TY  -  
T1  - Stock Option Compensation in Finland: An Analysis of Economic Determinants, Contracting Frequency, and Design 
SN  - 951-555-806-9 /  
UR  - http://hdl.handle.net/10227/182; URN:ISBN:951-555-806-9 
T3  - Working Papers 
A1  - Rosenberg, Matts 
A2  -  
PB  - Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration 
Y1  - 2003 
LA  - eng 
AB  - This paper addresses several questions in the compensation literature by examining stock option compensation practices of Finnish firms. First, the results indicate that principal-agent theory succeeds quite well in predicting the use of stock options. Proxies for monitoring costs, growth opportunities, ownership structure, and risk are found to determine the use of incentives consistent with theory. Furthermore, the paper examines whether determinants of stock options targeted to top management... 
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KW  - stock option incentives; principal-agent theory; contract design; Finance 
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