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2. Wine Globalization: Longer-Term Dynamics and Contemporary Patterns

David Inglis

Introduction

In this chapter we will consider the long-term development of both wine globalization and what we call ‘proto-globalization’ (that is, trends before the 18th and 19th centuries CE), looking at these especially in terms of wine production (that is, the ‘wine world’). By taking a long-term perspective, we aim to get a clear idea of trends and continuities across time, as well as periods of novelty and innovation – of which the most obvious are the movement towards trans-oceanic wine production and distribution in the 19th century, and the complexification of these again in the period from the 1980s onwards.

Wine is usually sold to us today as deeply redolent of the place where the grapes that went into it were grown. But almost certainly some part of the total set of factors involved in making a wine will have travelled from somewhere else to the place where the wine was made. What is occluded is the *trans-local*, *trans-regional* and *trans-national*, and *cross-border* nature of wines, vines and the wine-making techniques. Borders they cross include those that are cultural, symbolic, political and physical (Huber 2011). Wine has historically been much more likely to travel over long distances as a circulating commodity than other fermented drinks. It has had strong capacities for forging economic, social and cultural (and sometimes political) linkages between geographically disparate places (Dietler 2006).

Approximately 100 grape species grow wild across the world. But it is just one single Eurasian grape species, *Vitis Vinifera L. subsp. Sylvestris*, which is the source of 99% of the world's wine today. In its wild, uncultivated form, *Vitis Vinifera* grows from Central Asia to Iberia, spanning a distance of about 6300 kilometres, within a north to south band of about 1300 kilometres. In globally warmer times in the past, it probably grew outside of its current area (McGovern 2003). All domesticated grape varieties derive from it, in an astonishing variety of shapes, sizes, combinations of sugars and acids, and flavours. There are today as many as 10,000 cultivars or clonal types. The plant's 'pliable, almost chimeric nature' is perhaps its most notable feature (McGovern 2003: 13).

It is this capacity that has made possible the tremendous variety of styles of wine-making, both historically and in our own globalizing epoch, as viticulturalists have exploited *Vitis Vinifera*'s tremendous potential for being altered, manipulated and transplanted to new places. Roughly speaking, cultivated grapes historically have grown between 30 and 50 degrees latitudes, in both the Northern and Southern hemispheres (Taber 2005). But in recent years, as both expression and driver of wine globalization, viticulture has been developed nearer to Equatorial regions, in places with relatively hot climates like India, Thailand, Peru and Brazil, as

entrepreneurs seek to exploit new regions for production, and to supply both old and new consumer markets. As this has happened, so too have new hybrids been developed to grow effectively in novel grape-growing environments (Huber 2011).

Wine vessels – be they ancient amphorae, wooden barrels, metallic tanks filled with bladders, or glass or plastic bottles – are intended to preserve the wine adequately so that it is *potable and portable*, over shorter or longer distances. Finished wine has been travelling for millennia. In general, the nearer we come to our own time, the greater the distances that can be travelled, both in terms of viable transportation mechanisms, and the economies, financial and cultural, that make it worth sending over long distances. But even in the quite distant past, wine could travel considerable distances if there was sufficient demand for it (McGovern 2003).

The ‘Proto-Globalization’ of Wine

The slow but steady spread of grape-growing and wine-making across parts of Eurasia in ancient times can be construed as a kind of proto-globalization of wine – that is, as a set of processes that involve wine’s geographical and cultural spread across places and borders. The earliest evidence of making grape wine dates from about 6000BCE in the Caucasus, where modern Georgia is located (Kassam and Davis 2017). There was a wine industry in Egypt and Lower Mesopotamia circa 3000BCE. The writing on wine jars, and the stamps on clay seals put onto them, sometimes indicated quite detailed information: vintage year, vineyards, vintner name, and classified quality level. All these were important indicators for traders and buyers of where the wine had travelled from (Meneley 2007). In the 3rd millennium BCE, ‘wine was an object of trade ... [but] generally a costly good consumed only by elite strata’, while lower strata often drank beer (Dietler 2006: 233). In the 2nd millennium BCE, wine-making spread westwards to Crete by 2200BCE (McGovern 2003). Phoenician traders from Tyre and Lebanon took grape vines to North Africa, Italy and Iberia, importing a wine culture (McGovern 2003:

202-3). Greek settlers colonized southern Italy in the 8th and 7th centuries BCE, planting so many vines there that the Greeks called southern Italy ‘Enotria’, the Land of Vines (Millon 2013).

The development and travels of wine have historically been profoundly bound up with social relations of trade and commerce on the one side, and empires and imperial conquest on the other. This occurred across the centre of Eurasia, in the Assyrian, Persian and Chinese empires. The Roman Empire, which made the whole Mediterranean Sea its central highway, can be viewed as a major mechanism of ancient proto-globalization of wine. Within its massive territory, stretching from Iberia and Britannia in the West through to the Near East, there was a massive movement and churning-up of people, ideas, goods and commodities, including vines, wine-making techniques and finished wines (Inglis and Robertson 2008). The poet Virgil said Italy had an uncountable number of different grapes and wines. The author Pliny said that the wines of Campania were famous across the whole world, indicating that the concept of global reputation for especially fine wines is not new (Geraghty 2007). The Greco-Roman world understood the agricultural trinity of wheat, olives and wine as profound symbols of civilization (Serventi and Sabban 2002: 163). Elite drinkers at formal dinners liked to alternate between Italian and foreign wines, the latter being called *transmarina* (from across the sea), hailing from Greece and Asia Minor (Dalby 2000). Wines expressed ‘Western-ness’ and ‘Eastern-ness’, an ancestral form of modern *terroir* thinking, being not unlike the way that wine cultures and fields today distinguish between so-called ‘Old’ and ‘New’ World styles. Wine-making and drinking by the indigenous inhabitants of colonised lands, in imitation of Roman practice, were important parts of the Romanification process (Sweetman 2007). Such developments were partly made possible by large-scale transportation of wine-bearing *amphorae* all around the empire (Hingley 2005). For example, an estimated 55-65 million

amphorae of wine were imported into Roman Gaul over the course of the 100 years spanning the 2nd to 1st centuries BCE (Dietler 2006).

Keeping wine from spoiling while it travels over long distances has prompted different sorts of technological fixes at different times. Wines from the Eastern Mediterranean intended for long-distance travel to Western parts of the Roman empire usually had brine and/or spices added for preservative purposes. Over time, drinkers got a taste for these flavours, so they were added for aesthetic reasons – an anticipation of different sorts of modern technological interventions to make wine appeal to the palates of drinkers located at significant geographical and cultural distances from the point of production (Lukacs 2012).

After the so-called ‘fall’ of Rome, much wine-making knowledge was kept alive by the inhabitants of Christian monasteries. Some of these operations continue still today, mostly in Germany, exhibiting nearly 1000 years of ongoing wine-making practices (Millon 2013). In medieval Europe, the wine trade was relatively simple, with merchants seeking to make profits by selling wines, mostly to social elites located in places where wine was not made. There was little market differentiation, the main distinction being between more sweet styles from the Mediterranean, and more dry wines from further north (Unwin 1991). The major wine trading routes involved water-borne transportation: from the Mediterranean by sea and land to Poland and the Baltics, the southern German trade via the river Rhine to Northern Germany and Scandinavia, and the sea-trade from Western France to England and Flanders (Phillips 2000). Wine in medieval Europe was often bitterly complained about because of spoilage problems. Barrels replaced ancient *amphorae* as the solution to making wine portable (Murray 2007). But barrels were often sealed poorly, and the wine inside could rapidly oxidize. Even when barrels worked properly, once they were opened the wine was good for only a few days before turning sour. The advent of the new transport technology of the glass bottle and cork in the 16th century CE eventually dispensed with the need for adding spice to wine (Millon 2013). The spread of

bottle and cork technology was a significant part of early modern wine proto-globalization. Much later, in the 20th century, the standardization of bottle sizes into metric measures – including the now ubiquitous 75cl size – significantly rationalised the exporting of wines across the globe (Pinney 2005).

To understand the nature of long-standing wine regions today – vis-à-vis both their more localised features and their relative positions in the global wine field – we need to consider their long-term history. Roger Dion (1959) showed that the nature and relative status of wine-making regions have shifted often dramatically over time. Shifts up and down the prestige-scale often have strongly been linked to forms of political and economic power. One important reason why Burgundy enjoys such a high global reputation today is that in the medieval period the Dukes of Burgundy had sufficient political clout to put their terrain on the wine-making map, and to influence elite opinion around Europe that the region's wine was outstanding (Moran 1993). The vineyards were close to major travel routes, so the wines could easily be transported to other locations, and there was a constant stream of elite visitors from all over the continent to the monasteries where the monks had mastered advanced viticultural techniques (Pitte 2002: 16).

Ulin (2002, 2004) has shown how the rise to eminence, first in Europe and then across the world, of Bordeaux, was strongly bound up with political and economic factors. The English kings controlled large parts of Western France in the 12th and 13th centuries CE, and they awarded privileges to the Bordelais producers of wine over their rivals located further inland. This stimulated Bordeaux's exporting of wine to England and other countries, sowing the seeds of the strong orientation to world, rather than simply national, markets in the region evident today (Colman 2008). Bordeaux's reputation for wines of serious quality was also intertwined with world-level market forces. Competition that arose in the 17th century from Spain, Portugal and Italy led to Bordelais growers replacing high-yielding crops which produced more basic

wines, with lower-yielding vines and higher quality production. These wines found ready markets in places as far away as North America and Russia. Since the 12th century CE, Bordeaux has been profoundly shaped by the dominant political power in the region, and then the world, at any given time: first the English, up until the immediate post-WWII period, then the Americans in the later 20th century, and then the newly economically-empowered Chinese (Nossiter, 2009: 92).

By the 15th century CE, social elites in north-western Europe regularly drank wines from areas such as western France, Germany, Spain, and the eastern Mediterranean. About 80 different kinds of wine were reported in London in the early 16th century (Colquhoun 2007). By the early 18th century, Daniel Defoe remarked on the fast-changing fashions in drinking in London, with cheaper, more basic Portuguese and Spanish wines increasingly being relinquished by those with sufficient spending power in favour of more expensive Bordeaux, Burgundy and Champagne (Dillon 2002).

The availability of this variety of wines was made possible by a range of changes within contexts of production throughout the early modern period. New wine styles were developed in established European locations, entrepreneurs doing so with the expectation of increased profits. Traditional forms of feudal land-tenure gave way to more capitalist economic relations, involving the expansion of wine production, and the increasing use of wage-labourers to pick the grapes and make wine (Unwin 1991). Rapidly burgeoning urban populations in Northern Europe created more demand for mass-market wines made cheaply in large quantities. In response, social elites began to desire higher quality wines, partly to distinguish their drinking habits from those of lower classes. In this way, the characteristically modern bifurcation of wine markets and trade into premium wines and table wines was begun (Guy 2003). Producers have often survived by moving into quality wine production for those more far-flung

consumers who could still afford to pay premium prices when local demand was weak (Unwin 1991).

Towards Globalization

One could argue that wine only truly becomes ‘globalized’ at the point when production and distribution of it becomes trans-oceanic in scale, and when oceans, rather than rivers alone, become regular highways for wine’s movement from producers to ever more distant consumers. Such a turning-point is reached in early modernity.

Between the 16th and 18th centuries CE, more money was invested in wine production itself, and not just in the processes whereby it was traded across distances (Unwin 1991). Investment for the purposes of speculative profit went in into more far-flung and non-European wine-making regions. These were now in play because of two inter-related developments: colonial expansion, and new transportation technologies. The world’s oceans became navigable and viable trading routes. Spanish Jesuits began wineries in Peru in the 17th century, and Franciscan monks did the same in Mexico, and then in California, in the late 18th century (Colman 2008). In both cases, the motivations were religious – the production of communion wine – rather than commercial. But novel wine-making locations set up to make profits out of distant consumers right from the start included the Portuguese-controlled island of Madeira and the Dutch colony of the Cape in Southern Africa. The Madeira vineyards were begun after the colonial sugar cane trade had been shifted to the Caribbean and Brazil (Murray 2007). The new regions did not only produce bulk wine. Constantia wine from the Cape in South Africa already had a high pan-European reputation as early as the 17th century.

Production for far-off customers increased in the 18th century. The Atlantic now operated more as a waterway between continents than as a moat between them (Hancock 1998, 2005). Trading networks stretching from Europe to the Americas operated as information channels between

diverse wine-related actors. This was a world of small- to medium-sized wine trading companies. Firms located in Madeira had commercial contacts that stretched from Edinburgh and London to Jamaica, New York and Bengal. Actors in the networks these firms created and made a living out of included North American farmers (whose grain might be traded for wines), Swedish barrel-makers (who made the containers that rendered trans-Atlantic trade possible), and French brandy exporters (whose product was added to the wine to stabilize it on its travels), as well as buyers and consumers in European and colonial markets (Hancock 1998, 2005).

Madeira's global success led to the manufacture of cheap imitations from Tenerife, sold in at least one store in upstate New York as 'Made, here, a' (Hancock 1998). As wine came to consumers more regularly from far-away places, so too did levels of uncertainty rise as to its provenance. Such anxieties led to more demands for market regulation. There is some evidence to suggest that a legally-recognised region of wine production was running in Paris as early as the 12th century CE, although the border apparently was not fully legally codified until the early 15th century. Claims have also been made for 18th century Tuscany, Portugal and Hungary as the sites of the first substantial legal recognition of distinctive wine-making areas (Matthews 2015). In 1756 the Marquis de Pombal set up geographical boundaries to guarantee the authenticity and quality of Port wines for their major market, British merchants and consumers (Stening et al 2004). The French AOC (*Appellation d'Origine Contrôlée*) legal apparatus started to take shape in the early 20th century. A 1935 law created the regulatory agency the *Institut National des Appellations d'Origine* (INAO), to formulate and enforce AOC regulations (Trubek and Bowen 2008). An AOC appellation and the *terroir* it regulates is a complicated – and possibly ambiguous – 'assemblage' of nature, culture, land, plants, technologies and practices (Meneley 2007). Appellation rules were (and today still are) about *restrictions*: as to which grape varieties may be planted in the area, how large yields per hectare may be, allowed and disallowed wine-making methods ('traditional' ones are allowed, those

defined as non-traditional likely not), permitted minimal alcohol levels, etc. (Moran 1993). The INAO and AOC are often presented as developments purely internal to the French nation-state's territory. But it was from the start about winning international prestige and making money in foreign markets (Whalen 2009).

Returning to the spread of wine-making across the world in the 19th century, this was in large part due to the broader trajectories of European colonialism, and consequent mass migration across oceans and continents. As many as 100 million people migrated in the 19th century, half of them Europeans, and wine was bound up with such massive movements of people (Held et al 1999). In terms of imperialist politics, the administrators of European empires had certain symbolic concerns about the need to introduce wine-making to the colonies. They believed that viticulture allowed the landscapes of conquered territories to be located within a Western imperialist narrative of world history, which 'claimed that all powerful nations, since antiquity, had transcendent grape cultures'. Making and drinking wines was part of 'an international set of colonial tactics for transforming landscapes and for propagating a particular worldview of cultivation and control' (Hannickel 2013: 15). Colonial authorities were also driven by more pragmatic concerns of gaining new sources of supply. The British governmental elite of the 1820s regarded Australia as a potential source of wine supply that would allow the mother country to circumvent reliance on imports from an unfriendly France. German colonists were introduced to Australia by the authorities in the 1830s to begin wine-making activities, followed by Swiss and Dalmatians.

Throughout the rest of the century, migrants from wine-making regions of Europe colonised parts of the New World and brought vines and wine-making techniques with them (Unwin 1991). The wine-making Spanish, Italians and other Europeans who migrated to places like California, Argentina, Chile, Brazil and the US certainly can be viewed as pioneers of wine globalization (Cinotto 2012, Peck 2009). Their efforts lead 'to a significant diversification in

the world production of wine', as well as more production (Pinilla and Ayala 2002: 55). In the 1870s, California wines, often made by Italian immigrants, were being exported to places as diverse as Australia, Peru, China and Denmark, while being shipped to the US East Coast in 100,000-gallon containers (Unwin 1991).

Much discussion of the history of wine in the US focuses on Italian migrants in California, but this occludes two issues. First, Hungarians, Germans and French were among other nationalities also involved. Already in the mid-19th century, such people discussed whether new wine-making technologies could substitute for the traditional soils and wine-making practices of the long-established European regions, a theme that arose recurrently throughout New World wine-making circles in the 20th century (Geraci 2004, Simpson 2011). Second, wine-making appeared in locales beyond California. The Finger Lakes district in New York State produced high quality German-style wines in the late 19th century until Prohibition in the 1920s wiped the industry out there, as was also the case in North Carolina. These are areas that have only recently made comebacks in terms of national and global wine maps (see Taplin in this volume). In Latin America, Italian migrants settled in places like Southern Brazil, producing basic table wines for primarily Italian immigrants in the Brazilian cities. Like hitherto obscure areas in the US, such regions are nowadays coming back onto the global wine radar (Nossiter 2009).

One reason Europeans took their wine-making skills to other continents was the devastating spread of the phylloxera disease across European wine-growing regions from the 1860s to the early 1900s. Phylloxera spreads when tiny insects feed on the roots and leaves of vines, eventually killing off the plants. The disease wreaked havoc across Europe. By the start of the 20th century, nearly all vineyards in the affected regions had had to be uprooted and replanted with resistant rootstocks (Campbell 2004). Phylloxera was thoroughly trans-national in both nature and consequences. It spread rapidly across European borders. While railways could take

finished wines to ever more distant consumers, they also helped move around Europe the blight that seriously threatened the very existence of the industry (Macedo 2011). The pest originated in North America, brought over the ocean by steamship. The eventual solution to it was trans-oceanic too. European vines were grafted onto more phylloxera-resistant American rootstocks. North America was therefore source of both catastrophe and salvation for European wine (Campbell 2004). The disease was recognised as a profoundly trans-national problem. International congresses devoted to dealing with the threat were called in the 1870s, creating what today might be called an international 'risk community' (Beck 2011).

There were numerous important consequences of phylloxera and the attempts to stem it. A new topography of vineyards came into existence, intended to make the disease monitorable. This involved much more surveying of wine-growing areas than hitherto, involving the new technology of photography, which rendered in visual terms for the first time a sense of the *terroir* of specific locations (Macedo 2011). Scientific forms of monitoring and control of vineyards became more systematic and more commonplace, paving the way to the situation dominant by the late 20th century where vineyards and wineries were as much spaces of applied science and technology as of 'nature'. Wines made in the immediate post-phylloxera period, from grafted vines, probably in many cases tasted more generic than those made before the disease, paving the way for new, more homogeneous and trans-local wine-flavours (Lukacs 2012).

Just as the ancient Romans had set up North Africa as a massive source of wine production, so too did the late 19th century French set up Algeria as a vast source of supply (Pinilla and Ayala 2002). As the local peasantry were thrown off the land in favour of a small number of large industrial wineries owned by big companies, French colonial wine production jumped exponentially, from 1 million hectares under vine in 1885 to 8.4 million hectares in 1910 (Simpson 2011). French wine-making influence extended along the coast to Tunisia and

Morocco, as well as to Lebanon, where some fine French-style wines are still made today and have global recognition (Hyams 1965). The Algerian case points to a historically recurring feature of colonial and post-colonial contexts of wine-making concerning the scale of production. When new territories for wine-making were opened-up by colonial expansion, the scale of production was generally much larger than in Western Europe, where a free peasantry owned small-holdings over multiple generations. At the time of the emperor Nero, only 6 proprietors controlled *all* wine production in Roman North Africa, a situation of massive concentration mimicked by the French experience there two millennia later (Johnson 1989).

In areas such as California, Mendoza in Argentina, and Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil, by the late 19th century wine-growing was densely concentrated, and levels of production grew rapidly, creating homogeneous bulk wines in large quantities. This was made possible by a combination of the natural endowments of land and climate, where huge amounts of grapes could be cultivated, plus the use of modern farming technologies (Unwin 1991). These were fertile terrains for the growth of large industrial wineries, with grape-growers often operating in separate enterprises from wine-makers. Already in the late 19th century, much New World wine-making was highly concentrated, with about 70% of wine in Australia and the US produced by the top 5 companies in each, while the corresponding figure for Argentina and Chile was about 50%. European wine-making was still firmly based on small family and co-operative enterprises (Simpson 2011). Large wine-making enterprises, producing basic wines on an industrial scale, have been a hallmark of much New World production ever since.

The large companies in the New World engaged in ‘forward integration’, moving into the distribution and marketing of wine as well as its production. They also drew on the latest scientific and technological developments coming from Europe. New technologies allowed producers to make consistent wines in hot climates year upon year. These wines could be kept longer than before, and so were particularly susceptible to being sold under brand-names. Such

technical wine-making innovations of the late 19th century facilitated both the beginnings of a slow shift in the balance of power from Old to New Worlds, and also major shifts in production trends in Europe, most markedly in France, with ever more wine being made in the hotter south of the country and in Algeria (Simpson 2011). In the early 20th century, France occupied a paradoxical position of being by far the main producer *and* the largest importer of wines in the world – most of the imports coming from Algeria – and accounting for more than three-quarters of total world wine imports (Pinilla and Ayala 2002).

But while production increased in the New World, producers struggled to find viable markets. There had been a rise in cross-border trade from the 1860s in a wave of liberalisation made possible through international agreements. Yet by the end of the century, high tariffs on wine were erected by some European governments to protect their domestic industries (Pinilla and Ayala 2002). In a period of a major fall in international trade more generally, the US and Argentine governments brought in protectionist measures to defend their own agricultural economies and build up national wine industries. New World producers also confronted local populations that were not accustomed to drinking wine, as in the cases of Australia and California. They also faced the challenges of shipping wine over very long distances to European consumers, which, coupled together with the power of a relatively small number of wine importers in Europe, all held New World sales back in the late 19th century (Simpson 2011). Facing periodic crises of over-production, producers often turned to more easily marketable and transportable brandy, as well as crude table wines for primarily local consumption. It would only really be in the 1980s that it became generally profitable to export basic table wines over oceanic distances, when transportation costs fell and technology had been developed to prevent spoilage. While production was increasingly potentially globalized just before WWI, at the same time distribution and consumption were not nearly so globalized (Simpson 2011).

This gap between potential supply and actual demand was exacerbated by the fact that production and distribution were generally handled by different companies, undercutting the ease of getting wine made in one place to consumers in far-off places (Unwin 1991). Moreover, northern European countries, excluding France, constituted very limited markets for wine consumption at this period. Levels of wine imports remained stagnant in northern Europe in the first three decades of the 20th century, falling even further during the Great Depression (Pinilla and Ayala 2002). It would only really be in the 1970s when vertical integration of the different branches of the wine-making process, from growing grapes to selling wines off the shelf, would occur in major ways. What was lacking in the late 19th century came to fruition about a hundred years later: the dynamic presence of very large companies systematically connecting production in the New World with consumption in Europe, North America and elsewhere, through the systematic control of distribution and retail channels (Unwin 1991).

Neo-Liberalization and Related Matters

The production and selling of wine have been thoroughly bound up with broader processes of neo-liberalization. The latter involves pronounced trends in the global economy since the late 1970s, and especially after the fall of Eastern European Communism in the late 1980s, towards the dominance of financial capital and markets over other economic activities, and the transformation of national governments from being concerned to tame trans-national markets, to being facilitators of them (Harvey 2014). In wine world terms, what neo-liberalization has meant is increasingly lowered national governmental tariff protections of domestic wine production, with wine producers becoming ever more directly exposed to global market forces. Some actors have been able to take advantage of these, while others have suffered seriously or gone out of business. To survive in new, harsh liberalized market conditions, wine companies have had to adjust by relinquishing old-style table wines and making new, more smoothly

‘international’, ‘easy drinking’ styles of wine that can sell abroad (Pont and Thomas 2012). In Chile, for example, out of the 300 million litres of wine made each year in the early 1990s, 20% of that was exported, and 80% remained within the country. Yet by 2006, of the greatly increased annual production of 800 million litres, 75% went to export. Some companies became very large indeed through these processes. The Concha y Toro group was by the early 2000s selling wines to 110 countries across the world, accounting for more than 25% of all Chilean wine exports (Gwynne 2008).

There has also been a complexification of patterns of investment and ownership, with greatly increased numbers of investors and owners coming from outside the locales where wine is made (Curran and Thorpe 2014). Foreign investment has often come from very large companies, which are themselves products of changes in the beverage industry since the 1970s. There have been marked trends towards smaller enterprises being bought up by larger ones, with the resulting conglomerates having interests not only in wine but in multiple alcoholic beverages. These were taken over in turn by huge multi-sector corporations. Massive entities like Diageo and Constellation Brands engaged in corporate take-overs of well-known wine-making operations like Mondavi in California and Mouton Cadet in Bordeaux. The French luxury brands conglomerate LVMH, which sells luggage and handbags as well as wine, owns wine properties on five continents. Their luxury branded Champagnes and cognacs are sold across the planet in upscale retail outlets and airport duty-free lounges (Colman 2008). Apparently independent smaller-scale wineries are also often owned by corporations, although the branding usually implies otherwise. This has led to vast contrasts of scale in some regions, where owners of tiny plots sit next to vineyards owned by massive globe-spanning corporations (Pinney 2005).

It was the fall of Communist political systems in Eastern Europe which unleashed further neo-liberalization across the world economy. Eastern European wine producers found themselves

in the 1990s and after in a paradoxical situation, for the region constituted a kind of New World in, or at the eastern border of, the so-called Old World of Western Europe (for treatment of FYR of Macedonia, see Otten in this volume). The transition to capitalist economies and putatively democratic political systems meant large-scale privatization of previously co-operative vineyards and wineries, as well as the in-flow of some foreign investment (Noev 2007). Some former COMECON countries, notably Bulgaria, had been singled out by the USSR as the locales where the bloc's wine consumption needs would be catered for – a kind of Soviet globalization of wine production in the decades after WWII. Basic Eastern European table wines were exported to Western Europe as bargain-basement offerings in the 1990s, but were largely superseded by hugely increased New World exports in the 2000s. Wine-makers in the former Communist bloc have struggled with a wide range of challenges, ranging from Byzantine-levels of governmental bureaucracy and corruption among state apparatchiks, preventing easy access to European Union funding to market wines abroad, to a slow uptake of ideas as to making and marketing wines as coming from distinct *terroirs*. A wine-maker needs to show to international audiences that their products are sufficiently standardised to gain a foothold in foreign markets – for example, their Cabernet Sauvignon must taste something like its rivals from other parts of the world. Yet this demonstration involves reducing, both materially and symbolically, the distinctiveness of the wines and the terrains they come from, and presenting such distinctiveness is also a crucial part of gaining the wines international recognition (Jung 2011).

Wine-making and -marketing personnel circulate trans-nationally and learn from each other. Many of them hold university qualifications in wine production and/or management, from institutions in France, Australia, the US and elsewhere. These offer increasingly identical curricula, usually in English, which express convergent assumptions about how wine should be made and marketed (Roger 2010). This convergence is partly due to academics and

practitioners who teach such programmes sharing knowledge and engaging in cross-border pedagogic collaborations (Geraci 2004). Teachers and pupils operate with increasingly similar scripts, whether they are trained in California, Bordeaux or Stellenbosch.

The massive corporate ‘vintibusinesses’ drive the vertical integration of grape-farming, wine-making, distribution, and marketing (Geraci 2004). The American giant Gallo makes eight times as much wine every year as do all the regions of New Zealand put together (Veseth 2012). More specifically wine-focused enterprises, like the Italian Antinori company, own properties in regions in diverse countries like the US, Chile, Hungary and Romania. Bordeaux- and Champagne-based operations have invested in locales in California and Latin America. Powerful regional players, with world-spanning market presence, have also emerged, such as Guigal in the Rhone and Torres in Catalunya (Lukacs 2012).

Over the last 30 years, power in wine worlds has shifted downstream, from primary producers to processors and marketers. Branded wines sold in massive quantities in Europe and North America, such as South Africa’s major brands *Arniston Bay* and *Two Oceans*, which are not tied to particular vineyards or even specific regions, began to be the primary sorts of wines that most Developed World consumers would experience (Ewert and du Toit 2005). Yet despite these trends towards ever larger companies with large market-shares, across the EU in the early 2010s there were still 1.2 million wine-production entities that had less than one hectare of vines each (Smith et al 2013).

Neo-liberal doctrine is apparently hostile to State intervention in markets. Yet the rise to prominence of Australian wines was partly due to State planning. In the 1990s, the Australian government promoted the *Strategy 2025* policy, whereby the national wine industry would aim first for more volume of exports to target markets like the UK, then secure rising value per bottle, and then achieve overall pre-eminence over Old World producers. This strategy was copied by other governments and national industries, such as in South Africa (Ewert and du

Toit 2005), illustrating broader issues to do with policy convergence across nation-states (Alasuutari 2009).

Contemporary wine globalization involves the rise of new kinds of experts with novel skill-sets. A trans-nationally operative ‘wine consultant’ may know about such diverse but interconnected fields as technical and scientific vineyard and winery knowledges, economics and global markets, and marketing know-how (Gwynne 2008, Chauvin in this volume). The highest-flying ones are also rich in social capital, enjoying connections to multiple sorts of power-brokers, from the owners of prestigious properties, to influential critics and the organisers of international wine-fairs (Pont and Thomas 2012). The more wine-making is oriented to exports travelling very long distances, the less direct connections there are between producers and consumers. The high geographical mobility of the trans-national adviser seems able to bridge such gaps, allowing the wine to travel to accurately defined consumer groups. This new breed of experts no longer comes only from Europe, but also from areas that up until the 1970s been regarded as peripheries but which subsequently became prestigious, like California, Australasia and South Africa. Some who have risen to the greatest global prominence – such as the Bordelais Michel Rolland, who was heavily criticised as the ugly face of wine globalization in the documentary film *Mondovino* (2004) – have themselves become symbols of universally recognised styles and brands (Chauvin in this volume). Such consultants help create what Lagendijk (2004) calls the ‘inter-connected locales’ of the globalized, neo-liberalized wine world. Wine-making information of various types flows from multiple locations, in both Old and New Worlds, to receiving areas in both regions. Personnel move across the world, taking knowledge back and forth, disseminating it through multiple pathways, sometimes fitting-in two harvest seasons per year by flitting between hemispheres. This is one crucial element of the *de-localization* of wine-making practices (Anderson et al 2004).

Itinerant consultants and technical personnel spread knowledges and practices based across the continents, with vineyards and wineries the world over becoming subject to identical forms of control. The new ‘techno-science’ of wine has been, particularly from the 1970s onwards, the product of trans-national cooperation, between research facilities in major locations like California, South Africa, Australia and France. The technical know-how was then disseminated trans-nationally (Pinney 2005). Innovations spread rapidly around globe-spanning professional circuits. New knowledges can be taken-up quickly because most sizable wineries have laboratories and personnel, often trained in university wine-making faculties, that are competent in applying such innovations. Large companies have taken up new knowledges with alacrity, as they offer the possibility of creating ever more reliably similar-tasting wines year after year, seasonal variations being brought under control by varied techno-scientific interventions (Lukacs 2012). Innovations include trellising and irrigation systems; the planting of vines at prescribed distances from each other; more intensive pruning earlier on in the growing season; delaying of the harvest to maximise ripeness of berries; the use of stainless steel tanks for fermentation (allowing dry wines to be made in warm, or even hot, climates); precisely-managed induced malolactic fermentation and the use of artificial yeasts; and imported French oak barrels for maturation and storage. A side-effect of the latter is massive world-wide demand in the barrel-making industry (Colman 2008).

Travelling professionals have promoted the planting of the now-ubiquitous ‘international’ varieties, such as cabernet sauvignon, merlot, pinot noir and riesling (Lagendijk 2004, Pinney 2005). Grape varieties have always travelled both within and between countries, but the further back in the past this happened, the slower the travelling was, and the more unremarked upon. New grapes and wine-styles slowly became indigenized and were understood to be quintessentially ‘local’. In the pursuit of wines that Developed World consumers would find appealing, wine-makers especially from the 1990s onwards planted grape varieties in large

numbers in areas not previously associated with those types (Huber 2011). Nowadays the spread of a grape can seem dizzyingly fast. This is especially so if the new arrivals are planted at the expense of uprooting varieties that have been grown in a region for decades or even centuries, but which have come to be perceived as having no market value outside the region (Gade 2004). Such developments have stimulated fears by small producers and other observers that there is occurring a massive homogenization of tastes and flavours, in favour of bland, characterless mass-market wines where ‘case one taste[s] the same as case one million’ (Colman 2008: 104). This is wine that critics feel could be made *anywhere*, regardless of the terrain, having low acids and tannins, soft textures, fruit-driven flavours, and relatively high residual sugars. Critics regard these as ‘technically well-made, globally palatable, interchangeable “wine products” of no perceptible origin or identity’ (Nossiter 2009: 69).

Today mass-market wine may travel long distances in shipping-containers with 24,000 litre bags inside them (Murray 2007). These shipping methods have allowed for the bulk transportation of even the cheapest wines in the world, whose predecessors would never have left their region. At the lowest quality end, cheap Chilean wine sent in bulk to China may end up labelled as ‘Chinese wine’ when it reaches its destination. Pinot noir sold under a California-based brand may come from less prestigious parts of France and Italy (Veseth 2012). But at the same time, New World producers have also moved into the promotion of certain regions and varieties as being at least as good as classic European regions, seeking to exploit higher-end consumers (Corby 2010, Sternsdorff 2013).

Mass-market wines are sold through a globalized system of semiotics on labels, involving bold colours, easy-to-read text with standardised stories about flavours and the supposed natural endowments of the places of production (even if the wines were made more in the technoscientific-driven winery than in the vineyard). There is often a foregrounding of one of the internationally recognisable grape varieties on the label too (Veseth 2012). Such labelling

stands in contrast to the arcane and cryptic labels of many Old World producers. This required higher levels of cultural capital on the behalf of consumers to decipher which grapes may have been used and what the wine tastes like. Such producers have come under ever more pressure to revise their labels and marketing a more apparently user-friendly, 'New World'-style direction (Peck 2009).

Developed World consumers tend to buy their wine for everyday drinking from supermarkets rather than specialist wine merchants. As the wine economy became ever more neo-liberalized, a new kind of player emerged: the supermarket wine-buyer. This was particularly so in the UK, an increasingly important market for wine imports from the late 1980s onwards. Supermarket chains like Asda, Tesco and Sainsbury's came to have huge purchasing power. With that came the capacity to dictate which sorts of wines were to be made, first by New World – and then later by Old World – producers. Supermarket buyers bargain very hard, are keen to drive prices down, and impose stringent sanitary and technical requirements on producers (Ewert and du Toit 2005). From the 1990s UK supermarkets moved away from just reselling products bought from and branded by others, towards directly finding their own suppliers of wine and then putting their own brands on the bottles. This has had huge effects on how producers manage quality control, supply-chains and the wines themselves. These were increasingly made from the internationally-recognisable varietals, and according to ever more convergent, world-wide standards and taste conventions (Gwynne 2008). This mirrors broader 'McDonaldization' trends, whereby every part of a production process is engineered to fit tightly-defined templates (Ritzer 2007). A wine-maker becomes a manager making standard products for the perceived consumer tastes that are thought to drive global markets (Pont and Thomas 2012). This process in turn sets up the possibility of rebellion from such prescribed roles, by defiantly presenting oneself as someone who makes wines according to personal taste, a position markedly present in the 'natural' wine movement (see below).

Old World/New World

One of the most discussed aspects of wine globalization over the last 50 years has been the so-called rise of the New World at the expense of the Old World, creating crisis conditions in the latter, especially perhaps in France. One important aspect here is the New World's symbolic challenging of Old World (especially French) hegemony.

One aspect of this is the mythology surrounding the so-called 'Judgement of Paris'. The term refers to a blind tasting of high-end French and Californian wines in Paris in 1976, organised by the English wine merchant Steven Spurrier. The elite French critics rated some of the mostly unknown Californian wines higher than the very established French ones. Effects on the wine field outside of the US were much less rapid and dramatic than subsequent myth-making would have it, which claims that it was immediately clear to all that California 'had arrived' on the world wine scene (Asher 2002: 172). The *Judgment* was not really 'a vinous shot heard round the world', as a reporter on the Wall Street Journal at the time called it, not least because wine fields were more nationally than trans-nationally organised at that time (Matthews 2015: 189). Nonetheless many Americans thought that the French had for the first time recognised that they can make world-class wines in California. Moreover, reflections and debates about the *Judgment* were productive of at least two ways of thinking: either California (and by extension, the New World), is a place that can have *terroir* quite as much as grand regions in Europe can, or that great wine can be made in places without the sorts of *terroir* that French thinking regards as essential to it. Maybe great wine comes from the process in the winery, not the land itself (Matthews 2015: 203)? The image of California as literally *world*-class asserted that Old World methods were not the only route to the highest quality in wines, and implied that perhaps those methods were now looking out-of-date.

The myth of the *Judgment* was used by the Californian wine business, and especially by powerful players within it such as Robert Mondavi of the pioneering Mondavi Company, to forge a collective memory, mobilise other actors, build coalitions, and create new networks. All this was done with the aim of imposing a perception of California's importance in world wine-making, to raise its status to the level of the classic European regions, and to upset their strong symbolic mastery over 'great wine' (Itçaina et al 2016). This sort of coalition-building through the creation and circulation of collective images and myths was copied in other regions, such as Mendoza and North Carolina (see Taplin in this volume).

The New World also came to challenge the Old World in general, and France in particular, in the 1980s and 1990s because of successful coalition-building which upset the long-established dominance of French thought and practice (Roger 2010). New World actors in America, Australia and South Africa were able to challenge the older French model. They enjoyed close ties both to big, powerful wine companies like Gallo in the US, and to national governments ambitious to extend the export potential of national industries. The figure of the 'new consumer' was formulated and disseminated both by commercial operations and by academics in universities like Stellenbosch and the University of California, Davis. It was promoted through such mechanisms as international conferences and journals, which brought scholars and business professionals together in a common cause (Roger 2010). That was crystallized in the notion that the main focus of attention of the industry should be the 'new consumer'. This was conceived of as a middle-class person interested in easy-to-drink wines, presented in bottles with labels that spelled out in simple terms the grape varietal and the flavours of the wine. This figure was implicitly juxtaposed against an outdated 'old' consumer, someone who drank 'difficult' wines that needed aging, and who could decipher cryptic labels. Being formulated by New World wine actors, the 'new consumer' was defined as someone who in

effect wanted to drink New World wine, shunning the complex and arcane symbolism that had built up around French and other Old World wines over the previous centuries (Roger 2010). Business and academic actors from the New World developed this imagery and sought to impose it throughout the wine world trans-nationally. To do so, they built up a coalition with other types of people who also had interests in ensuring the types of wines that the new consumer supposedly wanted became dominant. These included plant scientists and biochemists, who were focused on interventionist wine-making techniques involving microbiology such as artificial yeasts and filtration (Roger 2010). Industry and academic actors also enlisted econometrists, who claimed to be able to predict the 'right' price for wines on global markets, and marketing specialists, who claimed that 'new consumers' were much less interested in provenance and *terroir*, and more oriented towards reliable, never-changing brands (Roger 2010). International organisations were set up by this coalition to promote these New World principles and ideas. A powerful binary discourse was deployed – stagnation versus dynamism, parochial versus global – which defined the Old World's *terroir*-oriented dispositions as badly out-of-date. The figure of the 'new consumer' became ever more unquestioned, and started to be perceived as a self-evident fact, not a rhetorical construction (Roger 2010). The 'new consumer' eventually came to inform fundamentally the EU's new wine policy in 2006, which demanded a shift from an 'artisanal' to an 'industrial and more competitive' model of wine-making across the bloc. Old world producers would have to imitate New World producers and make easy-to-drink wines, made using the latest techno-scientific manipulations, sell them under branded labels, drop *terroir*-based marketing on mass market wines, and put the grape varietal(s) on the label (Roger 2010). While some bigger European companies' interests were well served by this shift, many smaller, supposedly 'old-fashioned' producers were greatly disadvantaged, fuelling the senses of grievance about perceived 'globalization' that had been around for some time.

Nowhere has this been seen more dramatically than in France. ‘Globalization’ (‘mondialisation’) is seen by both the political left and right as perniciously striking at the very heart of France, namely its traditional *terroir*-based agriculture, and the foodstuffs and cuisine which derive from it. The term *terroir* is the antonym of unceasing and rootless globalization, and a rallying cry against it (Waters 2010). The wine-maker, like the peasant more broadly, stands as either a tragic or heroic figure, depending on how successful they are in combatting the destructive forces of globalized markets and predatory foreign capital, of which American money is the most distrusted (Demossier 2010). This was well dramatized in the so-called *l’Affaire Mondavi*, when in the early 2000s the Californian Mondavi company pulled out of a venture in the Languedoc, in response to bitter criticism from activists (Jones 2003).

Fears of the end of *terroir* involve worries about the destruction of the French countryside, rendering it into a series of empty, placeless zones, populated by massive industrial food monocultures and ersatz entertainment sites for tourists (Geller 2007). In the leftist version of this discourse, popularised by the farmer-activist José Bové who has become a global media star of the anti-globalization movement, the defence of *terroir* is not politically reactionary. Instead, small-scale and artisanal production rooted in place, standing in opposition to mass-market factory production that could be made anywhere, is defined as cosmopolitan rather than parochial (Bodnar 2003). Sometimes the defence of tradition has taken direct and violent forms. For example, in the Languedoc, protests at perceived government inaction in protecting the region from global markets has led to various violent and illegal protests (Colman 2008).

While ‘globalization’ and ‘terroir’ are presented in political discourse as opposites, they need not be construed that way in social scientific terms. Globalizing forces do not just assail or transform existing wine regions and *terroirs*, they can also help produce new ones too. For example, what is presented as the distinctive *terroir* of the New Zealand region of Marlborough was created in large part by globalizing dynamics driven by big companies and money from

outside the region and indeed from outside New Zealand (Haywood and Lewis 2008). The development of the region by these bigger players encouraged smaller, independent producers to set up wineries in the region, leading to ever more plausible claims about it possessing a distinct *terroir*.

Terroir is (apparently) protected by legal apparatuses such as the French AOC, Spanish DO and Italian DOC(G) systems. But these tend to keep in check ‘too much individuality on the part of a producer’, because wines must exhibit ‘typicity’ of the area, and what that counts as that is open to often controversial debate (Gade 2004: 855). Younger and sometimes more iconoclastic producers therefore today often prefer to avoid what they experience as constraining AOC rules, and to sell their wines under less restrictive nomenclatures, a phenomenon also found in other countries such as Italy today. In Southern Europe, many of these newer producers are university-educated young professionals who have ‘returned to the land’, disillusioned with careers in global capitalism, or unable to find graduate-level employment after the economic crash of 2007/8.

‘Natural’ Concerns

A striking feature of wine today is the centrality of issues to do with ‘nature’, reflecting wider social concerns to do with climate change and environmental degradation, both truly global problems. Climate change is already having major effects on wine production, and likely will have even more impact in the future.

Temperatures in Western Europe in the grape growing season have risen on average by 3 degrees Fahrenheit from the mid-1980s to the 2010s (Lukacs 2012). This is having major consequences for many aspects of wine-making, from choosing which varieties to grow in warmer conditions, to harvests happening earlier, and weather conditions becoming more erratic. This means a consequent loss of human control over the wine-making process, the very

objective that techno-science has been aiming at for decades. Changes in climate also affect *terroir*, which ultimately is a form of thinking and wine-making practice that strongly associates particular vines, grapes and wine-making methods with specific physical territories. As Pincus (2003: 87) argues, climate change, ‘the fruit of the Industrial Revolution and continued population growth, is beginning to make decades of wine-making expertise irrelevant. In an increasingly warm world, the particular associations between wine and place will be difficult or impossible to maintain’

Which types of wine have been made in particular locations, and how they have been made, has never been a matter simply of traditions stretching back to time immemorial. There has always been change, even if it was not thought much about or highlighted by those engaged in it. Yet the difference between the current period and earlier ones is the *rate* of change. In regions where there is a long history of wine-making, the totality of physical and natural endowments coupled together with human labour that has been given the name *terroir*, was born out of relatively slow adaptations, of humans and vines to the environment around them, sometimes built up over centuries. The rate of adaptation sped up in some places from the later 19th century, and then almost everywhere after WWII. Increasingly globalized markets upped the tempo for how wine-makers, in adapting to new markets, adapt their practices as to how grapes are grown and how wine is made (Unwin 1991). The increased speed of change throughout the later 20th century was primarily economically-driven - that is, it was created by mostly human factors alone. But what makes the current period distinctive is that those factors are combined with climate change, that itself is the unintentional creation of human agency (McKibben 2006).

That combination, of human practices together with a thoroughly human-impacted ‘nature’, is rapidly accelerating the pace of change in the wine world today, in historically unprecedented ways. If *terroir* was made possible by relatively slow human and plant adaptation to a relatively

unchanging environment, then in a period when human life is subject to faster changes than ever before, and when the environment is changing in rapid ways that our ancestors could never have anticipated, then it is no wonder that *terroir* is being unsettled in multiple manners today. As climate increases, it becomes possible to make richer, lusher wines almost everywhere where wine is made, even in classically ‘cold climate’ regions like Germany. By the same token, it is becoming too warm in some regions for some grapes and wine styles that require cooler climate conditions. In such areas, like Austria and Alsace, this will in future likely stimulate further moves to produce red grapes in locations that for centuries have only been able to support white varieties. This is a potentially radical disruption of what producers and consumers think of as the *terroir* of those regions. Such dynamics may speed up and radicalise trends to identify wines by grape variety rather than by geographic origin, at least for mass-market wines (Hannah et al 2013).

Simultaneously, areas that were previously regarded as too cool for grape cultivation at all are being opened-up to wine-making, such as the Netherlands and Denmark (Perkins 2004). The spectacular and rapid rise to prominence of English sparkling wine over the last 15 years has been made possible by rising temperatures in the south of England, creating climatic conditions similar to Champagne (Field 2008: 14). This marks a return to the southern part of England of widespread grape-vines, which flourished throughout the Middle Ages until the mini-Ice Age of the 16th and 17th centuries destroyed most English production. Even cold, damp Wales can now produce interesting white table wines. As investors define climate change as both risk and opportunity, new patterns of ownership emerge, as in the case of large Champagne producers investing in England in the hopes of having a ready supply of sparkling wine for global markets should production in the home region falter due to environmental changes (Millan 2013). English producers have adopted the universal terminology of *terroir* to describe the environment around them, and what they do to it and within it. This suggests that as growing

areas change, *terroir* discourse will continue to be the way that producers, at least of higher-end wines, both make sense of what they are doing, and how they sell their wines on global markets. Climate change may stimulate a proliferation of *terroir* ideas and practices, rather than destroy them.

In terms of environmental degradation, as Hannickel (2013) points out, a lot of contemporary wine-making is just like other forms of industrialized agriculture. It involves such questionable practices as mono-cropping (which radically reduces biological diversity in the surrounding area), and the use of chemical pesticides, while the deployment of methyl bromide to sterilize soils prior to planting grapes contributes to the depletion of the ozone layer. As supplies of water become less available in many parts of the world, so too do less areas become available for the planting of new vines. For existing vineyards, water shortages are likely to become a more chronic problem, given that in already dry areas they rely on extensive irrigation, misting and sprinkling systems. Moreover, vineyards in higher areas can despoil delicate higher altitude eco-systems (Hannah et al 2013).

In such an increasingly fraught global environmental situation, it is not surprising that both producers and consumers, in line with broader trends in food consumption among wealthier groups in the Developed World, have turned ever more over the last decade to wines that are apparently more environmentally sound and ethically virtuous. This has involved the rise of organically-farmed wines (which may or may not end up in fully ‘organic’ wines), and of biodynamic vineyard management, which promotes biodiversity among the vines (e.g. the presence of cows to produce fertiliser, the presence of insect-eating animals to reduce pest populations). Going beyond organic practices to embrace mystical ideas, first formulated by Rudolf Steiner, of the vines needing to be in alignment with lunar and astral movements, biodynamic grape farming challenges the idea of the vineyard as a self-enclosed plot of land, but rather as intrinsically connected to the wider planet and cosmos. Despite the mystical

elements, biodynamic wine-making still involves the use of soil science and careful research as to how elements in the total environment affect all the others (Lukacs 2012).

Recent years have also seen the rise of so-called ‘natural’ wines (Rothbaum 2006, Black 2013). These wines are presented as being made in as non-interventionist way as possible, rejecting the techno-scientific trends of the later 20th century in favour of something apparently more at one with nature. Wild yeasts from the vineyard, claimed to be as much part of the *terroir* as the grapes and vines, are used rather than the artificial ones industrialized wine-making deploys in the winery. Fermentation begins spontaneously, which may create very different wines each year, making vintages more distinctive, which is the opposite of the year-on-year consistency demanded by heavily techno-scientific wine-making. Sulphur is used sparingly or not at all, although this increases the risk of spoilage. The wine liquid may be moved by gravity rather than by artificial means like pumps. The use of enzymes, filtering and micro-filtration is avoided, creating wines that are often cloudy and full of sediment. These are taken to be ‘natural’ expressions of the ‘real’ wine of the *terroir*. These are wines that their advocates say are ‘laughing at modernity’ (Rosenthal 2008: 202, Goldberg 2013). Yet despite the strong emphasis on the hyper-locality of natural wines, they still must be sold in globalized markets. The selling of them stresses that very hyper-locality, while radicalising long-standing *terroir*-based marketing that presents the wine-maker as mere steward of the land, letting the natural endowments of the place come through with minimal actions on her part (Beverland and Luxton 2005). Natural and biodynamic wines are today being sold through the ambiguous means of a kind of anti-brand branding (Rothbaum 2006, Smith Maguire in this volume).

Natural wine-makers for the most part genuinely believe that they are letting *terroir* ‘speak for itself’ in ways that more interventionist methods prevent. But this has created a tension between ‘naturalists’ and those wine-makers who believe that *terroir* can only really be expressed if certain interventions are deployed. The latter may well complain of the ‘excessively

conventional taste typical of sulphite-free wines' (Teil 2012: 483). As one French winemaker explained to Teil (2012: 483), natural wines 'lack identity ... you don't know if you're drinking a cabernet, a syrah, a merlot'. Paradoxically, for their critics, natural wines betray *terroir*, as without intervention by humans, they all tend to taste the same, wherever they happen to come from – a perverse and unintended form of homogenization of taste. At a more institutional level, in the French case, AOC panels can refuse to certify as typical of a *terroir* some natural wines because of their alleged 'non-typicality', even if formally they comply with the letter of the AOC rules. Such dynamics have heightened disputes over what 'typicity' in a *terroir* really means (Demossier 2010).

While the wines of other former Communist locations may have by and large 'lost their accents' in the search for international markets, one possible way ahead for 'traditional' and 'natural' producers all over the world has been forged by wine-makers in the Republic of Georgia (Feiring 2016: xvi). Georgia has claims to the longest unbroken wine-making tradition in the world, extending over thousands of years, with some techniques used today being at least hundreds of years old (Feiring 2016). The Soviet Union engaged in its own distinctive homogenization of Georgian wine, forcing producers into generic bulk production and a massive reduction of varieties in favour of a few high-yielding vine types that made crude table wine. Yet ancient grapes and methods survived through the Soviet period and in the last decade have undergone a renaissance. The method of maturing wine made from distinctive regional varieties in clay *qvevri* containers buried under the ground, was recognised in 2013 by UNESCO as part of the world's intangible cultural heritage, consecrating the practice as a 'living tradition', and thus rendering that style of wine-making as part of what that international body defines as 'world culture'. Recognising and protecting 'heritage' is an important part of cultural globalization processes today, which runs in parallel with, and in some ways in

opposition to, the commodification and branding of cultures by actors in the globalized neo-liberal capitalist economy (Elliott and Schmutz 2012).

Such recognition is a significant boost to producers who want to continue to do things in ways very different to standardised production for global markets, but who also wish to raise to the profile of their wines in the high prestige, niche ends of the globalized wine market. Yet the growing trans-national presence of *qvevri* wines also points to the changing tastes of supermarket buyers, and their aspirations to cultivate the tastes of particular higher-end consumers. For the last several years, the UK supermarket Marks and Spencer has sold an entry-level *qvevri* wine, and this may herald broader attempts by supermarkets and other outlets to capture younger, hipper and more adventurous drinkers – exactly those people whose parents at first drove the development of New World consumption 30 years ago and more. The increased global profile of *qvevri* wines can be seen in the fact that small-scale wine-makers in places from across Old and New Worlds, such as Italy, France, South Africa, California and Australia, are today making wines in that manner, which then reach hip consumers in big cities, many of whose jobs involve servicing the global neo-liberal economy (Feiring 2016). Just as the latter is thoroughly implicated in the tendency towards massive amounts of homogeneous wine production, so too does it involve tendencies in apparently the opposite direction, namely the reactivation of ancient styles and the growing recognition by big city consumers of grape varieties hitherto hardly heard of outside of the region in which they are grown (Smith Maguire in this volume).

Conclusion

It is one of the many ironies of wine globalization that in its current phase it seems to have come full circle – some of the hippest wines in the world currently are from that very region in the Caucasus where wine was probably first made, some 8,000 years ago. Indeed, the rise to

prominence of Georgia as a source of fashionable wine, and of China as a location of both mass-market and increasingly prestigious wines, problematises the hitherto relatively stable classification of ‘Old World’ and ‘New World’. Should China be called ‘New New World’ in wine terms, and should Georgia escape those labels altogether and be referred to as an ‘Ancient World’ producing area (Li et al 2018)?

It is perhaps these sorts of constant reinventions - taking place in radically different socio-historical and spatial contexts, and which have over history become ever more complicated and ‘globalized’ - which are ultimately most expressive of the nature of wine globalization processes, when these are considered in long-term perspective. It is a (wine) case of old wine in new bottles, new wine in old bottles, and new wine in new bottles. Understanding the processes that bring such mutations about is the task of the wine-oriented social scientist, and it is to more specific investigations of such matters that this book now turns.

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