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VIRTUES OF MAN, WOMAN – OR HUMAN BEING?

An Intellectual Historical Study on the Views of the Later Stoics Seneca the Younger, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, Hierocles and Marcus Aurelius on the Sameness of the Virtues of Man and Woman

Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by due permission of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Helsinki in auditorium XII, on the 10th of September, 2014 at 12 o'clock.
ABSTRACT

The aim of this intellectual historical study is (using, modified for the purposes of the study, (con)textual analysis, philological method and approaches of women's/gender history) to examine the views of the later Stoics Seneca the Younger, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, Hierocles and Marcus Aurelius on the sameness of the virtues of man and woman, a question which gives a very non-anachronistic perspective on sameness, otherness, equality and inequality in Greek and Roman thinking. The basis of the study consists of two ideas found in Stoicism since its beginning: that the individual virtues are common to all human beings and that virtue as such is natural and possible to all. At the same time, other authors and material discussing women's virtues are used as an ideological background and context, i.e. views emphasising difference/inequality (or, in short, “otherness”) and views emphasising sameness/equality at least more than on average. Thus, it is an important aspect of this study to examine the proportion of these kinds of attitudes in the later Stoics, and how consistently they follow the two above-mentioned Stoic ideas in their construction of 'woman' in relation to 'man' and 'human being'.

It is obvious that the sameness of the virtues of man and woman, discussed most intentionally and consistently by Musonius, who also most unambiguously equates 'woman' with 'human being', means two things also for the later Stoics: that everyone has at least in principle capacity to acquire virtue and that the virtues of both sexes are the so-called cardinal virtues, i.e. prudence, bravery, self-control and justice. Thus, even bravery is not a masculine but a human virtue, and the sameness of man and woman does not mean that a woman becomes “masculine”, but their sameness is based on their common (rational) humanhood. Equality resulting from sameness is especially in Musonius not only theoretical but also practical in a wider sense and on a larger scale than usual, above all in the division of tasks, whereas Seneca, advocating many traditional ideals, constructs the gender of women mostly very conservatively and even reacts negatively to contemporary changes in women’s social/societal roles and spheres. He also refers to women’s emotional “weakness”, but does not, however, see it as specific only to women and seems to be convinced that women, too, can overcome it and be (at least in principle) equal in virtue - emphasising thus, after all, the fundamental sameness rather than otherness of women.

The views of the later Stoics provide a rather exceptional and ungendered perspective on individual virtues, capacity for virtue and philosophical education, as well as on sameness, otherness, equality and inequality, and what is “masculine”, “feminine” or “human”. Thus, their views are also an important contribution to discussions of who a “full” human being is, in an era when a “human being” was in the first place a (free) man.
4.2.2. Educating the innate capacity for virtue
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This study is now finally completed, not in the early 2000’s, as was intended, but after a long pause due to eye disease. We do not live, after 2000 years, in a world without otherness and inequality, and some are still regarded as more “full” human beings than others. I think that views of antiquity can give some historical perspective.

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This has been a long process. I would like to thank Intellectual Historian Markku Hyrkkänen for his encouragement when I was preparing my first thesis on this subject. I am also grateful to my late supervisor before my obligatory pause, Professor Juha Sihvola. He also encouraged me to focus still more intensively on the practical equality in the views of the later Stoics. And, of course, I would like to thank my pre-examiners, Docent Marja-Leena Hänninen and Academy Research Fellow Miira Tuominen for their valuable comments.

I dedicate this study to my loved ones, with gratitude.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The aim of the study

The aim of this doctoral dissertation is to examine what the later Stoics Seneca the Younger (c. 5 BC – 65 AD), Musonius Rufus (c. 30 – c. 100), Epictetus (c. 55 – 135), Hierocles (2nd cent.) and Marcus Aurelius (121 – 180) have understood by the sameness of the virtues of man and woman. It had been discussed since Plato (427 – 347 BC) and Aristotle (384 – 322 BC) whether (or to what extent) human virtues are also women’s virtues, but the later Stoics, with their strong emphasis on practical ethics, offer exceptionally rich material both in its extensivity and versatility: Musonius Rufus treats the virtues of women in more detail than any other author in antiquity, and Seneca wrote even two philosophical consolations to women, to a certain Marcia and to his mother Helvia.

The basis of this study consists of two fundamental Stoic thoughts set forth in Stoicism since its beginning: that the individual virtues are common to all human beings, both men and women, and that virtue as such is natural and possible to all. At the same time views of other authors, too, are used as an ideological background and context; these include two main types of attitudes, i.e. conservative\(^1\) attitudes (emphasising difference/inequality, or, in short, “otherness”) and attitudes emphasising sameness/equality at least more than on average. Thus, it is an important aspect to examine the proportion of such attitudes in the later Stoics - and how consistently they follow (using also strategies of inclusion/exclusion and categories such as ‘we’, ‘human being’, ‘men - women’, or, as in Seneca, ‘men – exceptional women – other women’) the two above-mentioned Stoic ideas in their construction of ‘woman’ in relation to ‘man’ and ‘human being’. The era itself is also rather interesting because in the first and second centuries AD both conservative and more “egalitarian” attitudes and trends appeared side by side and interacted with each other. And it is also interesting that Musonius’ views on women have been interpreted even in opposite ways: some scholars consider him a feminist, whereas more argue that he to a great extent advocates conservative attitudes\(^2\) - an interpretation supported by most scholars also regarding Stoicism and

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1 ‘Conservative’ is used to refer to (old, traditional, etc.) attitudes emphasising difference/inequality.
2 For the former view, e.g., Favez 1933 and Klassen 1984, for the latter view below pp. 53 – 54.
especially later Stoicism as a whole: despite ideas and ideals of theoretical equality the Stoics are thought to be conservatives who are not interested in the practical equality of women.\textsuperscript{1} So, it is also one aim of this study to investigate where this interpretation does not seem to be valid - and how conservatively these Stoics, after all, construct 'woman' and women's gender and roles in this respect, i.e. discuss women's social/societal “sameness” and “otherness” in this respect. This perspective is of crucial importance because if the later Stoics refer to changes in women's social/societal role(s), they deviate from Stoicism, for the Stoics thought that one can acquire virtue and happiness regardless of one's external circumstances, including one's position and role(s).

When we examine the above-mentioned two aspects of the sameness of the virtues, we should pay attention to the individual virtues and whether the later Stoics give one to understand that a woman can equally well acquire virtue and wisdom. Although, as will be discussed below, Seneca and male-centred texts in general often refer to the wise person as a man, we should not immediately conclude that the wise were thought to be only males - and likewise although, e.g., Musonius does not seem to settle the sex of the wise, this does not necessarily mean that both sexes were thought to appear among them. Thus, because at least men (though it was, of course, very difficult for them, too) were able to become wise in Stoicism we should - in order to find out whether this was possible also for women - examine whether the later Stoics see any difference between man's and woman's innate capacity to acquire virtue and in their moral accomplishments acquired through education and training of this innate capacity. Furthermore, at least Seneca rather often refers to women's emotional “weakness”, and some scholars have explicitly argued that the Stoics find their doctrine incompatible with the “essence” of women.\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1} See, e.g., Pomeroy 1975: 132: “The Stoic doctrine of equality and brotherhood of man, while contributing to the breakdown of class distinctions, did not posit equality between the sexes. The Stoics joined the Peripatetics in recommending the familiar roles of wife and mother for women”; Mauch 1997: 18: “Die Stoiker machten trotz ihrer Theorie der Gleichwertigkeit von Mann und Frau in der gesellschaftlichen Praxis erhebliche Einschränkungen. So sahen sie die Frau weiterhin der traditionellen Rolle von Hausfrau und Mutter verhaftet”; Balch 1983: 439: “Antipater, Musonius, Hierocles - - all understand the wife to be “similar” or even “equal” - - to her husband, but inconsistently, all four subordinate her in practice”; see also, e.g., Thraede 1977: 87, quoted below; on p. 67, n. 2 Wöhrle 2002: 142 – 143, quoted below on p. 81, n. 5; Trapp 2007: 205 – 207 (see. p. 81, n. 5. below).

So, it is also an important aspect whether the later Stoics mention that women have impediments in the process of acquiring virtue, such as excessive emotionality.

Although the focus of this study is on the later Stoics, its perspective is not philosophical but intellectual historical, i.e. it focuses (using, modified for the purposes of this study, approaches of women's/gender history,\(^1\) philological method and (con)textual analysis to capture nuances of meanings of words and texts in their intellectual milieu(s)) on the views and attitudes of these Stoics, and parallels and ideological background are sought also in other authors/material discussing women's virtues, including conventional Roman thinking – in order to reconstruct, at the same time, also a complete picture of the most central views expressed in antiquity on the sameness of the virtues of man and woman.

1.2. The basis of the study: Two aspects of the sameness of the virtues of man and woman

1.2.1. "ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ ἄνδρός, ἄλλαι δὲ γυναικός, ῥόδιον μαθεῖν"

The Stoic thought that there are no different virtues for man and woman is already expressed by Chrysippus (c. 281 – 208 BC)\(^2\) – and later by, e.g., Musonius who as explicitly as Chrysippus states that "ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ ἄνδρός, ἄλλαι δὲ γυναικός, ῥόδιον μαθεῖν".\(^3\) As will be discussed below, this thought is fundamentally based on a wider Stoic view on the virtues: because virtue (ἀρετή) is reason and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and because all human beings are related to each other by the same reason, also virtue is the same for all.\(^4\)

It was a normal practice in antiquity, especially in philosophy, that men wrote (and lectured) about

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1 E.g.: ‘woman’, ‘masculinity’ etc. as constructions, aspects of “men as the norm” in Greek and Roman thinking, aspects of women’s “otherness”, power structures involved in virtues and ideals, etc. Cf. also the approach summarised in Dixon 2001: 16: “Women appear in male-centred texts to define by opposites the masculine ideal as the norm”; see also above pp. 40, n. 1; 20, n. 1.
3 IV,4,9-10 Lutz: that there is not one set of virtues for a man and another for a woman is easy to perceive (trans. Lutz)
4 The Stoics express this thought also by distinguishing a human being as a rational being from other creatures, see, e.g., Epict. I,3,3; IV,7,7; Marc. Aur. med. VI,23; IX,8.
men to men, and thus a “human being” was in their writings (and lectures) mainly a (free) man. Despite this, already Plato (esp. in *Meno*) and Aristotle (esp. in *Politics*), paid some attention to women’s virtues; this tendency intensified in the Hellenistic Age,¹ at least partly because of a changing position of women,² and culminated in a discussion whether all virtues are common to all. This question was later treated also by Plutarch (c. 45 – 125) in *Mulierum virtutes* though not very profoundly: after a short introduction he only introduces numerous historical - or “historical” - examples of women showing bravery, heroism and resourcefulness. Above all, this theme was, however, discussed by the Stoics, and Chrysippus’ teacher Cleanthes (c. 331 – 232 BC) is known to have written a treatise on the sameness of the virtue of man and woman (Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ [καὶ] ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός).³

It is not anachronistic to distinguish two main types of attitudes towards the subject (i.e. conservative ones and those with more interest in sameness/equality), for the authors often seem to intentionally include themselves in either one of the groups, and sometimes they even explicitly resist the views of another group: Aristotle protests against Socrates’ (Plato’s) thought of the same virtue of men and women,⁴ and Adolf Dyroff argues that Cleanthes wrote his above-mentioned work to resist the Peripatetics - a thought expressed by Malcolm Schofield concerning the Stoicism as a whole.⁵ Those rather strongly advocating sameness/equality include above all Plato and the Stoics, and those mainly supporting conservative attitudes above all Aristotle and his followers; furthermore, some typical conservative ideas can clearly be seen also, e.g., in Plutarch and in conventional Roman thinking. It is, however, important to keep in mind that also those authors who seem to emphasise sameness/equality more than on average express also more or less conservative thoughts, and the same is usually true with conservative thinkers. And because of this, it is of decisive importance to find out what the proportion of these aspects is in each author.

1 For this see, e.g., Thraede 1972: 209 – 210; Wicker 1978: 114.
2 For women in the Hellenistic Age (Greece (incl. Athens), Makedonia, Greek islands, Asia Minor, Egypt, etc.) see, e.g., Pomeroy 1975: 120 - 148; Pomeroy 1984; Pomeroy 1997; Setälä 1993: 76 - 87; Houby-Nielsen 1997; Lilibaki-Akamati 2004; Stavrianopoulou 2006; Bintlif 2012: 322; below p. 6, n. 3.
3 D. L. VII,175. For (probable) female students of Cleanthes see D.L. VII,181; Taylor 2003: 174; Cohick 2009: 247, also n. 96. For Stoics in general, see also Scharrer 2002: 145 – 146.
5 Dyroff 1897: 312. Schofield 1991: 43: “Stoic ethics is deeply concerned with human nature and particularly with the rationality all humans have in common. We nowhere find the sort of differentiation between male and female capacities made by Aristotle. There is even some reason to think that the school explicitly rejected Aristotle’s position, which make women and slaves naturally inferior kinds of human being.” For these Stoic views on the common human nature see also, e.g., Knuuttila 1986.
The question of the sameness of the virtues of women is important especially because it provides a very non-anachronistic perspective on sameness, otherness, equality and inequality, and, on the other hand, is also inseparably connected with views on the role and position of women in family and society. For if women were thought to have completely own virtues, such as chastity, obedience and spinning/weaving, or if their virtues were thought to be at least partly the same as those of men but different and inferior in quality, this automatically meant that the nature of women and thus women themselves were considered inferior, more imperfect and subordinate – mentally and socially/societally “other”. And not only women’s nature but also the sphere of life was argued to be of crucial importance regarding women’s virtues, i.e. whether it is possible that the virtues of men and women are the same although they often act mainly in different spheres.

The significance of this subject is also increased by the longevity of these kinds of views in the human history and their influence on the position of women in different times – for example, it has not been insignificant what the Christian Church adopted from pagan attitudes towards women.

1.2.2. “σπέρμα ἀρετῆς ἑκάστω ἡμῶν”

“σπέρμα ἀρετῆς ἑκάστω ἡμῶν”,¹ Musonius says in his II diatribe, a thought expressed also (e.g.) by Seneca.² In this Stoic thought is manifested the second aspect of the sameness of the virtues of man and woman: that all human beings have the capacity for virtue and wisdom. Although the Stoics held that the wise were very rare,³ the thought of the capacity for virtue (and the same philosophical education) applied (at least in principle) to every one regardless ethnicity, position and sex:

Quodsi natura hominis sapientiae capax est, oportuit et opifices et rusticos et mulieres et omnes denique, qui humanam formam gerunt, doceri, ut sapiant, populumque <sapientum> ex omni lingua et conditione et sexu et aetate conflari. - - Senserunt hoc adeo Stoici, qui et servis et mulieribus philosophandum esse dixerunt - - .⁴

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¹ II, 38,14: the seed of virtue exists in each one of us (trans. King)
² A good example is, e.g., epist. 108,8: omnibus enim natura fundamenta dedit semenque virtutum.
³ For the views of the Stoics on this see, e.g., Geytenbeek 1963: 24 – 25; Edelstein 1966: 11 – 12. For a more optimistic view of Musonius see, e.g., XVII,108,19 in which Musonius speaking of the wise person says that “καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον”; Geytenbeek 1963: 22.
⁴ SVF 3,253=Lactant.instit.div.III25: and if human nature is capable of wisdom, artisans, peasants and women – in short, all who bear the human form – should be taught to be wise, and a people of wise from every language, position, sex and age should be produced … the Stoics understood this and said that both slaves and women have to practise philosophy. For this “Die Offenheit der Philosophie für alle Menschen” esp. concerning Seneca see Lausberg 1970: 126 – 142. See also p. 110, also n. 3.
Thus, Quintilian tells that it was Chrysippus’ wish that nurses (nutrices) would be “si fieri posset, sapientes”;\(^1\) which indicates that the female wise person was not an impossible thought for Chrysippus - and likewise many scholars conclude on the basis of what is known of Zeno's (c. 336 – 264 BC) \textit{Politeia} that he included also women among the wise.\(^2\) And a good example is also Musonius: where he most unambiguously and detailedly speaks of the essence of the wise person he neither, in a customary way, connects his description to a man’s concrete role in society, nor at least in this way settle the sex of the wise.\(^3\) Here he, however, belongs to the minority: as said before, the texts of antiquity often refer to the wise person as a male, which is evident especially when the wise person is said to act in a non-utopian society in spheres from which women were usually excluded, such as politics,\(^4\) or when the wise person is said to marry and take a wife - a thought found, interestingly, also in Seneca.\(^5\)

Zeno’s utopia is a radical model of society which was very probably influenced by the Cynics also regarding women; the thought of the sameness of the virtues of man and woman had already appeared in Antisthenes (c. 444 – 366 BC)\(^6\) and probably also in Diogenes (c. 404 – 323 BC).\(^7\) It is also known that Zeno was taught by Crates (c. 365 – 285 BC),\(^8\) and it is not impossible that the unconventional companionship and marriage of Crates and Hipparchia (4\(^{th}/3^{rd}\) cent. BC), two Cynic philosophers sharing the same way of life and dress, had an influence not only on Zeno’s claim for the same dress for all regardless of their sex,\(^9\) but also more widely on his thoughts of

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1 Inst. 1,1,4; Ferguson 1975: 118.
3 See esp. XVI,104,32-36; XVII,108,4-18.
4 For this thought in the Stoics see, e.g., Schofield 1991: 52, n. 47; Asmis 1996: 86 – 87. For women holding offices and having political power/rights esp. in Asia Minor (but also, e.g., in Greek islands, Histria, etc) in (and since) the Hellenistic Age, see, e.g., Pomeroy 1975: 126; van Bremen 1983/198, esp. 225; 238, n. 13 - 14; Setälä 1993: 79; Ferrandini Troisi 2000; Shipley & Hansen 2006: 61; Stavrianopoulou 2006; Cenerini 2011; Bielman 2012; cf. also van Bremen 2003/2005: 328 – 329. See also above pp. 83, n. 3 and 6; 86, n. 4.
5 E.g. Sen. epist. 9,17: \textit{ducit uxorem}; also, e.g., matrim.: Hier. adv. Iovin. I 48 = 318A; I 49 = 319A (ed. Bickel). Diogenes Laertius claims that the thought of the marriage of the wise was included already in Zeno’s \textit{Politeia} (D. L. VII,121), which is in conflict with the information that marriage in its traditional meaning was abolished in Zeno’s utopia. Thus, this thought probably reflects later standard how the wise should act in a non-utopian society (see esp. Schofield 1991:113 – 127; Nussbaum 2002a: 325, n. 63).
6 D. L. VI,12.
7 Rist 1969: 60.
8 D. L. VII,3-4.
9 D. L. VII,33.
relations between man and woman. On the other hand, the inequality of real society was not a condition to be abolished in the respect that the Stoics, as mentioned above, believed that one can acquire virtue regardless of external circumstances and one's position. Moreover, the cynically oriented early Stoic radicality and utopias were later on substituted by an increasing interest in real society and, especially since the middle Stoic Panaetius (c. 180 – c. 110 BC), how human beings realise the different aspects of their virtues in their different roles, tasks and duties - which has made some scholars ponder how all this influenced the Stoics’ attitudes towards women. Thus, e.g., Marcia L Colish argues that this development contributed to equality between the sexes in Stoic thinking, whereas, e.g., C.E. Manning advocates an opposite interpretation and argues that the different position of women in that time society began to influence the Stoics’ attitudes concerning women and that this is very prominent in the later Stoics, especially in Seneca. And the fact that the Stoic wise person is often described by using male-centred words and terms has been interpreted by some scholars to mean that the wise person was really thought to be a male - and, as Ludwig Edelstein puts it, “the only true statesman, husband, father”, though Edelstein elsewhere rightly says that the Stoics (one could add: at least in principle) “hold that men and women have one virtue and that beyond and above the manly virtues there are human virtues which are valid for both men and women.”

3 Colish 1985: 38: “The Stoics’ general tendency to internalize the virtues, making them human and not merely masculine possibilities, coupled with Panaetius’ elaboration of rules for the application of ethical principles to all kinds of people, strengthened the case for sexual equality.”
4 Manning 1973: 172 – 177, esp. 175: “We have thus established that for a Stoic of the Roman Period, a number of factors would assign different officia to two equally virtuous human beings; the chief of these being individual disposition, place in the social structure of the community, and individual fortune at any particular time, i.e. health, wealth, etc. It is quite clear that at least in the first two of these women in Roman society differed greatly from men”; Manning 1981: 87: “ - - Stoic virtue involved living consistently with nature (Cic. De Fin. III.7,26), and while this involved conformity to general nature and individual character, it also included maintenance of the social persona which one had been allotted in the universal scheme of things (Cic. De off. I,32,115). Just as a slave was expected to perform his ministeria (De Ben. III.18,1), so might a woman be expected to play the part of a woman, not only in dress and deportment (De off. I,36,130) but also in other aspects of social life.”
5 Edelstein 1966: 9; see also, e.g., Loretto 1977: 127 who referring to Seneca’s ideal description of his aunt argues that “das althergebrachte Bild der untadeligen Römerin wird hier überhöht vom Idealbild der perfectissima femina, von der, wenn man so sagen darf, „weisen Frau“, die als weibliches Pendant zum stoischen Weisen erscheint”; this interpretation is repeated by Köhler 1985: 71.
6 Edelstein 1966: 73.
We should not, however, forget that it is a question of a *usage of words* which does not necessarily tell the whole truth. A good example is found in Zeno's *Politeia*: J.M. Rist points out that although Zeno, like the Cynic Diogenes,⁠¹ states that in this ideal state "κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας,"² it is evident in both authors that the companionship should be based on mutual consent.³ Thus, if "women are in common", "men are in common", too - i.e. it is essential to remember here, as also in other texts of antiquity, that much depends on whose point of view is used - and that this point of view was usually, as said above, that of a man.

1.3. The most important sources and earlier research

In this study will be discussed the later Stoics' prose works so that the works under discussion would be as commensurate as possible with each other; of these works can be mentioned above all Seneca's *Ad Marciam de consolatione*, *Ad Helviam matrem de consolatione* and *De matrimonio*, Musonius' *III* and *IV* diatribes, and Hierocles' *Περὶ γάμου* and *Οἰκονομικός*. It is also worth noting that Musonius and his pupil Epictetus⁴ apparently wrote nothing themselves,⁵ but their thoughts have been transmitted/written down by their pupils, above all by Lucius⁶ (Musonius) and by Arrian (Epictetus). Other important ancient sources concerning the views on the virtues of women include above all Plato's *Meno*, *Republic* and *Laws*, Aristotle's *Politics*, the Stoic Antipater's (of Tarsus) (c. 200 – c. 130 BC) *Περὶ γάμου*, and Plutarch's *Mulierum virtutes* and *Coniugalia praecepta*, whereas valuable concerning conventional Roman attitudes are especially funerary inscriptions and longer eulogies, such as the so-called *Laudatio Turiae*, as well as, e.g., Valerius Maximus' *exempla* collection *Facta et dicta memorabilia* and Livy's "national history" *Ab urbe condita*.

1 D. L. VI,72.
2 D. L. VII,131; see also VII,33.
4 Born in Hierapolis, Phrygia, Epictetus was taught by Musonius when a slave in Rome; later a famous teacher of philosophy (probably at least mainly of upper class youths; cf. also below p. 98, n. 5) in Nicopolis, Epirus. –The later Stoics thus came from various backgrounds; the emperor Marcus Aurelius was influenced by the former slave Epictetus; Musonius (born in Volsinii, Etruria) and Seneca (born in Corduba in Hispania) were both of equestrian order, Seneca in addition of being a philosopher and teacher also a very wealthy statesman, writer, etc., also a tutor and adviser of Nero. Nothing is known of Hierocles.
The accounts by Arrian\(^1\) are considered rather reliable - unlike those by Lucius who probably wrote down his accounts only much later, after the death of Musonius, even if they were presumably based on earlier notes.\(^2\) It is, moreover, problematic that many of these diatribes written down by Lucius are preserved only partly in the Stobaeus anthology.\(^3\) Although a large part of Musonius’ thoughts and teachings are thus lost for ever and although his reputation and respect for him (at least in certain circles) in his own time cannot be understood when reading him in a more or less watered-down form created by Lucius,\(^4\) Lucius’ versions are despite all reservations and criticism very valuable because they provide the only possibility to become more widely acquainted with Musonius’ thoughts, the other extant fragments being very short - though it is important to note that the fragments preserved in Epictetus give us a different Musonius who is more poignant, shows interest also (e.g.) in physics, and uses more exact terminology, such as χρησι τῶν φαντασιῶν and τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν - τὰ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν.\(^5\)

Women and various aspects of women’s life in antiquity have been widely studied during the last years and decades. In the texts of the later Stoics we meet some of these women, such as Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, Rutilia, the mother of Cotta, and the empress Livia – but above all two women: Marcia who grieves her son’s death, the daughter of the historian Cremutius Cordus who courageously saved her father’s work to posterity, obviously a highly educated woman, and Seneca’s mother Helvia, one of those Roman women known to have been seriously

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1 The Enchiridion (Manual; a compilation made by Arrian) and eight books of discourses, of which four books and some fragments have remained.
2 Hense 1905/1990: XV; Lutz 1947: 8 – 10; 12. See also Long 2002/2004: 14: “In their transmitted form, made by an auditor, Musonius’s lectures hardly live up to the promise of his enlightened themes. They are a dull read by comparison with Arrian’s record of Epictetus.”
3 Lutz 1947: 11 – 12 and Geytenbeek 1963: 12; 53 argue that the III and IV diatribes are likely to be complete, whereas Nussbaum 2002a: 297 regards the III diatribe as incomplete; for the completeness/incompleteness of the other diatribes see Lutz 1947: 6, n. 13; 96, n. 11; Geytenbeek 1963: 12; 28 – 29; 40, n. 1; 41, n. 1; 42, n. 1; 53; 63 – 64; 72 – 73; 79; 97; 124; 135 – 136; 152.
4 Lutz 1947: 23 – 24, also n. 92; 12 – 13; Geytenbeek 1963: 14 – 15; see also above p. 81, also n. 2. Musonius probably lectured in Greek, for Greek was the language of philosophy. This did not necessarily affect the spreading of his thoughts, for those (rare) having opportunity and leisure for philosophy were usually educated also in Greek language (for women, see, e.g., Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 22; 199; 353, n. 62.; cf. also Vibia Perpetua (de Marre 2004: 67); see also below p. 84 (Domitila Lucilla).
5 Lutz 1947: 13 sees the same phenomenon also in the other fragments: “A strong personality stands forth, kindly but sharp, vivid and determined, a figure to admire and to follow.” See also, e.g., Long 2002/2004 (on Epictetus): 14: “The impression Musonius made on him was unforgettable, and something that plainly influenced not only his Stoicism but also his teaching style”; 15 (on Epict. 1,7,30-32, Muson. fr. XLIV): “Evidently Musonius taught Epictetus how to use black humour and hyperbole to make a philosophical point”; Bobzien 1998/2001: 331 (on Epictetus’ concepts of ἐφ’ ἡμῖν and freedom): “For most of the following points we find some related ideas in the few extant fragments of Musonius (in Stobaeus); this makes it likely that Epictetus took over many of these ideas from his teacher.”
interested in philosophy. Stoicism was the most popular philosophical school among the upper class in Rome at that time but also prominent in its confrontations with the imperial power in the first century AD, which is also reflected in these later Stoic texts: Seneca wrote his Ad Helviam matrem de consolatione to console his mother during his exile under Claudius, and in Epictetus we meet a female (Stoic) friend of Gratilla, a member of the so-called Stoic opposition exiled under Domitian.  

Unlike women in antiquity, women’s virtues have been a rather neglected area, rare exceptions being, e.g., Helen North’s article on ὑγιεία or articles/studies on women and their virtues in honorary or funerary inscriptions even if some works on individual virtues occasionally discuss women, too. Despite that, there are rather many studies which are useful also in this respect, not only those dealing more or less with views of one or several of the later Stoics on women, but also those which mainly focus on other topics of women’s lives but discuss also attitudes towards women in different kind of material, including philosophical and legal writings, historiography etc. Furthermore, some studies on the Stoics in general provide useful information especially on women in early Stoicism, whereas some scholars discussing views on women, e.g., in Plutarch or in early Christianity have paid attention also to the later Stoics. The views of the later Stoics on women have thus been discussed also from various non-philosophical perspectives. Relevant passages from secondary sources are cited especially in notes to show the place of this dissertation in the argumentations of the subject.

1 For Marcia and Helvia see, e.g., Hemelrijk 1999/2004; Langlands 2004; Wilcox 2006; McCullough 2007.  
2 Cf. also, e.g., its emphasis on practical ethics - not in conflict with Roman practicality; frugality, heroism, etc. - not in conflict with traditional Roman ideals; see above, e.g., p. 1; below pp. 33; 60 - 61.  
3 Cf. also Musonius’ (exiled under Nero and Vespasian) IX diatribe on exile; for Seneca recalled from exile by Agrippina minor see also below p. 56, n. 3; for Seneca forced to commit suicide (accused of conspiracy under Nero) and his wife Paulina see below p. 55, n. 1.  
6 Or also of early Stoics, e.g., Föllinger 1996; Scharrer 2002; Grahn 2013.  
7 E.g. Favez 1933; Favez 1938; Motto 1972; Manning 1973; Loretto 1977; Allen 1985; Köhler 1985; Harich 1993; Vidén 1993; Harich 1994; Asmis 1996; Houser 1997; Lavery 1997; Mauch 1997; Engel 2000; Hill 2001; Ramelli 2001; Lewick 2002; Nussbaum 2002; Wöhrle 2002; Engel 2003; Laurand 2003; Dillon 2004; Langlands 2004; Reydams-Schils 2005; Wilcox 2006; Ramelli 2008b; Van Abbema 2008; Ramelli 2009; see also e.g. Bonhöffer 1894; Geytenbeek 1963.  
9 E.g. Dyroff 1897; Rist 1969; Schofield 1991.  
2. SOME BASIC STOIC THOUGHTS CONCERNING VIRTUES

The essential content of Stoic virtue and wisdom is the ability to live “according to nature” and thus to enjoy permanent tranquillity of mind and happiness; to live “according to nature” means to acquire one’s real nature and essence and to understand one’s own place in the world. For the Stoics the most important branch in the philosophy is ethics which they firmly attach to physics, i.e. to knowledge of everything concerning nature: the human reason (λόγος) is only a part of the divine reason of the world, i.e. the structure of the cosmos repeats itself in a human being (the so-called macrocosm-microcosm analogy). The fact that the human logos is only a part of the divine Logos governing the universe, means that human and divine virtue is the same. The Stoics also identify logos, god and nature (φύσις), and to acquire virtue is to acquire one’s real essence as a rational being. Thus, to live virtuously is the same as to live according to nature, i.e. both the nature of the cosmos and one’s own (rational) nature.¹

Also the immovable tranquillity of the wise person is based on this understanding of reality, i.e. a human being should not only understand what is under his/her control and what is not (“τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν - τὰ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν”) but also what only seems bad because of one’s wrong attitudes; it is these attitudes which one can and should influence. Thus, virtue (ἀρετή) is the ability to understand which is good and which is bad and which is neither; these last-mentioned, indifferent and neutral things (ἀδιάφορα) include, for example, wealth (πλοῦτος), health (ὑγίεια), pleasure (ἡδονή),² life (ζωή), poverty (πενία), sickness (νόσος), toil (πόνος) and death (θάνατος). Although some of these neutral things are more preferable than others, virtue is the only good and the opposite of virtue is the only bad.³

Like Plato, the Stoics divide virtues to the so-called four cardinal virtues, i.e. prudence (φρόνησις), bravery (ἀνδρεία), self-control (σωφροσύνη) and justice (δικαιοσύνη), but discuss

¹ These (and following) basic Stoic doctrines are, of course, more or less discussed by all Stoics; a compact general introduction/overview is, e.g., D. L. VII,87-88.
² The Stoics mean by pleasure (ἡδονή) and toil (πόνος) the inevitabe pleasure and toil of the normal life to which one should not pay more attention and which one should neither seek nor avoid. Long & Sedley 1987a: 421.
also virtues subordinate to these primary virtues. Stobaeus has preserved in his Anthology the following classification of virtues, originating probably from Chrysippus:

Virtues subordinate to φρόνησις:  
εὐβουλία "good sense, good counsel"  
εὐλογιστία "good considerateness, good reckoning"  
ἀγχίνοια "quick-wittedness, shrewdness"  
νουνέχεια "discretion"  
< εὐστοχία "good aiming, sagacity">  
eὐμηχανία "resourcefulness, inventiveness"

Virtues subordinate to σωφροσύνη:  
eὐταξία "good discipline"  
κοσμιότης "seemliness, decency"  
αἰδημοσύνη "modesty"  
ἐγκράτεια "self-mastery"

Virtues subordinate to ἀνδρεία:  
καρτερία "endurance"  
θαρραλεότης "daringness, boldness"  
μεγαλοψυχία "magnanimity, high-mindedness"  
eὐψυχία "good-souledness, courage"  
φιλοπονία "love of toils"

Virtues subordinate to δικαιοσύνη:  
eὐσέβεια "piety" (towards gods)  
χρηστότης "honesty"  
εὐκοινωνησία "good companionship"  
eὐσυναλλαξία "fair dealing"

The four primary opposites of virtues (κακία) correspond to the four primary virtues, ἀφροσύνη (imprudence) to prudence, δειλία (cowardice) to bravery, ὀκολοσία (lack of restraint) to self-control, and ἀδικία (injustice) to justice. Moreover, Diogenes Laertius mentions three subordinate “vices”, i.e. ἀκρασία (incontinence), βραδύνοια (slow-wittedness) and κακοβουλία (ill-advisedness). Human beings are sharply divided by the Stoics to wise (σοφός, σπουδαῖος) and to foolish (φαῦλος): the wise person displays virtues in everything, whereas the foolish person displays opposites of virtues. It is, however, essential to note that the word κακία does not mean vice in the “normal” sense of the word but all those moral accomplishments deviating from the full perfection, i.e. virtue.

1 See, e.g., SVF 3,262=Stob.ecl.II59,4W;264=Stob.ecl.II60,9W, D. L. VII,92-93=SVF 3,265.  
2 SVF 3,264.  
3 Musonius, like occasionally also Epictetus (e.g. II,5; III,20,5; Epict. ench. 24,3), uses the synonyme μεγαλοφροσύνη.  
4 For this virtue in Stoicism see in more detail, e.g., Brunt 1989: 188. Also εὐσέβεια (lat. pietas) towards parents was considered very important by the Stoics (see, e.g., D. L. VII,120).  
5 See, e.g., SVF 3,262; D. L. VII,93=SVF 3,265.  
6 A good example of this thought is, e.g., SVF 1,216=Stob.ecl.II7,11gp,99,3W.: ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ᾿ αὐτοῦ Στωικοῖς φιλοσόφοις δύο γένη τῶν ἄνθρωπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου χρήσθαι ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων ταῖς κακίαις·  
As mentioned above, the Stoics continued the intellectual tradition of moral philosophy in antiquity and regarded virtue as knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and the opposite of virtue as ignorance (ἀγνοία). So, according to the “canonical” definitions of Chrysippus, prudence is not only knowledge of what should be done and of what should not be done, but also knowledge of what is good and what is bad and what is neither; thus, prudence in its second, broader non-specific meaning covers all the other virtues and is a synonyme to the word “knowledge.” Likewise, bravery is knowledge of what is fearful and what is not and what is indifferent, and self-control knowledge what ought to be chosen and what ought to be avoided, and what is neither. Justice, the fourth of these primary virtues, is knowledge to distribute to each his/her due. The purpose of the right choices belonging to self-control is to control and keep in accordance with reason all “impulses” (ὁρμή) of the human mind; the Stoics call uncontrolled impulses pathoses (πάθος).

Most Stoics think that these “irrational” impulses arise from wrong judgements concerning good and bad, as, e.g., Zeno think, or are these wrong judgements, as Chrysippus argues. The four “basic” pathoses are grief/pain (λύπη), fear (φόβος), desire (ἐπιθυμία) and pleasure (as pathos) (ἡδονή) which should be substituted by the equivalent rational emotions (εὐπάθεια), i.e. caution (εὐλάβεια), willing (βούλησις) and joy (χαρά). This “insensitivity” does not mean unconcern towards fellow human beings, for especially the later Stoics often emphasise the ideal of philanthropy based on reason and not on irrational emotions. This philanthropy has its roots in the thought of brother/sisterhood of all human beings - a thought which had belonged to Stoicism since the beginning. The Stoics construct also their cosmopolitan views on this basis: although they stress that everyone should actively participate in ordinary society and play the role....

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1 SVF 3,262;266=Andronicus περὶ παθῶν p.19 Schuchardt.
2 For this see, e.g., Bonhöffer 1894: 182 – 183; Pohlenz 1948/1959: 126; see also, e.g., Annas 1993: 79 – 83; Striker 1991: 42 – 43.
3 See esp. SVF 3,262;266.
4 See, e.g., SVF 3,264;280=Stob.ecl.II63,6W.; Pohlenz 1948/1959: 126.
7 ήδονή in this meaning is according to the Stoics a pathos arising from an erroneous thought that pleasure (which is in fact ὀδίσφορον) is good and worth pursuing Likewise, grief (λύπη) results from a “wrong” thought that toil ( авиа) - which is ὀδίσφορον - is bad and undesirable. Thus, ήδονή as pathos is to be distinguished from the above-discussed ήδονή as ὀδίσφορον. Long & Sedley 1987b: 405; see also Rist 1969: 37 – 53.
assigned to him/her as well as possible,¹ he/she is, at the same time and above all, a member of the cosmopolis constituted of all (rational) human beings.²

Finally, it can be mentioned that the Stoics rather often discuss the importance of teaching in acquiring of virtue. Plato had already dealt with the question whether virtue can be taught; of the Stoics at least Chrysippus, Cleanthes and the middle Stoic Posidonius (c. 135 – 51 BC) give according to Diogenes Laertius a positive answer, because the foolish can become wise.³ Thus, teaching and education were considered very important since early Stoicism, which is also evident from the fact that the word πεπαιδευμένος was sometimes used to mean the wise person.⁴

3. IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND: A SURVEY OF THE VIEWS ON THE SAMENESS OF MAN'S AND WOMAN'S VIRTUES IN ANTIQUITY

3.1. Thinking emphasising sameness/equality

As discussed above, the thoughts expressed in antiquity on the sameness of men's and women's virtues divide into two types, i.e. into conservative attitudes emphasising difference/inequality and into those emphasising sameness/equality more than on average. Although the latter views always include more or less conservative elements, their most important and central content is the thinking emphasising at least ethical/theoretical sameness/equality of all human beings, without excluding women.

The absolute starting-point of this thinking is a view that man and woman have (at least in principle) the same nature and thus also the same virtue. Already Socrates (469 – 399 BC) is known to have disputed a thought that a woman's nature is fundamentally inferior to that of a man,⁵

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¹ See, e.g., D. L. VII,160; Epict. II,14,7-8; Epict. ench.17; for this thought see also, e.g., Gill 1988: 175; 192; Annas 1993: 107 – 108; Annas 2007/2010. See also below pp. 71, also n. 4; 90; 128.
² See, e.g., SVF 1,262=Plut.de Alex.virt.I 6p.329a; Epict. II,5,26; Sen. otio 4,1-2.
³ D. L. VII,91.
⁴ Tsekourakis 1974: 21; 133.
⁵ Xen. symp. 2,9. It is also possible that Plato's thoughts in Meno have been influenced by Socrates and that Socrates, too, held virtue to be the same for both sexes.
and, as mentioned above, Diogenes Laertius tells that his successor Antisthenes held virtue to be the same for men and women.\(^1\) And Socrates’ pupil Plato, in order to justify this view, expresses a thought that virtue is always the same in whomever it appears: in his dialogue \textit{Meno} Plato makes Socrates prove that just as health, size and strength are always something particular, regardless of in whom they are found, so virtue, too, is always fundamentally the same so that it can be called virtue.\(^2\)

It is also typical of this thinking that potential differences in virtues do not result from one’s sex but from the properties of each individual human being. This can be seen especially clearly in Plutarch who in the short introduction of \textit{Mulierum virtutes} gives one to understand that he believes that, e.g., intelligence (\textit{σύνεσις}) and magnanimity (\textit{μεγαλοφροσύνη}) are always the same virtues - the core of the matter is that they always, however, differ a little from each other because each human being, both man and woman, has his/her own unique personality.\(^3\) In the same way, Plato, extending his perspective in the V book of \textit{Republic} also on education and division of tasks, argues that there are no properties which are restricted (only) either to men or to women, but all tasks are suitable for both sexes, according to the inclinations of each individual.\(^4\) Though Plato discusses the life of the Guardian class, it seems obvious\(^5\) that he here takes women and a woman’s nature generally as his starting point in order to justify his real subject, i.e. how to arrange the life of the women in the Guardian class.

Plato justifies the same education and teaching by saying that female sheepdogs are given the same teaching if they are meant to be used in the same tasks as males,\(^6\) and a little further on he says that it is contrary to nature and disadvantageous to the state that women have not been given the same education and training and that they have thus been prevented from participating in the state activity in accordance with their abilities and properties.\(^7\) Although \textit{Republic} is an ideal

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1 D. L. VI,12 .
2 Plat. Men. 72c-73c.
3 Plut. Mul. virt. 243c-d. Aalders 1984: 68 assumes that Plutarch’s thought of man’s and woman’s basic equality originates from Plato.
4 Plat. Rep. 455d.
6 Plat. rep. 451d-e.
utopia and although Plato in his late work *Laws* describes a more feasible, less radical social system, in which he pays more attention to the conditions of the society of his own time, he does not give up this thought: women must be given the same education and training so that they could put into effect their inclinations for the good of the state and develop also in virtue as well as possible.¹ As discussed already in the Introduction, this demand of giving women equal opportunities by means of ungendered education is strongly evident also in Stoicism; unlike Plato, the Stoics do not refer to the interest of the state but focus on the individual by emphasising the same (rational) humanhood of man and woman, and, as Yvonne Vernière says, “la femme est à leurs yeux un individu qui, comme les autres individus, doit pouvoir réaliser son destin humain dans la recherche de la sagesse.”² And as we shall see, the Stoics, too, sometimes extend this discussion also to the division of tasks.

Along with the thought that virtue is always the same regardless of who possess it, we can find in Plato’s *Meno* also another characteristic very typical of the thinking emphasising sameness/equality: virtue is always the same wherever it is used, and so, for example, justice is always the same virtue, both in the matters of the household and in those of the state - and in both cases equally important.³ Thus, each human being must have the same good properties so that he/she can be considered a good human being, and man and woman are good in the same way and on equal terms - as also the title character Meno must admit:

> ΣΩ. Τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρα ἀμφότεροι δέονται, εἴπερ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι καὶ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ὁ ἄνδρι, δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης.
> MEN. Φαίνονται.⁴

Conventional Roman thinking (which, as said above, can be found especially in funerary inscriptions and longer eulogies, such as *Laudatio Turiae* and *Laudatio Murdiae*, or, e.g., in Livy or Valerius Maximus) is close to Plato’s view in the respect that some virtues or parts of these virtues were regarded (at least in principle) as common to men and women although they displayed their virtues in practical life in (at least partly) different ways, especially because of the differences in their social/gender roles. These virtues include bravery (*virtus*/*fortitudo*), constancy (*constantia*),

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³ Plat. Men. 73a-c.
⁴ Plat. Men. 73b.
justice (iusitia), frugality/modest lifestyle (frugalitas), and dignity and seriousness (dignitas, gravitas); moreover, a “decent” Roman matron was, like a good Roman man, e.g., industrious (laboriosa) and pious (religiosa), and this piety meant faith of the ancestors without superstition and foreign, particularly eastern, influences (religio sine superstitione). Furthermore, it should be remembered that to the Roman ideal of marriage and family belonged not only (respectful) sense of duty and love (pietas) between family members but also, as especially central and important, the partnership of spouses with harmony and concord (concordia). This thought of intimacy and partnership of spouses is important also, e.g., in the views of Antipater of Tarsus and Plutarch on marriage - and this thought was not unfamiliar to Aristotle either, for he emphasises love and friendship between spouses.

Pliny the Younger describes in one of his letters his friend's daughter Minicia Marcella who died only 13-years old but was already an embodiment of many of these virtues:

Nondum annos quattuordecim i mpleverat, et iam illi anilis prudentia, matronalis gravitas erat, et tamen suavitas puellaris cum virginali verecundia. - - - Ut nutrices, ut paedagogos, ut praeceptores pro suo quoque officio diligebat! Quam studiose, quam intellegenter ludebat! Qua illa temperantia, qua patientia, qua etiam constantia novissimam valetudinem tulit!

It was possible that a woman who to a large extent fulfilled central ideals became an admirable example worthy of following, i.e the so-called exemplum, like ancient, more or less fabulous figures, such as Lucretia and Cloelia. Cornelia, the daughter of Scipio Africanus and the mother of

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1 See, e.g., laud. Tur. I 30-31; II 6a,8a,15,19 Wistrand; ILS 8394 (laud. Murd.); ILS 8444; Liv. 1,57,9; 2,13,9,11; 3,26,7-8; 26,49,14-16; 39,9,5;11,4;12,2; Val. Max. 3,2,2,9ext. For virtus as “bravery” in women see, e.g., Eisenhut 1973: 41 – 42; 108; 169; 220; McDonnell 2006, esp. 161 - 165; 169; see also below p. 40, n. 2. For virtues, and verbal, visual and ritual aspects of commemoration Hölkeskamp 1996; see also below p. 45, n. 3. See also below p. 61, also n. 2 for Roman admiration for the modest lifestyle of the ancestors – contrasted to the later extravagance (esp. after Rome's expansion) seen as one manifestation of the moral decline; for this see also, e.g., Dixon 2001: 58.
2 For this virtue see, e.g., Saller 1991: 146 – 151; 164 – 165; Treggiari 1991b: 242; cf. also the Temple of Piaetas in Rome.
5 See, e.g., Plut. coni. prae. 140e, 143a, 143e.
6 Arist. EN 1162a15-29.
7 The same thought is evident also in Seneca who states to Marcia that her late son had already as a young man prudence generally characteristic of old people (senilis prudentia) (Marc. 23,3).
8 Plin. epist. 5,16,2-4: combined the prudence of age and dignity of womanhood with the sweetness and modesty of youth. she loved her nurses, her attendants and her teachers…she applied herself intelligently to her books and was moderate and restrained in her play, she bore her last illness with self-control, patience, and, indeed, constancy (trans. Radice (abridged in d'Ambra 2007: 68), modified regarding the names of virtues mentioned).
9 For Lucretia and Cloelia see, e.g., Liv. 1,57,55-58,12; 2,9,1-4;13,6-11; Val. Max. 3,2,2; 6,1,1.
the Gracchi, was regarded as a model example of these kinds of exemplary dutiful matrons - and thus it was possible for Seneca to encourage his own contemporary Marcia by reminding her of the firmness and bravery of Lucretia, Cloelia and Cornelia.  

1 Bärbel von Hesberg-Tonn pays attention to this typical heroism in the picture of Cornelia: to inner power, self-control, bravery and contempt of own sufferings.  

Although undoubtedly the most important thing in her was her “right quality” heroism and that she was a loving mother to her children and a wife faithful to the memory of her husband, it should be noted that it was possible for her to be, at the same time, also something more without losing her exemplarity. Thus, it was possible for the ideal Cornelia to be intelligent and cultivated: she had an extensive circle of friends and many significant scholars gathered at her home, she also wrote herself, and it is known that her letters were published. Although these letters have been lost either completely or at least for the most part, they must have been very valued still long after her death, as the following Quintilian’s statement indicates:

Gracchorum eloquentiae multum contulisse accepimus Corneliam matrem, cuius doctissimus sermo in posteros quoque est epistulis traditus.

1 Sen. Marc. 16,1-4.  
2 Hesberg-Tonn 1983: 68. The attribution of such virtues to women such as Cornelia as a part of literary tradition see Hänninen 2011: 45; 51; 54.  
3 E.g. Tacitus sees Cornelia as one of those ancient ideal mothers who herself brought up her great sons and whose “praecipua laus erat tueri domum et inservire liberis” (Tac. dial. 28).  
4 After her husband’s death, Cornelia devoted herself to her children and did not remarry despite tempting proposals (Plut. Tib. 1,4). To be univira is expressly a Roman ideal, having obviously no counterpart in Greece. According to Marjorie Lightman and William Zeisel the concept univira had initially had a religious and ritual meaning, and it had been restricted to apply only to upper class women, but later it had become one of the epithets of a good wife without being necessarily (any more) bound to special religious background or social class: an univira was a woman who had had only one husband and who had died before her husband (Lightman & Zeisel 1977: 19 – 26). At the same time, this ideal was, however, closely connected to the thought of a widow’s love and loyalty towards her deceased husband (Dixon 1988: 22). In passing, it can be mentioned that although the marriage legislation of Augustus was intended to advocate old Roman moral values, it obligated also female widows to remarry - a thought which, as Dixon 1988: 22 states, was in conflict with the univira ideal.  
5 Plut. Gai. 19.  
6 Pomeroy 1975: 150. A good example of a learned Roman woman is also another Cornelia, the wife of Pompey, who was familiar, e.g., with geometry and philosophy (Plut. Pomp. 55,2).  
7 There are two fragments in Cornelius Nepos which may be excerpts from Cornelia’s letter (fr. 1,1 and 1,2).The authenticity of these fragments cannot, however, definitely be found out; see, e.g., Snyder 1989: 124 – 125; Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 193 – 196; Hallett 2004, esp. 32 – 33; 38, n. 5 See also Hallett 2004: 32 who argues that “regardless of who actually wrote this letter, ancient Roman readers assumed that the author was a woman. For there are apparent echoes of this letter in various Augustan literary texts, best explained if we ourselves assume that their authors viewed Cornelia as having written this letter”; Hallett mentions, e.g., Livy’s description of Veturia.  
8 Quint. Inst.1,1,6: we have heard that much of the eloquence of the Gracchi was the work of their mother Cornelia, whose most cultivated prose has been handed down, through her letters, to succeeding generations (trans. Dixon) Cf. also Quint. Inst.1,1,6: Hortensiae Q. filiae oratio apud triumviro habita legitur non tantum in sexus honorem. -For women writers in antiquity, see, e.g., Snyder 1989; Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 146 – 209; for women’s letters Bagnall & Cribiore 2006; Vindolanda letters nos. 291 – 294.
Likewise, a woman's intelligence, learnedness, resourcefulness, etc., and her ability to apply these to practical situations were praised, e.g., in some funerary inscriptions or in Laudatio Turiae,1 referring thus to at least some intellectual equality. Such inscriptions, as well as iconographical evidence, such as funerary reliefs and painted portraits with a stylus and/or book-roll(s), can be seen as a sign of pride felt (probably also by women themselves) of women's literacy/education/literary interests, regarded, moreover, apparently as a mark of status - and not only in upper classes.2 Furthermore, there is evidence for women teachers, grammaticians, scholars, secretaries, scribes, copyists, calligraphers etc. (of various social classes). 3 Thus, it seems that at least some kind of intellectual activity of women was not regarded as being in conflict with their gender. Likewise, e.g., Plutarch sees that a woman, like a man, can show not only justice (δικαιοσύνη), bravery (ομόρρησις) and magnanimity (μεγαλοψυχία) but also intelligence (σύνεσις), prudence (φρόνησις) and wisdom (σοφία).4 This thought is evident also in some Neopythagoreans: Phintys says that not only bravery and justice but also prudence are virtues common to both men and women – and also wisdom as a whole, common to the whole humankind, as Perictione (II) states in her Περὶ σοφίας.5

1 E.g. laud. Tur. II 4-9:55-56; ILS 8448; CLE 55; 492; 1307; 1570; 1965; further Hemelrijk 1999:2004:271, n. 71; for Asia Minor, e.g., Bain 2014: 32 - 33. Cf. also, e.g., an inscription praising Aufria's intellectual achievements esp. in rhetoric at the Pythian games in Delphi (FD 34:79; Bain 2014:30-31). 2 See, e.g., Hemelrijk 1999:2004: 72 - 75; 271, n. 71 – 78; Ward-Perkins 2005/2006: 162 – 163; Mattusch (ed.) 2008: 218; Rowlandson (ed.) 1998: 301; cf. also (Hellenistic) Sanchez 2008: 181; Künzl 2013: 36. For education, e.g., Marrou 1948/1950: 369; Bonner 1977: 27 – 28, 107; 135 – 136; Hemelrijk 1999:2004, esp. 17 – 58; 72 – 75, 228 – 258, n. 1 - 179; 272 – 273, n. 71 – 78; Lewick 2002: 138 – 142; Rottloff 2006: 121 - 123; for Tripolitania (incl. Perpetua and Apuleius' wife), e.g., De Marre 2004; for Asia Minor and Egypt Criboire 2001, esp. 31 – 33; 74 – 101; for iconographic evidence also Marrou 1937, e.g., nos. 1, 8, 13, 68, 71, 103, 154, 156, 163, 165, 192, 193; Hänninen 2004: 271; D'Ambra 2007: 123; Bain 2014: 33; for archaeology Rottloff 2006: 18. It should, of course, be remembered that most people probably got very little or no education, although, e.g., shopkeepers, artisans, etc. apparently needed at least basic literacy in their jobs (see, e.g., Harris 1989: 8; Beard 2008: 185); cf. also Bagnall 2011; Sears, Keegan & Laurence (ed.) 2013 for ordinary people participating in the written world of papyri, ostraca, inscriptions, graffiti, etc. Business: e.g. SENTIA SECUNDA FACIT AQUILEIAE; in glass found in Linz; Rottloff 2006: 134 - 135; dedications: e.g. I. Smyrna 744 (Tyche to Μῆτρα τῆς γυναικείας); CIL 9.5179: VALERIA MARI[CA] LIBERTA CITHERIS ISIDORI ISIDIS ISIDI VICTRICIS IUNONI EX VISU CIRCUITUM D[E] S[A] (Meusia) P[ECUNIA] FACIENDUM C[URAVIT], from Ascoli Piceno (Paci, fig. 146); wall plaque: IULIAE PARIS PRIVAT[US] PERPETUUS (from Herculaneum, SAP 78762 (Roberts, fig. 24)); temple seat inscriptions: SEG II 820, 822 (of Megisto, Salamboas, from Dura-Europos); curse tablets: e.g., Saturnina's, from Uley (Britannia 10 (1979), 343, no. 3; for women using curse tablets, e.g., Gager 1992/1999; Brodersen 2002; see also below p. 26, n. 6.) Cf. also owners' names inscribed, scratched etc. on, e.g., vessels (e.g., Clarillia's, from Tongeren; Rottloff 2006: 121). –For (wealthier) women participating also in the written public space of cities (incl. their names on statues, buildings, etc.) due to their patronage and benefactions Hemelrijk 2013b: see also below pp. 83; 102 n. 1. 3 For women teachers and grammaticians, e.g., Criboire 2001: 31 – 33; 78 – 83; Rottloff 2006: 124 - 125; for women secretaries, scribes, copyists, calligraphers etc. Rottloff 2006: 121 – 123; Kampen 1981: 118; for women scholars: e.g. Naevia Clara "medica philologa" (doctor and scholar in medicine; Parker 2012: 123; Künzl 2013:146: 54 – 55; fig. 11; see also below pp. 50, n. 1: 89, also n. 2. 4 E.g., Plut. mul. virt. 243c-d:251b:255e:257f:258i:261d:262d; amat. 769b: Tib.1.4; Gai 19. For women's bravery in Polyaeus, e.g., Harder 2007; in Greek novels, e.g., Ramelli 2008b: 388; Jones 2012. 5 Thesleff 152,11; Thesleff 146, esp 1-3.
3.2. Conservative thinking emphasising difference/inequality

While the thinking emphasising sameness/equality is based on the thought of (at least in principle) the same nature and virtue of man and woman, it is typical of the conservative thinking that a woman is not thought to have the same nature and thus not the same virtue. This means that women are not seen as individuals but as “other”, as a group different from and inferior to men\(^1\) (who are regarded as the norm), and, as said before, not only mentally but also socially/societally.

A rather common answer to the question whether man's and woman's virtue is the same was negative: because women were different, i.e. weaker than and inferior to men, they had their own virtues characteristic of their nature. In such strictest conservative thinking, of which one of the best known and clearest examples is surely the elite male ideal of women in classical Athens\(^2\) (although this ideal including the absolute dichotomy ‘public/male - private/domestic/female' did not, it seems, correspond social reality in Athens\(^3\)), there is not even an attempt to analyse the nature and virtue of a woman, but it is enough to a “decent” woman that she takes care of her home and children and is chaste and obedient - which means that most virtues important from the point of view of humanity, such as wisdom, prudence, justice and bravery, are “masculine”.

\(^1\) For women’s “otherness” in Greek and Roman thinking see also, e.g., Lefkowitz 1990; Hallett 1989; Skinner 1997; Dixon 2001.

\(^2\) A good example of this is the view expressed by the title character Meno in Plat. Men. 71e.

\(^3\) It seems that a majority of the citizen women worked/had to work outside the home in classical Athens, e.g., in retail trade, wet-nursing or woolworking (see, e.g., Katz 1998/2002: 117; Lilibaki-Akamati 2004: 90; Rottroff & Lamberton 2005: 10 – 11; cf. also Arist. pol. 1300a6-7). Schmitt Pantel 1992: 76; 84 - 85, n. 27 (see also Trümper 2012: 288 – 303) warns of the dangers when using the strict model “a feminine domestic space - a masculine public space” and regarding all that “falls outside it as ‘exceptions’”, and points out (on p. 78) that it is not correct to consider the works of Xenophon and Attic orators “concrete eyewitness reports” because we should remember that if, e.g., the writings of Xenophon “give the impression of real-life observations”, they are, like those of Plato and Aristotle, “none the less attempts at ordering the world, and just as theoretical”. See also Rottroff & Lamberton 2005: 27 who conclude that “the gender-based partitioning of Athenian space into public/male and private/female has proven less clear-cut in reality than Ischomachos and Euphiletos, as the outspoken proponents of the democratic Athenian ideology, would have us believe”; the same seems to be the case also with the “allocation of space within the home”, for archaeological etc. evidence from Athens, Olynthos and Priene, see Rottroff & Lamberton 2005: 28 – 29; see also Schmitt Pantel 2009: 107 – 109 on “l’introuvable gynécée”; Milnor 2005/2008: 132; cf. also Foxhall 1994: 138 – 140. For inscriptions as an example of women managing their property and acting, e.g., in business without a kyrios Rottroff & Lamberton 2005: 10; 12 – 13; for women in business and women’s economic power in Athens also, e.g., Cohen 2002; Bernard 2003: 118 – 120; for women as kuria heatês Cohen 2002: 158, also n. 79; cf. also Hartmann 2007: 51: “Freie Frauen in Athen durcharaus als juristische Personen handeln konnten”; cf. also Foxhall 1996: 149 – 152. For women reading book rolls in vase paintings as evidence for women’s literacy, e.g., Cole 1981/1984: 223 - 224; Casson 2001/2002: 21. – For women vase painters, e.g., Rystedt 1985: 25, fig. 24 (from Furtwängler-Reichhold, Griechische Vasenmalerei, p. 307); 26.
Unlike his teacher Plato, Aristotle did not question the position of women in the society of his own time but wanted to prove that it is assigned by nature and therefore fair to all parties and the best possible system.\(^1\) Thus, it can be said that he tried to systematise and scientifically justify common views of his time although he obviously was not guilty of the strictest prejudices.\(^2\) In *Rhetoric* Aristotle mentions as a woman’s bodily virtues κάλλος and μέγεθος, as mental virtues σοφροσύνη and φιλεργία ἀνευ ἀνελευθερίας,\(^3\) but he does not in any case close out other virtues, but we are given to understand in his *Politics* that also the ruled, i.e. the woman, must have the moral virtues.\(^4\) Thus, Aristotle represents another less strict attitude of the conservative thinking, the central thought being that, although man and woman have mostly the same virtues, the quality of these virtues is different depending on in which of the sexes they appear; the decisive point here is the weakness of a woman’s nature, i.e. that a woman’s deliberative faculty is “without authority” (ἀκυρόν).\(^5\) So, Aristotle states that - unlike Socrates claims\(^6\) - for example, the justice of a woman cannot be the same as that of a man but the justice of a man is the justice of the ruler and a woman’s justice is the justice of the ruled, and the same applies also to all other virtues:

\[
\text{όστε φανερὸν δτι ἐστιν ήθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὗχ ἢ αὐτὴ σοφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἄνδρος οὐδὲ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ἄκυρον ἄκυρον Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρεία, ἡ δ᾿ ὑπηρετικὴ, ὁμοίως δ᾿ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τάς ἄλλας.}
\]

As in conventional Greek thinking,\(^8\) women were considered also in Rome (at least in principle) weaker than men, also regarding their minds. “Mulieres omnes propter infirmitatem consili maiores in tutorum potestate esse voluerunt”, Cicero says in his speech *Pro Murena*\(^9\) – a statement (sometimes) thought to be a classical example of this thinking.\(^10\) Suzanne Dixon, however, remarks that Cicero states what he assumed to have been the view of ancestors and

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1 See, e.g., Arist. pol., 1254a86-1254b15.
3 Arist. Rhet. I,V,6: beauty, stature – industry without servility
6 Plat. Men. 72c-73c.
7 Arist. pol. 1260a21-24; see also pol. 1277b20-23 where Aristotle gives one to understand that men have bravery in a greater degree than women. Moreover, in *Poetics*, as Hobbs 2006: 71 puts it, “while not precisely denying that women can display andreia, he nevertheless maintains that it is ‘not fitting’ for a poet to ascribe it (or cleverness) to a female character” (Arist. poet. 1454a23).
9 Cic. Mur. 27: our ancestors determined that, on account of the weakness of their judgement, all women should be in the power of their guardians (trans. Dixon)
10 See, e.g., Crook 1986b: 85.
not his own view; according to Dixon, there are no clues of this kind of personal attitude towards women in Cicero's speeches or letters.¹ A more important point is, however, that other reasons were obviously more important in the origin of women's guardianship (tutela mulierum) and in its dissolution, for tutela mulierum had initially been necessary to the inheritance system, and later, e.g., Augustus' reform of women's guardianship had family political reasons: the ius trium liberorum exempted from guardianship freeborn women with three and freedwomen with four children.² And, on the other hand, also the fact that women themselves had especially since the end of the Republic showed competence in different kinds of areas in society outside the domestic/private sphere and thus proved to be able to manage their own affairs, made the thought of women's general weakness seem more or less ridiculous.³ And in fact the guardianship had increasingly become a mere formality – and in many cases not even that, for many women do not have guardians at all, it was possible to change a guardian etc.; later in the second century AD the jurist Gaius paid attention to this absurd situation and expressed his suspicion of the necessity of the guardianship of adult women.⁴

Suzanne Dixon argues that the Romans had used to mean by the female “weakness” rather women's greater emotionality and that they become upset more easily (imbecillitas animi);⁵ she finds it likely that the thought of the weakness of women's judgement (infirmitas/levitas consilii), which makes them incapable without guardianship to act sensibly, for example, in money matters, originates (above all) from Aristotle or from Hellenistic elaborations of Aristotelian views, i.e. "it is the imbecilli animi rather than levitas consilii of women which traditionally receives greater attention in Latin literature - - ".⁶ And we should, in any case, keep in mind that the Romans, as discussed

¹ Dixon 1984: 343.
³ Schulz 1951/1954: 184; Clark 1981: 208; see also, e.g., Clark 1989b: 8; Gardner 1986: 22. For increasing opportunities for women and more “egalitarian” trends of time see also, e.g., Van Abbema 2008: 9 – 11; see also below pp. 80, also n. 4 – 5; 83; 102, also n. 1; for marriages sine manu, e.g., Treggiari 1991b; Hemelrijk 2012: 488. - For various aspects of rather similar trends (and preceding processes) in the whole Roman empire in the period discussed in this study see also, e.g., Houby-Nielsen 1997: 246 - 247; Nevett 2002; Fantham et al. 1994, esp. 345 – 348; 361 – 375; Rottloff 2006, esp. 140 – 142; Van Abbema: 15 – 17; Hemelrijk 2012 (discussing, e.g., Romanization); see also above p. 4; below pp. 82 – 84, 91; 102.
⁶ Dixon 1984: 343 – 344; 359; 369 – 370. See also, e.g., Gardner 1986: 21: "Women's supposed weakness of judgement, or, more generally, weakness of their sex (imbecillitas sexus) is an idea, possibly deriving from Greek philosophy - - ".
above, greatly appreciated and admired women’s “right quality” heroism. Such a woman was, of course, usually considered more or less “exceptional” who was (to a great extent) free from “female weaknesses” - it is typical that, e.g., Valerius Maximus who in his exempla collection Facta et dicta memorabilia very clearly expresses the conservative view of the “weakness” of the female mind\(^1\) is inspired by the bravery (\textit{virtus}) of Cloelia excelled in Etruscan war to the following admiring words:

\[- -\text{ non solum obsidio se, sed etiam metu patriam solvit, viris puella lumen virtutis praeferendo.\(^2\)\]

The most essential thing is, however, that not only the ancient legendary figures, such as Cloelia, or the very ideal Cornelia, were able to be these kinds of “exceptional” persons but other women, too, especially absolutely loyal wives, such as the title character of \textit{Laudatio Turiae}, or Arria, the wife of the consul Caecina Paetus\(^3\) – or, on the other hand, for example, the above-discussed Minicia Marcella.\(^4\) It is also for this reason often difficult to conclude the quality and quantity of the “weakness” of a woman’s nature in each writer.

Thus, conventional Roman thinking is an example of such a conservative thinking in which the nature and virtue of women were not (always) necessarily regarded as crucially different from those of men but of which it is more characteristic to draw a strict distinction between women’s virtues in everyday life and the virtues they show when needed: women were thought to be able to display \textit{at need}, e.g., very great bravery, after which they where thought to withdraw back to their own “feminine” domestic sphere,\(^5\) a view which was not unfamiliar to Plutarch either.\(^6\) Plutarch is a good example also because he, too, seems to examine in his \textit{Mulierum virtutes} those possibilities in women which did not need to appear in everyday life; in everyday life he supports very traditional ideals and “ultrafeminine” virtues, such as silentness and obedience.\(^7\) So, although he emphasises

\[^1\] E.g. 6,1,1; 9,1,3, see also 3,2,15.
\[^2\] 3,2,2: she not only freed herself from hostageship but also her fatherland from fear, by carrying the light of bravery, (though) a girl, to men For ideological aspects of the story of Cloelia, e.g., Mustakallio 1999.
\[^3\] The heroism of Arria and her legendary words “Paete, non dolet” were still in fresh memory at the time of Pliny the Younger, see Plin. epist. 3,16. See also, e.g., Mart. epigr. 1,13; Cass. Dio 60, 5-6; see also Dixon 1991: 112, also n. 26.
\[^4\] See above p. 18. See also Plin. epist. 7,19 in which Pliny characterises Arria’s granddaughter Fannia, e.g., with the words \textit{gravitas} and \textit{constantia} and describes her firmness of mind during illness by saying that although she was physically weak, her “animus - - et spiritus viget”; also Plin. epist. 5,16,4: \textit{ipsamque se destitutam corporis viribus vigore animi sustinebat} (on Minicia Marcella).
\[^5\] For this thinking in \textit{Laudatio Turiae} see, e.g., Wistrand 1976: 39; Riess 2012: 497.
\[^6\] See esp. Plut. mul. virt. 257e; see also, e.g., Blomqvist 1997; Galaz 2000.
\[^7\] See esp. Plut. consi. praec. 139d;142d-e; see also, e.g., 139c; 140d.
reciprocity, intimacy and shared high goals of spouses, it is clear that the husband should guide his wife in everything; at the same time he sets high standards for the husband: he should be a good guide and worth obeying. Thus, the marriage ideal of Plutarch comes closer to Aristotle’s view that among spouses should prevail love and friendship - but friendship between the ruler and the ruled. This can be seen, though apparently in the milder form, also in conventional Roman thoughts of companionship: one of the virtues of the ideal wife was obedience (obsequim).

It is typical that women in Plutarch’s Mulierum virtutes show their wisdom, prudence and bravery when their fatherland, family etc. are threatened, and in a similar way it was precisely defined in conventional Roman thinking for whom or which it is, when needed, “appropriate” for women to display their bravery, prudence or justice. One of the special virtues of Roman women was spinning and weaving (lanificium) which was morally and ideologically especially important because it symbolically combined not only the good and successful household management but also women’s ideal devotion to home and its works. According to this ideology among the “acceptable” reasons for women’s unusual actions were both pietas in patriam and activity for the benefit of home, children and husband. Likewise (although women should not be “too” intelligent and learned), it was praiseworthy when a woman used her cultivation, intellegence and talent, e.g., to cherish and __________

1 See esp. Plut. praec. 140c;142e. The Plut. amat. 754d is, of course, only an exception.
2 Arist. EN 1158b13-14; Geytenbeek 1963: 65.
4 See, e.g., laud. Tur. I 30; ILS 8394 (laud. Murd.); CLE 455. See also, e.g., Lefkowitz 1983: 44.
6 For this can be mentioned, e.g, Livy’s heroic Veturia who prefers her fatherland to her personal feelings and shows “right” maternal love when she firmly and unsentimentally persuades his son Coriolanus (2,40,3-9); cf. a much more unheroic Veturia in Dion. Hal. ant. VIII,45,1-54,1 and Plut. Cor. 34,2-36,3 (here, Volumnia).
7 As discussed above, this ideology is evident, e.g, both in the case of Arria and in Laudatio Turiae. Women were praised not only for their bravery, constancy and resourcefulness but also for their justice (iustitia) among their families (see, e.g., ILS 8394 (laud. Murd.).
8 For this see, e.g., De Marre 2004: 55, n. 15; Blomqvist 1989: 113; Taylor 2003: 224 – 225, Cohick 2009: 244 – 245; see also Rottloff 2006: 17: “Allerdings gab es bereits in republikanischer Zeit Vorbehalte gegen „zu“ gelehrte Frauen, die den Männern bedrohlich erschienen”; see also, e.g., Shelton 2013: 117 – 118. Much-cited examples of this attitude are, e.g., Juv. sat. 6,445: quae docta nimis cupit et facunda videri and Mart. epigr. 2.90,9: sit non doctissima coniunx. We should, of course, always be careful when reading (exaggerated) satires, as Martine De Marre speaking of Juvenal rightly points out (De Marre 2004: 55, n. 15; see also, e.g., Cohick 2009: 243), but, on the other hand, we can assume that the themes of satirists, too, tend (or are at least meant) to have at least some relevance to readers and reflect their attitudes. For attitudes towards women in Roman satire see also below p. 58, also n. 3.
admire the accomplishments of her husband\textsuperscript{1} – or, for example and above all, in the education of her children to which Cicero among other things paid attention in Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi:

\begin{quote}
Legimus epistulas Corneliae matris Gracchorum: apparet, filios non tam in gremio educatos quam in sermone matris.\textsuperscript{2}
\end{quote}

In conventional Roman thinking is evident still one characteristic typical of the conservative thinking: although the virtues of man and woman were for the most part the same, women’s principal virtues were other than those of men. An especially good example of this is *pudicitia/castitas* (chastity, sexual purity) which was considered in antiquity one of the most important virtues of women (if not the most important\textsuperscript{3}) and which is common in Roman texts discussing the virtues of women, for example, in inscriptions,\textsuperscript{4} appearing also with other “ultrafeminine” virtues, such as *lanificium, obsequium*, and *modestia* – as in a son’s description of the virtues of his mother Murdia which she had common with other “decent” (probae) women:

\begin{quote}
Eo maiorem laudem omnium carissima mihi mater meruit, quod modestia probitate pudicitia opsequio lanificio diligentia fide par similisque cetereis probulis feminis fuit - - .\textsuperscript{5}
\end{quote}

The bravery of women was praised also when they at any price defended their *pudicitia* both in war and in peace.\textsuperscript{6} Furthermore, men had to behave so that *pudicitia* did not become endangered, and the chastity of (decent) women, young girls and youths was often not seen to differ in those cases when *pudicitia* was threatened because of a man’s behaviour deviating from this

\textsuperscript{1} A well-known example of this is Pliny’s young wife Calpurnia - as De Marre 2004: 55, n. 15 puts it: “in this spirit Pliny was satisfied to have a wife with enough education to appreciate his own talents” (epist. 4.19.2-4); see also, e.g., Shelton 1990. For this thought in Statius see Shelton 1990: 181; Treggiari 1991b: 257 who points out that Statius praises her wife for “her pride in his achievements”.

\textsuperscript{2} Brut. 211: we have read the letters of Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi. it is evident that her sons were enveloped not so much in her lap as in her speech (trans. Dixon, slightly modified); see also Tac. dial. 28; Plut. Tib. 1.3. For this ideal see also Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 64 – 71.

\textsuperscript{3} See, e.g., Clark 1989b: 21; see also Lattimore 1942: 291 – 293; North 1966: 1, n. 2; 21; 253; 307; Lefkowitz 1983: 41. For the thought that *virtus* (i.e. manliness, bravery ) is the same for men as *pudicitia* is for women see, e.g., Thraede 1972: 215; Günther 2007: 92; Liv. 10,23,7-8. Cf. also, e.g., Stat. silv. 4.8.27; Williams 2010: 145; see also above p. 41, also n. 3.

\textsuperscript{4} The majority of the inscriptions do not, of course, contain virtues but epithets such as *pia, piissima, bene merens, bene merita* and *optima* (see, e.g., Dixon 2001: 117; see also, e.g., Riess 2012: 493), but those with virtues include often *pudicitia/castitas*, see, e.g., laud. Tur. I 30, ILS 8394 (laud. Murd.), 8395, 8398, 8404, 8441, 8444, 8450, 8451, 8456. For the external beauty see, e.g., ILS 8402, 8403; CLE 1303, 1307, 1443.

\textsuperscript{5} ILS 8394 (laud. Murd.): in this sense my dearest mother earned the greatest praise of all, because in modesty, decency, chastity, obedience, woolworking, industry and loyalty she was equal to other good women (trans. Hemelrijk)

\textsuperscript{6} See, e.g., Liv. 1,57,5-58,12;26,49,15;38,24,2-10; Val. Max. 6,1,1; 6,1,1-3ext. It is interesting to compare, e.g., Liv. 38,24,9-10 and Val. Max. 6,1,2ext. (on Chiomara) to much more unidealistic Polyb. 21,38,6-7 (in Plut. mul. virt. 258f) – or, on the other hand, e.g., Liv. 3,44,2-48.5 (on Verginia) to Diod. Sic. 12,24,1-5.
ideal. Adultery (adulterium) “strictly applied only to affairs with married women”, as Beryl Rawson puts it, that the pudicitia of men was not thought to be threatened by the same things as the pudicitia of women is very evident from the fact that men’s relationships with slaves or other “non-respectable” women were usually accepted or at least overlooked, whereas a woman’s relationship with a slave was harshly condemned. Similar thoughts can be found in Plutarch and (e.g.), in some Neopythagorean writings. Thus, although bravery, justice and prudence are common to men and women, bravery and prudence are more “appropriate” for men and σωφροσύνη for women, and this thought that γυναικὸς δὲ μάλιστα ἀρετὰ σωφροσύνα is connected with a very conservative ideal of a woman who devotes herself totally to her husband and home - and with the above-mentioned idea, advocated also in the Greek world and found also in Plutarch, that women should tolerate their husbands’ extra-marital relationships. And it seems that σωφροσύνη is also for Plutarch one of the most important virtues of a woman: he uses the word σωφρων (and other corresponding expressions) very often and also when he does not expressly speak of chastity or other self-control, which suggests that he uses the word σωφρων as if as a synonyme of a “good” woman in general.
On the other hand, it is also necessary to remember that also those writers who seem to emphasise sameness/equality more than on average seem to have also conservative attitudes; this is the case with Plato and the Stoics, too. So, for example, Antipater of Tarsus in his writing about marriage says that the goal of a woman should be to please her husband: “τοῦτον σκοπὸν τοῦ βίου ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τέλος, τούτῳ ἀρέσκειν”.\(^1\) And when the virtues of men and women differ in Aristotle above all in quality, in Plato it is chiefly the difference in degree: when he in his Republic states that women are inferior to men in everything,\(^2\) this must mean that they (and their nature) are inferior also in virtue - which Plato later in Laws explicitly states by saying that “ἡ θηλεία ἡμῖν φύσις ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν χείρων τῆς τῶν ἀρρένων”.\(^3\) But we should, of course, at the same time, keep in mind that this is according to Plato true only on average: individual women can be better than individual men in many things,\(^4\) i.e. also in virtue.

4. THE LATER STOICS ON THE SAMENESS OF THE VIRTUES OF MAN AND WOMAN

4.1. The individual virtues - “ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἄλλαι ἄρεται ἄνδρος, ἄλλαι δὲ γυναικός, ῥόδιον μαθεῖν”

4.1.1. The sameness of the contents of the virtues

As mentioned in the Introduction, the basis of this study consists of two fundamental Stoic thoughts found in Stoicism since the beginning: that the individual virtues are common to all human beings and that virtue is natural and possible to all - thoughts very prominent also in Musonius. After expressing the thought that the virtues of man and woman are the same,\(^5\) Musonius gives one to understand that he, like, e.g. Chrysippus, means by these “same virtues” the four so-called cardinal virtues, i.e. prudence (φρόνησις), justice (δικαιοσύνη), self-control (αὐτοκρατία) and bravery (ἀνδρεία),\(^6\) discussing thus the first aspect of the sameness of the virtues - and, at the same time, as a Stoic, also the “sameness” of men and women.

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\(^1\) Περὶ γάμου (Stob. IV,22,25 = SVF 3,254,63); see also below. p. 77.
\(^2\) Plat. Rep. 455d.
\(^3\) Plat. Leg. 781b.
\(^4\) Plat. Rep. 455d.
\(^5\) IV,44,9-10.
\(^6\) IV,44,10-35. For Chrysippus see above pp. 11 – 13.
By the “sameness of the virtues” Musonius seems to mean, at least partly, that the contents of the individual virtues of man and woman are identical. We can most unambiguously determine which aspects in the content of each virtue are ungendered, i.e. common to men and women in the views of Musonius and other later Stoics, when they, while discussing the virtues of a woman, describe in the same way (either in the same section or somewhere else) also the virtues of a man - or do not specifically mention men or women (i.e. seem to speak about human beings in general), in which case they presumably include in their words at least men. And on the other hand, if the ideas expressed by these Stoics about the content of any of the virtues of a woman (or about any part of these virtues) are congruent with the general Stoic content of these virtues - and thus are not in contradiction with, e.g., Chrysippus’ definitions – we can conclude that they hardly could have uttered different views when speaking of the virtues of a man.

4.1.1.1. Prudence and bravery

Like the other Stoics, Musonius thinks that a person – both man and woman - who is capable to show prudence (φρόνησις) has to know what should be done, what is good and what bad, what useful and what harmful. ¹ True, A. C. Van Geytenbeek has paid attention to the fact that Musonius, unlike Chrysippus, does not use the word “knowledge” (ἐπιστήμη) in his definitions of virtues and that he thus seems to be unwilling to emphasise the intellectual aspect of the virtues. ² It should, however, be remembered that Musonius’ “definitions” are not definitions in the real sense of the word but sections in which Musonius just happens to touch the contents of these virtues. Besides, the same phenomenon is evident here, as everywhere in Lucius’ presentation of Musonius' teachings: Lucius does not try to go into the theory of Stoicism, but he supposes that the readers are already familiar with it. ³ And it is in any case clear that also Musonius stresses the intellectual nature of the virtues, i.e. that virtue is knowledge and that the

² Geytenbeek 1963: 26. Martha C. Nussbaum, however, argues that “this is a difference of emphasis only: Musonius still insists that philosophy is the only art that will deliver the right result, so he is clearly thinking of excellence as requiring knowledge of what is to be chosen” (Nussbaum 2002a: 322, n. 21). For Musonius’ concept of virtue see also Laurenti 1967.
³ Lutz 1947: 24, also n. 93.
opposite of virtue is hence unavoidably ignorance - let us, e.g., think of a passage in which Musonius asks how anybody who does not know what justice is could be just.¹

As mentioned above, the third alternative in all Chrysippus’ definitions of virtues, with the exception of justice, is “knowledge of what is indifferent”. When Musonius says that a woman (like a man) has to learn what is good and what bad,² he, too, refers to the really good - i.e. virtue - and the really bad - i.e. the opposite of virtue - which should be learned to distinguish from what only seems good (such as ἥδονή, ζωή and πλούτος) or bad (such as πόνος, θάνατος and πενία).³

Thus, as A C. Van Geytenbeek has noted, it is clear that Musonius regards these only apparently good and bad things as indifferent, although he does not - at least in his extant diatribes - use the traditional term ἀδιάφορα.⁴

Detaching oneself from wrong attitudes is of crucial importance for Musonius also in bravery (ἀνδρεία) - for him simply a freedom from the opposite of bravery, i.e. cowardice (δειλία).⁵ The bravery of a woman – like that of a man - means that she is able to distinguish the real from the apparent and to despise what only looks fearful (e.g. toils and death),⁶ and thus a brave woman neither submits (because of the fear of death or toils) to do anything shameful nor crouches before anyone, no matter how high born, rich or powerful this person is.⁷ So, φιλοπονία, a virtue subordinate to bravery, is for Musonius evidently a part of the bravery of a woman: Chrysippus explains that the content of this “love of toils” is precisely the ability to attain one’s goals despite toils.⁸ And beside φιλοπονία, magnanimity (μεγαλοψυχία/μεγαλοφροσύνη), another virtue subordinate to bravery, belongs to the bravery of a woman in Musonius.⁹

¹ VIII,60,25-26.
² IV,46,35-48,1.
³ VI,54,18-35; XVII,108,36-37; pleasure (ἡδονή), life (ζωή), wealth (πλούτος) - toil (πόνος), death (θάνατος), poverty (πενία), see also above p. 11.
⁴ Geytenbeek 1963: 49
⁵ IV,44,24-25. Musonius sees that bravery produces θαρραλεότης (VIII,62,23-24); for this virtue subordinate to bravery see, e.g., SVF 3,264;269=Andronicus περὶ παθῶν p.28,1 Schuchardt (ex Paris. 2131) (Κατὰ Χρύσιππον). For Stoic ἀνδρεία see also, e.g., Cullyer 2002.
⁶ III,40,33-42,5; VI,52,18-21; VII; VIII,62,23-26;66,10 .
⁷ III,40,35-42,2.
⁸ SVF 3,264;269.
⁹ III,40,35-42,4. For this virtue subordinate to bravery see, e.g., SVF 3,264;269;274= Sextus adv. math IX153; D. L. VII,92-93=SVF 3,265.
For the Romans magnanimity (magnitudo animi, magnanimitas) was in the first place a characteristic of great military commanders, statesmen, heroes etc. and thus hardly a traditional “feminine” virtue; the active aspect of bravery and magnanimity, manifested in great deeds and interpreted as Aristotelian by J. M. Rist, appears also in the middle Stoic Panaetius. The original Stoic content of magnanimity was, however, the ability to rise above all which falls to one’s lot, and there is no reason to doubt that Musonius sees a brave woman’s magnanimity as this kind of tranquillity towards all things happening in the world. In the same spirit Musonius describing in his tenth diatribe the ideal reaction of an insulted person says that he/she stands “πρᾴως δὲ καὶ ἡσύχως” what has happened because “πρέπον τοῦτο τῷ βουλομένῳ εἶναι μεγαλόφρον”. Because Musonius thus very explicitly includes both sexes on equal terms in his discussion of virtues, he very explicitly refers to their “sameness” and ethical/theoretical equality. What about Epictetus and Seneca? While speaking of virtues Epictetus, unlike his teacher, very seldom mentions women separately - although more often than, e.g., Marcus Aurelius whose work, because of its genre, is scarcely equipped with general statements concerning women. But if it is incorrect to assume that because Marcus Aurelius almost entirely fails to mention women, he, excluding women, means his words to apply only to men, still more wrong this is when reading Epictetus: it is of crucial importance to note that Epictetus says that a woman, like a man, can become wise:

That this thought obviously was a self-evidence for Epictetus, can be judged from the fact that

1 See, e.g., Plin. nat. 7,93-9; see also OLD s.v.; for this virtue in Roman thinking see also Knoche 1935.
2 Fr. 106 van Straaten = Cic. off. 1,66; Rist 1969: 194.
3 E.g. SVF 3,264;270=Andronicus περὶ παθῶν p.22,13 Schuchardt;274;275;=Clemens Al. Strom. II p.470 Pott.; D. L. VII,92-93= SVF 3,265.
4 X,78,10-11: gently and quietly – this befits one who wants to be magnanimous
5 II,14,7-8: we picture the work of one who practises philosophy to be something like this: he should bring his own will into harmony with what happens, so that neither anything that happens happens against our will, nor anything that fails to happen fails to happen when we wish it to happen. the result of this for those who have so ordered it is that in desire they are not disappointed, and in aversion they do not fall into what they would avoid: that each person leads a personal life free from grief, fear and perturbation, preserving the natural and acquired relationships of son, father, brother, citizen, husband, wife, neighbour, fellow-traveller, ruler, subject (trans. Oldfather, Hard, modified)
expresses it in passing to his (male) audience, without feeling an urge to justify it and without paying more attention to it. Furthermore, he also elsewhere - again as if incidentally - utters the same thought, as in III,22,68 of the diatribe Περὶ Κυνισμοῦ in which he says of the wife of the wise man that “ἡ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ ἔσται ἄλλη τοιαύτη.”¹ And because Epictetus says that a woman can become wise, her virtues are the virtues of the wise and, at the same time, also the characteristics of god, for wisdom means for Epictetus that a human being becomes like god also in his/her virtues;² of these virtues he mentions here, for instance, magnanimity, a virtue which means also for him - beside patience (καρτερία) and bravery (ἀνδρεία) - the ability to endure that which falls to one's lot.³

Virtue definitions in the real sense of the word can be found even less in Seneca than in Musonius, for Seneca discusses the content of each virtue mainly in so far as it is necessary for the subject under discussion. Where he pays a special attention to women - as especially in Ad Marciam de consolatione and Ad Helviam matrem de consolatione⁴ - such a theme is grief arising from the loss of a loved one and the conquering of this grief. Thus, the perspective concerning women's virtues is narrower in Seneca than in Musonius, and unlike Musonius and Epictetus, he discusses the contents of women's virtues chiefly by giving some female examples. Certainly the qualities of these women are virtues only in the normal meaning of the word and not in the Stoic sense, but this is not important, for it is easy to see that their properties and achievements are only material by which Seneca brings in front of Marcia's and his mother's eyes the Stoic attitude towards life and tries to make them espouse it. That “Stoicorum rigida ac virilis sapientia”⁵ is so central in these consolations, as Ulrich Knoche states especially of Ad Helviam matrem de consolatione.⁶

¹ his wife will be another person like himself (trans. Oldfather). For this statement of Epictetus as evidence for the female wise see also, e.g., Asmis 1996: 90; Deming 2004: 82; cf. also Schofield 2007/2010: 83. For other examples see, e.g., IV,1,8-10 where Epictetus mentions freedom (ἐλευθερία), a characteristic possessed by the wise, which everyone - as a ζῷον λογικόν - is born to acquire (see esp. IV,7,7-9; see also, e.g., III,7,27); for the thought that a human being differs from other living creatures because of his/her reason see also, e.g., I,3,3; for freedom as a manifestation of wisdom see, e.g., IV,1,3-5; 3,7: οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν τὸ τηρούμενον, ἀλλ' ἀιδώς καὶ πίστις καὶ εὐστάθεια, ὀπάθεια, ἀφοβία, ἀταραξία, ἁπλῶς ἐλευθερία. For freedom in Epictetus in general see, e.g., Bobzien 1998/2001: 330 - 343; Dragona-Monachou 2007/2010. 2 II,14,11-13.

³ See, e.g., I,6,28-29; III,8,6; 24,12, IV,1,107-110; Epict. ench. 10.

⁴ How these two consolations are connected to the consolation tradition of antiquity see, e.g., Kassel 1958: 11; 27; 71 – 72; 82; 99; Meinel 1972: 25 - 30; Manning 1981: 12 – 20; for the consolation tradition in antiquity in general see, e.g., Kassel 1958: 3 – 48.

⁵ Sen. Helv. 12,4: the strict and maculin/manly wisdom of the Stoics

⁶ Knoche 1935: 82.
is also due to the subject under discussion, i.e. how to be firm and stronger than grief (and fear) – a theme which he seems to discuss in an ungendered way.

For the most part, this theme is set out as a content of bravery (*fortitudo/virtus*) and virtues closely related to it. *Fortitudo* is genuinely Stoic “contemptrix timendorum” and “scientia - - distinguendi, quid sit malum et quid non sit”, a thought which Seneca in *Ad Helviam matrem de consolatione* connects expressly with one *virtue* subordinate to bravery, magnanimity (*magnitudo animi/magnanimitas*): as an indication that Helvia’s sister was “magni animi”, Seneca mentions that she was not only stronger than ambition (*ambitio*) and avarice (*avaritia*) but also that “non metus mortis - - deterruit” her. The essential point is not whether these properties of Seneca’s aunt are based on the Stoic doctrine of the indifference of external things (and that death is neither bad nor fearful), but the essential point is that Seneca wants that the person to whom he writes, i.e. in this case his mother - and likewise in *Ad Marciam de consolatione* Marcia - learns to think in this way; in many passages he instils into their minds the really good and teaches that those things which because of (incorrect) attitudes seem, for example, fearful or worth pursuing, are in reality indifferent. This thinking Seneca summarises in one of his letters as follow:

Omnia ex opinione suspensa sunt; non ambitio tantum ad illam respicit et luxuria et avaritia. Ad opinionem dolemus. Tam miser est quisque quam credidit.

Thus, magnanimity is - also in both of his consolations addressed to women - in an original Stoic way a calm and fearless indifference to externals and to things happening in the world, but, at the same

1 In addition to these words, Seneca once expresses a woman’s bravery and fearlessness also with a word which he elsewhere frequently uses in the negative meaning (see, e.g., Sen. *ira* 1,1,7; 2,15,2; epist. 87,32; 95,37) and even says that it is as far from *fortitudo* as magnanimity is from anger (Sen. *ira* 1,20,2): when he, like Valerius Maximus, takes as one example the legendary Cloelia, he does not - unlike he or, e.g., Livy - characterise the heroine of the girl with the word *virtus* (Val. *Max.* 3,2,2; *Liv.* 2,13,9;13,11) but with the word *audacia* (Sen. *Marc.* 16,2).

2 Sen. epist. 88,29: *scoerer of things which inspire fear*; 85,28: *knowledge to distinguish between that which is bad and that which is not bad* (trans. Gummere, slightly modified); Sen. *Helv.* 19,7: *was not deterred by the fear of death* (trans. Gummere) Seneca reacts very negatively to ambition (*ambitio*) and avarice (*avaritia*) also elsewhere, see, e.g., Sen. epist. 56,10; 85,10; nat.1, praef. 6.

3 Sen. *Marc.* 7,1;7,4;10,1;19,1;19,5-6;23,2; *Helv.* 5,1;5,6;6,1;8,2-4,9,2;11,5;11,7;12,1. How certain things, such as wealth, poverty, health, illness, life or death, are *ἀδιάφορα* (*indifferentia*, *media*) is a persistent theme in Seneca, see, e.g., Sen. epist. 82,10; 99,12; 117,8; prov. 5,1-2.

4 Sen. epist. 78,13-14: *everything depends on opinion; ambition, luxury, greed, hark back to opinion. it is according to opinion that we suffer, a human being is as wretched as he has convinced himself that he is* (trans. Gummere, slightly modified)

5 This content of magnanimity can be seen very clearly also, e.g., in some of his letters, see, e.g., Sen. epist. 74,13 in which Seneca states that *magnanimitas* “non potest eminere, nisi omnia velut minuta contempsit, quae pro maximis voluptus optat”; see also, e.g., Sen. epist. 107,12; 115,18.
time, there are also elements from the ideal of the traditional Roman heroism, personified notably in
the great figures of the past. This can be seen especially clearly when magnanimity appears in
women (and men) as an inflexible firmness to endure loss and grief,\(^1\) and the same is valid also in
bravery in its entirety - it is not surprising that Seneca takes as one example the fabulously heroic
Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi.\(^2\) And, on the other hand, as will be discussed below in more
detail, Seneca occasionally both in *Ad Marciam de consolatione* and *Ad Helviam matrem de
consolatione* speaks also of a very active conquering of dolor and uses military terminology\(^3\) or even
refers to bravery (virtus) in battle\(^4\) - and also his historical (or “historical”) examples, like that of
Cloelia, indicate that he does not exclude women from having/displaying active bravery and heroism.\(^5\)

Beside magnanimity, bravery in the middle of sufferings includes also patience (patientia, καρτερία), pars and ramus of bravery\(^6\) - an ability to endure patiently and without complaining
both mental and physical suffering and generally all which falls to one’s lot.\(^7\) In *Ad Helviam
matrem de consolatione* Seneca expresses this attitude also with the word constantia and says
that it can emerge from continuous misfortunes, i.e. it is possible for a human being to become
so strong in continual hardships that he/she has an ability to stand also the heaviest adversities
“forti et inmobi constantia”.\(^8\) That Seneca refers also here (at least in principle) equally well to
women, is evident from the fact that he expects his mother to rank among such people.\(^9\)

Just where bravery is an ability to be stronger than grief, the contents of also other virtues than
those connected closely to bravery are inseparably intertwined - and occasionally Seneca
speaks only of virtue (virtus) as such, as in the passage in which he says to his mother, that
“cum semel animum virtus induravit, undique invulnerabile praestat”.\(^10\) Of the individual virtues

\(^1\) Sen. Marc. 3;13,3-15,4; 16,3-4;26,3; Helv. 13,8;16,5-7; see also Knoche 1935: 78 – 79; 82.
\(^2\) Sen. Marc. 16,3; Helv. 16,6. For this Roman heroism ideal manifested in Cornelia see, e.g.,
Hesberg-Tonn 1983: 68; see also above pp. 17-18 .
\(^3\) See, e.g., Sen. Marc. 9,3-4; Helv. 3,1.
\(^5\) See also, e.g., Saxonhouse 1985: 105: “Seneca’s examples of women’s fortitude are ones of
action”; “some isolated women may stand out in the history of Roman heroes”.
\(^6\) Sen. epist. 67,6;10. part - branch
\(^7\) Sen. Helv. 3,1-2; Marc. 16,1; see also, e.g., Sen. epist. 24,24; 66,14; 67,10; 76,23; 91,15.
\(^8\) Sen. Helv. 2,2-3.
\(^9\) Sen. Helv. 2,1-5, see also 13,6.
\(^10\) Helv. 13,2: when virtue has once steeled your mind, it guarantees to make it invulnerable from every quarter (trans. Basore)
he connects to bravery especially prudence (*prudentia*) and self-control, and thus the prudence of both his aunt and another female example, Rutilia, is to understand that one should not be overcome with useless grief.¹

4.1.1.2. Self-control and justice

Furthermore, when he mentions that this same Rutilia lost her son “fortiter”, he explains, that “nec quisquam lacrimas eius post elatum filium notavit”, i.e. he discusses also self-control (*modestia*, *moderatio*),³ though he does not mention this virtue by name. In *Ad Marciam de consolatione* he, however, explicitly refers to self-control and expresses the same thought: *dolendi modestia* means that a human being who has lost a loved one, grieves only on the funeral day.⁴ Further on, he does not define the period so accurately, but we are given to understand that he seconds in self-control concerning grief the same principle which he in *Ad Helviam matrem de consolatione* states of self-control in other things, i.e. it is permitted to eat, drink, dress and ,grieve as much as nature demands but not more⁵ - or as he in one of his letters says:

Est aliquis et dolendi decor; hic sapienti servandus est et quemadmodum in ceteris rebus, ita etiam in lacrimis aliquid sat est; imprudentium ut gaudia sic dolores exundavere.⁶

It is, of course, true that Seneca is sometimes more severe and reacts as critically to grief as to such kinds of pathoses as fear and anger⁷ and says, that “non adfligitur sapiens liberorum amissio ne, non...” and elsewhere also.

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¹ Sen. Helv. 16,7. For this inseparable joining of prudence and bravery with each other see also, e.g., Sen. epist. 67,10: *prudentia* - *suadet, quod effugere non possis, quam fortissime ferre.*
² Sen. Helv. 16,7: *bravely - after her son was buried no one saw her shed any tears (trans.Basore)*
³ In order to express self-control displayed in grief, Seneca uses neither in *Ad Marciam de consolatione* nor in *Ad Helviam matrem de consolatione* perhaps the most common Latin translation of the Greek word *σωφροσύνη*, i.e. *temperantia*, but the equivalents are, as occasionally also in Cicero (see esp. Cic. Tusc. 3,16: *eamque virtutem ωφροσυνήν vocant,* quam soleo equidem tum temperantiam, tum moderationem appellare, non numquam etiam *modestiam*), *moderatio* and *modestia* (Sen. Marc. 3,4;11,1); he elsewhere occasionally extends the word *modestia* (among other expressions) to characterise “correct” reacting to life and the whole essence of the wise person (see esp. Sen. ira 3,6,1; epist. 40,14; 66,5; 98,3).
⁴ Sen. Sen. Marc. 3,4-4,1.
⁵ Sen. Marc. 7,1; Helv. 5,1;10,2;10,11;11,4; for this thought connected with grief see also, e.g., Sen. tranq. 15,6; epist. 99,16-18. Seneca discusses also *frugalitas* concerning eating, drinking and clothing, and the deficiency of this *frugalitas*, i.e. *luxuria*, not only in *Ad Helviam matrem de consolatione* but also elsewhere, see, e.g., Sen. epist. 8,5; 114,9;11; vit. beat. 20,5; tranq. 9,2.
⁷ See, e.g., Sen. ira 2,6,2;14,1. Anger (*ὀργή*) is for the Stoics one of the species of desire (*ἐπιθυμία*) (D. L. VII, 113). Seneca uses mainly *dolor/maeror*, *metus* and *ira* for *λύπη*, *φόβος* and *ὀργή*. 
amicorum” and that he/she endures their death “eodem animo” as he/she awaits his/her own and “non magis hanc timet quam illam dolet”¹ - an attitude which he somewhere else criticises for its inhuman severity (durus, inhumanus, inhumana duritia, inhumanitas and superbia sapientia).² The writing situation undoubtedly has an effect, for where Seneca reacts more favourably to grief, he speaks directly to the mourning ones, as in all three consolationis or in the 99. letter. The discrepancy is not, however, so great as it easily seems, for when Seneca writes to the mourning ones, he does not want that their grief breaks out out of control and over the limits of nature but that they preserve a virtue emphasised by him everywhere, i.e. (respectful) love (pietas) between family members - and thus he in Ad Polybium de consolatione expresses his view by saying that reason (ratio, λόγος) “nos in eo teneat habitu qui et piae mentis est nec motae”³. The same thought he expresses also to his mother:

Optimum inter pietatem et rationem temperamentum est et sentire desiderium et opprimere.⁴

Unlike Seneca, Musonius does not discuss grief separately from other pathoses, but his message is simply that a human being, both man and woman, who wants to show self-control should be free from all irrational “emotions” and impulses (πάθος) resulting from ἀκολασία and ἀκρασία.⁵ Like Seneca, Musonius thinks that the individual virtues are often inseparably joined together, and thus, for example, bravery (ἀνδρεία), being freedom (based on reason) from fear, is essential also for self-control (σωφροσύνη): in order to be able to show self-control a woman must not - e.g. because of fear - submit to anything shameful.⁶ A typical Stoic idea of the fundamental connection of all virtues is evident above all in Musonius’ thought that not only bravery and ἀἰδώς⁷ towards all shameful but also prudence (φρόνησις), here clearly in its wider meaning, i.e. as knowledge of good and bad,⁸ are needed for self-control. And it is also clear and worth noting that because Musonius, like also Epictetus in the above-discussed II,14,7-8, expects that both sexes are able to be equally free

¹ Sen. epist. 74,30: the wise person is not distressed by the loss of children or of friends – in the same spirit – fears the one as little as he grieves for the other (trans. Gummere, slightly modified)
² Sen. Marc. 4,1; Helv. 16,1; epist. 99,15; Polyb. 18,5.
³ Sen. Polyb. 18,6: keep us in the state that is the mark of affectionate [piae], and not an unbalanced, mind (trans. Basore., slightly modified)
⁴ Sen. Helv. 16,1: the best course is the mean between pietas and reason – both to have a sense of loss and to crush it (trans.. Basore, slightly modified)
⁵ For ἀκολασία and to it subordinate “vice” ἀκρασία see esp. III,40,18-19;42,26-27; XII, 86,12;88,4-6; XVIII,116,10; XX,126,17.
⁶ IV,44,24-28.
⁷ IV,44,24-28;48,3-4. Musonius includes αἰδώς in self-control also elsewhere, see in more detail Geytenbeek 1963: 26 – 27.
⁸ IV,46,35-48,4; see also above p. 13 and below p. 131, n.2.
from irrational emotions, he - like Epictetus - seems to deny the conservative view on the (feminine/effeminate) "weakness" of women's mind (i.e. their mental "otherness" at least in this respect) and, on the other hand, the conventional thought of men's ruling position based on their supposed (masculine) superiority in self-control - i.e. women's social/societal "otherness" at least in this respect.

In Musonius, as in other Stoics, the individual pathoses are fear (φόβος), grief/pain (λύπη), desire (ἐπιθυμία) and pleasure (ἡδονή); he also mentions one of the species of desire, anger (ὀργή).

Musonius does not discuss this subject here theoretically, but his goal is to correct "wrong" attitudes towards pathoses: a human being should understand that adiaphoron pleasure (ἡδονή) is in fact not good, nor is toil (πόνος) bad. And when Musonius reproaches pleasure-seeking in eating, drinking and sexuality, he seems to deal with the genesis of pathos pleasure (ἡδονή).

It is well-known that the Greek word σωφροσύνη has many meanings, not only "self-control" but also, e.g., "chastity" (i.e. in Latin pudicitia/castitas) which, as discussed above, was during antiquity thought to mean different things for a woman than for a man. There is no sign of this in Musonius, for in his third diatribe he briefly states that a woman who shows σωφροσύνη should "καθαρεύειν μὲν ἀφροδισίων παρανόμων, καθαρεύειν δὲ τῆς περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ἀκρασίας," and in his XII ditribe he makes the same demand on men and clarifies that unlawful - also in marriage – is sexual activity aiming at pleasure and that unlawful and resulting from ἀκολασία are all relationships outside marriage, also the relationships with slaves and prostitutes. Thus, when Musonius discusses the content of self-control concerning sexuality, he, without expressing, e.g., conventional Roman attitudes, makes no difference between man and

1 For this thought that, as Emily A. Hemelrijk puts it, a man's "superior capacity for self-control justified his control over others" who are thought to be more or less incapable, see, e.g., Edwards 1993, esp. 25; Hemelrijk 2004b: 189; Kaster 2005: 24 – 26; Williams 2010: 155. It is also worth noting that Musonius refers to this view in XII, 86,38-88,3 (see also below pp. 66 – 67; 78; 97) and that Hierocles links masculinity/manliness and self-control together, see below p. 75. 2 See esp.I,32,22-27;34,14-15;31-33; III,40,18-19;21;23; VI,52,16-17;54,13-14;17-18;33-34; VII,62,16-17; XII,86,7-8;29;39-40; XVIIIB,116,16-17;116,22-118,34. 3 I,32,22-28;34,14-15;31-33; VI,54,32-35; VII,62,24-29. 4 XII,86,7-8;28-29; XVIIIB,116,16-17;116,22-118,34. 5 For this virtue and the content given to it in different times see North 1966. 6 III,40,17-19: be pure in respect of unlawful sexual relations and in respect of unrestraint concerning other pleasures (trans. Lutz, Nussbaum, modified) 7 XII,86,4-20;24-38;88,4-6; see also IV,44,16-18.
woman and refers thus also here to their social/societal “sameness” – in fact he consciously resists the above-mentioned conservative view that men’s relationships with slaves or other “non-decent” women are not reprehensible. His statements are more unambiguous than those of Epictetus, for although Epictetus often strictly condemns relationships outside marriage, thinks that adultery ruins oĩδώς, κοσμιότης and πίστις and advocates abstinence before marriage, he nevertheless, as Adolf Bonhöffer has noted, does not treat chastity as coherently and consistently as his teacher. The same is true also with Seneca, but despite some inaccuracies and contradictions he, too, agrees for the most part with Musonius because he asks his mother to think that “libidinem non voluptatis causa homini datam sed propagandi generis” and says that men’s relationships with prostitutes are shameful – and, of course, because he condemns all relationships outside marriage:

Scis inprobum esse, qui ab uxor deque puticitiam exigit, ipse alienarum corruptor uxorum; scis ut illi nil cum adulter, sic tibi nil esse debere cum paelse - - -.

In accordance with the Stoic doctrines, freedom from irrational impulses and “emotions” does not mean for the later Stoics insensitivity in the usual sense of the word. So, a human being is for Epictetus Ἡμερον κοινωνικόν, and in the above-discussed diatribe II,14 where he explicitly refers also to women he mentions also εὐεργεσία and πίστις – i.e. a characteristic one should employ when one following one’s real nature reacts lovingly and helpfully to the other people.

1 XII,86,10-38;88,4-6. Like Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics, according to Origen, condemned the adultery of men/husbands, too (SVF 3,729=Origenes contra Celsum VII,63 Vol.II.p.213,6f. (p.739Del); see Delling 1972: 671; see also Rist 1989: 2009 in which Rist refers to Musonius’ view that exactly the same demands must be made on the chastity of man and woman and argues that this thought “was probably traditional. Loss of evidence alone may prevent us from recognizing it as part of the teaching of Zeno and Chrysippus.” For the Neopythagorean Bryson see Treggiari 1991b: 195; Swain 2013: 43.
2 See esp. II,4,1-2;4,11;10,18; IV,2,8-9; Epict. ench. 33,8; see also I,18,5-9; III,7,21; IV,9,6-9. Cf. also, e.g., Marc. Aur. med. I,17; Foucault 1984: 195 – 196.
4 See, e.g., Sen. benef. 7,20,3; tranq. 9,2; Geytenbeek 1963: 75, n. 1; Arnold 1911: 347.
5 Sen. Helv. 13,3: sexual desire to have been given to human being, not for the gratification of pleasure, but for the continuance of the human race (trans. Basore, slightly modified); see also, e.g., matrim.: Hier. adv. lovin. I,49 = 319A (ed. Bickel). For ἡδονη Seneca usually uses voluptas; the word ἐπιθυμία he mainly translates with cupiditas which he sometimes uses also when he speaks of pathoses in general. Most often he, however, translates νοθος with other words, e.g., with the word adfectus.
6 Sen. const. sap. 6,7: magno pudoris inpendio dilecta scorta.
7 Sen. epist. 94,26. For this thought in Seneca see also, e.g., Sen. epist. 95,37: sciet in uxor gravissimum esse genus iniuriae paelicem - - ; matrim.: Hier. adv. lovin. I,49 = 319B (ed. Bickel).
8 II,10,14: a gentle and social being (trans. Oldfather)
9 II,14,7-13.
Typically he equates pity (ἔλεος) with other pathoses and reacts negatively to it— as also Seneca who using words such as clementia, humanitas, benignitas and mansuetudo emphasises philanthropy and clemency (based on reason) and keeps clemency usually strictly apart from pathoses, such as pity (misericordia, ἔλεος). Likewise, Musonius, too, speaks very much of φιλανθρωπία and εὐεργεσία— which are very explicitly an essential part of justice (δικαιοσύνη) in both sexes. Thus, to justice (both in man and in woman) belongs also a thought we can find already in Chrysippus’ definition, i.e. that to each should be distributed his/her due, but, unlike in early Stoic definitions, justice of both sexes means also that one, as a human being, wants to do good and not ill to other human beings, an aspect which already Panaetius includes in justice and which may originate from him. And it is probable that the ideological basis of φιλανθρωπία and εὐεργεσία consists also of a Stoic ideal of a person who is active in society, and of the thought of natural sociality of human beings included in philanthropy not only in Musonius but also in other later Stoics— Musonius, unaware of the lifestyle of canis lupus, even states that a human being most resembles a bee which cannot live alone, and not a “lonely wolf.”

1 See, e.g., II,17,26; III,22,13;24,43; see also, e.g., IV,1,4-5. For ostensible inconsistencies in Epictetus’ attitude towards pity see Bonhöffer 1890: 305 – 306; Bonhöffer 1894: 102 – 103. Pity was for the Stoics one of the species of λύπη (D. L. VII,111).
2 See, e.g., Sen. clem. 2,5;1,5;3,6;3; ira 1,5,2; 2,28,2; 3,43,5; vit. beat. 3,4;24,3; benef. 1,15,2; epist. 95,33,51-52. For this Stoic φιλανθρωπία aspect of clementia see Griffin 1976/1992: 155 – 156; for different aspects of clementia in Seneca in general see Griffin 1976/1992: 148 – 171, see also Rist 1989: 2006 – 2008. Seneca does not, however, everywhere react negatively to pity, as Adolf Bonhöffer has noted, (Bonhöffer 1890: 306), see esp. Sen. vit. beat. 24,1: huic succurro, huīus misereor. Furthermore, Miriam T. Griffin points out that Seneca is not always fully consistent when using terms, and thus he, e.g., uses the word misericordia in Sen. clem. 1,1,4 as a synonyme of clementia (Griffin 1976/1992: 152).
3 VIII,66,7-11; XIV,92,31-33; XVI,104,32-36; XVII,108,14; XIX,122,22-32.
4 IV,48,9.
5 IV,48,10-11: εὖ ποιεῖν μὲν θέλειν, κακοποιεῖν δὲ μὴ θέλειν ἀνθρώποιν ἄντα ἀνθρώπως.
6 Geytenbeek 1963: 27; see also Rist 1969: 193. Moreover, Musonius includes in the justice of a woman (and of a man) a thought which occurs already in Socrates and among the Stoics at least in Seneca (epist. 95,52) that it is better to be wronged than to do wrong (III,40,30); Geytenbeek 1963: 27, also n. 2; 136; Hense 1905/1990: 11. For this thought see also Muson. X,78,2-5.
7 For this thought in Seneca see, e.g., Sen. epist. 95,52: Natura nos cognatos edidit, cum ex isdem et in eadem gigneret. Haec nobis amorem invidit mutuum et sociabiles fecit. Illa aequum iustumque composuit; ex illius constitutione miserius est nocere quam laedi. See also, e.g., Marc. Aur. med. II,11,1, V,6; VI,13,22; IX,42,4; XI,1,3,9; Hierocl. Πῶς συγγενέσι χρηστέον = Stob. IV,27,23; Περί φιλαδελφίας = Stob IV,27,20; Ηθική στοιχείωσις Kol. 11 (Arnim 1906: XXXV; see also Inwood 1984: 180); Epict. I,2,3,1; II,19,6;22,36; III,13,5; IV,5,17; Epict. ench. 42 (Bonhöffer 1894: 118 – 119, n. 70 and 80).
8 XIV,92,20-28. Musonius finds parallels in animals not only to sociality but also, e.g., to virtue (IV,46,2-10; XVII,106,20-106,5), bravery (IV,44,28-32) and education (IV,42,34-44,3); see also below pp. 51, 60; 95, 113. For Cleanthes’ consent, after observing the behaviour of ants, that also animals have, as Ilaria Ramelli translates it, “the elements of reason” (SVF I,515) see Ramelli 2009: IX; see also, e.g., Newmyer 2011: 19. Cf. also Chrysippus’ dog in Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1,69.
One of the reasons for which Musonius condemns luxury is that a person who yields to luxury uses for wrong purposes the money he/she should have used for the benefit of the fellow human beings. Cynically oriented ascetic ideals concerning modest lifestyle and frugality strengthened in later Stoicism are very prominent also in Musonius and are an essential content of self-control. Most of the pleasures against which a human being should fight are somehow related to luxury, whether in eating, drinking, clothing or dwelling; it is also worth noting that Musonius states that people spoilt by luxury are especially depraved also in their sexuality. "Τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα μέχρι τῆς χρείας ψιλῆς παραλόμβανε", Epictetus advises, and likewise everything which exceeds the necessary need is for Musonius excessive and improper. In a typical way Musonius also thinks that luxury and excess destroy and ruin mind and body: they weaken the body and in the mind they breed ἀκολασία and cowardice - a thought found also in Seneca.

And so, the sameness of the self-control of man and woman also means that they should not be inclined to luxury or beautifying themselves. Especially much exercise is needed in self-control in eating and drinking because a pleasure which one feels usually twice a day is the most difficult to resist. In fact Musonius says that the beginning and the basis of self-control is ἐγκράτεια in eating and drinking; a real human being eats to live and not to get pleasure, and who wants to acquire self-control should be free from all faults in his/her attitude towards food. So, Musonius emphatically states that gluttony, drunkenness and other corresponding vices indicate of ἀκολασία and prove that self-control is very necessary for both sexes:

τὴν σωφροσύνην ἀναγκαιοτάτην οὖσαν ἀνθρώπῳ παντὶ, τῷ τε θήλει καὶ τῷ ἀρρηνί, διὰ γὰρ σωφροσύνης μόνης ἐκφεύγομεν ἀκολασίαν, ἄλλως δ' οὐδαμῶς.

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1 XVIIIIB,122,18-32.
2 For the relationship between Cynicism and later Stoicism see, e.g., Griffin 1996: 197 – 204; see also Gill 2003: 46 – 47 (on Musonius). Cf. also below p. 61, also n. 2; above p. 17, also n. 1.
3 Musonius discusses this theme in his XVIIIA, XVIIIB, XIX and XX diatribes.
4 XII,84,31-86,4.
5 Epict. ench. 33,7 in things that pertain to the body take only as much as your bare need requires (trans. Oldfather); see also, e.g., III,26,31 in which Epictetus says that god "τρυφᾶν με οὐ θέλει".
6 See esp. XVIIIIB,118,21-22; XIX,120,18-21;122,12-15; XX,124,4-7.
7 XX,126,15-17.
8 See, e.g., Sen. epist. 55,1;82,2.
10 XVIIIIB,116,19-29.
11 For this virtue subordinate to σωφροσύνη see, e.g., SVF 3,264;272=Andronicus περὶ ποθῶν p.23,17 Schuchardt;275; D. L. VII,92-93=SVF 3, 265; see also above p. 12.
12 XVIIIA,112,6-7; XVIIIIB,118,2-5.
4.1.1.3. Masculine virtues, masculine women?

As we have seen, the later Stoics seem thus far to regard the contents of the cardinal virtues (including bravery) of both sexes as the same (and ungendered) and, although Seneca occasionally refers also to Roman ideals of heroism, to a great extent congruent with the general Stoic contents of these virtues – referring thus consistently to the “sameness” of man and woman.

Even if bravery and heroism were generally thought to be more exceptional in women, the gender of women was not, as discussed above, a fixed one, e.g., in the respect that women were especially in Roman thinking praised for bravery (viribus/fortitudo) when/if they display it for “right” reasons, for example, on behalf of their husbands or other family, or to protect their pudicitia - whereas women who behave “manly” for “wrong” reasons and abandon their traditional “feminine” virtues were often condemned harshly, not only for abandoning these “feminine” virtues, but also because they enter “male” spheres (such as military actions or politics), were thought to

1 For various aspects of this see also, e.g., Skinner 1997: 10 – 11; Montserrat 2000 who also discusses geographical differences (Plancia Magna). For “male”, “female” and inversions of gender roles in Roman elegy, esp. in Propertius, e.g., Gold 1993; for “transgendered” behaviour in Vergili’s Aeneid McManus 1997: 91 - 118; in Cornelius Nepos Hallett 2002; for women (and men) as constructions in ancient sources, e.g., Dixon 2001; Fischler 1994; for “nature” as culture and convention, e.g., Winkler 1990a: 20 – 22; Winkler 1990b: 172; for “masculinity” as an acquired quality (also in men), e.g., Gleason 1995; Moynihan 1997; Kunst 2007: 247 – 249; Williams 2010, esp. 4; see also below the ideal of a “real man”, and p. 41, n. 9.
2 See, e.g., laud. Tur. II 6a: quod ut conarere virtus tua te hortabatur; 19: quid hac virtute efficacius; laud. Mird (ILS 8394): neque uli cessit virtutis laboris sapientiae periculum; Plin. epist. 7,19,7: a qua viri quoque fortitudinis exempla sumamus (on Fannia); Vell. Pat. 2,26,3 virtus feminae/virtute eminet (on Calpurnia); Val. Max. 3,2,2: viris lumen virtutis praerendo (on Cloelia); 3,2,ext 9: Mulieris fortitudinis exemplo aequa fortem duarum puellarum casum adiciam (on Fannia); Liv. 2,13,11: novam in femina virtutem (on Cloelia); cf., also e.g., Val. Max. 3,2,15: minime muliebris animi (on Porcia); Sil. It. XIII, 830: contempratrix Clodiae sexus; for women displaying bravery when defending their pudicitia see, e.g., Liv. 1,57,5-58,12;26,49,15;38,24,2-10; Val. Max. 6,1,1; 6,1-3ext. -On the other hand, occasionally also “not-so-exemplary” women’s bravery was emphasised, see, e.g., Livy’s telling description of Sophonisba’s brave death: non locuta est ferocius quam acceptum poculum nullo trepidationis signo dato impavide hausit (30,15,8); see also, e.g., the freedwoman Epicharis in Tac. ann. 15,51,57 whose bravery and loyalty are, in a typical way, contrasted to (free) men’s actions. Although it is clear that women’s bravery could be emphasised (and praised) for various reasons, at least sometimes or even mainly in order to achieve other goals, already the fact that it was possible and more or less “normal” to emphasise women’s bravery is significant.
3 Well-known examples of this are Sempronia (Sall. Cat. 25: quae multa saeppe virilis audaciae facinora commiserat; cf. Pom. Trog. hist. Iust. 2.12.24: in muliere virilem audaciam cerneret (on Artemisia I); Boyd 1987: 201, n. 63), and Fulvia (e.g. Vell. Pat. 2.74.3: Ex altera parte uxor Antonii, Fulvia nihil muliebre praeter corpus gerens omnia armis tumultuque miscetab; Plut. Ant. 10.3). Furthermore, these kinds of women could also, in a (also rhetorically) typical way, manifest the moral decline of the age, as, e.g., in Sallust: “Catiline typifies the disappearance of true virtus, in its place we have a woman capable of virilis audaciae facinora” (Boyd 1987: 198).
threaten men’s position, “masculinity” etc.¹ even if there were also political reasons to blame, e.g., Fulvia, the wife of Marcus Antonius.² Thus, it is rather typical that although Cicero in a well-known passage of Tusculanae disputationes describes bravery as mainly a characteristic of men³ and says in Rosc. Am. 147 of Caecilia Metella that “cum esset mulier, virtute perfecit”,⁴ he not only in Rosc. Am. 27⁵ but also in his letters praises also the bravery of women⁶ and even writes to his wife Terentia and daughter Tullia that “nisi vos fortiores cognossem quam quemquam virum.”⁷

But on the other hand, it is interesting that authors occasionally refer to the manliness/masculinity of women showing bravery – even as explicitly as Valerius Maximus who states of Lucretia that “cuius virilis animus maligno errore fortunae muliebre corpus sortitus est.”⁸ And it has been a rather much debated topic how “manly”/“masculine” these kinds of women displaying bravery were considered to become or whether they were thought to become men⁹ - in Seneca the most discussed passages are Helv. 16,5 where Seneca (referring to Cornelia and Rutilia) speaks of “feminas quas conspecta virtus inter magnos viros posuit” and Marc. 16,2 where he says that “Cloelia - - ob insignem audaciam tantum non in viros transcripsimus.”¹⁰ Thus, it is important to examine the views of Seneca (and Musonius) also from this perspective and to try to find out whether they, too, after all, consider the Stoic ideal of virtues - and bravery in particular - masculine rather than human – all the more because some scholars have explicitly argued that the above-discussed idea (fundamental to conservative thinking referring to women’s “otherness”) about “men as the norm” can be found in all ethical writers in antiquity.

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3 Cic. Tusc. 2.43: Appellata est enim ex viro virtus; viri autem propria maxime est fortudo, cuius munera duo sunt maxima, mortis dolorisque contemptio; for Cicero’s “failure to treat” the bravery of women in Tusc. 2 see Nussbaum 2002a: 323, n. 22; Reynams-Schils 2005: 120.
4 Though she was a woman, carried her bravery so far (trans. Yonge, modified regarding virtue’s name)
5 Cic. Rosc. Am. 27: Eius virtute, fide, diligentia factum est ut hic potius vivus in reos quam occisus in proscriptos referretur (on Caecilia Metella). See also Hänninen 1999: 32; 38; Hänninen 2011: 46.
6 See, e.g., Cic. fam. 14,11: cuius summa virtute; Att. 10,8: cuius quidem virtus mirifica (on Tullia); fam. 14,1: incrediilem tuam virtutem et fortitudinem esse (on Terentia).
7 Cic. fam. 14,7: had I not known that you were braver than any man (trans. Shuckburgh, modified regarding virtue’s name)
8 6,1,1: by a malicious mistake of fortune her masculine mind is incorporated in a female body (trans. Hemelrijk); cf. also, e.g., Ov. fast. 2.847: animi matrona virilia; Dion. Hal. ant. IV.82,3.
9 E.g. Parker 1998/2001; Hemelrijik 1999/2004: 89 - 92; Torre 2000: 56, n. 133; Hemelrijik 2004b; Edwards 2007: 190; Williams 2010: 145 – 146; Riess 2012: 496 – 497; see also Roller 2004, esp. 38 – 39, also n. 81 for women displaying virtus gendered as viri as a part of the “evolving discourse of gender” in “late republican and early imperial texts that address gender and ethics”.
10 the women whose conspicuous bravery has placed them in the rank of great men - almost transferred by us, on account of her signal courage, to the list of men (trans. Basore, slightly modified)
(including Musonius) in the respect that the "ideal ethical subject" is in these writers constructed as "simply masculine", i.e. the female is always seen in relation to the male (generic) norm.  

And it is true that Seneca, at least at first sight, seems to compare women to men in this respect and think that women can show virtus (and other virtues, too) only when they overcome their "female weaknesses" (indicating their "otherness") and thus, as some scholars referring to Helv. 16,5 argue, “rise to the level of great men” - or are even considered “great men” or, simply, “men”.  

We should not, however, hastily draw too far-reaching conclusions because much of this is due to conventional gendered language and use of words (e.g. virilis in a positive and muliebris in a negative sense), and, as will be discussed below in more detail, to his aim to convince his readers of their strengths and abilities by raising them above other (“weak”) women (as when writing to Marcia and Helvia), or above “weak women” in general (as when writing to male readers) – here, even the construction "real/great men" is used for this purpose. And it is also essential to note that virtus is the active subject in Helv. 16,5 and it is on this virtue Seneca here focuses. So, it is in fact probable that when Seneca speaks of “feminas quas conspecta virtus inter magnos viros posuit”, he uses this expression to indicate that he regards the virtus of these women as exactly the same (or at least same enough) as the virtus of those “great men” - and that this does not necessarily mean that he thinks that these kinds of women become masculine/manly/men. It is interesting to compare this to Vibia Perpetua’s “magnam virtutem

1 See esp. Shaw 2008: 200 (referring to David Brakke, 'The passions and the Social Construction of Masculinity': “In Musonius as in other ethical writers, the “ideal ethical subject that they construct is simply masculine”, that is, the female as ethical subject is constructed as opposite to, tension or harmony with, or similar and even equal to a male norm. The male remains the generic in relation to which the female is measured or qualified.”

2 See, e.g., Sen. Marc. 1,1, Helv. 16,2 and Helv. 16,5 quoted on p. 106, n. 1; see also, e.g., Williams 2010: 145: "Women, indeed, may perpetrate acts of virtus, but in doing so they act like men"; 146: "the highest praise he can offer her is that she lacks all feminine vices."


4 See, e.g., Langlands 2004: 118: “In the Latin language (at least in the register of language that we are able to access in the written texts produced by educated men), the vocabulary that describes moral qualities often overlaps with vocabulary which denotes difference and opposition between male and female. - - - The core terms of ethical philosophy are thus strikingly gendered. The Latin we find in extant sources - - - privileges men and - - - and makes masculinity synonymous with all that is good”; 120: “to describe Marcia as good is to describe her as a man.”

5 For the use of virilis in a positive and muliebris in a negative sense, see, e.g., Loretto 1977: 127; Mauch 1997: 161; Langlands 2004: 118, and below p. 103.
esse in nobis”¹ on her own and on her (male and female) fellow prisoners’ virtus – an exceptionally explicit reference to the sameness of bravery of (and in) man and woman.

Undeniably, as mentioned above, Seneca sometimes uses in Ad Marciam de consolatione and Ad Helviam matrem in consolatione - i.e. when writing to women - also military terminology, as in Helv. 3,1 where he juxtaposes and even identifies conquering dolor with the capacity of veterani to endure pain,² or in Marc. 9,3-4 where he uses military words such as ictus, tela, murum, hoste, vulnus, sagittis and pilis and, as Elizabeth Asmis puts it, “holds out a single goal to men and women: to fight the tyranny of fortune with all one’s strength.”³ And in Helv. 15,4 he - as if using the word virtus mainly in one of its traditional meanings, i.e. as bravery in battle⁴ - says to his mother that the harder the buffets of fate are, the more bravely she has to struggle against them:

Sed quanto ista duriora sunt, tanto maior tibi virtus advocanda est, et velut cum hoste noto ac saepe iam victo acrius congreediendum.

And, on the other hand, we have seen that, in antiquity, difference/otherness was usually thought to mean inequality, and sameness (at least in principle and to some degree) equality, and, as Judith P. Hallett points out, “categorizing women as Same, reflects an assumption of sex unity, a view that unifies male and female by ascribing to the latter qualities and talents culturally valued in the former.”⁵

And we have also seen that many virtues very important to humanhood, not only bravery but also, e.g., wisdom, prudence and justice, were conventionally considered more a characteristic of men, or even “masculine”. But even if these conventions excluding women were more or less common, we should be very careful not to automatically attribute these attitudes to every author and thinker everywhere and every time - if some thinkers, such as the Stoics, explicitly regard virtue and

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¹ 9,1. Most scholars seem to regard Perpetua’s diary as authentic, e.g., for stylistic reasons (cf. also, e.g., Prinzivalli 2001: 119). Contrary to (also) early Christian ideals (see, e.g., Kunst 2007: 255 – 259; Mratschek 2007: 213-222) Perpetua does not seem to lose her female identity in showing virtus, strength, etc., despite her “facta sum masculus” (10,7); see also, e.g., Prinzivalli 2001: 121; 127 – 128; Williams 2012: 62 – 66. For a hypothesis for an egalitarian (Montanist) explanation for the androgynous “facta sum masculus”, e.g., Butler 2011: 76. –It would be interesting to examine women’s own views also on a larger scale on this subject, but it is, of course, a very difficult task due to the lack of extant sources.
² 2 Seneca uses the example of veterani also when speaking of men: Sen. prov. 4.7: Ad suspiciionem vulneris tiro pallescit, audacter veteranus cruorem suum spectat; Wilcox 2006: 99, n. 37.
³ Asmis 2009: 124. See also Wilcox 2006: 90 (referring to Sen. Marc. 3,1 funus triumpho simillimum): “when Seneca describes Livia’s progress through Italy with the funeral cortège of Drusus as “similar to a triumph”, her act is represented as public, heroic, martial, masculine”; cf., e.g., Ov. Pont. 3,1,91-94 where Ovid “uses military metaphors to encourage his wife to display virtus” (Hemelrijk 2004b: 192, n. 38).
⁴ For virtus as bravery in battle see, e.g., Eisenhut 1973: 30; 33 – 34, 136; 219.
⁵ Hallett 1989: 59.
wisdom as a (at least in principle) sex/gender-neutral ideal to be attained, this ideal should not be automatically reduced to/identified with qualities of men although, as mentioned already in the Introduction, the Stoics, too, may occasionally use conventional “masculine” expressions (like Seneca who, e.g., speaks of the virīlis sapientīa of the Stoics in Helv. 12.4), or, having conservative attitudes, as we shall also later see, even inconsistently refer to women’s inferiority (and “otherness”) in this sense.¹

Thus, despite conventional gendered language and all military and “masculine” expressions, it is very important to note that Seneca in Marc. 16,1 explicitly constructs the “ideal ethical subject” and generic norm as human, and that there is at least one striking difference between Seneca and those authors who seem to be (more or less) willing to explain a woman’s bravery and (at least some) “sameness” by her “masculine”/”manly” mind (or those authors who think that a woman’s mind is also otherwise so deficient that it must be masculinised, such as Philo of Alexandria: ἀρρενωθεῖσα τὸν λογισμὸν²): in accordance with the Stoic doctrine Seneca explicitly says that women can display bravery (and other virtues) when they reach their own, real nature - which is the same in all humans, both in males and females - and that bravery is equally well a characteristic of the nature of women:

Quis autem dixit naturam maligne cum mulierum ingeniis egisse et virtutes illarum in artum retraxisse? par illis, mihi crede, vigor, par ad honesta, libeat modo, facultas est; dolorem laboremque ex aequo, si consuevere, patiuntur.³

It is clear that Seneca here tries to encourage Marcia, but it is also clear that this aim would not have required so strong a claim, and thus it is very probably his own (Stoic) personal view.

One of the examples which Seneca uses to justify this view is the story of the heroic Cloelia, and

¹ The question whether (or to what extent) they - and Seneca especially - due to conservative attitudes see women having more impediments in acquiring this (in principle sex/gender-neutral) Stoic ideal will be discussed later in this study; for Seneca see also above p. 42.
² Phil. leg. Gai. 319-320; the quotation: 320. For this thought of Philo, e.g., Taylor 2003: 232 - 233.
³ Sen. Marc. 16,1: but who has asserted that Nature has dealt grudgingly with women’s natures and has narrowly restricted their virtues? believe me, they have just as much force, just as much capacity, if they like, for virtue; they are just as able to endure grief and toil if they are accustomed (trans. Basore, slightly modified); for honestum and honesta as synonyms to virtus, and the word vigor expressing the (necessary) power of the mind see below p. 102, also n. 2. Although Seneca due to his subject, as Saxonhouse 1985: 105 has pointed out, “does not encourage action” in his consolations but endurance, a quality needed both in men and women in his own day (see also Kowalewski 2002: 126: “Seneca versucht, Marcia - u.a. dadurch hinweg zu trösten, dass er Beispiele von Menschen anführt, die "Ähnliches erdulden mussten"”), he, as we have seen, occasionally refers also to a very active conquering of dolor and does not exclude women from having/displaying active bravery and heroism. For the importance of endurance, contempt and patientia concerning dolor and/or labor see also, e.g., Sen. Marc. 2.3;11,3; epist. 23,4; 31, 3-4; 66,14; tranq. 9,2, 9,8; ira 2,14,2; see also, e.g., Sen. epist. 51,8; 66,5;10; for this as a content of bravery in Seneca see also, e.g., Edwards 2007: 189.
so it is perhaps rather surprising that he, as said earlier, then continues in Marc. 16,2 to say that “Cloeliam - - ob insignem audaciam tantum non in viros transcripsimus” - a statement interpreted by some scholars to indicate that he regards Cloelia almost as a man.\(^1\) It is, however, important to look at the context and to note that Seneca does not necessarily express his own personal view: he uses the word “we” and states that Rome is the city “in qua Cloeliam contempto et hoste et flumine ob insignem audaciam tantum non in viros transcripsimus: equestri insidens statuae in sacra via - --.”\(^2\)

So, it is possible that this “tantum non in viros transcripsimus” contains no comment on the quality or degree of Cloelia’s bravery (or “masculinity”/?“manliness”) but that Seneca only refers to the fact that all the others who have been honoured by equestrian statues have been men and that Cloelia is the only non-male among them - in short, he tries to describe the uniqueness of the honour she has received from the city of Rome and its inhabitants. Thus, Matthew B. Roller is probably right when he argues that in Seneca’s view “Cloelia’s monument is a “normal” equestrian statue such as men otherwise have, signifying the same type and level of achievement.”\(^3\) But it is, at the same time, important to remember that Seneca continues that “Cloelia exprobrat iuvenibus nostris pulvinum ascendentibus, in ea illos urbe sic ingredi, in qua etiam feminas equo donavimus”,\(^4\) which means that at least here he seems (contrary to his (Stoic) claim emphasising “sameness” and ethical/theoretical equality in Marc. 16,1) to accept the common view that bravery is more exceptional in women and seems thus, rather typically, to use the bravery of women both as a reproach and as a challenge to men\(^5\) - a view expressed also by Quintilian who in a well-known passage says that “admirabilior in femina quam in viro virtus” and states that if one tries to incite men to brave deeds, one should rather refer to female examples because they are more effective in this respect.\(^6\)

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1 See, e.g., Edwards 2007: 190: “Cloelia, indeed, has almost been included in viros ‘among the men’”; see also Manning 1981: 89: “almost masculine behaviour”.
2 where Cloelia, who braved both the enemy and the river has been almost transferred by us, on account of her signal courage, to the list of men; the statue of Cloelia, mounted upon a horse, stands on the Sacred way (trans. Basore, slightly modified)
3 Roller 2004: 48 - 49. For the relationship between commemoration, virtues and honorary statues in Roman thinking Roller 2001; Hölkkeskamp 1996; Muth 2012; see also above p. 17, n. 2.
4 as our youths mount to their cushioned seats, Cloelia taunts them with journeying in such a fashion in a city in which even women have been presented with a horse (trans. Basore, slightly modified)
5 For women’s bravery as a reproach and a challenge, with more examples, see Barton 2001: 41 - 42, also n. 41; see also, e.g., Langlands 2004: 124 who refers to a tradition which sees “a woman’s heroism necessarily as a denigration of men” and concludes that Cloelia’s exemplum “which started out as reassurance to Marcia that women are not inferior to men, can end by functioning as a challenge to Roman youths by drawing on assumptions which seems to run directly counter to this - women are naturally inferior - - ”; see also, e.g., Edwards 2007: 189; Roller 2004: 48, n. 112.
6 Quint. Inst. 5.11,10: bravery is more remarkable in a woman than in a man (trans. Butler, slightly modified)
“vos enim, iuvenes, animum geritis muliebrem, illa virgo viri”,¹ and thus it is possible that the above-
mentioned idea was traditional and well-known already before the time of Seneca - which, of
course, does not mean that it could not have been, at the same time, also a personal view of
Seneca himself. So, perhaps we can conclude that because Seneca was willing to include it, it
hardly was in conflict with his own view concerning bravery when displayed by women.

Thus, it seems that Seneca neither regards bravery as a “masculine” virtue nor thinks that women
who, being “same”, display it (or other virtues) are “masculine” – following thus Stoic principles, but
agreeing also with those Roman ideas which do not necessarily link women's bravery to
masculinity/manliness and which are not strictly contradictory to the neutrality with which Vibia
Perpetua refers to her virtue. On the other hand, Seneca is not always entirely consistent with his
statements but expresses also more conventional and conservative attitudes emphasising women’s
“otherness,“² found also in conventional Roman thinking - e.g. that bravery is more exceptional in
women or that women display virtue to show their endless loyalty. So, he not only praises the
magnanimity and prudence of his heroic aunt³ but praises also her action in a shipwreck, i.e. how
she bravely, unafraid and endangering her own life and forgetting her weakness and tempestuous
sea remained beside her already dead husband.⁴ Likewise, Marcia typically shows pietas in her
virtus and magnitudo animi in Marc. 1,1-5. Furthermore, brave loyal women who in times of crisis
follow their husbands or sons into exile were among the favourite themes concerning women’s
bravery⁵ - and so it is not very surprising that Seneca’s Rutilia followed her son to exile “fortiter”,
and “in expulso virtutem ostendit” because “nihil illam a pietate deterruit".⁶

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¹ Cic. off. 1.61: for ye young men, show a womanish soul, you maiden a man's (trans. Miller); Langlands 2004: 126, n. 9. On the other hand, Livy does not use this idea in 2,13,11: Pace redintegrata Romani novam in femina virtutem novo genere honoris, statua equestri, donavere; in summa Sacra via fuit posita virgo insidens equo; see also, e.g., Plut. Publ. 19; cf., however, Plin. nat. 34,28: - - cum feminis etiam honore communicato Cloeliae statua equestri, ceu parum esset toga eam cingi - - .
² Other aspects of women’s “otherness” in Seneca will be discussed below; see also above p. 44, n. 1.
³ Sen. Helv. 19,4; 19,7.
⁴ Sen. Helv. 19,4-5; see also 19,7. For univira aspect (19,4) Abel 1967: 50; Reydams-Schils 2005: 174.
⁵ See also, e.g., Tac. hist. 1,3,3: Non tamen adeo virtutem sterile saeculum ut non et bona exempla prodiderit. Comitatae profugos liberos matres, secutae maritos in exilia coniuges. Other favourite themes: heroic suicides because of husbands, fathers etc. (e.g., Vell. Pat. 2.26,3 (Calpurnia); 2.88.3 (Servilia); Plin. epist. 3.16 (Arria)); see also, e.g., Woodman 1983/2004: 235; Parker 1998/2001: 164 – 167; Santoro L’Hoir 1992: 116 (esp. on Velleius); Shelton 2012: 37 – 39. See also below p. 54 – 55.
⁶ Helv. 16,7: bravely – in exile she showed bravery – nothing deterred her from showing sense of duty and love For Rutilia see also Cic. Att. 12,20,2; Dixon 1991: 112, who points out that “the same stories continued to circulate a century later”; for a tradition to use these kinds of stories see Dixon 1991: 111 – 113.
It is interesting that when Musonius discusses bravery (ἁρμονία), he, too, seems to think that women can and should display even bravery in battle:

ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀλκῆς τῆς δι’ ὅπλων μέτεστιν αὐταῖς, ἐδήλωσε τὸ Ἀμαζόνων γένος ἔθην πολλά δι’ ὅπλων καταστρεφόμενον· ὥστ’ εἶ τι ενδεί πρὸς τοῦτο τοῖς ἀλλαὶς γυναιξίν, ἄνασκησιά μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ μὴ πεφυκέναι.\(^1\)

Because he takes here the Amazons as an example he is thought to have been influenced by Plato\(^2\) who refers to the Amazons in his Laws.

Although, as discussed above, the thought that the virtues of man and woman are the same was advocated by some philosophers before Plato, it is rather exceptional that Plato uses the Amazons (and Sauromatides, the descendants of Amazons and Scythian men whom Herodotus had called Sauromatae\(^3\)) as an example that women can be trained (and have potential) to use weapons and ride horses like men,\(^4\) because not only women but also barbarians were normally regarded (employing the opposite pairs “men-women”, “Greeks-barbarians”) as “other”, like, of course, the Amazons who were both barbarians and women.\(^5\) And moreover, the Amazons were “masculine” women who seem to question the “natural” order between the sexes, i.e. between (superior ruling) men and (inferior subordinate) women.\(^6\) The same can, for the most part, be said also of the bravery of women which was usually also in Greek thinking considered something

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1 IV,44,32-35: that women partake in the skill of armed fighting the race of the Amazons proved, when they defeated many tribes in war, if, therefore, something of this bravery is lacking in other women, it is due to lack of practice rather than because they were not endowed with it (trans Nussbaum, Lutz, modified)

2 See, e.g., Nussbaum 2002a: 289; see also Geytenbeek 1963: 55.

3 4.110-117.

4 Plat. Leg. 804e;806b. It is, however, interesting that among the Socratics Aeschines of Sphettus uses in his dialogue Aspasia the stories of Rhodogyne and Thargelia apparently “as exempla to illustrate women’s capacities as rulers and warriors” (Gera 1997: 180; see also, e.g., Kahn 1994: 96 – 97); for stories of women rulers (/warriors) see, e.g., Gera 1997 (cf. also, e.g., Plut. mul. virt. 263c). Of women rulers (/warriors) can be mentioned, e.g., Artemisia I, Artemisia II and Ada I of Caria, Teuta of Illyria, Cleopatra VII of Egypt. Dynamos of the Bosporan Kingdom, Pythodorus of Pontus, and female rulers of Meroe, such as Amanirenas and Amanishakhet; see, e.g., Pomeroy 1984; 17 – 28; Isager (ed.) 1994; Salisbury 2001: 89 – 90; 345 – 346; Kearsies 2005; Trofimova 2007; Baud (ed.) 2010; Wildung 2011, and below p. 48, n. 1. For the ‘princess’ of Vix, e.g., Eluère 1992: 42 – 43; for Picenes, e.g., Lucentini 2002: 43 – 45; Percossi Serenelli 2000: 16 (‘Principessa di Sirolo’; fig. of her two chariots Calò 2008: 80); for the ‘princess’ of Kobiako, e.g., Prochorova 2001; for Sarmatians see also below pp. 48. See also below pp. 50, n. 1; 82, n. 4.

5 For women and Amazons (and barbarians) as “other” see, e.g., duBois 1982/1991, esp. 4 – 5; Moore 2010: 45; Bonfante 2011: 17 (who also mentions two other special groups of “female others”, Etruscan and Spartan women; for Spartan women see Pomeroy 2002; for archaeological evidence for Etruscan women see, e.g., Nielsen 1998; Amann 2007; Swaddling & Prag 2007); see also below p. 52, n. 2. For ideological aspects regarding the Amazons see also, e.g., Taube 2013. For barbarians and the Greek world in general see, e.g., Nippel 2002; Vassopoulou 2013.

6 A good example of this ideology is Lys. 2.4-6; see also, e.g., McInerney 2002: 324; Günther 2007: 89. For patriotic ideals in Amazonomachy see, e.g., Sebillotte Cuchet 2008: 23; Fornasier 2010a.
exceptional and “unnatural”, like, of course, women in arms, although we should not forget that the dreadful Amazons (or other brave women/female warriors) were also, at the same time, often seen as somehow fascinating and that the attitudes towards the Amazons (or “masculine” women in general) were not everywhere and everywhere in the Greek world as negative as, e.g., in the above-mentioned elite male ideology of classical Athens – e.g. in Asia Minor where the Amazons were honoured as founders of many cities, including cities, e.g., Ephesus, or where high-priestess Caesellia Maxima, probably proudly, had “Amazon” as her honorary title in Sebastopolis, Pontus. It is also good to remember that the stories about the Amazons have at least some historical and archaeological basis because it has been confirmed archaeologically that not an insignificant number of nomadic women were, e.g., in the regions around the Black Sea buried with weapons, apparently already in the Neolithic and Bronze Age, but especially later among Scythians, Sauromatians and Sarmatians.

1 Well-known examples are, e.g., Hdt. 7.99.1: Ἀρτεμισίας δὲ τῆς μάλιστα θύμα ποιεῖται ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα στρατευόμενης γυναῖκας· ἦτις ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνδρὸς αὐτῆς τε ἔχουσα τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ ἥτις ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνδρὸς αὐτή τε ἔχουσα τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ ἥτις ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνδρὸς αὐτή τε ἔχουσα τὴν τυραννίδα. (Herodotus also tells that the Athenians had offered ten thousand drachmas to anyone for arresting Arthemisia, who fought at the battle of Salamis, because “devon γάρ τι ἐποιεῦντο γυναῖκα ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας στρατεύεσθαι” (8.33.2)). For Artemisia as “other” as a woman and as a barbarian see, e.g., Goldhill 1995: 138; for Artemisia “located somewhere between Greek and barbarian” Harrell 2003, esp. 92; Sebillotte Cuchet 2008; cf. also, e.g., Ehhardt 2002 (on Teuta). For a similar thought that men have become women and women men see, e.g., Xen. oec. 7.25; Arist. pol. 1277b20-23; for women’s bravery and “manliness” in Greek drama see, e.g., Goldhill 1995: 138; Bassi 2002: 40 – 46; for the Amazons/barbarian women believed to be more or less like the Amazons and Greek tragedians with powerful, ‘transgressive’ women see Hall 1989: 202 – 203. See also Schmitt Pantel 2009: 179 – 192.

2 For this, see, e.g., McInerney 2002: 326. For compilations of tales of women displaying bravery, e.g., McInerney 2002: 326; for the anonymous Tractatus de mulieribus Gera 1997.

3 E.g. Fornasier 2007: 78 – 88; Fornasier 2010b; Weisser 2010; coins c. 4th cent. BC - 3rd cent. AD).

4 SP 295 Sebastopolis = Mitford, ZPE 87 (1991), no. 19 (2nd/3rd cent.); see Mitford 1991: 211 - 213; Chanioti 1996: 384. Sebastopolis was not far from where an important tradition located the land of the Amazons (for these traditions see, e.g., Börner 2010a), and so it has been argued that Caesellia Maxima may have claimed descent from the Amazons. Other “neighbours of the Amazons” also had their own interpretations, cf., e.g., the Amazon(s) depicted as strikingly equal in battle on locally made ‘Aquarellpelenken’ of the Bosporan Kingdom (Langner 2007: 33; cat.12-14; late 4th – early 3rd cent. BC).

5 See, e.g., Kótova 2010; Börner 2010a: 23; Börner 2010b.

6 See, e.g..., Davis-Kimball 2002/2003: 50 – 66; Terzian & Helmuth 2007; Lebedynsky 2009; Fialko 2010; Rolle 2010a; Rolle 2010b. For various Amazon myths and their relationship to archaeology see, e.g., Börner 2010a. – The intermingling of Greek and local cultures is evident, e.g. in many burials around the Black Sea, e.g., in the rich burial of a priestess in the Great Bilznitsa Kurgan (see, e.g., Kalashnik 2007); see also, e.g., Rowlandson 2004 (Egypt); Shepherd 2012 (esp. Sicily); cf. SEG II 822 (of Salambous, Dura Europos; Gascou 2011: 82; 94, n. 30); (Graeco-Phoenician) stele of Robia, Sidon; Sartre 2002: 46).
Plato’s attitudes towards women and their “masculinity” have been interpreted in different, even opposite ways. So, for example, Deborah Levine Gera in her study on the anonymous *Tractatus de mulieribus* (telling, incidentally, stories of fourteen women prominent, e.g., because of their bravery) pays attention also to Plato and states that “in sum, Plato overrules traditional gender roles and allows that women may be intelligent, successful rulers, and skillful warriors”,¹ and Kenneth Royce Moore discussing Plato’s *Laws* in his article “The Amazons - source of sex equality?” concludes that “the Amazons provide a ready model for the transition towards a more sexually inclusive social order”² whereas some other scholars have criticised that Plato’s thoughts do not mean equality but that his intention is to make women (like) men.³ But, on the other hand, it should be noted that these kinds of views are always based on views and ideologies of what is “masculine” or “feminine” and what the “essence” of man and woman is, etc. - and this applies to both modern attitudes (as is evident also in the views of those scholars mentioned above who do not see Stoicism and a woman’s “essence” compatible with each other⁴) and those of antiquity. Nancy Tuana refers to these views on “masculinity” in antiquity when she argues that “women - - can serve as guardians only to the extent that they are capable of being like men” because “essentially, guardians, both men and women, are to develop roles viewed as masculine within the Greek society: warriors, athletes, scholars, rulers”⁵ - although it is important to remember that social reality was also here more complex than ideals and ideologies presented by mainly elite male authors, i.e there were, of course, women in the above-mentioned occupations in antiquity,

¹ Gera 1997: 26; see also, e.g., Levin 1996: 13: “Others have maintained, in my view correctly, that Plato is indeed an advocate of women’s equality”.
² Moore 2010: 45. Regarding *Republic* V see also, e.g., Levin 1996: 30: “While it is certainly true that Plato does not support equality of training, education or opportunity for all women, and in that sense cannot be considered an advocate of feminism, he does argue against the common and simplistic equation of the capacity to bear children, or relative physical weakness, with the inferiority of women by nature.”
³ For these kinds of views see, e.g. Saxonhouse 1976/1997: “As Socrates attempts to turn women into men by making them equal participants in the political community, he ignores the peculiar nature of each”; Blundell 1995: 185: “Plato’s idea of women’s liberation is to convert them into honorary men. - - in his ideal state Guardian women are, in all but their child-bearing function, identical to men.”
⁴ As mentioned in the Introduction, good examples of this are, e.g., Elorduy 1936: 197 cited above p. 2, n. 2; Geytenbeek 1963: 57 cited above p. 2, n. 2; cf. also Mauch 1997: 16 cited above p. 2, n. 2.
⁵ Tuana 1992: 22; cf. also, e.g., Lefkowitz 1990: 800: “For the ancient Greeks, as for us, the standards were set by and for men. - - Since women in their society were compelled to play a subordinate role, the men assumed that their minds were as different from (and inferior to) men’s as their bodies”; 808: “Plato deals with the problem of women’s otherness by trying to make them as much like men - - as possible.”
even women athletes. And, as discussed above, it is problematic that many important human virtues were often considered more or less “masculine” and that a “human being” very often meant “a (free) man” and “a (free) man” “a human being” - but it must also be repeated that we should not cast all in the same mould: although the Stoic ideal and virtues were surely commonly regarded as “masculine” in antiquity, that should be kept apart from how the Stoics themselves viewed the thing - all the more when we discuss Musonius who, as we shall see, much more consistently than, e.g., Seneca follows the Stoic idea of the same, common humanhood of all human beings.

Despite that, also Musonius’ statements and the whole thought that women should display ἀνδρεία - especially because he sometimes even uses the verb ἀνδρίζεσθαι - have sometimes been interpreted to mean that he, too, wants to make women “virile” or “manly” - e.g. that, according to Musonius, the education which aims to produce ἀνδρεία in a woman “trangresses her female ‘nature’”, means that she acquires “qualities that are andreios (‘manly’)” and, in short, “masculinizes” her. 2 It is true that the verb ἀνδρίζεσθαι is strongly connected with the word ὁ ἀνήρ and can mean “to behave like a man” etc. But, at the same time, it is also connected with the virtue ἀνδρεία and can sometimes mean simply “to act bravely, courageously”, “to have/show bravery, courage” etc., especially when it is used immediately along with ἀνδρεία. 3 Musonius uses the verb in this way and states, when listing the individual cardinal virtues, 4 that “τὴν ἀνδρείαν φαίη τις ἂν ἴσως μόνοις προσήκειν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν. ἐξεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ τούτο ταύτη. δὲὶ γὰρ ἀνδρίζεσθαι καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα ”. 5 Of course, the word ἀνδρεία itself is also strongly connected with the word ὁ ἀνήρ and can mean also “manliness” etc., and, as discussed above, ἀνδρεία (like fortitudo and virtus) was considered rather a characteristic of a man and (more) exceptional

1 For women rulers/warriors see above p. 47, n. 5; p. 48, also n. 2; 5-6; attitudes towards women rulers were not always negative, see, e.g., Strab. 12,2,29 (on Pythodoris) cf. also, e.g., Plut. mut. virt. 263c. For women scholars, e.g., Pomeroy 1984: 61; Snyder 113 – 120; Netz 2002: 194; McLaughlin 2004; Plant 2004: 87 – 89 Lightman & Lightman 2008: 9; Küntz 2013: 46 - 47; 54 - 55.; for athletes Reese & Valiera-Rickerson 2002 (incl. winners’ inscriptions); Bain 2014: 31 - 32 (incl. iconographic evidence). 2 Whitmarsh 2001: 112 – 113; see also, e.g., Goldhill 1995: 137 – 138; Jantzen 2004: 281 – 282; Kunst 2007: 253, n. 33; Shaw 2008: 200; for a discussion of an aspect of ἀνδρεία (and ἀνδρίζεσθαι) of women connected to the defence of chastity and “tied to notions of honour and shame” discussed in Jones 2012: 111 – 112; 154 see below pp. 61; 64 – 65. 3 Most of the translators of Musonius (Lutz, Capelle, Eyben/Wouters, Nickel, Ramelli, Nussbaum, King) translate the verb in this way; see, however Jagu: agir viriliter. 4 IV,44,9-35. 5 IV,44,23-24 perhaps someone may say that bravery is a virtue appropriate to men only, that is not so, for a woman too must have bravery (trans. Lutz, slightly modified) For ἀνδρεία - ἀνδρίζεσθαι see also, e.g., Plut. Stoic. rep. 1046f-1047a (SVF 3.249); see also Long & Sedley 1987a: 379; Culyer 2002: 218.
in a woman. So, it would be in principle possible that it was also Musonius’ view that women have to become (at least somehow) manly/masculine in order to be able to acquire and display bravery. There is, however, no evidence for this in Musonius. On the contrary, in his fourth diatribe he first says that in every living creature, both in animals and plants, should be produced “τὴν ἐκεῖνῳ προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν”, and when he then continues to speak of man and woman, he analogically states that both of them should be educated to realise “τὴν ἀνθρώπῳ προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν” - which includes all the four cardinal virtues:  

Thus, Musonius still more explicitly than Seneca says that bravery (like prudence, justice and self-control) is not a masculine but a human virtue, not a virtue of a man but a virtue of a human being. The same thought is evident in Musonius’ statement of the Amazons: if ordinary women do not show the bravery of the Amazons, it is due to “ἀνασκησία μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ μὴ πεφυκέναι”. The generic norm is thus very unambiguously human in Musonius – and although Musonius often compares women to men, it is important to note that he does not do this in order to construct the “ideal ethical subject” as masculine but, as we shall also later see, in order to advocate the same opportunities for women.

Gretchen Reydams-Schils is surely right when she considers Musonius’ mention of the Amazons as one of the proofs that “the fluidity of the boundaries of gender roles is not mere theory for Musonius either” (the other proof being the unconventional marriage of the Cynic philosophers Crates and Hipparchia), and also Simon Goldhill speaks of Musonius’ “positive evaluation of the

1 See also above p. 28, n. 8 on Plutarch.
2 IV.46.2-4; the quotation is from IV.46.4: the virtue appropriate to it (trans. King)
3 IV.46.7-13; the quotation is from IV.46.8: the virtue appropriate to a human being (trans. Lutz slightly modified)
4 IV.46.8-10: the virtue appropriate to a human being, that is for both to be able to have prudence and self-control, and share in bravery and justice, the one no less than the other (trans. Lutz, King modified regarding the names of virtues)
5 Likewise, when Musonius, as we have seen, holds chastity to be the same for both sexes, he does not “feminise” men.
6 IV.44.34-35: it is due lack of practice rather than because they were not endowed with it (trans Lutz, slightly modified)
7 See above p. 42, n. 1.
8 Reydams-Schils 2005: 156; see also, e.g., Gill 2003: 46. Nussbaum 2002a: 312 points out that Musonius does not mention Hipparchia by name in his XIV diatribe Εἰ ἐμπόδιον τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν γάμος. But because Musonius here tries to convince the male querist that marriage and wife are not obstacles to the practice of philosophy, it is understandable that he mentions only men.
Amazons, as Musonius strains against the boundaries of convention and tradition.\(^1\) But at least as important is that Musonius uses the Amazons, usually regarded as “other”,\(^2\) to prove the sameness of women and their virtues, including bravery.

4.1.2. Virtues in practical life

Even though Musonius thus so far seems to follow the Stoic thought of the sameness of the virtues of man and woman even surprisingly consistently, including both sexes on equal terms in his argumentation, we should not, of course, disregard that he in his diatribes strongly refers also to traditional role differentiation and sometimes also seems to come at least very close to the above-mentioned view central to the thinking emphasising sameness/equality, i.e. that virtue is the same regardless of in which sphere of life it is used. This is especially evident when he, like Plato (Socrates),\(^3\) takes as an example justice (δικαιοσύνη) and says that both man and woman must be just because “ὅ τε ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολίτης ἀγαθὸς ἄδικος ὤν, ἥ τε γυνὴ οὐκ ἂν ὁ ὀἰκονομοίχος χρηστῶς, εἰ μὴ δικαίως”.\(^4\) This does not, however, obviously mean that he would regard a woman’s role as mother, wife and household manager as a content of her virtues in practical life - i.e. that the best possible fulfilling of these roles would be the goal to be attained through philosophy – but, as we shall see, there are, rather, other reasons for his statements.

True, it has also been argued, as mentioned in the Introduction, that women’s different position and role in that time society gradually influenced the Stoics’ views how women should in practical life put into effect their virtues,\(^5\) and scholars have examined in this light also (and expressly) Musonius' thoughts of how and for what purpose women should practise philosophy. So, for example, Sarah B. Pomeroy ends her famous book about women in antiquity with criticism towards

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1 Goldhill 1995: 141.
2 See above pp. 47 – 48. For the “otherness” of the Amazons/women considered to be (more or less) like the Amazons in Roman thinking see, e.g., Pohl 2004; Rollinger 2000; for the Celtic queen Boudicca as Amazon-like barbarian “other” Foxhall 2013: 86; for Roman attitudes towards women in arms see also, e.g., Ehrhardt 2002; Schnegg 2006; Günther 2007; Schmal 2007, and above pp. 40 – 41.
3 Plat. Men. 73a-c.
4 IV,44,12-14; the quotation is from IV,44,13-14: *a man would not be a good citizen if he is unjust, and a woman would not manage her household well, if she does not do it justly* (trans. King, Lutz)
Stoicism by saying that “Stoicism - directed women's energies to marriage and motherhood” and that this “rationalized confinement of women to the domestic sphere” is one of “the most devastating creations in the classical legacy.”¹ Pomeroy does not mention any Stoic by name, but it is possible that she refers also to Musonius, for she has earlier in her book stated of him that he “asserted that women should be given the same education as men, for the attributes of a good wife will appear in one who studies philosophy”.² This interpretation that a woman should, according to Musonius, practise philosophy in order to be better in her traditional gender roles, is supported by most other scholars,³ too, and some of them even equate Musonius’ thoughts still more precisely with conventional conservative attitudes – e.g., identifying a virtuous woman of Musonius with an ideal Roman matron,⁴ or finding parallels between Musonius, Antipater of Tarsus, Plutarch and some Neopythagoreans.⁵ It is, furthermore, important to remember that the view that virtue is the same regardless of in which sphere of life it is used, can be found not only in Plato but also, e.g., in conventional Roman thinking and Plutarch – and at least here combined with conservative

¹ Pomeroy 1975: 230; see also 131 - 132: “Despite the changing world, Stoicism, by far the most popular of the Hellenistic philosophies, reinforced traditional roles for women. This position may have been partially a response to the realization that a few respectable women – but a highly conspicuous few – were trespassing on male territory”; see also above p. 2, n. 1; cf. also Pomeroy 2002: 11. See also, e.g., Boatwright 1991b: 257: “At the end of the first and the beginning of the second centuries C.E. the domestic roles of women had been reformulated and emphasized anew by Stoic philosophers and other intellectuals who, although valorizing women as conscious participants in harmonious marriages, focused almost exclusively on women within a familial, domestic context.”

² Pomeroy 1975: 171.

³ Some examples of these very unanimous interpretations: Boatwright 1991a: 538, n. 99: “Musonius Rufus encourages women to study philosophy so that they might better perform their womanly and wifely duties”; House 1997: 159: “Musonius offered philosophy as a way to improve the woman’s ability to play her role as wife and mother and as household manager”; Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 261, n. 15: “In both treatises the chief aim of the study of philosophy is to make women into better (house)wives and mothers”; Lewick 2002: 149: “The snag about Musonius’ recommendation of philosophy for women is that it consists in turning her into a first rate household manager”; Clark 2007: 156: “Musonius - taught that women should study philosophy to be better wives and mothers”; Ramelli 2008b: 380: “If Musonius granted the same kind of capacity for virtue to women, and thus argued that they had to be educated in the very same way as men, he simply aimed at preparing them to be better wives, mothers, and household managers”; Cohick 2009: 243: “Plutarch, Musonius Rufus, and certain female Neo-Pythagorean philosophers trumpeted philosophy as the avenue toward better (read: socially acceptable) wives and mothers”; see also, e.g., Preisker 1927: 26 –27; Stadter 1965: 5; North 1977: 48; Schottroff 1980: 93; Blomqvist 1989: 112 –113; Cohen & Saller 1994: 51 – 53; 55; Hawley 1994: 75 - 76; Francis 1995: 14; Engel 2000: 377; 382; 385; Niehoff 2001: 185; Whitmarsh 2001: 102; Scharrer 2002: 130; Engel 2003: 280; Taylor 2003: 223; Jones 2012: 34; 35; 111; Shelton 2013: 118; 159.

⁴ See, e.g., Schottroff 1980: 93; see also, e.g., Ward 1990: 288 – 289; see also below p. 81, n. 5.

⁵ See, e.g., van Bremen 1983/1987: 234: “In literary and philosophical sources of the Hellenistic and Roman periods dealing with the subject of women, to name but a few, Stoics like Antipater of Tarsus and Musonius Rufus, Plutarch, some Neo-pythagoreans, the dominant theme is that of the virtuous, modest wife, whose main task it is to care for her husband and children, who is pious and silent”; see also, e.g., Hawley 1994: 76 (a parallel with Plutarch); Taylor: 2003: 333; 229 (a parallel with Pythagorean women).
and conventional gendered argumentation (stressing social/societal "otherness"), above all with the ideology of a woman's (more or less subordinate) ideal devotion to her family and home, and with the thought that chastity (σωφροσύνη, pudicitia/castitas) is a more primary virtue to a woman than to a man. And what is still more important: also Seneca seems to advocate these ideals – and so it is also essential to try to find out, whether (or to which extent) this is, after all, the case with Musonius, too.

4.1.2.1. Seneca

In De constantia sapientis 1,1 Seneca explicitly says that men are born to rule and women to obey ("ad obsequendum"), but he emphasises the traditional role of a woman especially clearly in the image of his above-mentioned heroic aunt. We have seen that he praises her magnanimity, fearlessness and prudence and describes how this "perfectissima femina" completely fulfils the ideal of a woman who is - always and everywhere, even after his death – loyal and devoted to her husband and performs at need heroic deeds for her dear one(s). Thus, he, in a typical way, strongly stresses female loyalty, as also when using the story of Rutilia who followed her son into exile. Women's absolute loyalty (and stories about it) were, as said above, important in times of crisis, especially in the late Republican and early Imperial periods, i.e. in times when old networks of loyalty, etc.,

1 This hardly means, however, that Seneca advocates this idea in its strictest form, see, e.g., Sen. ira 3.35.1: Respondisse tibi servum indignaris libertumque et uxorem et clientem: deinde idem de re publica libertatem sublatam quæreris quam domi sustulisti; see also, e.g., Hill 2001: 19; Loretto 1977: 120. On the other hand, some scholars have noted that "the wife is included in the list of people who are inferior to the man", as Vidén 1993: 112, n. 3 puts it, arguing that "it rather looks as if Seneca started the list from the bottom from slave via freedman to client, in which case the woman stands above the freedman but below the client"; see also, e.g., Mauch 1997: 18 (citing Harich 1993: 141): "Die Frau rangiert also auf einer Stufe mit den Personengruppen die „aufgrund ethnischer, juridischer oder sozialer Merkmale durch eine andere, mindere Existenzform gekennzeichnet sind.“ Mauch 1997: 18 also argues that "diese hierarchische Gesellschaftseinteilung wiederholt Seneca wenn er - - betont - - daß die Frau von Natur aus zur Passivität (pati natae), der Mann hingegen zum Handeln bestimmst sei" (referring to Sen. epist. 95.2); see also Harich 1993: 143: "die Frau geboren sei, um zu ertragen (pati natae), der Mann aber, um zu handeln", whereas Anna Lydia Motto interprets this to mean that women are "born to be enduring, naturally created to be pacific and receptive, not active, vehement, and aggressive" (Motto 1972: 156). –For Seneca and his wife Paulina see, e.g., Reydams-Schils 2005: 171 – 175; Shelton 2012: 38 – 39 (discussing also the versions in Tacitus and Cassius Dio).

2 Sen. Helv. 19.4: most perfect woman

3 Sen. Helv. 19.4-5.

4 Sen. Helv. 16. 7.

5 See also above p. 46. For these kinds of stories of loyal wives (and slaves) see, e.g, Parker 1998/2001, and Milnor 2005/2008, Harders 2008 and Hänninen 2011 mentioned below p. 55, n. 1. As Parker 1998/2001: 153 says, "later authors can draw on the cultural capital of the exempla by representing new crises in terms of older ones, using the same narrative units, and affirming the same value systems".
were breaking - as was emphasised (mirroring, at the same time, their own age) by Imperial period writers describing the times of proscriptions.¹ And it seems also clear that women’s absolute loyalty and devotion could be discussed also in the context of the changing/changed society of that time in general. As mentioned above, women’s activity in different kinds of areas in society increased especially since the end of the Republic.² Furthermore, it has been argued that the transition to the Principate resulted in at least some changes³ both in society, social structures, mentality, etc. in general, and, more specifically, in the role(s) of women – and men; the political, social/societal and military changes have made some scholars even speak of ‘crisis of masculinity’.⁴ In any case, it seems that Seneca’s discussion of the two above-mentioned ideas of the importance of women’s chastity and devotion to home should be seen not only as a part of a more “timeless” ideology referring to women’s social/societal “otherness” (and including very conventional critique towards them), but also in relation to and as a reaction against contemporary changes in women’s role(s).

So, Seneca continues that his aunt was otherwise totally reclusive in the “feminine” domestic sphere – even to the extent that she never appeared in public during the sixteen years when her husband was the prefect of Egypt; Seneca finds this admirable, as can be seen also in the end of his description:

Multum erat, si per sedecim annos illam provincia probasset: plus est quod ignoravit.⁵

Furthermore, the essence of his aunt is characterised by verecundia and modestia in their very feminine meaning, i.e. as a state of being modest, decent and demure;⁶ Seneca compares the latter virtue especially with the petulantia rustica of so many other women of his

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¹ E.g. Vell. Pat. 2,67; Cass. Dio 47,9,1; App. civ. 4,13-14; Harders 2008: 1; Hänninen 2011: 52; Milnor 2005/2008: 189 - 193; 195; see also Tregari 1991b: 211. For women’s loyalty (fides) during the proscriptions in Val. Max. 6,7,2-3, e.g., Milnor 2005/2008:196 - 198; Hänninen 2011: 50; 52; for critique towards (contemporary) women’s divorces esp. in Seneca below p. 58, also n. 3; for the heroic loyal wife in Laudatio Turiae, e.g., Hänninen 2011: 50 – 52; Milnor 2005/2008: 214 – 219; for the ideology of women’s absolute loyalty and their heroic suicides (because of their husbands etc.) in the versions of Tacitus and Cassius Dio on Paulina and Seneca’s death Shelton 2012: 38 – 39; Reydams-Schils 2005: 171 – 175; see also above p. 46, n. 5.
² See above p. 22.
³ For various aspects of these changes see, e.g., Alston 1998; Milnor 2005/2008; McCullough 2007; Van Abbema 2008; Hallett 2012; Cooley 2013.
⁴ See, e.g. Alston 1998; McCullough 2007.
⁵ Sen. Helv. 19,6: “it would be much to her credit if she had won the approval of the province for sixteen years; that she escaped its notice is still more (trans. Basore)
⁶ See also Kaster 2005: 25 for verecundia as a quality which “restrained proper women from mixing themselves in the public concerns of men”; see also, e.g., Gardner 1993: 101 - 106; Arjava 1996/1998: 244, and below p. 59, n. 4
time’ – as if, in a very conventional way, making also a distinction not only between ‘men – women’ but also between ‘exceptional women – other women’. The ideal picture is complemented by Seneca’s mention that his aunt - who has internalised the “right” place of a woman - has, when needed, devoted her energies to promoting her male relative’s (i.e. Seneca’s own) career - and in the same way Helvia completely differs from those women who “potentiam liberorum muliebri inpotentia exercent” and who “quia feminis honores non licet gerere, per illos ambitiosae sunt.” And Seneca presents her as an exception also in a wider respect: she is one of those (rare) “decent” (probæ) women who do not imitate their corrupted fellow women and is free from “feminine vices” (muliebria vitia), e.g., feeling shame of pregnancy, all kinds of make-up, unsuitable clothing, liking for jewels, gems and other wealth. And especially impuditia, “maximum saeculi malum” – whereas chastity (pudicitia) is a woman’s real and most lasting beauty, as he argues by saying to his mother that “unicum tibi ornamentum, pulcherrima et nulli obnoxia aetati forma, maximum decus visa est pudicitia”.

Thus, Seneca seems to advocate very traditional and gendered virtues and ideals (and power structures they reflect/include) for women in practical life, with a very conventional idea of a virtuous past embodied in only very few contemporary women. So, he reproaches, in a typical way, women of his day, like, e.g., Sallust blaming Sempronia who is not only impudica but also

1 Sen. Helv. 19,2: boorish insolence See also, e.g., Sen. Marc. 24,3: Seneca stresses the unique incorruptness of Marcia’s son by mentioning the “corruption of women”: Adulescens rarissimae formae in tam magna feminarum turba viros corrumpentium nullius se spei praebuit. On the other hand, it seems that the verecundia of Marcia in Sen. Marc. 3,4 means, rather, “self-control”, for it appears in this passage as a synonym of (here, as well, “neutral”) modestia: Quam in omni vita servasti morum probitatem et verecundiam, in hac quoque re praestabis; est enim quaedam et dolendi modestia. 2 Sen. Helv. 19,2.
3 Sen. Helv. 14,2: make use of their children’s power with a woman’s lack of self-control - because they cannot hold office, are ambitious through their sons (trans. Basore, modified); for this as muliebris impotentia Hallett 1989: 66; links with Tacitus Santoro L’Hoir 1994. Cf. also Seneca’s (according to Tacitus) similar vein towards Agrippina minor (see also, e.g. Manning 1973: 170 – 171; Mauch 1997: 66) who not only recalled him from exile to make him her son’s tutor (Tac. ann. 12,8; see above pp. 8, n. 4; 10, n. 1) but also promoted his career (Tac. ann. 12,8; see also Dixon 2001: 189, n. 122). For these kinds of attitudes in Seneca in general see, e.g., Hallett 1989: 66; Mauch 1997: 64 – 66; 153; Hill 2001: 24 – 25. 4 Sen. Helv. 16,2.

6 See also, e.g., Sen. Marc. 1,1: et mores tuos velut aliquod antiquum exemplar aspici; Helv. 16,3: bene in antiqua et severa institutam domo. For a longing for the “good old days” with its “virtuous” women in Columella’s Res rustica see Pomeroy 1994: 71 – 72; see also, e.g., Tac. Germ. 19-20 for still so “uncorrupted” Germanic women.
ambitious and “manly” in a “wrong” way and manifests the moral decline of the age,¹ or Tacitus in Germ. 19-20 praising Germanic women still so “uncorrupted” compared with women in Rome.

True, we should remember that Helvia was probably accustomed to value these kinds of traditional virtues² in herself and in women in general and that Seneca’s intention is both in this particular passage and in the whole consolatio to give her confidence and strength. If we examine his words against this background, we can see as one explanation for them that Seneca - in order to make his mother convinced of her exceptional bravery - wants to show her that it is natural for her to be as much above other (corrupted) women in bearing grief as she is in her virtues:

Non potes itaque ad optinendum dolorem muliebre nomen praetendere, ex quo te virtutes tuae seduxerunt; tantum debes a feminarum lacrimis abesse, quantum a> vitlis.³

As mentioned above and as we shall also later see, this strategy is rather common in Seneca. And it is also clear that the distinction between man and woman should not be exaggerated: Seneca condemns extravagance (luxuria) not only in women but also in men,⁴ and it is also important to remember that he - contrary to conventional (Roman) attitudes - does not, as discussed above, see (at least any decisive) difference between the contents of man’s and woman’s chastity but says that a man can be decent (probus) in this respect only on equal terms as a woman.⁵ It is also important to note that Seneca says in benef. 2,18,1 that “sunt aliquae partes mariti, sed non minores uxoris”⁶ and does not thus seem to belittle the part played by women.

But despite these reservations, it seems that also Seneca himself regards pudicitia as women’s most important virtue (and a more important virtue for a woman than for a man), values a woman’s reclusive

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¹ Sall. Cat. 25; see above p. 40, n. 3. For the “masculinity”, ambition and muliebris impotentia of Tacitus’ Agrippina minor see, e.g., Kaplan 1978; Santoro L’Hoir 1994, esp. 18 – 25 (cf. a very different image of Agrippina in coins, etc.; see, e.g., Ginsburg 2006; D’Ambra 2007: 161); for “männliche Frauen” in Tacitus, e.g., Späth 1994: 322 – 326; for the theme of dux femina Santoro L’Hoir 1994; see also above p. 56, n. 3. Cf. also, e.g., Ps.-Ovid’s Consolatio ad Liviam where Livia, although she possessed great, traditionally “masculine” power, and “had the opportunity and reason to use it”, she “did not, out of deference to her matrona role” (McCullough 2007: 147).
² Cf. also the above-cited Sen. Helv. 16,3: bene in antiqua et severa institutam domo.
⁴ For his (above-discussed) negative attitude towards luxuria, e.g., Sen. epist. 8,5; 114,9-11; 115,8-9;11.
⁵ Sen. epist. 94,26. This attitude can be seen also in Seneca’s thought that a woman, too, should show pudicitia because of her own internal decision - and not, for example, because of fear or yielding to the laws and orders (Sen. benef. 4,14,1).
⁶ a husband has certain duties, but those of a wife are no less important (trans. Stewart)
devotion to her family and advocates the strict dichotomy ‘public/male - private/domestic/female’. In short, he seems to be willing to construct the gender of women very conservatively (i.e. as subordinate/unpowerful, absent in public etc., linked to very gendered ideologies of power, masculinity, femininity etc.), referring to aspects of women’s social/societal "otherness". For such attitudes can also be seen not only in the above-cited Const. sap. 1,1 but also in his De matrimonio, above all in his “praise of pudicitia” in which he includes the thought of the crucial importance of a woman’s chastity in this very traditional view how and where man and woman can gain their real significance and honour:

pudicitiam inprimis esse retinendam, qua amissa omnis virtus ruit. in hac muliebrium virtutum principatus est. haec pauperem commendet, divitem extollit, deformem redimit, exornat pulchram; - - viros consulatus inlustrat, eloquentia in nomen aeternum effert, militaris gloria triumphusque novae gentis consecrat; multa sunt quae per se clara ingenia nobilitent: mulieris proprie virtus pudicitia est. haec Lucretiam Bruto aequavit, nescias an et praetulerit, quoniam Brutus non posse servire a femina didicit. haec aequavit Corneliam Gracco, haec Porciam alteri Bruto. notior est marito suo Tanaquil: illum inter multa regnum nomina iam abscindit antiquitas, hanc rara inter feminas virtus altius saeculorum omnium memoriae, quam ut excidere possit, infixit.1

And although Seneca condemns also men’s relationships outside marriage, he, in any case, typically seems, as Gunhild Vidén has noted, to have more to say about women’s impudicitia and adultery2 - and if he praises ideal loyal wives such as his aunt, he (not exceptionally among moralists (and satirists)) does not mince his words when he refers to those (corrupted) women who "non consulum numero sed maritorum annos suos computant". 3

1 Sen. matrim.: Hier. adv. Iovin. I, 49 = 319C–320B (ed. Bickel); Frassinetti p. 188 first of all, pudicitia should be kept; for when it is lost all virtue collapses. this is the chief virtue of women - - (trans. Treggiari). Mauch 1997: 19 is surely right that Seneca here refers to "eine klare Trennung der Aufgabenbereiche"; see also Geytenbeek 1963: 57: "he persist in giving them different tasks. Men should excel in outward activities", men are made illustrious by consulships, eloquence raises them to immortal fame, military glory and the triumph - - hallow them (trans. Treggiari); Treggiari 1991b: 220: "the narrowness of the sphere to which Seneca confined women – virtuous conduct towards husband and children. and probably the wise governance of the household. Cornelia, Porcia, and Tanaquil are not exalted for acting as politicians independently of their husbands or sons" – but because of their pudicitia. It is also interesting that, e.g., Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Plutarch, unlike Seneca, strongly refer to Tanaquil’s wisdom and intelligence (Dion. Hal. ant. IV,2,2; Plut. mul. virt. 243c); see also Liv. I,34-41,5 for a Tanaquil with ambition, resourcefulness and political intellect; cf. however, e.g., Sil. It. XIII, 818–820.

2 For this theme in Seneca Vidén 1993: 126 – 129, taking as an example esp. Sen. benef. 1,9,3-4; 3,16. 3 Sen. benef. 3,16,2: keep track of the years, not by the number of consuls, but of their husbands (trans. Griffin) Corbier 1991: 50 – 51 regards this as an example of that time’s misogynistic statements criticising divorces and remarriages; see also Treggiari 1991a: 42. For this favourite theme of moralists and satirists see, e.g., Treggiari 1991b: 471, also n. 181 referring to Juvenal and Martial. Moralistic themes concerning women and marriage have a rather long history also in Roman literature, see, e.g., Treggiari: 1991b: 205 - 206 for Metellus and the satires of Lucilius and Varro; for estimations of the real frequency of divorces in Rome see, e.g., Treggiari 1991a; Treggiari 1991b: 473 - 482, esp. 482. For attitudes towards women in Roman satire see also, e.g., Richlin 1984; Viden 1993; Ramelli 2008a: 2238 - 2240; Van Abbema 2008.
And there is still one interesting aspect in Seneca’s above-discussed praise of his aunt in relation to his contemporary society. For it is important to remember that the information writers offer concerning the persons they mention in their writings can be very explicitly related or even congruent with their ideologies and ideals or other aims. It seems that Seneca’s aunt was actually a rather influential woman: in order to be able to contribute to his career she must have had, as Suzanne Dixon convincingly argues, also political and social power and used apparently both her money and patronage. Furthermore, it is known that governors’ wives had official public duties and that although reactions to women speaking in public or appearing at court (and using their eloquencia) were not necessarily positive, women did not generally stay only at home but acted in different kinds of areas in society, also in public. So, it is also important to note that when Seneca praises the secluded lifestyle of his aunt and in a very conservative way wants to strictly separate the spheres of men and women, his attitudes seem to be more conservative than the normal practices in the society of his time - and still more explicitly directed against the changes of the role(s) (and spheres) of women they reflect.

It is, however, at the same time, very important to notice that Seneca, regardless of his many conservative ideals, nowhere (as will be discussed below in more detail) connects the traditional role of a woman with her practice of philosophy or gives us to understand that this role or the best possible fulfilling of it would be the goal to be attained through philosophy.

1 A good example of how we often get acquainted only with a tiny section of the life of the persons mentioned is Ummidia Quadratilla: in one of his letters Pliny mainly tells of her “unsuitable” fondness for pantomime actors (Plin. epist. 7.24.4-5), but from other sources we know that she accomplished also some other things in her life, e.g., built at least an amphitheatre and a temple in her native town Casinum (CIL 10.5813 (ILS 5813); Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 238, n. 101; Dixon 2001: 109; 188, n. 109; Dixon 2004: 61; 71, n. 20.)
2 Dixon 2001: 103; 186, n. 60.
3 See, e.g., Salisbury 2001: 281; d’Ambra 2007: 133 - 134. For occasional, apparently unsuccessful, criticism against them see, e.g., Dixon 2001: 103.
4 A well-known example of these kinds of attitudes is Valerius Maximus’ statement “Ne de his quidem feminis tacendum est, quas condicio naturae et verecundia stolae ut in foro et iudiciis tacerent cohibere non valuit” preceding his descriptions of Maesia (Amesia Sentinas), Gaia Afrania and Hortensia (8.3.1-3). It is also indicative and typical that the eloquence and proficiency of women is due to their “unfeminity” and/or because they embody their fathers’ talent. So, Hortensia pleaded the case “constanter et feliciter” because “repraesentata enim patris facundia” and “revixit tum muliebri stirpe Q. Hortensius verbisque filiae aspiravit” (8.3.3); see also Quint.1.1.6 on Laelia: Laelia C. filia reddidisse in loquendo paternam elegantiam dicitur. Likewise, Maesia expresses herself “non solum diligenter sed etiam fortiter” because she “sub specie feminae virilem animum gerebat” and thus “Androgynen appellabant” (8.3.1). See also above p. 56, n. 3 and below p. 84, also n. 6.
5 See above p. 22; below pp. 84 – 86; 102, n. 1.
4.1.2.2. Musonius, Epictetus, and Hierocles

1. Conservative ideals?

If we consider all statements of Musonius his own personal views, it easily seems that the conservative ideal of a (more or less) subordinate woman devoting herself completely to her home, children and husband belongs also to his thinking, for typical elements of this ideal are abundant in his III and IV diatribes (though we should, of course, remember that in real life, outside ideologies and ideals, household management was an active occupation requiring, e.g., skills to organise\(^1\)). Thus, Musonius says that bravery is necessary for a woman because she has to have, like hens and other birds, an ability to defend her offsprings, whereas she needs justice in order to manage her household well and not to wrong her husband, and besides, a just woman loves her children more than life.\(^2\) A good (ἀγαθή) woman must be οἰκονομική, ἐκλογιστική τῶν οἶκω συμφερόντων and ἀρχική τῶν οἰκετῶν\(^3\) who is, moreover, ready to take tasks thought (by some) to belong to slaves\(^4\) – and Musonius even complements his description by saying that a brave woman is ready to serve (ὑπηρετεῖν) her husband with her own hands.\(^5\) Furthermore, Musonius mentions as a woman’s work spinning/weaving (ταλασία, lanificium)\(^6\) which, as said above, was regarded during antiquity as one of the most important virtues of women and which had traditionally had a very important moral and ideological meaning especially for the Romans.

In addition to lanificium, we can easily see in Musonius also other central, expressly Roman ideals. As mentioned above, Cynically oriented ascetic ideals concerning modest lifestyle and frugality strengthened in later Stoicism and are very prominent also in Musonius\(^7\) - but it is, at the

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1 See, e.g., D’Ambra 2007: 94 – 96. Cf. also women as household heads (esp. due to widowhood), not a rare phenomenon at that time; see, e.g., Hübner 2013: 130 – 131; Osiek & McDonald 2005: 154 – 159; Bain 2014.
2 III,40,10-12; IV,44,14-15;28-32.
3 III,40,10-12: practiced in the management of a household, capable of estimating what is profitable to it and fit for rule the household slaves
4 III,40,8-12;42,5-6;8-9.
5 III,42,7-8.
6 IV,46,13-16;20-21; see also III,42,11-15.
7 See above p. 39.
same time, clear that he by idealising a modest and industrious lifestyle also agrees with Roman ideals.\(^1\) Furthermore, he says that a brave woman is ready to breastfeed her own children\(^2\) - an ideal which had been survived despite the fact that in reality particularly the women of wealthier classes had not since the end of the Republican era had a custom to breastfeed their children.\(^3\) And likewise, a brave women uses her bravery to defend her family and to protect her σωφροσύνη,\(^4\) and it is also striking that when Musonius, like, for example, Antipater and Hierocles,\(^5\) emphasises the ideal of partnership, he exceptionally strongly and as if in a very Roman way connects concordia (ὁμόνοια) with it, an ideal which he deals when speaking of justice: a just woman is also an absolutely like-minded companion.\(^6\) And, as said before, in an extremely traditional way Musonius mentions as characteristics of a good (ὁγοθη) woman management of the household and σωφροσύνη,\(^7\) which has made some scholars assume that he wanted a woman to carry out her σωφροσύνη according to the role of an ideal Roman matrona.\(^8\) But what is still more important, it may also seem that Musonius has not only absorbed the traditional (Roman) ideal of a woman (and thus progressed very far away from the early Stoics’ radical ideals of practical equality) but that he, unlike Seneca, also connects a woman’s practice of philosophy and her traditional virtues (and role) together completely unambiguously, especially in III,40,8-23 where he gives one to understand that the practice of philosophy produces in a woman (e.g.) σωφροσύνη and (good) management of the household.

It is, at the same time, however, clear that we should above all try to understand why Musonius sets forth all these conservative gendered ideals and virtues, although he, as we have seen, shows in these same diatribes surprisingly “egalitarian” (and as we shall see, also very radical) attitudes.

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1 Classical examples of this kind of admiration for modest lifestyle are Livy’s descriptions of Lucretia (1,57,9) and Cincinnatus (3,26,7-8); see also above p. 17, also n. 2. for Roman admiration for the modest lifestyle of the ancestors contrasted to the later extravagance seen as moral decline.
2 III,42,6-7. For this ideal in Roman authors (including Favorinus in Aul. Gell. NA 12.1; Tac. dial. 28-29; Tac. Germ. 20.1) see, e.g., Dixon 1988: 3; 122 - 123; Reydams-Schils 2005: 129, also n. 29; d’Ambra 2007: 107.
3 Dixon 1988: 3; 122; 128.
4 III,40,35-42,1; IV,44,24-32; see also III, 40,26-27.
5 For Hierocles’ ideal of partnership see Περὶ γάμου (Stob. IV,22,24).
6 III,40,25-27; for the importance of ὀμόνοια/concordia for Musonius see also diatr. XIIIIB. How Musonius by emphasising concordia is connected with the traditional Roman marriage ideal see also Dixon 1991: 107 - 108, esp. n. 21; for other aspects of ὀμόνοια Ramelli 2008b: 373 – 374; 378.
7 III,40,8-12;17-22; see also III,42,27-28.
8 E.g. Ward 1990: 288; see also, e.g., Jones 2012: 111.
This fact is occasionally detected by (and causing astonishment in) some scholars discussing Musonius, among them, interestingly, even some of those who argue that Musonius wants that women practise philosophy only in order to become better in their traditional roles. And it is in fact easy to see that Musonius does his best to prove that a woman can both practise philosophy and be an excellent wife, mother and homemaker in accordance with traditional (Roman) ideals. And the reason for this is, of course, that he, unlike the early Stoics or, e.g., Plato in his Republic, does not outline a utopia transforming the structures of the whole community but presents his challenge to real, existing society - i.e. it should not be forgotten that he argues all the time in order to convince his listeners that it is acceptable and useful for women to practise philosophy (and get the same education). An important tone in his argumentation is what benefit others, above all her husband, can get when a woman practises philosophy, an aspect which is very explicit in his words in III.42.9-11 by which he brings to climax his description of a woman who has practised philosophy:

"(sr' oúc ãn õ toisóúthi gvnì méga mèn õfrèlou eìp tò w gygymhótpo, kósmos õ de
toí̃s pròsèkousoi õénei, pàròdèìmà õ de xhrèotò õaiès épístàmatéévàs õútìv;"

As mentioned above, there is also epigraphic and iconographic evidence for an increasing number of women whose education was apparently, at least to some extent, appreciated and who probably also themselves were proud of it, and, as Emily A. Hemelrijk argues, reasons to educate daughters may, at least in some families, have been included their strong intellectual interests. Despite that we should keep in mind that a woman who develops herself for her own sake (e.g. in philosophy) aroused often prejudices. That Musonius is all the time aware of traditional attitudes towards women, is evident also from the fact that he frequently tries to anticipate and

1 See, e.g., Hill 2001: 33: “Musonius is a puzzling figure because his reader begins to wonder if what s/he is actually dealing with is a skilled feminist propagandist, able to appeal to Roman prejudices, all the while promulgating a subversive programme for reform”; see also, e.g., Nussbaum 2002a: 297 where she states that the third – as also the fourth - diatribe “is a strange combination of boldness and reticence”; Allen 1985: 173 – 180.
2 E.g. Engel 2003: 283: “Musonius' arguments about women are of two kinds.- -The deontological argument is that, since women are just like men in all ethically relevant respects, a principle of egalitarianism requires that equal people receive equal treatment. However, his consequentalist arguments seem to work in a very different direction: if you want your wife to be a better domestic servant, teach her philosophy. It is hard to reconcile the two”; Engel 2000: 386 – 387.
3 Cf. also Hemelrijk 1999/2004 who rightly argues that Musonius “defended female education against critics” (p. 214) but does not try to discern his own views from the concessions he thus has to make.
4 would not such a woman be a great help to the man who married her, an ornament to her relatives, and a good example for women who know her? (trans. Lutz, slightly modified)
disprove different kinds of (very conservative) objections – e.g. that it is not characteristic of women practising philosophy to have/show σωφροσύνη, or that such women abandon tasks traditionally belonging to them.1

Thus, it is clear that when Musonius immediately after that, in III,42,16-19, still continues that “ἐγὼ δὲ οὐχ ὅπως τὰς γυναίκας τὰς φιλοσοφούσας ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀξιώσαιμ’ ἂν ἀφεμένους τῶν προσηκόντων ἐργῶν εἶναι περὶ λόγους μόνον’ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσους μεταχειρίζονται λόγους, τῶν ἐργῶν φημὶ δεῖν ἐνεκα μεταχειρίζεσθαι αὐτούς2, we should not without question assume that he expresses his own view concerning the relation between the practice of philosophy, virtues, and tasks and duties of practical life. It is also necessary to notice that even where Musonius (in order to persuade his listeners) sets forth the traditional ideal of women, his statements are not after a closer examination as conservative as they at first glance may appear, but differences in gender roles seem to blur in many places at least to some degree. So, when Musonius, for example, speaks of the readiness of a brave and industrious woman to do the so-called slaves’ works, we should note that industriousness and ability to hard work are virtues of both sexes, just as “ability to work with one’s own hands” (σύτουργία),3 and that it is characteristic of him (in the same way as of many other Stoics and Cynics, too4) to refer

1 III,42,11-15: ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία, φασί τινες, ὅτι αὐθάδεις ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ θρασείας εἶναι ἀνάγκη τὰς προσιούσας τοῖς φιλοσόφοις γυναῖκας, ὅταν ἀφέμεναι τοῦ οἰκουρεῖν ἐν μέσοις ἀναστρέφων τοῖς ἀνδράσι, καὶ μελετῶσι λόγους καὶ σοφίζωνται καὶ ἀναλύσουσι συλλογισμούς, δέουν οἴκοι καθημένας τὰς ναυαγοῦρες.

2 For these prejudices see in more detail, e.g., Houser 1997: 182; 189; Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 84 - 88; Mratschek 2007: 212 – 213; see also, e.g., Blomqvist 1989: 113: “Many women actually did partake in philosophical discussions and accordingly may have shown themselves more clever than the men in argumentation. As has been displayed above, this irritated some men”; see also, e.g., Deming 2004: 76, n. 104 (for Philodemus and Lucian). Much-cited examples of mockery to women practising philosophy are, e.g., Hor. epod. 8,15-16; Juv. sat. 6,444-445; Luc. merc.cond. 36. On the other hand, Karin Blomqvist argues (mainly on the basis of or. LXI) that Musonius’ pupil Dio Chrysostom, influenced most probably by Musonius' teachings, regarded women as “being capable of independent philosophical thinking” (Blomqvist 1995: 183; 185; 188; see also Blomqvist 1989: 109; 114). For “τὰς προσιούσας τοῖς φιλοσόφοις γυναῖκας” as evidence for women attending to philosophical lectures and studying philosophy seriously see Lewick 2002: 141, n. 31; Nussbaum 2002: 297; 323, n. 30; see also Rawson 2003: 203. A well-known example of women devoted to philosophy is Cicero’s friend Caerellia, “studio videlicet philosophiae flagrans” (Cic. Att. 13,21a,2); see also, e.g., Lewick 2002: 146 - 149 for other examples of such women, including the empresses Plotina and Julia Domna; for unknown addressees, women very interested in philosophy, of Diogenes Laertius and Nicomachus of Gerasa Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 38 – 40; 124; for inscriptions, e.g., Barnes 2002; Lewick 2002: 134.

2 I would not expect the women who practise philosophy to cast aside their appointed tasks for words only any more than men, but I say that their discussions should be conducted for the sake of actions (trans. Lutz, King modified).

3 III,42,5-6;28; XI,80,15; XIIIB,90,8-10; for this ideal in Hierocles see Οἰκονομικός in Stob. IV, 28,21, p. 697,12-13. For attitudes of the Roman elite towards work see below p. 74, with notes.

4 For this theme in other Stoics and Cynics see Geytenbeek 1963: 105.
idealising to the lifestyle of slaves - i.e. that it is industrious and free of luxury and thus exemplary.¹

And in a similar way the thought of a close relationship between parents and children applies also to men, for both parents should always act for the good of their children, and also a man should, when needed, fight for his wife and children.² And if Musonius says that a woman should be a faithful and fond partner of her husband, it is obvious that the same applies equally well to a man: companionship, love and concordia are the core of the whole marriage ideal of Musonius.³

It is, of course, necessary to notice that although Musonius has important reasons to treat conservative ideals and virtues, this does not mean that these thoughts could not, at the same time, be his own, personal attitudes. A good example is the above-mentioned demand that shameful (αἰσχρόν) should be avoided at any cost,⁴ which Musonius discusses in connection with bravery and σωφροσύνη of women. For it could be possible that this demand would include a reference to the defence of chastity which was, as said above, according to the conservative thinking, one of the most important “acceptable” reasons for a woman, when needed, to display bravery — and thus also a reference to an idea that chastity is a more important virtue for a woman than for a man, i.e. that chastity is a more primary aspect in woman’s than in man’s self-control. This thought is not at all impossible, especially when we remember that Seneca, although he otherwise sees no (at least no decisive) difference in the contents of man’s and woman’s chastity, states that pudicitia is “muliebrum virtutum principatus”.⁵ Furthermore, also Epictetus says of women that “προσέχειν οὖν ἄξιον, ἵνα αἴσθωνται, διότι ἐπ’ οὐδενὶ τίμωνται, διότι ἐπ’ ὀὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ τιμῶνται ἀ τῷ κόσμῳ φαίνεσθαι καὶ αἰδήμονες”.⁶ When we, however, examine this statement of Epictetus closer, we can observe that he does not agree with Seneca, for he criticises here

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1 See, e.g., XVIIIA,114,19-26; XVIIIIB,118,35-120,7.
2 VII,58,21-24; XVI,102,28-30. Moreover, Valery Laurand refers to III,40,27 (in which Musonius says that a woman who practises philosophy carefully protects her husband and children (“ἀνδρός γε καὶ τέκνων ἐπιμελὴς κηδεμών”)) and points out that “on retient cette formule masculine, pour la femme, dans un rôle qui reviendrait plutôt traditionnellement au mari” (Laurand 2003: 95; 112, n. 44). See also Reydams-Schils 2005: 129 who sees breastfeeding manifesting the Stoics’ view of the parental bond in general and argues that “in the case of thinkers such as Musonius, what the Stoic view amounts to is that the parental bond can be integrated into the philosophical life.”
3 XIIIA,88,17-23; XIIIB,90,6-8;13-14; XIV,94,2-9.
4 IV,44,24-28; see also III,40,35-42,1.
6 Epict. ench. 40: it is worth while for us to take pains, therefore, to make them understand that they are honoured for nothing else but only for appearing decent and modest (trans Oldfather, modified regarding the translations of virtues mentioned).
that men make women imagine that they do not have other value than to be men's bed companions, which makes them then beautify themselves and put their all hopes in this ("ἐν τούτῳ πάσας ἔχειν τὰς ἐλπίδας"). Thus, it is clear that Epictetus does not say that αἰδώς and κοσμιότης would be in the common – and especially in the "ultra-feminine" - meaning women's most important virtues but that they are their most important properties and their real value in this area of life – as also men's, which Epictetus frequently states, e.g., when he says that both an adulterer and a man who concentrates on charming women - for example, by beautifying himself – lose among other things their αἰδώς and κοσμιότης.¹

Attention should also in Musonius be paid to the context, i.e. that it is Musonius' intention in this passage to justify why bravery is necessary also for a woman, and thus we should not draw far-going conclusions and assume that he treats a woman's chastity in a conservative, gendered way. The most decisive fact is, however, that Musonius says elsewhere in his fourth diatribe that this avoiding of shameful (αἰσχρόν), i.e. "αἰδῶ πρὸς ἅπαν αἰσχρόν",² applies in the same way also to men³ and that he cannot, as in the conservative thinking indicating women's "otherness", mean by this shameful different things in a woman than in a man, for he considers, as we have seen, the content of man's and woman's chastity completely the same. And it is also of importance that unlike many writers, e.g., Plutarch who stands for conservative thinking concerning a woman's σωφροσύνη, Musonius does not use the word σώφρων as a general epithet of a "decent" woman but only when he deals with the content of σωφροσύνη.⁴

Martha C. Nussbaum regards Musonius' condemning of the sexual double standard as a significant indication of his willingness to go beyond the norms of his time.⁵ She and Richard Saller have, however, paid attention to the fact that although Musonius in his XII diatribe condemns men's relationships with slaves, he does not condemn them – as Saller puts it – "on

¹ See esp. II,4,1-2;4,11;10,18 ; IV,2,8-9;9,6-10.
² IV,48,3.
³ This is evident in IV,48,3-4 in which Musonius combines this thought with the genesis of σωφροσύνη in man and woman: εἶτα δὲ ἐμποιητέον αἰδῶ πρὸς ἅπαν αἰσχρόν· ἣν ἔγγενομένων ἀνάγκη σώφρονας ἐἶναι καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα.
⁴ III,40,17-22; IV,48,3-4. For Plutarch see above p. 26. Cf. also, e.g., the statement "γυναικὸς δὲ μᾶλλον ἁρετὰ σωφροσύνη" of the Neopythagorean Phintys, see above p. 26.
⁵ Nussbaum 2002a: 298 – 299; see also, e.g., Williams 2010: 272.
the grounds that it exploited and abused slave women”.\footnote{Saller 1998: 89; Nussbaum 2002a: 307 – 308 ; see also Bradley 1994: 138 – 139; Goessler 1999: 112; Brenk 2000/2002: 274; cf also Osiek & McDonald 2005: 105; Swain 2013: 337. It is also important to note that Musonius’ pupil Dio Chrysostom expresses the thought of the equal humankind of prostitutes (or. VII,133-138, esp. 138; Blomqvist 1989: 58 – 59; see also Gill 2000: 606; Foucault 1984: 195; Brenk 2000/2002: 274 – 275).} On the other hand, Runar M. Thorsteinsson has argued that “his rebuke of the master’s abuse of the slave-maid goes hand in hand with his general understanding of virtue and its duties, which, in turn, is rooted in the Stoic theory of universal humanity”, adding that “the cardinal virtue ‘justice’ (δικαιοσύνη) is of particular importance here”.\footnote{Thorsteinsson 2010: 51 - 52. See also Treggiari 2003: 166: “Only the most idealistic, for instance, the Stoic Musonius Rufus, objected to the double standard and the sexual exploitation of slaves”; Rawson 2003/2005: 202. See also Williams 2010: 248; 272 – 274; 417, n. 22.} And it is true that it is not probable that a philosopher who says that justice’s essential content is “εὖ ποιεῖν μὲν θέλειν, κακοποιεῖν δὲ μὴ θέλειν ἀνθρώποιν ὄντα ἀνθρώπους”\footnote{IV,48,10-11; see above p. 38.} and who very strongly emphasises φιλανθρωπία and εὐεργεσία towards fellow human beings,\footnote{VIII,66,7-11; XVI,92,31-33; XVI,104,32-36; XVII,108,14; XIX,122,22-32.} would not have cared about the dignity and humanity of enslaved and abused women.

So, it is likely that there is another reason for Musonius’ choice of words. In his twelfth diatribe Musonius castigates men’s deficiency of self-control in their sexual life, and this diatribe is an especially good example of how Musonius can very deliberately choose a strategy by which he – disproving potential, mostly very conservative objections – strives for his goal and concentrates on only one perspective which he considers efficient. In this time the aim of this perspective is to prove the full paradoxicality of the prevailing situation. Thus, Musonius, in order to make men abandon all relationships outside marriage (i.e. also the relationships with prostitutes and slaves), constructs his description piece by piece, operates with the requirements traditionally set on the chastity of man and woman and demands from men the same moral strength as they have traditionally demanded from women – he, for example, urges men to think the horror they feel if a woman behaves like they and enters into relationship, e.g., with her slave\footnote{XII,86,10-38.} – until he finally condenses in front of his (male) listeners the situation in its whole paradoxicality: those who are in the ruling position in society (and who are the so-called stronger in mind) – i.e. men – are less able to control their desires (ἐνθυμησία) than those who are ruled, i.e. women.\footnote{XII,88,1-4.} Thus,
Cora E. Lutz is undoubtedly right when she regards the end of this diatribe as one of those rare passages in which Lucius has been able to preserve his teacher’s speech manner characterised by fine irony. But, on the other hand, the fact that Musonius is able to play in this way with attitudes and prejudices of his (male) audience indicates that such views must have been common enough still in Musonius’ time in the first century – again a good reminder of how conservative views were still prevailing among more “egalitarian” ones.

2. Practical equality and division of tasks

i. Within the household

Because one can, according to the Stoics, as a rational being acquire virtue regardless of external circumstances and one’s position in society, the Stoics are, as said earlier, often regarded as conservatives who advocate theoretical equality but do not support the practical equality of the sexes and want to confine women to the home or even to subordinate them – i.e. that they strongly stress women’s social/societal “otherness”. It is, however, interesting that, unlike many scholars argue, women’s social/societal “otherness”. It is, however, interesting that, unlike many scholars argue, 

1 Lutz 1947: 26, also n. 103; see also Thorsteinsson 2010: 51. For Musonius’ use of a rhetorical ploy see Reydams-Schils 2005: 157; see also, e.g., Broote 1996: 327, n. 102. Cf., e.g., Patterson 1992: 4712 & 1999: 130, n. 31 (criticising Foucault 1984: 201 - 202): “Foucault’s analysis of this passage as imposing a reciprocal obligation of fidelity upon husband and wife - - - is highly tendentious or simple wishful thinking. Musonius counsels the husband to restrain himself, and then asks rhetorically: “what if the wife is unfaithful with a slave or servant?” Would not that be intolerable? And do we expect a wife to have more self-control than the husband, the proper ruler of the household? The underlying assumption is that such behavior on a wife’s part is completely reprehensible, not that fidelity is a mutual obligation.” Foucault (1984: 201), like Patterson, ignores irony and paradoxes Musonius uses to persuade his male listeners, arguing that Musonius himself regards the man as the ruling one: “Et si Musonius trouve à la fois légitime et naturel que l’homme, dans la direction de la famille, ait plus de droits que la femme - - . Mais, d’autre part, cette symétrie des droits se complète par la nécessité de bien marquer, dans l’ordre de la maîtrise morale, la supériorité de l’homme”. Examples of this kind of irony, leading easily at first glance to incorrect interpretations, can be found in Epictetus, too, see, e.g., II,4.8-11.

2 For gendered spheres see above pp. 52 – 53; below pp. 71 – 72; 73, also n. 9; for subordination, e.g., Thraede 1977: 87: “Obwohl auch er von der „Herrschaft des Mannes“ spricht - - - die ethische Gleichwertigkeit der Geschlechter wird vorausgesetzt”; Balch 1983: 439: “Antipater, Musonius, Hierocles and Paul all understand the wife to be “similar” or even “equal” - - - to her husband, but inconsistently, all four subordinate her in practice”; Balch 1981: 144; 146 - 147; Engel 2003: 279: “All his arguments seem to aim at keeping women in the social position that they occupied in his lifetime: that of domestic laborers living under the authority of their male relations”; 287; Millnor 2005/2008: 249 - 250: “Indeed, even at the same time that he argues that women should study philosophy – since they are moral equals to men – Musonius continues to emphasize the separate spheres of male and female, and the necessity for the wife to subordinate herself to her husband’s needs”; above pp. 1 – 2; below p. 79, also n. 4; cf. Trapp 2007: 207: “Theoretical acknowledgement of a certain degree of equality - - - coexists with a straightforward acceptance of traditional social and political inequality.”
this interpretation does not seem to be valid especially in Musonius, above all in his thoughts concerning the division of tasks between the sexes but that the “sameness” of man and woman means also at least some practical equality, with an emphasis to women as individuals, not as “other”, i.e. as members of a group collectively different from and inferior to men.

As with respect to σωφροσύνη, it can at first sight seem that Musonius’ statements concerning the management of the household (οἰκονομική) – and women’s traditional role generally – are also his own views. When we, however, examine them closer, we can see that this is obviously not the case – although Musonius still in the end of the third diatribe returns to the same theme and even assures that a doctrine which regards it as virtue (“ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν οἰκονομικὴν”) urges to manage the household. It is, of course, already essential to notice that when the Stoics, at the least the early Stoics, speak of οἰκονομική as a virtue, they do not refer to a women’s traditional role but to one of the properties of the wise, to be precise “ἐξες θεωρητική [καὶ πρακτική] τῶν [τῶν] οίκω συμφερόντων”, and it is quite possible that at least something of this can be seen also in Musonius. For this definition brings to mind the above-mentioned passage in the beginning of the third diatribe in which Musonius, referring to this “what is profitable to the household”, starts to enumerate properties of a “good” (ἀγαθή) woman and says that “{oúttíka deī οἰκονομικήν εἶναι τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ ἐκλογιστικὴν τῶν οἴκω συμφερόντων καὶ ἀρχικὴν τῶν οἰκετῶν “. Certainly this does not yet exclude the possibility that Musonius, as a later Stoic, has in his own thinking connected οἰκονομική expressly to the traditional role of women. There are, however, many reasons which suggest that his statements can much more probably be explained by the fact that he tries to make his listeners accept that women should practise philosophy and get the same education. This aspect is, as we have seen, a through-going theme in the whole third diatribe and in the large part of the fourth, too, and is very explicit in the end of the third diatribe in which Musonius speaks of household management as a virtue: it is a question of the above-discussed passage in which Musonius by all means tries to disprove conservative objections that the practice of philosophy makes women abandon σωφροσύνη and their traditional tasks.

1 III,42,27-28; the quotation is from III,42,28.
2 See, e.g., Ar. Did.: Stob. II.7,11g,p.100.2-6W.; Natali 1995: 114. For this virtue in more detail see Natali 1995: 114 –116.
3 SVF 3,267= Andronicus περὶ ποιδῖν p.20,21 Schuchardt; see also, e.g., Ar. Did.: Stob.II,7b, p.95.9-23W.; Natali 1995: 115.
4 III,40,10-12; see above p. 60, also. n. 3.
The thought that a woman's virtues and her traditional role are connected with each other is, in the first place, in contradiction with how Musonius seems to understand the relationship between virtues and tasks of practical life, for in his XI diatribe he states that these tasks should be chosen so that they do not be too heavy and prevent one from concentrating on practising philosophy and on seeking of wisdom.\(^1\) And a clear example is also the last part of the fourth diatribe: after stating that some works are called women's and some men's works because of the difference in their physical strength,\(^2\) he continues that this is not the case with virtue by saying that "ὅσα μέντοι τήν ἀναφορὰν ἔχει εἰς ἀρετήν, ταῦτα φαίη τις ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐπ’ ἴσον ἑκατέρα προσήκειν φύσει".\(^3\) And when he in his sixth diatribe, referring also to the practical aspect of virtue, says that "ἡ ἀρετή - - ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν οὐ θεωρητικὴ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρακτικὴ",\(^4\) his thought is simply that a human being should be able to put into effect the theoretical knowledge expressing each cardinal virtue, i.e. he/she should be trained to follow above all the very Stoic understanding of good and bad.\(^5\) Musonius presents this view also in the end of the fourth diatribe, especially clearly in one passage in which he discusses bravery and emphasises that "καὶ μὴν τὸν παιδευόμενον ὀρθῶς, ὡστὶς ἂν ἦ, εἴτε ἄρρην εἴτε θήλεια, ἐβιστέον μὲν ἀνέχεσθαι πόνου, ἐβιστέον δὲ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι θάνατον, ἐβιστέον δὲ μὴ ταπεινοῦσθαι πρὸς συμφορὰν μηδεμίαν."\(^6\)

It is indicative that Musonius connects virtues to the traditional role of women only where he obviously tries to persuade his listeners. A good example of this can be found again in the last part of the fourth diatribe: both in the beginning and end of this section Musonius uses this kind of persuasion in order to make his thought of daughters' equal philosophical education accepted – but

\(^1\) Esp. XI,80,27-82,5. Engel 2000: 386 argues that because Musonius singles out physical labour in the open air, such as farming and shepherding, “as conducive to philosophy” and assigns these tasks to men, he “implicitly privileges the male realm of activity over the female.” It is, however, clear that the most important thing is, as said before, that tasks do not prevent one from concentrating on the practice of philosophy, and it seems that Musonius’ other recommendations are at least somehow dictated by the situation and the subject under discussion, and so he, e.g., in his III diatribe regards the management of the household as one of the suitable tasks for a philosopher (III,40,10-16); see also Asmis 1996: 82: “In pointed opposition to Plato, as well as Aristotle, Musonius asserts that the job of being a householder “belongs most of all to a philosopher” (fr.3). A person does not need to be a soldier or ruler in order to be a philosopher.”

\(^2\) IV,46,16-23;29-31.

\(^3\) IV,46,31-32: but whatever things have reference to virtue, these one would properly say are equally appropriate to the nature of both (trans. Lutz)

\(^4\) VI,52,8-9: virtue is not only theoretical but also practical knowledge

\(^5\) Esp. VI,52,8-25;54,7-25;54,30-56,11.

\(^6\) IV,48,4-7: and the person educated correctly, whoever it be, whether male or female, must become accustomed to endure toil, to not fear death, and to not become dejected in the face of any misfortune (trans. King)
when he in the middle systematically describes both this (same) education and its result, i.e. the
virtues themselves, it is evident that the contents of these virtues are exactly the same for man and
woman and, as discussed above, for the most part congruent, e.g., with Chrysippus’ definitions. And
on the other hand, when we, for example, examine the end of the fourth diatribe, i.e. Musonius’
general statements especially of the significance of theory and of what philosophy is, it becomes still
more evident that he cannot see virtues and practice of philosophy as inseparable in connection with
the traditional roles of man and woman and that he at least in this respect sees no difference between
men’s and women’s practice of philosophy or its aim. Thus, even if he in IV,48,20-23 says that “καὶ
οὐ τοῦτο βούλομαι λέγειν, ὅτι τρανότητα περὶ λόγους καὶ δεινότητα τις περιττήν χρή προσεῖναι
ταῖς γυναιξίν, εἶπερ φιλοσοφήσοισιν ὡς γυναῖκες”, he immediately after gives one to understand
that this applies to men as well by saying that “οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἀνδρῶν ἐγώ πάνυ τι τοῦτο ἐπαινῶ”.3

This expression “οὐδὲ - - ἐπ’ ἀνδρῶν - - πάνυ τι” is, of course, not completely unambiguous, but it
seems that among Musonius translators, e.g., Capelle/Nickel, Jagu, Eyben/Wouters, Ramelli and
King are right when they translate it with the expression “not in men either,”4 for Musonius completely
consistently objects all kinds of “excessive” theory and theoretising and refers contemptfully to the
“hair-splitting” and pedantry of the sophists.5 Likewise, A. C. van Geytenbeek concludes that this
statement in IV,48,20-23 in fact represents Musonius’ general view on the essence of philosophy and
states that to him philosophy “is not meletān λόγους καὶ σοφίζεσθαι καὶ ἀναλύειν συλλογισμοὺς - -
and no τρανότης περὶ λόγους καὶ δεινότης τις περιττή”.6 The same thought that philosophy and the
goal to be attained through it is always the same regardless of one’s sex can be found also in the end
of the diatribe: when Musonius in IV,48,25-26 says that the practice of philosophy should cause in
women “ἠθος χρηστότητα καὶ καλοκάγαθαν τρόπον”, the reason for this is that philosophy is
simply καλοκάγαθες ἐπιτήδευσις “καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπερον”.8 That this, indeed, applies to all

1 IV,46,31-48,14.
2 I do not want to say that women must have clearness in arguments and excessive cleverness, if indeed they
practise philosophy as women
3 IV,48,23: I don’t approve this for men either (trans. King); see also III,42,11-19 and above p. 63.
5 See esp. III,42,14-15; XI,82,34-37; for this attitude of Musonius towards theory see in greater
detail, e.g., Geytenbeek 1963: 34; 36; Reydams-Schils 2005: 156. See also also Laurand 2003: 88 cited below p. 84, n. 4.
6 Geytenbeek 1963: 34.
7 goodness of character and nobleness of habit
8 practice of nobility and nothing else
human beings, i.e. equally well men, is evident also from the fact that Musonius uses the exactly same definition of philosophy also in VIII,66,1-2, i.e. in his VIII diatribe in which he addresses a Syrian king; furthermore this definition brings to mind the early Stoic definition of philosophy ἐπιτήδευσις σοφίας.¹

In addition to the last part of the fourth diatribe attention should be paid especially to the above-discussed passage III,42,16-18 in which Musonius says that "ἐγὼ δὲ οὕτω δησις τὸς γυναῖκας τὰς φιλοσοφούσας ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀνδρὰς ἀξιώσαιμ' ἀν ὀφειμένους τῶν προσηκόντων ἔργων εἶναι περὶ λόγους μόνον: ἀλλὰ καὶ διὸς μεταχειρίζονται λόγους, τῶν ἔργων φημί δεῖν ἐνεκα μεταχειρίζεσθαι αὐτούς".² It is clear, as we have seen, that Musonius here tries to convince his listeners and disprove conservative objections, but one explanation to his words is also undoubtedly a thought that all theory which does not aim at virtue is useless – which he in the same passage immediately after explicitly says.³ And at the same time, it would be, of course, also possible that these words of Musonius include also an allusion to a very Stoic thought that a human being should play his/her role as well as possible⁴ – but, as will be discussed also below, this does not refer to traditional views on (more or less subordinate) gender roles.⁵ And, on the other hand, if Musonius thinks that a person who practises philosophy has also an ability to attend well to tasks and duties of practical life - or as A. C. van Geytenbeek puts it: "philosophy - - is the opposite of neglecting one’s duties"⁶ - this is not the same as to claim that Musonius regards the best possible fulfilling of these tasks as the goal of the practice of philosophy, as most scholars, as said above, have interpreted Musonius' thoughts of women.

It is also most essential to note what are in fact those ἔργα which women should not abandon – to be precise: what is Musonius’ own view concerning those tasks. As said earlier, most scholars

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¹ practice of wisdom SVF 2,26; Geytenbeek 1963: 35.
² I would not expect the women who practise philosophy to cast aside their appointed tasks for words only any more than men, but I say that their discussions should be conducted for the sake of actions (trans. Lutz, King modified); see above p. 63.
³ IV,42,21-22; for the same thought see also, e.g., IV,48,20-26; Geytenbeek 1963: 34. For this thought in Epictetus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius see Geytenbeek 1963: 36 – 40.
⁴ See above pp. 13 – 14.
⁵ See, e.g., Gill 1988: "What matters is not the role itself but whether we play the role well - - ; and playing it 'well' means playing it well morally, since every role provides the 'raw material' for rational moral agency"; see also above p. 14, also n. 1; below pp. 90; 128.
⁶ Geytenbeek 1963: 52.
refer here to the domestic sphere\(^1\) - e.g., that these tasks are, according to Musonius, “identical with socially acceptable gender roles” and “centered on the household.”\(^2\) It is true that Musonius utters this above-mentioned statement in III,42,16-18 as an answer to a suspicion that women who practise philosophy abandon their traditional tasks.\(^3\) But it is also here very important to distinguish Musonius’ own view from the concessions he has to make. For although he, rather exceptionally, as some scholars have pointed out, seems to consider tasks traditionally assigned to women as important (and of equal value) as those assigned to men,\(^4\) he explicitly says in his fourth diatribe that all tasks are common to men and women.\(^5\) And this, on the other hand, also means that maybe the best proof that he neither connects the virtues of a woman to her traditional role, nor regards, e.g., the virtue οἰκονομική expressly as a virtue of a woman is simply the fact that he does not, in a conservative way, seem to think that the household management (or any other thing traditionally belonging to women) is exclusively a woman’s task, abandoning thus the traditional dichotomy ‘public/male - private/domestic/female’.

And when Musonius says that all tasks – including those inside the home - are common to men and women,\(^6\) it is clear that this must, indeed, be his own, personal view, for this kind of view extremely radically deviated from usual attitudes of antiquity – and also undoubtedly from those of his audience. True, Musonius also says in the same passage, in IV,46,13-23, that because of the difference in physical strength heavy tasks and works outside the home are more suitable for physically stronger men and that lighter tasks and works inside the home for women, but he continues that the distinction based on physical strength is only the main rule and that men and women can exchange tasks, e.g., when need and time require. And, unlike in the conservative thinking, this kind of activity of a woman which deviates from conventional is not only occasional

\(^{1}\) See above pp. 52 - 53; 67.
\(^{2}\) Houser 1997: 192 - 193; see also 195 where he agrees with Manning 1973 and says that Manning “has pointed to Seneca’s distinction between men’s and women’s spheres and has suggested that Seneca can draw such a distinction according to Stoic teachings of καθήκοντα. This may also be true for Musonius - -.” Nussbaum 2002a: 302, on the other hand, argues that Musonius does not employ the four persona theory but that he emphasises symmetry of the spheres of men and women, regarding them as indifferent “so far as virtue is concerned.”
\(^{3}\) III,42,11-15.
\(^{5}\) IV,46,16-31, esp. IV,46, 28-29.
\(^{6}\) IV,46,16-31, esp. IV,46, 28-29.
in Musonius. For he does not set absolute boundaries between the sexes, but, like Plato,\(^1\) he pays his attention to *individuals*, the thought being that there are women who are suited for heavy works and there are men who are suited for lighter works\(^2\) - which, moreover, means that women (and men) can choose their tasks according to their physical strength/condition at a given time.

And it is probable that Musonius' own view concerning the division of tasks between the sexes is actually even more radical and that he at least in this respect constructs the gender of women exceptionally radically,\(^3\) emphasising still more strongly the "sameness" of man and woman also in practical life. For although he, in order to convince and persuade his listeners, has to choose his words carefully and to put less radical statements among radical ones\(^4\) (and although he thus, for example, states that "ὡς οὖν; καὶ ταλασσίῳ φησί τις ἰσως ὁ διοιξις ὑποπληθειας ἐκμαινθανειν τοῖς γυναιξίν τοὺς ἄνδρας - - ; τούτο μὲν οὐκέτι ἀξιώσω ἐγώ"\(^5\)), he in fact cancels this statement by saying that *all* tasks are unconditionally common to men and women and still stresses that "καὶ οὐδὲν ὁποτεκτόν ἐξ ἀναγκῆς τῷ ἑτέρῳ"\(^6\). After this very radical statement he, in order to somehow, again, soften its radicalism, repeats more conventionally that "ἐνια δὲ δὴ ἐπιτηδειότερα τὰ μὲν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ τῇ ἑτέρῃ; δι' ὃ τὰ μὲν ἀνδρεῖα καλεῖται, τὰ δὲ γυναικεῖα"\(^7\) - we have seen that he uses this strategy (putting radical statements among conventional/less radical ones, especially: conventional-radical-conventional) also when speaking of women's virtues;\(^8\) those scholars who argue that Musonius simply "accepts the traditional division of tasks"\(^9\) fail to discuss why he utters also more radical statements. And it is also important to note that Musonius does not even in his more conventional/conservative statements say that spinning and other indoor tasks are not suitable to men but that he only says

\(^{1}\) Plat. rep. 455d.

\(^{2}\) IV,46,23-27.

\(^{3}\) See also Hill 2001: 36: "In the context of his critique of gender-based specialization, he argues that individual disposition and gender are unrelated"; cf. also Nussbaum 2002a: 291 – 292.

\(^{4}\) For this strategy in his statements concerning the division of tasks see also below pp. 86 – 88.

\(^{5}\) IV,46,13-16: "come now," I suppose someone will say, "do you expect that men should learn spinning the same as women - - ? no, I would not require this" (trans. Nussbaum).

\(^{6}\) IV,46,27-29; the quotation is from IV,46,29: and none is necessarily appointed for either one exclusively (trans. Lutz).

\(^{7}\) IV,46,29-31: but some pursuits are more suited to the nature of one, some to the other, and for this reason some are called men's work and some women's (trans. Lutz).

\(^{8}\) E.g. in IV,46,31-48,14, see above pp. 69 – 70.

\(^{9}\) Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 62; see also 261, n. 15: "he accepts the traditional distinction between male and female tasks", disagreeing with Geytenbeek 1963: 60 who argues that Musonius "deletes - - the opposition between masculine and feminine tasks"; see also above pp. 52 – 53; 71 – 72.
that they are more suitable (μᾶλλον, ἐπιτηδεισιστέρα) to women.

As we have seen and shall also later see, especially clearly in Seneca, it is obvious that texts written about (and for) women and women's virtues are written in different registers, with strategies of encouraging, reproaching, persuading etc., and in "roles" such as mentor, moralist, castigator. And we have seen that especially strategies of persuasion are very prominent in Musonius' third and fourth diatribes – even in his discussion of the division of tasks. This is interesting because Musonius' (male) audience must have belonged, as can be seen, e.g., in Musonius' characterisation of a woman as oἰκονομική and ἀρχική τῶν οἰκετῶν, at least in a great degree to upper/wealthier classes who also have leisure to practise philosophy but whose ideology (contrary to values of lower classes who apparently regarded work as a part of identity) does not appreciate paid work, manual work in particular. So, it is probable that Musonius' perspective is here not primarily social/societal, though undoubtedly not without at least some social/societal dimensions (e.g. the division of the spheres of men and women, i.e. the traditional distinction between 'public/male – private/domestic/female'), but his treatment of the division of tasks between the sexes should be seen above all as a part of his philosophical visions (in the same way as his ideal philosopher-farmer/shepherd in the XI diatribe should be seen above all in the context of cynically oriented idealisation), i.e. as an aspect of a very central theme in his third and fourth diatribes: the discussion of the “sameness” of man and woman. Thus, it is not very surprising to see the reason why all tasks are common to men and women: because they are human tasks:

πάντα μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ἐν κοινῷ κεῖται τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἔργα καὶ ἐστὶ κοινὰ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀποτακτὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῷ ἑτέρῳ.  

The thought that a woman’s same humanity and humanhood may have some consequences also in practical life in a non-utopian society and mean at least some practical equality, is very unusual and unique among ancient writers, also among the Stoics, although Hierocles, too, says of the division of tasks between the sexes that “οὐδὲ μὴν ἀγεύστους ἀξιωτέον εἶναι τοὺς _______ 1 III,40,10-12: practiced in the management of a household, fit for rule the household slaves; see above p. 60, also n. 3.  
3 See, e.g., Kampen 1981: 114 – 115; 127; 130; Dixon 2001: 113 – 114. “Military, literary and political activity, supervisory care of landed estates and the duties of patronage were the proper business of an elite male” (Dixon 2001: 114).  
4 IV,46,27-29: for all human tasks - - are a common obligation and are common for men an women, and none is necessarily appointed for either one exclusively (trans. Lutz)
ἑτέρους τῶν ἑτέρων",¹ for he does not seem to say this for the same reason as Musonius.² And it seems to be clear that this thought results from Musonius’ own strong conviction³ - in which he deviates from Stoicism because the Stoics think that one can as a rational being acquire virtue and happiness regardless of one’s position and role in society. And not even Musonius’ goal, i.e. his desire to make the same education possible for girls and women, would not have required these kinds of thoughts - but instead they might have been harmful and aroused suspicions.

This is especially evident in the idea in which the breaking of the traditional role differentiation is most radically manifested: that tasks inside the home in the domestic, private sphere are suitable and belong to men, too - even spinning and weaving (ταλασία, lanificium), i.e. a task which especially clearly represented women’s ideal devotion to home, for which reason it was, as said before, traditionally (along with σωφροσύνη/pudicitia, castitas) regarded perhaps as the most important virtue of a woman. It is easy to understand how radical it was to say or even insinuate things like that to male audience when we remember that lanificium/ταλασία was normally thought to be suitable only to women and slaves, and low-status male weavers were sometimes scorned by elite male writers because of their unmasculinity.⁴ It is indicative that here also Hierocles makes an exception: only men with “τελείαν - - πίστιν ύπὲρ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀῤῥενότητος καὶ σωφροσύνης” should touch spinning and weaving.⁵ Otherwise, as mentioned above, Hierocles agrees in many things with Musonius and thinks that men should do works inside the home - and even assumes that many houseworks are in fact more suitable to physically stronger men.⁶

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¹ Οἰκονομικός (Stob. IV, 28,21, p. 697,4-5): but one must not think that the one group should be without a taste of the other tasks (trans. Konstan)

² He sees it as an opportunity to strengthen the κοινωνία (partnership) of spouses (Οἰκονομικός (Stob. IV, 28,21, p. 697,4-11; Reydams-Schils 2005: 155; Ramelli 2009: 130), and, moreover, he "approaches the subject from the point of view of household efficiency" (Geytenbeek 1963: 58).

³ Cf., e.g, Clement of Alexandria who, probably influenced by Musonius, sees nature and virtue but not tasks as the same for both sexes (Clem. strom. 4,8; see above p. 88, n. 3); see also, e.g., Castelli 2004: 63 – 64.

⁴ See, e.g., Hallett 1989: 64 - 65; Houser 1997: 184; Peskowitz 1997: 67 - 68; Reydams-Schils 2005: 155 who refers to "undertaking debate with accepted social norms: that certain tasks were beneath men and even threatening to their manliness"; see also Hierocles: δυσπειθέστερος δ’ ἴσως ὁ πρὸς θάτερα τῶν ἔργων, ὧν ἀπονενέμηται παρακαλῶν τὸν ἄνδρα λόγος. καὶ πάσχουσί οὐκ ἀπεικὸς οἱ καθαρειότεροι, μὴ καθ’ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι τοπάζοντες ἅψασθαι ταλασίας. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος εὐτελεῖς ἀνθρωπίσκοι καὶ τὸ τῶν κατεαγότων καὶ γυνικῶν φύλον ὡς τὸν ἐρίων ἐργασίαν καταφέρεται ἐξ ἐμεῖναι κατὰ τόν ἀληθινῶτερον ἄνδρα τυγχάνειν· (Οἰκονομικός Stob. IV,28,21, p. 698,2-10).

⁵ Οἰκονομικός (Stob. IV, 28,21, 698,p.10-13): complete confidence in their own masculinity and self-control (trans. Konstan, modified regarding the translation of σωφροσύνη) For this linking of masculinity/ manliness with self-control see also above p. 36, also n. 1.

⁶ Οἰκονομικός (Stob. IV, 28,21, p 698,16–699,1). For common elements in Musonius’ and Hierocles’ views see, e.g., Praechter 1901: 64 – 66; Geytenbeek 1963: 58.
Like Musonius he, too, regards marriage as καλόν (good, beautiful thing) and thinks highly of the κοινωνία (partnership) of husband and wife.¹ This does not, however, necessarily mean practical equality between spouses because Hierocles, as some scholars have noted, seems (in much the same way as Antipater of Tarsus) to think that the husband should be the ruling one.² It is, of course, of importance that both Hierocles’ and Antipater’s intention is to convince the (male) readers of marriage’s all-round benefits, but it is very probable that this thought is also their own opinion: in order to correct his readers’ “incorrect” and negative attitudes towards marriage Antipater explicitly gives us to understand that a man’s ruling position is a precondition for the success of marriage by saying that “ἔοικε μέντοι δύσκολος ἐνίοις ὁ μετὰ γυναικὸς φαίνεσθαι βίος διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἄρχειν ἄλλ’ ἣδονής δούλους εἶναι”³ - and in the same way the thought of a man as the ruling one seems to be so self-evident to Hierocles that – as David L. Balch states – “it can form the basis for another argument, that the house is incomplete without the wife”:⁴

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Όθεν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἁμάρτοι τις ἀτελῆ φῆσας οἰκίαν τὴν ἄνευ γάμου, τῷ μήτε τὸ ἄρχον ἄνευ τῇ ἀρχομένῳ δύνασθαι νοηθῆναι μήτ’ ἀνευ τοῦ ἄρχοντος τὸ ἀρχόμενον.⁵
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And it is also important to note that Hierocles says that a man who marries for “wrong” reasons (for big dowry, beauty etc.) does not take to his home a wife but a tyrant (“τύραννον ὄντι γυναικός”) and is not able to “τὴν περὶ τῶν πρωτείων ἅμιλλαν ἁμιλασθεῖν.”⁶

What about Musonius? When examining in his diatribes XIII A and B ideal properties of spouses Musonius makes exactly the same demands on both sexes,⁷ which was not a normal practice because writers, including Hierocles, used to pay attention only to the criterias of choosing a wife and to her properties.⁸ Furthermore, Hierocles tries to persuade his readers of the benefits of marriage by stating that, as Kathy C. Gaca puts it, “when the married man comes home

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¹ Hierocl. Περὶ γάμου (Stob. IV, 22, 24, p. 505,5-7).
³ Antip. Περὶ γάμου (Stob. IV, 22, 25=SVF 3, 254,63).
⁴ Balch 1981: 4; see also Asmis 1996: 83.
⁵ Hierocl. Περὶ γάμου (Stob. IV, 22, 23).
⁷ See esp. XIII B, 90,4-13; see also XIII A, 88,20-29.
⁸ For this see, e.g., Geytenbeek 1963: 66; see also Ramelli 2009: 118: “Musonius, in contrast to the more traditionalist Hierocles, contemplates both cases, in conformity with his more egalitarian conception of the two genders.”
burdened with numerous troubles in his career and public life", the "ever-untroubled wife" comforts him and makes him forget his cares.\(^1\) It is indicative that Musonius does not use this argument in his XIV diatribe – which, again, suggests his greater emphasis on practical equality.

Interpretively problematic is, however, the above-discussed III,42,7-8 in which Musonius, stating that "τῷ δὲ ἀνδρὶ υπηρετεῖν χερσὶ ταῖς ἑαυτῆς ἔσται ἔχει \\[\text{τοὺδὲ ἀποτελέσθαι τῷ ἄνδρι ἐστὶν}\\)\), says that one of the qualities belonging to a brave woman is that she serves her husband with her own hands; it can easily seem that he, too, also in his own views (and despite all his unconventional "egalitarian" statements), advocates very traditional power relations between the sexes and, indeed, approves of power structures involved in conservative gendered virtues and ideals abundant in his third and fourth diatribes - O. Larry Yarbrough draws a parallel between Antipater of Tarsus and Musonius and says that Musonius' statement is "only slightly less harsh than Antipater's claim that "the aim and goal of woman's life should be to please her husband"."\(^2\) Elizabeth Asmis, on the other hand, quotes another passage of Περὶ γάμου in which Antipater, describing the benefits of marriage, compares spouses to pairs of hands, feet and eyes:

\[
\text{ἐν ᾗ τῶν ἡδίστων καὶ κουφότατων εἶναι βάρος γαμετή γυνὴ δόξει. ὁμοιότατον γὰρ ἐστιν ως ἐὰν τις μίαν ἕχων χεῖρα ἐτέραν ποθὲν προσλάβοι ἢ ἕνα πόδα ἕχων ἐτέραν ἀλλαχόθεν κτήσει. - - ἀντὶ δύο όφθαλμῶν χρῶνται τέσσαρσι καὶ ἀντὶ δύο χειρῶν ἑτέραις τοσαύταις.}
\]

Asmis interprets that Antipater refers here to equal co-operation of the spouses, and although she first says that Musonius' statement in III,42,7-8 "hints at a directive role on the part of the husband", she, however, then on the basis of XIIIA diatribe on marriage concludes that "like Antipater, Musonius demands equality of service from husband and wife".\(^4\) And also William Klassen assumes that because Musonius regards all tasks as common to man and woman, this applies also to serving - which, of course, is not completely impossible even if the thought of the husband serving his wife is undoubtedly very radical, for Musonius' thought of a man spinning and weaving at home is also very radical.

\(^{1}\) Gaca 2003: 84.
\(^{2}\) Yarbrough 1985: 56; see also above p. 27.
\(^{3}\) Asmis 1996: 79 - 80; Περὶ γάμου (Stob. IV,22,25=SVF 3,254,63): a married wife would seem to be one of the most pleasant of burdens, and the lightest for it is just like acquiring another hand from somewhere if one has a single hand, or obtaining another foot from elsewhere if one has a single foot. - - instead of two eyes, they use four, and instead of two hands they use a second pair (trans. Asmis).
\(^{4}\) Asmis 1996: 82. Cf. also Ste.Croix 1981/1989: 110: "He is exceptionally free from the male-dominated outlook, desiring the subjection of women to their husbands. - - He never suggests that - - she ought to be subjected to him or dominated by him."
\(^{5}\) Klassen 1984: 194.
It is, however, clear that because Musonius tries in this passage to convince his listeners of the benefits resulting from women's practice of philosophy, it is very difficult to say to what extent he again attempts to persuade his listeners and to what extent this statement is his own personal view – we should not forget that also those writers, including Musonius, who emphasise sameness/equality more than on average seem to have at least some conservative attitudes. And it is also true that Musonius seems in passing, both in the above-discussed passage of the XII diatribe and in the eighth diatribe, to refer to women as ruled, as if accepting authority/power as gendered. But in the XII diatribe, as we have seen, he simply sets out the paradoxical situation in society, and it is easy to see that he only speaks of what men should be like if they consider themselves suitable to rule women:

It is, however, clear that he cannot here refer to the traditional subordination of the wife because he speaks also of ruling "one's friends" and of ruling "oneself". It is also important to note that in this diatribe Musonius discusses the idea that only a philosopher is a good king (ruler) (and every good king is a philosopher) and that his diatribe belongs to the tradition of writings dealing with the ideal virtuous king/ruler who (already) by his own example is able to guide also his subjects to a more virtuous life. So, it is probable

1 See esp. XXI,128,31-35; see above pp. 91 - 92; 102.
2 XII,88,1-3: see also above p. 36, n. 1; pp. 66 – 67.
3 VIII,66,12-16: even if he does not have many subjects obedient to him, he is not for that reason less kingly, for it is enough to rule one’s friends or one’s wife and children or, for that matter, only oneself (trans. Lutz)
4 Cf., e.g., Cohen & Saller 1994: 50 and Engel 2000: 383: “Clearly what Musonius is picturing is a relationship where the husband rules and the wife and children obey”; see also p. 385.
5 Reydams-Schils 2005: 157 argues that this “throws a different light on the proposition that men are supposed to rule their wives. In the traditional approach, the rapport with wife and children is not to be grouped with friendship. Furthermore, “ruling oneself” in Stoic psychology does not entail a split soul, the rule of reason over lower soul parts, nor the radical opposition between soul and body, as it does in its Platonic counterparts. Platonic psychology allowed later authors to reduce women to the analogue of the body or the lower appetites; Stoic psychology does not. In general Musonius underscores the affection, the symmetry, and the reciprocal character of the spousal relationship.”
6 For this thought in the later Stoics, esp. in Musonius see, e.g., Griffin 1976/1992: 205; Blumenfeld 2001: 256.
that Musonius in the above-mentioned VIII, 66,12-16 refers to this kind of ruling and wants to say that whoever is virtuous, and thus kingly, person (philosopher) has this ability to rule. And although this thought could, at the same time, represent the view found, e.g., in Aristotle and Plutarch that the ruling one – (at least) for Aristotle and Plutarch the man - should be as virtuous as possible,¹ and although Musonius’ words are sometimes male-centric,² we should not draw far-going conclusions, for we must not forget that Musonius addresses his words to a man, a Syrian king, and that he elsewhere, when speaking of women, says that women, too, can be/become philosophers.³ And it is also important to remember that he seems to deny men’s superiority in self-control (and thus their ruling position based on this) and that women can do tasks traditionally assigned to men and thus have authority/power included in these tasks/roles. Thus, unlike some scholars assume,⁴ there is no certain proof that Musonius himself would have supported women’s subordinate position. In this way he clearly differs not only from (e.g.) Aristotle, Plutarch and conventional Roman thinking but also from (e.g.) Ps.-Aristotle,⁵ many Neopythagoreans,⁶ and even from some Stoics, not only Hierocles and Antipater but also Seneca and Marcus Aurelius: Seneca states in the above-mentioned Const. sap. 1,1 that men are born to rule and women to obey, and Marcus Aurelius mentions as one of his wife’s good properties that she was πειθήνιος.⁷

We have seen that Musonius does not regard the fulfilling of women’s traditional role as the goal to be attained through their practice of philosophy - and that his own personal views are often more radical than many statements he utters in order to achieve his goals, i.e that women are given the same education and opportunity to practise philosophy. This approach and “the end justifies the

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1 Esp. Arist. pol. 1259a40-1260a24; NE 1162a15-29; Plut. coni. praec. 140c; 142e.
2 He not only speaks of “ruling one’s wife”, but in VIII, 64,37 he speaks of a good man (ἀγαθὸς ἄνηρ); for male-centric choices of words in Musonius see also below p. 122, n. 4.
3 This will be discussed in more detail below, but it can be briefly mentioned that both in III,40,28-29 and III,40,34-35 he even explicitly uses the word “philosopher” when speaking of women, and in III,40,34-35 he even uses a typical Stoic distinction a “layman” ignorant of virtue (ἰδιώτης/ἰδιώτις) – a (real) philosopher (φιλόσοφος).
5 Ps.-Arist. oec. III,1.
6 See, e.g., Callistratidas (The Pleas 105,8-8; 106,1-10;19); Bryson (3,87; Swain 2007: 149; The Pleas, 58; Treggiari 1991b: 195); Ps.-Ocellus (The Pleas 136,22-24); Perictione (I) (The Pleas 145,3); see also Melissa (The Pleas 116,11-13).
7 Marc. Aur. med. 1,17,8. Farquharson 1944/1968b: 485 takes as a parallel a passage of Marcus Aurelius’ letter to Fronto (Naber p. 80) in which he describes his wife’s behaviour during fever: sed deiis iuvantibus aequiorem animum mihi facit ipsa, quod se tam obtemperanter nobis accommodat.
means” reasoning have, of course, its disadvantages, and Gretchen Reydams-Schils is undoubtedly right when she says that “the danger with any such concession or mediation is that it can contribute to the reinforcement and justification of conventional values, which thus get in the way of changes that are in fact warranted.”¹ Some scholars have also examined his thoughts’ relation to feminism,² and David M. Engel rightly points out that there is an essential incompatibility between feminism and Stoicism in the respect that the Stoics regarded one’s external living conditions as indifferent³ - it is true that the most important thing for Musonius, too, is that women get an opportunity to practise philosophy, and he is, as said earlier, ready to make even “dangerous” concessions to achieve this goal. This criticism should not, however, obscure the uniqueness of some of Musonius’ explicit and entirely unambiguous statements about practical life. Some scholars have argued that Musonius’ attitudes concerning education (or, e.g., marriage and relations between the sexes⁴) may have been part of or reflected new “egalitarian” trends of the time, or have even had influence on women’s opportunities to get education⁵ – and the fact that Musonius has also very radical statements among more conservative ones, has made Lisa Hill wonder whether he is, after

¹ Reydams-Schils 2005: 158. This approach is rather typical in Musonius also elsewhere, e.g., in Εἰ πάντα τὰ γινόμενα τέκνα θρεπτέον (diatr. XV) where he in order to persuade his listeners not to expose children “advances three arguments for the raising of all children”, as A.C. van Geytenbeek puts it (Geytenbeek 1963: 78), and also otherwise advocates large families - thus possibly reinforcing the conservative traditional tendency to confine women to the domestic sphere although, as we have seen, his own view of the division of tasks was different. – Of other typical approaches of Musonius can be mentioned, e.g., that he tends to use very few female examples - although it is clear that he should not draw far-reaching conclusions, for it is very hard to say to what extent this is due to more or less summarised character of Lucius’ accounts, and it is also worth noting that he uses also surprisingly few male examples; for these problematics see also, e.g., Nussbaum 2000: 237 – 238; Nussbaum 2002a: 311 – 313. ² E.g. Hill 2001; Engel 2000: 390; Nussbaum 2002a; Engel 2003: 280; Dillon 2004: 27 – 29. ³ Engel 2003: 280; Engel 2000: 390: “Feminism – - is usually concerned with quality of life issues that the Stoics insisted were irrelevant to one’s quality of life”; Nussbaum 2002a: 302 - 303. ⁴ See, e.g., Van Abbema 2008: 8: “Musonius’ philosophy reflects changing gender relations during the Principate”; 11; 111; Milnor 2005/2008: 249: “More probably we should see the Stoic view as coexisting with other, less egalitarian attitudes toward relations between the sexes”; Foucault 1984. ⁵ See, e.g., Rawson 2003: 201: “The lectures deserve to be taken seriously as a reflection of at least one segment of contemporary liberal educated opinion”; Van Abbema 2008: 128: “Although we cannot attribute the spread of education among women to Musonius directly and singly, his fairly “radical” views concerning gender “equality” reflect the same social and political conditions that give rise to numerous educated women of the second century CE; 121; Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 214 who argues that Musonius’ (and Plutarch’s) defending of women’s education may “have influenced public opinion and thereby the opportunities of women’s education”; Nussbaum 2002a: 297 (speaking of the III diatrise): “In its context, it has real force: for so far as we can see, women at Rome generally did not go to study with the philosophers, and Musonius means to encourage real intellectual study in the philosophical schools”. Cf. also below p. 85. - On the other hand, also those Musonius’ listeners who took women’s and daughters’ education (and practice of philosophy) under discussion (see below p. 116, also n. 5) can be seen in this ideological context – although we do not know whether they agreed or disagreed with Musonius.
all, "a skilled feminist propagandist, able to appeal to Roman prejudices, all the while promulgating a subversive programme for reform."1 It should, of course, be noted that (despite his reputation (and respect for him) at least in certain circles) it is not possible, due to the lack of extant evidence, to know to what extent these Musonius' teachings influenced society of that time.3 Nevertheless, many of his views are ideologically very significant. Most unique and radical are Musonius' thoughts of practical “sameness” and equality regarding the division of tasks between the sexes - above all his idea that tasks in the domestic sphere are suitable and belong to men, too. The radicality of this kind of statement is obvious also when we remember that he does not try to create an ideal utopia, like Plato (or Zeno), but utters it to men in real society - and besides, it is worth noting that Plato never seriously suggests that men would do tasks usually assigned to women.

ii. Outside the household

But what about women working outside the household? As discussed above, most scholars seem to agree that Musonius wants to confine women to the home. It is also interesting that this supposed attitude of Musonius is sometimes explained in opposite ways, and so, for example, Ilaria Ramelli seems to see it as at least somehow comprehensible: “after all, in a society like that, it would have been hard to imagine different roles for them”,4 whereas Roy Bowen Ward considers Musonius' statements as an objection to a certain “emancipation” of women at that time.5 It is true that, as mentioned above, in the beginning of his fourth diatribe Musonius says that “ὅ τε

1 Hill 2001: 33.
2 See above, p. 9; see also, e.g., Milnor 2005/2008: 252 – 253.
3 Despite, e.g., Plut. cohib. ira 453d. See also above p. 80, n. 5 on Musonius' listeners. Cf. also, e.g., his (apparently not very successful/influential) condemnation of the double standard, see, e.g., Arjava 1996: 202 – 203; Treggari 2003: 166: “Only the most idealistic, for instance, the Stoic Musonius Rufus, objected to the double standard and the sexual exploitation of slaves”; cf. also, e.g., Tac. hist. 3.81.1.
4 Ramelli 2008b: 380.
5 Ward 1990: 288: “Such teachings would result in what had been the traditional expectation of a Roman matron in a traditional patriarchal family. In a time when women were exercising more freedom socially, economically and erotically, Stoicism advantaged the traditional family and thus also the traditional roles of women within the family”; see also, e.g., Wöhrle 2002 (referring to the later Stoics, incl. Musonius): 142 - 143: “Die prinzipielle postulierte Gleichberechtigung von dem Logos implizierte keine praktische Erweiterung der gesellschaftlichen Aufgaben. Die Beschränkung der Frauen auf das „Innere“, auf Haushalt und Familie, galt in der Realität des Kaiserzeitlichen Rom sicher weniger denn je in der Antike. Aber wir sehen jedenfalls, wie auch von philosophischer Seite an diesem Konstrukt einer begrenzten Lebensweise gearbeitet wurde”; cf also Cohen & Saller 1994: 53: “He advocates a gendered philosophy that reaffirms the dichotomy between public male and private female roles”; see also Trapp 2007: 207 cited above on p. 67, n. 2.
ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολίτης ἀγαθὸς ἄδικος ὤν, ἥ τε γυνὴ οὐκ ἂν οἰκονομοίη χρηστῶς, εἰ μὴ δικαίως¹ - but, as we have seen, this hardly is Musonius' own view concerning the division of tasks between the sexes. Joseph Samuel Houser, on the other hand, speaks of women's "occasional legitimate participation in public life", and Valery Laurand, referring to the traditional "seul l'homme peut se charger des affaires politiques" adds that "ce qui n'est pas strictement le cas chez Musonius"². And, as said above, later in his IV diatribe, in IV,46,16-31, Musonius states that women can do "men's jobs" at least under certain circumstances and even continues that all tasks are common to men and women, still stressing that "καὶ οὐδὲν ἄποτακτὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῷ ἑτέρῳ"³ and, as discussed above, this must be his own view. Thus, the question is more complicated than it may appear at the first sight.

The traditional idea that women should work at home was, of course, very common in ancient writings, and especially in those dealing with household management, including Xenophon, Ps.-Aristotle, Columella, and many Neopythagoreans, such as Phintys who states that "ἳδιο μὲν ἄνδρος τὸ στραταγέμεν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ δαμαγορεῖν, ἴδια δὲ γυναικὸς τὸ οἰκουρέν καὶ ἐνδον μένεν"⁴ On the other hand, it is interesting that another Neopythagorean Perictione (I) seems to approve that women, too, govern cities, which has made Voula Lambropoulou conclude that "Perictione does not exclude Pythagorean women from participating in politics" and "the distinction between oikos (household) for females and polis (city) for males does not hold"⁵ It is, however, difficult to evaluate the importance of Perictione's statement regarding women in general because she does not refer to the division of tasks of ordinary men and women, i.e. other women than, e.g., queens, and because she otherwise utters mostly very conservative views.

On the other hand, women worked and acted outside the domestic sphere in the Roman empire in a quite wide range of occupations and roles,⁶ and we have also some evidence for their professional

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1 IV,44,13-14; see above p. 52.
2 Houser 1997: 193, n. 84; Laurand 2003: 113, n. 47.
3 IV,46,29; see above p. 73.
4 Thesleff 152,9-11.Seen also, e.g., Xen. oec. 7,22-23;30; Ps.-Arist. oec. 1,3,4; Ph. spec. leg. 3.169; Dio Chrys. orat. 3.70; Col. r.r. 12 pr.; for the influence of Xenophon's Oeconomicus on Roman authors including Columella see Pomeroy 1994: 70 – 73.
5 Lambropoulou 1995: 125. Perictione probably refers here (Thesleff 142,18-143,1, esp. 142, 23-143) to women rulers, e.g., queens, of her time; see also above pp. 47, n. 4 ; 50, n. 1.
pride in their work\(^1\) (and that all this was not in conflict with their conception of their gender\(^2\)). Most work was done by women of lower classes, but at least some wealthier/wealthy women, e.g., acted as patrons and benefactors, were builders of public buildings and participated in different kind of business and larger-scale trade,\(^3\) or - like Domitia Lucilla, Marcus Aurelius’ mother - in brick production,\(^4\) and these activities of women were a normal part of life and society. But although ideals (which, it seems, remained at least for the most part the same\(^5\) during the Roman period discussed in this study) concerning women and their virtues were often more conservative than social reality, as we have seen, e.g., in writers of classical Athens or in many Roman authors, including Seneca (or in Plutarch living in Roman Greece\(^6\)), the fact that women acted outside the home did not necessarily reduce the importance of their traditional roles. Thus, also women who worked outside the domestic sphere were often commemorated in their funerary inscriptions primarily as mothers and wives,\(^7\)

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1 See Kampen 1981. Cf. also CLE 67: *clientes habui multis*; for the title *mater collegii* carved on tombs and dedications and thus a reason for pride Hemelrijk 2012: 483; see also below p. 102, n. 1.

2 Cf. also Milnor 2005/2008: 37.


5 Despite having some “enlightened” views on, e.g., women’s virtues and education, he has also, as discussed above, very conservative attitudes (concerning, e.g., the subordination of women) which, as Foxhall 1999: 150 argues, contrast “significantly with what we know about the social and legal position of wealthy women in Roman Greece”; see also, e.g., Fantham et al. 1994: 363; Kearsley 1999; Nevet 2002; Osiek & McDonald 2005: 9 – 12; 203; 205 – 208; 215 – 217; Bain 2014: 30 – 34; Barnes 2014; (Macedonia); Carney 2010: 424 – 425 (also for officeholders, benefactors; business, education, etc).

6 For the Latin West see below, p. 84.
and when Fronto wrote a (Greek) letter to Domitia Lucilla, he very traditionally praised her for having all virtues “befitting” to women.¹ Likewise, although women, e.g., in honorary inscriptions in Italy or as city patrons in the Latin West were praised mainly or only for the same civic virtues as men,² this is due to the fact that these inscriptions deal with only the public role of these women³ – i.e. this does not mean that traditional “feminine” virtues would not have been important in their private roles as mothers, wives and household managers.

And when some scholars criticise Musonius for failing to speak of women’s “potential to thrive in the law courts” and not advocating them to “display their learning through public speeches”,⁴ we must not forget that, as mentioned above, attitudes towards women who spoke publicly or appear in court were often rather negative, even hostile.⁵ And we have seen that the same applies also to women who study philosophy and were thus (e.g.) thought to abandon their traditional tasks at home and behave boldly, arrogantly and “too clever” in public:

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άλλα νη δία, φασί τινες, ὃτι αὐθάδεις ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ θρασείας εἶναι ἀνάγκη τῶς προσιούσας τῶς φιλοσόφους γυναίκας, ὅταν ἀφέμεναι τοῦ οἰκουρεῖν ἐν μέσος ἀναστρέφωνται τοῖς ἀνδράσι, καὶ μελετῶσι λόγους καὶ σοφίζωνται καὶ ἀναλύσσοντες συλλογισμοὺς, δεῖν οἰκοι καθημένος ταλάσσουργεῖν.
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So, remembering also these prejudices against philosophising women in particular, it is not very difficult to understand that Musonius has to concentrate on convincing his listeners that philosophy does not make women abandon the traditional virtues and tasks - it would be actually very surprising if Musonius would have openly advocated women’s public role.

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¹ Naber p. 243.
² Forbis 1990, esp. 496; 505; 507; Forbis 1996, esp. 85 – 86; 97; Hemelrijks 2004a: 229: “Traditional female virtues are mentioned in no more than two cases and only in conjunction with civic virtues. - - - In all other cases only civic virtues are mentioned.”
³ Forbis 1990: 496; 506. Furthermore, e.g., public statues of such women tend to portray them “in accordance with traditional female values” (Hemelrijks 2012: 489).
⁴ Houser 1997. 193. Cohick 2009: 245, citing the above-discussed (p. 70) IV,48,20-23; see also Francis 1995: 14. But we have seen that this is his opinion concerning men, too; for his general attitudes towards logic and rhetoric see also Laurand 2003: 88: “Son enseignement ne saurait se limiter à l’apprentissage vain de la seule logique, ou à des contenus de savoir, ou pire, de la rhétorique pour elle-même”; 111, n. 8. Note also the above-discussed XI,80,27-82,5 where Musonius states that one should choose tasks which do not prevent one from concentrating on the practice of philosophy, which means that he does not necessarily himself appreciate highly, e.g., traditional public “male” occupations – such as those of a citizen, as Engel 2000: 386 says: “If anything, perhaps the life of an active citizen would detract from a man’s opportunities for uninterrupted reflection - a point Musonius makes by citing the example of Myson of Chen”; Reydams-Schils 2005:: 220 - 221.
It is, of course, again true that although Musonius has good reasons not to recommend women's public role this does not yet mean that his own opinion would be more favourable. It is, however, interesting that Musonius in VIII,66,25-26, linking citizenship with philosophy, says that "ὁ ταύτην ἄναλαβὼν εὐθὺς πολιτικός ἐστι". It is thus possible that he thinks that both sexes can be citizens in the same way. And because he exceptionally strongly emphasises that all human beings should practise philosophy, it is also possible that he here represents a very Stoic thought that all human beings, men and women, free and slaves, are as rational beings regardless of their social/societal position and sex naturally able to be citizens (and rulers)\(^1\) – or as Elizabeth Asmis says: “By adding the cosmopolis as a stage that enfolds all political institutions, the Stoics indicate that women are citizens by nature – - - . Despite their conventional status as political subordinates, women have the capacity to be rulers, just as slaves – or free men – do.”\(^2\) Regarding the capacity of women it is also important to remember that in the only passage in which Musonius unambiguously compares men’s and women’s (mental) abilities he, unlike, e.g., Plato, explicitly says that there are no differences between the sexes.\(^3\) Thus, Martha C. Nussbaum is surely right when she argues that Musonius “emphasizes women’s fitness for all the virtues frequently enough that we can conclude that he thinks them in principle fit for citizenship”.\(^4\) Furthermore, Laura Van Abbema puts Musonius’ claim for the same education for women in its historical context of the first and second centuries and argues, referring to education as a mark of status at that time,\(^5\) that “as women became more influential, education provided an important mark of status as well as the means by which a woman properly formed her “ethical subjectivity” and that “education for daughters resulted not only in educated wives but also in women who could rightfully assume a more influential role in public affairs”\(^6\) - although we should, of course, make a distinction between possible and real influence and also here remember that it is impossible, due to the lack of extant evidence, to find out the real influence of these Musonius’ (or the other later Stoics’\(^7\)) teachings on the lives of women at that time. But, in any case, we should remember the ideologically significant fact that a woman is in

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1 For this thought see, e.g., Asmis 1996: 84 – 86.
2 Asmis 1996: 86.
3 IV,48,1-3.
4 Nussbaum 2002a: 310.
5 For education as a mark of status at that time see also above p. 19.
6 Van Abbema 2008: 121.
7 E.g.: although it is probable that Seneca really encouraged his mother to practise philosophy, we do not, e.g., know her (or Marcia’s) reactions to the consolations written to them.
Musonius not only an ἀρχική τῶν οἰκετῶν having authority over household slaves but that she can also have authority/power included in tasks and roles traditionally assigned to men/male gender.

There is also still more concrete evidence that Musonius, indeed, does not himself, as argued by most scholars, support the strict gendered division of the spheres of men and women in the respect that women should neither work nor act outside the home – and that his very explicit “τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἔργα - - ἐστὶ κοινὰ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν” in IV,46,28 on common tasks thus applies also to tasks outside the domestic sphere (and is not in this respect in conflict with how women acting in this sphere at that time seem to have conceived their gender). For, as we have seen, even in his less radical statements concerning the division of tasks in IV,46, 20-2, where he tries to convince and persuade his listeners, he does not say that θυραυλία are not suitable for women but that he only says that they are not as suitable for women as for men and that women can at least under certain circumstances do these tasks. Gretchen Reydams-Schils has argued that “as a thought experiment we could ask what would become of Musonius’s injunctions in a cultural setting in which physical strength does not matter so much anymore”, concluding that “in such a context his views would allow for a very far-reaching gender equality.”¹ But what about non-manual outdoor (and public) tasks which, of course, also exist? What does Musonius mean by θυραυλία?

As a comparison, we should keep in mind how Hierocles treats the subject in Οἰκονομικός. It is true that when Hierocles speaks of women doing men’s works he seems to deal with only tasks in the household, and also in Περὶ γάμου he gives one to understand that ἁγορά and γυμνάσιον belong only to men’s sphere.² Inscriptional evidence from the eastern part of the Roman empire, especially from Asia Minor, shows that it was possible for women to hold there offices and have at least some political power.³ These women were, however, exceptions, and because Hierocles tries to persuade his readers and convince them of the benefits of having a wife, it is not surprising that the only “public role” he mentions for women in Περὶ γάμου is their participation in

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¹ Reydams-Schils 2005: 155 - 156
² Stob. IV,22,24, p. 504,6.
feasts. But it is possible that his own view is more radical: in the beginning of Οἰκονομικός he mentions as men’s works not only “τὰ κατ’ ἀγρὸν” but also “τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν” and we cannot exclude the possibility that when he, as said above, a little later (after dividing works in a traditional way to those belonging to men and to those belonging to women) says that “οὔδὲ μὴν ἄγευστοι ἀξιωτέον εἶναι τοὺς ἑτέρους τῶν ἑτέρων”, he in fact refers also to tasks of agora and city although he in this writing, as also the title Οἰκονομικός suggests, does not discuss these tasks.

And this interpretation is even more probable in Musonius’ IV,46,20-27, i.e. that women’s works outside the domestic sphere include also different kinds of non-manual tasks, probably, indeed, as some scholars have, as said before, argued (although Musonius due to above-mentioned reasons omits to say that), even public tasks and roles usually assigned to men, including, e.g., those of a citizen – and possibly not only occasionally under certain circumstances. For it is not realistic to assume that Musonius would have been unaware that outdoor works differ from each other regarding heaviness; Joan E. Taylor even argues that his above-discussed ideas of the division of tasks based on one’s physical strength regardless of one’s sex may have been the result of “sheer observation of non-elite women doing decidedly heavy work”. And so it is important to remember that he not only explicitly says in IV,46, 28-29 that all tasks are common to men and women but that the only reason he gives in IV,46,16-20 (and IV,46,29-30) for the division of tasks between the sexes is the difference in physical strength - which suggests that he does not in fact mean here by θυραυλία all works outside the home but only those in which physical strength is of importance and that his division τὰ ἀνδρεῖα - τὰ γυναικεῖα may thus apply at least mainly to manual work. Furthermore, it is curious that women are in Musonius more capable to fight with weapons (due to its unconventionality Musonius’ own view, though perhaps influenced by Plato) than to do outdoor tasks

1 Stob. IV,22,24, p. 504,17.  
2 Οἰκονομικός (Stob. IV, 28,21, p. 696,23-697,1-2), i.e. tasks in field, agora and city.  
3 Οἰκονομικός (Stob. IV, 28,21, p. 697,4-5), see above p. 75.  
4 And although he explicitly, as Grahn 2013: 350 puts it, “exhorts his readers to respect the existing laws and customs” in his Πῶς πατρίδι χρηστέον.  
5 See esp. Laurand 2003: 113, n. 47 who referring to the traditional “seul l’homme peut se charger des affaires politiques” argues that “ce qui n’est pas strictement le cas chez Musonius”; see also Houser 1997: 193, n. 84 who refers to women’s “occasional legitimate participation in public life.”  
7 See above p. 47; see also above pp. 51 – 52; below pp. 116; 131; 133.  
8 Cf. also Engel 2000: 380: “How can he claim that, on the one hand, women are fit for training for combat and that, on the other hand, they are not strong enough to be taught γυμναστική?”
- which suggests that also this whole emphasis on the difference of physical strength in the division of tasks has more to do with his “obligatory” concessions to conventionality than with his own views. ¹

In any case, it is worth noting that even Musonius’ less radical statements concerning the division of tasks indicate at least some practical equality also outside the domestic sphere, even in public - based on the “sameness” of man and woman but, at the same time, also somewhat resembling the way in which it was possible to construct gender, e.g. in Asia Minor. ²

We can also find an important clue in Musonius’ statements concerning education in the IV diatribe. It is naturally a fact that when Musonius in this diatribe demands the same education and training for man and woman, he discusses above all the same education and training aiming at virtue, and thus he still in the end of this diatribe, in IV,48,17-18, says that “μόνον περὶ μηδενὸς τῶν μεγίστων ἔτερος ἐτέρᾳ μεμαθηκέτω, ἀλλὰ ταὐτά”, meaning by τὰ μεγίστα things concerning virtue. Immediately above, in IV,48,14-17, he, however, states that “εἰ γάρ τί ποι καὶ μικρὸν ὁ μὲν εἰσεται, ἢ δὲ οὐ, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν ἢ μὲν εἰσεται, ὁ δὲ οὐ, τεχνίτου τινὸς ἐχόμενον, οὕτω τούτῳ διάφορον ἀποφαίνει τὴν ἑκατέρου παιδείαν” and thus temporarily extends the perspective also on a more general education, i.e. to skills necessary in different tasks. And it is important to note that Musonius here concedes that the result of this education may differ in men and women in some small details but not more - which means that he thinks that mostly the same skills should be taught both sexes. It is, of course, again impossible to conclude to what extent Musonius’ willingness to accept these small differences in man’s and woman’s knowledge and skills concerning tasks can be explained by the fact that he tries to persuade his listeners, but the most important thing is, however, that his words in any case indicate that he seems to think that most or at least many of those τέχναι connected with tasks outside the domestic sphere must belong to women’s education, too, and are suitable also for them. Thus, this is, on the other hand, also an indication of Musonius’ tendency to focus also on a larger scale on human beings as individuals in practical life regardless of their sex. ³

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¹ For this strategy to convince/persuade his listeners in the division of tasks see also above p. 73.
² For aspects of geographical differences in the construction of gender see in more detail Montserrat 2000: 165 (taking as an example Plancia Magna); see also p. 40, n. 1.
³ See also Hill 2001: 39 who points out that only Musonius “seems to be asking the rhetorical question: ‘How far can female reproductive difference be pushed?’” cf. also above p. 49, n. 2 on Plato. Cf. Clement of Alexandria who, despite agreeing with Musonius in many views (see above p. 75, n. 3), considers this difference so decisive that he argues that women should devote only to home.
It is also interesting that Musonius - when justifying man’s and woman’s same education aiming at virtue - takes in IV,46,4-7 as a comparable example a situation in which a woman is a professional player of aulos or kithara. And because there is (according to Hense p.16,9) a lacuna in the text, it is possible that Musonius has continued his catalogue also with other occupations, such as a doctor, for musician and doctor are the most common occupations used as examples in Musonius’ diatribes and appear almost without exception together.¹ It is known from, e.g., inscriptions and archaeology that there were rather many women doctors in the Roman era, some of them also very highly esteemed, such as Antiochis of Tlos, and that among them were also women of wealthier classes.²

Female musicians were normally women of lower classes – elite women were expected to be able to make music but not “too much”, i.e. not more than was “suitable” for a “respectable” matron, as is evident, for example, in Sallust’s description of Sempronia.³ The most important thing is, however, simply the fact that Musonius could not have used this kind of example of a professional woman if he had not approved of this prevailing situation in society - that women work and act outside the home.

This seems to be – at least for the most part - the case with Epictetus, too. True, Epictetus rather often deals with one’s different roles and duties⁴ and compares a human being in a typical way to an actor who should as well as possible play the role (νπόουνον) assigned to him/her.⁵ For that reason, some scholars have seen in his views connections with Panaetius’ theory of the four personae,⁶ and, as mentioned above, C. E. Manning, basing his interpretation on this four personae theory and its development among the later Stoics, refers also to Epictetus when arguing that for these Stoics the only possible role for women is their traditional subordinate role with its duties and tasks.⁷

It is, however, very difficult to find concrete evidence for this: when Epictetus discusses social roles, as, for example, in II,10, “it does not occur to him to treat the role of a woman”, as David L

¹ See esp. II,36,28-30; VI,52,10-11; VIII,66,16-19.
³ Cat. 25,2-3: psallere, saltare elegantius quam necesse est probae. For female musicians see, e.g., Eichenauer 1988: 64 - 76; Rottloff 2006: 163.
⁴ See esp. I,2; II,10 ; see also, e.g., IV,12,16; Epict. ench. 30.
⁵ Epict. ench. 17. See also above pp. 14; 71.
⁶ For a summary of these discussions see, e.g., Gill 1988: 187 – 193.
⁷ Manning 1973: 172 – 177, esp. 175 ; see also Manning 1981: 8; see also above p. 7, also n. 4. Hershbell 1995: 201 – 202 points out that Epictetus sometimes seems to accept at least some hierarchical structures in society, including the subordinate status of slaves (II,23,24-25).
Balch puts it. It is true that he in the above-discussed II,14.8 explicitly mentions also women:

οἱ λιπῶς, ἀρδόξως, ἀταράχως διεξάγειν καθ’ αὑτὸν μετὰ τῶν κοινωνών τηροῦντά τὰς σχέσεις τὰς τε φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθέτους, τὸν υἱόν, τὸν πατέρα, τὸν ἄδελφον, τὸν πολίτην, τὸν ἄνδρα, τὴν γυναῖκα, τὸν γείτονα, τὸν σύνοδον, τὸν ἄρχοντα, τὸν ἄρχομενον.  

But it is evident here, as, e.g., in III,2,4, that when Epictetus refers to duties of family members and relatives, he does not specify them - and likewise, though he in II,10,11 states that “ἔκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ὄνομάτων εἰς ἐπιλογισμὸν ἐρχόμενον ὑπογράφει τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔργα”, he does not specify these ἔργα. It is also important to note that Epictetus’ focus is how human beings connected with σχέσεις should deal with each other according to reason, and his primary object of interest is always one’s (to all common) role as a (rational) human being and that to play one’s role “well” means rationally morally well. Thus, Lisa Hill, referring specifically to women’s traditional gender roles, criticises Manning’s contention that the duties of the social role “overpower or override the duties confluent with the universal persona”, concluding that “the social and ‘accidental’ duties of marriage and motherhood are to be understood as secondary to the duties attached to membership of the universal state.”

Manning quotes I,16,11-14 where Epictetus tries to convince his (male) listeners that a man should preserve the external signs of maleness given by nature and god. It is true that, as some

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1 Balch 1983: 438. For the difficulties with the evidence see also, e.g., Lewick 2002: 149: “Epictetus likewise was not interested in the ‘rights of women’ in the sense of their legal and social standing”. However, she cites no evidence for that claim but refers to Hershbell 1989: 2158, n. 63 who refers to Hijmans 1959: 4, n. 5 who criticises Adolf Bonhöffer’s claim of Epictetus’ “prinzipielle Anerkennung der Rechte des weiblichen Geschlechts” (Bonhöffer 1894: 89) and says that the instances he mentions are “too general to conclude anything” or “not rightly adduced here” or “too casual to be of much moment.” The problem is that the instances mentioned do not, in fact, deal with women’s “legal and social standing”.

2 that each person leads a personal life free from grief, fear and perturbation, and preserves all the natural and acquired relationships of son, father, brother, citizen, husband, wife, neighbour, fellow-traveller, ruler, subject (trans. Hard, Oldfather, modified)

3 Furthermore, Bonhöffer 1894: 90 argues that “diese Pflichten - - wesentlich dieselben sind, welche im Verkehr mit den Menschen überhaupt gelten”.

4 Each of these designations, when duly considered, always suggests the acts that are appropriate to it (trans. Oldfather)

5 See also, e.g., IV,4,16; Epict. ench. 30: III,21,5-6.

6 See, e.g., Gill 1988: 189 – 191, esp. 189: “The other roles should, in effect, be subordinated to our common human role”; Frede 2007/2010: 167: “He thinks of the first role as taking precedence over the others”; 166; cf. also “; Annas 2007/2010: 145: “Epictetus encourages us to act within our roles in a way aspiring to Stoic ideals and guided by principles which in the fully virtuous person lead to the perspective of the ‘citizen of the universe’.” See also above p. 71; below p. 128.

7 See above pp. 13 - 14, also n. 1; 71, also n. 4; below p. 128, n. 5.

8 Hill 2001: 35 – 40; the quotations are from pp. 36 and 38. Furthermore, Asmis 1996:86 has argued that “we may suppose that just as men may be excused from politics by ill health, study, or personal distaste, so women may be excused from a household role for the same reasons”. 9 Manning 1973: 176.
scholars have noted, when Epictetus treats the same subject in III,1, 34-35 he seems to unambiguously connect this thought also with gender roles, i.e. with a man’s role as a citizen, especially when he says to a Corinthian young man who has plucked out hair from his body that “τοιούτον σε θῶμεν πολίτην Κορινθίων, κἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, ἀστυνόμον ή ἐφήβαρχον ή στρατηγόν ή ἀγώνοθέτην;”¹ We should not, however, hastily draw too far-reaching conclusions and conclude that his words mean that he is willing to confine women to the home although he, besides, many times states that the (general) duties of a human being include γαμεῖν and παιδοποιεῖσθαι² and although he occasionally refers to the role of an οἰκοδεσπότης³ and to women in their role as mother and wife:⁴ we should remember that these roles of wife and mother did not, as discussed above, prevent them from acting and working also outside the domestic sphere at that time. This was the case with the eastern part of the empire too, in great degree also with Corinth - or Asia Minor and Epirus where Epictetus came from and where he had his philosophical school.⁵

Furthermore, when Epictetus tries to appeal to the male pride of his listeners in order to achieve his goal, he often, as will be discussed below in more detail, uses very sharp and poignant words – like also, very interestingly, occasionally even Musonius. For in his XXI diatribe he deals with, e.g., the cutting of hair and beard, and in XXI,128,5-7, comparing men’s beard with the crest of cocks and with the mane of lions as a sign of manhood, says that “τὸν δὲ πώγωνα καὶ σύμβολον γεγονέναι τοῦ ἄρρενος, ὥσπερ ἀλεκτρυόνι λόφον καὶ λέοντι χαίτην”, and, unlike Epictetus, even continues

¹ III,1,34; see, e.g., Vander Stichele & Penner 2005: 304: “Epictetus is quick to draw associations between the effeminate male and his role in civic life, the primary manifestation of male identity in the ancient world. In an intriguing reference to Corinth, Epictetus questions the suitability of such a “plucked” male for political service. Leadership and pedagogical positions require the demonstration of manly qualities, of which hair is here perceived to be a visible sign”; Penner & Vander Stichele 2004: 203, n. 35: “The connection between civic virtue and masculine comportment is aptly demonstrated by Epictetus’s comments on hair in his Discourses (3.1.27-35)”; Carter 2000/2004: 597, n. 3: “Hair distinguishes a man from a woman; removing it along with male-female differences is contrary to nature (3.1.30) and unworthy citizenship (3.1.34-35)”. See also the ironical καλὸς πολίτης καὶ βουλευτὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ in III,1,35.

² E.g. III,7,26; III,21,5, i.e. the duties of marrying and having children.

³ See esp. II,20,20; III,22,4; III,24,99, i.e. as the head of the household.

⁴ See II,22,32-33 where Epictetus, however, discusses Eriphyle, and not roles and tasks of women as mother and wife in real society.

⁵ For a rather strong position of women in Asia Minor see Osiek & McDonald 2005: 205 – 209; Bain 2014 and above pp. 6, n. 4; 83, n. 3; 86, also n. 3; 88, also n. 2; (cf. also above pp. 47, n. 4; 48, n. 1 for Artemisia I, Artemisia II and Ada I; p. 48 for the Amazons); for Epirus (where women could, e.g., own and manage property without a kyrios at least since the Classical period) see e.g., Bernard 2003: 120 – 121; Hansen 2009: 29; for Corinth Kearsley1999; Osiek & McDonald 2005: 205 – 206; 217; Bain 2014; 33; Barnes 2014; for Roman Greece above p. 83, n. 6.
that men who cut their hair and shave their cheeks find it tolerable that they look androgynous and woman-like, ἄνδρόγυνοι and γυναικώδεις - which a real man seeks to avoid:

ὥδε δὲ τινες καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ βαρύνεσθαι τὰς τρίχας κείρονται, καὶ λεινοῦσι τὰ γένεια, σαφῶς αὕτως γε κατεαγότες ύπο τῆς τρυφῆς καὶ ἐκνενευρισμένοι παντάπασιν, ὅ γε ἀνέχονται ἄνδρόγυνοι καὶ γυναικώδεις ὁρᾶσθαι ὅντες, ὅπερ ἐδει φεύγειν ἐξ ἀπαντὸς, εἰ δὴ τῷ ὄντι ἄνδρες ἔσαν.

So, it is important to note that, as we have seen, these kinds of conservative statements referring to women’s “otherness” did not prevent at least Musonius from having very radical attitudes towards the division of tasks between the sexes – without forgetting that, like Musonius, Epictetus seems to deny men’s superiority in self-control and thus their ruling position based on this.

Thus, it must be repeated that it is very hard to find concrete evidence that Epictetus, like Seneca, would like to construct the gender of women very conservatively, strictly separating the spheres of men and women, and would disapprove of women's activity outside the home. On the other hand, of interest are passages where Epictetus emphasises a father's parental responsibility, as in I,11 (here, for a sick daughter2), as also some passages in Περὶ Κυνισμοῦ. Because Epictetus’ intention is here to justify why the ideal Cynic educating the whole humankind cannot marry in real society, it is, of course, probable that he intentionally exaggerates the time consumption of family life, but it is nevertheless interesting that he gives one to understand that a man, too, has many obligations/tasks inside the home as husband and father.3 Furthermore, it seems to be self-evident for

1 XXI, 128,31-35; this strategy to heighten the effect of one’s words by belittling women, evident also, e.g., in Epictetus and Seneca, will be discussed in more detail below. It is true that in III,1,27 one of Epictetus' arguments is that a woman is "φύσει λεία γέγονε καὶ τρυφερά", interpreted by Bonhöffer 1894: 89 to indicate that he possibly thinks that women are (also) ethically inferior to men. We cannot, however, find support for this interpretation because Epictetus - as we can, on other hand, assume already from the name of this diatribe Περὶ καλλωπισμοῦ – seems to speak only of the physical essence of a woman: ἐκείνη φύσει λεία γέγονε καὶ τρυφερά· κἂν μὲν φύσει μὴ ἔχῃ τρίχας πολλάς, τέρας ἐστὶ, κἂν γὰρ ἔχῃ τρίχας πολλάς, τέρας ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τέρασιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ δείκνυται. ταῦτα δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκκόπηκε καὶ ἀποτίλληκτον εἰς τούτον ποιήσωμεν; ποῦ αὐτὸν δὲ ἐξελθόμεθα, καὶ τὲ προγράψωμεν; (III,1,27-28); see also esp. III,1,43-44. It is also important to remember that this does not mean that (beardless) women cannot be philosophers - for this see, e.g., Epict. II,14,7-8; Muson., esp. III,40,28-29;40,34-35; cf. also Grahn 2013: 153 for early Stoics (on male and female) sages). For the importance of beard in a philosopher in antiquity and among the Stoics see, e.g., Geytenbeek 1963: 119 – 123; Sellars 2003: 17 – 19; Wöhrle 2002: 137 – 138.

2 See also Reydams-Schils 2005: 78; 121 - 123.

3 I 3, 22,70-71; 22,74: ὅτι αὐτὸν ἀποδιδόναι δεῖ τίνα τῷ πενθερῷ, ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς ἀλλοίς συγγενεῖς τῆς γυναικὸς, αὐτῇ τῇ γυναικί εἰς νοσοκομίας λοιπὸν ἐκκλείεται, εἰς πορισμόν. ἐρίδια τεκούσῃ τῇ γυναικί, ἔλαιον, κραβάττιον, ποτήριον (γίνεται ἤδη πλείω σκευάσμα)· ποῦ σχολή τῷ εἰς τὰ ἰδιωτικὰ καθήκοντα ἐνδεδεμένῳ; οὐ δεῖ αὐτὸν πορίσασθαι ἱματία τοῖς παιδίσκοις; ἄγε, πρὸς γραμματιστὴν ἀποστείλαι πινακίδα ἔχοντα, γραφεῖα, τιτλάρια, καὶ τούτοις κραβάττιον ἑτοιμάσαι;
Epictetus that women, too, can be in an influential position, i.e. he mentions that state of affairs in passing, without criticising or paying more attention to it. And in II,7,8 Epictetus mentions Gratilla, a member of the Stoic opposition exiled under Domitian, and admires the courageous unconventional acting of her friend, obviously also a Stoic herself, who acts courageously outside the domestic sphere and not, in a conventional way, on the behalf of her family:

\[ \text{διὰ τούτο ἡ γυνὴ καλῶς εἶπεν ἡ πέμψαι θέλουσα τῇ Γρατίλλῃ ἐξωρισμένῃ τὸ πλοῖον τῶν ἐπιμηνίων κατὰ τὸν εἰπόντα ὅτι ὧν ἀφαιρήσεται αὐτὰ Δομιτιανὸς, ''Μᾶλλον θέλω, '' φήσιν, '' ἵν’ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὰ ἀφέληται ἢ ἵν’ ἐγὼ μὴ πέμψω.''}  

It is also important to note that Epictetus in Περὶ Κυνισμοῦ, in III,22,76, represents Hipparchia in a positive light and calls her “another Crates” (ἄλλος Κράτης), for this indicates that a woman, too, can on equal terms as a man free herself from her usual obligations in life.3

4.2. The capacity for virtue in man and woman - σπέρμα ἀρετῆς ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν

After the examination of the individual virtues it is time to discuss the second aspect of the sameness of the virtues of man and woman: the capacity to acquire virtue and wisdom, and the educating of this innate capacity - i.e. whether (or to what extent) the later Stoics really see women here as “same” and think that they can acquire virtue and become wise, for, as we have seen, their views, too, seem to include also conservative and conventional attitudes and ideals. On the other hand, it is also important to remember that Musonius does not himself seem to connect women’s practice of philosophy with their traditional role(s), but at least most of his conservative statements are due to his intention to persuade his listeners. Despite that, most of the scholars disagree and argue that, although he does not in a conservative way exclude women from philosophy, usually considered a male privilege, he advocates here other exclusions referring to women's "otherness" in relation to the Stoic norm linked with men and male gender. So, they not only argue that women should, according to Musonius, practise philosophy only in order to

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1 III,7,13. Cf. above p. 91, also n. 6 and women’s rather strong and influential position in Asia Minor and Epirus (i.e. where Epictetus came from and where he taught philosophy). –Cf. also, e.g., the native places of extant Greek women poets varying with time and place and at least somehow reflecting women’s position in periods and places in question.

2 whereas, that was an admirable answer which the woman gave who wished to send a boatload of supplies to Gratilla after she had been exiled. to a man who said, “Domitian will confiscate them”; she replied, “I should rather have him confiscate them than myself fail to send them” (trans. Oldfather)

3 Cf. also Asmis 1996:86 cited above on p. 90, n. 8.

4 See also above p. 63, also n. 1; p. 84.
become better wives, mothers and household managers, but some of them also go into details and explicitly argue that he wants to teach women “simplified or stripped down philosophy” as suitable to their role and restrict the content of philosophy women are allowed to practise\(^1\) - and that he even considers the goal itself to be attained through the practice of philosophy not the same for men and women: e.g. that he “anticipates a different condition for women philosophers than the condition that awaits men trained in philosophy” because “the promised result” of women’s practice of philosophy is “not that they become sage-like, but that they will be obedient and industrious in the domestic sphere.”\(^2\) But on the other hand, it is also worth noting that some other scholars seem to disagree and argue that the result of philosophical education is the same for man and woman, i.e. a “perfected, even godlike” person,\(^3\) or that Musonius accepts “philosophical training of women unconditionally,”\(^4\) and that women should “have the same education, and be as skilled in philosophy, as men”, including independent argumentation\(^5\) - although they do not discuss their claims more detailedy. So, it is also an important aspect to try to find out to what extent these kinds of interpretations are valid and how conservative and gendered Musonius’ views are in this respect.

4.2.1. The innate capacity for virtue

4.2.1.1. Musonius and Epictetus on the same innate capacity for virtue in man and woman

As discussed above, Musonius, like other Stoics, seems to think that every human being is endowed with the capacity for virtue.\(^6\) Unlike, e.g., Seneca, Musonius does not use the word “wise”,

\(^{1}\) E.g. that he wants them to practise only moral philosophy, denying them logic, e.g., Lewick 2002: 144; 149; see also 150: “His limited aim meant offering simplified or stripped down philosophy, designed not for human beings as such, but for human beings with a ready-made role”; p. 151 on “restricted freedom to philosophize” which “benevolent philosophers” (among them, apparently, Musonius) “allowed women”; for more examples see below p. 114, n. 5.

\(^{2}\) Engel 2000: 387; 385: “What must be rejected, I submit, is the idea that Musonius thinks that a man’s practice of philosophy and a woman’s practice of philosophy are identical”; 389; Engel 2003: 283; 380.

\(^{3}\) Dillon 2004: 47.


\(^{5}\) Blomqvist 1995: 188; cf. also, e.g., Allen 1985: 180: “Musonius argued, in contrast to Aristotle, that women were capable of the highest level of philosophy”; Rousselle 1992/1994: 329: “If women wish to study the intellectual side of philosophy – controversies, arguments and syllogisms, techniques of thought rather than of practice – they are just as capable of doing so as men”; Bradley 1994: 138: “He saw no barrier to women studying philosophy as well as men”; Gill 2003: 46: “He presents women as equally capable of virtue (and of philosophy)”

\(^{6}\) See esp. II,36,16-17;38,1-2;12-14.
but it is obvious that he speaks of the Stoic wise when he, e.g., draws his attention to a person who lives “according to nature” and as an image of god acquires lasting joy and becomes like god also in happiness.¹ For Musonius this is the absolute goal, as he also in his VII diatrace says:

οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο τί γε τέλος ἐστί τοῦ γενέσθαι ἁγαθὸν ἢ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ ζῆν μορφαρίως εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν.²

Typically Stoic Musonius thus identifies god with nature and means by this nature both the nature of a human being and that of the whole world and universe of which human nature is only a part. And “becoming wise” means also attaining one’s real essence, i.e. living “according to nature”; in the same passage Musonius also says that κατὰ φύσιν βιοῦν means “to live virtuously” (ἐν ἀρετῇ) because a human being, as well as other living creatures, reaches his/her real nature precisely when showing his/her own specific virtue.³

When Musonius in his second diatrace discusses the capacity of human beings for virtue, he, as mentioned above, explicitly speaks of all human beings and says that “σπέρμα ἀρετῆς ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν”.⁴ That he, indeed, includes also women in his words, i.e. extends the possibility for virtue and wisdom to apply equally well to them, is evident also from the fact that he defends the same opportunity for both sexes to realise “τὴν ἀνθρώπων προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν”;⁵ so, he seems to follow surprisingly consistently and deeply the Stoic doctrine of the common same human nature and virtue. Thus, it is clear that a woman can become wise in the same way and on equal terms as a man: when she is capable to live according to the rational nature of a human being.

In his third diatrace Musonius says that ὀρέξις καὶ οἰκείωσις ἀρετής ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν belongs to the nature of a woman just as to the nature of a man,⁶ and we can conclude from some of his

1 XVII,108,4-18; see also, e.g., XVI,104,32-36.
4 II, 38,14; see p. 5 above. For σπέρμα ἀρετῆς see also Laurenti 1989: 2129 – 2130; Geytenbeek 1963: 31.
5 IV,44,35-46,8. The quotation is from IV,46,8: the virtue appropriate to a human being (trans. Lutz) 6 III,40,1-2. The quotation is from III,40,1: a desire for virtue and a natural orientation toward it (trans. King, Nussbaum). On the other hand, it is necessary to remember that the Stoics thought that oikeiōsis is also the origin of justice (δικαιοσύνη) (see, e.g., Schofield 1995; Inwood 1984: 179), and it is probable that something of this remains also in Musonius, especially because he still continues that “οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢττον αὗτα πρὸς ἄνδρον μὲν καὶ δίκαιον ἀργός ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπων προβάλλεσθαι τὸ δ’ ἐναντία κατὰ βομβαλλεσθαι” (III,40,2-4: no less than men women are disposed by nature to be pleased by good and just acts and to reject the opposite (trans. King, Lutz)); see also below p. 97.
remarks here and in the fourth diatribe that he, indeed, sees no difference in their innate capacity for virtue. Already the fact that he demands the same opportunities for women to realise human virtue indicates that he believes that both sexes have the capacity, at least to some extent, to satisfy this demand. And he actually adds that man and woman must be prudent, self-controlled, brave and just and “μηδὲν ἢττον θατέρου θάτερον”. And when he, like other Stoics, particularly in his first diatribe and in the XLVI fragment speaks of “moral talent” (εὐφυία) - the main thought being that although teaching is of crucial importance, some persons are innately more inclined to virtue than others – he nowhere draws this line between the sexes but when he speaks of ideal properties of spouses, he simply states that both wife’s and husband’s souls must be “νρός ἁρετήν εὐφυεστάτος”.

The most important thing is, however, that Musonius in the beginning of the third diatribe explicitly says that men and women have received from the gods the same reason (λόγος) to weigh what is good and what is bad, because the acquisition of virtue is based on the ability of reason to make correct judgements of good and bad. He also sets out two points which indicate that this sameness of reason in man and woman means for him that reason is also in a deeper sense common to both sexes. Firstly, he speaks about the same reason “—who - χρώμεθα” and “καθ’ ὃν διανοούμεθα” and means by the word “we” either human beings generally or at least himself and his listeners – in both cases consequently equally well men. Secondly, it can be observed that after mentioning the same reason he mentions also the fact that man and woman have also the same senses and body parts - and that he clearly does this in order to prove the completely same essence of man and woman. And because Musonius explicitly and very unconservatively says that he expects women, like men, to be able to be free from irrational impulses (νάθος), i.e. from grief (λύπη), fear (φόβος), anger (ὀργὴ), desire (ἐπιθυμία) and pleasure (ἡδονή), it is clear that he does not find the basic ability of a woman’s reason weaker to

1 IV,46,7-10. The quotation is from IV,46,10: the one no less than the other (trans. Lutz)
2 I,34,4.
3 Epict. III,6,9-10.
4 For this concept see, e.g., Rieth 1933: 116; Geytenbeek 1963: 32 – 33.
5 XIIIB,90,13: naturally most disposed to virtue (trans. Lutz, modified)
6 III,38,26-30.
7 III,38,26-28; the quotations are from III,38,27-28: which we use – by which we think over
8 III,38,30-32.
judgements resulting in virtue. Furthermore, in one of those rare passages in which he completely unambiguously compares men and women, he defends women’s equal permission to become “good” and states that the nature of a woman no less (“οὐδὲν - ἦττον”) than the nature of a man is pleased by the good and just acts (τοῖς μὲν καλοῖς καὶ δικαίοις ἔργοις ἀρέσκεσθαι πεφύκασι), which means that he clearly sees in man and woman an equally strong innate capacity for the lasting (rational) joy resulting from virtue, and thus naturally also for the happiness of the wise.

But what about XII,86,38-88,1 where Musonius refers to women as weaker regarding to γνώμη, for which reason some scholars have argued that he, too, thought them to be inferior to men or, in short, (mentally, i.e. regarding their nature) “other”. As is well known, the Greek word γνώμη has quite many meanings, it can simply mean “opinion”, but above all it, however, refers to the intellectual side of the mind, i.e. to the ability to think and considerate, and it is interesting that, e.g., Epictetus sometimes uses the word γνώμη also as an equivalent to the word λόγος. As mentioned above, the views of the “weakness” of women’s mind were not rare during antiquity, and thus it could naturally be possible that this is the case with Musonius, too, although he elsewhere speaks of the same λόγος of man and woman – the statements about women are often dictated by the situation and do not often form a consistent unity, as we shall later see especially clearly in Seneca. Musonius does not, however, express in this passage his own view, but, as discussed above, he ironically brings to climax his description of the paradoxical situation in society: the so-called stronger in mind (and who are in the ruling position) – i.e. men - are in fact weaker than the so-called weaker in mind (and who are in the subordinate position) – i.e. women - in controlling their desires (ἐπιθυμία). But it is, on the other hand, also clear that these kinds of statements were “dangerous” in the respect that they could stimulate and reinforce old conservative attitudes among those failing to recognise irony and paradoxes.

1 Because Lucius does not reveal his teacher’s theoretical principles, it is impossible to say whether Musonius regards these irrational impulses as incorrect judgements of good and bad, or as arising from these incorrect judgements - the main point is, however, that in both cases the decisive is reason’s ability to make these judgements.
2 III,40,2-3; the quotation is from III,40,2; for this see also above p. 95, n. 6 (also in connection with οἰκείωσις).
4 Bonhöffer 1890: 120.
5 XII,88,1-4, see also above p. 36, n.1; pp. 66 – 67; 78.
Despite that, it is important to note that Musonius himself, following Stoic ideas very consistently, refers to the “sameness” of man and woman also by referring to the sameness of women’s capacity for virtue – discussing thus the Stoic ideal in an ungendered way also in this respect. So, the only role he finds here “appropriate” for them is not their traditional role but the same for both sexes: that of a human being capable of living according to the rational nature of a human being; the key idea is, again, the same humankind of man and woman – as also, consequently, in their right (as rational individuals) to the same (philosophical) education, as Martha C. Nussbaum, referring to Stoic cosmopolitanism based on the same humanity of all human beings, states: “Musonius Rufus uses Stoic cosmopolitanism to defend the equal education of boys and girls and the higher education of married women, arguing that rational and moral nature needs educational development.” 1 On the other hand, it is, again, obvious that the significance of these Musonius’ views is due to their ideological significance rather than their potential to influence the lives of that time women. We know of some Stoic women, such as the female members of the so-called Stoic opposition, such as Gratilla and Fannia, but we know virtually nothing of them as Stoics but primarily as heroic loyal wives. 2 A rare more unconventional exception is the above-mentioned friend of Gratilla, giving us a glimpse outside conventional ideals and ideologies, and, as discussed above, there is also epigraphical evidence for women interested in philosophy (and appreciated for it), 3 and not only in upper classes. 4 But it is in general very probable that the conventional role expectations (and ideologies of masculinity and femininity) made both necessary (preferably early) philosophical education 5 and life as a Stoic far more utopian for women than for men at that time.

1 Nussbaum 2002b: 38; see also Nussbaum 2002a: 300: Musonius’ “insistence that males and females should be treated on an equal basis with respect to education and cultivation of the innate capacities central to humanity.” Cf. also the above-cited Vernière 1994: 167: “La femme est à leurs yeux un individu qui - doit pouvoir réaliser son destin humain dans la recherche de la sagesse.”
2 The same can be said also of the two Arrias, Fannia’s mother and grandmother; for these Stoic women see Plin. epist. 3,11; 3,16, 7,19, 9,13; Tac. ann. 16,34; Tac. Agr. 45; Mart. epigr. 1.13; see also above p. 23, n. 4; 40, n. 1; pp. 23, also n. 3; 24, n. 7; 47, n. 1. Similarly also Porcia (Stoic both by birth and marriage), e.g., in Mart. epigr. 1,42; Val. Max. 4,6,5; see also above p. 58, n. 1 (Seneca). -It is also possible that Augustus’ sister Octavia was interested in Stoic philosophy, for the Stoic philosopher Athenodorus dedicated a book to her (Plut. Publ. 17,5; Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 106 – 107; 292, n. 36 – 39; for such dedications see also above p. 63, n. 1). –For mocking women interested in (Stoic) philosophy, e.g., Hor. epod. 8,15-16; Luc. merc.cond. 36.
3 φιλόσοφος, philosopha, e.g., Pleket 30; ILS 7783; see, e.g, Barnes 2002; Bain 2014: 33.
5 Women did not normally get a formal education in higher studies (the earlier age of marriage, daughters, unlike sons, not sent to study in philosophical schools, etc); see, e.g, Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 21; 30 - 31 and below p. 114, also n. 2, cf. also below p. 121, also n. 4 (philosophy suitable for elderly, not young women); for other prejudices see above pp. 62 – 63; 84.
Musonius speaks of “σπέρμα ἀρετῆς ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν”, whereas Epictetus says that god has intended all human beings to live in happiness and that he has given them “ηπόν τοῦτο ἄφορμός”. Adolf Bonhöffer is undoubtedly right in assuming that Epictetus, without excluding women, refers equally well to women because he, as we have already seen, clearly thinks that women, too, can become wise, which means that a woman must have the same nature and reason as a man. And also the fact that Epictetus, like Musonius, thinks that a woman can become free from pathoses, i.e. live “ὀλύπως, ἀφόβως, ἀταράχως” (and thus, as mentioned above, does not advocate the conservative view of the (emotional) “weakness” of women’s mind) indicates that he regards reason as the same in both sexes and that he does not see any difference in its ability to make judgements of good and bad. The above-discussed III,22,68 of Περὶ Κυνισμοῦ where Epictetus speaks of the polis of the wise and says about the wife of the wise man that “ἡ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ ἔσται ἄλλη τοιαύτη” is also worth noting: although Epictetus speaks of the wise, it is probable that he refers also to the (in all parts) identical nature and essence of man and woman. Further, this Epictetus’ expression “ἄλλη τοιαύτη” brings to mind a thought of Antipater of Tarsus in Περὶ γάμου that the wife is “ἑαυτὸν ἕτερον”; in this passage Antipater very probably refers also to the sameness of the essence of man and woman as such, for he still continues that “οὐθὲν γὰρ διοίσει εἴτε θῆλυ τοῦτό ἐστιν εἴτε ἄρρεν.”

True, Epictetus’ diatribe Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν προσπάθειαν τοῖς οὐκ ἐρ’ ἡμῖν may at first glance seem to include some very critical attitudes towards women. In this discourse Epictetus instils
into the minds of his listeners that a human being has to learn to distinguish things which are under his/her control and “own” from the things which are not; here he seems to strongly mention women’s weakness in this respect:

ἓ οὐδὲ σὺ ταύτα ἐμελέτησας, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὰ γύναια τὰ οὐδένος δέχα πάσιν οἷς ἔχαρες ὡς ἀieὶ συνεσθεμένος συνης, τοῖς τόποις, τοῖς ἀνθρώπωις, ταῖς διατριβαῖς;¹

These kinds of and other, rather conventional, negative statements concerning women, which are contradictory to his above-mentioned “egalitarian” views, have made some scholars argue that Epictetus does not think very highly of women and their capacity to use reason, that he emphasises their collective (mental) “otherness” – or that he is even hostile to them.² It is, however, obvious that this emphasising of women’s weakness in particular is only ostensible. Firstly, because Epictetus seems to think that both sexes can acquire virtue and have the same reason capable of judgements, it is not logical to conclude that he in fact considers a woman’s reason weaker to distinguish what is under one’s control (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, προαιρετικά, ἵδιο).

It is thus important to pay attention why Epictetus occasionally wants to raise in front of his (male) listeners the thought of “feminine weakness” and to note that because his intention is to disengage them from “incorrect” attitudes and make them absorb the “right” one, these contemptuous statements serve this goal: “do not be like those” and “because you are not like those, do not …” This method is anything but rare in the texts of antiquity and, e.g., Seneca, as said above, uses it rather often, as will be discussed below in greater detail – and, as we have seen, occasionally Musonius, too.³

¹ III,24,5: or did you also neglect to study this matter, but, like worthless women, did you enjoy everything in which you took delight as though you were to enjoy it for ever, your surroundings, human beings, your ways of life? (trans. Oldfather)
² See, e.g., Wöhrle 2002: 140: “So scheint es fast, als spreche er der weiblichen Natur eine grundsätzliche Vernunftfähigkeit ab”; 140: “Während wir also bei Epiktet jedenfalls eine starke Skepsis gegenüber einer weiblichen Vernunftfähigkeit bemerken”, taking as examples not only the above-cited III,24,5 but also III,24,52-53 and fr. 15 to be discussed below (although Wöhrle on p. 139 rightly remarks that the Stoic “Tugenweg” according to Epictetus “ihnen prinzipiell genauso wie den Männern offenstand”); Engel 2003: 285: “Epictetus and Seneca are, if anything, even more explicitly hostile to women”; Geytenbeek 1963: 57: “In reading Seneca and Epictetus one often has the impression that they did not think so favourably about women”; both taking as an example III,7,20, to be discussed below: Allen 1985: 181: “Instead of following Musonius’s example of strenuously arguing for the equal capabilities of women for virtue and wisdom, Epictetus appears to criticize women’s capacity for understanding Plato’s Republic”, taking as an example of fr. 15; Allen 1985: 182: “The use of derogatory remarks about women was used by Epictetus to refer to the lack of temperance and courage. In this way, the Stoic attitude towards woman became associated with a sex polarity. - - The issue concerned whether to emphasize the capacity in women for wisdom and virtue, and whether one sex was less capable of a Stoic life of virtue than the other.”
³ XXI,128,31-35; see above pp. 91 – 92.
In addition to the discourse III, 24, we can see the same strategy, e.g., in III,7,20 in which Epictetus, in order to make his listeners abandon the “damaging” doctrines of Epicurus - enumerates “weak” points in these doctrines and adds as a finishing touch that they “οὐδὲ γυναῖξι πρέποντα”\(^1\) - which undoubtedly still increased the effectiveness of his persuasion. In the same way, the construction of a “real man” acts as a counterbalance to “feminine weakness” in III,24, 53.\(^2\)

That Epictetus, indeed, sees no (or at least no decisive) difference between the sexes is finally evident also from the fact that he has found it necessary to compile this discourse Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν προσπάσχειν τοῖς οὐκ ἐφ’ ήμῖν. For this proves that he hardly has considered his (male) listeners more advanced - which becomes still more obvious when we read this discourse more accurately: he reproaches men for the exactly same “wrong” attitudes as women. And if he says that women surrender to grief when they have lost what they have incorrectly imagined as their “own”, there are plenty of examples of men suffering from the same “excessive emotionalism” and lack of firmness.\(^3\)

It should neither be assumed that when Epictetus seems to refer to women’s “weakness”, he refers to women as such and as a whole – just as it is incorrect to conclude that he refers to all men when he mentions men’s “weakness”. And it is of crucial importance that the only way to recover from this “weakness” is exactly the same for both sexes, i.e. the practice of philosophy. This thought is naturally a through-going theme in all his diatribes but is especially evident in this diatribe III,24 when he blames individuals of both sexes who have not (yet) learned what is under one’s control:

> ἀλλ’ ἀποκεχώρηκα τοῦ δεῖνος καὶ ὀδυνᾶται. “διὰ τί γὰρ τὰ ἄλλοτρα ἰδια ἡγήσατο;” \(^4\)  
> ἀλλ’ ἡ μήτηρ μου στένει μὴ ὁρῶσά με. – Διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ ἔμαθεν τοὺς λόγους τούς λόγους;\(^5\)

One can thus be/become “effeminate” or a “real man” regardless of one’s sex,\(^6\) as we have seen and shall see also in Seneca. But on the other hand, it is, at the same time, true that the above-

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1. not even fit for women (trans. Oldfather)
2. πρὸς ταῦτα ὑπὸ θεῶν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ταύτην εἰσηγμένος καὶ ἡδη τῶν ἄνδρὸς ἐργῶν ὀφείλων ἀπεθανα τιτθὰς ἐπιποθεῖς καὶ μάμμην καὶ κάμπτει σε καὶ ἀποθηλύνει κλαίοντα γύναια μωρά;  
3. See, e.g., III,24,4-8;18:25-37.
4. III,24: “but I have parted from So-and-so, and he is stricken with grief”, yes, but why did he regard what was not his own as his own? (trans. Oldfather)
5. III,24,22: but my mother mourns because she does not see me. – yes, but why did she not learn the meaning of these words of the philosophers? (trans. Oldfather)
6. It should, again, be repeated that the male-centred use of language of the Stoics (see also above pp. 7; 42; 44; 79; below p. 122), intertwined with conventional ideas of time on women’s “weakness”, should not obscure that the Stoic ideal was (at least in principle) independent of one’s sex (and very difficult to achieve for men, too).
mentioned statements of Epictetus are, again, good examples of how also the later Stoics, even Musonius, are sometimes ready in their "the end justifies the means" reasoning to refer belittling, or even despising, to women and thus perhaps even reinforce common negative attitudes emphasising women's “otherness” (though, as we have seen, such attitudes were not always congruent with social reality, including the actual acting of real women). In any case, the fact that the later Stoics are ready to refer belittling to women is one indication of conservative attitudes also among them although they as Stoics advocate at least in principle “equality” and “sameness” of all human beings. And, as we shall see next, this is still more evident in Seneca.

4.2.1.2. Seneca on the emotional “weakness” of women

Seneca's view of women's innate capacity for virtue is not as clear as those of Musonius and Epictetus and includes contradictory elements. In the above-discussed passage of Ad Marciam de consolatione, Seneca most explicitly reveals his conviction of the same virtue of man and woman and says that there is no difference in their power of mind and in their capacity for virtue:

Quis autem dixit naturam maligne cum mulierum ingeniis egisse et virtutes illarum in artum retraxisse? par illis, mihi crede, vigor, par ad honesta, libeat modo, facultas est;

And it is important to note that he uses the word vigor also elsewhere when he speaks of the

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1 E.g. in the respect that women were allowed (and seen as capable) to act in many “male” spheres – though not always without a hint at inequality (see, e.g., officeholder Aba in Histria seen as trying to imitate men in some “male” tasks (Pleket II 21)), also by using typical formulas such as “although she is/was a woman” (as, e.g., a husband praising his wife's medical skill which he equates with his own (Pleket 20); cf. also, e.g., P. Giss. 79 with “because I am a woman” - though this self-belittling is rather ostensible, for the writer seems to give her financial advices with competence and confidence; this kind of self-assurance seems to be typical of many letters of women, also those dealing with business and economic matters; cf. also women emphasising and exaggerating their “weakness” in their petitions to persuade officials, see Rowlandson (ed.) 1998 354 - 355). Rare glimpses of the own attitudes of women acting in public spheres suggest that their attitudes tended to be rather similar to those of men's, e.g., the importance of acting as a patron or as a benefactor and having a public statue due to one's patronage/benefactions or signifying one's professional skill (e.g. CLE 67: clientes habui multos (Manilia Gnome); ILS 5512 (Junia Rustica); for women explicitly demanding a statue Hemelrijck 2012: 483, e.g., Baebia Crinita (ILS 5402); e.g. medical skill, e.g., Pleket 12 (Antiochis of Tlos); for self-promotion, e.g., Hemelrijck 2013b: 139; Hemelrijck 2012: 483 – 484. Cf. Plancia Magna’s inscription defining, very unusually, her father in relation to her: [πα]τὴρ Πλανκίας Μάγνης (for this and other unusual aspects d’Ambra 2007: 21 – 22).

2 Sen. Marc. 16.1. As discussed above, although Seneca surely tries to encourage Marcia, this aim would not have required so strong a claim. Like honestum (e.g., Sen. epist. 76,10: haec ratio perfecta virtus vocatur eademque honestum est; epist. 76,15-16), also honesta is used as a synonym to virtue not only in Marc. 16,1 but also elsewhere (e.g. Sen. epist. 31,5: honesta et turpia virtutis ac malitiae societas efficit; see also, e.g., Sen. epist. 75,16; 81,13; 95,36; 115,10).
(necessary) power of the mind, also connected with controlling the pathoses, such as anger. So, it is interesting that he, as said before, more often refers to women’s emotional “weakness” and seems, rather conventionally and typically, to mean by it both a greater lack of restraint concerning pathoses and a some kind of emotional over-sensitivity: as already “levis suspicio periculi” upset women, so it is characteristic of them to feel grief (dolor) and anger (ira) from a small stimulus, for which reason “ira muliebre maxime ac puerile vitium est”. There are, however, certain problems also in these statements concerning the relationship between pathoses and the nature of a woman. And although it is a well-known fact, as discussed by many scholars, that Seneca rather often speaks very negatively of women and their “excessive emotionality” (and although it is possible that he really sees more emotional “weakness” in women), he, it seems, draws no absolute line between the sexes (or between the above-discussed gendered categories ‘(we) men – exceptional women – other women’), i.e. his views are not as conservative (emphasising (mental) “otherness”) as at first glance appears.

Firstly, when Seneca referring to emotional “weakness” (or such a thing) uses the word virilis in a positive and the word muliebris in a negative and contemptuous sense, the way he uses these words is, as mentioned above, extremely common and conventional in antiquity and at that time – as F. Loretto says, “eine Art Topos” - and does not, therefore, always necessarily include deep personal attitudes. Further, it is not always unambiguous when Seneca, while using the word muliebris, thinks specifically women and when he, conventionally, characterises all kind of weakness or other unwanted traits in a human being regardless of his/her sex. A good example of this kind of ambiguous use of the word muliebris is the above-quoted sentence of De ira, “ira

1 See Sen. esp. epist. 24,16, ira 2,15,1-2.
2 Good examples can be found, e.g., in Livy, see, e.g., 1,13,1;3,48,8; 6,34,7;34,7,7.
3 See, e.g., Sen. clem. 1,5,5: muliebre est furere in ira.
4 Sen. ira 1,12,1: the slightest suggestion of danger (trans Basore.)
5 Sen. ira 1,20,2-3; ira 1,20,3: anger is a most womanish and childish vice (trans. Basore, slightly modified)
6 These negative statements have been collected by many scholars, see, e.g., Lavery 1997: 6 – 9; for women’s “excessive emotionality” in Seneca see, e.g., Manning 1973: 171; Vidén 1993: 121 – 123; Mauch 1997: 29 - 44; see also, e.g., Lavery 1997: 9: “Women in general are depicted as irrational, unrealistic, angry, cowardly, childish, extravagant, unstable and immoral”; Cohick 2009: 244: “Because Seneca felt women were naturally wild and passionate, he advocated philosophy as a way to rein them in.”
7 See, e.g., Sen. Polyb. 6,1-2; const. sap. 1,1;10,3;19,2; tranq. 16,2;17,4; epist. 33,1; 78,17; 114,22; clem. 1,5,5; rem. fort. 16,4.
8 Loretto 1977: 127; see also, e.g., Mauch 1997: 161; Langlands 2004: 118.
muliebre maxime ac puerile vitium est" where Seneca probably means by the words *muliebris* and *puerilis* expressly women and children, for he next moves to speak of men, i.e. he states concerning anger that this pathos "at incidit et in viros". It is, however, clear that Seneca, at the same time, refers also to "effeminacy" and "childishness" which can be found in human beings regardless of their sex or age, for he still continues that "viris quoque puerilia ac muliebria ingenia sunt". Besides, Seneca seems to think also elsewhere that this kind of over-sensitivity and irritation at insignificant matters is a typical characteristic of human nature and thus not only of the nature of women. And on the other hand, when Seneca in the second book of *De ira*, basing his discussion of the old doctrine of the four elements (fire, water, air and earth) and on their effect on the personality of a human being, speaks of the relationship between anger and different personality types, he says that women are not among those who are most prone to anger.

When Seneca moves to speak of another aspect of "feminine weakness", i.e. that women in the state of pathoses are not as capable as men to restrain themselves, it is possible that he compares them with barbarians, the other classic "others", as if linking female and ethnic "otherness" here together: women are characterised by, e.g., the verb *furere* and the adjective

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1 Sen. *ira* 1,20,3: *anger is a most womanish and childish vice* (trans. Basore, slightly modified)
2 Sen. *ira* 1,20,3: it is found in men also (trans. Basore)
3 Sen. *ira* 1,20,3: for also men have childish and womanish natures (trans. Basore modified) For in a human being regardless of his/her age and sex existing childishness see, e.g., Sen. *epist.* 4,2; 99,10; const. sap. 12,1-3. Because of the above-mentioned Sen. *ira* 1,20,3 and, e.g., *ira* 2,30,1 (Quorumdam ipsi testes sumus: in his naturam excutiemus voluntatemque facientium. Puer est: aetati donetur, nescit a peccet. - - Mulier est: errat; cf. his thought of the unreliability of a woman’s nature in Sen. *rem. fort.* 16,4: *Nihil est tam mobile quam feminarum voluntas, nihil tam vagum*) and Sen. *ira* 3,24,2-3 (Ignoverunt multi hostibus: ego non ignoscam pigris negligentibus garrulis? Puerum aetas excuset, feminam sexus) where Seneca equates women with children some scholars have argued that "Frauensein bedeutet für Seneca ein „Nichterwachsensein“ (Harich 1994: 357; see also Harich 1993: 143: “Ihr Geschlecht hindert sie daran, vollends erwachsen zu werden”; 155: “Das Frau wird das Erwachsensein verweigert, das allein eine volle Entfaltung der Vernunft gestattet”; see also, e.g., Mauch 1997: 32 - 33). These undeniably negative comments of Seneca are, however, rather scattered, and because Seneca does not discuss the topic more profoundly and systematically, it is impossible to evaluate their real importance (for interpretations of Sen. *ira* 2,30,1, see e.g. Favez 1938: 337; Lavery 1997: 6; Mauch 1997: 31) - and in any case, we must also remember that Seneca sees this same childishness also in men. Moreover, the thought of women’s permanent "Nichterwachsensein" concerning reason etc. is also in conflict with the fact that Seneca, as will be discussed below in more detail, seems to believe that also women have potential to develop.
5 For this doctrine, e.g., Evans 1969: 27; Fillion-Lahille 1984: 183 – 185; Fillion-Lahille 1989: 1630 – 1631. 6 i.e.: *proinde aliquo magis incubunt ingenia prout alcius elementi maior vis abundant* (2,19,1).
7 Sen. *ira* 2,19,1-2;4;2,20,4: “quibus umidi plus inest” (e.g. women), “umidioribus sicciobiurisque et frigidis non est ab iia periculum, sed inertiora vitia metuenda sunt, pavor et difficultas et desperatio et suspiciones”, whereas most prone to anger are those whose dominating element is fire.
ferus rather often used in the texts of antiquity to describe the essence of the barbarians. 1 When Seneca, for example, in his De clementia says that “muliebre est furere in ira”, 2 one can easily conclude that he, indeed, thinks of women and their essence, especially because he also elsewhere, in De constantia sapientis, expresses a corresponding thought in the passage in which he explicitly speaks of women and which at first sight may seem only deeply contemptuos:

Tanta quosdam dementia tenet ut sibi contumeliam fieri posse a muliere. Quid refert quam <beatam> habeant, quot lecticarios habentem, quam oneratas aures, quam laxam sellam? aequae imprudens animal est et, nisi scientia accessit ac multa eruditio, ferum cupiditatum incontinens. 3

We can, however, assume that Seneca’s poignancy is at least partly caused by his antipathy to all kinds of decoration and extravagance, and the main point is that he in any case examines men and women on equal terms – as Anna Lydia Motto formulates Seneca’s viewpoint: “Woman, however painted and bejeweled and decorated, is like her flawed counterpart, man – “unless she has acquired learning and much erudition”.” 4 Or to be precise - as also Charles Favez and Mercedes Mauch point out 5 - Seneca characterises an uneducated woman by the word imprudentia by which he quite often describes undeveloped human beings as the opposite of the wise. 6 And it is furthermore clear that the word ferus includes here – as in the case of barbarians – this thought of (sex-independent) unlearnedness and uneducation of (yet) undeveloped human beings, for Seneca regards eruditio and scientia as the only way to free oneself from this state. And if a woman is in her (yet) uneducated state “cupiditatum incontinens”, Seneca connects also elsewhere grief, anger, fear and other pathoses to undeveloped human beings characterised by imprudentia – i.e. equally well to men. 7

If we then look more extensively at Seneca’s statements concerning pathoses, we can observe that to be ferus connected with pathoses, such as anger, is not at all a characteristic of women only, as can be seen, e.g., in a passage mentioned above in which Seneca considers irritation resulting from

1 See, e.g., Dauge 1981: 428 – 429; 438; 455 – 469; 576. For female and ethnic “otherness” in Roman thinking see also, e.g., Pohl 2004; Rollinger 2000; Ehrhardt 2002.
2 Sen. clem. 1,5,5: it is womanish to rage in anger
3 Sen. const. sap. 14,1: some are mad enough to suppose that a woman can offer them an insult. what matters it how they regard her, how many lackeys she has for her litter, how heavily weighted her ears, how roomy her sedan? she is just the same unthinking creature – wild, and unrestrained in her passions – unless she has gained knowledge and much instruct (trans. Basore, slightly modified)
5 Favez 1938: 342 – 344; Mauch 1997: 163 – 165. They both take as an example also rem. fort. 16.4: Omnium quidem imperitorum animus, maxime tamen in lubrico, muliebris est.
6 See, e.g., Sen. benef. 4,34,5; epist. 81,8; brev. vit. 1,1; const. sap. 19,1; Ira 3,26,1.
7 See, e.g., Sen. epist. 10,2; 99,21.
futile matters as a typical trait of all creatures, including human beings, and says that especially badly this over-sensitivity affects those living beings which are “natura fera.”¹ This same sex-neutrality seems to apply also to the word furere, for Seneca uses this verb often also elsewhere when he describes both anger itself and what is characteristic of those who are in the throes of this pathos.² Or to be brief: not only “effeminate” and “childish” but also “barbaric” mind appears in a human being regardless of his/her sex – as Yves Dauge says: “l’âme barbare est une réalité universelle: qu’on l’envisage chez un Perse, un Germain, un Romain quelconque, une femme, un roi, un enfant, elle présente la même structure et les mêmes caractéristiques”.³ And, as we have seen, the same applies obversely to the construction of a “real man” to which also Seneca, as said above, refers:⁴ a woman, too, is able to achieve this ideal, i.e. rank in firmness and in virtus “inter magnos viros”.⁵

Thus, it is improbable that when Seneca says that “muliebre est furere in ira”, he refers only and particularly to the essence and nature of a woman, but there are, rather, other reasons for his words: we should also here remember that he, like Epictetus and Musonius - but clearly more often than these – uses these kinds of statements as an effective strategy to achieve his goals, i.e. he refers to the “feminine weakness” especially when he wants to make his male readers abandon “wrong” attitudes and adopt the “right” ones;⁶ in this passage the former is “furere in ira”, the latter magnanimity (magnanimitas).⁷ And in one of his epistles Seneca says to his mourning friend that in spite of the fact that the ancestors permitted them a one-year mourning period, women’s weeping and sorrow do not last a month⁸ – and thus, as Gunhild Vidén rightly remarks, he tries (one could add: very conventionally) to prove to his friend how shameful it would be if he were weaker than these “weak poor women” (muliercula).⁹ And, as we have seen,

¹ Sen. ira 3,30,1-2.
² See, e.g., Sen. ira 1,1,1;18,4; ira 3,1,3;3,2;3,6.
³ Dauge 1981: 201.
⁴ For the construction of a “real man” in Seneca see, e.g., Sen. Polyb. 17,2: - - tuleruntque nec nimis acerbe et aspere quod acciderat nec molliter et effeminate; nam et non sentire mala sua non est hominis et non ferre non est viri; Sen. ira 1,12,2: et sic bono viro digna faciet ut nihil faciat viro indignum; Sen. epist. 96,4: ‘Sed volebam vivere, carere tam societatis omnibus’. Tam effeminata vox virum dedeceat. See also above p. 42.
⁵ Sen. Helv. 16,5.
⁶ For this strategy in Seneca, Epictetus and Musonius see above pp. 42; 91 – 92; 100 - 101.
⁷ Sen. clem. 1,5,5.
⁸ Sen. epist. 63,13.
⁹ Vidén 1993: 113. For the thought that it was very shameful for a man to show “effeminacy”, see also, e.g., Edwards 1993: 78 – 81; Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 282, n. 138; Williams 2010: 137 – 176.
Seneca uses this same method also in both consolationes addressed to women: in order to make both his mother and Marcia convinced of their firmness among women, he raises them above other (weak and corrupted) women.\(^1\) And a good example can be found also in a passage of De clementia in which Seneca discusses beside anger and grief also a third pathos, pity (misericordia), and in which he strongly emphasises clemency (clementia) based on reason: in order to make pity seem as repulsive as possible he says that it is peculiar to most wretched people having paltry mind (pusillus animus); he typically takes as examples of these kinds of people succumbing to pity “weak poor women” and old hags.\(^2\)

Thus, although, as said earlier, one's willingness to operate in this way with constructions such as “feminine weakness”, “effeminacy”, or a “real man" surely tells something about one's attitudes (and operating with these kinds of ideas involves at least some wielding of power), Seneca's own views are probably most unambiguously evident where he does not try to persuade/encourage his readers in this way - as in a passage of Ad Marciam de consolatione where he deals with one of the pathoses, grief:

> Ut scias autem non esse hoc naturale, luctibus frangi, primum magis feminas quam viros, magis barbaros quam placidae eruditae gentis homines, magis indoctos quam doctos eadem orbitas vulnerat. - - Paupertatem luctum ambitionem alius alter sentit prout illum consuetudo infecit, et imbecillum impatientemque reddit praesumpta opinio de non timendis terribilis.\(^3\)

The habit to draw this kind of parallel between women, barbarians and uneducated is, of course, not an uncommon practice,\(^4\) but it is clear that this view could not have been in conflict with the

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1 See, e.g., Sen. Marc. 1,1: Nisi te, Marcia, scirem tam longe ab infirmitate muliebris animi quam a ceteris vitis recessisse et mores tuos velut aliquod antiquum exemplar aspicis, non auderem obviari ire dolori tuo, cui vir quoque liberter haerent et incubant; Sen. Helv. 16,2: a te plus exigit vita ab initio fortior; non potest muliebris excusatio contingere ei a qua omnia muliebria vitia auferunt; 16,5: Non potes itaque ad optimandum dolorem muliebre nomen praetendere, ex quo te virtutes tuae seduerunt; tantum debes a feminarum lacrimas abesse, quantum a vitis. See also above pp. 42; 57.

2 Sen. clem. 2,5,1: anus et mulierculae sunt, quae lacrimis nocentissimorum moventur, quae, si liceret, carcerem effringerent. Misericordia non causam, sed fortunam spectat; clementia rationi accedit; see also, e.g., Sen. ira 2,17,2 in which Seneca says that cruelty (crudelitas) indicates a too hard, pity a too soft mind (nimis mollis animus).

3 See, e.g., Sen. Marc. 7,3-4: in order that you may know that it is not by the will of nature that we are crushed by sorrow, observe, in the first place, that, though they suffer the same bereavement, women are wounded more deeply than men, barbarians more deeply than the peaceful and civilized, the uneducated, than the educated. - - poverty, grief, and ambition are felt differently by different people according as their minds are coloured by habit, and a false presumption, which arouses a fear of things that are not to be feared, makes a human being weak and unresisting (trans. Basore, slightly modified); see also, e.g., Sen. Marc. 11,1: Moderandum est itaque vobis maxime, quae inmoderate fertis – but cf. also Sen. Marc. 1,1: dolori tuo, cui viri quoque liberter haerent et incubant.

4 For the same thought see, e.g., Ps.-Plut. Mor. 113a; de Vico 1955: 338; Mauch 1997: 37, n. 173. On the other hand, Manning 1981: 56 argues that “placing of women in an inferior category can probably be explained by the Peripatetic source for the argument".
own view of Seneca, for otherwise he could hardly have included it. And in any case this passage of Ad Marciam de consolatione is interesting also for the reason that we can on the basis of it still more explicitly see that, according to Seneca, there cannot exist any special emotional “weakness” peculiar only to women and to their essence/nature, for Seneca seems to think that this kind of “weakness” results also in a woman from “wrong” habits and opinions.\(^1\) So, when he refers to women’s emotional “weakness”, he can at most mean that this same weakness appearing in both sexes exists in women usually in greater amount than in men. And, on the other hand, some scholars have also argued that Seneca here equates women with uneducated because women were often (at least thought to be) less educated than men,\(^2\) and thus it is possible that women’s greater emotional “weakness” is (at least partly) due to their lack of education\(^3\) – as in the case of barbarians, too, who are compared to “placidae eruditaeque gentis homines.”

If Seneca thinks that women are, for some reason or other, less able than men to disengage from “wrong” habits and opinions, this possibly means that he sees in women at least on average less moral talent (εὐφυία), for in one of his letters he connects these kinds of faults to morally less gifted.\(^4\) But in the same passage he also says that morally less gifted persons are not at all incapable of virtue – they only need more teaching.\(^5\) And although Seneca elsewhere, as A. C. van Geytenbeek has noticed, seems to regard some people as hopeless in this respect

\(^1\) Cf. also Sen. Marc. 7,1: *Sed plus est quod opinio adicit quam quod natura imperavit.*

\(^2\) E.g. Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 91: “As rationality and good judgement were believed to be acquired through education, women were sometimes put on a level with men of the lower classes because of their (supposed) lack of education” and 284 – 285, n. 149 in which she mentions as one example of this Marc. 7,3 “where he connects women, barbarians and the uneducated generally in being prone to mourning”; Allen 1985: 169: “The obvious conclusion is that women have not been educated as men to moderate their passions, particularly the passion of grief”; Mauch 1997: 37: “Der die Beweisführung abschließende Vergleich der Frauen mit den *indocti* findet seine Bestätigung an anderer Stelle [i.e. const. sap. 14,1], wo Seneca das affektische Handeln der Frau auf ihre Unkenntnis, auf ihre mangelnde Bildung zurückführt”; Vidén 1993: 138 – 139; see also, e.g., Mauch 1997: 16: “Das affektische Handeln der Frau führt Seneca auf ihre Unkenntnis, auf mangelnde Bildung zurück”; Grahn 2013: 225: “Women’s tendency to weep more could also be attributed to differences in the education they have received rather than natural differences”.

\(^3\) It is interesting to compare this to the interpretations of Gregory Vlastos (Vlastos 1989/1995: esp. 138 - 139; 143) and Susan B. Levin (Levin 1996: esp. 14; 25 - 26; 220, n. 5; 114 - 226, n. 42 - 50) concerning Plato’s views on women in *Republic V*, summarised by Levin 1996: 26 who argues that Plato makes a distinction between women “as they are presently” and women “as they might be if assessed and educated based on the caliber of their souls.” Cf. Sevenster 1961: 196 (speaking of Seneca): “He may in principle consider woman, as she is created by nature, capable of great things, but he usually displays great contempt for her, as she is in reality.”

\(^4\) Sen. epist. 95,36-37.

\(^5\) Sen. epist. 95,37.
(he, for example, states that “sapientia ars est; certum petat, eligat profecturos, ab is, quos desperavit, recedat”\(^1\)) it is clear that he does not refer merely to women, as already the masculine form of the relative pronoun **quos** indicates – which, on the other hand, confirms the interpretation that he cannot in Marc. 7,3-4 mean that women are **as a whole** less gifted than men but at most only on average. Furthermore, it is possible that Seneca finds his mother exceptionally gifted or at least more gifted than people on average because he mentions her “**rapax ingenium**”\(^2\) – although he surely wants to encourage his mother, it is still interesting that this characterisation is very similar to the expression “**rapacia virtutis ingenia**” which Seneca in the above-mentioned letter uses of the morally most gifted people.\(^3\)

Also the fact that Seneca emphasises the crucial importance of the will in exactly the same way when he speaks of women indicates that he thinks that emotional “**weakness**” and capacity for virtue arise from the same basis in both sexes. So, when he on the general level refers to the reason why a human being does not reach virtue although “satis natura homini dedit roboris”, he says that “**nolle in causa est, non posse praetenditur**.”\(^4\) And he expresses exactly the same thought also when he speaks specifically of women: after saying that “**par illis, mihi crede, vigor, par ad honesta - - facultas est**”, he adds “**libeat modo**.”\(^5\) Thus, the “**weakness**” of women means for him, ironically, also that women **themselves** incorrectly suppose that they are weak and incapable of virtue and therefore do not even try to reach it.

It is naturally necessary to keep in mind that Seneca expresses these favourable statements to his mother and Marcia, elevated (by him) above other women in many respects, but it is clear that we should not automatically, like some scholars,\(^6\) make a conclusion that he thinks that virtue is possible only to these and not to women in general. Undoubtedly, he once again tries to...
strengthen Helvia's and Marcia's faith in their own abilities, but it must be remembered that because he has "good" reasons dictated by the situation to elevate both his mother and Marcia above other women, this also means that we should not attach too great importance to this juxtaposition. There is neither any reason to assume that those attitudes expressed by Seneca in his other works – i.e. to men – give a more reliable picture of his own real opinions, for he also here tries to strengthen the self-confidence of the addressees. And besides, his remarks on women in his works addressed to men are usually very scattered and do not constitute a consistent unity – or as Klaus Thraede says: "Maßgebend waren aber wohl Zweck oder Adressat der jeweiligen Schrift, System darf man hier kaum suchen". The same is evident in Seneca's statements of slaves and barbarians: sometimes he utters prejudices and contempt typical of his time, but sometimes – and where he goes deeper into the theme – he, following the Stoic doctrine, speaks of the "sameness", i.e. of the same humanity, virtue and equality of all human beings, regardless of their position and ethnicity/nationality.

Thus, it is very clear that the reliability of Seneca's words to Marcia and to his mother is not decreased by the fact that only when writing to them he more widely, more systematically and completely unambiguously pays attention to women – without forgetting that if Seneca presents Helvia and Marcia as exceptional, this is the case with the male addressees, too. And it should also be remembered that, as mentioned above, in addition to statements intended to encourage Marcia or Helvia, there are also other ones which prove that Seneca neither regards women as a whole weaker than men nor sees their "weakness" as specific only to women - and that he believes

1 Thraede 1977: 87; see also Arnold 1911: 271. Furthermore, Loretto 1977: 127 points out that Seneca's negative remarks on women are often not only dictated by the situation but also due to, e.g., his tendency to exaggerate (see also Favez 1938: 340) and to use rhetorical pathos, theatricality and "Schwarzweißmalerei".
2 Examples concerning slaves have been collected, e.g., by Griffin 1976/1992: 266 – 267 and Manning 1989: 1525; for examples concerning barbarians see Dauge 1981: 200 – 201.
3 This fundamental Stoic idea is especially clearly compressed in the above-cited SVF 3,253: the goal of the Stoics was "populumque <sapientum> ex omni lingua et conditione et sexu et aetate conflari". See also, e.g., Hadas 1959: 16 – 17; Christensen 1984: 46: "Parity of natural potentiality is implied by the very definition of Man. Therefore there can be no natural differences between Greek and Barbarian, man and woman, noble and commoner, free man and slave"; Long 1996a: XIII (referring to Stoic philosophers): "Their generalisations about good and bad lives were intended to apply to persons without regard to their sex or class or ethnicity".
that women, too, can overcome this “weakness” and that also people who are less gifted regarding virtue can develop. Important in this respect is also one passage of Ad Helviam matrem de consolatione on the grounds of which it seems still clearer that also Seneca himself, in accordance with his encouraging words to Marcia in Marc. 16,1 (and the basic Stoic doctrine), was convinced that the same nature and virtue, belonging to all people, both to men and to women, really exist: in order to prove that an exile cannot be a bad thing for himself or anybody else, he states that a human being never, wherever he/she is forced to go, loses which is the best in him/her, i.e. nature and virtue common to all; noteworthy in these words is that Seneca, although he addresses them to a woman, uses self-evidently the word “we” and that this “we” includes thus also women:

Duo quae pulcherrima sunt quocumque nos moverimus sequentur, natura communis et propria virtus.¹

That Seneca cannot refer only to his mother and other “exceptional” women but also women in general, is – ironically - evident already from the fact that women can feel anger (ira) – for this means that they must have the same common human nature and reason (ratio, λόγος), for anger is a characteristic of only human beings having reason:

Sed dicendum est feras ira carere et omnia praeter hominem; nam cum sit inimica rationi, nusquam tamen nascitur nisi ubi rationi locus est.²

Thus, it seems that Seneca, after all, emphasises women’s fundamental sameness rather than otherness. And because Seneca’s references to women’s emotional “weakness” are in many cases due to his intention to encourage, persuade etc. his readers, he should not be seen in this respect as an absolute opposite to Musonius or Epictetus – all the more when we remember that when or if Seneca thinks that women have on average more emotional “weakness” than men, he does not regard this emotional “weakness” as a definitive impediment for women. But it is, on the other hand, as clear that it is dangerous to interpret that Seneca (and his view of women’s emotional “weakness”) represent the general (and original) Stoic view concerning women although those scholars who suspect the compatibility of a “woman’s essence” and Stoic doctrines willingly quote or refer to him; it is indicative that they see Musonius expressing a new changed attitude of Stoicism, or regard him as a some kind of “feministic exception”³ - or ignore

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¹ Sen Helv. 8.2.
² Sen. Ira 1.3.4
him completely, as C. E. Manning who discusses the later Stoics’ views on women.\(^1\) Firstly, we should not focus only on Seneca and Musonius but on other later Stoics, too, especially on Epictetus - and should remember that Epictetus seems to agree with Musonius in the respect that he nowhere unambiguously gives one to understand that the nature of a woman is more emotional. And it is above all very important to remember that we have lacking knowledge in which amount this during antiquity undeniably common thought has in fact appeared in Stoicism before Seneca; the fact that the early Stoics seem to have had a rather exceptional view concerning women’s virtue and their potential to become wise supports the possibility that Stoicism at least in its original form did not advocate this thought of women’s emotional “weakness”.

Furthermore, as mentioned above, this thought belonged strongly, for example, to conventional Roman thinking.\(^2\) And although it is, of course, impossible to say with absolute certainty which impact this could have had on Seneca’s thoughts, we should keep in mind that Seneca at least elsewhere favours many attitudes and ideals central to this thinking, such as conventional views of the virtues of women\(^3\) or a tendency to criticise the (morals of) women of his day. Thus, if we also remember the fact that there are also some parallels to Seneca’s statements, for example, in Livy, it seems probable that Seneca is more or less influenced by traditional Roman attitudes also regarding his thoughts of women’s emotional “weakness”. So, when E. Vernon Arnold says about Seneca’s statements concerning the “excessive emotionalism” of women that they “were not rooted in Stoic theory”,\(^4\) we can specify that we do not at least know that this has been the case.\(^5\)

\(^1\) Manning 1973.  
\(^2\) See above pp. 21 – 22.  
\(^3\) E.g. Seneca’s conviction of the primality of pudicitia for women, or his thought that it was suitable for a woman when needed to display great bravery and firmness of mind and to withdraw then again to her own “feminine” domestic sphere (see above pp. 46; 54 – 55; 57 – 58; 64). It is also worth noting that also for Seneca one of the epithets of a “decent” matron is gravitas: Scribonia, gravis femina (Sen. epist. 70,10). – Furthermore, he also, as said before, refers to the unreliability of a woman’s nature (esp. in Sen. rem. fort. 16,4: Nihil est tam mobile quam feminarum voluntas, nihil tam vagum) - one of the best-known Roman examples of this thought is Verg. Aen. 569-570: Varium et mutabile semper / femina; for this theme in more detail see Favez 1938: 341, also n. 5.  
\(^4\) Arnold 1911: 271.  
\(^5\) Cf. also Grahn 2013: 235: “Stoic sources do not directly support the readings of emotions as something feminine or rationality as something masculine”; 228.
4.2.2. Educating the innate capacity for virtue

4.2.2.1. The content of the philosophical education

“παιδευτέον ὅσα πρὸς ἀρετὴν παραπλησίως τὸ τε θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν”,¹ Musonius states in his fourth diatribe and puts into words still one Stoic view concerning the sameness of men's and women's virtues: that an equal opportunity for (philosophical) education aiming at virtue must be given to all human beings regardless of their sex and that the content of this education is exactly the same for them. Like Plato, Musonius justifies his view, e.g., by saying that the same education is given to both male and female sheepdogs (and, in Musonius' argument, horses, too) which are meant to be used in the same tasks,² for which reason he is supposed to have been influenced by Plato.³ In any case, it is obvious that Musonius discusses the importance of education purely from the Stoic basis and thinks, like other Stoics, that teaching is of decisive importance when one tries to live according to nature and become wise.⁴ Although both man and woman have reason (λόγος) and thus (at least in principle) an ability to understand whether a thing is right or wrong, good or bad, the innate capacity must be educated, for, as Seneca says, “in optimis quoque, antequam erudias, virtutis materia, non virtus est.”⁵

Thus, Musonius' demand manifests the thinking emphasising sameness/equality as a whole, i.e. that the same opportunities should be given to both sexes with the help of the completely same education – in Musonius' claim probably even in philosophical schools,⁶ which was exceptional __________

¹ IV,46,34-35. As is known, the adverb παραπλησίως has also the meaning “in the same way” although the meaning of the adjective παραπλήσιος is “almost the same”. It is clear that Musonius uses the word παραπλησίως in the meaning “in the same way” because he uses it alternatively to the word “the same” (IV,44,8-9;46,2) and states also in IV,48,12-26 that he, indeed, refers to the completely same education aiming at virtue.
² IV,42,34-44,3.
³ See, e.g., Geytenbeek 1963: 56; see also Nussbaum 2002a: 286.
⁴ See esp. XVII,108,4-110,3. The reason why Musonius believes in the efficiency of teaching in acquiring of virtue, is his conviction that the nature of virtue is connected with knowledge, and so he, e.g., says that most offences are made because of ignorance (ἄγνοια) and lack of learning, and “ὧν ὁ μεταδιδαχθεὶς εὐθὺς παύεται” (X,78,29-31).
⁵ Sen. epist. 90,46 even in the best ones, before you instruct them, there is but the stuff of virtue, not virtue itself (trans. Gummere, slightly modified)
⁶ Nussbaum 2002a: 297 (speaking of the III diatribe): “In its context, it has real force: for so far as we can see, women at Rome generally did not go to study with the philosophers, and Musonius means to encourage real intellectual study in the philosophical schools”; 323, n. 30.
for although there were women proficient also in philosophy (or rhetoric/oratory), women did not normally get a formal education in higher studies. Likewise, as mentioned above, some scholars explicitly argue that Musonius accepts “philosophical training of women unconditionally” and that women should, according to him, not only have the same education but that they should also “be as skilled in philosophy” as men, including independent philosophical argumentation. But, on the other hand, as discussed above, most other scholars seem to disagree and attribute to Musonius rather conservative views, such as the one that he wants to teach women only “simplified or stripped down philosophy” (as dictated by their traditional roles) and restrict women’s practice of philosophy only to moral philosophy, denying them, e.g., logic, i.e. that he regards women as socially/societally “other” in the respect that he sees philosophical education as gendered and at least a part of it, such as logic, as belonging only to the male sphere.

It is, however, important to remember that, as we have seen, Musonius tries in IV.48,20-23 (and III.42,11-19) to dispel prejudices of his listeners towards women who practise philosophy and that his words represent his general view of philosophy and applies to both sexes: although he does not condemn logic as such he rejects theory for its own sake and “excessive” and “useless” use of syllogisms in the manner of the sophists – i.e. as Miriam Griffin says, he “believed in the importance of logic - - when properly used in the service of ethics.” Thus, because logic is also

1 See above pp. 63, n. 1; 59, n. 4; below p. 120 (Cornelia); see also, e.g., Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 23 – 25; 38 – 40; 124; 232, n. 28; 233, n. 37 – 38; 238 – 241, n. 77 – 87; 304, n. 119; Cape 1997; see also above p. 19, n. 1; cf. also the iconographic evidence in Hänninen 2004: 271 and Rottloff 2006: 18. 2 See, e.g., Hemelrijk 1999/2004. 23 – 25; Cribiore 2001: 56 ; Nussbaum 2002a: 297; above p. 98, n. 5. 3 Geytenbeek 1963: 60. 4 Blomqvist 1995: 188; see also above p. 94, also n. 5. 5 Lewick 2002: 144 (referring to moral philosophy): “Musonius expressly claims that he is not attempting to lead women to anything more”; 149: “the technical side of philosophy, the pleasures of syllogisms, paradoxes, and puzzles that Musonius would deny his female students”, refering to III.42,11-19; see also, e.g., Hoffer 1999: 131, n. 26: “Even Musonius says that girls should concentrate less than boys on mere dialectic”; Niehoff 2001: 185: “Daughters were - - excluded from the more theoretical training”; Stevenson 2005: 32: “He advocated some limits to women’s intellectual training”, all referring to IV,48,20-23. See also Jones 2012: 34 – 35; 111 who argues, without going to the details of that education, that Musonius’ “female paideia” differs from that of a man and is not only “predicated on a woman’s role within the household” but also “tied to notions of honour and shame”; for aspects of “honour and shame” see above pp. 64 – 65. 6 See above p. 70, with notes. As Geytenbeek 1963: 34 puts it: philosophy “is not μελετᾶν λόγους καὶ σοφίζεσθαι καὶ ἀναλύειν συλλογισμούς - - and πο τρανότης περὶ λόγους και δεινότης τις περιττή"; see esp. III,42,14-15; XI,82,34-37. For this attitude of Musonius towards theory see in greater detail, e.g., Geytenbeek 1963: 34; 36. For logic in Musonius’ teaching methods see esp. fr. XLIV; see also, e.g., Lutz 1947: 24 – 26; Long 2002/2004: 14 – 15; Dillon 2004: 74 – 75. 7 Griffin 1996: 198; see also, e.g., Barnes 1997: 63: “for him logic was the servant of ethics.”
for Musonius an essential basis for moral philosophy, it is not possible that he would in reality have excluded women from learning logic. And in fact he regards in the III and IV diatribes the philosophical education (which includes also logic) as completely same and common to both sexes and sees that to this common education aiming at virtue – in a word the practice of philosophy - belong both theoretical teaching and ἀσκησις (training) which he divides to two parts, the one influencing only mind and the one influencing, at the same time, both mind and body. The goal of this education is to learn to distinguish what is good and what bad and what only seems good or bad, and to be able to follow this understanding always and everywhere.

Thus, Musonius in his fourth diatribe, describing the education of boys and girls, says that “καὶ ἀρξαμένους ἀπὸ νηπίων εὐθὺς διδακτέον, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο δὲ κακόν” – a process in which also proofs (ἀποδείξεις) have an important role both in the theoretical teaching and in that part of the ἀσκησις which trains mind. Furthermore, Musonius sees that the understanding resulting from this theoretical teaching is an indispensable basis for ἀσκησις which he typically regards as the most important part of the whole philosophical education, the thought being that, as said above, it is not sufficient that a human being only understands which things are good, bad or indifferent, but he/she has to be able to react to them “rightly”, i.e. as taught him/her, also in practice. For this reason it is necessary that a human being gets accustomed to this and frees himself/herself from the corruption imprinted on him/her since childhood, i.e. from “wrong” attitudes and habits, the keyword is here ἐθισζεσθαι, as Musonius also in his fourth diatribe says when examining the developing of bravery in man and woman:

1 Musonius refers to this bipartition theoretical teaching - ἀσκησις, e.g., in III,40,21-24 where he speaks of educating σωφροσύνη and κοσμιότης, a virtue subordinate to σωφροσύνη, in men and women; for a more detailed picture of Musonius’ thoughts concerning theoretical teaching see esp. the I diatribe and fr. XLIV; the most thorough and systematic picture of Musonius’ thoughts concerning training can be found in the sixth diatribe Περὶ ἀσκήσεως, see esp. VI,54,2-25; for Musonius’ ἀσκησις analysed in details see Laurenti 1989: 2116 – 2120.

2 See, e.g., I,32,22-27-28; VI,52,18-20;52,21-22;54,19-20; see also Ill,38,26-30.

3 IV,46,35-36: straight from infancy they have to be taught that this is right and that bad (trans. Lutz, slightly modified)

4 This is evident especially in the I diatribe discussing the use of ἀποδείξεις (e.g. I,32,20-32).

5 See esp VI,54,18-25.

6 See esp. VI,52,26-54,2;54,35-56,7. For this thought in other Stoics see, e.g., Geytenbeek 1963: 44 – 45; a good example is, e.g., Sen. epist. 59,9: Diu in istis vitiis iacuimus, elui difficile est. Non enim inquinati sumus, sed infecti; see also, e.g., epist. 94,53-54; Mitsis 1993: 297.

7 IV,48,4-7 (for translation see above p. 69, n. 6); for the same thought see also VI,52,18-21;54,10-25;56,7-10.
The above-discussed passage IV,44,32-35 is also worth noting because Musonius here very explicitly stresses the decisive importance of training – a woman can only by ἄσκησις achieve her real nature: if something of the Amazons’ bravery is lacking in other women, the reason is "ἀνασκησία μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ μὴ πεφυκέναι". So, it seems that Musonius does not make a distinction between the sexes or between male and female spheres (or gender) in his views on the content of the philosophical education, referring thus to a rather high and specific level of intellectual equality.

This thought of the same philosophical education of man and woman can be found also in Epictetus and Seneca, in Epictetus, e.g., in the passage II,14,7-8 discussed above - or in III,22,81 where the ideal Cynic philosopher is charged with the task of teaching of the whole humankind: "πάντας ἄνθρωπον πεπαιδευτέον τοὺς ἄνδρας υἱοῖς ἔχει, τὰς γυναῖκας θυγατέρας". But what about Epictetus' fragment 15? It is true that Epictetus, like many of his contemporaries, may seem, at least at first glance, to react critically to women practising philosophy, as some scholars have argued,1 for he tells that in Rome women "μετὰ χεῖρας ἔχουσι τὴν Πλάτωνος Πολιτείαν, ὅτι κοινὰς ἀξιοῖ εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας" and still continues that they "τοῖς γὰρ ρήμασι προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν, οὐ τῇ διανοίᾳ τάνδρος" - as they should have done. It is, however, important to note that Epictetus in fact sees no difference between the sexes and that he does not ascribe women's insufficient interpretation of Plato to their insufficient abilities but he gives one to understand that it is intentional and regards it as one example of how human beings, i.e. men as well, are pleased when they find a defence of their own faults:

καὶ τὸ ὅλον οἱ ἄνθρωποι χαίρουσιν ἀπολογίας τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἁμαρτήμασι πορίζοντες.3

Although Epictetus speaks of the education of women clearly less than his teacher, this does not necessarily mean that it interested him less.4 For Musonius, too, discusses the subject only when he has received a stimulus from outside,5 and we cannot know how extensively Epictetus would

1 See, e.g., Wöhrle 2002: 141; see also, e.g., Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 253, n. 149.
2 have in their hands Plato’s Republic, because he insists on community of women – for they pay attention only to the words, and not to the meaning of the man (trans. Oldfather)
3 and in general people delight in finding excuses for their own faults (trans. Oldfather)
4 Cf. Hijmans 1959: 4: "One gets the impression that the question of women’s education, important as it may have been for Musonius Rufus, does not interest him at all: he hardly speaks about the question, and when he does, only touches upon it"; Hershbell 1989: 2158: “Education of women was an important matter for Musonius, but seems to have had little interest for Epictetus”.
5 This is evident already in the beginning of both the third and the fourth diatribes: Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖ τις αὐτῶν, ἐκαί γυναιξὶ φιλοσοφήτεον, οὕτω πως ἄρεσεν διδάσκειν ὡς φιλοσοφήτεον αὐτᾶς (III,38,25-26) and Λόγου δέ ποτε τινὸς ἐμπεσόντος, εἰ τὴν αὐτὴν παιδείαν παιδευτέον τοὺς υἱῶν καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας - - (IV,42,34-35). See also above p. 80, n. 5.
have dealt with women’s education and teaching if also his students had taken it under discussion. Rather, also the fact that he completely unambiguously gives one to understand that both man and woman can become wise by practising philosophy,¹ suggests that the same philosophical education of man and woman – like daughters’ education generally² – must have been self-evident to him (requiring no special discussion) and that the thoughts Epictetus generally expresses concerning the philosophical education apply in the same way to both sexes, i.e. equally well to women³ - all the more when we remember that he, in a very interesting way, seems to approve of and even praise women who courageously follow Stoic principles in their lives⁴ (and thus their “sameness” also in this respect).

This interpretation is supported by some passages in which Epictetus speaks of the practising of philosophy and explicitly mentions also women, for the thoughts he expresses are completely identical with his general statements of the common philosophical education. For example:

Epictetus often strongly emphasises that one should learn to distinguish what is under his/her control and “own” (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, προαιρετικά, ἕδιο)⁵ - and, as we have seen, this applies to all human beings including women, as he clearly states in III,24,22. And likewise, in the above-mentioned II,14,7-8 where he happens to specifically mention two of the three τόποι of ἀσκήσις, he says that a human being - both man and woman - who has acquired virtue by practising philosophy has the ability to “ἐν ὀρέξει μὴ ἀποτυγχάνειν, ἐν ἐκκλίσει δὲ μὴ περιπίπτειν” (i.e. free himself/her from the pathoses and live “ἀλύπως, ἀφόβως, ἀταράχως”⁶) and to fulfil his/her

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¹ See esp. the above-discussed II,14,7-8: Καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ μὲν ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος τοιοῦτον τι φανταζόμεθα, ὅτι δεῖ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν συναρμόσαι τοῖς γινομένοις, ὡς μήτε τι τῶν γινομένων ἄκοντων ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι μήτε τῶν μὴ γινομένων θελόντων ἡμῶν μὴ γίνεσθαι. Εξ οὗ περίεστι τοῖς συστησαμένοις αὐτῷ ἐν ὀρέξει μὴ ἀποτυγχάνειν, ἐν ἐκκλίσει δὲ μὴ περιπίπτειν, ἀλύπως, ἀφόβως, ἀταράχως διεξάγειν καθ’ αὐτὸν μετὰ τῶν κοινωνικῶν σχέσεων τὰς τῆς φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθέτους, τὸν υἱόν, τὸν πατέρα, τὸν ἀδελφόν, τὸν πολίτην, τὸν ἄνδρα, τὴν γυναῖκα, τὸν γείτονα, τὸν σύνοδον, τὸν ἄρχοντα, τὸν ἄρχομενον; see also above pp. 30 – 31, also n. 1.

² I,11,22-23; IV,11,35.

³ See also Long 2000: 96: “His general principles, of course, are as applicable to women as to men”; 96, n. 49: “Nothing that Epictetus says is inconsistent with Musonius’ striking defence of women’s natural suitability for philosophy and for being educated similarly to males.” Long refers here to the above-discussed II,7,8.

⁴ II,7,8; see also above p. 93.

⁵ For this exercise in Epictetus see, e.g., Hijmans 1959, esp. 78. The importance of this theme for Epictetus is evident also from the fact that the whole diatribe III,24 Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν προσπάσχειν τοῖς οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν is dedicated to it.

⁶ See also above p. 30. For this thought frequently emphasised by Epictetus see, e.g., Inwood 1985: 146; 297, n. 82; for the relationship between pathoses and the concepts ὀρέξις and ἐκκλίσις in Stoicism see in more detail, e.g., Inwood 1985: 144 – 146; 236.
duties, i.e. to take care of “τὰς σχέσεις τὰς τε φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθέτους”. In the same diatribe, in II.14.7, Epictetus also states that a human being who aims at virtue should “τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν συναρμόσαι τοῖς γινομένοις, ὡς μήτε τῶν γινομένων ἄκοντων ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι μήτε τῶν μὴ γινομένων θελόντων ἡμῶν μὴ γίνεσθαι”. He does not here mean by the word βούλησις one of the rational emotions (εὐπάθεια) but crystallises the essence of the whole practice of philosophy: one should learn to want that things happen as they happen – a thought which he expresses also elsewhere when he says that τὸ παιδεύεσθαι is “μανθάνειν ἕκαστα οὕτω θέλειν ὡς γίνεται”. It is also worth noting that in II.17 he accepts equally well a woman, Medea, as an example of how a human being can learn to think in this sense in the “right” manner:

Thus, it is evident that, according to Epictetus, the philosophical education of man and woman is really in all parts, both in general and in details, completely the same.

In Seneca the most important passage is the above-discussed passage Helv. 17,4 in which he asks his mother to seek for strength and consolation among studies. Although Seneca does not use the word philosophia, it has usually been assumed that he refers to philosophy, and it seems, indeed, completely clear that philosophy must have been included in these studies. For in the same context in Helv. 17,4 he regrets that his father did not allow his wife already when young "praeceptis sapientiae erudiri", and when he speaks of these studies to his mother, he says in Helv. 17.4-5 that they not only free a human being from grief, anxiety and distress but also “ταύτα μεν τὸ παιδεύεσθαι καὶ ὑπακοήν τῷ θεῷ καὶ μή θέλε τὸν ἄνδρα, καὶ οὐδὲν ὧν θέλεις οὐ γίνεται. μὴ θέλε αὐτὸν ἐξ ἅπαντός σοι συνοικεῖν, μὴ θέλε μένειν ἐν Κορίνθῳ καὶ ἁπλῶς μηδὲν θέλε ἢ ὁ θεὸς θέλει. καὶ τίς σε κωλύσει, τίς ἀναγκάσει; οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν Δία. Thus, it is evident that, according to Epictetus, the philosophical education of man and woman is really in all parts, both in general and in details, completely the same.

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1 II.14.8. Epictetus discusses this more extensively especially in III.2.1-4 where he discusses also the third τόπος of ἀσκησις: Τρεῖς εἰσι τόποι, περὶ οὓς ἀσκηθῆναι δεῖ τὸν ἐσόμενον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν: ὁ περὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκκλίσεις, ἵνα μὴ ἀποτυγχάνῃ ἤ ἐκκλίνως· ὁ περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς καὶ ἀπλῶς ὁ περὶ τὸ καθῆκον, ἵνα τάξει, ἵνα εὐλογίστως, ἵνα μὴ ἀμελῶς· τρίτος ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀνεξαπατησίαν καὶ ἀνεικαιότητα καὶ ἀλλὰ τὰς σύγκαταθέσεις. τούτων κυριώτατος καὶ μάλιστα ἐπείγων ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη· πάθος γὰρ ἄλλως οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ ἀποτυγχανούσῃ ἤ ἐκκλίνως ἔστωσης. For this tripartition of training (ἀσκησις) see in more detail, e.g., Hijmans 1959: 64 – 65; Billerbeck 1978: 60 – 62; Cooper 2007/2010: 15 – 19, Crivelli: 2007/2010: 20 - 23.

2 II.17, 22: - in a word, do not want anything but what god wants, and who will prevent you, who will compel you? no one, any more than anyone prevents or compels Zeus (trans. Oldfather, slightly modified). See e.g. Favez 1938: 38; Geytenbeek 1963: 57; Abel 1967: 66; Meinel 1972, esp. 207; 209; Vidén 1993: 122; 139; Mauch 1997: 140 – 142; 145 – 146; see also 15; 165.

4 to be (thoroughly) educated in the teachings of wisdom
praestabunt” and are “certissima praesidia” which “sola te fortunae eripere possint”\(^1\) – it is difficult to imagine what other studies could bring about this mental integrity and ability to calmly rise above all things happening in the world. And on the other hand, also the fact that he gives us to understand that he had practised these studies also together with his mother,\(^2\) suggests that Seneca, indeed, regards men’s and women’s philosophical education as the same.

It is important to remember that, as said above, Seneca nowhere connects the traditional role of a woman with her practice of philosophy - it is interesting to compare Seneca's views to those of Antipater of Tarsus and Plutarch or to attitudes common in those days. Antipater, unlike Seneca, does not discuss the practice of philosophy and the traditional roles of the sexes separately, but in his writing Περὶ γάμου he says that because the wife is responsible for everyday routines the husband has better opportunities, if he wants, to practise philosophy, “σχολὴν ἄγειν - - περὶ τοὺς λόγους.”\(^3\) It is, of course, clear that Antipater’s words can at least partly be explained by the fact that he tries to convince his male readers of the benefits of marriage. But it is, however, as clear that this reason would not yet have compelled Antipater to choose this kind of argument which in real life may have tended to strengthen the traditional conservative view that philosophy belongs to a man’s sphere of life; O. Larry Yarbrough compares Antipater here to Musonius and is very probably right when he says that Musonius, while presenting the benefits of marriage to men, does not use this argument because he “thought that wives too should be engaged in this pursuit”.\(^4\) Thus, it is possible that Antipater's words are, again, an example of how the Stoics can abandon views belonging to their doctrine and, so to say, adapt to the prevailing reality.

In Plutarch the most interesting thing is how and for what purpose women should practise philosophy. Plutarch seems to react positively to women’s philosophical studies, and

\(^{1}\) they will render you safe – unfailing safeguard – alone can rescue you from the power of fortune (trans. Basore)

\(^{2}\) Sen. Helv. 15,1.

\(^{3}\) Περὶ γάμου (Stob. IV,22,25=SVF 3,254,63). Despite the fact that he, when discussing how to teach a woman to be a “good” wife, refers to “τεθεωρημένα καὶ παραγγελλόμενα παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις”. On the other hand, most of these teachings seem to be rather conventional, as if aimed – as Deming 2004: 66 - 67 puts it - “to instruct her in the art of managing a household and living piously”. In any case, it is significant that Antipater does not here speak of women practising philosophy independently, which means that this passage gives no evidence that he would have envisioned a wife who practises philosophy in the same sense as men. Cf. Plutarch’s views below p. 120.

\(^{4}\) Yarbrough 1985: 40.
there were numerous learned women\(^1\) in his immediate circle and among his friends, including his wife Timoxena.\(^2\) Although he thus seems advocate at least some intellectual “sameness” and equality, it is striking that when he in his *Coniugalia praeccepta* discusses these philosophical studies on the concrete level, he seems to think that a woman should be guided by a man (i.e. the husband has to select to his wife “appropriate” passages to read\(^3\)) and that she thus should not, as Karin Blomqvist puts it, think or use argumentation independently.\(^4\) It is, of course, probable that Plutarch, too, is “on the defensive against opponents of female education”, as Emily A. Hemelrijk argues,\(^5\) but, on the other hand, because it is Plutarch’s intention in his *Coniugalia praeccepta* to give precepts concerning an ideal “philosophical” marriage, it is more probable that he really expresses also his own personal views than those authors who more explicitly try to persuade their readers/listeners by using more or less conservative arguments. Furthermore, the only goal of these studies is also very, partly even exceptionally, conservative, i.e. that women learn to behave as it is suitable for a “decency” woman - and that they do not conceive “ἄτοπα πολλὰ καὶ φαῦλα βουλεύματα καὶ πόθη” otherwise characteristic of them.\(^6\) Thus, Plutarch seems to refer here rather strongly also to both mental and social/societal “otherness” of women, and it is also typical that he sees that a woman’s, at least a young woman’s, learnedness has also its dangers: in the biography of Pompey, in Pomp. 55,1, he describes his wife Cornelia and after mentioning her familiarity with, e.g., geometry and philosophy, he adds that “καὶ προσῆν τούτοις ἥθος ἀηδίας καὶ περιεργίας καθαρόν, ἃ δὴ νέαις προστρίβεται γυναιξὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα”.\(^7\)

These kinds of thoughts cannot be found in Seneca, for (agreeing with Musonius and Epictetus) he, as we have seen, does not seem to believe that women have regarding virtues any "weakness" specific only to them - which indicates that his views are not, after all, in conflict with the idea that the Stoic virtue ideal is sex/gender-neutral. And thus he also thinks that women, like

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2 Plut. coni. praec. 145a; see also Blomqvist 1995: 175 – 177; LeCorsu 1981: 274.
3 145b. Cf. also Antipater's views discussed above p. 119, n. 3.
4 Blomqvist 1995: 182: “independent thinking or argumentation was not for her”; see also 174 – 175; 181 – 182; 188 – 189.
5 Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 70; see also Taylor 2003: 210 – 211.
6 145c-e: *many untoward ideas and low designs and emotions* \(\text{trans, Babbitt}\); see also Whitmarsh 2001: 111.
7 *in addition to this, she had a nature which was free from that unpleasant meddlesomeness which such accomplishments are apt to impart to young women* \(\text{modified Loeb trans. in Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 17: 78}\)
men, should practise philosophy in order to acquire (to all human beings common) virtue and
wisdom; of the properties characterising wisdom he mentions, e.g., understanding of good and
bad, freedom from pathoses and ability to calmly and steadfastly react to everything that falls to
one’s lot.¹ It is also important to note that conventional Roman ideas of at least some intellectual
equality are transformed by Seneca in the respect that the goal of women, too, should be
sapientia, i.e. he finds it positive that a woman develops herself for her own sake. Thus, he
deviates, like Musonius and Epictetus, from the conventional ideal of a “decent” woman who uses
her intelligence, learnedness and talent primarily and expressly for the benefit of others, above all
in the education of her children and for her husband’s good. This also means that these later
Stoics can, on the other hand, also be seen to discuss issues finding their expression also in
above-mentioned more “egalitarian” Roman ideas and trends concerning women’s intellectual
activity, including women themselves active in philosophy.² It also seems that a woman’s studying
does not mean for Seneca that she should read passages selected by a man, for he seems to
consider it natural that a woman, too, can practise her studies at least in this sense independently.³

But does Seneca here refer only to “exceptional” (and, conventionally, elderly⁴) women, such as
his mother (or Marcia), excluding other women? In the above-mentioned Helv. 17,4 in which he
regrets that his father did not let his wife when young become deeply familiar with philosophy, he
mentions as an excuse for his father’s action that some women practise their studies “ad luxuriam”
and not, as they should, “ad sapientiam”. It would be, of course, possible that when Seneca refers
to this view of his father that some women “litteris non ad sapientiam utuntur sed ad luxuriam
instruuntur”, he, too, expresses a rather common thought of that time, found in Plutarch or, e.g.,
(though in an exaggerated way) in Juvenal’s sixth satire, of women’s “otherness” seen as
intellectual inequality in the respect that learned women are thought to be “spoilt”.⁵ And it would
be also possible that, as Mercedes Mauch says, Seneca refers here among other things

¹ E.g. Sen. Marc 7,1;7,4;10,1;19,1;19,5-6;23,2; Helv. 5,1;5,6;6,1;8,2-4;9,2;11,5;11,7;12,1;17,4-5.
² See above pp. 19; 62 – 63; 114. Cf. also Cicero’s friendship with Caerellia as a well-known
real-life example.
³ See, e.g., Sen. Helv. 17,2-5; Marc. 1,6. Cf. also Grahn 2013: 240: “A woman is an independent
agent of her own happiness.”
⁴ For a rather common attitude that moral philosophy was suitable for “dignified, elderly matronae”
and not, e.g., to young women, e.g., Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 51 – 52; see also, e.g., Shelton 2013: 117 – 119.
⁵ For this theme see in more detail, e.g., Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 84 – 88. See also above p. 24.
also to women’s strivings for “die Aufmerksamkeit der Männer durch Kunstverstand und Bildung zu erregen”.\(^1\) It is, however, essential to note that this tendency to use studies in this way, for a “wrong” purpose, is not specific only to women, but it is a fault independent of one’s sex which, as Mauch states, Seneca elsewhere characterises, e.g., with the expressions studiosa luxuria and vana ostentatio.\(^2\) And the most important thing is that when Seneca criticises those women who use/practise their studies “ad luxuriam” and not, as they should, “ad sapientiam”,\(^3\) it is evident that their studies, too, must include philosophy - which undoubtedly indicates that he allots the same philosophical education aiming at sapientia not only to his “exceptional” mother but also to women in general.

### 4.2.2.2. The result of the philosophical education

While Epictetus explicitly says that women, too, are able to become wise by practising philosophy, Seneca and Musonius nowhere express this as unambiguously – whereas Marcus Aurelius and Hierocles do not explicitly discuss the matter at all, which should not, however, be interpreted to mean that they would have found the thought impossible.

It is, of course, true that the ideal of a “real man” which we have already seen in Musonius, Seneca and Epictetus, does not seem to be unfamiliar to Marcus Aurelius\(^4\) either, or that ῥηλυ ἠθος,\(^5\) as A. S. L. Farquharson says, “stands for effeminacy in a man”\(^6\) – without forgetting that to Marcus the word γυναικαρίον (weak poor woman) characterises those human beings whose (rational) nature (φύσις) i.e. νοῦς – or, as he it in this particular passage calls, τὸ ἡγεμονικόν and

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2 Mauch 1997: 142.
3 Sen. Helv. 17.4: for extravagance, ostentiosus display (see Hemelrijk 1999/2004: 86, 280) – for wisdom
4 He refers to this ideal especially clearly in the passage II,5: Πάσης ὥρας φρόντιζε στιβαρῶς ὡς Ῥωμαῖος καὶ ἄρρην – – ; see also Farquharson 1944/1968b: 507; Richlin 2012: 498 – 499 who points out that “goodness is associated with maleness” in Marcus Aurelius - one could add: very conventionally; for this in Seneca and Roman authors in general see above p. 42, also n. 4 – 5. Furthermore, when Marcus speaks of the “right” attitude towards life and occasionally uses expressions such as ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ (e.g. VIII,10;X,16;VII,67;III,4,3;IX,2), it is not worth drawing far-reaching conclusions – it should be remembered that these kinds of (anything but rare) male-centric choices of words can be found equally well, e.g., in Musonius, see, e.g., VII,64,37;IX,72,15; X,80,4;XI,80,22;XVII,110,10-11;XVIII,11,4,25-26;XVIII,120,7; see above p. 79, also n. 2.
5 IV,28.
(λογικὴ) ψυχή— is undeveloped and at far away from his/her real essence:

Πρὸς τί ποτε ἄρα νῦν χρῶμαι τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ ψυχῇ; παρ’ ἐκαστα τοῦτο ἔπαινα τοῦν καὶ ἐξετάζειν τί μοι ἐστι νῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μορίῳ, ο ἢ ἢ ἡμεροκαλοῦ καλοῦσιν, καὶ τίνος ἄρα νῦν ἐχω ψυχήν; μήτι παιδίου; μήτι μειρακίου; μήτι γυναικαρίου; μήτι κτήνους; μήτι θηρίου;

It is, however, at the same time, clear that this statement is so random that it is impossible to say whether Marcus Aurelius only happens to use conventional language and to what extent he really considers a woman’s nature weaker and “other”.

On the other hand, it is also obvious that when he reminds himself that "μέμνησο δὲ ὅτι φιλοσοφία μόνα, ἃ θέλει ἡ φύσις σου, θέλει", and thus expresses his belief that one can through philosophy acquire one’s real (rational) nature and virtue, this thought applies equally well to women although he - largely because of the genre of his work - nowhere says this. Like Musonius, Seneca and Epictetus he strongly emphasises that all people have the same nature and reason, a view which he expresses also by distinguishing a human being as a rational creature from other (irrational) living creatures. That he as a Stoic really refers to all human beings is proved also by the fact that he says that this thought applies to undeveloped people ignorant of good and bad.

1 How Marcus Aurelius more often uses the words νοῦς, τὸ ἡγεμονικόν and (λογικὴ) ψυχή - or sometimes also the word διάνοια - than the word λόγος to mean the human reason see in more detail, e.g., Pohlenz 1948/1959: 342 –343; Sandbach 1975: 174; Bonhoffier 1890: 110; Rutherford 1989: 237; Farquharson 1944/1968a: 282 – 283. He refers with the word φύσις to a human being's rational nature also elsewhere than in V,9, see, e.g., II,1; IV,29.

2 V,11.

3 For difficulties to interpret the views of Marcus Aurelius as a Stoic on women cf. also the opposite interpretations of some of his legislation; see summaries, e.g., in Francis 1995: 40 - 41; Gill 2013a: xlvii.

4 V,9: remember that philosophy wants only what your nature wants

5 For this thinking see beside V,9 esp. II,17,2;VI,30,1;IX,29. Marcus Aurelius expresses also elsewhere the thought that a human being should do as his/her (real) nature wants, see, e.g., IV,49,1-2;V,1,3;25;VI,35;VII,13.

6 He speaks of this in many passages, see esp. IV,29: ἀπόστημα κόσμου ὁ ἀφιστάμενος καὶ καθόλου πράγμασι καὶ ὑποκειμένοις, ὡς λόγον ἔχων λόγον μὴ ἔχουσι, χρῶ μεγαλοφρόνως καὶ ἔλευθέρως· τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρώποις, ὡς λόγον ἔχουσι, χρῶ κοινωνικῶς; IX,8: εἰς δὲ τὰ λογικὰ μία νοερὰ ψυχὴ μεμέρισται.

7 Good examples of this Stoic distinction are, e.g., VI,23: Τοῖς μὲν ἀλόγοις ζῴοις καὶ καθόλου πράγμασι καὶ ὑποκειμένοις, ὡς λόγον ἔχουσιν λόγον μὴ ἔχουσι, ἥρα μεγαλοφρόνως καὶ ἐλευθέρως· τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρώποις, ὡς λόγον ἔχουσι, χρῶ κοινωνικῶς; IX,8: εἰς δὲ τὰ λογικὰ μία νοερὰ ψυχὴ μεμέρισται.

8 This attitude can be seen especially in II,1: Ἐσθενεν προλέγειν ἑαυτῷ· συντεύξαςει περιέργῳ, ἀχαρίστῳ, ὑβριστῇ, δολερῷ, βασκάνῳ, ἀκοινωνήτῳ· πάντα ταῦτα συμβέβηκαν παρὰ τὴν ἁμαρτάνοντος φύσιν ὅτι μοι συγγενῆς, σὐχὶ αἵματος ἢ σπέρματος τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀλλὰ νοι καὶ θείας ἀπομοίρας μέτοχος - -.
The same is true - at least for the most part - with Hierocles although his conservative statements and those emphasising sameness/equality sometimes contradict each other – especially interesting are his fragments concerning marriage¹ in which he, like Antipater of Tarsus in his Περὶ γάμου – or Musonius in his XIV diatribe – tries to correct his (male) readers’ “wrong”, negative attitudes towards marriage and convince them of its all-round usefulness. Here we can see a certain essential difference in Hierocles’ and Antipater’s otherwise mostly congruent views: Hierocles does not anywhere, like Antipater, mention as one of the benefits of marriage that the wife taking care of practical matters frees the husband to deal with philosophy.² It is, however, a fact that it is not possible to find out whether he omits to say this expressly for the reason that he, like Musonius, would think that the wife, too, should practise philosophy; although his opinions are in certain respects congruent with Musonius’ thoughts, it is impossible to say to what extent he in his other views on women agrees with him, especially because, as mentioned above, his thoughts of women’s and men’s division of tasks in Οἰκονομικός are not, like those of Musonius, connected to a wider discussion concerning women’s abilities and opportunities.³ And it should be remembered that in some other matters Hierocles clearly takes a more conservative viewpoint than Musonius.

It is, however, very likely that also Hierocles extended his thought of the practice of philosophy, the same reason and virtue to apply to women, too. In Περὶ γάμου, fragment 22, he, unlike Musonius, continues the tradition which presents the Stoic wise person as a male,⁴ but - as already has been discussed - this does not need to mean that he would have thought that the wise person could only be a male. And a little further on he in fact states that human beings have received from nature reason (λόγος) which enables virtue and a life κατὰ φύσιν - that he really

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1 Stob. IV,22,21-24.
2 Περὶ γάμου (Stob. IV,22,25=3,254,63 ); Yarbrough 1985: 40.
3 As mentioned above, he focuses on the κοινωνία of spouses (Οἰκονομικός (Stob. IV, 28,21, p. 697,4-11; Reydams-Schils 2005: 155; Ramelli 2008b: 375 – 376; Ramelli 2009: 130) and, moreover, “approaches the subject from the point of view of household efficiency” (Geytenbeek 1963: 58).
4 This male-centricity is typically evident when Hierocles speaks of marriage: Οὐκοῦν ἔχομεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ οἴκων ἀποδεδειγμένοις, ὡς τῷ σοφῷ προηγούμενος μὲν ἑστιν ὁ μετὰ γάμου βίος, ὁ δὲ ἀνευ γυναικός κατὰ περίστασιν· (Περὶ γάμου, Stob. IV,22,22, p. 502,9-11). See also, e.g., Πῶς συγγενέσι χρηστέον (Stob. IV,27,23). For this common tradition which presents the Stoic wise person as a male (e.g. the wise person is said to act in politics or take a wife) see above pp. 2; 6; 7.
refers here to all human beings is evident above all from the fact that he, too, distinguishes “us human beings”, including both men and women, from other living creatures by making the distinction ἡμεῖς - ζῴα - φυτά.¹

Although Seneca, as said before, nowhere says as explicitly as Epictetus that women can become wise, it is clear that because he also when writing to women is willing to take a lot of trouble to acquaint them with central ideas of Stoicism,² he cannot advocate women’s “otherness” in this respect, at least not collective “otherness”, i.e. he cannot think that the Stoic attitude towards life does not belong to women and he cannot find it impossible that a woman, too, can develop and is (at least in principle) able to absorb this attitude and acquire wisdom. For although Seneca undoubtedly had also other aims,³ this does not change the fact that both the content and structure of both consolations written to women are dictated by the situation of these two women – as C. E. Manning speaking of Ad Marciam de consolatione dialogue puts it into words: “Certainly, it was Marcia's particular cause of grief to which Seneca addresses himself, and her situation which dominates the whole work”.⁴ And it is also important to note that it would have been ideologically impossible for Seneca to “officially” address philosophically full-bodied works to women if he had considered women and the Stoic learning and wisdom incompatible.

That Seneca, indeed, finds it (at least in principle) possible that a woman, too, can become wise, is evident also from some single passages of these two consolationes. So, when Seneca criticises his father for not allowing Helvia, when young, to enter deeply into philosophy and now asks his mother to return to her studies,⁵ he clearly states that a woman can try to overcome pathoses and achieve peace of mind in the exactly same way as a man, i.e. by practising

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¹ Περί γάμου, Stob. IV,22,22, p 502,20.503,10: we – animals - plants
² Of these core thoughts of Stoicism can be mentioned, e.g., the above-discussed thoughts concerning reason, virtue, pathoses and indifference of most things, but also, for example, the ideal of cosmopolitanism (Sen. Helv. 8,5;11,7), the thought of the big fire and of the rebirth of the world (Sen. Marc. 21,2;26,6-7), or the thought that all is only “on loan” (Sen. Marc. 10,1-3).
³ E.g. that his consolations can benefit also others in a comparable situation (see, e.g., Manning 1981: 6 – 7; Meinel 1972: 19 – 20); for other possible reasons for the writing of the Ad Helviam matrem de consolatione see, e.g., Abel 1967: 47 - 48; Meinel 1972: 21 – 22; 252, n. 19 (Seneca's wish to comfort not only his mother but also himself, and his desire to clean his reputation also wider in the eyes of his readership).
⁴ Manning 1981: 6; see also Langlands 2004.
⁵ Sen. Helv. 17,4.
philosophy – in the ideal case since young age. The key passage is in any case the above-discussed passage 16,1 of Ad Marciam de consolatione in which Seneca explicitly says that women have the same capacity for virtue and that they can by training get accustomed to endure dolor (grief, pain) and labor (toil) completely like men:

Quis autem dixit naturam maligne cum mulierum ingeniis egisse et virtutes illarum in artum retraxisse? par illis, mihi crede, vigor, par ad honesta, libeat modo, facultas est; dolorem laboremque ex aequo, si consuevere, patiuntur.

It is, of course, also here problematic that Seneca directs these (and other encouraging) words to his mother and to Marcia and presents at least his mother as exceptional also concerning her ability to absorb and her eagerness to learn. Thus, it is a rather much discussed question whether Seneca wants these kinds of words to apply also to women in general. So, for example, David M. Engel assumes that Seneca “thinks women should be educated and that their education can be used to gain wisdom,” and likewise, F. Loretto argues that Seneca not only thinks of his mother’s lot but reacts critically to the tradition which refused women’s higher education - an interpretation which some other scholars do not accept.

It seems that the interpretation supported by, e.g., Engel and Loretto is more probable. Firstly, because Seneca, as discussed above, obviously believes in nature common to all human beings, both to men and to women, it is not especially likely that he would have disliked educating this common nature when assigned to women. Moreover, Seneca does not seem to believe in any weakness (in acquiring virtue) specific only to women - and although he maybe thinks that women have this kind of weakness (which is in itself independent of one’s sex) in greater degree (and

1 Sen. Helv. 17,3-5. For this very Stoic thought that the practice of philosophy is of essential importance in acquiring virtue see, e.g., Sen. epist. 88,28 in which Seneca speaking of philosophy states that “una re consummatur animus, scientia bonorum ac malorum inmutabili; nihil autem ualla ars alia de bonis ac malis quae rifit”, and Sen. epist. 89,4 in which he says that “philosophia sapientiae amor est et adfectatio”. Seneca emphasises also elsewhere that a human being should be allowed to train himself/herself to the “right” attitude towards life as young as possible, see, e.g., Sen. ira 2,18,2;21,1.
2 Sen. Helv. 15,1;17,4.
4 Loretto 1977: 125, also n. 31; see also Mauch 1997: 16, 140 – 142, 165; Geytenbeek 1963: 57.
5 E.g. Vidén 1993: 132: “Those women who were morally superior to the majority of women and who could be trusted to make good use of their education ought to be allowed to study”; 132, n. 2: “I disagree with Loretto (1977), 125, who believes that Seneca’s words - - are to be taken as valid for women in general”; 139: “Education is a good thing in a woman only in those cases in which the woman is virtuous and can be expected to make good use of her education.”
thus also less moral talent (εὐφυία), this is at most true only on average, which means that there are, as in Plato, many women who are morally more talented than numerous men. Furthermore, Seneca expresses his belief in the developing possibilities of women not only in his two consolations written to women but also elsewhere, most clearly, ironically, in the above-discussed passage 14,1 of De constantia sapientis in which he referring to women states that “aeque inprudens animal est et, nisi scientia accessit ac multa eruditio, ferum cupiditatium incontinens” - i.e. he gives one to understand that a woman can equally well develop by receiving education (scientia, multa eruditio). And we must also once again remember the above-discussed Helv. 17,4 where Seneca reacts negatively to those women who “litteris non ad sapientiam utuntur sed ad luxuriam instruuntur” – for this not only proves that sapientia is the goal of life for all women (and not only for rare “exceptional” women) but also that all women must have (at least in principle) a potential to attain this wisdom.

What about Musonius? Musonius connects women’s virtues with philosophical education in many passages, for example, in the above-discussed IV,44,32-35 where one is he given to understand that women can by ἀσκησι acquire even bravery in battle, or in III,40,33-35, where he says that “καὶ μὴν καὶ ἀνδρειότερα εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀπαιδεύτου τὴν πεπαιδευμένην καὶ τὴν φιλόσοφον τῆς ἰδιώτιδος”.1 Musonius uses here a typical Stoic, also in Epictetus rather common2 distinction a “layman” ignorant of virtue (ἰδιώτης/ἰδιώτις) – a (real) philosopher (φιλόσοφος). Although Musonius occasionally speaks also of (male) professional philosophers, he is most interested in those people who are real philosophers - and not philosophers in name only.3 A (real) philosopher is a person who consciously aims at wisdom, and philosophy is καλοκἀγαθίας ἐπιτήδευσις – an expression which A. C. van Geytenbeek equates with the early Stoic definition of philosophy ἐπιτήδευσις σοφίας.4 And, as mentioned above, some scholars have argued that women can, according to Musonius, develop to the same level as men in the practice of philosophy.5

1 surely it is to be expected that an educated woman is braver than an uneducated woman and a philosopher woman braver than a layman woman (trans. Lutz, King modified)
2 See, e.g., III,19 ; Epict. ench. 29,7.
3 E.g. III,40,15; 42,12-13; IX, 70,8; XVII,110,14-15.
5 E.g. Blomqvist 1995: 188; Rousselle 1992/1994: 329; Bradley 1994: 138 cited above p. 94, incl. n. 5, and Blomqvist 1995: 185: “Women should be educated in the same manner as men, and were capable of advancing quite as far as they in philosophical studies”; see also Swain 2013: 119: philosophical training makes a woman “into a genuine philosopher”; Gill 2013b: 152: women, like men, are capable of “virtue in a full sense”.

\[\text{Equation} \]
– or even simply and unambiguously that both men and women can become “perfected, even
godlike.”¹ But the above-discussed interpretation supported by most scholars, i.e. that Musonius’
women practise philosophy only in order to be better in their traditional gender roles,² means the
opposite: that Musonius makes here an irreversible distinction between the male and female
gender and spheres, seeing women not as “same” but as subordinate “other”, and denies them
intellectual equality by excluding them from the highest goal, Stoic wisdom. This interpretation is
manifested even as explicitly as in the above-cited “Musonius anticipates a different condition for
women philosophers than the condition that awaits men trained in philosophy”, i.e. “that they will
be obedient and industrious in the domestic sphere” and “not that they become sage-like.”³

It is, of course, true that, unlike Seneca who in Marc. 16,1 says that women are able (at least in
principle) to train themselves to acquire virtue completely equally, Musonius compares in
III,40,33-35 the bravery of an educated woman exactly only to that of an uneducated woman and
the bravery of a philosopher woman only to the bravery of a layman woman. However, this does
not seem to mean that Musonius would not examine man’s and woman’s moral
accomplishments exactly from the same perspective, i.e. wisdom as the goal to be attained. As
discussed above, the Stoics believed that one can acquire wisdom regardless of one’s position
and role in society - and are often regarded as social/societal conservatives who do not advocate
women’s practical equality or are even eager to subordinate them. But: acquiring wisdom is
linked to one’s aim, as a rational being, to make one’s life with its obligations to (as Julia Annas
puts it) a good life formed by virtuous reasoning, with the perspective of the ‘citizen of the
universe’⁴ - not to traditional views on (more or less) subordinate gender roles.⁵ (And, on the
other hand, it is also important to keep in mind that when the Stoics argue that a human being
should play his/her role as well as possible, “well” means here rationally morally well,⁶ not that
one simply follows conventional ideals of society.⁷) The Stoics do not, of course, as we have

¹ Dillon 2004: 47.
² See above pp. 53 and 93 – 94.
³ Engel 2000: 387; see also Engel 2003: 283.
⁴ Annas 2007/2010: 145; 149.
⁵ Cf. above pp. 71; 90; Cf also Muson. XVI,100,22-24;104,30-106,2; for this as “a way of saying
that virtue and the laws of reason supersede the imperatives of social duty” see Hill 2001: 38.
⁶ See above pp. 14, also n. 1; 71, also n. 4; 90.
⁷ Cf. also, e.g., Annas 1993: 108.
seen, necessarily follow Stoic ideas, and this would have been the case with Musonius if he had really thought that women practise philosophy only in order to be better (in a conventional way) in their traditional roles. But as we have seen, Musonius does not regard the (best possible) fulfilling of one’s role in practical life as the goal to be attained through philosophy, and furthermore, we have also seen that Musonius’ own views concerning woman’s and man’s roles (and spheres) are often more radical than those common in antiquity – and that his views are based on the thought of their same rational humanhood (and thus on the above-mentioned ideas of Stoic Cosmopolitanism), as also his demand for their equal right to the same philosophical education (and thus to the same opportunity to acquire virtue and wisdom.)

So, it seems probable that Musonius discusses man and woman in the same intellectual context regarding wisdom. It is also important to note that because Musonius in III,40,33-35 tries to convince his listeners that it is useful also for a woman to practise philosophy, it is natural that he concentrates on presenting the beneficial effect of this practice of philosophy on women, and so it would be wrong to draw far-reaching conclusions – all the more if we bear in mind that he says that man and woman must show prudence, self-control, bravery and justice, and “μηδὲν ἧττον θατέρου θάτερον.”¹ Still more important is, however, the fact that Musonius, as discussed above, expresses his general thoughts of the contents of each of the four cardinal virtues - as well as of some virtues subordinate to these virtues – most systematically (and for the most part congruently with Chrysippus’ definitions) in his third and fourth diatribes, i.e. in his descriptions of women who have practised philosophy and received the “right” education.² For this, of course,

¹ IV,46,7-10; the quotation is from IV,46,10: the one no less than the other (trans. Lutz); see also above pp. 51, 96.
² That is: more systematically than even in his VIII diatribe (to which Engel 2000: 387 (see also Engel 2003: 283) refers in his argumentation, also very problematically equating all philosophising men due to their sex with philosophising kings: “The evidence of ‘That Kings, Too, Should Practice Philosophy’ puts it beyond serious dispute that Musonius anticipates a different condition for women philosophers than the condition that awaits men trained in philosophy”) where Musonius expresses same thoughts of the contents of virtues but except self-control more briefly. Likewise, in the sixth diatribe he speaks of the virtues in question in the same tone but the focus is elsewhere and the discussion is for the most part quite scattered and catalogue-like, and the same is true also in the IX and XIV diatribes. Individual mentions of virtues and/or of their contents can, of course, be found in all diatribes, as, for example, also in the XXXVIII fragment – without forgetting that Musonius discusses wider and in more detail some themes (such as those of ἄσκησις and of the significance of self-control in different areas of life) which are treated more generally in the III and IV diatribes in diatribes concentrating on those themes (V – VII; XII; XVII; XVIIIa – XX). See also above p. 70.
most probably means that he, indeed, thinks that women, too, can (at least in principle) acquire these virtues and become wise – "sage-like, "perfected", "godlike".

This interpretation is supported by some individual passages in the third and fourth diatribes. Because Musonius uses the terminology ἰδιώτις - φιλόσοφος, it is clear that he refers also to women as real philosophers aiming at wisdom - and, as discussed above, the thought that philosophy and the goal to be attained through it is always the same regardless of one’s sex is evident also in the end of the IV diatribe: the practice of philosophy should cause in women “ήθους χρηστότητα καὶ καλοκάγαθιον τρόπου” simply because philosophy is καλοκάγαθίας ἐπιτήδευσις “καὶ οὐδὲν έτερον”.1 Also the fact that Musonius uses this exactly same definition καλοκάγαθίας ἐπιτήδευσις also in his VIII diatribe where he addresses a Syrian king,2 proves that it applies to all human beings, i.e. equally well men - being, furthermore, as said above, equivalent to the early Stoic definition of philosophy ἐπιτήδευσις σοφίας.3 And of crucial importance is also Musonius’ description of a woman who has been trained to be brave and magnanimous: very Stoic Musonius gives one to understand that her fearlessness, tranquillity and steadfast holding to virtue are based on distinguishing the real from the apparent, i.e. on understanding that life is not good and that neither death nor toil are bad:

ὑπάρχει γάρ αὐτῇ μεμελετηκέναι μέγα φρονεῖν, καὶ τὸν μὲν θάνατον ἡγεῖσθαι μὴ κακόν, τὴν δὲ ζωὴν μὴ ἀγαθόν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸν μὲν πόνον μὴ ἐκτρέπεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἀπονίαν μὴ διώκειν ἐξ ἅπαντος.4

And it is obvious that this kind of woman has acquired virtue not only by absorbing the knowledge of good and bad5 but also by habituating herself (in the manner set forth in the sixth diatribe Περὶ ἀσκήσεως) to react in all situations to everything as taught her. It is also worth noting that Musonius uses here exactly the same terminology as in this diatribe on ἀσκήσεως.6

Unlike Seneca, Musonius does not use the conventional idea of a virtuous past embodied in very

1 IV,48,24-26: goodness of character and nobleness of habit - practice of nobility and nothing else
2 VIII,66,1-2
3 SVF 2,26; Geytenbeek 1963: 35: practice of wisdom
4 III,42,2-5: she has schooled herself to be magnanimous and to think that death is not bad and that life is not good, and likewise not to avoid toil and not to pursue freedom of toil (trans. Lutz, modified)
5 Musonius discusses this process, e.g., in the first diatribe ὅτι οὐ δεῖ πολλάκις ἀποδείξει πρὸς ἐν πρόγαι χρήσσοθαι.
6 This δόσκοντος terminology of Musonius - φεύγειν - διώκειν - ἐκτρέπεσθαι - μετέρχεσθαι - is analysed by Laurenti 1989: 2119 – 2120.
few contemporary women, or make a general distinction between “exceptional” women without “feminine weaknesses” and other women. Although, as we have seen, this distinction is in many cases only ostensible in Seneca, it is striking that Musonius, on the contrary, uses “exceptional” women, such as the Amazons, to prove the equal capacity of other, ordinary women, which indicates that his words are exceptionally explicitly meant to apply to all women, not only special ones. It is also important to remember that, as mentioned in the Introduction, Musonius seems to be more confident than other Stoics of a human being’s capability to become wise.¹

But we should not, of course, forget that Musonius, unlike, e.g., Epictetus, argues all the time to convince his listeners that women should not only practise philosophy and daughters receive the same education but that it is worth for them to practise philosophy and receive the same education. Thus, it is clear that it is expedient for him — in order support his argumentation — to describe as optimistically as possibly the effects of this practice of philosophy and “right” education on women and daughters - and so it is conceivable that his words do not at least in all respects be equivalent to his real views on women’s capacity to become wise. That this, however, is not necessarily the case, is evident, ironically, in a passage in which Musonius dealing with the genesis of prudence (φρόνησις)² both in male and female expresses his most optimistic claim:

καὶ ἀρξαμένους ἀπὸ νηπίων εὐθὺς διδακτέον, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο δὲ κακόν καὶ ταὐτόν ὑμωρόν, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὑφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ βλαβερόν, καὶ τὸ δε μὲν πρακτέον, τὸ δε ὁὔ ἐξ ὧν περιγίνεται φρόνησις τοῖς μανθάνουσιν ὑμώρες κόραις καὶ κόροις, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφορώτερον τοῖς ἑτέροις· ³

It is clear that merely an endeavour to convince listeners and thus make daughters’ same education possible would not have required so strong a claim — as a matter of fact, it is possible that Musonius’ thought of women’s completely same and equal abilities had an opposite impact and was harmful to the goal. For it should be remembered that although it was appropriate for women to be cultivated, intelligent and able, it was hardly as appropriate for them to be that “too much”, i.e. as much as men.

¹ See, e.g., XVII,108,19: καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον; Geytenbeek 1963: 22; see above p. 5, n. 3.
² I.e. in its wider meaning as a knowledge of good and bad; for this see above pp. 13 and 35. Musonius uses φρόνησις in its wider meaning also in VI,52,2123; 54,128-25.
³ IV,46,35-48,3: and straight from infancy they have to be taught that this is right and that is bad, and that it is the same for both alike; and that this is useful, that harmful, and that this must be done and that that must not be done. this teaching results in prudence in those who learn, girls and boys alike, with no difference (trans. Lutz, modified)
5. CONCLUSION

It seems obvious that the Stoic thought of the sameness of the virtues of man and woman means two things also for the later Stoics: that everyone has at least in principle the capacity to acquire virtue and, regarding the individual virtues, that the virtues of both sexes are the so-called cardinal virtues, i.e. prudence, bravery, self-control and justice. There is not much material available in Hierocles’ and Marcus Aurelius’ works, but they do not, however, say anything which would suggest that this thought of the sameness of the virtues of man and woman would be impossible to them. The thought is most clearly evident in Epictetus who seems to regard it as self-evident (requiring no more discussion) and who is the only of these philosophers who explicitly gives us to understand that women, too, can become wise – and, of course, by Musonius Rufus who discusses the thought most intentionally and systematically and who most unambiguously equates ‘woman’ (like ‘man’) with ‘human being’. Thus, we are provided with a rather exceptional and, compared to common views in antiquity, ungendered perspective on individual virtues, capacity for virtue and philosophical education - as well as on some other topics related to virtues of man and woman in Greek and Roman thinking, not only equality and inequality but also “sameness” and “otherness” of women, and what is “masculine”, “feminine” or “human”.

Common conservative views emphasising women’s difference and inequality did not see women as individuals but as “other”, as a group different from and inferior to men (who are regarded as the norm), and stressed the difference (and thus inferiority) of their nature, and, consequently, the difference of their virtues. In the strictest conservative thinking (as in the elite male ideal of Classical Athens) women were thought to have their own virtues: it was enough that they took care of their homes and children and were chaste and obedient - which meant that most virtues important from the point of view of humanity, such as wisdom, prudence, justice and bravery, were more or less “masculine”. It was also possible to think that man and woman had at least mostly the same virtues but the quality of these virtues was different depending on in which of the sexes they appeared (as argued by Aristotle), or that women’s principal virtues were other than those of men, i.e. “feminine” virtues “appropriate” to them, such as chastity (as evident, e.g., in conventional Roman thinking, Plutarch and some Neopythagoreans). Furthermore, conventional Roman thinking is an example of such a conservative thinking which did not necessarily regard
the nature of women as crucially different from that of men but which drew a strict distinction between women’s virtues in everyday life and the virtues, such as bravery, they showed when needed (after which they where thought to withdraw back to their own “feminine” domestic sphere) – thoughts found also, e.g., in Plutarch. Thus, women’s bravery was greatly admired if they displayed it for “right” reasons (and thus became “masculine” in a “right” way), for example, on behalf of their husbands or other family, or to protect their chastity - although such a woman was usually considered more or less “exceptional” who was (to a great extent) free from “female weaknesses”. In general, it was very typical of both Greek and Roman conventional views to emphasise the “weakness” of women’s mind.

The later Stoics disagreed with these conservative views, most consistently Musonius. Thus, Musonius considers the nature and virtue the same for all and the content of each individual virtue identical for man and woman and congruent with the general Stoic content of each virtue. So, he also says that chastity is not a feminine but a human virtue and states that even bravery is a human, not a masculine virtue - i.e. that the Stoic virtue ideal as a whole is sex/gender-neutral and the sameness of man and woman does not mean that a woman acquires “masculine” qualities and becomes “manly”, but their sameness is based on their common (rational) humanhood, proved also by the essence of the Amazons, usually regarded as “other”. Furthermore, he sees no difference in man’s and woman’s innate capacity for virtue and in their moral accomplishments resulting from (the same) education and training of this innate capacity. And he mentions nowhere that women would have special impediments in this process, such as excessive emotionality, but (like Epictetus who states that a woman who has acquired virtue and wisdom is able to live “ἀλύπως, ἀφόβως, ἀταράχως”) he explicitly says that a woman’s reason is equally well capable to keep under control all irrational impulses and “emotions”. Thus, both Musonius and Epictetus seem to deny the conservative view of the “weakness” of women’s mind and thus also the conventional thought of men’s ruling position based on their supposed superiority in self-control, i.e. both mental and social/societal otherness in this respect.

It seems, however, clear that the later Stoics did not always follow their Stoic ideas. So, unlike Musonius and Epictetus, Seneca often refers to the emotional “weakness” of women. But it is
important to note that this is in many cases due to his intention to encourage and persuade his readers and that he does not see this “weakness” as specific only to women and seems also to be convinced that women, too, can overcome it by education and training - emphasising thus, after all, the fundamental sameness rather than otherness of women. Like the other later Stoics, Seneca argues, in a very unconservative way, that the practice of philosophy belongs equally well to the gender and role of women, which means that conventional Roman ideas of at least some intellectual equality are transformed by these Stoics in the respect that they find it positive that a woman develops herself as an individual for her own sake. The ideological context of Seneca’s thinking is, however, more conservative in many other respects: in his views on ‘woman’ and women’s virtues he, as a moralist, more often and abundantly than the other later Stoics combines Stoic thoughts (emphasising sameness/equality at least in principle) with conservative, e.g., conventional Roman, attitudes and ideals, such as the importance of women’s chastity, loyalty and devotion to home.

Thus, although Seneca, as a Stoic, neither regards bravery as a “masculine” virtue (nor thinks that women who, being “same”, display it (or other virtues) are “masculine”), he is not always consistent but advocates not only the common view of the time that bravery is more exceptional in women but also the idea that women should display their bravery to show their endless loyalty. Furthermore, his discussion on these ideals can be seen also as a part of a more or less “timeless” ideology referring to women’s social/societal otherness and including very conventional critique (found in many authors during the late Republican and early Imperial periods, e.g., in Sallust and Tacitus) towards them and their ambition, “wrong” masculinity/manliness, unchastity, etc. But, at the same time, his discussion can be seen, more specifically, in relation to contemporary society. For it is important to note that he is rather often very conservative in his thoughts of women’s social/societal role - sometimes even more conservative than common practices of his time. Thus, he seems to react against the changes these contemporary practices reflect, i.e. against changes in women’s roles (and spheres) occurred especially since the end of the Republic.

His views are thus a very explicit and specific (and not as exaggerated, as, e.g., in Juvenal) example how the changes in women’s role(s) are reflected in the texts and literature of that time –
although it is, of course, clear that women’s changing/changed role is visible in the late Republic and early Imperial texts also in more “neutral” ways than in critique towards them: e.g., simply through the presence of many influential, wealthy, educated, etc. women in, e.g., Cicero’s and Pliny’s letters (or, likewise, e.g., through the dedicatee of Plutarch’s *Mulierum virtutes*, priestess Clea, whose conversation with Plutarch inspired the work) – or in Seneca, e.g., through the presence of Marcia in his consolation written to her.

The interpretation supported by most scholars that the Stoics, and especially the later Stoics, are social/societal conservatives (who are willing to confine women to the home and perhaps even to subordinate them – i.e. who strongly emphasise the social/societal otherness of women in this respect) seems to be valid only in Seneca and, to some degree, in Hierocles – but not because of their Stoic views. For Seneca is the one of these Stoics who most explicitly seems to accept traditional power structures, and Hierocles, in a conventional way, thinks that the man should be the ruling one. But, on the other hand, Hierocles also expresses nearly as radical and unconservative thoughts of the division of tasks between the sexes as those of Musonius – whereas Epictetus is not at all as conservative as Seneca but, at least in his extant discourses, not as radical as Musonius, although it is worth noting that he, very interestingly, praises women who, in an unconventional way, act and live according to Stoic principles.

Thus, the Greeks, Epictetus and Hierocles, are less conservative than the Roman, Seneca – it seems that one’s cultural background is here not as decisive in this respect as one’s eagerness to adopt conservative conventional ideas of time. Besides, it is good to remember that the differences between Greek and Roman world had apparently disappeared at least to a great extent in the period discussed in this study due to changes in women’s position and roles in the Hellenistic Age (and also due to Roman influence after that), rather similar trends thus influencing women’s lives in the whole Roman empire. Furthermore, the eastern part of the empire was more “egalitarian” in the respect that women had been able to hold there numerous same offices as men since the Hellenistic time, although it was, of course, possible for women to have public and civic roles also in the Latin West and act, e.g., as city patrons. All in all, it is important to keep in mind that there was – and had never been – one monolithic “Greekness” in the Greek world.
regarding women (or, e.g., the Amazons, as evident also in vase paintings and coins, or in a
honorary inscription of Caesellia Maxima), but attitudes and social reality varied in this respect
both with time and place, from the Greek mainland to Greek islands, Asia Minor, Epirus, areas
around the Black Sea, etc., at least in some cases also due to influences from local cultures.

Regarding Musonius, it seems that those scholars who see him advocating conservative attitudes
consider his statements often too unambiguously his own personal views, fail to discuss why
there are among these conservative statements also very radical and “egalitarian” ones,
disregard the strategies of persuasion he uses and ignore the fact that he has to make
concessions in order to convince his listeners that women should be given the same education
and opportunity to practise philosophy – although it is true that he is ready to make even
“dangerous” concessions to achieve these goals. Even if the “egalitarian” of Musonius’ views
should not be exaggerated, it seems obvious that he himself constructs the gender of women
also here rather exceptionally in many respects compared to views common in his time. Thus, his
views are, on the other hand, not in conflict with how women acting (at least those acting of their
own will and/or having professional pride) outside the domestic sphere (some of them having also
public activities) at that time seem to have conceived their gender and sameness and otherness
in this respect - or with the way in which it was possible to construct gender, e.g, in Asia Minor.

But it is obvious that Musonius’ views on ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are still more exceptional. This is true
above all of his thought that the same humanhood of man and woman can require also practical
consequences in their roles in a non-utopian society and that all tasks are common to both sexes,
even those inside the home - which means that he in his own views, still more clearly than
Hierocles, abandons the conventional ideology which not only makes a strict distinction between
‘public/male – private/domestic/female’ but which also finds it impossible to link men to the
domestic sphere. Thus, unlike in Seneca, equality resulting from sameness is in Musonius not only
ethical/theoretical but also practical in a wider sense and on a larger scale than usual. And by referring
to changes in women’s (and men’s) roles he also deviates from Stoicism, for the Stoics argued that
a human being can acquire virtue, wisdom and happiness regardless of external circumstances –
though, rather paradoxically, these non-Stoic views of Musonius appear (at least primarily) to have been resulted from the Stoic thought of the same humanhood of man and woman.

As in the case of Musonius, it has often been overlooked why Seneca and Epictetus say what they say: although one’s willingness to heighten the effect of one’s words by belittling women surely tells something about one’s attitudes (and although this kind of acting involves at least some wielding of power), the importance of Seneca’s and Epictetus’ negative statements concerning women has been exaggerated without noting that their intention is often, employing the above-mentioned strategy, to strengthen the self-confidence of their readers/listeners and to make them adopt “right” views and attitudes. Because Seneca uses this strategy also when writing to women, some scholars have been too cautious regarding the possibility that Seneca means his encouraging words to apply to women in general and not only “exceptional” ones.

There are some recurrent thinking patterns in the views expressed in antiquity on the sameness of the virtues of man and woman, evident in sources from the fifth century BC to the Roman era. Among them ideas emphasising women’s difference and inequality, i.e. collective otherness are far more numerous than those emphasising sameness – although these conservative attitudes, of course, varied with time and place and were not always congruent with social reality, e.g., in the respect that women were since the Hellenistic Age allowed (and seen as capable) to act even in many “male” public spheres, including the holding of offices. The view emphasising the same nature, virtue, humanhood and individuality of all human beings, without excluding women, was most explicitly and consistently advocated by the later Stoics who also most unambiguously extended it to apply to all women and not only, e.g., women of a special group, like Plato (who also, unlike the Stoics, thought that women were inferior to men in everything, also in virtue). Thus, the views of the later Stoics are an important contribution to discussions of who a “full” human being is, in an era when “a human being” was in the first place a (free) man.

It is not possible, due to the lack of extant evidence, to find out the real influence of these views of the later Stoics on the lives of women and on the society of that time, despite the reputation or even remarkably influential position of some of them; this apples also to Marcus Aurelius’
legislation which has been interpreted in opposite ways in this respect, well illustrating the
difficulties encountered in attempting to interpret even the extant material. Furthermore, although
it can, of course, be speculated that the later Stoics’ views on education may have had influence
on women’s opportunities to get education there is no explicit evidence for that - we do not, e.g.,
know whether those Musonius’ listeners who took women’s and daughters’ education (and
practice of philosophy) under discussion (or those who listened his lectures on these subjects)
agreed or disagreed with him. Likewise, it is also important to remember that we do not even
know Marcia’s or Helvia’s reactions to the consolations written to them.

But despite that, the “egalitarian” views of the later Stoics on sameness, equality, and what is
“masculine”, “feminine” or “human”, as well as, e.g., the claim for the same, above all
philosophical education (and intellectual equality) for both sexes, are an ideologically important
contribution also, more specifically, to the ideological context of their own time, the first and
second centuries AD, when both conservative and more “egalitarian” trends appeared side by
side in an above-discussed rather interesting and incongruent way. For there was an increasing
number of educated women whose education was apparently, at least to some extent,
appreciated and who probably also themselves were proud of it, some of them proficient also in
philosophy, and women worked and acted also outside the domestic sphere in different kinds of
areas in society, also in public, and were even praised in honorary inscriptions for the same civic
virtues as men – but, at the same time, ideals concerning women and their virtues often
continued to be more conservative than social reality, double standard was widely accepted,
women were sometimes even harshly criticised for abandoning their “feminine” virtues when
entering “male” spheres of life, including philosophy, and a woman who develops herself for her
own sake often aroused prejudices.

In a similar way as there was not one uniform “Greekness”, Roman thinking was not as
monolithic as one may easily assume. Thus, the later Stoics can be seen to disagree with many
of the above-mentioned conservative attitudes – but they can also be seen to discuss issues
finding their expression in the above-mentioned more “egalitarian” Roman ideas and trends
concerning, e.g., women’s intellectual activity, including women themselves active in philosophy.
Likewise, the later Stoics’ views, e.g., on women’s bravery are not at least strictly contradictory to those Roman ideas which do not necessarily link women's bravery with masculinity/manliness – or to the neutrality with which Vibia Perpetua refers to her virtus in her diary, a very rare extant source for views on virtues written by a woman.

Although only Epictetus explicitly says that women, too, can achieve Stoic wisdom, it is obvious that none of the later Stoics (at least in principle) excludes this possibility. But, it is also worth noting that there are differences in the views of these Stoics. And although it is, of course, clear that we should not consider these differences too significant and regard, for example, Musonius and Seneca as complete opposites to each other, it is also, at the same time, clear that if any other later Stoic really believed that women are equally well able to become wise, it was most likely Musonius. For although Musonius is surely not a “feminist” as characterised by some scholars, his negative statements concerning women are rather rare and unharsh compared to other writers in antiquity - and, what is still more important, when speaking of acquiring of virtue, he, unlike Seneca and occasionally even Epictetus, nowhere belittles women. And although his views include also some conservative elements, it is easy to see that his views are dominated by the thinking emphasising sameness/equality. Some of the most important aspects of this thinking are that he exceptionally strongly requires the same opportunities for women through education and training and is capable of seeing human beings as individuals regardless of their sex, not only on the theoretical level and concerning philosophical education, like many other Stoics, but also in practical life – and that he completely unambiguously sets forth the Stoic thought of the same nature and virtue of man and woman and seems to follow it consistently.
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