TY  -  
T1  - Emissions trading, non-compliance and bankable permits 
SN  -  /  
UR  - http://hdl.handle.net/10138/298116 
T3  -  
A1  - Lappi, Pauli 
A2  -  
PB  -  
Y1  - 2017 
LA  - eng 
AB  - We study non-compliance in an emissions trading system in which firms may bank and borrow permits. We find a condition involving auditing probability that characterizes compliance and allows us to analyze the time paths of actual emissions, reported emissions and violations. We find two interesting time instants. At the first time instant, reported emissions begin to be lower than the actual emissions, and at the second time instant, the reported emissions become zero and the actual emissions be... 
VO  -  
IS  -  
SP  -  
OP  -  
KW  - Banking; Compliance; Emissions trading; Enforcement; Monitoring; MARKET POWER; POLLUTION; ENFORCEMENT; BANKING; POLICY; FIRMS; QUANTITIES; PRICES; CHOICE; 511 Economics 
N1  -   
PP  -  
ER  -