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Chapter 4**A Transnational German: JHG von Justi on International Trade**

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Abstract

According to the existing scholarship, cameralists were generally in favour of a closed protectionist state. This was often conceptualised with reference either to Spartan or Chinese virtues. This so-called “philosophical way” or “isolated way”, so they argued, would lead the German states into long-lasting happiness. However, closer scrutiny of the thoughts of late cameralists, particularly Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, reveals a counter approach to international order and trade that challenges current understandings of a cameralist penchant for autarky. This chapter argues that Justi did not consider an exit from interstate competition feasible for Prussia nor for any European state. The “philosophical way” had become impossible in Europe because of the depth of ties created by interstate trade. Justi instead contended that the only way for European states to go was that of the “man of the world”. The chapter reveals that Justi, often heralded as late cameralism’s greatest theoretician, in fact suggested the emulation of British practices of international trade by Prussia. The principle advocate of “cameral sciences”, which have been considered as a land-locked discipline, was, in fact, deeply embedded in his transnational world.

1. Introduction

According to the existing scholarship, cameralists were generally in favour of a closed, protectionist state. Margaret Schabas recently argued that cameralism “focused on domestic trade and consumption, promoted population growth, but with a strong inclination toward autarky or economic self-sufficiency”.¹ Ernst Ludwig Carl’s *Traites de la Richesse* (1722–1723) is considered to be an exception, since it presented views in favour of global trade. The most recent volume on cameralism suggests that German cameralism was little interested in foreign markets and export trading.² But is it really true that the political economy (*Staatswirtschaft*) of Prussia favoured a protectionist state with a closed domestic economy? The most recent findings demonstrate that Friedrich the Great aspired to position Prussia as an internationally trading nation capable of participating in the world of overseas commerce. Florian Schui dubbed the creation of the Prussian Asiatic Trade Company during the 1750s as Prussia’s “Trans-Oceanic Moment”.³ In concluding a commercial treaty with France called the *Convention préliminaire de commerce* (1753), Prussia sought to establish itself as a trading nation on the same level as the Low Countries and the Hanseatic cities. The change in Prussia’s economic and strategic orientation was apparent in the expansion of its trade routes and the opening of the free port of Emden.⁴

All these initiatives were aimed at extensive involvement in overseas commerce. This change of commercial policy occurred around the 1750s and was supported by a royal campaign in which administrators, philosophers, merchants and diplomats participated; its theoretical culmination was represented by the writings of Prussian cameralists.⁵ This chapter will demonstrate how leading cameralist Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717–1771) participated in this campaign

through his own writings. I argue that in the 1750s and 1760s, Justi favoured the primacy of international trade. This can be seen in his more theoretical considerations as well as in the proposals he made for practical implementation. The principal advocate of what has been widely considered to be a landlocked discipline was in fact deeply embedded in a transnational world.

It is possible to explain why cameralism has not been prominent in the history of political economy. This has to do with shifts in political, economic and intellectual history. Cameralism was long considered a cornerstone of Friedrich's *Machtpolitik*, itself a nineteenth-century category. Recent research has recognised that, rather than impose themselves on later categories, contemporary concepts, such as balance of power, jealousy of trade and universal monarchy, are helpful tools in an analysis of the complex political and economic configurations of the eighteenth century.⁶ In adopting this approach, I am building on the work of Istvan Hont and Ulrich Adam.⁷ The contemporary concepts used to analyse international relations are often metaphorical.

However, the contemporary metaphors examined here are not those mentioned above. Justi vehemently rejected the concepts of universal monarchy and balance of power on the grounds that they were chimeras.⁸ The metaphors that he used were the man of the world (*ein Weltman*, *Gallant Man*), or the philosopher (*Philosoph*). He used these antithetically. The philosopher referred to a state that focused on the development of a closed domestic economy. The man of the world was a metaphor for a trading nation. Like so many of his contemporaries, Justi employed domestic analogies.⁹ According to Justi, states related to each other in the same way that human beings had in the state of nature. The goals of individual human beings and that of

states were the same: self-preservation and, ultimately, happiness.¹⁰ A human being could decide to seek his happiness in isolation. This was the image of the stoic philosopher meditating in solitude. These people were antisocial, living as if there were no one else in the world. The other option for human beings was to be social and enter into commerce and trade with other people: this involved social exchanges. Applying these metaphors to the international order, Justi argued that states could make the same choice. The metaphors in question implied that comparisons were made, and Justi's comparative method was by no means limited to Europe. He made global, inter-societal comparisons.¹¹ In the eighteenth century, the idea of the state as a solitary man was directly associated with Sparta, which was thought to have had a strict system of civil education and a culture of patriotism. The alternative to this was represented by Athens, which was characterised by cultural refinement, personal liberty and affluence. In Justi's time, China was an example of a philosopher state, whereas England came closest to the idea of the man of the world, or the gallant man.

Justi has often been interpreted along the lines of Schabas, and isolation has been taken to represent the primacy of domestic trade, frugality, autarchy and self-sufficiency. It has been thought that Justi's *Vergleichungen der Europäischen mit den Asiatischen und anderen vermeintlich Barbarischen Regierungen* (1762) represents such a line of thinking. Following the example of China, Justi presented a "philosophical" or "isolated way" that would lead German states and Prussia, in particular, to long-lasting happiness.¹² However, closer examination of Justi's writings reveals that he did in fact favour the other conception of international order and trade. He did not consider it feasible for Prussia or any other European state to abandon the competition between European countries. The path of isolation was impossible in Europe

because of the existing ties created by trade between European states. According to Justi, the German states had no other option than to choose the way of a man of the world. This becomes particularly clear in Justi's works on political theory.¹³ In these books, Justi argued that Germany, and Prussia, in particular, should emulate the way of international trade as advocated by Athens and England. A close study of Justi's metaphors and their location in the broader European framework of political economy will help us better understand his vision for Prussia.

2. Non-Commercial Nations

Broader questions posed by rising commercialism were at the forefront of the Enlightenment discussion. Charles Rollin's (1661–1741) *Traite des etudes* (1726–1728) and *Histoire ancienne* (1730–1738), together with Montesquieu's (1689–1777) *De l'esprit des lois* (1748), brought Sparta into the discussion. Rollin fostered ardent admiration for the purity of the laws introduced by Lycurgus, a sentiment that became dominant and can also be detected in Justi's writings. Rollin praised the wise legislator for abolishing economic equality, effected through the banning of money. Montesquieu associated Sparta with ardent patriotism and the love of equality.¹⁴ He saw Sparta as the antithesis of Athens:

In Greece there were two sorts of republics; some were military, like Sparta; others were commercial, like Athens. In the former citizens were required to be idle; in the latter, efforts were made to inspire a love of work.¹⁵

According to Montesquieu, the success of the type of military state that Sparta represented depended on the absence of luxury.

When Justi treated Athens as an example of a man of the world, he was commenting on the juxtaposition between Athens and Sparta in European political thought. Voltaire and others had compared Friedrich Wilhelm's militaristic state with Sparta; the aspiration was for Friedrich II to convert Prussia as Sparta into a brilliant Athens.¹⁶ This was a metaphorical way of expressing what Friedrich II sought to effect through a change in economic policy. Prussia was to become a trading nation, a new Athens. Many eighteenth-century German and Prussian writers were sharply critical of Rousseau's positive views of Sparta. The vast majority of German writers seemed to prefer Solon of Athens and praised Lycurgus, the great legislator of Sparta, much less. Christian Gotlob Heyne (1729–1812), a Göttingen classical scholar and philologist, and Johann Kaspar Friedrich Manso (1760–1826), a historian and philologist in Breslau, were exceptions to this rule because of their decisively Spartophilic views.¹⁷

Justi praised Lycurgus as the wisest legislator of antiquity (*des Alterthums*),¹⁸ joining an increasing number of writers who referred to Sparta in mid eighteenth-century political treatises.¹⁹ Justi raised the case of Sparta when discussing the possibility of an isolated state and the potentially corrupting impact of commerce and luxury. In an autobiographical note in *Fortgesetzte Bemühungen* (1760), he reflected on his early views of the ways states could achieve happiness. His conception of how the happiness of a state could be promoted changed over the course of the 1750s. In his note, he wrote that even eight or 10 years previously, he would have shared Bielfeld's critique of Lycurgus and his advocacy of isolation, as Bielfeld had

argued in his *Institutions Politiques* that isolation could not lead to happiness. However, Justi remarked that once he had extended his knowledge of the sciences of state, he came to regret the critique he had presented of Lycurgus. After study of the aforementioned sciences, he had come to realise that there were two equally good routes to happiness: the path of isolation and the path of exchange.²⁰

My view is that Justi's re-evaluation of Lycurgus drew heavily on Rousseau. At the time Justi was writing, the best-known Spartophile was beyond a doubt Rousseau, although it is a matter of debate how far Rousseau really admired Sparta. Rousseau praised Spartan laws for the support they gave to a common spirit and military discipline. Equally, he admired the Spartan repudiation of commerce and luxury goods.²¹ He elaborated on Sparta in his *Discourse sur les sciences et les arts* (1750), although such references are surprisingly rare in his *Discourse sur l'inégalité*. He too treated antithetically the wisdom of Sparta and the politesse of Athens.²² We know that Justi was familiar with these works by Montesquieu and Rousseau,²³ and he examined the antithesis between Sparta and Athens in the same spirit as they.

In *Vergleichungen* (1762), Justi stated that although he was not a supporter of Rousseau, he shared Rousseau's concern about the effects of luxuriousness (*Ueppigkeit*). According to Justi, Rousseau was right to argue that luxuriousness aroused self-interest and suffocated the love of the general good (*Liebe zu dem gemeinschaftlichen Besten*). This, in Justi's view, would lead to despotism.²⁴ He singled out money as the main source of greed, self-interest and luxuriousness; in sum, of all nefarious passions.²⁵ Inspired by Lycurgus, who had outlawed money and commerce, Justi opposed money-based decadence and argued that in order to restrain passions

and desires in an isolated state, it was indeed necessary to prohibit money, since money was inevitably a dangerous encouragement of the passions. It was a sickness that eroded the love of the fatherland, respect for the general good and all other noble impulses. An example of the corrupting nature of money had manifested itself in Sparta once simple iron coins were replaced with silver and gold. Soon the heroic qualities of the Spartans were gone, and repulsive self-interest took control.²⁶

Justi sought to draw moral and political lessons from the examples of antiquity. The path of isolation was a way of countering the financial greed and social antagonism associated with the growing importance of trade. The negative aspects of commercialism were increasingly recognised during the eighteenth century. The historical example of Sparta was used in various ways as an argument in debates on the corruptive nature of commerce. Sparta had banned luxury and currency and put the emphasis on simple and austere republican virtues. It exemplified the classical patriotism of the republics of antiquity in which agriculture and military skills were prioritised. Above all, in Sparta, the individual and self-interest were inferior to community and community interests. In Justi's view, Sparta had stepped out from the competition that was quintessential for commercial nations. It was rather comparable to a philosopher and not a fellow enthusiast or competitor in the arena of international trade.²⁷ China and Sparta had "philosophically" chosen to abstain from the jealousy of trade. As such, the path of isolation could be considered an interesting response to the jealousy of trade.²⁸ Central aspects of the way of the philosopher were isolation and economic self-sufficiency. Justi argued that Japan was an example of a nation with flourishing manufactures even though it was not involved in foreign trade at all.²⁹ China exemplified the virtues of a philosopher state; it was an unsocial nation with

outright protectionist policies. Justi emphasised that being an unsocial nation was not a violation of any code of conduct. The reason why states were not forced or expected to act socially lay in the fact that unlike individual human beings, states did not suffer from weaknesses that would require them to be sociable.³⁰ Justi was very clear in arguing that sociability was neither a natural law nor a law of nations. As an advocate of the notion of unsocial sociability, he emphasised that sociability only springs forth when one can recognise the benefits that mutual aid can bring.³¹ Justi pointed out that for this very reason, it was wise for trading nations to act sociably.

According to Justi, the choice of a right path for a nation was limited by the location of the nation in question. A nation without harbours could not become a maritime man of the world. Also, the intellect and customs of a nation played a role in the choice of the right path. For instance, it would be impossible for France to choose the protectionist way of a philosopher. Justi equated this with the chance of an opera singer or a comedian to become a Pietist.³² The philosophical way, the path of isolation, was best suited to melancholic people. This explained Lycurgus's success in Sparta. The Spartans did not become melancholic due to Lycurgus's reforms; they had been melancholic already.³³ For a nation to be successful in the path of isolation, it had to be like a philosopher who recognised the triviality of all the things that the world seemed to appreciate so highly. Instead, the philosopher nation choosing the path of isolation preferred to withdraw into silence from the dangers of sociable life. Yet, the isolated path was more likely to provide a more durable happiness.³⁴

Justi argued that the successful following of the path of isolation required the adoption of a set of principles. A philosopher state should concentrate on the perfection of itself and never seek to

dominate other states. Here is where the Sparta went wrong. Its attempt to dominate Greece was at odds with the path it had chosen and was therefore a misguided plan. Another important principle for a philosophical state was to keep religion, laws and morality in perfect harmony. This was a particularly difficult principle to follow in Justi's contemporary Europe. Having laws, morality and religion in correspondence could hardly be achieved without isolation, and being truly isolated in Europe was hardly possible, as Justi argued.³⁵ However, the necessity of keeping laws, morality and religion in correspondence in a philosophical state could be exemplified by several historical examples, as it had been recognised by many great lawgivers, including Confucius, Moses, Lycurgus and Plato. The crucial harmony between laws, morality and religion enabled a love of the fatherland that was impossible to achieve in any other way. An example of the depth of this love was given by the Jews, who continued to love their fatherland even though it did not even exist anymore. The correspondence and equality of the law, religion and morality enhanced the love of the fatherland in such a manner that the philosopher state could be exceptionally strong in its defence.

However, Justi argued, to strengthen the defence even further, the isolated state should cherish and encourage a bellicose courage among its citizens. China gave Justi an example of an isolated state that had suffered from a lack of bellicose courage. This explains why this otherwise powerful state had been occupied so many times. Similar was the case of Pennsylvania. William Penn had otherwise been a great legislator, but neglecting the importance of bellicose courage diminished his otherwise remarkable achievements in reforming the laws and institutions of Pennsylvania.³⁶ In sum, Justi argued that an isolated state could preserve its peace only by cultivating courage, which in practice meant that an isolated state was a military state. Sparta had

certainly succeeded in this. Its weaknesses resided elsewhere. The self-sufficient economy of an isolated state could not have a foundation anywhere other than in its diligent and skilful citizens, but in Sparta it was not the citizens but the enslaved helots who had proven their diligence and skilfulness. The citizens of Sparta were living off the work of the helots, preventing the state from reaching the true strength and perfection of which it was capable. Condemning the treatment of helots, Justi repeated a common view among Enlightenment thinkers: Sparta's treatment of the helots was a major embarrassment to Spartans.³⁷

3. Trading Nations

Justi's second path to happiness, which he regarded as the only one possible in his contemporary Europe, was that of exchange. Here, Justi followed in the footsteps of Montesquieu and Rousseau. Ultimately favouring the government of England, Montesquieu concluded that the Spartan model was not possible in the contemporary world.³⁸ And as Haydn Mason has argued, "Sparta represents for Rousseau the most pure phenomenon of a way of life that once existed, but exists no longer."³⁹ As we will see, Justi came very close to these views.

The Spartan way belonged to the ancient world, or at least not to modern Europe. Justi's admiration of the path of the philosopher was in some sense nostalgic, not unlike that of Montesquieu and Rousseau. He was, in fact, very pessimistic regarding the possibility that any European nation might escape jealousy of trade. The philosophical path was impossible because of the "unnatural" borders between European states, which made the defence of nations considerably more difficult. A second obstacle was posed by existing ties that formed a common

bond (*als ein gemeinschaftliches Band*). Justi concluded that the isolation of one European nation from all trade was almost impossible. Wealth and goods were divided unequally between different lands; every nation had its own special products. Therefore, the happiness of European states depended on foreign trade.⁴⁰ European states were doomed to choose the path of a gallant man (*eines galanten Mannes*⁴¹) or of a man of the world (*der Weg eines Weltmannes*)⁴² who participated in competition and wished to enter the global arena (*Schauplatz der Welt*). They chose the path of trade.

Justi regarded the levels of easiness and security as the main differences between the way of the man of the world and that of the philosopher. Both ways were equally justified, but one was easier and more secure than the other. Justi compared the difficult way of the man of the world to a secretary who wished to gain the position of minister. Perhaps only one out of a thousand secretaries was able to attain that goal. Justi also used very vivid language to describe the threats to the path of exchange. Considering the fate of a vehicle and its passengers on the path of exchange, he conceded that the journey might for a time be enjoyable, but that a lack of skill and experience might result in the coach being driven into a swamp. A second coach was doomed to travel forever because the driver was constantly drunk and, tempted by amusements and pleasures, unwilling to leave the tavern. A third coach went nowhere because it had joined the company of troublemakers and every sort of brawler, and it needed time to recover from its wounds. Here again, luxury and vices, the natural consequences of wealth, might cause the man of the world to lose sight of his path. In sum, the path of a man of the world was extremely difficult.⁴³ Central to Justi's thinking and political and economic thought in general was the need

for a plan that would guide the man of the world. Justi was convinced that he had such a plan for Prussia, a point to which we will return below.

The nations most suitable for this difficult journey were those with great maritime merchant fleets. Without such a fleet, successful commerce was almost impossible. Furthermore, Justi emphasised that for the path of exchange, well-cultivated and fertile land was a necessity. Only colonies with natural resources could partly or wholly replace this; and if so, care had to be taken that the colonies did not start manufacturing or trading on their own behalf. He thought that the Phoenicians and Greeks should have made their colonies dependent but failed to do so; this was the greatest error on the part of these two trading nations. The backbone of trading nations was their surplus (*Überschuß*) of products.⁴⁴

Although Justi praised Athens, eighteenth-century England was his prime example of a trading nation. England was the eighteenth-century state equivalent of the gallant man or the man of the world. In many ways, Justi was a committed anglophile: England had all the virtues necessary for a trading nation to achieve the greatest possible happiness. In England, citizens enjoyed freedom and security, which made them diligent. The freedom of citizens was guaranteed with a balance of power between the legislative and executive branches of government.⁴⁵ It is worth noting that Justi was not blind to the problems commercialism had caused in England, namely corruption and luxuriousness. However, he was eager to point out that freedom and corruption were intimately associated. Granting a high level of civil freedom to citizens was bound to lead to corruption. Furthermore, Justi argued that a trading nation could not outlaw money, and the drive for riches was considered a positive passion. In addition, he pointed out that while luxury

could destroy the virtues of a philosopher state, it was the driving force in a trading nation. However, he was also keen to point out that luxury should stem from national products. This would allow the trading nation to maximise the expansion of its own trade.⁴⁶ The passion of an individual, that individual's self-interest and the drive to achieve riches benefited the whole state and formed a part of a larger plan. Albert Hirschman argued that harnessing this passion was essential for the emergence of "capitalism". The desire for riches could become an acceptable, predictable "interest". It was a calm and calculated desire. Essential in this respect was the distinction between innocuous "interests" and harmful passions.⁴⁷ Any reader might now be wondering how it was possible that Justi could simultaneously praise the outlawing of money in ancient Sparta. The only plausible explanation I can think of is that the Spartan case belonged to the ancient world, whereas his praise of the benefits of moneymaking related to then-modern trading nations. The return to ancient republican virtues was impossible in Europe.

A nation that had chosen the path of isolation did not need to exhibit any kind of social behaviour. It lived as if it were alone in the world. The case was different for trading nations. Trading nations were poised to be sociable because it was in their interest to be so. Their sociability was commercial and in some ways could even be regarded as unsocial sociability. It was not sociability for sociability's sake but rather for trade's. However, Justi emphasised that the notion of sociability should not be understood too broadly in the case of the trading nation. A successful trading nation, just as a successful man of the world, did not hesitate to take advantage of fellow rivals. The trading nation had accepted the rules of competing once it had entered the competition between trading nations; it was social and open to fair competition; however, everyone would seek for their own benefit. Justi recognised that this might contradict some

common notions of sociability, but at the same time he argued that such an understanding of sociability was incompatible with living in the great human societies. For men of the world, as well as for trading nations, it was impossible to become rich, honourable or happy without using the weaknesses of others. This was not an injustice, since the trading nation expected the other nations to treat it similarly. It too had subscribed to the rules of competition once entering the world arena; adversaries would ruthlessly abuse its weaknesses for their benefit, and rightly so. The situation was even compatible with the famous golden rule: do unto others as you wish them to do to you. The only condition for using the weaknesses of other nations was that the trading nation may not be the source of the weakness of the other trading nation whose weakness it is using for its benefit.⁴⁸ Still the big picture was clear: every nation prioritised its own interest before the others and expected them to do the same.⁴⁹

Justi recognised the problem that successful trading nation would be envied by the nations whose weaknesses it was exploiting, even if it would not be the original source of these weakness. It would inevitably encounter jealousy from a wide spectrum of nations, including its allies. Jealous nations, who were losing their share in international trade were most likely to cause armed conflicts. These comments of Justi can be seen in the context of the Seven Years' War. England was envied by jealous nations, such as France, its major rival. Although England was a peace-loving nation, it was forced to go to war. Still, as a successful trading nation, it was well prepared to resist its enemies.⁵⁰

During the Seven Years' War, French authors in particular accused England of trying to establish a universal maritime monarchy. Justi denied that this was England's goal. At first glance, this is

in contrast with Justi's conviction that a trading nation aimed at dominating trade as much as it could. However, there is no real contradiction to be found here. According to Justi, England did not aspire for a universal monarch. In fact, Justi argued that the most successful trading nation would not become a universal monarchy on whom other nations were dependent, but rather it would be slowly forced into isolation and down the solitary path of a philosopher. Justi used metaphorical parallels to reinforce his point and argued that although the two paths to happiness were different at the beginning, they both led to the same destination, which meant that at some point, the paths would converge. The man of the world had an adventurous journey to places such as gardens and taverns, but after facing all manner of dangers and troubles, he had to leave the vanities of the world behind and settle down in isolation. Alluding to stoic philosophy, Justi wrote that this was the right use of life according to wise men such as Cicero and Seneca: to enjoy the fruits of labour in solitude. Justi emphasised that the return of the man of the world to the path of a philosopher was conditioned by the fact that prosperity seemed to set limits on itself. In other words, there were natural limits to the success of trade. This explained why England did not and could not have aspired to establish a universal maritime monarchy.⁵¹

In his conception of the natural limits of prosperity and the success of trade, Justi was building on ideas that were known from the works of Hume and Montesquieu. Montesquieu discussed the topic in his essay on universal monarchy, while Hume developed similar views in his "rich country-poor country thesis" related to what is known as the price-specie flow mechanism.⁵² The idea that trade balances could be self-correcting had already been accepted for some time before Hume elaborated on it. However, it was Hume who truly made this mechanism known to a wider public.⁵³ Justi's position shared similarities with the cyclical view of commercial progress that

Hume presented in *Of the Balance of Trade* (1752) and *Of Money* (1752). Hume argued that the “low price of labour in every nation which has not an extensive commerce, and does not much abound in gold and silver” compensates for the advantages in skills that successful commercial nations possess. Hence, “Manufactures, therefore gradually shift their places, leaving those countries and provinces which they have already enriched, and flying to others.”⁵⁴ According to Hume, the abundance of money in a commercial state enabled poorer actors to undersell the rich in all foreign markets. Hume wrote in a letter to Lord Kames that “the growth of all bodies, artificial as well as natural, is stopped by internal laws, derived from their enormous size and greatness. Great empires, great cities, great commerce, all of them receive a check, not from accidental events, but by necessary principles.”⁵⁵ Justi may have adopted Hume’s ideas on the cyclical nature of progress and decline, as they were found in preliminary form in Hume’s *Of Refinement in the Arts* (1742) and *Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences* (1742).⁵⁶ We know that Justi was at least familiar with these works. In addition, there is evidence that he knew Hume’s *History of England*.⁵⁷ In the context of Prussia, the idea that backward nations could catch up to more progressed nations must have been attractive to Justi much in the way it helped Hume envision a more prosperous Scotland.

Justi knew very well that in order for Prussia to be competitive in the international arena, internal reforms were necessary. It may even be argued that Justi’s whole oeuvre can be read as a response to how German states could succeed in international trade, a success that had become an imperative and set economic limits on politics.⁵⁸ Turning Prussia into a trading nation required extensive economic, political and social reforms. England, the most successful trading nation, served as an example for Justi. The two main goals of Justi’s reform proposals were a

moderate government and civil liberty, as only countries with these two features could excel commercially. Cultivating the economic self-interest of citizens and their freedom to seek for their own happiness—predominantly understood in economic terms—was crucial for any trading nation. These factors were the best driving forces of economic vivacity. For Justi, England was an example of how the freedom of citizens was guaranteed by separating the legislative branch from the executive. In this way, they could keep each other within limits. Justi was too cautious to suggest a separation of powers in Prussia. Instead, he suggested other measures that would enhance the freedom of its citizens. It is clear that in Justi's economic and political thought, nascent commercialism placed the validity of rank and privilege in question. He wanted to abolish agricultural labour, condemned the granting of feudal privileges and questioned the existence of hereditary judicial power.⁵⁹

Justi's plans for Prussia were not limited to calls for inner reforms. According to him, Prussia needed a successful foreign policy that would turn it into a maritime trading nation. These theoretical and practical considerations can be interpreted as Justi's direct support of Friedrich II's campaign to turn Prussia into a trading nation. And he wasn't doing this alone. Friedrich II's foreign policy was supported by university professors, who were increasingly interested in the opportunities maritime trade offered. Exemplary here is Carl Friedrich Pauli's *The Interest of the Prussian States in Profitable Trade, especially Maritime Trade (Die Vortheile derer Preussischen Staaten zum einträglichen Handel, sonderlich zur See)*.⁶⁰ Unlike many of his fellow German writers, Justi had own first-hand experiences from a state that was to a great extent involved in maritime trade. In 1757, Count Johann Hartwig Ernst Bernstorff (1712–1772) invited Justi to Copenhagen, where Justi consulted the Danish government and, according to

some sources, acted as customs director (*Kolonial-Inspektor*).⁶¹ Justi's brief stay in Denmark in 1758 inspired him to reflect on the benefits of neutrality as foreign policy for a trading nation with high ambitions. Count Bernstorff, Justi's powerful mentor in Copenhagen, directed Danish foreign policy from 1751 to 1770. His first principle was to keep Denmark neutral in all conflicts. For a long time, Bernstorff's ideology was idealised, and the principle of keeping Denmark out of wars was interpreted within an ethical framework, and, as a corollary, Bernstorff was characterised as a person of moral superiority. Later research has shown that Bernstorff was seeking to decisively advance Danish interests in shipping and commerce. Neutrality was a tool for a small state to keep out of conflicts, but even more so, it was a tool to become prosperous and increase its share of international trade, which could ideally be maintained in a future period of peace.⁶² It seems that Justi's views came very close to those of his mentor. First, German lands had often been battlefields, and Justi perceived neutrality as a tool in preventing future wars on German soil. Second, neutrality would not only serve to avoid destructive wars but also to conquer larger portions of foreign trade and advance prosperity. Therefore, neutrality could be a policy to liberate Prussia from its economic and political backwardness.⁶³ It could also help Prussia to stabilise its recently gained status as a great power among European nations.⁶⁴

Justi's most extensive treatment of neutral trade is to be found in his pamphlet on the chimera of the balance of trade (*Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung und Schiffahrt*, 1759), which was written as a reaction to the pro-French pamphleteers who blamed England and its ally Prussia for disturbing the balance of trade. The pamphlet was written in the context of the Seven Years' War. In particular, Justi criticised Jean-Henri Maubert de Gouvest (1721–1767), whom he considered to be the author of *Politique Danois* (1756), for mischievous scheming and for trying

to win Denmark's support of France and its allies against England, who, according to Maubert, was striving to become a dominating "universal monarch of the seas". In Justi's view, this could not have been further from the truth. If Denmark was to become belligerent, it should join Prussia and England for its own benefit. However, Justi did not insist on this point. Rather, he recognised the prudence of Denmark's neutral foreign policy. Unlike other countries that envied the success of England, Denmark wisely concentrated on developing its own economy and trade. Justi regarded Denmark's forward-looking policy as wise in another sense, as well: Denmark was not obsessed with trying to re-conquer its former provinces (Scania, Halland and Bleking) from Sweden; rather its focus was on domestic reforms. Justi made this point to address the pro-Austrian pamphleteers and that country's wish to recover Silesia from Prussia. Austria would do better to concentrate on reforming its agriculture and commerce.⁶⁵

The last chapter of Justi's *Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung und Schiffahrt* is an attack on the abusive nature of Dutch neutrality, which Justi did not consider as true neutrality.⁶⁶ The Dutch had compromised their impartial status by simply taking over trade from France's colonies. In other words, Dutchmen were doing France's trade for them by taking the position of the enemy. This contradicted Justi's idea of neutrality as defined in terms of impartiality and not giving "preference to either of the two belligerents".⁶⁷ Taking the position of the enemy in the form of trading on their behalf was equal to other violations of impartiality, such as providing a fortress under siege with war supplies. Therefore, according to Justi, Dutchmen could not be considered neutral in the Seven Years' War. In their case neutrality was only a mask to conceal greedy political designs, and Justi wanted the Dutchmen to stop carrying the loads of the enemy. He advocated a view that later became known as the Rule of 1756. This rule stipulated that

neutrals in wartime should refrain from trade that had been close to them in the time of peace. The violation of this rule made them into belligerents.⁶⁸

The Danish neutrality that Justi wanted Prussia to emulate differed from the abusive neutrality of the Dutch. This kind of genuinely neutral trade was to be allowed in times of war. Under the direction of Bernstorff, Danish foreign policy had respected the principle of impartiality. Justi explicitly counted Bernstorff among the greatest statesmen alive. In particular, Justi admired the mechanism of Danish neutrality. He believed that in wars, the belligerents were seldom able to conquer new markets. However, when two powers were in a commercial war with each other, it was relatively easy for a neutral state to increase its share of trade. Justi was by no means the only German author to address this issue, and neither was his view widely accepted. For instance, an anonymous pamphleteer argued that although belligerents weakened each other in war, this did not always automatically increase the relative power of a neutral state.⁶⁹ Justi's position was different. He argued that when England and France were fighting during the Seven Years' War, Denmark was the real winner thanks to its wise foreign policy.⁷⁰ Justi knew enough to tell this from his own experiences. According to him, only one product, sugar, had provided Denmark with a "surplus" of 800,000 thalers. This gave support to the reliability of the general principle that during long commercial wars both belligerents lost some of their share in global trade to neutral parties. To give further evidence of his view, Justi used historical examples of how the mechanism of neutrality as a foreign policy worked. He argued that although the commercial war that Denmark and Sweden started against the Hanseatic League was just, its consequences were not desired by Denmark or Sweden. While the Hanseatic League lost part of

its share of trade, Sweden and Denmark did not benefit. Rather, Holland had stayed out of the conflict and became its true winner in terms of trade.⁷¹

Justi's rebuttal of bellicosity was strikingly unambiguous among his German compatriots.⁷² As already mentioned, he regarded Danish neutrality so highly because it allowed Denmark to avoid conflicts. In Justi's view, not even the successful wars were economically sustainable. In *Grundriss* (1759), Justi argued that wars resulted into depopulation, caused currency disorders and forced the state into heavy taxation; taken together, these factors suffocated foreign commerce and any possibility of developing a manufacturing industry.⁷³ He repeated this view in his war pamphlet *Wohlgemeynte Vorschläge* (1760), in which he made a proposal for how peace could be secured in Europe. According to Justi, it was unfortunate that belligerents were so sure they would improve the conditions of their countries through war, while investments in domestic reforms, commerce and manufacturing would be much wiser and greater "conquests".⁷⁴ In short, the way of a man of the world could not be one of bellicosity. In this same pamphlet, Justi recognised the further benefits of neutrality and neutral trade in particular. Therefore, Justi envisioned for Prussia a foreign policy of "fixed neutrality" (*vestgesetzte Neutralität*). Neutrality as a foreign policy would prevent Germany from repeatedly becoming a battlefield, a cycle that had ruined the German economy over the past 200 years. Justi's plan for Germany's new strategic foreign policy would enable the German territories to leave behind the wars that had been so harmful to their economies.⁷⁵ Although Justi frequently referred to Germany in his pamphlet, it was clear to the readers of his pamphlet that he had written it with Prussia's interest in mind. In Justi's vision, Prussia would adopt fixed neutrality and concentrate on developing its foreign trade, which would allow it to catch up to France and England, whose rivalry was most

likely to spark new wars in the future. Justi's Austrian critic was keen to point out that Prussia seemed to be an ungrateful ally to England. Despite all the subsidies England had provided, Prussia was ready to abandon it. For this Austrian commentator, it was clear that Justi's *Wohlgemeynte Vorschläge* was a Prussian peace project that had to be debunked.⁷⁶ This is yet further proof that Justi had written with Prussia in mind. Justi responded to his commentator by arguing that he was not bound by any motive other than his patriotic love for Germany.⁷⁷

4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have revisited the common notion that cameralism focused on domestic trade by showing that Justi, as a leading cameralist, in fact favoured turning Prussia into a trading nation. In line with Friedrich's strategies and objectives, Justi's vision included extensive reforms to Prussia's domestic and foreign policies. This is in sharp contrast with the now out-dated interpretation of cameralists as simply interested in describing Prussia's existing practices of domestic administration.⁷⁸ The way Justi treated the contrast between Sparta and Athens reveals that his thinking was deeply embedded within European economic and political thought, and he came to conclusions very similar to those of Rousseau and Montesquieu. Modern society was commercial, and that was inescapable. The political economy of commercial states had transformed Europe to a point from which a return to ancient virtues was morally and politically impossible. Justi realised that Prussia was lagging behind, and it is against this background that his domestic reform proposals and vision for Prussian foreign policy are best understood.

Recent research has convincingly shown that cameralism was not only a Prussian or German economic and political administrative practice and discourse. It was European in character.⁷⁹ The aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate that it was also not purely landlocked and focussed on a closed domestic economy. Justi's work did not promote a closed princely state. He was very much a part of Friedrich II's royal campaign to turn Prussia into a trading nation. Following the example of the Danes would have been beneficial to Prussia. England and France would continue to weaken each other, while Prussia would become more powerful. In particular, the relative power of Prussia would grow in this constellation because, according to Justi, who was following the footsteps of Montesquieu, Justi power was always relative.⁸⁰ Friedrich II never managed to turn Prussia from a Sparta into an Athens. By the end of the Seven Years' War, he came to realise that Prussia was not suited to the path of the man of the world. Prussia was not able to protect its merchant vessels. In his 1768 political testament, Friedrich stated that grand commerce was not for Prussia; Prussia was a "puissance de terre ferme".⁸¹ All the same, it is worth remembering that Friedrich and Justi did for a time entertain a distinct trading future for Prussia.

¹ Margaret Schabas, "The Philosophy of the Human Sciences", in *The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth-Century Philosophy*, ed. Aaron Garrett (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 734.

² Marten Seppel, "Introduction: Cameralism in Practice", in *Cameralism in Practice*, eds. Marten Seppel and Keith Tribe (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2017), pp. 1–16.

³ See Florian Schui, Florian, "Prussia's 'Trans-Oceanic Moment': The Creation of the Prussian Asiatic Trade Company in 1750", *Historical Journal* 49 (2006): pp. 143–60.

⁴ Marco Cavarzere, "The Rise of a Trading Nation: Prussia and the Convention Preliminaire de commerce with France (1753)", in *The Politics of Commercial Treatise in the Eighteenth-*

Century, eds. Antonella Alimento and Koen Stapelbroek (Chaim: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 295–320.

⁵ Cavarzere, “The Rise of a Trading Nation”, pp. 316–9; Schui, “Prussia’s ‘Trans-Oceanic Moment’”, pp. 159–60.

⁶ Cavarzere, “The Rise of a Trading Nation”, pp. 295–6; See also Ere Nokkala, *From Natural Law to Political Economy: J.H.G von Justi on State Commerce and International Order* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2019).

⁷ Istvan Hont, *Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005), pp. 33–7. Ulrich Adam, *The Political Economy of JHG Justi* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2006).

⁸ Nokkala, *From Natural Law to Political Economy*, pp. 170–203.

⁹ Johann Justi, *Natur und Wesen der Staaten als die Quelle aller Regierungswissenschaften und Gesetze* (Mitau: Steidel, 1771 [1st ed. 1760]), p. 472: “Die Völker leben im Stande der natürlichen Freyheit: und da ein Staat einen einzigen moralischen Körper ausmacht; so verhält sich ein Volk gegen das andre nicht anders als ein einzelner Mensch im Stande der natürlichen Freyheit gegen den andern.” Christian Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedanken von dem Gesellschaftlichen Leben der Menschen und Insonderheit dem Gemeinen Wesen* (Frankfurt: Renger, 1736), § 220: “Ein jeder Staat ist, in Ansehung anderer Staaten mit Regenten und Unterthanen zusammen genommen, als eine Person anzusehen und also verhalten sich zwey derselben gegen einander, wie eintzele Personen”. Hidemi Suganami, *The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 13. Scholars have referred to the idea that the state is comparable to human beings as the “domestic analogy”. As such, the state is a person who possesses a will, seeking self-preservation and happiness. The equation of the domestic

sphere with the international sphere continues to attract adherents. Few, however, have applied it without restriction or modification. Among the standard arguments levelled against the domestic analogy is the claim that there is absolutely no empirical evidence that states act as would individual humans in international relations. In the light of this argument the domestic analogy has also been termed the “domestic fallacy”. Moreover, cosmopolitan theorists of international order have emphasised the role of citizens and other actors in the international arena, noting that states are not the only subjects in international relations.

¹⁰ Nokkala, *From Natural Law to Political Economy*, pp. 84–119.

¹¹ See the Introduction to this volume and Nicholas B Miller’s chapter. See also Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Entzauberung Asiens: Europa und die asiatischen Reiche im 18. Jahrhundert* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), p. 72. English translation: Jürgen Osterhammel, *Unfabling the East: The Enlightenment’s Encounter with Asia*, trans. Robert Savage (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), p. 77.

¹² Johann Justi, *Vergleichungen der Europäischen mit den Asiatischen und anderen vermeintlich Barbarischen Regierungen* (Berlin: Rüdiger, 1762). See Nicholas B Miller’s chapter in this volume.

¹³ Johann Justi, *Der Grundriß einer guten Regierung* (Frankfurt: Garbe, 1759). Johann Justi, *Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts von Europa: Eine Abhandlung, worinnen die Richtigkeit und Ungerechtigkeit dieses zeitherigen Lehrgebäudes der Staatskunst deutlich vor Augen gelegt, und dabey allenthalben neue und rührende Betrachtungen über die Ursachen der Kriege und dem wesentlichen Grunde, worauf die Macht eines Staats ankommt, beygebracht werden* (Altona: David Iversen, 1758). Johann Justi, *Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung und Schiffahrt, oder, Ungrund und Richtigkeit einiger neuerlich geäußerten Meynungen von denen*

Maassregeln der freyen Mächte gegen die zu befürchtende Herrschaft und Obermacht zur See: wobey zugleich Neue und wichtige Betrachtungen über die Handlung und Schiffahrt der Völker, und über den höchsten Punkt der daraus entstehenden Macht und Glückseligkeit beygebracht werden (Altona; David Iversen, 1759).

¹⁴ Haydn Mason, “The Literary Reception of Sparta in France”, in *A Companion to Sparta*, ed. Anton Powell (Hoboken, NY: Blackwell, 2018), vol. 1, pp. 665–84, pp. 666–9.

¹⁵ Montesquieu, *L’Esprit des lois* (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 1973), vol. 1, book 5, ch. 6, p. 55; Translation after Mason, “The Literary Reception of Sparta in France”, p. 669.

¹⁶ Elizabeth Rawson, *The Spartan Tradition in European Thought*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 225, p. 254.

¹⁷ Bauer, “Der Gegensatz zwischen Sparta und Athen”, p. 69.

¹⁸ Justi, *Vergleichungen*, p. 543, p. 546.

¹⁹ Rawson, *The Spartan Tradition*, p. 223.

²⁰ Johann Justi, *Fortgesetzte Bemühungen zum Vortheil der Naturkunde und des Gesellschaftlichen Lebens der Menschen* (Berlin: Rüdiger, 1759–1761), vol. 3, pp. 403–18.

²¹ Barbara Bauer, “Der Gegensatz zwischen Sparta und Athen in der deutschen Literatur des 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhunderts”, in *Staatstheoretische Diskurse im Spiegel der Nationalliteraturen von 1500 bis 1800*, eds. Barbara Bauer and Wolfgang G. Müller (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1998), pp. 65–6.

²² Mason, “The Literary Reception of Sparta in France”, p. 674; Christine Zabel, *Polis und Politesse: Der Diskurs über das antike Athen in England und Frankreich, 1630-1760* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016).

²³ Justi had read Rousseau's *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (1750). See Horst Dreitzel, "Justis Beitrag zur Politisierung der deutschen Aufklärung", in *Aufklärung als Politisierung: Politisierung der Aufklärung*, eds. Hans Erich Bödeker and Ulrich Herrmann (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), pp. 158–77, see p. 175, en. 5. Justi was also very familiar with Montesquieu's *magnum opus* and discussed it intensively from the late 1750s onwards.

²⁴ Justi, *Vergleichungen*, p. 211.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 543, p. 546.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 546.

²⁷ Justi, *Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung und Schiffahrt*, p. 23.

²⁸ Istvan Hont, *Jealousy of Trade*, p. 35. Wolfgang Burgdorf has pointed out that Justi's idea of an isolated state recalls Fichte's closed commercial state. See Wolfgang Burgdorf, "Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1720–1771)", in *Europa-Historiker: Ein Biographisches Handbuch*, ed. Heinz Duchhardt, et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), vol. 1, pp. 51–78, see p. 68.

²⁹ Justi, *Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung und Schiffahrt*, pp. 25–8; Johann Justi, *Vollständige Abhandlung von denen Manufakturen und Fabriken*, 2 vols. (Copenhagen: Rothe, 1758–1761). Web edition www.ub.uni-bielefeld.de/diglib/justi/vollstaendige/titel.htm, vol. 1, p. 14.

³⁰ Justi, *Natur und Wesen*, pp. 472–477.

³¹ Ibid., p. 474.

³² Justi, *Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung und Schiffahrt*, p. 37.

³³ Ibid., p. 23.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 23–9.

³⁵ Johann Justi, *Physicalische und Politische Betrachtungen über die Erzeugung des Menschen und Bevölkerung der Länder* (Smirna [i.e. Breslau]: In der neuen Buchdruckerei [i.e. Korn], 1769), pp. 144–5.

³⁶ Justi, *Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung und Schiffahrt*, pp. 25–7.

³⁷ Mason, “The Literary Reception of Sparta in France”, p. 676.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 669.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 673.

⁴⁰ Justi, *Vergleichungen*, p. 314.

⁴¹ Justi, *Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung und Schiffahrt*, p. 23.

⁴² Johann Justi, *Die Grundfeste zu der Macht und Glückseeligkeit der Staaten*, 2 vols, (Königsberg: Hartung, 1760–1761), vol. 1, p. 28.

⁴³ Justi, *Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung und Schiffahrt*, pp. 30–37.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 29–30.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁴⁷ Albert O Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interest: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996 [1977]), pp. 65–6; Luke Mayville, *John Adams and the Fear of American Oligarchy* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 112.

⁴⁸ Justi, *Natur und Wesen*, pp. 290–1.

⁴⁹ Justi, *Vergleichungen*, p. 316.

⁵⁰ Justi, *Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung und Schiffahrt*, p. 34.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 35–8.

⁵² For the rich country-poor country debate in Hume, see Hont, *Jealousy of Trade*, pp. 272–3; pp. 292–3.

⁵³ Lars Magnusson, *The Political Economy of Mercantilism* (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 124–6.

⁵⁴ David Hume, *Political essays*, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 116; p. 138 ff.

⁵⁵ Bruce Truitt Elmslie, “Retrospectives: The Convergence Debate between David Hume and Josiah Tucker”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 9 (1995): 207–16.

⁵⁶ Justi, *Vollständige Abhandlung*, p. 39.

⁵⁷ Johann Justi, *Gesammlete Politische und Finanzschriften über wichtige Gegenstände der Staatskunst, der Kriegswissenschaften und des Cameral- und Finanzwesens*, 3 vols. (Kopenhagen: Rothe, 1761–1764), vol. 3, p. 22.

⁵⁸ Ulrich Adam, “Nobility and Modern Monarchy: JHG Justi and the French Debate on Commercial Nobility at the Beginning of the Seven Years’ War”, *History of European Ideas* 29 (2003): 141–57. Adam, *The Political Economy*, p. 59. Hont, *Jealousy of Trade*, p. 185.

⁵⁹ Dreitzel, “Justis Beitrag”, pp. 167–8.

⁶⁰ Carl Friedrich Pauli, *Die Vortheile derer Preussischen Staaten zum einträglichen Handel, sonderlich zur See* (Halle im Magdeburgischen: JF Grunerts, 1751).

⁶¹ Erik S Reinert, “Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi: The Life and Times of an Economic Adventurer”, *The Beginnings of Political Economy*, ed. Jürgen Backhaus, (New York: Springer, 2009), pp. 33–74, pp. 44–5.

⁶² Carsten Holbraad, *Danish Neutrality: A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 3–19; Ole Feldbæk, “Eighteenth-Century Danish Neutrality: Its Diplomacy, Economics and Law”, *Scandinavian Journal of History* 8 (1983): 3–21.

⁶³ Adam, *The Political Economy*, pp. 55–9.

⁶⁴ On the concept of a great power, see Hamish M. Scott, *The Emergence of the Eastern Powers, 1756–1775* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). On Prussia’s attempts to secure the newly gained power position in the second half of Friedrich’s regime, Hamish M Scott, “Aping the Great Powers: Frederick the Great and the defence of Prussia’s international position, 1763–86”, *German History* 12 (1994): 286–307.

⁶⁵ Justi, *Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung*, pp. 56–58.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 75–86.

⁶⁷ Johann Justi, “Erörterung der Frage: Ob kriegende Mächte der Handlung und Schiffahrt eines neutralen Volks nach ihres Feindes Hafen, in Ansehung der sogenannten Contrebandwaaren, einige Hinderniß und Schaden zu verursachen befugt sind?”, *Ergetzungen der vernünftigen Seele aus der Sittenlehre und der Gelehrsamkeit überhaupt* (1748), vol. 5, pp. 475–510, p. 493.

⁶⁸ On the Rule of 1756, see Tara Helfman, “Neutrality, the Law of Nations, and the Natural Law Tradition: A Study of the Seven Years’ War”, *The Yale Journal of International Law* 30 (2005): 549–86.

⁶⁹ [Anon.], *Abhandlung von der Neutralität und Hülfsleistung in Kriegeszeiten* ([Gotha]: [Mevius], 1758), p. 53.

⁷⁰ Adam, *Political Economy*, p. 69.

⁷¹ Justi, *Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung*, pp. 56–60.

⁷² On bellicosity see Jörn Leonhard, *Bellizismus und Nation: Kriegsdeutung und Nationsbestimmung in Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten 1750–1914* (München: Oldenbourg, 2008).

⁷³ Johann Justi, *Der Grundriß einer guten Regierung*, p. 427. “Der Krieg stürzt zugleich allemal die auswärtigen Commerciën darnieder; man weis aber, daß die innländischen Manufacturen und Gewerbe ihren Flor hauptsächlich auf die auswärtigen Commerciën gründen; und der Verfall des gesammten Nahrungsstandes ist also eine unausbleibliche Folge auch der glücklichsten Kriege.”

⁷⁴ Justi, *Wohlgemeynte Vorschläge eines die jetzigen unglücklichen Zeiten beseufzenden Menschenfreundes auf was vor Bedingungen die jetzo Krieg befangenen Mächte zu einem dauerhaften und ihrem allerseitigen Interesse gemässen Frieden gelangen könnten zur Aufmunterung ganz Deutschlands* (Friedensnah, 1759), pp. 5–6.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 44–5.

⁷⁶ [Anon.] *Das entlarvte Preußische Friedensproject welches unter dem Titel: Wohlgemeynte Vorschläge, auf was vor Bedingungen die itzo im Kriege befangenen Mächte zu einem dauerhaften und ihrem allerseitigen Interesse gemäßen Frieden gelangen könnten [et]c. heraus gekommen, und sehet, was es ist!* (Alethopolis, 1760), pp.19–20.

⁷⁷ Johann Justi, *Der enthüllete Oesterreichische Schriftsteller, oder Anmerkungen über die so betitulte Schrift: Das entlarvte Preußische Friedensproject, welches unter dem Titul; Wohlgemeynte Vorschläge, auf was vor Bedingungen, die itzo im Kriege befangenen Mächte zu einem dauerhaften [...] Frieden gelangen könten* (Vienna: Trattner und Jungnicol, [ca. 1760]), p. 46, see footnote iii.

⁷⁸ Ernst Klein, “Johann Heinrich Gottlob Justi und die preußische Staatswirtschaft”, *Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 48 (1961): 145–202. Klein’s article is a

classic in this line of interpretation. Though outdated, the argument is still repeated in different forms.

⁷⁹ Seppel and Tribe (eds.), *Cameralism in Practice*.

⁸⁰ Grete Klingenstein, “‘Jede Macht ist relative’: Montesquieu und die Habsburger Monarchie”, in *Festschrift Othmar Pickl zum 60. Geburtstag*, eds. Herwig Ebner [et al.] (Graz: Leykam, 1987), pp. 307–24. Justi, *Physicalische und Politische*, p. 71. “Die Macht der Völker ist allemal nur ein relativischer Begriff, der sich auf die Stärke der übrigen benachbarten, und in diesen Welttheile wohnenden Völker bezieht”. Friedrich II, King of Prussia, “Testament politique” (1768), in *Die politischen Testamente Friedrich’s des Grossen*, ed. Gustav Berthold Volz (Berlin: Hobbing, 1920), p. 25.