<https://helda.helsinki.fi>

How Ideology Became Isms : A History of a Conceptual Coupling

Marjanen, Jani

de Gruyter
2020

Marjanen , J & Kurunmäki , J A 2020 , How Ideology Became Isms : A History of a Conceptual Coupling . in H Haara , K Stapelbroek & M Immanen (eds) , Passions, Politics and the Limits of Society . Helsinki Yearbook of Intellectual History , no. 1 , de Gruyter , Berlin , pp. 291-318 . <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110679861-017>

<http://hdl.handle.net/10138/319378>

<https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110679861-017>

cc_by
publishedVersion

Downloaded from Helda, University of Helsinki institutional repository.

This is an electronic reprint of the original article.

This reprint may differ from the original in pagination and typographic detail.

Please cite the original version.

Jussi Kurunmäki & Jani Marjanen

15 How Ideology Became Isms: A History of a Conceptual Coupling

Recent scholarly discussions about populism and neoliberalism as ideologies exemplify how changing political struggles are conceptualised through “isms” as navigating concepts.¹ These isms are further connected with the notion of ideology as a crucial category in politics. We argue that such couplings also constitute a redefinition of the concept even if it is often assumed that it has always been associated with political reasoning. In fact, there have been such redefinitions as long as ideology has been regarded as a key concept in the field of political conduct, both as an analytical category and as a rhetorical device. Our aim in this article is to trace the way in which “ideology” gained prominence in political vocabulary, and show that this happened largely through its coupling with “isms” in a period between the late nineteenth century and World War II.

Despite current questioning of what counts as an ideology, the common view seems to be that ideologies are omnipresent and trans-historical. According to the *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, for instance, “ideologies are, have been and will be very much with us”.² Studies that regard certain ages as more ideological also seem to assign them a trans-historical quality: it is stated in *The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought* that “the

1 Catherine Fieschi and Paul Heywood, “Trust, Cynicism and Populist Anti-politics,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9 (2004): 289–309; Ben Stanley, “The Thin Ideology of Populism,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 13 (2008): 95–110; Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Populism,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, eds. Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 493–512; Michael Freeden, “After the Brexit Referendum: Revisiting Populism as an Ideology,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 22 (2017): 1–11; Marco Tarchi, “Populism: Ideology, Political Style, Mentality?” *Politologický Časopis – Czech Journal of Political Science* 23 (2016): 95–109; Rajesh Venugopal, “Neoliberalism as Concept,” *Economy and Society* 44 (2015): 165–187; Jamie Peck, “Explaining (with) Neoliberalism,” *Territory, Politics, Governance* 1 (2013): 132–157.

2 Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc Stears, “Preface,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, eds. Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). v–vi, v; see also Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Michael Freeden, “The resurgence of ideology studies: Twenty years of the JPI,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 2 (2016): 1–8; Andrew Vincent, “Political Ideology and Political Theory: Reflections on an Awkward Partnership,” in *Liberalism as Ideology: Essays in Honour of Michael Freeden*, ed. Ben Jackson and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 159.

twentieth century was pre-eminently an age of ideologies”,³ but there is no apparent interest in how the concept developed.

Most scholars in the field of ideology are aware of its several different layers of historical meaning as one of the most “elusive concepts one can find in the social sciences”,⁴ being “thoroughly muddled by diverse uses”.⁵ Nevertheless, there have been few attempts to understand the historical processes in which the concept assumed this complex character. From the perspective of conceptual history, we aim to show how its meaning and field of application have changed since the coining of the term in the late 1790s. We build on earlier studies that trace the historical manifestation of the concept,⁶ but focus particularly on the historical connection between “ideology” and “isms”, which we argue explains the transformation of the notion of ideology. Although such a link has been noted in strands of research on ideology focusing on language and symbols,⁷ it has not thus far been analyzed as a historical process. Our examination of the historical coupling of ideology and isms clearly shows how the tendency to concentrate on a set of thinkers from Destutt de Tracy, Napoleon, Marx, Engels, Mannheim, Arendt, and Geertz to contemporary scholars in the fields of political theory and political sociology has underplayed the major semantic ruptures in the understanding of ideology in the early twentieth century. This shift, we argue, can only be grasped if one also pays attention to the more mundane language of ideology. As Michael Freeden points out, ideology as a concept has been “subjected to vernacular and professional meanings that are out of step

3 Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy, “Editors’ introduction,” in *The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought*, ed. Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 2.

4 Jorge Larraín, *The Concept of Ideology* (London: Hutchinson, 1979), 13.

5 Kathleen Knight, “Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century,” *American Political Science Review* 100 (2006): 619–626.

6 Ulrich Dierse, “Ideologie,” in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, Bd. 3 H–Me, ed. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982), 132–135; Bo Stråth, “Ideology and Conceptual History,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, eds. Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3–4.

7 See Michael Freeden, *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1; Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*; Jussi Kurunmäki and Jani Marjanen, “A Rhetorical View of Isms: An Introduction,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 23 (2018): 241–255; Jussi Kurunmäki and Jani Marjanen, “Isms, Ideologies and Setting the Agenda for Public Debate,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 23 (2018): 256–282. A kindred interpretation is to be found in Duncan Bell, “What Is Liberalism?” *Political Theory* 42 (2014): 682–715.

with each other”.⁸ It is our claim that the dynamics between vernacular and professional meaning were strengthened in the period from the 1910s until the aftermath of World War II.

We bring in the vernacular uses of the term ideology to give a better picture of how the concept has been understood in somewhat contradicting ways. To this end, we use parliamentary records from Britain and Sweden, newspaper reports from Austria, Sweden, Britain, and the Netherlands, and journal articles from JSTOR, thereby allowing access to textual examples and simple quantitative information about the changing frequency of the use of ideology and its coupling with different isms. Although the data sets may come across as disparate, they provide different entry points to the more general developments in the understanding of ideology that also affected professional, more sophisticated discourses.

In tracing the transformation of ideology from the post-French-Revolution era to the Cold War we chose three analytical distinctions for scrutiny: politicisation, democratisation, and historicisation. Although these processes are loosely chronological, they also overlap such that the politicisation of ideology continued when the concept became democratised and historicised, for instance. We argue that the concept of ideology was almost immediately politicised after its introduction, and it was used as invective throughout the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, it was only when it started to be used more frequently that it acquired more abstract meanings and became more commonly used as a hypernym for several individual types of ideology. Whereas individual isms were sometimes rhetorically described as empty playing with words and ideas, in other words ideology in its old sense, in this new setting the notion of ideology as a meta-category for individual isms took over. At this point, ideologies also became the subject of history writing. Perhaps paradoxically, their historicisation meant that the historical constitution of the links between isms and ideology was forgotten. Our aim is to bring such links to light.

The Politicisation of Ideology

The concept of ideology coined by Antoine Destutt de Tracy in 1796 (published in 1801) did not refer to grand sets of ideas that people (wittingly or unwittingly)

⁸ Michael Freeden, “Ideology and Conceptual History: The Interrelationship between Method and Meaning,” in *Political Concepts and Time: New Approaches to Conceptual History*, ed. Javier Fernández Sebastián (Santander: Cantabria University Press, 2011), 73.

needed when they acted politically, but rather concerned an Enlightenment program for a science of ideas, understood in the sensationalist tradition of Condillac. “Ideology” purported to deal with perception and theory of mind, and thereby to develop the means for categorising and teaching ideas.⁹ Destutt de Tracy’s conceptions became commonly recognised, and this positivist notion soon became prevalent around Europe and in the United States. It was described as a “theory of ideology” that had “modified all modern languages in correspondence to that theory”.¹⁰ It also made its way to university curricula as a separate topic alongside grammar, ethics, rhetoric and *belle lettres*, and the fine arts.¹¹

Destutt de Tracy maintained that the meaning of “ideology”, unlike that of terms such as “metaphysics” and “psychology”, was clear to everyone, being the Greek word for the science of ideas.¹² However, the word soon came to be associated with metaphysics when Napoleon turned his back on his former protégés around 1800, and labelled them “ideologues”. According to Napoleon, they were meddling in political praxis with a philosophical theory, and aimed to devise a political system based on metaphysical and fanatical speculation.¹³ As he argued in 1812, the troubles France had experienced were due to “ideology, that shadowy metaphysics which subtly searches for first causes on which to base the legislation of peoples, rather than making use of laws known to the human heart and of the lessons of history”.¹⁴ Such pejorative use by Napoleon and in subsequent debates politicised the notion, which was soon taken as an expression of republicanism and atheism, and was associated with well-known republicans and critics of Napoleon such as Georges Cabanis, Stendahl, Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, and Benjamin Constant.¹⁵

The Napoleonic conception of ideology spread quickly. As early as in 1804, a German account of the circumstances in Napoleonic France rhetorically associated it with politically laden terms such as “democrat”, “Jacobins”, and “terrorists”.¹⁶ F. H. Jacobi even used the ism form (*Ideologisme*) in a private letter in

9 See Emmet Kennedy, “‘Ideology’ from Destutt de Tracy to Marx,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 40 (1979), 353–354; Dierse, “Ideologie”; Freedén, *Ideology*, 4–5; Stråth, “Ideology and Conceptual History,” 3–4.

10 P. A., “On the Word Picturesque,” *The Belfast Monthly Magazine* 6, February 28, 1811, 118.

11 “Proceedings and Report of the Commissioners for the University of Virginia, Presented 8th of December 1818,” *The North-American Review and Miscellaneous Journal* 10, January 1820, 119.

12 Kennedy, “‘Ideology’ from de Tracy to Marx,” 355.

13 Dierse, “Ideologie,” 136–138.

14 Quoted in Kennedy, “‘Ideology’ from de Tracy to Marx,” 360.

15 *Ibid.*, 358.

16 Dierse, “Ideologie,” 141.

1805.¹⁷ The coining and early evolution of “ideology” goes well together with Reinhart Koselleck’s interpretation of the formation of modern political language during and after the French Revolution.¹⁸ For instance, the ways in which “ideology” was used in post-Napoleonic Europe show important strong similarities with the ways in which “liberalism” was treated in conservative and reactionary rhetoric, being associated with the French Revolution, liberalisation, the sovereignty of the people, freedom of the press, and constitutional principles.¹⁹ A later example of this sentiment expressed in German came to light in the early 1840s when the Prussian political culture was contrasted with “French liberalism, the idea of emancipation and constitutionalism”, and “papery ideology”.²⁰ The Napoleonic conception is reflected in some conservative Swedish newspapers in descriptions of ideology as “political opportunism”,²¹ or “the encyclopedic Lockean materialism” and “fanaticism”.²² A curious outlier in the use of ideology occurred in 1845 when the prominent intellectual E. G. Geijer was described in a positive tone as endorsing a “democratic ideology”.²³ This instance, although very interesting, is not representative of the established use of the terms ideology or democracy at the time.

Despite the widespread use of ideology as a pejorative label of political ideas and conduct throughout the nineteenth century, most accounts of nineteenth-century ideology have focused on Marx and Engels. This is understandable in many ways, but it is also somewhat problematic given our attempt to understand the historical trajectory. The main source for Marx and Engels’ view of ideology, *Die Deutsche Ideologie*, although written in 1845 to 1846, remained basically unknown until most of it was published as late as in 1903 to 1904, and all of it in

17 Ibid.

18 Reinhart Koselleck, “Einleitung”, in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland. Band 1*, ed. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1972), xiii–xxvii; Reinhart Koselleck, “Introduction and Prefaces to the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*,” *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 6 (2011): 1–37; Kurunmäki and Marjanen, “Isms, Ideologies and Setting the Agenda for Public Debate.”

19 Dierse, “Ideologie,” 141–142. In Britain, Lady Morgan’s *France in 1829–30* (1830) stated that the “theory of constitutional freedom had been stigmatized as ideology” in France. Quoted in the review, “Lady Morgan’s ‘France’,” *The National Magazine* 1 November 1830, 510–511.

20 Quoted in Dierse, “Ideologie,” 143. For other examples, see G. Croom Robertson, “Les Idéologues by F. Picavet,” *Mind* (1892): 119–120; Lucien Arréat, “Literary Correspondence,” *The Monist* 2 (1892): 390.

21 *Post- och Inrikes Tidningar*, 26 November 1835.

22 *Svenska Biet*, 5 March 1841.

23 *Östgöta Patriot*, 13 December 1845.

1932.²⁴ Although the view endorsed by Marx and Engels came to be known via their other works, especially the introduction to *Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie* (1859) and Engels's elaboration of the concept in "Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie" (1886), in fact they wrote little about ideology and, as David Leopold points out, what they did write were inchoate and opaque observations rather than a sustained discussion.²⁵

The impact of Marx and Engels' view of ideology emerged at a later date than indicated in a commonly held narrative starting from Destutt de Tracy and continuing to Marx and Engels and finally Mannheim and other twentieth century theoreticians. It is nevertheless worth pointing out the emergence of the notion as an expression of class-based false consciousness. Marx and Engels followed the pattern set by Napoleon and conservative rhetoric in their critical view of ideology, but they also put it in a theoretical framework. For them, ideologies such as romanticism, idealism, religion, and philosophy were disconnected from the material conditions of the people, and thus served the interests of the ruling classes.²⁶ The question that followed was whether the class-based ideological nature of ideas also dealt with the proletariat, or whether it was immune to ideology. According to Dierse, Marx and Engels did not have any positive conception of a socialist ideology, although they admitted that the working class had to be conscious of the ideological nature of the means of production in a bourgeois society.²⁷ However, it has also been maintained that Marx was shifting "back and forth between reductionism and the affirmation of his belief in the constructive role of ideas."²⁸ Referring to the positive role given to "bourgeois ideologists" who would go over to the side of the proletariat, as argued in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Reinhard Bendix held that Marx and Engels were trying to circumvent the need to state that even the proletariat would act ideologically.²⁹

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that it was not common in the time of Marx and Engels to regard socialism and communism as ideologies. Whereas socialism was understood as a future-oriented doctrine, the notion of ideology was not yet

²⁴ Dierse, "Ideologie," 146.

²⁵ David Leopold, "Marxism and Ideology: From Marx to Althusser," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, ed. Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 20.

²⁶ See, e.g., Freeden, "Ideology and Conceptual History," 83.

²⁷ Dierse, "Ideologie," 154.

²⁸ Reinhard Bendix, "The Age of Ideology: Persistent and Changing," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan, 1964), 309.

²⁹ Ibid., 309.

properly coupled with it. The ways in which two Swedish Social Democratic newspapers touched upon the question of ideology in 1889 and 1890 provide an illustrative example of the confusion caused by the “ideological dilemma.” The paper that is usually regarded as hardline Marxist projected a socialist line by making a distinction between “the decadent ideology of the bourgeoisie” and “the modern ideology of our revolutionary proletariat”,³⁰ whereas the organ of the party denounced (without mentioning its sister paper) the idea that the proletariat had an ideology, which was restricted to the ruling classes.³¹

The question of the ideological status and the role of the working class was raised in connection with debates on historical materialism in the 1890s when some leading Marxist socialists developed the conception of an ideology that not only belonged to the working class but was also neutral or even positive in tone. Ideology was used both as an analytical concept and a potential asset for the working class. Eduard Bernstein, to take a prominent example, maintained that proletarian ideas were more than just reflections of their material conditions: they were, in fact, forward-looking and value-based, in other words ideological. He also made an explicit connection between “ideology” and “socialism” in his article “Das realistische und das ideologische Moment im Sozialismus” (1898).³²

At the same time, the meaning and sphere of the term ideology diversified further as it was becoming an analytical concept of the social sciences.³³ Drawing on the earlier positivist ambitions of the ideologues, the new social sciences took the term to the sphere of social phenomena. Although there were intellectual and political links to socialist political thinking, sociologist and political scientists even introduced the notion of ideology into the non-socialist analysis of society and politics.³⁴ This ultimately opened up a way of linking ideology with several different isms.

³⁰ *Arbetet*, 2 March 1889.

³¹ *Social-Demokraten*, 8 November 1890.

³² Dierse, “Ideologie,” 158–159; see also Eduard Bernstein, *The Preconditions of Socialism*, ed. by Henry Tudor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1899] 1993), 17–20. A conservative Swedish newspaper published a positive review of Bernstein’s Kantian view of socialism, maintaining that, for Bernstein, materialism was “a deceptive ideology.” *Svenska Dagbladet*, April 7, 1901.

³³ See, e.g., Erville Bartlett Woods, “Progress as a Sociological Concept,” *American Journal of Sociology* 12 (1907): 804; James Melville Coleman, Review of “Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History, by Antonio Labriola,” *The American Journal of Psychology* 16 (1905): 137.

³⁴ See also Stråth, “Ideology and Conceptual History,” 9.

The Democratisation of Ideology

By the 1910s it was no longer uncommon, even in scholarly accounts, to write about “the working class” or “the proletariat” as having their own ideology that was not presented in a pejorative manner,³⁵ although it was still open to discussion. George D. H. Cole, for instance, opened the chapter “Proletarianism” in *Labour in the Commonwealth* (1919) by maintaining that “it is a question that has been posed again and again in the history of Labour and Socialist agitation how far the working class, or proletariat, ought to have a culture and an ‘ideology’ of its own”.³⁶ Cole’s answer to this question was in the affirmative: in his book on the history of the British working-class movement, published a year later, he held that socialism was becoming Labour’s “official ideology”.³⁷ The coupling of ideology with socialism and the Labour Party made it something that belonged to modern party politics.

Although the question of socialism dominated the articles that mentioned political ideology in the journals investigated here, the 1920s was also the age of bolshevism and fascism. For instance, according to an article on the class-based theory of morals, the main principle of bolshevism was the assertion of the “supremacy of the ‘ideology’ of the working class”.³⁸ Peter Struve, a former Russian Marxist who became a White and then emigrated to Paris, wrote that a “hybrid ideology” existed in Russia, “the so-called Eurasianism and the so-called national Bolshevism”.³⁹ Fascism, in turn, was often labelled as an ideology, although Mussolini claimed that it was, in fact, “action” not ideology: for him, ideologies such as liberalism meant “programs and a superstitious reverence for the formal democracy of the ballot box”.⁴⁰

35 E.g., A. A. Goldenweiser, “Russia and the Socialists: A Protest and a Reply,” *The North American Review* 206 (1917): 808–809.

36 George D. H. Cole, *Labour in the Commonwealth: A Book for the Younger Generation* (London: Pelican Press, 1919), 166; see also Laura A. Thompson, “Worker’s Education: A List of References (in English),” *Monthly Labor Review* 14 (1922): 181.

37 S. Perlman, Review of “A Short History of the British Working Class Movement by G. D. H. Cole,” *The American Economic Review* 18 (1928): 318; see also Emil Frankel, “Present-Day Tendencies in the German Socialist Movement,” *Journal of Political Economy* 33 (1925): 71–72.

38 M.W. Robieson, “The Theory of Morals on a Class Basis,” *International Journal of Ethics* 29 (1919): 294–295.

39 Peter Struve, “Russia,” *The Slavonic Review* 1 (1922): 27.

40 William Yandell Elliot, “Mussolini, Prophet of the Pragmatic Era in Politics,” *Political Science Quarterly* 41 (1926): 167; Carl Joachim Friedrich, “Review of Sozialismus und Faschismus in Italien by Robert Michels,” *The American Political Science Review* 22 (1928): 198.

A major consequence of the broadened use of “ideology” was that it was, at times, discussed in connection with many isms. For instance, a volume dealing with the progress of Latin America published in 1913 included a chapter entitled “Political Ideology”, in which topics such as “liberalism, radicalism, Jacobinism” are discussed.⁴¹ It also made sense to write about “progressivism” in a positive tone and to maintain that the author’s way of proceeding was “ideological and historical rather than scientific and economic”.⁴² However, such early couplings of ideology and certain isms were rare and by no means imply that the two were commonly understood as self-evidently belonging together, let alone being synonymous. For instance, none of the renowned British authors included the word ideology in their accounts of socialism, liberalism and conservatism in books published around 1910.⁴³

To obtain some idea of when ideology and different isms were coupled we turned to newspaper collections from Sweden and Austria, which provide easily searchable data sets. They indicate that writing about a particular ism and ideology in conjunction with one another became common only later (see Table 1 for Sweden and Table 2 for Austria).

Table 1: Occurrences of the word ideology together with selected ism words in Swedish newspapers. The years reflect the first occurrences within a window of 50 and 10 words before and after the word ideology, as well as adverbial use. The results were extracted from <https://tidningar.kb.se>.

	window of 50	window of 10	adverbial use
socialism	1916	1920	1929 (socialist ideology ⁴⁴)
Marxism	1916	1935	1929 (Marxist ideology ⁴⁵)
liberalism	1928	1938	1917 (liberal ideology ⁴⁶)
conservatism	1921	1931	1944 (conservative ideology ⁴⁷)
fascism	1933	1933	1925 (fascist ideology ⁴⁸)

⁴¹ Roscoe R. Hill, “Review of Latin America: Its Rise and Progress, by F. Garcia Calderon,” *Political Science Quarterly* 28 (1913): 701.

⁴² William English Walling, “Review of Progressive Democracy, by Herbert Croly,” *American Economic Review* 5 (1915): 380–381.

⁴³ See J. Ramsay MacDonald, *Socialism and Society* (London: Independent Labour Party, 1908); L. T. Hobhouse, *Liberalism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1911); H. Cecil, *Conservatism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1912).

⁴⁴ *Signalen*, 15 August 1829, 3.

⁴⁵ *Dagens Nyheter*, 29 October 1829, 15.

Two words appearing within a certain window in historical texts obviously do not give a precise measure of individual speech acts, but they may serve as a proxy for how ideology and particular isms were gradually associated. Turning to the Austrian collection of newspapers,⁴⁹ we see that the timing is different, but only slightly. The period of coupling isms and ideology in the Swedish press seemed to be from the 1910s to the 1930s, whereas the process seems to have started in the 1890s in the Austrian press (as the first co-occurrence with liberalism is an outlier).

Table 2: Occurrences of the word ideology together with selected ism words in the collection of Austrian newspapers (not only from present-day Austria). The years reflect the first occurrences within a window of 50 and 10 words before and after the word ideology, as well as adverbial use. The results were extracted from <http://anno.onb.ac.at/anno-suche>.

	window of 50	window of 10	adverbial use
socialism	1894	1926	1913 (socialist ideology), 1926 (ideology of socialism) ⁵⁰
Marxism	1898	1899	1916 (Marxist ideology), 1924 (ideology of Marxism) ⁵¹
liberalism	1873 (outlier)	1873 (outlier)	1921 (liberal ideology), 1908 (ideology of liberalism) ⁵²
fascism	1922	1922	1927 (fascist ideology), 1925 (ideology of fascism) ⁵³

Several interlinked factors affected the ways in which ideology and isms were understood in the 1930s. These include Hitler's rise to power in Germany and the deterioration of international order that was built on the League of Nations; the great depression and its repercussions; and the widely held opinion that parliamentary democracy was in crisis even in countries that were not subjected to

⁴⁶ *Göteborgs Aftonblad*, 12 November 1917, 6. Next uses: *Dagens Nyheter*, May 11, 1924, 10; *Svenska Dagbladet*, 3 February 1930, 11.

⁴⁷ *Svenska dagbladet*, 14 February 1944, 10.

⁴⁸ *Norrskensflamman*, 22 June 1925, 4.

⁴⁹ <http://anno.onb.ac.at/anno-suche>.

⁵⁰ *Arbeiterwille*, 23 August 1913, 7; *Der Hausbesitzer/Hausherren Zeitung*, 15 October 1926, 1.

⁵¹ *Freiheit!*, March 4, 1916, 3; *Neue Freie Presse*, 13 April 1924, 4.

⁵² *Die Rote Fahne*, 29 May 1921, 6; *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 27 February 1908, 2. This included the qualifier (older liberalism). The first occurrence without qualifiers such as “economic” or “progressive” is from 1929.

⁵³ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, July 10, 1927, 3; *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 21 June 1925, 4.

dictatorship or autocratic rule. We make two general observations about the consequences of that development with regard to how ideology and isms were understood in the parts of Europe that did not become totalitarian.

First, fascism, National Socialism, and Bolshevism/communism were sometimes portrayed in English-language texts as basically one and the same ideology.⁵⁴ Not only was ideology regarded as something false and negative, it was also seen as a political force that was utterly dangerous and against which free and democratic countries should defend themselves. As German born American novelist Ludwig Lewisohn wrote in 1934, for instance, “the patterns of the Russian, the Italian Fascist and the German Nazi revolutions are one hundred per cent identical”, and the ideology these revolutions displayed was “identified with absolute truth and with the power of the state”.⁵⁵ His conclusion was that it was “possible today to disregard completely the merits of any case or any ideology”, and that this type of revolution “must be resisted if we are not all to become quite literally filthy savages in the howling wilderness of a desolate earth”.⁵⁶

Lewisohn’s powerful style may not be representative of the ways in which ideology was discussed in academic journals, but it spelled out a common sentiment that reflects an increasing trend to see danger in isms in general. It was held, for instance, that there was an “epidemic of ‘isms’”, as US sociologist Howard Odum put it,⁵⁷ and a governmental report in the US used the expression “those fearsome European isms” in 1936.⁵⁸ It is worth pointing out that during and after World War II, isms in general were associated with one in particular, totalitarianism, which had a strong impact on the ways in which ideology was understood.⁵⁹ Carlton J. H. Hayes, who became famous as one of the pioneers of the study of nationalism, was among the first to identify the link between ideology, communism, fascism, and totalitarianism. In his article “The Challenge of Totalitarianism”, published in 1938, he denies the alleged difference between communism and fascism as ideologies:

54 See, e.g., Ludwig Lewisohn, “The New Meaning of Revolution,” *The North American Review* 238 (1934): 211; Ernest Barker, “The Conflict of Ideologies,” *International Affairs* 16 (1937): 348.

55 Lewisohn, “New Meaning of Revolution,” 211.

56 Ibid.

57 Howard W. Odum, “Orderly Transitional Democracy,” *American Academy of Political and Social Science* 180 (1935): 38.

58 Quoted in M. Hilson, “Consumer Co-operation and Economic Crisis: The 1936 Roosevelt Inquiry on Co-operative Enterprise and the Emergence of the Nordic ‘Middle Way,’” *Contemporary European History* 22 (2013): 182.

59 Kurunmäki and Marjanen, “Isms, Ideologies and Setting the Agenda for Public Debate,” 267–268.

When we turn from the actual political functioning of the totalitarian state to the philosophy of totalitarianism – to its ideology, as we nowadays like to describe it – many of us are apt to be confused by apparent differences between Communism and Fascism and to imagine that there is no similarity of thought or ultimate goal among the variously designated brand of totalitarianism. [. . .] Nevertheless, if we will but look behind all the phrases and catch-words and discount the propaganda of Fascists against Communists and the counter-propaganda of Communists against Fascists, we shall perceive that their seemingly diverse ideologies have actually much in common, that there is in reality an intellectual pattern for all totalitarianism.⁶⁰

Hayes positioned totalitarianism against democracy and, not unlike Karl Loewenstein⁶¹ for instance, maintained that totalitarianism flourished in countries that had never, or only very briefly, been democratic.⁶² This brings us to our second observation: “ideology” was also something that even democratic and liberal countries could have. Defenses of democracy against totalitarian doctrines tended to idealise one’s own political system and culture as more democratic and as belonging to national tradition more than warranted by social practices, constitutional law, and political institutions.⁶³ “Democratic ideology” belonged to this kind of rhetorical defense of democracy in the same manner as “American ideology”.⁶⁴

The viewing of democracy as an ideology is one indication that the word was becoming so commonly used that it was difficult to avoid, let alone ignore. Following the analytical terminology of Reinhart Koselleck, we understand the increase in its use as a process of democratisation. This obviously has nothing to do with the question of whether or not ideology as a word had more democratic undertones than before.⁶⁵ It is difficult to pinpoint when this democratisation happened. If anything, the process was gradual, but it can be traced through three historical indicators: 1) historical actors started reflecting upon the popu-

⁶⁰ Carlton J. H. Hayes, “The Challenge of Totalitarianism,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 2 (1938): 21–22.

⁶¹ Karl Loewenstein, “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I,” *The American Political Science Review* 31 (1937): 417–432.

⁶² Hayes, “The Challenge of Totalitarianism,” 26.

⁶³ See Jussi Kurunmäki, “Democracy both Young and Old: Finland, Sweden and the Interwar Crisis of Democracy,” *Journal of Modern European History* 17 (2019): 1–14; Francis Dupuis-Déri, “History of the Word ‘Democracy’ in Canada and Québec: A Political Analysis of Rhetorical Strategies,” *World Political Science Review* 6 (2010): 1–23.

⁶⁴ Howard W. Odum, “Orderly Transitional Democracy,” 32; Walter James Shepard, “Democracy,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 180 (1935): 96.

⁶⁵ For a discussion on democratization of concepts, see Koselleck, “Einleitung,” XIII–XXVII; Koselleck, “Introduction and Prefaces,” 10–11.

larity and ambiguity of the concept of ideology; 2) the semantic shifts stemming from the coupling of ideology, and different isms were recorded in lexicons and dictionaries of general language use; 3) ideology experienced a growth in relative frequency that can be measured in different digital corpora.

The association of ideology with democracy serves as our first example of an awareness among historical actors of the increasingly common and ambiguous nature of the concept. Ernest Barker, a renowned advocate of British parliamentarism, clearly sensed that he was taking steps in a new direction when he spoke about democracy as an ideology at Chatham House in 1937. Acknowledging the controversial nature of associating ideology and democracy, Barker asked whether it was right to speak of an ideology of liberal-democratic states. His answer was that if the definition of ideology was related “both to aim and to method, both to the purpose and to the process of community-action”, then it was right to claim that liberal-democratic states with their “doctrine of discussion” did have an ideology that stood against the doctrine of fascist and communist states. It is worth pointing out, however, that Barker began his speech by acknowledging the ambiguous, polysemic, and contextually shifting nature of ideology, which he maintained was “a barbarous term” that had been popularised by the British Foreign Minister and had “undergone a new change in the twentieth century”. Having been adopted by Marxists, as he put it, it had “flowed from the peculiar vocabulary of Marxism into the peculiar vocabulary of statesmen and publicists. Distorted from its original meaning of a science of ideas, or a thinking of ideas, it has come to mean ideas themselves”.⁶⁶

Barker’s argument was that not only fascism and communism were ideologies, but also liberal democracy and the Catholic Church could be seen as such. This was exceptional but not unique. Illinois professor Francis G. Wilson referred to “the war of ideologies” in which democracy needed “some clear principles of ‘internal evidence’ that may be applied in its own defence”.⁶⁷ As he saw it, democracy was “the technique of popular participation and control” and was focused, “like other ideologies”, on the future.⁶⁸

Barker and Wilson represented something new. The more common take on ideology as a false opinion was put forward in an unsigned response to Barker: “I always thought ideologies referred to other people’s erroneous opinions [. . .] I agree that Communism and Fascism are both ideologies, but I am quite certain that Liberal-Democracy is not an ideology, and I am also quite certain, although

⁶⁶ Barker, “The Conflict of Ideologies,” 341.

⁶⁷ Francis G. Wilson, “The Structure of Modern Ideology,” *The Review of Politics* 1 (1939): 387.

⁶⁸ Wilson, “The Structure of Modern Ideology,” 388.

I happen to disagree with it, there is not an ideology of the Roman Catholic Church".⁶⁹

The association of ideology with democracy signaled a semantic shift that rendered the term ideology more ambiguous and open to further theoretical inquiry. A clear landmark in this sense was Karl Mannheim's *Ideologie und Utopie* (1929) and its extended English version (1936). Mannheim famously argued that, as the Marxists had maintained, ideology was something that was dependent on social position, but he also claimed that this referred to all social positions including the working class. His theory was not a class theory as such but a sociological theory of the dependence of ideas on social position. Many contemporary readers of Mannheim's work accepted the notion that ideology did not escape any political or class position, but his claim that intellectuals could move beyond their ideological positions and study ideology in an objective manner was largely repudiated. Although the political context of the late 1930s clearly affected the ways in which the theory was discussed, the tone tended to be sociological and analytical rather than directly connected to ideologies that were topical at the time.⁷⁰ In line with Barker, although on a more theoretical level, Mannheim also captured a semantic ambiguity that we relate to the democratisation of ideology, pointing out that "we have to disentangle all the different shades of meaning which are blended here into a pseudo-unity".⁷¹

With this in mind, Mannheim made an analytical distinction between the particular and total meanings of ideology. According to him, the particular conception of ideology is implied "when the term denotes that we are skeptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent", whereas the total conception is at play when "we refer to the ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group, e. g. of a class".⁷² Taking an analytical rather than a proper historical perspective on these two conceptions of ideology, Mannheim interpreted the discursive landscape of his time such that the "particular conception of ideology now merges with the total". He claimed that this had changed the

⁶⁹ Barker, "The Conflict of Ideologies," 354.

⁷⁰ See, e. g., Hans Speier, "Ideology and Utopia, by Karl Mannheim," *American Journal of Sociology* 43 (1937): 155–166; T. V. Smith, "Ideology and Utopia by Karl Mannheim, by Karl Mannheim, Louis Wirth, Edward A. Shils," *International Journal of Ethics* 48 (1937): 120–128; Robert K. Merton, "The Sociology of Knowledge," *Isis* 27 (1937): 493–503; Wilson, "The Structure of Modern Ideology." For the German reception of the 1929 volume, see Lyman Tower Sargent, "Ideology and Utopia: Karl Mannheim and Paul Ricoeur," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 13 (2008): 264.

⁷¹ Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 49.

⁷² Ibid.

communicative abilities of different groups: “previously, one’s adversary, as the representative of a certain political-social position, was accused of conscious or unconscious falsification. Now, however, the critique is more thoroughgoing in that, having discredited the total structure of his consciousness, we consider him no longer capable of thinking correctly”.⁷³

Both Barker and Mannheim were astute observers who captured the topicality of ideology in their time, and both ended up making propositions that would play a major role in the study of the phenomenon. Their insights related to semantic ambiguity of ideology were also reflected in the ways in which dictionaries presented ideology, which is our second theme. Dictionaries tend to be somewhat conservative, only including new words and meanings that are considered well established in the language. When this happens, and the inclusion coincides with a rise in frequency in other sources, one can assume a link between the semantic shift and the democratisation of the term. *A new English dictionary on historical principles; founded mainly on the materials collected by the Philological society* (1901), an earlier version of the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED), gives three senses of the word ideology: the first pertaining to “the science of ideas” and the “study of the way in which ideas are expressed in language”; the second being “ideal or abstract speculation”; and the third simply labeled “idealism”, i. e., understood as philosophical idealism and shown to be a counter concept to materialism.⁷⁴ The first meaning dates back to Destutt de Tracy, the second is closer to Napoleon’s (and even Marx’s) use of the term as invective, whereas the third expands on the first and comes closer to scholarly discussions on the role of sociology. All these uses were still prevalent in 1901.

The current edition of the OED provides four different senses of the word ideology, three of which roughly correspond to those in the 1901 edition whereas the fourth is a new concise definition reflecting the currently predominant meaning related to political ideologies: “ideology” is a “systematic scheme of ideas, usually relating to politics, economics, or society and forming the basis of action or policy; a set of beliefs governing conduct”.⁷⁵ In our view, the emergence of uses that correspond to the fourth sense of the term came about through a process of contestation and negotiation that began in the late nineteenth century and led to the growth in the frequency of its use in the first four decades of the twen-

⁷³ Ibid., 61–62.

⁷⁴ James H. Murray, ed., *A new English dictionary on historical principles; founded mainly on the materials collected by the Philological society*, Vol. 5: H to K (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901).

⁷⁵ “ideology, n.,” in *Oxford English Dictionary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, <https://oed.com/view/Entry/91016?redirectedFrom=ideology>, accessed 8 October 2019.

tieth century, helping to make the notion of ideology an irreplaceable part of political discourse.

This semantic drift was not limited to English. As in the OED, we find additional meanings of ideology in different editions of the *Dictionnaire de L'Académie Française*. The eighth edition from 1932 to 1935 gives only one meaning, *idéologie* described as a science of ideas. The edition also notes the predominantly pejorative use of the word. The current ninth edition provides two new senses: one denoting a collection of ideas that are typical for a society, an epoch or an intellectual movement (e.g., the ideology of the Enlightenment), and the other referring to ideology as a political doctrine.⁷⁶ In the case of German, we have to resort to dictionaries without historical examples. The 1911 edition of the *Brockhaus Kleines Konversations-Lexikon* contains an entry for *Ideolog*, which is simply defined as dreamer (“Schwärmer, Träumer”), but nothing for *Ideologie*.⁷⁷ The *Sprach-Brockhaus* from 1935 defines *Ideologie* as a doctrine that is alien to the world (“Weltfremde Lehre”), echoing the pejorative definition of ideologue, but also suggests a specific system of visions and values (“Bestimmte Vorstellungs- und Wertungswelt”).⁷⁸ The 1958 edition repeats the two above definitions, whereas the 1972 edition loses the first, much more pejorative reference to an alien doctrine, but maintains the definition of ideology as a worldview and value system.⁷⁹ For Swedish, we turn to *Svenska Akademiens Ordbok* (SAOB), which like the OED provides historical examples of word use. The entry *ideologi* was written in 1933, and has not been updated since. It provides two familiar senses: the science of ideas and the negatively laden idealist theory of the world. The 1933 edition of the SAOB did not give a clear meaning of ideology as a system of thought.⁸⁰

Dictionaries are seldom useful in pinpointing the birth of new meanings, but it is noteworthy that it is difficult to find dictionary definitions of ideology as a political doctrine in editions published before the 1930s. There is textual evidence of a shift in meaning in the first three or four decades of the twentieth cen-

⁷⁶ We consulted the online version here: *Dictionnaire de L'Académie Française*. <https://www.dictionnaire-academie.fr/article/A9I0063>.

⁷⁷ *Brockhaus Kleines Konversations-Lexikon, fünfte Auflage, Bd. 1* (Leipzig, 1911), 847, <http://www.zeno.org/nid/2000120677X>.

⁷⁸ *Der Sprach-Brockhaus: Deutsches Bilderwörterbuch für jedermann* (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1935).

⁷⁹ *Der Sprach-Brockhaus: Deutsches Bilderwörterbuch für jedermann* (Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1958); *Der Sprach-Brockhaus: Deutsches Bilderwörterbuch für jedermann* (Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1972).

⁸⁰ “ideologi,” in *Svenska Akademiens Ordbok* https://www.saob.se/artikel/?seek=ideologi&p-z=1#U_I1_89220 (“Liberalismen var (för Marx) inbegreppet av all världens ideologi och illusioner”).

tury, and we claim that the breakthrough is traceable through simple word frequencies. The emergence of this new sense was a gradual process in which the different meanings were not as neatly separated as the definitions in dictionaries might lead us to believe. The senses were rather linked in language use, and the term ideology carried several older layers of meaning.⁸¹ It was now more commonly invoked in the sense of competing political doctrines, but old meanings referring to the science of ideas and irrational reasoning were, and still are, retained for particular purposes.

Our third source, the examination of digital corpora, reveals that not only was the word ideology changing in terms of meaning and context, it was also much more common. All the diachronic corpora we consulted indicate a similar trend: the word ideology gradually became more popular in the early twentieth century, and the 1930s was a decade of particular intensification. The Google Books data set,⁸² although justifiably criticised for its biased selection of books,⁸³ provides the largest corpus available for studying frequencies. Its data-sets in English, German and French all indicate a rise in the relative frequency of the word ideology in the first three or four decades of the twentieth century.⁸⁴

Figure 1: Relative frequencies of ideology, Ideologie and idéologie in the English, German and French data sets of Google Books, respectively. The plot was produced here: <http://books.google.com/ngrams>

81 Reinhart Koselleck, *Zeitschichten: Studien zur Historik* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2003).

82 Jean-Baptiste Michel et al., “Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books,” *Science* 331 (2011): 176–182.

83 Eitan Adam Pechenick, Christopher M. Danforth, and Peter Sheridan Dodds, “Characterizing the Google Books Corpus: Strong Limits to Inferences of Socio-Cultural and Linguistic Evolution,” *PLOS ONE* 10 (2015): e0137041.

84 Google. <http://books.google.com/ngrams>.

Although the trends are similar, there are clear differences between the countries. Usage of the term increased earlier in German-speaking Europe and occurred more frequently overall in German than in English or French. A perusal of digitised German-language newspapers in the ANNO collection of the Austrian National Library also indicates its earlier usage in connection with political movements or parties, and individual isms. Because ANNO does not provide relative frequencies, we had to look at absolute frequencies of the term in individual Austrian newspapers published during the first, second, and third decades of the twentieth century: occurrences of the term *ideology* became more frequent in the 1910s and 1920s, as evidenced in the newspapers *Arbeiter Zeitung* (59 for the 1900s, 184 for the 1910s, 351 for the 1920s), *Reichspost* (15 for the 1900s, 31 for the 1910s, 99 for the 1920s), and *Salzburger Wacht* (10 for the 1900s, 50 for the 1910s, 182 for the 1920s).⁸⁵

Other European countries followed a similar trend. Delpher, a collection of Dutch newspapers, provides absolute frequencies, which also point to the sporadic use of ‘*ideologie*’ until the first decade of the twentieth century, followed by a sharp increase up to the 1930s.⁸⁶ The Times Digital Archive, containing all issues of *The Times* between 1785 and 2012, is a significantly smaller data set, but provides parallel trajectories. The first uses of *ideology* in it are from 1827,⁸⁷ 1846,⁸⁸ and 1862.⁸⁹ There were very few occurrences of the word during the last decades of the nineteenth century (between zero and seven per decade), but from 1910 onwards it clearly became part of everyday language, with 11 occurrences for the 1910s, 30 for the 1920s, 284 for the 1930s, and 349 for the 1940s. Absolute word frequencies are not normalised per decade according to the size of the data set, but bearing in mind that the Times Digital Archive covers only one newspaper, the absolute figures do give an indication of the trend. The stories in *The Times* also indicate that *ideology* tended to be increasingly used in explicitly political settings once it became more frequent. Usage relating to language or as the opposite of facts were replaced with a more general take in which ideologies were seen as something that competed for space, supporters or influence.⁹⁰

⁸⁵ *Arbeiter Zeitung*. Searches were done in <http://anno.onb.ac.at/anno-suche>.

⁸⁶ Delpher. <https://www.delpher.nl/>.

⁸⁷ “Portugal,” *Times*, 15 September 1827, 2. *The Times Digital Archive*, <http://tinyurl.gale.com/tinyurl/CCJH53>, accessed 11 November 2019.

⁸⁸ “The debate in the Chamber of Deputies which,” *Times*, 7 September 1846, 4. *The Times Digital Archive*, <http://tinyurl.gale.com/tinyurl/CCJZ99>, accessed 11 November 2019.

⁸⁹ “Arches’ Court, Feb. 25,” *Times*, 26 February 1862, 11. *The Times Digital Archive*, <http://tinyurl.gale.com/tinyurl/CCJdP6>, accessed 11 November 2019.

⁹⁰ For an example, see “The Soviet Structure,” *Times*, 2 September 1948, 5.

Turning to the Hansard corpus comprising British parliamentary debates between 1803 and 2005 reveals the change in use of the word ideology more clearly: there is not a single occurrence of “ideology” or “ideological” before the 1920s, and even then both words appear only once. The breakthrough was in the 1930s: ideologies are often “political”, “rival”, “offensive” or used in conjunction with particular isms, most often socialism, communism or fascism.⁹¹ The British Parliament was not in the least concerned with issues of ideology as the science of ideas, but once it assumed its new meaning it entered the sphere of Parliament. The Swedish Riksdag serves as a further example of parliamentary talk about ideology. The first use of the term in the Riksdag was in 1874 in a statement advising against rushing into the metric system. Swedish parliamentary debates not only include the word ideology earlier than the British debates, they also show much more awareness of its history and Napoleonic uses of it. Whereas nineteenth-century uses are close to Napoleonic uses, the Swedish Parliament referred to ideologies as something political and competitive as early as in the 1910s and the 1920s.⁹² Nevertheless, the trend is similar in that usage of the term rocketed in the discourse of the Swedish Riksdag during the 1930s.

As ideology was entering new language domains, we also observed a shift in semantic context related to the popularity of the term. It was not only the word ideology, but also and in particular the phrase “political ideology”, that were increasingly used in English in the 1930s (the first uses were obviously earlier). As part of this semantic change, we also note the rise of the plural form: the proportion of “ideologies” in all forms of the word rose from around 10 percent in the 1910s to around 20 percent in the period after 1930 in the Google Books data set, meaning that it was more common to have a comparative outlook on competing ideologies.⁹³ Had ideology only meant the science of ideas or wishful and irrelevant thinking, the plural form would have been less relevant.

Having been part of the theoretical discussion in philosophy, sociology, and other academic disciplines, ideology as a term became much more common in newspapers and parliamentary debates. The rise in frequency and the semantic changes described above are related, and probably reciprocally constitutive.

⁹¹ Results were obtained through a search on “ideolog*” in <https://www.english-corpora.org/hansard/>.

⁹² Occurrences of ideology in the Swedish Riksdag were extracted by downloading all Riksdag documents from before 1970 and searching them as text files. The data is to be found here: <https://data.kb.se/datasets/2017/09/riksdagstryck/>.

⁹³ Both claims are based on <http://books.google.com/ngrams>, so further corpus linguistic verification would be welcome.

When the term became more common, more people thought in terms of ideology and perhaps consciously used the word in new ways. In these new contexts, it was also more likely to be associated with different ism words. It is clear that different periods of time produced new ideologies (such as the notion of totalitarianism in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s),⁹⁴ but we should also point out that the coupling of different isms with it also helped to transform the notion of ideology as a meta-category.

The Historicisation of Ideology

We have focused in the previous sections on when and how the word ideology acquired a new meaning and how isms have come to be understood as competing ideologies. As noted, ideology was occasionally coupled with different isms even in early nineteenth-century pejorative rhetoric against ideologues and ideology, but this was rather uncommon and based on an old sense of ideology. A more modern use was when an ism was described as one ideology among others. Although it is sometimes difficult to separate the two senses, our contention is that the latter became more common in the 1920s and 1930s, as indicated above in our discussion about Swedish and Austrian newspapers and supported by parliamentary material from Britain and Sweden. At this time, ideology was coupled with socialism, communism, Marxism, fascism, anarchism, totalitarianism, and liberalism, although not necessarily simultaneously. According to Michael Freedén, ideology became a focal concept of political analysis and gained prominence in political vocabulary with the rise of totalitarian ideologies.⁹⁵ Our interpretation resembles Freedén's, but we highlight the gradual coupling of different isms, as a result of which ideology came to be perceived as omnipresent on the political spectrum. No longer did only political adversaries have ideologies (although this sentiment still occasionally recurs), but ideologies were perceived as being held also by one's own political movement and the academics analyzing them.

The experience of ideology as omnipresent provoked historical accounts of the phenomenon. The original Ideologues gained their place in the history of

⁹⁴ Kurunmäki and Marjanen, "Isms, ideologies and setting the agenda," 267; Juan Francisco Fuentes, "Totalitarian Language: Creating Symbols to Destroy Words," *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 8 (2013): 45–66; Id., "How Words Reshape the Past: The 'Old, Old Story' of Totalitarianism," *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 16 (2015): 282–297.

⁹⁵ Freedén, "Ideology and Conceptual History," 73.

ideology.⁹⁶ Although there were already books about liberalism, conservatism, and socialism in the early twentieth century,⁹⁷ they were not presented as historical studies of ideology, nor were the historical accounts of the ideologues tied to isms. A relative frequency search shows that terms such as “history of ideology”, “study of ideology”, and “age of ideology” appear in Google Books data set from the 1920s, but became more common in the postwar period.⁹⁸ Moreover, ideology was commonly associated with isms during and after World War II and, vice versa, isms were understood as ideologies, which called for an account of their history. For instance, the *Handbook of Political ‘Isms’*, published in 1941, was presented as “a dictionary of ideologies”,⁹⁹ and the chapters in a volume on European ideologies was organised according to different isms.¹⁰⁰ The age of ideology as a notion stemmed from the need to provide historical explanations for the experience of totalitarianism.¹⁰¹ Although this meant that the history of particular isms was written as the history of ideology, the historical coupling of the two was lost. The link was readily postulated as far back in time as one could write the history of a particular ism.

Works that describe the age of ideology, or that claim the end of it, tend to have a dual temporality. On the one hand, they clearly arose from the experience of World War II and the Cold War as an age of ideology, but on the other hand they provide an extensive historical account, most often depicting the nineteenth century as the age of ideologies.¹⁰² However, these interpretations had different starting points. It is possible to find influential accounts of ideology that go back to Francis Bacon and religious conflicts,¹⁰³ to the birth of modern politics around

96 See, e.g., François Picavet, *Les ideologues: Essai sur l'histoire des idées et des théories scientifiques, philosophiques, religieuses, etc. en France depuis 1789* (Paris, 1891).

97 See, e.g., Hobhouse, *Liberalism*; Guido de Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism* (London: Oxford University Press, [1925] 1927); Cecil, *Conservatism*; J. Ramsay MacDonald, *Socialism and Society* (London: Independent Labour Party, 1908). On liberalism as an ideology and Ruggiero, see also Bell, “What Is Liberalism?”.

98 <http://books.google.com/ngrams>.

99 Louis Wasserman, *Handbook of Political ‘Isms’* (New York: Association Press, 1941), 5.

100 Feliks Gross and Robert M. Maciver (ed.), *European Ideologies; A Survey of 20th Century Political Ideas* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948).

101 See, e.g., Karl Dietrich Bracher, *The Age of Ideologies: A History of Political Thought in the Twentieth Century* (London: Methuen & Co, 1985), ix. For a critical view on understanding ideology merely through totalitarianism, see Freedman, “Ideology and Conceptual History,” 87–89.

102 Henry D. Aiken, *The Age of Ideology* (Boston: Houghton & Mifflin, 1957); L. Wasserman, *Handbook of Political ‘Isms’*, 5.

103 Bendix, “Age of Ideology: Persistent and Changing,” 294–295.

the Enlightenment in the late eighteenth century,¹⁰⁴ to the period after the 1848 revolutions,¹⁰⁵ or to the age of mass society and totalitarianism.¹⁰⁶ Most accounts also acknowledge Destutt de Tracy's coinage of the term ideology after the French Revolution, but none of them seem to consider the introduction of the word the starting point of an age of ideology.¹⁰⁷ Interestingly, Quentin Skinner, an ardent critic of conceptual anachronism in the study of political thought, readily placed ideology as a category in the medieval and early-modern periods in his magnum opus on political thought, *The Foundation of Modern Political Thought* (1978).¹⁰⁸ James Tully has without any reservations described Skinner's book as "a map of the great political ideologies of early-modern Europe."¹⁰⁹

The notion of a currently experienced age of ideology is particularly plain in some of the early volumes on the history of ideologies. As the above-mentioned 1948 volume *European Ideologies* states: "In our day it has surely become clear to every thinking person that mankind is now, whatever it was before, governed by ideas, activated by ideologies, and ridden by myths".¹¹⁰ Thinking about ideologies was as topical as it could get, but their roots were most often placed in the nineteenth century. Similarly, Hans Kohn provided historical accounts of ideologies starting from the revolutions of 1848, but the prefaces of his book clearly show how his work grew out of an uneasiness with ideology in the present. This perspective also changed over the years: whereas the first edition from 1949 still reveled in the experience of an international conflict between ideologies, the third edition from 1967 echoed the end of the ideology thesis, as Kohn recognised a different present: "But winds of change are blowing which in 1914 or even 1945 few would have expected. The ideologies of the first part of the century are undergoing a subtle transformation without giving up their distinct charac-

104 Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan, 1964), 64.

105 Hans Kohn, *Political Ideologies of the Twentieth Century* (New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1967), xi.

106 Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New edition with added prefaces (San Diego: A Harvest Book, Harcourt Brace & Company, 1973), 45.

107 The conceptual histories of ideology by Dierse, Stråth, and Freedon are exceptions, but they do not make claims about a particular age of ideology.

108 See e.g., Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. 1* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978), xii.

109 On this point, see Vincent, "Political Ideology and Political Theory," 165.

110 Robert M. MacIver, "Introduction," in *European Ideologies: A Survey of 20th Century Political Ideas*, ed. Felix Gross (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), xiii.

ter” and “ideologies count less than twenty years ago and national and imperial interests count more”.¹¹¹

Some Western intellectuals, such as Edward Shils, Daniel Bell, Seymour Martin Lipset, Albert Camus, and Raymond Aron, had been advancing the theory of the end of ideology in Western democracies since the late 1940s. Claiming the end of ideology in developed countries was intended to limit the influence of communism and left-wing radicalism in the West.¹¹² Such theories tended to build on the belief that ideologies such as socialism, communism, and liberalism emanated from Enlightenment thought, but degenerated in the era of the mass society into xenophobic nationalism, doctrinaire socialism, communism, and fascism – in other words, totalitarianism. This interpretation placed ideology outside the liberal democratic sphere. If the Marxist understanding of ideology presented it as something negative and as something that the bourgeoisie held, the end of ideology thesis turned this on its head. The liberal or social-democratic position was now non-ideological, whereas communism and fascism were deemed the opposite and as belonging to the past.

Many historical treatises on ideology became foundational works in the field. Two scholars are particularly noteworthy in the way they historicise the concept: Hannah Arendt and Clifford Geertz. Arendt gives a brief history in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), in which she identifies ideology with totalitarianism, but she also builds her argument on the long-term development of totalitarianism, describing antisemitism and imperialism as ideologies.¹¹³ She maintains that only a few nineteenth-century ideas became “full-fledged ideologies”, which she describes as “systems based upon a single opinion that proved strong enough to attract and persuade a majority of people and broad enough to lead them through the various experiences and situations of an average modern life”. According to her, “an ideology differs from a simple opinion in that it claims to possess either the key to history, or the solution for all the ‘riddles of the universe’”.¹¹⁴ For her, the two full-fledged ideologies had defeated all oth-

111 Kohn, *Political Ideologies of the Twentieth Century*, xi.

112 See Edward Shils, “The End of Ideology?” *Encounter* 5 (1955): 52–58; Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (New York: Norton 1962 [1955]); Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties. With a New Afterword* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988 [1960]); Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960). For an analysis, see Howard Brick, “The End of Ideology Thesis,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, ed. Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 90–112.

113 Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 45; see also Fuentes, “How Words Reshape the Past,” 287.

114 Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 159.

ers: “the ideology which interprets history as an economic struggle of classes, and the other that interprets history as a natural fight of races”.¹¹⁵ They were not universal, but every “full-fledged ideology has been created, continued and improved as a political weapon and not as a theoretical doctrine”.¹¹⁶ Arendt explicitly equates ideologies with isms in her article “Ideology and Terror” (1953), which was added to the second edition of the book on totalitarianism: “ideologies – isms which to the satisfaction of their adherents can explain everything and every occurrence by deducing it from a single premise – are a very recent phenomenon and, for many decades, this played a negligible role in political life”. She further explains that the political potential of ideology was not realised before the time of Hitler and Stalin.¹¹⁷

Arendt’s understanding of these two full-fledged and totalising ideologies was widely acknowledged during the following years. Drawing on her analysis, in the early 1960s Bernard Crick presented a powerful denunciation of ideology by contrasting it to what he called “politics”, arguing that totalitarian rule “marks the sharpest contrast imaginable with political rule, and ideological thinking is an explicit and direct challenge to political thinking”.¹¹⁸ Like Arendt, he viewed totalitarian regimes as the product of a democratic age and ideology as the womb from which both totalitarianism and modern sociology had evolved.¹¹⁹

Geertz, on the other hand, produced a longer history of ideologies that ended up being an interpretation of the birth of modern political culture, reminiscent of the way in which historians Reinhart Koselleck and R. R. Palmer saw the emergence of liberalism, socialism, and conservatism in the aftermath of the French Revolution.¹²⁰ In his seminal article on ideology as a cultural system, Geertz maintains that the function of ideology “is to make an autonomous politics possible by providing the authoritative concepts that render it meaningful, the suasive images by means of which it can be sensibly grasped”.¹²¹ Referring to Burke and de Maistre, he considered the emergence of ideology as part of the modern era:

115 Ibid.

116 Ibid.

117 Hannah Arendt, “Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government,” *The Review of Politics* 15 (1953): 315.

118 Bernard Crick, *In Defence of Politics* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, [1962]) 1966), 34.

119 Ibid., 35, 38.

120 See Kurunmäki and Marjanen, “Isms, ideologies and setting the agenda,” 257.

121 Geertz, “Ideology as a Cultural System,” 63.

It is, in fact, precisely at the point at which a political system begins to free itself from the immediate governance of received tradition, from the direct and detailed guidance of religious or philosophical canons on the one hand and from the unreflective precepts of conventional moralism on the other, that formal ideologies tend first to emerge and take hold.¹²²

He described the French Revolution as “the greatest incubator of extremist ideologies, ‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary’ alike”, because “the central organizing principle of political life, the divine right of kings, was destroyed”.¹²³ Geertz’s take on ideology was very different from that of Arendt, and opened up a perspective from which the end of the ideology thesis no longer made sense: ideologies were everywhere, and they were needed to “render otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful”. He described them as “maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience”.¹²⁴ Geertz’s account of ideology as a symbolic phenomenon has inspired many contemporary analysts who view it as an elementary aspect of politics and not degeneration or deviation from it, and who have a constructive and rhetorical view of the role of language in history, politics, and, consequently, ideology. Michael Freeden’s morphological analysis of ideologies is perhaps the best and most influential example of this line of thinking.

According to Geertz, a variety of things could reasonably be called ideologies, and consequently he imagined a large range of isms and their hybrids as cultural systems. He further argued that the search for symbolic frameworks in reaction to political problems “whether in the form of nationalism, Marxism, liberalism, populism, racism, Caesarism, ecclesiasticism, or some variety of reconstructed traditionalism (or, most commonly, a confused *mélange* of several of these) is therefore tremendously intense”.¹²⁵ Any new political situation could constitute a setting in which new ideological systems could emerge, which also meant that whereas ideology was a phenomenon of the post-French revolution setting, individual ideologies have their distinct histories. In making this move Geertz opened up a very flexible framework in which to discuss individual ideologies, but again, the historicisation of ideology and its historical coupling with individual isms was, in a sense, lost. In such an interpretation, ideologies could not be invective, as in Napoleon, or forms of false consciousness as in Marx, but rather had their own intellectual trajectories. In tracing those trajec-

¹²² Ibid., 63–64.

¹²³ Ibid., 64.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 65.

tories the historical linking of the notion of ideology and individual isms did not make sense. Ideology was purely a meta-category.

This more open notion of ideology also made it easier to label political movements as ideologies. The fact that Caesarism, populism, agrarianism, and trade unionism could at least be discussed as ideologies is indicative not only of the link between ideology and particular isms, but also of the increasingly strong link between ideology and almost any ism. One chapter in a 1969 volume on populism was devoted to populism as an ideology, but it is characteristic of the volume that all the authors except American historian Richard Hofstadter, who had published a book that was mainly about the impact of nineteenth-century populism on the political culture in the US, were clearly very uncertain about what populism was at that time.¹²⁶ Nevertheless, ideology was included in the book through the ism. Something similar is happening in the current discussion about populism and neoliberalism as ideologies, although the meanings of ideology are also being renegotiated. Whereas the discussion on populism tends to build on the notion of ideology as a cultural system, the discussion on neoliberalism seems to build on something that is closer to Arendt's thinking – neoliberalism as a distorted form of nineteenth-century liberalism – or even to Marx's – neoliberalism as false consciousness that is prevalent in new public management.

Conclusion

The transformation of ideology as a concept can be traced through the slightly overlapping processes of politicisation, democratisation, and historicisation. Politicisation took place almost immediately after the coinage of the term as it was immediately contested and used as invective. This feature is still present in the use of the word ideology. Democratisation, the process in which ideology was much more commonly used, took place in the early twentieth century, in particular the 1920s and 1930s. The term also entered various different language domains, and assumed an ambiguous meaning in vernacular use. Historicisation is the process in which ideology was understood as a meta-category that covered a potentially endless selection of individual ideologies (usually called isms of

126 Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969); Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F. D. R.* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955); see also Anton Jäger, "The Semantic Drift: Images of Populism in Post-War American Historiography and Their Relevance for (European) Political Science," *Constellations* 24 (2017): 310–323.

some sort), and thus prompted the writing up of these individual ideologies as a feature of the history of political thought.

It was common in the early coupling of ideology and particular isms to take an outside position by presenting one or several isms as ideologies but not identifying one's own position as an ideology. Marx is a typical example of this, whereas Bernstein was an early exception. The tradition was a direct continuation of Napoleon's use of ideology as invective (which was also a dominant feature of isms). It is also evident in quite late characterisations like in many analyses of totalitarianism and in the end of ideology thesis in the 1950s and 1960s, and still occurs today in less reflected uses.

It is difficult to pinpoint which isms were first associated with ideology, because it depends on the political culture and the types of source consulted. Nevertheless, it seems that Bernsteinian revisionsim and discussions on the position of ideology in sociology made socialism and communism the first isms to be regularly associated with it. The rise of fascism and National Socialism gave it a new focus in the 1920s and 1930s. At this time, too, it was surprisingly common in British and American discourse to regard fascism, National Socialism, and Communism as one and the same ideology. Although we found examples of liberalism being called an ideology in the 1870s, it still seems that the notion of liberalism as an ideology became more common only around World War II, if even then.

What characterised the discourse of ideologies in the period before World War II was that they were considered to be few in number. This changed in the postwar period as it became more common to regard ideologies as indispensable such that everyone had them. At the time it made more sense to provide long lists of ideologies to describe the essentials of the ideological spectrum. Many of them had in individual cases been called ideologies already earlier (this applies even to isms such as feminism and anarchism), but then it became more common to consider them all as ideologies at the same time (although probably giving them different prominence). It also meant that even academic analysts of ideologies reflected upon their own positions as persons with ideologically founded opinions. This was evident in the case of democracy being an ideology, for instance, but it is also a feature of current literature on ideologies.¹²⁷ Once ideology was regarded as being everywhere, and as it had gained a higher level of abstraction it could not really be seen as a science of ideas that could be juxtaposed with other takes on creating knowledge (even the Mannheimian take on ideology as a sociology of knowledge was marginalised). Instead, it

127 See e.g., Ball and Bellamy, "Editors' introduction," 1–4.

became a meta-category that could not have a clear counter-concept. Instead it was the different ideologies that could be juxtaposed, opposed, and historicised. However, older meanings did not disappear altogether, and are visible in the current use of the adjective “ideological” as invective in political debate, for instance. In this meaning, ideological is often presented as a counter-concept to pragmatism or the pragmatic, but when the talk is of ideology as a meta-category, the only feasible antonym is anti-ideological or non-ideology.