TY  -  
T1  - Essays on Stock Option Compensation and the Role of Incentives and Risk (summary section only) 
SN  - 951-555-827-1 /  
UR  - http://hdl.handle.net/10227/98; URN:ISBN:951-555-827-1 
T3  - Economics and Society 
A1  - Rosenberg, Matts 
A2  -  
PB  - Svenska handelshögskolan 
Y1  - 2004 
LA  - eng 
AB  - Managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity has increased rapidly around the world. Early empirical research showed that pay-for-performance sensitivity resulting from stock ownership and stock options appeared to be quite low during the 1970s and early 1980s in the U.S. However, recent empirical research from the U.S. shows an enormous increase in pay-for-performance sensitivity. The global trend has also reached Finland, where stock options have become a major ingredient of executive compensati... 
VO  -  
IS  -  
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KW  - agency costs; capital expenditures; contract design; employment growth; firm risk; firm value; optimal contracting; principal-agent theory; stock option incentives; Finance 
N1  -   
PP  -  
ER  -