomes of fear intersect rhizomes of pain, producing a desire for painlessness. The concepts employed are fictive. And the will to be able to is subsequently negated. The paradox of the above mapping is that by isolating the nomadological desire, which in fact lives out of critique and negation through distancing, the reactive forces stand victorious⁵⁶.

Utility, when coming across guilt also produces work for work's sake. Combined with rhizomes of normativity, what is produced no longer works out of distance. Prology on this map is no longer reaching out, but rather craving in. Synolons are easily drawn together with rhizomes of reproduction and forgeries. The desire for structure without the interaction of nomadology loses its joy of combining, shaping, forming. Even synolon no longer possesses its reserve of ruptures, since the utilitarian rhizome together with the time rhizome (in terms of a time attracted to escape) and the decision-making rhizome (in its limited sense of making decisions for decisions' sake) work from a milieu that is attracted to ever fewer and faster decisions.

Being utile is to work for something's sake. That means working with a belonging. It signifies working with somebody, buddy or bodies. And it usually is not even that simple. It is signing oneself into existing systems. It is closely related to being below ironically often meaning to simultaneously reaching for the above. Going with or going beneath is however not the core message of 'creating new knowledge'. Further if there is no saudade in researching under whatever circumstances it is like not making a revolution because it happens to rain.

Under these circumstances the affirmative will to be able to, or the saudade, rarely comes into the open. It obviously is still immanent as well as the wills to researching and organising. They exist in minor forms - but the apparatus of the rhizome of utility and its reactionary allies simply draw lines that leave too little space for motion for nomadism. Rhizomes of subjection, rhizomes of pastoralisation, rhizomes of punitive societies further add to the multitude of reactive and passive territorializations⁵⁷.

Another line that draws negation is the rhizome of production which lacks the desire of reaching out into the distance of the prological machine. The rhizome of production together with the rhizome of finiteness draw maps that lack interbeingness. The rhizome of production

⁵⁶ This section is partly based on ideas taken from Deleuze(1983). The Bataillan idea of deceit comes from Piironen (1999).

⁵⁷ See also Foucault (1983).

and the rhizome of signature desire anything but intermezzo. Interbeingness, interludes, intermezzo, is alien to production, as actualised production. In this sense the rhizome of production intercrosses willingly with the absurd rhizome of security. Security instead wants to be drawn with rhizomes of fairy tales and rhizomes of bibles. Security desires rhizomes of formality, rhizomes of home, and rhizomes of bourgeoisie with all its interconnected rhizomes of thrift, industriousness, regularity and moderation. Rhizomes that are far away from saudade. Evidently a good bit apart from the will to researching.

Insecurity is nevertheless the *wesen* of life and organising. The above means that one comes to interludes of organising and researching, being simultaneously amidst both. With the principle of problematisation, researching is equal to organising and organising is equal to researching. They are interwoven and interbeing. This involves the Deleuzian conceptualisation of the equal nature of the potential and the real as long as it in Derridean (2000) terms is in the state of *as perhaps*. One could also describe this minimalistic ethos as (in opposition to conditionalis or pre-conditionalis) as professing the unconditional. It is not limited nor even liminal.⁵⁸ It is evidently a question about discussion⁵⁹ beyond (pa)thetical⁶⁰ confirmation⁶¹. Without the will to discuss or with a will to know, with knowledge as certainty or truth, knowledge resembles religion. Problematising, beyond a pre-given, or coming-at-a metaphysics is naturally being attracted to questions, with a nomadic attitude towards answers. The contemporary resembles paparazzi journalism which waits in the bushes to get a glimpse of something nobody has seen. The difference is that paparazzis know where to look for.

One of the voids in historical accounts, anthologies, and reviews of literature in organising is ignorance of Alfred North Whitehead's *Process and Reality* (1929) which is an essay of an Organic Philosophy.⁶² He discusses the transfusion of science and religion which goes back to the English translation of Bacon's *Novum Organum*:

⁵⁸ For an example of liminal thought in organising see Gherardi (1997).

⁵⁹ Discutere is derived from Latin dis + cutere, to shake apart. It follows the principle of problematisation and is beyond such concepts as consensus and conclusion.

⁶⁰ Pathos meant of course passion in ancient Greece, but here the text refers to its modern connotations of kitsch. For a discussion on the thetical see Derrida (1983).

⁶¹ **confirm** ...fr. *com-* + *firmare* to make firm...or firmer : STRENGTHEN **2** : to give approval to : RATIFY **3** : to administer the rite of confirmation to **4** : to give new assurance of the validity of : remove doubt about by authoritative act or indisputable fact **5** : ASSERT, MAINTAIN (Webster's 1977). This Nietzschean text obviously also relates the term to its religious connotation.

⁶² There was also an intensive debate regarding the organism metaphor in the 19th century and in the beginning of the 20th century. Actually some authors said the organism metaphor had become worn out. Oddly enough there are hardly no signs of these discussions within management and organisation. E.g. Worms *Organisme et Société* (1896) reviewed by Ward (1897); Lloyd (1901:577) "The organic theory of society is entertained by nearly every serious thinker of the present time."; and Bernard (1911: 839-40) "The primary motives or purposes of a theory or a movement frequently do not appear

Only let the human race recover that right over nature which belongs to it by divine request, and let power be given it; the exercise thereof will be governed by sound reason and true religion.

Op. Cit as cited in von Wright, 1986 p. 66.

Bacon's famous words from 1597 'knowledge is power' are somewhat unprecisely translated. He stated de facto: *Ipsa scientia potestas est*, which directly means science *itself* is (either still according to Pomay, 1768) power, powerful, authority/authoritarian, a force, capacity, or potentiality. Von Wright (1986:55-67) argues that with Bacon and Descartes' (1637) *Discours de la méthode*, science becomes an instrument for the exercise of power. But principally it signifies that science becomes a servant of power, and in first place it was to serve the power of religion and the Judeo-Christian tradition, which suited Bacon's *real* science that was based on hard work. A major reason for the unity of the church and the truth of science was obviously a monotheistic tradition which, at the time suited the interests of the church in falsifying all kinds of pagan and magic rites, which still were quite common at the time.⁶³ In the same era utopian literature became popular, with Plato's *Republic* as their predecessor.⁶⁴ The worldview back in the 16th century however was still mechanical, rather than organic. The most mechanical of all was Bacon's *The New Atlantis* (1629) in which (juxtaposed with philosophers in Plato's work) scientists are in charge. Bacon describes a scientific organisation in which mother nature is tamed in such a way that humans will make mechanical copies of themselves, and imitate both birds and fishes. Bacon thus predicted that technology would provide humans with robots, airplanes and submarines. But on the other hand he was a managerialist as well.

Whitehead, instead, speaks for a creative philosophy emphasising the process, coming close to contemporary views on organising. At the time, of course, Whitehead owed much to Bergson, whose concept of duration is also of relevance to organising. Bergson's concept (*durée*) invites us naturally to the vicinity of the conceptualisation of 'the interbeing' as a central notion in organising as well as researching in this essay. Duration basically means experience and in an event it folds upon itself or is contracted and this takes place through

in its argumentative or propaganda literature[...] This notably has been the case with the organismic theories." (On the other hand the times were of course heavily marked by the recent findings of Darwin and the subsequent emergence of social darwinism.)

⁶³ It is notable that many 'great thinkers' have for instance been interested in alchemy e.g Goethe, Strindberg and even Newton.

⁶⁴ The most famous one is Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516) although Machiavelli's *Prince* also can be viewed as belonging to the realm of utopian literature. Both works aim at a hierarchical society. Whereas Tommaso Campanella's *Civitas Solis* resembles a socialist perspective. Later of course literature of the utopian kind is of the latter nature from the late 18th century onwards e.g. Rousseau,

intensity. According to Deleuze (1966/1988:92) it is intensity that gives experience its quality. It is the intensity of the *saudade* that gives it difference.

Now returning to *saudade*, to explicate it in a different manner what it ideally means in terms of researching is that if it wants to belong to historybooks, it wants to belong to yesterday. That is why an intense duration is not ready to settle down. What conventional organising does is asks for constant reassessment and re-accountability. This is more than the case in researching. Organising researching 'as such' is having to report on progress in a fashion that makes it almost the opposite of the will to know, the will to look for something that has not yet already been found. Upon account the research, the being and becoming, the going halts and is already leaping behind that which at least principally should be moving on.

There is a lot of thinking along these lines e.g. Agamben (1999) and Vähämäki (2003). Here similar ideas are merely pictured in brief and they are originating from Deleuze (1991). What accountability belongs to is the common or the banale. This is what theorising in organising, especially management does not understand. The *virtuoso* cannot be copied because he is escaping. Literature in management attempts to make excellence into the common. That just does not work. The common is for copying. That what is truly different is in intensity beyond grasp as such. In this sense intensity is aceticism in its old form. Contemporary work cannot be about devotion in the sense that devotion is beyond the ordinary. This brings us to the vicinity of cathedrals and churches.

Along this line of thought texts of a thetic character, philosophies, theories and practises alike want to be on the Gods' playgrounds. That is a kindergarten for adults only. It is a school for slaves dressed as masters. Such textuality is for sheep in sheep's clothes. These fine professionals are nothing but living dead angels. Not do they only want to evangelise their novel inventions as in the etymological sense of *profiteo*, they also tend to want to make *profit* as an ascetic supplement of their 'knowledge'. There is no lust for adventure, serendipitous journeying, joy of life. Knowledge as truth is suicide and an absurd will at eternity in different disguises.

Now this text is aggressive and exaggerative, but such is the nature of destruction. This is negation that is not reactive but destructive in a creative sense and as such constructive. Being an 'immoralist and an annihilator *par excellence*' is what the vulgar morale calls for. In *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche states:

Paine, Owen, Proudhon, Kropotkin, Bakunin and of course Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao to mention

”And whoever wants to be a creator in good and evil, must first be an annihilator and break values. Thus the highest evil belongs to the greatest goodness: but this is-being creative.”...(...) ... I obey my Dionysian nature which does not know how to separate doing No from saying Yes. I am the first immoralist: that makes me the annihilator *par excellence*.

Op cit p. 327. [Emphasis in the original].

The same is said by the same author in other words in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*:

Look at these good and the just! What do they hate the most? The one who brakes their tables of values, the destroyer, the criminal! But it is precisely he, who is the creative one.

Look at these believers where ever they might be! Who do they hate the most? The one who breaks there believes into pieces, the destroyer, the criminal. But it is exactly he who is creative.

Nietzsche (1883-92/1989:40).

The above is of course the main source of inspiration for both Deleuze and Derrida, whether or not they admit it. When accepting Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1988) notion of interbeingness the apparent geopoliticalisation of thought is advancing from the middle. This does not mean a given locus of a centre. It is a question of being among different complexities, or folds⁶⁵ that call for connections and conjugations. Simultaneously it is to an extended extent a question of both in- se-curity and a-ascetism turned against themselves (in the modern sense of ascetism. In ancient times askesis was a way of life which for a friend of wisdom meant to live for the friendship of knowledge, going through the distress of seeing the sun. Above all it is a question of curiosity, creativity and joy.

But to stand in the midst of this *rerum concordia discors*⁶⁶ and the whole marvellous uncertainty and ambiguity of being and *not to question*, not to tremble with the desire and lust to ask, not even hate the one who questions, maybe even bluntly being amused by him - that is what I experience as despicable.

Nietzsche (1977/1882:17) emphasis in the original.

but a few. For a wider discussion on utopistic literature see Lundwall (1973) and (1977).

⁶⁵ Com-plex means actually fold together, derived from (com+ plectere in Latin). Swedish has an even better term *invecklad* meaning folded in (itself), in + vecklad = folded. This sense has also been used by Thomas Bay e.g. (1998:16 and 20). The oeuvre, which to a great extent follows the lines of this text, is the first Deleuzian work within this area of ours and draws heavily on etymology.

⁶⁶ The confusive harmony of things.

Towards destruction and reconstruction of organising

Even if it's true that, as it is usually understood, a man of action can't be a human entirety, human entirety nonetheless retains the possibility of acting. Provided, however that such action is reduced to appropriately human (or reasonable) principles and ends. Human entirety can't be transcended (that is, subdued) by action, since it would lose its totality. Nor can it transcend action (submit it to its ends), since in this way it would define itself as a motive and would enter into and be annihilated by the mechanism of motivation. It's important to distinguish between the world of motives on the one hand, that is, things making sense (rational), and the (senseless) world of non-sense on the other. Each of us sometimes belongs to one, sometimes to the other. We can consciously and clearly distinguish what is connected only in ignorance. Reason for me is limited only in itself. If we act, we stray outside the motivation of equity and a rational order of acts. Between the two worlds only a single relationship is possible: action has to be rationally limited by a principle of freedom.

Georges Bataille (1945/1994: xxxiii-xxxiv).

The above is from Bataille's introduction to his work on Nietzsche. Bataille's cry for freedom is a call for a creative philosophy along the lines of Deleuze and Guattari as well as Foucault's latest works. What Bataille is on the other hand criticising is both political economy and economics. He speaks for a general economy beyond limits where *le parte maudite* (often translated as the accursed share) is what oeconomy tries to grasp in absurd manners. Le parte maudite nevertheless is beyond cages, matrixes and boxes of any kind.

As a projection of the above, that is, given one affirms the ideal of problematisation as well as interbeingness, in-security, and saudade, as the minimal tectonic bases in thought, some of the so called fundamental questions in the literature in organising are posited in a quite different manner. This leads to a real potential of reconceptualising this fragmented field by unfolding some of the so called complexities to attain different conjugations. What is interesting is that some 'classical' organisational concepts nevertheless prevail. The above principles are in line with e.g. Chester Barnard's (1938) statement, that the more complex the problem is the less one can control it.⁶⁷ James March and Herbert Simon (1958:4) note that

'a biological analogy is apt' and continue "it is a picture of a choosing, decision-making, problem-solving organism that can do only one or a few things at a time, and that can attend to only a small part of the information recorded in its memory and presented by the environment." (Ibid:11).

⁶⁷ What is interesting is that Barnard in his classic notes that "I am under the impression that in a general way both the form of expression and the concepts stated [regarding decision making] were derived from or influenced by A. N. Whitehead's *Process and Reality*." Reprinted in Koontz and O'Donnell (1964: 153f).

The concept of 'uncertainty avoidance' as a prime mechanism, as presented by Richard Cyert and James March (1963) is also in line with the nature of problematisation of this essay. Further the 'garbage can' model of organisational choice by Michael Cohen, James March and Johan Olsen (1972) also designs similar lines with this treatment. It describes organisations as organised anarchies⁶⁸ and focuses on timing and simultaneity of critical factors. Karl Weick (1969/1979) was one of the first to stress the notion of the process in organising. He introduced that one should talk about organising and not about organisation, because of the latter term's static nature. A rarely mentioned classic thinker in organisation who studied both dynamics of organising as well as the situational nature of organising was Mary Parker Follett (1942) and (1949). David Silverman (1970) has also pinpointed the importance of action. Later he has also actually said (1989) that as one defines it also immediately disappears. All the above conceptualisations can to a certain extent be seen as notions of interbeingness and insecurity. Burns and Stalker (1962) and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) are the ones who usually get the credit regarding organic views and contingency, which have sort of been reinvented in the 80's by Pettigrew e.g (1985). Whereas it is argued that Morgan (1986)⁶⁹ has reinvented Follett. This repetitive and reinventive nature of theories in management and organisation is very typical for the field. It took 200 years for Chen (1995) to repeat Carl von Clausewitz, a bit less for Ansoff (1965) to reinvent von Bülow and 2000 years for Michael Porter (1980) to reinvent Sun-Tzu. But this constant reinvention has in recent years been marked by renaming in management science. Groups have become teams, trademarks have become brands, scientific management has become total quality management. The list is endless.

Perhaps one of the explanans for our current trend is that managers actually are aware of the process. Obviously organisation is what management is about, but it does not mean one has to be obsessed with order and rationality while defining and identifying. This political awareness is however more concerned about image than intensity in knowing. Knowledge-intensity, of course being one of these novel views on organising. As raised by Burrell (1996b) *charisma* is the only mystical/religious notion that exists in the literature in management and organisation. This 'divine gift' is of course in the eyes of the beholder. One way for a

⁶⁸ Although this term has actually been presented at least by Röpke (1936).

⁶⁹ Morgan's famous *Images of Organization* has been widely recognised within the literature of organising. It in some peculiar way demonstrates the state-of-the-art. The book is full of flaws. An entire section *Op cit.* (199-232) is devoted to the *unconscious*, which supposedly in line with men like Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung, who are both widely referred to, is usually called the *subconscious*. This remains intact in the second edition. The new edition (1997) also recognises chaos theory with the butterfly effect coming with winds from China to Texas. Bengali Gulf-streams! (Lorenz' original referred to Brazil...) (No further direct criticism of 'literature' will follow.)

manager to attain or maintain such an image is to constantly appear to either introduce novel ideas or at least to keep up with what is fashionable within management⁷⁰.

What is argued for here is that the goodness and godness of management and organisation leads to religious spheres of utopian character that are also atopic in nature. Static inventions lead to superjection of ethics which leads to the replacability of organisation with knowledge and religion. Goodness can in a similar fashion be substituted by the goods of the production of organising, given the production has been taking place according to the true, known forms of organisation in accordance with management. The prime virtue of management as noted by Claes Gustafsson (1996) is efficiency in his funny "Why is the good good?" According to Gustafsson even children have to play in an efficient manner...

Now the above sounds very negative. But it is not. What makes the difference is understanding the notion of the superjection of ethics upon man. Some organised subjects might of course be seen as direct subjects of a given code, or ethics. This is relative to the creative capacity of the social subject. This text is also aware of the fact that the problem of subjectivation (and oppression) is extremely relevant when seen from a hierarchical perspective, especially regarding such contexts as the third world. However, and also criticising pre-given (more or less marxist) hierarchies regarding being, this text states in line with Foucauldian e.g. (1985) and Deleuzian e.g. (1968) narratives that the subject/collective can create its own identity beyond predestined iron collars of representation. If one buys into the conceptualisation of ethics as superjection, as an umbrella (parasole), Deleuze and Guattari: 1993/1991:206-224)⁷¹ with the possibility of connectedness as well as with the acceptance of the sheer existence of lines of flight for any organising, subjectivation no longer is the subject. Simultaneously as a line of flight is identified (or organised as such) it obviously is always subject to order. The main issue with superjection is nonetheless, that ethics is of a (though to an extent constituted by the local milieu) creative character. What this desires to express is that organising always has the potential of escaping the preconditioning of sovereignty.

The concepts of *sovereignty* and of *constituent power*, which are the core of our political tradition, have to be abandoned or at least, to be thought all over again. They mark, in fact, the point of indifference between right and violence, nature and *logos*, proper and improper, and as such they do not designate an attribute or an organ [...] they designate rather, their original structure. Sovereignty is the idea of an undecidable nexus between the living and language – a nexus that necessarily takes the

⁷⁰ For "Organising as Fashion" see e.g. Borgert (1992).

⁷¹ The original idea of the sunshade comes from Lawrence Op. cit. 208.

paradoxical form of a decision regarding the state of exception (Schmitt) or *ban* (Nancy) in which the law (language relates to the living by withdrawing from it, by a-*bandoning* to it its own violence and its own unrelatedness. Sacred life – the life that is abandoned by the law in the state of exception – is the mute carrier of sovereignty, the real *sovereign subject*.

Agamben (1992:11-112 [Emphasis in the original]).

Organising is of course about making decisions. But as already Barnard (1938/1964:153) stated, a part of decision-making is *not* to make a decision. The style of Barnard's text is not quite common in the literature in organising today:

Finally, the decision may be not to decide. This is a most frequent decision, and from some points of view probably the most important. For every alert executive continually raises in his own mind questions for determination. As a result of his consideration he may determine that the question is not pertinent. He may determine that it is not now pertinent. He may determine that it is pertinent now but that there are lacking adequate data upon which to base a final decision. He may determine that the question is pertinent, can be decided, will not be decided except by himself, and yet it would be better that it be not decided because his competence is insufficient.

Why organising nevertheless prefers decisions to insecurity and tends to stick to given codes of conduct is attempted to explain in the following.

3. Organising, oeconomy and politics

The whole universe is change, and life itself is but what you deem it.

Marcus Aurelius

'There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.'

William Shakespeare [Hamlet (Act II Scene 2)]

Current transgressions

Organising today, however, can be defined as house holding both in its public as well as in its private sense. That what once was called economics has gone beyond its conventional definitions. It is affecting society not merely more profoundly than ever, it also occurs in constantly novel forms. The economy and politics cannot be separated from each other. This was already realised by Karl Marx in terms of 'general intellect'. In contemporary thinking this difficult distinction is addressed by e.g. Agamben (1999) and Marazzi (2003). What the above, if such an ignorant generalisation is allowed, try to indicate, is that public affairs, work, private life and being are hard to distinguish from each other. The above thinkers vaguely follow Nietzschean lines of thought in a separation from transcendence. Nevertheless this by no means that any of the above should be related to 'postmodern' philosophy in terms of relativistic thinking.

What is common to the thinkers mentioned in the previous paragraph is that none of them refer to the area of organisation as a unifying discipline. On the contrary when organisation is mentioned it is used in a pejorative sense. Usually, that is, in the cases when it is mentioned at all, e.g. Deleuze and Guattari (1992/1988) it is described as something static, or as something that makes-static, or non-creative or against-life.⁷²

Today, however, with the fall of Eastern-Europe, while marxists and socialists have bought into the market economy, the situation is different from the times of let us say Foucault or Deleuze. There is no side to be taken in the sense of being either left or right or wrong. In this sense students in organisation are in a privileged position now. Besides, there is nothing bad or evil about organising per se. Organising is non-good if one assumes that the ethics guiding

⁷² Because of the fact that the thinkers mentioned are some of the most influential intellectuals of the twentieth century it is a plausible explanation for the fact that many so called 'intellectuals' within the area of management and organisation tend to have a negative attitude towards their own discipline. Especially followers of the Habermasian thinking of the Frankfurt School have a tendency to be critical towards what they are involved in themselves. This goes for Marxists, socialists, post-socialists and post-Marxists alike. Management and organisation with the 'power/knowledge' that goes with it is usually illustrated as something more or less bad or evil.

organising are of questionable moral nature. This of course involves that one divides the world according to yes and no.

This essay has desires of avoiding such dialectics, although it also admits to the impossibility of a full practical avoidance of moral judgement. It is argued that no matter the intentions of whatever texts, there are always positionings. That is *politics*. But it is politics 'as such', when politics has been expressed and communicated. Politics 'as perhaps' is the politics of this work. Politics that has not yet come. This is what Derrida (2000) would call 'politics of the unconditional (resistance)'. Such a resistance has nothing to do with given ethics. The 'as perhaps' is merely the state-of-mind of a will towards freedom.

On the other hand politics is not, as generally defined, about taking parties. Politics is rather about positions, roles and relationships. No matter how unpolitical agents or agencies are, they can always be placed in accordance with (political) order. Along the same line of thought that very same collective has an oeconomy by having an accountable arrangement. This does not mean that the beings and becomings of collectives would have directly preconditioned politics or oeconomies. Not to mention that they would be subjected to a given moral standard or ethics. What politics and economics in actuality to do is to capture everything as if *carpe diem* would be possible. This a-topic seizing of the day is the main problem with theorising in social sciences today. The politics/economics of theorising is to draw borders, or matrixes, or arrows. This becomes more evident if we think about the constant, current, re-conceptualisation of markets in modern capitalism.

This text, however, defies ethics beyond minimalism. The main political/oeconomical argument here is that ordering is something unavoidable in a social world. Writing, is as far as we know from Mesopotamia and ancient Egypt, was invented at least partially to serve the purposes of accounting Benoit et al (1992). According to Ezzamel and Hoskin (2002), elaborating on the former together with works of Foucault, especially (1984a) and (1984b) and Derrida, especially (1976) claim that writing has been developed as a supplement to accounting. If one realises this relationship, one may get a primary understanding for the virtualities of the marriage between oeconomics and organising. Organising, if we believe Weick (1989) or Gioia (1991) is about sense-making and sense-giving. Put in other words this means identifying and legitimising. Given that organising is collective interaction it means that what is identified must make sense. In order for it to be legitimised it must also give sense. In another lingo it means it has to be accountable. Since it also is a question of a social context it cannot have any significance without communication. Organising cannot take place without textuality.

In accordance with the above Reigning in Babylon

for fifty-five years some time in the twenty-third century before Christ. Hammurabi was...an able administrator. [...]The code of Hammurabi gives sharpness of definition to many features [about Babylon] which otherwise would be vague. These are, however, the *economic*, civil and domestic relations only.

Vincent (1904:738,741). Emphasis added.

The Law of Hammurabi in a sense unites economy with politics. Further as a law, in the broad sense of law as ordering and legitimising as well as being a form of friendship⁷³ comes close to what organising entails. The above illustrates that ideas regarding organising can be traced even further back than to the vicinities of ancient Athens and Rome. The point though is not to look for origins. The above is merely an interlude to what the symphony of economy and politics partly is about. In ancient Greece the private and the public were separate spheres. The orchestration thus involves both the private and public. Now, if we are to believe contemporary literary theory, e.g. Sollers (1983) there is unclarity regarding subject, object, and text. In musical terms it is difficult to distinguish who or what is conducting a musical performance. Is it the conductor, the orchestra, the music itself, the audience or the composer?⁷⁴

Organising as performance

These are questions that have recently been addressed in literature in organising e.g. Czarniawska (1997), Guillet de Monthoux (1999), Kirkeby (2000) and Sevón (2002). Although the above have vaying articulations they all feature definitions of organising in relation to performance.⁷⁵ Aesthetics in general, cf. Guillet de Monthoux (1993), Gagliardi (1990), literature e.g. Czarniawska-Joerges and Guillet de Monthoux (Eds.1994) Czarniawska (1997), and Salzer (1999) but especially theatre e.g. Jeffcutt, Linstead and Grafton-Small (Eds.1996), Guillet de Monthoux (1996) and Höpfl (1996) has become a quite popular metaphor in organising. Also in opposition to the prevailing production of seriousness of businesses, as argued by Gustafsson (1994), ironic and comical aspects have by no means been forgotten, e.g. Sköldberg (2002), Czarniawska-Joerges and Jacobsson (1995) and Harju

⁷³ On law and friendship see e.g. Alexander Carnera Ljungström (1997)

⁷⁴ Latour (1999) has used the same metaphor, but in a different manner in connection with what can be called the meso-level of analysis.

(2002). The theatre is the most obvious metaphor for organising as it is a collective form of art. At its best, the theatre or the spectacle, is an energetic enterprise where different aspects are combined in a sublime manner. Managers have to be playwrights, directors, stage managers, actors and improvisers at the same time. The theatre as a form of expression, can be viewed as where 'meaning' can be constructed, but as Kirkeby (2000:239-240) notes, it is not something that does not manifest itself but as epiphany. It is simultaneously something that appears at the surface and is also something one has to pay a heavy price for in terms of experience. Phainô, in Greek (Latin *adventus*) means:

to bring to daylight, appear, make visible, make audible, make acknowledgeable, but it also means to shine, and to happen, to call on, to be present. The word "phainô" is the core in the word "phainomenon": "phenomenon".

Meaning breaks on us. This is the insight transferred by this many-sided word that invokes all senses, just like the happenings on the stage do, but primarily sight and hearing. A word that fuses all its facets into one centre of contingency.

Meaning as epiphany is simultaneously something thrown at us from the flow of time, and something summoning us on behalf of a necessity which only draws on a legitimacy that comes from the very fact that it exists. Thus it contains, contemporaneously, the possibilities of holiness, and deceit. Op.cit: 240.

If we now return to our definition of organising along identification, performance is through which it presents itself as an extended event – with the obvious parallel to theatre. In this connection organising as perhaps resembles Plato's *khôra* from *Timaeus*. *Khôra* is the mother-event. It both is and is not and it is both this and that and neither. In a sense it is pure virtuality. Yet it does not *really* exist.⁷⁶ *Khôra* is the receptacle of all becoming. In this view organising is close to *khôra* but not quite. *Khôra* precedes the event. Organising is the medium through which the event itself is actualised. It is of great relevance to understand the event in its extended form. An event can be both series of events as well as simultaneous events. It all depends on what kind of forces are prevailing upon actualisation.

This is where the intensity of the will/care or *saudade* matters. This is where abstract machines are momentarily tamed upon experience. This is where tragedy takes place and drama occurs. Organising takes shape upon recognition of something-taking-place. This is the moment of actualisation. It is in the event that the difference between the virtual/real and the actualised is realised as such.

⁷⁵ See also Article II.

One could say that organising starts unfolding. Here *saudade* is within will and care. If there is actually intensity in the event it will make a difference. If experience, which contracts itself in an occurrence activates the *hexis* (the having) of organising through difference, meaning something is experienced and desiring-machines start molding that which is in becoming.

Chaos does not exist; it is an abstraction because it is inseparable from a screen that makes something – something rather than nothing – emerge from it. Chaos would be a pure *Many*, a purely disjunctive diversity, while the something is a *One*, not a pre-given unity, but instead the indefinite article that designates a certain singularity.

Deleuze (1988/1993:76). [Italics in the original.]

Organising can be viewed as such a screen⁷⁷.

⁷⁶ See Derrida (1993/1995) and Kirkeby (2000) for more comprehensive readings.

⁷⁷ By the one Deleuze does not mean something with a singular significance. For Deleuze the One is always a multiplicity. It is rather a question of something that can be singularised. It is not a question of subjectivating and certainly not in accordance to given ethics. At least not in principle.

Actualising organising⁷⁸

What is produced in the event is the act-ualisation of organising. It is in the event that organising takes off from the virtual sphere. When something is being actualised it must be seen in relation to its interbeingness and the local milieux. More precisely the *how and what is being produced* is:

- Bringing before a collective, which can be seen as ‘the people’, ‘the government’, ‘the critic’ or ‘the judge’.
- It is what is acted or presented or performed or re-presented.
- The above means also that when one produces, one exposes something ‘for sale’.
- This also signifies that one places something before another.
- When accepting the interbeing it also means to draw or stretch out, prolonging and extending. This extension also implies that production goes on.
- Nevertheless it also signifies bringing something to a place, which could also be a grave.
- Simultaneously, still related to the concept of intermezzo, one brings along other ‘organisations’. One also leads as well as brings away.
- In a similar vein one brings to light or discloses or exposes.
- Which on the other hand signifies that one brings forth. One brings into the world as in a-
letheia. It is bearing and begetting as well as bringing forth to trial.
- Now that implies also to make something to grow, to advance and to promote.
- Actualising can also be seen as merely lengthening or prolonging.
- Production is in a sense merely to lead.
- In that sense it is a question of bringing up as well as educating.
- It is a question of planting and cultivating.
- Finally one can bring the traditional meaning of production into play namely that of making, devising, producing, and bringing into use.

⁷⁸ This section is based on a transfusion of different dictionaries. The main sources are the Greco-

Now it is not just as simple like that. When something is actualised, the production, and becoming of 'that something' entails simultaneous producings of:

- ethics
- politics
- knowledge
- culture
- collectives
- identities

The list is endless. But the point is exactly to understand this multitudos as One as $n - 1$. In some sense the aesthetics of management is that once it learns something new regarding collectives it attempts to make it accountable. Economy made man accountable as a slave as well as other economical products or and serf(v)ices. Later the actions of man were measured in order to maximise their value. Now 'knowledge' is measured in a similar vein. We have circled back to ancient times in that economical practises (HRM) has gone back home to the idiocy of attempting to include the private doings of WOrman. Idiocy back in Athens meant simply doing something by oneself. When Hesiod tells his brother to work hard he begins:

I mean you well, Perses, you great idiot

Hesiod as cited in Grant (1982: 56)

What management perhaps understands but does not explicitly have a saudade for is what organising in all its connotations implies as not-quite-organised as virtual and real. Because although we have statements desiring stalemates, organising has nothing to do with a preconditioning set of rules and boards with given pieces, with their preconditioned actions. Computers may beat grand masters in chess with artificial intelligence, but social action is not written on three pages of rules. Management nevertheless worries about this 'artificial intelligence'. The hippiest students in management are now interested in what aesthetics can offer management but once art is an organisation it no longer is art – it is a commodity – thus losing its virtuous virtuality of the *virtuoso*. The charismatic manger is of course the *virtuoso* par excellence today, but She cannot be replicated.

Aesthetics at large, of which the perhaps most well-known problematisations have been given by first Plato then by Kant as well as later by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and more recently

by Heidegger and Derrida, are all definitively sublime, but although they are frequently used in the literature in organising, although they problematise this problematic area in an eloquent way, they nevertheless leave something missing. This brings us to music and Bob Marley and the Wailers and Babylon...

Organising as production

Babylonian society was pyramidal. The king was the apex, and the broad base rested upon a foundation of slaves. Social control was mediated from class to class. Caste and status are embedded in the code. In precise tariffs human values are set forth. this system served the political and economical needs of the time. ..()...The economic activity of Babylonia was stimulated by individual ownership and the careful definition and protection of property rights. The code makes one see vividly *the dominance of economic interests*. One can fancy the pressure by which countless conflicts were consolidated into this body of laws. If the code was well enforced, Babylon must have been popular with men of wealth. Yet there is always danger that protection for property will be pushed to the point where the industrially weak will be impoverished, discouraged, made less productive, or driven into revolt. The code of Hammurabi guards against this tendency by several provisions designed to protect the poor and unfortunate. Justice from the standpoint of social control is the psychological means of reconciling the individual to his status and stirring him to his social tasks. The code of Hammurabi gropes toward a justice which shall stimulate the accumulation of wealth without impairing the stability or diminishing the productive power..

Vincent (1904:753) emphasis added.

In another sense, or at a more profound level, that what is called 'organising' can be completely reconceptualised as a sum of some of its various branches and debates, i.e. critical theory, postmodernism and poststructuralism, human resource management, strategic literature in general, institutional theory at large as well as cultural theory, cognitive theory, literature in organisational learning and innovation just to mention a few, be transfused with economics, sociology, political theory, and yes, theory in political economy. This may sound as something absurd especially to those whose self-interest lies in the argumentation for fragmentation, since divergence and dissidence are fertile soils for the existence of 'the variety of perspectives', simultaneously as the existence of variance in itself gives it a droit d'être.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ This does not imply that the text would be against variance and divergence. Different perspectives naturally suit different contexts and different levels of analysis. In a certain manner they provide a good tool-box for research and practise in different situations. They of course also serve understanding both the uniqueness and the commonalities of organising (depending on perspective). There is basically

Such theorising is however currently under development, e.g. Fuglsang and Sørensen (Eds: forthcoming) and Heiskala and Virtanen (Eds: forthcoming) but because of divergent academic interests and due to the not only fragmented but also vast nature of the field, the materialisation of the trend that is taking place underground is not likely to actualise quite yet. For the very same reasons this essay is merely an introductory interlude to the potentialities of this novel conceptualisation, which hopefully will present itself in a more subtle manner and with a more sublime style in the future. Another relatively obvious reason for the divergent nature of the field is the 'thetic'⁸⁰ and short-sighted nature of academia today, not to mention its orientation towards 'market demands'⁸¹. This is also why this essay just slightly touches upon the issue. The effort required has a poor pay-off in terms of academic prestige. One may choose between doing an empirical study and then applying the findings to a dozen different contexts within management and organisation or trying to obtain a broad range of thinking which does not actually belong any specific area of "current relevant interest". The former gives the researcher and her employer a dozen publications in a cost-efficient manner, while the latter is time-consuming and seemingly inutile. But a few have the privilege or courage to follow Bob Frost.

I shall be telling this with a sigh
 Sometime ages and ages hence:
 Two roads diverged in a wood and I -
 I took the one less-travelled by
 And that has made all the difference
 Robert Frost
 (The road not taken).

nothing wrong with the multi-voicedness, on the contrary multiplicity is definitively hailed in front of conformity or fascism. This is not an attempt at unifying different branches in order to create some kind of a paradigm of organising or organisation. This is rather a discussion regarding virtual thinking beyond the current quite blunt politics of division that provides very little space for discussion. The point is that research is about search. In Batesonian (1980) terms it is about probing not about proving. The existence of different perspectives facilitates that endeavour, but without discussion divergence tends to give priority to prejudice and seclusion. But as this essay will attempt to demonstrate, disclosure and openness are against the nature of collectives. Closets feel safer when they are securely locked.

⁸⁰ For an in-depth discussion of the thetic time of ours see especially Derrida's (1983) *The Time of the Thesis: Punctuations*. But also *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs* (1973/1967) as well as *Truth in Painting* (1987/1978) by the same author. In comparison see also Heidegger (1995/1935-6) and (1967/1962). For a discussion of some of the above see also Rapaport (1989:246-264).

What is ironic is that although the poem is so popular the overwhelming majority chooses highways and freeways⁸². Or maybe that is why it *is* so catchy and kitschy. The problem of catching the idea of less frequented avenues or sidewalks in research just might be explained that it probably takes more time to adapt to various lines of thought that is "burdening and boring reading"⁸³ than to read a couple of reviews on this and that. The words: "I do not have the time to read all that stuff" are also daily remarks within this area of re-search, *id est* finding out looking for, and re- means again. But the problem of not-being catchy is exactly the disinterest in research. It is fairly simple to kiss⁸⁴ it goodbye by sticking to familiarity and repetition. The issue at hand, somehow, one might argue, is to have a will to understand, that which is beyond one's knowing or at least having a will of trying to understand. The *laissez-faire* policy within academia is unfortunately against its own principles "of creating novel knowledge". This trend *per se* facilitates both divergence and lack of discussion, not just through the fragmentation itself but also and foremost because there is no common semantics. The above explains both the trivial language of this text as well as its so called quality. Nevertheless, the enterprise tries in some peculiar way to open, if not boulevards, at least paths for discussion. One such perhaps futile aim is to use writing that has a desire not to have a definite author(itarian) voice. It just seeks to find itself amidst other texts as an addition, avoiding, both following Derridean and Deleuzian thinking, to totalise or to seek transcendence, given truths, goals or objectives, beyond a humble will to know. See also Articles 2. and 3.

As an addition to the above one could first perhaps appropriately ask why there are so few definitions of organising in the literature. We have definitions of organisations but there are no conceptualisations beyond form and function. Barnard (1938:73) defines organisations as systems of collective action. March and Simon (1958:4) call organisations 'assemblages of interacting human beings'. Later definitions add goal orientation e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and Scott (1992:10) or having certain objectives Donaldson (1995:135). These definitions stick to 'organisation' (juxtaposed with 'organising) although for instance March and Simon (op cit.) though not 'too seriously' compare the organisation to a living organism. Weick (1976) and many followers though profess the use of verbs instead of nouns, thus evangelising organising as a process. That is nice. It brings time, insecurity and openness into the picture. Yet for instance Weick himself calls organisations "loosely-coupled systems". Contemporary theorising focuses especially on concepts such as culture, interaction, learning,

⁸¹ See also James March's (1996) retiring remarks.

⁸² I want to thank Raza Mir for this comment.

⁸³ As quoted by numerous students.

⁸⁴ Keep it short and simple v keep it short, stupid as presented by Case, Lilley, Munro and Sinclair (1996).

transfer and translation of knowledge, and networking.⁸⁵ Novel literature, especially in Europe, has been based on phenomenological sociology, with an emphasis on 'social construction of reality' which was introduced by Berger and Luckmann (1966) but it has had various translations usually labelled as 'social constructivism'. Stated with exaggeration, their general claim is that reality is neither objective nor subjective but socially constructed.

Above all there is hardly no philosophising regarding organising⁸⁶. Not to mention management, which is not the issue here and now. It seems as if philosophy is too impractical and far out for the praxis of management and organisation. So called practical researchers are often amused about philosophising organising and do not even bother to attend the discussions. Philosophising organising is in their view abstract without any practical significance. In reality, however, these doctors of organisation are the ones who are the truly abstract ones since they constantly make abstractions of what they call reality. It is not by any means strange that so many businesses fail and fall as "practically" oriented servants are the ones who run them. Naturally many organisations vanish because of plain stupidity which also might be one of the reasons for why so called practitioners are not interested in philosophising organising.⁸⁷

How is it possible to combine the vulgar morality of the adolescent Nietzsche and his arrogant followers Bataille, Foucault and Deleuze with the virtuous thinking of Aristotle and the dignity of Socrates and Plato, yet spicing the soup with the coupling of fascist and marxist writers by bringing in Heidegger, Machiavelli, Kosík and Kristeva and finishing it all up through the destruction of Derrida? Perhaps it takes a genuine dilettante to undertake such an enterprise predestined at calamity. Students in management and organisation are on the other hand the true dilettantes of every possible branch of knowledge. It is thus actually appropriate that this essay should be an endeavor of someone whose home is in the milieu of this massmarket-oriented non-being place – this utopian, *ou topos*, beyond khōra, sometimes

⁸⁵ These primary conceptualisations are based on typical and often quoted reviews of the literature e.g. Pfeffer (1982), Perrow (1982) and Scott (1992).

⁸⁶ Exceptions make the rule e.g. Kirkeby (2002), Guillet de Monthoux (1999).

⁸⁷ This does not mean that the one who philosophises management would be a better manager than the one who does not. The argument is also not that one who makes abstractions could not be a good manager. On the contrary managers have to constantly make abstractions and simplifications in and about practice. Many decisions are based on assumptions about future events although, as most of us know, it is impossible to foretell the future. In light of this 'insight' many managers are actually extremely skillful in their doings. Besides in many situations it would be completely absurd to question taken-for-granted agendas, which often might be based on immense amounts of experience. This is more of a question about the level of acceptancy regarding abstractions. What this signifies is that one has to be able to question that what is less than self-evident.

written as *chora*, no place, where there is no passion or *pathos*. *Da prá chorar*⁸⁸. This is theory and in theory⁸⁹. Hence this microscopic interlude is played in the tune of a bossa nova, with varying rhythm, with all its *saudade*, something beyond just longing. Bossa nova also because it signifies the new knack, the new nerve, the new daring. Bossa nova because its created out of something (samba) and goes even deeper into it (than samba itself) actually disturbing those who are possessive about what it (samba) should or shouldn't be. Bossa nova because some of its players would claim that God is Brazilian, which of course is so Carioquesquely illusionary as the whole notion of Rio's *carnaval*⁹⁰ that one might as well admit that God is dead. This is a welcoming to the crematory.

This enterprise theorises organising. It discusses the relationship between organising and researching and it is interested in knowledge.⁹¹ This essay is partly illustrated by five articles that attempt to demonstrate what generally might be regarded as a continuum of organising and researching. The articles included are not presented in a historical order. This essay does not necessarily believe in metamorphoses⁹². The modern concept of progress is thus questioned.

A crystal clear objective however, is to criticise that what is happening in the society at large and its implications on researching and organising. The morphoses of organising and researching should be all about search, a continuous search that is re-search. This is the case when one is interested in something related to knowing. Simultaneously one can ask what

⁸⁸ Portuguese. It makes you cry.

⁸⁹ According to contemporary thinkers in the field of organisation studies or organizing there is little agreement except on the belief that there is no such thing as one "organisation theory". See for instance Clegg et al, 1996, Czarniawska (1995). The field is extremely fragmented and there is argumentation for viewing theorising as literature. See Czarniawska, 1997, Czarniawska-Joerges and Guillet de Monthoux, 1994 Among other conceptual problems the above also leads to a problematization of the binary opposition theory/practice. Irony being one of the fairly obvious (though complex) forms of mediation. See also Sköldberg, 2002, Guillet de Monthoux, 1983, and Kirkeby, 2000.

⁹⁰ The etymological paradox of the carnival is that the word is derived from *carne* + *valere* meaning without meat, which is obviously connected to the end of fast but the event in Rio is very much a fleshful fantasy.

⁹¹ Obviously every thesis in the field of organization and management should be interested in researching and organizing and our knowledge about it all. This project attempts however to demonstrate that this is not always the case.

⁹² What this means is that a research process might grow from its initiation marks into something quite different. A change into a higher level of understanding is of course welcomed when one has a will to know. This is however not always the case. Research that is precisely outlined with clear goals and objectives can actually be regarded as no research since everything is defined from the very beginning. In this sense the importance of research plans could be questioned. The financial realities of research seems to have an opposite opinion. In a similar vein one should not regard research as a continuum of a hierarchical kind. Research should rather be seen as rhizomic and interbeing.

implications our research in organisation and management has on our societies.⁹³ Knowing something about these issues thus just might have some relevance and significance. This is but one of the voids in the general discussions within this intriguing field that should be subject to the technique of voice-over.

Some of the comfortable numbness in the literature in management and organising is fairly evident. There is severe shyness regarding politics to the left and to the right as well as in between. Authors in management seeking profits on the market do not want to speak of their often quite clear will to sound lucrative in the heads of managers. Writers attracted to the wing opposite to the right may be afraid of stating their opinions in the face of the unprecedented despotism of the utilitarianism of the market economy, especially as socialists with a few Fidel (Castro) exceptions have bought the reasoning of neo-liberalism. Even so it is interesting that hardly nobody is willing to admit for whom their ideas might be utile. Nevertheless some of the comfortably silent topics include:

- 1) the relation between sociology and management literature
- 2) philosophy of organising (and management) in general
- 3) politics, also in relation to one's own, with the exception of 'critical theory'
- 4) audience – especially in relation to "the objectives"
- 5) bounded rationality vs efficiency
 - does organising actually buy into the modus operandi in the contemporary age?
 - why is there such a disinterest in participating in the societal discussions?
- 6) uncertainty and insecurity vs craving for order + multiplicity-simplicity
- 7) order-organisation vs change
- 8) interest in rethinking organising by its own
- 9) servility

The final point is that although organising is situated amidst the production and reproduction of societies and individuals alike it does not have any interest of attaining a role that would be independent and free. Rather it serves such sovereign forces as the market economy and

⁹³ It is quite amazing that there is no desire for convergence between the not but hostile fields of sociology and management science especially as the latter is the prime transformer of societies at the time being both at micro and macro levels. The same question regards the silence in management literature concerning its implications on the society at large. It is not too hard to look into the socio-political motives beyond the existing divergence.

directives in academia, regarding efficiency. This is absurd especially as the concept of bounded rationality is widely accepted within this field.

The claim here is that philosophising organising may help us understand some of the basic notions about it. It is actually quite astonishing that so few have actually stated the basic question:

- What is organising?

This is what this essay attempts to find out. While trying it might be relevant to try to answer another question:

- What is organising today?

What is proposed is an interplay between philosophy and economics by the modality of organising, from especially the polis of organising researching. Whatever philosophers or economists or sociologists might want to claim, this is the essential *peristasis* of today. In the state of the art in the sociology of the beginning of a new millennium students in management and organisation *are* the prime evangelists of the dominant paradigm – utilitarianism. Literature in organising preaches and takes care of this unprecedented despotism of creed all over society. The angels of the system are amidst the perhaps most interesting lines of power, knowledge, and care in our environment today. The quite absurd and even polymorphously mystically deceitful servility of the virtue of efficiency is exactly politicised, localised and supervised by students in management. One of the microscopic conjugations of this dissertation is precisely that management *is* the *polis*⁹⁴ of the theology of utility. The man who hit the words that Islam is the most growing religion in the world today is definitively out of bounds, because the ethics of utilitarianism are spreading all over our globe crossing every border of gender, ethnicity, culture, nation-state, political doctrine and other religion⁹⁵. What is called management science is the polis, being the alma mater, the technology, the politics and the police simultaneously in the very same place, body, and soul. And when the *polis*

⁹⁴ Greek for city-state but also politics and technique. (Acropolis being the arch- or highest form thereof). Police and policy are its derivatives.

⁹⁵ It is actually quite amazing that the majority of the world's socialists, with some Fidel exceptions, have bought into the ideals of the market economy. Yet this paradox is hardly discussed in societies-at-large.

takes place it takes the form of the poiesis (saying) of tragedy. The polis is thus as Vernant(1972) would say that what performs the tragedy⁹⁶.

This research project that grows from the rhizomes of this new *acropolis* is concerned with the production of this incredible credibility. This thesis seeks to find out what this organising is all about. Its purpose is to propose a minor contribution to knowing in organising by studying researching in organising and by researching organising and through organising researching but merely by re-organising and re-searching and de-organising and de-searching and deserting.

Just as much as researching/organising is about nomadism and a (fatal) attraction toward the desert it by no means desires to attribute itself to the (arrogant) herd of nomads in the notion of signing in with claims of being non-political. Nor does it want to affiliate with (the almost identical) flock of believers in a vulgar morality as such. The above are quite complex problems in this work since it still rests mainly on the bold shoulders of especially the infant madman Friedrich Nietzsche, the suicidal Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, not to mention the wild and absurd Georges Bataille.

Never the less, rather, always just as an addition, there is hardly any issue in discussing whether or not the issue in researching would not exactly be re-searching, searching over and over again. Not just wandering along the same familiar routes. Unless such an enterprise would not include consenting with the death of God, one can hardly see any desire in knowing, finding out, willing to be-in-the-world beyond death. Servility to God is losing faith in the will to knowing, because if (wo)man knows (s)he would not have anything left to unfold. With the acknowledgement of God man dies in an extremely *practical* manner. It is a mastermindedly serflike recognition of the sovereignty of *security*. It is a fantastically absurd reasoning beyond life. It is the commencement of a subjectification that is a self-commandment within a lifeless ascetism. It is an affirmation of life after death. It is an affirmation of that which is not. It is an affirmation of verisimilitude. It is to vote for individual ascension, resurrection or rebirth beyond being as being-in-the-world. It is foremost beyond care. It is a-voidance. It is fear in front of the underlying emptiness that surrounds an agnostical world. And it is se-cure. That is, without care.

⁹⁶ Vernant, 1972, p. 288 "Greek Tragedy: Problems of Interpretation." in Macksey and Donato (Eds.) *The Structuralist Controversy. The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man*. John Hopkins. Baltimore. p. 273-295 (cf. Hirvonen, 2000 p.519).

This is naturally partly a caricature, but one has to draw caricatures rather than paint heavy realism in order to deliver the goods. One has to be a good dark angel. Simultaneously one has to admit that servants of Gods may produce the world with, according to their own ethics, Good gifts. Assuming morality, many codes of religious doxa attempt to serve the well-being of the world and paradoxically being-in-the-world. However, accepting God or Gods in the broad sense of the concept entailing commitment to a Truth not only brings closure to knowing in the sense of not being receptive to any alternatives. Closure comes also in the form that from the moment of con-firmation one belongs to a community – which further not only ascertains, but also distorts perception from being through assimilation. And utmost it is quite strange in the presence of the will to knowing. It is a form of absence of the will to knowing.

The will to knowing is a form of the will to be able to which is the omnipresent concept that is the virtual tectonic basis for the territorializations of researching/organising in this interlude. The will to be able to has an eternal return and is formed through production/producing vis-à-vis being/becoming. Their relations and formations include active and reactive forces of the will regarding desiring-production and desiring-becoming. This abstract architecture of researching/organising consists of topologies and actualisations of power, knowledge and care. The masterly affirmation of the will to be able, is the substance of super(wo)man. A vulgar morale is a pure and symbiotic form of super(wo)man. It is its essential form in willing the will in being the destroyer/creator. This is its highest virtue in virtuality. In actuality, in being-in-the-world, that exact being, by including *cura* is what separates virtuality from the actual in man and thus man from superman. The passion for the will is uncanny with the death of God.

This essay is by no means interested in solving managerial questions regarding organising, it merely is a minor attempt to illustrate some of the problems behind both theorising and practising organising. It discusses the utopian (ou topos = no place) or unrealistic, idealistic tradition of the field as well as its atopic, or non-place characteristics. On the other hand it is attracted towards demonstrating the major significance of the subject today. It actually puts particular emphasis on the innovativity of it right now.⁹⁷ Eventually the essay aims at demonstrating the hows and whats of this actuality. Specifically this entails the following:

⁹⁷ It is interesting that literature in organising has not been interested in Gabriel Tarde until recently Leskinen (forthcoming). Tarde combined economy and psychology already in 1902. He was also a

a) **Organising as utopia**

- i. literature in organising tends to prescribe an ideology
- ii. organising as organisation aims at achieving given "good" goals
- iii. organising is about knowledge of man and knowledge of the world alike, it thus tends to demonstrate itself as a transgression or interchangeability of god/knowledge/economy
- iv. major parts of the literature promises ascension and heavens as if man would be able to foretell the future and it has a strong attraction towards the new

b) **Organising as atopia**

- i. in connection with the above it has a strong tendency of re-inventing (repeating itself) by novelties, which basically are merely new names for old concepts
- ii. the area entails almost every other branch of knowledge meaning it is dilettante in nature
- iii. the field is characterised by an unwillingness to openness regarding politics
- iv. literature in organising is concerned with security, which is a non-natural, non-processual structure
- v. many of the common dichotomisations are oxymoronic in a social sense id est especially:
 - rationality vs irrationality
 - individualism vs collectivism
 - stability vs change
 - voluntarism vs determinism (in some extent)

c) **Organising as metropolis**

- i. organising is in the centre of societal change
- ii. organising is what organises societies and its individuals in practise
- iii. organising as theory/praxis is the alma mater of the market economy today

predecessor of institutionalisation. But as one can realise the field in organising is so concerned about

In addition it also questions some of the widely discussed "dichotomies" which according to the conceptualisations of this oeuvre are keen to be foolish, i.e. oxymorons (oxys = keen + moros = foolish in Greek). They are a-topic in nature as they are if not not-real at least non-real. Politics is obviously something unavoidable as one has to take positions and is constantly being identified versus different topologies. The argument against dichotomising organising rests in the argument that dichotomisation in connection with researching should serve the purposes of research and not the servants of research.

The problematised dichotomies are:

- a) **rationality vs irrationality** (also described as order vs chaos, order vs disorder, and organisation vs disorganisation)
- b) **individualism vs collectivism**
- c) **stability vs change**
- d) **voluntarism vs determinism**

The existence of dichotomies is, if we believe Derrida (1983) in that natural language should be treated as a formal system, or as a logocentric construct. Any utterance is subject to its opposite or to its not. Another obvious explanan is that Western thinking has until Nietzsche been marked by moral systems that divide by means of good and evil or in other words through yes and no. Moral positioning *as such* or in praxis is basically impossible to escape. On the other hand one can also always escape a given order. Such reasoning, however, does not lead very far if one accepts that researching is about searching. If one accepts that the project of conducting research is to look for something that has not yet been found one would assume that it calls for a will to find out and caring for the project.

When assuming the identity of a researcher, with a given, preconditioned morale, one immediately dissects the potentiality of finding out. Further, one predefines one's results in accordance with the morale at hand. As human beings or as social animals we cannot of course detach ourselves from our subjective or intersubjective histories. The point is that if

the new that it is always late (= tarde) in finding what has already been said.

one is assumed to profess researching as seeking the unknown or as creation the principle must be that of as much freedom as possible or attempting at adapting a vulgar morale.⁹⁸

Besides and above all being assertive is against life if we accept that life is a becoming which includes little a priori understanding regarding tomorrow. Just a quick glance at the work of Spyros Makridakis e.g.(1990) would consent with the above, and after all he is one of the leading professors in forecasting in the world.

Acceptance of interbeingness and insecurity by no means (in opposition to nihilistic postmodernist relativism) signify negation of form or structure. It is just a question of a principle attitude to preconceptualise as little as possible Deleuze and Guattari (1993/1991). The vulgar morale is actually on the contrary an affirmation of the will to know. Insecurity is something attractive. It is a potentiality in opposition to a bourgeoisie craving for security. The latter lacks the will of daylight and passion. It could also be ascribed to nonchalance and a disinterest for being-in-the-world. It resembles the ascetic in that it is a question of as little pain as possible. The outcome of such a reasoning in that one accepts an impotent position one naturally loses the real potentiality of creative joy in terms of not perhaps finding a treasure but rather treasuring the possibility of just coming to a minor conjugation that has previously been outside the realm of experience.⁹⁹ Deleuze's conclusion of Nietzsche's writings is that knowledge as such expresses negation.

Which is why the history of man is that of nihilism, negation and reaction. But the long story of negation has a conclusion: the full stop where negation turns back on reactive forces themselves. This is the point of transmutation and or transvaluation; negation loses its own power, it becomes active, it is now only the mode of the powers of affirming. The negative changes quality, passes into the service of affirmation; it is now valid as a preliminary offensive or a subsequent aggression. Negativity as negativity *of the positive* is one of Nietzsche's anti-dialectic discoveries. This is the same as saying that transmutation is a condition of the eternal return, or rather, that it depends on the eternal return from the standpoint of a deeper principle. Because the will to power only makes what is affirmed return: it is the will to power which both transforms the negative and reproduces affirmation. That the one is *for* the other, that the one is *in* the other, means that eternal return is being but being is selection. Affirmation remains as the sole quality of the will to power, action as the sole quality of force, becoming-active as the creative identity of power and willing. Deleuze (1983/1962:198).

⁹⁸ This is obviously a question of ambition, politics and posture. If one seeks to prove or has the desire to confirm the yes, it is necessary to define the world according to yes and no. But if one is truly interested in how the world *might* be this is beyond the essence of conducting studies in the world.

⁹⁹ These ideas are primarily synthesised from the works of Friedrich Nietzsche but especially the first edition of *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, and *Der Wille zur Macht*.

What is politicised here is not being inside or outside nor simultaneously both nor being at the borderlines. What is politicised is having an orexis for being more inside than being inside and being more than outside than being inside and being more simultaneously both than just simultaneously both and subsequently being more at the borderlines than merely being there. It is a question of will and care. It is about intensity. It is a question of affirming motion without moving.

Returning to dichotomies this means that they cannot be denied. What one can or may do is to approach them from novel positions. Juxtaposed with not-dichotomy one can instead come forth with a linguistic turn of non-dichotomy. If dichotomy is viewed as one, and that the one is a multiplicity, the potentiality for observing actuality emerges as different genealogies and different archeologies. In other words, as language returns with its logos, it can be ascribed to different potential rationalities.

The question of different rationalities brings us to the re-creation of the first dichotomy in the literature in organising, id est, the binary opposition of rationality versus irrationality or of the Platonic problem of order and chaos, which has also been labelled as organisation versus disorganisation as well as order and disorder. Still adhering to the notion of being weak when confronted by the form of language anything can be so to say textualised into an order despite its level of (apparent) order (versus apparent disorder).

Now one can mean completely different things with this term, [rationality] which will be explained in the following description. There is for instance "rationalisation" of the mystical contemplation, that is, of an attitude which, seen from other areas of life, is particularly "irrational", just as there is "rationalisation" regarding the economy, technology, science, education and war, the juridicial system, and government. Each of these areas can further be "rationalised" from highly different perspectives and positions, and that what is "rational" from one point of view can be "irrational" from another. Weber (1978/1934:13).

Anything, no matter how chaotic it appears can always be economised into an arrangement with an order. This does not deny the fact that that particular order is simultaneously attracted to escape and other subsequent organisations or rationalities. Whatever the intentions regarding not-being-organised are, one can rationalise them according to some structure. Dadaists and Surrealists, in art, to give an example, intended to escape the conventions of the arts, but they just have become organised as belonging to the conventions or economies of dada and surrealism per se or as new subdivisions of novel conventions of the arts. Language

itself is a good illustration of this. A sentence in a foreign tongue that the reader has no knowledge of gives the impression of non-sense, while it gives signification to the reader who masters that language. Further, no matter its level of non-sensibility, it nevertheless belongs to the rationale of language¹⁰⁰.

Before entering further into the fascinating world of organising some pervading concepts have to be explicated in order to give a minor understanding of what the ethos of the texts may perhaps be. To begin with, this researching/organising has been accused for attempting to create some form of metaphysics of organising. This has by no means been the endeavour of the project. First of all an organ called a keyboard has not been connected to the capacity nor the will to manifest such a thing. This work is merely a bacterial conjugation to the discussion in the polymorphous field of organisation. Rather than contributing to our knowledge in organising it could be seen as an interlude in the orchestration of researching organising as well as organising researching. The programme of this enterprise is to problematise researching and organising beyond any idea of sovereignty.

The problem of individualism versus collectivism is of course a relevant topic, when it comes to units of analysis. At the core, however, it is as Latour has noted, hard to distinguish who is doing the playing of an orchestra - the conductor or the musicians? That is still not the point because the embryonic concept of the individual has not even made half a millennium although humans have existed for millions of years. Individualism aside, the individual is a product/ being produced of different texts from various places and others, in such a way the individual is a collective in herself. The debate of individualism versus collectivism can be viewed as a political debate (amongst others) which primarily serves political purposes.

The dichotomy of stability and change is a classic and as such it cannot be surpassed. In the majority of the literature within organisation and management, especially the latter, it nevertheless is so poorly posited that it has to be brought upon critical investigation. In general the literature has difficulties in separating change from something that could be called a desired future state. There are of course thinkers who see change as an inherent logic e.g. Mintzberg e.g. (1996). Nevertheless even within the perspective of change 'as an emergent pattern' change is seen as different to 'the current way'. This is a major problem, since the current is about flow and motion. It is a different story when change is referred to as intended changes regarding whatever in organising. In this case it is not a question of change versus stability or order versus disorder as it is also illustrated.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Article IV

When an organisation is undergoing a change it is a question of order and order or disorder and disorder whatever one prefers. Whatever label one prefers the question (which is often tackled with problems such as overcoming resistance to change) the correct way of positing the problem is organising (formally) in different ways. The 'problem of overcoming resistance' is in many senses an interesting issue when (often the same thinkers) profess a strong organisational culture and commitment to existing values and norms. Cognitive theory has shown that even within coherent groups of people values are divergent. Unitary organisations, in the pure sense, do not exist in reality, not as long as there is no cloning beyond sheep. If one on top of the above accepts that being-in-the-world is about a process involving social interaction, change in varying amount and degree is always taking place as time goes by and the clock is still ticking.

Finally voluntarism and determinism are no pure opposites either. First of all pure forms of neither do exist in a social world. In given milieux things can only take place if they have threads of traces in that time/place/location. Because of 'infinite' potentialities of connecting things may appear virtually free, that however is not true if one has even a modest belief in social theory. The question of pure freedom on the other hand is too absurd to even be discussed.

The minimal concepts¹⁰¹

A) The virtual and the real

- i) *The virtual and the real are in principle the same.* (This is the paramount import of this enterprise vis-à-vis literature in organising and the cornerstone of the essay on which the entire architecture stands and falls.)
- ii) The above signifies that the real is principally a potentiality beyond given conditions. What else but the real can be of a virtual character? The paramount politics of this thought is to hail the state of *as perhaps*. As long as anything belongs to the realm of *as perhaps*, or as being problematised, it is both virtual and real. This is the *essential ideal* or politics of this work.
- iii) In modern philosophy in general the virtual is before the real. The potential pre-defines the real. The potential is better-than the real. The real is always subjected to the potential. According to such conceptualisations the real is always preconditioned.
- iv) Such thinking could be described as belonging to the realm *as if*. This is close to the dichotomy theory/praxis. When theorising is juxtaposed with practising they mutually re-present each other with novel *as ifs*¹⁰².
- v) However when something becomes actualised or becomes *as such* it is subject to the ethics that is superjected upon it. Please note the difference of the superjection of ethics as being thrown above the subject without preconditioning, permitting construction of identity versus direct subjection to a given ethic.¹⁰³

B) Social

- i) The social is in principle *rhizomic* as opposed to arborescent. Usually the environment is described as a tree that is hierarchical both vertically and horizontally. Rhizomes lack both.
- ii) Rhizomic thinking includes the idea of *infinite interconnectedness*. This implies that anything (such as a particular organisation) can be infinitely connected to something else (such as another organisation). This implies that the rhizome is of a *conjugative* nature, meaning its fabric is the conjugation and, and, and... It is principally an

¹⁰¹ The definitions are strongly influenced by the introduction of Deleuze and Guattari (1988:3-25), Deleuze (1968) and the works of Friedrich Nietzsche.

¹⁰² This essay is not denying the value of such thinking especially with regard to applied science. This essay just is not focused on applied science.

¹⁰³ For an in-depth analysis of this conceptualisation see Foucault (1997/1994:207-301) consisting of the texts: *Self Writing*, *Technologies of the Self*, *On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress*, and *The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom*.

addition as opposed to a totality. The principle idea of the rhizome resembles *khora* of Plato's *Timaeus*.

- iii) These lines of thought *advance from the middle*. Origins and ends are, although not insignificant, not conceptual foci. What is elevated through such a reasoning is *interbeingness*. Every moment entails today, tomorrow and yesterday within it. The social is always in a state of in-between-things, it has an interluding character. Deleuze and Guattari (1988) call it a state of *intermezzo*. But it is not a given intermezzo. It is in principle not preconditioned.
- iv) The above leads to two basic statements about the social world. Firstly, that the social is a process and a duration. It is being and becoming and social action leads to production, producing and being produced. Secondly, the above implies that we live with insecurity as an inherent part of everyday life.

C) Economy

- i) Economy is derived from *oikonomia* or householding/taking care of the house or the management of a household in Greek. In Ancient Greece economy referred only to the private sphere of life, whereas political activity referred to the public sphere (though of free men only). This conceptualisation has of course changed a lot over the years. In the beginning of modernity it has also been related to government Pomay (1768). Today it refers of course to thrifty and efficient use of material goods as well as the efficient and concise use of non-material resources such as effort, language and motion Webster's (1977). In our age it has (at least) five different societal definitions:
 - a) the structure of an economic life in a country or area
 - b) the market exchange
 - c) the material exchange of man's nature (according to political economists e.g. Marx and Polanyi).
 - d) a cultural frame of meaning e.g. Freud's economy of the psyche Heiskala (forthcoming)
 - e) the arrangement or mode of operation of a particular entity
- ii) This text views economy as all of the above when written in its English form, depending on the context.
- iii) When the term appears as *oeconomy* it refers to organising in a given form *as such*. This is closely related to organisation, as an ongoing process that calls for accountability as a simultaneously private and public medium.

D) Organising

- i) Organising is defined as the difference between the **virtual** (or potential) and the **actual** (or real). Upon organising the virtual becomes actualised.
- ii) Organising is always a *multiplicity* but it is also *One* as $n - 1$. Organising is always at the level of the **social**. It is always a textual collective, no matter whether it is concerned about individuals or societies or collections of societies.
- iii) Organising is preconditioned by its **milieux** which simultaneously superjects its potential for "unconditioning". This means that organising due to its contextual genealogy constitutes that what is to be actualised within geopolitical constraints while its creative character depends on the intensity of its **will/care** to organise, i.e. the intensity and orchestration of the interplay of its local desires. The milieu is what someone would call the "deterministic" nature of organising, but since it does not constitute organising as a totalising, sovereign force, this concept is, if not denied, at least avoided. In a similar vein the so called "voluntaristic" nature of organising could be assigned to the interplay of its local/temporal desires, as a blunt simplification that is nevertheless atopic.
- iv) Organising upon actualisation may be defined as orchestration, identification and legitimisation of multiplicities into **account**. It is thus always subject to **oeconomy**.
- v) Organising unfolds in **the event**. The event is always in extensio. This implies that it is always subject to novel **creation** and yes, novel oeconomy.

The idea to critically examine literature in organising through lines of thought that are mainly derived from Gilles Deleuze and Friedrich Nietzsche. This implies that the work attempts to go beyond the conventions of theory and praxis. This is done by investigating what has been said about organising, organisation and organisations within the field of organisation and management as well as by doing genealogical investigations into the hows and whats of organising today. The enterprise is on the other hand an attempt at going in-between what is going on in researching organising today. The aim of the study is to problematise organising and to develop a plateau on which the conceptual fundamentals are drawn. The purpose of the conceptualisation is also to demonstrate that except for being omnipresent, organising is omnipotent today. Generally speaking organising is both utopic and atopic in nature while it can simultaneously be described as being located in more than many ways in metropolis today.

4.Introductory lexicon

Before entering the fascinating world of organising some conjugative concepts have to be explicated in order to give a minor understanding of what the ethos of the texts may perhaps be. To begin with this researching/organising has been accused for attempting to create some form of metaphysics of organising. This has by no means been the endeavour of the project. First of all an organ called a keyboard has not been connected to the capacity nor the will to manifest such a thing. This work is merely a bacterial conjugation to the discussion in the polymorphous field of organisation. Rather than contributing to our knowledge in organising it could be seen as an interlude in the orchestration of researching organising as well as organising researching. The programme of this enterprise is to problematise researching and organising beyond theory and praxis. It attempts to sketch the complexity of the area of research by contours of virtuality and actuality in which this 'abstract conceptualisation' is the concrete canvas and where there is no place for any idea of sovereignty.

The minimal tectonic concepts of this work are the principles of interbeingness, rhizomic nature and multiplicity together with the will/care of any social enterprise that bring together the intensities of power/knowledge/saudade. These elements draw lines of interrelationships with other researching/organising in terms of desires and attitudes, which are melded, into the khora through their genealogies and circumstantial interactive intensities of desiring-production, desiring-structure, desiring-search and desiring-performance.

The nature of the architecture is de facto ungraspable as each element involved is in constant motion. In addition organising is continuously taking place regarding different aspects as well as at different levels. As an organisation is making decisions about policies regarding meetings at the personnel department it is simultaneously organising its meeting policies as well as its decision policies as well as the departmental policies as well as the entire organisation as well as its socialising as well as its management and every possible aspect that is involved in that particular event regarding the genealogies of difference in that specific context such as power relations, gender relations, relations towards markets and the market economy as well as nature and being human.

Obviously the foci vary and there is an immense variance in the influence upon the infinite interconnections – but they are nevertheless there. In saying this there is no intention whatsoever to get into the details of organising but rather to pay attention to just the basics of organising or rather the more than just "uttered" organising or the formal products of organising. The idea however is not to get interwoven in the rhizomic interconnections but to

mainly pinpoint some of the more crucial aspects or interconnections that manifest every organising.

The importance of writing the cornerstones of organising is to bring forth the strength or for that sake the vulnerability of organising per se. This aspect becomes actually even more relevant when researching is brought on the stage of organising. Someone has described organising as bringing order into chaos. It has also been called sense making and sense giving (Weick, Gioia). That is what it looks like. But this is superficial. Meaning, as Kirkeby (2000) has noted cannot be constructed 'just like that'.

This work may primarily be seen as an interlocution where the whys and whats are pictured in the khôra, at the acropolis, or the moment of tragedy, where the "idiot" dies. This is the event/space/point in time where multiplicity is specified where the genealogies of difference in interbeing meet the saudade of the intensities of the actual. This is where the virtual multiplicity with its interbeingness is specified ex communicatio. This is where the actual is brought into the open and identification and legitimation takes over.

Since the interplay is taking place on the stage of organising, the dilettante field of every thinkable branch of knowledge, it is perhaps appropriate that the score is based on distorted tunes from Nietzsche, Deleuze, Deleuze and Guattari, and Heidegger. The orchestration is of course in dissonance with all of the above.

This essay is about organising. Thus it cares about it and deals much around the topic of security and insecurity, organisation and disorganisation, adaptation and change, or in other words the 'main dilemma' in the area, as March e.g. (1995) calls the balance between experimentation and exploitation. And the phenomenon per se is a question of an interplay in-between disguises of deceit and whatever 'pure experience'. This work however is an attempt to go beyond the above dichotomies. It problematises organising beyond the convention theory/praxis.

The idea is to bring forth into the open some of the fundamental questions in organising and thus illustrate why this area is so problematic.

Contemporary problematisations within the vast array of studies in organisations seem to suggest that organising must be viewed as a medium for the politicalisation of a variety of structures.

Conjugative architecture

This essay rests on the following postulates:

- 1) That the world is insecure and existence is tragic in nature.
 - 2) That the contemporary is an era marked by liberalism and economy
 - 3) That the sign of our times is an intensive flow of information
-
- 1) Implies that there is no a priori knowledge about what tomorrow de facto brings with it beyond the eventuality of death. The in-in-security of being-in-the-world as a collective interbeingness and as an extended in-betweenness is the “stage” where the tragedy is being performed. Tragedy also refers to the rationality/irrationality of communication in that communication; sense-making, sense-giving, legitimation is always an ejection from life itself in that it is projected towards the other or the not self or not-life as a communicative leap as a re-sult or pro-ject. Such an account, no matter its legitimacy regarding accountability, is, once it is actualised as such, always ethico-political. Ethics is superjected upon it as a potentiality in a given time/place/event as the virtual for its actualisation as organising.
 - 2) The contemporary, that is simultaneously liberal and economic, implies that there is a problematic marriage between a hybrid of ethics and eternal economicisation, with its requirements to continuously render accounts, be accountable, economic, and re-assessed. This means that the (private) household goes open (public) as a Dutch aquarium-like house with its big windows. But it still is a very private and individual household although it has a given space/place in relation to the ethics of its vicinity of Dordrecht. In the synod there in the 17th century Protestants were fighting for individualistic relations towards God. House holding is having a given (oikonomical) structure that can be refurbished individually within the limits of that space.

If one is to believe Kuhn (1970) one could say that the area of research in organising is experiencing a period of scientific revolution. There are heavy debates on paradigm incommensurability and students in organisations are plurally divided to serve their own political interests. The debate of paradigm incommensurability per se serves politics generously in itself. On the other hand one may state that there has never even been such a thing as ‘organisation science’. What is occurring at this turn of the century within management and organisation resembles debates within sociology a hundred years ago, when sociology started to gain ground as a branch of knowledge.

The problem in organising is that the area is linked to almost every branch of knowledge from the art of war to anthropology and from economics to cognitive psychology. The heterogeneous nature of this ‘area’ has of course invited scholars to try to unify and voices have simultaneously been raised to praise the richness of its multidimensionality.

With a polyphonic history that asserts the droit d’être of anything labelled as science within the field of organisation, it is by no means strange that students in organising are dilettantes of every thinkable branch of knowledge. Along the same argumentation one must also understand the logic of the complexity. Since the area is so multiplitious there are no major expectations regarding expertise beyond fragmentation. The increasing specialisation of students in organising of course tends to augment the diversification in itself.

Contemporary societal pressures on academia regarding accountable self-assessment further production of ‘scientific’ investigations. Unfortunately they are most often nothing much but applications and combinations of theories/practices in ways that they have not been applied before. However they are generally duplicates of other similar, quite superficial, studies. The massive production apparatus within management and organisation is sort of a self-reproducing process that through its focus on today stays eternally young.¹⁰⁴

This eternal youth works with two main principles.

- 1) The amount of novel information is so great that nobody can even imagine to be able to follow everything that is going on. Thus a new theory is rarely applied at all. The multitude of the potential of the non-applicability thus serves as a platform for “creation” of constantly new applications. Once theory x has been produced. y can refer to x as “the first application of x producing y(x). Then, given the next student is fast enough, z can be the first to apply y...
- 2) The wise student applies theory x, y or z in a completely novel context. Thus a theory from e.g. the area of culture can for example be applied to a geographical area where it has not yet been used. Que fortuna! There are so many different places in the world. There are of course innumerable similar potential combinations. The true genius combines three or more such novel observations in an unprecedented manner.

¹⁰⁴ Please excuse that this part does not involve any references of mockery.

This continuous progress and development is multiplistically linked to time. It belongs to the concept of utility in the sense that it is actually relevant as fashionable and new. It fulfils the predicate efficiency with its speed. Serving utility is a simple task. It is a basic calculation. Productivity is easy to measure. Accountability further gives the air of security. That is fine. Productivity is obviously a lucrative business.

The contemporary love of youth is also linked to the knowledge-intensive contemporary time, that is attracted to information. The ever-increasing speed and amount of information, on the other hand, becomes an acceleration of the rhythm of work. This production means an aesthetic of escape in the landscapes of Virilio. This constant and continuous escape implies a flight from actuality into a continuum of serving tomorrow as expectations of production. The above is line with both Christian and bourgeois ethics. It is an enterprise that confuses asceticism, in that it has a simple code, and a continuous decoding of actuality by a continuum of renewal. This is the more than strange *modus operandi* today. In a way it is a materialisation of satisficing rationality in the spirit of Simon's (1947) bounded rationality. But it is not concerned itself with the limitations of *homo oeconomicus* regarding social, collective March and Simon (1958) aspects nor any other aspects. Limited capacity to process information is taken as a given excuse for the intent not to process that what is being observed, especially regarding the fundamentals of the basic ontological and epistemological assumptions. This is what Nietzsche saw as more than despicable in his *Gay Science*. Had he lived today, he would have most probably gone insane much sooner than he did. "There are so many books one has to read". "It is extremely strenuous to read a heavy book". No wonder there are academics who read life in academia through shame and guilt Mäntylä (2000). To the one who affirms the will/care, the pile of unread books, or anything undiscovered, is a virtuality. It is something to be enjoyed.

If conceptualisations of a knowledge-intensive, "new" economy hold, and are what is at hand, the illustration of the state-of-the-art is more surreal or surironic. One could perhaps rather define the contemporary as intensely non-sensical. This does not imply that there would not be a substantial input of "serious" research. However the relation of for instance doctoral dissertations published annually versus especially conceptual development at least within the field of organising, has no convergence whatsoever.

Systagmus

A basic fact about vision, all vertebrate vision in fact, is that the eyes do not wander or drift relative to the environment. More exactly, they do not wander or drift when an optic array anchored to the environment is present. They tend to drift in the presence of homogeneous ambient darkness and (the evidence suggests) in the presence of the homogeneous ambient light provided by sky, dense fog, or a "Ganzfeld." So the stabilizing of the eyes to the environment is actually an anchoring to the optical projections from the environment converging to the point of observation.

This stabilization of the eyes is not the same thing as fixation of the eyes. It is more basic, for stabilization occurs in animals with no tendency toward foveation, as in some fish. It is simply a prerequisite for vision since, if an eye moved continuously and aimlessly its retina could not register the array. Stabilization is an adjustment that maintains or keeps constant the animal's orientation to its environment, but this is a special kind of orientation that occurs not by way of gravity, not by way of mechanical contact, but strictly by way of steady-state illumination. This adjustment is shown in pure form by experiments on the optokinetic reactions of animals, or on optokinetic systagmus. When the ambient array of a stationary animal is unnaturally made to rotate around his (as when a textured cylinder surrounding the animal is turned on an axis passing through the point of observation) the eyes track the array. Sometimes the eyes-and-head do so, or even the eyes-and-head-and-body. The phenomenal experience of the human observer in this situation should be the illusion of being rotated.

The stabilization of the eyes is facilitated and assured by compensatory eye-movements. Head-turning is compensated for by eye-turning so that the eyes tend to be fairly stable even in the absence of an ambient array. As Dodge knew, there are two parallel causes of compensatory eye turning, coordinate compensation and vestibular compensation. Gibson (1969)¹⁰⁵

In other words while for instance travelling in a train we tend to fix our eyes on a certain point in the landscape and then subsequently change this point of fixation as it no longer is present in the landscape. That is what the phenomenon systagmus is about. In a natural state the eyes thus change the anchor of observation.

Foveation, on the other hand refers to a small fossa, or an area of the retina that affords accute vision. Fossa is also a major Roman road.¹⁰⁶ But actually fossa in Latin means a pit or a hollow or a cave. In this sense it is linked to a straightforward vision, something quite one-, or at its best twodimensional perspective. Ironically fossa also means depression. This brings us to Gibson Burrell's (1997) conceptualisation of organising as a railwaytrack. But the

¹⁰⁵ Obtained from <http://www.computerusability.com/gibson/files/eyeposture.html>

¹⁰⁶ This information was provided by Jeff Hearn.

association of systagmus goes even beyond. If we think of a person with a fixation which does not follow the logic of changing the focus regarding perspective, this perspective is against the nature of life, given that one accepts that life is being in-between-things as a process. This by no means indicates that it would be futile to focus on things every now and then. It is a matter of principle especially regarding the will to know.

Which obviously brings us to the pits or rather the cave and to a very particular cave; the one in Plato's *Republic* 514ff:

'Then, after this,' I said, 'liken our nature *in its education and want of education* to a condition which I may thus describe. Picture men in an underground cave-dwelling, with a long entrance reaching up towards the light along the whole width of the cave; in this they lie from their childhood, their legs and necks in chains, so that they stay where they are **and look only in front of them**, *as the chain prevents their turning their heads round*. Some way off, and higher up, a fire is burning behind them, and between the fire and the prisoners is a road on higher ground. Imagine a wall built along this road, like the screen which showmen have in front of their audience, over which they show their puppets.' Plato (1992:203). (Emphases added).

Plato then describes that if one of the men would be released he first would not be able to see the world above him, the world that comes into light as he comes out into the open (aletheia). This ascent would also be a painful exercise, but slowly he would start seeing that what he has previously seen has merely been shadows on the wall. After the painful journey he would also feel sorry for the others and find joy in the change.

Plato goes then on to declare that if this man would return to the cave and tell the other prisoners what he knows of what is outside they would not believe what he has seen. They would not have the "eyes" for such knowledge. They would think that the 'stranger' has been blinded by the light and rather stick to their chains than elevate themselves to the dangers of the world outside. This cave allegory is very popular among especially psychologists and has in that particular context been brought to organisation theory e.g. Morgan (1987). He points out that "a way of seeing becomes a way of thinking" and foremost that a way of seeing becomes a way of not seeing. This is of course of utmost importance but this is merely a part of what Sokrates in Plato's work is problematising.

'Now suppose that the prisoners had had among themselves a system of honours and commendations, that prizes would be granted to the man who had the keenest eye for the passing objects and the best memory for which usually came first, and which second, and which came together, and who could most cleverly conjecture from this what was likely to come in the future, do you think that our friend

would think longingly of those prizes and envy the men whom the prisoners honour and set in authority? Would he not rather feel what Homer describes, and wish earnestly

To live on earth a swain,
Or serve a swain for hire,

or suffer anything rather than be so victim of seeming and live in their way?' Ibid:205.

'... education is not what certain of its professors declare it to be. They say, if you remember, that they put knowledge in the soul where no knowledge has been, as if men put sight into blind eyes.'

'Yes, they do,' he said.

'But our present argument,' I said, 'shows that there resides in each man's soul this faculty and the instrument wherewith he learns, and that it is just as if the eye could not turn from darkness to light unless the whole body turned with it; so this faculty and instrument must be wheeled round together with the whole soul away from that which is becoming, until it is able to look upon and endure being and the brightest blaze of being...' Ibid.:207

What Plato discusses here (and later) is on the other hand something that is of elitist nature and is close to Nietzschean thought. It is a question of having courage to endure the suffering of the will to know. Plato also further points out the import of experience and together with the above this is also in line with Heideggerian thinking.¹⁰⁷

This work as previously mentioned defies any ideal orders because they all depend on the subjective ethics. Thus in accordance with Lundwall (1977) it does not really matter whether one seeks a Maoist revolution, anarchy or dystopias like Huxley's *Brave New World* where the protagonist seeks poetry, adventure, fear, sin and goodness. The ruler Mustapha Mond comments that he actually seeks the right to be unhappy. Huxley (19xx/1965:196).

Following Heidegger's and Nietzsche's footsteps and especially the candid revelation of Voltaire's *Candide*. A perfect world is not only against life, Eldorado is an extremely boring place because it is carefree as secure or ascetic. Life is a burden and a quite different kind of utopian thinker received the Nobel prize in literature for such eloquent lines as:

¹⁰⁷ Simultaneously Plato's work can be viewed as the first utopian book, in that it seeks perfection and the ultimate good. '... the best of both sexes ought to be brought together as often as possible, the worst as seldom as possible, and that we should rear the offspring of the first, but not the offspring of the second, if our herd is to reach the highest perfection, and all these arrangements must be secret...' Ibid.:148-49. The "republic" '...has to place the race in the centre of public life. It has to care for keeping the race clean. It should seek that the child is the most valuable property of the people...The one who is sick or has a hereditary taint must be forbidden to give birth to children..' Hitler (1970/1925:377). The parallel is obvious. Ethics and goodness of the ideal is in the eyes of the beholder.

Take up the White Man's burden
 Send forth the best ye breed,
 Go bind your sons to exile
 To serve your captive's need;
 To wait in heavy harness
 On fluttered folk and wild,
 Your new-caught sullen peoples,
 Half-devil and half-child.
 Rudyard Kipling (1899).

2003 Metropolis

This is but a microscopic introduction to the commonplace yet strange modality of organising and as the title already suggests this work is concerned about organising. The lines in between, the interludes mean the enterprise is also about organising researching as a supplement to researching organising. But this professional amateurism is not derived from the above or from the *acro*. On the contrary one may wonder why theorists in organising engage in attempting to totalize organising *below* a unifying paradigm. Who does such sovereign discourses serve? The main worry about the acrobatics of such narratives is not whether they will fall and be hurt but rather when that will happen.

This text is merely an interlude. It does not want to situate itself in any higher sphere or *acropolis* but rather in the lower city or the *hupopolis*, in case there is an interest in *politics* of any sorts. There is more than enough written on magic recipes for managers, most of which has been said on twenty pages titled "The Art of War" by Sun Tzu¹⁰⁸ some 1500 years ago. The tragicomedy of the massproduction of these replicas is that they are almost exclusively written from a privileged, and divine heavenly higher position. The one who has not visited Acropolises can at least look at illustrations and hopefully realise that they are in ruins.

¹⁰⁸ Many theorists would find themselves in this "notebook" which covers most of what literature in organisation theory would normally regard as the fundamentals of organising. It includes concepts ranging from planning, ordering, commitment to adaptation, innovativity, contingency and yes strategy.

By now it should thus be fairly evident that this text does not want to belong to the neighborhood of any *Princes*¹⁰⁹ or other rulers whether they are valid on rational, traditional or charismatic grounds as Weber (1947:328) has defined legitimate authority in its purest forms. Purity and authority are definitely virtues that are defied in this work.

What is the problem with organising?

Now if one believes in probability there just might be a multitude that would like to identify this work as postmodern. *Timendi causa est nescire*. But do not be afraid. It is perhaps also clear that this so called introduction is exactly about positioning. If someone is happy about labelling this as postmodern it is beyond the realms of this text. However, when discussing the ethico-ontological-epistemological positioning it is precisely beyond any relativistic nihilism that "postmodernism" often is related with. On the contrary this piece of work attempts to problematise the fundamental cornerstones of any organising. Problematisation may be seen as nihilism or as abstract thinking. Such ideas are absent here. They are in the vicinity of any *acropolis* that is attracted to totalitarianism. The latter is by virtue quite far away from what is called researching. IF researching is the issue as one can assume in the case of a doctoral thesis THEN one assumes that one is supposed to look for something. IF it is expected of a doctor "to create new knowing"¹¹⁰. THEN one assumes one has to try to find out something that is *different* from what has already been stated. THEN it is also assumed that what is produced is not merely repetition of what has already been found out. IF THEN researching means searching over and over to find something new in the spirit of doing novel searches and not re-searching in terms of reproduction it just might imply problematising that what (already) is.

¹⁰⁹ The Author is referring to Niccolò Machiavelli's opus primus from 1523 which also can be regarded as an early treatise of organising. (The use of early examples of theorizing organising here does by no means imply that this *oeuvre* would sign itself into the search for origins. Quite in opposition this work is more concerned with traces or lines in a *différance* of directions Derridefinitely.)

¹¹⁰ Dictation from the ordinance on examination in economic sciences (in Finland) prescribed on January 31st 1995 in Helsinki, § 36, Doctoral thesis.

- A) This brings us to the main question in organising namely:

What is organising?

- B) We can further develop this a step further and problematising organising and posit the question:

What is the problem in organising?

- C) And more specifically:

What is the problem in researching organising?

At this point it should be appropriate to ask what has all this to do with *metropolis*¹¹¹. The only city mentioned this far is Helsinki, which by no means could be called a metropolis, in the contemporary significance of the word. Now this *is* the more than proper question. It is pan-proper when it comes to organising and researching organising. The above questions are at the heart or rather the womb of all questions in the *milieu*, or the plural *milieux*. It is both mi-lieux and lieu and the mother of all places as in *metro*-polis, *metro* meaning mother or poetically centre. In the golden era of modernism, in the 18th century metropolis was translated as capital Pomay(1768). It is in a place yet this place is 'abstract' since organising is all over as well in New York and in Beijing as well as in Timbouctou and in Helsinki while also flying over the Atlantic sitting down.

¹¹¹ Organising has both endogenous and exogenous forms and neither. It can be seen as both potential and virtual as well as both actual and real. There is neither a potential nor virtual idea to actually discuss it for real by the modality of these interludes.

Simultaneously organising is very 'concrete'. We are organising all the time. In addition to all the organisations that surround us we are organising ourselves both in formal organisations as well as outside them. Organising is beyond what it happening within organisations. Organising could in a very broad sense be seen as that what actualises anything coming from khôra.

However, now brought back to metropolis organising as a discipline is in *The World Today* perhaps the most significant polis given that the statement "the market economy is the most influential *power* in *The World Today*" is true¹¹². This '**power**' of the (market) economy cannot have any force without something being done to it. This power is exactly materialised or being actualised through organising, as such. The politics of the market economy is not economic theory. Economic theories are virtual/potential¹¹³ concepts of economy. According to such theory organising does hardly exist. The funny thing is though that 'measuring' economy as 'expectancy value' is in mind a very cognitive act. Interestingly enough we know very little about the human brain. Economy has not even been interested in the level of organisations until transaction-cost economy Williamson (1975). This is of course also a question of definitions but at large one can claim that organising exists in all the basic structures of the economy. Organising exists as the organising of suppliers, the organising of demanders the organising of controllers as well as the organising of speculators. Now these questions are far beyond the realms of this essay. The quite absurd milieu of the economy (the market) is re-presented through flux values which express projections and results. These interbeing interrelated values are sums of mass organising derived from rhizomes of organising regarding supply, demand, control and speculation. And there is organising beyond these milieu that is not accounted for "on the market".

Organising *is* that which is difference between the virtual and the actual

as the ipso facto (atopic) actualising communication of utopia in(to) metropolis.

Per se it is realised as a given orchestrating-legitimizing rationale for house-holding that works as a constitutive ethico-political ejection or re-sult in given milieu(x) where

¹¹² The not-that-quite-merry oedipal/incestal relationship between organising (& its Kerberos management) and economics is discussed only superficially here. A thorough conceptualizing is worth several future theses e.g. Virtanen (forthcoming).

it *as such* becomes a transgressive multiplicity which is real and is produced through concepts of knowledge and God.

Representation, language and actualisation forces **as if** or utopian qualities into the *as such* through the atopic, abstractive notion of security. It is killing life by giving it an abstract eternal-like life. This identification is constantly renewed because it suffers of its air (mal-aria) and it is like an eternal request "to see Naples and then die".¹¹⁴ In the sense of the bourgeoisie it is being a *Bürgermeister*¹¹⁵ raising protective walls for the polis towards the surrounding world. In a strict sense it is freeing oneself from freedom. But this is merely a superjection. The milieu is like heaven's vault, but under it lie potentia for a variety of creations of the structures.

The milieu refers to the topology both as producer and produced as producing/becoming and product/being as organising/organised as well as organising now and all-the-time, this time, yesterday and tomorrow.

The organising in-itself is defined by its *saudade* or will/care which is simultaneously

- a) pro-duc-ing
- b) structur-ing
- c) search-ing
- d) perform-ing

It is leading towards while constructing-searching and doing it as something to be done.

The milieu constrains/possibilitates the local production of the actualisation in situ and in mortem, while producing as coming about as not yet, but as to (may)be. Throughout, it dances between monism and dissemination actively and reactively depending on the intensity and nature of the will/care. The will/care could be translated as the essence of the force of creation. It is waiting for the moment of tragedy – the performance itself, while actually already performing as an *intermezzo* with today, yesterday, and tomorrow is built within it.

¹¹³ Based on Deleuze (1968) and loosely also on Deleuze's (1988) readings of Leibniz, as well as *ibid*:s reading of Bergson (1966). Very simply put the virtual and possible is never AS SUCH in actuality/reality. The overall explanan for this is *khora* and the actualisations of actuality.

¹¹⁴ Naples was originally *Nea(new)poli*. The expression *vedi Napoli e poi mori* comes from the fact that the area between Rome and Naples used to be largely humid marsh, where mosquitoes spread mal-aria (bad air). Hence many people journeying south caught the disease and their final will was to see (beautiful) Naples before dying. We have the fascists under *Il Duce* to thank for ploughing the area into fertile land where friends of the *cucina italiana* can buy *mozzarella da bufala* on location today.

The moment of tragedy is the very actualisation of organising. It signifies the becoming-visible, becoming-world, of the organising. Metaphorically it is the moment when the hero dies. This is when the potential loses its creative potent. However, that this original sin could not be redeemed through novel organisations of the actualisation. What it , of the organising. Metaphorically it is the moment when the hero dies. This is when the potential loses its creative potent. However, that this original sin could not be redeemed through novel organisations of the actualisation. What it merely implies is that the organising now-being-actualised loses its real authority upon the organised. That which is brought to the world of actuality is upon actualisation killed off from the organising subject. Upon being brought forth it still belongs to the world of potentiality, but with novel characteristics. It now ex-sists, as something that has appeared as having come forth as something that has emerged from a given (different) virtuality. Now *as such* it is visible and talkative and is *as such* subject to other existing organising, both virtual and actual. in accordance with the original meaning of the word production (derived from pro and ducere, that is for- and towards and to lead, akin to towing) it is now brought before the people or judgement. Thus it is primarily subject to the sovereign discourses on the stage of its performance, which is first of all determined by its temporal space/location. The moment of tragedy is when organising becomes relational and is often experienced as a drawing or a placement of one before another. It is also viewed as a performance, achieving a (complete or thorough) form. It is a fulfilment of sorts. This comes close to Heidegger's (1962:177) notion of production in relation to Medieval thought. He suggests that existence in that era was closely related to existence itself.

The model upon which this understanding of Being is based is that of the artisan, potter, say, who aims to engender a certain form in the clay; the clay then takes on a look which conforms to the exemplar – the anticipated look – which he attempts to copy. The prototype, the exemplar, shows us how the thing is supposed to look before it is actually produced. That is why the expression *quid quod erat esse*, that which a thing was to be, is used interchangeably with *eidōs (causa exemplaris)*. The *eidōs* is that from which the actual thing is descended, its kin, its *genus* (kind). The members of a genus form a group only because they have a common 'descent', belong to the same family. Hence the word *phusis* belongs to the same sphere of significance. *Phusis (natura)* means growth, to produce its own kind. The 'nature' of a thing is a self-producing essence.

Caputo cited in Kearney (1988:139) emphasis in the original.

The point with the genealogy is to demonstrate the development of organising into what it is in the contemporary world. This genealogy attempts to serve the purpose of explaining the central role of organising today.

¹¹⁵ Consul, lord mayor, mayor according to Pomay (1768:90).

Producing, organising

Because the very production is an extended event, which on the other hand is connected to contextual productions but also to the contexts of production itself, what it wills/cares depends on its relations to:

- i) the what of leading forward
- ii) the trials of the public
- iii) the act of performance itself
- iv) the extensions
- v) the conductions, the bringing-alongs
- vi) the drawings and placings of the interrelationships
- vii) time, as moment and as duration

They are "expressed" in terms of the actualized values of the interbeingness of productions and their interrelationships. These flux values express re-sults and pro-jections

The form of the economy *is* organising – producing organising, organising the matter of the economy: organisations, ideas, products and services, producers and servants. The milieu(x) of the economy is the market in all its connotations.

Now it is evident that "organising" as the predicate of subjects called 'organisations' especially with regard to management, and typically such management that is tied to the virtues of efficiency, serving objects of utility, have strong bonds together. It must be stressed that this linking is but one of many links of organising and its milieux. Since organising is however studied par excellence in institutions tied to business administration it is fairly obvious one would recognize the connection. Utility as a quasi-transcendental virtue today naturally brings us to organising in many senses beyond the 'sole' values of good, progressive, efficient, productive, visionary, result-oriented, you name them, management rhetorics of actuality. The goodness of utility connects to organising in multiplitious *rhizomic*¹¹⁶ ways in combination with other virtualities and these are actualized accordingly. If we recognize that organising is both active and reflective it must be viewed both as exogenous as well as endogenous.

¹¹⁶ The concept of the rhizome is thoroughly discussed in the Introduction to *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari (1988/1980: 3-25). The concept has also been used by Husserl.

Once again one may ask whether this definition is too abstract in the context of organising 'real' organisations. Organisations are collectives of individuals. They are collections of texts tied together in various ways where all the links cannot be seen. In a similar vein individuals may also be viewed as collections of texts that are interwoven in various ways. Since texts do not necessarily need to have possession of a body, it does not really matter whether or not a collection of texts exists within an individual or within a collective of individuals. Nevertheless organising cannot take place in actuality unless it is brought out into the open. Once again then, it does not matter whether it is put forth through an individual or through a collective. What matters then is that it is something that is a modality aiming at differentiating that which is shaped or formed from 'the other', by the means of orchestrating its different parts together in such a way that it is in relation to 'the other' (giving it identity) and simultaneously giving it sense or legitimating.

When organising takes place (orchestrates, identifies and legitimates) it takes care of something. Organising cannot take place without having a longing for something. Organising must be attractive. Without being attractive it will not actualise. It must have the potential of becoming textual/talkative/visible. In this sense individual organising cannot be seen as organising in actuality unless it is given expression. But upon giving expression, upon communication, that what is expressed is related to 'the other' and is no longer for itself or by itself.

Taking place with a longing – taking care – means thus that there has to be a care-for-something by being attractive but it is simultaneously attracted. It is attracted in the sense that it is so to speak on a track of sorts – on its way – in between things – interbeing. It is tied to its milieux and the texts it has discussed. It is in a state of intermezzo. In this sense the (forming) bodies that are organising are being constituted as they are-being-organised as a part of being-organised. The bodies that (in organising) organise are products of organising within their milieux. Simultaneously they are basically infinitely connected to other bodies of organising that although they are stratified they in actualizing organising – may draw a new milieu – but only in such a manner that it can be traced from their milieux. This is the second level of the intermezzo.

Taking care, positioning, placing, relating, taking a place and occupying a space all at once and multiplistically is of course a question of producing-something and thus also being-produced-into-something. And beyond. While producing oneself – identifying – being identified – it is also a question of becoming beyond the identified identities. It is

being/becoming vis-à-vis the actual organising as well as vis-à-vis any potential organising. In this sense the interbeingness of organising organises at three levels:

- 1) It expresses the content of what is being organised (upon actualisation)
- 2) while that content is in a becoming (of the actualisation of the 'organised' in the particular process)
- 3) while yet it organises any becoming-organising (of any potential organising).

The principle of infinite connectedness implies though that there is no necessary causal inference between a "specified" actualisation of organising and organising in general. Organising may result in destruction of that "which was actually organised". Simultaneously it brings along durations.

We are producing organising constantly at multiplitious levels. Organising (derived from organon = instrument) is orchestration. In actuality this means identifying and legitimating multiplicity into 'specified' multiplicities. When organising is actualized it is becoming talkative and visible. This in turn means that the texts that are being produced become readings/visions/feelings or in other words *affects*¹¹⁷ of a certain kind. They are decided or cut off from that what is actualized. But there is a multiplicity of certain kinds or secrets that are actualized.

In actuality texts produce texts as well as milieux and subjects. Milieux produce subjects and texts through the content of what is territorialized. Subjects also produce texts and milieux through novel territorializations. What is decisive is what is longed for. What matters is the intensity of *the will to be able to*. This means that the *longing* of any organising depends on texts/milieux/subjects as well as their interrelationships where the becomings are 'forced out' by virtue of the knowing/caring that is brought out into the open.

And the organising that is actualized is actually always collective. Anything potentially "own" or "personal" does not exist outside the subject. "Inner experience"¹¹⁸ is beyond grasp in the context of organising if it is actualized in any shape whatsoever. It can only virtually or

¹¹⁷ On affects see also Deleuze and Guattari (1993/1991: 168-205).

¹¹⁸ See Bataille e.g (1997). Botting and Wilson edition.

potentially be produced by-itself-for-itself. Since it is a question of identification such a thing is impossible without 'the other' not to mention the absence of the third and the fourth¹¹⁹.

In this sense organising is – and this is important – conceivable only as parts of actuality, and as the already-organised. Supplements or articles of this essay (Articles 2 – 4) attempt to describe the subjective position and the some of the empty spaces of organising, but one may view them as futile attempts at something rather pataphysical, that is, the metaphysics of the absurd. However these lines, that can be traced back to the writings of Alfred Jarry or surrealism, are intentionally included to politicise those very silences. Because as organising as not-yet-organised is outside the actual world of organisation and communication (even to the so called self) it still exists as something virtual that has not yet become visible/talkative. The problem is that whatever is communicated as reflection is immediately subject to organising beyond authority. Simultaneously, in praxis, it is primarily subject to the sovereign discourses of its loci.

One may on the other hand also argue that any organising as actualization can also be seen as death as proposed by Bataille(1997). Bataille argues that anything beyond the self is death precisely because it has to be projected towards something that is not-self. In this sense all communication is death. This is of course interesting as major thinkers in organising i.e. Barnard(1938) and Weick (1979) have proposed that organising is almost identical to "the process of organising". As proposed by ibid (1987) it is also an inherent main argument of Burns' and Stalker's (1967) important dichotomization between machine and organism. Putnam, Phillips and Chapman (1996) have done a thorough and informative review of organising by the modality of communication. They have unfortunately been too tied to the popularized (in the field of organisation studies by mainly Morgan, 1987) concept of metaphor. Although metaphor is about communication and often tied to the discourse of managers it is but one of several 'easy' traps in theorising organising. This superficial, dilettante *Wesen* is the tragedy of organising. Death is another one. This is but one of the unvoiced paradoxes of the tectonic bases of organising as one of the dominant explanans for belonging to a community (vis-à-vis not belonging) namely that man fears freedom as proposed by Fromm (1987/1943) in his influential "Escape from freedom". Belonging as immortality is another related aspect as maintained by Rank (1930) and more widely psychologised by Brown (1957) and Becker (1973) and finally brought to the dilettante field of organising by Sievers e.g (1993). Much in line with Deleuze and Guattari's (1984/1972) perhaps main argument of "Anti-Oedipus" (the first volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia)

¹¹⁹ On the other the third and the fourth see e.g. Heidegger (1962/1926), Derrida (1976), Kirkeby

is their attack on the institutionalization of Freudian "mommy-daddy-me"-psychoanalysis and society's herdal, almost religious, adherence to the fascism of the explanan.

On genealogy¹²⁰

The history of Western civilisation or the history of the First World since, what was once called the Great War (WW I), is a history, combined with its being in an intermezzo with precedent times, an Anti-Oedipal story beyond Deleuze and Guattari. The silence in organising can to a certain degree be explained as symptoms of the complexes of the past century. It is first of all an Anti-Nietzschean history.¹²¹

It is our tragedy that we have lived through the 20th century with its very German complex. The preceding age was an unprecedented flourishing of Germanic aesthetics in all walks of life.¹²² This fact together with what fascism on the other hand did with Nietzsche and Heidegger, not to mention what the Nazis did with Jews and other 'inferior' people, have lead to on the other hand a very paradoxical attitude towards anything associated with 'the elite', although words such as 'intelligence' and 'creativity' are generally acceptable attributes of social beings – and typically of the good ones. In a similar vein it is a taboo to speak about the small ones and the stupid ones – who during the times of the Nazis – were if not eliminated – at least sterilised, and not just in Germany but also all over the West. Since Nietzsche, the elitist par excellence, was interpreted by the Nazis for the sake of their own interests, he, and Heidegger, who also was a Nazi, are personae non gratae in actuality¹²³. Bertrand Russell, who was a friend of Wittgenstein's (and not Heidegger) appropriately has stated that:

Philosophy, if it cannot *answer* so many questions as we could wish, has at least the power of *asking* questions which increase the interest of the world.

Russell (1912/1984: 6).

(2000)

¹²⁰ For not-so-in-depth additions see Articles I, II and V.

¹²¹ For those who do not understand why this section on Anti-Nietzscheanism is here is politicizing this very text. It is about making clear where this text wants to reside. Proudly beside Nietzsche and his view regarding the Jews, far away from fascist and Nazi rules. There are long so called Anti-Semitist sections in Nietzsche's writings. These sections are however primarily Anti-Christian. For Nietzsche Christianity is primarily a slave's logic whereas parts of the Semite Old Testament were of noble origin. See e.g. Nietzsche (1976/1884-88: 93.) Compare also Op. Cit. p.406 on Jews and will to power with citations from Nietzsche in this work (p.24), regarding creativity!

¹²² Much of which was produced ipso facto by Germanic Jews.

Russell, was, of course politically correct, being on the winning side (of the predominantly analytical) Anglo-Saxon philosophy, from which of course both utilitarianism and the fundamentals of neo-classical economic theory also result. The resisting fact is that Nietzsche, more than anybody, wants to question, but it is questionable to take his position today, especially in Germany¹²⁴. What prevails is that since Nietzsche and the concept of *uebermensch* is misguidedly associated with Nazism, Nietzsche is a taboo. Here, one must point out that Nietzsche's superman is exactly beyond man. To the contrary Nietzsche has stated e.g.:

What a blessing a Jew is among Germans!¹²⁵

Nietzsche (1976/1888:31)

What is awkward is that Wagner, a strong Anti-Semite, is *O.(ll) K.(orrect)* in modern society, but music is not evidently a part of modern understanding, in the modernist sense of reading of history. Another similar 'winner takes it all' paradox in contemporary sociology is the hailing of protestant ethics as the spirit of capitalism (in the positive meaning of capitalism). This is based on various (predominantly Anglo-Saxon) readings of Max Weber. Most references in English to Weber, refer to the 'original' from 1947 titled 'Economy and Society'. (Although Weber had been dead at the time for quite a time.) This work is a revised translation by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons edited by the latter. In connection to the 'spirit of capitalism' the above states that

[In dealing with modern economy] Weber takes certain conditions, which are more fully analysed in other parts of his work, for granted, or discusses them only incidentally. The first is that to a high degree, it is a 'rationalized' economy in which its bearers orient their decisions to the rational weighing of utilities and costs in a context of relatively wide scope. Closely related to this is the assumption of a 'mentality', a set of attitudes to economic activity relatively favourable to the functioning of such an economy. This consists, in a very broad sense, in the 'spirit of capitalism' which is so prominent in his sociology of religion. In part this involves a particularly favourable attitude toward, and ethical sanction of, acquisitive activity.

Weber (1947: 32-33).

¹²³ When arranging a workshop in Frankfurt on Gilles Deleuze and organising, (in the womb of Critical Theory) as late as in 1998, the suggestion of arranging a similar venue based on Nietzsche, was faced with comments of impossibility because of being and time.

¹²⁴ An interesting question regarding German post WW II cultural history is its divergent nature of its genealogy. Most of the so called elite culture coming out of the peristasis of Germany deals with the trauma of being German. One may also ask has the present also to do with the fact that there are so few Germans of Jewish origin left on German soil.

¹²⁵ In e.g. Nietzsche's posthumously printed notes published under the title *The Will to Power* there are over thirty references to Jews, all in mainly positive senses whereas i.e. he is quite critical of both Germans and the English cf. op cit p. 21 and 79.

When comparing the above with some of Weber's own text one gets an extremely distorted harmony. Together with Parsons' conclusion that Weber ultimately was against Marx, (op cit, p.6) Parson's above edition of "Weber" not only suited Parsons' own Grand Theories (1951a and 1951b). Since Parsons is the one who introduced Weber (and Durkheim) to the American audience Heiskala (1997: 57) the above reading of Weber has prevailed especially in theorising organising. The above in juxtaposition with what Weber says in the final pages of the conclusion of *Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism* is anything but a symbiosis:

[R]elinguishing human, faustian universality, is a condition for all successful activity in the modern world, action and self-denial presuppose each other inevitably in our days. This basic ascetic feature of the bourgeoisie lifestyle, if it wants to be style, and not absence of style has Goethe also, at the height of his life's wisdom taught us in "Wanderjahren", and in the end of life he gave his Faust.

Weber (1934/1978: 85).

Nobody knows who will live in the cage in the future, or if new prophets will rise at the end of this incredible development, or whether there will be a powerful rebirth of old thoughts and ideals, or, that neither will occur, mechanical petrification, trimmed with a kind of spasmodic self-indulgence. Then these words could be rightly said about the last humans in this cultural development: "Specialist with spirit, epicurean without heart, and this nobody believes that she has attained an unprecedented phase in human history". Ibid. p. 86

As Weber additionally states that acquisitive activity (desire for profits) 'has nothing to do with capitalism' (Ibid. p.6) Parson's conclusion is more than absurd.

The quite absurd and even polymorphously mystically deceitful servility of the virtue of efficiency is exactly politicized, localized and supervised by students in management. One of the microscopic conjugations of this dissertation is precisely that management *is* the *polis* of the theology of utility. Now the text is becoming repetitive. The point is to extend the concept of 'economy' to cover the accountability of any actualised organising, where theorising/practicing organising functions as its bookkeepers. It is a general house holding following Arendt's (1986/1958) lines of thinking. Arendt says that what formerly was private, that is house holding, has become public. But today, in contemporary capitalism, it is extremely difficult to separate the public from the private. In a poetical sense contemporary living resembles living in "aquarium-houses" with glass walls in the spirit of Ludvig Mies van der Rohe and Philip Johnson. An interesting connection is that they resemble the big windowed puritan Flemish houses, that have their roots in protestant ethics along on the other hand the lines of Weber (1988/1934) who traces the roots of capitalism to Holland and the Synod in Dordrecht 1618-1619. That was when the reformers fought for an individualistic

relation towards God. And all of a sudden The Netherlands started becoming a world power at least regarding trade. Another capitalist aspect of the reformation was that it leads to conflicts, wars and competition. The monopoly of the Catholic Church not only started shaking its power through the immoral Protestants, it also released power to the nation-states as potential competitors on the market for these lost souls. With the loss of the pastoral power that had kept the Catholic Church in metropolis the morale started (in a catholic sense) to become decadent. Trade, business and economic activities in general had been something if not strictly immoral at least trivial, now found a space not only in keeping more people busy in business, but all of a sudden being busy with agency involving finances (with the individualist view of God) gave room to think that this is not merely something for Semites.¹²⁶

Nevertheless the Catholic Church, and its ethics still govern contemporary man. The pastoral power has just moved from the church to the organisation. The liberalisation of nation-states from the monopolistic power of the Catholic Church, though, was needed as an intermezzo. Thus it was first the nation-state that started 'taking care' of its subjects instead of the church. Naturally these changes did not occur 'like a strike of lightning'. People still were more or less humble servants of God and frequented church masses if not voluntarily at least involuntarily until last century. The Catholic Church also dominated Jews in such a way that they had to move like nomads in such a manner that they became capitalists in more than one way. Capitalist spirit can be rooted in Hebraic thought in the sense that in their view (wo)man is not equal in front of God. In addition the Jews were partly forced to become capitalists since it was something more or less evil in older times especially the Dark and middle Ages.

¹²⁶ Anti-Semitism has some of its roots in the fact that Jews were known as good in dealing with trade and finances. Christians though, have themselves to blame for that in extraditing them from place to place. With this constant nomadism Semites obviously learnt about different cultures and brought novel ideas to their new addresses. Since they on the other hand were not Christians they did not need to follow the Christian morality regarding mammon, that is, in the eyes of the Christians. Basically of course they originally did not think highly of their professions either, but since they had no means of belonging to the higher ranks of Christian societies this was their trade as a restricted potentiality. Sombart (1911) has demonstrated how the presence of Jews often lead to the prosperity of their locations while areas that extradited Jews accordingly experienced economic decline. The no-mentions of the Jews in connection with economic history might just have to do with the holocaust, and as noted in a speech (December 11th 2002) by Imre Kertész, it is the great trauma of our times. Sombart's book which in part, see also the review in the American journal of sociology, is a good historical review, also involves dubious questions of ethnicity and race. The fact that Sombart later amended his theorising, after Hitler had come to power, to serve Nazi purposes, might also explain the negligence of his work. Nevertheless the work, in a historical sense demonstrates the substantial influence of the Jews upon economic history, regardless of morale. It also brings us to the point that much of the theorising regarding the influence of Christian morale upon Western civilisation, can of course be traced to the nomadic Hebraic culture and the Old Testament. Since this is not a treatment in economic history the theme will not be discussed further in this essay.

Being forced from place to place was becoming a predecessor of the contemporary polyphonic global individual. Not only did Jews learn new cultures, they also learnt languages. When the Jews were expelled from the Iberian Peninsula they were the only non-Hispanics who knew Spanish. It was thus no surprise that they took care of all the trade between Spain, at the height of its power, and the rest of the world.

With the contemporary speed in the divergence of information it is no surprise that organising is something that appears to be difficult. Plural 'truths' lead to problems because modern (wo)man is not accustomed to thinking beyond monist religion. The very nature of language and argumentation does nothing to improve the difficulty. Protestantism together with the Renaissance, have both facilitated the spread of liberalism and individualism. The problem perhaps is their awkward marriage with the monism of religion and the shepherding of Judeo-Christian tradition that still exists in novel forms of control today. Language is of course a form of accounting. Now we are back in Babylon and Egypt, but members of contemporary societies have to be accountable in enhanced manners. There are thus five simultaneous lines that draw the minimal contours of organising today:

The Pre-classical => accounting, order,

The Hebraic => nomadism, non-equality¹²⁷

The Judeo-Christian (especially Catholic) => monism, subjection¹²⁸

The Protestant => individualism

The Post-Renaissance => 'freedom'¹²⁹

This has led to the current interbeingness of the spirit of bourgeois living side by side with capitalist conceptualisations of freedom. Perhaps it is the final victory finalised by the genius disarmament of the American public sector for the sake of military spending as orchestrated by the B-class Actor Ronald Reagan, that was the decisive killing strike for the nation-state¹³⁰. In a sense the world is back to a monopoly. The power of the Catholic Church has just been replaced by the market. Today the church, which previously was the main building task of any polis, has just taken a few steps outside to the market (square). And to let those who trade their stuff there prosper the bourgeois take money away from the local government that still

¹²⁷ Meaning both with religious and cultural connotations. On the other hand it refers to a given uneven distribution. On the other hand it refers to the other, the different, and the outside.

¹²⁸ Subjection here refers to pastoral power. It signifies that individuals are treated as individuals under (sub-) a given code of conduct (ethics). They are thrown (-jected) below a preconditioning care or organising.

¹²⁹ One could also refer to +/- Marxist theorising as an additional element of freedom also in terms of its difficult relation to equality vis-à-vis Christianity.

tries to guide them wishing the people of the marketplace will hand them instead. Or perhaps hoping they will open a stand of their own. And this is of course a question of individualist ethics. But the market does not operate freely based on the wishes of these small actors. The market is not an open market. It is constantly being regulated by mainly those who have influence upon governments and other regulative instances.

The man who hit the words that Islam is the most growing religion in the world today is definitively out of bounds, because the ethics of utilitarianism are spreading all over our globe crossing every border of gender, ethnicity, culture, nation-state, political doctrine and other religion¹³¹. What is called management science is the polis, being the alma mater, the technology, the politics and the police simultaneously in the very same place, body, and soul. And when the *polis* takes place it takes the form of the poesis (saying) of tragedy. The polis is thus as Vernant (1972) would say that what performs the tragedy¹³². This alma mater is the metropolis of academia.

The project is also about a conceptualisation of organising based on the above along a transfusion of lines of texts by primarily Nietzsche, Heidegger and Deleuze. The thesis statement is that organising *is that which* actualises the virtual into the actual. This is illustrated by the paramount aim of this enterprise by developing metaphysics of organising.

This work is attracted to discussion within the extremely vast and colourful area of research that could be called literature in organising. It problematises some of the fundamental tectonic elements of this field of study. The interbeing thoughts that arise is that there are none. It deals with what is said within organising as well as what is not stated. Eventually it investigates why and how the modus operandi works as it does.

Eventually these microscopic interludes attempt to demonstrate different modes and means of the medium organising. The inclusion of these texts serves the purpose of demonstrating the multiplicity of organising as an actualising organ, not only regarding merely its content and contextual foci, but also regarding its extensions and non-extensions that are matters of language games, politics and aesthetics alike. In addition they are also included to

¹³⁰ And perhaps inventing new wars is the only droit d'être for this massive military apparatus that was left behind as a relic of the good old times of cold war.

¹³¹ It is actually quite amazing that the majority of the world's socialists, with some Fidel exceptions, have bought into the ideals of the market economy. Yet this paradox is hardly discussed in societies-at-large.

¹³² In Vernant (1972: 288) "Greek Tragedy: Problems of Interpretation." in Macksey and Donato (Eds.) *The Structuralist Controversy. The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man*. John Hopkins. Baltimore. (273-295) cf. Hirvonen (2000: 519).

demonstrate different intensities of organising. Obviously the paramount politics of the entire essay is a hailing of the the nomadic, of peregrination, not because it is a fundamental element of organising per se, but primarily because it is the essence of researching itself.

The ontological and epistemological ground on which the work rests on is the assumption that if there is such a thing as organising there must be a will and a care¹³³. This basis is henceforth referred to as *will/care*. According to Nietzsche this will should ideally have a vulgar morale. Shortly put this means that if one has a will/care regarding organising one should not have an ethics that prestructures or preconditions that organising. In principle if one really craves organising one craves knowing about organising this ‘knowing’ is ideally knowing as not-knowing. A preconditioned ethics of organising, however, already organises the world according to a given morale that states what is good and evil or good and bad...

In actuality, being-in-the-world, one cannot escape being organised. One’s any potential/real organising is actualised. Thus one cannot escape ethics, morale and order. At any given time/place/space organising *as such* can be politicised according to any potential structure. The very idea of organising can be related to an *oikonomia*, economising a household, an economy that is simultaneously both private and public.

Now, if we look at the classical iron-collars of representation, that according to Deleuze (1994/1968:262) are:

Identity in the concept
Opposition in the predicate
Analogy in judgement
Resemblance in perception

By giving something “an organisation”, as such, meaning that it is brought forth, brought to light, into the open, as on stage or in front of a trial as being performed, it is being identified (primarily in relation to previous contextual organising) and while it is named it simultaneously is judged and depending on its content it in-itself judges its environment. As it

¹³³ The will is derived from Nietzsche’s concept of ‘will to power’ *wille zur macht* and it is modified in accordance with Heidegger’s concept of care (*cura* or *sorge*). This is described in more detail in section 1.X. The main reason d’être of this conceptualisation in opposition to Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ is that this enterprise problematises the will as something beyond merely power. The German concept *macht* refers also to the will to be able to, as being potent, but it is not a question of any direct or indirect political influence as just an inherent force. Organising molds being as being-(more)-organised. It thus entails care, which for Heidegger (1926/1962) is the central aspect of being. In actuality this molding manifests itself, as such, much according to system and order.

is brought along and conducted to a place/space where it becomes talkative and thus is subject to other totalising and sovereign organisations.¹³⁴

What this means further is also that organising per se becomes a framework as perception/perspective. Eventually organising as such, as being professed and performed, becomes akin to knowledge and ethics of knowledge. Once it has been professed it is in the realm of actuality as actually structured. The way in which that structuring has taken place as been, become, being produced, extended, is, in any given space/place an organ or abstract instrumentalisation of the idea of god as “truth” in relation to “knowing about organising”. Thus what occurs when organising is actualised is that the production/becoming of that what is being organised simultaneously entails the coming about of the idea both as the idea as knowledge and its relation to ethics/god as well as the reproduction of the above as conducted, brought along. All the above maybe seen as inherent (though not given) parts of the process of the occurrence. The economy/structure of organising takes care of not merely the organised as a structure, it also orchestrates the organised as ‘knowledge’ in accordance to the local *polis*.¹³⁵

Organising, here, is viewed as *that what actualises* any potentiality/reality into the realm of actuality. In its will/care it brings along the intensity of its topology especially as experience/duration or rather as a multiplicity of local/temporal durations.¹³⁶ It is an extended event as performance/ being performed. As organising is actualised it is simultaneously producing and seeing itself being produced, but not merely as a product. It is also a question of being/becoming as being/becoming organised and thus becoming less not-organised. Thus no matter what organising touches it has influence upon future organising. As organising is recognised it now (in imperfectum) belongs to the realm of the cognised and identified (ratio cognoscendi). As something is actualised it no longer belongs to virtuality as it becomes ‘concrete’ (as such). This by no means that it would bear a given ‘true’ identity. This just implies that it is subject to or rather superjected below logocentrisms of whatever structures that are thrown over it.

The orchestration of organising is constitutive. But it is not directly deterministic. It advances along two main dimensions. These are the dimensions of the will/care.

¹³⁴ This conceptualisation is a fusion of Deleuze (1994/1968, especially p.191 ff) and Derrida (2000). It could in a broad sense also be traced back to the central arguments in Nietzsche e.g. (1984/1886) and (1988/1882). Obviously most of Deleuze’s work as well as his joint work with Félix Guattari share similar lines of thought.

¹³⁵ The polis here refers to the place/politics/police of the milieu of organising.

¹³⁶ The concept of duration *durée* is from Bergson cf Deleuze (1997/1962).

- 1) It is constitutive in the sense that the milieu¹³⁷ of any organising is “defined” by the locality and temporality of the particular organising. No other organising than the locally/temporally virtual or potential interbeing lines of organising are possible. This is the geopolitical location of organising. This constitution is the canvas/medium of having been portrayed as simultaneously having-traveled/being-at-home-with something.¹³⁸
- 2) Since that which is organised is along the ideas of Deleuze (1995/1968) and Deleuze and Guattari (1988/1980) is always a multiplicity there is an infinite potential for different possible outcomes of the orchestration of organising.

If one accepts the rhizomic Ibid (3-25) fabrication as basis of any becoming(s) one follows principles of infinite interconnectedness. The introduction of the rhizome as a tectonic base for the orchestration of organising means further that it is first of all a question of interbeingness. This means that every actualisation is basically a novel intersection of rhizomic lines that in principle lack both vertical and horizontal hierarchies.¹³⁹ Interbeingness means that every actualisation belongs to actuality that is in-between-things. It has yesterday, today and tomorrow built within it in opposition to the more orthodox ‘present’, which leans on yesterday/today.

The politics of this conceptualisation means that the rhizome is basically not interested in beginnings and ends, since it locates itself in the middle. It is a creative geopoliticalisation that lives out of the intermezzo. Deleuze and Guattari further argument that the *fabric* of the rhizome is the conjugation and, and, and.¹⁴⁰ The underlying thought of this thinking is that thinking/philosophising should be of a creative nature cf Deleuze and Guattari (1993/1991). In other words what thinking according to the above in terms of the love/friendship of wisdom is a question of adding to a discussing, merely as additions. The focal politics is to attempt to avoid a totalising, subjective writing/thinking.

¹³⁷ The French term milieu(x) is used throughout this work instead of environment, because it is more descriptive as both a mi = middle and lieu(x) one/several places. Milieu refers to a habitat, a middle and a centre as well as to a medium. It also has connotations to the verb *avoir lieu*, meaning to take place, to happen and to occur. See also Massumi’s (1988: xvii) translator’s notes of the English version of Deleuze and Guattari’s *Mille plateaux* (1988/80).

¹³⁸ This conceptualisation is translated from the Swedish terms *att vara bevandrad* and *att vara hemmastadd*. They both mean to know in the sense of having experienced in a similar vein of Heidegger’s conceptualisation of *aletheia*, truth/reality as bringing out into the open as bringing forth through experience opposite to ‘appearance’. This is obviously also closely related to the nomadic notion of moving *in-situ* as Deleuze (1995/1990: 138) cites Toynbee: “The nomads are the one’s who don’t move on, they become nomads because they refuse to disappear.”

¹³⁹ One of the main arguments of the rhizome versus the conventional tree-like, arborescent view of the world is that the rhizome principally lacks a given hierarchy whereas the tree is always hierarchical and binary in its structure.

Now this is where this Deleuzian/Guattarian problematisation becomes problematic. They argue further that the rhizome has a principle of asignifying rupture. This means that as a new part is added the rhizome no longer is as it used to be. Finally the writers argue for nomad thought, which is based on the idea of motion and escape. This is obviously in line with Nietzsche's idea of a vulgar morale.

One cannot however avoid the fact that one is in-the-world and thus (regardless of ideology and politics) always subject to different codes of ethics that are superjected upon man. Although the nomadic ideology follows the Nietzschean virtue the nomad is in the world and can thus be located and ordered according to signifiers as such. This is exactly why Nietzsche invented superman. Superman is what one should strive for, but man cannot become superman because (wo)man is (wo)man¹⁴¹. Only superman can "live" the eternal return of the will.

The politics of the above is the hailing of the will/care as an attraction to difference while simultaneously being attracted to the eternal return of the will/care as repetition. In an epistemological sense it is a question of having the *philos of sophia* as a principle where one as a norm must escape knowledge and wisdom as such. Along the lines of Derrida (2000) this can merely be attained beyond professing or performing, merely as *as perhaps*. As *as perhaps* knowledge belongs to the world of the potential and virtual. Also as long as something is problematised it is simultaneously both real and potential.

By a **repetition** of a fundamental problem we understand the disclosure of the primordial possibilities concealed in it. The development of these possibilities has the effect of transforming the problem and thus preserving it in its import as a problem. To preserve a problem means to free and to safeguard its *intrinsic powers, which are the source of its essence and which make it possible as a problem*. The repetition of the possibilities of a problem, therefore is not a simple taking up of that which is 'in vogue' with regard to this problem. ... The possible, thus understood, in fact hinders all genuine repetition, and thereby all relation to history. ... (A good interpretation must, on the contrary, decide) how far the understanding of the possible which governs all repetition extends and whether it is equal to that which is repeatable.

[Heidegger (1962: 211-12) cited in Deleuze (1995/1968:201). Emphases in the original except for the emphasis on the word repetition which is added.]

¹⁴⁰ On a rare Deleuzian treatise in management science see Bay (1998) which advances from the conjugativity of the rhizome.

¹⁴¹ Henceforth this essay will not concern itself with neutralising masculinely connoted expressions except in the appendixes. There are too many unvoiced/uttered indirect silences that organising takes care of. See e.g. Hearn (1996) for some of them.

Problematisation is of course attracted to affirming a will to search. In its Nietzschean sense it is devoted to a will to an indefinite, endless devotion towards searching, with a caring for motion. ***Problematising is the essence of researching.*** In the moment when researching stops it starts resembling death and religion. Knowledge as such, might not be static if we accept its interbeingness, but once it is professed (as *pro fateri*) as declaration and as acknowledgement it is attracted to sovereign orders that define it.

Every useless element (in the productive society) is excluded not from all of society but from its homogeneous part (p122 ff.) in *The Psychological Structure of Fascism* by Bataille. He states:

The common measure, the foundation of social *homogeneity* and of the activity arising from it is money, namely the calculable equivalent of the different products of collective activity. Money serves to measure all work, and makes man a function of measurable products. According to the judgement of *homogeneous* society, each man is worth what he produces; in other words, he stops being in existence *for itself*: he is no more than a function, arranged with measurable limits, of collective production (which makes him an existence *for something else than itself*). (Ibid. 123).

Management attempts to look like something quite different. Managers dressed in uniforms perform reforms. Managers dressed like masters are the true slaves of their rationality. Their suits suit them like any servants of a system. They might as well be dressed as soldiers, maids, prisoners or policewomen. Management is the police of the economic rationality. Management is the police (polis) in many senses; it is the sort of utopian, (ou topos), no place where utilitarian theorising comes into practice; and it is the politics of the absurd that is the politics of serving economic rationality or serving something non-existent.

5. Summary

<u>organising</u>		
as an ideology	relation to the world	geopolitics
<u>Utopia</u>	<u>Atopia</u>	<u>Metropolis</u>
oikonomia	abstraction	power/technique
god	abstraction/insecurity	power/technique
(wo)man	abstraction ¹⁴²	will/care (saudade)
knowledge	abstraction + insecurity	will/care + power, technique

Figure 1. Organising. The tectonic problems of its fundamentals

Would it seek a hierarchy it just might, be that is if there are *pro(s)per(ous)*¹⁴³ requirements

god

knowledge

oikonomia (as a structure, household, which is both private and public)

man

master/slave (the way in which the will/care or saudade comes about)

¹⁴² With reference to the work of Georges Bataille, who claimed that all communication is death, in the sense that in order to communicate one has to extend oneself beyond the self towards the other, thus becoming non-self or non-life.

¹⁴³ Proper referring to requirements of production and performance while prosperous requirements also include structure. this is in line with the 'abstract machines' of PROduction, Structure (with/without Search) and PERformance with an actual accentuation on production/performance. Cf utility. This nevertheless does not imply that there is something evil/wrong with such a politics. This is a conjugation/interlude in the discussion. Power and its techniques are per se beyond morale.

*Organising could also be reduced to having man (as master/slave) within the trinity god, knowledge, economy where they transgress each other and are almost synonymous and thus replicas and soon we are back to Plato and the question of mimesis...

*(Wo)man being both voluntarist/determinist through the will/milieu and collectivist/individualist always as a multiplicity and beyond order/disorder as 'as perhaps'.

*The force of the will/care is its intensity as being-at-home and as having-travelled, both and simultaneously both and neither.

The conjugation is to describe what organising is about in a different language - it is not a direct critique of theory in organising per se - it is rather a question of going beyond the commonplace dichotomy theory/praxis and discuss the area under scrutiny primarily by problematising organising.

The fundamental and minimal thesis statement is that organising is actualising...

Organising is not repetition when it really/potentially has the saudade to organise as being-at-home with homesickness of the unattainable.

Thetic thinking which this piece of work is an example of, regardless of saudade, as not knowing, and as such utopian, yet ever-present, the very idea of representation, or rather aesthetic of representation, might be that of breaking through to the other side, which of course is a utopian project and very actual, as a question of tautology

(For the ignorant reader the tautologies or repetitions in this bacterial work are an intentionally tautological or surtautological or more-than-tautological aesthetic. And purely merely of an interbeing conjugative nature.)

The interplay idea=god/knowledge/architecture=economy as orchestrating production/producing/being/becoming of any potentiality is somewhere in-between.

The genealogy of the contextual milieu of organising will constitute the virtuality of organising but the very nature of differences in intensities of the abstract machines that are unfolded in the occurrence of an event constitute the non pre-requisite “voluntaristic” nature of the ipso facto “constrained” milieux.

The multiplicity man/collective is brought into the open as actualised in terms of active/reactive in accordance with Deleuze’s Nietzsche. The point is sort of deconstructing Francis Bacon’s translated ‘knowledge is power’ *ipso scientia potestas est*.¹⁴⁴ This also brings a new Derridean (2000) dimension of *as if* which is in a sense a brutal combination of ostensive and performative definitions, Latour (1986). Meaning ‘scholars’ in this field, which is everywhere, and no-where use it and are being used by it as if it were knowledge/structure...

The enterprise attempts to demonstrate the actual state-of-affairs in all but some (in)Fidel exceptions in contemporary societies. The pinpoint is in a Deleuzian idiom to get in between things – to advance from the middle. This paper is based on the assumption that interbeingness and insecurity *are* essential elements of reality. This is the fundamental argument which geopoliticises organising as the basis which transforms potentiality into actuality. The utopia is atopic as security and abstraction as it is formed in metropolis especially as askesis.

Scholars of economics are *not* the paramount preachers of the market economy. Students in management and organisation are the archangels of economic theorising as organising as a theory/praxis spreads itself all over society from business schools to business, to schools, universities, hospitals and prisons. Everyone is hailing the virtue¹⁴⁵ of being utile with the virtue of efficiency, while being organised in a scientific manner. Because of the non-problematisation, there is no need for asking how this organising is taking place beyond something that is taken-for-granted.

In the classical age the world above the moon was seen as the world of exceptional order whereas the world below the moon was pictured as the place for birth, change and vanishment cf. Aristotle (1994: 87b 19-27). This work is not interested in the above or the *acro* it prefers the position below, or the *hupo*, and even the centre or the *metro*. What this enterprise is about is seeking the place/space where knowledge and power is actualised or being managed.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Only let the human race recover that right over nature which belongs to it by divine request, and let power be given it; the exercise thereof will be governed by sound reason and true religion
Francis Bacon (cited in von Wright, 1986:66.)

This place/space of organisation is where the actual is actualised. It is the event *in extensio*. This is its (metro)polis as materialising into local milieux as place/space/politics/police. On the other hand as virtual/real it resembles the *khôra* of Plato's *Timaeus* in that it both is and is not and is both this and that and neither. It resembles the *khôra* in that it is a receptacle, but it is not a receptacle of all becoming - it is that which transforms becoming into becoming-something. *Khôra* is formless whereas organisation or organising is already prestructured situated amongst organisations of other organisations. Yet it is not more than limitedly constitutive. Since it lives out of interbeingness and is always a multiplicity it never the less lives out of creation¹⁴⁶.

Organising is both endogenous and exogenous. Its endogeneity is what is constitutive in nature since the territory it is concerned with has its own particular *durée* as a multiplicity of durations-without-having-endured that are simultaneously attached to organising depending on the will/care of that which is being organised. This will/care is the particular multiplicity (in a particular territory) that forms organising as being organised and becoming organised at the same time, as an occurrence Whitehead (1941/1929) and Deleuze (1997/1966).

Organisations that do not become actualised in the sense of being organised, although they are very real, are always beyond the actual, as long as they are in a 'perfect' state or in an untouched virginal state. The organised is always imperfect because as it is uttered as belonging to the realm of organised, it can always be mutilated, and it can thus never be the same. As the imperfect has already been recognised it is attracted to (subjective) sovereign order. This by no means implies that there would not exist reconciliation regarding the tainting of that "imperfection". The multiplicity within the milieux gives organising its creative character.

The will/care of organising is that what draws the contours of the milieu(x) of all organising. It is what eventually territorializes as sketches. This means that in a given time/space a territory has a given will/care to organise. It might be called the *élan vitale* of organising in a broad sense. It is evident that in the event of organising nothing can be organised but the virtual. The will/care on stage has in other words predetermined what is virtual in the milieux of that organising. What on the other hand is *actually* organised is difference from the virtual.

¹⁴⁵ And it is a deceitful hailing since bounded rationality is 'common knowledge'. Once again *as if*.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Deleuze and Guattari (1993/1991) on creation and Derrida (1995/1993) regarding *khôra*.

This text examines the very idea of organisation in relation to both economy and society. It attempts to demonstrate that organisation *as such*, i.e. as actuality, is the centre of economy/society. It is the *metropolis* of economy/society as the actualising element of ideology/knowledge/economy in three senses. First, it is the alma mater of technologies of homo oeconomicus as the prime polis of the abstraction theory/praxis. Second, it is the architectonic base for, in a Marxist sense, ontologising methodology e.g. Kosík (1976). Third, it is the both exo,- and endogenous mechanism which mat(t)erialises individuals/collectives as producing/becoming organised. Organisation following both Deleuze (1994/1968) and Derrida (2000) *as perhaps*, as being virtual or being potential, as well as being real, as being-problematised, is something different, and belongs to the affirmation of the will/care, as long as it is not subjected to secure order¹⁴⁷. Following the minor logos of Deleuze, the virtual and the real are the same as long as the real is not actualised.

The endeavour of this project still is thus to try to illustrate how organisation locates itself amidst society/economy as praxis/theory aiming at uniting the discussion of the value of simultaneously critically studying economy/ideology i.e. utopia, and their (geo)politics. Ideologies of economy are scrutinized by means of their abstraction or atopy from reality as they occur in the vicinity of metropolis or how they are brought into the realm of actuality. It is not a question of attempting to reach acropolis or a valorisation of economic theory. It is rather an attempt at a reconciliation of Marxist, Non-Marxist and Post-Marxist theorising by combining ideas from Nietzsche and Heidegger claiming will/care is the ethical substance of organising in opposition to as Foucault (1997/1983:263) states what for the Christians was *desire*, for Kant was *intention* or today is *feeling* cf. Foucault (1997/1984). Globalisation or as e.g. Derrida (2000) names it *mondalisation* ('becoming-world') is obviously a relevant projection of the above.

This medium is brought forth by a study of the emergence of organisation as a branch of knowledge in relation to other analyses of society and capitalism cf. Weber (1988/1934), Arendt (1986/1958), Deleuze and Guattari (1983/1972),(1990/1988) as well as contemporary works e.g. Hardt and Negri (2000) and Marazzi (2002). This synthesis together with a Nietzschean (1987/1882) view of knowledge in combination with the Heideggerian (1962/1926) concept of *cura* (*sorge*) suggests that organisation does not subject but *superjects*

¹⁴⁷ This conceptualisation is derived from Nietzsche and especially the vulgar morale. It is linked to the idea of the death of God because without the death of God there is (in an ideal sense) not any pure/infinite potentiality. God as an idea pre-organises the world. Man in reality cannot escape the polis of ethics because ethics is indefinitely superjected upon man. This is why Nietzsche invented superman. But superman is beyond man. Only superman can ideally live the eternal return of the will, having a vulgar morale beyond good and evil. This living beyond morale is perhaps what is most problematic with Nietzsche especially connected to the genealogy of morals, pre-

as a continuum of a transgression of idea/knowledge/economy as an event that is always extended cf. Deleuze (1994/1968: 188-189) and Kosík op cit. 38, 50). This is summarized by locating organising as the geopolitics of actualising the virtual or potential into actuality. The very idea of organising can on the other hand be summed up as the difference between coming about and professing per se, i.e. problematisation.

Towards a general intellect or is it general economy?

A bacterial problematisation

The questions: Who is man? and What is man? prevail. Today, after realist/materialist/Marxist efforts in trying to solve this problem, the problem has turned upon itself. Because what modern organising in its (soft) HRM-policies have adapted is exactly the critique from the left. Today management actually *cares* about man. Management sort of has to have (as a precondition for good management, the sort of will/care regarding man that this text has professed as an ideal or as a minimal principle. But merely *as sort of will/care*. Because just like Marx, contemporary literature in (especially the first) management and organisation such care about man's being is along reasoning regarding man as if one would truly know what man is. This brings wannabe Marxists and capitalists alike to a-topical substances. Both Karl Marx and Mr Soft HaReM know the answer to the question: Who is man? with different emphases only. The former emphasizes man as the oppressed subject; the latter sees man as the empowered subject. Both know the 'true' self of man. Both put emphasis on the 'finitude' of man and man as a component in production (of nature). The first see capitalists and the bourgeoisie as 'evil' in saying they are non-human or inhuman because they attempt to serve utility. The latter think man is human and should therefore be treated according to the (social) psychology of his nature in order to serve utility.

Eventually and **as repetition** if one accepts interbeingness and regards ethics as superjected, man is not a subject under a pre-given ethos, subject to perform according to a given formula or code. Man is merely organised through several interconnected ethoses, that are projected above her, contingently so, unlawfully more or less subject to the one or the other depending on the genealogies of local milieux. It is (wo)man's own will/care that creates her. This will/care however has no knowledge of man as 'know-how' about questions regarding what or who is/are these social anomalies. But this *is* the power of freedom. This is the social animal's potency and impotence in contemporary idealism. This is what both capitalist and Marxist emancipation tries to hail but is unable to reach because of the urge to 'stick to reality'.

By clinging to the minimal tectonic principles of this essay this creative notion of a super-ethos of organising one may resemble the tragic character with the will to know and the care to organise and vice versa. This does not deny the significance of both primary ethics of materialism. Marxism and capitalism are supplements of each other but both are servile (slave-like) logics of the 'as such'. Neither has a will to confront (the insecure/ indifferent)

nature of potentiality or the 'as perhaps'. Contemporary thinking, therefore, regardless of ideals, exactly because of the preconditioning of the ideals per se, cannot avoid the limitations of bringing the general intellect/general economy out into the open. They belong in their unique ways to the realm of utopia and are atypical in character, at least when it comes to the notion of saudade as a weak or non-existent rhizome amongst them.

Whatever ideals contemporary (wo)men carry on their backs, like Singer's laundrywoman, there is this fear of life or is it fear of insanity.¹⁴⁸ Some cling to the bourgeois to bear with this uncertainty of ours, others believe in Gods, which come in all forms and colours through organs and media, id est. organising as such. Some stick to idiocy, in a Dostoyevskian fashion. This text has attempted at a transfusing irrationalities as a surreal, knowingly utopian, out-of-this-world project. As omnitudo and never¹⁴⁹. This is a bacterial conjugation.

¹⁴⁸ See the first citations of this essay.

¹⁴⁹ For an interesting explanation of these concepts see Fuglsang (2002).

List of References

- Agamben, Giorgio (1998): *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Stanford University Press.
- Agamben, Giorgio (1999): *Potentialities*. Stanford University Press.
- Agamben, Giorgio (2000): *Means without End. Notes on Politics*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Ahonen, Guy (1998): *Henkilöstötilinpäätös – yrityksen ikkuna menestykselliseen tulevaisuuteen*. Kauppakaari. Helsinki.
- Allison, David B. (Ed.) (1995/1985) 7th ed. *The New Nietzsche*. MIT Press. Cambridge.
- Alvesson, Mats and Stanley Deetz (1996): *Critical Theory and Postmodernism Approaches to Organizational Studies*. 191-217
- Anderson Paul A. (1983): *Decision Making by Objection and the Cuban Missile Crisis*. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. Vol 28: 201-222.
- Ansoff, Igor (1965): *Corporate Strategy*. Mc-Graw-Hill. New York.
- Arendt, Hannah (1958/1988): *Människans Villkor. Vita Activa*. Röda Bokförlaget. Eslöv.
- Argyris, Chris and Donald A. Schön (1978): *Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective*. Addison-Wesley.
- Aristoteles (1981): *Nikomakhoksen Etiikka. (Nichomachean Ethics)*. Translated by Simo Knuutila. Gaudeamus. Helsinki.
- Astley, W. Graham ja Andrew H. Van de Ven (1983): *Central Perspectives and Debates in Organization Theory*. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. 28: 245-273.
- Aurelius, Marcus (1982): *Meditations*. Penguin. Harmondsworth.
- Ayer, A.J. (1984): *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*. Vintage books. New York.
- Barnard, Chester A. (1938): *Functions of the Executive*. Harvard University Press. Cambridge.
- Barney, Jay B. (1991): *Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage*. *Jornal of Management*. 17: 99-120.
- Barney, Jay B. ja William Hesterly (1996): *Organizational Economics: Understanding the Relationship between Organizations and Economic Analysis*. In Clegg, Stewart R., Cynthia Hardy and Walter R. Nord (eds): *Handbook of Organization Studies*. Sage London. 115-147.
- Barthes, Roland (1982) 3rd ed.: *Image. Music. Text. Essays selected and translated by Stephen Heath*. Fontana. London.
- Barthes, Roland (1993): *Tekijän kuolema. Tekstin syntymä. (The death of the author. The birth of the text)*. Collected writings 1953-1978. Vastapaino. Tampere
- Bataille, Georges (1945/1994): *On Nietzsche. (Sur Nietzsche)*. Paragon House. New York.
- Bataille, Georges (1954/1988): *Inner Experience. (L'Expérience intérieure)*. SUNY Press. Albany.
- Bataille, Georges (1974/1992): *The Theory of Religion*. Zone Books. New York.

- Bateson, Gregory (1980): *Mind and Nature. A Necessary Unit*. William Collins. Glasgow.
- Bartunek, Jean M. (2002): The Proper Place for Organizational Scholarship: A Comment on Hinings and Greenwood. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. Vol. 47 (3): 422-427.
- Baudrillard, Jean (1991/1998): When Bataille attacked the Metaphysical Principle of Economy. In: Botting, Fred and Scott Wilson Eds. (1998): *Bataille: A Critical Reader*. Basil Blackwell. Oxford: 191-195.
- Bay, Thomas (1998): *And...And...And... Reiterating Financial Derivation*. School of Business. Stockholm University. Stockholm.
- Beer, Michael and Nitin Nohria eds. (2000): *Breaking the Code of Change*. Harvard Business School Press. Boston.
- Benoit, P., K. Chemla and J. Ritter (1992): *Histoire de Fractions, Fractions d'Histoire*. Birkhauser verlag. Basel.
- Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckmann (1967): *The Social Construction of Reality*. Anchor Books. New York.
- Bernard, L.L. Rev. (1911): Organismic Theories of the State. *American Journal of Sociology*. Vol 16 (6): 838-840.
- Borgert, Leif (1992): *Organiserandet som mode. perspektiv på hälso- och sjukvården*. Nerenius & Santérus. Stockholm.
- Botting, Fred and Scott Wilson Eds. (1997): *The Bataille Reader*. Basil Blackwell. Oxford.
- Botting, Fred and Scott Wilson Eds. (1998): *Bataille: A Critical Reader*. Basil Blackwell. Oxford.
- Burrell, Gibson (1997a): *Pandemonium. Towards a Retro-Organization Theory*. Sage. London
- Burrell, Gibson (1997b): *Linearity, text and death*. Key note presented at the conference: *Organizing in a multi-voiced world*. June 4-6. Leuven.
- Burrell, Gibson (2001): *Ephemera*. *Critical Dialogues on Organization*. *Ephemera*. Vol. 1(1): 11-29.
- Burrell, Gibson and Gareth Morgan (1979): *Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis*. Heinemann. London.
- Carnera Ljungström, Alexander: (1997): *The Alchemy of Law: On Friendship, Justice and Pathos*. English Summary (375-385).
- Case, Peter, Simon Lilley, Rolland Munro and John Sinclair: (1996): *RRE, Rapid Results Ethnography*. Paper presented at the 14th SCOS conference. University of California. Los Angeles.
- Chandler, Alfred. D. (1962): *Strategy and Structure*. MIT Press. Cambridge.
- Clegg, Stewart R: (2002): "Lives in the Balance": A Comment on Hings and Greenwood's "Disconnects and Consequences in Organization Theory?" *Administrative Science Quarterly*. Vol. 47 (3): 428-441.
- Clegg, Stewart R., Cynthia Hardy and Walter R. Nord (Eds) (1996): *Handbook of Organization Studies*. Sage London.
- Clegg, Stewart R. and Cynthia Hardy (1996): *Introduction. Organization, Organizations and Organizing*. Teoksessa Clegg, Stewart R., Cynthia Hardy and Walter R. Nord (Eds): *Handbook of Organization Studies*. Sage London: 1-28.

- Coase, Ronald H. (1937): The nature of the firm. *Economica*. 4: 386-405.
- Cohen, Michael D., James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1972): A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. 17:1-25.
- Cooper, Robert and Gibson Burrell (1988): Modernism, postmodernism and organizational analysis: an introduction. *Organization Studies* 9 (1):91-112.
- Cyert, Richard M. and James G. March (1963): *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm*. Prentice-Hall. Englewood Cliffs.
- Czarniawska, Barbara (1997): *Narrating the organization: Dramas of institutional identity*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago.
- Czarniawska, Barbara (1999): Management She Wrote: Organization Studies and Detective Stories. In *Studies in Cultures, Organizations and Societies*. 5 (1): 13-42.
- Czarniawska-Joerges, Barbara (1992): *Exploring Complex Organizations. A Cultural Perspective*. Sage. London.
- Czarniawska-Joerges, Barbara (1995): Narration or Science? Collapsing the Division in Organization Studies. *Organization*. Vol 2 (1): 11-33.
- Czarniawska-Joerges, Barbara and Pierre Guillet de Monthoux (Eds.) (1994): *Good Novels Better Management*. Harwood Academic Publishers. Reading.
- Czarniawska-Joerges, Barbara and Bengt Jacobsson (1995): Politics as commedia dell'arte. *Organization Studies* 16 (3): 375-394.
- Czarniawska, Barbara and Guje Sevón (Eds) (1996): *Translating Organizational Change*. Walter de Gruyter. Berlin
- Czarniawska-Joerges, Barbara (1993) *The three dimensional organization*. Studentlitteratur.Lund.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1983/1962): *Nietzsche and Philosophy. (Nietzsche et la philosophie)*. The Athlone Press. London.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1990/1988) : *Foucault*. Symposion Bokförlag. Stockholm.
- Deleuze, Gilles: (1991/1988) Afterword. A Return to Bergson. In Deleuze, Gilles (1997/1966)(4th Ed): *Bergsonism (Le Bergsonisme)*. Zone Books. New York.
- Deleuze, G. (1993/1988): *The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque.(Le Pli: Leibniz et le baroque)*. The University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis.
- Deleuze, G. (1994/1968): *Difference and Repetition (Différence et Repetition)*. Columbia University Press. New York.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1995/1973): *Nomad Thought. (Pensée nomade)*. In: Allison, David B. (Ed.) (1995/1985) 7th ed. *The New Nietzsche*. MIT Press. Cambridge.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1995/1990): *Negotiations, 1972-1990 (Pourparlers 1972-1990)*. Columbia University Press. New York.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1995): *Postscript on control societies*. In *Negotiations, 1972-1990 (Pourparlers 1972-1990)*. Columbia University Press. New York: 177-182.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1997/1966)(4th Ed): *Bergsonism (Le Bergsonisme)*. Zone Books. New York.

- Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari: (1972/1984) *Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia. (l'Anti-Oedipe. Capitalisme et schizophrénie Tome I)*. The Athlone Press. London.
- Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari (1980/1988): *A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia. (Mille Plateaux. Capitalisme et Scizophrénie Tome II)*. The Athlone Press. London.
- Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari (1991/1993): *Mitä filosofia on? (Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?)* Gaudeamus. Helsinki.
- Derrida, Jacques (1973): *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*. Northwestern University Press. Evanston.
- Derrida, Jacques (1981/1998): *From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve*: In Botting, Fred and Scott Wilson Eds. (1998): *Bataille: A Critical Reader*. Basil Blackwell. Oxford: 102-138.
- Derrida, Jacques (1983): *The Time of the Thesis: Punctuations*. In: *Philosophy in France Today*. Cambridge University Press.
- Derrida, Jacques (1987): *The Truth in Painting*. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago.
- Derrida, Jacques (1995/1993): *Khora*. In Derrida, J. (1995): *On The Name*. Edited by Thomas Dutoit. Stanford University Press. Stanford: 89-130.
- Derrida, Jacques (2000): *The University as a Place for Unconditional Resistance*. Lecture given at the University of Helsinki. May 25th.
- DiMaggio, Paul and Walter W. Powell (1983): *The Iron Cage Revisited . institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields*. *American Sociological Review* 48: 147-160.
- Ehrnrooth, Mats (2002): *Strategic Soft HRM: The Very Idea*. Svenska handelshögskolan i Helsingfors.
- Eisenhardt, Kathleen (1988): *Agency and institutional theory explanations: the case of retail sales competition*. *Academy of Management Journal*. 30: 488-511.
- Ezzamel, Mahmoud and Keith Hoskin (2002): *Rethorizing Accounting, Writing and Money with Evidence from Mesopotamia and Ancient Egypt*. In *Critical Perspectives on Accounting*:13, 333-367.
- Fayol, Henri (1949): *General Industrial Management*. Pitman.
- Follett, Mary Parker (1942): *Dynamic Administration*. Harper. New York.
- Follett, Mary Parker (1949): *Freedom and Coordination*. Management Publications Trust. London.
- Foucault, Michel: (1972/1983): *Vansinnets historia under den klassiska epoken. (Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique)*. Arkiv förlag. Lund.
- Foucault, Michel (1972/1984): *Preface in Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia. (l'Anti-Oedipe. Capitalisme et schizophrénie Tome I)*. The Athlone Press. London: xv-xxiv.
- Foucault, Michel (1974/1993) *Övervakning och straff. (Surveiller et punir)*. Arkiv förlag. Lund.
- Foucault, Michel (1997/1982): *Technologies of the Self*. In Foucault, Michel (1997/1994). *Ethics. Subjectivity and truth. The Essential works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984. Volume 1*. Edited by Paul Rabinow. Allen Lane The Penguin Press. London: 223-252.
- Foucault, Michel (1997/1994). *Ethics. Subjectivity and truth. (Dits et Ecrits)*. The essential works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984. Volume 1. Edited by Paul Rabinow. Allen Lane The Penguin Press. London

Foucault, Michel (1997/1994): What is Enlightenment? In Foucault, Michel (1997/1994). Ethics. Subjectivity and truth. The Essential works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984. Volume 1. Edited by Paul Rabinow. Allen Lane The Penguin Press. London:

Frost, Peter, L. Moore, M. Louis, C. Lundberg and Joanne Martin (Eds.): Reframing Organizational Culture. Sage. Newbury Park.

Fuglsang, Martin (1998): At vaera på graensen. En moderne faenomenologisk bevaegelse. CBS. Kobenhavn.

Fuglsang, Martin (2001) Paper presented at the "Practice(s) of Meaning" Workshop. September 24th – 25th. Utrecht.

Gagliardi, Pasquale (Ed.) (1990): Symbols and Artifacts : Views of the Corporate Landscape. Walter de Gruyter. Berlin.

Gherardi, Silvia (1997): Learning in the face of mystery. Paper presented at the "Modes of Organising" conference. University of Warwick.

Gioia, Dennis A. (1986): Symbols, Scripts and Sense-Making. In Sims, H.P et al (Eds.): *The Thinking Organization*. Jossey-Bass. San Fransisco.

Goux, Jean-Joseph (1990/1998): General Economics and Postmodern Capitalism. In: Botting, Fred and Scott Wilson Eds. (1998): *Bataille: A Critical Reader*. Basil Blackwell. Oxford: 196-213.

Guillet de Monthoux, Pierre (1978): Handling och Existens. –Anarkoexistensuell analys av projekt, företag och organisation. Nerenius & Santérus förlag. Stockholm.

Guillet de Monthoux, Pierre (1992): Det konstnärligas sublimes ledning. Konst, estetik och företag. Nerenius och Santérus Förlag. Stockholm.

Guillet de Monthoux, Pierre (1996): The Theatre of War: Art, Organization and the Aesthetics of Strategy. In *Studies in Cultures, Organisations and Societies*:2 (1): 147-160.

Guillet de Monthoux, Pierre (1998): Konstföretaget. Mellan spektakelkultur och kulturspektakel. Korpen. Göteborg.

Gustafsson, Claes (1993): Varför är det goda gott? Finsk Tidskrift. Häfte 7. p. 386-401.

Habermas, Jürgen (1984/1998): The French Path to Postmodernity: Bataille between Eroticism and General Economics. In: Botting, Fred and Scott Wilson Eds. (1998): *Bataille: A Critical Reader*. Basil Blackwell. Oxford: 167-190.

Hamel, Gary and C. K. Prahalad (1994): Competing for the Future. Harvard University Press. Cambridge.

Hannan, Michael T. and John H. Freeman (1989): Organizational Ecology. Harvard University Press. Cambridge.

Hardt, Michael & Antonio Negri (2000) Empire. Harvard University Press. Cambridge.

Hearn, Jeff (1996): Deconstructing the dominant: making the one(s) the other(s). *Organization*. 3(4): 611-626.

Hedberg, Bo (1981): How organizations learn and unlearn. In: P.C. Nystrom and W.H. Starbuck (eds.): *Handbook of Organizational Design* vol 1. Oxford University Press. New York: 3-27.

Heidegger, Martin (1962/1926): Being and Time (*Sein und Zeit*). Basil Blackwell. Oxford.

- Heidegger, Martin (1995/1935-6): Taideteoksen alkuperä. (*Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes.*) Taide. Helsinki.
- Heiskala, Risto (1997): Society as Semiosis. Neostructuralist theory of culture and society. Research Reports No. 231. Department of Sociology, University of Helsinki. Helsinki.
- Heiskala, Risto and Akseli Virtanen (Eds.) (forthcoming): Talous ja yhteiskuntateoria. Gaudeamus. Helsinki.
- Hietaniemi, Tapani (1998): Max Weber ja Euroopan erityistie. Vertailevia sivilisaatiohistoriallisia tukielmia. Tutkijaliitto. Helsinki.
- Hinings, C.R. and Royston Greenwood: (2002): Disconnects and Consequences in Organization Theory? *Administrative Science Quarterly*. Vol 47 (3): 411-421.
- Hirvonen Ari (2000): Oikeuden käynti. Antigonen laki ja oikeuden oikeus. Helsingin Yliopiston Verkkojulkaisut. Helsinki.
- Hofstede, Geert (1980): Motivation, leadership and organization: do American theories apply abroad? *Organizational Dynamics*. 9:43-62.
- Höpfl, Heather (1996): Authority and the Pursuit of order in Organizational Performance. In *Studies in Cultures, Organisations and Societies*:2 (1): 67-80.
- Höpfl, Heather and Monika Kostera eds. (2002): Interpreting the Maternal Organisation. Routledge. London.
- Jackson, Norman and Pippa Carter (1993): 'Paradigm Wars'. A Response to Hugh Willmott. *Organization Studies*. Vol 14(5): 721-726.
- Jeffcutt, Paul, Robert Grafton Small and Stephen Linstead (1996): Fore-Play: Organization as a Theatre of Performance. In *Studies in Cultures, Organisations and Societies*:2 (1): 3-8.
- Kanter, Rosbeth Moss (1990): The Change Masters. Unwin. London.
- Kearney, Richard (1988): The Wake of Imagination. University of Minnesota Press.
- Kirkeby, Ole Fogh (2000): Management Philosophy. A Radical Normative Perspective. Walter de Gruyter. Berlin.
- Kahneman, Daniel and Amon Tversky (1972): Subjective probability: a judgement of representativeness. *Cognitive Psychology*. 3:430-454.
- Kant, Immanuel (1784): Was Ist Aufklärung? Berlinsche Monatschrift. November.
- Kosík, Karel. (1976): Dialectics of the Concrete. A Study on Problems of Man and World. D.Reidel. Dordrecht.
- Kristeva, Julia (1980/1977): Desire in Language. A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art (Polylogue). Columbia University Press. New York.
- Kristeva, Julia (1984/1974): Revolution in Poetic Language (La révolution du langage poétique). Columbia University Press. New York.
- Kristeva, Julia (1993): Puhuva Subjekti. Tekstejä 1967-1993. Gaudeamus. Helsinki.
- Kunda, Gideon (1992): Engineering Culture: Control and Commitment in a High-Tech Corporation. Temple University Press. Philadelphia.

- Lawrence, Paul R. and Jay W. Lorsch (1967): *Organization and Environment*. Harvard University Press. Cambridge.
- Latour, Bruno (1986): *The powers of association*. In Law, John (Ed.): *Power, action and belief*. Routledge. London.
- Latour, Bruno (1999): *Pandora's hope – essays on the reality of science studies*. Harvard University press. Cambridge.
- Lehtonen, Turo-Kimmo (2000): *Virtuaalisuudesta*. *Tiede & Edistys*. Vol. 25 (1): 1-16.
- Levitt, Barbara and James G. March (1988): *Organizational Learning*. *Annual Review of Sociology*. 14: 319-340.
- Leskinen, Jaakko (forthcoming): *Gabriel Tarden arvoteorian lähtökohtia*. In Heiskala, Risto and Akseli Virtanen (eds.): *Talous ja Yhteiskuntateoria*. Gaudeamus. Helsinki.
- Lloyd, A. H. (1901): *The Organic Theory of Society. Passing of the Contract Theory*. *American Journal of Sociology*. Vol. 6 (5): 577-601.
- Lundwall, Sam J. (1973): *Den fantastiska romanen 3. Viktorianska framtidsdrömmar från Claës Lundin till H.G. Wells*. Gummessons. Stockholm.
- Lundwall, Sam J. (1977): *Utopia – Dystopia*. Delta. Bromma.
- Machiavelli, Niccolò (1513/1992): *The Prince*. (*Il Principe*). Dover Publications. New York.
- Mandelbrot, Benoit (1977): *The Fractal Geometry of Nature*. Freeman. New York.
- Marazzi, C. (2002): *Crisis: The New Political Structure of Capitalism*. Lecture given at the University of Helsinki. October 4th. Helsinki.
- March, James G. (Ed) (1965): *Handbook of Organizations*. Rand McNally. Chicago.
- March, James G. (1965): *Introduction*. In March, James G. (Ed) (1965): *Handbook of Organizations*. Rand McNally. Chicago: i-xx.
- March, James G. (1994): *Three Lectures on Efficiency and Adaptiveness in Organizations*. Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration. Helsinki.
- March, James G. (1996): *A Scholar's Quest*. Stanford University.
- March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen (1976): *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations*. Universitetsförlaget. Bergen.
- March, James G. and Guje Sevón (1988): *Behavioral Perspectives on Theories of the Firm*. In van Raaij, W. Fred, Gery M. van Veldhoven and Karl-Erik Wärneryd (Eds.): *Handbook of Economic Psychology*. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Dordrecht.
- March, James G. and Zur Shapira (1981)
- March, James G. and Herbert A. Simon (1957): *Organizations*. Wiley. New York.
- March, James G. and Robert I. Sutton (1997): *Organizational Performance as a Dependent Variable*. *Organization Science*. 8 (6): 698-706.
- Martin, Joanne and Debra Meyerson (1988): *Organizational cultures and the denial, channelling and acknowledgement of ambiguity*. Teoksessa L. Pondy, R. Boland and H. Thomas (toim): *Managing Ambiguity and Change*. Wiley. New York: 93-125.

- Maslow, Abraham H. (1943): A theory of human motivation. *Psychological Review* 50: 370-396.
- Mayo, Ethan (1949): Hawthorne and the Western Electric Company. The Social Problems of a Western Civilization. Routledge.
- Meyer, John W. and Brian Rowan (1977): Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremony. *American Journal of Sociology*. 83: 340-363.
- Mintzberg, Henry (1994): The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning. Prentice-Hall. Hemel Hempstead.
- Mir, Raza, Marta Calás and Linda Smircich (1995): Global technoscapes and unborn voices: challenges to theorizing global cooperation. Paper presented at the conference on organizational dimensions of global change. Case Western University. Cleveland.
- Morgan, Gareth (1986): Images of Organizations. Sage.London.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1878 2nd Ed./1993): The Birth of Tragedy. Out of the Spirit of Music. Penguin. Harmondsworth.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1882 1st Ed./1987): Den glada vetenskapen. (*Die fröhliche wissenschaft.*) Bokförlaget Korpen.Göteborg.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1883-1892/1989) Sålunda talade Zarathustra. (*Also Sprach Zarathustra.*) Carlssons. Malmö.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1886/1984): Hyvän ja pahan tuolla puolen. (*Jenseits von Gut und Böse.*) Otava. Helsinki.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1887/1989): On the Genealogy of Morals. (*Zur Genealogie der Morals*) Vintage. NewYork.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1888/1989): Ecce Homo. Vintage. New York
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1883-1888/1968): The Will to Power. [*Der Wille zur Macht. versuch einer Umwertung aller Werthe. (Studien und Fragmente.*.)] Vintage. New York.
- Nohria, N. and R. G. Eccles (1992): Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form and Action. Harvard University Press. Cambridge.
- Nonaka, Ikuru (1995): The Knowledge-Creating Company. Oxford UniversityPress. Oxford.
- Perrow, Charles (1986): Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay. Random House. New York.
- Peters, Tom J. and R.H. Waterman (1982): In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best Run Companies. Harper and Row. New York.
- Pettigrew, Andrew (1973):
- Pettigrew, Andrew (1985): The Awakening Giant. Continuity and Change in Imperial Chemical Industries. Basil Blackwell. Oxford.
- Pfeffer, Jeffrey (1982): Organizations and Organization Theory. Pitman. Boston.
- Pfeffer, Jeffrey (1997): New Directions for Organization Theory. Problems and Prospects. Oxford University Press. New York.
- Pfeffer, Jeffrey and Gerald R. Salancik (1978): The External Control of Organizations: a Resource Dependence Perspective. Harper and Row. New York.

- Piironen, Pekka (2000): Petos auttaa meitä tuhlaamaan. (Deceit helps us to spend) Unpublished working paper.
- Piironen, Pekka (2003): Teknologia. Draft for Heiskala, Risto and Akseli Virtanen (eds.) *Talous ja Yhteiskuntateoria*. (Forthcoming). Gaudeamus. Helsinki.
- Plato The Republic.
- Plato Timaeus.
- Pomay, Fransisco (1768): Magni Dictionarii Regii. Trium Linguarum. Pars II. Matthaei Rieger et Filorum. Augustae.
- Porter, Michael E. (1980): *Competitive Strategy*. Free Press. New York.
- Porter, Michael E. (1985): *Competitive Advantage*. Free Press. New York.
- Powell, Walter J. and Paul J. Di Maggio (Eds.) (1991): *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago.
- Prahalad, C.K. and Gary Hamel (1994): Strategy as a Field of Study: Why Search for a New Paradigm?. *Strategic Management Journal*. Vol. 15: 5-16.
- Rapaport, Herman (1989): Heidegger & Derrida. Reflections on Time and Language. University of Nebraska Press. Lincoln.
- Reed, Michael (1996): Organizational Theorizing: a Historically Contested Terrain. Teoksessa Clegg, Stewart R., Cynthia Hardy and Walter R. Nord (Eds): *Handbook of Organization Studies*. Sage London s.32-56.
- Rumelt, Richard P. (1984): *Toward a Strategic Theory of the Firm*. Teoksessa. *Competitive Strategic Management*. Prentice-Hall. Englewood Cliffs.
- Russell, Bertrand (1984/1912): *The Problems of Philosophy*. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
- Röpke, Wilhelm (1936/1951): *Taloustieteen perusongelmia*. (Die lehre von der wirtschaft.) Otava. Helsinki
- Salzer-Mörling, Miriam (1998): Murderous Ink. A case of rhetorical killing. *Studies in Cultures, Organizations and Societies*. Vol 4 (1): 125-145.
- Schein, Edgar H. (1985): *Organizational Culture and Leadership*. Jossey-Bass. San Fransisco.
- Scott, W. Richard (1992): *Organizaions: Rational, Natural and Open Systems*. 3rd ed. Prentice-Hall. Englewood Cliffs.
- Scott, W. Richard and John W. Meyer (1994): *Institutional Environments and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism*. Sage. Thousand Oaks.
- Selznick, Philip (1957): *Leadership in Administration*. Harper and Row. New York.
- Sevón, Guje (2002): Att uppträda som public. In: Berg, P.O., Anders Linde-Laursen and Orvar Löfgren (Eds.): *Öresundsbron på uppmärksamhetens marknad. Regibyggare i evenemangbranschen*. Studentlitteratur. Lund.
- Shapira, Zur (1995): *Risk Taking. A Managerial Perspective*. The Russell Sage Foundation. New York.
- Sievers, Burkard (1993): *Work, Death, and Life Itself. Essays on Management and Organization*. Walter de Gruyter. Berlin.

- Simon, Herbert A. (1945): *Administrative Behaviour* 2nd ed. Free Press. New York.
- Silverman, David (1970): *The Theory of Organizations. A Sociological Framework*. Heinemann. London.
- Silverman, David (1989): Six Rules of Qualitative Research: A Post-Romantic Argument. *Symbolic Interaction*. Vol 12. No. 2: 25-40.
- Sköldböck, Kaj (2002): *The poetic logic of administration. Styles and changes of styles in the art of organizing*. Routledge. London.
- Smircich, Linda (1985): Is the Concept of Culture a Paradigm for Understanding Organizations and Ourselves? In Frost et al (Eds.): *Organizational Culture*. Sage. Beverly Hills.
- Sun-Tsi (Sun-Tzu) (ca 500 eKr/2002): *Sodan taito*. Translated by Matti Ojonen. HKKK. Helsinki.
- Tarde, Gabriel (1902): *Psychologie économique*. Félix Alcan. Paris.
- Taylor, Frederick W. (1912). *Principles of Scientific Management*. Harper. New York.
- Thompson, James D. (1967): *Organizations in Action*. McGraw-Hill. New York.
- Townley, Barbara (1994). *Reframing Human Resource Management: Power, Ethics and the Subject at Work*. Sage. London.
- Tversky, Amon and Daniel Kahneman (1986): Rational choice and the framing of decisions. *Journal of Business*.59:251-284.
- Töttö, Pertti (1991): *Werner Sombart ja kiista kapitalismin hengestä*. Vastapaino. Tampere.
- Vernant, Jean-Pierre (1972): Greek Tragedy: Problems of Interpretation. In: Macksey and Donato (Eds.) *The Structuralist Controversy. The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man*. John Hopkins. Baltimore: 273-295
- Vincent, George E. (1904): The Laws of Hammurabi. *American Journal of Sociology*. Vol. 9. Issue 6.: 737-754.
- Virilio, Paul (1980/1994): *Katoamisen estetiikka. (Esthétique de la disparition.)* Gaudeamus. Helsinki.
- Vähämäki, Juhani (2003): *Kuhnurien kerho*. Tutkijaliitto. Helsinki.
- Ward, Lester F. Rev. (1897): Organisme et Societé; La Pathologie Sociale. *American Journal of Sociology*. Vol 3. (2): 258-265.
- Wallgren, Thomas (1996): *The Challenge of Philosophy. – Beyond Contemplation and Critical Theory*. Limes. Helsinki.
- Ward, Lester F. (Rev.) (1897): Organisme et Societé.; La Pathologie Sociale. *American Journal of Sociology*. Vol. 3 (2): 258-265.
- Weber, Max (1934/1988): *den protestantiska etiken och kapitalismens anda (Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus)*. Argos. Lund.
- Weber Max (1947): *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. (Translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons. Edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons.) The Free Press of Glencoe Collier-Macmillan Limited. London.
- Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. G. & c. Merriam Company. Springfield. Massachusetts. U.S.
- Weick, Karl E. (1979): *The Social Psychology of Organizing*, 2nd ed. Addison-Wesley. Reading.

Weick, Karl E. (1995): *Sensemaking in Organizations*. Sage. Thousand Oaks.

Weick, Karl E. and Frances Westley (1996): *Organizational Learning: Affirming an Oxymoron*. Teoksessa 440-458.

Wernerfelt, Birger (1984): A resource-based view of the firm. *Strategic Management Journal*. Vol 5: 171-180.

Whitehead, A.N. (1929/1941): *Process and Reality - an essay in cosmology*. 4th edition. The Social Science Book Store. New York.

Williamson, Oliver E. (1975): *Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications*. Free Press. New York.

Willmott, Hugh (1993): Strength is ignorance; Slavery is freedom: Managing culture in modern organizations. *Journal of Management Studies*. Vol. 30 (4): 515-552.

Willmott, Hugh (1993): Breaking the paradigm mentality. *Organization Studies*. 14(5): 681-719.

Wittgenstein, Ludvig: (1929/19xx): *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

Woodcock, George (1963/1979): *Anarchism*. Penguin. Harmondsworth.

von Wright, Georg Henrik (1986): *Vetenskapen och Förnuftet*. Söderströms. Borgå.

Article I

Harju, K. (forthcoming a) *Theorising in organising – Utopia, atopia and metropolis*. Translation of the forthcoming book chapter in Heiskala and Virtanen (Eds.) *Talous ja yhteiskuntateoria*. (Economy and social theory). Gaudeamus. Helsinki.

Article II

Harju, K. (2002) *Images of Madonna and fugue*. Book chapter in H. Höpfl and M. Kostera (Eds.) *Interpreting the Maternal Organisation*. Routledge. London: 137-154.

Article III

Harju, K. (1999) *Protext: The Morphoses of Identity, Heterogeneity and Synolon*. *Studies In Cultures, Organizations and Societies*. Vol. 5: 131-149.

Article IV

Harju, K. (2000) *Organizational Texts Lost and Found in the Architecture of Organizing*. *Studies in Cultures, Organizations and Societies*. Vol 6: 101-115.

Article V

Harju, K. (forthcoming b) *Inside Metropolis: Knowledge/Power – Who Cares?* Book chapter in Fuglsang and Sørensen (Eds.) *Gilles Deleuze and the Social*. The University of Edinburgh Press. Edinburgh.

EKONOMI OCH SAMHÄLLE

Skrifter utgivna vid Svenska handelshögskolan

Publications of the Swedish School of Economics
and Business Administration

93. KIM SUNDKVIST: Essays on Option Pricing with Smiles and Non-Constant Volatility. Helsingfors 2001.
94. PÄIVI VOIMA: Negative Internal Critical-Incident Processes - Windows on Relationship Change. Helsingfors 2001.
95. DARYOUSH FARSIMADAN: Reforming Public Administration Based on New Public Management Concepts. The Case of the Public Administration Reform in Kyrgyz Republic. Helsingfors 2001.
96. PETER ZASHEV: IMF in Eastern Europe - Success or Failure? International Monetary Fund Operations in Eastern Europe - Comparing the Results. Helsingfors 2001.
97. THOMAS SANDVALL: Essays on Mutual Fund Performance Evaluation. Helsingfors 2001.
98. MIKAEL VIKSTRÖM: Essays on Option Pricing and Trading - Evaluating the Effects of Dividends and Different Time Units in the Pricing Models. Helsingfors 2001.
99. KIRSTI LINDBERG-REPO: Customer Relationship Communication - Analysing Communication from a Value Generating Perspective. Helsingfors 2001.
100. JAN-ERIK KRUSBERG: Studies on Dumping and Antidumping Policy in Finland. Helsingfors 2001.
101. JAN-MAGNUS CEDERLÖF: Ecological Modernisation and Market-based Policy Instruments. The Use of New Instruments in Environmental Policy in Finland and Sweden. Helsingfors 2001.
102. AKU PENTTINEN: Peso Problems in the Level and Volatility of Stock Returns. Helsingfors 2001.
103. INGALILL ASPHOLM: Rättsekonomisk analys av revisors skadeståndsansvar i Norden. Helsingfors 2002.
104. JUHANI PEKKOLA: Etätyö Suomessa - Fyysiset, virtuaaliset, sosiaaliset ja henkiset työtilat etätyöympäristöinä. Svensk resumé. English Summary. Helsinki 2002.

105. MATS EHRNROOTH: Strategic Soft Human Resource Management - The Very Idea. An Exploration Into a Social Science. Helsingfors 2002.
106. PIA POLSA: Power and Distribution Network Structure in the People's Republic of China - The Case of an Inland City in Transition. Helsingfors 2002.
107. JOAKIM WESTERHOLM: The Relationship between Liquidity, Trading Activity and Return - Studies of the Finnish and Swedish Stock Markets. Helsingfors 2002.
108. ANDERS EKHOLM: Essays on Stock Market Reactions to New Information. Helsingfors 2002.
109. DANIEL PASTERNAK: Essays on Stock Options, Incentives, and Managerial Action. Helsingfors 2002.
110. NIKLAS AHLGREN: Inference on Cointegration in Vector Autoregressive Models. Helsingfors 2002.
111. HELI ARANTOLA: Relationship Drivers in Provider - Consumer Relationships. Empirical Studies of Customer Loyalty Programs. Helsingfors 2002.
112. RICHARD OWUSU: Collective Network Capability in International Project Business Networks - A Case Study of the Business Network for the Ashanti Electrification Project in Ghana. Helsingfors 2003.
113. WILHELM BARNER-RASMUSSEN: Knowledge Sharing in Multinational Corporations. A Social Capital Perspective. Helsingfors 2003.
114. MOHAMMED ABA AL-KHAIL: Essays on the Determinants of International Portfolio Investments. Helsingfors 2003.
115. ANNIKA VATANEN: Leader - Follower Relations in an Intercultural Chinese Context: Personal, Interpersonal and Behavioural Influences and Impact on Work Contribution. Helsingfors 2003.
116. ALEXANDER VON NANDELSTADH: Essays on Financial Analyst Forecasts and Recommendations. Helsingfors 2003.
117. DENISE SALIN: Workplace Bullying among Business Professionals: Prevalence, Organisational Antecedents and Gender Differences. Helsingfors 2003.
118. VESA PELTOKORPI: The Impact of Readily Detected- and Underlying Attributes on Social Integration in Cross-Cultural Settings: A Multi-Method Examination. Helsingfors 2003.
119. MARIA ÖSTERÅKER: Arbetsplatsens betydelse – från självklarhet till medvetenhet. The Meaning of the Workplace. English Summary. Helsingfors 2003.
120. KARL FELIXSON: Finnish Short-Term Stock Returns. Helsingfors 2004.