TY  -  
T1  - Evolution of iterated Hawk-Dove games with quitting : adaptive dynamics approach with population embedding 
SN  -  /  
UR  - URN:NBN:fi:hulib-202011254596; http://hdl.handle.net/10138/321918 
T3  -  
A1  - Laurén, Toni 
A2  -  
PB  - Helsingin yliopisto 
Y1  - 2020 
LA  - eng 
AB  - The Hawk-Dove game has been used as a model of situations of conflict in diverse fields as sociology, politics, economics as well as animal behavior. The iterated Hawk-Dove game has several rounds with payoff in each round. 

The thesis is about a version of the iterated Hawk-Dove game with the additional new feature that each player can unilaterally decide when to quit playing. After quitting, both players return to the pool of temporally inactive players. New games can be initiated by random... 
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KW  - Game theory; adaptive dynamics; invasion fitness; mixed strategy; iterated games; singular strategy; Soveltava matematiikka 
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ER  -