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T1  - Robot Responsibility and Moral Community 
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UR  - http://hdl.handle.net/10138/336585 
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A1  - Gogoshin, Dane Leigh 
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Y1  - 2021 
LA  - eng 
AB  - It is almost a foregone conclusion that robots cannot be morally responsible agents, both because they lack traditional features of moral agency like consciousness, intentionality, or empathy, and because of the apparent senselessness of holding them accountable. Moreover, although some theorists include them in the moral community as moral patients, on the Strawsonian picture of moral community as requiring moral responsibility, robots are typically excluded from membership. By looking closely ... 
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KW  - 611 Philosophy; moral responsibility; moral agency; robot moral agency; artificial moral responsibility; accountability structures 
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