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The concept of nationalism in discussions on a European society

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ABSTRACT

In scholarship, nationalism has been found to be an integral ingredient of any sense of nationhood. In everyday public use, nationalism is used as a term of disapproval. The stubborn discursive border between the two uses of the concept of nationalism evokes questions about the historical preconditions of creating an ism concept based on the roots 'nation' or 'national'. In the period often called 'the age of nationalism', from the French Revolution to the First World War, nationhood was essentialized in ways that did not allow nations to be explained as constructions of any ism. 'Nationalism' gained popularity from the 1890s onwards as a critical concept directed at ideas and actions that broke against what was seen as the legitimate role of a nation. Defining the role of nations and nationhood took place in a series of political contests utilizing the concept of nationalism. Debates on Europe and 'European society' created one of the contexts of these contests. In current scholarly discussion on the idea of a European society, the critique of 'methodological nationalism' has been targeted at the nation-state-bound notion of society. However, in much of policy-oriented research and policy planning, the references to nationalism only contain views and actions found to be reactions against globalization and European integration. 'Nationalism' does not apply to efforts to improve 'our' national and European competitiveness nor 'our' joint EU policies of external bordering.

Nationalism is a key concept in the age of nation states and modernity, but it has rarely worked as a concept of self-identification.¹ Nationalist language is intertwined with many different ideologies,² although those who use nationalist language often fail to recognize it. Nationalism is the rhetoric of nation,³ yet this rhetoric is often vigorously opposed to 'nationalism'.

Research on nationalism has expanded since the 1970s, but the ordinary uses of the concept of nationalism are far removed from the ways nationalism studies apply the concept. General usage seems to be especially immune to the influence of scholarly language, but scholars have shown little interest in why that is. I will argue that nationalism studies would benefit from taking this question more seriously.

In scholarly use, the concept of nationalism extends to ideas that have been constitutive of modern political forms of social life. Nationalism provided motivations and legitimizations for nation states and the international system based on nation states, and people adopted it as an unquestioned view on how social reality is constructed. Nationalism research has endeavoured to problematize and historicize nationhood and the nation state. The emergence of 'transnational history'⁴ contributes to this research insofar as it is not defined by 'transnational' as opposed to 'national' research objects, but transnational history is understood as an approach interested in transnational dynamics that have played a crucial role in the making and remaking of nations and nation states.

The 'nationalism' of current nationalism research is reflexively distant from modes of thought and action that have been adopted as taken-for-granted premises and frames of politics, economics and culture. In reflections on 'methodological nationalism' and how to overcome it,⁵ the concept of nationalism is applied to unquestioned premises of the research itself. A central concept found to be charged with this kind of nationalism is 'society'. The notion of society as an integrated holistic entity within the borders of the nation state appears not only in public debates but also in scholarly texts, and especially in comparative studies. As Craig Calhoun notes, 'Sociologists draw more of their concept of society from the nationalist imaginary than they realize.'⁶

The effort to distance scholarship reflexively from what is taken for granted in the order of nations and nation states may find support in certain influential contemporary diagnoses of social and political transformations. Many observers have argued that globalization and European integration

have fractured nationalism. It is easy to agree that the fate of nationhood and the nation state is a central topic in public debates on globalization and European integration. However, one may ask whether the fracturing of nation-centred modes of thought and action has actually changed the uses of the concept of nationalism. If this is the case, we might expect to find such changes in contexts where a key concept laden with 'the nationalist imaginary' appears, namely the concept of society.

Indeed, in political as well as scholarly debates on European integration, the concept of society is often provided with the transnational attribute 'European'. Does this not mean that the nationalist imaginary of 'society' is breached? If it does, the horizon would be open to changing the uses of 'nationalism', that is, there would be changes concerning the criteria of the situations in which the term is used, its range of references, and the valuations associated with the term.⁷

I discuss this question by tracing usages of 'nationalism' since the early 19th century in contexts in which 'Europe' and 'European' appeared as attributes to social entities, especially to those linked to the concept of society.⁸ I have made use of Google Ngram Viewer to find relevant texts, well aware of the need for caution with this instrument.⁹ I then proceed to examine the relationship between nationalism and a European society in texts that either self-define or examine recent and current European integration. What kinds of verbal and non-verbal actions have been called nationalism in connection with varying notions of a European society? I examine these questions by using EU policy documents and studies on EU integration, especially those focusing on the 'social dimension' of European integration and that are related to recent and current 'strategies' of the European Union, including the so-called Lisbon strategy (2000–2010) and the subsequent Europe 2020 (2010–2020).

In my historical approach I take the temporalization of modern political concepts as a point of departure. Temporalization, including the temporalization of the concept of history itself, made concepts into 'instruments for the direction of historical movement'¹⁰ and adding isms was a mode of temporalization. It is, however, true that isms were often introduced as labels for ideas to be opposed – as examples of wrong ways to steer historical movement – and only later were adopted as concepts for self-description. Furthermore, in the process of ismification, narratives were constructed in which earlier thinkers who never used the concept were defined as representatives of the ism in question, Locke's 'liberalism' being an example. 'Nationalism' and 'nationalists' were also defined retroactively.

However, 'nationalism' failed to be widely adopted as a term of self-description or as a correct 'instrument for the direction of historical movement', which makes it different from 'liberalism', 'conservatism' and 'socialism'. Why were those individuals who found nations in general and their own nation in particular pivotal agents of world history so reluctant to add 'ism' to 'national' in their self-descriptions? Despite the later efforts of nationalism researchers, self-critical historians and social scientists, the term 'nationalism' conventionally only refers to a very specific selection among a wide range of ideational and practical modes of expressing and reproducing nationhood, national perspectives and the world order based on nation states. Why has the concept of nationalism failed as a concept of self-identification as well as an attractive descriptive concept for all kinds of support of national interests, institutions and identities? Does the questioning of a nation state and a nation-state-bordered notion of society in debates on globalization and European integration not imply changes in the usage of 'nationalism'?

The limits of ismifying nation and national

The concepts of nation and national were politicized by the French Revolution. These words had a long history. 'Nationalism' did not; yet in the late 18th century it occasionally appeared in writings on political philosophy. In 1774, Johann Gottfried Herder criticized those who labelled the animosity between two nations as merely prejudices, mob-thinking and 'limited nationalism' (*eingeschränkter Nationalism*, interestingly not *Nationalismus*), thus obviously assuming that his audience was familiar with the word.¹¹ Yet, while the concepts of nation and national gained popularity after the French Revolution, nationalism was frequently used much later, at the turn of the next century.

In the early 19th century, the rare uses of nationalism seem to have occurred mostly in the field of religious discourse. In 1840, a historian of Christianity, Henry Milman, described the early history of Christianity as breaking the borders of 'the rigid nationalism of the Jew'.¹² In Catholic reviews of the mid-19th century, nationalism occasionally appeared as a tool of current political contestations. The 'catholic' essence of Christian religion was defended against nationalism. This was associated with the Reformation as well as with the French Revolution, that is, with wrong attempts to extend the temporal order of nation and nationality into the spiritual sphere in which the universal order of the Catholic Church should prevail.¹³

However, the word nationalism seldom appeared before the end of the 19th century and was certainly not a central concept in the European nation-building processes. The emerging national movements in Europe or in Latin America did not adopt nationalism as a concept of self-description, at least not in any programmatic sense. In the texts captured by Google Ngram Viewer the relative frequency of 'nationalism' – and its equivalents in other European major languages – began to rise only in the 1890s, at the end of the century, often characterized afterwards as the age of nationalism.

True, since the end of the 19th century, 'nationalism' and 'nationalist' were in some cases quietly approved as characterizations of one's own political stand. Irish nationalism seems to be a late 19th-century example of this kind of approval. We may even find cases where nationalism was publicly adopted as the label of one's own political project, denying, at the same time, the alleged identity of nationalism and extremism. The history of Basque nationalism, notably *Partido Nacionalista Vasco*, founded in 1895, indicates such an adoption of nationalism as a concept of self-identification. Nationalism was a word in the external rulers' language (in the Irish case English, in the Basque case Spanish or French) and adopted as the equivalent to something that in the vernacular language was expressed through a means other than an ism.¹⁴

However, it appears unusual that a national movement accepted 'nationalism' as a synonym for the vernacular expressions of its ideology.¹⁵ In the European vocabularies of 'the age of nationalism', in general, nationalism was a rare word until the 1890s, and it was, and kept being, a term to express disapproval in contrast to concepts of selfidentification such as 'Catholicism', 'patriotism' or 'internationalism'. It referred to politics pushing the worldly principles of nationhood into the sphere of Catholic universalism, to policies of a foreign country, or of groups in foreign countries, threatening the valuable aspirations of one's own nation, or to the opposition against the peaceful international cooperation or the international solidarity of the working class.

However, in the United States political language was shaped in a different way, and this can be seen in the use of the concept of nationalism in the late 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century. Nationalism could be used as an analytical and political concept for describing and advocating modern progress. Reading just a few American texts may help explain why nationalism in Europe failed to play this kind of role.

In 1868, three years after the end of the US Civil War, Francis Lieber contributed to the victorious presidential campaign of General Ulysses S. Grant by publishing a pamphlet called *Fragments of*

Political Science on Nationalism and Inter-Nationalism. The Prussian-born professor of Public Law at Columbia College, New York, argued that 'the national polity' was 'the normal type of modern government'. He also pointed out that a characteristic of the modern world was the increasing 'interdependence' between the nations. The concepts of nationalism and internationalism referred to these two closely related sides of the same large process of civilization, in which the 'Cis-Caucasian race' had played a leading role. Internationalism and nationalism needed each other. Lieber sharply rejected not only communism but also the 'anti-nationalism' of those ideas of European unity that did not recognize the importance of nationhood.¹⁶

Despite the title of his pamphlet, however, Lieber's central concepts were not 'nationalism' and 'internationalism', but 'nationalization' and 'internationalization'. The concepts referred to varying historical processes of nation building and the reinforcing interdependence of nations. 'The different processes of Nationalization form one of the most instructive subjects in the whole history of civilization.'¹⁷ He had already used the concept of nationalization in this way in his *Manual of Political Ethics*, published in 1839.¹⁸

Two decades later, Edward Bellamy, the author of the popular Utopian novel *Looking Backward: From 2000 to 1887*, provided 'nationalism' and 'nationalization' with more programmatic and radical contents. Bellamy founded a network of clubs called Nationalists. 'Nationalism is economic democracy', he defined. It would be achieved by the 'nationalization of industries' and realizing 'the brotherhood of humanity'.¹⁹ Less radical political programmes could be called 'nationalism' as well. In 1910, former President Theodore Roosevelt introduced his Progressive programme 'The New Nationalism', aiming to reinforce and extend the responsibilities of the federal – that is, national – government. This was the main slogan, admittedly unsuccessful, for his campaign in the presidential election of 1912.²⁰

In the United States, the concept of nation came to refer to a constitutional political community. The nation could be conceived as a political construction based on universal principles, thus being unique and universalistic at the same time. It was possible to apply the concept of nationalism to efforts fostering the progress of this consciously constructed community. As Lieber's writings indicate, from a US perspective 'nationalism' and 'internationalism' could also have been adopted as concepts for a historical interpretation of what had been and was going on in the world and, especially, in Europe. The concepts referred to modes of thought and action that corresponded to and promoted the ongoing processes of political progress.

Applying the Koselleckian approach, one can say that in the United States it was possible to temporalize the concept of nationalism in a way that it could be used as 'an instrument for the direction of historical movement'. However, in addition to 'nationalism', 'nationalization' also deserves attention here. Isms and izations can be defined as two different modes of temporalization. While isms appear as right or wrong instruments for the direction of historical movement, or history conceived as progress or development, izations are concepts for this movement itself.

The steps from the root word to the ism and further to the ization seem to proceed neatly in series such as 'liberal', 'liberalism', 'liberalization' and 'social', 'socialism', 'socialization'. They did so also in the way Lieber and Bellamy interlinked 'national', 'nationalism' and 'nationalization'. However, this triangle did not get established. Bellamy's 'nationalism' did not manage to substitute for 'socialism' – a word that, by virtue of its much more widely adopted negative connotations, was better applied to political struggles. The way Bellamy used 'nationalization' proved to be more successful. 'Nationalization' was generally adopted as synonymous with 'socialization', also in Europe, especially after the Second World War. Thus, socialism appeared as internationalism aiming at nationalization. On the other hand, Lieber's 'nationalization' did not gain great success. The word was, and has been, seldom used as a concept for nation building.²¹ In any case, as Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism implies, adding ism to 'national' without moving from a positive word to a negative one was easier to do in the United States than in Europe.

The idea of the nation as a political rather than ethnic community was far from absent in Europe. Yet those developing this idea did not adopt 'nationalism' as the concept for their own view. One does not find nationalisme in Ernest Renan's *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* (1882), conventionally regarded as a key text of nationalism, notably the political variant of nationalism. In the most-often cited part of his lecture, Renan declared that 'a nation's existence' was 'a daily plebiscite'. However, we should see this in connection with his other main point of view. He emphasized that a shared history, consisting of remembering and forgetting, formed the basis of the nation.²² It is reasonable to surmise that, in Renan's view, the shared history of sacrifices and sufferings guaranteed the invariant result of the daily plebiscite.

As argued by many recent contributors to nationalism studies, the distinction influentially proposed by Hans Kohn in 1944 between 'Western' civic and 'Eastern' ethnic nationalisms²³ should be rethought. Different combinations of these ideational elements were pivotal in any notions of

nationhood.²⁴ The combinations appeared in constructions of national past, including also those constructions that pointed out shared experiences instead of blood ties.

Nationhood was tied with the past in a way that essentialized the nation and made 'nationalism' too constructivist and too voluntarist to be used as a concept for its ideational and institutional contents. It would not have gained popularity in describing the nation and nationality as a result of the activities of nationalism and as an outcome of the processes of nationalization. Belonging to a nation was not an act of any ism. The consciousness of belonging could be expressed by an ism, not nationalism, but rather patriotism – the concept for how emotions, thoughts and actions had to be orientated according to the intergenerational continuity of community – now associated with nationhood.²⁵ Later, in radical right-wing ideas as in German National Socialism, 'nationalism' could be used for the willingness to act according to what the nation demanded.²⁶ However, in widespread and long-standing conventional usage, 'nationalism' was established as a concept for ideas and actions breaking away from what was supposed to be the essential, and thus legitimate, role of nationhood in the temporal and spatial order of the world. Defining this role was an issue of political contests including those that appeared when nationhood was discussed in relation to Europe and 'European society'.

European society in 19th-century experiences and expectations

Many different ways of writing about 'European society' emerged in connection with the 19th-century transformations in which the horizon of expectation became coloured by the intertwined notions of modernity and nationhood. These different usages were actualized later in changing and varying contexts. However, during the 'long' 19th century, between the French Revolution and the First World War, the link was reinforced between the concepts of society and nation. Such a concept of society could not easily be converted into a tool for describing or advocating transnational extensions of social solidarity.

Several political thinkers had developed plans for European peace in the 17th and 18th centuries, and following the French Revolution and during the final phase of the Napoleonic wars, Henri de Saint-Simon and Augustin Thierry joined that tradition.²⁷ *De la reorganization de la société européenne*, published in 1814, was their radical post-Napoleonic design for a European federation.

La société européenne would unite European peoples as one political body, while at the same time it would conserve the national independence of each country.²⁸ However, the later 19th-century visionaries of a united Europe, including Giuseppe Mazzini, Victor Hugo and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, did not use 'European society' for the name of their future goals, as had Saint-Simon and Thierry. According to tentative findings, when they wrote about a 'European society', it was meant to express general characteristics and developments of European countries, as it was in many other texts, too.²⁹

Linked with the tradition of elaborating the idea of Europe, 'European society' appeared in the constructions of the past. In his *Histoire générale de la civilisation en Europe* (1828), the French historian François Guizot wrote about 'European society' when depicting different historical forms of a 'European civilization'.³⁰ Not infrequently, 'European society' served comparative ambitions. For example, during her American visit in the 1830s the English social theorist Harriet Martineau had witnessed how a former senator in his speech contrasted 'the worst circumstances of European society' with 'the best of New England arrangements'.³¹

The 'European society' of Saint-Simon and Thierry in 1814 had been a 'society' in the framework of political philosophy and referred to a political entity. In the 19th century many social theorists contributed to another kind of notion of society. 'Society' came to imply processes, relationships and structures that could not be reduced to the intentions of a society's leaders and members. Among the founders of sociology, Émile Durkheim was most interested in the possibility and factuality of society. In his *De la division du travail social* (1893), he also pondered possibilities of a Europe-wide society to be based, as any modern differentiated society, on 'organic solidarity'. He found a tendency towards such a European society, even towards a worldwide society, but doubted if a necessary condition, a collective self-consciousness reflecting generalized values, could be achieved, not least because this proved to be difficult even in single European countries. It is important to note that Durkheim here applied the same concept of society on the national and European scale. As Gerard Delanty concludes, 'Durkheim believed that the formation of a European society was simply a reproduction of the nation-state, albeit on a larger scale'.³²

In the 19th century, the concept of society was defined in various ways by making distinctions between state and society. In these distinctions, society was defined as the sphere of private needs and interests, voluntary actions and public opinion, or a target of the state's regulative knowledge and policies. Sometimes 'society' could still work as a term used for the state, as the history of Nordic

political concepts indicates.³³ However, the different distinctions and connections defining the concept of society were located in the framework of nationhood and, in turn, reinforced the unquestioned role of this framework for the use of 'society'.

This definition of 'society' was not an appropriate tool for advocating European unity, but it was easy to bestow on this concept of society the attribute 'European' in the context of nation building. As a temporalized concept, 'European society' referred to a path of development characteristic of European countries and thus came to play a role in the construction of national political agendas and agents. It could help the elites of less-developed countries adopt an active peripheral perspective, as they found it possible to foresee their own futures by observing how 'European society' was formed in the most developed countries. That was the way a leader of the Finnish national movement, Yrjö Koskinen, wrote about 'European society' in a text that placed the so-called labour question onto the political agenda in Finland.³⁴

While 'European society' was used as a conceptual tool in the promotion of the national political agenda and agency, 'nationalism' was usually not. 'Nationalism' did not play a central role in the texts of the 19th-century advocates of European unity either. They had divergent views on the value and fate of nations in the European whole, yet the 'nationalist' Mazzini and the 'antinationalist' Proudhon seem to have only occasionally used the concept of nationalism, and both of them used it for modes of thought and action in opposition to what they found to be a modern understanding of nationality and progress.³⁵

Interestingly, Durkheim made a small addition in the second edition of *De la division du travail social*, 1902. After a quotation from Georges Sorel that argued that, following the congress of Vienna, the continent had a stronger sense of Europe than had been the case at the time of the ancien régime, Durkheim added a sentence warning about any 'return to narrow nationalism' that would result in 'the spirit of protectionism' and isolation.³⁶ After the first edition in 1893, a general breakthrough of 'nationalism', notably as a tool of critique, had actually begun. The word also appeared a couple times in *Sur la pierre blanche* by Anatole France, 1905, which opened socialist visions towards the United States of Europe and, further, the United States of the World.³⁷

In discussions on European unity, 'nationalism' appeared more frequently after the First World War. It was during the post-Second World War European integration that 'European society' referring to Europe as a society returned to this discussion.

European nation against European nationalism

After the First World War and the collapse of multinational European empires, nationhood, however conceived, was established as a basic principle of how the world was or should be structured. Yet it was not called nationalism. In the Wilsonian vision of a new peaceful order, the principle of national sovereignty was linked with ideas of international interaction, to be institutionalized and promoted by the League of Nations, often against 'nationalist' aspirations threatening the order with demands for border changes.³⁸ In the Bolshevik and Comintern version of Marxism, proletarian internationalism included an emphasis on national self-government as an objective, phase and tool in the process of world revolution.³⁹ For Soviet-centred Marxism-Leninism, the concepts of internationalism and patriotism came to represent 'good' modes of thought and action, which were opposed to 'bad' cosmopolitanism and nationalism.⁴⁰

However, visions of Europe as a political entity were also developed. In part, they were inspired by the transnational nature of capitalism and the internationalism of the socialist labour movement. Edo Fimmen, the Dutch leader of the International Federation of Transport Workers, argued in 1924 that the future of Europe would be decided in a struggle between two conflicting alternatives of intra-European interconnectedness: 'The United States of Europe or Europe Limited'.⁴¹ The pan-European vision of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi evoked much wider discussion. The way he conceptualized his vision deserves attention here, notably his way of using the concepts of nation, nationalism and society.

In his book *Pan-Europa*, published in 1923, Coudenhove-Kalergi characterized his goal as *die europäische Nation*.⁴² Thirty years later this expression was elevated into the title of his book, which contributed to Western post-Second World War efforts of European integration in the context of Cold War confrontation.⁴³ What kind of implications did the pan-European extension of the concept of nation have in the usages of 'nationalism' and 'society'?

In fact, Coudenhove-Kalergi introduced 'nationalism' as a central concept into the discussion on European unity. He also used the expression 'European nationalism'. However, the concept did not refer to elements of a European identity or to ideas justifying Europe as a nation, but to the common characteristics of how each of the European nations justified their separate existence. They did it in

the 'wrong' way, by claiming that the nation was a community of blood, instead of understanding that nations were communities based on shared experiences and culture.⁴⁴

Coudenhove-Kalergi did not, however, argue that understanding the nation in terms of culture was the right kind of nationalism. He reserved the concept of nationalism only for those justifications of nationhood of which he disapproved. The concepts in *Pan-Europa* he used for the correct understanding of one's own national belonging were *Patriotismus* and *Nationalgefühl*. While nationalism – or 'abstract internationalism' – did not include any ingredients that could be developed into a sense of European community, patriotism and national spirit did. 'European patriotism' would be 'the culmination and extension of national emotion' (*Krönung und Ergänzung des Nationalgefühls*).⁴⁵

In *Die europäische Nation*, published in 1953, an expression for the contents of European nationalism was '*der völkische Nationalismus*'.⁴⁶ The Second World War had been its heyday and crisis. One could associate this account with the particular type of nationalism represented by German National Socialism, and, more generally, with the 'bad' variant in Kohn's distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism. Importantly, however, as in *Pan-Europa* in 1923, also in *Die europäische Nation* in 1953, Coudenhove-Kalergi avoided using 'nationalism' when he wrote about the correct ways of understanding and justifying a nation and belonging to one. The European nation especially would not be based on anything called 'European nationalism'.

Arguably, while Coudenhove-Kalergi could use 'nationalism' as a disapproving concept for an essentializing and deterministic understanding of nation, it was for him not only too tightly associated with this rejected mode of thought but it was also too constructivist and voluntarist to be employed for what he found to be the essence of the nation, a community of culture. After all, the European nation would actualize something that already existed as an outcome of long history. The European nation would imply the pan-European extension of patriotism in people's minds, but the European nation, as such, was not a result of any ism. It is worth noting that Coudenhove-Kalergi did not use an ismified name for his programme ('pan-Europeanism'), at least in his major works. Nor did he use the concept of Europeanism that had appeared since the mid-19th century with varying meanings, referring, for example, to (too) close cultural ties to Europe among some American groups⁴⁷ and later most often to ideas of European unity.

It appears that the pan-European vision á la Coudenhove-Kalergi did not serve as a context in which the references and valuations of the concept of nationalism would have been redefined. On the one

hand, the opposition towards European unity was explained by a particular type of nationalism, though no approved forms of nationalism were recognized. On the other hand, as a tool of disapproval, the concept was not extended to comprehend the justifications of nationhood in general. True, in 1954 Hannah Arendt recognized a threat of fascist anti-American 'pan-European nationalism',⁴⁸ yet, as the texts of Coudenhove-Kalergi indicate, it was possible to reject 'European nationalism' while advocating 'the European nation'.

European community and the nationalism of *Volksgemeinschaft*

Operating with the concept of nation implied a European extension of the notions of cultural and political community. However, the concept of society did not play any major role in pan-European argumentation and was not provided with unconventional ingredients. The usage introduced by Saint-Simon and Thierry at the beginning of the 19th century was not revitalized.⁴⁹ When 'European society' appeared in the literature, it most often referred to common features of national 'European societies', as it had since the late 19th century.

In political as well as scholarly use, in general, the concept of society was ambiguous. It was defined in relation to many different counter-concepts including nature, state, economy, community or individual, or by means of adjectives that referred to subsequent historical phases, for example, agricultural and industrial, or to conflicting principles of organizing social life, most notably capitalist versus socialist. Nevertheless, as far as society was conceived in spatial terms, the concept was tied to the borders of a nation state in a way that was taken for granted, and this was neither referred to nor criticized as nationalism.

True, in many languages, the word for social entities on the borders of nation states was also used for voluntary associations, and as the French and Spanish names of the League of Nations (*Société des Nations* and *Sociedad de Naciones*) indicate, it could be used for international organizations. In connection with efforts for European integration, however, the concept for unity came to be community rather than society. Coudenhove-Kalergi's 'European nation' was a community (*Gemeinschaft*), and this concept was also generally used in the names of the post-war Western European organizations preceding the European Union.

The triumph of community may seem paradoxical, given the role of anti-fascism as a background to European communities. A tentative view on 'nationalism' in the community-laden vocabulary of German National Socialists is needed here.

In *Mein Kampf*, published in two volumes in 1925 and 1926, 'nationalism' and 'nationalist' referred to positive steps in the author's political development. Hitler mentioned two consequences of his youth experiences in the multinational Austria: 'First: I became a nationalist. Second: I learned to understand and grasp the meaning of history.' At the age of 15 he already understood the difference between *dynastischer 'Patriotismus'* and *völkischer 'Nationalismus'*, and he disapproved of *Hurrapatriotismus*.⁵⁰

Later, during the Second World War, a leader of Hitler-Jugend education, Gottfried Griesmayr, reminded his audience that the nationalism of the young Adolf Hitler had had nothing in common with the *Hurrapatriotismus des Bürgertums*. According to Griesmayr, National Socialism represented 'genuine nationalism' (*echter Nationalismus*), and he described the 'world view of the German' as a unity of the 'concepts of nationalism and socialism'.⁵¹

The message that National Socialism would bring genuine nationalism and genuine socialism to fruition had been spread widely by *Der Mythos des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* (1930) of Alfred Rosenberg, the leading Nazi ideologist and the developer of *der nordische Gedanke*. Rosenberg condemned 'French-Jewish' pan-European ideas and was happy to observe that nationalism had gained impetus in its defence against those ideas.⁵²

It is reasonable to say that 'nationalism' and 'nationalist' did not belong to those key words of the National Socialist vocabulary that were provided with an authorized meaning in the descriptions of ideology, movement and societal system.⁵³ However, these words were given a positive gloss. Among their enemies the Nazis identified the representatives of cosmopolitanism and internationalism as well as the advocates of false, rather than genuine, nationalism. In the National Socialist vocabulary, it was clearly possible to combine the essentialist understanding of nation with 'nationalism' and 'nationalist'. The National Socialists identified Nation with *Volksgemeinschaft* that signified for them a blood-and-soil entity, not the product of an abstract ism. Yet the correct consciousness of the existence of, and belonging to, the nation could be called 'nationalism'. The Nazis did not share the conventional distinction between bad nationalism and good patriotism. The ideas of the nation as an actor and the individual as a bearer of national agency were united by 'nationalism' rather than 'patriotism'. In *Mein Kampf*, the latter concept appeared with negative

attributes, whereas *Vaterlandsliebe* as well as *Nationalstolz* were not only much more frequent but also unequivocally positive terms.⁵⁴

In connection with the National Socialist design of *Neue Europa* during the Second World War, the concepts of nationalism and community could be provided with the attribute 'European'. In *Europa und die Welt* (1944) by Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann, a National Socialist author who in 1960 became Professor of Philosophy, Sociology and the History of Ideas at the University of Münster, 'European nationalism' (*der europäische Nationalismus*) referred to the expected self-consciousness of European peoples about the happy future of 'the European community' (*die europäische Gemeinschaft*).⁵⁵

After the war, the ideas of European unity were contrasted with the National Socialist *Volksgemeinschaft* and *Neue Europa*. The use of the concept of community in the new arrangements of European integration entailed a conceptual contestation. The warm concept of community was a tool for uniting previous enemies and for struggling against anything called 'nationalism'.

National sovereignty and the welfare state without nationalism

From the experiences of the Second World War, two divergent perspectives to ideational foundations of nationhood were reinforced. On the one hand, nationalism was widely condemned as a major cause of the war. In addition to fascism, the concept of nationalism was also associated with mid-war economic protectionism, which was found to have generated preconditions for the destruction. On the other hand, the principle of national sovereignty gained new universal recognition. The legacy of the wartime activities of national resistance in Europe and the movements of national liberation in the colonies contributed to the universalization of this principle. The United Nations combined the principles of national sovereignty and universal human rights. In the Cold War confrontation, national sovereignty was a Western argument in the critique of Soviet politics towards its 'satellites' and an Eastern argument in the critique of Western interference, under the guise of human rights, into 'internal affairs' of socialist countries.

In scholarly use, extensions of the concept of nationalism appeared in which it referred to the justifications of nationhood in general and was divided into more or less openly assessed bad and good variants. Kohn's distinction between ethnic and civic nationalisms reflected a political

assessment of the Second World War confrontation. Karl W. Deutsch analysed the dualism of nationalism as a threat to peace and life and as a response to vital human needs of communication.⁵⁶ Later diagnoses on decolonization, 'underdevelopment' and the 'Third World' proposed distinctions between reactionary and progressive roles of nationalism. In the late 1950s, Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish developer of development studies, criticized nationalism as an outdated property of welfare states but recognized it as a progressive force for the economic and social development of decolonized countries.⁵⁷ It may have been easier to use nationalism as an analytical concept when explaining European experiences from an American perspective or to an American audience: Kohn and Deutsch were European emigrants now active in US universities, and Myrdal presented his analysis in his lectures at Yale.

However, in post-Second World War political understandings, the gap between the condemned nationalism and the universalized principle of national sovereignty seemed too wide to be bridged by any extension of the concept of nationalism. Moreover, the latter principle contributed to an essentialist notion of nationhood and, thus, to its deeper level than any of the isms. The borders of 'nationalism' as a concept for disapproval, unfit for self-identification, were reinforced. At the same time, conceptual perspectives of scholarly reflections and political debates seem to have diverged.

Opposing economic protectionism and promoting international economic collaboration was an important aspect of post-war Western European political orientations. It was shared by major political parties and the representatives of business and labour and conceived of as a struggle against nationalism. These orientations contributed to the transformations researchers in political economy often retrospectively call the making of the Keynesian welfare state. It was a process of reinforced institutionalization of the nation state, and it had implications for the notion of society. As a target of knowledge and policies, society was structured according to the division of labour between different nation-state policies; as the source of political aspirations and conflicts of interest, society was more deeply and widely organized and intertwined with the nation state; and as the forum of national integration, society set the norms and taught the values sociologists highlighted, supported by their increased influence on public debates. While inherently connected with and contributing to nationhood, all these aspects of the notion of society were outside the sphere of phenomena to which the concept of nationalism was applied.

International confrontation, competition and comparison among different societal systems, development paths and institutional arrangements played a crucial role in the formation of welfare

states. In the comparative international context, the notion of national society as the basic unit was deemed unquestionably true. International regulations by the Bretton Woods organizations and the UN system did not question the idea of a nation-state society. The efforts on behalf of European integration worked against 'nationalism', but that did not refer to a structure that needed to be replaced by an integrated Europe. The concept was associated with otherness, instead of being a characteristic of 'us' to be overcome. European integration would remove the preconditions of nationalism rather than a nationalist order of social life. Alan Milward famously argued that European integration was oriented towards rescuing the nation state.⁵⁸ In any case, it was not oriented towards removing the nation state. The nation-state bordered notion of society was deeply rooted in institutional and discursive practices, even in connection with visions of 'supranational' European structures. The nation state and nation-state society were not seen as expressions of nationalism, except from particular perspectives of scholarly distancing or political provocation. The concept of supranationalism was, since the late 1940s, sometimes associated with post-war international organizations, in general, and with the arrangements for European integration in the 1950s, in particular. Most often, it was used from an observer's, yet occasionally also from a participant's, perspective, and it referred to limitations on national sovereignty.⁵⁹ It appears, though, that 'supranationalism' was not constructed by placing the prefix 'supra' before 'nationalism', but by ismifying the concept of supranational. Thus, supranationalism was not nationalism at a higher level, much like internationalism had no connection to different nationalisms. It was easy to see supranational and international entities as constructions resulting from intentional action – and thus, isms – while national entities, nations, still appeared too essential to be seen that way.

Nationalism in the historicizing of nation and society

Critical debates over global interdependencies emerged in the 1960s, associated with varying ways of criticizing essentialized notions of nationhood and conventional imperatives of patriotism. The critique was refined in a new wave of research on nations and nationalism in the 1970s and the 1980s. Researchers inspired by Weber or Marx – Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and others⁶⁰ – wished to historicize nationhood and did this by connecting it with modernization and industrial

capitalism. The approach Anthony D. Smith has named 'modernist' has been criticized, especially by Smith, for ignoring the premodern ethnic preconditions of modern nations and nation states.⁶¹ Nevertheless, further along the line of interpretation opened by Kohn and others, both the rise of the 'modernist' approach and its critiques established a framework for scholarly debates on nations and nationalism, in which nationalism was usually recognized as an inseparable ingredient of nationhood.⁶² In this framework, 'nationalism' was the concept signifying the ways nations, nation states and the world order based on nation states were and are legitimized.

Ismifying was here a means of anti-essentialist historicizing of nationhood, yet it excluded historicizing the concept of nationalism itself. The fact that people found 'nationalism' more often in extreme views of the 'other' was, and has been, for nationalism research little more than an uninteresting sign of the limits of nonscholarly thought.

Researchers of nation building use the concept of society when describing the intertwining of nationhood and modernity. Sociological distinctions between community and society or between mechanic and organic solidarity played an analytical role in the discussion on national integration. Hence, paying attention to the structures and processes of society seemed necessary for discussing the relationship between nation and class as collective agents or frameworks of agency and solidarity.

The critical researchers of nationalism recognized that nationalism, when producing and reproducing nationhood and legitimizing the nation state, was embedded in societal structures and processes. However, the relationship between their concepts of nationalism and society was mostly detached from their historical problematization. It is reasonable to say that the desire to deconstruct nationhood and nation state rarely explored the ways 'the nationalist imaginary' was built up in the concept of society.⁶³

Reflexive distanciations from conventional usages of the concept of society, which bordered on the concept of the nation state, certainly appeared in social theory. Theorizing 'society' was a main theme, especially in the work of Niklas Luhmann since the 1970s. His *Gesellschaft* consists of communication, is structured into subsystems that are integrated and has developed as a non-bordered *Weltgesellschaft*.⁶⁴

However, in bringing 'society' into the agenda of nationalism research, the debates since the 1980s around 'postmodernity', 'first and second modernity', 'reflexive modernization' and 'globalization'

have been more influential. The ambition of historicizing the nation state also affected the idea of society.⁶⁵ Nationalism was recognized not only in how nationhood, with its civic and ethnic ingredients, was based on invented joint traditions but also in how modern rationalities worked in society and, more profoundly, reproduced society, institutionally and ideationally. The modern idea of society was too strong and too limited to sustain: too strong while presupposing a holistic integrated entity with inherent dynamics of progress, too limited while being tied to the borders of the nation state. One of the most active contributors to this discussion was the German sociologist Ulrich Beck, who aimed his critical 'cosmopolitan gaze' at how the image of society resulted from the 'national gaze' and was at the centre of 'methodological nationalism'.⁶⁶

While the modern nation-state society was questioned, the term 'society' gained new popularity as a part of the concept of civil society. This concept, rarely appearing after its different usages in the late 18th and the early 19th century political philosophy, became in the 1980s a popular tool for conceptualizing Eastern European protests against the so-called real socialism and the Western European critique of the allegedly patronizing welfare state.⁶⁷ Referring to the space of voluntary action and association, the concept pointed out the distinction between state and society, yet was tied to the state precisely by virtue of being defined in relation to it.

Turning to interpret nations as modern constructions based on and justified by nationalism, questioning the modern idea of national society, and revitalizing a particular conceptual divide between the state and civil society – these were subsequent and parallel, separate and intertwined orientations in social and political studies from the 1970s through the 1990s. They had implications on how 'European society' was discussed and how 'nationalism' was included in this discussion.

Just a European extension of nation-state society?

The 'modernist' view on nations as new historical constructions opened up possibilities for critical commentators to find elements of nation building, and thus nationalism, also in European integration. The expression 'European nationalism' could now – since the 1960s, though seldom before the 1980s – refer not only to similarities in how nationalism (as a disapproved mode of thought and action) appeared in different European countries, but also to the efforts of making (Western) Europe into a cultural, economic and political entity. In the 1960s, this kind of European

nationalism was sometimes called 'european nationalism'. It could be associated with Charles de Gaulle's opposition to US influence, but could also be seen as a variant of 'supranationalism'. In this usage, 'supranationalism' did not appear as an ismified 'supranational', as it had and still often did, but as 'nationalism' provided with the prefix 'supra'. On the other hand, from this perspective, it was possible to ask whether nationalism in general and European supranationalism as its particular form would last in the world of increasing cross-border communication and interdependence.⁶⁸

When assessing experiences and expectations of European integration, debaters sometimes framed their accounts by pondering options of a 'European society'. Such accounts appeared, for example, in a phase of the enlargement of the European Communities in the early 1970s. In this context, as well as earlier, 'European society' was an ambiguous expression. In the same text, it could refer to similarities among national societies, to their shared fundamental values and common elements of history, and to a potential of future unity that would either be achieved through deepening integration or would prove to be an unrealistic dream. 'European patriotism' was discussed as a precondition or a result of deeper integration and occasionally defined in relation to 'European society'. Most often, 'European patriotism' referred to missing popular bottom-up preconditions of transforming Europe into a society, whereas 'European nationalism' was applied either to dubious elite top-down attempts or, more conventionally, to the nationalism of each European country and, thus, to a counter-force to European integration.⁶⁹ The 'society' of 'European society', in turn, followed the model of nation-state society, as it had in Durkheim's account,⁷⁰ and that image of Europe as a nation-state society worked as a criterion for assessing options and defining the limits of European integration.

From the time prior to discussions on postmodernity and globalization, we can find single examples of associating the option of a European society with a supposedly changing meaning of 'society' itself. In their 1974 scenario of Europe in the year 2000, a group of Dutch researchers of European university reform forecast that 'the phenomenon of European patriotism' would not emerge by 2000. In their view, however, a 'European society' would not actually need 'European patriotism' or 'European nationalism'. Rather, Europe as a society would emerge through 'the process of removing the mythical element from power', an element the researchers apparently saw as inherent in any version of patriotism and nationalism. European society would be based on openness and functional cooperation, principles that would also be strengthened in the national societies of Europe, removing mythical elements from a society.⁷¹ Thus, a perspective was opened for extending the

concepts of society and nationalism across nation-state borders, yet the concept of nationalism, identified with patriotism, was limited to particular – ‘mythical’ – elements of the cohesion of a national or European society.

A vision of a European society could be based, on the other hand, on attempts to redefine ‘European patriotism’ in a way that would push aside nationalism as a force of societal cohesion. In this vision, European integration would be linked, by means of European patriotism, to the anti-mythical legacy of the Enlightenment. Jürgen Habermas famously represents this line of thought. In the 1980s he developed an argument for ‘constitutional patriotism’⁷² that had to be promoted not only in postwar Germany and elsewhere in ‘post-traditional societies’ but also at the European level. A post-traditional society, integrated by constitutional patriotism, would be ‘post-national’ in the sense that belonging and solidarity would not be based on any transformation of national into nationalism, that is, into an un-reflexive belief in the essential role of national identity. From this point of departure, the way was open for descriptive and normative constructions of the future of decentred polity and society: the coexistence of national polities and societies together with a European polity and society, as Jan-Werner Müller argues.⁷³ In this reasoning a European society would not follow a large-scale model of a modern nation-state society, and so a pragmatic organizational role was left to ‘national’, whereas ‘nationalism’ meant dangerous (ethnic nationalism) or outdated (civic nationalism) justifications of polities and societies.

As the ties between the concept of society and an image of integrated holistic entity within the borders of the nation state were loosened, ‘European society’ could serve as a tool for discussing a variety of open-ended futures rather than just a given criterion of assessing the limits of European integration. This can be seen in the field of scholarly discourse. Concepts applied in studies on nation-state politics such as ‘public sphere’, ‘demos’ and ‘civil society’ were involved in discussions on European integration and sometimes associated with ‘European society’. The attribute ‘European’ more often appeared simply as an extension of references, sometimes in accounts believing that modernization would proceed to larger-scale societies,⁷⁴ yet it was often found in arguments claiming that a European public sphere, European demos, European civil society and European society did not and would never exist. However, the perspective of European integration also inspired ambitions to problematize these concepts and their boundedness to the nation state and national society. This perspective gained more significance with the major steps of deepened integration since the late 1980s – the introduction of a single market, the changing of the European

Communities into the European Union, the introduction of the euro, and the constitutional process resulting in the Lisbon Treaty – and with the subsequent phases of EU enlargement that changed the references to ‘Europe’ itself. From different theoretical perspectives, researchers developed arguments that a European society did not and could never exist if the concept of society was defined according to the nation-state society model, but it might, at least some time in the future, if ‘society’ could be liberated from the premises of homogeneity and territorial integration stemming from that model.⁷⁵

Delanty argues that discussing a European society as if it were just an extension of a nation-state society is an indicator of ‘methodological nationalism’. This should be contested by importing the problematization of ‘society’ into the discussion on European integration.⁷⁶ The argument is well-grounded, yet it may be difficult to link it to the ways the concepts of society and nationalism have been conventionally used in connection with European integration, especially in texts articulating self-descriptions of the EU and its so-called social dimension. While theoreticians of globalization have seen global transformations reveal the deep-rooted nationalism in prevailing modes of thought and action, including the methodological nationalism of social research, in much of policy-oriented research and policy planning the references to nationalism are limited to what is interpreted as reactions against globalization and European integration.

Competitiveness without nationalism

The relationship between national society and international economy has been a major topic in defining the so-called social question since the early 19th century. The concept of national economy referred to a kind of immanent mediator between these two sides. The concept of globalization, when it powerfully emerged in the early 1990s, implied that this transformation would severely question the existence of anything that could be called national economy. Many found this fatal to national society or to society in general or created visions of a global society as a counterforce, complementing or supporting global economy. However, divergent arguments for national society, national economy, European economy and European society playing a role in globalized capitalism were also developed.⁷⁷

Indeed, visions of a borderless world were soon overshadowed by efforts to redefine interests of territorial communities – local, regional and national communities, and a European community – as competitive operational environments for globally mobile economic actors. While globalization would weaken earlier modes of societal integration, including the national welfare state, the nation state would adopt new competition-state functions in the shaping of competitive national communities. Those defending the welfare state – the concept itself was used more frequently than it had been during the time subsequently called the golden age of the welfare state – developed arguments for its possessing a major competitive advantage.⁷⁸

The concept of nationalism did not apply to efforts to provide an active role for the nation state in globalized capitalism. The references of nationalism were limited to views and actions deemed to be protectionist, xenophobic and racist reactions against global mobility and against the unavoidable transformations called globalization. In 1999, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, urged global business leaders to adopt policies of corporate social responsibility, because otherwise the global economy would remain ‘vulnerable to backlash from all the “isms” of our post-Cold War world: protectionism; populism; nationalism; ethnic chauvinism; fanaticism; and terrorism’.⁷⁹

A ‘model’ was a conceptual way of re-establishing a territorial correspondence among economy, society and polity within the framework of globalized capitalism. Efforts of creating such a correspondence on a European scale also emerged. It was no novelty that the possibility of a European society was evaluated in relation to the central role of the economy in European integration. However, new elements came from the manner in which the ‘European Social Model’ and ‘Social Europe’ were defined in relation to the conceptual construction of a ‘European economy’, that is, Europe as an economic space and a competitive agent in global competition.⁸⁰

An open asymmetry exists between the economic and the social, as EU social policies are only complementary to the member states’ national welfare and industrial relations systems, and the impacts of the EU on national social policies primarily come from single-market principles. Nevertheless, after the launch of the single market in 1986, European Community-level practices of ‘social dimension’ were also introduced. For the notion of European society, the institution of ‘social dialogue’ between ‘social partners’ is particularly interesting.

The terms have one of their origins in social Catholicism’s organicist image of society.⁸¹ ‘Social partnership’ and ‘social dialogue’ imply communication and negotiation between trade unions and

business-life organizations. In EU documents, social partners are presented as a natural element of any society, yet, at the same time, described as voluntary organizations of 'civil society' with a structure of democratic representation.⁸² Whereas in scholarly debates on globalization and EU integration territorial or trans-territorial characteristics of civil society have been discussed, often in relation to European public space and European citizenship,⁸³ in EU policy manifestations 'civil society' conventionally appears as the sphere of nongovernmental organizations within the governmentally defined territorial borders of the member states of the European Union. Social dialogue is a territorially bordered institution and so contributes to the territorial image of (civil) society. The EU-level social dialogue appears as the Europeanization of a national institution that mediates between the spheres constructed by the distinctions of society and economy, society and state, and economy and state. In research on European social policies, this practice, resembling the national practice often called 'corporatism', has been assessed as an element of a nascent European society.⁸⁴

The limited achievements of EU-level social dialogue indicate, more generally, the limits of 'social dimension' in European integration and the limits of the European dimension in social policies. All these limits appear in the 'European Social Model' and in the way 'European society' has been used in advocating this model.

The 'European Social Model' gained great popularity in the preparation of the so-called Lisbon Strategy, launched in 2000 for guiding EU policies in the first decade of the 21st century. The Lisbon Strategy expressed the ambition of integrating social policies as an aspect of the European-level main objective, that is, making Europe by 2010 'the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion'. The strategy was aimed at developing a 'knowledge economy and society' and pointed out ways in which the 'new information society' would promote 'social inclusion'. Prominent economists and social scientists contributed to the contents of the strategy and also to the Social Policy Agenda set out for its implementation. The Social Policy Agenda advocated a virtuous circle among social policy, economic policy and employment policy and aimed 'to reinforce social policy as a productive factor'.⁸⁵ The primacy of national policies was recognized, but the so-called Open Method of Coordination was developed as the means of EU-wide social political integration.⁸⁶

‘European society’ was not a concept of administrative policy preparation or official strategy texts. However, for the Presidents of the European Commission it was easier to talk about a ‘European society’. In Romano Prodi’s speeches at the end of the 1990s and José Manuel Barroso’s speeches after the launch of the Lisbon Strategy, European society was described as ‘knowledge-based’ and ‘open’, and was built upon ‘our values’ and ‘our culture’ as well as on the respect for diversity and human rights. ‘European society’ could refer to Europe as a whole, yet it more often referred to common qualities of European societies.⁸⁷

In the ambiguous meanings of the ‘European Social Model’ and the associated usage of ‘European society’, one can distinguish three aspects: similarities between national patterns of social regulation, the role of transnational connections in the shaping of national patterns of social regulation and the transnational norms of social regulation. It appears that in the course of the Lisbon Strategy period (2000–2010) the two latter meanings were marginalized, and even the first aspect, that is, the existing or emerging similarities of national societies, was discussed with greater caution.

The Lisbon Strategy period ended in financial crisis. New modes of macroeconomic coordination (the so-called European semester) were launched, through which the EU was oriented towards mediating the imperatives of globalized financial markets into national policies. This orientation did not provide much inspiration for developing a ‘European Social Model’ and a ‘European society’. The failure of achieving the Lisbon Strategy objectives and developing a European-level social model was recognized in the next 10-year strategy launched in 2010, ‘Europe 2020: A European Strategy for Smart, Sustainable, and Inclusive Growth’. Now ‘social model’ was consistently in the plural. ‘Structural reforms’ were ‘essential for a strong and sustainable recovery and for preserving the sustainability of our social models’. The strategy urged ‘us’ to take action ‘now’, so as to ensure that ‘our own and future generations’ could ‘continue to enjoy a high-quality of healthy life, underpinned by Europe’s unique social models’. The word ‘society’ appeared endowed with the attributes ‘civil’, ‘digital’ and ‘cohesive’, but never with ‘European’.⁸⁸

In the Lisbon Strategy, the optimistic vision of Europe as an economic and social space was not presented as a reinforcement for a European perspective in relation to nationalistic perspectives. The word ‘nationalism’ did not appear in the Lisbon Strategy or in its Social Policy Agenda. In ‘Europe 2020’, it appears once. When evaluating the challenges of the single market, the strategy notes that the crisis had added ‘temptations of economic nationalism’.

Nationalism as a reaction

In pro-EU arguments, the preference for what are seen as short-term national interests is often criticized as a major obstacle of deepened European integration and even as a disintegrating threat to the EU. However, the concept of nationalism is rarely used here. As in the earlier post-war decades of European integration, nationalism is assigned to the 'other' in such a way that it cannot easily be used in contexts in which 'we' in Europe represent and adjust together 'our' different national interests. 'Nationalism' seems to be too heavy a weapon to be used in a compromise-oriented political process. It does not refer to anything 'we' still share and are attempting to overcome – 'we' have already overcome nationalism by the lessons drawn from the world wars. Rather than being itself an expression of nationalism, the weight of national interests may create favourable conditions for nationalism by causing harm to European integration.

Still less does the concept of nationalism work as a positive 'instrument for the direction of historical movement',⁸⁹ that is, as a concept for the valuable aims of the European project. The 'europeanization' that had occasionally appeared since the 1960s gained more popularity in the 1980s and the 1990s as a concept used by critical observers describing unapproved modes of promoting this project. A representative example is a work by Timothy Garton Ash in 2007 in connection with the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome:

Both the negative stereotyping of others [the US and Islam] and the mythmaking about our own collective past are typical of what I call Euronationalism – an attempt to replicate nationalist methods of building political identity at the European level.

Garton Ash sharply condemned Euronationalism and distinguished between it and 'European patriotism': 'I am a European patriot.'⁹⁰

'Euronationalism' is also used in more scholarly accounts of European integration. It is defined, for example, by the more general nationalisms, 'supranationalism' and 'transnationalism',⁹¹ yet seldom 'internationalism', a concept that lost much of its popularity by being associated with the so-called real socialism. 'Euronationalism' refers to ideas and practices of internal interconnectedness as well as external bordering. The latter aspect of Euronationalism opens a conceptual horizon to another usage of this compound word. It has also turned into a term for those

political movements that advocate anti-immigration policies and oppose European integration. In this sense, 'Euronationalism' describes the emergence of these nationalistic movements as a Europe-wide phenomenon, in which the so-called separatist movements are often included.

Fighting against nationalism is a core element of the self-definition of the European Union. This self-description gained new impetus in the 1990s, when it was easy to interpret the deepening of European integration and the EU enlargement as a counterforce against the destructive power of nationalism, especially in the conflicts of the former Yugoslavia. The experience was largely interpreted in a way that reflected and reinforced the separation of nationhood and nationalism. Nationalism meant an aggressive outburst or exploitation of national emotions, facilitated by the failure of a totalitarian regime to properly recognize national identities and interests that, after the breakdown of the regime, then erupted dangerously or were easy to harness in the service of dangerous goals.⁹² Understanding nationalism as carrying a conflict potential in the transition from dictatorship to democracy gave support to further elaboration of the threat image, in which nationalism appeared as a reaction against the progressive or unavoidable processes of globalization and European integration.

Nationalism has many faces, but all are ugly. This was the message of José Manuel Barroso, the then President of the European Commission, in the session of the European Parliament '100 Years on from the First World War – Lessons to Learn and the Future of Europe', April 2014:

There are many shades of nationalism. Some of them are more protectionist, some of them more chauvinist, some of them focused on foreigners or migrants, some have a discourse against globalisation. But there is always one thing in common among nationalists: they hate the European Union. They think the European Union is their enemy. And indeed it is. The European Union is made against the aggressive nature of ultra-nationalism.⁹³

Barroso's 'nationalism' refers to aggressive, xenophobic and protectionist thoughts and actions. A specific expression, 'ultra-nationalism', is reserved for especially dangerous, war-generating forms of nationalism. In Barroso's speech, as in the language of EU representatives, 'nationalism' is applied to 'others', opponents and enemies. And those claiming to represent nationalism usually vigorously reject such an allegation.

One does not need to adopt a scholarly concept of nationalism in order to recognize phenomena that do not easily fit Barroso's claim that all nationalists hate the European Union. Most obviously, the political movement that commentators routinely call Scottish nationalism has adopted an actively pro-EU orientation. The Scottish National Party does not struggle against being characterized as nationalist, yet nationalism is not used as a concept of self-description in its current website policy manifestations.⁹⁴ Even in the rhetoric of this party, the concept seems to be mostly used as a tool of disapproval, imbued with negative attributes. After the conference of the British Conservative Party in October 2016, dominated by discussions about the British exit from the EU, Nicola Sturgeon, the leader of the Scottish National Party, wrote: 'If there's one thing we've learned from the Tory conference, it is that it is perfectly clear who the divisive, nasty nationalists are.'⁹⁵

In EU rhetoric, the threatening image of nationalism leaves space for justifications of national, nation and the nation state as well as joint EU policies of external bordering. In July 2016, a couple of weeks after the Brexit referendum, the Finnish EU Commissioner Jyrki Katainen and the Greek EU Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos published an article on the Commission's efforts to develop joint migration policies. The Commissioners argued: 'The EU can never be built against the nation states but only through them and with their support. In hard times we must hold together.'⁹⁶ The Commissioners would hardly have agreed with anyone finding a semblance of nationalism or Euronationalism in this statement.

Conclusion

In everyday public usage, nationalism is a contested concept, yet laden with a lot of shared, unquestioned content. It is a tool of disapproval, and most of those accused of being nationalists deny this. True, there have been national movements, often labelled as separatist, as well as radical right-wing groups, including the German National Socialists, who have used nationalism as a term of self-identification. However, this has reinforced rather than challenged the conventional understanding of the references of nationalism. The references have been limited to particular political orientations among the much wider range of ideational and practical modes of thought and action that reflect and reproduce nationhood, national perspectives and a world order based on nation states.

In research dedicated to nationalism and nationhood, and in contributions of historians and social scientists who try to get rid of 'methodological nationalism', the concept of nationalism is different. It usually refers to ideas and practices associated with nationhood. The concept is a contested one in scholarly discussion, as well. Yet, while interpretations of historical preconditions and consequences of nationalism differ, they share the view of nationalism as an integral ingredient of nationhood, nation state and international relations.

Little communication exists between the two different fields of understanding and contesting the concept of nationalism. Researchers in the field of nationalism studies take a reflexive distance to 'nationalism' that politicians and public debaters do not recognize, even when they discuss national interests, institutions and identities as constraints to European integration. Moreover, most of the researchers interested in different models of welfare or competitiveness, including a 'European social model', seem to be immune to the efforts of nationalism studies and the critique of 'methodological nationalism'. They do not question the way the concept of nationalism is used in political rhetoric and do not recognize any nationalism in their own – often comparative – approaches.

While the concept of nationalism in nationalism studies is an analytical tool of anti-essentialist historicization of nationhood, it tends to exclude the historicization of the concept of nationalism itself. However, the stubborn discursive boundary between the two main usages of the concept of nationalism should evoke questions about the historical preconditions of ismifying 'nation' and 'national'.

In the period often called 'the age of nationalism', from the French Revolution to the First World War, nationhood was essentialized, notably in Europe, in ways that did not allow nations to be explained as constructions of any ism. 'Nationalism' was too voluntaristic a concept to be used for the ideational and institutional contents of a nation. It was possible to express the correct consciousness of belonging to the nation with an ism, yet this usually applied not to nationalism but to patriotism. This was a concept accounting for how emotions, thoughts and actions had to be orientated according to the intergenerational continuity of community that was now associated with a nation. 'Nationalism' gained popularity only since the 1890s as a tool for disapproval. It came to be used as a concept for ideas and actions of the 'other' that militated against what the legitimate role of a nation was, in particular, and nationhood, in general, in the temporal and spatial orders of the world.

Defining the role of nations and nationhood was a subject of political contests utilizing the concept of nationalism, and one of the contexts of these contests came to be the debates on Europe and 'European society'. This has been an ambiguous expression. 'European society' has referred to similarities of national societies, to their shared values and common elements of history, or to a potential of future unity that either would be achieved through deepening integration or was doomed to prove an unrealistic dream. The latter visions have, since the late 19th century, most often implied a notion of society as an integrated entity within the borders of the nation state, and 'European society' has been imagined as a more or less plausible spatial extension of such an entity.

In current scholarly discussions on a European society, the critique of 'methodological nationalism' has been targeted not only at the nation-state-bound notion of society but also at understanding a European society as if it were, or should be, just a larger nation-state society. The critique implies the demand to include the problematization of 'society' into discussions on European integration. That is a well-grounded argument. However, there is a long distance between that argument and the conventional ways of employing the concepts of society and nationalism in connection with European integration, especially in texts articulating self-descriptions of the EU and its 'social dimension'. Theoreticians of globalization have argued that global transformations reveal and question the deep-rooted nationalism prevalent in prevailing modes of thought and action, including the methodological nationalism of social research. However, in much of policy-oriented research and policy planning the references to nationalism only contain views and actions that constitute reactions against globalization and European integration.

In a compromise-oriented political process, 'nationalism' seems to be too heavy a weapon to be used against other actors. The weight of national interests may be criticized by complaining that it causes harm to European integration and thus nourishes nationalism, but one hardly connects 'nationalism' with national interests as such. The concept of nationalism is bordered so as to leave a lot of unquestioned space for national, nation and the nation state. 'Nationalism' does not apply to efforts to improve 'our' national and European competitiveness in global economic competition nor 'our' joint EU policies of external borderings.

Notes

1. R. Koselleck, *Begriffsgeschichten: Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2006), pp. 234–239.
2. M. Freedon, *Liberal Languages: Ideological Imaginations and Twentieth-Century Progressive Thought* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 204–224.
3. C. Calhoun, *Nationalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 3–7.
4. P.-Y. Saunier, *Transnational History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
5. A. Wimmer and N. Glick Schiller, 'Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation-state building, migration and the social sciences', *Global Networks*, 2 (2002), pp. 301–334; D. Chernilo, 'Social Theory's Methodological Nationalism: Myth and Reality', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 9 (2006), pp. 5–22.
6. C. Calhoun, *Nations Matter: Culture, History, and the Cosmopolitan Dream* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 8.
7. On the distinction of these three aspects of terms see Q. Skinner, 'Language and political change', in T. Ball, J. Farr and R. L. Hanson (eds), *Political innovation and conceptual change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 8–22.
8. I have written this paper in connection with the research projects PRISM (The Political Rhetoric of Isms, Network for European Studies, University of Helsinki) and NaDeWe (Nationalism and Democracy in the Welfare State, Academy of Finland, Research Council for Culture and Society).
9. For searches in the Google Books, see <https://books.google.com/ngrams>; for a description of how to use the Ngram, see <https://books.google.com/ngrams/info>, and J.-B. Michel, Y. K. Shen, A. Presser Aiden, A. Veres, M. K. Gray, W. Brockman, The Google Books Team, J. P. Pickett, D. Hoiberg, D. Clancy, P. Norvig, J. Orwant, S. Pinker, M. A. Nowak, and E. Lieberman Aiden, 'Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books', *Science* 331 (2011), pp. 176–182.
10. R. Koselleck, *Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979), p. 344 ('Steuerungsinstrumenten der geschichtlichen Bewegung'); R. Koselleck, *Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 251.
11. A. Kemiläinen, *Nationalism: Problems concerning the Word, the Concept, and Classification* (Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopistoyhdistys, 1964); E. Piirimäe, 'Sociability, Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in Herder's Early Philosophy of History', *History of Political Thought* XXXVI (2015), pp. 521–559.
12. H. Milman. *The History of Christianity I: From the Birth of Christ to the Abolition of Paganism in the Roman Empire* (Paris: Baudry's European Library, 1840), pp. 143, 224.
13. The Catholic periodical *The Dublin Review*, published in London by Cardinal Nicolas Wiseman, in 1854 sharply contrasted Catholicism and 'the evil spirit of nationalism' that had made rulers and people abandon Catholicism and led to the French Revolution. 'Jansenism, Gallicanism and Jacobinism', *The Dublin Review* XXXVII (1854), pp. 104–106, 130, 155–156, 184, 187. The American Catholic writer Orestes A. Brownson in his 1855 article on 'Luther and Reformation' defined the concept of nationalism: 'As long as nationality confines itself to the temporal order, we respect it, and are, perhaps, as intensely national as any one; but when nationality seeks to enter to the spiritual order, and to make itself supreme in spirituals as well as in temporals,

we call it nationalism, and oppose it as hostile to religion, which, if religion, is and must be Catholic, not national.' Brownson's Quarterly Review III (1855), p. 67.

14. The Basque name of Partido Nacionalista Vasco is Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea (EAJ), literally meaning Basque Party of Supporters of God and Old Laws. None of the Irish parties that contemporary British commentators and later researchers have called a nationalist party seems to have used this attribute even in their English names.

15. For example, in Finland, those who found themselves as true representatives of kansallismielisyys (national-mindedness) could, since the turn of century, use the concept of nationalism, but always as a tool of disapproval, most often in conflicts concerning the role of (the Finnish or Swedish) language.

16. F. Lieber, *Fragments of Political Science on Nationalism and Inter-Nationalism* (New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 1868), especially pp. 10–11, 20.

17. Lieber, *ibid*, pp. 5–7, 21.

18. F. Lieber, *Manual of Political Ethics, Designed Chiefly for the Use of Colleges and Students at Law. Part II. Political Ethics Proper* (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1839), p. 497 ff.

19. E. Bellamy, *The Programme of the Nationalists* (Philadelphia: The Bureau of the Nationalist Literature, 1894), p. 3.

20. Th. Roosevelt, *The New Nationalism* (New York: The Outlook Company, 1910); C. Delahaye, 'The New Nationalism and Progressive Issues: The Break with Taft and the 1912 Campaign', in Serge Ricard (ed.), *A Companion to Theodore Roosevelt* (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), pp. 452–467.

21. An example of such usage was a book on the US Civil War by John Calvin Reed (*The Brothers' War*, [Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1905]). After stating that nationalization is the process by which a nation makes itself, Reed interpreted the Civil War as a clash between two different paths of nationalization. In *Mein Kampf* (1925, 1926), Adolf Hitler wrote about 'the nationalization of masses' (*Die Nationalisierung der Massen*). A similar usage of nationalization appears occasionally in current nationalism studies, too, for example in J. Breuilly (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 58, 520, 622, 695.

22. E. Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? Conférence faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars 1882* (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1882), pp. 7–8, 26–28.

23. H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background* (New York: Macmillan, 1944).

24. E.g. Calhoun, *Nations Matter*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 6, pp. 117–146.

25. The distinction between nationalism and patriotism was also introduced into the research of nationalism by Carlton J. H. Hayes in his pioneering *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: Richard R. Smith, 1931).

26. Cf. Koselleck, *Begriffsgeschichten*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 1, p. 236. For further discussion on 'nationalism' in the National Socialist rhetoric, see pp. 10–11.

27. H. Mikkeli, *Europe as an Idea and Identity* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), pp. 33–58.

28. H. de Saint-Simon and A. Thierry, *De la réorganisation de la société européenne: ou De la nécessité et des moyens de rassembler les peuples de l'Europe en un seul corps politique en conservant à chacun son indépendance nationale* (Paris: A. Égron, 1814).

29. For example, in his *Doveri dell'uomo*, published in 1860 (*The Duties of Man*, London: Chapman & Hall, 1862, p. 7), Mazzini criticized the unequal distribution of wealth and well-being in 'European Society'.

30. F. Guizot, *Cours d'Histoire Moderne. Histoire générale de la civilisation en Europe depuis la chute de l'Empire Romain jusqu'à la Révolution française* (Paris: Pichon et Didier, 1828), pp. 1–5, 19, 24, 31, 35, 48, 56, 74.
31. H. Martineau, *Society in America in Three Volumes. Volume I* (London: Saunders and Otley, 1837), p. 140.
32. É. Durkheim, *De la division du travail social: étude sur l'organisation des sociétés supérieures* (Paris: Alcan, 1893), p. 456; G. Delanty, 'Social Theory and European Transformation: Is there a European Society?', *Sociological Research Online* vol. 3 (1998), no. 1, <http://www.socresonline.org.uk/3/1/1.html>.
33. P. Kettunen, 'The language of social politics in Finland', in Daniel Béland & Klaus Petersen (eds), *Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), pp. 157–176.
34. Y.K., 'Työväen-seikka I–III', *Kirjallinen Kuukauslehti* 1874, especially part I, p. 5.
35. See, especially, P.-J. Proudhon, *De la justice dans la révolution et dans l'Église*, Tome deuxième. *Œuvres complètes de P.-J. Proudhon*, Tome XXII (Bruxelles: A. Lacroix, Verboeckhoven et Cie, 1868), p. 130; Giuseppe Mazzini, 'Nationality and Cosmopolitanism' [1847] and 'Nationalism and Nationality' [1871], in Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati (eds), *A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini's Writings on Democracy, Nation Building, and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 61–64.
36. Cf. Durkheim, *De la division du travail*, op. cit., Ref. 32, pp. 311–312, and 1902, p. 266.
37. Anatole France, *Sur la pierre blanche* (Paris: Calmann Lévy Editeurs, 1905), pp. 200, 214.
38. M. Mazower, *Dark continent. Europe's twentieth century* (London: Penguin Books, 1998), pp. 40–76.
39. Eric Hobsbawm and Immanuel Wallerstein famously talked about the 'Wilsonian-Leninist' ideology of the self-determination of nations. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 187; I. Wallerstein, *After Liberalism* (New York: The New Press, 1995), pp. 21–24, 111–116.
40. No doubt, changes appeared concerning the popularity of the concept of patriotism, yet it was provided with a strong positive charge in the conceptual system of Marxism-Leninism, as established in the Stalin era. That was still a permanent part of the doctrine in the post-Stalin era: 'In contrast to the nationalist and cosmopolitan the internationalist is a patriot. Internationalism and patriotism are as inseparable as the nationalism and cosmopolitanism which oppose it. The working class expresses the true interests of the people of its country, their desire for progress and prosperity.' *Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy* (Moscow: Progress, 1982), p. 290, italics original.
41. E. Fimmen, *Labour's Alternative: The United States of Europa or Europe Limited* (London: Labour Publishing Company, 1924).
42. R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europa* (Wien: Pan-Europa-Verlag, 1923), pp. 142–144.
43. R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Die europäische Nation* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1953).
44. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europa*, op. cit., Ref. 42, pp. 135–137.
45. Ibid, p. 166.
46. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Die europäische Nation*, op. cit., Ref. 43, pp. 18–20.
47. E.g. 'Public and Parochial Schools', *Brownson's Quarterly Review*, New York Series, Volume IV (1859), p. 332.

48. H. Arendt, 'Dream and Nightmare', in H. Arendt, *Essays in Understanding 1930–1954. Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism* (New York: Schocken Books, 1994), p. 416.
49. Coudenhove-Kalergi was well aware of his predecessors in advocating the idea of European unity and referred, e.g., to the design of Saint-Simon and Thierry. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Die europäische Nation*, op. cit., Ref. 43, pp. 76–77.
50. A. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 172.-173. Auflage (München: Zentralverlag der N.S.D.A.P., 1936), pp. 8, 11.
51. G. Griesmayr, *Das völkische Ideal* (Salzburg: Buchdruckerei E. Müller, 1944), pp. 29, 34.
52. A. Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts. Eine Wertung der seelisch-geistigen Gestaltenkämpfe unserer Zeit*, pp. 33–34. Auflage (München: Hoheneichen Verlag, 1934), pp. 362–364.
53. As Koselleck (*Begriffsgeschichten*, op. cit., Ref. 1, p. 236) concludes, in Hitler's rhetoric Nationalismus was less significant than Volksgemeinschaft or Rasse.
54. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, op. cit., Ref. 50, e.g. p. 31.
55. E. W. Eschmann, *Europa und die Welt* (Berlin: Junker & Dünhaupt, 1944), 30, 43, 82,
269. On the German plans of 'European Economic Community' (europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft) see, e.g., H. Kahrs, 'Von der "Grossraumwirtschaft" zur "Neuen Ordnung". Zur strategischen Orientierung der deutschen Eliten 1932–1943', in H. Kahrs et al., *Modelle für ein deutsches Europa. Ökonomie und Herrschaft im Grosswirtschaftsraum. Beiträge zur nationalsozialistischen Gesundheits- und Sozialpolitik 10* (Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1992), pp. 20–23.
56. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, op. cit., Ref. 23; K. W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (New York: The Technology Press of MIT and John Wiley & Sons, 1953).
57. G. Myrdal, *Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning in the Welfare State and Its International Implications* (London: Duckworth, 1960).
58. A. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).
59. An example of observer perspective: 'Three years ago this week the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community held its first meeting and the new experiment in "supranationalism" began.' 'Supranationalism's Third Birthday', *The Economist* 13 August 1955. An example of participant perspective: 'There is one road open to the future – the way of greater and greater integration, and this implies the giving up of certain aspects of national sovereignty. . . . We are climbing the ladder of supranationalism which is leading us to a new political reality in Europe.' 'New Political Reality. Caron Sees Need for Increasing Integration', *Bulletin from the European Community*, No 43, December 1960 (quotation from a speech of EEC Vice President Giuseppe Caron).
60. E. Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964); E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); E. J. Hobsbawm, 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions', in E. J. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (eds) *The Invention of Traditions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso, 1983).
61. A. D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999).
62. A noteworthy exception is the Czech historian Miroslav Hroch, whose *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas. Eine vergleichende Analyse zur gesellschaftlichen Schichtung der patriotischen Gruppen* (Praha: Universita Karlova, 1968) became important in comparative nation-building research. Hroch has never accepted such an

extension of the concept of nationalism. M. Hroch. 'Learning from Small Nations. Interview', *New Left Review* 58 (2009), pp. 49–50.

63. Calhoun, *Nations Matter*, op. cit., Ref. 6, p. 8.

64. Especially, N. Luhmann, *Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft*. Erster Teilband (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp), pp. 145–171.

65. Contributions to this discussion include, e.g., U. Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash, *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994); A. Touraine, *Critique of Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass. & Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); M. Featherstone, *Undoing Culture: Globalization, Postmodernism and Identity* (London: Sage, 1995).

66. U. Beck, *Der kosmopolitische Blick oder: Krieg ist Frieden* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004).

67. J. Keane (ed.) *Civil Society and the State* (London: Verso); L. Trägårdh (ed.) *Civilt samhälle kontra offentlig sektor* (Stockholm: SNS förlag, 1995).

68. E.g. G. van Benthem van den Bergh, 'Contemporary Nationalism in the Western World', *Daedalus* Vol. 95 (1966), pp. 828–861 (especially p. 848 ff., 'European Nationalism: Supranationalism or Anti-Americanism?'); F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany and the New Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 159, 227, 273, 317; W. Laqueur, *A Continent Astray: Europe, 1970–1978* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 150 ff.

69. E.g. Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly. Documents de Séance 12 (1970), p. 26.

70. Delanty, 'Social Theory and European Transformation', op. cit., Ref. 32; G. Delanty, 'The Making of European Society: Contesting Methodological Nationalism', *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research* 29 (2016), pp. 3–15.

71. D. Berstecher et al., *A University of the Future* (The Hague: Martinus Wijnhoff, 1974), pp. ix, 132.

72. Political scientist Dolf Sternberger had introduced this expression in connection with the 30th anniversary of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1979. J.-W. Müller, *Constitutional Patriotism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 21–26.

73. Müller, *Constitutional Patriotism*, pp. 2–9; J.-W. Müller, 'A "thick" constitutional patriotism for the EU? On morality, memory and militancy', in E. O. Eriksen, C. Joerges and F. Rödl (eds), *Law, Democracy and Solidarity in a Post-national Union: The Unsettled Political Order of Europe* (London and New York: Routledge), pp. 193–210.

74. S. Giner. 'The Advent of a European Society', in M. Haller and R. Richter (eds), *Toward a European Nation? Political Trends in Europe* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 15–31.

75. Delanty, 'Social Theory and European Transformation', op. cit., Ref. 32; C. Offe, 'Is There or Can There Be a "European Society?"', in Ines Katenhusen and Wolfram Lamping (eds), *Demokratien in Europa: Der Einfluss der europäischen Integration auf Institutionenwandel und neue Konturen des demokratischen Verfassungsstaates* (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2003), pp. 71–89; C. Rumford, 'European Civil Society or Transnational Social Space? Conceptions of Society in Discourse of EU Citizenship, Governance and the Democratic Deficit: An Emerging Agenda', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 6 (2003), pp. 25–43; G. Delanty and C. Rumford, *Re-thinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005); W. Outhwaite, *European Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008); A. S. Krossa, 'Conceptualizing European Society on Non-Normative Grounds', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 12 (2009), pp. 249–264.

76. Delanty, 'The Making of European Society', op. cit., Ref. 70, pp. 3–15.

77. See, e.g., P. Kettunen, 'Globalization and the Criteria of "Us": A Historical Perspective on the Discussion of the Nordic Model and New Challenges', in D. Fleming, P. Kettunen, H. Søbørg and C. Thörnqvist (eds), *Global Re-defining of Working Life – A New Nordic Agenda for Competence and Participation?* (Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 1998), pp. 56–59.
78. P. Kettunen and K. Petersen (eds), *Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives to Social Policy* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011).
79. 'Secretary-General proposes global compact on human rights, labour, environment, in address to World Economic Forum in Davos', Press release SG/SM 6881, 1.2.1999. United Nations Meeting Coverage and Press Releases. <http://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990201.sgsm6881.html>.
80. B. Rosamond, 'Imagining the European Economy: "Competitiveness" and the Social Construction of "Europe" as an Economic Space', *New Political Economy*, Volume 7 (2002).
81. R. Hyman, *Understanding European Trade Unionism. Between Market, Class and Society* (London: Sage, 2001), pp. 38–65.
82. For example, in his opening address in the seminar on 'European social dialogue and civil dialogue' in 2003, Roger Briesch, President of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), stated that the EESC has aimed to 'strengthen the role and the position of organised civil society and its various components, in particular the social partners, both within and outside the EU'. http://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/resources/docs/briesch_dialogue_social_100603_en.pdf. – The idea of social partners as a part of civil society is also included in the Lisbon Treaty. According to article I-32, 'The Economic and Social Committee shall consist of representatives of organizations of employers, of the employed, and of other parties representative of civil society, notably in socioeconomic, civic, professional and cultural areas.'
83. Rumford, 'European civil society', op. cit., Ref. 75; Y. Soysal, 'Citizenship, Immigration, and the European Social Project: Rights and Obligations of Individuality', *British Journal of Sociology* 63 (2012); R. Sanchez Salgado, *Europeanizing Civil Society. How the EU Shapes Civil Society Organizations*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Delanty, 'The making of European society', op. cit., Ref. 32.
84. A. Nieminen, *Towards a European Society? Integration and Regulation of Capitalism* (Helsinki: Department of Sociology, University of Helsinki, 2005).
85. Social Policy Agenda. COM (2000)379, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee of the Regions (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 2000).
86. J. Zeitlin and P. Pochet, with Lars Magnusson (eds), *The Open Method of Coordination in Action: The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies* (Brussels: PIEPeter Lang, 2005).
87. E.g. Prodi in 1999 at a conference on 'Progressive governance in 21st Century' (SPEECH/99/170, Date: 19 November 1999) and in 2001 in 'Social Dialogue Forum' (SPEECH/01/132, Date: 22 March 2001); Barroso in several speeches in 2006 and 2007 (SPEECH/06/706, Date: 17 November 2006; SPEECH/07/67, Date: 06 February 2007; SPEECH/07/293, Date: 08 May 2007). Speeches are available in European Commission. Press Release Database, <http://europa.eu/rapid/search.htm>.
88. EUROPE 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth /* COM/2010/2020 final */ . <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52010DC2020>.
89. Koselleck, *Vergangene Zukunft*, op. cit., Ref. 10, p. 344.

90. T. Garton Ash, 'Europe's true stories', Prospect Magazine 131 (2007), http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/enlargement_thinking_Garton_Ash_Europes_Stories.pdf.
91. R. Taras, *Europe Old and New: Transnationalism, Belonging, Xenophobia* (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), p. 71.
92. Cf. J. B. Allcock, *Explaining Yugoslavia* (London: Hurst & Company, 2000), pp. 309–313.
93. Speech by President Barroso: 100 Years on from the First World War – Lessons to learn and future of Europe. European Parliament plenary session, Strasbourg, 16 April 2014. European Commission, Press Release Database, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-330_en.htm.
94. True, the student organization of the SNP, The SNP Students, is also known as the Federation of Student Nationalists. According to their website (December 2016), 'we are the student wing of the Scottish National Party and are a social-democratic and internationalist group'. <http://www.snpstudents.com/>.
95. 'Tory conference has exposed the real nasty nationalists, says Nicola Sturgeon', Daily Record 6.10.2016.
96. Jyrki Katainen and Dimitri Avramopoulos, 'Komissio haluaa yhteisen muuttoliikepolitiikan', Helsingin Sanomat 13 July 2016.