Subject Strategies in Music
Subject Strategies in Music

A Psychoanalytic Approach to Musical Signification

Susanna Välimäki
Acknowledgements

A scholarly book is an effect of a researching subject(ivity)’s activity in scholarly communities. In the end, the written words and thoughts result from displacement, condensation and transposition processes of various voices, those of the researching subject’s significant others in and outside of the academy. The practice of the bibliographical system in scholarly writing takes care of the obvious, literary ones. The other part of the voices – those not explicitly credited in the text – derives from the social activities and discourses in the daily life of a researching subject during the years of writing. I am thinking here with gratitude especially of my colleagues and friends in the Department of Musicology and Institute of Art Research at the University of Helsinki, the Finnish Musicological Society and Ethnomusicological Society of Finland and their annual collaborative symposiums, the International Musical Signification Project, International Doctoral and Post-Doctoral Seminars on Musical Semiotics, the Semiotic Society of Finland and International Semiotics Institute’s annual summer congresses on semiotics.

The Department of Musicology in the University of Helsinki provided the institutional, material and intellectual needs for my research. It also offered me various posts and teaching possibilities and brilliant students to motivate and with whom to sharpen my own engagements with music research. I thank the Department head, Professor Eero Tarasti, for his support and for all the scholarly opportunities he offered me during my years at Vironkatu 1. I also thank Eero for his intellectual way of educating young scholars in a flexible atmosphere of scientific curiosity and open-mindedness. With gratitude I am thinking of the late Professor Erkki Salmenhaara who significantly encouraged me ever since my undergraduate studies, and who supervised, supported and inspired me at the beginning of my doctoral studies. I am deeply grateful to university lecturer,
docent Alfonso Padilla, who incessantly encouraged me in my research, ever since my attending his proseminar. Alfonso’s continuous, almost daily care, collegial sharing, critical insights and friendship, have been crucial in all the stages during my research. To Professor Anne Sivuoja-Gunaratnam I am exceedingly grateful for significant scholarly and other discussions at very critical moments, and for her collegial support and friendship. Discussions with Anne affected both the substance of the book and, no less importantly, finally helped me to get rid of it. As an external examiner she was a constructive critical reader whose comments improved significantly the final form of the book. To Emeritus Professor Raymond Monelle, I am grateful for his being the most witty and eloquent external examiner that one can imagine. As a spirited writer and fascinating lecturer whom I much admire, I felt privileged to have his willingness to be involved with my work.

The final, most important stages of putting the finishing touches to the book I experienced while fulfilling post-doctoral research positions for two research projects funded by The Academy of Finland’s Music and Media project under Professor Erkki Pekkilä’s management in the Department of Musicology in the University of Helsinki, and the Contemporary Music, Media and Mediation project under docent, Dr. John Richardson’s management in the Department of Music at the University of Jyväskylä. I thank Erkki and John for offering me research posts and for opening vistas of the future during the complicated transitional period that comes after the completion of a Ph.D. thesis. I also thank Erkki for his support during my doctoral studies and John for his kind backing, help and care during the last, hectic moments.

Several people have commented on my manuscript or sections of it, which include articles and papers related to my research during the years of writing. In addition to my supervisors and examiners, I am grateful to all my colleagues, friends and family members for their interest in reading my texts and discussing psychoanalytic music research. Special thanks go to Christian Holmqvist for his comments on the Tchaikovsky chapter. I also thank Christian for all the discussions and sharing of music, including his own. I thank Markus Lång
for commenting on the Schubert and Tchaikovsky chapters and various other texts. To Professor Veijo Murtomäki I am grateful for his detailed comments on my engagements with Sibelius. To both Professor Robert Hatten and Professor Anahid Kassabian I owe thanks for encouraging discussions concerning the overall frame of my thesis and the concept of musical subjectivity.

Various people at the Institute for Art Research in the University of Helsinki have helped me in many ways, especially by being involved with my research and making daily academic life a rewarding experience. In particular I thank Erja Hannula for her exceptional willingness and ability to help both in concrete practical ways and psychologically, and for her precious friendship and consistent support. Particular thanks also go to Jaakko Tuohiniemi, the most invaluable and sweetest librarian in the world, for helping me a thousand times in gaining access to books, articles and other research materials. Paul Forsell, who helped me in countless other ways, also patiently did the layout of the book. I also thank (and apologize to) Paul for his having been my office neighbor, thus his being the first door for me to run to in times of trouble.

I thank the following for help, collegial support, and valuable friendship: Irma Vierimaa, Seija Lappalainen, Harri Veivo and Merja Hottinen. Likewise I thank Kai Lassfolk, who helped me in harrowing moments of technological crises, Mikko Ojanen for also helping me with technological and library matters, Esa Lilja for listening to k.d. lang with me and for helping with the transcriptions, and Kristian Bankov, Liisamäki Hautsalo, Drina Hočevar, Rita Honti, Anu Konttinen, Jarmo Kuitunen, Petri Kuljuntausta, Antti-Ville Kärjä, Kari Laitinen, Luiz Fernando Nascimento de Lima, Markus Mantere, Dario Martinelli, Maritza Núñez, Kirsti Nymark, Juha Ojala, Elina Paukkunen, Sanna Rojola, Eila Tarasti, Jukka Tiilikainen, Juha Torvinen, Jussi Tuovinen, Helena Tyrväinen and Tiina Vainiomäki. I also thank Márta Schmidt for helping me with copyright matters, Päivi Juvonen for writing out my musical transcriptions, Tutta Palin for advice concerning the publication of images, and Henrik Ruso, planning officer for postgraduate studies in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Helsinki, for guidance and help when the going unexpectedly got rough. Thanks go also to Henri Terho,

I am indebted to Pentti Saaritsa and Hannu Heikinheimo for providing me material related to Pehr Henrik Nordgren’s TV-opera *Alex* from their own personal archives, and to Helena Myllykoski at the Finnish Broadcasting Company / Yleisradio TV-Archive for her kind help with the material related to *Alex*, and to the Finnish Music Information Center. I thank Breitkopf & Härtel in Wiesbaden, Peters Edition Limited in London, Schott Musik International in Mainz, and Pehr Henrik Nordgren, for their permission to publish certain notated examples. I am grateful to Elisabeth Molle and the Photographic Agency in Reunion des Musées Nationaux in Paris for their service related to Lucien Levy-Dhurmer’s painting *Medusa* on the cover of the book. Likewise I thank Professor Antonio Paolucci at The Polo Museale Fiorentino and The Cultural Ministry of Italy for permission to reprint Caravaggio’s *Head of Medusa*. My thanks go to the Finnish Broadcasting Company for giving me permission to use their photographs in the chapter on *Alex*.

I warmly thank Professor Richard Littlefield for revising and correcting the language of the manuscript as well as commenting on it, and Michael Dutton for proof-reading. I also want to express my gratitude to International Semiotics Institute at Imatra and the Society for Semiotics in Finland for publishing the book in their publication series. To Jorma Hinkka I am forever grateful for the wonderful cover desing.

The Finnish Cultural Foundation made my research financially possible with a three-year scholarship. Travel grants I received from the Chancellor of the University of Helsinki, Alfred Kordelin Foundation and the Finnish Konkordia Fund. The University of Helsinki also offered me a scholarship toward finishing the thesis. I am indebted to all of the aforementioned for their financial support. Also I thank the Finnish Institute in Rome (Villa Lante) where I wrote about my research during some months in 2002–2005.

Thanks are also due to my friends Eerika Olkinuora, Jouna Pyysalo, Minna
Väyrynen and Sakari Jääskeläinen for their generous emotional support as times have gone by, Kaija Harjanne for years of discussions in front of the piano, Tuulikki Kankaanpää for keeping me occupied with the practice of the troping of musical meaning in theatre, and the staff of Espoo Music Institute for keeping me in touch with the concrete art of music education.

My parents, Vilma and Jukka Välimäki, I thank for reading and commenting on a great number of texts, and for the countless discussions on psychoanalytic theory. I also thank them for their unremitting and unconditional support. My brother Hannu Välimäki helped me with all kinds of questions about k.d. lang’s music, transcriptions, and mathematical logic. I also thank Hannu for sharing the music during the past 35 years. Much gratitude I owe to Hannu and his wife Elina Välimäki and their daughters Vilja, Maija and Liisa for providing me with lots of joy to balance the monastic life of a dissertation writer. My beloved friends, Tarja Knuuttila and Max Ryynänen I thank for being everything a friend in and outside of the academy is for, and for so much more. Oceans of affectionate thanks go to my companion Altti Kuusamo who has been involved with my research in all possible ways. He has shared my daily life, helped during my struggles, and listened to my complaints, read and commented on my writings, and functioned as a living encyclopedia of art research, philosophy and semiotics. Even more, his own scholarly work has been a continuous source of inspiration for me.

Lastly, a very special thanks from the bottom of my heart to all my challenging students in the Department of Musicology at Helsinki University, especially in the “gradupiiri” seminars during 2001–2005, for keeping me busy with all kinds of intellectual efforts and for making music research – and even thesis writing – seem meaningful and important, while at the same time so funny and hilarious.

Helsinki, August, 2005

Susanna Välimäki
Note regarding earlier publications

Contents

Acknowledgements v
Note regarding earlier publications x

Chapter 1. Introduction 1
1.1 Subject strategies in musical signification:
Object and aims of the study 1
1.2 Framework and organization of the study 8
1.3 The concept of “music”; justifying the music chosen for analysis 11
1.4 Earlier research on subjectivities in music; the
semiotico-psychoanalytic framework of the study 16
1.5 Summary of theory and method 20

PART I: ON PSYCHOANALYTIC MUSIC RESEARCH 23

Chapter 2. On the relationship between
psychoanalytic theory and musicology 25
2.1 Applied psychoanalysis, psychoanalytic criticism, music research 26
2.2 Some starting points, beginnings, and
debates in psychoanalytic music research 30
2.3 Music in the margin of psychoanalytic criticism and
psychoanalytic criticism in the margin of musicology 38
2.3.1 The “invisibility” of psychoanalytic music research and the
ideologies of musicology: Who’s afraid of musical representation? 38
2.3.2 Psychoanalytic music research is not monolithic 46
Chapter 3. Objects of study, metapsychological viewpoints, and paradigms in psychoanalytic music research

3.1 Describing psychoanalytic music research 53
3.2 Common objects and types of study, and special issues in psychoanalytic music research 56
3.2.1 Biographical psychoanalytic studies 56
3.2.2 Psychoanalytic music psychology 58
3.2.3 Psychoanalytic music analyses 61
3.2.4 Psychoanalytic studies of opera, film music, and other audio-visual media 63
3.2.5 Psychoanalytic studies of ideologies of music 64
3.2.6 Psychoanalytic topics in music; special methodological questions 65
3.3 Metapsychological perspectives on music 70
3.4 Psychoanalytic paradigms in the Freudian tradition and in music research 80
3.4.1 Id-psychology: Music and repressed conflict 81
3.4.2 Ego-psychology: Music as unconscious cognition and nonverbal thought 86
3.4.3 Object-relation theory: Music as a site of separation and subject–object dialectics 91

PART II: THEORIZING MUSIC AS UNSETTLED SUBJECTIVITY 99

Chapter 4. Music analysis, musical meaning, and subjectivity 101

4.1 Postmodern music analysis: The (re)discovery of musical meaning 101
4.2 Semiotics and the call of musical semantics 109
4.2.1 Semiotics and meaning as construction 109
4.2.2 Three waves of musical semiotics and its postmodern condition 111
4.2.3 Topical study of music 119
4.2.4 Musical semiotics and subjectivity in music 123
4.3 Hermeneutic windows (after Kramer) 128

Chapter 5. Locating the subject (strategy) in music 132

5.1 On the intersection between subject and musical text 132
5.1.1 Listening subject, subject position, and identification process: The subject of the musical discourse 132
5.1.2 The played subject: On musical suture (Silverman’s application) 135
5.2 Semiotico-psychoanalytic theories of the subject’s constitution in the analysis of musical subject strategies 138
5.2.1 The semiotic chora, abjection, and melancholy as the nonlinguistic material of music (Kristevan approach) 138
5.2.2 Registers of subjectivity in music (Lacanian approach) 142
5.2.3 The uncanny in music 145
5.2.4 Gender-theoretical and feminist considerations 148
5.3 Hearing the “fantasy thing” and “fantasy space” – the pre-separation nostalgia of music (after Schwarz and Poizat) 154
5.4 Methodological summary for subject-strategical music analysis 159

Chapter 6. The semiotic chora in musical experience, or, at the edge of sign system, meaning, and subjectivity 163

6.1 The nonlinguistic dimension in music 164
6.2 The positing of thetic and semiotic transgression 169
6.3 The matrix of psychosomatic and conesthetic meaning 178
6.4 Amodal and vitality affect schemata 183
6.5 Symmetrical logic 187
6.6 The multidimensional experience of music 192
6.7 The nonlinguistic dimension of music as a troublemaker in philosophy and psychoanalysis: Music as a fantasy of full presence 199
PART III: ANALYTICAL CASE STUDIES
OF MUSICAL SUBJECT STRATEGIES 205

Chapter 7. From abjection to assimilation:
Figuring the (feminine) other in Sibelius’s Kyllikki 207
  7.1 Kyllikki as stories of subjectivity 207
  7.2 “And if her story again turned out to be his story…” – Must the protagonist always be male? 209
  7.3 Chromatic borderline condition as abject music 215
  7.4 Melancholy and lost objects 220
  7.5 The music of memory and musical portrait-landscape 225
  7.6 Feminine figuring as exemption from the weight of subjectivity – Assimilation into nature 228
  7.7 Postlude: Sibelius’s piano music, music research, and gender ideology 232

Chapter 8. Music of absence and melancholy: Schubert’s “Der Lindenbaum” and Chopin’s Nocturne in C minor Op. 48 No. 1 236
  8.1 The shadow of the object 236
  8.2 A linden tree, horns, and maternal fantasy: Schubert’s “Der Lindenbaum” as acoustic mirror 239
  8.3 Memory, distance, and absence – The transitional space of horns 243
  8.4 The conflict of present and past, absence and presence, fact and fantasy 249
  8.5 Depression, irony, symptom, alienation 251
  8.6 Remaking nothingness: Chopin’s Nocturne in C minor, Op. 48 No. 1 258
  8.7 The excessiveness of the imaginary 261
  8.8 The apocryphal object of melancholy 264
Chapter 9. The uncanny in Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 6 (Pathétique) 267

9.1 Some remarks on the interpretation tradition of the Pathétique 267
9.2 The uncanny and a foreign body within oneself 271
9.3 Death, tombeaux, mortification 276
9.4 Carnival, the balletic war-machine, and the subject as a tragic puppet 288
9.5 Dimness, repression, extreme nostalgia 295
9.6 Some reflections 299

Chapter 10. Echoes of self and other in the vocal significance of k.d. lang 301

10.1 k.d. lang as “poststructuralist” 301
10.2 Protean vocal identity and Nash-vaudeville 303
10.3 The body of music, the music of language, the language of body: Singing the materiality of language 307
10.4 Acoustic mirrors and lustful glissandi: The rhetoric of desire 311
10.5 Lawless voice, liberation from language, union in sound 318
10.6 Theoretical reverberations 324

Chapter 11. Between being and meaning: Music of alienation, emptiness, and death in P. H. Nordgren’s TV-opera Alex 328

11.1 Genre on trial: TV-Zeitoper in the age of media – Contemporary relevance and a depth-psychological view 328
11.2 Music as the protagonist’s psychical mise-en-scène 333
11.3 Representation of the lack 338
11.4 Between two deaths 342
11.5 Death and sexuality – and some questions of interpretation 350
Chapter 12. Conclusions and after-images 353

Bibliography 357

1 Music research 357
2 Other theoretical literature 374
3 Newspaper articles and press releases 381
4 Music-analytical source material 382

Index 383
Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Subject strategies in musical signification: Object and aims of the study

The present study investigates music as a signifying practice that constructs a developing and divided subject. In other words, music is studied as a site of unsettled subjectivity. It is considered as something that displays what Julia Kristeva has called the-subject-in-process/on-trial.\footnote{Kristeva 1980: 97–249 passim; 1984 [1974]: 22, 58, 233. “Subject in process/on trial” is Margaret Waller’s translation of Kristeva’s (1977: 55–106) le sujet en procès (in Kristeva 1984 [1974]: e.g., 22); “a questionable subject-in-process” is provided by Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez (in Kristeva 1980: e.g., 135). My usage of hyphens in Waller’s expression is aimed to emphasize the processive and unsettled nature of the psychoanalytic subject, which distinguishes it from the “subject” as understood in other philosophies of the subject.} The overall setting here is essentially psychoanalytic, as is the theory developed in the study. Further, the theoretical orientation relies significantly on poststructural semiotics, for I engage here with the larger question of musical signification and meaning, and do so in a certain psychoanalytic way.

Consequently, the theoretical framework of the present study may be referred to as “poststructural psychoanalytic semiotics” or as a “poststructural semiotico-psychoanalytic”,\footnote{“Poststructural psychoanalysis” is a synonymous term, understood as contemporary psychoanalytic theorizing that is semiotically oriented.} understood primarily in the Kristevan sense (e.g., 1980, 1982, 1984 [1974], 1985, and 1989). The present study complements, rereads and integrates the Kristevan approach with ideas and theories advanced by other psychoanalytic theorists, ranging from Sigmund Freud to Donald W. Winnicott, from Jacques Lacan to Kaja Silverman, to mention just a few. Theories of object-relation and child-development also play a crucial role here.

The poststructural and semiotical\footnote{“Semiotical” is a term used in order to distinguish between the noun “semiotics” (adjectivally, semiotical) as a discipline, and “semiotic” as Kristeva’s (1980 and 1984 [1974]) concept, which refers to the unconscious modality of signification. In the latter sense, the semiotic is related to the chora and opposed to the symbolic modality. For this, Kristeva} framework means here that subjectivity in...
music is theorized from the position of the listener (receiver), and is taken to be a constituent in the process of musical signification. Poststructuralism theorizes subjectivity as a result of signifying practices (sign systems); the subject does not control meaning but is an effect of the ongoing construction of meaning. In this view, music appears as an agency that produces subjectivity by *posing the listener as subject*. Because of this theoretical stand, the present research does not view subjectivity in music as a composer’s subjectivity inscribed in the composition, as most art-music research has done and continues to do. Instead, I take a more abstract view of the subject in music, *as the subject of discourse*. This refers to the subject as a constituting element in the musical-textual mechanism, and to music as a shared cultural screen for addressing general themes of primal subjectivity formation. Accordingly, the musical text is conceived as logically inseparable from the listener and her subjectivity, and from the related meaning processes. All these instances—musical text, subjectivity, and meaning—are produced in and by the same process of signification. From this perspective, music reveals the subject of signification (semiosis). The musical subjectivity sought in the present research is therefore best observed at the site of the reception (consumption), and is located in the listener as the ideal code-reader of the musical text.

This study develops a *textual* psychoanalytic listening of music. The central hypothesis of my argument and music-analytical demonstration is that music is grasped by the listening subject in the textual identification process. The music constructs, reflects, and represents; even more, it creates, sustains, and shapes the developing subject-in-process and the divided subjectivity-on-trial. The psychoanalytic point of view taken here means that the focus is on the unconscious mode of being and signification in musical subjectivity. More specifically, it focuses on the constant demarcation, border-crossings, and undermining processes that take place in the irresolvable dialectics of the consciousness and the unconscious at the heart of subjectivity, signification, and musical text. This is precisely what is meant in the use of the expression *developing* and *divided*

---

4 Primal or archaic is to be understood as referring to the psychoanalytic mechanisms of subjectivity formation that, from a developmental point of view, dominate the very early stages of emerging subjectivity.  
5 Psychoanalytic listening is to be understood as the equivalent of the psychoanalytic reading of literary and visual texts.  
6 The notion of the listening subject comes from David Schwarz (1997a; cf. also, 1997b) and Naomi Cumming (1997a; cf. also, 2000).
subject, and likewise the synonymous expression of subject-in-process/on-trial: sub
jectivity is always questionable, unsettled, unstable. It is something that is worked on, but that never attains an ultimate, fixed point. Rather, it reaches only momentary points of established meaning in the ever-changing registers of sub
jectivity. Psychoanalytic theory posits this as the true condition of the subject, firstly due to the unconscious motivation and fundamental split (constitutive gap) in her being, and, also because of subject(ivity)’s dependence on discourse and signifying practices. This also means that the subject is discontinuous. In this view, music is approached as its own, exceptional realization of the signifying subject’s condition.

Poststructural semiotics approaches sign systems as signifying, represen
tional practices imbued with contents; the problem of meaning and signification is that of subject and subjectivity, and vice versa. As Kristeva’s oft-stated position goes: a theory of meaning is a theory of subject. This also means that the semantic dimensions of musical discourse (its communicative and signifying structures) can be analyzed, interpreted, and discussed with the language of psychoanalytic theories concerning subjectivity formation.

Accordingly, the musical text is approached as a cultural practice representing articulations of subjectivity. As poststructuralism claims, however, the experi

7 Cf. Emile Benveniste’s (1971 [1966]) and others’ differentiation between the subject of speech and the speaking subject having radical implications for psychoanalysis.
8 Subject and subjectivity form a pair of concepts that imply each other. The subject is the whole individual (the thinking, speaking, and acting agent), which is at its base subjected to the unconscious and the Symbolic. Subjectivity refers to subject’s self-representative level, to her conceptions of herself, feelings, and senses of self – and these have unconscious dimensions as well (wishes, desires, etc.). As Benveniste (1971 [1966]: 224) writes: “The ‘subjectivity’ . . . is the capacity of the speaker to posit himself as ‘subject’.” It “is only the emergence in the being of a fundamental property of language” (ibid.). Identity may be considered as the subject’s conscious sense and conception of self, though it too is grounded on unconscious operations and dynamics. The poststructural conception of subjectivity derives from the structuralist and linguistic tradition of Ferdinand de Saussure and Benveniste, among others; this conception descends from the “French” tradition of psychoanalysis, semiotics, and philosophy. It is importantly developed by Lacan (the split subject and constitution of subjectivity in language), Jacques Derrida (critique of the self-presence of the subject, deconstructive view on language), and Michel Foucault (theory of subjectivity and discourse). All these issues are important elements in Kristeva’s theory of subject. Indeed, in continental philosophy, psychoanalysis is understood basically as a philosophical project. In the psychoanalytic tradition of ego-psychology and object-relations theory, psychoanalysis is considered mainly a psychological, psychiatric, and therapeutic project. Analytical philosophy attributes little scientific status to psychoanalysis. Still, in postmodern and poststructural theorizing on subjectivity, the psychoanalytic notion of subject is unavoidable.
ence of the subject cannot be represented fully or perfectly, i.e., without residues or failings, in a Symbolic system. On the contrary, for the subject is divided, and defined by a structural, constitutive gap (split). Hence we view music from a double perspective of (1) socialized and coded subjectivity (rules and norms of the musical sign system), and from that of the (2) excess and residue (impossibility) of symbolic representation (i.e., the choratic semiotic, which undermines the symbolic establishment). Music appears as a constant state of transition and an intermediary zone: a fermenting space of ongoing negotiation, production, and undermining of subjectivity, and thus a borderline practice of meaning. To study music as constructing the subject-in-process/on-trial means to study music as revealing the subject in a constant process of formation and deformation, establishment and rejection, appearing and disappearing, at constant risk of fusion or annihilation. Our subject is in a condition of subjectivity crisis and threatened with non-existence, because of fundamental psychic divisions and because of the subject’s dependency on discourse. The subject can never attain total fullness of being or full presence, because of the structural fissure between her existence and her self-representation, between things and representations, between unconsciousness and consciousness. The structural gap manifests as psychical and textual splits in the subject and discourse, including that of music; subject formation takes place at the limits of language and sign system.

Accordingly, music is considered as addressing the basic problematics of subject, i.e., the psychical processes in the subject’s constant and ongoing constitution, and the divisions (psychical splits) that this constitution sustains. Here, to study these constructions of primary subject formation, and the divisions they engender in music, is to study musical subject strategies. These strategies are

10 Here, the symbolic is written with a capital S (Symbolic) when it is to be differentiated from Kristeva’s more specific notion of the symbolic as another modality of meaning (in this practice, I follow Oliver 1993: 10). Thought often quite compatible, various understandings of the concept of symbolic have to be differentiated in psychoanalytic theory, in order to understand Kristeva’s theory of subject. Kristeva’s symbolic, as a modality of meaning, is one element in the Symbolic as the total social realm of signification. The same goes for the semiotic: Kristeva’s “symbolic” and “semiotic” are both elements within the Symbolic order. The Symbolic (with capital S), as the cultural sphere and social realm of signification, is related to Lacan’s notion of the “symbolic order/register” (in my study, Lacan’s symbolic is not written with a capital S); Kristeva’s perspective on the “Symbolic” is broader than his. Lacan’s symbolic focuses on the symbolic function, whereas Kristeva’s notion of Symbolic order of signification covers the semiotic as well. It is thus important to distinguish between Lacan’s notion of symbolic and Kristeva’s symbolic/Symbolic: Kristeva’s understanding of symbolic/Symbolic is not fully equivalent to Lacan’s symbolic order. (See Oliver 1993: 9–10.) If not otherwise indicated, the concepts of semiotic and symbolic (with small s) are to be understood in Kristeva’s (1980 and 1984 [1974]) sense as modalities of meaning.
musical representations or constructions of processes that characterize the constitution of the subject in the interplay between the conscious and unconscious mode of being and signification. These strategies are psychical and textual positions, standings, conditions, mechanisms, or functional structures, which the subject-in-process/on-trial is producing in, by, and through the musical sign system. By means of psychic/textual subject strategies, the subject tries, more or less successfully, to maintain her subjectivity, sense of self, psychical integrity (coherence), and capacity to function. At the same time, the subject is able to experience jouissance, i.e., a pre-subjective, oceanic bliss resulting from a loosening of the bonds of subjectivity.

These subject formations are said to be primal; they are archaic in regard to an individual’s personal (pre)history (see n. 4, p. 2). Thus, developmentally speaking, they are interrelated subject formations that exist prior to entry into language, subjectivity, and sexual differentiation. Primal mechanisms of subject formation, such as the mirror stage (Lacan 1977 [1966]) and abjection (Kristeva 1982), for instance, are most activated at the threshold of entry into language, which precisely characterizes subjectivity. Because of this, they serve as proto-models for all meaning production, psychic constitution, and subjectivity formation. They are fundamental functional structures of the subject in her continuous subjectivity work; psychoanalytic theories of the subject’s developmental stages are always, at the same time, theories of the functions and structures of mind in general. Thus, subject strategies are linked with a certain kind of music’s proto-meanings or archaic meaning schemata\(^\text{11}\).

In this perspective, music unfolds as a surveying and questioning of fundamental binarities that characterize the constitution of the (listening) subject. Music unfolds as a borderline practice in dialectical dynamics – in the void between self and other, subject and object, meaning and non-meaning, symbolic and semiotic, psychical and bodily, social and libidinal. Musical discourse manifests as a product of a psychic “assembly-line”\(^\text{12}\) that fixes and undermines, sets and transcends the boundaries of subjectivity. It is a psycho-textual drama played in the musical theatre of the mind and body, where different subject positions, settings, and strategies of being a subject, becoming a subject, (trying to) remain(ing) a subject, failing to maintain subjectivity, or transgressing the boundaries of subjectivity, are formed. This psychical scene is characterized by divisions and losses, set up by primal separation (from the [m]other\(^\text{13}\)) and symbolic castration

---

11 The concept comes from psychoanalyst Lajos Székely (1962), and has been applied to music research by Eero Rechardt (1984 and 1987).
12 The industrial expression is Silverman’s (1983: 54).
13 In this study, the word mother refers to the primary caretaker of an infant; it can of course be a person other than the mother, but is most often the latter. For a broader account,
Subject Strategies in Music

(separation from the Lacanian real as the fullness of being); these are the price of subjectivity, paid upon entry into language. The present study demonstrates how music discloses these psychical mechanisms, viewed under the umbrella concept of subject strategies. It presents a psychoanalytic journey, across a musical landscape of such phenomena as object losses, abjection, melancholy, uncanny, depression, primary narcissism, imaginary identifications, mirroring, transitional space, and oceanic fusion. It is also a journey towards the “body in music”, as the unconscious modality of signification indicates a sensory and affective system closely related to the somatic (non-)signification of the body as it is inscribed into discourse. The concept of a bodily aspect, like the idea of primal subject strategies in general, is not restricted here only to (1) the level of (non-)articulation, in which the “true” body and archaic subject would appear in the semiotic-choratic gaps, holes, and ruptures in the discursive (symbolic) logic of music.\footnote{14} For discourse is a psychic (textual) representation of bodily experiences. Rather, the present semiotical frame goes against the idea that (2) musical subject strategies are social and cultural articulations of primal subject strategies dealing with bodily-based and affective desires: i.e., expressed in the Symbolic of the social realm. It should be emphasized that we are dealing here with matters inside the signification system.

Musical subject strategies are to be understood as coded subject strategies, presentations, constructions, even if unconsciously or preconsciously processed, and however loaded they might be with drives, bodily sensations, and affects. The term “construct” (as well as the related “constructed” and “construction”) implies this double perspective: of the drive-based and of the cultural arbitrariness. In any musical unit under discussion, it is always a question of both aspects, indeed of drive representations. The realm of signification consists of a symbolic and a semiotic that need and posit each other. It is a question of channeling the unconscious realm of drives within a site of cultural sharing, and thus these two aspects are necessarily intertwined. The body in music is reachable only as drive-derivative, that is, as culturally mediated (and sublimated), and thus in a disguised (socialized) form. Yet, this does not diminish the body’s capacity for semiotic outbursts in a discourse. The above claim does not diminish, but, rather positions these outbursts in such a way that they occur in the arena of the Symbolic. They are never graspable as such, but always mixed with the symbolic. Drive-based impulses and desires can become manifest only when they enter the social and Symbolic realm of signification, and thus always appear in some kind

\footnote{14} Whereas structuralism emphasizes the power of the signifier in defining and determining the subject, poststructuralism, for its part, focuses on how texts undermine themselves, how writing both represses and reveals.
Chapter 1. Introduction

of mediated (indirect) form. (The degree of socialization, the symbolic disguise, varies a lot, and is another matter in itself.) The semiotic can never manifest in a “pure” form. This is why, in the end, the question of the semiotic’s trace – is it a break in the discourse or a conventional sign of a break? – always remains open. I claim it is always both, though one or the other may dominate. My interest in this study is the workings of the semiotic element and the related subject strategies, encrypted in the Symbolic at many levels of articulation. Rather than tricks of the unconscious “as such” in the text, I look for cultural fantasies – representations or constructions – of unsettled subjectivity driven by semiotic pressure.

We arrive at the basic question that this study hopes to answer: How does the unsettled subjectivity – the developing subject and divided subjectivities (the subject-in-process/on-trial) – become constructed in music? This basic question leads to more specific ones: How does music construct or represent psychoanalytic formations of subjectivity? How does the system of representation in music inhabit or construct the divided and discontinuous subject-in-process/on-trial, and her psychical and discursive strategies for dealing with the fundamental divisions and losses? How does the realm of musical signification construct psychic subject strategies, such as melancholy, object loss, and transitional space? How does that field of the Symbolic, which is called “music”, represent psychoanalytic formations of subjectivity at the boundary of the sign system, language, and meaning? How does all this happen in particular works of music?

This study not only tries to answer to the question of primary psychoanalytic subject formation and construction of subjectivities in music, but also to offer a possible answer to the problem of musical signification from a certain psychoanalytic point of view. Just as important, is my aim to develop a psychoanalytic method in music analysis, through which to discuss musical semantics from the point of view of subjectivity formation. The study includes a model for a psychoanalytic listening (interpretation) of music – an undeveloped field in musicology. The present research is fundamentally theoretical and methodological in nature and purpose, even in its musical analyses of the chosen empirical material. The very starting point has been an intra-theoretical one, which is why theoretical and methodological considerations carry such weight and account for such a large proportion of the whole study. Thus, my analyses of musical works should be considered as demonstrations of the developed methodology. This study serves as a possible model for textual-psychoanalytic music criticism; that is, how to analyze music in a psychoanalytic framework.

15 The starting point of this research was not a certain genre or style of music in the ordinary musicological sense, nor the music of a certain composer; rather, my point of departure was from psychoanalytic theory of unsettled subjectivity, and the application of this theory to music analysis.
1.2 Framework and organization of the study

In this research, the construction of subject-in-process/on-trial in music and the related musical subject strategies are studied at two basic levels: (1) firstly, at a general theoretical, semiotico-psychoanalytic level; and (2) secondly, at the level of specific significations (the music-analytical level), by interpretation of the discursive rhetorics of subject strategies in particular works of music. This two-level approach is reflected in the organization of the research as follows: Part I is a study of psychoanalytic music research. Part II continues and puts to use the theoretical and methodological discussions inaugurated in Part I. Music is theorized at the first basic level (explained above), as the construction of unsettled subjectivity (especially Chaps. 5–6). Part III analyzes music at the second basic level, the methodology of which is built in Parts I and II.

In Part I, *On psychoanalytic music research*, issues are engaged in terms of the place and scope of psychoanalytic music research in the field of musicology and in general humanistic theorizing. Chapter 2, *On the relationship between psychoanalytic theory and musicology*, outlines the foundations of psychoanalytic music analysis, both historically and systematically, by examining the relations between psychoanalytic theory and musicology. Also discussed is the question of the marginality of psychoanalytic approaches to musicology and music analysis. Chapter 3, *Objects of study, metapsychological viewpoints, and paradigms in psychoanalytic music research*, is a survey of psychoanalytic music research. General ideas of psychoanalytic music research are presented, as well as the most common objects and types of study in the field. The chapter includes a metapsychological discussion of music, and outlines psychoanalytic music research in the light of the central paradigms in the Freudian tradition. The extensiveness of certain discussions in Chapters 2–3 is motivated by the fact that psychoanalytic music research and analysis remains underdeveloped and “invisible” in musicology. Hence, more extensive discussion of this little-explored area is much needed.

Part II, *Theorizing music as unsettled subjectivity*, presents a poststructural semiotico-psychoanalytic approach to analyzing musical subject strategies, and theorizes musical experience as unsettled subjectivity at a general theoretical level. With the aid of Part I (Chaps. 2–3) and Part II (Chaps. 4–6), the following can be done: (1) an outline of different theoretical, methodological, and disciplinary developments that provide background and context to the present study, and position the latter within current humanistic studies; (2) basic psychoanalytic theorizing of musical subjectivity and subject strategies; (3) elaboration of the subject-strategical, music-analytical methodology; and (4) an understanding of how music embodies subjectivity formation.
Chapter 1. Introduction

As stated above, the study most importantly interrelates the following disciplinary areas: psychoanalytic music research (including psychoanalytic music analysis); psychoanalytic criticism in general (on art and culture); psychoanalytic poststructural semiotics; musical semiotics; and postmodern music analysis. All of these fields overlap in many ways here.

In Chapter 4, *Music analysis, musical meaning, and subjectivity*, and Chapter 5, *Locating the subject (strategy) in music*, I outline a more specific methodological and theoretical framework that relies on concepts drawn from the various fields mentioned in the previous paragraph, by aligning a general psychoanalytic critique of art with postmodern music analysis. The latter refers to such areas as the “new musicology”, new hermeneutics, cultural, poststructural, gender-theoretical, and feminist music analysis, all of which have contributed to the study of subjectivity in music. Postmodern music analysis gives the present study a broad disciplinary framework that relates it to contemporary debates in current musicology. In Chapter 5, I explain how subjectivity in music is conceptualized here, and develop a semiotico-psychoanalytic theory and method for studying music as subjectivity.

Chapter 6, *The semiotic chora in musical experience, or, at the edge of sign system, meaning, and subjectivity*, presents a psychoanalytic theory of music as constructing the developing and divided subjectivity. Musical experience is described as being dominated by a powerful, nonlinguistic dimension and the unconscious modality of signification. Listener-and-music negotiations unfold along the lines of many binary oppositional processes: self/other, meaning/non-meaning, linguistic/nonlinguistic, symbolic/semiotic, conventional/subversive, psychical/bodily, and more. The domination of the nonlinguistic dimension in musical experience is seen as the basis for the capability of music to construct and function as an unsettled signifying process. This explains the effective functioning of music as a transitional site for primary subject formation.

In sum, Part II explores unsettled subjectivity in music at a general theoretical level. Together with Part I, it provides background and justification for the final, music-analytical part of the study.

Part III, *Analytical case studies of musical subject strategies*, demonstrates unsettled subjectivity in various musics by exploring their specific subject strategies. Musical styles and genres, ranging from Schubert to singer-songwriter k.d. lang, are analyzed according to the theoretical framework outlined in the previous parts. The focus thus is on musical rhetorics of subject strategies. The analyses cover Chapters 7 to 11, and Part III ends with a brief conclusion (Chap. 12).

The psychoanalytic theories used in the analyses vary according to the music and the interpretative scheme that seems to be called for. They draw from many paradigms of psychoanalysis, from early Freud to present-day developmental
The interpretation of musical subject strategies is carried out first and foremost psychoanalytically, but interpretative theories from neighboring fields are also applied, such as feminist theorizing, gender studies, and general semiotical theories. The theoretical spectrum thus opens even wider in this part of the study. The concepts and theoretical views introduced in Parts I and II gain specificity, as well as new dimensions, meanings, and applications, when brought into contact with specific musical material. The aim of the present research is not to construct a single, conflict-free theory, by which to analyze all the musics under study in a single manner, but rather to enable readers and listeners to experience different interpretative possibilities, which come to light on the multi-dimensional, overdetermined, and heterogeneous musical screen of the developing and divided subject. The connections between musical and theoretical (psychoanalytic) texts are reciprocal, and analyses of specific pieces of music open up broader speculative paths than were possible to describe in Parts I and II.

In the analyses, psychoanalytic interpretations are inseparably mixed with traditional means of music analysis and music research: analysis of pitch, harmony, rhythm, and formal design; semiotical analysis of musical “topics” and the like; historical information; and so on. This seemingly eclectic mix is required by the purposes of this study to demonstrate how music functions as a matrix of archaic subject formation, and to develop psychoanalytic music analysis. Therefore, the widening of the theoretical and interpretative spectrum takes various directions in the music-analytical part. I should re-emphasize that the analyses are not “total analyses”, meant to reveal the overall structural, formal, or other workings of composition. Rather, they are psychoanalytic interpretations within a framework designed to reveal certain psychoanalytic layers in the musical works studied, and to open up new ways of listening to the pieces, and of understanding their semantic and affective dimensions. In postmodern music analysis, even the smallest detail in the musical substance may provide the key to a new interpretation – to the act of listening. Theories of whatever kind, be they psychoanalytic, feminist, semiotical, or those of basic music theory, are also cultural horizons and the dialogical integration of methods may open up many different gates to the semantic fields of a work of music.

The expression “constructing subjectivities” refers to the connections between music and the basic psychical problematics of the subject, at various psycho-textual levels of the musical discourse; for instance, in the structures, in the enunciation, the enunciated, or in the modalization of music. The subject-strategical level in music is not unidimensional, but multi-layered. In more or less (un)conscious, in more or less effective, and in multi-layered and multideterminate ways, different musics may thematize the psychical and textual space.
Chapter 1. Introduction

of subject strategies. As is the case with musical narrativity, here, too, it is a question of communicative interplay between many musical levels of articulation, the combination of which contributes to the overall listening (identification, projection, transference) experience of music as a sonic self;\(^\text{16}\) as an auditory extension of subjectivity. Musico-psychical subjectivity is both “polyphonic” and “heterophonic”. In every part and in every chapter, the study focuses on the scene of the unsettled subjectivity at the center of musical representation.

1.3 The concept of “music”; justifying the music chosen for analysis

As to the music chosen for analysis in this study – how, specifically, is it “music”? What criteria guided the choice of the music examples analyzed in Part III? One’s concept of music ultimately derives from the music one listens to; so I will first reflect on my choices. These are as listed in chronological-historical order: Franz Schubert’s “Der Lindenbaum” (1827) from Winterreise (D. 911, No. 5); Frédéric Chopin’s Nocturne in C minor Op. 48 No. 1 (1841); Pyotr Il’yich Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 6, Pathétique, in B minor Op. 74 (1893); Jean Sibelius’s piano work, Kyllikki Op. 41 (1904); Pehr Henrik Nordgren’s TV-opera, Alex Op. 56 (1982–83/1986); and various songs by the singer-songwriter k.d. lang, recorded during the years 1984–1992.

Firstly, “music” refers here to the tradition of western art music, with the sole exception of the popular-music recording artist k.d. lang, whose music has been categorized variously as country, rock, pop, and alternative.\(^\text{17}\) This is the case when viewing music through the common categorizing lens of periods, styles, genres, and institutions, along with the ideological barriers inherent to these categories. More specifically, the music chosen for this study is that of Romantic and contemporary art music. The set of pieces is heterogeneous, and not only due to the choice of k.d. lang as an excursion out of the tradition of art music, but also because of the differing genres and the time span of over 150 years during which the examples of art music were produced. There is Romantic piano music; a lied representing music with lyrics; a symphony that marks the basic and most canonized genre in musicology; a TV-opera by a contemporary Finnish composer, representing the operatic genre (though a marginal and odd one) and

\(^{16}\) The term “sonic self” was coined by Cumming (2000).

\(^{17}\) Nevertheless, the case of k.d. lang is ambiguous, because her ethos and rhetoric of making music is multi-stylistic and multi-categorical, drawing on many sources, such as art music and performance art juxtaposed with popular culture (including musical “pop standards” and aspects of “retro”). Her early alternative, “avant-garde” country style is difficult to categorize, as is typical of postmodern music.
Subject Strategies in Music

contemporary music; and music by k.d. lang, a singer-songwriter whose music is a mixture of various popular genres. In this set, k.d. lang stands alone, not only in representing popular music, but also as music composed by a woman. This remark and choice of music, however, is not intended to “feminize” popular music (cf. Huyssen 1986).\(^{18}\)

The pieces analyzed include canonized, very well known works, which have been much discussed in musicological literature (Tchaikovsky’s *Pathétique*, Schubert’s “Der Lindenbaum”), as well as little-known works that have relatively no music-analytical reception history (Nordgren’s TV-opera *Alex*). Sibelius’s *Kyllikki*, for its part, represents a non-canonical, even denigrated composition by a canonized composer.\(^{19}\) Paradoxically, k.d. lang seems to be both canonized (to the point of being a cult figure) and marginal at the same time – depending on the social context in which she is viewed/heard.

Before thinking about what these musics have in common, let me first emphasize that the heterogeneity of the above repertory is purposeful. The examination of musico-textual strategies whereby the primary subjectivity is constantly reactivated\(^{20}\) is carried out in several different kinds of music and for several reasons. It is meant to demonstrate the flexibility and broad applicability of my approach to psychoanalytic music analysis, hence the need to test the method on a variety of musics. Moreover, different musics engender different psychoanalytic (subject strategy) possibilities, and different aspects (and shortcomings) of the developed theory and method. The chapters in Part III illuminate the formation of subjectivity from various points of view, not only because of the different musics analyzed, but also because the variety in music calls for variety in psychoanalytic theories, depending on historical, cultural, and philosophico-aesthetic contexts.

For example, in the analysis of Sibelius’s *Kyllikki* (Chap. 7), psychoanalytic theories of melancholia and separation (Freud, Kristeva, Lacan, Žižek, Agamben) are infused with feminism, gender-theory, and narratology (de Lauretis, Silverman). The examples of short Romantic pieces by Schubert and Chopin (Chap. 8) continue the discussion of the musical representation of melancholy and depres-

---

18 For the sake of gender equality, it might have been more equitable to add a piece or pieces of art music by female composers to the list of music to be analyzed; this became apparent too late in my research for it to be treated properly and at length. To do so, however, makes little difference, since gender is discussed here only in terms of the textual gender of a musical discourse.

19 Canonization is, however, not a simple matter, but has to do with issues of nationalism, universalism, ethno-centrism, and post-colonialism. Sibelius is overwhelmingly the most canonized composer in Finland, but in the broader, central-European context Sibelius may be considered as a peripheral composer, who worked outside the German-based canon of western art music (Tyrväinen 1995 and 1998; Tarasti 2001).

Chapter 1. Introduction

sion, adding to it accounts of psychoanalytic developmental theories of the early mother-infant dyad (Winnicott) and the notion of the acoustic mirror (Rosolato, Silverman, Schwarz). The discussion of Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 6 (Chap. 9) is rooted most strongly in Freud’s notion of the uncanny. The analysis of k.d. lang’s music (Chap. 10) concentrates mostly on the voice, and is constructed on theories concerning the mother-infant dyad and acoustic mirror, as well as Roland Barthes’s ideas about the role of the body in music. For the analysis of Nordgren’s TV-opera Alex (Chap. 11), I use an interpretative framework based almost exclusively on Lacan’s theories.

What, then, do these musics have in common? What ties them together? Although the starting point of my research is a theory of musical subject strategies, it is also possible to speak about music of absence, loss, and melancholy. This is the case not simply because there is a lot of melancholy in Romantic and contemporary music. Nor is it only because the representation of melancholy has been a traditional subject in western arts since the Renaissance, when it was viewed as an attribute of ingegno, and in Romanticism, as the most common subject position of an unrequited love relationship. Rather, it is because melancholy is an essential factor in the (Kristevan) psychoanalytic conception of a subject that is, in general, defined by divisions and losses. Melancholy is a central theme in psychoanalytic aesthetics and criticism (e.g., that of Melanie Klein, in addition to that of Kristeva), which arises from the unavoidable, primal object loss, and separation: subject formation takes place over the abyss of melancholy.

From a subject-strategical point of view, it is evident that all the pieces of music under discussion represent, in different ways, the construction of primary subjectivity, as seen against the psychical landscape of losses, divisions, melancholy, and alienation. Of course, that is how I, as researcher-subject, have experienced these works and have chosen to be engaged with them: there seem to be an infinite number of other possibilities, too, for the music of a vulnerable subject and melancholy is not rare in Romantic and contemporary music (in fact, just the opposite seems to be true). Accordingly, the musics have been chosen on the basis of their suitability as objects of the kind of psychoanalytic analysis employed in the present research. It may be that the music of Romanticism and thereafter, is especially apposite for the psychoanalytic, subject-strategical approach. If so, then we must ask, why do these musics of Romanticism and post-Romanticism represent the psychical landscape of unsettled subjectivity in such appealing, impressive, powerful ways?

As a first reply to this question, it could be pointed out that the music of Romanticism, especially late Romanticism and music of the early twentieth century (Expressionism, for example), is music of the “Freudian era”, by which we mean the world in which Freud lived and which was thus his object of study,
as well as the cultural context of his theories. It is more important, however, to understand Romanticism and its aesthetics as the ideological framework for how music started to be conceived generally as “music of the subject”. The arts and aesthetics have, since around the year 1800, served as an important site for exploring models of individuality and subjectivity (McClary 1994: 212; cf. also, Rosen 1995a: 72; Kramer 2002: 1). “[T]he publicly oriented priorities of the arts before 1800 or so tended to preclude personal expression as an artistic goal”, and indeed “it was around Schubert’s time that representations of ‘the self’ began to become prominent in the arts”, writes Susan McClary in her essay on the subjectivities in Schubert’s music (1994: 211). Music was produced “out of inner necessity” because there was no church or court to order it (Rosen 1995a: 72). This “rise of the subject” in artistic discourses coincides with the rise of the “uncovering psychology” that preceded psychoanalysis.

The turn in aesthetics towards an ideology of self-expression and psychological music is thus related to the new conception of (“art”) music as detached from the (previous) social and ritual functions that accompanied it up to the eighteenth century; later, music was intended for listening to and performing at home, in the salon, and concert hall, as an “art for its own sake” and as entertainment (Kramer 2002: 1). Romanticism inaugurated a music of the subject (the self, the individual). Composers and audiences came to understand music as a representation of self. It was a music of feelings, body, and desire – indeed, of subjectivity – and it could be understood that way “preconsciously”, that is, with or without our consciously noticing it to be so (cf. McClary 1994: 212). There arose an autonomy aesthetics, with its notion of the “music itself”, detached from social context (except this new social context of the concert and salon). This notion, somewhat paradoxically in regard to its modernist continuation, contributed to the birth of the music of self (of subject). This made musical discourse self-reflective, in a new way, and imbued with signs of estrangement and alienation; these signs are often related to rhetorics of melancholy, longing, and transcendence. As Charles Rosen (1995a: 78) writes, the emancipation of music from language and a social and religious context, and the new idea of the independence of a work of art, “may be legitimately thought of as a form of Romantic alienation”. This is why, for example, David Schwarz (1997a: 2) writes: “. . . much nineteenth-century classical music is about alterity” – it is because Romantic (and modern) subjectivity is about alterity. “Historically, the nineteenth century opens the space of modernism, and its music explores the epistemological doubt of the era” (ibid.). Extending this view, Raymond Monelle considers Beethoven as “the discoverer of ontological estrangement in music” (2000: 116). In Romantic music, the mar-
gins of subjectivity ("Romantic alienation") are as central a theme as gender and sexuality. Furthermore, the emancipation of music from language can also be taken to imply that, since its “liberation”, music has often been understood as a study of the relationship between the music and language.\textsuperscript{22}

As music of self and subjectivity, certain music from the era of Romanticism and thereafter, is especially suitable for studying musical subject strategies. This is because that music is widely understood as individualistic and subjectively expressive. This claim is not meant to evoke (psycho)biographical dimensions. On the contrary, my concern is the cultural expression and articulation of subjectivity, as formed in artistic discourses. Thus, I refer to music as a culturally shared and coded site for a discourse of self and subjectivity. The Romantic conception of art and artist triggered the rise of subjective expression in music as a style. “For the Romantic artist, self-expression is not self-serving or even personal; it often, indeed, entails a sacrifice of the self”, writes Rosen (1995a: 72). Signs of individuality, subjectivity, and self-reflection are cultural codes related to styles, genres, and ideologies. They are conventions within the social realm of signification (the Symbolic), and tell us that we are supposed to hear the music in question as “subjectively expressive”. In the psychoanalytic framework of the present research, my interest lies in the cultural specificity of how subject strategies take place and how (imagined) lost objects and other attributes of the subject are represented in musical discourse.\textsuperscript{23} In a study of music from other periods, or any music outside the genre of subjective music, the psychoanalytic research procedure would probably, at least in some senses, be different. This, however, must remain an issue for future research to sort out.

The music aesthetics of self and subjectivity continues in the post-Romantic and postmodern, contemporary musical spheres, as well as in popular music. k.d. lang’s \textit{Ingénue} album (1992), for example, addresses unrequited love and is imbued with melancholy (see Chap. 10). It is as much music of the subject as are Schubert’s lieder, and overall, the album even has much in common with the Romantic song cycle. Much of the music studied here represents intimate chamber music of the subject (brief piano pieces, lied, some pieces by k.d. lang), yet even the large orchestral works (Tchaikovsky and Nordgren) represent music of the individual self and subjectivity, rather than music of a collective, group, community, or nation. This music thematizes problems of subjectivity and, thus, the forces of the unconscious in subject formation. (Here we might even speak of subject[ive] as opposed to “object[ive]” or “collective” music.) As Lawrence

\textsuperscript{22} There were of course many conceptions of music in the aesthetically pluralistic age of Romanticism, such as “absolute” instrumental music alongside programme music, opera, lied, and the like.

\textsuperscript{23} Cf. Williams 2001: 72.
Kramer (1990: 26; referring to M. H. Abrams) writes, the subject-object polarity is a cardinal principle of Romantic culture, and relates to awareness of the self as subject, the intervention of reflection, and choice between instinct and action. I do not suggest that music could be categorized either as music of the self (subjective) or of a collective (objective), but only that some music is music-of-self *par excellence*. In fact, “object music” could be interpreted as an optional position for the Romantic subject or as an internal object of subject, and thus as a subject strategy. For example, an “objective” scherzo coming after a “subjective” slow moment in a symphonic work could be interpreted as a subject strategy of withdrawing, alienation, detachment, de-subjectivization, anti-subjectivity.

The foregoing aesthetic-historical reflections on the music analyzed here are not meant to ground the subject-strategical interpretations historically. The subject-strategical hearings of the works are not historical but psychoanalytic. The principal historical context in each analysis is not that in which the music was composed or first performed, but rather the music-analytical reception history, that is to say, the *interpretation history* of the work.

### 1.4 Earlier research on subjectivities in music; the semiotico psychoanalytic framework of the study

Subject and subjectivity in music have recently become an important theme in contemporary music analysis. On the postmodern music-analytical scene, it is argued that subjectivity is culturally constructed and that music actively participates in that construction (Kramer 1995: 21). Studies of musical constructions of subjectivity can be grounded in the various theories of subject advanced in critical and cultural theories, such as feminism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, and others. Precursors to postmodern music analysis of subjectivities can be most importantly found in earlier musical hermeneutics, musical semiotics, and psychoanalytic music research.

---

24 Romantic concertos, for example, thematize powerfully the subject/object dialectics.

25 Theodor W. Adorno’s writings (e.g., 1973 [1948]; see also, Williams 2001: 13–14) have proven to be an important influence on the view that music may deal with ideology, subject, and subjectivity, despite the fact that contemporary approaches differ significantly from Adorno’s in how the subjectivities are studied in music. It is noteworthy that Adorno used psychoanalytic vocabulary when discussing early modernism and Expressionism, which he relates to alienated modern subjectivity. Adorno compares Schoenberg’s atonal works to psychoanalytic case studies. According to him the transition from Romanticism to Schoenberg’s “modern” music meant that “passions are no longer simulated, but rather genuine emotions of the unconscious – of shock, of trauma – are registered without disguise through the medium of music”. (Adorno 1973 [1948]: 39.)
Chapter 1. Introduction

ities by musical means, such as tonality, harmony, timbre, rhythm, counterpoint, form, gestures, topics, tropes, narration, allusions, and other devices that create musical semantics. In this way, music appropriates, reinterprets, and contributes to the complex dynamics of culture (cf. Kramer 1990: xiii). Furthermore, when music is understood as a mixed medium, these workings are inseparable from various visual and literary devices of musical communication.

For this study, the most important models of postmodern music analysis are those provided by Lawrence Kramer and Susan McClary. Crucial to my research is Kramer’s (1990, 1995, 1998a, 1998b, and 2002) new-hermeneutic model, which puts the meaning of music and construction of musical subjectivity at the center in analyzing Romantic music; moreover, the model is flexible in its usage of interpretative and interdisciplinary theories in which psychoanalytic theories play a significant role. Feminist, gender-, and queer-musicological studies, studying gendered and sexual constructions of subjectivities in music, receive special emphasis here because of their huge impact on the study of constructions of subjectivity in music in general. Feminist and gender music analysis (e.g., McClary 1991, 1993, 1994, and 2000; Citron 1993 and 1994) have exemplified how to study musical constructions of subjectivity in general, including psychoanalytic subject formations. So, although gendered aspects of music are of secondary importance to the present research, the theoretical orientation of my study owes much to the pioneering work in musical subjectivity done by feminist and gender music analysis.

From previous psychoanalytic research on the subject in music, the most important music-analytical model for the present research is provided by David Schwarz (1997a). Also Naomi Cumming (1997a) importantly, although briefly, has developed a similar kind of poststructural, psychoanalytic music analysis, which focuses on the listening subject and subject positions. The approach developed here comes very close to that of Schwarz’s postmodern psychoanalytic music analysis, which is based on notions of developing subjectivity and the listening subject. However, certain differences could be pointed out. My study is explicitly, even programmatically, oriented toward musical semiotics, and it is also explicitly integrated into the long tradition of psychoanalytic music research. Schwarz’s work, though semiotically inflected, is more oriented toward combining new musicology with formal music theory (including Schenkerian analysis). Psychoanalytically, Schwarz’s approach is grounded in the Lacanian tradition (less than Kristeva) and on Slavoj Žižek’s model of Lacanian cultural criticism. The present research is grounded in Kristeva’s theories and eclectically on psychoanalytic object-relation and developmental theories.26 The differ-

26 My starting point is Kristeva’s theory of the subject, into which Lacan’s theories are incorporated.
ence in the conception of subject in Lacan’s and Kristeva’s theories is critical, especially when it comes to matters of pre-linguistic elements in subjectivity. Lacanian theory locates the birth of subjectivity solely in the acquisition of language, whereas Kristeva sees the logic of signification and thus the processes of subjectivity at work already in the pre-linguistic, semiotic body of the infant. According to Kristeva, this nonlinguistic element also plays an important role after the acquisition of language. This marks a theoretical difference between Schwarz’s notion of musical subjectivity and my own, but music-analytically it hardly makes any difference in the end. Schwarz does not go far in developing the notion of subjectivity as a music-analytical category, however, which stands in contrast with the present research, in which that category functions as the basic theoretical idea. Along with western art music, Schwarz also studies popular music, and so do I. The advantage of the psychoanalytic method is that it approaches both popular and art music in the same way: as sites of subjectivity. Indeed, the study of subjectivity and identity formation has been importantly developed in popular music studies, as well as film music research (e.g., Kassabian 2001, Flinn 1992, and Whiteley 2000).

In musical semiotics, subjectivity has been studied mainly in musical narratology and in postmodern semiotic approaches in which subjectivity is a central theme (e.g., Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 1997 and 2003a; Richardson 1999; Monelle 2000: 147–195; Tarasti 2002). Anne Sivuoja-Gunaratnam’s (1997 and 2003a) work on subjectivity in contemporary music, by combining semiotics, narratology, music analysis, and gender studies, has served as an important model that shows how to use subjectivity as a music-analytical category, and how to deal with this question at both levels of the musical sign. Although the significance of psychoanalytic theory to semiotics is immense, with psychoanalysis possibly even being regarded as a branch of semiotics, psychoanalytic theory has not had as much of an impact on musical semiotics as it has had, for example, on semiotical studies of film and literature. Thus, the latter kinds of study provide a point of departure for musical constructions of subjectivity.

Poststructural psychoanalytic semiotics in the present research emphasizes the following: (1) the centrality of psychoanalysis in semiotics, and (2) that “signification occurs only through discourse, that discourse requires a subject, and

27 This problematic term is discussed later, especially in Chap. 6.1.
28 As Silverman (1983: 130) writes, “both Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan have demonstrated that psychoanalysis is in effect a branch of semiotics.”
29 The impact of semio-feminist film studies has been crucial to musicological feminist and gender studies as well. For example, McClary’s (1991) theory of the construction of male subjectivity in sonata form is greatly indebted to Teresa de Lauretis’s (1984 and 1987) semiotical and narratological feminist theorizing. Here, also of interest are Catherine Clément’s (1999 [1979]) interpretations of opera.
Chapter 1. Introduction

that the subject itself is an effect of discourse” (Silverman 1983: vii). The post-structural semiotical orientation determines the focus on meaning and signifying processes in the psychic constitution of an individual. It also determines the basic terminology: for example, the primacy of such key concepts as signification, meaning, discourse, text, and subjectivity. Most significantly, it determines the dominant use of the concept of subject instead of those of human being, psyche, psychical apparatus, individual, ego, or self, which are favored in the traditions of id- and ego-psychology and object-relation theory. The use of the term subject emphasizes the subjection of the subject. In fact, the concept of the subject (subject) precisely points to a special relationship between psychoanalysis and semiotics. It emphasizes the individual’s subjection, in the maintenance of her self (her subjectivity), to the unconscious and to the sign system. It stresses the decisive role of the unconscious – the fact that the subject (individual/psyche/self) is subjected to the unconscious. As Silverman (1983: 130) writes, it also “helps us to conceive of human reality as a construction, as the product of signifying activities which are both culturally specific and generally unconscious”. Furthermore, it accentuates the instability and discontinuity of an individual, and the divisions that separate one area of psychic activity from another (ibid.). It also makes clear that the sign system – language and other signifying practices – can never fully afford what it promises to deliver: the fixed, permanent, and exhaustive union between signer and signified (cf. Wright 1999: 4).

As Silverman (1983: 126) notes, the concept of subjectivity marks a radical departure from the philosophical tradition “by giving a more central place to the unconscious and to cultural overdetermination than it does to consciousness”. According to poststructural and semiotical psychoanalysis, the subject and her experiences, her subjectivity, as the socio-cultural reality in general, are products of discursive activity. Signifying processes, in the making of meaning, always produce subject positions; whereas, on the other hand, signification can happen only as an act of a subject. In this sense, meaning and signification are as fundamental and central in psychoanalytic semiotics as intentionality is in phenomenology: they characterize the being, the psychical existence, the mind of the human subject. In terms of metapsychological orientation, this poststructural semiotical orientation of my study emphasizes Freud’s early topography (the division into the consciousness and unconscious as systems) over his later, tripartite model (id, ego, superego). In the concept of “subject” all the theoretical perspectives and disciplinary contexts of the research intersect. Hence “subject” also functions as an integrating concept.

As already pointed out, the primary focus of this study is on the listener that is hearing the cultural codes of music. By locating subjectivity in the listener and the musical discourse, this study differs critically from psychobiographical stud-
ies, as well as from those semiotical and gender-theoretical studies that deal with subjectivity in music as deriving from the composer. Nevertheless, in a theory grounded in the listener, the composer can also be considered as a listener to her own works and thus, above all, as a cultural coder of musical communication and subjectivity. I do not rule out the possibility of discussing subjectivity in music by relating it to the author – however, this question remains out of my textual approach. The present study focuses programmatically on the shared, inter-subjective level in the musical construction of subjectivity.

The larger question in the present research, that about musical signification, is semiotical in nature. However, the more specific questions, answers, and theorizing, are psychoanalytic. It is somewhat pointless to draw a dividing line between semiotics and psychoanalysis, because the target of the present research is an area that they share: the unconscious dimensions of musical signification. Meaning is central to both semiotics and psychoanalysis. It may be said that in the music analyses in this study, semiotics functions as the methodological mediator between psychoanalytic interpretations and descriptions of musical structure and substance.

1.5 Summary of theory and method

The analytic method developed in the present research draws most importantly from poststructural psychoanalytic semiotics, psychoanalytic criticism, and postmodern music analysis. Generally speaking, the theoretical-methodological framework consists of two levels: (1) the general theoretical level and (2) the music-analytical methodology. Both of these intertwined levels are based on poststructuralism, psychoanalysis, and semiotics. The first level refers to how music is understood and approached generally in the research. The second level refers more specifically to the musical substance, and to how the analyses and interpretations are carried out.

More specifically, the methodological basis for the music analyses is based on the following: musical semiotics, especially in its postmodern form; the “new hermeneutics” of music (as theorized most importantly by Lawrence Kramer); general psychoanalytic criticism of arts and culture as adopted to music analysis; psychoanalytic music analysis (such as that of David Schwarz); and traditional ways of analyzing musical structure, form, harmony, rhythm, styles and topics, genre, timbre and orchestration, among other musical parameters and qualities of musical substance.

Semiotics has several functions in this theoretical-methodological framework: (1) It supplies methodological tools for dealing with musical signification and meaning at the highest level of abstraction; (2) it provides concepts and
means for analyzing musical works; (3) and it serves as a mode of ideological critique and self-reflective practice. Moreover, semiotics implies (4) a certain research attitude in regard to the question of representation, meaning formation, and the workings of discourses in human culture. This has theoretical-methodological implications for my project: on the one hand, in regard to how the music is approached (see points 1 and 2, above); and on the other hand, for the way psychoanalysis is understood. In regards to the former implication, music is approached as a repository of cultural values and meanings. Music is a representational system of signs standing for ideas; it is a signifying practice and a medium through which ideas are represented and constructed in a culture. Musical works are not considered as reflecting socio-cultural reality, but instead, as partaking in the production, construction, shaping, and maintaining of that reality (the latter indicating our conceptions of “reality”). As to the second implication: in regard to psychoanalysis, a research orientation based on semiotics means that psychoanalysis is understood as a theory that outlines the fundamental problematics of subjectivity and signification from the point of view of the unconscious. In this perspective, psychoanalysis is implicitly a semiotical theory.

In this study, social/cultural constructivism is understood as complementing and further supporting the poststructural semiotico-psychoanalytic framework that theorizes meaning as arising in the construction of subjectivity. Both poststructural and constructivist approaches draw on post-Saussurean linguistics and can be seen as overlapping in their semiotical essence, either explicitly or implicitly. Constructivism advances arguments about representation and subjectivity in the social sciences and cultural studies, arguments similar to those of poststructuralism in art research and humanities, in the sense that both claim subject and meaning to be subjected to sign systems, socio-cultural practices, and discourses. Both of these two kinds of argumentation are adopted here, and both are filtered through a psychoanalytical-semiotical framework.

Psychoanalytic theory, as a theory of the unconscious workings of the human mind and its musical manifestations, has various functions in the present research. Generally speaking, psychoanalytic theory is understood as a branch of contemporary human sciences and most importantly as a theory of subject. Moreover, it is understood not only as a (continental-)philosophical and psychological theory, but more importantly as a semiotical theory. The semiotico-psychoanalytic theory, grounded in the theories of Freud, Kristeva, Lacan, and Silverman, among others, provides the larger framework for the conceptions of music and musical subject advanced here. This is the theoretical horizon into which all the psychoanalytic theories addressed in the present work are integrated. At the music-analytical level, psychoanalytic theory functions as a theory of interpretation unfolding to reveal the semantic dimensions of music. Hence,
when musico-textual strategies are interpreted as archaic psychic strategies of negotiating with unsettled subjectivity, psychoanalysis functions also as a hermeneutic theory.

Accordingly, in this study, psychoanalytic theory sheds light on the general question of musical signification, meaning and subjectivity, and it is a theory by which to analyze and interpret musical works. Finally, as does semiotics, it also functions meta-theoretically as a position from which to practice a postmodern critique of the theoretical and music-analytical procedures in musicology. In this way, psychoanalytic theory serves as both a self-reflective practice, and a method for the critique of ideology.
PART I:
ON PSYCHOANALYTIC MUSIC RESEARCH

If a few bars of music are played and someone comments that it is from Mozart’s Figaro (as happens in Don Giovanni) a number of recollections are roused in me all at once, none of which can enter my consciousness singly at the first moment. The key-phrase serves as a port of entry through which the whole network is simultaneously put in a state of excitation.

SIGMUND FREUD 1953 [1900]: 497
Chapter 2
On the relationship between psychoanalytic theory and musicology

This chapter outlines the field, scope, history, and basic ideas of psychoanalytic music research by scrutinizing the relationship between psychoanalytic theory and musicology, the emphasis being on music analysis and musical meaning.\(^1\) Because my research is grounded in poststructural semiotics, poststructural terms and concepts (such as subject, text, discourse, etc.) are privileged, even when the discussion is of non-poststructural paradigms.

Chapter 2.1 presents the field of psychoanalytic music research as encompassing two different traditions: applied psychoanalysis (as a field of psychoanalysis) and postmodern criticism in the humanities (as a field of current musicology). Chapter 2.2 discusses connections between psychoanalytic music research and current musicology, which are illustrated, as a case in point, in terms of the new-musicological Schubert debate that sprang up in the 1990s. A history of psychoanalytic music research is outlined as well. Chapter 2.3 continues general discussion of the field, the scope, and history of psychoanalytic music research, and the marginalization of psychoanalytic approaches in musicology.

\(^1\) Here, musicology refers broadly to all kinds of music research, including ethnomusicology, music history, music theory, popular music studies, and music analysis, among others. Music analysis is broadly understood as musicological study from a chosen theoretical perspective or system regarding structural details of specific works of music. Often the result is to valorise the music under analysis by linking interpretative schemata – be they formal, hermeneutic, critical, psychological, or other – to elements and processes in the musical substance by means of the chosen theoretical and music-analytical tools. Thus music analysis refers, on the one hand, to a sub-field of music research and, on the other hand and even more importantly, to a theoretical methodology exploited in various areas of music research. Thus, I understand music analysis to refer to a wider analytical and musicological practice than mere formal and structural analysis. The mode and field of music analysis represented in this study is generally hermeneutical, aiming at discovery and interpretation of the meanings of music. Music analysis also refers to music criticism that draws on theories of culture in addition to music-analytical methodologies.
2.1 Applied psychoanalysis, psychoanalytic criticism, music research

The history of psychoanalytic music research parallels that of general psychoanalytic criticism and the so-called “applied psychoanalysis”. In music research, however, the psychoanalytic approach has never gained the approval or status that it attained in literary studies, art history, film and other studies on visual culture. Psychoanalytic music research has been mostly practiced in the margins of musicology. It has been employed more in applied psychoanalysis and psychiatry than it has in musical academe. This situation has changed somewhat during the past twenty years. In that time, musicology, because of the changes imposed by its embrace of postmodern thought, has become more willing to adopt methodologies and critical theories established in other fields of humanities and social sciences, together with lifting the ban on the study of musical semantics. Especially in the 1990s, the atmosphere of poststructuralism and new musicology drastically improved the conditions and potential for psychoanalytic research in musicology.2

Psychoanalytic music research is a general designation for all kinds of research that in one way or another theorize relationships between music and psychoanalysis, regardless of the discipline in the name of which it is practiced, whether in, say, musicology or applied psychoanalysis. Applied psychoanalysis refers to the application of psychoanalytic theory to cultural and social phenomena, which, of course, lie outside medical and clinical frameworks. This area of psychoanalytic thinking has developed alongside clinical psychoanalytic thought since Freud inaugurated the field.3 The objects of applied psychoanalysis have

---

2 The term new musicology is used here quite pragmatically (rather than paradigmatically), as an umbrella term for diverse musicological studies drawing from various contemporary critical and cultural theories, and inaugurated most significantly in North America at the turn of the 1990s by feminist interpretations of canonical works of western art music. British-originated critical musicology, for its part, draws from contemporary critical and cultural theories as well, and is related more significantly to cultural studies, popular music research, sociology, and the negotiation between “low” and “high”. The cultural study of music (e.g., Clayton et al., eds. 2003) and current musicology (Williams 2001: ix) refers loosely to recent ethnomusicology and popular music studies as well as to the new musicology that focuses on western art music. Of even broader usage is the term contemporary musicology, which refers to all areas and subfields in present-day musicology. The most important claims of new musicology have gained wide acceptance in contemporary musicology (see, further, Greer et al., eds. 2000: 179–229; Scott 1998; Stock 1998; Treitler 1995; Agawu 1997; and Cook & Everist, eds. 1999).

3 Freud gave several definitions for psychoanalysis. In his “Two Encyclopaedia Articles” (1955d [1922/1923]: 235) he describes psychoanalysis as including: (1) a procedure for the investigation of mental processes that are otherwise inaccessible because they are
traditionally come from history, biography, literature, art, religion, mythology, and anthropology. This term is used in the Freudian psychoanalytic tradition. In the humanities, by contrast, psychoanalytic studies are often referred to as *psychoanalytic criticism*. The difference between the terms *applied psychoanalysis* and psychoanalytic criticism lies in their respective research emphasis and relationships with scientific and disciplinary histories, institutions, and practices. The term “applied psychoanalysis” originated in the field of psychoanalysis; “psychoanalytic criticism” refers to the humanities and social sciences. In these last two, the psychoanalytic method – detached from clinical theory and therapy – is one among many for studying cultural and social phenomena, such as art research. In this case, the starting point and the discipline that the research is supposed to contribute to, is a special field of humanities or social sciences. Roughly speaking, applied psychoanalysis is done by psychoanalysts, and psychoanalytic criticism by art researchers and cultural critics (of course, these two attitudes/positions/identities can mix together in the work of individuals; e.g., Julia Kristeva, Ernst Kris, and Anton Ehrenzweig).

The differentiation between applied psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic criticism is also a matter of history: psychoanalytic theory, emancipated from being the private property of medical science and psychiatry, and now a province of general interdisciplinary critique and cultural theory, began invading university faculties of humanities, especially departments of literature, in the 1960s in France and in the 1970s in the United States. (Psychoanalytic theory – especially its Lacanian form – has met with better reception in art research, linguistics, and philosophy than in psychology.) Psychoanalysis became a transdisciplinary theory concerning the unconscious of human beings and cultures. It also became an influential cultural phenomenon and agent in itself. Prior to the philosophic-linguistic turn in psychoanalytic theory and the conquest of human unconscious; (2) a therapeutic method (based upon that investigation) for the treatment of neurotic disorders; and (3) a collection of psychological knowledge that evolved into a new scientific discipline. The third category includes psychoanalytic studies of art and culture; Gay’s bibliographical essay (1988: 763–767) offers an exemplifying review of applied psychoanalysis.

4 In Anglo-American everyday speech, this difference may be expressed with the terms *clinician* and *academic* (“theorist”, usually a university researcher). We recall that the story of psychoanalysis in the USA differs from that in Europe. In Europe, e.g., in Germany and most notably in France (i.e., those countries that embrace the Freudian tradition), in the Freudian psychoanalytic movement, the so-called lay psychoanalysts (non-medical analysts, such as literary scholars), were accepted early on (from the 1920s onwards). Such was not the case in the USA, where psychoanalysts were required by law to earn the medical degree (MD) in addition to a degree in psychoanalysis (Rosen & Zickler 1996: 71–72).
ties departments, the psychoanalytic music research that took place is probably best conceived of as a kind of applied psychoanalysis. Properly speaking, psychoanalytic music criticism and musicology (such as new hermeneutics) did not significantly appear until the 1990s. The distinction between “applied psychoanalysis” and “psychoanalytic criticism” is not always workable, nor even possible. In my opinion, both the applied psychoanalysis of music and psychoanalytic music criticism together form the tradition of psychoanalytic music research (and music analysis). Yet, the difference may be important to keep in mind in deliberations about the nature of psychoanalytic music research, the potential of psychoanalytic music analysis, and the question of why psychoanalytic music research never developed as fully or strongly as did psychoanalytic studies of literature and visual culture. One can, for example, ponder if a certain psychoanalytic study on music is a matter of psychoanalysis making use of music or of musicology making use of psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis today stands as an important form of interdisciplinary critical theory alongside new/post-Marxism, semiotics, deconstruction, and feminism, among others. But it still simply means “psychoanalytic psychology” as well. It is also one of the most influential theories on the workings of the human mind and culture created in the last century: the Freudian unconscious with its drives, fantasies, slips, dream work, joke mechanism, Oedipus complex, and sublimation – all these, and more, operate almost axiomatically (or perhaps unconsciously) as “traditional” aspects of human behavior and culture in many fields of study. Psychoanalysis is an important factor in postmodern thought; poststructuralism is intimately related to psychoanalysis – for example, through Jacques Lacan’s notions of subject, language and signification, and via feminist readings of Lacan, or because of the psychoanalytic impulses in the Frankfurt School. Due

---

5 For example, some areas of systematic musicology (such as music therapy or education studies drawing on psychoanalysis) do not fit in the category of psychoanalytic criticism or applied psychoanalysis, but are certainly part of musicology and psychoanalytic music research. Our focus, here, however is music analysis.
7 Critical theory refers here quite loosely “to a whole range of theories which take a critical view of society and the human sciences or which seek to explain the emergence of their objects of knowledge” (Macey 2000: 74). This denotes the transdisciplinary critical theorizing that has occupied humanities and social sciences during the most recent decades. Such theorizing, sometimes referred to simply as “Theory”, engages socio-cultural phenomena to their full extent and focuses on the construction of socio-cultural meanings (for example, in art and aesthetics, alongside other cultural signifying practices). Evoked in its narrow sense only, it is referred to as “the Frankfurt school”.
8 The impact of psychoanalysis on feminist thought and gender studies is crucial, although the relationships of psychoanalysis and feminism are highly complicated; feminism has functioned both as the most acrimonious opponent of psychoanalysis and the most
to the influence of Lacan’s linguistic psychoanalysis, all poststructural thought bears the traces of psychoanalysis, including some modes of feminism, even in the mode of negative criticism or rejection. This is why psychoanalysis, with its theories claiming the centrality of the unconscious and sexuality to subjectivity, permeates different kinds of postmodern music research, even when such research fails to recognize it. Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, psychoanalytic currents are taking new directions in the pluralistic stream of today’s musicology, with renewed force, and under many rubrics.

In the relationship between psychoanalytic theory and musicology, the object of study presents two sides for investigation: (1) the role and importance of psychoanalytic thinking in musicology; and conversely, (2) the role and importance of music in psychoanalytic thinking and psychoanalytic criticism. These two aspects intertwine in complex ways. It is problematic to talk about “psychoanalytic music research” in the singular, since it divides, for example, into applied psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic criticism, as noted above. Also, different traditions of psychoanalytic music research do not necessarily communicate with each other; different paradigms of psychoanalytic criticism, too, often pay little attention to each other (e.g., ego-psychology and Lacanian psychoanalysis). Psychoanalytic art research in the humanities most often means Lacanian criticism; in music research, also, it forms a separate tradition and scientific continuum that differs from Freudian research. The latter primarily studies music and other arts from ego-psychological and object-relation theoretical perspectives in the field of applied psychoanalysis; such research is published and discussed mainly in and by the (medical/psychological) psychoanalytic community. Interaction between these two has been slight. Moreover, in academic musicology, “psychoanalysis” is not monolithic: for example, in interpreting the semantics of musical (cultural) texts, psychoanalysis plays a different role than it does, say, as a background theory for psychodynamic music therapy.

Psychoanalytic music research is disconnected, dispersed, and discontinuous – Pinchas Noy (1966: 126) was complaining about this nearly four decades ago. Yet, it is, nevertheless, both meaningful and necessary to try to delimit the field or space of psychoanalytic music research. It is needed, among other reasons,
simply because of the lack of critical-historical surveys carried out in the field of musicology, as well as general presentations on psychoanalytic music research. Noy’s series of articles (Noy 1966 and 1967a–d), though almost forty years old, might still be the broadest and most profound historical and thematic presentation on psychoanalytic music research, even though its scope reaches only to the 1960s. The problem of psychoanalytic music research is not that it has been practiced very little, but rather that its practice as such has not been identified in musicology. It has not been really recognized and legitimized as a field of research, approach, and orientation of its own. Psychoanalytic music research has not been made visible. To use the jargon, the identity process – the interactive mirroring phase in which the approving and integrative gaze of the Mother musicology, as well as the symbolic affirmation in the name of the Father musicology – remains largely unaccomplished.

2.2 Some starting points, beginnings, and debates in psychoanalytic music research

Psychoanalytic music research is not monolithic, but consists of many different possibilities of using psychoanalytic theory and knowledge in understanding musical phenomena. Still, psychoanalytic music research always means, first and foremost, that the object of the study is understood as a problematic of the unconscious. Music is studied as psychic work significantly formed by the unconscious. Music’s textual mechanisms are outlined as analogous to the operative mechanisms of the human psyche. The musical text is considered and listened to (read) as psyche, and psyche as musical text. The subject, in psychoanalytic discourse, always means a subject-in-process/on-trial, and thus one of a developing and divided subjectivity. Hence the latter manifests as a fragmentary collection of texts and discursive activities. (Cf. Wright 1998: 5, 99, 120.)

Accordingly, the objects of psychoanalytic music research are not predetermined, but the way of approaching and treating them is. Psychoanalytic theories based on Freud’s work always concern, in one way or another, the subjectivity of the human being as constructed crucially by the effects of the unconscious, sexuality, and repression. This provides a certain view of the functions, significance, and meanings of music for subject and society. Essential questions include the following: What kind of meanings do subjects and communities attach to music unconsciously? How much, and to what extent, does musical signification happen unconsciously? How does the unconscious work and become manifest in a certain piece of music? How are basic human needs and desires represented and constructed in, with and by music? What kind of forms can sexuality take in music? What is repressed in music – and in musicology?
Psychoanalysis has been called a psychology of desire (Fr. désir, Ger. Wunsch/Lust/Begierde): it studies the rhetoric or semantics of desire, i.e., the relations between the desire and sign system (cf. Ricoeur 1970: 5–7). In this view, a drive-based impulse derives from the corporeality of the human being, that is, from the essential needs of the body required for maintaining life (anaclitic needs), receives a psychical representation when orienting itself towards the outside world, to the social sphere, and thus is transformed into discourse. This happens for two basic reasons: (1) firstly, to satisfy these needs; (2) and secondly, so as to maintain a sense of self and of its continuation (subjectivity) (J. Välimäki 1996: 121–122). We may say that the disguised manifestations of this desiring in music are the object of psychoanalytic music research.¹⁰

In contemporary musicology it is often emphasized that we produce, shape, and maintain our selfhood, identity, and sexuality (subjectivity) through music (and musicology) – the personal as well as social-cultural (group) identities, and the cultural conventions and ideas concerning them. The message of postmodern music research – that music is imbued with socio-cultural and sexual meanings – was nothing new to the psychoanalytically-oriented music scholar. Connections between music and sexuality have always been a central topic in psychoanalytic music research, from the very beginning of early id-psychology during the first half of the last century. In the 1910s–1920s, for instance, psychoanalytic journals carried discussions about music as a constructor of sexual tensions (e.g., Pfeifer 1922 and 1923; van der Chijs 1923;¹¹ see also, Noy 1966: 129–130; and Wintle 2003: xiv–xv). From the psychoanalytic perspective, sexuality is already an essential factor in all artistic work because of the theory of sublimation that Freud linked significantly to art. Early id-psychological studies of music, prior to the era of postmodern psychoanalytic criticism, took great interest in sublimation, castration, phallus, homosexuality, and so on. Those studies resemble in many ways the new-musicological research that theorizes linkages between

---

¹⁰ “Music” here refers to any musical activity or practice related to music, whether it is playing, listening, composing, dancing, organizing a festival, writing about music, buying records, going to a concert, writing a musicological dissertation, and so forth. As pertaining to the main focus of this study, and thus of psychoanalytic music criticism, music is understood as the textual processes of musical works, and thus refers mainly to compositions and how they are heard.

¹¹ Pfeifer (1922 and 1923) does not discuss specific types of music or compositions, but in using libido theory psychologizes the Darwinistic biological-evolutionary conception of the fundamental significance of music in the life of a human being. The musicological contribution may be scant, but as a matter of curiosity, and from the point of view of the history of psychoanalytic music research, Pfeifer’s thoughts are an interesting phenomenon. Van der Chijs (1923) analyses compositions by two patients of his, and links unisons to the (musical) expression of “union in love”, and in some places, of homosexuality.
music and sexuality. It is not only a question of similar thematics, but also of similar epistemological problems and the pitfalls of overshooting. Both have received negative and distressed reactions from the more conservative music scholars.¹²

One of the most heated debates revolving around the new musicology has concerned precisely the connections between music and sexuality, in particular the question of the significance of the sexual orientation of the composer, its effect on her output, and its relevance in terms of reception and research. A constant point of reference in this debate was an essay written by Maynard Solomon, a representative of psychoanalytic music research (thus, not actually the new musicology), entitled “Franz Schubert and the Peacocks of Benvenuto Cellini” (Solomon 1989) in the journal Nineteenth-Century Music. Solomon is one, and likely the best known, of those rare and prominent musicologists who were carrying out psychoanalytic music research in the academic world before the new-musicological paradigm came along.¹³ In the essay mentioned above, Solomon considers the possibility of Schubert being a homosexual composer. Many of his arguments offered in that essay, Solomon had already formulated in an earlier article in American Imago¹⁴ (Solomon 1981), which received no attention from musicologists (as is typical for psychoanalytic studies on music published outside the institutionally musicological sphere). The earlier article (1981) is written from a strictly psychoanalytic point of view. In the later article (1989), which received wider attention and publicity, Solomon interprets the matter in the light of biographical facts, the history of homosexuality, and social history in general. Concentrating on the life of Schubert and his close male esthete friends, Solomon interprets, for example, the imagery of their special language and other secret-society habits and behaviors, as typical of the metropolitan (Bohemian) homosexual subculture of the time. According to Solomon, this subculture had to be at least somewhat concealed due to legal regulations that prohibited pederasty.

¹² In a critique in the New York Times Review of Books, Charles Rosen (1994: §3) pays passing attention to psychoanalytic music research as one forerunner of Anglo-American new musicology: “Both gender and gay studies have happily insinuated themselves into the vacuum left by the disappearance of Marxist and Freudian criticism; we should be thankful that they are trying to salvage what is most stimulating and valuable in those fields.” What was, however, truly new in the feminist and gender-theoretical musicological studies, compared to the earlier (e.g., psychoanalytic) hermeneutics, was that gender was taken systematically as an analytic category (as Anne Sivuoha-Gunaratnam put it, in a private communication).

¹³ Solomon has published influential and debate-provoking psychoanalytic studies on composers of the classical period (Mozart, Schubert, Beethoven) since the 1970s.

¹⁴ American Imago is a journal for psychoanalytic studies of culture founded by Freud and Hans Sachs in 1939 as a sequel to the earlier German Imago.
Chapter 2. Psychoanalytic theory and musicology

But on the other hand, ways of disguising one’s activities created very recognizable signs, codes, and practices of a homosexual culture. Solomon’s critics have argued that a non-homosexual interpretation is possible on the basis of the very same documents. Solomon (1989: 205) himself does not deny this possibility. For different interpretations are not necessary mutually exclusive – especially in the postmodern perspective – and also generally, can we not, in the name of mult-determination, tolerate the meaningfulness and appositeness of various different interpretations simultaneously? Solomon (1989: 203) himself pays attention to the possible margin of error in his research, and thinks over other possibilities of interpreting the descriptions of Schubert’s “deviating” and “immoral” sexual habits given by the composer’s contemporaries. On the other hand, he pays attention to the strong need in some of Schubert’s biographers to prove, despite the lack of documents, the “heterosexuality” of the composer – from psychoanalytic thought we have learned that often it is the most eager defense that comes to reveal just the opposite in its anxious effort to hide things.

Although Solomon (1989) connects Schubert’s sexuality to his musical creativity, this is confined to a general psychological level; Solomon is not studying Schubert’s music, but only his biography. According to Solomon (1993: 45–46; cf. also, 1989: 206), it is self-evident that in general a composer and her music cannot be defined and restricted by her sexuality, for homo/bi/heterosexuality is not something fixed – despite the fact that there exist correlations between music and sexuality, as there exist correlations between music and other aspects of personality too, about which interpretations can be suggested when one is examining the music. In any case, Schubert became a central composer around whom the issue of sexuality in music, especially the relationship of composer’s sexual orientation to her musical output (an interest triggered by the new musicology),

---

15 For instance according to Eero Tarasti (private communication), Schubert was forced to escape the police because of political reasons, which is why the composer was doomed to a life style of secrecy and hiding. About the Schubert debate, see, e.g., Nineteenth-Century Music No. 17 (1), 1993, where stands were taken (Kramer serving as editor in chief); Solomon again (1993), Kofi Agawu, David Gramit, Rita Steblin, and McClary; see also, Brett 1997.
16 This psychoanalytic concept is clarified below; see p. 35.
17 According to Solomon (1993: 37) it is important to understand that in Schubert’s Vienna, using the services of female prostitutes was not generally considered morally despicable, which may lead us to conclude that accounts of Schubert’s “immoral” sexual behavior might refer to something other.
18 In Lacan’s (1953: 11) words: “We have learned to be quite sure that when someone says ’it is not so’ it is because it is so.”
19 Cf. also, trans/inter-sexualities.
was discussed in the 1990’s and thereafter.20

In that discussion are several elements familiar from psychoanalytic art research during the last hundred years. Heated debate, resistance, and critique were also provoked by the feminist and gender-theoretical discussions made by Susan McClary (e.g., 1993) about Schubert’s sexuality, which also extended into his compositions. Later on, various gender and gay critical studies have appeared (e.g., Brett 1997). Lawrence Kramer’s (1998b) study casts Lacanian and new-hermeneutic light on sexual and gendered topics, homoerotic musical imagery, and figuration of the feminine that characterizes Schubert’s music, as an alternative to the stereotypical, middle-class masculinity. The psychoanalytic studies of Solomon and Kramer, from a certain point of view, are fundamentally different in type – yet, they can be read as complementary as well: where Solomon psychoanalyses the author, Kramer studies compositions as cultural texts (though considering biographical aspects, too). In general, psychoanalysing the author has been the most typical mode of research in the tradition of applied psychoanalysis and classic Freudian criticism (id-psychology); whereas studies of musical texts as cultural articulations (without claims concerning the author) appear in the tradition of musicological psychoanalytic criticism along the lines of poststructural psychoanalytic criticism.

Although the conception of connections between music and sexuality was nothing new to a psychoanalytic music researcher, something else truly was, and made her ears burn. Following the impact of the postmodern project on musicology, the psychoanalytically oriented music scholar was no longer necessarily or completely marginalized: she was moving towards the centre, or that was now at least possible, because of the new paradigm of new musicology that came into fashion.

Nowadays, there is much musicological discussion of subjectivity and sexuality, and of music as a way of conveying central human feelings and constructing social meanings. Psychoanalytic research in this area centers on the unconscious dimensions of subject and signification: the psychic realm of desire, wishes, fantasies, and dreams concealed from our consciousness. Consideration is also extended to nonlinguistic and preverbal articulative spheres of subject and human existence, dedicated to potentially endless multi-significance and ambiguity, heterogeneity of meaning, and “to set free the interplay of references between signs” (Ricoeur 1970: 177). The heterogeneity of signification and resulting multi-significance are consequences of unconscious processes that operate in every act of signification. In psychoanalytic theory, it applies, at the

20 As early as 1915, E. Hitschmann wrote a psychoanalytic pathography of Schubert based on Oedipal thematics (“Franz Schubert, Schmerz und Liebe” in International Zei- tung für Psychoanalyse 3; see Noy 1966: 130; 1967d: 123).
same time, to the fertile, more bodily-related foil of signification and subjectivity. Behind a manifest established meaning lies the undermining and heterogeneous polyvalence of the unconscious. In other words, the inescapable heterogeneity of meanings follows from the subject’s split into conscious and unconscious (manifest and latent) and is related to Freud’s concept of multidetermination.21

According to the latter principle, all human behavior and psychic phenomena (including musical phenomena) are, due to the impact of the unconscious, multiply motivated and endless, ambiguous, multi-signifying, multi-analyzable, and multi-interpretable. As Freud (1953 [1900]: 279) said that the degree of semantic density in dreams is indefinable such that a dream admits several, even infinite interpretations, likewise does music become manifest as multiply analyzable in psychoanalytic music research. Such research seconds the common view in current musicology (influenced by deconstruction, which, for its part, is influenced by psychoanalysis) about the mobility of musical meanings and the possibility of analyzing musical works in many different ways, none of which is exhaustive, final, ultimate, or more privileged than the other.

During the century-long history of psychoanalytic music research, it has been said many times that the nonverbal nature of music makes it especially open to easy and powerful connections with the unconscious and nonlinguistic sphere of subject. This, in turn, has been identified as the basis for the therapeutic potential of music: music is flexible and permissive, admitting many projections of meanings and content. Furthermore, psychoanalytic music research, as does all psychoanalysis, attempts to account for the heterogeneous, “inexpressible”, and “unattainable” mode of being, which diverges from linguistic-conceptual consciousness and rationality. It tries also to describe those parts of our being that are not rendered as representations (for instance, Lacan’s notion of the real). This makes us confront the limits of our thinking and the musical representations of those limits; and to confront music as a romantic – hopeless but enjoyable and nostalgic – effort to escape from the conceptual gaol of representation, mediated-ness (mediality), and absence (alienation).

Max Graf (1873–1958), a Viennese musicologist and critic who belonged to Freud’s immediate circle, is regarded as an important pioneer of psychoanalytic music research (e.g., Abrams 1993; Chumaceiro 1993; Feder et al. 1990: x). Besides Graf, the original members of Freud’s Wednesday gatherings (1901–1908), originally very interdisciplinary in nature, included two other music scholars: teacher of music aesthetics Leher and music critic David Josef Bach. Graf developed psychoanalytic music research by writing on the matter. The very first psychoanalytic studies of music may be his studies published in the years 1906–1911, which he claims to have written under such close supervision of

21 *Multiple determination* is often rendered as *overdetermination.*
Freud that it would be difficult, in those texts, to separate his own thoughts from those of Freud’s. These studies include, for example, “Richard Wagner und das dramatische Schaffen” (1906), “Probleme des dramatischen Shaffens” (1907), and “Richard Wagner im Fliegenden Holländer: Ein Beitrag zur Psychologie künstlerischen Shaffens” (1911).22 (Abrams 1993: 283–287, 304; Chumaceiro 1993: 258; see also, Graf 1942: 470.) The first well-known representative of psychoanalytic music research was thus a musicologist and not a psychoanalyst.23 Graf (see Abrams 1993: 285) actually even tried to make Freud and other psychoanalysts see ways of approaching art and artistic creativity other than that of traditional pathography. The best known of Graf’s studies comes from years later, and is his From Beethoven to Shostakovich: The Psychology of the Composing Process (1947). It is based on a book he had published already in 1910, Die innere Werkstatt des Musikers24, which may be the first ever book to repre-

---

22 Texts in order of publication: (1) Österreichische Rundschau 9 (1906): 111–121; (2) Österreichische Rundschau 10 (1907): 326–337; (3) Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde 9 (Vienna: Franz Deutike, 1911 [new printing Nandeln/Liechtenstein: Kraus 1970]. (For more about these essays, see Abrams 1993 and Chumaceiro 1993.)

23 As a matter of curiosity relating to women’s studies of music, we note that Graf’s doctoral dissertation of 1896 concerned women’s music during the Renaissance (Die Musik der Frau in der Renaissancezeit), later published in 1905, as Die Musik in Zeitalter der Renaissance (Chumaceiro 1993: 259). Interesting for historians is the fact that Graf’s son, opera director Herbert Graf (1903–1973), is known in the history of psychoanalysis as “Little Hans”, the case about which Freud wrote his Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy (1955c [1909]) on the basis of Max Graf’s report and thus in a way as much written by the boy’s father as by Freud. Max Graf became interested in psychoanalysis through his first wife who had been Freud’s patient (Graf 1942: 467). She, the mother of “Little Hans”, was actress Olga König (König-Graf) (see Roudinesco & Plon 1997: 393–394; I am grateful to Markus Lång for this information). (On Herbert Graf’s recollections of the first child analysis in the history of psychoanalysis, and on his father as well, see Rizzo 1972: 25–26.)

24 Stuttgart: Verlag von Ferdinand Enke, 1910. Graf examines music composition in the light of Freud’s first topography (cf. pp. 71–74, Chap. 3.3) and considers it to consist of three stages of construction: (1) preliminary work done by the unconscious; (2) the collaborative work of the consciousness and the unconscious (such as preconscious sketchings and the like); (3) the final, conscious refining of the form (1947: 80). Graf studied these overlapping stages in the creative activity of individual composers, by examining how composers released the powers of the unconscious and struggled against repression. This struggle can go in, for example, notebooks: the greater the amount of used notebooks, the stronger the repression – of which Beethoven is an excellent example (ibid.: 280). Graf traced evidence from the first unconscious stage by sketching out – on the basis of historical documents, biographical data, and psychoanalytic knowledge – the role and significance that drives, psychic conflicts, and complexes, early childhood memories, and inner and outer experiences could have played in the composer’s creativity.
sent psychoanalytic music research.25

Graf’s early writings contain many basic premises of later psychoanalytic music research. For example: (1) music provides efficient contact with the unconscious; (2) music affects all parts of the personality, both conscious and unconscious; (3) listening to music provides narcissistic reinforcement and is experienced as revivification; (4) making music (for example, composing) may function as the processing of personal, unconscious conflicts; (5) repetition compulsion, identification, early object losses and grief-work, mother fixation, and fantasies of youth are of significant importance in artistic creation and music making; (6) dream mechanisms (primary process) are important regulating, organizing, and ordering operations in music; (7) the composing process should not be viewed pathographically, but as the liberation of unconscious resources. (See Abrams 1993: 289–290, 304; Feder et al. 1990: x–xi; cf. also, Graf 1942: 471.)

The 1910s–30s witnessed remarkable growth in psychoanalytic music literature, chiefly as a result of a booming psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic journals in Germany and France from that time contain a surprisingly large and varied body of psychoanalytic studies on music.26 Most cases deal with the life of composers or, cast in a psychoanalytic light the significance of music for individuals and humanity at large. Until the 1950s, and up to the arrival of ego-psychology, the main theme of psychoanalytic music research was the understanding of music as a highly regressive experience; the pleasure and satisfaction aroused by music are considered to originate from a regression to experiences connected to early developmental stages of the psyche, which predate the establishment of the borders of ego and the separation of inner and outer worlds. Music is studied in the light of concepts including sublimation, autoeroticism, narcissistic pleasure, dream work, drive, and so forth. At the same time, music is believed to shelter the subject against a threatening, massive regression. Indeed, the peculiarity of music is understood to lie in its embodiment of both “deep” regression and “higher”, “synthetic” operations of ego at one and the same time (Sterba 1965: 111; also, Feder et al. 1990: xii–xiii). The difference between this view and later trends in psychoanalytic criticism does not hinge on the relevance and role of earlier developmental stages in musical experience. Rather, the difference is, on the one hand, that this would not necessarily mean just regression and, on the other hand, in later claims regarding psychobiographical accounts of music, i.e., the development of non-biographical approaches has been regarded as an important goal.

25 Graf himself said that, as early as his Wagner book of 1900 (Wagner Probleme und andere Studien), he was writing “under Freud’s influence” (see Abrams 1993: 284). In that book, however, the Freudian influence is not yet visible to the reader.
26 For bibliographies of psychoanalytic music studies from 1910–50, see Noy 1967d: 122–125; 1966: 129–133; Sterba 1965; Michel 1951: 17, 231–244.
Psychoanalytic theories have been applied to the study of culture and arts throughout the history of psychoanalysis. Often, when a new psychoanalytic theory is invented, it is soon applied to art research. Psychoanalytic art research, especially of literature and film since the 1960s–70s, has developed innovative methods for its own purposes and has influenced cultural criticism in general, which clearly indicates the change in emphasis from applied psychoanalysis to psychoanalytic criticism. This development has had an impact on general psychoanalysis as well, especially certain trends in French and feminist psychoanalysis. Along with Lacan-driven poststructuralism and deconstruction, psychoanalysis itself has been subjected to literary critique, for the tricks of the unconscious are working in all texts and thus in psychoanalytic literature also.

As already noted, university departments of music, musicology, and music history have largely shunned psychoanalytic methods, which have not obtained as established a position in music curricula as they have in departments of literature and visual culture. Correspondingly, music has not been the chief concern among psychoanalysts and psychoanalytic theorists of arts and culture. Music research lacks classics of psychoanalytic interpretations on a par with Freud’s Leonardo, Michelangelo, Dostoyevsky, Hoffmann, and Gradiva analyses, and Lacan’s Poe or Antigone analyses, to name but a few; such classics could have sparked and sustained a research tradition. If Freud had written even a tiny study on Mozart or Wagner, would a closer relationship between music research and psychoanalysis have developed?

Music has been discriminated against in psychoanalytic criticism – to judge from comparison with psychoanalytic approaches found in the vast amount of pages addressing literature and visual arts by notable psychoanalysts, philosophers, semioticians, and art researchers. This tradition starts with Freud and is still alive, for example, in current psychoanalytic philosophy and semiotics. This can be seen as one expression of the visual sphere predominating over the auditory sphere. The auditory mode of being in subject’s life – and the auditory sphere of human existence in general – has received little attention. Freud and Lacan, for instance, concentrate almost exclusively on the role of visual and verbal imagination in psychic life. The auditory and sonorous dimensions of dream symbolization (this being the central object of psychoanalysis), for

---

27 Noy was already complaining about the matter nearly forty years ago (1966: 126).
instance, have not received much attention. Yet should not audiophilia be placed, at least, on a par with scopophilia? It is telling that the most profound psychoanalytic insights into the auditory realm of the subject have developed in film studies (e.g., Silverman 1988) rather than in musicology—28—and all this despite the fact that Freud discovered *a new way of listening. 29*

Stuart Feder (1993a: 15; see also, Stein 1999: 396) states that the visual bias of psychoanalysis may be one reason why sensible psychoanalytic approaches to music have gone underdeveloped. More often, however, the reason has been thought to lie in the supposed “nature” of music, which, considered in its non-verbal, temporal, and abstract essence, is adjudged non-representational (non-figurative). According to Richard Sterba (1965: 97; see also, Feder et al. 1990: xii), it is a matter of “difficulties inherent in a psychoanalytic study of music”: the familiar and crucial psychoanalytic categories of manifest (conscious) versus latent (unconscious) content “cannot be applied in the realm of music, where the work of art is not a copy of reality”. This kind of thinking holds the position that, in music, unambiguous meanings of the manifest (pheno)level cannot be named directly, as can the denotations of natural (verbal) language. From this, the judgment has been made that, in music, there is nothing behind which to look for latent (hidden) meanings, the revealing thematics cherished by psychoanalysis.

Pinchas Noy (1993: 125–126; see also, Stein 1999) criticizes psychoanalytic criticism for being too stuck on the archaeological model of revealing thematics, i.e., an interpretative reconstruction of hidden narrative. Contrary to what one might expect from a psychoanalyst, Noy’s critique does not target the conception of music as abstract, non-representative (non-figurative), and lacking in contents (semantics, meanings), and the unconscious motives and psychodynamics inherent in this conception. This is because Noy represents an ego-psychology tradition of music research, which is colored by modernist aesthetics. According to the latter, psychoanalytic music research should turn its ears to the formal aspects of music about which psychoanalysis, according to Noy, has been unable to say anything pertinent before the advent of ego-psychology. Noy writes: “form too

---

28 Here we may also see why research on opera has been much more open to psychoanalysis than have the other genres of music. This is true because the strong visual and verbal dimensions in opera make plain the semantics of the work; moreover, opera research, especially in the wake of feminist thought in musicology, has drawn much inspiration and methodology from film studies, a field pervaded by psychoanalytic, feminist, and semioti- cal theorizing. Of course, the same situation holds in film-music studies.

may represent in some cases an unconscious content” (1993: 126). Still, his suggestion to focus on musical forms as unconscious contents does not mean to examine specific works of music; Noy’s studies stay at the general music-psychological level. Most often Noy contemplates musicality, creativity, and the emotional effects of music from a psychodynamic perspective and at a very general level. A sympathizer with Susanne Langer and Carroll Pratt’s isomorphism theory, Noy sees music as conveying operational structures of psychical processes, but not specific contents that can be identified and named. We see that the modernist notion of “form-as-content” does not get us very far in psychoanalytic music analysis.

More interestingly, Noy earlier identified a latent disciplinary resistance to psychoanalytic music studies as one reason for the lack of psychoanalytic engagements with music (1966: 127). Noy refers to Kleinian psychoanalyst Heinrich Racker (1951), who attributed – as new musicologists decades later did – the neglect of music in psychoanalytic literature to “an unconscious resistance inherent in the emotional quality of the effect of music”.

Ego-psychological music research has often accepted the modernist ideology of music as non-figurative and non-representative. This idea of “absolute music” sprang from and extended one strand of the heterogeneous Romantic aesthetics; the aesthetics of autonomy opposed programme music, literary subjects, and the socio-cultural use of music. This is not a question of ideology as related to psychoanalytic or ego-psychological thinking, but as related to modernist aesthetics, musicology, and music philosophy, which, in psychoanalytic jargon, have remained in “denial” of musical semantics. The popularity of the ego-psychological perspective in psychoanalytic music research (cf., e.g., Feder et al., eds. 1990 and 1993) might partly be explained by the fact that, of all the paradigms of psychoanalysis, it fits most snugly – both historically and ideologically – with the modernist ideals of abstract “Art” and “Form”. We may ask if both ego-psychology and modernist aesthetics are indulging in the kind of repression that robs music of semantics and thus sexuality, affects, emotions, and other aspects of the unconscious. This matter is paradoxical, in the sense that one would expect that psychoanalysts, in particular, would stop to reflect on the dominant opinion that music is non-figurative and non-representative in nature, and to inquire into the unconscious intention that this ideology satisfies. Why, for instance, has

30 Ego-psychology is explained in more detail in Chap. 3.4.2.
31 There are many kinds of ego-psychology. The significant anthologies of Feder et al. (eds.) 1990 and 1993 are related to a research circle in the American Psychoanalytic Association, called Psychoanalytic Perspectives in Music, and to the Music and Mind project (see http://www.mindandmusic.org [18.5.2005]).
modern(ist) music analysis and theory excluded the semantics of music? What repression is in question here? Do semantics, iconography, and symbolism of music threaten anyone or anything?

From the point of view of psychoanalytic semiotics, all meaning systems have content for no discourse can be produced without signification and subject. But certainly a naïve concept of content or meaning has to be rejected – as arduously argued in general semiotics during the last two decades. Unquestionably there are different modes and levels of articulation in musical discourse, but all of these articulations are understood together as music only because of the system of musical signs as cultural practice with that system’s conventions and codes. This means that modernist ideas of non-representativeness, lack of content, and “Art as Form” have to be represented (transmitted) in modernist (“abstract”) works of art in order for these works to be received or understood as such (as “modernist”, “Art”, “abstract”, “non-figurative”, and so forth). From a semiotical point of view, we have to examine how modernist music represents the idea of non-representation. The same goes for the idea of absolute music, for instance, which marks only one aesthetic convention and invention of the nineteenth century among many others (e.g., programme music). Absolute music represents the semantics of a-semanticism (cf. Kuusamo 1996: 118), i.e., the ideology of

32 However, as Richard Littlefield pointed out to me (private communication), referring to Richard Cohn, the question could also be put otherwise – depending on how one defines the expression “music theory” and even “semantics”. According to Cohn, most of the history of music theory does not deal with semantics since that is not its primary focus. Music theory began in abstract mathematics and quantification and later as rules for composition. This is why, according to Cohn, one could as well claim that “postmodern” questions of meaning “represents” musical mathematics; one could talk about phobia of mathematics and rigorous logic. Still, in my research I define “music theory” more broadly, as comprehending theories of music in all its signifying dimensions, including both the abstract mathematical and the semantic dimensions (both of which have been issues of theorization since the Antiquity).

33 As Hatten (1994: 247) and Monelle (1992: 19) point out, the core of the problem in discussions of musical meaning often lies, on the one hand, in the confusion between linguistic and musical meaning and, on the other hand, in the confusion that “meaning” is understood in the naïve sense of the most obvious referential meaning.

34 The fundamental philosophical, psychological, phenomenological, and semiotical issue here concerns the roles that knowledge or cognition plays in the act of musical perception. Different stands have been taken on this issue. In the semiotical perspective that focuses on specific works of art, the role of conventions becomes crucial and insuperable. Naturally it is activities of the art world (criticism, research, art talk, and so forth) that form, maintain, and construct a given system of art and that guarantees a semantics, even if it is ideological and unconscious.
Subject Strategies in Music

non-representativeness.\textsuperscript{35} Thus the concept of absolute music can be approached as a musical topic,\textsuperscript{36} as Raymond Knapp (2003: xiv, 98), for instance, has done in his study of Mahler. The author relates the topic of absolute music in Mahler’s music to alienation and lost subjectivity: absolutist machinery constructs non-subjectivity (ibid.: 98, 115–117), which in the light of this study count among the rhetoric of unsettled subjectivity.\textsuperscript{37} In a way, the topic of absolute music in late Romantic and modern music comes quite close to the Classic topic of the “learned style”. Similarly in visual arts, signs of “non-figurativeness”, “abstract high art”, and “Form” (e.g., tables of rows and columns, and geometrical color fields) are crucial subject materials and themes – topics – forming the iconography of modernism (Kuusamo 1996: 118–146).

Accordingly, from the sign-theoretical point of view, we have no reason to consider music as more abstract, more without content, and less representative than some other art forms. For all sign systems are naturally abstract (e.g., that language is an abstraction is a fundamental tenet of Saussurean semiotics), and no sign system can exist without representation. Needless to say, musical representation differs from literary or visual representation because it is musical, i.e., because the medium is different. But even if we experience music as more abstract, we cannot conclude that music is less representative. On the contrary, it thus seems to represent “non-representativeness” most successfully. Moreover, it may be that the contents of music are mostly grasped unconsciously or preconsciously. In fact, if we do experience music as “abstract” and “loose” in content, it could be inferred that the density of its contents (cf. the degree of condensation in the Freudian sense) must be especially high, for high levels of abstraction produce “thicker” content.

In psychoanalytic art research, music has been traditionally considered in terms of its nonverbal and temporal nature, and, as such, difficult to approach; these, among other “difficult” characteristics, make music feel so abstract. And yet, it could be thought, for this very reason, that music may be especially effective in propelling us into the realm of the unconscious, affects, body, and sexuality. Not only do postmodern musicologists think this way, many researchers and theoreticians of music therapy think the same. Thus, as a short cut to the unconscious, music would be a convenient object of psychoanalytic study. On the other hand, precisely because of its effectiveness in regard to unconscious workings

\textsuperscript{35} My semiotical critique of the aesthetics of musical modernism is largely in debt to Altti Kuusamo’s (1996: 118–146, cf. also, 34–47) semiotical critique of the aesthetics and iconography of modernism in visual arts.

\textsuperscript{36} See Chap. 4.2.3

\textsuperscript{37} Robert Fink (1998: 256, 259), for his part, wittingly considers “absolute music” as a display of hysteria, comparable to the “sign language” of hysterical women’s bodies.
related to affects, body, and sexuality, music has been most sheltered from discussions addressing such aspects on behalf of rigid, modernist formalizations, and rejection of semantics and affective dimensions in music. Indeed, the most rigid formalism could be theorized as an “anxiety-ridden defense mechanism” (Fink 1998: 252). As brought out above (p. 40), this unconscious resistance against the emotiveness of music has long been recognized (Racker 1951).

The rejection (or repression) of semantics and content from modern musicology may of course have other reasons besides those of the disciplinary-historical, cultural-historical, and aesthetical-ideological ones. For example, it has been suggested that music, as an art form connected to the auditory organs, does not stand mainly for the representation of outer reality (Tarasti 1998: 1626). That is, instead of performing sign functions involving external phenomena, music is a more “self-related” (ich-bezogen) art form than literature or the visual arts are (ibid.). If this is the case, then does music represent inner reality (cf. the expression theories of Romanticism and modernism)? Indeed, it is not possible in the perspective of semiotics to conceive of music as non-representation and non-sign. Yet, in the discourse of art and psychoanalysis – not to mention poststructural semiotics and constructivism – it is impossible to maintain a distinction between representation of outer and inner reality: subject, signification, and discourse belong necessarily together, and our reality consists of discursive acts that signify our conceptions of “reality”. Still, the auditory sense, and its peculiar role in signification and subjectivity, has received much less semiotical study than has the visual sense. Yet, psychoanalysis can contribute much to the study of how the auditory sense functions in signification, subjectivity, and cultural practices; for psychoanalysis has special knowledge and particularized theories concerning the pre-linguistic experiential world of the infant – a world dominated strongly by the auditory sense. The auditory sense, and its special significance for pre-linguistic childhood, has been discussed psychoanalytically and with interesting results (e.g., Isakower 1939; Kohut & Levarie 1990 [1950]; Nederland 1958; Anzieu 1979 and 1995; Rosolato 1978), and these ideas have been applied to explain musical experience. In the light of these ideas, we could also inquire how the special significance of the auditory sense and the human voice in early childhood later manifest in our views (ideologies) about music.

38 It is often forgotten that music, as an art, does not have a monopoly on the auditory organs. For example, literature is not only related to the visual but to the auditory organ, too (e.g., rhythm, onomatopoieia; also, one often reads by the inner ear). Moreover, music is significantly related to visual and verbal organs and representation as well (for an interesting account of this, see Kramer 2002: Chaps. 7–8, esp. pp. 145–147). Likewise, Eero Tarasti (1998: 1626) continues his course of thought: “On the other hand, during its various stylistic periods, music has always been more or less related to extra-musical reality, and has been semantic by its very nature of transmitting messages.”
As Kramer (2002: 2–3) writes, “as the art of the ear more than the eye, music collapses the sense of distance associated with visuality”. This, then, results in a sense of immediacy (presence).

In sum, and in the opinion of this writer, the dearth of psychoanalytic music research may be explained less by the “nature” of music, and more by the ideologies concerning that supposed nature – from conceptions of art and music, from aesthetics, philosophy, and musicology, which define, determine, and discipline the (nature of) music and musicology of any given time. If one accepts the feminist view that an essential characteristic of mainstream musicology has been the disparagement, if not downright denial, of the emotional and sensual aspects of music, then it is not surprising that there has been little place given to psychoanalytic music research. For example, the resistance against semantics in positivist-formalist music analysis and theory has effectively excluded the possibility of most psychoanalytic music research. Conceptions of musical meanings and contents, and ways to analyze them, have in recent decades become more acceptable, with hermeneutics being in the mainstream of music research and analysis. It thus seems to be more acceptable than before to import psychoanalytic thinking into the traditional heartlands of music research.

Nevertheless, I offer a caution: discussions of modernist ideology and formalist music analysis, their hostility to meaning and hermeneutics, postmodern trends in musicology, and so on; such discourse can oversimplify things, and often ignore large parts of music research, such as a century of hermeneutic analyses prior to the paradigm of new-musicological hermeneutics. Oversimplification happens when a discussion is not understood in its disciplinary, historical, and institutional context, and when the claim of being “new” is taken as the whole truth or just at face value. It is true that formal analysis has dominated Anglo-American music analysis, but the same does not strictly apply to continental Europe, Eastern Europe, and Scandinavia, for instance. Furthermore, much music research, both before and after the new musicology, has been addressing the very same questions of musical meaning and socio-cultural semantics. Altti Kuusamo (1996: 5) has observed that a new research trend (e.g., new musicology, musical semiotics, musical biosemiotics) in the humanities usually has three stages of development. Firstly, the new trend emphasizes the differences in regard to the former research and profiles itself by differing radically from other research in general. From a psychoanalytic angle, this can be seen as a necessary and inevitable separation – problematics of puberty related to archaic ways of maintaining selfhood/subjectivity/identity. At the second stage, interest arises in the predecessors of a trend. At the third stage, the scholars of the new trend notice that there seems to be so much previous research that one has to admit that the new trend was not all that new. In other words, first the proponents claim that
their paradigm is new and nothing like that existed before; then, at the third stage, they realize that many relevant studies existed before their paradigm came into being. By this process the new trend finds fruitful, dialogical contact and a kind of interactive, “peaceful” relation with former and other research. The “new” trend joins the tradition instead of emphasizing the break. (Ibid.) With regard to new musicology, the third stage has been attained, which is why the name of the trend is not very important anymore, and it may even sound “old” or passé. This general developmental curve can be seen in musical semiotics also.

Furthermore, the relationship between new musicology and psychoanalytic research is not quite as simple as it may seem from the above discussion. This is the case because, above all, new musicology has been distinctly feminist-drawn. The relationship between feminism and psychoanalysis is a complex and sometimes chafing one, for classic Freudian psychoanalysis appears in feminist perspective as guilty of patriarchal bias, ahistoricity, biological essentialism, and overall insensitivity to matters of gender. Robert Fink (1998: 250–251) argues, that the feminist new musicology has been ideologically hostile to psychoanalysis because it is grounded in those postmodern feminist theories that are constructed on the denial of Freud and rejection of his theories. Fink certainly points out an important fact, though it might also be an oversimplification; for despite their objections to psychoanalysis, postmodern feminist theories have provided both new and revisited psychoanalytic theories, which are used in art research and applicable to the study of music also. Still, it is true that feminist new musicology has not drawn explicitly from psychoanalysis; one notices this omission in inaugural works by writers such as McClary, Suzanne Cusick, and Catherine Clément, the last-mentioned of whom has made a clear break from French psychoanalysis. In general, feminist new musicology seems to be surprisingly closed to all psychoanalytic theorizations, both in and outside of feminism. Musicology, as a field characterized, on the one hand, by a taboo on discussions of sexuality and music,39 and, on the other hand, by psychoanalysis-indifferent feminism, has made the fortunes of the postmodern project in music studies seem preposterous. In Fink’s words, this has meant “that psychoanalytically inspired critical methodologies, so common as to have become passé in the study of literature or film, have never been accepted in musicology. For us, Freud has become old-fashioned without ever becoming fashionable.” (Ibid.: 251.)

39 Along with the taboo, Fink mentions “a powerful totem: Structure”. He also points out that “breaking the taboo does not necessarily mean smashing the totem; there is no reason why musical psychoanalysis cannot coexist – or cohabit! – with as much formal analysis of musical structures as anyone cares to undertake.” (1998: 252.) On this, I agree with Fink.
2.3.2 Psychoanalytic music research is not monolithic

In some fields of art research it is possible to write the history of psychoanalytic research, from early id-psychology which dominated at the beginning of the last century, to poststructuralism, and thereafter. In musicology, however, such a history is difficult to write, and it is hard to get an integrated, over-all picture of the field. Psychoanalytic music research has been practiced little in musicology, perhaps mostly in music therapy research. Work analysis and other traditional, core areas of music research remained largely untouched by psychoanalysis until the 1990s. Occasional exceptions may of course be found, even in the field of music theory, such as Hans Keller’s (see, e.g., 1994 and 2003) Freud-inspired music analysis and psychoanalytic music criticism. However, prior to 1990s, psychoanalytic analysis of musical works mostly served the interests of psychoanalysts rather than musicologists. The possible musicological significance of general psychoanalytic or psychiatric research dealing with music has been difficult to ascertain and assess from a musicological perspective. Hence, its impact on musicology has been almost nil, but for a few exceptions mainly in the field of biographical studies.

The tradition and continuation of psychoanalytic music research may be poorly known, weak, marginalized, often forgotten or neglected. Still, it does exist, and it has its consequences. This tradition has gone largely unrecognized as such; for example, during the past ten years, psychoanalytic music research appears under the headings of new musicology, postmodernism, and new hermeneutics, without attention being paid to the earlier tradition of psychoanalytic music research. For instance, David Schwarz and Lawrence Kramer, two dominant figures in contemporary psychoanalytically-oriented music analysis, have largely ignored psychoanalytic music research that preceded their poststructural paradigm. Of course, neither one has aimed to present any kind of history of psychoanalytic music research. Moreover, psychoanalysis is just one of several factors in Kramer’s new hermeneutics; he describes his work as hermeneutics or postmodern music research, not psychoanalytic criticism. Schwarz identifies his work as new musicology, but relates it to general (post-)Lacanian criticism, too.

Similarly, Elizabeth Wright, in her discussion of music research in her Psychoanalytic Criticism (1998), which is partly a history of psychoanalytic criticism, ignores music research prior to the poststructural paradigm. She considers music only in connection with poststructural critiques of ideology, with refer-

---

40 In Chap. 7 of his Listening Subjects, Schwarz (1997a) relies heavily on Kristeva’s theorizing (the notion of the abject); but his main orientation is guided by the critical theories of Lacan and Žižek.
Chapter 2. Psychoanalytic theory and musicology

ences to Kramer, Žižek, and Poizat (Wright 1998: 162–166). (This is reasonable, however, since the book focuses on literary studies.) As early as 1966, Noy was complaining that psychoanalytic music research was badly known even among its practitioners, who often “start from the very beginning”, as if no previous work in that area existed (1966: 126). However, a long tradition of psychoanalytic music research did exist by that time, if mostly in the field of applied psychoanalysis. The beginning of 1950s, for instance, was one “golden era” of psychoanalytic music research, as practiced, for example, by Anton Ehrenzweig (1953), Heinz Kohut (1990 [1957]; Kohut & Levarie (1990 [1950]), Heinrich Racker (1951), André Michel (1951), Theodor Reik (1983 [1953]), and Edith and Richard Sterba (1954).

In his book Wagner androgynne, Jean-Jacques Nattiez (1993: xiv) writes that, when discussing thematics of androgyny in Wagner’s works, one must engage with psychoanalytic theories. He states: “[i]f musicology does not concern itself with psychoanalysis, psychoanalysis will concern itself, sooner or later, with musicology” (ibid.). How should we read these words from the early 1990s, when Wagner – the object of study in Nattiez’s book – had already been studied psychoanalytically for about 90 years? Why fear psychoanalysis attacking music, when it had been doing so for almost a century? After all, Wagner has become a permanent topic of psychoanalytic music research throughout its history. Apparently, Nattiez is worried about the fact that most psychoanalytic music research has been done by psychoanalysts, not by musicologists; this has affected the nature and musicological significance of the research in question (Nattiez mentions Michel, Reik, and Gavriel Salomon). This writer agrees with Nattiez, if he indeed means that musicologists should grasp psychoanalytic music research and develop it for musicological purposes rather than a branch of applied psychoanalysis.

The problem is thus: A strong psychoanalytic trend in musicology has never been identified – recognized and established – as such, but instead, has remained marginalized. As a result, new psychoanalytic approaches have nothing to attach themselves to, and psychoanalytic music research has never developed as a

41 The list may easily be continued; see Noy 1966: 131–132. Also psychoanalytic music-therapy research was inaugurated in the 1950s.
42 The Freudian psychoanalytic angle of Nattiez’s book is mainly biographical in the traditional manner, concentrating on Wagner’s maternal and paternal relations. In this respect, Nattiez joins the long tradition of psychoanalytic Wagner research; Nattiez refers to just two: Michel and Georg Groddeck (Nattiez 1993: 181). On the other hand, in compliance with the Zeitgeist of current musicology, Nattiez combines psychoanalytic material with structuralist, semiotic, and gender theories in making various theoretical excursions for musicological purposes. Nattiez also discusses Freud’s views on androgyny and, from a Jungian perspective, symbolism in operas.
Subject Strategies in Music

unique musicological field. It is still rare to speak of psychoanalytic approaches to music research, perhaps with the exception of music therapy and psychobiography. Yet, I am concerned with traditional activities of musicology that have remained almost completely untouched by psychoanalysis. Although psychoanalytic currents – issuing from postmodern musicology – have started to emerge in the pluralistic stream of today’s musicology, as part of the understanding of subject, sexuality, and identity, this usually goes unrecognized. That is to say, it is not perceived as psychoanalytic but often discussed under another heading (e.g., gender studies), thus remaining once again in the margins of musicology. Psychoanalytic music research is not usually regarded as a musicological orientation of its own. This may be why many practitioners of poststructural psychoanalytic music research prefer instead to identify themselves and their work as “new” or “postmodern” musicology, gender studies, and so on. If music has been a minimal topic in psychoanalytic criticism, and psychoanalytic criticism a marginal discourse in musicology, then psychoanalytic music criticism has manifested as doubly marginalized.

In the 1990s, two significant anthologies of psychoanalytic music research appeared: _Psychoanalytic Explorations in Music_ and _Psychoanalytic Explorations in Music, Second Series_ (Feder et al., eds. 1990 and 1993). Most contributors to these volumes are psychoanalysts and psychiatrists, not musicologists: in the first book only two writers out of fourteen are music researchers; in the second book, four out of fourteen.43 Neither anthology is poststructurally or Lacanian-inspired, but instead represents research mainly based on classic psychoanalysis and ego-psychology. One of the rare books on music that explicitly articulates a psychoanalytic approach is David Schwarz’s _Listening Subjects. Music, Psychoanalysis, Culture_ (1997a). Schwarz discusses music from Schubert to Diamanda Galás by combining traditional music analysis with the psychoanalytic theories of Lacan, Žižek, and Kristeva. Also opening up vistas for music analysis is Markus Lång’s (2004: esp. Chap. 7) treatise on the epistemological questions and scientific status of ego-psychological music research.44

Yet, generally speaking, and despite the studies just mentioned, psychoanalytic music research in effect remains invisible. For example, in the most recent _New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians_ (and _Grove Music Online_), there is no entry on “psychoanalysis and music”, although there are frequent refer-

44 For more bibliography on psychoanalytic music research, see Noy 1966 and 1967a–d; Nass 1989; Lima 1997; Feder et al. 2001. Sterba 1965 provides a survey of German literature on the topic, written before the Second World War.
Chapter 2. Psychoanalytic theory and musicology

ences to musicological gender and sexuality studies, and although the editors seem to have tried to include all kinds of “othernesses” in this edition. The fact that Alastair Williams’s recent book, Constructing Musicology (2001), includes a separate small chapter on Lacanian music criticism, indicates something new and exceptional, for chapters on psychoanalysis are rarely found in basic books on musicology.

The difference is striking when musicology is compared with literature, film, or other visual-culture studies. The fact that only recently has psychoanalytic thought extended to the field of musicology may be surprising to scholars in other areas of art research and cultural criticism. Psychoanalysis is perhaps too old to become popular in a discipline that lacks a recognized and established tradition of psychoanalytic research. It is clear, however, that opportunities for psychoanalytic music research improved during the 1990s. As noted, recent forms of critique, combining various methodologies and focusing on the ideological aspects of music, have espoused psychoanalysis, bringing it to the attention of more and more musicologists. In addition to Williams’s book, good examples of this trend include the anthologies Embodied Voices (Dunn & Jones, eds. 1994) and Music/Ideology (Krims, ed. 1998), Caryl Flinn’s (1992) Strains of Utopia, John Richardson’s (1999) Singing Archaeology, and Anahid Kassabian’s (2001) Hearing Film. During the 1990’s, musical studies drawing on psychoanalysis finally started to appear in mainstream musicological journals too (e.g., Cherlin 1993, Gibbs 1995, and Cumming 1997a). Psychoanalytic lines of thought lead in many directions in current musicology. For instance, research on musical manifestations and representations of sexual, gendered, and bodily experiences would be difficult without an understanding of the crucial significance of the unconscious and of sexuality at the core of the subject’s identity and existence. Nor can one imagine a musical deconstruction that does not presuppose infinite semiosis and tricks of the Freudian unconscious. And musical semiotics, too, often deals with the subject’s desire for signification, and with its division into the conscious and unconscious modes of being.

Questions abound as to the place of psychoanalytic theory in today’s musicology, especially in the study of musical signification and subjectivity. Psychoanalytic theory may contribute to several needs of current musicology and thus we must justify it in many different ways. Like semiotics, psychoanalysis is not only a method or theory in the service of music research. It may also serve as a critical and self-reflective, i.e., reflexive account of the “unconscious” aspects of musicology. The reflexivity of postmodern research is common to both

45 As a comparison, the art-historical Grove Art contains a full entry on “psychoanalysis and art” (Wollheim 2002). In sum, basic books on methodologies in literature, film, and visual-culture studies usually include discussions of psychoanalytic critique.

49
psychoanalysis and semiotics. Semiotics is a reflexive discipline *par excellence*, because its object of study is a sign system. In other words, since the theory of signs and signification is a language of its own, and thus a system of signs and a signifying practice itself, a semiotical theory should ideally be applicable to itself also (Nöth 1990: 5); it should be able to analyze, on a meta-level, the very system and practice of signs used for the investigation of signs. As a signifying practice itself, semiotics thinks (of) its object, its instrument, and the relation between them (Kristeva 1986: 77–79; see also, Nöth 1990: 5, 322). Kristeva has argued that, in addition to being a technical discourse, semiotics should become a critical science of its own foundations, “an open form of research, a constant critique that turns back on itself and offers its own autocritique” (1986: 77–79). By contributing to the “disillusionment that takes place within scientific discourse itself”, semiotics may be called both a ”science of ideologies” and an ”ideology of sciences” (ibid.). In the interest of science-making and (self-)reflexivity, surprising alliances might be forged between not only musical semiotics and postmodern musicology, but also between many opposing sides in general musicology as well. A recent observation is that, when doing musicology, one is at the same time disciplining and delimiting it (e.g., Bergeron & Bohlman, eds. 1992). In this way, we reflect upon the musicological “toolbox”, to use Don Randel’s (1992) metaphor for standardized methods of musicology. Moreover, this leads to a reflection upon our ways (tools) of practicing reflexivity, for they make up a sign system and a signifying practice as well.

What kinds of psychoanalytic “tools” can help in this endeavor? Self-analysis and auto-critique, as understood in the psychoanalytic tradition, parallel the demands of reflexivity and need to determine the “situatedness” (the subject position) of the researcher, as is expected in the humanities and sociological studies. Furthermore, the self-analysis (self-knowledge), as related to the notions of transference and counter-transference, engages one in an auto-critique of the modes of practicing reflexivity. We may ask, what is the ideology of reflexivity? What desire/wish is disguised in the claims and signs of reflexivity?\(^6\) To make known one’s research position does not guarantee reflexivity. Other signs and badges of reflexivity, too, only indicate that one is obeying the demands of the scientific superego dominating the field. From the point of view of psychoanalysis, we may notice a kind of (postmodern) narcissism in overemphasized autobiographism, stimulated by ethno-methodology; this is evident, for example, in article or book introductions that give extensive first-person evaluations of one’s own research position. Also, if the subject is continuously in process and relational, it cannot be announced beforehand, at the beginning of the research (cf. Rose 2001: 130). If the most crucial part of us, ”the larger sphere” of the psychic

\(^6\) I am here indebted to conversations with Tarja Knuuttila (see also, Knuuttila 2002).
Chapter 2. Psychoanalytic theory and musicology

reality (Freud 1953 [1900]: 612), is beyond our reach, then transparent reflexivity must be a great illusion, a neatly constructed rationalization for unconscious psychodynamic (political) purposes. Of course, illusion plays a positive and important role in all our activity. Still, meta-critique in psychoanalysis must account for unconscious aspects, for “blind spots” in musicology. Such critique must also extend to psychoanalytic practice itself. At this point we ask, what does a psychoanalyst of music want?

To finish this discussion, let me add that the picture of psychoanalytic music research and its place in musicology, as outlined above, is somewhat distorted. One reason for this distortion goes to the English-centrism and Anglo-American dominance of general musicology. A second “distortion,” or bias, is my interest in musical signification, semantics, and music analysis in the tradition of western art music; this means, for one thing, that my account of psychoanalytic studies in the field of music psychology are not rigorously systematic.

As to the first point, psychoanalytic music research has been practiced in many languages and countries, the traditions of which may differ from the more widely-known Anglo-American ones. For example, psychoanalytic music research in the USA since the Second World War has been dominated by applied psychoanalysis and ego-psychology, up to the entrance of new musicology. By contrast, the French tradition has a more varied grounding, in id-psychology as revisited by Lacan and others. Lacan’s thought was absent from music studies in the USA until the new musicology came along. Strong traditions of psychoanalytic music research have developed also, for example, in Germany, Italy, and Finland, to cite a few examples, most of which are not available in English. It would be impossible to account for all publications in this area; hence it is pos-

49 In Finland during the 1990’s psychoanalysis was embraced enthusiastically, especially in the field of music therapy research (e.g., Lehtonen 1986, 1993a–b, and 1994; Erkkilä 1995 and 1997a–b). Psychoanalytic music research in Finland since the 1970s was developed by psychoanalysts and psychiatrists rather than musicologists. The first Finnish doctoral dissertation in psychoanalytic music research – Kimm Lehtonen’s Music as a Promoter of Psychic Work: A Psychoanalytic Study of the Educational Possibilities of Music Therapy (1986) – was defended in the field of education studies, not musicology. Recently Markus Lång (2004; see also, 1995 and 1996) defended a thesis on psychoanalytic music research from an ego-psychological perspective in the field of musicology. Psychoanalytic music research in Finland has been developed also by Eero Rechardt (1984, 1987, and 1998); Yrjö Heinonen’s studies on the composing process from Bach to The Beatles (1990, 1995, and 1998); Kari Kurkela’s (1993) work on the psychodynamics of musicians and music students; Daniel Falck’s (1996, 1998, and 2000) Lacanian
sible that important publications might have escaped my notice. The same can be said of the following chapters, in which psychoanalytic music research is surveyed in a more detailed way.\footnote{50}

analyses of music in the films of Campion, Kieslowski, and Hicks; and John Richardson’s (1999) study on Philip Glass’s aesthetics. 
50 Rosi Braidotti notes that organization and classification of different schools of thought and area of research, is always an issue of indexation and canonization. Nationally-orientated indexation (Anglo-American, French-oriented, German-inspired, Latin-American, Italian, Finnish, etc.) is one of the central systems in such work, an advantage of which is the possibility to highlight relatively less-known traditions, such as Scandinavian, Eastern European, or non-European, and by this contribute to a less ethnocentric approach. It is also useful to focus attention on traditions and movements of thought that take place in languages other than the dominant English. Still, the nationalistic system of indexation has its disadvantages, and not least because of the rising nationalism and xenophobia in the contemporary world. (Braidotti 2003: 195–196.) However, because the format of my study is one of academic dissertation, I cannot “nomadize” all the categorizations. That is why this study, despite these remarks, remains Anglo-American oriented in musicological matters; at the same time, my general theorizing is crucially French-inspired, and my subject position is that of a Finnish musicologist.
Chapter 3
Objects of study, metapsychological viewpoints, and paradigms in psychoanalytic music research

In this chapter, psychoanalytic music research is surveyed from three different angles. After the introductory chapter (3.1), psychoanalytic music research is sorted roughly into common objectives and types of study (Chap. 3.2), and in Chapter 3.3 a metapsychological approach to music is presented. In Chapter 3.4, the most central paradigms of psychoanalytic thought and criticism are discussed, apart from poststructural and feminist paradigms, which are described in Chapter 5. This descriptive “triple-survey” is above all meant to give a complete and integrated picture of the scope, potential, and basic ideas of psychoanalytic music research. Such a survey is needed also because it strengthens the position and identity of psychoanalytic music research, and provides a firm background for understanding the poststructural, psychoanalytic, and musical analytic method outlined in Part II.

3.1 Describing psychoanalytic music research

Psychoanalytic music research may be presented and categorized in many different ways; for example, on the basis of the objects of study or on that of psychoanalytic persuasions (paradigms, schools, trends). These kinds of survey are few in the literature, leaving much to be done.

Groupings according to the most common types of psychoanalytic music research are those by Eero Rechardt (1984: 83; 1987: 512) and Martin L. Nass (1989: 165). The two authors take a similar approach, hence their views may be synthesized as follows:

1. Biographical studies on composers and musicians, and efforts to understand works of music on the grounds of biographical data.
2. Shedding much light on musical thought and musical experience are
those studies that address the (clinical) experiences of composers and musicians who have undergone psychoanalytic treatment.

3. Studies of psychological meanings of music, musical experience and thinking, viewed by psychoanalytic metapsychology and developmental psychology, based on knowledge about childhood psychic development.

4. Rechardt (1984: 83; 1987: 512) alone represents a fourth type: introspective psychoanalytic studies of experiences prompted by music. Though Rechardt does not say so, my presumption is that such studies are carried out in the tradition of self-analysis, the spirit of which is central to psychoanalysis.¹

The point of departure in this categorization is the literature on music that is written in the tradition of applied psychoanalysis. From the point of view of musicology, it does not indicate sufficiently the manifold potential of psychoanalytic music research. It is difficult to see how such literature might be adjusted or adapted to methodologies, trends, and current discourses in musicology. For example, it is not obvious how non-biographical psychoanalytic music analyses can be categorized. In fact, Rechardt’s and Nass’s presentations are restricted to psychoanalytic psychology of music and to the methodological possibilities thereof (biographism, clinical experiences, meta- and developmental psychology, introspection/self-analysis). Many musicological possibilities thus remain unnoticed, such as the psycho-history of music, hermeneutico-psychoanalytic or other textual music analysis, or psychoanalytic studies on the ideologies of music and musicology, among others. Psychoanalysis, however, can be applied in almost every subfield of musicology.

The same problem characterizes the five-part series of articles by Pinchas Noy, entitled “The Psychodynamic Meaning of Music” (Noy 1966 and 1967a–d), mentioned above (Chap. 2). This careful survey is written quite clearly from the perspective of applied psychoanalysis and, in fact, neither interrelates nor intersects with musicological traditions. Still, Noy manages to give a systematic presentation of psychoanalytic music literature, not only from a historical (chronological) point of view, but also from a systematizing one. In Noy’s view, the central themes in the psychoanalytic music literature are these:

1. Music as language and communication.
3. The origin of music and the development of musical language (cf. the developmental viewpoint²).

² Metapsychological viewpoints are explained in Chap. 3.3.
Chapter 3. Objects of study, metapsychological viewpoints, and paradigms

4. The intra-psychic sources of music (cf. the structural and drive-energetic viewpoints).
5. The structure of music.
6. Psychological functions of music (music as stimulus and ego function; cf. structural and developmental points of view).
7. The musician’s personality, often that of a composer. (Noy 1966 and 1967a–d.)

In Noy’s way of discussing them, the seven issues above belong to the category of psychoanalytic music psychology and philosophy; other central musical areas are, for the most part, left out of discussion. This same problem is typical of many similar presentations of psychoanalytic music research, and of many other fields of art research as well. For example, Shoshana Felman has faulted research that applies psychoanalysis to literature. One field of knowledge is used to interpret another, which leads to the literature being read in a reductive way (in psychoanalytic terms), with the special nature of the object under study receiving scant attention. Felman would prefer a dialogical interaction between the two. (Felman 1982: 5–10.) It can easily be argued that same situation has obtained in psychoanalytic music research.

Psychoanalytic music research is construed narrowly in the field of applied psychoanalysis and musicology, and the problem just discussed was but one illustration of this state of affairs. Another kind of example is Alastair Williams’s description of psychoanalytic music research (2001: 71–75), mentioned above. The author focuses only on Lacanian-Kristevan studies of music made during the 1990s, mentioning no other scholars in the field save Kramer and Schwarz. Reviews of psychoanalytic music research connected with current (postmodern) trends in music research do not acknowledge other traditions of psychoanalytic music research, except the Lacanian, Kristevan, and new-hermeneutic approaches of the last 15 years. As evident in all of Chapter 2, a gap exists between postmodern psychoanalytic music criticism and the much longer tradition of applied psychoanalysis. In the present study, I try to bridge this gap.

As outlined below, describing psychoanalytic music research leads to many overlappings in theory and method. Hence, one type of psychoanalytic music research may be located in several contexts in the following surveys.
Subject Strategies in Music

3.2 Common objects and types of study, and special issues in psychoanalytic music research

In this sub-chapter, an overview of the central areas of psychoanalytic music research is given from the point of view of objects and types of study frequently appearing in the field. The questions are: What kinds of research and objects of study have proved most popular in psychoanalytic music research? In what areas and on what objects of music research have psychoanalytic methods been most frequently used? The survey is object- rather than method-oriented; i.e., the point of departure is in musical phenomena rather than in psychoanalytic methodology. The function of the categorization is, thus, mainly descriptive and organizational.

3.2.1 Biographical psychoanalytic studies

Biographical studies form a traditional area of psychoanalytic music research. The category includes psychoanalytic biographies of composers, musicians, and other persons of the music world. Also, music analyses and interpretations of works from a biographical point of view can be put in this category (as well as that of music analyses discussed below, in Chap. 3.2.3). Biographical studies focus on childhood experiences and (repressed) memories of a sexual content, object losses, adolescent fantasies, “family romances”, and conflicts (especially Oedipal), and on significant relations in later life as repetitions, projections, and displacements of early mother-, father-, and sibling-relations. These factors are considered the unconscious sources of musical activity, creativity, and output. Often compositions and events of life are seen to be closely connected. However, despite the effort, many psychobiographies do not consider music proper, and thus may have little musicological or music-analytical relevance. New-musicological studies focussing on the composer’s sexuality, however, have recently tried to develop precise ways to connect musical substance with biographical facts. Indeed, the new musicology has brought marked innovations – along with heated controversy – to the field, in aiming to bring biographical data and works of music together in a more interactive way, by means of more rigorous music-analytical insight. According to Maynard Solomon (2001), it is Adorno’s “idiosyncratic” writings on Mahler, Berg, Wagner, and Bach, especially, that have encouraged musicologists to construct more synthetic models in the mixing of biography, psychoanalysis, and music research.

Psychoanalytic biographies have focused on canonical (male) composers, with Beethoven, Wagner, and Mahler being the most popular objects of study (Max Graf was a pioneer in this area of psychoanalytic music research, too).
Chapter 3. Objects of study, metapsychological viewpoints, and paradigms

Among well-known psychobiographical studies are, for example, Edith and Richard Sterba’s biography of Beethoven (1954) and Solomon’s studies of Beethoven (1978 and 1990) and Schubert (1981 and 1989; discussed above in pp. 32–34, Chap. 2.2). Psychobiographies recently have invaded popular music studies as well, fascinating examples of which are Yrjö Heinonen’s (1995 and 1998) studies of The Beatles. Moreover, along with the micro-historical and feminist emphases in musicology, biographies on women and lesser-known musical groups could have taken a psychoanalytic approach to their subjects; such work, however, has only just begun.

More often than not, psychobiographical studies dwell on object losses, such as the death of mother or father, and the composer’s life and output is studied against a psychic landscape of mourning and depression resulting from such loss. The construction of object losses and depression can be criticized for the usual problems of biographism, and especially because object losses are perhaps too easily found in order for them to have much explanatory force. Also, often not enough attention is paid to historical contexts, such as high rates in child death, frequent disease epidemics, the low ages of death in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the relatively young (psychosocial) history of the nuclear family. On the other hand, if object losses always in some way mark the subject’s life (real object losses of close persons are usually unavoidable) and the subject’s very constitution in a psychological sense (separation from the mother, or fullness of being, as a structural object loss and a prerequisite for subjectivity), then the landscape of loss could be studied in music without any hypothesis about a specific historical (personal) loss – that is, without a biographical perspective (though it might add poignancy to one’s reception of a work). Peter Ostwald’s (1993) interpretation of Schumann’s “Ich hab im Traum geweinet” (from Dichterliebe, Op. 48, No. 13) provides an excellent example of a psychoanalytic study that centers on the idea of object loss, both as a biographical analysis of a work (historical object loss) and as a psychoanalytic interpretation of a piece of music understood to represent a general psychical mechanism (psychological/structural object loss). Understood in a poststructuralist way, and as related to music analysis, the biography – the author and her life as culturally understood – forms one text among others in the signifying web of texts in a musical work, from which the analyst picks the text she prefers. In that case, the author/composer is placed in quotation marks, either implicitly or explicitly, for it manifests as cultural a construction (image of the composer) as does the work.

Subject Strategies in Music

under analysis. However, the biographical possibility is not taken up at all in the present study, since my purpose is to namely develop a non-biographical, textual means of psychoanalytic music analysis. In my study, works of music are studied as musical landscapes of loss, but on a textual basis only, without biographical assumptions or interpretations.

A common danger in psychoanalytic biographies, and a ruinous one at the beginning of the last century, was the slippery step from psychobiography to pathography, which resembled a case record and considered artistic creativity as a mixture of genius and madness, resonating with psychology as it was at the end of the nineteenth century. The traces of such thinking may still lurk within psychoanalytic music research.\footnote{4 E.g., Ostwald (1987, 1991, and 1997) has written several books the titles of which associate creativity with genius and pathology. This tradition goes back more than a century and remains very much alive, perhaps thanks to readers’ insatiable hunger for scandal and shock promised by the rhetoric of advertising and marketing.} At its worst, such issues as context, relevance, or even interest may be totally lacking from a musicological point of view. It was not until the arrival of poststructuralism that musicologist became engaged with the area of psychoanalytic music analysis. This does not mean that interesting music analyses were not done before the arrival of poststructuralism, but simply that they were most often done by psychoanalysts or psychiatrists whose main interest was not musicological.

In sum, biography holds great possibilities for psychoanalytic music research, both in music analysis and in music history. Biographical writing often evokes strong criticism, even in new musicology that has (re)positioned biography-based music analysis at the center of music research, if in a new way. Most usually, new-musicological studies use the biographical perspective as just one among others, such as socio-historical and gender-theoretical points of view.

3.2.2 Psychoanalytic music psychology

Psychoanalytic music psychology aims to understand musical phenomena as related to a problematic of the unconscious, as theorized in certain psychoanalytic metapsychology and developmental psychology. The question is, what does music represent for subject and society at the unconscious psychological level? General objects of study include musical thinking and experience, creativity, music’s affective and emotive impact, the psychodynamics of composing, playing, performing, listening, teaching and improvising, and more. During its century of existence, music-psychological psychoanalytic research has shifted from the study of musical creativity and genius – \textit{Wunderkinder}, authors, Great Men and their Art – to the study of everyday musical experiences of ordinary listen-
ers and musicians. Today, psychoanalytic music psychology largely focuses on the nature of musical experiences from the perspective of the experiential world and development of the infant. The infant’s earliest experiential world has been regarded as a prototype of musical experience, and interesting similarities have been recognized in musical and pre-linguistic life-worlds, based on the nonlinguistic dimension of musical experience.

As noted earlier, in reading the psychoanalytic literature, we find that sound, voice, and auditory sensory mode are considered to be of special significance in the early world of the infant; how this archaic auditory sphere relates to music has been pondered a great deal (e.g., Kohut 1990 [1957]; Kohut & Levarie 1990 [1950]; Nass 1990 [1971]; Rechardt 1984, 1987, and 1998; Lecourt 1992 and 1994; see also, Noy 1967a: 11). In Lacanian and feminist traditions, the auditory sphere in relation to the subject’s constitution has been studied especially abundantly in film theory (Doane 1980; Silverman 1988; Flinn 1992; Žižek 1996), in minimalist music (Schwarz 1997a and 1997b), and in research into opera and voice (Poizat 1992 and 1998; Žižek 1996; Dolar 1996; Dunn & Jones 1994).

The musical experience, at its most archaic level, has been understood as anchored to the early reciprocal space between infant and mother (and the infant’s total dependency on her mother) in the infant’s development towards entering language (subjectivity, separation, differentiated self). Since the pioneering child studies of Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, psychoanalysis has continuously gathered new developmental knowledge concerning the preverbal communicative space, by means of baby observation and experimental psychology, especially since the 1960s (e.g., Donald W. Winnicott, Margaret Mahler, René Spitz, Joyce McDougall, and Daniel N. Stern). This research has contributed much to the understanding of the archaic sources of musical pleasure. Sound and voice (which at the most archaic level may not be differentiated from each other) have been outlined as an overwhelmingly enveloping experience that carries and supports its receiver (the listening subject), functions as an integrating, protecting, and sheltering object, and acts as a musical extension of self. Music may function, for example, as transitional object or space (Winnicott 1971), self-object (Kohut 1978), sonorous envelope (Anzieu 1979 and 1995), or acoustic

5 In psychoanalytic literature, the notion of mother refers always to the closest caretaker, i.e., the “motherer” of the child. Psychoanalytic theory is for the most part constructed on the concept of the nuclear family. In real-life situations however, there may be several mother-figures around the child, including fathers, other family members, nurses, etc. Also, the child may have more than one mother(er) in the total process of development. The concept of the mother is both traditional and crucial to psychoanalysis. The mother is regarded as the central person (even in terms of absence) and most significant other in the child’s development. Mother-relations (object-relations) may be (more or less) positive or negative for the child’s early experiential realm.
mirror (Rosolato 1978, Silverman 1988). The object-distance seems to diminish in the auditory realm. Also, music unfolds in time and does not obey linguistic semantics in the strict (predicative) sense. Music seems to represent a kind of hinterland (cf. the area between infant and mother, subject and object), where the differentiation between inner and outer is labile. It has also been pointed out that it is more difficult to shield oneself from sounds than, for example, from visual stimuli: it is easier to close your eyes than to cover your ears.

During the past twenty years, psychoanalytic developmental psychology has been integrated with more empirical methods, which focus on infants that are newborn to those of a few months old. Psychoanalytic developmental psychology, grounded above all on Daniel N. Stern’s (1985) work, has eagerly been applied to psychology and semiotics of music (e.g., Rechardt 1992 and 1998; Imberty 1997; Välimäki 1998; Aksnes 1998; Volgsten 1999 and 2003; Postaccchini et al. 1998) and in theories of music therapy (Lehtonen 1993b and 1994; Erkkilä 1997a and 1997b). In my research, this line of psychoanalytic music research is integrated with Kristeva’s notion of the *semiotic chora* in order to illuminate music as unsettled subjectivity (Chap. 6). Moreover, some music-analytical case studies (in Part III) use developmental concepts as music-analytical tools, especially the concepts of transitional space and acoustic mirror stage. On the other hand, many of the psychoanalytic concepts that are used in music analysis – acoustic mirror, semiotic, and more – become more understandable when viewed against the background of psychoanalytic psychology.

Musical thinking, experience, and signification may also be studied in terms of psychoanalytic metapsychology (see Chap. 3.3). For example, formal characteristics of the unconscious processes in music have been studied in the light of Freud’s theories of dreams, jokes, and everyday psychopathology, as when musical equivalents for condensations, displacements, and parapraxes are pointed out in musical scores and manuscripts (Friedman 1960; Keller 2003; Ballantine 1984; Sabbeth 1990; Heinonen 1990; Klumpenhouver 1994; Lewin 1995; Klempe 1998; Lyotard 1998; Lång 2004: 190–219). Freud’s theories have been united in this perspective, for example, with Schenkerian analysis (Sabbeth 1990: 57–59; see also, Cook 1987: 221; and Lima 2005: 5). According to Daniel Sabbeth (1990: 57–59) common elements in Freud’s theory of jokes and Schenkerian analysis are the addressing of nonverbal aspects as latent structures beneath the surface and also as related to aspects of familiarity and repetition (cf.

---

6 In addition to Stern, Colwyn Trevarthen and others have done much work in empirical developmental psychology, in and outside of psychoanalysis. However, my study (Chap. 6) relies on Stern.
A burgeoning field of inquiry involves psychoanalytic- or psychodynamics-oriented research in music therapy, including study of the self-therapeutic function of music. Music is considered a means by which to work through repressed, depressing, and inhibited mental contents. Music-making may help to solve intrapsychic conflicts and to channel unconscious impulses; at the same time, music may function as an object that protects the psychic integrity of the subject (Lehtonen 1986, 1993b, and 1994; Ostwald 1989; Erkkilä 1997a–b). An important, though less developed, area of research is the psychodynamics of studying (learning) and performing music.

3.2.3 Psychoanalytic music analyses

In the past century, psychoanalytic music analyses, especially prior to the new criticism of literary studies, structural, poststructural, and other textual theories, often relied on biography (see Chap. 3.2.1). In this way, psychoanalytic criticism followed the general trends in art research. Later came non-biographical music-analytical studies that understand music as inter-subjective examples of the psychic workings of the human mind as such workings are determined by unconscious mechanisms. As a socio-cultural object, music reflects, represents, and constructs general principles of psychic formation. When psychoanalytic music analysis shifted focus, from the biographical to the socio-cultural, there came the possibility of understanding different musical genres and subcultures, and of theorizing style and context from more musicological points of view. Consequently, sometime in the 1990s psychoanalytic music analysis became more dialogical, a discourse that alternated between music-analytical and psychoanalytic methods. Not until the belated postmodern project in musicology did music analysts truly seize upon all the possibilities that psychoanalytic theories could offer musicology.

In psychoanalytic music analyses, psychoanalytic theories and concepts are used to open routes for understanding and discussing a work of music. Current

---

7 These aspects of Freud’s theories have influenced music theory. Analysis, especially motivic analysis at the beginning of the last century, drew upon Freudian concepts; and so did in mid-century models that drew on the psychology of perception. Central to certain theories, such as Hans Keller’s conception of deep structures of music, is the notion of unconscious perception in musical thinking. In this sense, Schenkerian theories have a “Freudian tint” (cf. Cook 1987: 221). Nearly all music analysis carries out identity testing of musical themes, motives, and gestures in relation to phenomena of repetition, contrast, and variation, which are also elements of Freudian theories of the formal workings of the unconscious.

8 Kurkela 1993 provides an extensive treatment of this subject.
psychoanalytic music analysis often integrates different methods and viewpoints. Kramer (1998b), for example, examines Schubert’s songs as puzzles of identity, desire, and sexuality, drawing from psychoanalysis (from Freud to Lacan and Deleuze), and from gender studies and hermeneutics. Robert Fink’s (1998) study on the “sexual politics” of sonata form in Brahms’s Symphony No. 1 combines Freudian perspective with gender theories and social-hermeneutics. Regrettably, Fink provocatively talks about Brahms’s sexuality as if he were strictly analyzing the author, the composer’s personality – in a way reminiscent of the rather wild analyses of early id-psychology. Though perhaps important for emancipatory queer politics, this is precisely the opposite of my aim. And it is even quite opposite to Fink’s own analysis of Schoenberg’s Erwartung, in which Fink states that “Schoenberg’s sex life need never enter the discussion” (Fink 1998: 262). One can only wonder why Brahms’s sex life deserves (musicological) investigation.9

The Lacanian tradition – conceived broadly enough to encompass Žižekian, Kristevan, and feminist developments – forms the dominant framework in recent psychoanalytic music studies. This framework may or may not be explicitly related to the new-musicological studies, gender theories, and postmodern perspectives. That is to say, current writers may choose their own ways to relate or integrate their psychoanalytic engagements to new musicology, gender studies, and the like. Kramer (1995 and 1998b) draws eclectically on Lacanian and Kristevan theories in his new-hermeneutic and postmodern analyses. Schwarz (1997a) adds Žižek to the mix, and has overhauled, for music-analytical purposes, the concepts of acoustic mirror and “acoustic gaze”, applying them to the music of Schubert, Peter Gabriel, and Beatles. Schwarz (1997a and 1997b) and Naomi Cumming (1997a) have both used Lacanian and Kristevan (and some of Žižek’s) ideas to analyze minimalist music, especially that of John Adams and Steve Reich. A different usage of these and other poststructural ideas appears in John Richardson’s study of Philip Glass’s Akhnaten (1999). Richardson (1998) has also studied repetition in film and popular music. Drawing upon the work of Kristeva, Ivanka Stoianova (1977) pioneered in the field of psychoanalytic engagements with minimalism as early as the 1970s. Other interesting studies include Schwarz’s (1997a) analysis of Diamanda Galás’s music based on Kristeva’s (1982) notion of abjection, and Joke Dame’s (1998) discussion of pheno- and genotextual elements in Berio’s Sequenza III.

9 For a critique of Fink’s analysis of Brahms, see Monelle 2001: 409–410. I return to Fink’s analysis ahead (pp. 68–69, Chap. 3.2.6). A psychoanalytic precursor to Fink’s and others’ studies of sexuality in Brahms music, see Hitschmann’s essay “Johannes Brahms und die Frauen” from the year 1933, in which Hitschmann attempts to find Brahms’ conception of women in his music as well (Psychoanal. Bewegung 5: 97–129; see also, Noy 1966: 130).
Interesting analyses have also been carried out that rely on theories other than those of Žižek, Kristeva, Lacan, and other familiar names. Ellen Handler Spitz (1991), for instance, has studied George Crumb’s *Ancient Voices of Children* on the basis of Winnicott’s theory of the transitional phase. Literary theorist Harold Bloom’s (1973) Freudian-inflected theory of the anxiety of influence has been adapted to musicological purposes (Straus 1990; Korsyn 1991). Korsyn (1991), for instance, reads Brahms works “through” Chopin, since, according to Bloom, works of art always convey Oedipal fights against and misreadings of their precursor models. This idea results in a notion of meaning as a collision of many texts, coming close to Kristeva’s notion of intertextuality. Recently, Freud’s (1955a [1919]) notion of the uncanny has fascinated music theorists and analysts, especially in understanding certain harmonic phenomena (see pp. 147–148, Chap. 5.2.3).

In Part III of the present study, different psychoanalytic theories are mixed together in the music analyses, in order to enable discussion of specific musical subject strategies. The basic poststructural semiotico-psychoanalytic framework remains the same throughout the analyses, while the concepts by which the semantics of the works are interpreted vary from poststructural psychoanalysis to object-relation theory, and from Freudian accounts to feminism.

### 3.2.4 Psychoanalytic studies of opera, film music, and other audio-visual media

Psychoanalytic studies of opera, film music, and other audio-visual media form a popular and dynamic area of research that may be differentiated into a special field of its own. Such research ranges from the study of characters and narration (Pollock 1993; Ostwald & Zegans 1997; Richardson 1999; Castarède 2002; Žižek & Dolar 2002; Keller 2003: 121–163) to studies of voice as object voice and acoustic mirror (Doane 1980; Silverman 1988; Poizat 1992 and 1998; Dunn & Jones 1994; Jones 1994). For example, Michel Poizat (1992: 31) theorizes opera as a site for “radical autonomization of the voice”, its transformation into a detached drive object. In opera’s ecstatic moments (vocal cries), signification is

---

10 For examples of the use of psychoanalytic method in studies of non-western music, see Connelly & Massie 1989 and During 1997. Psychoanalysis came about with a view to the western (occidental) subject; hence, the universalizing, ahistorical, and Eurocentric tendencies in classic Freudian and other modes of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis has continued to develop, however, becoming more and more a context-sensitive theory. Recently an ethno-psychoanalytic perspective has developed for the study of non-western cultures. Moreover, as a method of self-analysis and self-reflexivity, psychoanalysis works no matter whether its object of study is western or non-western.
destroyed, and the listening subject can forget her attachment to language and to lack (ibid.). Opera research has drawn greatly from psychoanalytic film studies, narratology, semiotics, and feminism (e.g., Clément 1999 [1979]; Abbate 1991), and likewise for studies of film music (e.g., Flinn 1992; Falck 1996, 1998, and 2000; Kassabian 2001) and music in other audiovisual media, such as music videos (Niekerk 1992; Cubitt 1997).

This branch of psychoanalytic music research is most evident in the present research in the chapter on k.d. lang’s voice and music (Chap. 10). However, the concept of acoustic mirror, as importantly developed in feminist psychoanalytic film studies, is central to the analysis of Schubert’s “Der Lindenbaum” as well (Chap. 8). Moreover, the object of study in Chapter 11, Nordgren’s TV-opera Alex, represents a study of mixed audiovisual media: TV and opera. Passing reflections on the special genre and medium of TV-opera are rendered under this category too.

3.2.5 Psychoanalytic studies of ideologies of music

Psychoanalytic studies of ideologies of music ferret out the unconscious elements and motivations present in the conceptions, beliefs, and practices of music. This means analyzing from a psychoanalytic perspective, the collective fantasies around music and their historical formation. This can be done in regard to any musical phenomenon, be it a work of music, its reception, music-historical presentation, a particular musico-cultural practice, or musical institution (such as academic music research or a school of composition). Current musicology is at the same time often a study of ideology; this happens, for example, in music-historical study and music analysis. Feminist research, as a case in point, always deals with gender ideologies.11

Musical ideology works as collective (aesthetic) superego that controls musico-cultural practices (cf. Kohut 1990 [1957]; Kurkela 1993: 443–447). Rigid formalist music theory and aesthetics, and the related resistance of musical semantics in modern musicology, can be studied as repression of the emotional, sexual, and corporeal dimensions of music, or as controlling the “feminine” in music. To Kramer (1995: 61–64), the feminizing othering of music, and conversely, the defending of music’s masculinity, manifest as a split between the Lacanian imaginary and symbolic.12

---

11 Besides psychoanalytic feminism, influential psychoanalytic views on ideologies have been developed, for example, by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

12 Eric Zakim (2001) has applied Bloom’s (1973) theory of the anxiety of influence to the study of modernist ideology in music, as seen especially in its rejection of tonality. This Zakim connects to Lacan’s notion of “surplus” and Žižek’s “symptom”, which refer to
Leo Treitler (1993a: 53–54) has proposed that the job of psychoanalytic music research is to study how the question of music’s ability to communicate affects and ideas – the question of musical expression, signification, and semantics – has been treated from Plato’s time until today. Such scrutiny may also explain the little room made for psychoanalytic theory in music research, especially before the 1990s. According to Treitler, this is a question of the ideology of depersonalization central to modernism: excluding the subjectivity and possibility of many identities offers protection from the fear and anxiety of losing control. (Ibid.: 58.)

This matter is related to the paradoxical position of music in the history of western thought, where it has been attached, on the one hand, to sensuality and passions (body), and, on the other hand, to the highest possible rationality (mind).

3.2.6 Psychoanalytic topics in music; special methodological questions

Other kinds of dialogue, in addition to research, can take place between psychoanalysis and music. Psychoanalysis, as a significant and powerful cultural phenomenon, has affected and inspired music and other arts, aesthetics, and composers. (This holds for music research and theory as well.) Surrealists, for instance, adopted and developed the “psychoanalytic iconography” of Freudian symbols and dream imagery (Kuusamo 1996: 73–75; 1984). Psychoanalysis also had considerable impact on musical Expressionism. From the twentieth-century till now, opera librettos have been especially sensitized to psychoanalysis. Thus, different art forms often allude to the “psychoanalytic” (cf. Salvador Dali’s works, Schoenberg’s Erwartung, or literature from Thomas Mann to Eugene O’Neill); such arts have their own reception (history) of psychoanalysis.

something that refuses to be included in the signifying mechanism of a semiotic structure. As is always the case with psychoanalytic perspectives, even in regard to Bloom’s theory, a possibility for self-analysis opens up: Does not the anxiety of influence – the Oedipal fight and defense mechanisms against the predecessors and the misreading of “old” musicology – affect to a great extent the formation of current musicology as well?

13 For more extensive discussion of the matter, see Kramer 1995; and 2002: esp. 1–9. For a summary of Kramer’s and Žižek’s views on music and ideology, see Wright 1998: 162–166.

14 Composers’ relation to psychoanalysis has been one object of interest in applied psychoanalytic music research. Psychoanalysts have often been interested in clinical experiences of people that belong to special groups, such as performing musicians and composers. Case studies of musicians’ psychoanalyses may open new vistas, for example, on the treatment of performance anxiety. Freud was deeply interested in “great men”, and his relations with artists, including Mahler and Bruno Walter, have interested other psychoanalysts engaged with the arts. See Nass 1989: 167–169 for a review of such studies.
A work of music may have a clear psychoanalytic topic or program, or psychoanalysis may be explicitly present at the level of the subject-matter and plot, as in Kurt Weill’s musical *Lady in the Dark*, Schoenberg’s *Erwartung*, or Tauno Marttinen’s TV-opera *Burnt Orange*. On the other hand, psychoanalysis may inspire a composition (e.g., Richardson 1999 on Glass’s *Akhnaten*) in the same way that feminist (and psychoanalytic) theories have inspired the feminist avant-garde in visual arts. The reflexive procedure or “self-commentary” in musical arts is typical of the era (art itself “comments” art, previous works, and art theories), and comparable in a certain way to musical works of the nineteenth century that had literal programs. Such self-reflexiveness is, however, much more popular in visual than in musical arts.¹⁵

Psychoanalytic topics in works of music pose a unique methodological problem for psychoanalytic music analysis. As with feminist theories and music influenced by them, there are musics and music-makers who consciously deal with psychoanalytic issues. In these cases, psychoanalysis is a theme, an issue in the work, forming a certain “psychoanalytic iconography”. From the perspective of psychoanalytic criticism, these works can be considered as psychoanalytically *double coded*.¹⁶ This means that theoretically two different psychoanalytic levels are to be taken into account in the analysis: 1) the manifest iconographical level and 2) the psycho-textual level (i.e., that of the activating identification and formation of subjectivity). To analyze the manifest psychoanalytic iconography alone would restrict the analyst to the level of recognizing the topics without grasping the proper or further interpretative level. Accordingly, it is necessary to differentiate, when possible, between (1) “theory” (e.g., psychoanalysis, feminism) as a subject-matter in the work and (2) theory as an interpretative methodology (cf. Kuusamo 1996: 73–75, 165–167).

In Schoenberg’s *Erwartung*, for instance, there are psychoanalytic topics in the story and depicted musically, in which case it is a question of the codes of psychoanalytic iconography at the manifest level. Fink’s (1998: 262) study

---

¹⁵ Psychoanalysis has also inspired scientific, music-analytical, music-theoretical, and compositional theories. In that case, it is not necessarily so much a question of a psychoanalytic approach in music research than of a theory for which psychoanalysis has functioned as a kind of model. On the other hand, such differentiation may be artificial and not relevant with regard to theories of certain periods, which might have understood theory and music research differently from how they are understood nowadays. Hans Keller’s “wordless functional analysis”, for instance, not only uses the Freudian idea of disclosing deep structures, but also serves modernist ideology (prevailing in the music theory of that time). As another example, Allan Walker’s music theory connects the idea of motivic unity to Freudian notions of repression and preconscious association. See n. 7, p. 61 (Chap. 3.2.2).

¹⁶ I am indebted to Kuusamo for the concept.
of *Erwartung* as repressing the key of D minor, and even “repressing the traumatic fate of a particular D minor leitmotif from Strauss’s *Salome*”, addresses the second-level textual strategy.

Psychoanalytic iconography proper, in the strict sense as a kind of conscious or generally acknowledged strategy, does not exist prior to Freud, that is to say, before the invention of psychoanalysis. Yet certain musical iconographies in late Romantic music, such as the “Tristan chord”, are nowadays read largely as signs of sexuality and affective psychological crisis. Today, because of the cultural reception tradition, we might talk anachronistically – though with certain reservations – about psychoanalytic or depth-psychological iconography in such cases as Wagner. To interpret the Tristan chord as a “psychoanalytic” sign of crisis in contemporary music (or in contemporary reception of older music) thus also relates to the iconographical level. An obvious way of addressing the second, textual level in analysis is to search for ruptures in the musical discourse, such as points of discontinuity in a certain style, understood as Freudian slips or other tricks of the unconscious. But differentiation between the two levels of psychoanalytic interpretation or representation is not always so easy and sometimes not even possible.17

To approach music as if it constructs unsettled subjectivity is unavoidably related to this central and insolvable question: how is the representation of unconscious mechanisms to be understood? (and how should it be reflected in the study?)18 This question points up the paradoxical nature of psychoanalysis, and the fact that the unconscious (or semiotic) can never be grasped as such but only through discursive acts (conventions) powered by the vicissitudes (derivatives) of drives. This makes problematic the methodological status of such concepts as Kristeva’s *semiotic*, Barthes’s *genotext* and *grain of the voice*, or Lacan’s *real*. In the present research, psychoanalytic interpretations are made in the continuity formed by the two (textual) levels of representation (mentioned above) as the polar extremes of dominance: the symbolic and the semiotic. The symbolic and semiotic levels of representation cannot be separated from each others: what is sought after are “specific sites of interplay between the semiotic … and the symbolic” (Kramer 1995: 21). My interest lies in the cultural specificity of how psychic/-textual mechanisms of unsettled subjectivity take place.

The libretto of Nordgren’s TV-opera *Alex* (written by Saaritsa; see Chap. 11) addresses existential issues of subjectivity, even in the “psychologizing” music of the opera. The opera thus addresses a deep-psychological thematics program-

---

17 Cf. the discussion in pp. 6–7 (Chap. 1.1).
matically and iconographically. This is not the case with other music in this study, though all of it touches upon the thematics of subjectivity (and melancholy, as does the case in point). It becomes evident that the border between the two levels of representation and interpretation is malleable when the object of analysis is music that has “psychoanalytic” subject matter in the sense that it relates to the subject’s fundamental constitution in a way that psychoanalysis considers significant. An example would be that of object loss stemming from unrequited or impossible love (as in Schubert’s Winterreise or k.d. lang’s Ingénue). Romantic song cycles about lost love deal with loss in general – and thus with the ever-resounding loss of the primal object. The thematics of melancholy love enacts subjectivity formation in an imaginary register of other, mirror, and ego ideal. Moreover, in this setting, an object loss is also a loss of oneself, that is to say, of subjectivity.

Fink’s (1998) analysis of Brahms’s Symphony No. 1 prompts a related methodological question, that of the relationship between the music of Freud’s day as it relates (or not) to Freud’s theories. I disagree with Fink’s view that Freudian or even psychoanalytic methods in general should be restricted only to the music of the “Freudian era” of about 1848–1950. Fink argues that Freud’s theories provide windows into cultural hermeneutics, only in the music of that era, as a kind of fin-de-siècle rhetorical theory. For example: “no Freudian readings of Don Giovanni, Hildegard of Bingen, or John Cage”. (Fink 1998: 254.) Fink would even “hesitate to use the death drive to explain a piece written in 1865, or even 1905 – although after 1915 it becomes a tempting cultural resource” (ibid.: 255). Obviously, to Fink psychoanalysis cannot function as a valid scientific/critical approach to contemporary music research, but only as a kind of Affektenlehre comparable to the Cartesian theory of bodily humours. This position goes against almost all contemporary psychoanalytic criticism. This would be to claim that feminist theories are not applicable to music written before feminist movements. Certainly Freud can be considered as having a “unique position as crystallizer and expositor or widely-spread fin-de-siècle beliefs about human psychology and sexuality” (ibid.: 254, 256). But I do not see why the historicity of Freud’s theory should be considered either extraordinary or inhibiting, for all theories of all time, both in and outside of the sciences, are indeed historical; they all must be historicized and revised as time goes by. Psychoanalysis did not stop with Freud. When Kramer (1990: 184), for example, writes that “Freud’s psychoanalysis is in part a codification of nineteenth-century expressive and discursive practices”, the expression “in part” is crucial in acknowledging the function of psychoanalytic theory as contemporary critical theory too.19

19 Naturally, psychoanalytic theories are influential cultural phenomena of a certain Zeitgeist and they interact with music; against this fact it is possible to analyse music as
Chapter 3. Objects of study, metapsychological viewpoints, and paradigms

Psychoanalysis is conceived in the present research in a postmodern way as a socio-cultural historical construction (as are all the theories and other cultural phenomena). But I do not view psychoanalytic theorizing simply as a manifestation of a certain Zeitgeist and applicable only to music of the same era.\textsuperscript{20} I take psychoanalysis to mean first and foremost a \textit{contemporary} and generalized form of critique and as a cultural theory, which is based on Freud but has been significantly reformulated since its inception more than a century ago. Moreover, I understand it as a semiotical theory that provides various approaches to music analysis. In studying musical signification and unconscious musico-textual mechanisms, I am seeking a broader cultural – historical, ideological, aesthetical – and psychoanalytic understanding of the pieces chosen for analysis. Further, the present study does not represent historical music analysis, but textual listening (reading); thus, the historical context most important to my interpretations is that of the interpretation history of a work in question today and as it relates to today’s music listeners.\textsuperscript{21}

In this sub-chapter, psychoanalytic music research has been examined according to common types and objects of study, and some special methodological questions in the field have been brought up. Next, psychoanalytic music research is explored in terms of metapsychology.

\begin{itemize}
\item conveying psychoanalytic “Affektenlehre” (or being double coded). But it does not nullify other, much more common possibilities of using psychoanalytic theories in music research.
\item 20 This “same era” thinking is very problematic also because people listen to old music \textit{today}. However, I couldn’t help observing that in my study the analyses of music of the post-Freudian era (k.d. lang, Nordgren) are indeed dominated by post-Freudian psychoanalytic theories, whereas the analyses of Romantic music are grounded more significantly in Freud (especially the analysis of Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 6).
\item 21 Psychoanalytic approaches are often criticized for being insensitive to historical context. However, sensible psychoanalytic criticism always pay attention to historical and socio-cultural contexts, as any analysis of music must do, even if implicitly. With the exception of psycho-history and biographical studies, psychoanalytic criticism most often focuses on what art works mean to people of today (listeners, viewers, readers), and not what they might have meant when the works were created. (Some postmodern musicologists, like Kramer, combine a historically and socio-culturally sensitive perspective with psychoanalytic interpretation when analyzing meanings of western art music; 1998b.) Moreover, our interpretations of music, from any historical period, always happen in the present. Music analyses are always “this work, now!” -interpretations, even though they might intend to construct the past or even “authenticity”. This does not mean that we should overlook historical contexts in psychoanalytic analyses, but that our contextualizations of history are themselves historical (contextual). It is always a matter of “the past of our present” (Kuusamo 1996: 56; quoting Wallgren 1989: 42). For an influential account of historiographical aspects in music research, see Treitler’s \textit{Music and the Historical Imagination} (1989).
\end{itemize}
3.3 Metapsychological perspectives on music

The theoretical foundation and point of departure of psychoanalysis lies in the notion of unconscious psychic life. The concept of the “unconscious” means various things in various theories and types of research – consequently in music research, too. Freud (1957b [1915]: 181) coined the term metapsychology to indicate a “general theory” in psychoanalysis: a theory of the psychic apparatus at the highest level of abstraction. Accordingly, in the Freudian tradition, metapsychological viewpoints are addressed in order to differentiate the ways in which psychoanalysis theorizes the unconscious and its significance, scope, and workings. Each viewpoint poses a different kind of question about unconscious psychic life, thereby emphasizing different aspects of the latter. All the viewpoints may be said to form the totality of Freudian psychoanalytic understanding. These viewpoints provide the “rules” of understanding psychical functioning. It may be said that metapsychology together with developmental psychology form the basic theory of psychoanalysis (Sandler et al 1997: 1, 5). By means of these viewpoints, the various functions and dimensions of music in the subject’s psychical life can be outlined: how music is connected to personality and its unconscious foundations. Further, metapsychology introduces concepts and notions that can be used as music-analytic tools.

I shall next discuss metapsychological points of view and their applications in music research. My point of departure is Freudian psychoanalytic theory, with emphasis on its methodology (rather than that of musicology). This means that the potential of psychoanalysis in music research is discussed via metapsychological horizons, which theorize the unconscious dimension of subject and culture and which thereby invite various ways of understanding musical phenomena. The question is: What and how does music mean for the subject from the point of view of the unconscious as theorized by psychoanalytic metapsychology? This approach elucidates various important basic ideas, presuppositions, and starting points of psychoanalytic music research in general, which help us to conceptualize the more specific (semiotical) psychoanalytic framework of this study, too.

Though the idea of metapsychology derives from classic Freudian psycho-

22 Still, the individual’s psychical development is studied from metapsychological points of view, too. Sandler et al. (1997: 1) write that for “metapsychology” one might substitute psychoanalytic psychology, given all the advances made since Freud’s day. Nevertheless, metapsychology remains a useful and valid term. In addition to metapsychology and developmental psychology, the third essential part of the Freudian psychoanalytic theory is the theory of therapeutic method.

23 Metapsychological accounts of the functions of music include, for example, Kohut (1990 [1957]).
analysis, it has been importantly developed in the ego-psychological tradition. Object-relation theories and Lacanian psychoanalysis, by contrast, have their own general theories (though they, too, may draw on classic accounts). The semiotically reformulated metapsychological survey undertaken here will later help in the understanding of poststructural and semiotical paradigms too. Unlike other surveys, mine emphasizes the centrality of the unconscious modality of meaning and subjectivity formation in every signifying practice.24

Classic Freudian psychoanalytic theory differentiates from three to four, and Freudian ego-psychological tradition from five to six metapsychological viewpoints, depending on if Freud’s topographical model is divided into “early” (first) and “late” (second). The early one is usually referred to as “the topographical viewpoint”, and the late as “the structural viewpoint”.25 The viewpoints are as follows: 1) dynamic, 2) economic (drive-energetic), 3) (first) topographic, 4) structural26 (= second topography), 5) genetic (developmental), and 6) adaptive. Numbers 1–3 were named by Freud; the structural viewpoint was added later, after he formulated notions of the id, ego, and superego in 1923. The last two are additions developed in ego- and self-psychological traditions.27 (See Moore et al. 1990: 119–120; Laplanche & Pontalis 1988: 126–130, 249–250, 449–453; Tähkä 1970: 6–8; Wright 1998: 9–10.)

I am adding a seventh metapsychological viewpoint: (7) the systemic. By this I refer to the semiotical viewpoint, which refers to the degree of the symbolic/symbolization in a psychic process or representation. The systemic view outlines the binary logic of the two modalities of meaning, and emphasizes the importance of the (il)logic of the unconscious in every signifying act. The systemic point of view forms an essential point of departure in psychoanalytic semiotics – alongside dynamic and economic viewpoints.28 It is to be understood as a

24 This modification could be seen as an attempt to integrate poststructural and Lacanian psychoanalysis to the Freudian metapsychological discussion, and thus bring it in line with the ego-psychological tradition. On the other hand, it offers broader framework for psychoanalytic semiotics than what Kristevan or Lacanian points of departure would do alone.

25 The first topographical and structural concepts are also called “models” or “theories”. As Jukka Välimäki (private communication) points out, these two points of view have a special position in psychoanalytic theory, in that they represent Freud’s two central theoretical models. Some ego-psychological psychoanalysts even think that the structural model replaces the first topographical model; not so, here.

26 The structural viewpoint is Freud’s term and does not refer to linguistic or Lacanian structuralism and semiotics.

27 The genetic viewpoint is an addition attributed to Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris, and Rudolph Loewenstein; the adaptive viewpoint, to David Rapaport.

28 Lacan’s own “general theory” (”schemata” and other formalizations) forms a large branch of Lacanian exegetics not addressed in the present study. In my research, I use
Subject Strategies in Music

metapsychological model that clarifies Kristeva’s concepts of the subject-in-process/on-trial and the text (music) as a dialectic of the semiotic and the symbolic. As mentioned earlier (especially in Chap. 1), psychoanalytic semiotics emphasizes (1) the role of meaning production (discourse, text) in subjectivity, and (2) how meaning is formed by the cooperation of the logic of consciousness and of the unconscious.\(^{29}\) I thereby lay emphasis on early Freud, that is, from *circa* 1900–1915 (see Freud 1953 [1900] and 1960 [1901]), who by studying dreams, parapraxes, and jokes formulated rules that regulate the unconscious logic at work in all signification.

The systemic viewpoint derives most importantly from Freud’s first topography, which outlines the systems of unconscious, preconscious, and conscious, as well as the formal characteristics of the (il)logic of the unconscious. Unlike the ways in which Freud’s first topography is commonly understood, we shall not be too casual in differentiating between the nominal (systemic) and adjectival (descriptive) modes of conceiving the unconscious. In fact, this distinction is crucial to the study of signification. Thus, in the metapsychological framework of the present research, Freud’s first topography is actually divided in two: (3) “the degree of the consciousness” (term coined by Tähkä 1970: 7) and (7) “the systemic”.\(^{30}\) This solution and terminology are supported by Freud’s (1957b [1915] and 1958 [1912]) division of the “unconscious” into descriptive, dynamic, and systemic meanings in his metapsychological texts.


1. The *dynamic* point of view considers mental operations as “forces” deriving from the drives and drive-based impulses; among these are ego defenses, repression, inhibitions of superego, conflicts, and considerations related to

---

\(^{29}\) Lacanian ideas not *in toto*, but only as they serve my purposes.

\(^{30}\) Kristeva uses the expression *meaning work* to evoke Freud’s concept of *dream work*. The same goes for my term, *subjectivity work*.

I am greatly in debt for discussions with Jukka Välimäki for this solution.

72
Chapter 3. Objects of study, metapsychological viewpoints, and paradigms

the outer world. Psychic tensions, anxieties, and conflicts develop when drive impulses stemming from bodily urges confront the demands of outer reality, i.e., the social order. From this viewpoint, “unconscious” refers to psychic material that is actively dissociated; that is to say, access to consciousness is prohibited by repression that produces disturbing mental content.

In this perspective, music appears as resulting from, bringing forth, disturbing, and working out the unconscious conflicts of psyche. Here lays the basis of music’s therapeutic impact. Repressed wishes may, in music, be discharged via a substitute channel. The dynamic point of view also provides a theoretical perspective for studying what is repressed in music and why, in various musical manifestations ranging from genres, styles, compositions on up to musical tastes, ideologies of musicology, and various musico-psychological phenomena. For example, take an obstinate melody that keeps playing in one’s mind or that suddenly pops up in the middle of another train of thought. Such a melody may be a disguised manifestation of a repressed idea, i.e., the return of the repressed in a musical form, which at the same time both reveals and hides (cf. Reik 1983 [1953]: 10; see also, Ferenczi 1980 [1909]).

2. From the economic or energetic viewpoint one examines psyche and unconscious with the drive-energetic metaphors introduced by Freud. Sexuality and aggression are understood as forms of psychic energy. Other central concepts are cathexis (a charged drive of energy), life and death drives (eros and thanatos), pleasure and reality principles, and narcissism. The notion of “binding” included in the economic viewpoint relates so-called “mobile energy” to the primary process and pleasure principle, which together rule in the unconscious, and “bound energy” to the secondary process and reality principle, which rule in the consciousness. Language has been deemed the main binder of psychic energy. From the point of view of psychoanalytic semiotics, we see that all signifying practices (texts, discourses) are ways of binding the psychic energy that arises from drives, and transforming it into desire, into meaning work (subjectivity work), and into discourse.

In this framework, music can be studied as an outlet for tensions ensuing from drives, such as sexuality and aggression. It can be studied both as a binder and a releaser of these tensions. As a non-verbal discourse, music has been considered capable of effectively activating the mobility of psychic energy, thereby defusing tensions. Music has also been linked to pleasure-seeking, and it can be studied from the point of view of narcissism as well.

3. The degree of consciousness (cf. the first topography) tells the position of a psychic process in its relation to the consciousness. The term “unconscious” is

31 Freud gives several accounts of narcissism, which can be understood in terms of the psychic economy, and of structural and developmental viewpoints.
used here as an adjective. One may ask, for example, if listening to music and the concomitant production and grasping of meanings take place at the conscious, preconscious, or unconscious level of mind. How and what kind of work is done unconsciously when one is making music, listening to it, when composing, dancing, and more? Does music make unconscious psychic contents conscious? If so, then on what basis?

4. The *structural viewpoint* refers to the model of psychic life that Freud formulated in 1923 (second topography; Freud 1961a [1923]). It differentiates the psyche into three macro-structures of id, ego, and superego. The id, ego, and superego are aspects of psychical processes that describe how the mind operates in conflicted states as they are caused by drives and motives. It is a question of the structural totality formed definitively and finally in the Oedipal stage; the superego does not take proper shape until the Oedipal complex is resolved. Still, the superego has earlier developmental forms, as do the id and ego (though opinions and emphases about the matter differ greatly). The *id* is a compound of libidinal, sexual, and aggressive drive representations aroused by bodily urges. It represents the pleasure-seeking side of psychic life. The superego ensues from the mind’s absorption of attitudes and values of “outside” demands (such as the parents, social rules, and taboos), aimed at taming drive-based, sexual, and aggressive tendencies. The superego is linked with moral rules, inhibitions, and social pressures, and it stands for the observing and punishing side of the psyche. The *ego* refers to the operations of control and mastery of the self. It develops from the id, and it takes care of the subject’s relation to the outside world and social reality. The ego further regulates and stabilizes psychic life by building compromises between the demands of the drives and the outer world. It functions as a mediator between id, superego, and outside world, and it differentiates inner and outer worlds from each other. A failure in this regulation leads to the development of anxiety.

The Oedipal complex is the network of the child’s loving and aggressive wishes toward her parents. In this network, the different-sex parent is esteemed as an object of sexual desire, while the same sex-parent is experienced as a rival and replacement. Freud links this complex to the phallic stage (age 2.5–6 years), but on the other hand, the Oedipal complex is a fundamental, unconscious structure of psyche, a nucleus of desire, repression, and sexual identity. (Laplanche & Pontalis 1988: 282–287.) In Lacan’s linguistic psychoanalysis, the entry into language is considered to be more important to the Oedipal complex than is the actual father; with language the child enters into the realm of the symbolic (“the name of the father”). Both Freud’s and Lacan’s conceptions of the Oedipus complex have been criticized by feminists because of the male (and heteronormative) perspective, attitude of patriarchy, and phallocentrism; Guattari and Deleuze, on the other hand, view Freud’s and Lacan’s theories on this matter as conventional, repressive, and capitalistic.
Chapter 3. Objects of study, metapsychological viewpoints, and paradigms

On this view, the term “unconscious” often refers to the mental representation of the drive-base (id), but left untold is the position of the psychic process in relation to consciousness and degree of the latter. The id represents solely the field of the (adjectivally) unconscious; in contrast, both the ego and superego have conscious and unconscious sides. Defense mechanisms, for instance, belong to the (adjectivally) unconscious domain of the ego.

Psychoanalytic music research has relied greatly on structural concepts, especially in music therapy and music psychology drawing on ego- and self-psychology. Kohut has often been mentioned as the most central figure in theorizing the id, ego, and superego functions of music. According to Kohut, in relation to the id, music functions as an emotional catharsis for releasing the tensions produced by repressed wishes, which the ego usually experiences as threatening. Also, music functions as a sublimation\(^{33}\) and transference phenomenon\(^{34}\). Certain suggestive rhythms, for instance, may be unconsciously experienced as the release of sexual tensions, and at the same time as the consciousness is paying attention to other musical aspects, such as melodic variation. Kohut stresses that music may act upon the id-function in many ways, and not just music bearing the most manifestly sexual content, such as Ravel’s *Bolero*, for instance. (Kohut 1990 [1957]: 22–23.) In music, aspects of the id may wear many complex disguises.

In relation to the *ego*, Kohut thinks music appears as an activity of mastery and as a parallel for play (games) requiring a kind of psychic exertion. Kohut argues that, at the most archaic level – instancing the weaker psychic organization of an infant – sounds produce anxiety and are always experienced as threatening. Auditory hyper-sensitivity at this level may become activated in the adult, when the latter is in threatening situations (e.g., being alone in the dark) or has psychical disorders such as schizophrenia, which may manifest as the hearing of voices issuing commands. (Kohut 1990 [1957]: 23–24; Kohut & Levarie 1990 [1950]: 4–9; see also, Nass 1990: 44–45.) In such cases, the organized sounds of music may represent relief and the pleasure of mastering a (potentially) traumatic threat.

The *superego* functions of music relate, according to Kohut, to the recognition of and obeisance to an aesthetic ideal, i.e., to socio-cultural and ideological

---

33 *Sublimation*, in the jargon, indicates the channeling of a drive-based impulse into a socially acceptable form. Freud considered sublimation as essential factor in artistic work.

34 *Transference* is the actualization of unconscious wishes or fears, in such a way that feelings and thoughts which in early childhood were experienced toward an important person (object) are now re-located, and related to (what the subject considers as) an important person in the present. It is thus a question of a kind of projection or displacement. The efficiency of psychoanalytic treatment is to a great extent based on the mechanics of transference.
norms. Kohut talks about aesthetic or musical superego. Aesthetic rules, concerning form and harmony and the like, can be seen as artistic-emotional equivalents of moral codes (ethics). According to Kohut, aesthetic experience is connected to the satisfaction characterized by a sense of sureness resulting from submission to the demands of the aesthetic superego. It thus comes close to the moral satisfaction one senses upon “having done something right”. (Kohut 1990 [1957]: 25.)

Superego mechanisms operate in matters of musical taste, aesthetic ideologies, and schools of thought (paradigms). The aesthetic superego may, for example, prevent the enjoyment of certain music or composing technique by deeming it bad, stupid, wrong, inappropriate, and so on. Aesthetic superego mechanisms are closely allied to those of the religious superego (Kurkela 1993: 443–447). André Michel (1951) considers the composer to be an artistic representative of a society’s superego demands, and the composer’s musical style as a compromise between subjugation to and revolt against the demands made by the social superego.35

In psychoanalytic theory, the formation of superego relates in an interesting way to the early acoustic sphere of the subject. Freud (1961a [1923]) describes the superego as developing from orders, laws, and censorship mediated by the parents’ voices. Shades and tones rule: the voice, for example, can be cutting, sharp, fuming, paralyzingly distant, or deathly cold. This sphere in the superego is not constructed on “contents” only (such as rules of behavior) but also on the tone of voice and other non-lexical material of speech (Kohut talks about “forms”). Kohut gives a literary example: In Eugene O’Neill’s The Emperor Jones, the ceaseless drumming that comes ineluctable closer does not signify only impending, external punishment, but is also a symbol of one’s internal sense of guilt. According to Kohut, the domain of sounds, tones, and timbres cached in the superego is closely related to the preverbal acoustic sphere of the subject. This is also connected to the soothing and calming, even hypnotic effect that certain music may have when it recalls an early experience, say, of the mother’s

35 One wonders if Michel is here studying western art music as socio-cultural and ideological construct à la new musicology forty years avant la lettre. Michel interprets Bach’s Protestant music as a secret continuation of Catholic tradition and as an artistic mediation between the two. When discussing Schumann, Michel refers to André Coeuroy’s claim that Schumann, just before a psychotic break, was intensively studying Bach’s works, which Michel interprets as an attempt to make peace with the father-superego. (Michel 1951: 100–102.) Michel’s thought has points in common with Bloom’s (1973) theory of the anxiety of influence, according to which poets – and by extension, composers – are fighting an Oedipal fight against their predecessors and against earlier models. Kohut (1990 [1957]: 25) offers another interpretation: if one experiences the ego as collapsing, one may will make desperate efforts to heal herself by musical contact and identification with an “omnipotent” party, here Bach.
The structural functions of music, according to Kohut, can be summarized as follows: 1) emotional catharsis of primitive impulses and repressed wishes (id function of music); 2) satisfactory mastering of a possibly traumatic threat (ego function); 3) satisfactory submission to rules offering an inner sense of acceptance (superego function). Correspondingly, Richard P. Wang, in discussing music therapy, talks about id-music as stimulating unconscious fantasies. Ego-music, for its part, supports ego functions and strengthens the sense of reality and ego-defenses (tranquilizing music, for instance). Superego-music represents moral rules, orders, and inhibitions; such music would include anthems, military and church music, for instance. (Wang 1968: 114.) It could be added that narcissistic satisfaction also is a central element in superego-music.

5. From the developmental (or genetic\textsuperscript{36}) point of view, we see the psychic realm through the early developmental stages of an individual, and by paying attention to these stages as they form strata in the adult psyche. According to psychoanalytic developmental psychology, (1) a person cannot be understood as a psychological being if her childhood is not accounted for; (2) furthermore, all the developmental stages of the subject, along with the related psychic mechanisms, are crucial, and play the most decisive role in the adult psyche, even though they may operate mostly unrecognizably, i.e., unconsciously. This is why psychoanalytic developmental psychology also means the theorization of the subject’s psychic structures in general.

The impact of childhood experiences on psychic formation, the subject’s adult life, and her creative production has been examined closely in studies of music therapy, music psychology, and psychobiography. Musical productivity can be considered a way of dealing with childhood or adolescent experiences. On the other hand, the connections between developmental stages and musical experience are studied also at a general psychological level. At this level, one focuses on the formal characteristics and constructive, harmonizing, and integrative functions of unconscious psychic mechanisms. Psychoanalytic art research has always emphasized the relevance of early psychic mechanisms to art, but the emphases vary greatly according to what research paradigm is used. For example, whereas ego-psychology and object-relation theory emphasize point of integration, Lacanian psychoanalysis highlights symptom and discourse, and Kristeva looks at subversion processes triggered by psycho-textual mechanisms. (The connection of art and early psychic mechanisms can be discussed with or without pathological or regressive emphasis; opposite views are typical of

\textsuperscript{36} In psychoanalytic language, \textit{genetic} refers to ontogenetic, not phylo-genetic. It should be understood as simply \textit{developmental} and not associated with genes or genetics. Kristeva prefers the expression “genetic”, whereas I use the term “developmental”.

77
Psychoanalytic art research.) Lately, psychoanalytic developmental psychology has much invested in research on newborn and very young infants, the study of which has been adopted to music research, as noted earlier (p. 60, Chap. 3.2.2). Psychoanalytic developmental concepts can be used as music-analytical tools, too.  

6. The adaptive (integrative) viewpoint puts emphasis on the subject’s psychic adaptation to the environment and her integration into society. Of primary concern are the impact of cultural-social conditions and the role of interaction in the subject’s psychic development and her life in general. Ego-psychology, especially, stresses on the importance of adaptation, in arguing that not all psychic phenomena should be reduced to the conflict-model of drive psychology.

Music may be considered to reflect and partake of the problematics of social adaptation and integration, and even to function as a vehicle for adjustment. Music is an extraordinary site of socio-cultural interaction. The concept of identity – personal, social, and group identity – is essential here; music is a site where identities and differences are constructed. We may ask, how does music deal with the relation of self and outer reality (world)? How does music aid in psychic integration? How can identity be constructed with and by music? How does music help identity processes?

7. At the beginning of this sub-chapter, I acknowledged the systemic viewpoint. Understood systemically, the unconscious of early Freud is a mode of being that is ruled by a logic that differs radically from the linguistic-conceptual mode that prevails in consciousness. This viewpoint thus concerns the mode of logic and the degree of symbolization/semiotization in a psychic process or text. In this perspective, the “unconscious” is used as a noun and conceived as a mode of thinking and modality of signification completely different from the kinds that take place in consciousness.  

37 Psychoanalytic developmental models form a broad field and comprehend, for example, Freud’s theory of sexual development and object-relation theories from Winnicott and Klein to Kohut and Bion (see, e.g., Tyson & Tyson 1990). Various psycho-semiotical theories, such as Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage, can be understood as developmental theories as well. Even Lacan’s theory of registers of psychic constitution, as well as Kristeva’s theory of the chora, are to some extent developmental in concern, though they focus mainly on general mechanisms of subject and text.

38 From this point of view, Freud’s most momentous discovery was not the unconscious as such – not even in its dynamical sense as a source of repressed contents; rather, it was the revelation of an inner world that is governed by laws totally different from those which prevail in conscious thinking (Matte Blanco 1988: 63; 1998 [1975]: 69, 93–94). The view of Freud as the finder of radical otherness is held by such French philosophers as Kristeva and Derrida; still this theme has gone somewhat neglected, even in psychoanalytic theory.
Chapter 3. Objects of study, metapsychological viewpoints, and paradigms

As referred to above (p. 60, Chap. 3.2.2), manifestations of unconscious logic have been studied not only for music-psychological and similar purposes (Friedman 1960; Heinonen 1990; Sabbeth 1990; Klempe 1998; Lång 2004: 206–224). Such manifestations have been studied also music-analytically, especially in some work of a recent, postmodern vintage (Klumpenhouver 1994; Lewin 1995; Lyotard 1998).

We have also pointed out that the systemic viewpoint is central to psychoanalytic semiotics, structural, and poststructural psychoanalysis, and for post-structural and semiotical psychoanalytic music research. Freud’s primary and secondary processes are roughly comparable to (or included in) Kristeva’s (1984 [1974] and 1980) notions of the semiotic and symbolic components in signification, and her concept of geno- and phenotexts at the discursive level of textual mechanisms. For Lacan, the primary process operations of condensation and displacement are linked to the linguistic mechanisms of metaphor and metonym; the unconscious is structured like language, in a complex and systematic way, and obeying certain principles of operation. Lacan describes this “other logic” of signification also with the concepts of real and imaginary and by theories concerning the endless longing or desire for (and of) the “other”. Matte Blanco (1998 [1975] and 1988) derives a systemic view from a “symmetrical logic” and his notion of the unconscious as infinite sets. Kristeva (1984 [1974]: 59–60) adds a third primary process to those of Freud: transposition, by which she means intertextual transformations that take place between sign systems.

Musical signification and subjectivity formation can be examined in the light of these two intertwined modalities of meaning, as it obtains in textual levels related to the consciousness and the unconscious. Such an examination is carried out in Chapter 6, where music is viewed as constant crossings of the thresholds between the semiotic and the symbolic as those crossings manifest or result in musical subject strategies (cf. analytical case studies in Part III).

It is certainly possible to map the general roles of the consciousness and the unconscious in musical experience. At the same time, however, each music, genre, style, work, and piece of music in itself forms a special case and a special discourse, in which the semiotic and the symbolic may manifest differently than in some other. For example, traditional ideals of vocal technique in country music differ starkly from those of opera, and thus “semiotic transgressions”, so to speak, manifest in them quite differently.

In this sub-chapter, I have focused on the methodological primacy of (psychoanalytic) metapsychology, at a general level and with certain post-Freudian additions and variations. The structural and systemic viewpoints have received more extensive attention than have the others, because they refer to the two most

39 For more on this topic, see Silverman 1983: esp. Chaps. 2–3.
Subject Strategies in Music

comprehensive general models of mind introduced by Freud. Moreover, they have been applied in psychoanalytic music research more widely than other viewpoints. Further, the systemic concept is the most important metapsychological framework for the present research.

In the next sub-chapter, three important psychoanalytic paradigms are presented (id-psychology, ego-psychology, and object-relation theory), along with their musicological implications. This forms yet another way to present psychoanalytic music research.

3.4 Psychoanalytic paradigms in the Freudian tradition and in music research

Discussed here are different paradigms in psychoanalytic criticism and their implications for music research and music analysis. Often the borders between paradigms are highly flexible or “porous”, allowing them to intermingle, and research may draw on various paradigms. In fact, a distinguishing characteristic of contemporary psychoanalytic criticism is precisely theoretical eclecticism, impurity, heterogeneity, and pluralism.

My presentation valorizes the history of psychoanalytic music research and its paradigm shifts, from early id-psychology to ego-psychology and object-relation theory. However, “old” paradigms are never completely replaced, but are revised or enriched by later ones. For example, Lacanian and Kristevan analysis may be understood as linguistic and semiotical revisions or re-readings of drive-psychological models. This is why a broader view of psychoanalytic thinking (Chaps. 2–3) offers a necessary ground for understanding poststructural psychoanalytic methodology (Chaps. 4–6). This study relies significantly on general psychoanalytic theories and terminology, not just poststructural ones.

There are different opinions as to what are the most important paradigms of psychoanalytic thought and how they should be categorized. In my research, I distinguish among four such paradigms: (1) id-psychology (classic Freudian psychoanalysis), (2) ego-psychology, (3) object-relation theory (most importantly, Kleinian psychoanalysis and Winnicott’s theories), and (4) the Lacanian tradition. This last comprises various developments, from structuralism and post-structuralism to feminist and other political forms of psychoanalysis.

Here I present the first three of these paradigms. The point of departure in the presentation is general psychoanalytic criticism and art research (cultural psy-

40 On generalized paradigms in psychoanalytic criticism, see Wright 1998 and Minsky 1998, among others.
41 Kleinian psychoanalysis is often considered a school of its own, due to professional divisions in British circles. Such matters do not affect the present study.
Chapter 3. Objects of study, metapsychological viewpoints, and paradigms

The emphasis is more on methodology than on objects of study.

3.4.1 Id-psychology: Music and repressed conflict

During the first half of the last century, psychoanalytic criticism was dominated by id-psychology (drive-psychology) based on the work of Freud, Marie Bonaparte, Ernst Jones, Otto Rank, and others. It emphasizes the dynamic – repressed – content of art (cf. the dynamic viewpoint) in terms of drive-based desire, regression, neuroses, and infantile wishes. It draws on Freud’s view of artistic work as sublimation grounded in unconscious and unsatisfied wishes. “Creativity” and art are understood on the basis of conflict and, as was typical of general art research in those times, often in terms of authorial (psycho-)biography.

In regards to music, this means sketching the musical mise-en-scène prompted by unconscious fantasies. As derived from drives, musical meaning and experience are connected to sexuality and other primal sources of bodily experience. Musical manifestations of psychic conflicts and repressed wishes are examined, and often music is compared to dream. Musical pleasure implies a regression to early developmental stages and a drift into narcissism, vague differentiation between inner and outer realities, loosening of ego boundaries, and undifferentiated, oceanic experiences. Further, music has been considered as an outlet of “sexual-kinesthetic energy” (Sterba 1946) and even a derivative of anal sounds (Michel 1951). Id-psychology connects music to aggression as well. Music is seen as a sublimation of aggressive impulses, such as the sadistic and cruel drives that signal the oral stage. At the same time, music functions as magical protection against the destructive and frightening sides of the self. (Racker 1951; Sterba 1946; Reik 1983 [1953]: 144–145.) Racker (1951) and Reik (1983 [1953]: 144) interpret music as “a transformed scream” conveying primitive aggression. According to them, in this way music functions as a reliever of violence and provides oral satisfaction. Reik points out that music is interpretable as compelled to present an emotional defense against aggressive drives only because it is experienced at the conscious, cultural level as absolutely non-violent and even void of

---

42 In psychoanalytic literature, the oceanic feeling refers to a primordial experience of merging into a greater totality, entailing a sense of limitless omnipotence beyond time and place. It is thought to be a memory trace of a child’s emerging union with the mother at an early stage of narcissism, before stabilization of the borders of subject and object, and prior to the differentiation of time, place, and ego. Freud (1961b [1929/1930]: 64) took the expression from Romain Rolland, to describe certain religious states of mind. This kind of merging experience has been considered an important factor in musical experience (e.g., Graf 1947; Schwarz 1997a: 7; Kohut & Levarie 1990 [1950]: 19).
content (1983 [1953]: 144). A more recent (Lacanian) accounting of the voice as drive manifestation ("ecstatic cry") is provided by Michel Poizat (1992: 100): it “doesn’t matter whether this ‘first’ cry is ‘the first’ or some other cry … [T]his ‘first’ cry is mythical or at all events hypothetical”. What matters is, that

this cry is a pure manifestation of vocal resonance linked to a state of internal displeasure, and that this cry is answered by the Other…, who attributes meaning to the cry, interprets it as a sign of hunger or thirst or whatever, and in bringing the baby something to relieve the tension that provoked the cry, provides the child a first satisfaction. (Ibid.)

According to Poizat, the trace of infant’s first jouissance springs forth in the vocal representations of objects of desire, as occur, for example, in the most extreme or poignant vocal moments of opera (ibid.).

Besides certain psychobiographies (see Chap. 3.2.1.), one of the most comprehensive, even somewhat bizarre, id-psychological way of listening to music is André Michel’s Psychanalyse de la musique (1951). Michel outlines music’s psycho-sexual functions in the light of Freud’s sexual theory. He attributes pregenital drive-bases (oral, anal, phallic) to certain musical articulations in specific works and specific styles of composers. The “oral” musical experience, for example, stems from bodily experiences of rhythms that echo early rocking and sucking experiences. The “anal” aspect of music Michel relates to “puffing” sounds, and phallic aspects to repetition, among others. (Michel 1951: 36, 47.)
To cite more examples, Stravinsky’s aggressive rhythms and “brutal” harmonies are classified in the anal category, as is Ravel’s music; Chopin’s music belongs to the oral category; and Debussy’s and Bach’s to the phallic one (ibid.: 36, 51–52). In further regard to Stravinsky, Michel (ibid.: 51) notes the composer’s extraordinary fondness for percussion instruments and the use of brass instruments in orchestrating the sweetest melodies, which he compares to the “magical undoing of the destructive tendencies”. Music is also interpreted against background of the Oedipal complex; hence Debussy’s music, for instance, reflects unsettled conflict and Bach’s a settled version of the same.

Michel’s work has received much negative criticism both in and outside of psychoanalysis; despite its failings, however, it has been considered rich in originality and inspiration (Kohut 1951). The criticism charges Michel’s book with insufficient and suspect documentation, a reductive and hyperbolic attitude, and with a blatantly simplistic genetic approach that categorizes composers by libidinal developmental stages and draws wild conclusions on the basis of biographical

---

43 Id-psychological interpretations of music’s origin in violent drives are strikingly similar to Jacques Attali’s (1985) views on music’s connection to ritual murder. Attali does not draw explicitly upon psychoanalysis, though traces of anthropological structuralism (Lévi-Strauss) and poststructuralism (Lacan) may colour his argument.
information. In my opinion, however, Michel deserves credit for really studying music: he adduces specific works, compositions, and notated examples, and thus demonstrates how psychoanalytic music criticism is practicable at the level of works, and not just at the level of general psychologizing and philosophizing. This should be seen against the fact that most psychoanalytic music research during the 1950s still concentrated either on general psychological issues or on biographical studies; much rare was specific study at the level of compositions – the most relevant level for a music-analytical orientation. A most telling example is a central text of psychoanalytic music research: The Psychoanalytic Explorations in Music (Feder et al., eds. 1990). That text, primarily in the tradition of applied psychoanalysis and comprised of studies written from 1950 to 1986, does not contain a single notated musical example in all of its 500 pages. Michel, despite his predilection for wild analysis, developed new ways and procedures for analyzing and interpreting music psychoanalytically. Of course, his interpretations would be more convincing, powerful, and relevant (musicologically) if they did not link music so strongly to the personalities of composers.

Drive-psychological music research need not rely on biographical studies and on grounding interpretations in the composers. Indeed, it has long been realized that, instead of setting oneself the (impossible) task of analyzing authors, it is better that the texts be psychoanalyzed. Precisely in its attitude towards the author (composer), psychoanalytic art research during the first half of last century differs from later methods deriving from drive-psychology (e.g., Lacanian criticism). In later revisions of id-psychology, concern with the author disappears, and drive-based desire is examined in the work/text in terms of culture and subject. In the 1950s and earlier, however, psychoanalytic music research existed, such as Michel’s interpretations; but at that time, author-independent ways of interpreting works of art were not in the mainstream despite the efforts of new criticism, Russian formalism, and early structuralism. Things changed with the advent of literary poststructuralism in the 1970s, and later in musicology, when the possibility for analyzing psycho-sexual aspects and other libidinal, drive-based articulations in works of art without biographical argumentation was properly realized and developed. Such discussions were carried on apart from any presumptions about the art work’s (direct, analyzable) connection with authors and authors’ fixations. Yet this remains a problem that characterizes the research from time to time: How does one get rid of genetic interpretations returning to the author? The problem has its continuation – or double – in those

44 The term is Freud’s (1957c [1910]); for clarification, see p. 86 ahead.
45 To confuse author’s personality or life with the representative imagery in the work displays the genetic fallacy. It is a relative of the intentional fallacy (to confuse author’s intended purpose with the actual meaning of a work of art) and the affective fallacy (a
new-musicological studies of authorial sexuality as it appears in their music (cf. Chap. 2.2). How might a composer’s sexuality be relevant to music analysis? And further, in what ways can sexuality be studied in music without it being restricted to aspects of the composer’s personality? At its worst, such studies reduce the potential of socio-cultural criticism to sheer banality. Perhaps worthy of reflection is the question, why has the pursuit of sexuality in music so often relied on the use of biographical methods? Do we want to remove sexuality away from us as listeners to the safer arena of a distant (dead) composer that clearly is an other, a “not-me”?

From the id-psychological perspective, compositions and artistic activity are seen as resulting from an unconscious conflict or the effort to deal with such. The musico-textual thematics to be revealed is identified with composer’s unconscious motives (cf. the genetic fallacy). This is why the common id-psychological research searches for connections between events in the composer’s life and her musical production. Id-psychological studies vary in their conception of the interrelations between unconscious conflict, author and work, and of the purpose of the study. The resulting interpretations may be regarded, for example, as valorizing one particular aspect of the work; the interpretation is understood as one among the others. On the other hand, it may be claimed that unconscious conflicts, reconstructed in the interpretation, sufficiently explain the total work in the spirit of reductionism and psychic determinism. This is also a matter of the purpose of research. Does it contribute to the understanding of music in the field of culture? Or does it instead illuminate a psychoanalytic theory by means of musical examples? In the latter case, interpretation works as a demonstrative appendage of psychoanalysis and psychiatry.

Id-psychological music research has received strong criticism inside psychoanalysis, especially from proponents of ego-psychology (e.g., Nass 1989). Such criticism has been leveled at the diagnostic “tone” in biographical-causal explanations, the linking of creativity to regression, the inclination to reductionism, overemphasis on morbidities and unhealthiness, and focusing on “psychoanalysis of the author”. Also the overall indifference and insensitivity to cultural and aesthetic values and meanings should be noted. Nass (1989: 177) has summari-

work of art is equated with the psychological affect or emotion that it evokes), the concepts of which were inaugurated by William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley and later discussed by many others in and outside the new criticism.

46 A crucial difference exists between id-psychology and later drive-psychology: whereas id-psychology examines music from a perspective of symptomatic versus non-symptomatic, Lacanian and poststructural approaches consider the subject and culture to be inevitably constructed symptomatically; nothing non-symptomatic actually exists. Ego-psychology, for its part, emphasizes the non-conflicting and non-symptomatic workings of ego.
rized the most common methodological risks of id-psychology: (1) the genetic fallacy (see n. 45, pp. 83–84), (2) interpretation and evaluation of a work on the basis of the supposed (unconscious) motive of the author, and (3) the conflict-centered conception of creativity. The lack of musicological knowledge and competence and knowledge should also be mentioned. A basic problem of applied psychoanalysis has been its disregard of research traditions of art forms in question (e.g., musicology). (On the other hand, in new-musicological studies on representations of sexuality, the absence of psychoanalytic theorizing seems just as odd.)

I would not discuss at such length the problems of this kind of research if it were not for the fact that new-musicological gender studies have from time to time lapsed into the same kinds of biography problems as those of id-psychology. For example, in Timothy Jackson’s study of Tchaikovsky (1999), biography serves as the shaky bridge connecting formal analysis (Schenker above all) and homosexual interpretations. Other options are available in these times of poststructuralism and social constructivism, as do (perhaps more pertinent) gay-critical or queer-interpretations of musical meanings.47 Perhaps Jackson’s interpretations of Tchaikovsky exemplify the difficulty of understanding musical meaning as a fundamentally social one, i.e., that the formal is social and the social is formally articulated. It seems that music analysis still finds it difficult to deconstruct distinctions between internal, “purely musical” meaning (formal analysis) and “extramusical” meanings, such as those of culture, society, and biography (cultural analysis). This raises the philosophical and semiotical problem of musical form and content, of signifier and signified.

The main problem in much biography-based id-psychological and new-musicological interpretations is that the leap from the works to sexual interpretation of them is not sufficiently prepared, argued, or justified. The reader may have difficulty understanding how exactly the musical substance and biographical events are linked. Anne Sivuoja-Gunaratnam (1994: 289) has pointed out that to connect works to the psychosexual development of a composer in new-musicological studies does not differ all that much from long-standing biographical approaches, whose weaknesses of probity are well-known. Indeed, for psycho-analytic or gendered interpretations of music, the most important challenge, I think, is to develop non-biographical methods for approaching works of music. These last should be understood as inter-subjective cultural texts, as manifestations of cultural practices, not of the personal psycho-sexuality of this and that.

47 In Jackson’s book, the reader may be surprised at the disregard of earlier homosexual interpretations of the Pathétique since Havelock Ellis, as well as a general unconcern for gay and lesbian studies and queer theory.
composer. Hence the theoretical orientation of the present research concerns the interpretation of musico-cultural imagery, reception, and de-coding grounded on the listener (receiver).

Some extreme id-psychological, biographical-causal interpretations have from time to time succeeded in casting all psychoanalytic art research in a negative light. Freud (1957c [1910]) himself realized this problem at the very beginning, and coined the term “wild analysis” for such “overshooting” of boundaries. Feder (1993a: 7) thinks that wild analyses is one reason for the circumspect and negative attitude of musicology toward psychoanalytic hermeneutics. However, this does not explain the fact that wild analyses did not lead to such a defensive attitude in other fields of art research (literature or visual studies, for instance); thus, Feder’s explanation is not fully credible. The fact is that music analysis and theory have tended to reject various currents of thought in the humanities and hermeneutics in general, and not only psychoanalytic ones. Thus the reasons must be more psychodynamic and unconscious than what Feder thinks (see chap. 2.3.1). It should be noted also that overshootings are not that rare, both in and outside of psychoanalytic research, especially when methodology becomes an end unto itself. “Automaton” interpretations happen as much in Schenkerian and set-theoretical analyses as they do in psychoanalytic music research and new musicology. Perhaps the development of science always moves ahead through overshootings, especially when a new research orientation or paradigm is in its infancy.

3.4.2 Ego-psychology: Music as unconscious cognition and nonverbal thought

Until the new paradigm of ego-psychology was established in the 1950s–70s, psychoanalytic music research was dominated by the conception of music as regressive experience saturated by sexual and aggressive drives. Ego-psychology (e.g., Anna Freud, Heinz Hartmann, Rudolph Loewenstein) partly arose in counteraction to id-psychology and its concern with conflicts. It also contrasted with object-relation theory which developed alongside ego-psychology as early as in the 1930s. Ego-psychology draws most importantly on Freud’s (1961a [1923]) structural model and on the theory of the ego’s defense mechanisms, developed importantly by Anna Freud. Psycho-social factors are figured into modern ego-psychology, with psychoanalysis understood as a general psychology of mind.

---

48 Yet these two perspectives can be united as well.
49 Wild pathographic analyses can be seen as a continuation of late nineteenth-century, Romantic art psychology, the central explanatory idea of which was the “degeneration” of artists (Ihanus 1987: 10).
Chapter 3. Objects of study, metapsychological viewpoints, and paradigms

and not only of psychic states of dissociation (repression). Whereas id-psychology emphasizes the drive-based and repressed content of mind, ego-psychology underlines the ability of the ego to be in contact with its early developmental stages and to put unconscious process under its control. Central concepts are the ego’s autonomous functions and conflict-free areas. All in all, the spotlight is not just on the drives, sexuality, and aggression. Ego-psychology approaches art as a multidetermined phenomenon, the central function of which is to partake in psychic development, construction, and growth.

Ego-psychologists think it is a serious misunderstanding to consider creativity in a pathological light, because working with archaic dimensions of mind actually requires much ego strength. According to ego-psychology, the facile linking of creativity to psychopathology, typical of id-psychology, can be explained at least partly by the fact that a creative subject has a greater ability to grasp those earlier modes of thought that are attached to bodily experiences. In ego-psychology, artistic work – with its autonomic and cognitive functions – may operate independently of conflict, while building and sustaining conflict-free psychic structures. Ego-psychology thus emphasizes that cognitive operations can also take place unconsciously, and in the form of conflict-free functions. According to ego-psychologists, an approach that focuses on the conflict-free and formal aspects of art (instead of latent, dynamic ones) is more sensible, since it is impossible to get real clinical knowledge of dynamic meanings or transference required to confirm interpretations. (Nass 1989: 163–164.) In sum, we notice that neither ego-psychology, in this form, nor early id-psychology (though in a different way) can disengage themselves from clinical psychoanalytic theory and its demands and, thus, cannot confront the challenge for more culture-sensitive psychoanalytic music research and analysis.

Ego-psychology has dominated the history of applied psychoanalysis in music research (e.g., Heinz Kohut, Siegmund Levarie, Pinchas Noy, Martin L. Nass; see, e.g., Feder et al., eds. 1990 and 1993). In this paradigm, music is viewed as ego-activity (cf. the structural viewpoint) and a vehicle that helps maintain identity and social integration (cf. the adaptive viewpoint). According to ego-psychology, psychoanalytic art research should focus on the non-neurotic, conflict-free aspects of the arts, aspects overly neglected by id-psychology. It claims that music is not significant only in regard to archaic functions of mind, but, at the same time, services the needs of the adult creative ego. Furthermore, musical thinking takes place at the level of secondary process too: music binds together archaic mental contents and psychic energy coming from the unconscious. Archaic pleasure co-exists with the more “developed”, aesthetic satisfaction.50 Ernst Kris (1952: 177) articulates this state of affairs with the slogan of

50 The problem here is how to differentiate between these two.
“regression in the service of ego”, in contrast to “ego overwhelmed by regression”. One could argue, however, that it may in fact no longer be regression in the proper sense and perhaps the term should be avoided: to grasp the more loosely structured states of mind in the conflict-free sense does not necessarily mean regression, but rather a different mode of thinking. This means, for example, that primary process mechanisms become comparable to the working out of musical themes in the composing process. Listening to music resembles the evenly hovering attention of a psychoanalyst (Nass 1990 [1971]: 45–46; Lång 1996: 77–78). Music manifests as unconscious thought and nonverbal cognition. All in all, ego-psychology puts emphasis on the active listener who attaches meanings to music, whereas id-psychology studies the composer and her drive-based fixations.

Kohut directs attention to the listener as an active organizer of the musical communication, to which she unconsciously attaches meanings. However, Kohut also wants to retain the id-psychological perspective. He emphasizes that the meanings and functions of music must not be reduced to one explanatory model, for music appeals to many different aspects of mind. Also the classic drive-psychological view of music as the release of repressed desires and sexual tensions, is to be regarded as one factor among others, such as superego obligations, egomastery, or the despair resulting from the inability to master inner or external impulses. (Kohut 1990 [1957]: 26.) Kohut’s combining of id- and ego-psychology in his studies of music also characterizes ego-psychological music research in general.

Kohut theorizes archaic auditory dimensions in musical experience based on the developmental knowledge of the acoustic realm of the infant. The auditory sense and sphere have a special role and significance in early communication based on nonlinguistic sounds, rhythms, and interactive motions with the mother. According to Kohut and Levarie, music can be a way to master the chaotic sound-world and thus a way of dealing with psychic tensions and anxiety. As already mentioned (p. 75, Chap. 3.3), Kohut and Levarie argue that acoustic stimuli, at the most archaic level, are always experienced as threatening. This archaic dimension is activated in musical experience in various ways. The threatening acoustic stimuli have to become recognized and “attributed”, made sensible, and brought under the mastery of the ego. (Kohut & Levarie 1990 [1950]: 4–9.) It is the ego that tries to reject and control the anxiety evoked by non-understandable and disquieting sounds. If music is too difficult and unfamiliar for the listener, its content cannot be mastered, and it is experienced as unpleasant. In that case, the reaction may be compulsive laughter or other “counter” sounds of rejection, such as booing, hissing, compulsive coughing and moaning, or fleeing from the concert. (Kohut 1990 [1957]: 12.) For ego-psychology, listening to music means
above all an attempt to master one’s reality. Unlike id-psychology, it connects musical pleasure significantly to ego.

Kohut points out, that amongst the sounds experienced as external and threatening by the infant is also that of her own voice, too; namely crying, which is not yet understood as belonging to self (there is not yet such a self). Crying is not “voluntary” but automatic, and related to the feeling of frustration connected with hunger. This early psychological association, according to Kohut, colors the archaic experience of sound as a threat in musical experience. The pleasure of mastering music and its special position in a no-woman’s-land between self and the outer world, is connected at the most archaic level to sounds of hunger and crying, and to their transformation into sounds of fullness and satisfaction, to “a mastered cry”. (Kohut 1990 [1957]: 25.) Kohut’s notion of the “mastered cry” is similar to the id-psychological idea of music as a “transformed scream”. Though interesting, these kinds of psychoanalytic interpretations are problematic in their generalizing, universalizing, and reductive tendency. (Moreover, they hardly carry contribution to music analysis.) Markus Lång (1996: 77–78) has criticized such ideas as based on the fallacy of the origin. Nass (1990 [1971]: 47) and Noy (1990 [1979]: 210–211), too, criticize the tendency of psychoanalysts – especially id-psychologists – to locate the meaning of music or other arts in the earliest developmental contexts and reduce its hidden meanings to basic conflicts.

However, it should be noted that this problem is worth recognizing in all branches of psychoanalytic music research and in other ways of studying musical meaning. Lacanian criticism, for instance, can also be a simplifying, interpretative automaton that reduces all meanings to “the wound in our subjectivity”, to the subject’s fundamental lack. Often the meaningfulness of a psychoanalytic interpretation lies in the tones of voice as they reflect the claimed degree of the reliability. Writers, in their use of language, divulge how certain they are about their arguments, the degree of certainty in their words either leaving space for other interpretations or not. On one extreme of a continuum lies simplifying reductive interpretation, and on the other, musical interpretation that valorizes the complexity of the object. The problem is the same in all art research: to bring theory in line with the musical material more or less successfully, reductively, or meaningfully (cf. Felman’s idea on the interaction between psychoanalysis and art research; 1982: 5–10).

The conflict-free approach of ego-psychology differs greatly from many other trends of psychoanalysis, which claim that the unconscious and thus psychoanalysis always concern conflicts, and that conflict-free psychic structures cannot even exist. This aspect of ego-psychology has been the most criticized one. It has been claimed, for example, that the most central idea and essence of
psychoanalysis has been lost; apparently, the notion of the Freudian unconscious has been rejected or hidden in ego-psychology (Matte Blanco 1998 [1975]: 10). It has been asked, if ego-psychology emphasizes cognition over conflict, is it still psychoanalysis? For Lacan, ego-psychology errs in subjecting the revolutionary Freudian unconscious to the rational ego. According to Lacan, Freud’s great concept is that of the continuous state of conflict (split) between the consciousness and unconscious, and the supremacy of the unconscious over consciousness. To put it bluntly, for Lacan, the psyche – especially the ego – is a kind of symptom; ego is based on a misrecognition (e.g., 1953 and 1977 [1966]).

Structural and poststructural psychoanalysis seeks to connect the linguistic formulations to the id-psychological tradition and to later drive-psychological developments (Klein), rather than to ego-psychology. Therefore id-psychological themes did not disappear after the advent of ego-psychology and other new paradigms, although the term is associated with early Freudianism. For example Kleinian, Lacanian, and Kristevan criticism emphasize the drive-based unconscious, but differ from the most typical id-psychology, by putting the main focus on the reader (listener, receiver), and not the author, as the processor and decoder of a text understood as a cultural articulation.51 Nor are the concept of regression and the distinction of normal/abnormal very relevant in contemporary, drive-psychological approaches to art research. Also, in contemporary psychoanalytic criticism, ego-psychological theories may be combined with other psychoanalytic paradigms; as we have said, theoretical eclecticism is typical of psychoanalytic research. For example, one can combine ego-psychology and object-relation theory, whence strong drive-models are mixed with adaptive and integrative models of ego development, interaction, and socialization. Ego-psychology is not one unified and harmonious theory, but a sampler of theories and accents.

Ego-psychology that stresses formal aspects of music seems to be characterized by the same kind of concern for “pure” musical meaning that one finds in modernist views of music as nonrepresentational and of “form as content” (cf. Chap. 2.3.1). In truth, ego-psychology has been under-used save in music psychology and therapy – music analysis has hardly used it at all. Yet, ego-psychological theories and concepts could be used as analytical tools in music analyses.52 In this writer’s view, there is no inherent difficulty in using ego-psychology for music analysis, especially its contemporary revisions with concepts drawn from developmental psychology. For instance, Ostwald’s (1993) analysis of Schumann’s “Ich hab im Traum geweinet” views the piece developmentally, as a malfunctioning of communication between mother and infant. Of course, the

51 Kristeva, however, especially in her later works, enthusiastically discusses works of art in relation to their authors.
52 Certain vistas are provided in Lång 2004: Chap. 7.
ego-psychological paradigm has been most significantly practiced in the tradition of applied psychoanalysis, and not in musicology, the former being characterized by a lack in studies of specific musical material (compositions, styles, genres, pieces). But the same problem characterizes most general aesthetics and most philosophy of music as well. Furthermore, the ideology of modernism has made it difficult to discuss the substance and semantics in works of music. This ideology is visible in ego-psychological (and object-relation theoretical) applied psychoanalysis, and also in their unargued usage of such terms as “Art” and “Creativity”, not to mention, for example, “genius” and “masterpieces”.

In sum, by shifting the focus to ego-mastery, cognition, and adaptation, ego-psychological music research shifted the focus from the (latent) contents to the formal aspects of music, and from the author to the receiver (listener). This signalled and contributed importantly to psychoanalytic criticism’s move from symptom-oriented explanation to being more symbol-focused, which leads to more profound considerations of cultural and social elements in music.

### 3.4.3 Object-relation theory: Music as a site of separation and subject–object dialectics

Object-relation theory is contemporary with ego-psychology. In its narrow sense, it refers to the so-called British object-relations school (e.g., Donald W. Winnicott, W. R. D. Fairbairn, Michael Balint). In that case the paradigm based on the work of Melanie Klein, which greatly influenced object-relation theory, is separated unto itself. However, various object-relation theories, conceived broadly enough, have been developed by other psychoanalysts, too (e.g., Kohut and other ego-psychologists, René Spitz), and has proved most influential in the contemporary Freudian tradition. In this study, Kleinian psychoanalytic theory is discussed under object-relation theory. Winnicott’s theories are also here presented along with a discussion of the notion of “object”, a central concept in Lacan’s theories as well (e.g., object a, other, etc.). In my view, his and Klein’s work stand as the most influential object-relation theories in art research, and, especially Winnicott’s theories seem to be very suitable for music-analytical research. Moreover, the thought of those two writers (as well as that of Spitz) is important in understanding Kristeva’s theories of subjectivity and subject-object dialectics

---

53 Another influential theoretician and child-analyst in the object-relation school is Anna Freud, a contemporary and sometime adversary of Klein.

54 Despite its enormous influence, Kleinian theory remains highly controversial. One of its most debated aspects is Klein’s adaptation of Freud’s “death drive” as a clinical concept.
Subject Strategies in Music

in general.\textsuperscript{55} Klein deals with separation (from the mother) and early subjectivity formation, which makes her theory an important background against which to understand the idea of musical subject strategies. Similarly, Winnicott’s and Spitz’s (object) theories cast light upon the interplay of the semiotic and symbolic, and are also important for understanding processes of language acquisition. Finally, my own subject-strategical approach has been influenced by object-relation theory.

Object-relation theory describes the manifold dynamics between subject and object, and the significance of the object in the development of an individual (self-hood, ego). At issue is the development of the infant, from primitive object-relations to more complex psychic formations and mature relations. According to object-relation theory, the infant relates to a significant object (mother, caretaker, part object) by internalizing elements from the behaviors of the objects and from interaction with them. The subject may recognize the object as being either external or internal, and as good or bad. The archaic modes of relating to objects and their motivational cues remain powerful in the (adult) subject’s relations to things, to herself, and to other people. (Moore et al. 1990: 131–132.)

The starting point of object-relation theory is Freud’s remarks on the significance of the object in ego development and as a vehicle for instinctual gratification. In this general sense, we can talk about the theory of object in psychoanalysis, which provides the metapsychological basis for object-relations theory. In psychoanalytic theory, “object” designates anything toward which actions, affects, or desires are directed and which the subject requires in order to achieve satisfaction. At bottom, act, affect, and desire result from a drive that turns into a demand, then to need, and then to desire (social discourse). The object of affection and attention enables a drive-based desire to achieve its aim.\textsuperscript{56} Most often the object is a person or part of a person (such as a breast); or it may be the symbol of a person or personal attribute, which may be inanimate or abstract as well. Klein developed importantly the theory of part objects on the basis of Freud’s ideas. The object is first experienced and fantasized as part object (breast, for instance); later, according to the development of a sense of external reality, it appears as a whole object (person, for instance), out of which the infant creates its own sense of self. (Moore et al. 1990: 131–132.)

Important from a musicological perspective, is that Lacan (1998 [1973]) lists the voice alongside other (oral, anal, and genital) instinctual objects, such as the

\textsuperscript{55} Kristeva (2001) has even written a biography of Klein.
\textsuperscript{56} We might add, “only in the sense that it can be achieved”, for different opinions exist as to the relations among object, desire, and satisfaction. Lacanian psychoanalysis, especially as influenced by Žižek, emphasizes how the object of desire can never be achieved, for structural and constitutive reasons.
Chapter 3. Objects of study, metapsychological viewpoints, and paradigms

breast (Poizat 1992: 105). This provides a frame for theorizing the object voice or voice-object, understood as a part object. On this view, the voice is construed as a libidinal drive-object “outside” of language (Poizat 1992 and 1998; Žižek 1996; Dolar 1996). The choice of object is never predetermined by something “natural”, but by the individual’s personal history and significant childhood experiences. The object-relations, in classic psychoanalysis and Kleinian thought, thus refers primarily to the relation of the subject to her object, and not the relation between subject and object. The object is discussed from the point of view of a single subject. Later object-relations theory (e.g., Winnicott) has tried to avoid Freud’s inclination to speak of the subject in isolation; rather, an interpersonal dimension is introduced into psychoanalysis (cf. the adaptive viewpoint). Hence contemporary object-relations theory also outlines the individual’s interaction with the object that constitutes her environment. All in all, the subject’s need to relate to objects is the primary issue, in contrast to the drive-model of id-psychology, which focuses on the subject’s need to reduce drive-based tensions. (See Tyson & Tyson: Chap. 5; Moore et al. 1990: 131–132; Rycroft 1986 [1968]: 100–101; Macey 2000: 279.)

As feminist psychoanalysis has highlighted, object-relations theory shifted emphasis, from paternal and Oedipal complexes, to the early relationship between mother and infant. In Freud’s writings, primary importance is given to the father-child relationship, whereas object-relations theory looks at the maternal space. Object-relations theory has also brought many developments in psychoanalytic thought about women and femininity in general.57 This has also meant extending the focus to the pre-linguistic and pre-Oedipal experiential realm of the subject. Klein (1998 [1977]) observed that experiences of remorse and guilt, which traditionally were attributed to the post-Oedipal stage of superego internalization, also operate in very young children (see also, Segal 1979). Thus Klein claims that the superego develops long before the Oedipal stage, and the newborn infant is viewed as already having a “germ” of ego. Similar is Kristeva’s view that the logic of the signification is already operative in the semiotic body of a pre-linguistic and pre-Oedipal infant – a view that contrasts with Lacan’s fixation on language and the Oedipal stage.

The Kleinian model has influenced the study of visual arts, but is much more rare in music research. Exceptions to this are Racker (1951 and 1965) and Anton Ehrenzweig (1953 and 1973 [1967]), who have theorized the significance of music in the light of Klein’s theories, but not carried out music analysis on that basis. Kleinian art research, like ego-psychology, has mostly focused on the psychology of musical creativity and production, rather than on the analysis of individual works. Nevertheless, we find that developmental-psychological concepts

57 Nancy Chodorow, among others, has developed a feminist object-relations theory.
and models are apt for music analysis (e.g., Ostwald 1993 and E. H. Spitz 1991), and thus Klein’s theory, too, has music-analytical potential.\textsuperscript{58}

In the ego-psychological perspective, music relates to game playing and activities of (ego) mastery. In the Kleinian perspective, it relates to the psychic working-through of internal object-relations and their collateral affects. Music, which can represent both partial and/or whole objects, manifests as the working through of early conflicts triggered by drives, primitive fantasies, aggressions, (self) destructiveness, guilt, envy, anxiety, manic defenses, and depression. It is related to the trauma undergone by separation (from the mother’s body), archaic aggressive and destructive impulses, and the resulting sense of guilt. This repARATION process unfolds as an effort to restore the object (mother, breast) that was destroyed during the separation; to re-create it again as unbroken. Music is heard and produced in the framework of depression and compensatory effort, and is comparable to grief-work. It also relieves or channels off aggression. Musical activity repeats in a special way the early development of the psyche, which the subject repeats or “re-plays” throughout her life. The dialectic of destruction and construction is not unique, but a pattern reproduced again and again; thus, it is inherent in the psychic constitution: internalized object-relation configurations form the functional structures of psyche.\textsuperscript{59} (Cf. Klein 1998 [1977]; Segal 1979; see also, Racker 1951 and 1965.)

According to Klein, infantile aggression leads to two central (object-relation) positions: paranoid-schizoid and depressive. The term “position” underlines the fact that these phenomena are not passing ones, but fundamental psychic configurations of affects, drives, anxieties, and defenses. The positions overlap and fluctuate in early childhood and are reactivated in later life in various situations. The paranoid-schizoid position is characterized by splitting, which means the division of an object (the mother’s breast, for instance) into good (satisfying, loving) and bad (frustrating, persecuting, distressing). The mechanism of splitting offers a defense against the ambivalence felt toward the maternal part object that is both withheld (good) and withdrawn (bad). Through projective identification, the infant experiences these two sides as parts of herself (subject and object are not yet differentiated), which in turn relates to the experiencing of magic, omnipotence, denial, and idealization. The depressive position consists of the recognition of a whole object, acceptance of ambivalence, appearance of constructive guilt and repentance, and the relaxation of defenses. The subject’s development is largely a matter of integrating a part object into a whole. But the

\textsuperscript{58} Klein (1998 [1977]: 210–215) herself analyzed the story in Ravel’s opera The Bewitched Child, with libretto by Colette, as representing infantile anxiety-situations.

\textsuperscript{59} On the Kleinian approach to cultural studies and art research, see Minsky 1998: Chap. 2; Wright 1998: Chaps. 5.1–5.2.
gradual recognition of the mother as a whole-object (with both good and bad aspects) results in the recognition of the potential loss of the mother, and damage done to the mother as caused by the child’s aggressive impulses. This is precisely what leads to the depressive position. (Klein 1998 [1977]: passim; Segal 1979; see also, Wright 1998: Chaps. 5.1–5.2; Minsky 1998: 33–43.) The sources of musical experience can be studied in these acts of separation from the primal object (mother) and re-creation of the object. The subject oscillates between the two positions of sadistic destruction and creative (recovering) repentance, without ever reaching a final solution. A creative act reproduces the bodily withdrawal of the self from the primal object.

Racker (1951 and 1953) has examined music as a defense mechanism in the service of ego, which protects the latter against paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, bad objects, and object loss. Likewise, Ehrenzweig’s (1953 and 1973 [1967]) psychoanalytic theory of music and visual art joins ego-psychology with Kleinian theory. Ehrenzweig focuses on the receiver, on the unconscious cognition as an ego function, and on the formal aspects of arts. He argues that psychoanalysis can be used to understand pre-cognitive and unconscious aesthetic perception that characterizes the reception of visual and musical arts. Ehrenzweig calls this process *unconscious scanning*, and it focuses on the structures of art comparable to primary processes. (Ehrenzweig 1973 [1967]: 20, 46–59.) Along with Kohut, Ehrenzweig ranks among the first psychoanalytic theorists of music as an unconscious, nonverbal mode of thought.

Ehrenzweig emphasizes the constructive role of the unconscious, though the workings of the unconscious might seem illogical from the point of view of the consciousness. According to Ehrenzweig, the auditory representation of music may even help general psychoanalytic theory to understand what kind of cognition the unconscious maintains overall. Ehrenzweig talks about the *destructuralization* and *dedifferentiation*, in referring to processes by which the unconscious ego dissolves and suppresses “superficial imagery”, while grasping “deep” structures in a kind of “syncretistic vision”. Modernism, in visual and musical arts, plays a crucial role in Ehrenzweig’s thinking. According to him, it is precisely modern (i.e., non-figurative, such as abstract expressionism) art and music that display especially vividly the importance of accepting the illogic related to dedifferentiation. Ehrenzweig interprets modern art also as an attack against conscious *gestalt*-perception. (1973 [1967]: 20–21, 34, 160–161.)

Ehrenzweig’s theory relies significantly on that of Klein: he understands the first phase in the artistic process of reception and creation as consisting of fragmentary projection and persecution anxiety in the paranoid-schizoid position. In the second phase, this is replaced by depressive anxiety: the repressed split-material is transformed into symbolic material, and undergoes a new becoming
in the depressive secondary re-formation, which in turn functions as a kind of “receptive womb.”

In the Kleinian perspective, the problematics of separation forms the most crucial horizon of understanding music. Music is conceived as a site of aggressive, depressive, and self-destructive affects that appear at once both concrete and feral. The connecting of art and music to separation is not exclusive to Kleinian thought. On the contrary, it characterizes in one way or another almost all psychoanalytic approaches to art. All of Kristeva’s theories can be read as surveys of the effects of separation on subjectivity and text. Kristeva’s theory of abjection (1982) examines separation issues most directly. Likewise, in her theory of melancholy (1989), sorrow and depression follow from separation, i.e., from the loss of the primary object (mother), and this is even understood as a kind of prerequisite for artistic work. In addition to Kristeva, Klein has also influenced the work of Lacan and Žižek.

Donald W. Winnicott is another important developer of object-relations theory. Winnicott outlines the early interaction between the mother and infant by developing a theory of the mother’s face and glance as a mirror against which the infant’s self slowly takes shape, and where the differentiation of subject and object (the separation) may take place. Here the influence of Lacan’s (1977 [1966]: 1–7) theory of the mirror stage is evident. But whereas Lacan studies the subject as facing an inanimate mirror; for the latter, Winnicott substitutes an interactive mother. This results in crucial differences between his and Lacan’s conceptions of subject and self.

Winnicott (1971) theorizes the function and significance of a transitional space and transitional object in the process of separation and differentiation. These mark a step towards “true” object-relations and the first spatial differentiation between “me” and “not-me”. A transitional object represents, for the child, her relation to the mother; such an object may be a teddy bear, doll, or blanket, for instance. The child is emotionally attached to this object, and it helps to keep the (absent) mother present in the mind. The child treats this object as existing half-away between herself and the (m)other. According to Winnicott, this creates a potential space that later broadens into a field of culture. The transitional object manifests as a prototype of an artwork. (Winnicott 1971: 4–7.) As Kristeva

60 Ehrenzweig (1973 [1967]: 187) agrees with Otto Rank, that the birth fantasy about destruction of the womb, and a return to it, is central in all mythology and arts. This brings up the notion of womb-envy as well (a boy’s discovery that he can never be like his mother), inaugurated by Freud’s contemporary Karen Horney and developed by Klein. On expressions of womb-envy in contemporary culture, see Minsky 1998: Chap. 6 (“Womb-envy and women as ‘too much of a good thing’”).

61 This point may be read also an expression of the fundamental melancholic and depressive nature of Lacan’s theory (discussed in Välimäki 2004).
Chapter 3. Objects of study, metapsychological viewpoints, and paradigms

(1980: 286) points out, Winnicott’s potential space helps us to understand the prerequisites for all semiosic action, including the child’s gradual acquisition of language, the symbolic, and subjectivity.

Music has been much studied as a transitional object and as a representation of the transitional space that shelters and integrates the subject’s self. Such study has been mostly concerned with the therapeutic function of music (Rechardt 1984: 86–87; Lehtonen 1986: 103–110; Ostwald 1989; Lång 2004: 261–264). Racker (1951) has summarized the characteristics of music as a transitional object as follows: (1) Music shelters the subject in paranoid situations. (2) Music functions as a pleasure-producing and lovable object that protects the subject against sadness, loneliness, guilt, and disintegration. (3) Music provides a shelter from unpleasant states of mind and produces the psychic strength needed to confront and work through them. (4) Music helps in frightening and distressing situations, such as in silence when it stands for loneliness. (See also, Lehtonen 1986: 104.) Musical instruments, too, can be considered as transitional objects (Burrows 1987). Furthermore, studies of lullabies have been carried out from the Winnicottian perspective (McDonald 1990 [1970]). The concept of transitional object has also been used as a music-analytical procedure (E. H. Spitz 1991), one that contributes to the present research as well; the concept of the transitional object and the notion of the m/other as the mirror of self are used in my analyses of Schubert’s “Der Lindenbaum” and k.d. lang’s music (Chaps. 8 and 10). From the subject-strategical point of view, music as a transitional object addresses the unsettled subjectivity between the semiotic and the symbolic. It “temporarily crosses, blurs, and may even dissolve the listener’s ego boundaries” (Kramer 1995: 55).

Along with object-relation theory, another important development of Freud’s theory of object is provided by Lacan’s (1998 [1973]) notion of the object a and various notions of the other(s), and theorizations on part-object. Some correspondences can be seen between Lacan’s concept of object a and Klein’s part-object. Lacan’s conceptions of object play a crucial role in the music-analytical part of this study, especially with regard to melancholy. Overall, the concepts of object and object loss are essential to subject-strategical analysis.

In Part I an outline was given of the background of this study as it relates to the field of psychoanalytic music research in general. Next, in Part II, poststructural semiotico-psychoanalytic theorization, as well as (musical) subject-strategical methodologies, are discussed in terms of their connection to poststructural criticism, semiotics, and music analysis.

---

62 Music can also be considered a self object that provides a continuation of self, does psychic work on behalf of self, and functions like an empathetic friend (Kurkela 1993: 460–467). This concept by Kohut (1978), comes close to that of the transitional object.
PART II:
THEORIZING MUSIC AS UNSETTLED SUBJECTIVITY

To view texts as signifying practices is to view their signifying operation in the light of their subject in process/on trial – in light of that subject’s always unsuccessful positing.

Julia Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 214
Chapter 4
Music analysis, musical meaning, and subjectivity

This chapter discusses the music-analytical methodology for the study of musical subject strategies in relation to postmodern music analysis and musical semiotics. Chapter 4.1 deals with postmodern music analysis in general; Chapter 4.2 discusses musical semiotics. General reflections are made on semiotics as it pertains to this study, along with a brief survey of musical semiotics as a special field studying musical meaning, signification, and representation. Next come discussions of topic theory and on subjectivity in music as it has been approached by musical semiotics. (This also serves as a preface to Chapter 5, in which musical subjectivity is viewed from the angle of poststructural semiotico-psychoanalytic theory.) Chapter 4.3 presents a new-hermeneutic approach to music analysis based on certain theories and ideas of Lawrence Kramer (1990).

4.1 Postmodern music analysis:
The (re)discovery of musical meaning

During the past twenty years, as noted in Chapter 2, musicology has been colored by postmodern thought and a search for reformations that have largely come to pass. Central to these reformations have been the philosophy of science and the methodological questioning of musicology from postmodern perspectives, such as poststructuralism, deconstruction, and feminism, among others, all of which have influenced other disciplines as well. From this perspective, knowledge about music manifests as socially constructed and linked with subject and sociocultural structures. The same goes naturally for music itself. Aesthetic systems of thought manifest as historical conventions and socio-cultural constructions created, maintained, shaped, and negotiated by ideological structures of power. Postmodern discussions, music research à la cultural studies and social history have become fashionable and formed the nucleus of contemporary musicology. Names like “critical musicology” and “new musicology” appeared, following parallel phenomena in the humanities at the beginning of 1990s (e.g., new art history, new historicism).¹

¹ On the new musicology, see n. 2, p. 26 (Chap. 2.1).
As Jonathan Stock (1998: 55) has put the matter, increasing numbers of musicologists started “to take a greater interest in the broader questions of how music actually works in (Western) society”. The ideology underlying the canon of western art music – as well as the musicological canon itself – was subjected to considerable scrutiny. Customary points of departure, procedures, and ideologies in music research and analysis were criticized and questioned, and new ones were established. Derek Scott (1998) notes that the focus changed from one canon and one culture to different cultures and cultural differences, values, contexts, and to the listener (receiver). Styles turned out to be discursive codes, and meanings effects of discourse (or text). In general, special emphasis has been put on reception and subject positions. (Scott 1998: 135, 140–142.) Consequently, classical music started to be studied and analyzed more, “not only as an object that invites aesthetic reception, but also as an activity that vitally shapes the personal, social, and cultural identities of its listeners” (Kramer 1995: 33).2

The postmodern project wrought significant changes in the analysis of western art music.3 One such change, crucial to this study, was the new interest in musical meaning and content: it is precisely the question of musical meaning that occupies postmodern music analysis. In postmodern music analysis, music is described as systems of representation. Secondly, postmodernism brought interdisciplinary critical and cultural theories (occupying the humanities and social sciences) to bear on interpreting music in its socio-cultural contexts. Contemporary transdisciplinary theories in the humanities are used to understand the semantic horizons of music; such an aim has often taken second place to “hard” modes of music analysis that have dominated mainstream music theory and analysis for quite a long time after the Second World War, especially in Anglo-American circles (“soft” hermeneutic models have never been outright oppressed in European musicology) (cf. Williams 2000: 395). It can be said that postmodern music analysis seizes on aspects of music that have received little attention by formal analysis, and that are difficult to quantify rigorously, such as timbre, intensity, tones, shades, nuances, gesture, embodiment (body), and sensuality (cf. Williams 2001: 28).

Postmodern music analysis is thus a loose term for several trends in cur-

---


3 On conceptions of music analysis and musicology in this study, see n. 1, p. 25 (Chap. 2).
rent music analysis. It can be said that the postmodern project “secularized” the understanding of musical meaning and brought new force to the study of musical semantics. It brought into focus the semiotical issue of musical codes and conventions involved in the mediated nature and situatedness (locality) of all cultural practices, i.e., the sign function of a cultural unit. Postmodern music analysis, no matter what rubric is used to describe it, deals with musical contents. It could be defined in a post-Kermanian (cf. Kerman 1985) way as “critical” or “criticist” music analysis, in that musical semantics is understood to be as important as the musical syntax. It thus presents a form of “soft” analysis inspired by the humanities, in contrast to the “hard” modes of music analysis inspired by mathematics and natural sciences. “Criticism”, as practiced in such fields as feminist or psychoanalytic music criticism, has taken on new connotations. This is true, on the one hand, because music analysis has heretofore been largely associated with formal analysis and the study of syntactic musical structures. On the other hand, the term “criticism” joins music research to other fields in the humanities; postmodern music analysis discusses meanings and values of music in relation to traditional humanistic theory-formation. Such analysis tries to exceed purely structural-technical analysis, so as to discuss the broader significance of music for subject and culture.

The methodological eclecticism and multi-disciplinarity of postmodern music analysis not only mirrors that of other disciplines, but also takes place in subfields of music research. Postmodern music analysis also questions and transcends borders inside musicology. It can extend to all branches of music research: analysis, theory, historical music research, ethnomusicology, music sociology, music psychology, or popular music studies, and so forth.

A critical and cultural theory, for instance psychoanalysis, functions in postmodern music analysis in two basic ways: (1) Firstly, at the general theoretical and epistemological level, it relates to the understanding of the nature and role of music in culture, and the purpose, scope, and place of music analysis in

4 I was prompted to use the term “postmodern music analysis” in this way by Anne Sivuoja-Gunaratnam (private communication), and by Lawrence Kramer’s Classical Music and Postmodern Knowledge (1995).

5 Joseph Kerman and Leo Treitler are the names most often referred to as forerunners of the new musicology, because of their significant critiques of the positivistic and formalist emphases in North-American musicology during the 1970–80s. Treitler, however, distances himself from the new musicology (e.g., in a lecture at Helsinki University in March 2004). Critique was not invented by new musicology, of course, but has been the defining feature of all scholarly practice and scientific thinking.

6 In musical semiotics, both of these lines have lived side by side: linguistic models used as hard science, and cultural theorizing à la French philosophy.

7 Cf. Padilla 1996.
music research. This may include political matters and paradigms. (2) Secondly, it works at the more specific music-analytic level, defining the approach to the musical substance under analysis, and determining the music-analytical tools. Hence, it defines the music-analytical and interpretative framework through which the music is examined and heard; for example, theories of poststructuralism, deconstruction, narratology, cultural history, psychoanalysis, postcolonial theory, gender studies, feminism, gay and lesbian studies, queer theory, etc.

It could be said that postmodern thought (re)humanized, (re)hermeneutized, (re)semanticized, and semiotized music analysis. The latter enabled the emancipation of musical meaning, semantics, and hermeneutics. Since its early days, hermeneutic music analysis has aimed at the interpretation of the meanings of musical works. Therefore, the postmodern approach may be seen as a continuation of the hermeneutic tradition. Indeed, postmodern music analysis is not at all that new although it draws on current philosophy and current critical and cultural theories. In several senses, Joseph Kerman, Lawrence Kramer, Susan McClary, Leo Treitler, and Carolyn Abbate and others continue in their own ways the tradition of German hermeneutics inaugurated by scholars such as Arnold Schering and Hermann Kretzschmar. As Robert Hatten (1994: 290) defines musical hermeneutics, it “refers to an interpretive approach to any meaning that goes beyond the purely structural or ‘syntactic’ (implicational, functional), drawing on evidence from any relevant source to (abductively) reconstruct (stylistically guided) strategic interpretations”. Instead of explaining the composition, it is

---

8 Because in music analysis poststructuralism is rarely discussed in an explicit way, poststructuralism and postmodern research are considered here simply as belonging to the same conglomeration of postmodern theorizing. Thus postmodern music analysis serves as an umbrella concept for poststructural music analysis as well. In my research, poststructuralism locates, on the one hand, to poststructural music analysis (e.g., Kramer), and, on the other hand, to poststructural psychoanalysis and semiotics (Kristeva, late Barthes, late Lacan, Derrida and deconstruction in general). When considering poststructural thinking in musicology, we must change the perspective from musical semiotics to musicology in general, for paradoxically poststructuralism – and the same goes for postmodern thought overall – has not received such a sympathetic reception in musical semiotics as in other musicological fields discussing musical meaning. On deconstruction in music analysis, see, e.g., Samuels 1989; Monelle 1992: 304–323; 2000: 149–164, 229–232; Krims 1998; and Littlefield 2001: 7–16. On poststructuralism in music research, see, e.g., Williams 2001: 27–33.

9 Eero Tarasti (2002: 63, 117) speaks of “the emancipation of the sign” as the phenomenon behind all new-musicological and postmodern trends.

10 On connections between postmodern music analysis and hermeneutics of the nineteenth century, see Bent 1994. For Kretzschmar, for instance, musical hermeneutics meant revitalizing the Baroque Affektenlehre, which gives a musico-technical basis for hermeneutic analysis, as opposed to “free association”.

104
made “understandable”; the work is “illuminated”. After a long period of being consigned to the marginal, musical hermeneutics has again taken a central role in music analysis.\(^{11}\)

My loose notion of “postmodern music analysis” includes the new hermeneutics and other methodologies grounded in postmodernism and focused on musical meaning. This label does not rigorously define or determine the analytical method, tools, or trend. The labeling of a music-analytical practice is always a sign of identification with a scientific paradigm, trend, tribe, or sect. I try to keep this tribe as multi-voiced and open as possible, by using the term “postmodern music analysis”. Also, it does not contain an overly restrictive association with gender studies at the expense of other perspectives, which the term “new musicology” often carries. Instead, the present research joins the new-musicological project by re-reading music and interpreting its meanings through critical and cultural (here: psychoanalytic) theories. My research also draws on many “old” musicological traditions, such as hermeneutics, music analysis, and psychoanalytic music research, and I want to emphasize the continuation, rather than the break, with those traditions. The same goes for my understanding of the concept of “postmodern”. The ethos of the postmodern emphasizes multi-voicedness, openness, and avoidance of all kinds of “tyranny” (Monelle 1996: 53; 2000: 4). It means to oppose certainties and grand centralizing forces and to favor pluralism. It is to understand reason, language, and subjectivity in relation to concrete human activities rather than to universal principles. (Ibid.) It means welcoming the possibility of many – and multi-voiced – analyses of the same text.\(^{12}\)

Most importantly, postmodern music analysis does not hold to the distinction

\(^{11}\) Alongside Kramer (e.g., 1990; 2002: esp. Chap. 1), a thorough elaboration of contemporary hermeneutic music analysis has been developed by Hatten in his *Musical Meaning in Beethoven: Markedness, Correlation, and Interpretation* (1994) and *Interpreting Musical Gestures, Topics, and Tropes: Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert* (2004).

\(^{12}\) A wide variety of definitions circulates around the experience and definitions of “postmodern” and “postmodernity”. The postmodern experience purports to be multi-voiced, often paradoxically so. This is the case, for example, in the debate around whether postmodernity is more a continuation of modernity or a complete break from it. Likewise, it is disputed if postmodern cultural practices – sciences included – are more or less totalizing, relativistic and pluralistic, or even new “iron cages” or valueless cultures of narcissism. Most important for my research is, on the one hand, psychoanalytically inflected postmodern thought in the line of Lacan, Derrida, and Kristeva, and, on the other hand, postmodern critique in musicology in all its entirety. In a general sense, the postmodern project can be understood as a critique of certain ideas and ways of thinking around which western life and science have been constructed for the past two centuries (Scott 1998: 134). Its message could be summarized by its “opposition to meta-narrative, an acceptance of heterogeneity and multifariousness in preference to uniformity and unity”, thus bringing “into being an infinite range of others”, as writes Monelle (1996: 39).
between “the music itself” (“what is there”) and the cultural meanings it accrues (“how we understand it”) (Garnett 1998). Musical meaning is not viewed as immanent in itself or inherent, and in this way purely (or only) musical; nor are social and cultural meanings considered as mere add-ons from verbal and cultural discourse. According to postmodern orientation, music and the rest of culture do not exist as two different spheres. Instead, music is to be considered a specifically musical discourse that forms part of the human realm of signification. In fact, (the idea of) “purely” musical meaning is just as cultural a construction as are so-called “cultural” or “extramusical” meanings. This is why the expression “absolute” music is often given in scare quotes in the postmodern context; the marks indicate a social, historical, and aesthetical ideology or even a topic representing modernist (semantics of) a-semanticism. The question of musical meaning in itself, at some isolated and pure level, and of other meanings at cultural and extramusical level, makes no sense if the postmodern, constructivist, and post-structural conceptions of meaning, signification, and subject’s role in the endless making of discourses are taken seriously. Signifying practice always relates to subjectivity, desire, and need for signification; no music is free of cultural contents and subject. The basic task of postmodern music analysis has been this deconstruction of the concepts of inner musical meaning (inherent, congeneric, endosemantic, embodied, absolute, syntactic, formal etc. musical meaning) and extramusical meaning (extrageneric, exosemantic, designative, programmatic, semantic, expressive etc. musical meaning). Kramer (1990: 1) writes that cultural meanings in music “are not ‘extramusical’, but on the contrary are inextricably bound up with the formal processes and stylistic articulations of musical works”. Contrary to what is sometimes believed, this view does not reject the notion of music as a special signifying practice, a discourse of its own. It just reminds us that there is “no extra-cultural locus from which to observe music, nor extra-cultural meaning to observe” (Garnett 1998). Music does not reflect meanings; it constructs them. Music works in a culture as does any other signifying practice. The fact that music has been considered – since its “emancipation” from the verbal text at the eighteenth century – as opposed to language manifests precisely as a meaning historically inscribed in music; in this way, it reveals the workings

13 Cf. Kuusamo 1996: 118; see also, pp. 41–42 (Chap. 2.3.1). Feminist musicology has been the most decisive agent in dismantling the modernist insistence that music lacks content and meaning. McClary (1991), in her key book of feminist music analysis, Feminine Endings, says its central idea is to remove the last fig leaf from “absolute” music (the master narrative) and from the manifestly neutral language of music analysis that has hindered discussion on the social meaning of music (cf. ibid.: 55).

14 The concepts of embodied and designative meanings come from Meyer 1956.
Chapter 4. Music analysis, musical meaning, and subjectivity

of signification at the very “scene of the crime” (Kramer 2002: 1–5, 11–14).15

When postmodern music analysis welcomes the heterogeneity and infinitude of musical meaning, it accepts the Freudian fact that we cannot master ourselves, nor control meaning as well as our consciousness would like to believe. Nor can we master music and its textual (unconscious and subversive) force. Meaning is multiply determined (cf. multidetermination16), and for the unconscious a sign always manifests as a potentiality for infinite production of meaning. Meaning is never absolutely or ultimately fixed (inherent). It is slippery, changing, shifting with contexts, usage, reception, historical and other circumstances (Hall 1997: 9). Peter Brooks writes that the best lesson that poststructural criticism has taught us, is the refusal of the last word in the interpretive process (and history) and any privileged position in analysis (1994: 24; see also, Jackson 2000: 165). In agreement with this view, postmodern music analysis means accepting the non-final and non-original nature of every single analysis. As Raymond Monelle (1992: 316) writes, “an analysis is the analyst’s track through the unending codes that permit the music to be heard as a structure”. An analysis should show new insights into finding and examining stimulating, surprising, marginal, and interesting connections of signifiers (ibid.: 321–322).

To take programmatically the (socio-)cultural dimensions and contexts as objects of study in music analysis does not mean that formal, structural, technical, and other considerations at the level of signifier are not still relevant and crucial. The essential task of music analysis is to create descriptive languages for addressing the musical substance as accurately and in a detailed way as possible in regard to all its elements, no matter how small these units may be. For example, it is impossible to discuss a detail in a work if it cannot be theoretically named and technically described. To take a rough example: it is impossible to

15 The venerable idea of inner (embodied, musical) and outer (designative, cultural, extra-musical) meanings in music sees the music as fundamentally dualistic in nature. Kramer (2002: 2) emphasizes that this dualistic understanding is a historical fact (a historical construction) attached to music, and that the problem of musical meaning is at the same time its own solution: the meaning of music is the question of musical meaning. He also compares musical meaning to Wittgenstein’s “duck-rabbit” double-figure (ibid.). The conception of music as a totally different from language derives also from a naïve conception of referentiality in language, which is the very issue that poststructuralism has tried to develop with its complex models of signification as practices. However, music has paradoxically kept its meaning as opposite to language even inside poststructuralism, serving as a model for poststructural notions of the infinite play of signs, textuality, and heterogeneity. This has resulted in confusion about musical meaning in contemporary discussions carrying traces, on the one hand, from eighteenth and nineteenth century aesthetics and philosophy, and on the other hand, from modernism.

16 This psychoanalytic notion implies the polyvocality of the single subject (see p. 35, Chap. 2.2).
discuss the gendered ideology in a sonata form in a certain piece of music if this form cannot be recognized and pointed to technically. Moreover, musical-formal structures and techniques are a significant part of the specific culture called western art music. Therefore, in spite of the fact that music analysis, especially during the 1990s, was frequently attacked and criticized of work-centredness and score-centredness,\(^{17}\) the existence of the score is a defining genre characteristic in the Classical, Romantic, and contemporary western art music tradition. To abandon this medium in western art music research would mean to neglect one of the most important characteristics, aspects, contexts, and methods of the music tradition in question – it would amount to a cultural misunderstanding. It is another question as to the status, significance, and function given to the score and to music theory among other music-analytic devices, such as listening and reflection of affective responses in oneself as analyst, listener, or musician, for instance. Also, for most music analysts, the score is not the score as such, but as played, heard (including by the inner ear), lived, experienced, understood – indeed: textualized, as semiosis. The score and references to it do not inhibit musical experience and reflections on that experience, but rather try to share these experiences at an intersubjective level. This makes discussion and communication of meaningful listening experiences possible, by providing a method for referring to and figuring out the musical details and substance in the process of musical semiosis. All in all, postmodern music research, with its emphasis on the socio-cultural functions and meanings of music, has not meant that all music scholars occupied with music analysis should turn from their work in order to study “how a cloak is hanged on the peg in a concert”\(^{18}\). Many scholars do reflect how the socio-cultural meanings are inscribed in musical structures by studying the score with cultural and critical theories of representation. As Anne Sivuoja-Gunaratnam (2003b: 14) observes: “Research that categorically refuses to address music as sounding phenomenon, its structures, and the conditions of their formation, in fact reinforces the project of absolute music, because musical structures then remain a space divorced from meaning, power, and gender…..”

Furthermore, postmodern music analysis emphasizes its culturally relativizing view of music and music analysis when justifying the claims (on musical representation), in the end, by referring to musical structures, techniques, technical-theoretical, and composition-aesthetical elements, and such (the sonic substance). Also, the nature and purpose of analyzing works is different from what

\(^{17}\) For an example of the charge of “scorism”, see Bohlman 1993: 420.

\(^{18}\) The expression is Sivuoja-Gunaratnam’s (private communication). Alfonso Padilla (in a private communication) sharpens the matter: if the music-analytical methodology is taken from musicology, the name of the discipline has to be changed; for example, to “music sociology” or “cultural studies around music”.

108
Chapter 4. Music analysis, musical meaning, and subjectivity

it was in the heyday of formalism and the aesthetics of autonomy – if that ever existed in such a way as the new musicology has claimed (national traditions make a great difference, and fabrication of enemies are part of a research trend’s growth and identity formation19). The postmodern approach analyzes music – its fundamentally and thoroughly social, cultural, and semantic elements – in the hermeneutic spirit of suggesting and interpreting rather than explaining. The kind of music analysis advanced in the present research (the subject-strategical approach) can be seen as but one thread in the heterogeneous and pluralistic tapestry of postmodern music analysis.

4.2 Semiotics and the call of musical semantics

4.2.1 Semiotics and meaning as construction

Semiotics is a field of inquiry that continuously asks questions about sign, meaning, and signification.20 It indicates a research attitude as well as a discipline, and is an inquiry based on the view that all cultural practices depend on meaning and all meanings depend on subjectivity. In poststructural perspective, in addition to the mentioned basic concepts of sign, meaning, and signification, the existence of semiotics requires other, central concepts, such as the double articulation of the sign, representation, and discourse (Kuusamo 1996: 34). Poststructural semiotics springing from French traditions is characterized by a critique of the classic structuralist notion of the sign and theories of metaphysical origin. Furthermore, it is characterized by an insistence on the instability of meaning and demands of pluralism and heterogeneity.

Poststructuralism emphasizes the constitutive role of signifying practices – sign, meaning, and discourse – in the formation of subjectivity. It theorizes the human mind as culturally produced, both as product and producer of the discursive reality. The same goes for meaning and subjectivity. Meaning arises in the construction of subjectivity. Moreover, my orientation here is broadly constructionist, with culture approached as a conglomeration of representative practices and representation as constructive in nature (see, e.g., Hall 1997).21 The constructionist approach to culture and circulation of meanings therein is related to the cultural turn in social and human sciences emphasizing culture as

19 These are scholarly subject strategies.
20 The diversity in general and applied semiotics is manifold, with its major schools of thought in the Saussurean, Peircean, Greimassian, Lotmanian, and other traditions. In this study, semiotics is restricted, on the one hand, to musical semiotics, and on the other hand, to poststructural psychoanalytic semiotics.
21 The presentation of social/cultural constructivism, below, follows, most importantly the discussion by Stuart Hall (1997: 13–64).
practices in which meaning is produced and exchanged.\textsuperscript{22} Meaning is constructed in and through sign systems, i.e., in representative practices, rather than simply found. It does not inhere in things but is produced in signifying activity: the very notion of discourse implies that the system of representation is practice-related. Important is how we use things, such as music, for in usage the construction and transmission of meaning takes place. In other words, the importance may not be what certain sign vehicles or media are “in themselves” but what they do and what we do with them, i.e., what is their function in the socio-cultural sphere. This framework underlines the crucial role of the Symbolic domain at the very heart of social life. (Hall 1997: 1–9, 24–25.)\textsuperscript{23}

This cultural turn in humanities and social sciences can also be seen as a semiotical turn. As a science of signs and a theory of signification, semiotics studies how representation works and how signs act as vehicles of meaning in culture. This overall semiotization of the cultural space, sciences, and research trends is manifested, for example, in the great emphasis put on such issues as the crisis of representation, and the mediatedness of all human/social, the locality of meaning, and reflexivity (Knuuttila 2003). Semiotics differs from other studies of culture and representation, however, in its insistence on how the representation works and sign system produces meaning. Semiotics cannot be content with the effects and consequences of representation and the politics of cultural practices only, as discourse analysis, feminist, and gender studies, and Foucauldian constructivism in general can be.

\textsuperscript{22} Whereas poststructuralism has been theorized most importantly against the study of the artistic practices, such as literature and film, social constructivism has been theorized against a vide variety of social and cultural phenomena, from popular culture to medicine. Michel Foucault’s work plays a central role in the field. Despite the emphasis that Foucault gave to psychoanalysis, the latter does not play so important a role in contemporary, Anglo-American social constructivism, than what it does in poststructuralism.

\textsuperscript{23} Strange to say, one can refer here to Stuart Hall’s writing only inasmuch as he is not talking about music, but other cultural practices. As do many cultural theorists, Hall has difficulties with musical representation and cannot completely avoid the fatal fallacy of giving music a different, more “abstract” (as if other sign systems were not abstract!) status than he gives other cultural practices, this being very paradoxical in a constructivist framework. Let one example speak. Hall (1997: 5) writes: “Music is ‘like a language’ in so far as it uses musical notes [sic] to communicate feelings and ideas, even if these are very abstract, and do not refer in any obvious way to the ‘real world’. (Music has been called ‘the most noise conveying the least information’.)” How well modernist ideology flourishes, even in the most constructive circles, the moment the discussion turns to music! The constructionist notion of meaning as activity goes out the window, and the naïve view of referential linguistic meaning is resurrected in order to mystify music as lacking the most naïve referential signification. No matter that the same notion has been arduously deconstructed in language and literature since the late 1960s.
Correspondingly, the shift of orientation in musicology over the past 20 years could be considered not only hermeneutical or constructivist, but also as semiotic in nature, although this may not be explicitly recognized in different postmodern studies (cf. Tarasti 2002: 63, 117). Postmodern musicology is implicitly semiotical by its interest in the function and the importance of music to subject and society, and in questions about why and how music signifies in specific cultures. The question of musical signification – how meaning obtains and what is the nature of it – forms the nucleus of postmodern musicology. According to Kramer (2002: 1), this question has been eating at modern musicology throughout its existence.

The realization of the constructive and mediating nature of all cultural practices has initiated in musicology a (re)discovery of the subject basically in two ways. First, it has (re)discovered in a new way the subject that makes and listens to music, i.e., the fact that music is an activity of subjects. Secondly, it has been realized in a more fundamental way that musicological research is also done by subjects, i.e., that musicology is activity practiced by subjects – this resulting in a new kind of demands of disciplinary self-reflection.

4.2.2 Three waves of musical semiotics and its postmodern condition

Musical semiotics theorizes musical signification and provides ways and tools for discussing signification in specific works of music. It is a discipline which defines music as sign, system of signs, semiosis (the action of signs), representation, meaning process, communication, signifying practice, and cultural coding. Semiotics’ focus on the sign function of music means that it studies not only the meanings of music but the production of meaning and its prerequisites: the processes that construct, shape, and transform musical meaning. It not only asks what the meanings of music are, but how they are – how musical signification happens. It has to focus on semiosis both at the level of signifier and of the signified. It includes both syntactic and semantic methods of theorizing, analyzing, and interpreting musical meaning. Recently, the tendency has shifted from syntactical methods more towards the semantic ones as being of equal import.

24 Because the scope, history, and impact of musical semiotics reaches well beyond the postmodern condition of musicology, a broader look at the field is outlined here. However, my presentation of musical semiotics centres around issues most relevant to the present research and leaves others untouched. For an extensive handling of musical semiotics, in both the historical and systematic senses, see Monelle 1992.

25 The concepts derive from Saussurean semiotics. The signifier denotes the acoustic image and the signified the mental concept which together form the sign as meaning. This double structure of sign is a basic theoretical construction in the French tradition of “semiology”.

111
Musical semiotics has developed study of many of those aspects of musical discourse which have been difficult to handle or even neglected by traditional music-theoretical procedures, such as the “kinetic” aspects in music or its temporal unfolding. Altogether, musical semiotics encompasses various approaches, such as structuralist linguistic methods, theorizations on the discursive and narrative strategies, theory of topics, postmodern critical and cultural theories, and socio-cultural contextualizations (to mention just some).

Compared to semiotics in art research, musical semiotics manifests more resistance to postmodern transformations and more keen on structuralism than, say, visual or literary semiotics. Also, musical semiotics forms a strikingly separate and quite different theoretical discourse and tradition than do the poststructural, psychoanalytic, or constructivist paradigms in general semiotics. Reasons for the distant relationship between psychoanalytic/poststructural/constructive semiotics and musical semiotics may largely be the same ideological ones that explain the small amount of psychoanalytic approaches in musicology (see Chap. 2.3.1).

Accordingly, contrary to what one would suppose on the basis of the cultural or “semiotical” turn in social sciences and humanities, the study of representation in or by music has not been discussed all that much in musical semiotics or modern music analysis in general. In the history of musicology and music philosophy and even in the early history of musical semiotics, even the idea of music as representation is more often denied and dodged, than theorized. In this respect, musicology differs from other kinds of art research, perhaps with the exception of that of the abstract visual arts (which took music as their ideal). Indeed, discussions of musical representation and abstract painting form two great demonstrations of how difficult semiotics is to practice in art research, due to the ideological blindness inherited from modernist aesthetics.26 We are confronted with an issue that precisely semiotics, as a critique of ideology and ideology of critique, should resolve. Before the semiotics, poststructuralism, and constructionism that broke the chains of analytic philosophy, the concept of representation was in art history related only to so-called figurative art, as opposed to abstract art (Kuusamo 1996: 42). In music research and philosophy and aesthetics of music, the concept of representation has traditionally been related only to programmatic and other “figurative” music, such as bird-song and storm imitations, defined as extra-musical meanings. These kinds of imitative figurations are sometimes referred to as iconic signs by semiotics (in contrast to symbols and indices, to use Peircean terms). The assumption that iconicity, as opposed to indexicality and symbolism, has a more direct relation to the referent is from the constructionist point of view problematic, for iconic representation is just as

complex, mediated, conventional, and culturally constructed as are the others. It is the process of naturalization – mechanisms of myth and ideology – that makes (iconic or other) signs hide their constructed nature.\(^{27}\) We have learned how birds or storms are stereotypically, rather than “naturally”, represented in music. This problem could be regarded as analogous to that of the nature of musical signs of masculinity and femininity; it in some sense also resembles the simplistic differentiation between gender and sex (body) which Judith Butler (1990) has criticized.\(^{28}\)

Hence, even musical semiotics in its first (formalist and structuralist) phase considered music to be a self-referential system lacking double-articulation of the sign and thus also of semantics, and thought it possible to regard music as somehow isolated from cultural semiosis – a very anti-semiotical stance, as seen from today’s perspective. The oddities and paradoxes in the history of musical semiotics, resulting mainly from the semiotically absurd theory of the autonomous musical sign (referring only to itself), are well illustrated in, for example, the entry on “Music” in Winnifred Nöth’s *Handbook of Semiotics* (1990: 429–434). For instance: “Symbols, in the sense of Peirce, conventional signs, are only marginally important in music” (Nöth 1990: 433).

Alongside postmodern developments in the theorization of musical sign, musical representation has been taken more seriously, especially in poststructural and constructive approaches in musical semiotics. The constructionist notion of musical meaning dissolves the division of musical and extra-musical meaning (see p. 106). The two aspects of representation, one related to the mental and the other to musico-material representation, are connected in the constructive nature of representation (cf. Kuusamo 1996: 43–44). As Altti Kuusamo writes,

> the representation can … be defined as a contractual system of substitutes which contains in itself processes of signification, i.e., of meaning production. It is a construction of meaning, in which the referential relation outside the sign is only one of its functions. The whole concept of representation thus lies in the sign function (symbolic function) and is therefore enough to dispel the odd, unclear, and ideological boundary between the “figurative” [cf. “representative”] and “non-figurative” images. (Ibid.)

However, the relationship between postmodern musicology and musical semiotics has developed thus far mainly as individual attempts rather than as a broad trend (e.g., Samuels 1989 and 1995; Monelle 1996 and 2000; Jacono 1996 and 2003; Tarasti 2002; Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 1997, 2003a, and 2003b; and

---

27 This is why Peircean categories are often understood as differentiating sign functions or aspects in one and the same sign (or sign vehicle) rather than in different kinds of signs as vehicles.

28 For an elaboration of the conventionality of iconic musical signs, see Monelle 2000: Chap. 2.
Musical semiotics has been ironically reluctant “to connect music with social space or to analyze the interconnections between the two” (Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 2003b: 14). On the other hand, musical semiotics that focuses on socio-cultural musical semiotics and semantic analysis was fairly well-developed even before it engaged with postmodernism and despite the dominance of formalist and syntactical analytic methods in mainstream musicology (e.g., Stefani 1976, 1984, and 1985; Tarasti 1978; Ratner 1980; Karbusicky 1986; Allanbrook 1983).

As a branch of inquiry, musical semiotics can be considered a long-standing field related to studies of musical communication and meaning since the very beginning of music philosophy and theory.29 As a self-consciously semiotic project calling and understanding itself explicitly as such, it has a 40 to 50 year history. As a relatively independent and distinct field of (general) semiotics and musicology, it started to develop notably in the 1970s. In this perspective, a differentiation can be made between three phases (Hatten 2000: xi; Cumming 2001). These stages describe not only the historical development of musical semiotics but, even more fundamentally, the different basic orientations towards music as a sign system and signifying practice, and hence, as engaged with musical meaning.

The first phase is that of structuralism (Ruwet, Molino, Nattiez). It emphasizes the structure of music and only the structure, but it diverges from formalism in that it studies signifying and thus structures that produce meaning. In this perspective, smaller signifying structures of music always form larger ones and so on, and in this way the relations between musico-structural factors generate a signifying system. The basic methods are segmentation and comparison of constituents (as occurs in all music analysis, though here for a slightly different purpose). Already in structuralism the idea of sign implies that something is standing for something by means of a sign vehicle. Because a sign represents something – this is the nature and function of the sign – it cannot be completely explicable by self-referentiality (by “inner properties”), as Claude Lévi-Strauss too states in his critique of formalism (Kuusamo 1996: 19). However, this is a fact that musical structuralism has difficulty accepting.30

30 The relations between formalism(s), structuralism, and semiotics are complicated. Kuusamo (1996: 16) writes that Lévi-Strauss’s comparisons with the structures of myths “was not a victory of form on contents à la Russian formalism, but meant a victory of the study of signifying structures over the old opposition of form/content. Now ’contents’ were found at the level of comparing the structural models of myths.”
Chapter 4. Music analysis, musical meaning, and subjectivity

It is telling, that when modern musicology (and analysis) was touched by an interdisciplinary – here linguistic – critical theory, it first happened in a way that allowed for formalist interpretation. Hatten (2000: xi) calls that period in musical semiotics the “formalist phase” – an accurate assessment in the context of music analysis at that time, most of which dealt only with musical syntax. As Monelle (2000: 9) writes, it was characteristic of the first wave of musical semiotics in its Nattiez–Molino version that it started by excluding semantics.\(^\text{31}\) The difference between structuralism and later semiotics is most striking: whereas structuralism emphasizes universal signifying structures and established unities, and maintains an idea of ahistorical meanings, semiotics always studies sign systems and meanings as culturally conditioned (Kuusamo 1996: 18). It can be said that musical semiotics has continued to develop into a more context-sensitive field of inquiry.

Structuralism meant important innovations in its syntactical and formalist modes, too, because of its aim for radically new perspectives by adopting methodologies from other disciplines. This alone already marked “semiotics as radical music theory” (cf. Monelle 1992: 21). Theories also developed that focused on semantics (the signified), an instance which is Tarasti’s (1978) study on myth and music. In it, very specific – “surface” – musical phenomena are studied at the music-analytical level, despite the basic structural orientation to the idea of deep correspondences between the narrative schemata of myth and music. Mythical styles and topics are studied at the aesthetic and semantic levels of music: the formal and structural aspects of music are connected in a non-reductive way to cultural topics forming semantic categories (mythic semes). Because of this orientation towards musical conventions, styles, and semantics, Tarasti’s study with its hermeneutic slant, and contrary to many other structuralist studies of music, remains relevant in today’s musical semiotics as a kind of handbook of mythical topics. In this sense, it well serves the postmodern music-analytical methodology, which combines traditional methods of music analysis with interdisciplinary cultural theories. In the end, Tarasti studies mythical rhetoric in music as contextual and conventional meanings as related, for example, to the Romantic style – and thus as discursive codes. In so doing, Tarasti shows how music constructs mythicalness.\(^\text{32}\)

The second phase of musical semiotics marks an orientation that sees music

\(31\) Common characteristics of “hard” structuralist and formalist music analysis are, for example, an ahistorical attitude, tendency to universalism, reductiveness, and the idea of total analytic control. Kofi Agawu (1997: 297 n. 1) has observed the similarities in their ways of defining the music analysis.

\(32\) The way to (re)read Tarasti’s study of course depends on one’s philosophical stance towards musical signification.
as occupying two domains at the same time. For one, structures can be studied “as such”, as autonomic and self-referential (pure musical meaning). Secondly, these structures can be studied as referring to something “outside themselves” in the sphere of society and culture (extra-musical meaning). With this, a significant leap is made towards hermeneutics and semantics, though the differentiation between “inner musical” and “outer cultural” meaning is maintained. Hatten (2000: xi) refers to this as combining the structural and the hermeneutic in interpreting musical meaning. Naomi Cumming (2001) talks about referential or internalist semantic musical semiotics (as opposed to postmodern external semantic musical semiotics). Tarasti (1994: 11) speaks of iconic musical semantics as included here. Altogether, these studies have significantly boosted the theorization of “semantic musical syntax”, by considering the both dimensions of the musical sign. Mártá Grabócz’s (1996 [1986]) and Tarasti’s (1994) Greimas-based theorizations of discursive and narrative strategies of music, in which the generative course of music results from different levels of articulation and discursivization, serve as good examples.³³

The third phase of musical semiotics is postmodern, and focuses on musical semiosis as a socio-cultural site. It rejects the dichotomy of inner (musical, embodied) and outer (extra-musical, designative) meanings in music, and deconstructs the notion of absolute music (see p. 106, Chap. 4.1.). This makes possible free access to the study of musical semantics. The boundary between “the music itself” and its context is fluid and continuously negotiable; there is no such a thing as music itself, for music is constantly (re)created in acts of interpretation (Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 2003b: 13).

Postmodern musical semiotics deals with musical signification as textuality, construction of subjectivity, and ideology. It focuses attention on the listener and discusses musical meanings as culturally produced. It emphasizes the inseparability of musical syntax and semantics, and signifier and signified. Music is one “cultural technology” among the others (Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 2003b: 27).

Musical semiotics differs from other postmodern studies of musical meaning in its particular insistence on the structures and formal mechanisms of music. It has to address both sides of the musical sign. Meaning is located on the side of the signifier as accurately as possible, in order to answer the semiotical question about how signification is taking place in sounding musical material. The central aim of musical semiotics is to define as exactly as possible the structural level of the textual mechanisms producing the referential world. In this musical semiotics differs from those cultural and new musicologies that focus neither on musical structures nor on sonic substance (cf. Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 2003b: 13–14). That is the advantage of musical semiotics today. As Anne Sivuoja-Gunaratnam

³³ For other examples, see the work of David Lidov and Vladimir Karbusicky (1986).
writes, the premise of music as cultural technology

... is in fact nowadays quite largely accepted at a theoretical level within cultural musicology, which is grounded in postmodernism. The problem from a practical point of view is how to connect back to music, particularly music analysis. The danger, as Lawrence Kramer [1993] points out, is that we will end up with a postmodern musicology without music. The structural alignments of music should not remain untouched; on the contrary. (Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 2003b: 13.)

Tarasti (2002: 69) refers to the same problem and writes that theories which totally contextualize the existence of a musical sign lose music as a sonic phenomenon by neglecting the structural dimensions of musical signification. This is precisely why I, in the first place, begin with discussions about psychoanalytic and subject-strategical music analysis: to emphasize that the object of study here is the musical substance as sonic phenomenon. Musical semiotics cannot be satisfied with interpreting meanings but must also ask how those meanings are structured. Musicology and music analysis may have become “semiotized” implicitly in the sense that focus is on musical meaning, but explicit semiotization asks questions about the workings of the musical sign in its material and conceptual dimensions. As Hatten (1994: 279) writes: “What semiotics can offer music theory is the realization that structures and meanings arrive in a single package, wrapped by a symbol system (style) and unwrapped by a series of interpretive acts (presumably guided by the style).” The material aspect of musical sign as musical immanence does not exist independent of the cultural circuit of meaning.34

The eclecticism of postmodern music analysis (cf. Chap. 4.1.) appears in the commingling of different modes of thinking, theories, and methods, aimed at engaging with the complexity of musical signification. This, in turn, is related to the fading of interest in general communication models, and a growing concern with the particular and the momentary. The detail, rather than structural wholes of musical discourse, has started to interest scholars, and methodological tools have been developed for more and more context-sensitive analysis for addressing unique significations.35 Whereas structuralism and formalism deal

34 Thus the immanence of music is not to be equated with the autonomy of the music(al sign). Likewise, the two-level structuration of the musical sign (signifier/signified) is a semiotico-theoretical construction of two inseparable aspects in the inner structure of sign, and thus it cannot be equated with the (formalist) differentiation between musical and extra-musical/cultural meaning.

35 I am indebted to Kuusamo’s series of articles (1998, 1999, and 2002a–b) on the “theory of detail”. One wonders if this concern for detail might be a kind of feminization of musicology; for in the history of western art and philosophy, details, such as ornaments and decorations, for instance, have been regarded as feminine (in a sense of something
with totalities (details are subjected to the whole), postmodern analysis may look at a key detail that opens a view onto the signifying realm of the work so that it may be experienced in a new way. Kramer’s (1990: 6, 9–10) notion of “hermeneutic window” is a metaphor for such an opening into polysemy of content. This notion also accords with psychoanalytic methods; the paradigmatic Freudian model for interpretation is precisely to reveal the latent polysemy in a manifestly “trivial” detail. Similar concepts are Freud’s nodal point and navel of dream, Lacan’s point de capiton, Barthes’s punctum, and Mieke Bal’s navel; also, Klein’s part-object and Freud’s screen memory are connected to the theme of detail and polysemy (Kuusamo 2002b: 69–70).

An example of the recent development focusing on the individual and momentary in musical signification is Tarasti’s “existential semiotics” (2002; cf. also, 2000). Already his earlier Theory of Musical Semiotics (1994) was colored by a certain hermeneutic and phenomenological tendency towards the study of specific musical significations implied by Ernst Kurth’s concept of “kinetic energy” in music, these being impossible to describe in terms of structure alone. Tarasti develops his ideas further in his newer work in existential semiotics, in which specific significations are now conceived as musical situations that manifest as outbursts of genotext (cf. Kristeva 1984 [1974]). His thought marks a leap towards philosophies of the subject, in that music is connected to existential being.\footnote{Tarasti (2002) is not explicitly discussing, in this context, the sign-nature of music nor mediation in musical communication; i.e., whether the music is considered to refer, reflect, represent, or construct meanings (the sign as the material of exchange between two communicating subjects). Thus, it remains unclear if Tarasti, in his existential semiotics, has given up the view of the dualistic nature of musical meaning (musical/extra-musical). From the postmodern perspective, it is no longer possible to hold onto the idea that “in general, it is true that music is essentially a non-representational art” (Tarasti 1998: 1626).}

Between the second and third phase of musical semiotics, the research “attitude” changed, both in a philosophical sense, and in a practical one. The purpose of music research and music analysis in general has come up for questioning, leading to an interest in the “politics of research”. The difference is in emphasis: Is the immanence of music emphasized at the expense of the broader, socio-cultural significance of music? There is also the question of the researcher’s identity and scholarly subject-strategy. One may want (or need) to make a clean break from one research trend in order to identify with another, opposing one;\footnote{Sivuoja-Gunaratnam (2004) interprets the rejection of western art music in cultural (ethno)musicology as a process of “abjection” (cf. Kristeva 1982).} bridges

unimportant or trite, as opposed to large-scale, “masculine” architectures; cf. Schor 1987; Kuusamo 1998: 63–64).
may be built between opposing trends; etc. (this is an issue for science studies to be made from object-relation-theoretical perspective).

The three phases or orientations in musical semiotics do not follow a logical or necessary (progressive) development, although they do describe the recent history of that science. The same kinds of differences in outlooks on musical meaning have oscillated throughout the history of music research and philosophy (e.g., the Dionysian/Apollonian, sensual-emotional/rational-spiritual, semantic/asemantic, heteronomic/autonomic, and so forth). Moreover, new approaches are born from and influenced by precedents – often as a counter-reaction of struggle and necessary connections with the “old” (cf. Bloom’s “anxiety of influence”; 1973; see also, pp. 44–45, Chap. 2.3.1). Think, for example, of the (Saussurean) structuralist conception of language as a system of differences as radically (re)read by poststructuralism.

Next, I discuss two special fields of musical semiotics. The first is (1) topic theory, which has become a well-defined area of current study of musical semantics. The second, (2) subjectivity in music, is a far more vague and fragmentary area of research in musical semiotics.

### 4.2.3 Topical study of music

Topic theory (cf. Gr. *topos*) focuses on musical semantics in terms of conventions (*topoi*, “commonplaces”, stock of common ideas). Music is examined for its conventional codes related to styles, genres, and other elements of musical rhetorics that have developed socially, culturally, historically, and aesthetically. Topics form a kind of standard vocabulary of semantic expression in western art music; in this sense, certain musical constructions are comparable to metaphors, motifs, allegories, plot formulae, clichés, and other figures or tropes as defined in classic rhetoric. Topics are distinctive musical units, the structural characteristics of which have standard semantic references related to historical, social, compositional and technical styles, and genres. They have been much studied especially in Classic and Romantic repertoires; yet, theoretically, any genre or period in western art and popular music could be studied in terms of their own, characteristically topical realms. The idea can be extended both to older and later music and to cover other genres of western music as well.\(^\text{38}\) Topics refer to definite semantic themes that are recognizable to a culturally competent listener. They are one of the most central signifying mechanisms in western music. As Monelle (2000: 40)

---

\(^{38}\)Topical systems in popular music genres may borrow topics from art music, just as art music has always borrowed from popular music. For example, many genres of Heavy Metal draw on Baroque techniques (Walser 1993). A key text on topics in popular music is Tagg 1979.
summarizes the historical role of musical topics: “western music has signified through topical reference throughout its history”.

Topics form an essential repository of standard codes in music; these have to do with musical imagery, stylistic references, expressions of sentiment, affects, and more. The rhetorical usage of this general vocabulary of a musical style, results in the “strategic level of expression” in individual works in that style (Hatten 1994: 74). Classic topics feature “social” styles (e.g., strict and free, church, chamber, theatrical, learned, high, low, middle, brilliant); marches (e.g., rustic, Bürgerlich, church, military, funeral); dances; military music, hunt music, horn signals; pastoral styles (e.g., musette, siciliano), pianto, French ouverture, Turkish music, singing allegro, Sturm und Drang, Empfindsamkeit, and more. Each topic signifies a large semantic world, connected to aspects of society, literary themes, and other traditions (Monelle 2000: 79).

In Leonard G. Ratner’s (1980) now-classic text, centering on the music of Haydn and Mozart, topics are considered as characteristic patterns and figures that have developed from music’s connection with social and cultural situations, practices and institutions, such as religion, poetry, theatre, entertainment, dance, ceremonies, military, hunting, “upper-class” and “lower class”, and more. Contacts between music and socio-cultural life have resulted in different styles, most notably the seventeenth-century notion of church, theatre, and chamber styles (Ratner 1980: 3–27; see also, Hatten 1994: 74–75). Topics can manifest in musical discourse as types, pieces, styles, figures, and such. The differentiation is flexible, because a topic, such as menuet, may function as a genre, piece, formal scheme, style, passing allusion, and so forth.


In the present research, the category of topics is understood as overlapping with genres, styles, intonations, and word painting. This means that genres, for instance, are understood not (only) as formal patterns but as conventional and

---

39 This list is constructed on the basis of Monelle (2000: 14–80).
40 Also Allanbrook (1983) and Noske (1977) offer still other topical studies on music. See also, Rosen (1971 and 1995a) for various references to topical imagery.
41 Cf. Grabócz’s (1996 [1986]) “intonational types” and Tagg’s (e.g., 1979) semantic studies.
established signs, communication matrices, discursive codes. The introduction, mixing, and juxtaposition of various genres in a single piece, simultaneously or in succession, results in a dialogue or “polyphony” of genres (cf. Kallberg 1996: Chap. 1), in which references to genres (“genre markers”) act as topics and have expressive functions. This may result in multi-level play of rhetorical strategies, as is the case with parody and irony. For example, Hatten theorizes musical *tropes* and *troping* as textual mechanisms in which one sign (topic, genre, form, gesture) modifies another in order to produce a new expressive meaning. An expressive meaning thus results from a collision or fusion of two otherwise incompatible style types. An expressive genre is based on oppositionally defined topics and styles. (Hatten 1994: 74; 2004.)

Jeffrey Kallberg, in his *Chopin at the Boundaries: Sex, History, and Musical Genre* (1996), examines genre as a communicative contract between composer and receiver. Kallberg is especially interested in anomalies and unorthodox moments in the musical discourse which break the communication contract, leaving the listener “at the edge of the genre”, and constructing a (new/higher) expressive meaning. According to him, it is such frustrated expectations that form the key moments in communication and the production of meaning. We see this, for example, in the subversive workings of counter-genres in musical rhetoric. (Kallberg 1996: 4–8.) Somewhat similarly, Robert Samuels (1995: esp. Chap. 4) treats genre as social construct in his study of the “parodic counterpoint” of genres and topics in Mahler’s Sixth Symphony.

Monelle (2000: Chaps. 2–3) provides an extended critical, cultural-historical study of topics. He gives a critique of Ratner’s attributions and offers broad case studies of various topics. According to Monelle, topic theory should offer elaborated cultural case studies, examine the history of topics, discover new topics, and confirm the already known ones (ibid.: 33, 38, 80). For finding a new topic, Monelle (ibid.: 80) poses the following question: “Has this musical sign passed from literal imitation (iconism) or stylistic reference (indexicality) into signification by association (the indexicality of the object)? And, second, is there a level of conventionality in the sign? If the answers are positive, then a new topic has been revealed, whatever the period of the music studied.”

Altti Kuusamo (1996: 91, Chap. 2.3 passim), in reference to iconography and semiotics of visual arts, speaks of the “wandering histories” of topics. These reveal how a certain topic has made its way through various discourses, from period to period and genre to genre, and how its meaning has transformed in the

---

42 In classic rhetoric a *tropē* is a figure of speech in which words deviate from their ordinary, “dictionary” meanings; e.g., metaphor, metonym, irony, anti-thesis, and synecdoche.

43 Jim Samson (1989) talks about “host” and “ghost genres” in Chopin’s music.
Subject Strategies in Music

course. In literary studies, Ernst Curtius (1990 [1948]) developed a landmark categorization of literal topics and studied their courses from Antiquity to his day. To apply concepts of rhetoric to music is conceptually a much looser procedure, since rhetorical terms in music overlap. I construe the study of topics so broadly that it may be said to denote the study of musical iconography, i.e., the study of conventional musical imagery that is based on literary and other historical and cultural references. Art-historical iconographies, the classics of which were written by Aby Warburg and Erwin Panofsky most notably, come close to musical topics, in the sense that both art-historical types and musical topics are established as recurrent, cultural subject-matters that maintain certain essential characteristics (signifiers) as they “wander” through history for centuries, but receive new meanings in new cultural-historical contexts (signifieds). On the other hand, new characteristics are invented to denote already-established meanings. Topics are defined by continuity and variation on both levels of the sign. (Kuusamo 1996: 91–98.) For example in the “dance of death” topic – and referring to Samuels’s (1995: 119–131) and Esti Sheinberg’s (2000) studies of that topic – Monelle (2000: 80) discovers “a clear case of noncontemporaneity of signifier and signified; musical dances of death date mainly from the nineteenth century, but their signification is medieval”. Monelle (2000: Chaps. 2–3) offers such histories of various topics, for example, the galloping motive of the noble horse.44

To cite some topical instances relevant to examples in this study, one topic is that of lamentation, which may be constructed, for example, by musical cata-basis (sudden fall in register) or pianto (a descending minor second); these may be found in Monteverdi’s as well as in k.d. lang’s music (Välimäki 2003).45 The horn call, for its part, such as the one at the beginning of Beethoven’s Sonata “Lebewohl” (Op. 81a), is not only a constant topic in Classic and Romantic music but also in popular and film music. It can be found, for example, in music as disparate as Aaron Copland’s or Ennio Morricone’s music for western movies and country music vocal harmonies. The codes of Romantic music seem to thrive

44 For a hermeneutical-semiotical account of topics, musical iconology and iconography, see Garda 1998.
45 In my analysis of k.d. lang’s re-make of the classic “girlie” rock song, “Johnny Get Angry”, in her video compilation Harvest of Seven Years (Cropped and Chronicled 1991) (Välimäki 2003), I discuss a shift into the operatic register at the end of the performance as a subversive allegory of artistic and homosexual (lesbian) suffering, constructed by a critical parody comprised of topics, genres, and other musical and visual figurations. These consist, for example, of lamentation (pianto and catabasis), romantic opera (dying soprano/other), Elvis (king of glory and man of sorrow of rock’n’roll and the liberator of sexuality), and self-portrait of the artist as a human sacrifice (artistic and homosexual topic).
and multiply best in film and advertisement music.

Topic theory offers a powerful methodology by which to analyze musical representation as socio-cultural construction. It exposes music as a representational system with dense referential historical and stylistic practices. It addresses musical meanings as recurring musical units established in certain socio-cultural and historical circumstances and getting new meanings during different periods, environments, and other contexts.

4.2.4 Musical semiotics and subjectivity in music

Subjectivity in music is an important, if still under-theorized, theme in post-modern musical semiotics (e.g., Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 1997, 2003a, and 2003b; Richardson 1999; Monelle 2000: Chaps. 6–7; Tarasti 2002: Chaps. 5–7). Subject and subjectivity in musical discourse has also been significantly studied in narratological approaches to explaining music\(^{46}\) (e.g., Tarasti 1994; Grabócz 1996 [1986]; Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 1997). In narratological approaches, the central concerns are various forms and hierarchies of musical narration, narrative structures, and narrative agencies in music. There has for some time been a wide-spread and ongoing dispute as to whether all music is narrative and in what ways.\(^{47}\) On this issue, I side with Sivuoja-Gunaratnam (1997: 135; 1996a) and others, in understanding musical narrativity as an expression of the general capacity of the human mind to signify by telling stories (narrating). Furthermore, I focus on musical narrativity as it manifests at the textual level of music, in accordance with the overall orientation of my research.

Narratological studies have outlined different ways by which music may convey agencies in its narrative structures at various discursive levels. These can include, for example, (1) implied author, inner narrator, implicit agent; (2) concrete protagonist, character in the story, grammatical subject of the “I” (in a lied, for instance); (3) subject as a more abstract agency or actant\(^{48}\) in the musical text; and (4) projected subjectivity of the listener or performer.\(^{49}\) These may overlap

---

46 These apply theories of A. J. Greimas, Roland Barthes, Gérard Genette, Tzvetan Todorov, Paul Ricoeur, Christian Metz, and Claude Brémond, for instance. Narratological theories draw importantly on Lévi-Strauss’s linguistic myth analysis, poetics of Russian formalism (Victor Sklovski), and Vladimir Propp’s morphological folk tale analysis.


48 The concept derives from Greimas (see Tarasti 1994).

49 I am indebted here to discussion with Robert Hatten. For other accounts on agencies, voices, and subjects in musical discourse, see Maus 1997 and Abbate 1991, among others. Since Russian formalism and new criticism, it has been clear that the “I” or subject in the work is not the same or compatible with the real-life author of the work (yet the biographi-
Subject Strategies in Music

in various ways, and differentiations are flexible. Important is to note that musical narration is not confined to one level in music – it is multi-voiced, intertextual, both dialogical and “polyphonic” in the Bakhtinian sense.\(^{50}\) This means that music may construct and articulate narrative in various and complex ways. These may even include the construction of non-narrativity or anti-narrativity in music (Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 1997: 200–205). As Sivuoja-Gunaratnam (ibid.: 137–138) has emphasized, narrativity is not something that concludes music analysis; it is only a starting point.

Sivuoja-Gunaratnam states that the experiencing of narrative in music requires an inner subject in the work to function as a musical protagonist, about whose life story the work in a way tells (Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 1996b: 70; cf. also, 1997: 152–153; 1992: 35–36). Textual narratology locates the musical subject in the music’s structural elements. It may be understood, for example, as an actant whose modalizations the musical discourse constructs (Tarasti 1994). According to Sivuoja-Gunaratnam, we can think of the inner subject as an abstract protagonist of the musical discourse. A particular unit in the musical discourse can be interpreted as a musical subject and the work can be then analyzed from its point of view (cf. categories 2 and 3, above). In this case, the musical subject is a certain concrete musical element, such as a characteristic thematic figure, motive, gesture, or pattern, the appearances of which are more emphatically articulated and powerful than the other material in the discourse, and which is individual enough to function as a significant producer of coherence in the composition. (Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 1997: 152–153; cf. also, 1996b: 70; 1992: 35–36.)

Narratological music analysis has also been developed in gender-theoretical, feminist, and other new-musicological studies (e.g., McClary 1991 and 1993; Clément 1999 [1979]; Kramer 1995; Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 1997: Chap. 6.2.2). McClary’s (1991) pioneering work on the gendered aspects of musical narratives is indebted to narratological studies in feminist semiotics and film theory (e.g., de Lauretis 1984 and 1987). In addition, topic theory (see Chap. 4.2.3) and theories of musical narrative often support each other, for topics can form narratives.

Important perspectives on musical subjectivity have been introduced by post-modern, deconstructive analysis that discloses gaps and discontinuities in the musical discourse that play a crucial role in the production of musical meaning (e.g., Abbate 1991; Kramer 1995; Samuels 1995; Monelle 1992: Chap. 10; 2000:

\(^{50}\) For an elaboration of this view, see Samuels 1995: Chap. 5.
Subjectivity in music has also received some small discussion from psychological and philosophical points of view on musical experience and the performer (Cumming 1997b and 2000). The study of gestures in music (Hatten 2004) may also contribute to the study of subjectivity in music.

Tarasti’s (2002: Chaps. 1.4 and 3–6; see also, p. 118, Chap. 4.2.2) existential semiotics marks another, new leap towards subject philosophies. By emphasizing individuality, uniqueness, particularity, and momentariness of the musical sign, it points to the subject’s existential situation. Every sign is an act performed by a subject. Semiosis is situational, and the being in (relation with) the world (Heidegger’s in-der-Welt-sein) happens through situation, in which the whole existence network of the subject becomes realized. This complex Tarasti compares to the “being” or “existence” of a tone as a constellation of different parameters and musical situations. (Tarasti 2002: 71–72.) From this perspective, music manifests as situations, and not as a fixed object – “situations” rather than “objects” coming closer to the poststructural notion of text. Unlike the present research, in Tarasti’s music-analytical applications, the subjectivity of music is grounded on the composer (or “composer”) rather than the listener. For example, Tarasti refers to the “transcendent body” of the “composer” (in this case, “Chopin”), whose individuality breaks into the musical discourse as kinds of “choratic pulsation” (ibid.: 138–140).

Various ideas about the composer’s presence, manifestation, insertion, or inscription in a work have been developed in musical semiotics, and they are intimately related to the study of subjectivity in music. These include such notions as the “composer’s voice” (Cone 1974), projected self, self-references, self-reflective rhetoric, and other textual strategies, such as, a recognizable style, gesture, or idiolect (Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 1997: 154–155; cf. also, Monelle 2000: 158–169). Still, even if subjectivity is discussed as an inscription of the composer’s subjectivity, in a semiotical framework it is never understood simply as the subjectivity of the author, but as a feature of the text. “Subjectivity” in music should therefore be studied as an implied subjectivity of the text (Monelle 2000: 169, see also, 158–159); i.e., it is the role of the inner subject within the piece (Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 1997: 160 n. 48). This means that subjectivity in music, even when theorized as composer’s, is in fact textual subjectivity fulfilling discursive functions (ibid.: 160): semiotics must extrapolate subjectivity from (the features of) the text and not by studying the author (Monelle 2000: 161). Monelle

---

51 Tarasti (2002: 73) outlines three dimensions of the existential sign: (1) facticity (being in Dasein), (2) physical aspect as organic process, and (3) the role in the consciousness. For a psychoanalytic scholar, these dimensions may recall Lacan’s theory of the three registers of the subject. (Tarasti himself notices a resemblance of his outline to Peirce’s triadic notion of the sign.)
Subject Strategies in Music

continues (ibid.: 167): “even for Cone, the composer’s voice does not belong to the composer.” Certainly the same could be said about Tarasti’s (2002: Chap. 6) idea of composer’s “transcendent body” emerging in musical discourse. Yet both Tarasti and Monelle, when searching for the extreme individuality of a musical work, tend to theorize the author, and by this, to suggest a “resurrection of the composer” after its Barthesian death (cf. Monelle 2000: 158).

It is somewhat surprising that in the art music research and especially in musical semiotics, the idea of subjectivity in music is still so regularly, almost always, connected to the composer, even if in a highly complex way, as if there were no other prospects – surprising, because postmodern musicology overall has so emphasized the listener’s role in the production of meaning (though one might point out that, on the other hand, postmodern musicology has concentrated on “real-life” individuals instead of anonymous structures). At this point, the present research differs perhaps most strikingly from many previous music-analytical semiotical studies on subjectivity, by developing the idea of musical subjectivity as grounded in the confrontation of the listener – and her body, if someone’s – with the text. In this emphasis, I differ, for example, from Monelle’s (2000: Chaps. 6–7) and Knapp’s (2003) theorizations of subjectivity in Mahler’s music. For both writers cling to the author as an analytical concept, though they both move at the level of textual analysis engaged with the implied subjectivity of the text as a structural item (Monelle 2000: 169), and thus understand subjectivities as “rather newly constructed subjectivities” (Knapp 2001: 151) and thus features of the text. Hence, little is said of the listener; rather, it is “the masked composer”, “projected composer”, or “Gustav” and “Mahler” in the score (cf. Monelle 2000: 178, 195; Knapp 2003: Chap. 5). This necessarily puts the emphasis on the composer rather than the listener, even though the composer is textually understood.

Because my aim is to discuss music as a signifying practice of shared meanings, aspects of subjectivity grounded on the notion of composer are excluded here. This is necessary because, although Romantic musical aesthetics crucially contains the idea of autobiographical music, the composer is still first and foremost composing in the culture and using the shared – intersubjective – codes of “subjective”, “autobiographical”, and “confessional” style, as defined by the prevailing aesthetical system. The music of subjectivity is a genre characteristic of the Romantic style (cf. pp. 14–15, Chap. 1.3). A sense of subjectivity is a

52 In this sense, this study is more in line with the research tradition in semiotical film studies and/or semiotico-psychoanalytic criticism in general, than with the established tradition of musical semiotics.

53 Similarly Cone (1974: 57) talks about the “composer’s voice” as the “implicit” or “complete musical persona” as constituting “the mind of the composition”.

126
discursive (aesthetical) code in Mahler’s and others’ (Romantic) music, and is in turn related to the rules of genre and style. The composer’s writing hand is guided by the culture which defines those signs that hint at “autobiography” and are read as such by a competent listener. “Subjectivity” or “individuality” must be represented with musical codes. Though a musical work may be full of a composer’s inscribed personal meanings, they are not, as such, the shared ones which the listener grasps as constituents of the subjectivity of the discourse. In accordance to this, in my study, subjectivity in music is approached rather as general schemata, shared musical patterns, used and read by those members of the culture competent in the signifying practice in question. My analytic focus is on the finished work and its status as a cultural text and site of subjectivity for its listeners. Here, in locating subjectivity in the listener (see Chap. 5), I embrace the notion of subject which takes the latter more as a product than a source of meaning.\footnote{It seems that in western culture, music is considered more “authentic” than, for example, visual arts, and this may be why it is so difficult to break away from the composer when studying subjectivity in music. To associate the subjectivity of a Romantic painting with its painter would be much more “odd” than it is with music. For cultural-historical and psychological reasons, it is more common to suppose the “I” in music to be that of the composer (or in popular music, more often that of the singer), a fallacy that is perhaps better recognized in studies of other forms of art.}

Sivuoja-Gunaratnam (1997: see esp. Part II), in discussing narration and subjectivity in Einojuhani Rautavaara’s serial music, first locates and studies the musico-discursive subject in the work under analysis. She further views this textual subject to act, at the same time, as the author’s musical simulacrum, i.e., as a sign, trace, and signature of the aesthetic presence of the composer. According to Sivuoja-Gunaratnam (ibid.: 160–161), it is a question of “a textual strategy specific to Rautavaara’s idiolect”. Because of this double-leveled understanding of subjectivity in music, Sivuoja-Gunaratnam’s textual approach is, in practice and with regard to its semiotical music-analytical procedures, very similar to the one developed here. The difference is that my concern is not in any way in composer’s self-reflective, reflexive, or narcissistic\footnote{Sivuoja-Gunaratnam (1997: 241) writes about Rautavaara’s “composer image as that of a musical narcissist at the level of the oeuvre”. For a different account of reflexivity in music, see Hatten 1994: 202.} presence in the musical discourse. Also, Sivuoja-Gunaratnam, because of her narratological framework, locates the subject as just one factor among other musico-narrative elements. Though this kind of narrative subjectivity is certainly among the most important strategies in western art music, from a semiotico-psychoanalytic perspective it forms only one rhetorical means of organizing music and one aspect of musical subjectivity in the total, broader screen for the construction of subjectivity in
music. In my study, subjectivity is theoretically located in the “played subjectivity” of the listener, based on her identification with a subject position offered by the musical discourse (Chap. 5.1). In both approaches, however, it is a question of textual analysis, textual subjectivity, and general signifying processes of the human mind (narration or identification as a subject position in the discourse). Narratological and psychoanalytical approaches often share some basic ideas at a very general level, such as the subject’s basic need or desire to tell stories, and an overall understanding of music as related to stories of subject and subjectivity. Indeed, musical narrativity is one of the articulative dimensions in experiencing music as subject strategies. Also, the notion of “musical subject strategy” comes close to the concept of narrativity as a basic mode of signifying.

4.3 Hermeneutic windows (after Kramer)

Lawrence Kramer’s (e.g. 1990, 1995, 1998a, 1998b, and 2002) model for post-structural and new-hermeneutic music analysis, and especially his concept of hermeneutic window (Kramer 1990: 6, 9–10), offer potent methods for finding, locating, and interpreting musical meanings – and further, subject-strategical layers. In Kramer’s studies, the focus is on musical meaning as a multi-signifying and multi-determined cultural construction that may be discussed and interpreted with cultural and critical theories, including psychoanalysis. Like psychoanalysis, musical hermeneutics in general “seeks meaning in places where meaning is often said not to be found” (Kramer 1990: 2). Poststructuralism (or deconstruction), for its part, affirms “that the meaning of a text, representation, or cultural practice is multiply determined and exceeds what such things declare themselves to mean” (ibid.: xii). It “proposes that texts find it difficult to restrict what they mean and that their very effort to restrict meaning often propagates further” (ibid.). For Kramer, poststructural music analysis equates with musical hermeneutics (see esp. Kramer 1990: xii; Chap. 1; 2002: introduction and Chap. 1; 2003).

At the beginning of his Music as Cultural Practice, 1800–1900, Kramer

56 Sivuoja-Gunaratnam’s narratological study and my own subject-strategical approach are grounded on different semiotical theories, but have similarities at the music-analytical level. From the point of view of my study here, Sivuoja-Gunaratnam’s analyses of the horrified, disintegrating musical subject in the dysphoric narrative of Rautavaara’s Canto I (1997: 189–196), the narcissistic subject in the euphoric narrative of Canto II (ibid.: 196–200), and the estranged subjectivities in Arabescata (ibid.: 200–205) reveal powerful, psychoanalytic subject strategies in music.

57 Kramer often talks simply about musical hermeneutics and not new hermeneutics. I, however, use the term “new hermeneutics” because it has become fairly well established in postmodern musicological discourse.
Chapter 4. Music analysis, musical meaning, and subjectivity

sums up his poststructural new-hermeneutic music analysis as consisting of the following basic premises (1990: 1):

1. that works of music have discursive meanings;
2. that these meanings are definite enough to support critical interpretations comparable in depth, exactness, and density of connection to interpretations of literary texts and cultural practices;
3. that these meanings are not “extramusical,” but on the contrary are inextricably bound up with the formal processes and stylistic articulations of musical works;
4. that these meanings are produced as a part of the general circulation of regulated practices and valuations – part, in other words, of the continuous production and reproduction of culture.

According to Kramer, the hermeneutic attitude regards the text as potentially secretive or a provocation, which must be made to yield to understanding. This is done by opening a hermeneutic window, through which the discourse of understanding can pass. (Kramer 1990: 6.) The concept is meant to shed light on “the illocutionary forces of music”\footnote{The expression “illocutionary” (contra “perlocutionary”) force derives from the speech-act theory of J. L. Austin.} in the dynamic constellation of harmonic, rhythmic, linear, formal, and other strategies in which musical meaning may be found, grasped, and interpreted. Musical processes are viewed as expressive acts, that is, as performative dimensions of utterance. (Ibid.: 6–9.)

Kramer differentiates three types of hermeneutic windows – partly overlapping each other – to be opened up in the music under analysis, either as expressive acts to be recognized as such or as signposts to such a recognition:

1. \textit{Textual inclusions} such as texts set to music, titles, epigrams, programs, notes to the score, and expression markings. These inclusions, just like the two other types too, do not establish, authorize nor fix the meaning “but only invite the interpreter to find meaning in the interplay of expressive acts”.
2. \textit{Citational inclusions} such as links to a literary work, visual image, place, or historical moment; allusions to other compositions, texts, styles, periods; inclusions and parodies of other characteristic styles not predominant in the work under analysis.
3. \textit{Structural tropes} are procedures “capable of various practical realizations, that also function as a typical expressive act within a certain cultural and historical framework”. Because structural tropes are “defined in terms of their illocutionary force, as units of doing rather than units of saying” – they are to be understood as performatives. They “cut across traditional distinctions between form and content. They can evolve from any aspect
of communicative exchange: style, rhetoric, representation, and so on.” (Kramer 1990: 10.)

Structural tropes would include, for example, the topics, as well as musical tropes and other rhetoric figurings theorized by musical semiotics, such as narrative modalities (Tarasti 1994) or expressive meanings (Hatten 1994). (In fact, topics may be conceived as belonging to all three categories.) The structural tropes are the most implicit and powerful of the hermeneutic windows. It is precisely the loose network of structural tropes that forms an illocutionary environment for expressive acts. (Kramer 1990: 9–10.) Borrowing from J. L. Austin’s speech-act theory, Kramer (ibid.) theorizes meaning as *performative* and *illocutionary* act. The illocutionary act refers to the performance of an act in the saying of something, such as issuing a command, asking a question, assuring or warning (the classic example is the “I do” in a marriage ceremony).59 Speech act theory is important to semiotics for its insights into rule-governed forms of behavior, i.e., everyday cultural practices based on the convention-governed production of signs in the performative dimension of speaking and writing, and by extension, all forms of communication. In feminist theory, most notably in Judith Butler’s (e.g., 1990) work, the understanding of gender as produced in performative is influential and adopted widely. Contemporary revisions, such as Butler’s, of what constitutes a performative, view meaning in general as performative (instead of staying with Austin’s original differentiation into perlocutionary and illocutionary acts).

To return to Kramer:

Structural tropes operate freely across the entire cultural field. … They may or may not derive from the explicit vocabulary that a historical period uses about itself. … In their malleability and semantic openness, structural tropes implant the hermeneutic attitude within the object of interpretation itself. As latent hermeneutic windows with a diversity of cultural affiliations, they form something like the body language of an interpretive community. (Kramer 1990: 12.)

These lines of Kramer resonate with a psychoanalytic understanding of culture. As Elizabeth Wright (1998: 192) sums up: “Freud discovered that psychoanalysis has to deal with the body caught up in the tropes and figures of language”, and – we can add – of other signifying practices, such as musical sign systems. Psychoanalytic theory focuses on the inadequacy of the subject’s body and its difficulties in confronting the socio-symbolic world, as experienced from the subject’s and subjectivity’s point of view. Hence, unsolvable meanings, ambivalence, ambiguity, fantasy, illusion, play, and the like are frequent objects of study.

59 For John Searle, another speech act theorist, the illocutionary act is synonymous with the speech act.
of psychoanalytic criticism. Kramer’s work combines “French” and “Anglo-American” criticism in a way that melds psychoanalytic theory with a rhetoric of deconstruction, showing that musical tropes, figures, or gestures in musical articulation may function both as mechanisms of subversion and defense (cf. Wright 1998: 192). The sign system is both the object or reason for the desire, and its consequence as well (cf. Lacan 1998 [1973]: 149).

Due to the linguistic and cultural turn in humanities, social sciences, and psychoanalytic criticism, and rather than fixating on the possible psychosexual intersections or coincidences between the author and the characters (usually, the protagonist) of a work, we can instead use psychoanalysis to question and describe musico-textual figurations against a background of identity problematics and subjectivity formation. Here we see a major turn in psychoanalytic art research. In the classic setting of psychoanalytic criticism, the text (or worse, the author) is the “patient” (“analysand”) and the reader the “analyst”. But that scene is reversed, from a poststructuralist, deconstructionist perspective: the text, too, is the analyst. The reader/listener is subjected to the effects of the text, while at the same time analyzing those effects, thus inhabiting a complicated position when acting as something like a subject-critic (Wright 1998: 193–194). In the next chapter, and bearing in mind the “classic”/new-hermeneutic dialectic in various forms of psychoanalysis, I theorize in more detail certain elements and processes of subject(ivity) in musical discourse.
Chapter 5
Locating the subject (strategy) in music

In Chapter 4, research on musical subjectivity was addressed as related to postmodern music analysis and musical semiotics. In the present chapter, musical subjectivity, subject, and subject strategy are discussed in poststructural semiotico-psychoanalytic perspective. Chapter 5.1 outlines listening subject and musical subjectivity as textual subjectivity. The theorization is grounded on (1) the constructivist understanding of the interdependent relation between the subject and discourse and the related notion of subject position, (2) on the psychoanalytic notion of identification, (3) and on the notion of “the played subject” and musical suture, based on the application of Kaja Silverman’s (1983) psychoanalytical-semiological discussions in film theory. Chapter 5.2 discusses Kristeva’s and Lacan’s basic ideas on the constitution of subject and their music-analytical applicability, and the Freudian notion of the uncanny is presented. Furthermore, a note on the gendered aspects follows. In Chapter 5.3, David Schwarz’s (1997a) psychoanalytic theorization of the listening subject is discussed and complemented by Michel Poizat’s (1992) views. Chapter 5.4 gives a summary of the constructed methodology of interpreting musical subject strategies.

5.1 On the intersection between subject and musical text

5.1.1 Listening subject, subject position, and identification process: The subject of the musical discourse

In the constructivist perspective, “the representation is conceived as entering into the very constitution of things” (Hall 1997: 5). Culture is seen as conglomeration of constitutive processes shaping subjectivities. In poststructural and constructivist perspective, the subject does not have a privileged position – over the social and cultural – in relation to meaning. The subject is always the subject of the discourse, which means that subject(ivity) is produced within the discourse and therefore subjected to it. Subject does not exist outside the discourse or out-
Chapter 5. Locating the subject (strategy) in music

side the text as its source and author but only within the discourse as its effect.\(^1\) (Hall 1997: 42, 55.) Poststructural (semiotical) psychoanalysis, social/cultural constructivism, and postmodern continental philosophy overall, displace the subject and individual as the source of meaning and sees it rather as a product of signification, for the source of meaning is located in socio-cultural structures, practices, and ideological systems. Subjectivity is mediated and constructed, it is socially and culturally produced, and hence it is not something immediate and stable outside of or isolated from discursive/cultural/textual practices.

If one follows Stuart Hall’s (1997: 56) presentation of the relation between subject and discourse (text), which is grounded on Michel Foucault’s (1973 [1966]: 3–16) classic account, and if one applies it to the musical experience in the listening process, then the subject can be thought to be produced through the musical text in two ways. (1) Firstly, the musical discourse (text) itself produces “figures”, such as abstract recurrent motives and themes or other characteristic elements as agencies, narrative subjects, and actants, which personify the “claims” (“knowledge”, meanings) the discourse produces. This denotes the subject as a figure in the text (cf. narratological approach; see Chap. 4.2.4). (2) Secondly, another place for subject(ivity) is provided by the listener who becomes subjected to the musical discourse. This is the place from which the musical discourse’s (text’s) particular meanings make the most sense, and it is called a subject position. This denotes the subject of the discourse. It is the musical text itself that constructs the ideal subject position from which it becomes meaningful for the listener-subject. In this way, the listener is composed into the position of the ideal listener. She projects herself to subject positions offered by the musical text in order to make sense of it. Hence it is a matter of identification: music is experienced as sonic self\(^2\).

Identification refers in psychoanalysis to “all the mental processes by which an individual becomes like another in one or several aspects” (Moore et al. 1990: 103). In psychoanalytic theory, various modes of identification are differentiated from very primal to more mature ones (see, e.g., Laplanche & Pontalis 1998: 205–208). Here, as related to the question of subjectivity in music, identification means the listener’s preliminary identification with the “inaudible” listening agency of the music as discourse, as the agency which puts forward the unfolding of music as a sensible text (cf. Metz 1982: 96). It is thus not a question of the listener’s identification with the character in the musical story (that is another

\(^1\) The classic account of the subject and discourse in these terms is provided by Michel Foucault in his The Order of Things (1973 [1966]) and The Archaeology of Knowledge (1977 [1969]).

\(^2\) The expression sonic self is that of Cumming (2000), although it is used here in a different theoretical sense than in Cumming’s Peircean account of the musical performer.
Subject Strategies in Music

matter) – though it may happen, too, during the listening process. The preliminary identification could be seen as a necessary and the most fundamental subject strategy (or mechanism) of the listener towards the music as an object of identification, characterizing all meaningful listening experiences. For music to work, the listener must “subject” herself to music’s discourse. The listener is not able to take meaning until she has identified with the positions indicated, produced, and constructed by the musical text, i.e., until she has subjected herself to its rules and conventions and hence become the subject of text’s signification, the producer of its meanings. This means that the discourse (work of music) constructs the listener as a subject. Accordingly, the subject is both the subject of the music (what it is about) and the subject in the music – the one whom the discourse sets in place and who simultaneously makes sense of it.³ (Cf. Hall 1997: 56, 60–61.) In this way, the listening subject extends her identity into music, borrows her identity from music, or (con)fuses her identity with the music (cf. Rycroft 1986 [1968]: 67). This indicates also a transference process, for it is through transference that the listener identifies with the text (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 210). But because a musical text is never unified but on the contrary shatters the unity of the thetic⁴ (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 43–67), it also shatters the unity of the subject position. Therefore the subject manifests as a process rather than a fixed position of the unified subject (the unified subject is only one stage in the process of signification) (cf. ibid.).

Subjectivity is understood from our psychoanalytic perspective more broadly and psychologically than in narratological approaches. The whole textual process is understood as constructing musical subjectivity in its signification process, in which the listener becomes a subject by subjecting herself to text’s meanings (subject as a position in the discourse). It is a question of the constituents of overall subjectivity as played by music, understood as textual mechanisms suggesting subject positions with which the listener identifies. The psychoanalytic approach in art research always proceeds by seeing textual mechanisms as analogous to psychic mechanisms, whence the whole musical text manifests as a psychic screen. The subject is thus to be understood in a very abstract way as referring to the total experience of the elementary identification with the musical work. Musical work in its entirety is experienced as a projection of self. A characteristic theme as subject in a musical narrative manifests only as a tip of the ice-berg, as if the smaller sphere of the consciousness in contrast to the larger sphere of the unconscious as “the true psychic reality” (Freud 1953 [1900]: 612–613).⁵ As

---

³ In this perspective it is the listener who completes the meaning of the work constructed in the dialogue between the work and the listener.
⁴ This concept is clarified in Chap. 6.2.
⁵ Similarly for Lacan the subject is the subject of the unconscious (cf. Chap. 5.2.2).
Kristeva (1984 [1974]: 215) writes: “The subject never is. The subject is only the signifying process and [s]he appears only as a signifying practice, that is, only when [s]he is absent within the position out of which social, historical, and signifying activity unfolds.”

As a site of subjectivity, self, and identity formation, music touches or “plays” subject strategies at many different psycho-textual levels. Music is experienced by the listening subject as a continuum of self, a mirror or a screen of self, a site of identity, a theatre of (the constitution of) mind. Identification, mirroring, projection, and other such psychoanalytic processes, engendered in the dialectics of self and other in the formation of subjectivity, are working especially effectively in music because of its strong nonlinguistic appeal shattering the thetic and activating the subject-in-process/on-trial.

Accordingly, music can be approached as a projection of the listener’s psyche, as if it were her subjectivity that sounds in the music. It does not mean that a piece of music would represent a coherent self or subject but heterogeneous layers of subjectivity, the developing and divided subject-in-process/on-trial. This subject manifests as a fragmentary collection of texts, of discursive activities. It ensues in an intertextual space created by the listener. When analyzing a work, different elements in musical text can be interpreted as different modes of being, psychic registers, mechanisms, and agencies, of the same subjectivity; “objects” and “others” in the text are interpreted as projections of subject’s unconscious sides in herself. For example, a characteristic theme or figure (the narrative subject; subject as a figure in the text), may function as an ego or imaginary object in the musical work and its surroundings as other registers of subjectivity.7

5.1.2 The played subject: On musical suture (Silverman’s application)

In her psychoanalytical-semiotical theorization, Kaja Silverman has differentiated three subjects in cinematic texts. The first two are to be understood on the basis of Emile Benveniste’s (1971 [1966]) linguistic differentiation of (1) the speaking subject (le sujet de l’énonciation; the subject of uttering) and (2) the subject of the speech (le sujet de l’énoncé; the subject of the utterance), largely


7 For example, in my analysis of Chopin’s C minor Nocturne Op. 48 No. 1 (Chap. 8), the theme could be understood as the subject’s conscious side (the ego in its symbolic dimension) in this sense, and the texture accompanying it as the imaginary of the subject.
adopted in general semiotics. The first refers to the agency of the discourse and the second to the discursive element. By resonating Lacan (who resonates Benveniste), Benveniste argues that it is only in and through language that the subject can be constituted, and the use of “shifters”, such as the word “I”, to signify subjectivity, introduces a split into the core of the subject. The “I” constantly shifts between the level of the uttering and that of what is uttered. This is also related to the gap between the signified (referent) as the speaker (the individual participating in discourse; cf. also the subject of the unconscious) and the signifier as “I” (the discursive element, a figure). (Silverman 1983: 196–199, cf. also, 45–47.) “They remain forever irreducible to each other, separated by the barrier between reality and signification, or what Lacan would call ‘being’ and ‘meaning’” (ibid.: 46.) This condition of the alienated subject Lacan (1998 [1973]: 210–213) describes also with the notion of vel. It refers to the subject’s “either/or” position (fundamental division) between Being (real/imaginary fullness) and Meaning (social-symbolic order). If choosing being (freedom), the subject will vanish into non-meaning. If choosing meaning (signifier, subjectivity) it happens at the expense of being: subjectivity is a condition of alienation. (Ibid.)

In addition to the speaking subject situated at the site of production, and the subject of the speech as a figure in the text, Silverman adds a third subject. This is (3) the spoken subject, which means the subject produced through the discourse, understood as a “projected viewer” (in our case: “projected listener”) and most visible at the site of consumption. The spoken subject activates the signifiers of the text and “agrees” to be signified by them by identifying with the subject of the speech and “permitting the signifier ‘I’ to represent a subject to another signifier (i.e., ‘you’).” (Silverman 1983: 47, 198–199.) This idea is based on Lacanian notion of subject that constitutes itself through speaking – within discourse – and is always simultaneously spoken (ibid.: 199). This is the subject that inheres in musical discourse, and I call it the played subject, constantly reconstructed through the discourse and understood as an ideal subject position in the musical text.

In Lacanian psychoanalysis and especially in film theory, the notion of suture has been theorized to explain the relation of the (divided) subject to her own discourse, and the means by which and at the expense of which she emerges there. It can also be used to describe the process by which cinematic texts – or musical texts, I claim – confer subjectivity upon their viewers and listeners (cf. Silverman 1983: 195). The concept derives from Lacanian psychoanalyst Jacques-Alain

8 Greimas’s theorizing of uttering (énonciation; related to the modalization) as the semiotic moment logically required by the fact of the utterance (énoncé; related to the modalities) has been influential and applied in musical semiotics (see Tarasti 1994: 23, 38, 50–51, 197–208; Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 1992: 35–38; 1997: 153–156).
Miller (1977/78), and it has been developed – as well as criticized and revised – in film theory by a number of writers (e.g., Jean-Pierre Oudart and Jacqueline Rose).

Suture refers to the process by which “the subject inserts itself into the symbolic register in the guise of a signifier, and in so doing gains meaning at the expense of being” (Silverman 1983: 200). It names the relation of the subject to the chain of its discourse, and the relation of the primal lack to the structure of which it is an element. The subject disappears for the sake of the symbol or representation. The signifier, which grants the subject access to the Symbolic order, stands in for the absence in the subject’s being, whose lack it can never stop signifying. Thus it refers to absence, split, and alienation, and resembles closely the subject’s inauguration into language.9 (Ibid.; see also, Dor 1998: 136.) The subject is the other of the discourse, and the discourse is the other of the subject. The subject is “not the speaking consciousness, not the author of the formulation, but a position that may be filled in certain conditions by various individuals” (Foucault 1977 [1969]: 115). Correspondingly, the listening subject becomes played by means of musical discourse in the musico-syntactical relationships as the agency whereby meaning emerges and a subject position is constructed for the listener (cf. Silverman 1983: 201). The listener becomes played (“written”) by the text – by the text she thinks herself to be listening (cf. Wright 1998: 120).10 By offering subject positions, music (re)produces archaic unsettled subjectivity and related subject strategies.

Accordingly, the concept of musical subject refers in this perspective to the space between the listener and the text, sutured together by incorporating the text as part of the listener’s self. It refers in the first place to the signifying elements in the discourse and only after that to psychological and emotional contents and agencies (figures) in the music. Primarily it refers to music’s ability to function as a site of unsettled subjectivity unfolding at the border between self and the other, the semiotic and the symbolic, leading to broader understanding of various psychic strategies of unsettled subjectivity.

To experience music as a continuum of self by an elementary identification process is not dependent on experiencing music as coherent narration. For example, music that seems to be “anti-subjective” or “anti-narrative” in its incoherence and lack of recurring characterizing elements (certain aleatoric music, for instance), is experienced as subjectivity as well. It could be interpreted, for

10 This goes for the composer and performer as well, for they too become played by the text (cf. p. 20, Chap. 1.4).
example, as constructing a subject strategy of withdrawing, annihilation, fusion or other dissolving of ego borders, or defense such as reaction formation, undooing, turning against self or inhibition. However, these interpretations are always contextual and piece-related, whatever the style or genre. Music has to be familiar enough to the listener in order for it to be experienced as played subjectivity and a continuum of self. If it is not familiar enough or the listener is not competent in the musical language in question, the identification is rejected, whence the music may be experienced as “bad” or “stupid” or not even music at all. These denote the listener’s subject strategies needed to maintain the borders of self under the threat of disturbing or abject music (Kristeva 1982), not accepted by superego or controllable by ego, whence identification cannot take place.11

5.2 Semiotico-psychoanalytic theories of the subject’s constitution in the analysis of musical subject strategies

5.2.1 The semiotic chora, abjection, and melancholy as the nonlinguistic material of music (Kristevan approach)

Kristeva’s theories of the subject, signification, unconscious, and literal text, draw on many directions of psychoanalysis (Freud, Lacan, Klein, and Winnicott most importantly), linguistics, structuralism, semiotics, feminism, and continental philosophy in general. If Lacan “linguisticizes” and semiotizes Freud, Kristeva does the same to object-relation theory. As is object-relation theory, Kristeva is also interested in the pre-Oedipal and pre-linguistic levels established as the nonlinguistic side of the subject’s being and signification. This realm she theorizes most crucially with the notions of the semiotic modality of signification (as opposed to the symbolic) and the chora as the organizing space related to the semiotic modality (Kristeva 1980 and 1984 [1974]; see also, Chap. 6). Moreover, of importance is her term of abjection that refers to the fundamental mechanism of differentiation related to the separation process (1982), and a melancholic disposition underlies the condition of the speaking subject (1989).

The focus of Kristeva’s theorization, since very early on, has been the subject’s continuous meaning work (cf. Freud’s concept of dream work): the question of how the subject forms meanings and how her subjectivity becomes organized and divided – how it comes into being – in the process of signification.12 Kristeva’s theories revolve around the child’s psychological differentiation, or separation,

11 Cf. the notion of aesthetic superego, see pp. 75–76 (Chap. 3.3).
12 Broadly taken, all psychic happenings can be seen as an effort to grasp and understand one’s own experience and the world around one, and thus as meaning and subjectivity work.
from the mother. She reinterprets it semiotically as the separation of words from things making possible the entering into language and Symbolic order. The separation from the mother, i.e., the primary differentiation of subject and object, is for her the proto-model for the subject’s very constitution, as it is with Klein and Winnicott too. Kristeva is fascinated by the moments of the becoming subjectivity, and thus by the prerequisites of signification as if before the state of the sign. In a way, all artistic articulation and textual production, is about the crisis that human subjectivity means. The subject is always a subject-in-process/on-trial.

Kristeva (1984 [1974]: 19–106) outlines the constitution of subjectivity in the interaction of two systems, and actually in the fissure between the two. According to Kristeva, all significations consist of two components: the pre-linguistic and drive-based semiotic located at the *chora* and in the unconscious, and the symbolic referring to language as syntax, sign, and nomination.\(^\text{13}\) The textual levels generated by the semiotic and the symbolic Kristeva (1984 [1974]: 86–87) discusses as geno- and phenotexts. Barthes (1985: 270–271), in his study of singing, has transposed these concepts into geno- and pheno-song.\(^\text{14}\)

When studying the bi-logic and crossings of these two modalities in music, two levels of study are to be theoretico-methodologically differentiated, as proposed already in Chapter 1.2 (pp. 6–7). To begin with, it is possible to theorize music generally as a type of discourse dominated by the semiotic (as Kristeva herself does when discussing music). Secondly, the unique dialectics of the semiotic and the symbolic can be studied in a certain specific work of music at the music-analytical level.\(^\text{15}\) In this case (in music-analytical study), a further differentiation is to be made between *primary* and *secondary representations* of the semiotic.\(^\text{16}\) Primary representation means that an element is to be interpreted as if as such belonging to the semiotic realm. Secondary representation means that it is to be understood as a far more contextual representation and defined more obviously by the stylistic and other contexts. In practice, the line between

\(^{13}\) These are discussed in more detail in Chap. 6. Here the orientation is more music-analytical whereas in Chap. 6 is more semiotical and psychological.

\(^{14}\) For examples of Kristevan applications in music analysis, see Stoianova 1977; Kramer 1995; Schwarz 1997a; Cumming 1997a; Dame 1998; and Richardson 1999. See also Flinn (1992) on film music.

\(^{15}\) I am grateful to Anne Sivuoja-Gunaratnam (personal communication), who first helped me to understand the importance of this differentiation.

\(^{16}\) In general, when applying in music research poststructurally and deconstructively grounded theories about the textuality beyond the language but simultaneously influencing it, similar differentiations should be taken into account. With these kinds of concepts, the similarity to Freud’s notion of the unconscious – or to drive as well – is noticeable. Freud’s unconscious (or drive) cannot be grasped as such, but only in the disguised vicissitudes (derivatives) in the discourse.
these two levels of representation is often impossible to draw, and it may not be sensible to try to judge into which of the two representative fields a certain musical gesture belongs (this constellation resembles the one between Schwarz’s [1997a] “listening thing” and “listening space”, discussed in Chap. 5.3). This is because musical gestures belong simultaneously to both levels – for all musical elements contain several articulative levels. Still, theoretically, the differentiation is important to make, for it is related to the central methodological problematic in psychoanalytic music analysis. Accordingly, the semiotic and the symbolic do not refer to the same thing at different theoretico-methodological levels of examination (the two levels of examination form different logical categories and vary also with different works of music).

The primary representation of the semiotic is not that much genre- and style-related as secondary representation is. In Gino Stefani’s (1985: 83–84; 1984: 219–220) terms, the primary representation is closer to the general codes, and the secondary representation closer to the level of style and individual works (stylistic and idioleotical codes). The categories of the semiotic and the symbolic are thus to be proportioned to the unique and special discourse formed by the work under analysis. One should reflect on what is to be considered as semiotic and symbolic within the rules of certain musical style and genre, and so forth. Each music, genre, and style, in itself forms a special case (special discourse of its own), where the semiotic and the symbolic are expressed in different ways than in some other music. What can be considered semiotic in one piece may not be that in another piece.

Similar differentiation is made in regard to Kristeva’s (1982) notion of the abject. As with Klein and Winnicott, also for Kristeva the roots of artistic experience and discourse-making occur in the state of separation, in which Kristeva is interested for its abject dimension. Abjection is produced in the separation from the primary object (mother) in order to form one’s own boundaries of self. Abjection lies between subject and object – and between the pre-Oedipal and Oedipal – and marks a site of fundamental loathing. Concrete material that represent the abject and evoke the abject experience are, for example, all of the bodily liquids such as blood, sperm, and vomit, growing surpluses of the body such as fractured hairs and nails, and decomposing or in other ways disgusting (“infected”) food.

17 Stefani’s (1985: 79–102; 1984) model of musical competence covers five levels of codes: 1) general codes, 2) social practices, 3) musical techniques, 4) styles, and 5) opus. 18 In feminist, avant-garde visual arts, abject art using or depicting body fluids and other human surplus material forms a well-established genre of its own (e.g., Cindy Shearman). In this case the abject is a conscious issue or topic in the work and thus forms a certain psychoanalytic-feminist iconography (cf. Chap. 3.2.6).

It is cultural “toilet training”, the norms and rules concerning food and hygiene systems, that defines what is abject, i.e., what is to be excluded from the Symbolic order and
They signify a border crossing, a zone of “not-me”, and a material representation of psychic anxiety, of fear of annihilation, provoked by a darkening of the borders of self. According to Kristeva, an artist (I would say here, a receiver) must both activate the pre-Oedipal maternal condition of abjection and rejection, and free herself from it. An artist becomes enchanted by the abject condition, whence language and the symbolic sign system become distorted, as if under the pressure of archaic, carnal gravity. The abject is a semiotic residual of a sign that escapes signification. In this way, it is “under” the process of signification as a necessary mechanism of differentiation by which signs are cut off from things; the most fundamental differentiation takes place in the area of the body. In abjection, this differentiation is incomplete. (Kristeva 1982: 1–4, 16–17.) Music may be one way to “purify the abject” and “name the un-nameable” – to ameliorate, through sublimation, the rejection of and separation from the m/other’s body.

When applying the concept of the abject in music analysis, two basic possibilities and levels of analysis are to be differentiated. Firstly, a certain musical quality, element or gesture, such as an especially loud, extremely high or low, or otherwise physically unpleasant sound, can be considered in itself as an abject sound. This is the case with primary abject representation. Secondly, a certain musical quality, element, or gesture can function as a representation of abjection in a more context-sensitive way, more tightly related to work- and style-specific considerations: a certain musical quality, element, or gesture represents unpleasant abjection in a certain stylistic context. This is a case of secondary abject representation.

To connect separation, melancholy, object loss, and depression to music and musical experience is not something specific to the Kristevan approach only, but to the psychoanalytic approach in general. The nucleus of musical productivity and creativity has, throughout the history of psychoanalytic criticism, often been considered to lay in the mourning over the lost primary object and its re-creation in musical fantasy. The Kristevan approach – and also object-relation theory – transcends problems of biographism of id-psychology (discussed in Chaps. 3.2 and 3.4.1) by considering the mourning problematics to characterize subject and texts generally. In the Freudian tradition of biographical interpretations of unambiguous subjectivity. Kristeva grounds her theory of the abject significantly on Mary Douglas’s anthropological studies of food codes, rituals of contamination and purification, and religious beliefs about the sacred and uncleanliness.

19 Schwarz (1997a: Chap. 7) outlines various unpleasant abject vocalizations of both representative levels in Diamanda Galás’s music. He (ibid.: 151) differentiates between primary abjection that is produced when “boundaries are drawn” and secondary abjection that “fantasizes a return back across these thresholds” and that is produced when “boundaries are erased”. Kramer (1995: 58–59, 63) has studied musical representations of the abject at a general ideological level in music.
the melancholy in music, it has been thought that actual (historical) object losses are perhaps not necessary for creativity, but if such happen, they are of great importance and direct the creative work towards mourning and memorializing. This has been a standard idea, for example, in psychoanalytic studies of Mahler’s music (e.g., Pollock 1990; see also, Nass 1989: 165–167). For Kristeva, the psychological/structural object loss in early childhood, which every subject entering language experiences (the loss of full presence and union with the mother for the sake of the signifier), is enough of an object loss to guide artistic practice. Kristeva’s (1989) theory of melancholy is a semiotical theory that outlines the prerequisites for, and interruptions and disorders in the subject’s signifying capabilities: the fracture emerging between things (world, [m]other) and words (signs, representations) introduced by separation and the Symbolic (language). All this positions the speaking subject into an always potentially melancholy disposition. This somewhat resembles Margaret S. Mahler’s (1968 and 1972) descriptions of the mother-child dyad as symbiotic maternal unity, the gradual leaving off of which (called the separation-individuation process) forms a life-long mourning process. With these psychoanalytic theories of melancholy, we confront a question answered differently by different theorists: What is the status of the object of melancholy? Is it actual (real) or illusory (fantasized), historical or structural? Are these differentiations even sensible? These questions are further addressed in the music-analytical part of this study; issues of melancholy, separation, and fantasy of union permeate all the presented analyses.

5.2.2 Registers of subjectivity in music (Lacanian approach)

In Lacan’s (e.g., 1998 [1973] and 1977 [1966]) linguistic translation of psychoanalysis, language (sign system) manifests as the decisive factor in the psychic constitution of the subject. According to Lacan, we come to know ourselves as separated and discernible from others and from the world only through language and other representation systems. The price of this self-recognition – of subjectivity – is a series of losses, due to which the nucleus of subjectivity is characterized by absence, lack, division, and fundamental alienation. Entering the language requires abandonment of the immediate, undifferentiated connection to (m)other/world and the state of fullness. This differentiation begins in an imaginary space, which is a psychic system based on identifications. The imaginary register in subject manifests itself as an experience of lack and as a longing for fullness, unity, fusion, and full presence. With the Oedipal crisis, the infant moves to the symbolic order, i.e., enters the language. This entering the symbolic (language and subjectivity) indicates also symbolic castration and a state of alienation (division) and vel (see p. 136). Language is about absence; it handles
and processes absence, and fills the basic lack in the subject with its continuous symbolizations. The psychic constitution of the subject is ordered by yet a third register, the real, which means that which is and which always stays beyond signification, i.e., unsymbolizable and unrepresentable “straight existence”.20 (Lacan 1975; 1998 [1973]: 210–213; Wright 1998: 99–102; Silverman 1983: 151–165.)

The mirror stage describes a process through which the subject enters language and becomes subjected to it. It refers to the developing subject between the ages of about 6–18 months, when the infant, who is not yet able to speak (cf. Latin in-fans) and control her body movements, finds in the mirror an unbroken picture of her body as a whole. The infant, dominated by a chaotic and fragmentary body experience, reacts to the integrative and unifying picture, to the illusion of her own body as a whole, by identification and jubilation. This inaugurates and pushes forward the dialectics of subjectivity where recognition is at the same time always a mis-recognition (the child is not the reflection in the mirror), due to which the ego is in a fundamental way illusory and the subject always alienated. (Lacan 1977 [1966]: 1–4; see also, Silverman 1983: 157–158.) The mirror stage is a metaphor of subjectivity; between the image and the experience there remains a necessary structural gap.

For Lacan, the subject is thus always already traumatized because she is defined by a fundamental lack. Shattered, split, and unstable, the subject can never grasp the ultimate object of her desire. Forced by her desire, the subject slips from one signifier to another. The progress of the metonymic chain never stops because the final object a of the desire is always unreachable. (Lacan 1998 [1973]: 62, 103, 185.) The subject tries to fill the gap in her existence (the fundamental lack) with endless substitutes, such as music, among others. Indeed, in western culture, music works powerfully as an imaginary object or signifier. As Michel Poizat (1992: ix) writes about opera, it “gives voice to a certain truth: human being can suffer from their status as speaking subjects, and they can find an ecstatic pleasure in seeking to forget or deny their fundamental attachment to language.”

The ego as a product of the mirror stage belongs to the imaginary register. At this point, especially in his understanding of ego, Lacan differs strikingly from other psychoanalytic paradigms. Lacan’s notion of the subject brings out that entry into the symbolic situates the subject as subjected to the language

---

20 Contrary to the rest of the study, here in Chapter 5.2.2 (as well as in Chap. 11) the “symbolic” refers, if not otherwise indicated, to Lacan’s symbolic order. As noted before (n. 10, p. 4, Chap. 1.1) Lacan’s and Kristeva’s concepts are not in any straightforward sense compatible. It can be thought that Kristeva’s semiotic encompasses both real and imaginary, but is perhaps best exemplified in the imaginary.
system. This leads to a split: to the unavoidable difference between the subject of the utterance and the subject of the enunciation (cf. Chap. 5.1.2). The speaking subject is not compatible with the “I” which is expressed in the message. (In Kristeva’s notion of subject-in-process/on-trial this resonates in two dimensions: [1] the subject is always involved in a process [a product of it], and [2] it is always on trial.)

As a discourse of desire, music can be seen as displaying signs of an unstable and fragmented subject. These can be traced from the musical discourse, for example, as fractures and distortions of text, as complex signifying structures of anxieties, fears, and pleasures. Whereas to Freud art is something for the subject to analyze, for Lacan, art is rather something that analyzes the subject (Wright 1999: 7). When approaching a musical sign system as constituting subjectivity and representing subject strategies, Lacanian concepts of the psychic registers (symbolic, imaginary, real), the object a, and the acoustic mirror, provide important music-analytical categories and complement the basic Kristevan framework used in this research.21

David Schwarz (1997a: 16–22) and Daniel Falck (1996: 24–25), on the basis of Guy Rosolato’s (1978) and Kaja Silverman’s (1988) theorizations, have developed as a musicological concept the notion of the acoustic mirror as an audible parallel of Lacan’s notion of the visual mirror stage.22 Schwarz (1997a) elaborates it as a music-analytical tool, and Falck (1996) uses it for Lacanian film music criticism. Both authors talk about the acoustic mirror stage (Schwarz 1997a: 20; Falck 1996: 25). The concept of acoustic mirror refers to the auditory dimension in the reciprocal space between the mother and the non-speaking infant; this dimension dominates the pre-linguistic, experiential realm of the subject at the very threshold of language acquisition. This refers to Lacan’s imaginary register.

---

21 The psychoanalytic approach in the humanities refers most often to the Lacanian tradition in its poststructural and feminist versions (Lacan, Derrida, Silverman, Žižek, Kristeva, Butler, Irigaray, etc.). In the tradition of applied psychoanalysis (e.g., Feder et al., eds. 1990 and 1993) Lacan’s theories are not necessarily even known, let alone recognized or applied. The Lacanian approach in music research, contrary to approaches grounded on id-psychology, ego-psychology, and object-relation theory, most often takes place in music analysis, i.e., in the study of the musical text; e.g., Schwarz 1997a and 1997b; Cumming 1997a; Richardson 1999; Falck 1996, 1998, and 2000; see also, Williams 2001: 71–75; and Chaps. 3.2.3–3.2.4. For an overview and introduction to Lacanian criticism, see Wright 1998: Chap. 6; Silverman 1983: esp. 149–193; Žižek 1991; Borch-Jakobsen 1991; and Dor 1998.

22 The concept of acoustic mirror, introduced originally by French psychoanalyst Guy Rosolato (1978) and widely known through Silverman’s (1988) theories, has been used especially abundantly in studies concerning the sound world in films, and which draw upon psychoanalysis, semiotics, and feminism (cf. Chap. 3.2.4).
and mirror stage, and Winnicott’s transitional stage (age 6–18 months), but the acoustic mirror stage starts a bit earlier.

The early interactive system operates through the close physical and auditory contacts between mother and child. The acoustic mirror is related to the auditory sphere of this maternal care and interaction, and to the support and animation of an elementary sense of “self” necessary for the psychical development of the infant. It is characterized centrally by a basic mechanism of auditory recognition and differentiation. The concept of the acoustic mirror emphasizes the significance and role of sound in the vocal and auditory sensory sphere in the formation of subjectivity, and the connection which music and auditory pleasure have in the pre-linguistic mode of being of the early childhood.

Music may excite this mode by touching the erotic and infantile sources of auditory pleasure related to the pre-linguistic space of communication, which the infant creates in interaction with the m/other. This psychic space is richly studied and theorized in non-Lacanian psychoanalytic tradition as well (see Chap. 3.2.2). Like the visual, the acoustic mirror stage is characterized by experiences that are organized by the binary oppositions of the imaginary register, such as full/empty and presence/absence (Schwarz 1997a: 16). To the child – or to the developing subject – the acoustic mirror presents the child with her first early experiences of self, a system of maintaining a germ, a primal state of self, a proto-model for the psyche that will develop later.

Music can be approached as constructing its own articulations of this mode in the cultural sphere. Various double structures in music, for instance, can be interpreted as aspects recalling the acoustic mirror (Schwarz 1997a: 21–22). Transitivity, transitionality, transformations, and threshold crossings characterize the realm of the acoustic mirror. It is a line of demarcation for psychic boundaries and a space for the inter-registral transitions and crossings, and displacements back and forth, such as transitions between the imaginary and the symbolic, and threshold crossings between language and nonlinguistic sound material. The acoustic mirror is connected to jouissance and to the experiences of the closeness of the real and of object a (Falck 1996: 25–26, 30).

5.2.3 The uncanny in music

“The uncanny” is a marginal term that Freud (1955a [1919]) developed in one of his essays but that poststructural criticism and psychoanalytic semiotics have brought out and highlighted as a central notion in postmodern discussions on representation and subjectivity formation. In Elizabeth Wright’s (1998: 134) words, it shows “how a marginal term (something on the borders of aesthetics and psychology) can reveal itself as a special example of what is most general”.

145
For poststructuralism, it is a key example of the indomitability of the unconscious, denoting a threat for signification, a crisis of representation, a site of the un-presentable. The concept has also been used for reading and criticizing Freud himself. For a subject-strategical approach, the uncanny is an important notion because it refers to a bizarre disturbance in subjectivity formation and a special mechanism of the threshold crossing of unconscious and consciousness. It indicates a borderline condition of selfhood where the sense of self as separate, distinct and autonomous, under one’s own control, becomes strangely troubled.

According to Freud, the uncanny happens when something “very old and once familiar” turns alien, provoking a sense of dread and unease. Thus the uncanny marks the presence of the alien in the familiar. Something is added to the familiar element, so that it transforms into its opposite. *Heimlich* (home-like, secret, canny) turns to *unheimlich* (un-homely, uncanny), evoking terror, fear, anxiety, and repulsion. (Freud 1955a [1919]: 219–221.) The uncanny is aroused easily, for example, when one confronts death, a dead body, dismembered limbs, wax figures, skillfully made dolls and puppets resembling (creepy) humans, especially those dolls with automatic mechanisms. The uncanny also rises up when something reminds us of the repetitiveness and machinery behind a manifestly mental activity, or when a “primitive” or aboriginal belief, that should rule only in the unconscious, appears to be confirmed in real life. The fantasy and reality dissolves; the symbol ceases to be a symbol and takes over completely the functions that it was supposed to only symbolize. Functional values and principles of signs as signs weaken, and their logic becomes frail; they are no longer experienced as arbitrary but as real. As a result, the material world (which the sign was supposed to refer to) crumbles under the imagination as the signs are objectified. (Kristeva 1991: 191–192.)

Freud (1955a [1919]) theorized the uncanny by reading E. T. A. Hoffmann’s *Sandman.* This essay has often been considered a landmark in psychoanalytic

---

23 Think, for example, of wax copies of human bodies, organs, limbs, foetuses, etc., used in medicine and in wax museums. Recently uncanny wax figures – as well as (abject) remains of real bodies – have been used as installation and sculpture material in contemporary arts. Consider also the human that plays a wax figure or statue – a common device in theatre and street art – which, when it wakes suddenly, may induce an uncanny experience.

24 This happens, for example, when something or someone that we have just been thinking of manifests in front of us in reality.

25 This mechanism of the uncanny exposes the function of language as a defensive construction (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 49) and also its fragility as a protecting wall structuring the repressed (Kristeva 1991: 191–192).

26 Freud is indebted to Ernst Jentsch’s slightly earlier presentation of the uncanny (see Cohn 2004: 287).
criticism because it presents a thematic textual reading of a work of art instead of analyzing the author or the work in the light of its author’s biography, as was typical in early id-psychological criticism. The experience of the uncanny, as psychoanalytic criticism defines it, forms a central cultural imagery and aesthetic dimension. It is an important element in aesthetic experience and may be connected to the experience of the sublime (the same goes for the abject).\(^{27}\)

The aesthetics of the uncanny, in psychoanalytic criticism, has received much discussion in literature, film and the visual arts, but not so in music, yet it has its manifestations in the realm of music as well. Music may construct signs of the uncanny (death, doubles, multiplication, mechanicalness, repetition compulsion, etc.) by harmonic, structural, topical, gestural and other figural, both formal and iconographical means, producing musico-cultural tropes of the uncanny. In musicology, this has been more often fleetingly touched upon than seriously developed. But the accounts already show that musical manifestations from Freud’s uncanny items really are interestingly found in western art and popular music, such as musical automata, doublessness, repetition compulsion, repression, and various defamiliarizations (Kramer 1990: 203; 1998b: 152, 158–160; 2002: 80–81, 259; Cherlin 1993; Gibbs 1995; Schwarz 1997a: 67–68, 76–77; Marston 2000; Abbate 2001; Kerman 2002: 158–159; Cohn 2004; Richardson [forthcoming]). Central, also, is the need to interpret musicological reception and rhetoric of analysis in the light of “the uncanny listening effect” (Gibbs 1995), in order to support analysis of uncanny constructions in music.

Recently the notion has been taken up more thoroughly for musicological purposes (Cherlin 1993, Gibbs 1995, Marston 2000, and Cohn 2004). Richard Cohn (2004) has systemically studied a harmonic progression that he calls “a hexatonic pole” (sometimes referred to as “antinomic minor third exchange”) as a musical equivalent of Freud’s and Jentsch’s uncanny (e.g., the lack of common tones in the juxtaposition of E Major and C Minor\(^{28}\)). He offers an impressive gallery of examples of the hexatonic pole in compositions from Haydn to Richard Strauss in which they denote uncanny events or features (dead bodies, conjuring up the dead, reincarnation, magic, spirits, severed heads). The interpretations are

---

\(^{27}\) For readings, interpretations, and developments of Freud’s notion of the uncanny, see Royle 2003.

\(^{28}\) The efficient working of hexatonic poles as signifiers of the uncanny is based on the effect of effacing the distinction between dissonance and consonance. The consonant triad’s implicit potential to turn dissonant is realized when juxtaposed with its hexatonic pole, resulting in an effect of the uncanny; something considered extremely dissonant appears suddenly as a consonance. It is the status of the hexatonic poles’ constituents as both triads and not triads, consonants and not consonants (dissonants), real and imagery, “alive” and “dead”, that is at the heart of the uncanny experience. (Cohn 2004: 303, 317–320.)
further supported by other writer’s descriptions of the passages in question and also by tonal theorists contemporary with Freud and Jentsch. Moreover, Carolyn Abbate (2001) has extensively studied mechanistic repetitions in music and opera, the rhetorics of machine and automaton, imagery of puppetry, disconnected limbs, conjuring of the dead, etc., all elements in the Freudian conception of the uncanny. Though not explicitly applying Freud’s psychoanalytic notions of it, Abbate’s study nevertheless marks a remarkable study of the psychoanalytic uncanny as it manifests in western art music.

As a borderline condition of threatened or lost subjectivity and signification, in which one’s sense of possessing her mind and body is shaken, the concept of the uncanny has certain family resemblance to Kristeva’s (1982) notion of the abject and Lacan’s (1998 [1973]) notion of the real. All these three concepts concern experiences related to fantasies of the subject’s own origin and materiality, the incomprehensible mystery of body, sexuality, and death (e.g., birth fantasies), and fear that someone else is running one’s mind and body. When experiencing the abject, uncanny, or real, the subject’s self cannot mark itself as clearly separate from the outside world and others, which results in anxiety, horror, and repulsion. The abject can also evoke nausea, the uncanny eerie, and the real terror close to psychotic experience. In these experiences, something primal and long-repressed, which should stay in the unconscious, pops out and into the outside world, which suddenly seems to obey one’s own magical logic of the unconscious (as if dreams or nightmares had come true). The system of representation and maintaining of subjectivity goes out of joint. Though evoking horror, the state of undifferentiation and de-subjectivization may also be a source of jouissance.

5.2.4 Gender-theoretical and feminist considerations

When one studies (developing) subjectivities in music, certain gender-theoretical issues have to be considered.29 This is for two basic reasons: Firstly, the study of musical constructions of subjectivity has been developed this far perhaps most importantly in gender-theoretical and feminist music analysis, which thus provides methodological model for analyzing subjectivities in other perspectives as well (e.g., McClary 1991; Citron 1994). Here we can also point out that feminist semiotics or semio-feminism has significantly developed the study of subjectivi-

---

29 Here I treat gender-theoretical and feminist research together. Feminism contains always the emancipatory aspect according to which the relationship between the sexes and the cultural gender systems are oppressive and unequal, which has to be changed. Gender-theoretical approach not necessarily takes this claim as its starting point but only explores gendered and sexual representations.
ties in western narratives. By this I refer, above all, to the work of such theorists as Teresa de Lauretis and Kaja Silverman, whose main screen of theorization has been film. De Lauretis (1984 and 1987) has examined western narrative models as studied by A. J. Greimas and Vladimir Propp, for instance, from the angle of gender, and discovered them to be based on the masculine subject (a male hero) and a textual mechanism that oppresses women. From this research feminist and gender-theoretical musicology has largely drawn.

Secondly, contemporary psychoanalytic criticism (covering literature, visual arts, and film) is importantly influenced by feminist revisions. Psychoanalytic semiotics and poststructural psychoanalysis has been developed to a large extend by feminist thinkers (Kaja Silverman, Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Hélène Cixous, Judith Butler, Teresa de Lauretis), and feminist psychoanalysis has reformulated psychoanalytic theories significantly. As one central trend of feminist theory, psychoanalytic feminism has revised and developed the traditional psychoanalytic theory of woman and femininity, by shaping it to a more gender-sensitive direction (e.g., Julliet Mitchell, Nancy Chodorow, Jane Gallop, Toril Moi, in addition to the above mentioned). Especially importantly, it has developed the theorization of maternal and feminine realm of the subject, also as related to the pre-Oedipal and pre-linguistic sphere.

The relationship between psychoanalytic and feminist theory has been reciprocally beneficial, but also complicated, arduous, even fierce. At the most general level, it could be said that the significance of psychoanalysis to feminism lays in the fact that along psychoanalysis the understanding of sexuality turned away from the biological understanding based on the reproduction to a conception of sexuality as related to the formation of unconscious drives and developing and getting articulations already in the childhood. With this, the psychological and cultural dimensions of sexuality were realized. The differentiation between biological sex, social gender, and sexual orientation, has been crucial also to feminist and gender-theoretical music research, as well as to queer-musicology that (by leaning significantly on Lacan) sees the formation of identity as unstable and ambivalent game.

Feminism, however, has also been at the front row in criticizing psychoanalysis, even rejecting it totally in certain quarters. Feminist critique of Freudian

---

30 According to Butler’s (1990: 10–13, 22–25, 33, 42) psychoanalytically inflected queer-theory, the sex–gender differentiation is finally insupportable because “sex” is culturally produced as well. On queer musicology, see Brett et al. (eds.) 1994 and Brett & Wood 2002.

31 For an interesting account of new musicology’s relation to psychoanalysis as determined by feminism’s rejection of psychoanalysis, see Fink 1998: 250–251 (see also, p. 45, Chap. 2.3.1).
and Lacanian psychoanalysis has focused on its patriarchal and colonializing features, biologicist and Euro-centric tendencies, and male perspective in general. It has been observed that Freud and Lacan consider woman against a norm that is formed as a male subject (similarly the homosexual is considered against the norm of heterosexual). Within this perspective, woman becomes defined by negative terms as a non-male and defined by a lack.\textsuperscript{32} This conception of woman, femaleness, and femininity is in an obvious, yet complicated, way linked to the ambiguous Romantic and modernist aesthetical ideology, that considers, or is afraid of that, music is “like a woman”, something feminine, characterized by a lack (in its referential capability, for instance), a mystic “other” that cannot be reached with words. Music in general, during various times, has been in a danger to become marked as effeminate, womanish, and women’s business (McClary 1991: 79; Kramer 1995: 52; Solie 1993: 13–14).\textsuperscript{33} According to McClary, attitudes towards music reflect in an extraordinary and paradoxical way the mind/body-division that troubles western thinking: music has been considered simultaneously, on the one hand, as the most abstract of all the arts, and on the other hand, as the most capable of carrying the body with it. The confusion if music thus belongs to the realm of mind or that of body, condenses in the fundamental division of masculine vs. feminine projected onto music. To a great extent, mind (thought) has been defined as masculine and body (sensuality) as feminine. Thus, music is always in a danger to become comprehended as feminine and therefore effeminate.\textsuperscript{34} (McClary 1991: 151.)

The understandings and interpretations of psychoanalysis’s patriarchality differ strikingly inside feminist discourse. The extreme poles are the view of psychoanalysis as a thoroughly patriarchal theory and as an analysis of and an

\textsuperscript{32} As Spivak (1983: 169) sharpens: “Woman does not exist.”

\textsuperscript{33} The problematics of music and the feminine is not at all this simple. There lies a strong ambivalence in music’s femininity: on the one hand, music, likewise other arts and male artists in general too, has been vested strongly with the idea of feminine. Yet simultaneously, so far as women are concerned, the problem is, that a favorable attitude towards feminine features has been possible only if they were connected to men (Battersby 1989: 7). For more on this topic, see Battersby 1989.

\textsuperscript{34} We can think that it is precisely this danger that manifests itself in the chronic defensive reaction towards everything associated with the feminine (for example, towards corporeality and emotions), this trend remaining for a long time as the normal atmosphere in musicology. Music research and theory have succeeded well in developing and preserving the rigid “masculine” imagery, aesthetics, and research attitude, where technical note graphics, diagrams, and schemata function as symbols and signs of rationality and intelligence (that is: of manliness, real research, true aesthetics, and Art). The emotional side of music not easy to handle or control, and other more secular (socially) signifying realms of music have been kept at distance with the help of technical-theoretical barbed-wire fence, letting in only the so called “pure musical level”.

150
analytical methodology for studying patriarchal culture. Conflicting tenets are not rare inside feminist theorizing. Also in music research, a contradictory situation may characterize feminist interpretations concerning gender presentations, such as in music videos. It is often difficult to say if a gender presentation under analysis, such as Madonna’s, for example, is reinforcing or subverting the patriarchal conception of women, i.e., if it is fulfilling and serving or parodizing and criticizing patriarchal expectations.

Despite the phallocentric moments in Freud’s and Lacan’s work, psychoanalytic feminism regards that the contemporary feminist revisions of the psychoanalytic tradition still provide the best basis complicated enough for understanding the role of language and sign systems in the psychological and social construction of subjectivity and gender identity. In its theoretical perspective, it is possible to reflect the questions of gender and sexuality in a model complex enough to take into consideration both the social restrictions as well as the transgressive and subversive potentials in gender systems. It emphasizes passages in Freud’s and Lacan’s thinking in which sexuality and gender roles are analyzed as rather arbitrary than “natural”.

The (“new”) French feminism (Cixous, Kristeva, Irigaray), queer theory (Butler) and semio-feminism (de Lauretis, Silverman) draw especially on psychoanalysis by reformulating it quite radically. French feminism has also theorized the non-phallocentric place of woman in language and culture, and the related discursive style that would contain traces of body, drive, desire, and voice of the writing woman, exposing the *écriture féminine*, feminine writing or “writing the body” (Cixous, Irigaray, Kristeva, Clément). French feminism connects (though Kristeva more problematically) the pre/nonlinguistic material to femi-


36 Feminist psychoanalytic music research has thus far been most visibly the study of musical genres that have overwhelming visual and literal representative dimensions. A possible reason for this must be the influence the feminist film and media theory – drawing importantly on psychoanalysis – has had in feminist criticism in general. In addition to opera, film music, and music videos, feminist psychoanalytic music research has focused on female artists (Suchet & Sand 1999; Hallstein 1996), lesbian sexuality (Suchet & Sand 1999), and female voice and vocality in general (Dunn & Jones, eds. 1994). To focus predominantly on musical representation has been rarer. To cite an exception, Sivuoja-Gunaratnam (2003a) analyzes musical discourse of feminine subjectivity, desire, and *jouissance* in Kaija Saariaho’s music, but her emphasis is rather on feminism than psychoanalysis.

37 They key text here is Cixous’s “The Laugh of the Medusa” (1980). This direction has to balance in an especially complicated way between biological essentialism and social
nine space (due to the dominance of the maternal space and mother’s body in the pre-linguistic realm of an infant). It is thought that women (or “woman” as a position) have a closer relation and more immediate access to the semiotic and to the bodily than what men do. This is not relevant perspective in the present research, which concentrates only to textuality. Things outside the text (composers’ intentions or their gender, sex, and sexual orientation) are irrelevant for the subject-strategical approach: gender matters only as a subject position, i.e., as a feature of the text. In this approach, the musical subject can have a gender only at the musico-social conventional level. Therefore, correspondingly to the understanding of the notion of developing subjectivity or Kristeva’s semiotic, écriture féminine is here (perhaps heretically) understood not as a quality of an ascribed or fixed gender, but as a subject position that can be adopted by female and male alike – by the listening (or composing) subject whatever her gender. The flexible disposition of the subject-(in-process/on-trial) is a subject position available and indeed necessary, unavoidable, and real for both (or all) sexes.

The subject-strategical approach draws significantly on theories concerning the pre-linguistic and pre-Oedipal stages of psychic development, i.e., the stages before sexual differentiation. However, these semiotic experiences in musical discourse are for the language-sensitized and gendered subject available only inside the Symbolic. From the gendered point of view, all representations are gendered culturally. Thus this applies for music too. All the music in the study could be studied from gendered point of view, and from many different gendered point of views, but the gendered aspects are discussed only insofar as they seem significantly related to and compatible with (psychoanalytic) musical subject strategies. Accordingly, primal subject strategies may receive various and different genderings in specific musical texts. Strategies of separation and melancholy, for instance, may receive, further articulations in cultural gender systems. For example, cultural models of the melancholic disposition throughout the western

\[\text{constructivism. It has been criticized because of its potential trap of essentialism reducing femininity to biology.}\]

\[\text{38 Music-makers may consciously choose the area of gender constructions (or other area of subjectivity) to be thematized in their music. This is related to the discussion on “theory” (psychoanalytic, feminist, or other) as an issue or topic in a work of art (see Chap. 3.2.6). For instance, k.d. lang could be considered a strategic feminist, lesbian, and gender blender musician, even despite the fact that she has herself stated that she would prefer to keep the questions of sexuality and music separate (which is why the notion of “strategic essentialist” would be a little bit problematic here).}\]

\[\text{39 I thus differ from those radical or French feminists that consider the feminine écriture as a special articulation available or peculiar to women only (the first problem here would be how to define “woman”, i.e., who are allowed to belong to that category and on what basis). Also feminine écriture is culturally produced.}\]
Chapter 5. Locating the subject (strategy) in music

history are gendered. However, in the present psychoanalytic study the emphasis is on a psychic matrix that is pre-Oedipal, pre-linguistic, and pre-sexual-difference – on the primal mechanisms of melancholy and other subject strategies that are same for both (or all) sexes. We can even say that the deepest strata of melancholy precede the understanding of sexual difference; perhaps the representations of subjectivity in the shadow of melancholy and under the threat of non-meaning are not always that gender-specific. The perspective in the present study is in primal subject formations shared by subjects whatever the sex, gender, and sexuality. This means that I am not regarding representations of developing subjectivity as (culturally or otherwise) gendered per se, in certain one way (as feminine, as French feminism perhaps would claim).

It could be also noted that musical constructions of divided and unsettled subjectivity – under the threat of non-meaning, at the edge of signification and loosening the ego boundaries – may often be closer to a *queer* than masculine/feminine subjectivities, understanding the concept to mean first and foremost a position of opposing the norms (cf. Turner 2000). The constructions of unsettled subjectivity may represent the transcending the gender or sexual binarity. The unsettled subjectivity (meaning) process means that the norms are somehow subverted at the same time they are settled because of the subversive workings of the unconscious in the formation of meaning. What, according to a scholar of gender studies, would be queer, could be, according to a psychoanalytic scholar, be possible to interpret as an especially effective intercourse between the conscious and unconscious modes of being and signification. The queer and psychoanalytic interpretations may often prop up each other. Also, it is a normal procedure of psychoanalytic criticism to look for several interpretations for a certain one phenomenon (cf. the notion of multidetermination). Because in the present research, the primary focus however is not in the gender, even more meaningful concept than queer to evoke here perhaps is that of listening *awry* (cf. Žižek 1991; Schwarz 1997a: 58–59). It means to listen the subversive semiotic component undermining the securing subjectivity, the imaginarily directed desire under the hard fact of real and symbolic.

As to epistemological and ontological problematic of gender and gender difference, I am above all relying on such feminist thinking, the best-known representative of which is Judith Butler (e.g., 1990, 1993, and 1997). In her genealogical account, reshaping French poststructuralist and psychoanalytic theory, the gender, as an analytical category, cannot be traced back to the physical bodily

---

40 We can think, for example, of the Renaissance concept of *ingegno* or of Hamlet (man) as melancholic and Ophelia (women) as hysterical in Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*. 
difference between man and woman. The gender is understood as a performative construction, to which no ultimate basis and thus ontological status can be found. Rather than “being”, gender is “doing” and “performing”. If gender is grounded on something, it is on the repetition of this performing: gender is imitation without origin. (Butler 1990: 10–13, 22–25, 33, 42.) “There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results” (ibid. 33). This notion of gender as non-originary criticizes also the distinction between biological sex and social gender, for sex too is always culturally produced and thus a construction and a gendered category in itself (ibid.: 10–13, 22–25, 33, 42). This view can be connected to such psychoanalytic thinking that emphasizes in all matters – and thus also what it comes to gender, sexuality, and gender difference – its focus to be always and only in the examination of the psychic representatives (whatever the degree of the symbolic in the representation), i.e., of the discourse as opposed to something “natural”. In this perspective, whatever is thought about the body, for instance, is always already a construction and thus in the area of the social. Accordingly, the categories of feminine and masculine in the present study are always to be understood against the above discussed theoretical background as cultural representations and performatives, social constructions, and regulative fictions of gender, i.e., all but “natural” or “normal”.

5.3 Hearing the “fantasy thing” and “fantasy space” – the pre-separation nostalgia of music (after Schwarz and Poizat)

Music as developing subjectivity has been theorized most importantly, as related to voice in opera by Michel Poizat (1992), and in music-analytical perspective by David Schwarz (1997a). Both rely on Lacanian tradition, ground their accounts on the listener (cf. Schwarz’s central notion of the listening subject), and both are interested in music as a visceral experience. Schwarz (ibid.: 5) aims “to explore what is happening to our bodies, our sense of identity, both individually and collectively, when we listen to music.” Poizat (1992: x, 7, 11) asks, what is the desire, ecstasy, and gratification – the jouissance machine – behind opera.

According to Schwarz (1997a: 1), the bodily effects of music, for example

---

41 Butler’s thinking is significantly informed by Derrida, Foucault, Freud, and Lacan. What it comes to psychoanalysis, Butler’s view on gender difference is more critical than Kristeva’s or Irigaray’s. Butler has also been criticized about the detachment from the “material basis” and “experience of woman”. (Pulkkinen 2000: 46–47.)
42 Here we see also certain affiliations with de Lauretis’s psychoanalytic and semiotic feminism, and theorization of the “eccentric subject”.

154
Chapter 5. Locating the subject (strategy) in music

at the listener’s skin (such as goose bumps), tell about the effective workings of music at the front line between self and the world. Music functions as a zone in which “the boundary separating the body from the external world seems dissolved or crossed in some way” (ibid.: 7). Schwarz relates musical experience to the maternal space, “sonorous envelope”, and acoustic mirror developed by Guy Rosolato (1978), Didier Anzieu (1979 and 1995), Michel Chion (1999 [1982]) and Kaja Silverman (1988), and to Freud’s (1961b [1929/1930]: 64) notion of oceanic feeling, as has been common in contemporary psychoanalytic approaches to music. According to Schwarz (1997a: 7–9), this experience can be pleasurable, unpleasurable, or ambivalent. Poizat theorizes opera as a site of jouissance in which the speaking subject, suffering from her condition of lack and alienation, can forget or deny the primordial act of separation for the sake of vocal ecstasy. Opera provides a powerful site of nostalgia for a paradisiacal unity of pre-separation.43 (1992: ix–x.) From my perspective, both denote the nuclear area of subject strategies.

Schwarz (1997a: 2) describes “music and the body as a fantasy of being enclosed in a second skin of all-around sound”. He outlines in this music-as-fantasy two registers of listening.44 The first one is listening as a fantasy thing and the other is listening as a fantasy space. The listening as a fantasy thing refers to “one-to-one correspondences between musical details and an archaic, oceanic fantasy”. It is related to “structural” listening and it can be formalist, objective, and “purely textual”. The listening as a fantasy space, for its part, is related to “the conventional registers” and to the “theoretical” listening crossing the thresholds of perspectives be they psychoanalytic, music-theoretical, or other. This listening can be heterogeneous, fragmented, co-ordinated, culture specific, or personally specific. (Ibid.: 3–5, 8–9.) According to Schwarz (ibid.: 5) these two levels of listening refer to different logical classes in which the representation of (the musical) structure (re)sounds. Together they constitute the sonorous envelope of music but the hierarchy of these two registers is not fixed and does not obey any pattern (ibid.: 8). In a footnote Schwarz (ibid.: 165 n. 4) mentions the differentiation to be understood in the light of Benveniste’s (1971 [1966]) differentiation of “the speaking subject” and “the subject of the speech”, but he does not explain how. However, the speaking subject must relate to the listening thing and the subject of the speech to the listening space. In this way, we might speak of the listening subject and the subject of the listening. (Also Schwarz’s differentiation naturally resembles the one between semiotic and symbolic expe-

43 Somewhat similarly, Caryl Flinn (1992) has discussed classical Hollywood film music in the perspective of the pre-separation nostalgia and lost maternal object.
44 Schwarz also talks about these as “levels”, “representational levels”, or “contexts” of listening.
Subject Strategies in Music

According to Schwarz (1997a: 8), both registers of listening are grounded on retrospective fantasies and not on direct access to something beyond subjectivity; they may refer to something beyond subjectivity only as fantasized. The “fantasy thing” refers to events that structured developing subjectivity in its early days and fantasy space to historical contexts, but only in the sense that these have left traces to our listening of music; there is no direct access to either one (ibid.: 4). This means that the attributes of listening as a fantasy thing are likewise related to conventional registers (ibid.: 8).

Schwarz’s (1997a) notion of fantasy emphasizes the poststructural understanding of meaning and subjectivity as produced in the signifying act and being always subjected to sign system and discourse, i.e., to the socio-cultural sphere. Also it emphasizes the fact that for the subject there is no direct — un-mediated — access to pre-subjective realm but only the mediated — representative — one. Furthermore, it evokes Lacanian conception of the subject (rather than Kristeva’s). Correspondingly, Poizat theorizes the vocal object — the objectified voice that offers jouissance — as a lost object of nostalgic idealization, and claims it to occupy a fundamental place in structuring the subject. This refers to process by which the voice is constituted as an object of drive, and is thus established as lost from the very outset, for there is no ultimate reification for the drive object.45 (Poizat 1992: 93, 95, 99.) The “initial” (“mythical”) trace of first jouissance before the entering into the language and subjectivization, resonates in vocal representations of object of desire as materiality behind signification (ibid.: 102). According to Poizat that is precisely the thing (object a) what is desired in opera: the phonic material freeing itself from the domination of signification (ibid.: 103). But this trace of jouissance resonates there only “as lost behind the meaning the Other has given it and in its failure to be recognized as identical to the first object of jouissance, which now assumes the value of a paradise lost” (ibid.: 101–102).

The structural element that guarantees the connection between the two representational contexts of listening Schwarz theorizes by a notion of the emergence into conventionality. This linking structure is to be understood as referring to the subject’s development as described in (post-)Lacanian psychoanalysis. Thus it refers to the subject’s entry into the language (symbolic) via the mirror stage. (Schwarz 1997a: 15.) We could say that somehow music plays (a representation of) this developmental passage of subjectivity, or to be more precise: a retrospective fantasy of the subject’s developmental passage from imaginary to symbolic. Music re-sets musico-fantastically the entry into the language and by this the

45 As said above (p. 92, Chap. 3.4.3), Lacan identified voice and gaze as objects of drive, i.e., as part objects, in addition to oral, anal, and genital objects.
crossing of the thresholds of subjectivity. Schwarz’s notion of emergence into conventionality thus points to the constructive socio-cultural nature of musical meaning and subjectivity, based at the bottom on drive-based impulse but coming into being and noticeable by its vicissitudes only when the impulse is directed to the social world, i.e., when the need transforms to discourse of desire.

Music fantasizes (represents) the entry into the language by its effective working of the imaginary logic playing with musical identities. By this, I refer to traditional music-analytical practice, that proceeds by testing identities – similarity (repetition) and difference (variation) – of musical elements (themes, motives, phrases, and other elements). In this way understood, formal music analysis is about imaginary binarities, and cultural (hermeneutic) analysis about linking these to symbolic sphere. In this perspective, formalist analysis manifests as symbolically [sic] “rejecting” the (music analysis’s) entry into the language and symbolic system (to cultural interpretation) – it refuses to break the union with “the mother music”, the perfect being and full presence. From postmodern semiotical angle, it is clear that music, as a fantasy thing, is as much a cultural construction as the fantasy space (this is just why the term ‘fantasy’ is included in both expressions). Still, the status of this construction at the end remains open, as remains vicissitudes (derivatives) of drive and unconscious. We carry the body and our personal prehistory as the unknown but all the more effective mode of being in us. How it is heard in music, can be theorized only from disguised vicissitudes.

I agree with poststructural and constructive understanding about the impossibility for “direct” encounter with pre-subjective experience and the necessary and unavoidable mediatedness of everything. However, I think, differently from Schwarz, that developing subjectivity in music is not covered up by or equated with the subject’s fantasy of pre-linguistic sonorous envelope only. The unsettled subjectivity in music covers more than a retrospective fantasy. (Though this depends what is understood by the term fantasy.) It covers the active – and in that way non-retrospective – workings of the unconscious in the subject set up by the insolvable dialectics of the consciousness/unconscious, symbolic/semiotic, meaning/non-meaning, body/psyche, etc. Music not only represents and reminds us about something into which we no longer have access, but also activates the dialectics of the splits in subjectivity. This means that in my research, the unsettled and developing subjectivity in music is not approached primarily as a retrospective fantasy (though it is that too), but as a manifestation of the subject-in-process/on-trial. This is what I am emphasizing when grounding my approach to Kristeva’s notion of subject-in-process/on-trial: poststructural understanding does not diminish the role of nonlinguistic and pre-subjective dimension in musical experience, but just emphasizes its relatedness to the symbolic. Likewise, the
symbolic cannot grow without the fertile soil of the semiotic. Semiotic dimension in music is not a fantasy but a burdensome fact, even though it cannot be experienced “directly”. This makes possible the momentary pre-subjective experiences in music. The fact that these experiences are not “pure” and “direct” but mixed and mediated by their (Symbolic) nature, only means that they are not psychotic, i.e., experiences in which the mediating nature of sign were prevented and distorted.

Accordingly, it is a philosophical and theoretical condition to emphasize the ontological and epistemological status of the sonorous envelope in music as a retrospective fantasy or a psychoanalytic fact. In either stand, one must notice that there is no direct access to the unconscious, or to the “original” sonorous envelope. The subject can retrospectively only fantasize the union with the (m)other before entering the language but not experience as such because of the structural impossibility. However, actual music can be experienced as choratic impulses inside the Symbolic. Therefore, whereas Schwarz talks about fantasy I rather talk about the mediatedness of all experience: music as representative practice. However, the fact of the activated unsettled subjectivity, certainly may lead the subject into a retrospective fantasy as a possible subject strategy – to a music of melancholy or that of fusion. Retrospective fantasy (over the lost object/being/fullness/presence) is certainly one aspect in this psychic scene, but I would not prioritize it as all that can be said about unsettled subjectivity in music.

I am interpreting Schwarz’s theory so that as a fantasy thing the sonorous envelope of music denotes the level of the semiotic chora as constructed in the listening experience. It refers to music’s effective working as an illusion of full presence and of “direct isomorphism” between developing subjectivity and the music. It is one of the textual analogies of music and psyche. As a fantasy space, the sonorous envelope of music denotes the level of other cultural articulations and historical contexts, representing the dialectics of self and object in subjectivity formation. It is one of the textual analogous of music and the rest of the cultural sphere. Poizat (1992: ix) would talk about the ecstatic, transgressive register that denies the subject’s fundamental attachment to language (cf. thing) and the register of the effects of sociohistorical, ideological, and psychological contingencies (cf. space). Still, it could be pointed out here, that somehow along Schwarz’s differentiation the dualistic conception of musical meaning seems to be resonating. One may wonder what is the motive for the differentiation that seems to separate the structural/psychical (“formal”) and “other conventional”/historical-cultural (even though claiming these two to be inseparably intertwined). It may collapse too easily to a dichotomy of inner and outer musical meaning. Perhaps it explains the formalistic desire to protect “the music itself” as an attachment to archaic fantasy? Also, and perhaps more importantly, it emphasizes music’s effective
working both at the level of individual and social meanings.46

Similar to how Schwarz (1997a: 7) theorizes the sonorous envelope of music as a fantasy thing and threshold-crossing space, in the present research the semiotic chora of music is theorized as a general characteristic of musical experience (Chap. 6) and as related to cultural “theoretical” spaces (Part III). Yet the fantasy thing must be as articulated a fantasy and cultural a construction as that of the fantasy space, it must be coded and disguised as such in order to become experienced as a fantasy thing. This is why both of Schwarz’s listening registers are “cultural” levels of listening and not to be understood as “musical” and “cultural” registers.

5.4 Methodological summary for subject-strategical music analysis

Whereas classic Freudian psychoanalysis approaches music as a disguised manifestation of the repressed drive-bearing (sexual–aggressive) conflicts, ego-psychology as unconscious cognition in the service of ego-building, and object-relations theory as manifestation of the archaic subject-object-relations, the poststructural semiotico-psychoanalytic approach sees music as a site for the unconscious mechanisms of signification and subjectivity. As Paul Ricoeur (1970: 177) describes this transition:

Psychoanalysis thus invites us to move from a first and purely reductive reading to a second reading of cultural phenomena. The task of that second reading is not so much to unmask the repressed and the agency of repression in order to show what lies behind the masks, as to set free the interplay of references between signs…

Here we see the crucial shift in psychoanalytic criticism, as it moves beyond the purely reductive interpretive method of the hermeneutics of suspicion. As Robert Fink (1998: 261–262) interprets Ricoeur’s idea: The first reading, which consists of the uncovering text’s repressed content, seduces to the second, more semiotically subversive reading, which produces a new and bewildered relationship with musical signs themselves. “The musicologist who invokes a postmodernized Freud is not necessarily seeking to reduce everything to sex; he may just be attempting to set free the interplay between musical signs” (ibid.). In the present research, this free interplay is not seen that “free” but, as is the case with Freud’s view of free association or dream interpretation, as determined and driven by the subject’s constant subjectivity and signification work, resulting in subject strategies.

Accordingly, the music-analytical methodology of the present research con-

---

46 For a different critique of Schwarz’s analytic method, see Scherzinger 2001.
sists of the traditional means of music analysis for discussing and referring to the formal and structural aspects of music; the poststructural semiotical music analysis focusing on the structures of music as signifying, forming a cultural practice, and producing socio-cultural semantics; the musical new-hermeneutics as developed by Kramer for locating the key signifiers in the musical substance; and poststructural psychoanalytic music analysis, which understands and discusses the musical text with psychoanalytic vocabulary. From these sources, the specific poststructural semiotic-psychoanalytic methodology for music analysis aiming at the subject-strategical interpretation is developed to reveal how the developing subjectivity is played by musical texts. The interpretative procedure can be summed as follows:  

1. The musical work under analysis is seen as psychical text (i.e., as psycho-textual discourse). This means that musico-textual mechanisms in the work are considered equal with the psychical mechanisms theorized by psychoanalysis. Accordingly, the musical discourse – the structural, formal, and rhetoric constructions in the work – is described with psychoanalytic terms and concepts concerning primal subjectivity formation.

2. Music is approached as a socio-cultural site of subjectivity formation, i.e., representative system constructing musical subject positions. A central theme or motive in a work, for example, may function as an abstract “ego” or an inner object of the subject whose primal subject formation the work under the study constructs. Different layers and elements in music are seen as representing the layers and elements in the psyche, as if musical projections. Subjectivity is seen as a result and product of the textual mechanisms of music; the work under analysis is a musico-psychic screen of subjectivity and approached as analogous to the primal psychic formation of the subject revealing unsettled subjectivity. The analyses focus on how the developing and divided subject-in-process/on-trial becomes formed and constructed in, through, and via the musical representations in the work in question.

3. The analysis of the musical constructions of the unsettled subject-in-process/on-trial is called in the present study as the analysis of musical subject

47 An important inspirational source in my summary has been Warren Hedges’s (2001) brief methodological guide for psychoanalytic literature criticism.
48 Correspondingly, psychoanalytic music criticism may also proceed by describing psychical processes with musical terms, in which case psyche is approached as music. In a way, this is done by such poststructural theorists as Kristeva, Derrida, and De Man, though in an elementary and non-musicological way if viewed from our point of view. For example, Kristeva describes intertextuality by a music-theoretical concept of transposition. Many music semioticians and others theorizing the musical signification think that musical signification can reveal important things about human signification in general (e.g., Monelle 1996; Tarasti 2002: 25; and Kramer 1995).
strategies. Musical subject strategies includes wide variety of musico-textual constructions of psychic mechanisms, such as musical articulations of separation problematics, abjection, melancholy, acoustic mirroring, transitional space, defense mechanisms, the experience of the uncanny, and so on. These musico-textual mechanisms are kinds of subjectivity patterns, which the musical text by its representative system suggests for the listener.

4. To study musical constructions of unsettled subjectivity, is to study music as a discourse of desire. Points of discursive fractures, slips, and transgressions, be they stylistic, genre-specific, or other discursive breakages, are considered especially marked musical representations or manifestations of the operations of desire, crucial for the interpretation of subject strategies. These points of under- or over-determination may at first sight seem to be insignificant passing details in the musical substance but from the poststructural psychoanalytic perspective they appear as highly condensed gates and decisive keys to the subject-strategic interpretation reminding of the role the manifestly small detail has in Freudian dream interpretation. Through it the whole discourse may organize in a new way.

5. Like the above-described breakages in the musical discourse, similar attention and treatment is given to the musical representations of states of dissociation (repression) and splits (divisions) characterizing, according to psychoanalysis, the subject. This can be further outlined, for example, as an interaction of the semiotic and the symbolic modalities, or a negotiation between the registers of the imaginary, symbolic, and real. The constitution of subjectivity in the psychoanalytic perspective happens in the trial-like process of the insolvable threshold crossing between different registers of subjectivity and signification in the dialectics of the consciousness and the unconscious. In this perspective, the subjectivity manifests as continuously working out psychic strategies for dealing with this unsolvableness, i.e., she is working out subject strategies.

6. Likewise, attention and treatment is given to the musical representations of body, bodily motion, and corporeality, and the related representations of sex, gender, and sexuality. Special attention is given to how the musical work, in its representative system, portrays desirable and non-desirable body, the desired and the loathed one, the internalized (incorporated, introjected) and the abjected one, the whole (perfect, full) and the fragmented one. In short, one attends to all bodily and affective dimensions of music, also bodily effects of music on the listener (analyst).

7. Rather than to the manifest content of the musical communication, attention is given to the manifestations and rhetorical devices of affect, repetition, fantasy, conflicts, crisis, trauma, aggression, and so forth. (cf. the level of latent

meanings). Various extremes in musical expression are paid attention to, such as silence vs. cry. Silence (such as a general pause, for instance) is of special interest as a sign of that which is not talked about or which cannot be represented or expressed. It may be, for example, a sign of trauma, repression, denial, or impossibility of symbolization.

8. The musical text, discourse, sign, and meaning are considered fundamentally heterogeneous by their nature, because of the carnivalistic workings of the unconscious producing endless heterogeneity of meanings, the chain of signification, the free interplay of signs. Examples of the heterogeneity of musical meaning are precisely looked for. This puts the emphasis rather on details than on overall structures. This means that several meaningful explanations and interpretations – even contradictory ones in the spirit of the undermining workings of the unconscious – are given simultaneously to the same musical mechanism, gesture, or detail in a work (cf. the notion of multidetermination).

9. Finally, musical works are also studied without attention paid to the contents of the musical communication in the ordinary sense of the word but penetrating the work’s textual mechanisms as such (for example text’s defense mechanisms). However, most often, these levels cannot really be differentiated, but is one of the researcher’s choices for expressing her philosophical attitude toward the psychoanalytic methodology.
Chapter 6
The semiotic chora in musical experience, or, at the edge of sign system, meaning, and subjectivity

This chapter theorizes the nonlinguistic dimension in musical experience by elaborating Julia Kristeva’s (1984 [1974] and 1980) notion of the semiotic modality of meaning and the related concept of the semiotic chora with other psychoanalytic theories, in particular with developmental and object-relation theories concerning the pre-linguistic realm of the infant and with metapsychological theories concerning the logic of the unconscious. Thus, the theorization rests, metapsychologically, not only on the the systemic viewpoint (which differentiates two components in the signification process and subjectivity formation), but also on the developmental viewpoint. Kristeva’s notions of the semiotic and the chora are interestingly complementary or compatible with certain theories of psychoanalytic developmental psychology (Klein, Spitz, Winnicott), and are also significantly influenced by them. These theories provide more specific and concrete ways of understanding Kristeva’s notions. It could be even claimed that Kristeva’s theory of meaning and subject is not sensible without knowledge on metapsychological and developmental theories. This is not too often recognized in Kristevan criticism in the humanities. In the present research, however, precisely this connection is developed. Because of this integrative framework, the present chapter partakes not only in poststructural and semiotical, but also, in some amount, in psychological and philosophical music research.

The theorization here integrates semiotico-psychoanalytic theory (grounded on Kristeva and in certain amount on Lacan), theory of the logical workings of the unconscious (Freud, Matte Blanco), and psychoanalytic developmental psychology (Spitz, Stern, Winnicott). Central notions, in addition to Kristeva’s (1984 [1974] and 1980) terms of the semiotic and the chora, are: Freud’s (1953 [1900]) definitions concerning the formal characteristics of the unconscious.

mechanisms, Ignacio Matte Blanco’s (1998 [1975] and 1988) symmetrical logic and symmetrical mode of being, Daniel N. Stern’s (1985) amodal perception and vitality affects, and René A. Spitz’s (1965) conesthetic organization. Also Donald W. Winnicott’s (1971) transitional space, Lacan’s (1998 [1973] and 1977 [1966]) real and imaginary register and the post-Lacanian concept of the acoustic mirror (Rosolato 1978 and Silverman 1988) serve here the same purpose, though more importantly applied in the music-analytical part of the study. With this integrative theory, not only the nonlinguistic dimension in musical experience become illuminated, but also certain aspects and prerequisites of musical signification and subjectivity in general, such as the heterogeneity of musical meaning, enduring various meaning projections, and the related multianalyzability of a musical work. Precisely due to its contact to the “archaic”2 landscape of mind, related to the unconscious modality of signification, and to the drive-based and bodily realm of the subject, music may serve in a powerful way as a site for the primal subjectivity formation. It is just the nonlinguistic realm in musical experience that exposes and activates the listener’s identification with the music and its subject-in-process/on-trial in such an effective way.

6.1 The nonlinguistic dimension in music

Psychoanalytic theory offers a perspective by which to study music as a type of discourse dominated by the nonlinguistic modality of signification that activates unsettled subjectivity and mobility of meaning. By the nonlinguistic dimension in music, I refer to the dominance of the modality of meaning that Kristeva (1984 [1974] and 1980) calls the semiotic related to the unconscious processes, drives, and language as instinctual material flow (non-language). The semiotic posits itself as opposite to the symbolic modality related to the conscious processes and language as judgment, nomination, positing of identity, and fixing the meaning. Signification happens in the conflicting dialectics and oscillation between these two modalities, where one stands for transgressive rejection of any stasis (the semiotic) and the other aims for establishment of a stasis, identification, and law (the symbolic). (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: Chap. I passim, see esp. 23–24; 1980: 133–136.)

Kristeva’s differentiation of the semiotic and the symbolic modality in signification and subjectivity formation can be interpreted in accordance with the systemic viewpoint of the psychoanalytic metapsychology. These two components that operate simultaneously in an interplay denote roughly Freud’s (e.g., 1953 [1900]) unconscious and consciousness from the point of view of their logic

2 Archaic is to be understood in the present research in its Freudian sense meaning infantile (Freud 1963 [1915–1917]: 199, 210, 180). See n. 4, p. 2 (Chap. 1.1).
Chapter 6. The semiotic chora in musical experience

of operation, outlined, for example, by the concepts of primary and secondary processes. Psychoanalyst Ignacio Matte Blanco (1998 [1975] and 1988), who has developed Freudian systemic metapsychology, talks about the symmetrical and asymmetrical modes of being and logic, and developmental theorist René E. Spitz (1965), about the conesthetic and diacritic organizations. Very broadly, it is possible to talk about the archaic and the rational, or nonlinguistic and linguistic components. No value-judgment is implied in the naming of these categories; they are simply different modes of organization of equal importance in signification process and subjectivity formation.3

It is to be noted here that the semiotic modality of meaning is however not in any straightforward way “nonlinguistic”, but on the contrary (these kind of problems are typical for psychoanalytic theory). This is because the semiotic modality of meaning, together with the symbolic modality, forms the entirety of the signification, and thus the linguistic capability as well (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 23–24). The semiotic is necessarily involved in the linguistic process and without it the Symbolic order and language could not be constituted. The very same goes for the symbolic. It is only together that these modalities make signification possible. Therefore, the semiotic is as important an element in the social realm of signification (the Symbolic order) as the symbolic, which is why it is not fully unproblematic to name it as the “nonlinguistic” modality. However, I have chosen this label for various reasons that will be clarified ahead, but the mentioned conditions in the use of the term are important to keep in mind. Chapter 6 is not only a Kristeovan application to music research, but also an interpretation of her theory of meaning and subject.5

Firstly, by the concept of the nonlinguistic dimension in music, I want to

3 The logic of the unconscious can be called by various names depending on the theory one wants to emphasize, for instance: the semiotic logic (resonating Kristeva), the imaginary logic (resonating Lacan), or the symmetrical logic (resonating Matte Blanco). The Lacanian expression of the imaginary logic resonates the thematics of same/other most clearly, central to the (Winnicottian) transitional stage before the language acquisition, the stage where the emergence into conventionality takes place.

4 For an account of the Symbolic (written with upper case) as different from the semiotic (with lower case), see n. 10, p. 4 (Chap. 1.1). I rely here on Kelly Oliver’s (1993: 9–10, cf. also, 39) interpretation of Kristeva’s two uses for the word symbolic: (1) as a modality of meaning symbolic is an element in (2) the Symbolic order as the stasis of the social and cultural realm of signification.

5 My way to understand Kristeva’s theory of meaning is significantly influenced by Oliver’s (1993) Kristeavan interpretation. In the secondary literature on Kristeva, various interpretations on Kristeva’s theory of meaning and subject are presented, many of them in the form of criticism, especially feminist criticism. Important critiques are offered by Kaja Silverman (1988: esp. Chap. 4) and Judith Butler (1990: 101–118). For overviews on critique, see also, Oliver 1993 (esp. 1–2) and Moi 1986 (in Kristeva 1986).
emphasize music as a different type of discourse than language, be that poetic, scientific, or ordinary language of communication. Music is nonverbal and temporal, and its medium and material resemble in many ways the extra-linguistic (prosodic) features of language rather than the linguistic (predicative) contents. This is the state of art even when it is a question of music with lyrics, for in that case too the extra-linguistic is emphasized, even fetishized.\(^6\) This does not mean to deny that music is a representative system with conventional socio-cultural codes, for that precisely marks the basic semiotical approach in the research. It just points out its difference as a type of discourse to language. As Raymond Monelle (2000: 12) writes: “Music … is not opposed to language in being unable to represent the real world; on the contrary, it \textit{shares this feature with language.}” But, “more vitally than language, music reflects the mobility of meaning, denying those points of rest which give language its semblance of referentiality” (ibid.: 13).\(^7\) At a general level, we may say that the semiotic dominates the music as a signifying practice. But the semiotic modality is not against or beyond representation, rather it works for representation, though differently than the symbolic. Whereas the symbolic aims for stasis, the semiotic pulverizes the stasis and organizes the representation at a new signifying level in the text, produces multiple meanings (polysemia), and activates the mobility of meaning in condensations, displacements, and transpositions.\(^8\) (Kristeva 1980: 133–136; 1984 [1974]: 22, 49, 59–60.) Because the semiotic marks not only the instinctual fuel, but also pulverization of linguistic meanings and rejection of the establishment of signs, it can be said to mark a nonlinguistic operation. In other words, the semiotic can be called nonlinguistic because it (also) undermines the basic procedures of communication such as judgment and fixing of meaning, and because it contains elements of nonmeaning and rejection.

Secondly, though the semiotic encompasses processes that from the point of view of the developmental theory are called preverbal or pre-linguistic, the term pre-linguistic/preverbal (instead of nonlinguistic) would be here misleading because the semiotic operations do not cease at the acquisition of language, but establish themselves as the necessary other of the symbolic capacity defining as

---

\(^6\) It is to be noted that the terms \textit{linguistic} and \textit{linguistics} are here used in their traditional sense referring to language as a computational and predicative product (the pheno-text of language as the object of linguistics) and not a process of production encompassing the semiotic as well (the genotext of language) as Kristeva claims we should.

\(^7\) According to Monelle (1991: 87; 1995), in music the boundary between semantics and syntactics is differently situated than in language, and the syntax of music works like semantics in language.

\(^8\) The \textit{transposition} Kristeva (1984 [1974]: 59–60) inaugurates as a third primary process mechanism in addition to Freud’s condensation and displacement. The notion is clarified in p. 173.
crucially the subject, subjectivity, and language as the symbolic modality does. In this sense, the semiotic is not pre-linguistic, but denotes the realm of drives, body, and affects as they are manifested in language, signification, and culture (Oliver 1993: 7 note *, 104). Developmentally it (partly) is pre-linguistic but not systemically. We can explain the semiotic with the developmental theory concerning the pre-linguistic realm of an infant, as is the purpose of the present chapter, but in the adult subjectivity, it does not operate as pre-linguistic but as the semiotic component together with the symbolic. This is why when talking about the semiotic, or nonlinguistic modality in the present research, I am not talking about any experience out of signification or simply prior to it, but about an undermining process that manifests in signification as an essential mechanism (cf. Oliver 1993: 7 note *). It denotes the very logic of the signification in a form – or the beginning of – which is seen already in the pre-linguistic operations of an infant. Furthermore, evoking Freud’s (e.g., 1955b [1912–13]) remarks on ancient words that contain in themselves their oppositions too (this marks a characteristic of the unconscious logic), we could say that the ‘nonlinguistic’ contains in itself the linguistic and the prefix ‘non’ denotes the repression to which the semiotic modality is subjected. The semiotic is always already tied to signification.

Thirdly, by the notion of the nonlinguistic dimension in music, I want to emphasize the difference Kristeva’s theory of subject makes to Lacan’s theory of subject. The crucial difference from the perspective of the present research lies in the conception of the role and scope of the pre-linguistic, instinctual, affective, and corporeal dimension in subject’s being and in the signification. 9 From Kristeva-van perspective we may say, that Lacan focuses on the linguistic subject at the expense of affects, body, and pre-linguistic sphere of subject. Whereas Lacan’s subject has its beginning in the reflection in the mirror and paternal function of signification, Kristeva’s subject has its beginning in the maternal function related to the affects, body, and pre-linguistic sphere (Oliver 1993: 13). 10 Although Lacan outlines the pre-linguistic side in subject’s being with his notions of the imaginary register and the mirror stage, and the non-representable in subject as the real, his theories are however centred around the linguistic, post-Oedipal subject, and eroticized language. Kristeva’s theory of subject lays crucial importance to

9 It can be said that Kristeva has importantly turned the attention of post-Lacanian psychoanalytic criticism to the pre-linguistic and pre-Oedipal material in signification, theorized importantly also by object-relation theory but neglected by Lacan. On the contrary to Lacan, who puts the emphasis on “the name of the father”, Kristeva and object-relation theory put the focus on mother’s role and on the maternal space in subject’s development, and to the embodied experience in the shadow of linguistic subjectivity.

10 Kristeva (1980: 278) herself writes: "Cannot the history of post-Freudian child psychology, culminating in the works by Spitz and Winnicott, be summarized as a shift from the paternal, Freudian attentiveness to a maternal attention?"
the processes of subjectivity prior to the mirror stage and language acquisition. Kristeva sees the logic of signification and subjectivity to operate already in the semiotic body of an infant. Also, it claims that these heterogeneous operations of subject-in-process/on-trial crucially characterize subjectivity after the acquisition of language and subjectivity. Thus Kristeva’s language conception must be different to Lacan’s. After entering the language, the pre-subjective and pre-linguistic dimensions start to live another life in subject, entangled in the symbolic and language. It is not something retrospective in subject but a constant state of art that is established in the acquisition of language and subjectivity. To Kristeva language is not a system of pure signifiers but made of heterogeneous elements resulting from drives, affects, and body. If for Lacan the unconscious is structured like language, for Kristeva it is heterogeneous to language and points to the semiotic body that both gives rise to language and destroys it. In this way, the semiotic is both in and beyond the language. (Kristeva 1987: 4–6; Oliver 1993: 95, 118.) In this perspective, the term nonlinguistic is used in the present research in order to emphasize the realm of the unconscious, body, drive, and affects, as they manifest in musical signification: musical experience is subjugated to *semiotic* structures related to affective, nonlinguistic, and bodily residues in subject(ivity) (this emphasizes simultaneously the [failing] mediatedness of all experience and cultural meanings).\(^{11}\)

Here we see how conceptual differences between Kristeva’s semiotic/symbolic and Lacan’s real/imaginary/symbolic work. Kristeva theorizes modalities of meaning; Lacan details registers in which subject lives. Though these concepts are not really compatible, we may still say that Kristeva’s semiotic encompasses not only the imaginary but the real as well, because it denotes the drives and the body as the materiality of signification. This is why, for Kristeva, representa-

---

\(^{11}\) This means that the notions of ‘language’ and ‘linguistic’ are not used in the present research in Lacanian all-covering way that vacates the subject and the body into a linguistic signifier. Lacan’s slogan about the unconscious as structured like language, is agreed only inasmuch as to emphasize the systematic nature of the unconscious. However, Lacan’s locating the “birth” of the unconscious to the acquisition of language, is agreed only as far as understood to mean that the unconscious becomes formed as a separate mode of being alongside the birth of the consciousness and subjectivity (and S and repression). But, I hold the Kristevan view that the pre-subjective realm of an infant operates actively in (adult) subject as a nonlinguistic modality of signification, and that the psychoanalytic developmental psychology can theorize it in relevant ways. This is why Lacan’s developmental contribution concerning the mirror stage and imaginary, and the notion of real, are in the present study more important than his structural and linguistic formulations. Here I am in accordance with such post-Lacanian theorizing (e.g., Kristeva and Derrida) that rather approach the unconscious as the prerequisite of language and sign systems, than as shaped by the language.
tion, signification, and Symbolic order are never only “specular” and transparent by their nature. Symbolic order is heterogeneous and not a realm of “pure” (immaterial, unfleshy, linguistic) symbolic à la Lacan. According to Kristeva, language, signification, representation, culture, and meaning are in themselves heterogeneous: they include elements of nonlanguage, nonmeaning, and non-symbol, and thus they are not purely symbolic, but composites of semiotic rejection and symbolic stability. (Kristeva 1980: 24, 133; 1987: 4–6; Oliver 1993: 104, 96, 94.) In this perspective, the semiotic is not pre-linguistic or nonlinguistic in any straightforward sense (cf. Oliver 1993: 104), but neither is it linguistic in any forthright sense. In this sense, the semiotic processes are translinguistic, for “they operate through and across language, while remaining irreducible to its categories as they are presently assigned” (Kristeva 1980: 36). Indeed, there is no simple opposition between linguistic and pre-linguistic in Kristeva’s theory (Oliver 1993: 103). Thus, we can say that “the other scene” of the signification (that of the semiotic) is only partially linguistic (Kristeva 1980: 102). This is why for Kristeva (ibid.: 36) the text is a translinguistic apparatus, a productivity. Accordingly, the expression of nonlinguistic dimension in music, does not place it outside the Symbolic order but inside the Symbolic order as opposing the closure of sign and fixing of meaning. The semiotic is an element in signification but it does not pay attention to the laws of communication.

Accordingly, and what is of most importance in Kristeva’s theory of meaning and subjectivity, the realm of drives and body operates in the social realm of signification and Symbolic order, though much repressed by the symbolic element that aims for the fixing of meaning. The fixing of meaning marks an operation that is emphasized in the Symbolic order for maintaining the stasis. Both elements mark the heterogeneity of signification and they are logically intertwined together. The semiotic is not outside signification and Symbolic order, and the Symbolic does not consist of the symbolic only but of the semiotic as well. In the following, it is the semiotic dimension in music that is under the theorization.

### 6.2 The positing of thetic and semiotic transgression

The semiotic is related to the unconscious, drives, desire, affects, body, and primary process, and it is connected with the chora in as much as it denotes a non-linguistic organizing space or matrix. From a synchronic (cf. systemic) point of view, the semiotic is an effect and trace of the workings of drives, and from a diachronic (cf. developmental) point of view, it derives from the archaisms of the

---

12 However, it should be emphasized here, that to put Lacan’s and Kristeva’s concepts to the same conceptual chart cannot be done without twisting compromises.

13 The notion of the chora is clarified in Chap. 6.3.
Subject Strategies in Music

The semiotic body marked by the maternal presence and dependency. The symbolic, for its part, refers to the consciousness, secondary process, synthesis, and judgment – to the language as nomination, sign, and syntax. It refers to the “paternal” function of language, to grammatical and social rules and law. It is the symbolic factor of signification that structures the possibility to take a position and identity, make a judgment and fix the meaning. As an opposite to the semiotic, the symbolic means the inevitable existence of meaning and signified in the consciousness of the “transcendental ego”. The symbolic marks the stasis and establishment, and the semiotic marks the rejection and transgression in the Symbolic order. (Kristeva 1980: 134–136; 1984 [1974]: 22–30; 1985: 216–217.)

The semiotic (rejection) and the symbolic (stasis) work always together in every act of signification and subjectivity formation. The operations of the unconscious are always subjected to the function of nomination and predicating. Without the symbolic – language operating as system of nomination, sign and syntax – the semiotic could not become manifested. Likewise, without the “deeply buried” semiotic logic of signification, its instinctual material, there would be no possibility for symbolic operation. The semiotic is the other side of the symbolic, and the symbolic the other side of the semiotic. It is always the symbolic that structures the semiotic and it is always the semiotic that makes the symbolic possible. (Kristeva 1980: 133–139; 1984 [1974]: Chap. 1.)

Developmentally, we may say that this bi-logic is established in the acquisition of language, though the semiotic logic is operating already in the semiotic body of an infant long before the mirror stage. Developmentally Kristeva explains the semiotic to exist before the mirror stage. ¹⁴ This means that these two modalities of signification become both established and formed as separate modalities in the acquisition of language, symbolic, and subjectivity, marking one of its basic psychic splits. In this sense, as Lacan claims, the unconscious becomes formed only when consciousness comes into being, against which we can understand Lacan’s slogan about the unconscious structured as language. If we want to hold to his view in Kristeva’s perspective, we must make the reservation that the ‘language’ is not the one Lacan imagines but something that is also heterogeneous to language (Oliver 1993: 118; cf. Kristeva 1987: 4–6; 1980: 133). ¹⁵

In accordance to object-relations theory and Kristeva’s theory, the pre-linguistic realm of an infant forms the logic and the material of the unconscious established

¹⁴ Developmentally Kristeva explains the semiotic to exist before the mirror stage. Semiotic processes prepare the future speaker for the entrance into the symbolic. The symbolic constitutes itself only by breaking with the anterior semiotic, which is then retrieved as signer and primary process which always remain subordinate to the principal function of naming-predicating. “Language as symbolic function constitutes itself at the cost of repressing instinctual drive and continuous relation to the mother.” (Kristeva 1980: 136.)

in the constitution of consciousness. It also forms the logic and material of the basic mechanism of primal repression required for subject to become a subject with symbolic inter-subjective capacities separated from the “psychotic” experiential world of the pre-linguistic infant. Whereas Lacan considers the primary process mechanisms of condensation and displacement as linguistic mechanisms of metaphor and metonym, in Kristevan perspective they mark as much nonlinguistic mechanisms in translinguistic sense because they mark heterogeneity for language.\(^{16}\)

The semiotic is thus not an option for the symbolic organization, a language, that could be talked instead of normal speech, but a process operating inside the conventional sign systems, which questions, transcends, and undermines its operations and borders (Kristeva 1980: 134–137). In the text, it is present as a piercing, penetrating, and undermining element, disrupting the symbolic order. Correspondingly, René A. Spitz\(^{17}\) (1965: 44, 152) describes the conesthetic as disturbing the diacritic system. The semiotic is the “Other” of language, which nonetheless is always intertwined to it closely, and indeed is the fertile foil from which the language is anaclitically\(^{18}\) dependent on. It is the site of loosening subjectivity, detached from the bi-valent logic of rational discourse, and experiencing polysemy (and all the ambiguities that the latter brings) instead of fixing the meaning and identity.

According to Kristeva (1980: 134; cf. also, 1984 [1974]: 24), the poetic language\(^ {19}\) and comparable poetic practices always constitute the semiotic system so powerfully that it seems to take the upper hand from the symbolic. This is what distinguishes a poetic practice from other signifying practices such as language used in ordinary communication, for instance. In poetic language, the semiotic gets so much space that the practice in question almost turns into Otherness of language, with its transrational, affective, corporeal, and drive-bearing elements such as sounds and rhythms of the words, instead of their linguistic contents and rational communication (Roudiez 1980: 5). According to Kristeva, in a literary text, the workings of the semiotic can be recognized as a certain pulsing pressure inside the language: in the shades, tones, nuances, timbres, rhythm, in

---

16 Yet they mark also protolinguistic mechanisms.
17 Spitz is psychoanalyst and child psychologist who have significantly developed experimental research on infants in psychoanalytic perspective since 1960s.
18 Anaclisis and anaclitic, notions deriving from Freud, signify in psychoanalytic theory the early relationship of the sexual drives to the self-preservative ones, the tight relationship between the sexual drives and certain body functions (Laplanche & Pontalis 1988: 29). They also denote absolute dependence on mother without which the child would not survive, as related to the satisfaction of needs (Fink et al. 1990: 14).
19 The expression of poetic language Kristeva picks up from Russian formalism. I change it often for poetic practice in order to include music in the discussion.
bodily, kinetic, phonic, and material features of language, and in inconsistency, contradiction, disappearing of meaning, nonsense, disunity, silence, and absence (Kristeva 1980: 133–137; 1984 [1974]: 28). When dealing with the semiotic modality of signification, we are dealing with a truly diverse, rich, and excessive modality of meaning. It forms a “disposition that is definitely heterogeneous to meaning, but always in sight of it or in either a negative or surplus relationship to it” (Kristeva 1980: 133). Because of the semiotic element, a signifying practice marks both the establishment and the countervailing of the signifying system, meaning, and subjectivity. It exposes the flexible, precarious borders of meaning and subjectivity. According to Kristeva, we can say that the semiotic does not deal with settled, fixed meanings, but “outlines meanings before adoption of the referent”. It marks a discursive site in which the potential and mobility of the bodily-based meanings are open and fluid. (1984 [1974]: Chap. 1.)

In order to understand the workings of the semiotic and symbolic modalities in signification, yet one term by Kristeva is crucial to introduce, that of the \textit{thetic} (1984 [1974]: 43–67). The notion of thetic is related to the preconditions of enunciation and denotation (ibid.: 53). By it Kristeva refers to the conditions and operations that permit “the constitution of the symbolic with its vertical stratification” (ibid.: 61) composed of referent, signified, signifier, and all the related modalities of logico-semantic articulation. Thetic operation refers to the very moment and act of the establishment of sign system and identification of subject. Thetic marks the “place on the basis of which the human being constitutes himself as signifying and/or social”. (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 67, 43.) It thus means the adoption of a subject position.

Against the notion of thetic, Kristeva explains that in the poetic practices aiming to subvert the stasis, it is the thetic that the semiotic precisely “tears open”. The transgressive remodeling of the symbolic that, according to Kristeva, “brings about all the various transformations of the signifying practice that are called ‘creation’ ” can happen only against the thetic. In other words, the subversive semiotic inflexion cannot happen without the very unstable yet forceful positing of the thetic. Here lies the crucial difference between a poetic practice and certain other borderline-practices of meaning, such as psychotic or infantile practices (the difference difficult to make in id-psychological, ego-psychological, or object-relation theoretical perspective): without the completion of the thetic phase, no signifying practice and \textit{poetic} distortion are possible. (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 62–63, 65.) The semiotic transgression in poetic practice therefore does not mean that the meaning has not yet appeared (child) or that it no longer is (insanity), but that it functions as restructuring the Symbolic order in a new way (Kristeva 1980: x). It is a question of a \textit{reactivation} of the semiotic disposition \textit{in} the Symbolic order and adopting thetic positions for transgressive purposes in
order to obtain new meanings (1980: 136; cf. 1984 [1974]: 50–51, 62). The signifying completion or structuration, as a kind of totalization of the semiotic motility, constitutes a synthesis that requires the thesis of language in order to exist. The semiotic pulverizes the thesis of language only to make it a new device. This distinguishes a text as a signifying practice from the neurotic “drifting-into-non-sense”. (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 50–51.) Against this explanation we understand why Kristeva emphasizes that signification always contains rejection, and rejection always contains signification.²⁰

According to Kristeva, it is because of this necessary involvement of the thetic, that we must say the irruption of the semiotic within the symbolic is only relative. Though permeable, the thetic continues to assure the position of the subject-in-process/on-trial. So, the dominance of the semiotic does not mean a state without signification, but on the contrary, is indeed deployed within it exploring its very process rather than a result. (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 63.) The semiotic processes of condensation, displacement, and transposition produce an excess of signification. The transposition that Kristeva adds as the third primary process mechanism means precisely the transposition of the thetic position. It denotes a transposition from a sign system to another, an operation by which the thetic becomes re-articulated. This involves a destruction of the old position and shaping of a new, and this can happen with the very same material in signification. As condensation and displacement, transposition also marks a ferment point of multiple meanings, a mobility of signification, and the potential of the infinite polyvalence. Kristeva calls the process of transposition also by her more familiar term of intertextuality²¹. (Ibid.: 59–60.)

In the act of the semiotic transgression, the sign system becomes as if drawn out of its symbolic function (sign-syntax) and opening into a semiotic articulation. Symbolic operations are present, but they are pulverized and being displaced, condensed, and transposed toward something that is no longer within the realm of the sign, syntax, and Logos, but within the realm of the semiotic functioning. The precondition for this heterogeneity that posits and removes meaning, is the thetic phase, and, Kristeva writes, “we cannot overemphasize this point”. (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 63.) Therefore it can be said that the semiotic processes are carried forth by linguistic or other symbolic (musical) means at the

²⁰ Against this we also understand that the “revolution” in the stasis, which Kristeva (1984 [1974]) so willingly would welcome, be that artistic, political, or social, can happen only by re-signifying the established order and bringing it out of joint by penetrating it with the semiotic flux. The thetic can be break only when it is first posited.

²¹ In the light of the primary process, intertextuality is thus not primarily to be understood in its later established and denatured usage to denote source studies, conscious borrowings and such.
level of the second-degree thetic:

>[the subject must be firmly posited by castration so that drive attacks against the thetic will not give way to fantasy or to psychosis but will instead lead to a “second-degree thetic”, i.e., a resumption of the functioning characteristic of the semiotic chora within the signifying device of language. (Ibid.: 50.)

This, according to Kristeva (ibid.), is precisely what a poetic practice demonstrates. It is also this second-degree thetic semantics that is primarily outlined in the music-analytical part of the study.\(^{22}\)

In poetic practice, the semiotic process does not stop in meaning (to the position of a subject of enunciation) and significance (to possible, plausible, or actual denotation). They remain, but as if stripped of their stasis and establishment, and there occurs an instinctual breakthrough of primary processes dominated by intonation and rhythm, stylistic figures, and such. This act

is situated at the most intense place of naming – at the thetic place on an inescapable syntax that abruptly halts the maternal body’s vague, autoerotic jubilation – recognizes its reflection in a mirror and shifts instinctual motility into logically structurable signifiers. The Aufhebung of instinctual drive across this boundary, which nonetheless exerts its full impact, situates the semiotic experience beyond the sentence, and thus, beyond signification and meaning. (Kristeva 1980: 167.)

This is Kristeva’s theoretical model for the production and mobility of meaning: it is only by the semiotic process and through the positing of the thetic, that a new Symbolic order can be formulated. In Kristeva’s theory, the semiotic does not come into discourse as somehow “directly” from the body or outside the signification, but rather it can only return through the symbolic position it brings. Only through the thetic can the body and drives and the related primal subject strategies be reactivated in music too. In this perspective, poetic practice manifests as an explicit confrontation between jouissance and the thetic, as a permanent struggle to expose the facilitation of drives within the Symbolic order itself (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 81). The semiotic transgression introduces through the symbolic that which works on, moves through, and threatens the Symbolic order and thus works against it. Poetic practice is a semiotization of the symbolic, cracking and splitting the Symbolic order open, changing vocabulary, syntax, and signs, and releasing from beneath them the drives born from vocalic, rhythmic, kinetic, and other differences, and representing a flow of jouissance into the Symbolic order. It marks a penetration of the socio-symbolic by this drive-bearing jouissance. (Ibid.: 79–81.)

As said, the modalities of the semiotic and the symbolic are not alternative,

---

\(^{22}\) Cf. also, the different levels at which to theorize the dialectics of the semiotic and the symbolic in music (see pp. 139–140, Chap. 5.2.1).
but in all psychic processes operating components, which only together make signification, subjectivity, and discourse possible. We can think these modalities to form in their bi-logical interaction an endless continuation of types of signifying and subjectivity experiences, which differ in their degree of the semiotization. The more the semiotic dominates, the more it activates the unsettled subjectivity and fluidity of meanings. (Cf. Kristeva 1980: 134.) In primal subjectivity formation, the semiotic component is considerably greater than in the conscious rational thinking, in which the symbolic component fixing and communicating the meaning is the dominating one.

According to Kristeva, the semiotic and the symbolic amalgamates in different ways in different social practices, which thus produces different types of discourses. A scientific discourse, to cite an instance, is a type of discourse which, in its strive for meta-language, aims to eliminate the share of the semiotic component (though in the process of scientific inventing the semiotic dimension is important). In poetic language, for its part, the semiotic aims for a dominant position at the expense of the judging ego and its predicative thetic, which strives for explicitness. In literary language, rhythm, for instance, can be put ahead of the symbolic order. (Kristeva 1980: 134.)

In this perspective, we may argue that music is already in its non-verbal-ness and temporality very willing and fluid material for the semiotic modality to dominate. Despite the fact that music is Symbolic practice, based on the interaction of the semiotic and the symbolic, it is not based on the subject-predicate identification, determination, and causality in the same way as the language is (cf. “Greek sentence”). Though both poetic language and music are dominated by the semiotic system, a difference is in the fact that music is not grounded on the predicative function. It instead specializes in another kind of signifying. Rather than computational and predicative (“abstract”), music is temporal and affective (“concrete”). Rather than the communicative aspect of language, music resembles “the language of materiality as opposed to the transparency” (cf. Roudiez 1980: 5) and “identity … infused with alterity without completely breaking down” (cf. Oliver 1993: 12). It grounds on sound, rhythm, sensuousness, and temporal unfolding, rather than to the categorical (linguistic, predicative) contents in human experience. This is why it evokes more powerfully semantic displacements, condensations, and transpositions (intertextuality) and is, by its contents, more fundamentally vague, open, and “polyphonic”. This does not mean that there is no semantics in music, but it means that musical semantics is both more open (looser) and denser. We may say that as a type of discourse music is specialized in the semiotic and subject-on-trial. As a signifying practice, music is “almost an Otherness of language”. This means that not only the semiotic is to be understood differently in music than in language, but that also the
symbolic is.

Kristeva (1984 [1974]: 24) herself mentions music as an example of an exceptional signifying system that is constructed relatively exclusively on the basis of semiotic. However, though I want to emphasize the dominance of the semiotic in music as a signifying practice, this claim of Kristeva is very problematic. Kristeva does not develop the idea any further. She pays attention only to the semiotic in music and not to music as Symbolic order. This is why Kristeva’s ideas should be developed more accurately in a musicological way, if using her concepts in music analysis (cf. Chap. 5.2.1). She uses the word music and other musical vocabulary only metaphorically. By music and musicality, Kristeva usually means simply intonation and rhythm in language, i.e., all those choric elements that play only a subordinate role in everyday communication but in poetic practices constitute the essential elements of enunciation and “lead us directly to the otherwise silent place of its subject”. (Kristeva 1980: 167.) Kristeva thus uses ‘music’ synonymously to primary process, semiotic modality, and choric register.23 The emphasis must therefore be put on the word “relatively”, as denoting all the philosophical and semiotic reservations related to the fact that, despite semiotic dominance, music is as socio-culturally and symbolically constructed signifying practice as any other cultural practice, however different it may be by its medium and material from the linguistic practices such as speaking and writing. It can reactivate archaic subjectivity only as a signifying practice that lets it happen (cf. the second degree thetic). The fact that the experience of music is dominated by the semiotic modality, that music appeals to the choric register in the listener, does not mean that it would be even relatively “free” from the symbolic because a signifying practice always depends on the symbolic. This, for its part, does not mean that it would not represent freedom from the symbolic and linguistic. For that is one of music’s most fundamental cultural functions. Music can be a borderline practice of meaning and subjectivity only on the basis of its symbolic functioning and nature as social signification. Precisely as a signifying discourse based on the thetic positions, even if more vague than in language, music can activate the nonlinguistic mode of being in the listening subject. Only as a socio-cultural practice, music is able to offer a site for the semiotic domination.

Kristeva describes in her theory of poetic language the process that accounts for the way all signifying practices are generated, but it is still only certain sig-

23 In one of the rear moments that Kristeva mentions actual music is a passage in her essay on Philippe Soller’s H where she talks about modern artistic practices that draw on a phase before the mirror stage upsetting commonplace logical order. She claims this practice having found its most fruitful ground in music of John Cage, La Monte Young, Maurice Kagel, and Karlheinz Stockhausen. (Kristeva 1980: 168.)
signifying practices that encompass the “infinite totality of that process”. This is because multiple constraints, socio-political above all, stop the signifying process at one or another of the meanings it traverses. Socio-political constraints lock the signifying practice into a given structure and discard the practice under the fixed. (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 88.) Kristeva means simply the conventional meanings established in the activities of cultural practices. Music generally is to be counted to signifying practices that manage easily to encompass the infinite totality of the process of signification. It inscribes within its textual level powerfully the plural and contradictory process of signification encompassing the flow of drives, material discontinuity, and the pulverization of fixed contents (cf. ibid.).

As pointed out already, there are two reasons basically for why or how the musical signifier functions powerfully as a semiotic signifier. Firstly, because the predicative logic of linguistic practice does not hold in nonverbal musical experience, music is received more easily with the bodily, affective, and drive-based system of signification. In this way, music is tightly linked to the prelinguistic realm of subject before the mirror stage; this realm becomes easily activated in music. Secondly, because of this, music is experienced as a more “direct” and “presence” signifying practice than verbal language, despite the fact that this experience is produced by music as a conventional sign system (as a fantasy), and is thus as mediated as any other process of representation. This is also related to the special nature and role of the auditory sense in subject’s constitution.

Accordingly, it is our (psychological) listening experience that is dominated by the semiotic modality (this is a different question from that of the semiotic/symbolic dialogue in a certain work of music per se). Largely it is the socio-cultural and socio-political constraints that define the function of music as such. Our activities invest the cultural practice called music with such meaning. This means that in western culture in general music has a function to work as a site for the semiotic. As an imaginary signifier, music functions as a powerful cultural fantasy of blissful unity in being and full presence, an effort to cure the split subject. This experiencing of music pushes forward in the listening subject her nonlinguistic workings, bodily, affective, drive-based responses, mobility of meaning, and fluid subjectivity – semiotic pulsation that subject experiences in herself.

In a very broad and schematic way, we can say that in music, the relation of the semiotic and the symbolic – the degree of semiotization – is different than in linguistic practices because of its medium, material, substantial factors (e.g., temporality), and cultural functions and status. However symbolic the musical sign system ever is, it gives an experience of appealing effectively to the nonlinguistic side in being, because it is harnessed in our culture to represent “otherness”. Accordingly, music re-activates, arouses, stimulates, or blurs strongly the
demarcation between the semiotic and the symbolic. It is just this trespassing that creates the potential of music to portray effectively subject strategies.

6.3 The matrix of psychosomatic and conesthetic meaning

Kristeva also describes the workings of the semiotic modality of signification in terms of the concept of *chora*. From the systemic perspective, the *chora* denotes an organizing sphere articulated by the mobility of the drives (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 25; 1980: 133), an elementary (non-)signifying space with and against which all discourse and representation move simultaneously, both depending upon while refusing that very sphere (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 25–26). Developmentally it denotes a space before the sign, an archaic pre-linguistic disposition in which the interaction between an infant and mother takes place long before the mirror stage (e.g., Kristeva 1980: 283): the mother is called upon to form the *chora* with her infant so that a semiotic disposition might exist (ibid.: 286). This reciprocal space of interaction has been richly studied in psychoanalytic child psychology, especially since the 1960s.²⁴ (It has been already addressed in various contexts in the present research.) When musical experience is studied from the angle of its nonlinguistic dominance, we can well describe the overwhelming experiential world of music as the semiotic chora of music.

The notion of *chora* that actually is a “non-concept” escaping in its post-structural definition all definitions, Kristeva (1984 [1974]: 25; 1980: 133; 1987: 5) derives from Plato’s *Timaeus*-dialogue. There, when dealing with the pre-cosmic primordial state of the world, Plato describes the *chora* as a susceptible receptacle, not yet organized wholeness, “an invisible and formless being which receives all things and in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible, and is most incomprehensible” (see Roudiez 1980: 6). Kristeva borrows the term “to denote an essentially mobile and extremely provisional articulation constituted by [instinctual] movements and their ephemeral stases”, “a nonexpressive totality formed by the drives and their stases in a motility that is as full of movement as it is regulated” (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 25). It is “unnamable, improbable, hybrid, anterior to naming, to the One, to the father, and consequently, maternally con-noted” (Kristeva 1980: 133).

Kristeva explains that

---

²⁴ In hear early works at the end of the 1960s, Kristeva too did some child-psychological research on small children’s speech in order to scientifically prove the existence of the semiotic modality (see Kristeva 1969; see also, 1980: Chap. 10).
discrete quantities of [instinctual] energy move through the body of the subject who is not yet constituted as such and, in the course of his development, they are arranged according to the various constraints imposed on this body – always already involved in a semiotic process – by family and social structures. (1984 [1974]: 25.)

This is the archaic primary narcissistic disposition, the paradoxical semiosis of a newborn body, which the poet exposes in order to defy the closure of meaning (Kristeva 1980: 281). It marks the subject-(dis)position of the poetic practice, the subject-in-process/on-trial, for whom the word is never uniquely sign and who “maintains itself at the cost of re-activating this repressed instinctual, maternal element” (ibid.: 136.) “Indifferent to language, enigmatic and feminine, this space underlying the written is rhythmic, unfettered, irreducible to its intelligible verbal translation; it is musical, anterior to judgment, but restrained by a single guarantee: syntax.” (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 29.) In many contexts, Kristeva describes the chora (or the semiotic) as “musical” order, the “maternal music” of language (e.g., 1984 [1974]: 24, 29, 63, 65; 1980: 133, 167). By this, she refers to the rhythm, intonation, and other such operations in the language, and to the heterogeneous, bodily-based chaining of multiple meanings, where possibilities and mobility of meanings remain open:

[This heterogeneousness, which is later reactivated as rhythms, intonations, glossalalia in psychotic discourse, serving as ultimate support of the speaking subject threatened by the collapse of the signifying function; this heterogeneousness to signification operates through, despite, and in excess of it and produces in poetic language “musical” but also nonsense effects that destroy not only accepted beliefs and significations, but, in radical experiments, syntax itself. … The notion of heterogeneity is indispensable, for though articulate, precise, organized, and complying with constraints and rules (especially, like the rule of repetition, which articulates the units of a particular rhythm or intonation), this signifying disposition is not that of meaning or signification: no sign, no predication, no signified object and therefore no operating consciousness of a transcendental ego. (Kristeva 1980: 133.)

Developmentally, Kristeva’s choratic organization is active from the very first weeks in an infant’s life. Thus, it is not restricted to transitional (Winnicott) and mirror stage (Lacan) at the threshold of the language acquisition but covers a larger sphere from a stage of anaclisis to diatroph. Kristeva even gives equivalents for the semiotic disposition in the intra-uterus stage: choratic markings make up for the absence of intrauterine life components: mother’s movements, rhythm of breathing, heartbeat and walking, and noise of blood circulation. Choratic markings are memories of bodily contact, warmth and nourishment, vocal and muscular contractions, spasms of the glottis and motor system, and anaclitic facilitations. (1980: 282–283, 286; 1984 [1974]: 26.) Kristeva emphasizes the chora as a bodily matrix: it is “neither request nor desire”, but “an invocation, an
anaclisis” (1980: 281). Drives and needs flow through the body of the infant and contain semiotic functions that connect the subject to the mother. They become oriented and organized around the mother’s body and through her bodily reactions. Chora receives and organizes the anaclitic channelings towards the object (mother), as related to the necessary satisfaction of needs that maintain the life. Being neither outer nor inner, outside nor inside, the fixed points of chora offer a bed for the anaclitic outbursts but cannot make them to stop. They are noticeable only because they admit anaclisis, but they do not end it. This takes shape as a rudimentary permanence, a totality of the motions of the drives. As a continuity of linked instants, it produces organization related to the vocal, gestural, and kinaesthetic rhythm in the interaction between the mother and the infant. (Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 25–28; 1980: 282, 286.)

The early interactive system between an infant and her mother is built on close physical and auditory contacts organized largely as temporal patterns. Communication takes place in motions, movements, rhythms, skin and body contacts, sound and visual shapes, the perceiving of which resembles very much the elementary comprehending of music. The sensing is wide and mainly visceral which means that it is happening in the inner parts of the organic system of the body (Spitz 1965: 63), an experience grasped easily when listening music. In this pre-linguistic matrix of archaic communication, signification takes place prior to the linguistic universe, before the object and the subject, and the outer and the inner, have been differentiated from each other. This system reacts to nonlinguistic and non-directed expressive signals and dimensions in signification (cf. Spitz 1965: 135). It also denotes the choratic register of listening in which music receives its conesthetic, bodily, visceral, psychosomatic, imaginary, and other drive-bearing, affective semiotic meanings. It is characterized by an overwhelming sonorous envelope, in which the meaning processes are global, overwhelming, temporal, flexible, and moving.

Spitz (1965) calls this archaic system of sensing a conesthetic organization. Kristeva refers to Spitz and talks about the conesthetic organization as “a highly complex semiotic phenomenon” (Kristeva 1980: 283, cf. also, 278, 282). Signs and signals belonging to this conesthetic system receivable for the infant in her the first months of life are such as:

- equilibrium, tension (muscular or otherwise), posture, temperature, vibration, skin and body contact, rhythm, tempo, duration, pitch, tone, resonance, clang, and probably a number of others of which the adult is hardly aware and which he certainly cannot verbalize. (Spitz 1965: 134–135.)

Spitz (1965: 44) writes that the conesthetic organization is a system of sensing basically different from the system of perception that operates at a later age,
the system with which we are more familiar and which he calls the diacritic organization, comparable to Kristeva’s symbolic modality. Spitz describes the conesthetic experiential world as a global, all-inclusive, extensive, and finely built world in which he includes many features belonging to the world of musical experience. What is essential is the total constellation of the various features of rhythm, duration, tempo, tone, pitch, mood, and other such parameters (Lehtonen 1986: 91–92). In this terrain of tensions and discharges of tensions, sound, movement, and psychophysical experiences belong tightly together (Kurkela 1993: 414). This manifests also in the fact that the vocabulary of emotions comes close to being a vocabulary of sensual touch (Fuller 1988: 209); for example in such word pairs as to feel – a feeling; to move, movement – moving; to touch – touching. Kari Kurkela writes that perhaps sound is primordially linked with physical experiences, with movements, touch, physical contact, and sensations. Later it joins in all the more differentiated and divergent ways of psychical representations of these experiences. Then the music becomes touching, moving, arousing sensations and e/motions. Perhaps this is also why an imagery of movement is used to describe sounds and music: tone (sound, voice) wanders, ascends and descends, moves forward in time, hesitates, rushes, jumps, crawls, and so forth. To this course of music, listeners often partake with their bodies, by tapping fingers or feet, wiggling the head or other parts of body, not to even mention dancing. (Kurkela 1993: 410, 414–415.)

In the archaic communication matrix, the developing subject reacts to all sounds and thus to speech too, with the conesthetic code and thus focusing the attention to the “musical” (prosodic, para-linguistic) features of the speech. These aspects, such as rhythm, tempo, temporality (linearity), melody, pitch, tone, shade, timbre, color, sound and intonation, capture the attention of an infant. This is intuitively understood in all cultures in which parents and other people around the infant, automatically exaggerate the “music” contained in the speech: one talks to children often with a higher voice, with more changes in the pitch and in a more singing style than to another adult.25 (Rose 1993: 77.) As Kristeva (1980: 168, 172) writes when discussing “musicating” intonations in poetic language, “children learning a language first learn the intonations indicating syntax structure – that is, melody or music – before they assimilate the rules of syntactic

25 This is how people act automatically with pets as well, such as dogs and cats. Perhaps the owner tries to understand her pet by sympathizing and reading the conesthetic codes in order to find out “what does the pet want”. As Anne Sivuoja-Gunaratnam (private communication) remarked, this is the procedure also when we talk to someone who does not understand the spoken language very well: the conesthetic (semiotic) features in speech are exaggerated as if making up the lack in the semantic (symbolic) competence. Correspondingly when listening a language that is not mastered, we pay attention rather to the conesthetic than to the diacritic features.
Subject Strategies in Music

We can say, that the nonlinguistic signifying realm in music anchors at the very bottom to subject’s pre-linguistic experiential realm. Because in the early experiential realm of an infant, her body and psyche are as yet not fully formed, we may say that the nonlinguistic experiential realm is largely a bodily one. “The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego”, as Freud (1961a [1923]: 26) states. According to the developmental psychoanalytic theory, the realm of mind is thought to develop little by little and getting more space all the time. Archaic organizing is thus thought to be bodily-based, i.e., basically corporeal: an infant arranges her perceptions by bodily forms and shapes in such a way that the understanding of reality happens by means of forms and shapes deriving from the functions of the body (Rechardt 1984: 91). These forms function as kinds of elementary schemata or proto-concepts of reacting to the world. Body is the “vehicle” through which the infant “thinks” before a separate realm of mind has been formed and the differentiation of subject (self, inner) and object (m/other, outer) is established.

We may say that musical experience appeals to and enlivens the landscape of bodily understanding based on the bodily functions and corporeal schemata in the listening subject.27 Psychoanalyst Eero Rechardt (1984 and 1987) talks about the archaic meaning schemata of music.28 Correspondingly, Roland Barthes (1985: 303–310) talks about somathemes as the structural elements of music. Somathemes (cf. Greek ‘soma’ = body) are kinds of bodily expressions or motions. According to Barthes, music is based on these inner movements of body, rather than states of soul.29 (Ibid.) Likewise psychoanalyst Björn Salomonsson (1991) writes about music as especially capable of giving shape to bodily expressions of emotions. According to Salomonsson, music does not give shape to emotions, but to bodily expressions of emotions. This means, for example, that at this archaic articulative level, music does not express sadness per se, but it can dynamically express a bodily expression of sadness, such as a sigh. (Salomonsson 1991: 167–168.) Here, one thinks of the pianto topic (“a sigh”), for instance. Likewise music – at this level of listening – does not express hope or hopefulness

26 “Intonation and rhythm are the first markers of the finite in the infinity of semiotic process; they delineate the limited positions of a subject who first invokes but, soon thereafter also signifies.” (Kristeva 1980: 172.)
27 Here, certain links with the phenomenological understanding emphasizing the bodily origin in artistic experience and in perception in general, could be drawn. By evoking Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (1977 [1964]) way of speaking, we could formulate that the listening subject transforms her world (experience) into music by lending for it her body, i.e., intertwining braids of hearing and moving.
28 The concepts of the archaic meaning scheme and body scheme of thought come from psychoanalyst Lajos Székely (1962).
29 Barthes’s views on embodied music are discussed in Chap. 10.
but a bodily expression of hope or hopefulness, such as a leap upwards (ibid.). Theoretically, it may be difficult to differentiate this level from the symbolic-conventional level of the agreed expressions of emotions, such as defined by *Affektenlehre* or system of Classic topics. On the other hand, we might suggest the latter ones are based on the former. Perhaps the theory of gestures in musical signification will bring more light to the matter (see Hatten 1998, 2003, and 2004; Aksnes 1998).

According to Barthes (1985: 303–310) the naming of somathemes requires the use of literary and poetic metaphors and images, for they cannot be captured with concepts of music theory. The ordinary language of communication too, captures and resonates experiences grounded on corporeal understanding and archaic bodily metaphors. We talk, for example, about something as a *breath* of fresh air, or that someone is a *warm* person (Salomonsson 1991: 167–168, 170). It is common to refer this way to the body when talking about music: it makes one *shiver*, it is *stunning*, and so forth. These verbal expressions, according to Salomonsson, are relics of archaic meaning schemata. (Ibid.) This also tells about the fact that we experience and receive music importantly as a visceral experience, and demonstrates music’s choratic nature.  

Kristeva (1984 [1974]: 27) calls the semiotic (choratic) modality as *psychosomatic modality*, emphasizing by this the corporeality and body-ness of the archaic experiential world. We may say that the semiotic *chora* in the musical experience reactivates the psychosomatic oscillation at the interval between body and psyche, corporeality and psychicalness, the threshold crossing between the two realms of being, and other splits in subjectivity. In its choratic register, musical experience allows a weaker differentiation between mental and psychic spheres of experience, and between inner and outer stimuli.

### 6.4 Amodal and vitality affect schemata

The choratic and conesthetic experiential world could be compared to the level of general codes in Gino Stefani’s (1985 and 1984; see also, n. 17, p. 140, Chap. 5.2.1) semiotical model of musical competence. In Stefani’s theory, the general codes form the basis for all meaning production of music as sounding phenomenon. By general codes, we perceive and interpret whatever experience we confront. These perception schemata refer to spatial, kinetic, tactile, luminary, terminal, synesthesic, dynamic, and other such sense processes that, according to

30 Cf. also Schwarz 1997a: 7–8.

31 This can be connected to the fact that composers and musicians may experience musical impulses and inspiration to be of outside origin as if they were only copiers or mediators instead of creators (Nass 1993: 26–27).
Stefani, activate sensomotoric intelligence and concrete thinking already before the logical thinking. (1985: 82, 86–87; 1984: 219.) Stefani (1984: 86) writes, that these general modes of reality, as perceived by us, can be understood, for example, as slow growth or explosion, sudden extinguishing or gradual disintegration, “those innumerable processes about which the everyday experience gives us examples.”

By Daniel N. Stern’s (1985) concepts, it is a question of vitality affects that do not fit into the traditional affect categorization consisting of the so-called categorical affects, such as, sorrow, hate, anger, and joy. Stern has examined how newborn infants experience the world around them, and how they bring together the varied sights, sounds, and sensations in pre-linguistic forms. Stern (1985: 54) suggests that “there is a quality of experience that can arise directly from encounters with people, a quality that involves vitality affects”. Stern finds it necessary to posit this concept because many qualities of feeling do not fit into our existing lexicon or taxonomy of affects. These elusive qualities are types of experience the quality of which is better captured by dynamic and kinetic terms, such as surging, fading away, fleeting, explosive, crescendo, decrescendo, bursting, drawn out, and so on. (Ibid.: 53–56.) These, rather than the categorical affects, dominate the nonlinguistic dimension in the experiential realm of music. According to the contemporary developmental knowledge, an infant is not a passive receiver, but from the very beginning tries to organize and arrange the chaos around her by her inborn capabilities and inclinations. These abilities and experiences are not linguistic per se, and they are difficult to study. From the Kristevan perspective, they nevertheless already contain the (semiotic) logic of signification. It has been stated that these abilities share many elements that are familiar to us from musical experience (Rechardt 1992: 179–180).

According to Stern, these vital qualities are experienced in oneself and in others’ behavior as dynamic shifts, changes, and rhythms, related to the different sensations and functions of the body, as again and again appearing in constant patterns and changes in patterns (1985: 56–57). It is thus not a question of emotions proper, but rather of types of meaning and experience typical for the early

32 Like Spitz, Stern is a researcher who has combined psychoanalytic and experimental child-psychological traditions for examining infant’s development.

33 As mentioned in Chap. 3.2.2 (p. 60), Stern’s theories have been richly applied to music research, for example, by Rechardt (1992 and 1998), Lehtonen (1993b and 1994), Erkkilä (1995 and 1997a–b), Imberty (e.g., 1997), Volgsten (1999 and 2003), and Postacchini et al. (1998). Aksnes (1998: 177–178) suggests that an approach based on Stern’s concepts could be integrated with the study of gestures for theorizing musical signification. Stern’s notion of vitality affects could offer as well a new perspective of rereading Susanna Langer’s theory about the forms of feeling in music. Stern himself (1985: 54) mentions Langer in his book.
stage in the individual’s development. They are comprehensive affective ways of perceiving the environment, as Jaakko Erkkilä (1995: 128) has put the matter in his theory of the signifying levels of music in music therapy. These vital experiential qualities, which sound very much like musical ones, such as performance instructions or descriptions of musical events, are according to Stern (1985: 54) “most certainly sensible to infants and of great daily, even momentary, importance”. Psychoanalytic music psychology is naturally not alone with this idea, though it has a special method and framework to theorize the matter. Gestalt-psychologists, such as Wolfgang Köhler (1947: 231), for instance, have as well claimed that in the intra-psychic life of a human, emotional as well as intellectual, and also in outside behavior, there occur generally and constantly types of development that could be named by qualifiers normally used for the musical events such as crescendo, diminuendo, accelerando, ritardando, rinforzando, and so on.

Stern cites music and dance as “examples par excellence of the expressiveness of vitality affects” (1985: 56). Dance and music display various vitality affects, such as bursting, rushing, fading away and the like, by referring to the mode, rather than “content” of feeling. Also, by means of vitality affects, the categorical affects gain more fluid expression. An infant engages in a kind of ballet performance when she is perceiving her social environment. As dance and music are for the adult, “the social world experienced by the infant is primarily one of vitality affects”. (Stern 1985: 55–57; see also, Rechardt 1992: 183; Erkkilä 1995: 93.)

The realm of vitality affects is analogous to the physical world of amodal perception, which is another concept by Stern (1985) than can be used to illuminate the semiotic chora of the musical experience. We can say that the vitality affects dominate the experiential world of music together with the amodal qualities. In both of these modes of perceiving, it is a question of combining different experiences together on the basis of structural, dynamic, kinetic, or rhythmic similarity, for instance. This could be thought to imply the semiotic logic of signification looking for the sameness as a kind of operational isomorphism. The amodal perception is, according to Stern (1985: 51), an innate general capacity of infant to take information received in one sensory modality and somehow translate it into another sensory modality. “The information is probably not experienced as belonging to any particular sensory mode. More likely, it transcends mode or channel and exists in some unknown supra-modal form.” (Ibid.) By amodal ability transcending the boundaries of the sensory modes, an infant is able to

34 Stern defines here “abstract dance” but does not specify the music or dance in any concrete ways.
35 In Chaps. 6.5 and 6.6 this is described as symmetrical logic.
recognize similarities in the experience of different sensory fields and form kinds of elementary concepts, forms, and shapes free from categorical (linguistic) contents.

Stern thinks that the experiential world of an infant is one of perceptual unity, in which they can perceive amodal qualities in any modality from any form of human expressive behavior. They are able to represent these qualities of perception abstractly, and to transpose them to other sensory modalities, and to use them as perceptual or “conceptual” frames in future experiences, so that some perceptions of people and things are experienced directly as global, amodal qualities. (Stern 1985: 51.) The information received from these primary qualities of perception is more general in nature: “These abstract representations … are not sights and sounds and touches and nameable objects, but rather shapes, intensities, and temporal patterns – the more global qualities of experience” (ibid.). These abstract representations can be thought to constitute archaic meaning schemata (Szekely 1962; Rechardt 1987), the choratic patterns of all human experience, which music “plays” in the listening subject. By animating archaic schemata, music touches various experiences and contents that are constructed on their basis producing transposing focal points for multiple meanings.

The infant’s experiential world is in this way more unified – and intertextual – than the conscious realm of thinking in adult:

Infants do not attend to what domain their experience is occurring in. They take sensations, perceptions, actions, cognitions, internal states of motivation, and states of consciousness and experience them directly in terms of intensities, shapes, temporal patterns, vitality affects, categorical affects and hedonic tones. (Stern 1985: 67.)

The infant can differentiate and organize the abstract, global qualities of experience in a subtle way (Stern 1985: 67) and thereby form archaic meaning schemata. This ability is activated in the semiotic chora of music. We can say that in this way musical archaic meaning retains its potential for other meanings, such as technical, historical, personal, psychological, and more. All these meanings and contents share the same dynamic structure. The archaic meaning schemata are transparent in this way: opaque in their corporeality but transparent in their lack of categorical (linguistic) content, and thus they enable loading of all the meanings which share the same vitality affect or amodal structure.

By abstracting the schemata from an experience in one sensory mode, and applying them to another sensory mode – for example, to the auditory mode – the subject can “translate” experiences from one sensory sphere to another, say, that of music. Here we have one way to explain Kristeva’s (1984 [1974]: 59–60) notion of transposition, i.e., intertextuality. The listening subject can explore whatever she experiences “musically” by abstracting amodal structures of those
experiences. She transposes schemata that are amodal and vitally affective onto music and is able to organize her experiences in terms of music. Hence, in a way, music may function as a microcosm of life. We can say that in this sense music presents and represents functional structures of psychic processes, certain general principles of mental processes (Rechardt 1984 and 1987). By virtue of this amodal ability, a sound may be seen or felt, in addition to being heard. Similarly, listening subject may also “think” visually or kinesthetically when being “played” by the music.

6.5 Symmetrical logic

In addition to the above discussion drawing on developmental theories, the semiotic modality and its logic – crucial to choratic register of musical experience – can be outlined in the systemic perspective as the logic of the unconscious. As emphasized in Chapter 3.3, in this perspective, the unconscious does not mean only a repository of the actively repressed mental contents (cf. Ihanus 1987: 37), but another modality of signification, which, due to its different nature and quality, cannot as such, become integrated into the conscious psychic life.

Although one important line in Freud’s thinking concerns the possibility to make something that is unconscious conscious (this is the therapeutic perspective; cf. the dynamic viewpoint and that of the degree of consciousness), the more radical line is to describe the otherness of the unconscious as irreducible and non-returnable to consciousness (Hintsa 1998: 13–14). In the Interpretation of Dreams Freud (1953 [1900]: 612–613) writes:

It is essential to abandon the overvaluation of the property of being conscious before it becomes possible to form any correct view of the origin of what is mental. … [T]he unconscious must be assumed to be the general basis of psychical life. The unconscious is the larger sphere, which includes within it the smaller sphere of the conscious. … The unconscious is the true psychic reality; in its innermost nature it is as much unknown to us as the reality of the external world, and it is as incompletely presented by the data of consciousness as is the external world by the communications of our sense organs.

This otherness is qualitatively unconscious primarily due to the nature of its logical structures, not because of repression. This “unrepressed unconscious” is especially, but not only, seen in the typical manifestations of the unconscious, such as in dreams, for instance. The unrepressed unconscious is there, as another modality of meaning (the semiotic), in every psychic process of signification and subjectivity formation, whether that process is qualitatively unconscious or not. In this perspective, music is considered an example of the ability to operate with the nonlinguistic logic of signification, the muted “otherness” of language,
because of its openness for the mobility of meaning.

Freud formulated the logic of the unconscious in a detailed way already in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1953 [1900]). Freud emphasizes that the unconscious has its own constructive role and that it functions according to its own systematics, to which the rules of ordinary logic cannot be applied: “The governing rules of logic carry no weight in the unconscious; it might be called the Realm of the Illogical.” (Freud 1964 [1940]: 168–169.) From rational-logical point of view (cf. Aristotelian logic), it may seem that there is no logic at all in the unconscious, but Freud demonstrated, for example, in his study of dreams and slips, that the unconscious functions systematically according to its own logic. That contains, firstly, the primary process mechanisms of the 1) condensation (an object or thought is unconsciously condensed from several objects or thoughts) and 2) displacement (an object is unconsciously substituted by another which shares some aspect with the original one)\(^36\). Furthermore, 3) absence of negation and mutual contradiction; 4) absence of time/temporality (that is to say, timelessness); and 5) replacement of external by internal reality. (Freud 1957b [1915]: 186–187; 1953 [1900].) The logic of the unconscious does not recognize negatives, oppositions, the difference between part and whole, or temporal concepts. There is no time, no negation, no contradictions, no inner and outer worlds; cause and effect, place and time turn upside down. The logic of the unconscious seeks for infinite sameness, and is based on endless substitution.

Psychoanalyst Ignacio Matte Blanco\(^37\) (1998 [1975] and 1988), working with one arm in classical Freudian psychoanalysis and the other in basic mathematical logic,\(^38\) has studied by means of a logical analysis what all the above-listed characteristics of Freudian unconscious have in common. Matte Blanco is one of those rare scholars who have studied the unconscious from a logical point of view as a radical otherness in human existence. This marks kinship with early Kristeva theorizing the carnivalistic cosmogony of human mind. Also, as Lacan, he is worried about contemporary psychoanalysis diminishing the revolutionary nature of the unconscious as early Freud outlined it. Matte Blanco’s examination

---

36 Veikko Tähkä (1970: 15–16) clarifies the displacement in a following way: “The energy charge attached to a certain object or process may be displaced to concern another object or process on the basis of that the new object or process has some quality shared with the original one. Some totally unimportant detail with certain alikeness may be enough for this.” Displacement thus denotes experiential and cathetic transition from one object image to another (Tähkä 1993: 67).

37 Matte Blanco (1909–1995) is a Chilean-Italian psychoanalyst, Freudian theorist, and psychiatrist. Matte Blanco’s thinking is not well known neither in the field of psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic semiotics. For an introduction, see, e.g., the special issue on Matte Blanco in *International Review of Psychoanalysis* No. 17 (1990).

of the logic of the unconscious as endlessly seeking the sameness, makes more understandable Lacan’s imaginary logic and its search for the object having “as little otherness as possible” (the object a). Also, it makes more understandable the relationship between the real and the symbolic. Both to Matte Blanco and Lacan (and to Derrida), the unconscious is at the end the Impossible (cf. Hintsa 1998: 86–87). Maybe with the exception of Wilfred Bion, early Kristeva, late Lacan and Matte Blanco seem to be the only ones after Freud who have tried specifically – and with a certain fascination for mathematics – to formulate the logically subversive workings of the unconscious.

According to Matte Blanco (1998 [1975]: 93–94, n. 1), it is even regrettable that Freud named this other mode of being as the “unconscious”, because being unconscious is “no doubt one, but only one, of the characteristics of this world”. Matte Blanco claims that being unconscious is only a necessary consequence of the properties of the logical structures of unconscious thinking. According to him, what Freud described with the noun “unconscious” was not a quality but a mode of being (ibid.: 69, 93–94), i.e., a component in every psychic process, and thus a modality of signification. Psychoanalytic theory views the subject as doing psychic work – meaning and subjectivity work – all the time. Subject tries to understand world around her as well as herself, and tries to place herself into active – discursive – relation with that world. The mind, as a collection of ongoing psychical processes (subjectivity), can be grasped as a result of this continual psychic work, as an effect of signification. Whereas Lacan and Kristeva reformulate this basic view of psychoanalysis with linguistics and semiotics, Matte Blanco reformulates it in terms of mathematical set theory (not alien to late Lacan or early Kristeva): A subject is at every moment performing unconscious or conscious classifications, that is to say, forming sets. Matte Blanco (1998 [1975]) considers the mind as an apparatus for discriminating and classifying (see Rayner & Tuckett 1988: 18; Etchegoyen & Ahumada 1990: 493–494). All classification involves taking note of sameness or identity. Here, according to Matte Blanco, is the basic characteristic of the unconscious system of thought-construction: the endless registration of sameness.

Matte Blanco argues that the unconscious joins together things that the ordinary, conscious thinking keeps separate. Whereas the conscious thinking differentiates, the unconscious melts things together. According to Matte Blanco, to register sameness or similarities involves a symmetrical operation from a logical point of view, whereas to differentiate involves an asymmetrical operation. This is why Matte Blanco renames the Freudian unconscious a symmetrical mode of being, the logic of which is also symmetrical, and renames consciousness an

39 Matte Blanco’s writings have no references to Lacanian tradition. This is one expression of the void between Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic traditions.
asymmetrical mode of being, the logic of which is asymmetrical.\textsuperscript{40} (Matte Blanco 1998 [1975]: 20–21, 39–40, 69–70, 96–97.)

Accordingly, symmetrical relations characterize the unconscious, and asymmetrical relations characterize the consciousness. Symmetrical logic seeks for similarities, it registers simple sameness, it does not differentiate but combines, and it does not recognize individuals but infinite sets\textsuperscript{41}. It rejects time and space and does not differentiate the whole from its parts. The unconscious treats the converse of a relation as identical to the original one, where ordinary, conscious logic would discern asymmetry. Symmetrical logic abandons time and place, and does not differentiate the whole from its parts: if A is part of B, then B is also part of A. And if A is after B, then B is after A. The consciousness governed by asymmetrical logic, differentiates, discriminates, and is bound to time-space concepts. It makes differentiations and abstractions between the whole and its parts, time and space, and conceptualizes the past, present and future, inner and outer, self and non-self. In its symmetrical mode of being, the unconscious is all-inclusive, whereas the consciousness in its asymmetricity can concentrate on only one thing at a time, because it has to separate that thing from the next one. As in Kristeva’s theory, in which the semiotic and the symbolic intertwine, in Matte Blanco’s theory, symmetrical and asymmetrical logic combine to form bi-logical structures. The most important logical feature of the unconscious processes thus is to treat symmetrically relations that the ordinary everyday logic of conscious communication treats asymmetrically, as bound to concepts of the time and space. (Matte Blanco 1998 [1975]: 20–21, 39–40, 69–70, 96–97; Roos 1996: 36–37, 40.) This “surrealistic” logic of the \textit{chora} lacks contradiction, opposites can unite, a thing can simultaneously exist and not exist, as in a dream someone can be both dead and alive, father can be son, and son father (cf. Roos 1996: 38). As Juhani Ihanus (1987: 38) writes, “time and space dissolve, opposites … melt together, borders darken, outer becomes inner and inner outer, the body thinks and thought becomes embodied”; “self comes from the other and the other from self” (Ihanus 1995: 213).

According to Matte Blanco (1998 [1975]: 20–21, 39–40, 69–70, 96; see also, Roos 1996: 40) creative processes such as poetic language, music, dream, asso-

\textsuperscript{40} A logically symmetrical relation is one whose converse is identical to the original relation. For example, the converse of “A is near B” is “B is near A”. For “Peter is married to Mary”, the converse is “Mary is married to Peter”. These are symmetrical relations. A logically asymmetrical relation is one whose converse is not identical to the original relation. This asymmetrical relation obtains, for example, in “A is after B”, the converse of which is “B is before A”; or, “John is Peter’s father”, whose converse is “Peter is the son of John” (not “B is after A” or "Peter is John’s father"). These are asymmetrical relations. (Rayner & Wooster 1990: 426–427.)

\textsuperscript{41} Whatever things, even an infinite number of objects, can belong to a set. A class is a set, the members of which share whatever common characteristic.
ciation, symbolization, transference, introjection, projection, and identification, use symmetrical logic more greatly than the ordinary communication and signifying practices that emphasize the rationality and exactness of communication. This supports Kristeva’s idea of the poetic practice as a semiotization of the symbolic.

The symmetrical logic sheds light to the semiotic chora of musical experience: to the heterogeneity of musical signification resulting in potentially unending polyvalence and powerful activation of the unsettled subjectivity. We can say that the virtual microcosm of music operates effectively with symmetrical logic. The heterogeneous elements of music – such as pitch, duration, timbre, harmony, and dynamics – along with mental musical concepts and ideas, are flexible materials susceptible and responsive to being worked upon and out by symmetrical thinking. By its nonverbal, non-predicative, and temporal structures apt for amodal transpositions, music seems to “isomorphically” convey and present manifold complex psychic events and mechanisms. For example, with different musical parameters logically contradictory things can be carried out. Typical seems to be for musical devices to combine and juxtapose contradictory possibilities, for example, a simultaneous increase and decrease of tension, or at the same time a decrease in harmony (e.g., a release in harmonic tension when coming to a certain tonality) and an increase in rhythm (e.g., time values can become denser). This covers also the area of acoustic mirror playing with sameness and difference. Imaginary register displays well the mixing of symmetrical and asymmetrical logics, for the imaginary denotes developmentally the very state where the differentiations (asymmetry) slowly start to take more place but the symmetry in the search of sameness (for endless others as images of self) dominates powerfully. Matte Blanco’s implicitly semiotical formulation of the endless search for the sameness as the operative principle of the unconscious, and the system of differences as the fundamental nature of the consciousness resonates various poststructural theories of the signification as a radical system of difference with potential for infinite semiosis. Likewise Guy Rosolato (1978: 50–51) talks quite similarly about the systems of “digital articulation” (cf. system of differences) and “analogic combining” (cf. search for sameness). It could be also pointed out that music displays the logic of identity and difference very obviously as a signifying practice without predicative purposes.42

42 As already said, this is also displayed in music analysis based on testing identities and differences (similarities and variations) in musical elements.
6.6 The multidimensional experience of music

According to Matte Blanco, the principle of symmetry is a true expression of the Freudian unconscious and explains the logic of the characteristics of the unconscious listed by Freud. For instance, timelessness is a necessary consequence of symmetry, because if there are no asymmetrical relations, then there can be no succession in time in its mathematically-physical sense; the same goes for space. (Matte Blanco 1988: 86.) The keystone of Matte Blanco’s work is that the unconscious is not a-logical – i.e., without any logic – but bi-logical in its mixing of symmetrical relations with asymmetrical ones (Rayner & Wooster 1990: 427). One component registers endless sameness; the other differentiates and forms relations. Psychic life (signification) can be seen as a continuous interaction of these two modes of being, with their two different functions. (Matte Blanco 1988: 13.)

Matte Blanco suggests that, theoretically, we can imagine the mind as consisting of different zones which are more or less symmetrical/asymmetrical (cf. symbolic/semiotic). We can conceptualize an infinite series of levels, such that our asymmetrical (symbolic) ability to recognize differences weakens as the amount of symmetry (semiotization) increases. When the symmetry increases enough, it transgresses the borders of bi-valent logic, and there comes a point when consciousness vanishes. Qualitatively, both conscious and unconscious thought use the bi-logic of symmetrical and asymmetrical thinking, but their proportions vary in the psychic processes and its products (signifying practices). The “deeper” the unconscious process, the more symmetrical the thinking. (Matte Blanco 1998 [1975]: 151–152.)

Different types of discourses and texts are thus determined by how the symmetrical and asymmetrical components are entangled with each other, and how much and how effectively they are used. In fact, it would be more accurate to speak of degrees of the modalities in the discourse rather than of the division. Some of the signifying practices are clearly dominated by one or the other, but still it is always a question of the bi-logic of the two. Ordinary, conscious, rational thinking does not use symmetrical logic as much as, say, dreams do. The principle of symmetry in the ordinary communication of the conscious thinking is applied only to a limited amount of relations for the sake of clarity and precision (i.e., so as to avoid ambiguity). Scientific discourses try to minimize the symmetrization, but it is always there in some degree. (Matte Blanco 1998 [1975]: xxvi; see also, Rayner & Tuckett 1988: 23.) In poetic practices, the realm of symmetrical mode of being is allowed to be more openly present. The understanding of music’s unfolding presupposes accepting the released use of symmetrical thinking.
According to Matte Blanco’s set-theoretical formulation, when registering simple sameness, the symmetrical world of the unconscious does not differentiate, but combines; it does not recognize individuals but infinite classes. Here Matte Blanco uses Dedekind’s definition of an infinite set: A set is infinite when, and only when, it can be put in bi-univocal correspondence with a proper part of it. In mathematical set theory, the whole and its part are the same only in the case of infinite sets, where the set and its proper part have the same cardinal or power. Thus, Matte Blanco interprets the unconscious as infinite sets. (Matte Blanco 1998 [1975]: 16–17, 33.) When a part is identical to the whole, all the members of the class are treated as identical. Any object of a class can be substituted for by another object from the same class. (Ibid.: 12, 38–41.) This is seen, for example, in dreams wherein characteristics from different persons and from different places are condensed into one mixed person or place. The reason for these condensations is the one thing that is shared among and connects different persons, places, or whatever elements, thus making them a class or set. (Matte Blanco 1998 [1975]: 12, 38–41; Roos 1996: 36–37, 40.)

According to Matte Blanco, when perceiving a concrete object, the subject always knows the class or set to which it belongs (Matte Blanco 1998 [1975]: xxvi; see also, Rayner & Tuckett 1988: 23). We might think that the registering of endless sameness incites the continuous chaining of signification, though it may be hidden or stopped by some social-political or personal constrain, or largely suppressed in order to maintain subjectivity and the communication to reach its destination. Poetic practices entice the subject to engage in this play of infinite sets of meanings. This is one way to explain Kristeva’s (1984 [1974]: 88) idea about the encompassing of the infinite totality of the process of signification. It means that the thletic moments are continuously subverted and fixing avoided.

Kristeva, too, in her theory of poetic language, makes metaphorical use of mathematics – a use that has drawn harsh criticism from some quarters. Still, Kristeva’s metaphorical use of mathematics is illuminating: it shows that the relation between Aristotelian logic and poetic logic is analogous to the relation between what is countable and what is infinite (e.g., Kristeva 1980: 91 n. 15). Likewise, according to Matte Blanco (1988: 68–69), the concept of infinite could be said to be the unconscious – or the schizophrenia or poetry – of mathematics, because “deep down both the infinite and the unconscious are human attempts, independent of one another, at understanding something which is indivisible and, as such, unthinkable”. Here Matte Blanco comes close to Lacan’s (1998 [1973]) concept of the real. The real can be approached as the realm in human experience that is primarily repressed for the sake of the sensible experience of the world, for the sake of representation. The deeper the symmetrical logic in experience,
the closer the experience of (Lacanian) real.\textsuperscript{43}

According to Kristeva (1980: 91 n. 17), the other logic of the poetic practice can be found also in certain modern physics or in ancient Chinese thought, in the sense that both are anti-Aristotelian. She (ibid.: 88) argues that a text is not “an atomic corpus”, but rather, it should be understood as relations in which the signs function as “quanta”. In that case, the problematics of the poetic practice pertain to space and infinity, which can be formulated with the help of modern mathematics and set theory. When reading these Kristeva’s ideas, one cannot overemphasize that her purpose in using such metaphorical expressions is to emphasize the anti-Aristotelian nature of the logic of the radical otherness in signification.\textsuperscript{44} As Matte Blanco (1988: 68) points out, modern mathematics makes use of the infinite through differential and integral calculus; it is extremely subtle and avoids contradictions. Still the antinomies remain, for they cannot be solved in terms of the normal mathematical logic that holds in the case of finite sets.\textsuperscript{45}

Accordingly, like Matte Blanco, Kristeva also describes the poetic practice as exposing the logic of the infinite. Kristeva talks about the infinity of pairing, combination, and endless transpositions that the poetic practice triggers. She formulates this poetic logic especially in her essay “Word, dialogue, and novel” (Kristeva 1980: Chap. 3) drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1984 and 1987) studies on carnival, dialogism, and polyphonic text. Poetic logic is alien to scientific logic but akin to dream logic and carnivalesque discourse. It is syntagmatic and correlational. It is logic of symbolic relations, analogy, and nonexclusive oppositions, rather than of substance and inference, and it is opposed to causal connections and identifying determination. Lacking in subject-predicate identification, determination, and causality, it transgresses the rules of linguistic, logical, and mathematical logic but akin to dream logic and carnivalesque discourse. It is syntagmatic and correlational. It is logic of symbolic relations, analogy, and nonexclusive oppositions, rather than of substance and inference, and it is opposed to causal connections and identifying determination. Lacking in subject-predicate identification, determination, and causality, it transgresses the rules of linguistic, logical, and mathematical logic but akin to dream logic and carnivalesque discourse. It is syntagmatic and correlational. It is logic of symbolic relations, analogy, and nonexclusive oppositions, rather than of substance and inference, and it is opposed to causal connections and identifying determination. Lacking in subject-predicate identification, determination, and causality, it transgresses the rules of linguistic, logical, and mathematical logic but akin to dream logic and carnivalesque discourse. It is syntagmatic and correlational. It is logic of symbolic relations, analogy, and nonexclusive oppositions, rather than of substance and inference, and it is opposed to causal connections and identifying determination. Lacking in subject-predicate identification, determination, and causality, it transgresses the rules of linguistic, logical, and mathematical logic but akin to dream logic and carnivalesque discourse. It is syntagmatic and correlational. It is logic of symbolic relations, analogy, and nonexclusive oppositions, rather than of substance and inference, and it is opposed to causal connections and identifying determination. Lacking in subject-predicate identification, determination, and causality, it transgresses the rules of linguistic, logical, and mathematical logic but akin to dream logic and carnivalesque discourse. It is syntagmatic and correlational. It is logic of symbolic relations, analogy, and nonexclusive oppositions, rather than of substance and inference, and it is opposed to causal connections and identifying determination. Lacking in subject-

\textsuperscript{43} In a way Matte Blanco tries to formulate the unthinkable that Derrida (e.g., 1978 and 1987 [1972]) approaches as the dynamic process of signification, which encompasses both the passive structural principle of \textit{difference} and the active principle of \textit{différance}. Does not the economy of traces in the Derridean sense obey the principle of symmetry and the (il)logic of the unconscious, which does not differentiate, but endlessly searches out sameness? The traces would be our “knowledge” of the infinite sets and classes behind and in the way of signs, in “the structural impossibility of limiting this network, of putting an edge on its weave, of tracing a margin that would not be a new mark” (Derrida 1987 [1972]: 40).

\textsuperscript{44} Kristeva uses both mathematical and musical vocabularies in similar metaphorical way not to be taken too literally (musicologically or mathematically).

\textsuperscript{45} It is interesting that, before Freud, science avoided considering anything that did not follow the laws of logic. At roughly the time as Freud was thinking about the unconscious, eminent mathematicians – Cantor, Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Hilbert, to mention just a few – where reflecting on the nature of mathematics. “The knowledge of infinite and that of the concept of set were being submitted to a thorough scrutiny, and the same can be said of the foundations of mathematics.” (Matte Blanco 1988: 63–64.)
Chapter 6. The semiotic chora in musical experience

social codes. It marks a place where discourse attains its potential infinity and where representation and its transgression (dream, body, transposition) coexist. (Kristeva 1980: 70–72, 85, 88–89.)

Furthermore, Kristeva describes the other logic as the “0–2 poetic logic”, which the 0–1 logic of the scientific discourse or Aristotelian sentence cannot formalize. According to Kristeva, “in poetic logic the concept or the power of the continuum would embody the 0–2 interval, a continuity where 0 denotes and 1 is implicitly transgressed”. (Kristeva 1980: 70–71.) In this formalization, 2 denotes a specifically poetic double and 1 stands for the linguistic, psychic, and social prohibition (law, definition, and such). For the poetic logic (or for music), this 1 does not mark a limit because it escapes the socio-cultural prohibition and stasis. It is not based on the 0–1 interval as the laws of the predicative language are, but inhabits the 0–2 poetic logic. This transgression means “categorical tearing from the norm and a relationship of nonexclusive oppositions” (ibid.: 71). Poetic logic does not mark “freedom to say everything” but an other imperative than that of 0. Precisely the transgression over the 1 gives to the poetic practice a law. It is the logic of the transfinite: the 0–2 power of continuum “introduces a second principle of formation: a poetic sequence is a ‘next-larger’ (not causally deduced) to all preceding sequences of the Aristotelian chain”. (Ibid.: 70–72, 85, 88–89.)

According to Matte Blanco, the more symmetrical logic – which means the more there is chaining of signification of infinite classes, escaping social constraints fixing the meaning – the more intensive and stronger the affect or emotion involved with the psychic process (act of signification). The more “deeply” the unconscious is involved, the larger the magnitude of emotion, because there is more symmetrization, i.e., more chaining of objects of a set or a class (with their affective cathexis). Symmetrization (semiotization) thus increases the intensity of affect and emotion. (Matte Blanco 1988: 17, 62; see also, Rayner & Tuckett 1988: 27.) We can say, that the affect-cathexes of signs are united into experiences of potentially infinite magnitude, cumulated from the unconscious “memory”. This, for its part, illuminates the innumerable waves of emotions that musical experience evoke in its choratic register where emotions and affects do not have one source of content but rather various (potentially infinite) (set)contents. Music offers willing material for primary process to reach new meanings.

The non-repressed system of the unconscious escapes conscious efforts to capture it. This untranslability and irreducibility to conscious thought which Kristeva describes with the 0–2 poetic logic, Matte Blanco describes with the notion of multidimensionality. This means that the realm of conscious perception has fewer dimensions than the unconscious has. The unconscious operates in a multidimensional hyperspace, but due to physiological reasons we are unable to observe and think it, which is precisely why it is unconscious. (Matte Blanco
1988: 91–92; Roos 1996: 45.) (Here again we notice congeniality to Lacan’s notion of the real.) This multidimensional world of unconscious or the choric register of musical experience cannot be captured by means of the logic of the consciousness. To explain the matter Matte Blanco asks us to consider a painting representing a jug. The painting is so well executed that it creates an impression of being three-dimensional, although we know it to be two-dimensional. If we try to pour milk into the jug in the painting we naturally fail because the two-dimensional jug cannot contain in a three-dimensional liquid (milk). The same situation obtains for the unconscious and conscious: we cannot pour the multidimensional substance of the unconscious into the three-dimensional realm of conscious thinking and Aristotelian logic. (Matte Blanco 1988: 87; see also, Roos 1996: 45; Ihanus 1995: 213.) As Kristeva writes, any logical system based on a 1–0 sequence is incapable to account for its operations. It is impossible to formalize according to the existing bi-valent logic of the scientific discourse without distorting or denaturing it (Kristeva 1980: 70, 89).

It is clear that (western) culture tends to suppress and silence the archaic modality – because otherwise controllable communication and socio-symbolic order in its entirety could not be maintained. However, it could also be said that the rational system of consciousness is colonializing the unconscious modality. Spitz claims that in western culture, the adults have largely replaced the signals belonging to the conesthetic categories by the semantic symbols of the diacritic organization in their communication between people as well as in the auto-communication of an individual. Spitz writes that western culture tries to hush or subdue the unconscious and seal its manifestations off, even though the unconscious is the foundation of all meaning processes and creativity, and plays the most decisive role in subject’s emotional life and thinking. (Spitz 1965: 45, 136.) Spitz mentions that musicians and composers have well succeeded in retaining the ability and sensibility to use one or many of the atrophic categories of the conesthetic organization (ibid.: 136). Similarly Kristeva writes about the carnivalistic cosmogony, which “remains present as an often misunderstood and persecuted substratum of official Western culture”. And, “the real stakes of a

46 To the question why is the Freudian unconscious qualitatively unconscious, Matte Blanco gives a following explanation. The unconsciousness is a consequence of the existence of a mode of being based on asymmetry, and only in this indirect sense it is a constitutive feature of the symmetrical mode of being. According to Matte Blanco, it may be that the rupture of symmetry calls for or makes the consciousness. There can be no consciousness on the basis of symmetrical relations only. The qualitatively unconscious does not follow from the symmetrical mode of being – it is not the inevitable characteristic of the symmetrical mode of being – but from the nature of the consciousness, from the fact that the consciousness cannot include in itself the symmetrical mode of being which governs the unconscious. (Matte Blanco 1998 [1975]: 96–97; Roos 1996: 36–37.)
discourse on childhood within Western thought involve a confrontation between thought and what it is not, a wandering at the limits of the thinkable”. (Kristeva 1980: 78, 276.)

Matte Blanco believes that suppression has taken place even in psychoanalytic theory, for psychoanalysis has been formulated in ways that repress the revolutionary features of the Freudian unconscious. The tendency to neglect the theme of unconscious is also related to the inherent epistemological problems posed by the object of study of psychoanalysis (the unconscious that can never be grasped as such). Because of this, there lies a paradoxical element in the heart of the psychoanalytic theory, sometimes reflected in poststructural writings in the obscure, insolvable, and fanciful uses of language, non-concepts and neologisms (such as *chora*, *différance*, or *pharmakon*). Likewise, the epistemological and ontological status of the nonlinguistic dimension in music and subjectivity remains, in the end, insolvable. What connects psychoanalysis and deconstruction, at this point, is their interest in and willingness to make contact with the otherness suppressed by western consciousness (Hintsa 1998: 16), the mode of being ignored or prohibited by the laws of language (cf. Wright 1998: 1).

In contrast to predicative language, music is not constructed so dominantly on the monopoly of bi-valent logic (cf. Ilhanus 1995: 213). Music is more fluid or open when it comes to the social constraints that suppress the chain of signification in order to fix meaning. Thus, the unconscious level in musical experience is able to treat asymmetrical relations symmetrically. This is why musical space can be considered a multidimensional signifying hyperspace, the amodal (intertextual) “milk” of which cannot be poured to the two-dimensional “jug” of rational consciousness, and the complex structures of which are analogous to the construction of flexible subjectivity and mobility of meaning. However, this minimizing of the symbolic does not mean that the “message” would disappear, or that it would restrict us to the “empty” syntax and music theory. (Sign is always an empty category by its structure, i.e., based on system of differences only.) Rather, it means that the semiotic compulsion refers more deeply to drive operations, archaic modes of comprehension, the realm of heterogeneous mobile meanings (cf. Kristeva 1980: 137). It refers to the threshold crossing at the border between body and mind, self and other, subject and object, signifier

---

47 Matte Blanco refers here, for example, to some types of ego-psychology, the latter being much criticized also by Lacan. According to Matte Blanco, Freud’s invention of the unconscious has been – in terms of psychoanalytic jargon – “subsequently replaced by neatly constructed rationalizations”. (1998 [1975]: 9–10, 70.) Matte Blanco (ibid.: 9) writes that “in the course of its development psychoanalysis has become less psychoanalytic in the sense that, though it continues to deal with so-called unconscious contents, it tends to treat them as though they were ruled by the same laws that are seen in consciousness and applied in the study of all the other sciences”.

197
and signified, oceanic and differentiated experience, and so forth. It refers to the flow of primary process and multidetermination enabling mobile and un-closed meanings. These choric meanings are not unambiguous, fixed, or settled, but transparent expansive frames which can accommodate an endless influx of isomorphic meanings. Archaic meaning schemata are “floating currency”\(^{48}\) which can absorb meanings of all levels of musical competence (cf. Stefani’s 1985 and 1984) which share the same dynamic structure.

Matte Blanco’s symmetrical mode of being, Kristeva’s semiotic *chora*, Spitz’s conesthetic organization, Stern’s amodal perception and vitality affects, Barthes’s – and Rosolato’s, Anzieu’s, and Poizat’s – ideas of the body in music, and Stefani’s general codes of musical competence, emphasize the same non-linguistic dimension of musical experience. Although the views, concepts, and emphasises of different writers differ from each others, sometimes even greatly, in general, the pre-linguistic and likewise the adult subject’s nonlinguistic experiential realm is characterized by comprehensiveness, undifferentiation in the border of self and other, and of inner and outer, and by a gradual growth of the psychic realm and of an elementary sense of self from the sphere of experience dominated by bodily sensations. The listening subject cooperates in a multi-level way with the unconscious and the consciousness, conesthetic and diacritic system, the semiotic and the symbolic modality, the symmetrical and the asymmetrical logic. In this process all the strata of the subject, both the active functions of self, such as perception, thinking, memory, reasoning, argumentation, judgment, choosing, and means of control, cooperate with the weakening of the ego functions and control, which allows us to dive into the undifferentiated matrix of oceanic experience and to loosen the borders of subjectivity, to permit us enjoyment of the body and flexible sense of self (cf. Ihanus 1987: 25).

In the above, the nonlinguistic dimension in the experiential realm of music and musical subjectivity has been discussed at a general theoretical level. In the next Chapter 6.7 which ends the theoretical part of the study and leads to the music-analytical case studies, the question of representation in music is once more addressed as related to the nonlinguistic dimension in subject and the ideological issues in music philosophy and research. The question of representation in music is discussed in terms of its treatment in general psychoanalytic, philosophical, and poststructural discourses. The status of music in psychoanalysis, philosophy, and poststructural theorization can be regarded as a symptom of the powerful workings of music as a site of developing subjectivity resulting in a cultural fantasy of music as a full presence.

---

\(^{48}\) This expression is Kuusamo’s (1988: 89).
Chapter 6. The semiotic chora in musical experience

6.7 The nonlinguistic dimension of music as a troublemaker in philosophy and psychoanalysis: Music as a fantasy of full presence

The fact that the workings of music as a site for unsettled subjectivity is based on its workings as a cultural practice and representative system, means that there are no unmediated meanings in music even at its nonlinguistic level, because all signification must go through the thetic; for this reason, drives can become manifest only in disguised, discursive forms. Music, as any representative system, brings the semiotic forth inside its conventional representative system. Thus, to emphasize music as a signifying practice dominated by the semiotic modality does not diminish its workings as part of the Symbolic order. This is, however, something handled in general semiotics, classic poststructuralism, and psychoanalytic criticism with difficulty. Perhaps it is precisely the power of music to activate the unsettled subjectivity and the nonlinguistic dimension in subject that has its impact in scholarly field as well, most strikingly in the field of music philosophy, in the fantasy of music as non-figurative abstract play beyond language and representation. This is also the reason why modernist ideals are more firmly stuck in music than in other fields of art and art research (with the exception of abstract expressionism).

As brought out in Chapter 2, when Freud as a psychoanalyst was moving about in the realm of art in order to find analogies, examples, and correlations for his theories about unconscious workings, he never searched for them on music. Moreover, in the work of Lacan and Kristeva, concrete music is never a serious object of writing or common referential area. Poststructurally oriented current philosophy and criticism does not speak about music as it speaks on literature and visual arts (including film – but not film music since that is neglected in film studies). The only function music has in many writings is to serve as a metaphor for that which escapes the language, which is unspeakable, which cannot be named. For example, Kristeva, as brought out above, uses the word ‘music’ metaphorically when describing the choratic organization and the semiotic modality in poetic language. She does not refer to actual music like compositions, in the way she does with visual and literary works. Correspondingly, Paul De Man (1983: 126–131) uses music as a metaphor for Derridean textual signification, and we know that it is useless to search for serious discussions on real music (compositions, styles, genres) from Derrida’s, Kristeva’s, or De Man’s essays (Samuels 1995: 1). It is as if these poststructuralists did not care that music is a form of sign system, which is historically, culturally, and socially as coded a signifying practice as any other system, literature or visual art.

Here we are confronted with the tradition of conventions, conceptions, and
Subject Strategies in Music

ideas attached to music throughout the history of western culture, philosophy and aesthetics, and resonating in psychoanalytic philosophy and cultural criticism. In general, music has been tormented with ambivalent projections: On the other hand, music has been considered the “highest” art form for being the most “abstract”, the “least representative”, the most “spiritual”, “transcendent”, etc. (with the connotation of rationality and masculinity). On the other hand, it has been considered the “lowest” art form, for being the most “sensual”, “emotional”, “bodily”, etc. (with the connotation of femininity). 49 In this light, we may understand modern musicology’s strong rejection of musical semantics as an over-reactive attempt to master the threat of music’s sensual and emotional “otherness”. This is done by suppressing the seductive and irrational side of music under a tight control of mathematical-like rational music theory that is concerned only with contentless forms and structures. Here, the new musicology and psychoanalytic music criticism strike the sorest spot of formalist/modernist musicology: it is a blow to the strict superego of that musicology which, by rigid aesthetics and rigorous theory, would like to keep difficult and indefinable things (semantics) out of music. As Lawrence Kramer (1989: 165) phrases it, perhaps the impulse to idealize music in terms of abstract entity betrays a need to establish a preserve, protected area where the compromises and brutalities of the world cannot encroach. This may be why music has been regarded, often unconsciously, as something dangerous, feminine, something other which needs tight control. Kramer writes that “as the art of otherness and the other’s art, music helps construct the very category of otherness” (1995: 63). And elsewhere:

Confronted with the dense referential and symbolic capacities of language or visual imagery, even the most “classical” music collapses instantaneously into the inarticulate, emotionally loaded, and erotically charged character of the more demotic forms. … In this context, music begins to look like the modern cultural institution by which this desire can be satisfied with impunity. (Ibid.: 62–63.)

In this light, the idea of “pure music itself” manifests as a powerful cultural construction of something made up by an unconscious need.

In revering this tradition of the philosophy of music, poststructural semiotics, and psychoanalytic theorizing – the theories of signification – have problems with dealing with music as a mode of human communication. On the one hand, music appears to be an anomaly among the other arts because of its lack of certain predicative linguistic articulation, and on the other hand, simply because of that “lack” (that could as well be said to be an extra or surplus), music seems to contain the key to those abstruse, hardly comprehensible questions of textual

49 More about this, see, e.g., Kramer 1995: esp. Chap. 2 (pp. 33–66), “From the Other to the Abject. Music as a Cultural Trope”.

200
workings, deconstruction, and intertextuality (Samuels 1995:1; Monelle 2000: 198). Like in regard to Freud, also with the philosophers of poststructuralism, we could ponder upon the reasons for being silent about music; why serious study of music has so often been rejected and kept outside the philosophical discourse recently. Has musicology succeeded in patrolling its high density in spheres so tightly-knit that nobody else but musicologists dare to write about music? Or can it be that just as Freud refused to understand the forms of art that are paradigmatically the closest to the workings of the unconscious, poststructural philosophers also avoid this cultural form that is too close to their abstruse theories? There are exceptions, of course, as Roland Barthes, for example. One should also mention Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Edward Said, François Lyotard, and Slavoj Žižek, who have discussed in certain amount music along with other topics of cultural practices.

If music has been neglected in psychoanalysis, psychoanalytic criticism, and poststructural philosophy, it has neither been important – in the way literature is, for instance – in the philosophy of the 20th century in general. This could be seen as a kind of counter reaction to the 19th century’s enthusiasm for music, when all arts were supposed to aspire to the condition of music. This Romantic burden of transcendence may confuse even the contemporary philosophers and theorists in the times of constructivism (cf. n. 23, p. 110, Chap. 4.2.1). With the linguistic turn of philosophy (and later with constructivist turn in humanities), the musical discourse, experienced as non-denotative and demotic, was largely ignored among major philosophers. At the same time, the rigid formalist theory of music and modernist aesthetics flourished and suppressed the indefinable emotional nature of music by disciplining it as non-representative “spiritual” play. Then, along the lines of postmodern thought, music becomes for philosophers of deconstruction and theorists of textuality a metaphor for “the radical otherness” in signification. And thus, music once again gains a mystic aura, which is just the thing the postmodern musicologists, for their part, have industriously tried to strip off in their efforts of secularize the meanings of music. The linguistic turn of philosophy and humanities has thus paradoxically also prevented the study of socio-cultural meanings in music (the semantics) and contributed to the discrimination of music in philosophic discourse.

Many classical models of semiotics have been created on analogy to verbal language as stressing the truth-value, proposition, predication, and denotative function (cf. the Aristotelian logic). Use of these models derived from language and verbal discourse tend to make music seem lacking and conceptually indefinite, and therefore semantically empty (Kramer 1990: 3). Hence, one would have assumed that musicologists would have been delighted with deconstruction, because one would suppose music to deconstruct itself more obviously than do,
say, literature and philosophy, as Raymond Monelle (1992: 317) has written. If nothing else, deconstruction has taught us that we cannot even rely on language to carry stable meanings, for as Monelle states, “the musical sign is empty, not because of its impotence in referring to real objects, but because meaning is itself fundamentally empty” (ibid.: 20). McClary (1991: 21), for her part writes, that “meaning is not inherent in music, but neither is it in language: both are activities that are kept afloat only because communities of people invest in them, agree collectively that their signs serve as valid currency. Music is always dependent on the conferring of social meaning…”

Still, it is often said that we cannot capture music by words. But this is self-evident: Nor can words capture other experiences perfectly or satisfactorily. Irreducibility to language is not a characteristic just of music, though music may be an excellent example. According to poststructural psychoanalysis, the irreducibility to language is precisely the characteristic of human existence; this state of alienation – the gap between experience and words – is a (pre-)condition of subjectivity. Also, sign systems are not watertight compatible to each others, which is self-evident when, for example, translating a text from a language to another. The irreducibility to language in all sign systems is the special and even bizarre interest of both deconstruction and psychoanalysis, for it denotes the aspect of being which is ignored or prohibited by the laws of language (Wright 1998: 1). Certainly here is one reason for the use of the metaphor of music in poststructural thought (e.g., in Kristeva’s theories). By the metaphor of music, it is emphasized that there is something in subject and signification which does not obey the rules of predicative language and symbolic. Musicology has barely benefited from this habit, for musicology must approach concrete (i.e., not metaphorically) music as something coded, sensible, and conventional (a sign system), and not only as a stream of semiotic modality. The project of studying musical signification is thus very complicated, and denotes a central challenge for current musicology and for the present research too: how to apply “back” to music the general poststructural theories of signification that draw on the metaphor of music.50

Accordingly, music has an ambiguous double function in the history of philosophy, and in both of these two functions, music has meant the opposite, even an antithesis, of verbal language. It has served both as a dream world of philosophy, which words cannot capture, and on the other hand as a troublemaker, that has to be repressed. In Lacoue-Labarthe’s words: philosophy’s attitude towards music has been either full of pathos or rejection. Music has functioned as a “rebel object par excellence”. It has rebelled against the control of philosophy by mark-

ing the limit of philosophy and ratio, perhaps even a threat.51 (Lacoue-Labarthe 1994: 86.) This however does not tell that much about music than it tells about our psychological need for this kind of object – about the fact what kind of object (a) we want to make of music.

As has been pointed out, from the point of view of psychoanalytic semiotics, all meaning systems always and necessarily are systems with contents, for no discourse is produced without signification, sign system, and subject. Even if we experienced music as more “abstract” and more “immediate”, we cannot yet draw a conclusion that music is less representative and less “mediated”, because of the possibility that the content may primarily be grasped unconsciously or preconsciously. As a matter of fact, if music succeeds so well in masking its constructedness, does this not reveal its effectiveness in the realm of the imaginary? Moreover, if we do experience music as “abstract” and “loose”, then we can infer that the degree of the density of its contents (the degree of condensations, displacements, and transpositions) must thus be especially high, for a high level of abstraction produces thick content bearing. Although in psychoanalytic art research, music has been traditionally considered to not easily unfold due to its nonverbal and temporal nature, it can be thought that just because of this, music may take us especially effectively to the realm of unconscious, affect, and sexuality. Thus, as a short cut to unconscious, music would be a most convenient object of study for psychoanalytic criticism. To investigate these ideologies of music philosophy, aesthetics, and musicology truly calls for psychoanalytic thinking. One important question would be how the question of music’s emotionality – related to the problem of content and meaning in music – has been addressed during the history of music research and music philosophy (cf. Treitler 1993; see also, p. 65, Chap. 3.2.5). Generally the philosophical burden with ambivalent projections seems to have hindered the study of music as conventional sign system in modern times (especially since the Romanticism).

Psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic semiotics focus on what happens to the so-called primary drive-based impulses when they are directed to social life, that is, when the needs of the body confront the rules of culture and the desire is transformed to socio-cultural discourse. According to this, we are always, as signifying subjects, behind the glass created by the system of signification. After subjectivity has entered the language, that marks the main binder of psychical

51 I would not say as Lacoue-Labarthe (1994: 85) that the relationship between music and philosophy has been usually quite dull, but I would say that it has been symptomatic. Lacoue-Labarthe (ibid.) writes: “With the exception of mathematical or mathematical-cosmological kinds of speculations … it would not be an exaggeration to propose that, by most reckonings, nothing really has happened in more than two thousand years between music and philosophy.”
energy and the possibility of subjectivity, she is unavoidably and irrevocably doomed to this intermediate world, the realm of “substitutes”, of signs. No signifying system can capture being or desire or the Lacanian real in itself – not even music, however powerful the illusion of this may be. But indeed it can represent our experience and understanding of our existence.

Music may have the amazing power to create an exceptional sense (an illusion, fantasy) of full presence and direct (un-mediated) experience. It offers excellently the bliss of the basic imaginary delusions of subject. The experience of immediacy may be related significantly to the nonverbal, auditory, and temporal nature of music. It may touch the archaic experiential world in subject with its semiotic pulsation functioning inside the conventional sign systems, questioning and exceeding the symbolic order and deluding the subject into the border of the system of sign, to the limit of the thinkable: to the border between meaning and disappearing (or undermining) of meaning, psychical and bodily, desire and need, self and the other, subject and object, inner and outer. Against this perspective, music tends to function as an object towards which to project the most innermost desires (cf. the presence of the beloved object as a fantasized paradise lost). Also for the scholar, music may serve as an object of drive. The imaginary blissfulness of music leaves it mark on music research as well. For instance, as a researching subject who is fed up with the problems of representation in language, music may appear as a dreamland of philosophy, a fulfillment of an unconscious wish. Then it is referred to as a dizzy and obscure zone, always out of reach of words, definitions, and differentiations, unspoiled by the disturbing denotative layer of language, being always somewhere “elsewhere” (“beyond”, “on the other side”) – where-ever this “elsewhere” is set in the axis of the history of philosophy of music with its poles in transcendent and demotic. In this way, music may serve as an imaginary balsam not only for the wound in our being and subjectivity about which the French psychoanalysis talks, but also for the sense of loss and lack caused by such theories in the scholar.

To fill the experienced lack by imaginary presence denotes one essential subject strategy of music. In the next Part (III) of the present study, this and other subject strategies are analyzed in works of music as reactivated at the second-degree thetic level. The analyses are meant to show unique workings of music – as a signifying practice – to construct stories of primal subjectivity formation and reactivate the threshold crossing between the semiotic and symbolic as if constantly re-addressing the acquisition of language and its denial.
PART III: ANALYTICAL CASE STUDIES OF MUSICAL SUBJECT STRATEGIES

[M]usic has an image-repertoire whose function is to reassure, to constitute the subject, who hears it....

R O L A N D  B A R T H E S  1 9 8 5 : 2 6 8
Chapter 7
From abjection to assimilation: Figuring the (feminine) other in Sibelius’s Kyliikki

7.1 Kyliikki as stories of subjectivity

*Kyliikki, Three Lyric Pieces for Piano*, Op. 41 (1904) numbers among the well over one hundred opus-listed piano works of Jean Sibelius, and is also one of his few large-scale piano works. The title, *Kyliikki*, places the piece among Sibelius’s many works based on the *Kalevala*, the Finnish national epic.¹ The very title – *Kyliikki* – opens an important hermeneutic window, exemplifying the “textual inclusion” type of window as referred to by Lawrence Kramer (1990: 9–10; see Chap. 4.3 above). This is the case despite the curious remarks that Sibelius himself sometimes made, denying the relevance of *Kalevala* to *Kyliikki* (e.g., see Tawaststjerna 1971: 31).² From a poststructural perspective, we need not let composers’ intentions or remarks about their work keep us from focusing on musical-cultural texts as they manifest in the listening process.

Poems 11 and 12 of the *Kalevala* tell about the maiden Kyliikki, whom a young, fierce man, Lemminkäinen, abducts and forces to be his wife. The first movement of Sibelius’s *Kyliikki* can easily be heard as depicting the abduction, as well as the fight between Kyliikki and Lemminkäinen. But the second and third movements are more problematic at the manifest (surface) level of the epic, not lending themselves easily to descriptive interpretation as the first movement does. As early as 1906, Karl Flodin heard the three parts of *Kyliikki* as the abduction of Kyliikki (Part I), her lonely solitude (Part II), and in Part III her attendance at the village dance (see Tawaststjerna 1971: 31). Other critics and commentators

---

¹ The first edition of *Kalevala* appeared in 1835; my citations here are from the second, more extensive version of 1849, which is still in use today. It consists of epic folk poems compiled and edited by Elias Lönnrot. The poems belong to a runic (poetic) song tradition, scansion of which reveals a type of trochaic tetrameter.
² In its late Romantic style, *Kyliikki* is connected to Sibelius’s “ballad period” (the term is Veijo Murtomäki’s; 2001: 104). Murtomäki (ibid.) defines Sibelius’s ballad period to the years 1881–1891, but despite the fact that *Kyliikki* is composed in 1904 it stylistically belongs to that period.
Subject Strategies in Music

have more or less followed suit in their interpretations of the work. For example, Erik Tawaststjerna considers *Kyllikki* as a form of program music, although “we do not know the details but only the general atmosphere” (1958: 46; see also, 1955: 48–49; 1979: 232). Eric Blom (1947: 101) departs a little from the general line of assessment, in considering the second movement as a restless love scene disturbed by dark presentiments. Nils-Eric Ringbom (1948: 115), for his part, says that despite its title *Kyllikki* is “completely program-free”. According to Schouwman (in Tawaststjerna 1958: 7), *Kyllikki* does not depict any specific events and is thus not “genuine program music”; instead, the work is similar to Sibelius’s *Rakastava* for string orchestra (*The Lover*, Op. 14, 1893/1911–12), in as much as it was “made under certain specific impressions” and thus arises from the “Finnish realm of myths”. Still, Schouwman is lured into programmatic interpretation of Part III of the work, which according to him might well express *Kyllikki’s* hesitation about going to the dance (ibid.).

From the subject-strategical perspective, more important than the piece following a programmatic pheno-story (or not), are the textual processes that receive the *Kalevala* at a geno-story level of the epic (cf. Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 86). At this interpretative level the manifest events in the epic are irrelevant; what matters is the overall ambience of myth and dream, sexuality and drives, that is to say, all that relates to the primal, unconscious problematics of subjectivity. From the perspective of this study, *Kyllikki* appears as a musical text, a productivity (to use Kristeva’s term; 1980: 36), representing various adventures of the subject(ivity) formation: the play of desire on the border of self and other, subject and object, psyche and body, consciousness and unconscious. I also take this position with respect to the relevant poems of the *Kalevala*. From the subject-strategical perspective, rather than events in a saga, the *Kalevala* constitutes a geno-narration of the mind, desire, sexuality, dream-likeness, mysticism, the magical, and so forth. In this sense, one can catch in *Kyllikki* the scent of *Kalevala*, which can also provide a vocabulary for discussing the musical work. In my analysis, subject strategies in *Kyllikki* are interpreted in addition to the psychoanalytic theories of Freud, Lacan, and Kristeva, in the light of feminist and gender-theoretical semiotics (de Lauretis) and music analysis (McClary, Citron).

3 Of all these writers, only Tawaststjerna is interested in *Kyllikki* from a music-analytical point of view. Discussions of the piece in music-analytical and stylistic terms provide also Ignatius-Fleet 1999 and E. T. Tawaststjerna 1990.

4 Also Eero Tarasti (1978: 83–84) classifies *Kyllikki* as mythical music.
Chapter 7. From abjection to assimilation: Sibelius’s Kyllikki

7.2 “And if her story again turned out to be his story...”5
– Must the protagonist always be male?

In the published edition, the title of the work is “Kyllikki, Three Lyric Pieces” (Kyllikki, Drei lyrische Stücke), which in the original manuscript6 was subtitled “A Lyric Piece in Three Parts” (Kyllikki, Lyrische Stücke in drei Sätzen) (Tawaststjerna 1971: 31; 1955: 47). Naturally, one likes to think that the three pieces (parts, movements) of the work together form a unity. Though at a quick glance the movements may look very different from each other, they may also be viewed as based on a single idea: descending and ascending seconds. Seen (or heard) in this way, all of the musical elements ultimately reflect and recall each other – as if the motives and themes were being combined, thereby forming new, “compound” terms. The seconds sometimes flow diatonically, sometimes chromatically, and sometimes modally, as the melodic ideas are plunged into various musical isotopies (cf. Tarasti 1994), or textual “environments”, where they take on different meanings and serve a variety of functions. For example, in the introduction to the first movement (Largamente), the melodic seconds outline the B♭ dorian mode (natural minor with raised sixth degree), giving the movement a sense of majesty, irrevocability, and determination, a path that one must follow step by step, note by note (see Example 7a).

To draw the Kalevala into the discussion, the first theme in the first movement (from m. 5 onward, see Example 7a) is of course Lemminkäinen, who is going to take Kyllikki for his wife. The second theme (beginning at m. 22, see Example 7b) is then interpreted as Kyllikki.7 The passage from Kalevala’s poem 11 reads as follows (lines 199–216):

Thither came the ruddy scoundrel,
There drove lively Lemminkainen,
With the best among his horses,
With the horse that he had chosen,
Right into the green arena,
Where the beauteous maids were dancing.
Kyllikki he seized and lifted,
Then into the sledge he pushed her,
And upon the bare skin sat her,
That upon the sledge was lying.
With his whip he lashed the stallion,
And he cracked the lash above him,
And he started on his journey,

5 The quote is from de Lauretis (1984: 125).
6 Tawaststjerna 1957 includes a facsimile page of the Kyllikki manuscript (beginning of the first movement, mm. 1–14).
And he cried while driving onward:
“O ye maidens, may ye never
In your lives betray the secret,
Speak of how I drove among you,
And have carried off the maiden.”

In the opening movement of a work that bears the title of a female name
(Kyllikki), one wonders why the first theme – the protagonist – is associated
with a male character (Lemminkäinen)? Is Kyllikki the principal figure in name

---

Example 7a. Sibelius, Kyllikki, mvt. 1, mm. 1–9: Largamente-introduction, mm.
1–5 (bt. 1); first theme (“Lemminkäinen”) begins, Allegro, m. 5 (bt. 2). © 2002 by
Breitkopf & Härtel, Wiesbaden, for the revised edition, used by kind permission.

8 Translated by W. F. Kirby; original Finnish version: “Tuli veitikkä verevä, / Ajo lieto
Lemminkäinen / orihiillansa omalla, / Valitulla varsallansa / Keskelle kisaketoa, / Kau-
nokaisten karkeloa; / Reutoi Kyllikin rekehen, / Koppoi neien korjahansa, / Tuon asetti
taljallensa, / Liitti liisteyisellessä. / Laski ruokalla hevoista, / Nauskahutti nauhasella, / Siitä läksä liukumahan, / Lähtiessänsä sanovit: / ‘Elkätte minua, immet, / Ilmi antako ikänä, / Minun täällä käyneheni, / Täältä neien vieneheni!’ “
Chapter 7. From abjection to assimilation: Sibelius’s Kyllikki

Example 7b. Sibelius, *Kyllikki*, mvt. 1, mm. 20–24; second theme (“Kyllikki”) begins in m. 22. © 2002 by Breitkopf & Härtel, Wiesbaden, for the revised edition, used by kind permission.

only? The setting tells us much about the firmness of the conventions used for representing femininity (and masculinity) in western art music; for example, by the sonata procedures which the first movement of *Kyllikki* follows. In addition to the persistence of musical stereotypes, this movement enacts more broadly a mythical-textual mechanism that has dominated western narratives for centuries. It is based on a certain presupposition about sexual difference and the role for female characters in these narratives (de Lauretis 1984: 113), and it has not been the role of a protagonist.

With its sonata form and conventions of how to construct the feminine and the masculine in music (see, e.g., McClary 1991; Citron 1993 and 1994), the first movement of *Kyllikki* seems in an exemplary way carry on signifying practices on which feminist semioticians have focused in their studies of narrative, narration, and narratology (e.g., de Lauretis, Silverman, inter al.). (Sonata form, in general, can be considered as one manifestation of the stereotypical western narrative procedure.) From a feminist angle, the narrative machinery produced by

---

9 The situation is similar to what one confronts in articles and book chapters on “Sibelius’s piano music” but which start with declarations about Sibelius as an orchestral composer. On this and other gendered ideologies in Sibelius research, see Välimäki 2001: 5–22. The question is briefly addressed in Chap. 7.6.

10 One might, however, “queer” this interpretation, and instead consider the Kyllikki theme as masculine female, thus listening it against the mainstream reception.
those texts is an expression of a centuries-old, patriarchal\textsuperscript{11} culture. It is a question of \textit{his} story, wherein the female figure is an obstacle through which the male hero becomes (trans)formed. Female characters such as Medusa, the Sphinx, and other monsters of Antiquity understood as female, have been preserved only as inscribed in the narratives of male heroes, i.e., inside an other’s (male’s) story and not in their own. Teresa de Lauretis writes:

In the mythical text, then, the hero must be male regardless of the gender of the character, because the obstacle, whatever its personification..., is morphologically female – and indeed, simply, the womb, the earth, the space of his movement. As he crosses the boundary and “penetrates” the other space, the mythical subject is constructed as human being and as a male; he is the active principle of culture, the establisher of distinction, the creator of differences. Female is what is not susceptible to transformation, to life or death; she (it) is an element of plot-space, a topos, a resistance, matrix and matter. (1987: 43–44; cf. also, 1984: 118–119.)

Accordingly, female figures stand for position, space, site, place, boundary, threshold, test, trial and so on, through which the hero and the story proceed to their fulfilment. The obstacles that the man confronts – on the path towards manhood, manliness, power, and wisdom – must be slain or otherwise defeated, so that the hero can fulfil his destiny. (De Lauretis 1984: 109–110.) The narrative is thus constrained and defined within two positions of sexual difference: “male-hero-human, on the side of the subject; and female-obstacle-boundary-space, on the other” (ibid.: 121). The first movement of \textit{Kyllikki} seems to follow these mechanics: her story turns out to be his story, and the man’s (Lemminkäinen’s) desire forms the focus of the plot (cf. ibid.: 144).\textsuperscript{12}

In terms of feminist musicology, \textit{Kyllikki}’s first movement obeys a gendered sonata aesthetics (the crystallization of which a sonata form is),\textsuperscript{13} as mapped out effectively by writers Susan McClary (1991) and Marcia J. Citron (1993 and

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Patriarchy}, as supreme power passed from fathers to sons, refers to the maintenance of male power and its ideological mechanisms.

\textsuperscript{12} Feminist research studies male as well as female images; only in this way can conceptions of gender \textit{difference} be revealed. Stereotypical descriptions of the male gender are as well monotonous, tedious, oppressive, and restrictive. For example, the mythical (stereotypical) male subject is often a source of extreme violence (a central object of study in critical men studies). The starting point of feminist study always focus on gender difference as constructed to oppress women. In my view, feminist music analysis should first and foremost be concerned with female and male \textit{images} and \textit{conceptions}. Naturally, this cultural imagery of male and female conceptions is maintained, created, criticized, and changed by subjects of every sex and gender.

\textsuperscript{13} Citron (1994: 18–19) states that “the term \textit{sonata aesthetic} includes sonata form, the sonata cycle as a multimovement form type, and the genres that deploy these plans.... It also entails the attendant rhetoric, ideology, and symbolism, a powerful cultural force.”
Chapter 7. From abjection to assimilation: Sibelius’s Kylliikki

1994). Feminist musicology has demonstrated how the ideological subtext of sonata aesthetics is in many respects a product and symbol of patriarchal values. This subtext is constructed on masculine metaphors, such as power and hegemony (domination of one over the other), opposition, and competition. The first theme constructs the masculine by representing energy and strength; the second theme constructs the feminine as otherness by representing lyricism and tenderness. (Citron 1994: 18–20.) The constructed opposition “is in no way a contest between equals but a clear hierarchic relationship, with the feminine functioning as the subsidiary” (ibid.: 21).

The subject-strategical (textual) approach does not presume that music is or is not essentially feminine (see Chap. 5.2.4). Rather, the question is how culture considers – and often condemns – anything as feminine or womanish. Feminism, in all its forms, views the principal source of discrimination against women to lie in cultural constructions of the feminine as opposite to man, male, and masculinity. This takes us into the realm of prejudices, fears, oppressions, anxieties, social norms, unconscious fantasies, wishes and so on, as they are associated with women and sexuality, and men and manhood. This mental terrain plays host to the gendered discursive rhetorics of music. As McClary (1999: xiv) writes, the question is about

how a discourse as apparently abstract as music can be fundamentally informed by prevailing attitudes of “how women are,” of how these attitudes are metaphorically articulated in musical imagery, and of how these images can be wielded either as weapons of misogyny or as signs used out of context in ironic, self-empowering strategies. In other words, what might have been initially a cultural truism concerning women became in subsequent stages an empty formalism (when acknowledging its implications became socially embarrassing), and finally a politically charged image….

From the point of view of sonata aesthetics, it is interesting that in the recapitulation section of Kylliikki only the first theme is repeated, as if there were no longer an (independent) Kylliikki (female protagonist). Masculine rhetoric seems to have won out completely. Usually, i.e., in the most normative and patronizing procedure of the sonata aesthetics, the second theme returns in the recapitulation as “tamed”, brought in line with the key of the first theme (tonic). In our case, however, the second theme disappears altogether in the recapitulation. The transition from the development to the recapitulation (mm. 49–50; see Example 7c), is established and assured by the violent force of chords using material from the introduction, by expressive features of sforzato, forte fortissimo and by accents, as if Lemminkäinen were finally, and brutally, breaking down Kylliikki’s resistance. After this, the second theme goes missing. Perhaps Kylliikki has escaped, even after Lemminkäinen’s violence – but given the harmonic and textural events, it is more persuasive to conclude that she has been done in rather than escaped to some safe haven.
The themes representing Lemminkäinen and Kyllikki seem, in some ways, to be quite similar. Both themes feature long notes held against tremolandoes, and harmonic coloration by the Neapolitan sixth and minor sixth chords. But the “light”, the keys, and dynamics of the two themes are different. Lemminkäinen’s theme is in D♭ major, whereas Kyllikki’s is in E major/minor and set in a higher – “colder” – register. There is a stark difference between the two themes, even though enharmonically the D♭ major (of the first theme) is C♯ major, whose tonic parallel (C♯ minor) is the relative minor of the second theme’s E major (cf. the modulating transition in mm. 20–21, Example 7b). Moreover, in the recapitulation the first theme is in C♯ major (= enharmonically D♭ major of the exposition; see Example 7c): the first theme (Lemminkäinen) seems to have absorbed (“swallowed”) into itself the sharps-filled second theme (Kyllikki). It has cleared “the Other”, “the alien terrain which the monologic subject (the first

Example 7c. Sibelius, Kyllikki, mvt. 1, mm. 48–54; retransition to recapitulation established with violent chords (mm. 49–50). Note the gap in m. 53, suggesting a traumatic trace of the confrontation with the alien other. © 2002 by Breitkopf & Härtel, Wiesbaden, for the revised edition, used by kind permission.
Chapter 7. From abjection to assimilation: Sibelius’s Kyllikki

tHEME) needs in its narrative adventure” (McClary 1991: 15), but not without permanent scar.

The second theme is absent in the recapitulation, but a new feature appears: a lack or void, signaled by the great pause right after the first line of the main theme has reached its most potent forzando (ff), which is also the most powerfully accentuated dynamic marking in the whole work (m. 53, Example 7c). Instead of the second theme, there is a gap inside the first theme in m. 53, such a gap being as if a trace of the traumatic encounter in the development of the feminine other; the feminine was slain at the border of development and recapitulation (mm. 49–50). In the corresponding place in the exposition (m. 8), the sixteenth note figures and whole notes in bass and melody carry steadily throughout the measure.15 Here the hero seems to have transgressed the border, penetrated into the space of the other and defeated it/her with the weaponry of violent chords (as discussed; cf. mm. 49–50). By this “the mythical subject is constructed as human being and as a male” (de Lauretis 1984: 119; cf. also, 1987: 43). Femininity, as totally subsidiary to and defined by the masculine, is crystallized in how the themes relate to each other. Feminine subjectivity is subordinated to masculine subjectivity and in the end succumbs to negation (pure lack).17

7.3 Chromatic borderline condition as abject music

In the development section (mm. 30–49), the first and second themes intertwine and lose their identities in the polyphonic texture and the rushing sequential passages through daring, if momentary, tonalities. Thematic fragments, including some taken from the introduction, is diminished, condensed, and arranged into simultaneously descending and ascending counterpoint, with stretto-like vehemence, chromaticism, and continuous modulation (e.g., see m. 48, Example 7c). Chromaticism, excessive use of tritones, diminished seventh chords, interval-

---

15 Other changes in the first theme when it returns in the recapitulation: the phrase that begins at m. 56 is prolonged with two measures not in the exposition (mm. 54–55); and a 6/4 chord appears in m. 57, where in the exposition there occurs a softer, minor sixth chord. Also, the theme is altered such that it begins directly in a Neapolitan position (in the exposition this position occurs after a preceding tonic chord); thus, it seems more “dissonant”, with an accent and contraction.

16 Anne Sivuoja-Gunaratnam (in a private remark) called my attention to the possible sexual interpretation of this transition, to its “penetrating”, “ravaging” (“rapacious”) chords – and perhaps the maiden’s loss of virginity?

17 In the feminist frame, it is irrelevant to ask if the title of the work refers to Kalevala’s Kyllikki-figure. For whatever the case, the object of study is the place of woman in the sonata form narrative as it follows mythical-textual mechanics (cf. the quote from de Lauretis, above, p. 212).
lic motion by semitones, rhythmic acceleration, and ambiguous or indefinite harmonies; all these, in the late Romantic style, carry associations of sexuality, eroticism, and sensuality – and angst. The section is Tristan-like in its passionate excesses. Here, what Kristeva (1984 [1974] and 1980) calls “the semiotic” manifests as the disruption of the musical order established in the exposition. The musical material undergoes a thorough work-out, as if conveying the continuity of (presubjective) libidinal desire (jouissance). It is a question of the musical representation of desire and strategies of stimulation; for example, counter-movements and shortening – condensation – with chromatic lines “puffing”, as it were, toward a climax, by which the promised (tonal) fulfilment is delayed (cf. the transition from the development to the recapitulation in Example 7c). The effect of withholding of fulfilment leaves the listener wanting and waiting for it. In this way just described, musical narrative may function as a metaphorical simulation of sexual activity, which is traditionally referred to neutrally as tension and release (McClary 1991: 12–13).

The passage can easily be interpreted as a violent and traumatic confrontation, a fight, or even ferocious sexual act between Lemminkäinen and Kyllikki. In psychoanalytic terms, it is a question of the dynamics of self and other, against which subjectivity is formed. The drives continuously push forward desire, channeling it into endless signifying practices that help to loosen or maintain subjectivity.

We could also speak here about the Romantic ballad as a genre of death and love, as Veijo Murtohaki (2001) has done in his discussion of Sibelius’s orchestral tone poems of the 1890s. Murtohaki grounds his discussion on Satu Grünthal’s (1997) study of Finnish literary ballads. The female characters in Romantic ballads – obeying western mythical-textual mechanics – are often liminal beings that exist between the natural and the supernatural, such as spirits of nature, demons of water, air, earth, forest, or fire. Considered as part of nature, they are static creatures. The male characters, by contrast, are moving characters; for example, riders on horseback. (Grünthal 1997: 38–44, 165–166.) Nature, gendered as female, is a training site for the male figure. Its unmoving (female) figures and personified antagonists represent limits and barriers that the hero alone can cross. In this setting, male-hero-man is defined as the side of the sub-

18 For another example of overlapping themes as representation of sexual desire, see Glenda Goss’s (2003: 68–71) discussion of Kullervo’s confrontation of his sister in Sibelius’s Kullervo Symphony (Op. 7).
19 Tawaststjerna hears Kyllikki, in this section, as begging for mercy, her petitions rising gradually to desperation (1955: 49).
20 Once when lecturing about this work and the development section, I used the word “Lemmikki”. This slip is a Freudian condensation of Kyllikki and Lemminkäinen, and actually a very apt description of the section.
Chapter 7. From abjection to assimilation: Sibelius’s Kyllikki

ject, while the woman-resistance-border-space acts on the side of the Other. (De Lauretis 1984: 113–115, 118, 121.) This assessment applies well to the themes of static Kyllikki and dynamic Lemminkäinen. Liminal woman both attracts and terrifies men; she is both the projection of a man’s wishes and fears, and also a link to inspiration, creativity, nature, and immortality (Grüenthal 1997: 40–44, 86). It is a matter of topographical projection: the female personage symbolizes the border between nature and culture, and presents a trial to the male hero (de Lauretis 1984: 109). Gayatri Spivak (1983: 169) makes it more precise: “the discourse of man is in the metaphor of woman”, i.e., in what “femininity” is for man. De Lauretis (1984: 11) brings up in this context Freud’s famous question, “what does a woman want?” – the question triggered by man’s desire for woman and for knowing. 21 Here we may notice that Kyllikki’s theme begins in E major, then turns to E minor and toys with A minor; there is no cadence, and the key is nowhere firmly established. Kyllikki’s theme is harmonically much more restless and tonally vague than Lemminkäinen’s: therefore, harmonically speaking, here we echo (patriarchal) Freud and ask: “Was will das Weib?” 22

In the nature/culture dichotomy, nature is associated with the feminine and corporeality (body), and culture is related to male power structures. Some feminist scholars argue that this dichotomy manifests in the western, aesthetic myth of masculine creativity. (E.g., Battersby 1989; Citron 1993.) Men try to own creativity as producers of art works, because women create life in their bodies: men create mentally, women physically. Culture requires knowledge, intellect, and social structures produced by men; nature requires “moral innocence” free from all intellectual activity. But nature also contains in itself something dangerous and negative (the magical power to produce life), and the job of culture (man) is to control it. (Citron 1993: 45–48.) From a psychoanalytic point of view, we are dealing with unconscious fantasies that disturb the subject’s sense of separate self-hood that is under one’s own control and possession. The fears related to one’s own sexuality and body, and the related fantasy of one’s origin, are projected onto woman as birth-giver, and thus also a potential dealer of annihilation.

Considered from this angle of self-other dialectics, where subject(ivity) is continuously constructed, the development section in this movement of Kyllikki could be seen as a symbol of uncontrollable sexuality (the seducer-woman as a projection of man’s fear of his own sexual desire and infidelity), and thus of fear and anxiousness with regard to everything uncontrollable, such as nature or

21 From the psychoanalytic point of view that is taken in the present study, man’s desire to know relates to the primal mystery of his (subject’s) origin in the female body (mother’s womb).
22 In Jones 1955: 468.
woman. This fear, deriving from one’s corporeality and material origin, relates to the experience of the “uncanny” (Freud 1955a [1919]), too, and to the horrified, uncontrollable, and incomprehensible real (Lacan 1998 [1973]) in the subject’s existence. The latter cannot be controlled and thus represents a site of the subject’s dissolution. Kristeva (2000: 145) writes:

This ambivalent war against the feminine is to be understood in counterpoint to the war that the subject wages with himself: with his superego and paternal identity. In order to protect himself from the abjection of the other (starting with the other sex) and the other itself, the woman is made sacred, fetishized: this is what the two sides of … feminine imagery (ambivalence-rejection, marvelous-magic) make apparent.

In Freudian psychoanalysis, these feminine images operate in the small child’s (male and female) infantile, unconscious fantasies about the mother; these also form the basis of the subject’s conception of the female in general. The Mother gives birth and thus possesses the marvellous and incomprehensible power both to give and take life, to do extreme good and bad, to enable (to fuse) and annihilate (to lose). The Mother (female body) is the material origin of the subject and thus a site for unconscious birth fantasies related to bodily and sexual issues. The Mother is also that from which the child must separate herself in order to become a subject. Hence, the most threatening dimension of Medusa as Mother, would be to understand her as a sexual monstrosity which is of the same material as that of the subject (the subject’s origin, from which the subject is bodily separated). This is later experienced by the child as the threat of the woman’s body (sexuality and the power to give and take life). Insufficient riddance of the bad-mother image, and of feelings and fantasies of guilt and anxiety related to separation from her, may later manifest, say, as misogyny, if the annihilating monster-woman is constantly attacking the subject’s sense of self and identity.

Self-other dialectics need not be gendered so that “self” is male and “the other” is female, though this is culturally favoured gendering. In the scheme of self-other separation, the threatening “other” can be any burden that weighs

23 The matter is re-addressed in Chap. 9, in the analysis of Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 6.
24 In psychoanalytic theory, understanding of the mother as a sexual being is related to the birth of the superego and inauguration of the Oedipus complex.
25 Feminist musicologists, such as McClary (1991 and 1999), have examined the possibly misogynistic meanings in chromaticism in late Romantic style. See also, Clément (1999 [1979]), on female opera characters as threats to the tonal-patriarchal system and their “undoing”.
26 The girl has to separate from the mother, as well. Despite this psychological fact, cultural imagery of the separation problematics is still predominantly patriarchal and gendered (the subject is normatively male). Thus, female subjects are forced, by culture, to identify with masculine subject positions that deprecate the feminine.
heavy on the (listening) subject’s life. It is precisely because of this flexibility that narrative mechanisms are so powerful, especially when they serve as the basic schemata of the formation of self and subjectivity, in which the self fights against and rejects the Other. This mechanism can be also discussed as one of abjection, and accordingly, we could speak of the development section of Kyllikki’s first movement as abject music (see pp. 140–141, Chap. 5.2.1).

Abjection, or “the abject” (Kristeva 1982), denotes something that is needed in the separation from the primal love- and care-giver, i.e., the mother, the “proto-woman” (also primal monster) – who is always there, resonating in every object of love and sexual activity in later life as well. The abject is necessary in order to grasp one’s own identity and produce the borders of self. The abject is something terrifying, which has to be rejected vehemently as not-me in order for the subject to stay alive, to become a living subject of one’s own, and not to lose one’s identity in fusion with the other. Desire and loathing intertwine; desire means a desire to fuse with the other, and loathing relates to the fear of being destroyed, “eaten” by the other. This is why we are in such a hurry in the development section: it is a question of subject’s fight against the terrifying all-swallowing, liminal woman or the abject woman/mother (natural monster).

We can thus hear in Kyllikki the tension between the two feminine images described by Kristeva (2000: 195). (1) The marvellous-magic (the “good”) would be represented by the second theme in the exposition, when it is still “chaste”, i.e., diatonic and static (non-active), and thus obeying symbolic law and order. (2) The ambivalence-rejection (the “bad”, threatening, abjected one) is let run wild especially in the development section threatening the tonal order with its chromatics. In terms of musical style, we could speak of the fight or split between the ideological-patriotic ballad and the erotic-sensuous ballad style, to use Murtomäki’s terms (1998: 105; see also, 2001). It could well be connected to the split female imagery or to the Kleinian one between the good and bad object (Klein 1998 [1977]).

27 I would add here two further interpretative layers: Firstly, the patriotic ideological-national ballad style can be linked to man, masculinity, culture, thinking, and “self”, and the erotic-sensuous ballad style to woman, nature, body, and “the other”. Secondly, in terms of musical female images of western culture – and particularly those reserved for women in Finland – we could talk about the tension between official, Finnish (pure, virgin) maiden modality and vicious, Wagnerian seducer-chromatics. 28

27 See Chap. 3.4.3. On splitting, see p. 234 (Chap. 7.7) and n. 19, p. 250 (Chap. 8.4).
28 Murtomäki (2001: esp. 103–104, 127) has brought out biographical interpretation possibilities in Sibelius’s orchestral poems of the ballad period as depicting forbidden and fatal sexual connections (such as the one with an irresistible nymph in Skogsräet). Timothy L. Jackson (2001: 178–179) has written from a biographical perspective about
7.4 Melancholy and lost objects

The second movement of *Kyllikki*, Andantino, is a slow movement in ABA form. Glenn Gould (1977: 22; 1985: 103) describes it as a brooding two-sided nocturne. Eero Heinonen (2000: 9) talks about “a sort of Karelian nocturne that sounds truly Oriental and exotic in places.” It may be interesting to remember – especially because the movement is nocturnal and the opus carries a female name – that in the nineteenth century, a nocturne was considered, on the one hand, to represent a love poem sung by a man to a woman, while on the other hand, it was also understood as a mirror of feminine essence. Therefore, the nocturne found its manifestation in man’s activity but expressed the woman’s soul, resulting in something like a “cross-gendered” genre.\(^{29}\) (Cf. Kallberg 1996: 47.)

After the action music of the first movement, the second movement seems to follow as a confessional-like, as if it were a psychological reaction to the (traumatic) events of the first movement, of which the hystERICALLY glittering double tremolo trills, spiced with tritones (e.g., mm. 17 and 21), and the cadenza material (m. 44) seem to be reminders.\(^{30}\) To use Greimassian terminology, after Tarasti (1994), the dominating modality in the second movement is Being, in contrast to the first movement, where Doing prevails.

Here the music unfolds slowly, as a halting chorale or twisted lullaby to a lost one; the dynamics resemble a rocking motion. For example, the gesture with which the movement starts is heard twice in succession, consisting of three opening chords, the first of which starts on an anacrusis (see Example 7d). Trills (mm. 17 and 21) cut the dark flow like stings of the conscience, symptoms of repression, anguish of memory, or attacks of the Lacanian real (the body as the real), or punishment of the superego. The melancholy effect increases, by the emphases

\(^{29}\) Both of these two aspects of the nocturne have been largely constructed as male fantasies of the ideal, “true” woman (think, e.g., Schumann’s *Frauenliebe und Leben*, Op. 42). The ideological message of the genre thus was that, even if the nocturne were an image of female, this image essentially contained the idea of woman as directed towards a man, i.e., that a woman exists only in as much as she is pursued and courted by a man (Kallberg 1996: 47).

\(^{30}\) Murtonäki (private communication) remarked that these trills recall those in the first movement of Beethoven’s “Appassionata” Sonata (F minor No. 23, Op. 57).
on off-beats, the feature which works here as if it were a sign of displacement and repression; all is not right or in its place. The many rests lead to a pathos of gaps. The semantic density seems to mount with each of the rests (mm. 18, 22–24), as in the repetitive and monotonous speech of a depressed person: “Faced with the impossibility of concatenating, they utter sentences that are interrupted, exhausted, come to a standstill”, as Kristeva writes in her melancholia study *Black Sun* (1989: 33). Breaks, silences, and muteness can be interpreted here, as in psychoanalysis, as signs of trauma and of the unrepresentable which one cannot speak about. This interpretation aptly describes the gap in the first theme in the recapitulation in the first movement as well.


In mm. 19–24, gaps occur in every measure and the dynamic decreases to piano. Still following Kristeva (1989: 33), we could say that the “frugal musicality becomes exhausted in its turn,” and “simply does not succeed in becoming established on account of the pressure of silence.” “[T]he melancholy person appears to stop cognizing as well as uttering” (ibid.) in the last measures of the first section, until the aura of melancholy opens up when moving to the middle section (mm. 25–54), revealing the garden of longing – the lost happiness – behind the melancholy. This is music of absence.

In the middle section, a striking detail opens a hermeneutic window (cf. Kramer 1990), a key point, a poetic “runway” on which interpretation may take off. Measures 30–31\(^{31}\) contain a horn-call trope; the last notes of the right hand can be found, for example, in the opening of Beethoven’s “Lebewohl” Sonata (E\(^b\) major No. 26, Op. 81a\(^{32}\)), though one octave higher here in Sibelius (see Example 7e). As Charles Rosen (1995a: 118) writes, “le son du cor au fond des bois” is one of the rare bits of Romantic iconography that has a firm place in

---

31 I henceforth call this the *farewell*-phrase.
32 The title and names of movements in Beethoven’s “Lebewohl” Sonata are these: *Sonata caractéristique: Les adieux* [I], *l’absence* [II] and *le retour* [III].

221
Subject Strategies in Music

music. It often acts as a symbol of memory, or to be more precise, as a symbol of absence, distance, longing, and regret; as a remembrance, or call from paradise lost (ibid. 117–118). Here in Sibelius, this sign of memory and absence is hidden. It is not played in the warmest register of the piano, as it is in Beethoven, and it occurs fleetingly and only twice (again in mm. 40–41). It is heard as if coming from afar: set in a higher register and at the end of the phrase. As a result, it seems to come from so far away that it is almost invisible, unnoticeable, unheard. The sense of distance, created also by the open intervals, brings along the “aura of the

Example 7e. Sibelius, Kyllikki, mvt. 2, mm. 23–38: B section begins, m. 24 last beat; horn-call trope (“Lebewohl”) in m. 31; “the memory” in mm. 32–37; Ab, as “the exhausting lure of memory” (m. 25). © 2002 by Breitkopf & Härtel, Wiesbaden, for the revised edition, used by kind permission.
Chapter 7. From abjection to assimilation: Sibelius’s Kylliikki

sublime and the melancholy”, to use Rosen’s (1995a: 135) words.

The Lebewohl-notes at the same time act as a secret return of what is repressed and a moment of most intense longing. It is a painfully transparent breaking-point in the work, “on the one hand, a gap, a lack, a missing connection; on the other, a surplus of pattern, an extra repetition, an excessive connection” (Kramer 1990: 12). To some, this detail may seem marginal. But if poststructuralism and deconstruction have taught us anything, it is the importance of attending to details, even the “smallest” ones. As in psychoanalysis, in music analysis it is precisely the details and the marginal from which interpretation takes flight.33 Here the “farewell motive” acts as a Lacanian point de capiton or anamorphosis, to be heard slightly awry: an anamorphosis behind the object represents enticement, from which desire is satisfied when the observer sets her gaze askew, as when one has almost stopped observing something, turned her eyes (or ears) to something else (Lacan 1998 [1973]: 92).

According to Freud (1957a [1917/15]: 249), a central characteristic of melancholy is that the libido attaches itself to the lost object. Here, in the middle of the middle section of the middle movement of Kylliikki – at the very heart of the whole opus – one can hear an echo of that object. We may interpret the Lebewohl motive as a sign of absence, that echoes the lost object, the memory of the paradise lost; it is as if the awareness of the most beloved, but never attainable (or re-attainable) object would overwhelm the subject. The Lebewohl-notes are almost like a (re)presentation of the Lacan’s object a, “from which the subject, in order to constitute itself, has separated itself off as an organ,” and which thus serves as a symbol of the lack (Lacan 1998 [1973]: 103; 1977 [1966]: 21, 164). In an uncanny way, object a produces the subject’s most familiar realm, because it is an object with only a little “otherness”, and which is “carved out of subject’s own flesh.” This is why it carries a strong aura of presence, despite the fact that it simultaneously serves as a symbol of the lack. (Lacan 1998 [1973]: 103.)

In Lacanian psychoanalysis, a lack and object a denote both the central void of the subject and the latter’s prerequisite (the potential for subjectivity). Subjectivity evolves around a lack and the subject is not a true subject before the “self-mutilation” of the object a. (Lacan 1998 [1973]: 103.) As Silverman (1988: 7) writes: “Indeed, it could almost be said that to the degree that the object has been lost, the subject has been found.” Classic psychoanalysis claims that traces of first object loss and separation (from the primal object of love) resound in all of our significant relations. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, it is a structural feature of the subject’s constitution. Kristeva, for her part, emphasizes both classical and Lacanian aspects.

33 We might also ask, what is music other than details? To pick one detail as an object of attention means simultaneously to adopt a certain viewpoint (cf. Kuusamo 1999: 73).
Giorgio Agamben (1993) and Slavoj Žižek (2000) emphasize that the melancholic’s loss is illusory, for the lost object is something which the subject never had; paradise exists only as lost. The object (of melancholy) is both possessed and lost at the same time; it is at once real and unreal, incorporated and lost, affirmed and denied (Agamben 1993: 21). Thus it shares characteristics of a *fetish* – an object inhabited by a spirit and/or imbued with magical powers. The *Lebewohl*-notes in *Kyllikki* – and perhaps the music of absence in general – may be understood to function as a fetish, which is at once the sign of something and its absence. The presence of the music of absence, as a fetish, gives it a potency that it otherwise lacks (cf. Rycroft 1986 [1968]: 51). Precisely this contradiction creates the object’s phantasmatic status (Agamben 1993: 33). As Agamben (ibid.) writes, the fetish “confronts us with the paradox of an unattainable object that satisfies a human need precisely through its being unattainable.”

A contemporary listener may hear in the *Lebewohl*-motive the slight echo of cowboy or western movies (“westerns”). True to the musical codes of Romanticism, westerns use these tropes in emphasizing the sense of goodbyes and riding off into the sunset (as well as outdoor life and “open landscape” in general), the feeling of having to leave something or someplace forever. Aply, in his analysis of this passage, Tawaststjerna describes a “bright red sun to rise upon the landscape of wilderness” (1955: 49). He, too, considers *Kyllikki* a kind of farewell – a composer’s farewell to Romanticism (1957: 49; 1955: 52): “in Sibelius’s Romantic works there is a rising intoxication with living, a sense of excitement of dreams evoked by a century coming into being, and at the same time, they utter farewells to the present” (Tawaststjerna 1955: 52). Certainly, we can see the *Lebewohl*-motive functioning as a hyper-cathexed displacement of the lost object, and the music as a whole as poly-semantized, “floating currency” of farewells – with the continuing resonance of primal loss. Like a fetish, the *Lebewohl*-gesture has multiple meanings derived from other objects, through condensation, displacement, transposition, and symbolization (cf. Rycroft 1986 [1968]: 52).

34 Perhaps it could be also seen as an act of Freudian “screen memory”: the fetishistic operation may be linked to the screen memory that conceals pre-Oedipal traumas and castration fear (Moore et al. 1990: 77).
35 Listen, e.g., the western movie music scores by Aaron Copland (*The Red Pony, Rodeo*) or Elmer Bernstein (*Magnificent Seven*). I thank Richard Littlefield for turning my attention to the abundant use of farewell motives in these famous films. Also it is a fact that country music vocals are characterized by open intervals of fourths, fifths and sixths much in the same manner, as denoting the outdoor life and landscape too (the open prairie).
37 This is precisely why Tawaststjerna and others may interpret this work as Sibelius’s farewell to the Romantic and *Kalevala*-Romantic musical language of his adolescence,
Chapter 7. From abjection to assimilation: Sibelius’s Kyllikki

7.5 The music of memory and musical portrait-landscape

In linguistic and narrative terms, the tense in Kyllikki’s first movement seems to be that of the present; the ambience is one of “the now” and crowded with actors and events. The second, lyrical movement, however, seems relatively event-less, and rather represents attachment to melancholy state of mind, to loss and to the past. Immediately after the farewell-phrase (mm. 30–31), come fanfares and heroic chords (m. 32 onward; see Example 7e), all somewhat military-sounding, but their nature is like that of something remembered, not performed. Time is not “now”, the tense is not the present, but the imperfect. The military and hunting tropes are here in the past tense and lyrical use. After this comes the farewell-phrase again (mm. 40–41). Hence the passage I call “memory” (mm. 32–37) is plunged between two framing farewell-phrases, as if it were a falling into a dream.

In the middle section, the past seems to have unexpectedly overwhelmed the subject in a Proustian manner. The texture, mood and atmosphere change drastically when the heavy and ponderous A-section changes to the middle part in B♭ major (tonic parallel). The burden of five flats lightens to two when gliding from the present moment of B♭ minor to the most yearning, “sliding” legato lines, moving polyphony, and sweetly modulating harmonies in mezzoforte. The construction of this sinking into the past is interestingly started by the first note in the bass line in m. 25, which is A♭, and thus the lowered seventh degree of B♭ major (= the dominant of E♭ major, which is also the key of the horn call trope). It has here the function of a bottomless tone, a fathomless depth, creating a sense of sinking that is immersive as the navel of a dream. Through this fathomless note, like “the exhausting lure of memory”, the subject dives into the fantasy created around the hollow centre of melancholy, in order to chase the memory that comes from so far away that it needs an introduction of four measures (mm. 25–28). And then it comes, announced by accentuated B♭ major chords in m. 29, and the

---

38 According to Tawaststjerna (1971: 32) the fanfare motive f²–♭b¹–c² (m. 32) could be a free inversion of the “Lemminkäinen motive” in Sibelius’s orchestral poem Lemminkäinen’s Return (Op. 22 No. 4).

39 Tawaststjerna (1958: 47) probably means this passage when writing that Kyllikki sees in a vision Lemminkäinen’s destiny: in Kalevala Lemminkäinen goes to a war (this is a subject matter in one movement of Sibelius’s orchestral series Lemminkäinen, Four Legends, Op. 22).

40 The expression is Barthes’s (1979: 217).
memory begins in m. 32, after the preceding sign of the past and remembrance of the farewell-phrase in mm. 30–31. (See Example 7e.)

At the end of the B-section there follows a cadenza-like transition (mm. 43–54), like a repression or an attack of the real, with the burdensome harmonies of the first movement, octave scale runs, and even more hysterical tremolando-trills. It returns the subject out of the time loop of the memory/dream to the distressed present time, the moment of now, to section A (m. 55 onward). The music is the same as in the beginning, but now pianissimo, and with a syncopated pedal point accompaniment that imports a fragrance or an echo of a funeral march and sense of irrevocableness (see Example 7f). The anxious trill in m. 76 is now heightened with fortissimo, creating an even more violent contrast. It is as if the repeated pedal point bass notes were saying that the libido is still blocked in the lost object (as it is in Freudian melancholy); the fundamental lack will always remain, and the melancholia is inevitably in us. The trills and pauses, the descent in volume to mezzoforte and to the “unstable” minor sixth chord, the same which began the movement, reinforce the sense of disconsolation and incompleteness, the landscape of defeat, the unfinished, incomplete circle.\(^{41}\)

A different kind of landscape opens up in the last movement of Kylikki, which is airy and scherzo-like, with dance characteristics (such as those of the Finnish polska). The musical material alternates continuously, on the one hand, between minor and major, and on the other hand, between chromatic and diatonic, as if the

---

\(^{41}\) Symmetrical form (ABA) may be particularly suitable for music of melancholy, the middle section functioning as a description of the lost object. According to Tarasti (1999: 269), in Sibelius’s Valse Triste, for instance, the active and more moving middle section offers a momentary illusion of releasing (liberation), after which the return to the section A emphasizes the self-reservedness of melancholy.
light in the musical landscape were changing all the time (see Example 7g).

Likewise, the pastoral middle section of the this movement (Tranquillo, mm. 35–60) seems to be a strange combination of darkness and lightness. This musical chiaroscuro is in Gb major and reminds one a little bit of the trio of the third movement of Sibelius’s Symphony No. 2, with its melancholy-pastoral oboe.42

![Example 7g. Sibelius, Kyllikki, mvt. 3, mm. 1–4. © 2002 by Breitkopf & Härtel, Wiesbaden, for the revised edition, used by kind permission.](image)

If we compare the middle sections of the second and third movement of Kyllikki, we hear also in the third movement a music of memory and remembrance, but different from that in the second movement. If the second movement is Freudian melancholy related to object loss which is withdrawn from the consciousness, in the stagnant trio of the third movement it is rather a question of conscious remembrance and thus of mourning, in which central is the ego’s effort to free its libido from the lost object (Freud 1957a [1917/15]: 245). The yearning is admitted openly, in Chopinesque figures (e.g., m. 51) that recall times past, and other figures of sentimental longing (cf. open intervals, horn tones, syncopated pedal point chords, pastoral as sublime). These are not hidden or repressed, but on the contrary, highlighted by crescendo, as if a song about the good old times were bursting out in full voice: the subject is dashing unabashedly into sentimentality and nostalgia (as in musicals, when someone “spontaneously” burst into song)

---

42 Tawaststjerna (1958: 36) also points this out. Heinonen (2000: 9) hears the middle section to resemble thematically and harmonically Borodin’s opera Prince Igor (1869–70/1874–87). I hear Tchaikovskian melancholy in this section – another master of after-beat pedal points and harmonic non-progression. According to Blom (1947: 101) the middle section of the third movement “is not completely light-hearted” and “certain heavy-heartedness is noticeable” there, as in the second movement. According to Tawaststjerna (1958: 35) it is not a question of heavy-heartedness but of a pastoral. The heavy-heartedness Blom experiences could be related, say, to the syncopated pedal-point accompaniment – to that typical device of Sibelius (and Tchaikovsky) which manifests in the second movement as well.
Subject Strategies in Music

(see Example 7h).

The third movement is associated with a description of nature by the pastoral trio; even more, the impressionistic elements bring forth this effect. In talking about nature in the third movement – and borrowing the idea from Rosen (1995a: 131) – I would say it is not a question of an overall pastoral, but rather of a musi-cal counterpart to a so-called portrait-landscape, which in the late eighteenth century started to carry signifying dimensions of memory and remembering. Then it would be a question of a musical landscape as a presentation of a specific site from which to gain a transcendental level (ibid.).

Example 7h. Sibelius, Kyllikki, mvt. 3, mm. 34–37, beginning of middle section: a melancholic-pastoral trio, musical mourning. © 2002 by Breitkopf & Härtel, Wiesbaden, for the revised edition, used by kind permission.

7.6 Feminine figuring as exemption from the weight of subjectivity – Assimilation into nature

The third movement of Kyllikki has often been criticized as being too insubstantial, insignificant, or weak to serve as an ending for the whole opus. For example, Tawaststjerna (1971: 32) writes that the “finale is here and there pianistically tasteful but not significant enough to balance the first movement of the triptych.” According to him, the sonata form of the first movement proves Sibelius’s brilliant mastery of form, the second movement is also well-constructed, but the formal design of the Finale is commonplace, and “musically bad, too”:

[r]egarding the high quality of the first two movement, it is regrettable that finale does not at all attain their level. … It is also surprising that after sonata form and rondo form there is a lied form functioning as the finale. A more developed rondo or even a sonata would have been the right form in the right place. … the relatively insignificant dance-like movement as finale weakens the whole work. (Tawaststjerna 1958: 39–41.)
Tawaststjerna (1958: 41) suspects that the shakiness in the formal balance has kept the work from making it big on concert stages.

From a gendered point of view, apparently the fact that the finale does not bend to stereotypical “masculine-narrative” listening has made it “unsatisfying” in the ears of scholars demanding more ponderous form and “severity” of substance for the finale. If the Oedipus story does not tell what happens to Sphinx after confronting Oedipus, Kyllikki’s last movement, for its part, seems truly to tell what happens to Kyllikki, i.e., to the female character, rather than what happens to Lemminkäinen (male character) after the meeting of these parties, that is, after the demonstration of masculine narration in the first movement. This is so because the last movement contains much feminine imagery, which is not erased, but rather seems to let a (happy!) feminine subject position to end the work.

Of the whole opus, only the first movement is gendered as normatively masculine (cf. hegemonic masculinity). There Kyllikki’s story turns out to be Lemminkäinen’s story. The second movement I would not genderize at all, because the burden of melancholic subjectivity blacks out gender there. Nocturnal cross-gendering in this melancholy perhaps results in an effect of neutrality or androgyny, in the sense of effacing the gender characteristics, rather than mixed gender.43 (Another interpretation might follow Butler’s idea that precisely sexuality itself is the source of human melancholy; e.g., 1990.) Although the second movement is, in my opinion, gender-neutral overall, it is a powerful music of subjectivity. And although in the third movement the (normative) subject seems to disappear from the stage, the movement is not gender-neutral but strongly coloured in a feminine way. Contextually feminine characteristics in the third movement are, for example, lightness, 3/4 meter, dance qualities such as the polska-character, which distantly recalls the mazurka and polonaise, and which also creates a signifying dimension of ethnic and oriental exotics. Femininity is constructed by monothematicity and a non-developing conception of harmony, form, and themes. Also chromaticism, such as the descending and enticing half step motives and watercolour-like oscillation between chromatic and diatonic, creating a sense of (oriental) exoticism too, is here marked as feminine. Also feminine are the rapid changes of key (female “flightiness”), impressionistic

43 The archaic roots of melancholy derive from the subject’s developmental phase in early childhood, before the Oedipal stage, in which the subject is not yet socially genderized because it has not yet become a subject and does not recognize its existence as a sexual/gendered being. On the relations of gender and melancholy, see Butler 1990: 73–83; 1997: 132–198; also, Schiesari 1992.
44 Rhetoric of the feminine has often been understood that of seduction or insanity, as opposed to masculine bravura. The rhetoric of woman does not express intellect and thinking but sexual power. This kind of gender ideology seems to have been ruling in musical discourse since the Renaissance. See McClary 1991.
element imitating nature, the spirit of stylized improvisation, and sentimental Chopineries. The ending, too, is feminine in the sense of abruptness, thematic unpreparedness, openness, and sense of whimsy. The ending may bring to mind the “detachable” endings typical of Chopin’s preludes. This kind of music is often described as “charming”, that is to say: insignificant.

The feminine imagery that this movement displays has been considered, by several scholars, not weighty enough to close the work. In Tarasti’s (1994) Greimasian-Tarastian terminology, the movement does not have enough the modality of “Can” (masculine potency?) to obey the common finale formula. From the angle of normative sonata aesthetics, the movement would be acceptable and appropriate as a playful and harmless middle movement (scherzo), the charm of which is to pop in for a while between more serious movements. But a finale should not be danced to a woman’s tune: such a tune lacks the masculine affirmation and security of thematic sonata wrestling, by which the patriarchal order would be re-established. Because the feminine is not silenced, the movement, and thus the whole work, seems not to obey norms of the master narrative of western art music. On the contrary, it lets Kyllikki (woman) dance and even in a popular folk-dance genre (polska), leaving “undefeated” the impurities of populism (as opposed to Art) as well as femininity. This is why the finale is unpatronizing. Woman/nature (sexuality) is not controlled but instead it is let gently free. Thus the last subject position in the work is feminine (or queer). If Hélène Cixous’s (1980) Medusa is still laughing, then Kyllikki is still dancing.

However, though we speak of feminine subject position, it actually means here a subjectivity that assimilates itself into nature and thus denotes de-subjectivization; the feminine subject position is a de-subject-position, i.e., the opposite of a normative, proper, true subject position (masculine subject). If we see in Kyllikki a transition from the acting subject (I mvt.), via subjective reflection and melancholy (II mvt.), to the subject’s assimilation into the (feminine) nature (III mvt.), this last stage can be described also as a withdrawal of the subject into a state of subjectless fusion with nature. Here we confront the fact that, in the conventional gender-ideological thinking in western culture, femininity alone cannot actually represent the “subject” but rather only nature and subjectlessness. In this way the musical representation in the third movement of Kyllikki still obeys patriarchal codes, but can also be seen to establish (the thetic of) patriarchy only to overturn it. The question is tricky. A contemporary listener, listening against the grain, might take the feminine in this case as subjectivity, and not as the lack of it, i.e., as a negative deviation from the masculine norm.

45 Tawaststjerna (1958: 43) has observed the sixteenth-note figuration at the end as recalling Chopin’s F Major Etude (Op. 10 No. 8).
Accordingly, we have several different ways to hear the feminine subject position at the end of the work. It can even be heard as a masculine position; this feminine figuring could be considered as constructing an optional model of (masculine) subjectivity for the repressive and restrictive stereotypical model of masculine. Indeed, some representations of femininity created by Romantic and late Romantic (male) artists could sometimes reflect a kind of “wish to be a woman” (Courtivron 1979). Kramer (1998b) has talked about this in the context of Schubert. The latent purpose of this wish may be to escape the aggressiveness and Oedipal contest that structures the normative (middle class, hegemonic) masculine identity.47

Accordingly, the first movement seems to contain a mythic actor or actors, persons with heroic characteristics and destinies (a true story). The second movement could be considered as melancholia, with a dream-like feeling and remembrances of events unfolded in the first movement. The third, light, scherzo-like movement turns towards a “pure” miniature landscape, as if too much had been done, said, or confessed in the preceding movements, and therefore the solution would be to turn to nature, to surrender in front of something “above” the subject. I would interpret it as detachment from the weight of subjectivity which can be seen as an assimilation into nature,48 or as a figuring of optional (gender) identity. Applying Tarasti’s (2001: 13) concepts, there occurs a depersonalization or de-actorialization of the subject of desire. Tarasti reflects on the subject of desire in Sibelius’s music in a following way:

But for Sibelius, desire is also neutralized by a process of sublimation that transmutes it into something else altogether. This is not the straightforward repression of desire, but rather a stymying, freezing, depersonalization and de-actorialization of it. … This neutralization of the subject of desire in Sibelius’s music is associated with the phenomenal category of presence/absence. The music often creates the impression of a bare landscape without a living soul …. (Ibid.)

In this way we progress from action of the first movement (also from sexuality, body, and the real) and reflection of the second movement (melancholy),

47 Sibelius composed many female images, such as, Pohjola’s Daughter (Op. 49), Luonnotar [female spirit of nature] (Op. 70), The Oceanides (Op. 73), The Wood Nymph, The Ferryman’s Brides (Op. 33), The Dryad (Op. 45 No. 1), The Captive Queen (Op. 48), and many other female portraits in several numbers of orchestral and incidental music and solo songs. An interesting interpretation of the subject position in the symphonic poem Kullervo as sliding towards feminine is provided by Peter Franklin (2001: 74).

48 In a private comment, Murtomäki notes that, as well as turning towards nature, it could be a question of turning towards society and integrating into it – for it is clearly a dance movement. (In the Kalevala, Kyllikki once leaves the house in order to go to the village dance.) However, because of the powerful feminine, pastoral, withdrawal, and impressionistic imagery, I would not suggest this interpretation.
to the pastoral assimilation, transcendence, and the subject’s withdrawal from the stage in the third movement. This may relate to the quest theme in western cultural imagery, which is reserved for male psychological profiles: the quest – separation, exploration, and adventure – leads to transcendence and that to personal change. This development, in which the ego, through maximum isolation, is able to go “beyond the here and now”, depicts a spiritual journey, that results in male creative maturation. (Citron 1994: 23.) Read through this frame, Kyllikki may unfold as search for knowledge (I mvt., adventure), self-knowledge (II mvt., separation), and transcendence (III mvt., self-realization, personal change). In this perspective, the female title would denote (man’s) creativity – as a nude woman has worked as a metaphor for art (as men’s business) in the western history of painting and sculpture. The melancholy (sign of ingegno) is either worked out or postponed (repressed).49 As Rosen (1995a: 161) writes: a landscape, a remembered image, can often be a substitute for one that is suppressed. It may be an attempt to forget, to repress. In the words of Ortega y Gasset (in Agamben 1993: 32): “the metaphor substitutes one thing for another, not so much in order to reach the second, as to escape from the first.”

7.7 Postlude: Sibelius’s piano music, music research, and gender ideology50

Often in musicological literature and other writings on music, Sibelius’s piano output has been branded as a marginal and fairly unimportant area in the composer’s oeuvre. This disparaging attitude is visible also in the scarcity of research on Sibelius’s piano music. And still, Sibelius’s piano output forms quantitatively a very considerable part of the whole oeuvre of composer: Sibelius composed well over 100 opus-listed piano works, making piano music the third most plentiful genre among his opus-listed works, after orchestral works and works for choir or for choir and orchestra.51 Moreover, there are numerous piano works without opus numbers, various piano arrangements, and great amount of early piano pieces outside the opus-list (see Gräsbeck 2000).52 Sibelius’s manifold piano

---

49 Irony and humour are not often used to describe Sibelius’s music, but the third movement of Kylikki, with its paradoxical nature, might call for such descriptors.

50 I have written in more detail about this matter elsewhere (Välimäki 2001). Recently Veijo Murtomäki (2004) published an essay on the related subject matter (“Sibelius and the miniature”) in which the problematics of small vs. large scale music is discussed much in the same manner as I have done (Välimäki 2001) drawing on similar arguments and literature references.

51 See, e.g., Salmenhaara 1984 and 1996.

52 Furthermore, Sibelius also composed for solo voice and piano. However, it has not been the habit to subject the piano parts of songs to such harsh criticism as that leveled at
output includes works of various kinds, shapes, characters and qualities, chiefly brief pieces. Brief piano music of small forms has been strongly associated with the feminine in the tradition of western art music.\textsuperscript{53} It refers, in the aesthetic hierarchy of values, to the lowest category of (art music) composition, which is not worthy of much cultural and scholarly attention or respect. The almost systematic disregard for Sibelius’s piano works reveals that a powerful gendered discourse is operating in the (de)valuation of the music in question (cf. Cook & Tsou 1994: 1). Sibelius’s piano pieces, when most typical, are brief pieces, such as character pieces, for instance, images of mood and moment, not titanic sonatas. Therefore we may ask, do Sibelius’s “pensées de piano lyrique” result from the lack of “masculine” ejaculative-virtuoso sonata aesthetics?\textsuperscript{54} Is it because of “effeminacy” that it has been necessary, for the sake of the canonizing patriarchal system, to declare them insignificant or even despicable?

The customary method has been that Sibelius’s piano output is juxtaposed against his orchestral works and found as something which must be dismissed with passing reference to their temporary nature. For example, according to Guy Rickards, Sibelius as a “thinker” is “a symphonist, of imposing classical severity”, whereas as a “notesmith” – who is to be blamed, for example, for the piano pieces – he is a “perpetrator of light music pot-boilers of embarrassing vacuity”, “able to keep on producing of sellable pieces when the ’thinker’, at the mercy of the caprices of inspiration, stayed silent” (1997: 12, 113). Sibelius “never grew to like the piano, nor did he write any successful major pieces for it”\textsuperscript{55} and that, as a general rule, Sibelius’s instrumental pieces are “lacking in substance” (ibid.: 21, 125).\textsuperscript{56} This example may seem to be extreme, but such views form a solid


\textsuperscript{54} Citron (1994: 22) even presumes that sonata form formerly corresponded to the need to keep women under social control in bourgeois society. Yet, in my view, the dramatic sonata form model can be heard as a demonstration of any authoritarian control, and thus the listening subject may project who- or whatever as representatives of the controlling power and of the “others” in submission to that power (cf. Said 1991: 100; see also, McClary 1991: 16).

\textsuperscript{55} Does it also mean anything, that Sibelius never composed a concerto for this instrument? Is that what Rickards’s “never grew to like piano” actually denotes? If Sibelius had written a piano concerto, would the accustomed conceptions on his piano music be more merciful – if the composer had proved his musical potency with the piano? Would Sibelius then had been seen as having a “close” (fertile/fertilizing/productive/begetting) relation to the piano?

\textsuperscript{56} Femininity has often been theorized as a lack, and such a discourse easily expands to imply allusions to womanishness, effeminacy, unmanliness, emasculate, etc.
tradition in Sibelius literature, and one even gets the feeling of repetition compulsion when scanning it (e.g., Blom 1947: 97–98; 1954: 774; Layton 1980: 286; or James 1983: 130–132). Robert Layton’s Sibelius entry in The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians (1980) says, “Sibelius had relatively little feeling for piano”; “rarely is his keyboard writing idiomatic”; “generally speaking his keyboard layout is ineffective”; and “only in the sonatinas is there as strong hint of the concentration and economy that mark his finest orchestral scores” (1980: 286).37

Eric Blom writes, in his article on Sibelius’s piano music, that Sibelius is a master of orchestra and

… no other category of his work is really important … [S]mall pieces predominate vastly among his keyboard works … a great many nothing more than the suavely lyrical things …. A large number of them may be said to be potboilers, if that term will be accepted as implying nothing more shameful than the supplying of pleasant recreation for the leisure hours of amateur pianists and providing a composer with an occupation which, though doubtless lucrative, is innocent of anything worse than agreeable trifling for the shake of harmless triflers. Certainly no worse accusation can be levelled at Sibelius for spinning a hundred and one innocuous yarns for the entertainment of those who would probably be worse occupied, at the piano or elsewhere, if he had devoted the time given to these pieces to an Eighth and Ninth Symphony instead – which is about what the saving of labour on the piano music would have represented in orchestral work. (Blom 1947: 97–98.)

Blom’s worry that Sibelius’s harmless piano works have deprived us of the master’s eight and even ninth symphonies, tells how dangerous the small, “insignificant” and “pleasant” miniatures really are: lyrical pianism “castrates” masterpieces from the western art music canon. Also, they stain composer’s reputation. In this ideological sphere, one and same composer cannot compose both large symphonies and small piano miniatures. Thus the composer image is split into two. The purpose of this defense mechanism is to avoid anxieties that accompany the synthesis of the two. As a starting point for a discussion on Sibelius’s piano music, this regressive split, preserved by the aesthetic superego of Sibelius research, has been surprisingly vigorous.58 Although Sibelius did hammer his themes most noticeably – most publicly – in the compositional field considered the manliest, i.e., in “absolute” symphonies, the fear of the feminine, unmanly

---

37 The Sibelius entry in the newest Grove Music Online was written by James Hepokoski (2001). Piano works are not discussed at all. In place of such discussion there is silence, a gap, a void.

58 Sibelius’s brief piano music is also associated with the negative impressions of incidental and popular music. Often, certain disparaging statements from the composer himself are repeated. For example, Sibelius’s statement to Törne: the “piano does not sing” (Törne 1937: 29; see also, Kilpeläinen 2002: ix), and the like. However, the composer may have had various motives for such statements, such as being in accord with the prevailing (gender) ideology.
Chapter 7. From abjection to assimilation: Sibelius’s Kyllikki

stamp has been apparently strong in Sibelius literature. Because music already in itself has been in danger of becoming marked as feminine, effeminate, womanish, and women’s business, in the context of brief piano music the fear of femininity and effeminacy is raised to a second degree.\(^{59}\) During the last decade, however, Sibelius’s piano works have become a topic of growing interest, especially among pianists.\(^{60}\) The growing interest in the marginal Sibelius (the “other Sibelius, not the symphonist”) is related to the change in musicology, where the canons and ideologies of western art music, and research on it, have been subjected to considerable scrutiny. Therefore, studying Sibelius’s whole output, including areas formerly standing in the shadow of his orchestral works, can nowadays form a “respectable” pursuit. At the same time, research expeditions into the semantic (“non-absolute” and “non-abstract”) areas of Sibelius’s music have become more and more popular.\(^{61}\)

---

\(^{59}\) Thus it has been important to write about Sibelius as an “abstract thinker” (cf. Rickards) or, for instance, that the power and sensuality of Sibelius are “never erotic”, and that his music is “perfectly manly” (Downes 1945: 48). The symptomatic value of the latter statement is further enhanced by the fact that Olin Downes wrote these words in the context of Sibelius’s orchestral poem *Lemminkäinen*! As McClary (1991: 68) has reflected: “Perhaps if erotic impulses were valued as positive – if, in other words, arousal were not a pretext for anti-woman hysteria – the whole repertory [of western art music] would be radically different ….”

\(^{60}\) See Alesaro 1998; Gräsbeck 2000; E. Heinonen 2000; Ignatius-Fleet 1999; Kon 1995; Loesti 1998; Ostrovsky 1998; and E. T. Tawaststjerna 1990; see also, Gould 1977 and 1985. New recordings on Sibelius’s piano music are released constantly. Maybe along with the research project of *Jean Sibelius Works – A Critical Edition* (*Jean Sibelius Werke*; published by Helsinki University Library, The Sibelius Society of Finland, and Verlag Breitkopf & Härtel [Wiesbaden]) inaugurated in 1996, scholars will become more interested in Sibelius’s piano music. Piano music editions will comprise altogether five volumes, three of which consist of piano pieces with opus numbers, one with no opus number, and one includes piano arrangements of compositions originally made for other instruments as arranged by the composer himself. My thanks to Kari Kilpeläinen, for this information in August 2001 (private communication). See also, Kilpeläinen 2002 and http://www.lib.helsinki.fi/sibelius.

\(^{61}\) See, e.g., Jackson & Murtomäki (eds.) (2001), where semantic studies exist side by side with formal symphony analyses.
Chapter 8
Music of absence and melancholy: Schubert’s “Der Lindenbaum” and Chopin’s Nocturne in C minor Op. 48 No. 1

Romantic memories are often those of absence, of that which never was.
(Rosen 1995a: 175)

Indeed, it could almost be said that to the degree that the object has been lost, the subject has been found.
(Silverman 1988: 7)

8.1 The shadow of the object

If speech – language – produces absence, and is produced from and in absence, as can be stated in accordance to Lacanian theory, then we could perhaps say that western art music, and especially that of Romanticism, seems to elevate that absence to a fetish. Becoming enchanted with this absence and lack, and clothing the structural trauma often into forms of loss and reminiscence, music paradoxically succeeds in creating a sense of full presence, an illusion of complete being. If music starts from where words cease, it starts as enjoying its symptom,¹ as a paradoxical combination of emptiness and fullness. When representing loss, emptiness, silence, dreaming, and death – this is a specialty of Romantic music – music fills the listener with gratification. With its illusion of immediacy, it seems to offer us, especially successfully, the bliss of the main illusions of what Lacan (1977 [1966] and 1998 [1973]) refers to as the imaginary. As an extreme art of absence, music may be heard as a dense fantasy that plays the subject’s fundamental trauma. In Freudian terms, it is a question of the inner landscape of primary narcissism, separation problematics, object loss, and melancholy. This

¹ The expression is from Žižek 2001 [1992].
night-garden in the subject’s being is something that intimate Romantic music, such as brief piano pieces and lieder, cherishes and cultivates with utmost care and devotion.

Brief Romantic music offers ideal material for studying musical representations of melancholy. Romantic aesthetics produces a special melancholic rhetoric of lost paradise and eternal longing, the discourse of absence, and, as inseparably related to this, a conception of the temporal unfolding between two tenses, the present and the past. Raymond Monelle (2000: 116) describes this turn in musical aesthetics and the resulting temporal dynamics in the music of subjectivity:

In short, the gulf between duration and progression has become ontological. The past and future, infinitely desired and feared, occupy an area of being quite different from the empty and meaningless present. To pass through time is to move from the vague and aimless present back to the longed-for, alluring, and perfumed past, the world of imagination….; what is sought is usually a distant past, personal, ancient, mythic or ethnic, sufficiently sundered from the present to be unavailable for a very close inspection. The two temporalities, lyric and progressive, have become two states of being, and art enters on a period of schizophrenia.

In psychoanalytic theory, melancholy concerns disappointment in object-relation, and in the very first one. It is a question of the subject-other dialectics and subjectivity formation in a very primal state. According to Freud, in the essentially ambivalent object-relation that melancholy sets up, the libido attaches itself to the lost object. The situation is frozen into a special state, wherein ”the shadow of the object” totally takes over the subject and her being – so totally, that the ego of the subject becomes empty, because of its identification with the lost object and with the latter’s attributes of absence. Thus the subject in fact suffers a loss in regard to her ego, whereas in mourning, the subject suffers loss in regard to an object. (Freud 1957a [1917/15]: 247, 249.) As Michel Poizat puts it: “The best way not to lose an object is to identify with it, to make oneself that object”: “to become loss oneself” (1992: 104). Freud writes about this loss of the melancholic:

[O]ne feels justified in maintaining the belief that a loss … has occurred, but one cannot see clearly what it is that has been lost, and it is all the more reasonable to suppose that the patient cannot consciously perceive what he has lost either. This, indeed, might be so even if the patient is aware of the loss which has given rise to his melancholia, but only in the sense that he knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him. …[t]he inhibition of the melancholic seems puzzling to us because we cannot see what it is that is absorbing him so entirely. (Freud 1957a [1917/15]: 245–246.)

Different psychoanalytic paradigms and writers give different status, content, and connotations to the object of melancholy that is absorbing the subject so entirely. Lacanian psychoanalysis emphasises the inherent, unavoidable consti-
tutive lack in subject and the illusory nature of the object of melancholy. The emphasis is in the impossible other, a fantasized unconscious belief in whole self and full presence. Freudian psychoanalysis gives empirical content to the object of melancholy whence it would be first and foremost a question of the separation from primal love (mother); or there resonates the breast standing for the wish of union with mother. Kristeva’s (1989) semiotic theory of melancholy combines both Lacanian and Freudian ideas. Subjectivity is a result of a kind of mourning work, but the melancholic subject is unable to count on signification and refuses to symbolize the lost object (m/other, *la chose*).

Giorgio Agamben (1993) and Slavoj Žižek (2000) emphasize that the melancholic’s loss is illusory, for the lost object is something which the subject never had. Žižek stresses that lack (*manque*) is not same as loss (*perte*); the subject only experiences a lack as a loss. In the darkness of the night of subjectivity, the melancholy person does not see that the object was lacking from the very beginning, and that its manifestation can happen only in the form of a lack, that the object is only a positivization of the lack or void. Something (real, a fundamental trauma) resists symbolization, and melancholic posits this resistance to the positively existing, although lost, object: the only way to possess an object (of melancholy), is to treat an object that you still fully possess as if this object were already lost. (Žižek 2000: 659–661; 1997: 195.) Thus the material object (e.g., the beloved one) is elevated to the status of an impossible love. This is the strategy, for example, of Schubert’s *Winterreise*, Schumann’s *Dichterliebe* and *Frauenliebe und Leben*: paradise exists only as lost. This is what provides unique flavor for a melancholic love relationship (Žižek 2000: 661) and condenses the innermost logic of Romanticism (cf. Žižek 1997: 194). Precisely here lies the fetishist nature of Romantic music of absence, lost object, and eternal longing.

In this chapter, romantic music of absence and melancholy is examined as a stand-in for an impossible presence, which envelops the central void in subject’s being. Here continues the discussion on musical figuring of the lost object, a discussion begun above, in Chapters 7.4–7.5. Here, two examples from the lyrically expressive literature of brief Romantic pieces are closely heard (read) subject-strategically: Schubert’s “Der Lindenbaum” and Chopin’s Nocturne in C minor Op. 48 No. 1. As with the interpretation of the second movement of *Kyllikki*, two cases here are also approached as presenting a dialogue of the present and the past, in figuring the lost object of melancholy. They expose an imaginary dialectics of absence and presence, lack and fulfillment, emptiness and completeness. It is precisely by constructing the present and past tense that they are able to represent the lost object and the logic of memory at the edge of the melancholic disposition where the shadow of the object has fallen upon the ego (cf. Freud

2 The expression is Dolar’s (1996: 26).
Chapter 8. Music of absence and melancholy: Schubert and Chopin

1957a [1917/15]: 249). This affective rhetoric of loss however differs in the two works. It is these different subject strategies of dealing with object loss that I have tried to interpret.

8.2 A linden tree, horns, and maternal fantasy: Schubert’s “Der Lindenbaum” as acoustic mirror

The fifth song in Franz Schubert’s Winterreise, “Der Lindenbaum” (D. 911 No. 5, 1827), belongs to those moments in the cycle in which dream and fantasy provide a momentous peace and solace from the traumatic present time, the state of depression that the cycle depicts. From a psychoanalytic point of view, Winterreise, composed to poems by Wilhelm Müller, is in its entirety a music of trauma, memory, and forgetting: a depressive journey towards the freezing of the self, the emptying of psyche. From the very beginning, already in the first song of the cycle, “Gute Nacht” [!], the “I” of the lied (subject) is a stranger, an alien, as David Schwarz (1997a: 39) observes in his psychoanalytic discussion on Winterreise. The song and thus the whole cycle begins from a strikingly high pitch (f⁴)⁴, as if representing vulnerability or pain, and proceeds downwards in D minor by irrevocable eighth notes which mark a wandering topic and which continues through the whole song from start to end: “Fremd bin ich eingezogen, fremd zieh ich wieder aus.” Trauma has confronted the subject already before the beginning of this first song, where she⁵ is at the front of the long journey of 24 songs, into the night and shadowlands of subjectivity. Each song of Winterreise is a psy-

---

3 Winterreise has been much discussed in the history of music research. Most important for my interpretation are Susan Youens’s Retracing a Winter’s Journey: Schubert’s “Winterreise” (1991; see also 1996, 1997, and 2002) and the ones by Schwarz (1997a: Chap. 3) and Charles Rosen (1995a: 116–204). Rosen’s (1995a–b) discussions on the horn topic have served as one starting point for my study. A central contemporary study of Winterreise is also Richard Kramer’s Distant Cycles: Schubert and the Conceiving of Song (1994). A study examining Schubert’s songs in general – though not so much Winterreise – in psychoanalytic and gender-theoretical perspective focusing on the constructions of subjectivity, is Kramer’s Franz Schubert – Sexuality, Subjectivity, Song (1998b). About psychoanalytic Schubert research and new-musicological debate, see the discussion in pp. 32–33 (Chap. 2.2).

4 The pitch in question is sounding f⁴ when sung by male singers. The piece is often transposed to a lower key and something of its “pain” in the beginning is lost.

5 My feminist (compensatory) habit to use the feminine pronoun “she” as the general way to refer to the human being may sound strange here because of the male protagonist in the cycle. Indeed, in Romantic aesthetics and arts, the subject (here, the wanderer) was a patriarchally constructed male subject. However, in my study, the “she” as a general third person, refers neither to female nor male subject but to the listening subject or “played subjectivity”, regardless of “her” gender (and/or that of the object of “her” affection).
Subject Strategies in Music

chic landscape; all events and happenings have already taken place before the beginning of the cycle. Before the fifth song, the psyche of the subject has been compared to iron, rattling weather vane teared by wind (2. “Die Wetterfähne”), to frozen tears (3. “Gefrorne Tränen”), and numbness (4. “Erstarrung”).

In the fifth song, “Der Lindenbaum”, the subject briefly succeeds in enlivening her depressively frozen psyche, to grasp more comfortable echoes inside her, images from a happier past, or fantasy that the subject takes as her past and that envelops the empty center of her trauma. As Charles Rosen (1995a: 116–123) shows, the musical iconography of the linden tree caressed by the wind and the distant horn call constructs the song to be music of memory, music in the past tense. At the level of psychoanalytic interpretation, a musical fantasy of maternal care is depicted, a maternal vocal space, or acoustic bosom.6

As Susan Youens (1991: 163, see also, 102–103) shows, the comfortable fantasy (dream) and the painful present are in a complex dialogue in “Der Lindenbaum”. From subject-strategical point of view, the consoling fantasy of unity with the beloved/object/[m]other (linden tree) has however also its negative dimension, the state of annihilation and de-subjectivization. In Winterreise’s landscape of loss, the fantasy of unity in “Der Lindenbaum” receives its color from the death drive (thanatos) rather than the life drive (eros): The death drive strives towards the reduction of tensions to zero-point: its goal is “to bring the living being back to the inorganic state” (Laplanche & Pontalis 1988: 97). This is why at the place of annihilation, there thus actually manifests something else. In “Der Lindenbaum” the comforting fantasy has another kind of negative dimension, the possibility which tragically seems to suggest itself in the last section of the song: the loss of contact to the outside world and the inner world’s total occupation of subject’s reality experience, the extreme form of which is a psychosis, that the last song in the cycle (24. “Der Leiermann”) well could be considered to depict (cf. Schwarz 1997a: 42, 61). In Winterreise and similar Romantic song cycles about the lost love, the subject is going towards her death (cf. Rosen 1995a: 120–121, 194–195). From the point of view of psychoanalytic theory of melancholy we see it as a matter of ego loss.

As referred to above (p. 237), according to Freud (1957a [1917/15]: 249) in melancholy the ego identifies with the lost object, and so the object loss turns into an ego loss. This is a central mechanism in the psychic landscape of “Der Leiermann”, the last song in Winterreise, where the organ-grinder player turns mechanically and monotonously the handle of his instrument in a frozen winter

The compensatory and emancipatory “she” is important here: so that this music need not necessarily be heard from a male and/or heterosexual position.

6 My usage of the notion of the interactive space between the infant and mother as a music-analytical perspective is drawn from E. H. Spitz 1991 and Ostwald 1993.
Chapter 8. Music of absence and melancholy: Schubert and Chopin

landscape and in an as frozen and senseless (dead) harmony, as Rosen (1995a: 194–195) depicts. For Schwarz (1997a: 63) it portrays the death as a “contact with a piece of the inscrutable Real.” In his study on vocal object as lost object, Poizat (1992: 104) writes about this tragic fate of the melancholic discovered by many Romantic composers: “To identify with the lost ... object is to become loss oneself, to become supreme purification, to be silence; in other words, to die. Death becomes the only possible locus of return to that initial real that has not yet been elaborated by the symbolic.” The object a of desire is impossible in its elusiveness: “one never has jouissance of object in the sense of ‘possessing’ it, except in the embrace of death” (ibid.). The blurred condition of subject as somewhere between living and dead, i.e., as turned towards the death, is constructed in “Der Leiermann” effectively by the mechanicalness of the music. Mechanicalness is an important element in Freud’s notion of the uncanny (1955a [1919]; see also, Chap. 5.2.3), which provides one with an interpretative key to the song and, as proposed in the present chapter, a key that unlocks the meanings in the last section of “Der Lindenbaum”.7

I am examining “Der Lindenbaum” here as a fantasy of the acoustic mirror (Rosolato 1978; Silverman 1988; Falck 1996: 24–25; Schwarz 1997a: 16–22), in which the beloved one, the desired other envelopes the subject in a caring, holding, and supporting sonorous envelope. This space of the acoustic mirror can be understood as a reminiscence or fantasy – an echo – of the interactive, pre-linguistic space between mother and infant, based on sounds and voice: the space characterized by Spitz’s (1965) “conesthetic” organization, Stern’s (1985) supramodal transformative system of amodal perception and experiential realm of vitality affects, as well as Kristeva’s (1984 [1974] and 1980) semiotic chora.

In the acoustic mirror stage, the infant bathes in her mother’s voice and starts by degrees to imitate the sounds she hears. In this way, the infant incorporates the auditory sphere that is articulated by the mother’s voice. The infant “plays” with her voice, trying to match it with that of the mother (Silverman 1988: 80–81; Schwarz 1997a: 2, 16, 20–21). From the angle offered by Donald W. Winnicott (1971), it is important to emphasize that the mother also answers to child’s uttering of sounds by imitating her in the same way. The mother gives back the “child’s first self” by identifying with the child and her utterings (Davis & Wall-

7 Another uncanny element in “Der Leiermann” is the confronting of the double in the lyrics (the organ-grinder-beggar as the double of the wanderer). See also Schwarz’s (1997a: 58–63, 79) discussion of the song, in light of Žižek’s Lacanian notion of destination, as representing trauma, repetition compulsion, psychotic’s “forgetting to forget”, split, and contact with the real. Interesting also is Christopher H. Gibbs’s (1995) entry into the debate concerning Schubert’s “Erlkönig” as exposing uncanny listening effects; Gibbs describes the song’s rhetoric as deconstructing the logic of binary thinking (life/death, male/female).
An illusion is produced in the child such that she believes herself to have produced the sounds she actually imitates. The child *hears herself* through mother’s voice and first “recognizes” herself – her elementary “identity”, her voice – in the vocal mirror provided by the mother. The vocal mirror holds the child in an acoustic envelope and forms a kind of “other, sounding skin” in a state in which the child is not yet able to produce the borders of self and experience her body as a separated unity. The child recognizes herself in her mother’s voice and melts to it, and at the same time hears through it herself as separate, distinct, parted by the voice. (Silverman 1988: 80–81; Schwarz 1997a: 16, 20–21.) The acoustic mirror seems to offer the child her first early experiences of selfhood, which are kinds of momentary experiences of continuity, constancy, permanence, and capability to act.8

According to Schwarz (1997a: 16), the acoustic mirror stage is to be understood as an acoustic equivalent and predecessor of the visual mirror stage (Lacan 1977 [1966]); as such, it dominates child’s developing psychic reality already before the visual mirror stage. Nevertheless, I would instead prefer to understand the acoustic mirror stage in a Winnicottian way, as an interaction of “acoustic” or “voiced regards”. Lacan does not theorize the regard or face (or the voice) of the mother as mirror as Winnicott does (Kuusamo 1990: 28–29; Muller 1996: 121–122; Davis & Wallbridge 1984: 129). Winnicott (1971), as others later (Joyce McDougall, for instance), emphasizes the *mirror role of the mother* in the development of child’s self. The infant’s *self* develops in the environment’s/mother’s “good enough care” and in the emergent *potential space* characterized by illusion, transitional object, and transitional experience. Mother’s vocal nursing strengthens child’s weak and immature ego by offering it ego-support when holding the child in mind as a whole person (Davis & Wallbridge 1984: 51). Whereas Lacan’s subject mis-recognizes herself (alone) in the front of a mirror and alienates fundamentally, Winnicott’s subject integrates in the intersubjective, reciprocal space. As Winnicott says, actually the concept of “baby” does not even exist, for when describing the baby, one describes someone other: the baby cannot get along alone but is always necessarily part of an interactive relation (see Davis & Wallbridge 1984: 46). This is a realm of a kind of *two-unity*, inaugurating the subject’s imaginary realm of (“identical”) doubles always there. Lacan’s subject develops around the void, gap, lack, and alienation of being, Winnicott’s around the fullness of interactive space and familiarity. Furthermore, Lacan does not emphasize the sensations and experiences of the *sensuous body* of the small child, i.e., the *sensational* side of the developing (bodily) ego (cf. Silverman 1996: 10–14). It remains in his theory in the shadow of the visual

8 Stern (1985) provides an interesting account of the manifold development and related various stages of the infant’s self during her first year of life.
Chapter 8. Music of absence and melancholy: Schubert and Chopin

– distanced – (mirror) imaginary construction of the ego.

As argued in Chap. 5.2.2, music may evoke in the listening subject a textual and experiential state resembling the acoustic mirror stage, a fantasy of an unbroken paradise of two-unity. Construction of binary oppositions (full/empty, presence/absence, etc.) is fundamental in this (Schwarz 1997a: 16), and willing material for it are various kinds of sonic double structures, such as echoes, doublings of voices, unison, unison transforming into two-part counterpoint, and question and answer structures, for instance (ibid.: 20–22).

8.3 Memory, distance, and absence – The transitional space of horns

The beginning of “Der Lindenbaum” is a titillating musical image of the sonorous envelop of the acoustic mirror. The linden tree, in the shadow of which the subject has dreamt so many sweet dreams (“ich träumt’ in seinem Schatten so manchen süßen Traum”), is already at the level of lyrics, an image of a maternal care. The song begins with a piano introduction that consists of a musical image of wind that rustles the leaves of the linden tree, depicted by fast triplets of sixteenth notes containing open sixths in E major and pianissimo (cf. the right hand part), as many analysts has pointed out (Rosen 1995a: 117–119; Youens 1991; 2002: 262). The sonorous leaves of the linden tree envelope the subject in an acoustic bosom. The leaves’ whirling is accompanied in the bass register by open sixths that widens over the measure to octaves – a kind of horn calls (see Example 8a). In accordance with romantic musical iconography (see above, Chap. 7.4), the horn calls here signify distance, or to be more precise, temporal distance between the present time (winter) and remembered time (summer) (cf. Rosen 1995a: 117–119). Also, the pianissimo can here be interpreted to contribute the construction of distance: the music (here: the memory) comes from “far away”.

9 Henry S. Drinker’s metric translation of the poem is provided in n. 17, p. 249. I thank Markus Lång for kindly suggesting this translation and providing the material.

10 Markus Lång (private communication) notes that in German the term is masculine (Der Lindenbaum), and furthermore, that a tree in itself could be interpreted as a phallic symbol, here “father-linden” – or “he-linden” which might offer a queer point of listening. However, the abstract other (object of desire) in my discussion is not gendered in any one way. Rather, the roots of this acoustic envelope are developmentally in maternal space, due to which I interpret the linden tree as maternal space. Furthermore, it could be pointed out that an archaic fantasy of an omnipotent mother is also a phallic mother (who contains the phallus/father).

11 Youens (2002: 162) finds them “evocative of a storied past, of Nature, of memory, of fealty to one’s native country”.

243
The sense of distance could be examined also as a function of mythic music (Tarasti 1978). The bell-like, clanging horn signal, composed of a dotted eighth, sixteenth and accentuated half notes \((b–c^\#–b^1)\) in m. 2, could be interpreted as a delicate – distant – reference not only to a hunting horn but also to a pastoral-mythic topic in the sense of dance-likeness and magic-mythicalness. Thus it would construct a reference to nature and natural mythicalness in the sense of Romantic nature symbolism, as do the linden tree and horn (cf. Tarasti 1978: esp. 65–112).

The piano introduction contains elements of the acoustic mirror also in other senses besides a sonorous envelope: The whir of leaves and horn calls in the first phrase are repeated immediately (m. 3), mirrored an octave higher. This forms an echo effect, an answer of the other, which gives back to the subject an acoustic image of self. The triplet units of the leaf rustles in themselves (e.g., \(g^\#–e^1–g^\#\)) can be regarded as reflecting backwards, or re-reflecting, by their symmetrical structure. The total effect of the leaf rustle can be heard as a mirror-like ripple. And the bell-like (hunting) signal in m. 3, which in itself is already retrospective in structure, is repeated immediately two octaves lower in the bass, as a dark echo (m. 4).

The horn-call impression of the piano introduction is enforced by the used intervals: open sixths, fifths, and fourths heighten the sense of distance and bareness. The crystallization of the horn call topic happens in mm. 7–8, in which there is a perfect romantic sign of memory, a two-part horn call trope\(^{12}\) descending from the interval of third to that of fifth. As already addressed (pp. 221–222, Chap. 7.4), the horn call serves in Romantic musical semantics as a symbol of memory, or to be more precise, as Rosen (1995a: 117–118) writes: as a symbol of distance, absence, regret, and longing, the call of the lost paradise. Here the figure is heard at the very border point between the instrumental introduction and vocal part as if marking the beginning of remembrance (= singing). It is a boundary marker. The horn call trope manifests here twice, first with a fortepiano attack, i.e., as emphasized (m. 7), and then as a very silent and tender, even fragile echo in piano pianissimo, as mirrored in m. 8.

Along with distance, absence, remembrance, and longing, the horn calls also signify, in the winter landscape of the Winterreise, a thought of summer and thus a shift to another – past – time (cf. Rosen 1995a: 121–123; also, Youens 1991:

---

12 Here I use the term “trope” to indicate more loosely a musical equivalent for “figural, metaphorical language”, a conventional symbol (symbolism, metaphor), and thus not the specific mechanism of one topic changing the other for the sake of new meaning, as Hatten (1994: 295) defines it.
Chapter 8. Music of absence and melancholy: Schubert and Chopin

Der Lindenbaum


245
163), as if depicting the multi-layered compose of subject’s psyche.\textsuperscript{13} Instead of the common key (E\textsubscript{b} major) of the German hunting horn, the trope is here in B major (= the dominant of E major), which could be interpreted as a sign of distanciation emphasizing its symbolic nature.\textsuperscript{14} Harmonically it is composed to a dominant function V\textsuperscript{7} (leading to the tonic in which the first stanza begins), which creates a different sound from the common tonic position of the horn call, such as in the second movement of Sibelius’s \textit{Kyllikki} or at the beginning of Beethoven’s “\textit{Lebewohl}” Sonata.\textsuperscript{15} Here the horn call trope is also a symbol of perfection, an image of the beloved as an idealized object, and of the subject’s alter-ego as an ego ideal. Musically it is an image of the unbroken unity of two separate voices, as well as their overall one-ness, a sounding two-in-one, or unity-of-two.

Post and hunting calls, such as fanfares and signals, in the times of Romanticism, may still have belonged to the everyday soundscape, but at the same time, they already started clearly to mean a vanishing tradition. Therefore in music, the imitation of post and hunting horns started in Romanticism to signify not only landscape, nature and such, but also more and more an acoustic image of a past time. In Mahler’s late Romantic music they become signs of excessive nostalgia, but to construct an effect of nostalgia by horn trope is familiar already from Mozart's music. In western art music, a quote like imitation of horns by other instruments has been a relatively common rhetorical device since the 16\textsuperscript{th} century, but its “golden age” was the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries. (Monelle 2000: 38–40, 135, 172; Ratner 1980: 18.) In the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Romantic forest symbol-ism adopts the hunting topic of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century to refer to forest and woods as mythical, mysterious, and magical place (Monelle 2000: 40, 135). The overtones of the horn represent “wild” nature, and this mythical aspect is reinforced by the link the horn has with archaic horns made of animals’ bones (cf. Tarasti 1978). As a sign of forest, a horn call refers, except to mystery and magical, also to unknown, adventure, danger, romance, fairies – to sexuality and lovers’ trysts (Monelle 2000: 40, 135).

\textsuperscript{13} More often in western art music, the hunting horn refers to autumn, as in Joseph Haydn’s \textit{Seasons} (Monelle 2000: 40).

\textsuperscript{14} The “actual” post horn in “Die Post” (the 13\textsuperscript{th} song of the \textit{Winterreise}) is in E\textsubscript{b} major. In Müller’s sequence of poems as it was published in complete form in 1824, “Die Post” comes immediately after “Der Lindenbaum” but Schubert relegated it to the 13\textsuperscript{th} place in the cycle. “Frühlingstraum” that was 4\textsuperscript{th} in Müller became 11\textsuperscript{th} in Schubert. Interesting also is that Müller had “Mut” as the penultimate but Schubert put “Der Leiermann” as the last song and set the “Die Nebensonnen” between “Mut” and “Der Leiermann”. (Capell 1973 [1928/1957]: 229.)

\textsuperscript{15} In the horn call on the dominant, the first interval is a minor third instead of major third, the sixth is more tense at the end, and the middle interval is a major third instead of a perfect fifth.
Furthermore, the horn call trope is not only a sign of forest or hunter, but of the Romantic *wanderer*, who stands for the Romantic subject *par excellence*, and the landscape the Romantic subject inhabits. Precisely by making up a sign of subject by referring to outdoor life and forest, the horn call trope carries a connotation of the exotic alienation of the urbane subject. (Cf. Monelle 2000: 135, 40.) In accordance with this cultural imagery, Schubert’s and Müller’s linden is an urban tree at the town gate, as Rosen (1995a: 117) writes. It could be said that actually horn trope signifies a *boundary space* between nature and culture, body and spirit – and thus maybe also the one between feminine and masculine. (Here it is to be remembered that the horn acts as a conventional sign of sexual activity and virility in comic buffo operas; Ratner 1980: 19.) Moreover, the horn symbol acts in “Der Lindenbaum” as a boundary marker also formally (structurally): it denotes a transition from a section to another – and from a time stratum and psychic register to another. Interestingly, in his essay “La voix: Entre corps et langage” where Rosolato inaugurates the concept of the acoustic mirror, he happens to mention horns in Romantic literature and music as a symbol of voice as a sign of life (1978: 43). He also points out the closeness of the words *le corps*, *le cor*, and *le coeur* (ibid.: n. 1).

When after the piano introduction the vocal part starts by recalling the linden tree (“Am Brunnen vor dem Tore da steht ein Lindenbaum”), this act of remembrance is accompanied by the piano’s mellow, mainly four-part E major chords, as if a quartet of horns were playing (cf. Rosen 1995a: 119). From the perspective of the acoustic mirror, the full sound of four horns functions as a sign of presence and maternal sonorous envelope. Harmony based on major thirds constructs here a meaning of presence and fullness in contrast to the preceding introduction, the open intervals of which rather signify absence, or to be more precise, the presence of the sign of absence – or the presence of the absent in mind. These specifications expose the function and purpose of the transitional object and space (Winnicott 1971) – the threshold crossing in the registers of subjectivity. The highest horn is in unison with the vocal melody, which thus also forms a kind of acoustic mirroring. Often unison in itself is a strong sign of presence. Dynamically, the vocal part starts in *piano* and thus the nuance is here slightly stronger than what it has been for this far (if not taking into account the passing *fortepiano* accent in the horn call symbol in m. 7 as the boundary marker for the memorizing to begin). This also contributes to the musical construction of presence and

---

16 Müller’s poem “Der Lindenbaum” does not include horns, and thus we are here truly dealing with conventional *musical* iconography. However, Müller’s poem collection from which Schubert lixiviated his *Winterreise*, as well as *Die Schöne Müllerin*, contains a horn already in the title: *Seventy-seven poems from the posthumous papers of the wandering horn player*.  

247
the voice as presence. If the horn-support is the m/other (the imaginary), it holds here the subject/singer/melody in the best possible way. One of the most striking “feed-back” (mirroring) sounds in this passage is in m. 13 where the piano’s b' comes one eighth note behind the same pitch of b' of the vocal part, as if a most immediate “maternal” emphatic reaction to the voice, or as a well-defined delayed echo. This detail is not repeated in the following sections in the song, it happens only this one time at the word “träumt”.

In mm. 12 and 16 the “horn quartet” plays an interlude containing mirrored thirds placed one atop the other simultaneously, so that lower and higher horns play the same two-part pattern of thirds at a distance of octave. From the last eighth note in m. 18 and continuing in m. 19, the horns play this way, and the vocal part joins the action by trebling the upper part: melody, the image of subject and the construction of presence is built here by a threefold unison, or actually by a handful of unison constructions. This full, rich, and multiply supported mirror-like echoing and reflecting is emphasized by fortepiano and accent in the “tenor horn”. The degree of presence is at this point as its highest, here where the lyrics goes: “so many loving words”. Also the mirroring in m. 23 happens in the same manner by tripling the voice melody and by doubling the accompanying thirds (and the passing fifths and sixths). Here, at this point, where the lyrics goes: “zu ihm mich immer fort”, unfolds the highest pitch in the song, e2 at the word “ihm” as if emphasizing the forever ungraspable nature of the lost object (a). The passage is also highlighted by the ornamental grace note in the piano.

The vocal melody in section A1 saturates the horns also within phrases (see the latter parts of measure in mm. 11 and 15), a melodic gesture of the upper part of the horn call trope (a-g#-f#) is repeated, broadened into a triplet-like distant echo (at words “linden” and “süssen”). In mm. 18 and 22 an acoustic mirror is constructed not only by unison but also by counter-movement inversion in the bass. The pianissimo figure in the piano (m. 20), as well as the one in the last measure of section A1 (m. 24), can be heard as recalling not only the bell/horn-signal of the introduction (m. 2) but also the trill-bearing weather-vane figure in the second song of the Winterreise cycle (“Die Wetterfahne”).

The introduction and first A1-section, and likewise the whole song, is saturated with horns (Rosen 1995a: 119). It is in this musical iconography of horns that the figuring of the lost object and the imaginary dialectics of the acoustic mirror, between absence and presence, emptiness and fullness, present and past, distill into a song. As already suggested, it is possible to interpret the “topography” of horns in “Der Lindenbaum” to function as a transitional space and the horn symbols to mark a transitional object (Winnicott 1971). As a boundary marker and transitional object the horn symbol denotes the transition between the present and the past, and the dealing with the absent as present in the mind,
the lost as enliven by the memory. The transitional object denotes simultaneously both absence and presence; it is possible to interpret that in “Der Lindenbaum” the horn topic that is dominated by open intervals of fourth and fifth constructs absence and emptiness, and the horn topic that is dominated by a texture based on the thirds constructs presence and fullness.

8.4 The conflict of present and past, absence and presence, fact and fantasy

Typical of Schubert’s lieds – and to some degree for Romantic lied and music overall – is the representation of fantasy and the past in major mode, and reality and the present in minor mode, as for example Youens (1991: 102–103; see also, 1996, 1997, and 2002) has revealed. This forms an established point of discussion in Schubert literature in general (see, e.g., Kinderman 1986; Schwarz 1997a: 40–43). In “Der Lindenbaum” this works also as a basic rule (Youens 1991: 163; Schwarz 1997a: 41). It is not, however, a question of simple alternation of passages always in either past or present tense, but also of passages that have elements of both, and are complex figurations of subjective temporalities composed of various “tenses” simultaneously. Either of these two tenses may dominate clearly or completely, but the two tenses may also be in conflict or the domination may undergo transformation (this is why Table 8b is to be taken only schematically).

To discuss this temporal dialogue in subject-strategical perspective, some things about the formal structure of the song should be kept in mind. “Der Lindenbaum” is a mixture of ABA lied form, strophic composing, and through-composing (see lyrics and structure in Table 8b). The overall constellation is a complex and irregular puzzle of piano interludes, stanzas, melodies, and accompaniment.

17 Henry S. Drinker’s translation of “The Linden Tree” (in Schubert 1970):

[1] Beyond the gate and fountain / a linden towers high; / in dreams beneath its shadow / the hours went sweetly by. / [2] Ah many a tender message / was graven in its bark, / its presence gave me comfort / when days were sad and dark. / [3] And now I pass beneath it, / alone in deepest night, / and in the utter darkness, / I shut my two eyes tight. / [4] and then its branches rustle, / as if to call to me: / ‘Come here, my good companion, / for here at peace are we.’ / [5] The icy wind of winter / was blowing in my face, / my hat flew off and vanished, / I did not slack my pace. / [6] The tree is far behind me, / but as the miles increase, / I still can hear it rustling: / ‘Come here and find your peace’.

18 As can be observed from Table 8b, section A\(^1\) covers the first two stanzas (1\(^{st}–2^{nd}\)) of the poem. Section A\(^2\) covers two stanzas as well (3\(^{rd}–4^{th}\)). The B section covers only one
Subject Strategies in Music

figures, recycled in a kaleidoscopic way from section to section. For example, the A-sections (A¹, A², and A³) differ from each other largely because of the varying piano part. The lied form’s supposedly contrasting B-section, for its part, does not form any simple contrast to A-sections. This is because, firstly, the A-sections among themselves already form contrasting relationships in regard to each other. Secondly, although the melody in the B-section is new, i.e., different from that of the A-sections, the material in the piano part is based on elements of introduction, despite the fact that the harmony and mood are now different (contrasting). The piano introduction presents the central material of the song in a condensed form and functions as a kind of gesture repository or code matrix for the song, as is typical for Schubert’s music. Introductory materials of different forms and lengths manifest importantly in the boundary areas between the sections and at other turning points. (All transitions and the coda are based on the introduction; part B, too, is partly based on the introduction.) These irregular, later manifestations of the introduction materials create a sense of anomaly as well as of utmost condensation and intensity.

The present tense is constructed by various factors after the section A¹: The key changes from E major to the tonic parallel E minor for the transition¹ and first part of section A² (3rd stanza). The rustling-leaf figure of the introduction (mm. 1–2) sounds again in the transition¹ in E minor (mm. 25–28). The vocal part in the first part of the A², beginning at the end of m. 28, repeats the melody of A¹ in minor, and without the horns’ support (and no horn-symbol of memory/past). The lyrics and song are about “today”, about what is happening now: “Ich muß auch heute wandern vorbei in tiefer Nacht.” Yet, poignantly, the subject wants to repress this present, its hard facts, so much so that even in the dark she also closes her eyes: “da hab ich noch im Dunkel die Augen zugemacht.” In subject-strategical perspective it is a description of denial, one of the central mechanisms by which the subject may react to an unexpected, major object loss (Tähkä 1993: 103) and refuse to accept the reality of a traumatic perception (Laplanche & Pontalis 1988: 118).¹⁹

Compared to the preceding section A¹, the melody here is both the same and different. The “mirror” between the melodies of A¹ and A² reflects the image, but as twisted into minor. In addition to the change from major to minor, a significant

stanza (5th). The last section A³ covers one stanza that is the sixth and last in the poem, repeated twice in succession, and the second time it furthermore repeats the last line.

¹⁹ Developmentally, the mechanism of denial is rooted in the early life of the infant and the experience of the primal object (mother) as frustrating. It is an attempt to oppose the frustration that follows from the object loss or the object’s (even momentary) abandonment. The concept of denial is related to the concept of splitting which means a dichotomic experience of the object (mother) in terms of all-good and all-bad. It can be said that splitting results from the defensive activity of denial. (Tähkä 1993: 77, 67–69.)
change happens in the piano part: it does not even once play in unison with the vocal part; i.e., no unisons occur between the two. This constructs the state of disjunction (between the subject and the object) and absence (the object is lost). There is no two-unity, no maternal support: the vocal melody does not create unisons with its “other” (the piano). The acoustic mirror is not functioning; the subject’s psyche is not enlivened. Some passing occasional points that are shared with piano and vocal part ($g^1/g^1/g$ and $f^#/f^#/f^#$ in mm. 29, 31, 33, and 35 and without harmony) only increase the sense of non-contact, separation and loneliness. The non-sonorous, non-enveloping reality is unison-less, thirds-less, and harmony-less. Contrasted to the preceding section’s support of four horns and thirds, the sounds ring bleak and hard.

After this episode in the minor mode (first part of section $A^2$) the music returns to major (the latter part of $A^2$ and 4th stanza). The melody returns to the earlier mold of section $A^1$ but the piano part not entirely, for it mixes material from section $A^1$ (mellow major thirds) and the minor part of section $A^2$ (accompaniment figure). The music is stripped of the dotted, downward-jolting figure, as it were softened and rounded off. This is a shift from absence to presence, from the present to the past, from reality of facts to fantasy and memory; horns have returned, and the softly arching piano figures open and shut as branches of a tree. However, the fantasy does not work as perfectly as it did in section $A^1$: the echo of the minor part of $A^2$ in the accompaniment figure brings with it a sting of reality. The caring fantasy condenses in the unisons and mirroring, third-bearing harmonies in mm. 39 and 43, though, as said, the dialectics of the acoustic mirror – the one of presence/absence, present/past – is once again altered.

In Table 8b the subject–object dialogue – the transitional space – in the work is schematically depicted on the basis of the observed and discussed elements of acoustic mirroring, rhetoric of harmony and topics, and lyrics. In the table three semantic dimensions are differentiated into oppositional pairs: (1) presence vs. absence, (2) past vs. present, and (3) the state of unity vs. disjunction (the latter refers to the relation between the piano and vocal parts).

8.5 Depression, irony, symptom, alienation

As regards object loss, the minor part of $A^2$ could be interpreted as representing the memory of being abandoned by the beloved object (other), the repression of this memory and of the distress that the memory brings, and the return of the repressed. It also means a return to the present (consciousness). In the interpretative dimension of the maternal space it would represent the memory of both the m/other’s abandonment and abandoning the m/other, separation anxiety and related affects, such as guilt, the distress of symbiosis – and the failed attempts
Subject Strategies in Music

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION</th>
<th>LYRICS</th>
<th>MM.</th>
<th>KEY</th>
<th>presence vs. absence (of the lost object)</th>
<th>past vs. present tense</th>
<th>state of unity vs. disjunction</th>
<th>other acoustic mirroring elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTROD.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1–8</td>
<td>E Major</td>
<td>presence (distance)</td>
<td>past</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>leaf rustles – horn calls (open intervals) – echo effects – horn quartet (thirds) – unisons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSIT.²</td>
<td></td>
<td>45 [1]</td>
<td>C/B Major</td>
<td>absence</td>
<td>present</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>horn quartet unisons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODA</td>
<td></td>
<td>77–82 [6]</td>
<td>E major</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>leaf rustles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8b. Transitional subject–object dialogue in Schubert’s “Der Lindenbaum”: unity vs. disjunction means the relation between the piano and vocal parts; arrows (>) describe a tendency toward something or a struggle between tenses; the asterisk (*) marks the horn call symbol as a transitional boundary mark.

to repress these feelings. According to Silverman (1988: 72–73), the reconstruction of maternal sound space happens in two kinds of powerful cultural fantasies: in the positive bliss of unity and in the negative horror of being trapped.
Chapter 8. Music of absence and melancholy: Schubert and Chopin

(or annihilated). If section A$^1$ represents the positive fantasy of unity with the object (euphoria), section A$^2$ is ambivalent (dysphoric and euphoric), and leads to dysphoria in section B. But rather than as a negative fantasy of maternal space, I would interpret the minor part of the A$^2$-section and B-section from the point of view of melancholic depression: the fact of loss (the present) starts to become more dominant in the midst of the blissful fantasy. The B-section, then, would represent facing the fact of loss (reality) and the subject’s psychological choice in a situation in which she cannot get in touch with the fantasy of being cherished. At the border between A$^2$ and B, there is a break (an eighth pause) and then the dysphoria starts in sforzando. Because of its shortness, abruptness, and absence of the horn symbol (sweet memory) in the transition$^2$, the break can be experienced as expressing a violent cut, the dark side of the memory, the non-representable trauma. As Monelle (2000: 115), quoting George Sand, describes the logic of memory in Romantic music:

As for memory, this is no longer merely the faculty of uniting present with past, for they are now made of different stuff. “Between [present and past] there reappears a sort of dead duration, a kind of negative time composed of destruction and absence, an existence finished.” Remembering is now no longer uniting present with past, but realizing “all the distance that has to be crossed in order to discern … the dark, remote, and mysterious being of memory”.

Section B, the third episode in the song, is characterized by a change in tone in all its articulative levels. The one measure (introductory) transition$^2$ (m. 45) depicts the wind by the established figure of leaf rustle, but the wind is now more chromatic, dissonant, and sforzato, and it continues to blow throughout the B-section. The harmony oscillates unstably between augmented sixth chord and dominant seventh chord. This is the hard and cruel wind of the present that blows across the winter landscape of loss, not the gentle, caressing wind of the (recalled) past, summer, and the presence of the object as it was in the introduction (cf. Rosen 1995a: 117, 122). According to Rosen (1995b) the wind imagery functions in Schubert’s music as a unique means to represent the present and past simultaneously by one motive. In more psychoanalytic terms, it is apt to represent the divided subject, a kind of Proustian memory, and the conflict between outer circumstances (facts) and inner state of mind (fantasy). When the vocal part starts (“The icy wind of winter was blowing in my face”), its beginning note (f$^4$ in m. 45) forms a tritone with the bass note (C), and the c$^1$ of the triplet rustle in the piano part. As the most remote harmonic distance possible between two tones in a (twelve) tonal order, it constructs here a negation of the acoustic mirror,

---

20 According to Youens (1996: 127) the associations are “furious, driven motion and Death”.

253
fusion, and unity. Thus it could signify the pain of separation and disjunction for it can be read as conventional sign of “bad” (diabolus), angst, anxiety, and distress, and at least nowadays carrying association to sexuality and love/death topic. Short and dramatic B-section represents subject’s crisis and presentiment of destruction by the absence of mirroring elements (unison, echoes, and other supporting elements) and with Romantic iconography of the whistle of the rising wind, dissonant and chromatic harmonies, contrasting in dynamics (alteration of sforzato or forte and piano), bleakly repetitive octave drips (m. 48), and loud monotonous bass-note knocking.

The octave leap in the melody in m. 51, as a sudden change of register from high to low, could be heard as a kind of catabasis, a total, numbing collapse. Here occurs the psychological solution, the moment the subject makes her decision, the point of no return, where she can only go forward (“my hat flew off and vanished, I did not slack my pace”): the subject is not turning, for she thinks that there is no return; the good, to which there is no access, cannot be chosen. The subject abandons the object that abandoned her; this is why the B-section could be interpreted also as depressed person’s aggression against the lost object. With the irrevocable decisiveness of a depressed and self-destructive subject, she chooses her gloomy path, from which there is no return. After the c\textsuperscript{2}, the melody stays repetitively at c\textsuperscript{1} and turns at the last syllable to b; the melodic figure emphasize the decision of going towards (self-)destruction and de-subjectivization.

In the following transition\textsuperscript{3} (mm. 53–58) the wind slowly calms down, the horn call trope follows (mm. 57–58) as identical to its first appearance (cf. mm. 7–8). To crown the effect, there is now a fermata increasing the duration of the echo, making the listening subject to reflect the disappearance of fragile symbol of memory and absence in piano pianissimo. The transience of the blissful sound turns to an image of vanitas. In Barthes’s (1979: 114) words: The voice supports, “evinces, and so to speak performs the disappearance of the loved being, for it is characteristic of the voice to die. What constitutes the voice is what, within it, lacerates me by dint of having to die, as if it were at once and never could be anything but memory.”

In the last section (A\textsuperscript{3}), the combination of vocal melody and piano texture is once again of a new sort. The piano part keeps repeating a measure-long fanfare figure that derives from the minor part of A\textsuperscript{2} but is transformed here to major, a higher register and pianissimo, and allied with a pizzicato-like bass element. The overall effect of repeating the same major third fanfare, on the tonic or dominant degree throughout the sixth stanza, is a sense of the mechanistic, rather than of phrases experienced as continuities. There is no progress, destination, or purpose for which phrases would strive. Because of the alienation effect constructed by nuance, dynamics, and register, the mechanicalness becomes emphasized in a
sense of music-box quality. Instead of organic development, there is “dead” automa-
tion. The lyrics too refer to alienation: “Nun bin ich manche Stunde entfernt
von jenem Ort, und immer hör ich’s rauschen: du fändest Ruhe dort!” This works
as a presentiment of the last song in the cycle (“Der Leiermann”), which takes
such mortifying, clock-work automatism to its extremes.21 (See Example 8c.)

This last psychic transformation in subjectivity is very ambiguous. I am
tempted to hear in the fanfares – a conventional sign of victory – irony and repre-
sentation of alienation; the horns are not playing the warm acoustic bath that sup-
ports the subject’s selfhood but rather a cold and mechanical fanfare. When up to
the end of the sixth stanza (mm. 59–66) the piano has played its distant fanfare
without unisons or other mirroring with the vocal melody, it must be a question
of disjunction – but between what parties? Perhaps between the outer world and
the inner psychic reality of the subject? Can we deduce from the piano part that
the subject in the work is at the end able or unable to integrate the positive and
negative fantasy/memory together? Is this last transformation one of integration
or splitting?

If we interpret the piano part overall in “Der Lindenbaum” as a description
of the speaking subject’s state of mind, as the developing and divided psyche, we
have arrived in mm. 59–66, after the maternal care of the acoustic mirror at the
beginning, through ambivalence and distress, to a state of repetition compulsion
or overcompensation, rather than of a working through. The fanfare-like signal
recurs too many times as exactly the same. The acoustic mirror has transformed
into the uncanny (cf. Freud 1955a [1919]), the most familiar (heimlich) has
turned alien (unheimlich), the mechanicalness behind the mental representation
has revealed itself. It seems to be saying that the call of the linden tree or horn is
no longer in force. The transitional object has broken into pieces. The music-box
fanfares are like a sign or symptom of the psychic break that will take later place
in the Winterreise. They seem to be depicting a failing, desperate, perhaps ironic
attempt to hang onto the lost good, onto something that has already broken or is
about to break. Interesting here is what Richard Cohn (2004: 285, 299) observes
as the harmonic uncanny – the hexatonic pole – in the juxtaposition of “Der
Lindenbaum’s” E major with the preceding song’s (“Erstarrung”) C minor, an
effect that Youens (1991: 161) describes as “magical”.22 Magic (related to infant-
tile thought) is likewise a feature of Freudian uncanny and is perhaps evoked also
in the music-box quality of this musical section.23

---

21 Here the effect is far more crucially dependent on how the performers modalize the
passage than in “Der Leiermann”.
22 As “magical” Youens (1996: 220) describes in Winterreise also the sudden transforma-
tion of D minor into D major for the final stanza of “Gute Nacht”.
23 More thorough treatment of the notion of the uncanny is provided in Chap. 9.
Chapter 8. Music of absence and melancholy: Schubert and Chopin

If the distant fanfare would constitute in its *reiteration* a kind of sonorous envelope and acoustic mirror, it would not be a question of Winnicottian space of interaction (because the piano part is not “communicating” with the vocal part) but would represent rather Lacanian mis-recognition, the illusory construction of ego and the unavoidable state of alienation and loneliness of the subject (cf. Lacan 1977 [1966]: 1–7), in the sense of a failure to get along with this psychic structure. Its function would be to cover, to hide, like fragile and transparent ice, underneath which is the depressive nucleus of the subject’s existence. As Schwarz (1997a: 41) condenses the cycle: “*Winterreise* is a textual and musical representation of the narrator trying to sustain the illusion of signification and falling.”

My interpretation of “Der Lindenbaum” is guided by the overall context of *Winterreise*. Rosen (1995a: 120–121; 1995b) has noticed that “Der Lindenbaum” is the first song in *Winterreise* that deals with the longing for death that is the central theme of the cycle. At the end of the song, the embrace of the linden tree in which to “find one’s peace” manifests as longing for death, an expression of depression and self-destructiveness, a presentiment of destruction. From longing for the beloved (object), the subject has shifted to longing for death (de-subjectivization).  

At this point, we are only halfway through the ending section, for after the sixth stanza the same text is sung again in mm. 67–74 (repetition, once again). Now the fanfare-like piano part has a broader register, it seems to have come “closer”, though perhaps forcibly? The last three eighth notes in m. 69 form an acoustic mirror in the treble unison and double thirds-bearing accompaniment, suggesting that the horn quartet – the idea of good presence – returns for a moment. Thick triads in the bass on the first beats in mm. 67, 68, 71, and 72 create a sense of echo and recollection of cherishing. The climax takes place at m. 73 with e² (as in m. 23), and as a resolution in m. 74 there follow excessively doubled triads. Surprisingly, the last line (“du fändest Ruhe dort”) is repeated once again. Finally, the piano plays the leaf rustle (of the introduction) in pianissimo; replacing the former crescendo there is now diminuendo, cadencing, closure. The memory of the linden tree is still somehow existing, it still is resounding, but now its meaning is almost opposite to what it was in the introduction.

In the next two sub-chapters, I shall discuss another kind of strategy of object loss, in the other example of music of absence and melancholy, Chopin’s Nocturne in C minor.

24 Markus Lång (private communication), in a bit macabre way, sharpened this interpretative dimension for me, as if putting into words the latent meaning of the last line: “Du solltest dich hier erhängen.” Youens (2002: 262), for her part, writes: “the linden leaves that seem to say, ‘Come to me’ … beckon the wayfarer to death, as it is only in death that one truly becomes part of Nature.”
8.6 Remaking nothingness: Chopin’s Nocturne in C minor, Op. 48 No. 1

Frédéric Chopin’s Nocturne in C Minor (Op. 48 No. 1) begins *lento* and *mezza voce* as a very slow and dark march. The first two notes of the theme, as heavy as they are fragile, sound nerve-wrackingly on the off-beats, preceded by on-beat rests. Already in the first bar, the theme (subject) is broken and discontinuous (see Example 8d).


A march, chorale, Italian operatic sounds, and excessive appoggiaturas and ornamentations are mixed into the texture. In Chopin’s music, it is often a question not only of unique contrapuntal technique and polyphonic voice leading, but, also of a polyphony of genres: whatever the “host genre” (Samson 1989: 224), the latter absorbs contrasting voices, ghost genres,\(^25\) such as waltzes, marches, mazurkas, polonaises, chorales, and more. Chopin’s music constructs subjectivity significantly by a rhetoric of genres.\(^26\) Here, for example, a funeral march-like chord accompaniment with quarter note staccatos brings a “dense nocturnal air” into the texture and creates, together with the breaks in the theme, a smothering pathos of gaps and rests – a mass of pauses. Bass notes are as low as possible. Put simply, the musical subject is fragile, while its surroundings are ponderous and hard. But in Chopin’s musical landscape of melancholy, there seems to be mixed in certain wistfulness and sublimity or ennoblement, along with a great amount of latent aggression. Loss or good-byes to the lost object may be bitter, remembrances like hallucinations; irony, disdain, and superciliousness seem to

---

\(^{25}\) The term is Samson’s (1989: 224).

\(^{26}\) On the rhetorics of genre, see Kallberg 1996 and Hatten 1994. Illuminating also is Mártat Grabócz’s (1996 [1986]) study of Liszt’s piano music as rhetoric of “intonational types” such as funeral march, religioso themes, Italian bel canto, heroic themes, lament, etc.
accompany wishes to retrieve what was lost. The subject is not only sinking into the quicksand of the loss and trauma of her being, but at the same time seems to be reflecting on herself.

The middle section (mm. 25–48) begins in the tonic parallel C major (see Example 8e). As with the nocturnal second movement of Sibelius’s *Kyllikki* (see Chaps. 7.4–7.5), the (major) tonic parallel releases the subject from the burden of the minor mode and the present tense, and prepares the listener to hear the aura of melancholy open and to reveal the lost object. The effect of the middle section, its subject-strategical setting and related affects, are however quite different than in Sibelius’s *Kyllikki*. Here the lost object is fantasized via chorale and sacred topic. As Rosolato (1978: 46) points out, the idealization process of a lost, nostalgic object is connected to the category of sacred. But, we are to ask, where does this chorale-like texture take the subject? The performance instructions read: *Poco più lento* that means even slower and *sotto voce*. The slow chorale, or better, the effect of an *imitation* of a chorale, constructed by a slightly artificial sound, moves on as if an undertone, as if under one’s breath. The fact that the chorale is excessively arpeggiated seems to increase its artificiality. Kristeva’s study of melancholy, *Black Sun* (1989), contains a passage that might apply to this chorale, understood as a hypersign created by the sublimation-idealization process around the depressive void:

> This is *allegory*, as lavishness of that which *no longer is*, but which regains for myself a higher meaning because I am able to remake nothingness, better than it was and within an unchanging harmony, here and now and forever, for the sake of someone else. Artifice, as sublime meaning for and on behalf of the underlying, implicit non-being, replaces the ephemeral. Beauty is consubstantial with it. Like feminine finery concealing stubborn depressions, beauty emerges as the admirable face of loss, transforming it in order to make it live. (Kristeva 1989: 99.)

From m. 39 onward, the chorale texture starts to break and is soon taken over by Lisztian octave-runs in a bare technology of virtuoso (see Example 8f). By now, this is not a chorale anymore, as it were not even in the first place. It was, rather, a positivization of an absent chorale. *Crescendos* follow *crescendos* ending up with the ennobling of the chorale theme in m. 45. This ennobled chorale theme is given in *fortissimo*, *ritenuto*, and with polonaise-like trills evoking drum-rolls – bombast, grandiloquence, solemnity, and “heavy tramping” remind us, here almost in a ghostly way (this is precisely the rhetoric of ghost genre), that this is music from a composer of polonaises. The sign of the noble military dance carries here an effect of the sublime. But what is being paraded here, and what is being displayed? – Emptiness, I would say. With the rattlingly noisy

---

27 I owe this remark to Anne Sivuoja-Gunaratnam (private communication).
diatonic and chromatic octaves, with the ennobled choral theme riding alongside, as if watching the voids, we seem to be in the middle of a wearied noble decadence. Instead of “cadence” is there “decadence”? In this perspective, the grandeur seems to be a grandeur of ruins, the pride of one who has lost her land, the boldness that of the disinherit.

We may ask, what made the chorale crack? On the one hand, we could interpret this transformation as an attack and aggression against the lost object, for mournfulness in melancholy can take the form of a hidden attack against the frustrating other, whom the subject imagines to be hostile because it is stripping the subject of herself, her most precious part (Kristeva 1989: 12). Freud writes about the melancholic disposition, that when the love for the object escapes to the protection of narcissistic identification, hatred starts its acts of reprisal. The object is dealt with harshly; it is disparaged and made worse; the object is made to suffer and from this suffering one gains sadistic satisfaction. (1957a [1917/15]: 251.) It displays a logic of revenge at any cost. On the other hand, it could be a question of realizing the illusory nature of the lost object. The octave runs, in a way, wipe off “the false chorale consciousness”, in which case it is not a question only of a loss, but also of the loss of a loss. This double loss is concealed by a fetishizing of the loss in itself – a typical gesture of romanticism – at the cost of a lost object (Žižek 1997: 196).
8.7 The excessiveness of the imaginary

From m. 49 onward, we are back in section A (see Example 8g). But there is a total change as compared to the opening section A. The return of the theme happens in doppio movimento, agitato, and pianissimo, which forms a very loaded and affective combination. The fragile, punctured theme is now accompanied by an excessive triadic chord swinging that is wallowing in continuity. Each quarter-note of the theme has triadic support, and not a single point of discontinuity.

Example 8f. Chopin, Nocturne in C minor, Op. 48 No. 1, mm. 35–47: breakage of the chorale (starting in m. 39); polonaise-like ennoblement of the chorale theme (m. 45). © Reproduced by kind permission of Peters Edition Limited, London.
occurs in the accompaniment, the overtone effects of which are worshipfully 
exploited as is typical of Chopin’s style. This return is exultant and tragic, like 
the entry into language. Indeed, it can be heard as a poignant musical construc-
tion of a “threshold crossing” from one register of subjectivity to another.

If the theme is the subject which struggles against the real and at the same 
time is frustrated with the trap of the (Lacanian) symbolic order, then the accom-
paniment – the support – can be said to represent the imaginary. Continuity is 
not in the theme as the subject of the utterance but in the texture/imaginary. If the theme in the first section signifies emptiness and lack, it is now, in its 
return, (ful)filled in a blissful way. This music of absence/presence is exceeding-
ingly mellow and gentle, and yet, under the surface it smoulders and rankles: 
the overtones of aggression, bitterness, and other affects seem to be resonating 
all along, as if the subject sensed that this constructed illusion of full presence 
is truly an illusion, an image. This brings to mind Listz’s characterisation of 
Chopin’s music as a “ferment of resentment, premeditation of vengeance, sterile 
bitterness, inconsiderable regret after an irrevocable loss, concentrated exaspera-
tion, despair sometimes ironic, sometimes disdainfully proud” (quoted in Rosen 
1995a: 398). 28

---

28 All this is included in the Polish word ’zal’ (Rosen 1995a: 398).
In this music of absence, the subject seems to be aware of the past tense, as if many voices were speaking at the same time. It is as if to the eternal longing, in this last section, were added different survival strategies that allow the trauma of being and loss to sound so magnificent and great, without the sparing of brilliance and pathos. As if to say: “Hear how grandly I can lose.” Good examples of this ecstasy of suffering are found, for example, in the hypercathected measures 63, 65, 70, and 72, in which it is possible to hear the melancholic’s “masochistic domination of narcissistic folds by a mediationless superego” (Kristeva 1989: 49). To cite a detail, the passing key of C major (key of the chorale) in m. 65 seems to refer back to the time when the “happy” or “victorious” major still would have been possible. One could well speak of a subtle construction of musical sadism. Rosen (1995a: 383) notes that the subtlety of sadism in Chopin’s music can be seen in the fact that often the actual pain of the pianist is coterminous with the emotional violence in the piece.29

In the end, when “the tears and jouissance have been devoted to the subject’s fringe of strangeness” (Kristeva 1989: 14), there follow three C minor chords containing “suffocating” thirds played pianissimo, as if the subject were pondering her limited nature. As a story of subjectivity, the work is an example of how lyrical music can produce a dramatic shock.

Rosen writes that the intensity and poetic force of Chopin’s music is significantly based on its tendency to go beyond what seems permissible. According to Rosen, it is this morbidity that saved Chopin from “good taste” and from “bland crippling neoclassicism”. (1995a: 398–399.) Eero Tarasti (2002: Chap. 6), in his existential semiotics, has theorized this stylistic feature or discursive code of morbidity in Chopin’s music from the point of view of the body in music and the related “transcendental acts of affirming and denying”. According to Tarasti, the act of affirmation is connected to the Kristevan choratic, primal bodily register, and the act of denying to the denial of the choratic register, in order to support or reinforce the symbolic and patriarchal order. Tarasti thinks that certain moments in Chopin’s music may transcend the socialized body of norms and stylistic sanctions trapped in musical topics, and reveal the choratic, individual body. These moments also mark fractures in the discursive logic of the work and moments of alienation. Such a transgressive act happens when a conventional sign is exaggerated to such an extent that it turns into something else and thus obtains a new meaning. (Tarasti 2002: 129–140, 154.) The passages of hypercathexis and other moments of exaggeration of conventions in the work just discussed are interpretable as destruction of the thetic (cf. Kristeva 1984 [1974]: 43–67) that they

29 A similar kind of combination of the pain of the singer and the emotional pain (representation) of the music can be heard in the beginning of the vocal part of Schubert’s “Gute Nacht”, as referred to above (p.239).
posit, and thus as transcendent acts of affirming and denying. The threshold of the social to the drive-based choratic is crossed. Indeed, in places, Tarasti’s existential-semiotic train of thought is like a new reading of the poststructural theorization of the ineffable in the line of Kristeva (1984 [1974]) and Barthes (1985). Tarasti’s idea of transcendent sign associates not only to Kristeva’s theory of meaning and semiotic transgression but also to Barthes’s (1985: 41–43) third meaning. Both ideas are well-suited for describing Chopin’s music: the genre is not the one expressed in the title, communication contracts become dissolved, signs are exaggerated, and codes grow dim for the sake of the new meaning.30

8.8 The apocryphal object of melancholy

In psychoanalytic perspective, the lost object, which the Romantic music of melancholy figures, is the always lost object a. This object is not really an empirical object of desire, but an impelling force of desire, which embellishes the endless set of desire’s empirical objects or partial objects, which have the status of object a. (Lacan 1998 [1973]: 158–159, 268; Hintsa 1998: 252–255; Žižek 1997: 8–10.) The continuity and consistency of the subject’s experience of reality depends on the exclusion of the object a from experience. It must be primordially repressed, primally separated; it is a question of self-mutilation induced by the approach of the real. (Lacan 1998 [1973]: 83, 258; Žižek 1996: 91.) Object a continually reminds us that the subject is never whole, complete, but retains the so-called desire for/of the other. Object a is “something which in the subject is more than the subject itself”. It is what the subject imagines the other to see in the subject, on the basis of which the subject assesses herself as worthy of desire of the other. Therefore, the subject loves in the other something more than this other, namely, object a. (Lacan 1998 [1973]: 158–159, 268; Hintsa 1998: 252–255; Žižek 1997: 8–10.) Accordingly, to the subject, the music of absence and melancholy represents “more than the other”. In Monelle’s (2000: 121) words, it is also music characterized by a conflict between the structure and genre as if the structure, as temporality, had lost its sting.

In discussions of the apocryphal object of melancholy, especially in Roman-
tic music, the distinction between absence (lack) and loss is central. We may ask:
Is the experienced absence/lack only interpreted as a loss at a narrative level, thus actually creating a personal myth based on misrecognition? Is it more a question of fundamental absence rather than of real/empirical loss? Is the loss of the object of melancholy real, historical, structural, illusory, imaginary, narrated, unreal, or something else? Can, and should, one even discover if the paradise lost once existed or not?

Questions about the status and nature of the object a and the object of melancholy, lead into the endless swamp of metapsychological and epistemological questions of psychoanalytic theory. For example, how does one use the concept of “subject” when talking about subject-object – self-other – dialogue? Can we even talk about a pre-Oedipal subject at all? When talking about primal separation – as we usually are when discussing melancholy – we may developmentally be referring to a subject that is not yet a subject, but is just on her way to becoming one. Therefore, we are in fact always concerned with a post-Oedipal subject for whom retrospectively the lost object may have a nature of full presence (the impossible wished “self-identification”) or maternal coloration. Maybe this is why Lacan (1998 [1973]) denies any empirical or symbolic content to the lost object qua object a.

Dominick LaCapra (2000: 178–179, 181, 192) calls attention to the difference between metaphysical absence and historical loss, which is related to the distinction between structural trauma and historical trauma (cf. also structural loss vs. actual object loss). Music is an effective medium for working with both kinds of trauma and loss. When dealing with actual, historical – both personal and collective – traumas, music works as a therapeutic means and a vehicle of the collective memory (e.g., Steve Reich’s Different Trains, which deals with The Holocaust). In that case, the loss is always historically named. When dealing with structural trauma and metaphysical absence, music may also work therapeutically as existential and psychological discourse. Lacanian registers describe well music that concerns metaphysical absence and structural trauma, as do the musical piece discussed above. Romantic music of absence and melancholy is music of metaphysical (structural) absence. But for analyzing historical losses represented in music, another kind of perspective would be needed. Also, it is to be emphasized that a psychoanalytic theory of melancholy is not something into which the subject-strategical analysis ends (that would mean “musical verifica-

31 According to LaCapra, a historian, far too often in contemporary thinking about trauma, the loss is transformed into absence, when the historic process is absolutized; thus the possibilities for change and recovery are eliminated, as well as the specificities of historical traumas. LaCapra finds this kind of “all or nothing” tendency in Paul De Man, Lawrence Langer, and Žižek. (2000: 178–181, 190–192.)
tion” of a psychoanalytic theory). On the contrary, it is only a starting point for analysis of a unique and specific musical discourse, with its specific significations in the infinite musical figuring of absence and melancholy.

In the next chapter, the Romantic rhetoric of subjectivity is explored in a different type of music: the Romantic symphony.
Chapter 9
The uncanny in Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 6 (*Pathétique*)

9.1 Some remarks on the interpretation tradition of the *Pathétique*

Along with Schubert, Pyotr Il’yich Tchaikovsky numbers amongst the most discussed composers in the musicological debate of the 1990’s concerning music, subjectivity, and sexuality (e.g., McClary 1991; Jackson 1999; cf. also, pp. 32–34, Chap. 2.2). Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 6 in B Minor, *Pathétique* (Op. 74; 1893), which is under subject-strategical interpretation in this chapter, moreover carries an extraordinary reception-historical burden related to the composer’s life, homosexuality, and death nine days after its first public performance. The debate over the cause of death will probably never end.¹ A sudden death, whatever its cause, after the première of a work that is tragic in stylistic genre and nature, is enough to create a reception tradition of a kind of requiem and autobiographical lamentation.² This is even more so, because the work is chock-full of musical rhetoric, topics, and other sign constructions of death and despair, such as a quote from a Russian Mass for the dead, “doomsday” brass, depressing chorales, sudden and aggressive outbursts, extreme contrasts, musical stoppages and choking, continuous slow-down in musical time, “inorganic” breaks one after another, and various other inconsistencies.

Homosexuality plays a significant role in all kinds of receptions of this symphony, and, perhaps, even most powerfully when its role is not consciously recognized or noticed, but lurking at the unconscious cultural level. By this I refer to two things most importantly. Firstly, in the narratives of the dominant culture, the homosexual always dies (Brett & Wood 2002: 30). As Philip Brett and Elizabeth Wood (ibid.) have remarked, it is difficult to say which version of Tchaikovsky’s death is the most homophobic, the denial or neglect of the composer’s homosexuality, or the stereotypical narration of the homosexual’s destiny, whether combined with the official cause of death (by cholera or typhoid) or with a theory of a

² Or a suicide note, if one believes in the suicide theory.
composer-suicide, or something else. The tradition of interpreting the *Pathétique* as a homosexual tragedy is long, ranging from the early sexologist Havelock Ellis to Timothy L. Jackson (1999). Secondly, Tchaikovsky’s style and formal designs have prompted his music to be heard from a sexual perspective, whether consciously (“Tchaikovsky as a homosexual/queer composer”) or unconsciously as a result of a certain gendered ideology (“Tchaikovsky as a composer of weak forms and mawkish melodies”). I refer here to Tchaikovsky’s deviations from certain normative ideals of (German) symphonic thinking, such as the composing of “non-goal-directed” dances, phenomenological stasis, inorganic breaks, and other destabilizing (“inorganic”, non-structuring) discontinuities, in place of active development and teleological motion in time (Monelle 2000: 141–142).

In her fascinating study of homosexuality and patriarchal suppression in the first movement of Tchaikovsky’s Fourth Symphony (F minor, 1877/78, Op. 36), Susan McClary (1991: 69–79, 187–190) is a bit more cautious than Jackson (1999) is with the *Pathétique.* McClary relates her interpretation more crucially to the socio-symbolic sphere of the musico-cultural conventions. Still, she too links the sexual imagery she finds in the composition to the composer’s biography and homosexual suffering (her starting point is a gay-critical question “does the fact that Tchaikovsky was homosexual have any bearing on his musical narratives?”; McClary 1991: 32). In the end, her argument seems to culminate with the interpretation describing an acute psycho-sexual crisis of a homosexual composer that might be reflected in the symphony’s structural and formal solutions (ibid.: 77–78). McClary has reservations concerning her own interpretation and reflects general problems of gay criticism. But when, in new-musicological studies, gay criticism is not done punctiously and with such a finesse, the results come surprisingly close to early psychoanalytic art research, which seemed incapable of studying works independently from authors and biographical argumentation. By contrast, McClary classifies her interpretation as only one among others, adding that different interpretations, even from the point of view of homosexuality, could be made. For example, the symphony can be heard as a general, non-

3 Jackson’s (1999) study was addressed above (p. 85, Chap. 3.4.1). In his discussion of hermeneutics as related to reception aesthetics, psychoanalysis, and music research, Markus Lång (2004: 166–167) states that Jackson creates rather than unfolds meanings in the *Pathétique.* By this Lång (ibid.: 145) refers to Rachel B. Blass’s classification of the three types of hermeneutic interpretation, the (1) description, (2) unfolding (or, revelation), and (3) creating of meaning.

4 Cf. Chaps. 3.2.1, 3.2.3, and 3.4.1. As Anne Sivuoja-Gunaratnam (1994: 289) marks in her discussion of McClary’s analysis, the linking of a composer’s psychosexual development and work does not basically differ much from the old and familiar biographical approach, with its basic problem of how to prove the connections between musical units and real (historical) happenings and persons in the composer’s life.
Chapter 9. The uncanny in Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 6 (Pathétique)

New-musicological (homo)sexual interpretations of Tchaikovsky’s symphonies have displayed a decisively biographical twist, as grounded in other factors such as harmonic analysis, Schenkerian theory, and topic theory (Jackson 1999), or gender and feminist theories (McClary 1991). This is partly the case because the composer’s homosexuality – or gender – cannot be deduced (heard) unambiguously only from the composition and without any other documentation. The music itself is not secure evidence of a composer’s sex, gender, and sexuality, which is precisely why the discussions of composers’ homosexuality must eventually turn to biography. Yet, this is the research procedure only when one wants to discuss the gender and sexuality of a composer, i.e., the sexual imagery in a work as related to the composer’s life. If one instead focuses solely on the sexual and gendered imagery in the composition, then biography – as a basis for argumentation – can be excluded from the discussion. Indeed, one may wonder what is (behind) the urge for biographical interpretations in contemporary gender and sexual studies of music? Today, in the age of queer theory, poststructuralism, constructivism, and cultural studies, sexual and gendered meanings in works of music can be listened to, studied, and interpreted convincingly at a textual (cultural) level without any need for biographical speculation.

Certainly an important reason and purpose of a biographical approach is to contribute to the emancipatory politics of marginalized groups, by bringing the formerly repressed issue of homosexuality to light as concretely and poignantly related to well-known historical individuals (“great masters”), and by this, to counter homophobia in culture. With the textual procedure only, one can claim nothing about a composer’s sexuality, but only about a work’s sexual figurations and intersubjective meanings. This, in my view, is why analysis that remains at the level of cultural constructions is stronger than biographical argumentation in its music-analytical force (though not perhaps by its emancipatory and political force). For example, cultural conventions of homosexual imagery in music seem to mark imagery of deviation (from a norm) in general, i.e., signs of many kinds of difference, queerness, anomaly, and transgression. Figurings of devia-

5 By this I simply refer to the fact that we can never know for sure what the relation of a representation of sexuality (or something else) in a piece of music is to its creator (cf. intentional, affective, and genetic – and pathetic [sic] – fallacies; see n. 45, pp. 83–84 (Chap. 3.4.1). A composer may play with gendered, sexual, ethnic, national, and other styles and identities, and thus adopt and produce different subject positions, whatever her own gender, race, or sexuality (cf. gender as a performative construction; see Chap. 5.2.4).

6 This does not mean that we should ignore composers’ homosexuality. This only means that gay criticism does not have to be built on biographical argumentation, a perspective that also marks a shift towards queer studies.
tion can be listened not only against normative sexuality (whatever that is for the listener), but against normative and oppressive cultural rules of various kinds also. To argue that the implied composer, inner author, or musical subject(ivity) signifies only homosexual alterity (or heterosexual norm/alterity) and nothing else, would go against the multi-dimensional grain of music and the multidetermination of signification. No theory owns musical constructions of deviation or the body in music⁷ – not even feminist, gender, or queer theory.

In the following analysis, I apply a textual psychoanalytic approach to musical signification in the Pathétique. In accord with the rest of this study, the subject-strategical interpretation does not touch upon biographical questions.⁸ The musical subjectivity in the work is analyzed through Freud’s (1955a [1919]) notion of the uncanny (das Unheimliche; see Chap. 5.2.3). The notion of the uncanny seems to open up a specific rhetoric in the symphony’s textual workings and semantics, thereby providing a new way of listening. This approach focuses on the musical mechanisms by which familiar elements are made to seem unfamiliar (uncanny). To analyze the Pathétique via the concept of the uncanny means to listen to it as a presentation of a bizarre, odd, and eerie state of disorder in the subjectivity, in which the representation and production of the borders of self-hood are out of joint. In this untamed, liminal state of the self’s de-structuration, the subject’s psychological autonomy is questioned, the ego is not able to sharply mark out itself as a distinct being, and the subject is under a threat of becoming fused with an annihilating other. The uncanny’s potential is not solely regressive but subversive as well: it is a shock that challenges the established borders by showing an area that does not lend itself to representation (Wright 1999: 24).⁹

---

⁷ I owe the expression to Robert Hatten.
⁸ In his study of the Pathétique, Jackson (1999: 84) refers to the necessity for passionate autobiographical representations in late Romantic aesthetics, and to the “pathétique” symphonies of Mahler, Berg, Britten, Sibelius, and others. Indeed, in the line of Romantic ideology, Tchaikovsky emphasized the autobiographical aesthetics in his Pathétique. But, as pointed out previously (see pp. 14–15, Chap. 1.3; p. 127, Chap. 4.2.4), from a textual, poststructural point of view this “autobiographicalness” is a genre-characteristic in late Romantic “confession” symphonies and denotes the cultural (intersubjective) codes and rhetoric of autobiographical, “pathétique”, and “decadent” expression. In this perspective, “autobiographicalness” means conventional iconography of self-biography.
⁹ Recent music-analytical studies on Tchaikovsky and the Pathétique, from which I most importantly draw on in my textual listening, are Henry Zajaczkowski’s stylistic study (1987) and the semiotical account by Raymond Monelle (2000: 137–145). I also draw on Jackson’s (1999) discussions of iconography and harmony. In the interpretation of uncanny in music in general, I draw significantly from Carolyn Abbate (2001).
Chapter 9. The uncanny in Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 6 (Pathétique)

9.2 The uncanny and a foreign body within oneself

The uncanny has to do with a strangeness of framing and borders, an experience of liminality. It may be that the uncanny is a feeling that happens only to oneself, within oneself, but it is never one’s ‘own’: its meaning or significance may have to do, most of all, with what is not oneself, with others, with the world ‘itself’. It may thus be construed as a foreign body within oneself, even the experience of oneself as a foreign body, the very estrangement of inner silence and solitude.

(Royle 2003: 2)

As discussed in Chapter 5.2.3, Freud argues that the uncanny happens when (1) the subject confronts something familiar and established that is alienated by repression; (2) when events and happenings are compatible with infantile modes of thought; (3) when something reminds us about the repetition compulsion (Freud 1955a [1919]; Kramer 1990: 203–204). As a result, psychic reality becomes overemphasized in regard to material reality (Freud 1955a [1919]: 244). The border between imagination and reality dissolves, primordially repressed unconscious fantasies about one’s origin break into our habitual way of perceiving the world, turns it to the uncanny and evokes images of death, automata, doubles, and female genitals (Kristeva 1991: 193). Even a slight alteration in a small detail may transform an object or situation into an uncanny one (Žižek 1991: 53).

The experience of the uncanny marks a rediscovery of something very ancient in the individual’s (pre)history, which should remain repressed but is just about to manifest itself. It refers to a secret element in something that once was very familiar, intimate, and most close, but later covered by an act of repression and thus parted from the familiar (the prefix “un” in un-heimlich/un-canny denotes this repression10). It is this parted material that in the uncanny experience suddenly subdues the consistent conception of the world and self under a massive menace. (Freud 1955a [1919]: 241, 245.) Kristeva (1991: 189) emphasizes that Freud’s true contribution to the study of the sources of anxiety and horror is in his realization that the source is not solely alien but also, in a weird way, familiar. The horrifying other lies at the end in the subject’s own unconscious; the experienced strangeness in oneself (the repressed) is projected onto something exterior. The subject is at odds with itself, split, doubled (Royle 2003: 6). The uncanny is thus nothing alien, but something long-established that the process of repression

10 That words contain antithetical meanings marks a characteristic of the logic of the unconscious. Freud reflected on this phenomenon, taking interest in certain “ancient”, primal words (see p. 167 and Chaps. 6.5–6.6).
has transformed into something alien (Freud 1955a [1919]: 241).

According to Freud, disconnected heads, legs, arms, and other body parts and their images and representations have an especially uncanny aura when they are accompanied with an idea about their ability for independent functioning.¹¹ A dead body, disconnected hand, a pair of legs, a puppet, a figure in a painting, suddenly seem to become animated. (Freud 1955a [1919]: 244, 246.) There arises an intellectual uncertainty as to whether an object of horror is dead or alive, mechanical or organic, a doll or a human being, person or machine. The boundary between the living and the dead becomes blurry. (Ibid.: 233, 226–227.) This characteristic of the uncanny experience forms a common theme in science fiction literature and films addressing cyborgs, androids, replicas, duplicates – which are contemporary versions of the theme of the tragic doll that the Romantic age developed (Käkelä-Puumala 2003: 3).

A central instance of the uncanny is the double – Doppelgänger, replicas, duplicates, look-alikes. Psychoanalytically this means a division or exchange of self as an ego’s defence against the fear of annihilation, destruction, death, and castration. This purpose is served by mirrors, shadows, protecting spirits, guardian angels, ideas of immortal soul, and the like. (Freud 1955a [1919]: 234–236, 241–242.) The uncanny experience turns these into demons, ghosts, devils, evil eyes, zombies,¹² revenants, and so on (ibid.: 240).¹³ By this projective mechanism, the ego fills the alien object outside the self with repressed material. Thus, the uncanny object represents the unconscious aggressive and threatening sides of the self. It can be said that the uncanny marks one’s personal “voodoo” or “mojo”. This refers to the archaic aspirations of the omnipotent self as capable of mastering and transforming the outside world: animism, witchcraft, supernatural, and secret powers – the techniques of magic. The source of the uncanny is not so much an infantile fear but an infantile wish or belief. (Freud 1955a [1919]: 233, 240–243, 246–247.)

Freud posits a multiplication as a powerful counterpart to doubling, as a defence mechanism. It emerges most powerfully in dreams where castration (death) anxiety manifests as an endless multiplication of the representatives of a genital symbol. As a mythological instance, Freud refers to Medusa’s head as a representation of castration anxiety and its overcompensation by the multiplica-

¹¹ This is a common procedure in horror movies.
¹² The uncanny fear of being buried alive is a kind of reverse of the fantasy of life inside the uterus that marks the subject’s original home (Freud 1955a [1919]: 244).
¹³ The “ghostly” double derives from the very early mental stage in which the double had a friendlier nature. In the uncanny experience, the double becomes horrifying in the same way, as when religions collapse, their gods become demons. (Freud 1955a [1919]: 236.) The double as a dissimulation or mask is a fundamental element in the Bakhtinian–Kristeva conception of carnival (Kristeva 1980: 44).
tion of snakes representing the phallus (see Figures 9a–b). The snakes rising from Medusa’s head mark an excessive denial of castration and death.\(^\text{14}\) (Freud 1955a [1919]: 235; 1955f [1922/1940]: 273–274; 1953 [1900]: 357, 412.) The image of Medusa evokes the uncanny also because it is a severed head that seems to recognize its own condition and its capacity for independent functioning. In musical mythology, the open mouth of Medusa may be associated with the decapitated yet still-singing head of Orpheus (cf. Abbate 2001: xv, Chap. 1 passim). Representations of severed limbs and removed eyes, such as those that occupy, say, E. T. A. Hoffmann’s stories, offer other illuminating examples.

\textit{Figure 9a.} Caravaggio’s \textit{Medusa’s head} (1600–1601, oil on wood, Uffici, Florence) that probably was an important element in Freud’s analysis of the Medusa myth. © Reproduced by permission of the Italian Cultural Ministry.

\(^{14}\) Death and castration mean the same from the point of view of the uncanny. The unconscious denies the necessity of death (Freud 1955a [1919]: 242; Kristeva 1991: 190) that may be fantasized as castration, denial of which is manifested in the mechanisms of double and multiplication.
Figure 9b. *Medusa, or The Furious Wave (Méduse, ou Vague furieuse)* (1897) by Lucien Levy-Dhurmer (charcoal and pastel, Paris, musée Louvre, D.A.G. [fonds Orsay]), which is contemporary with Tchaikovsky’s *Pathétique*. Reproduced by permission of Réunion des musées nationaux, Agence Photographique. (C) Photo RMN / © Droits réservés.
The uncanny is easily aroused when one confronts something that reminds us of repetition compulsion. The involuntary repetition of a thing or event could be considered a coincidence if it happens only once; but when appearing constantly, as if forced to do so, it manifests as an unavoidable, horrifying, and demonic “destiny” (Freud 1955a [1919]: 234, 236–238). It evokes a sense of the automatic, of a lack of control and of helplessness in the face of an enormous machine (ibid.: 226, 237), as if one were suddenly being thrown in the front of the Matrix, the inhuman system behind everything (according to the film of the same name). From Freud (1955a [1919]), we may sketch various categories of the uncanny, the figurations of which to look for in music: (1) processes of the familiar transforming into the unfamiliar; (2) death; (3) mechanicalness and automatism (including doll/human automaton thematics); (4) doubles and multiplication; (5) magic and “magus-like” (omnipotent), infantile thinking; (6) repetition compulsion; (7) repression; (8) horror; (9) dimness; and (10) extreme nostalgia. In music, the familiar can become unfamiliar, for example, when it becomes distorted or takes on an alien appearance. A theme or topic may become alienated, for example, if combined with a new topic or other strange element or context. Borrowing a notion from Robert Hatten (1994: 295), we could speak of uncanny troping (see p. 121, Chap. 4.2.3); for example, ballet elements in a Romantic symphony may easily take on an uncanny aspect. In the Pathétique, dance music functions to camouflage creepiness: “a superbly effective foil to threatening gestures”, observes Henry Zajaczkowski (1987: 141).

15 An extreme state of this kind of helplessness is typical in recurrent nightmares (cf. Freud 1955a [1919]: 237).
16 I refer here to the first Matrix film directed by the Wachowskii brothers (1999). The film could be read as a fantasy about the subject’s origin inside the body of a mechanical mother-monster (the material of which the subject is composed). In a central passage, the main character (Neo) finds out about his origin (castration?) in the Matrix and receives his real body in a most violent, uncanny, and abject process that separates him from his symbiosis with the enormous, Medusa-like machine. The meaning of “womb” in the word “Matrix” should be noted. Anahid Kassabian (2004) has found out that the music (mainly techno) in The Matrix builds on iterations, non-linearity, fragments, returns, anti-directional loops, and mechanicalness that could be heard as musical thematizations of the uncanny.
17 A titillating survey of automata as related to music is found in Abbate 2001. The author says the 18th century was the golden age of automata, when they came into use for scientific experiments and as luxury toys. In the 19th century, automata start to gather more and more uncanny, creepy, and demonic characteristics, manifested even before E. T. A. Hoffmann, in the works of Jean Paul.
18 According to Zajaczkowski (1987: 141), the integration of a balletic style into late Romantic symphony is one of the ways in which Tchaikovsky “put his personal stamp
It is to be noted that only in combination can these aspects be interpreted as categories of the uncanny. Also, the categories may overlap, and certain musical figurations could be interpretable in more than one category. The military elements in the Pathétique, for example, seem to belong to almost all of the mentioned categories. Also, often, most of the categories are present simultaneously, as if linked within a unified network. In terms of structural semantics (Greimas 1983), rather than a discursively recognizable topic, the uncanny works as a classeme that consists of various semes (= categories). When manifesting together, the semes form the classeme of the uncanny.19 Because of the plethora of uncanny imagery in the Pathétique, only some examples of its constructions can be discussed here, for reasons of space.

9.3 Death, tombeaux, mortification

Representations of death suffuse the Pathétique, interpretable not only as confrontations with death per se, but also as related to other categories of the uncanny, such as machine-like automatism (mechanicalness), repression, horror, or repetition compulsion. Death imagery is so rich in the Pathétique that it could well be labeled – as the converse to Jackson’s (1999: 5) calling it an Eros Symphony – a Thanatos Symphony.

A central means of constructing death imagery in this symphony are the aggressive, brass-dominated figurations drawing on military, demonic, and eschatological imagery.20 These also form constructions of the “ugly” and grotesque, contributing to the uncanny effect of terror and horror (cf. Zajaczkowski 1987: 227 n. 41). Often, military topics and eschatological rhetoric evoke each other, by connoting fate and judgement; such cases are familiar in Tchaikovsky’s other works too, most notably the Fourth Symphony (cf. Jackson 1999: 44–45, 62, 131 n. 25, 135 n. 44, 137 n. 55; Zajaczkowski 1987: 40–41, 45; McClary on the late Romantic symphony”. This is an element that Dmitri Shostakovich explores further, and perhaps it is precisely in the art of the uncanny that Tchaikovsky and Shostakovich are comparable. On national intonations, Russian music, and similar thematics in the Pathétique, see Taruskin 1997 and Volkov 1996; also, Zajaczkowski 1987: 235–236.

19 I owe this clarification to Anne Sivuojja-Gunaratnam (private communication). The terms derive from Greimassian structural semantics. The notion of seme is to be understood here as an “atomic” semantic component in a semic system forming conceptual categories. Classeme refers to contextual semes affecting an area in the discourse and connecting its semantic elements together. (Nöth 1990: 317–319; Monelle 1992: 233–234; Tarasti 1990: 68–69.)

20 E.g., the military fanfares in mm. 67–70 in the exposition of the first movement; brass figurations in mm. 271–276 in the recapitulation, with military fanfares and ascending and descending chromatic scales played fortissimo (horns, trumpets, trombones, and tuba).
Chapter 9. The uncanny in Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 6 (Pathétique)

1991: 70–71, 74–75). How does one interpret these constructions (such as the “fate” theme\(^{21}\)) in the Pathétique as augurs of a horrible fate, doomsday, judgment, and punishment? and from there, to uncanny death, terror, and horror? To do so requires a reading of musical iconography, on the one hand (e.g., eschatological, demonic and dysphoric imagery, representations of death);\(^{22}\) and, on the other hand, a demonizing effect of uncanny “troping” snakes through the sememes of the discourse.

Example 9c reveals a telling instance of the aggressive construction of death/fate in the development section of the first movement (mm. 189–197). The mechanical machinery of sixteenth-notes in the woodwinds and strings forms a relentless and automaton-like moto perpetuo, a device used excessively throughout the symphony (Zajaczkowski 1987: 18). It can be related to the repetition compulsion, death drive, anxiety, horror, and mechanicalness – a trope that Shostakovich will later develop (in his Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Symphonies).\(^{23}\) Against this straightjacket texture,\(^{24}\) the famous “fate” theme descends in the trumpets, oboes, and bassoons, in octaves, forte fortissimo and marcatisimo; here is violent force, doom, the voice of condemnation, such as God’s in the Apocalypse of St. John, “like a great trumpet” (cf. Abbate 2001: 53). Feminist ears would probably hear the representation of patriarchal forces (cf. McClary 1991: 77–78). When these signifiers are demonized here, further categories of the uncanny are evoked, such as supernatural and omnipotent magic. To borrow again from Abbate (2001: 53–54), the “Apocalyptic trumpets” may be heard to replace the authority once attributed to Orpheus’s magical vocal authority, which bade obedience and raised the dead. In the nineteenth century this topic settled itself in the brass outbursts in the requiem Mass to denote resurrection (ibid.).\(^{25}\) Some of these, and other gradually-descending figures in the Pathétique, act as strange passi duriusculi with their dysphoric meanings (cf. recollections of the Passion). They are not

---

\(^{21}\) On constructions of “Fate” in Tchaikovsky’s music, see Zajaczkowski 1987: 40–41, 45.

\(^{22}\) Here, I draw most importantly on Abbate 2001; Scott 2003: Chaps. 5–6; Kramer 1998a: 80–81; Knapp 2003; Monelle 2000; and Jackson 1999.

\(^{23}\) In Tchaikovsky’s symphonic ballad Voyevoda (1891), close to Pathétique by its time of composing, Zajaczkowski (1987: 18) notices that the exaggerated moto-perpetuo device depicts the “feverish anxiety” of the main character, and that “clearly the insistent rhythmic drive conveys this emotional force more than the actual melodic contour”.

\(^{24}\) The expression is Zajaczkowski’s (1987: 143).

\(^{25}\) According to Abbate, the figure of Orpheus and his singing as a representation of the most fugitive sound, dies out as an operatic topic after 1800. It is gradually replaced by a representation of another fugitive sound, the trumpets of the Apocalypse. According to Abbate, this is just one of the Orpheus topic’s metamorphoses in music and opera after 1800. Another new Orpheus figure is the (real or fictional) singer that has a forceful singing voice: Trovatore, Tannhäuser, Walther, the diva, the virtuoso. (Abbate 2001: 53.)
completely diatonic or completely chromatic, and they turn into uncanny when the (passing) odd pitch strikes the listener as (tonally) unexpected, as harmonically “unnatural”. This is eeriness by juxtaposition – blurring – of diatonic and chromatic, and as do hexatonic poles (Cohn 2004; see also, n. 28, p. 147, Chap. 5.2.3), they efface the distinction between dissonance and consonance.26

The category of death can also include other choral and church music elements, as well as (secular or sacred) topics of lamentation, pianto and catabasis (relatives of passus duriusculus), silences, discontinuities, and breaks. These may serve simultaneously as signs of various other categories of the uncanny and of terror, horror, and anxiety.

The burial-chant quotation from Russian Orthodox Mass (“With thy saints, O Christ, give peace to the soul of thy servant”27) in the first movement (mm. 201–205) may be interpreted not only as a creepy confrontation with death but also as a double, in the sense of a belief in the “immortal soul”. Transformed into a demon, it portends death, and threat of de-subjectivization. Higher-pitched, bright-sounding (“luminous”) instruments are absent, and the timbre and orchestration is dark, dim, and low, as if it is as “near to the ground” as possible (or even under it, grave-deep). Almost silent and cantabile, the four-part burial chorale in the trumpets and trombones is set against such low-pitched and slow-moving triplets of strings in pianissimo (cello and double bass) that the figures are almost indistinguishable.28 The juxtaposition suggests that, rather than a musical memento mori or mourning, as would be the case in an ordinary vocal lament, this is a tombeau, a grotesque motif of Romanticism: “animation of the inanimate, the fragment that suggests limitless enigma and the noumenal” (Abbate 2001: 186 and Chap. 5). If ever there was a musical iconography for zombies and other revenants, this is it. The same applies to the ghostly chorale at the end of

26 In Romantic music, the passus duriusculus may receive meanings of dysphoria, false, unnatural, irrational, grisly, threatening, magical, uncanny (Monelle 2000: 75). Its Renaissance and Baroque meanings also usually contain dysphoria and pathos, pain, distress, tenderness, sorrow, or anxiety. In organ chorales it indicated sin, strife, sorrow. (Ibid.: 198–199.) As a church feature, it had “a dimension of mystery, an air of neurasthenic fervor” (ibid.: 199). In sacred music it has also served as a symbol of the crucified Christ (ibid.: 198). This last fact might have affected Jackson’s interpretation of the Pathétique under the (art historical) topic of the artist’s self-portrait as (a crucified) Christ (Jackson 1999: 4, 44, 50–51, 132–133 n. 35–36, 40–41). In the symphony to hand, the passus duriusculus’s dysphoric, irrational, and threatening meaning is raised to a second degree because of its “odd” handling and uncanny aesthetics. It is also to be noted that the passus duriusculus may occur with lamentation and pianto topics.

27 This translation is from Jackson (1999: 131 n. 24). Tovey (1990 [1935–1939]: 513) provides: “With your saints, O Christ, may the soul of the departed rest in peace”.

28 As Freud (1961a [1923]: 46; 1955e [1920]: 40) says about the death drive: it works in silence (whereas Eros is loud).
Example 9c. Tchaikovsky, Symphony No. 6, mvt. 1, development, mm. 190–195: the uncanny evoked by the grotesque "fate" theme and by relentless, "automated" sixteenth-note repetitions. © 1993 by B. Schott’s Söhne, Mainz, used by kind permission.
Example 9c (continued).
the finale (4th movement, mm. 137–146; see Example 9d). There, a dead object from an unquiet tomb is brought to life by trombones, tuba and tam-tam, with rallentando and diminuendo fading to quintuple pianissimo (ppppp). No strings and no woodwinds are allowed in this underworld. The tam-tam has the ability par excellence, to die away sound-wise, hence indicating a kind of transience and vanitas: the odd sound vanishes bit by bit into the abyss (silence), to lead its non-existence (death). 29

Musical tombeaux present the lost (dead) object in an uncanny register, as a foreign body in(tro)jected into oneself: “Singing a mourning song means standing apart from the person being apostrophized. Tombeaux … contain the dead.” (Abbate 2001: 191). A tombeau, a hollowed-out place covered by a stone, a place that swallows memory (ibid.: 239), is an apt representation or metaphor of the subject’s silent confrontation with the (Lacanian) real.

As do church-music elements, various pauses, stoppages, and other signifiers of silences can be included under the category of death. 30 They also contribute to effects of terror, distress, and anxiety, and perhaps repression as well, and thus may work as signs of trauma and inexpressibility. The whole work, with its rich imagery of pauses and ceasing, dying sounds, dying tempos, dying dynamics and the like, seems to aim at continuously slowing down the pulse, unto the death of music, 31 as if the work were dying from start to finish. The first and last movements of the Pathétique are thoroughly riddled with these constructions. As acts of repression, the breaks and cuts distort the flow of music. Breaks, often with “traumatic” aftermath, and repressive distortions could be interpreted also as defence mechanisms for coping with a traumatic experience (e.g., isolation, reaction-formation, undoing, or turning against self).

Effects such as musical choking or asphyxiation are also constructed by topics of lamentation, pianto, and catabasis. Example 9e illustrates these topics well along with breaks, endings, and stops all of which that combine into a

29 Tovey (1990 [1935–1939]: 524) refers here to the “distant stroke of a gong” that is “the most ominous sound in the orchestra, if discreetly used”. The sound of bells and gongs are, in many folklore and religious traditions, employed to dispel bad spirits; conversely, they may refer to bells that accompany the transition of the soul shuttling its mortal coil, assuming incorruption, and ascending up to the spiritual world. The association of bells with death and spirits (the magical and uncanny zone between death and life) covers quite a time span in western history and prehistory of music, from the folk beliefs and practices of the iron age to those of the church bells of our times (Rainio 2004).

30 From a psychoanalytic perspective, muteness is a common representation of death. Freud discusses this issue, in terms of dreams, in “Beyond the pleasure principle”, which theorizes the death drive (Freud 1955e [1920]: 239; see also, Royle 2003: 87). On silence in music from a psychoanalytic perspective, see Cumming 1997a; see also, pp. 161–162 (Chap. 5.4).

31 I am here in debt to conversations with Christian Holmqvist.
Example 9d. Tchaikovsky, Symphony No. 6, mvt. 4, mm. 134–146; chorale as an uncanny tombeau (mm. 137–146). © 1993 by B. Schott's Söhne, Mainz, used by kind permission.
construction of massive repression, suffocation, and death of the music. The passage takes place in the recapitulation of the first movement, just before the second theme arrives. It is composed of extremely slow, funereal tempos, lacrimose, \textit{pianto} and \textit{catabasis} topics, pedal points, repetitions, drum rolls, extreme nuances and registers, breaks, excessive gestures of ending, finishing, ceasing, stopping. From measure to measure, there is an end, and an end, and an end – and the pathos takes a freakishly long time (to stop). This intemperate gathering of signs of trauma and death shakes the discourse and the continuation of the narration, acting as the representation of desire’s demise.

As noted, death and horror are constructed in the \textit{Pathétique} both as silence and as aggressive orchestral outbursts – and juxtapositions that sharpen the effect. A sense of violence, terror, and destruction is created by extreme contrasts between the silent, weak and fragile texture and the loud, potent and aggressive one. Such a sudden explosion takes place, for example, in the first movement at the shift from the exposition to the development (mm. 160–161). From the dynamic of sextuple \textit{piano} (\textit{pppppp}) and a lonely solo clarinet/bassoon (m. 160) echoing the last fragile notes of the blissful second theme, the work proceeds (m. 161) directly to a furious \textit{subito fortissimo} chord in full orchestra, followed by further demonic, sinister outbursts.

Furthermore, in the uncanny context, military topics may work as signs of death – and terror, horror and destruction: army is a death machine. Military topics are already in themselves mechanical, a quality further emphasized in their overuse and exaggeration. In the uncanny context, military topics may also take on the status of object music (music of the masses) rather than as subject music (music of individuality): in the Romantic symphony of subjectivity, military music de-subjectivizes the subject. From the angle of Freudian and Kleinian dynamics, this imagery, joined with eschatological and other morbid signs, would belong to the realm of the unbending superego, persecution anxiety, paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, and being mutilated by part-objects (Klein 1998 [1977]; cf. Chap. 3.4.3). It is the depressive landscape of self-reproaches, sense of guilt, expectation of punishment, and tendency to self-destruction. Rather than ego, military (and eschatological) music represents the superego (order, sublimation) and the id (aggression, destruction, death). Hans Keller (1994: 32) fittingly described Tchaikovsky’s music as focusing on the conflict between id-centricity and superego-centricity, and thus opposing egocentricity. “As a result, where the music sounds most personal, most intensely charged with emotion, it is, in fact, at its most impersonal: so far as our ids are concerned, we are basically pretty much alike, and the question of personality no longer arises – or does not yet
Example 9e. Tchaikovsky, Symphony No. 6, mvt. 1, recapitulation, mm. 284–304: “Music dying”, the mortification of desire. © 1993 by B. Schott’s Söhne, Mainz, used by kind permission.
Chapter 9. The uncanny in Tchaikovsky's Symphony No. 6 (Pathétique)

Example 9e (continued).
Example 9e (continued).
The construction of mechanicalness is central to the Pathétique’s uncanny atmosphere. Obsessive figurations, musical machinery, pedal points, and other repetitions of one element, permeate the whole symphony. They tap ineluctably and indelibly, leaving marks on the psychic score of the subject; sometimes tapping noisily, sometimes silently, almost so softly as to go unrecognized. For example, the sixteenth-note “mechanics” shown in Example 9c form, on the one hand, a kind of basic acoustic screen of subjectivity and, on the other hand, uncanny automata. These “machines” could be interpreted as representations of drive energy, repetition compulsion, or (aggressive and destructive) death drive.

Like tombeaux, machinery could relate to a representation of the body as the (Lacanian) real, the body out of representation, the body as a corps sonore – and the body as the home of (the subject’s own future) death.

The mechanical constructions do not exude any essence of progression, but rather stamp out and destroy that effect everywhere in the Pathétique (cf. Monelle 2000: 141–143). They point to the automation behind mental activity. The same mechanistic quality characterizes the dance elements in the work.

---

32 With the thematics of judgement and superego mechanisms, Tchaikovsky’s late symphonies could be related to Dostoyevsky’s novels psychoanalytically. Another possibility could lay in the Bakhtinian-Kristevan notions of dialogism and carnival (see Kristeva 1980: 64–91). In the Russian musicological tradition, the comparisons of Dostoyevsky’s novels with Tchaikovsky’s symphonies are not rare. Dostoyevsky’s characters are ambivalent and suffering, i.e., “pathetic” personalities in conflictive psychic states. According to Solomon Volkov, Tchaikovsky and Dostoevsky employ the same kind of technique of accumulating events and emotions into a congeries of catastrophic explosion. Central thematics include mad longing for love, passion; and, on the flip-side, fear of and fascination with death, and a desire to taste the hemlock of thanatos. Tchaikovsky and Dostoevsky both equate death with destiny (fate). (Volkov 1996: 116–117.) Volkov (ibid.: 117–118, 121, 472) interprets the Pathétique as a mythical requiem to St. Petersburg as a lost paradise. According to him (ibid.: 462, 549), the St. Petersburg iconography of tragedy connects Tchaikovsky, Dostoevsky, Shostakovich, Osip Mandelshtam and Anna Akhmatova.

33 See, e.g., mm. 214–228, at the end of the exposition in the first movement, where cellos tap a relentless tattoo to counter the thematics of suspiration, like a psychic noise or a roar of drive; or mm. 37–75 in the finale, where the syncopated, triplet, military fanfares keep on repeating ad nauseum.

34 According to Freud, behind the repetition compulsion, the demonic death drive lies curled (1955e [1920]: 35–36). On the death drive and repetition in music, see Richardson 1998.

35 Ballet and military elements may evoke various dance characteristics. See, e.g., the polonaise that accompanies, eis rhuthmos dactyliou, the third theme in the first movement (mm. 101–126).
9.4. Carnival, the balletic war-machine, and the subject as a tragic puppet

It is a spectacle but without a stage…. A carnival participant is both actor and spectator; he loses his sense of individuality, passes through a zero point of carnivalesque activity and splits into a subject of the spectacle and an object of the game. Within the carnival, the subject is reduced to nothingness….

(Kristeva 1980: 78)

The climax of the mechanistic aspect of the uncanny is constituted by the third movement (scherzo-march). Using balletic and military elements, the movement at once stages a fairy tale, lightness, magic, and magic-enchanted lantern show, interspersed with the war machinery of the military. The ambivalent nature of the movement results from the conjoining of these two, conflicting sets of material into a dream-like condensation of nonexclusive oppositions, distances and analogies (cf. the symmetrical principle of the unconscious, see Chaps. 6.5–6.6). Kai Maasalo (1956: 220) talks about a fabulous but frightening realm created by the combination of brutal war imagery with fairy tale imagery in the manner of Mendelssohn or Berlioz. Zajaczkowski (1987: 21) hears an amalgamation and mutual infiltration of disparate material leading to a sense of struggle when frenetic, scherzo triplets alternate and later combine with a robust march. The two unexpected sign systems form a carnivalesque text that, as Mikhail Bakhtin and Julia Kristeva would put it, displays grotesque, cynical and murderous overtones, repetition and “inconsequential” statements, non-sequiturs, twistedly humorous elements and “serious laughter”: a juxtaposition of high and low, birth and agony, laughter and tears, praise and curse, sexuality and death (Kristeva 1980: 72–73, 78–80). The movement is a kind of “Midsummer Nightmare”\(^{36}\).

The basis for mixing ballet and military is the shared, uncanny dimension of automation or mechanistic Prattling. Ballet performances and military parades both signify extreme order and rigorous discipline, defined pulse and automatic movements. The ballet elements denote a doll-like ballet dancer moving through motions predestined. Also, it denotes the theme of a doll coming to life, common in fairy tales, folk stories, and western literature, from carnivalesque satires to Romantic novels. In Romanticism the theme signifies a tragic puppet: the human as marionette and a marionette as an image of a human controlled from the out-

\(^{36}\) I owe the expression to Christian Holmqvist. Cf. the sixteenth-note figuring in the movement and the fairy music of the overture to Mendelssohn’s *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*. 

288
side (Käkelä-Puumala 2003: 3). The Nutcracker, for instance, plays precisely with the slight difference between personhood and doll, between the manifestly free individual and a wind-up mechanism. A soldier in a military parade is, likewise, a kind of mechanical puppet, with automatic, choreographed movements. With these devices, in the third movement, a dead object is resurrected by subordination of the musical elements to a repetition compulsion, an incantation perhaps, as is used to magically conjure up spirits. This kind of effect is constructed by magical, fairy tale, and fabulous-mythical topics (cf. Tarasti 1978: 97–103), such as pizzicato figures and flute gestures in high, “luminous” (read: astral) registers. In the context of the uncanny, the ballet signifies, in addition to the doll aspect, the supernatural. The music in the third movement signifies both human and supernatural, subject and machine, female and male, life and death, alluring and threatening, intimate and profoundly alien. By this, it deconstructs normative, binary logic and evokes, in its opposition to norms, not only a category of the uncanny but also that of the queer: a carnivallistic effect of transgression.

According to my interpretation, the third movement is a quasi-victorious horror march characteristic by tragic doll-thematics. It represents extreme order to the point where the subject turns into a machine: a doll wakes and starts marching. In this machinery, there is no place for individual subjectivity. As Kristeva (1980: 78) writes, a carnival participant loses her sense of individuality, “splits into a subject of the spectacle and an object of the game.” If the quasi-victoriousness and tragic (doll) thematics go unnoticed by the listener, they will be acknowledged retrospectively in the Finale.

37 The trope of relentless automation in Shostakovich’s music is easily associated with the positioning of the subject in a totalitarian society as a marionette – or, as Markus Lång has pointed out (private communication), the totalitarian machinery itself (e.g., Symphony No. 8): it consists of human beings, but functions and behaves like an emotionless machine and destroys human lives.

38 The theme often recurs in Hoffmann’s output. As observed by Alexandre Benois (in Volkov 1996: 124), Tchaikovsky’s ballets are, from the Nutcracker to the Sleeping Beauty, Hoffmannian in their “world of captivating nightmares”.

39 Often the pizzicatos go up and down in fifths, fourths, or octaves, and are intertwined with various figurations in woodwinds (see, e.g., mm. 37–40). Eschatological imagery, most notably the descending fate/death/judgment theme, is further alienated as compared to the first movement: it is displaced into woodwinds and strings, and the brass instruments play triplet “fate” motives reminiscent of certain war cries. This seems to receive even more magic and supernatural connotations. See, e.g., mm. 44–51, 181–182, 185–186; note the “war calls” in mm. 93–95.

40 I am here in debt to Christopher H. Gibbs’s (1995: 130–133) discussion of the uncanny in Schubert’s Der Erlkönig, in which the figuration of the Erl-King evokes meanings of seduction, allure and death, the song of (female) sirens luring male prey. He also discusses it as a representation of a homoerotic encounter.
From a gendered point of view, the bizarre mix of feminine and masculine elements stands for unstable (queer) sexual identity and metamorphosis – typical of fairy tales – just as it stands for the human-machine mutation.\footnote{I am here in debt to Abbate’s (2001: 105) remarks about the mechanical march in Mozart’s \textit{Magic Flute}.} The fairy (ballet, dance) music can be interpreted as a figure of feminine seduction (which always leads to catastrophe in stereotypical western narratives) and military (masculine) music as first opposing this threat but later uniting with it. The result of the mixed rhetoric is a carnivallistic, “hermaphroditic” conflation of feminine and masculine, and of sexuality and death (cf. Gibbs 1995: 133). In the uncanny perspective it can be interpreted as the archaic Medusa-monster, mechanical chimera\footnote{Cf. Abbate 2001: 77.} with both female and male sexual signatures, the source of castration. According to Freud (1955f [1922/1940]: 273–274; 1955a [1919]: 245), uncanny representations of castration anxiety (e.g., Medusa) denote fantasizing that there is something uncanny and threatening about female genitals. These last mark the vaulted entrance to the utmost \textit{Heim} of the subject, the original human home, the material origin of the subject, the womb, the matrix. According to Freud, it is precisely this fantasy of origin that forms the nucleus of the uncanny experience and an object of great repression.\footnote{According to Freud (1955f [1922/1940]: 273–274) the Medusa that stands for castration (to decapitate = to castrate) “repels all sexual desires since she displays the terrifying genitals of the Mother”. Though Medusa’s head is perhaps a cultural male fantasy, according to my interpretation, more in accordance to contemporary psychoanalytic theory, the fear of female genitals, is not restricted to men: the innermost “Medusa fear” is one of the annihilating horrifying “m/other-monster” who possesses the magical power of producing and thus of taking life too (because she/it is the material origin of the subject), fantasized and abjected by an infant regardless of the sex. The castrated Medusa is not sexless, but stands for an uncanny composite of both sexes; for she contains the (castrating) phallic father too. However, due to its gender ideology, western culture has harnessed this psychological fact for misogynistic purposes. So, I am at this point not in accordance with Freud, who sees that castration fear is experienced fundamentally differently by girls and boys, a controversial point in Freud’s theory much discussed in and outside of feminist discourse.}

The phenomenon of \textit{multiplication} brings another view, for the movement is indeed also an acme of musical multiplication as inflicted by the march motive (see Example 9f). The march motive starts to breed here and there in the texture, persistently, like snakes uncoiling from Medusa’s head. With an accelerating pace, it starts to occupy more and more space, resulting finally in an enormous (and vapid) edifice. The multiplication, along with the swelling rhetoric of magnification and exaggeration, evoke comical undercurrents – the uncanny experience is never far from being clownish and ridiculous (cf. Royle 2003: 2).
Rustic, festive gestures combined with the super-pompous, empty march echo a Bakhtinian burst of laughter and the Rabelaisian, “grotesque” carnival (see, e.g., mm. 60–70). This makes the music even more monstrous: marche macabre, a Totenmarsch. In terms of the uncanny, it manifests as an enormous overcompensation, a repression, a rejection of death/castration anxiety.

If the march is a “battle song”, it is a distorted and alienated one. It is not the subject who is singing, for she is frozen, fallen mute before the uncanny, war ballet machinery. In place of a subject with free will and the ability to choose, there is a subjectless puppet. In the uncanny context of the Pathétique, a military parade (which Tchaikovsky so often evokes in his output) suggests the subjection of the puppet on a string, a de-subjectivization (automaton). Also, an army, as a war vehicle, marks utmost violence (torture, death): the absolute annihilation of subjectivity and humanity (an educated and armed soldier effaces the distinction between human and machine). Also, the doll, and automatons in general, mark a dead “object”, not a quickened one and thus, the opposite of a human subject. If we interpret the subject here as a wind-up doll, we may even hear here and there the cranking of the toy’s mechanism, sounding with a slight, comic rustle. One kind of wind-up takes place in mm. 282–283. On the last beat of m. 280, it is possible to hear the “click” that sparks the machine back into motion, evoking the “back from the dead” effect. As Abbate points out, the mimicry of mechanical music must include an image of the silenced machine starting again. The polarity between the human subject and a machine hinges on the very fact that the machine might go awry or stop, that it will need repairing, a gesture that represents both wit and horror.

Example 9g the cranking of the toy’s mechanism is carried out by alternating up-and-down flutters of diatonic scales played – a musical device typically used for describing certain transformations in fairy tale ballets (i.e., the magical change of a human into an animal; a doll into a person; and the like). Here (mm. 221–228) the scale-flutters seem like musical talismans stirring up supernatural forces and by that animating a lifeless object. This also stands for mutation. After the transformation, the march theme returns in full orchestra playing. The theme runs over the (lost) individual (the subject) with the bulldozer force of a mortifying superego; the subject vanishes from the screen and only the empty, violent (Lacanian) symbolic order remains – and the wind-up puppet.

I thank Markus Lång for this expression.

There are interesting differences between performances and recordings as to how this “click” is played. Some produce an uncanny effect by slowing down at the “click” (as do classic Viennese waltzes, to accommodate the dancers’ backward foot-lifts that come on downbeats in the music, as Richard Littlefield has pointed out to me); some pay no attention to it at all.

46 Or in fairy tale film and animated cartoon music, such as Disney’s, for instance.
Example 9f. Tchaikovsky, Symphony No. 6, mvt. 3, mm. 196–206: Multiplication of the march motive. © 1993 by B. Schott’s Söhne, Mainz, used by kind permission.
Chapter 9. The uncanny in Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 6 (Pathétique)

Example 9f (continued).
Example 9g. Tchaikovsky, Symphony No. 6, mvt. 3, mm. 226–228: Wind-up of the puppet-subject and magical transformation. © 1993 by B. Schott’s Söhne, Mainz, used by kind permission.
9.5 Dimness, repression, extreme nostalgia

The second movement is a dream-like waltz that steps with a limp, so to speak. The waltz is famously distorted – defamiliarized – by dismissal of the usual 3/4 meter into an alienated, anti-waltz meter of 5/4. And yet, the music still seems to try to waltz. The waltz, as such, is a familiar and cozy element, but when used widely in a repetitive and monotonous way, as if constrained to “work”, it becomes uncanny under the mechanical stress and compulsory behavior. Also, in the theme’s “naive” appearance, there perhaps flickers a music-box quality. These features seem also to signify a temporal dynamic that is not the present tense but an imaginary time of fantasy (cf. Hatten 1994: 219, 322 n. 18). It denotes a waltz vision that does not take place in a real ballroom but in the inner theatre of the mind on the timeless ballroom floor of the unconscious.

The dark-hued Trio constructs the uncanny by obsessive pedal point strokes (d°; timpani, bassoon, double bass) that occur more than 200 times, and on each beat of 40 measures (mm. 56–81). Certainly, the heartbeat comes to mind here, as many analysts have noted. Because of the tempo and dynamics – and troubling scene of the uncanny experience – it suggests a frightened high-pulse heart, beating loud and fast in the otherwise silent, still, “frozen” body (the orchestra dimming to pianissimo to represent the body here). The uncanny context suggests that perhaps it is not a heart but a machine, an inhuman pulse. In this obscure zone, there is once again an obvious potential to apply Lacan’s (1998 [1973]) concept of the real, in the sense that one’s body belongs to that order too. In the register of the real, the subject’s own body is beyond representation to herself, control and

47 The 5/4 is sometimes interpreted as a Russian (folklore) feature, but, in that case too, it still forms an alien opposition to the familiar Viennese 3/4 dominating the German-based orchestral music tradition of waltzes. In Zajaczkowski’s (1987: 45) words, it is a “waltz whose elegance is perverted … into a limping quintuple meter”. Mostly it seems to be 3 + 2, but sometimes it clearly tilts 2 + 3.

48 Then the figure changes a little, due to the new elements of tremolo and rests (m. 82 onward); it stops and starts, stops and starts again, mechanically (as if one were winding-up a music box). The magnitude of the effect on the listener depends a lot on the attention one pays to the strokes. I myself have found that it is psychologically difficult to keep one’s ear firmly on the strokes throughout the Trio, because in doing so one can start to feel anxiously unpleasant.

49 According to Hatten (1994: 322 n. 18), the 5/4 waltz “sets an exterior dramatic scene” and the trio “shifts to an interior, psychological level of discourse, almost as though piece-time were standing still”. Hatten compares the effect of the Trio to the theatrical and cinematic “freeze-frame” device (ibid.)

50 A heart beat is a sign of life; but because of its relentless and obsessive nature here, the sense of the mechanistic produced by extreme prolongation makes one suspect that, behind it, there might be a machine.
possession; it is alien. We cannot see inside our own bodies (without the uncanny possibilities afforded by ultra-sonic mechanisms, X-rays, and the like), and there remains in one’s mind the possibility that the body is invaded by the uncanny, by mechanisms, matrices, implants, and other unsuspected “invaders” (science fiction specializes in exploring these fantasies). As Nicholas Royle (2003: 2) writes, the uncanny is “a foreign body within oneself, even the experience of oneself as a foreign body”. The innermost alien is the death inherent in my own body, the final alien that will get the subject for sure. For when this body dies, I die.51

The pulsation returns in the coda (m. 160), now tempered, or “tamed” to be more precise, because it now appears in the lower strings instead of the timpani, and at the very end of the coda it coexists with the “soliloquies” of the violas, alternately. In the interpretative horizon of melancholy, the obsessive pedal point would be a sign of the libido’s unbreakable attachment to the lost object (see p. 226, Chap. 7.5, as related to Sibelius’s Kyliikki; cf. also, the tombeau). It acts (uncannily) as a key-sign of the impregnability of the unconscious and the return of the repressed (cf. Wright 1999: 18).

According to Freud (1955a [1919]: 246, 252), dimness, darkness, silence, and loneliness mark favorable circumstances for the uncanny to appear. This applies to the Trio also. The combination denotes fear or horror amid darkness.52 The Pathétique is a haunted gallery of dark, obscure and dim timbres, harmonies, dynamics, agogics. For example, at the very beginning of the symphony, in the introduction of the first movement, the music unfolds fragmentarily and is marked by breaks, inconsistencies, and endings (devices of suppression and repression). The murky and unstable harmony does not suggest the tonic key of B minor but instead moves in the subdominant key of E minor.53 The melodic material begins with a solitary, dark, solo bassoon playing ppp; only the double basses play along, as if pointing out how fragile and alone the subject is in this dim twilight. Actually,
almost all the instruments are silent, and those that are not seem to mark a kind of silence too. At the end of the introduction, the musical utterances come to a standstill, again and again. Over and over the music recommences, against the darkness of the unstable buzzing of low strings. These measures (1–18) present the psychic condition of the subject in the *Pathétique*, and it is also the state in which the work concludes in its “dynamically depressive power of the finale” (Zajaczkowski 1987: 45). Tovey (1990 [1935–1939]: 524) paints it thus: “And so the music of the whole symphony dies away in the darkness with which it began.” Curious is the fact that the utmost fragility of the subject is, at the opening of the finale, depicted strangely: the theme is famously fragmented into first and second violins, which alternately intone steps in the melody. As Marshall Brown (1997: 246) writes, “no one plays the melody that audiences have always heard and analysts analyzed”. It is as if it does not exist in the “real” world, but emerges only in the spiritual (ghostly) realm.

In measures 39–40 of the first movement, the double basses play the beginning motive of the first theme (B–c♯–d), here broadly augmented and in *forte fortissimo*, as a dark echo (double) and uncanny transformation. Zajaczkowski (1987: 228 n. 46) talks about the violent gesture of “sudden, brutal intrusion from the double basses”. The triplet pedal point in the basses, in the coda at the end of the finale (m. 147 onwards), is another construct of dimness and death as inevitability.

According to Freud (1955a [1919]: 245), the uncanny may, at some emotional level, be bound up with extreme nostalgia. This brings to the stage of the uncanny the lost object in a form that provides a look into the origin of the uncanny, as an affect that has undergone a change (an alteration). In the *Pathétique* this has its manifestation in the blissful second theme of the first movement, which is most “familiar”, canny, cozy (see its first manifestation in mm. 89–100). As Monelle (2000: 139) writes, it is homely and domestic in its folk-like pentatonicism, recalling warm folk song and children’s rhymes, Arcadian pastoral, and simple harmonic progressions. At the same time, it is stylized and “refined”, orchestrated in a “high style”, i.e., handled with the utmost care and devotion, and prepared by a “framing gesture, which resembles a clock running down”: celestial gestures, silence, slowing, softening, thematic attenuation, harmonic derailment (ibid.: 140). It is to be played *teneramente, molto cantabile, con espansione*, which, writes Monelle (ibid.: 138), “are not so much instructions for performance as descriptions of a projected subjectivity”. It has a closed form, it carries celestial, hymn-like, and “timeless” characteristics (cf. Jackson 1999: 41), and it does not change during the work; undeveloped, it remains the same.

54 The beginning motive is often said to allude to Beethoven’s *Pathétique* Sonata (Op. 13). If it is experienced as such, the allusion is perhaps ghostly in nature.
Perhaps this theme could be described as narcissistic in its evocation of the idea of perfection and ideal, an inflated concept of self, an unusually high degree of self-reference, as if it craves to be loved and admired.\(^55\) This theme may well represent the object \((a)\) of desire, the subject’s lost paradise, the perfect presence, and an ideal mirror image, with the help of which the subject tries to reconstruct her shattered self-image (cf. Wright 1999: 23).\(^56\)

In its second manifestation in the exposition (mm. 130–141), the theme appears in full harmony and orchestration. The melody is in the violins and violas and \textit{senza sordini} (in its first manifestation, the 1\textsuperscript{st} violins and cellos play \textit{con sordini}). But at the same time, it is muffled or damped by the gigantic, eighth-note “padding”. These eighth notes do not occur on the first beats of measures, which creates an effect of a reactionary damping, a figure of repression.\(^57\)

In its third manifestation (mm. 153–160), just before the development, the theme is played by a solo clarinet very slowly and quietly, against an almost non-existent orchestral texture. It is shortened, and ends by diminuendo to \textit{pppppp}. the last few notes going to the solo bassoon in its lowest register.\(^58\) In this context, the theme seems to go even further than in previous occurrences, as if it were now even more distant, fading away. It could well denote the object \(a\), which slowly disappears (cf. Lacan 1998 [1973]).\(^59\) The contrast to the following aggressive outburst, which starts the development section, is one of a traumatic crash. From the angle of melancholy and depression, the crash is explained by the ambivalent nature of the lost object. It is an object both of love and hate: the admired object alters for the object of horror and terror (cf. Wright 1999: 23). The distortions in the object are signs of taboo (ibid.: 21) or narcissistic rage after


\(^{56}\) The experience of the presence of the object \(a\), uncanny, and real, all mark elementary confrontations of one’s own flesh (body): the experience cannot fully be represented for it remains at the border of psyche and soma. These confrontations serve as documents of the divided subject, her basic urge and failure to represent – to form a language to track – her own raw existence.

\(^{57}\) This kind of dampening figure could be seen as a rhythmic displacement of the dactyl motive in the first movement. The latter first appears in m. 39 and, importantly colours the third theme. It may be associated with rustic dance, military dance, or a distant, echoing polonaise. From m. 101 onwards, it turns into mechanistic repetitions.

\(^{58}\) The nuance of \textit{ppppp} in the bassoon’s lowest register is a paradoxical (if not impossible) combination, and a bass clarinet is often substituted.

\(^{59}\) Jackson (1999: 41) locates to the second theme in the composer’s nephew, Robert, as an object of desire; Volkov (1996: 117–118) hears it as referring to St. Petersburg as a mythical paradise lost. These interpretations share the same scheme of loss. A central difference between Jackson’s, Volkov’s and my interpretation is that, from a psychoanalytic perspective, the lost object is considered an internal object (not an actual person or thing).
a disappointment that produces severe depression or supreme wrath (Moore et al. 1990: 125). According to Freud (1955e [1920]: 40), the death drive arises from a wish to return to a static state where desire does not exist. Nostalgia, as excessive “homesickness”, is a manifestation of this compulsion. It may take the form of (self-)destruction, it may ally with sexual drives, will for power, or with sadistic and masochistic aggression. When working with the life drive, the death drive edges the desire into orbiting around a lost object, instead of fixing on the subject herself. (Wright 1998: 129.)

In its blissful and cozy closed form, the second theme also exposes a Romantic gesture of fetishizing loss (cf. Chap. 8). As a fetish it refers to an object that once was invested with an emotion but is now an excess of the past, a dead uncanny experience, it conceals the ultimate Heim, the subject striving to reach the most home-like and familiar thing, as close to her as her own flesh.

9.6 Some reflections

The picture gallery of the uncanny in Tchaikovsky’s Pathétique is so richly hung that it was possible here to outline only the main directions of interpretation and point out only some examples and details. In working on this interpretation, I have been puzzled by the (overly) bountiful imagery of the uncanny. An uncanny experience almost overcame me, as the analyst, at moments when the work corresponded almost too well with Freud’s theory of the uncanny (uncannily well, one might say). Nonetheless, the notion of the uncanny is, in itself, not too flexible or “loose” to be used for music analysis. On the contrary, its operational power becomes evident in its ability to call forth new perspectives of listening. In my analyses, the notion of the uncanny has been used as an operational, music-analytical (conceptual) category for opening discussion of the work’s signifying dimensions. Moreover, the musical uncanny is understood here as a complex semantic phenomenon that affects the whole work: the semes of the uncanny, when activating each other, shape the work into uncanny textuality as a whole. For this reason, it seems pointless to pick out isolated cases as “uncanny”, without acknowledging the context of the entire work.

Another important point to make is that, when Tchaikovsky uses ballet elements to evoke the doll/human-automaton thematics in the Pathétique, it is as if the dolls were taken out of the fairy tale genre of ballet and twisted or forced to fit into the “realistic” genre of the subjectivity of the Romantic symphony. Devices that in ballet music might not be sources of horror and uncanny, receive this alien aura in a symphonic context. As Freud notes (1955a [1919]: 250), “in the realm of fiction many things are not uncanny, which would be so if they happened in
the real life”. Fairy tales openly accept animistic systems of belief, which is why the odd elements in them do not evoke uncanny feelings. The uncanny arises only in the conflict of judgment, when things take place that seem impossible in real life (or in a text depicting real life). The play of real and supernatural becomes uncanny only when “the writer pretends to move in the world of common reality” (ibid.; see also, Gibbs 1995: 129–130). Here lay the differences between the signification of ballet topics in Tchaikovsky’s ballet music as opposed to their signifying in his symphonic music. A similar kind of clarification might be pointed out with respect to other symphonic “misfits” in the uncanny rhetoric of genres and topics in this work.

Apart from the uncanny, a Kleinian conceptual framework could work well with the Pathétique, and the work’s gendered, homosexual, or more broadly, non-hetero-normative (queer) aspects could be further studied psychoanalytically. Indeed, my interpretation is not intended to wage war with other interpretations of the Pathétique but, rather to add a different facet to the discussion by focusing on a specific textual level in the work that has remained under-explored. In my opinion, the notion of the uncanny comes close to the notion of queer when it breaks norms by various threshold crossings, transgressive processes, and sedition against fixed norms. On these conceptual foundations, other semantic – such as bi/homosexual – interpretations of the Pathétique can perhaps be built.

Certainly there are many ways to assess or judge whether a presented psychoanalytic interpretation of a work of music is rewarding. Most importantly, the frame or viewpoint applied in analysis must demonstrate its operational power to the musical material. In the case of a canonized work, a new, yet sensible way, should be presented for analyzing a famously known piece of music, thereby offering new listening strategies. The aesthetics of the uncanny contributes to a listening that is as pertinent to psychoanalytic discourse on art as it is to Romantic aesthetics. The presented analysis proposes to hear the Pathétique not as an autobiographical requiem, nor as a homosexual tragedy, but as a kind of “gothic” horror symphony, in the form of a demonized requiem, playing with the theme of non-subjectivity.
Chapter 10
Echoes of self and other in the vocal *significance* of k.d. lang

*That is what the “grain” would be:
The materiality of the body
speaking its mother tongue:
perhaps the letter; almost certainly
what I have called signifying [significance].*
(Barthes 1985: 270)

10.1 k.d. lang as “poststructuralist”

k.d. lang is known as a singer and songwriter, who started her career at the beginning of 1980s and gained wide attention with her unconventional country-music, queer and camp aesthetics, and encyclopedically virtuosic and powerful voice. The present chapter discusses lang’s music by focusing on the most titillating feature in her vocal expression: its excessive bodily sound and feeling, its corporeality, sensuousness, enticement and provocativeness and, as related to these, the enjoyment and delight of the listening experience. lang’s voice and music has been most often discussed in music research, thus far, from gendered, queer, and lesbian musicological perspectives (Mockus 1994; Bruzzi 1997; Whiteley 2000: 152–170; Negus 1996: 130–133), by viewing the woman-singer as composer-poet (Potter 1994), and as postmodern artistry (McClary 2000: 157–159). My subject-strategical approach in the present chapter, for its part, builds upon Roland Barthes’s (1985) concepts of geno-singing and grain of voice, and on the psychoanalytic concept of the *acoustic mirror* (Rosolato 1978; Silverman 1988; Schwarz 1997a). Barthes’s ideas concerning the embodiment in music have been enthusiastically adopted in the music research since the 1990s, especially in the study of voice, both in the field of western art and popular music studies (e.g., McCreless 1988; Flinn 1992: 56–69; Engh 1993; Dunn 1994: 53–55; Dame 1994: 140–147; 1998; Frith 1996: 191–195; Ellis 1998; Richardson 1999: 25–

---

In my research, Barthes’s psychoanalytically inflected ideas about the body in music are adapted to an explicitly psychoanalytic framework via the notion of the acoustic mirror. In the analysis of Schubert’s “Der Lindenbaum” (Chap. 8), the focus was on the effects of the acoustic mirror as constituted especially by the piano part of the lied. In k.d. lang’s music, the focus is primarily on the singing voice.

In a psychoanalytic light, lang’s strongly bodily singing refers to the affective and sensitive registers of tones and shades in the subject’s nonlinguistic realm of signification, which has more unobstructed contact with bodily experience and drive-bearing desire than that which the linguistic-conceptual realm of the symbolic has. Psychoanalytic theory offers a perspective in which to consider the voice as an autonomous inter-subjective space independent from language as rational communication and linguistic contents (Dunn & Jones 1994: 1–2). From a queer-theoretical perspective, lang’s bodily singing relates to a transgression of stereotypical gendered and sexual dichotomies and roles. Additionally, it relates to the rhetoric of camp, drag, and parody (e.g., Mockus 1994; Bruzzi 1997; Whiteley 2000: 154–156; Välimäki 2003). This aesthetic field addresses interestingly the problem of nonlinguistic communication based on the recognition of timbres, nuances, rhythms, affects, etc., theorized by psychoanalytic theory and criticism. All the mentioned theoretical perspectives track, with its own investment, the “body in music” in lang’s voice, which I call here, in the Barthesian way, the vocal *significance* of lang.

lang’s oeuvre and career span more than 20 years, but this examination focuses on her music from the 1980s and early 1990s. Hence, we are dealing with music made by lang that is most clearly – yet in different ways – bound to country music: from her anarchistic and performance art-like alternative country at the beginning of the 1980s (often referred to as cowpunk) to the post-country and more pop-like album *Ingénue* (1992). When discussing lang’s musical and vocal style, I include in my discussion, of her post-*Ingénue* recordings, only the soundtrack to the film *Even Cowgirls Get the Blues* (1993) and the concept album of cover classics called *Drag* (1997). The examples come mainly from lang’s video compilation *Harvest of Seven Years*³ (1991), which contains material from the years 1983–1991, and from the albums *Shadowland* (1988), *Absolute Torch and Twang*⁴ (1989) and *Ingénue* (1992).

In literature written about k.d. lang the *Ingénue* album (1992) is seen as a

---


3 Hereinafter referred to as *Harvest*.

4 Hereinafter referred to as *Torch & Twang*. 
boundary mark, after which her style changes to a more mainstream pop sound that plays with androgynous elements in a more subdued way than one finds in her early “cowpunk” (e.g., Bruzzi 1997: 191). The dating of a stylistic turning point is problematic in the discernment of her two style periods, because the style of lang’s pre-Ingénue period is multi-styleness. Startlingly, lang’s music mixes together unexpected, even conflicting styles. This play with codes results in stylistic blunder as a style characteristic. One cannot draw from it a homogenous style and identity. Moreover, the albums after Ingénue form another heterogeneous jumble, despite the fact that they mainly stay rather far from the rock’n’roll-inflected, critical cowpunk of early lang.

Still, the rhetorical style and technique of early lang certainly can be named: critical parody (Hutcheon 1985) and postmodern historicism. Escorting both of these are irony and camp, drag, and role conflict (see Bruzzi 1997, Mockus 1994, and Välimäki 2003). Critical parody mainly characterizes lang’s earliest hybrid, cowpunk style. At the end of the 1980s, the sting of the parody becomes more moderate and here and there becomes submerged. But these notions define only the ethos and the strategic construction principles of the music, not the musical style in its common popular-musical senses as references to genre, voice type, character, and so on. These references – stylistic signs – act in lang’s music in a way that emphasizes their nature as discursive codes and ideological constructions. Elements are drawn, for example, from honky tonk, hillbilly, rockabilly, new and old country in general, stage musicals and popular music of the 1940–50s, performance, cabaret, art music, blues, torch, rock, jazz, pop, Patsy Cline, Peggy Lee, Billie Holiday, Buddy Holly, Elvis Presley, and more. They build up a kind of postmodern collage, the frames being “about” country in the sense of the entire history of Country & Western music. Different genres, styles, modes, and techniques of playing from various periods, literary imagery (lyrics), and visual elements (costumes, gestures, moving, visual performing in general) function as codes with which lang seems to be playing, as if aware of their sign-nature. The re-use of conventional, clichéd, and kitsch musical signifiers in creating new discourse makes lang, in this sense, a “poststructuralist” or postmodern artist (McClary 2000: 158–159; cf. also, Walser 1994).

10.2 Protean vocal identity and Nash-vaude-ville

Early lang exploits popular musical imagery in its entirety and without biding by gender rules and divisions. Often this has made lang look more like Elvis or Buddy Holly than Loretta Lynn or Dolly Parton. Illustrative are the often-quoted citations used to describe her: Seymour Stein’s “Buddy Holly in drag”

5 On lang’s critical parodic style, see Välimäki 2003.
and Madonna’s “Elvis lives – and she’s beautiful!” lang breaks conventions and gender systems of country (and music in general) by not obeying the traditional (patriarchal) rules and models available to the female country-singer. lang does not care if a technique or style has traditionally belonged to one sex only. Her virtuous vocality stays steady through different categories, and forms an opposition to the typical female subject position and basic feminine imagery of country music representing (heteronormative) submissiveness, dependency, and sacrificing. lang shows, for example, how “bodily” rockabilly vocals, which mask masculine desire, power and bravado, can also belong to female singers. From the listener’s point of view, it is not so much a question of a female singer adopting styles and techniques of a male singer, bur rather that lang’s vocal sound does not ally and historically determined category, gender in music can be considered as a matter belonging to style, and thus a question of choice, and not an extra-stylistic property, as Joke Dame (1994: 140) has claimed. Gender can be understood as a stylistic feature. Michel Poizat (1992: 105) claims that, “the voices considered most erotic, those that hold the greatest fascination for the listener, whether male or female, are voices that may be called trans-sexual”. lang’s border-crossing voice suggests sapphonic, as Elizabeth Wood (1994) calls it.

lang’s style forms an opposite not only to the predominant gender and sexual ideology, but also to the modernist ideology of purity, originality, genuineness, and authenticity, ideals that are cherished in many genres and sub-genres of rock and country music. This modernist ideology is related to the idea of one, true, and authentic style, genre, and persona or “image”. In lang’s music, as important as breaking the gender borders, is breaking the genre and style borders (naturally these are intertwined in tight and complex ways). Richard Middleton (2000: 32) and others find two central strands in the aesthetics of rock music, as it is broadly understood, the first building on the idea of sincerity and authenticity, and the other on stylization and role-play. In this perspective, we see lang as a pure representative of the impure aesthetics of the latter strand, which derives from the tradition of cabaret and vaudeville and is characterized by vocal masking, irony, and an exaggeration of stereo-types. lang’s music, opposes – occasionally in a truly tongue in cheek manner – the ideals of authenticity and truthfulness that are central to country music. She plays with genres, styles, and identities – with

---

6 This typically feminine country position is often referred to by the lyrics to “Stand by your man”, which Tammy Wynette made famous in the 1970s. The song has since become a popular object of camping up.

7 This strand has been under some pressure in the 20th century popular song because of the strength of the aesthetics of authenticity (Middleton 2000: 32).
Chapter 10. Echoes of self and other in the vocal significance of k.d. lang

performativity (cf. Butler 1990)\textsuperscript{8} – like a jester who demonstrates how to juggle masculinity, femininity, authenticity, and other central attributes. lang de-naturalizes and de-mystifies, i.e., exposes the “constructed-ness” of C&W music. She reveals the Nash-vaude-ville, the mechanism behind the ideology of naturalness\textsuperscript{9} in the country-music world. Simultaneously, lang reminds us about the “impurity” and “American non-originary origin” of country music itself, by referring to its hybrid (queer) nature with European roots and Mexican influences, Irish fiddling tunes, Slavic polkas, Canadian musicians, and so forth (cf. Collis 1999: 25). The same goes for rock music in general, with its (among others) art music influences.\textsuperscript{10}

lang is a musical mixer of elements from hillbilly to country-politan, from jazz to opera. The creation of new discourse by “old”, worn, trivial, and stereotypical signifiers, happens in lang’s music most appealingly in the area of vocal performance. This is dominated by virtuous vocal lines moving from one style, timbre, color, and technique to another, and playing with different vocal characters and transcending genre and gender borders. In the continuous carnivalization, unlocking and swinging on doors at the edge of categories, lays the critical and subversive nature of lang’s music: in the moving about at the boundary surfaces of nobody’s yet everybody’s categories.\textsuperscript{11} Crucial here is that lang’s vocal aesthetics is characterized not only by heterogeneity, but just as importantly by delicate and overwhelming exaggeration and excess. This does not mean continuous high volume or downpours of technical trickery but exaggeration also in pianissimos, breaks, legatos, whispers, expressionless singing, in all vocal mannerisms and genre and style characteristics. The spacious gamut of colors, shades and nuances, wide range of voice, qualities, volumes and vocal techniques, all the way from country-hickery and yodel to torch, blues and jazz singing, to musical, opera and bel canto, gives lang’s voice a Protean voice identity (a notion related to “sapphonics”). As such, it represents utmost power, omnipotence and mastery, and puts the listener into a surrendering position. In a Lacanian perspective, the

\textsuperscript{8} See p. 153–154 (Chap. 5.2.4).
\textsuperscript{9} I refer here to Barthes’s (1973 [1957]) explication of the “mechanism” of myth and ideology.
\textsuperscript{10} Rock singing (broadly conceived) is a jumble of influences from various traditions. Middleton (2000: 29) mentions as the most important strands (1) “natural” technique deriving from the neo-folk styles of the American South (country, gospel, blues), (2) vernacular derivatives of bel canto (“light” music, operetta, sentimental ballads), and (3) theatre, cabaret, and carnival (music hall, vaudeville).
\textsuperscript{11} Certainly lang is not alone as a rock singer whose range of vocal techniques and timbres within an individual style portray a heterogeneous voice. Middleton (2000: 18) mentions as examples Annie Lennox, Kate Bush, and Björk. In their styles, classical vocal techniques are just one among others.

305
Protean quality in lang’s voice could be seen to powerfully represent the phallus as the object of desire of the (m)other, the object with which the listener/infant identifies in her effort to satisfy both the desire of other and her own desire for the other (Lacan 1977 [1966]: 288–289; Rosolato 1978: 38, 35; cf. also, Barthes 1985). On the other hand, it recalls the omnipresent object voice (Poizat 1992: 93–106; Dolar 1996; Žižek 1996: 90–93) and the demimonde of the scoff-law and site of jouissance.

Here are some good examples of lang’s Protean use of the voice. In “Don’t be a lemming polka”, one hears yodels and other country/hillbilly vocal imagery; in “Pay dirt”, masculine vocalizations à la Elvis, and surprising falsettos (both in the Harvest video and both lang’s own compositions); the autobiographical “Big bone girl” containing falsetto and other rockabilly/country trickery; Willie Nelson’s classic “Three days” patched together with blues and young-Elvis (in the Torch & Twang album); or the Country standard “(Waltz) me once again around the dance floor” (Shadowland) containing various blues- and jazz-techniques and colors, such as vocal cracks and growls.

One important feature of lang’s Protean use of voice is to slide inside one phrase (breath) from one voice formation (style, technique, voice color) to another. These twinklingly momentary vocals produce transformation by juxta-posing existing styles – a device that characterized Elvis’s singing as well. One transformation type is a sudden transition to an operatic register (e.g., “Polly

12 “Pay Dirt” can be found also from the album Angel with a Lariat and “Don’t be a lemming polka” in Even Cowgirls get the Blues, but I refer purposely to the titillating live versions on the Harvest video.

13 Mockus (1994: 265–266) offers an illuminating analysis of lang’s queering vocal play with a polyvalence of a text. She finds that the multivalence of lang’s bodily uttering and woman-to-woman singing suggest a new signifying dimension to “Three days”, as denoting women’s bodily processes and periods. This is certainly a meaning that Nelson’s version does not suggest.

14 The most astonishing of lang’s Elvis-like mannerisms are seen in her performance of “Jingle Bell Rock” in the 1988 Christmas special of Pee Wee’s Playhouse. Perhaps lang darkens the borders of the categories of male and female voices, as early Elvis darkened the categories of black and white voices. The connections between lang and Elvis are many and not only at the level of voice, outlook, and performance. One of the anecdote-like Elvis-bearing extraordinaries is The Jordanaires ensemble’s background vocals in lang’s Shadowland album: the same ensemble accompanied Elvis, for the most part early in his career (the ensemble worked with Patsy Cline too). This is one example of the various ways to construct historical continuities and historical references typical for lang (think of lang’s famous Patsy Cline stories, for instance). The Shadowland in its entirety, indeed up unto its name, is such a construction with such a strong signifiers of the Nashville sound as The Nashville String Machine, Loretta Lynn, Kitty Wells, Brenda Lee, and the producer Owen Bradley.
Ann”, “Pine and Stew” and “Johnny get angry” on the Harvest video). In these pieces, one meaning of the sudden change to operatic vocal color, technique, or character, is to function as a new theme or topic in a coda, which (re-)thematizes the song from a new vocal (operatic) perspective and takes it to a new semantic level. It could be said to function as a new or “foreign” isotopy, producing the effect of alienation. This vocal gesture can also be interpreted as marking a “concrete” (vocal) distance taken from the song under the performance, as if the performed song were observed from another position, outside its genre and discourse. The resulting reflexive and mainly ironic distance leads to ambiguity and multi-significance, and also to a sense of undefinability and acategorization. As the paraphernalia that lang favors, likewise the operatic elements, denote a “poststructural” consciousness of constructedness, artificiality, and an un-originality of signs.15

10.3 The body of music, the music of language, the language of body: Singing the materiality of language

lang exploits vocal signs of genres, styles and techniques, tricks and modes of voice formation by exaggerating the phonetics and bodily production of sounds, words, phonemes, and musical vocalics. Her vocal output emphasizes the corporeal dimension in uttering and singing, for example, in torch-song cries and moans, growlings, momentous shifts in register, slight falsettos, glissandos, hic-ups, yodeling, and other vocal figures familiar from country and jazz-singing. In fine filigree, lang embroiders her singing material with whispers, sighs and other breathy sounds, guttural and nasal sounds, the creaks of vowels and consonants, cracks, crashes, softenings and glides, lip-smacking, and various other attacks indigenous to extra-linguistic discourse. All this emphasizes the physical, material, drive-bearing, and sensual aspects of voice formation. lang’s singing builds on a corporeally provocative vocal imagery and forms, if saying it in a Barthesian register, an amorous discourse (1985: 283–284; cf. also, 1979). It emphasizes the corporeal allurement of textual systems, “the Don Juanism of the text” (Barthes 1991: 159). Whereas lang’s audiovisual performance is like a practical equivalent of Barthes’s (1973 [1957]) myth analysis and Butler’s (1990) performative notion of gender, lang’s vocals enact a Barthesian demonstration of the materiality of language, oozing third meaning and traces of geno-singing in the

15 In “Polly Anna”, the operatic vocalizations mock stereotypical femininity alongside lang’s pink nylon jacket costume, wig, blinking of eyelashes, and handling toast. The operatic reference in “Johnny get angry” I have analyzed in a detailed way elsewhere (Välimäki 2003; see also, n. 45, p. 122, Chap. 4.2.3). The operatic devices in “Pine and Stew” will be readdressed later.
relaxation of repression: music becomes embodied, language eroticizes. lang’s subversive re-articulation, her bodily re-signifying\textsuperscript{16} calls for us to hear “voices in the voice” (cf. Barthes 1985: 272), the play within the text’s polyvalence.

In his essay “The Third Meaning”, addressing still-shots from Sergei Eisenstein’s films, Barthes (1985: 41–43) proposes a theory of the three levels of meaning: (1) the level of information or communication (informational message, communicative meaning; denotation); (2) the level of symbolic or signification (symbolic meaning); (3) the level of significance\textsuperscript{17} (third meaning, a poetic apprehension, obtuse meaning, the referent of which cannot be named). In the light of this theory, lang’s excessively bodily vocalization may be interpreted as a “counter-singing” at the level of significance, a vocal construct that puts a subversive distance between the levels of communication and symbolic signification.

The meaning of the level of significance is inconsistent and is not bound to the story. Rather, it disturbs and subverts both story and meaning, turns them topsy-turvy, and obscures the song being performed. lang’s vocalization digs out nameless meanings from the grooves of phonemes. It picks up the material of inconsistency and deviance between the notes and letters and vocalizes them by evoking “another structure”. The song manifests ambiguity: its (first level) thetic\textsuperscript{18} is subverted and something else comes to the fore in the polyvalence of the text. The listener creates a kind of counter-story by tasting these fragments with sensuous listening. This vocal space is simultaneously ironic and erotic. It refers to the area, indifferent to moral or aesthetic categories, of word-play, puns, jokes, and other “useless” verbal exertions: the dimension of the carnivalesque aspects of things. Rather than meanings (identifiable signifieds), lang carves out, from words and tones, vocal figures of desire, excessive and extra significance, the referent of which – if it is to be named – is the body. (Cf. Barthes 1985: 43–44, 47–59.) This is what I mean by lang’s vocal significance: the undermining and subversion of the manifest communicative and symbolic meaning, the breaking of the thetic, and surrender to bodily felt, sensuous, and lovable meaning.

Nowhere in Barthes’s text does he explicitly combine his theory of third meaning with the grain of the voice or with geno-singing. The connection, however, is obvious and, through the concept of significance, even explicated in a way.\textsuperscript{19} In Barthes’s essay collection \textit{The Responsibility of Forms} (1985), the final

\textsuperscript{17} The concept derives from Kristeva (1984 [1974]: 17): “unceasing operation of the drives toward, in, and through language”.
\textsuperscript{18} Kristeva 1986 [1974]; see Chap. 6.2.
\textsuperscript{19} Typical of Barthes, as it is for Kristeva, is the generation of new concepts in order to illuminate a single theoretical problem (that of signification), though perhaps in the context of different materials and points of time. The third meaning could be connected to Barthes’s notion of punctum (“poignant” meaning, a detail that changes the way of
sixty or so pages are dedicated to music, or as the title of that part reads: to “music’s body”. In regard to vocal music it refers to the corporeal and material significance of singing. According to Barthes, it is precisely that which entices the listener and enthralls her most.20

The thing that fascinates Barthes is the double position of voice as a producer of language and music. By the grain of the voice, Barthes indicates precisely the border rendez-vous of music and language in the voice. It denotes the space where the language as a structure (as a system, abstraction, order of differences) confronts physical sound. (Barthes 1985: 269.) According to Barthes, singing can touch the body in a special way by addressing the corporeal base of language, the materials without which meaning could not arise, but which usually remain beyond signification, hidden, repressed, permitting the transfer of communication and symbolic signification to reach its destiny. The singing voice is a space where language meets sound and lets the grain be heard. (Ibid.: 255.) In that way, vocal music is a means of bringing language and body together – in a Biblical register we might say it is “the Word [Logos]” becoming “flesh” (as begins the Gospel of John). Music “enters the language and rediscovers there what is musical, what is ‘amorous’ ” (ibid.: 283). To Barthes, music is the body of language, a quality of language, the materiality of language, the voluptuousness of language.

The grain of the voice is an abstruse notion at its most precise. Barthes (1985: 269–273) tries to make it more understandable by using the concept of geno-singing, developed from Kristeva’s (1984 [1974]: 86–89) theory of geno- and phenotexts. It denotes those aspects of signification in which voice and singing signify by their bodily dimensions. Although it is a question of “something which is directly the singer’s body”, it is not merely a question of the physical dimension of singing in its physical sense (breathing sounds, vibrations of the nasal cavity, vocal cords, membranes, cartilage, and muscles, etc.), but of a voluptuous pleasure in the body produced by the physical aspect of sound production and the enjoyment of it. (Barthes 1985: 270–271; see also, Dame 1998: 239.) Geno-singing drives out corporeality, desire and sexuality, lust, as well as the eroticism and sensuousness repressed by language as rational thinking and consciousness. It denotes the workings of the unconscious and desire welling up from drive-dominated corporeality.

---

20 In Barthes’s writings, music usually refers to western art music, especially to that of Romanticism, and even more especially to Schubert and Schumann. In Barthes’s (1985: 267–277) famous essay “The Grain of the Voice”, the issues concern the German lied and the French mélodie.
Barthes describes geno-singing against its counterpart and opposite, pheno-singing. To the sphere of pheno-singing belong all the ordinary aspects that serve communication and symbolic expression. These are, for example, structures, features and rules of the (sung) language, genre (both compositional and lyrical), compositional, vocal, and interpretation styles as discursive codes, which define, for example, ways of representing and expressing emotions (cf. the first two levels of meaning). It, thus, contains all that which music criticism usually pays attention to. (Barthes 1985: 270–271.) To put it crudely: pheno-singing is accompanied by the “soul”, geno-singing by the body.

Geno-singing does not address messages and meanings – that is the function of language (as communication, symbolism, signification) and pheno-singing. Rather, geno-singing is beyond meaning or before it. According to Barthes, geno-singing is the weight of signification. It is the materiality of discourse, and space where significations ensue in the materiality of language. It is the volume of the voice, its mass, in whose depths the melody does work in language, and aims not for communication (meaning), but at voluptuous pleasure (jouissance) through the sensuousness of the signifier-sounds. (Barthes 1985: 270–271.) It might reveal the mechanisms of meaning-work as they are sung aloud. Barthes (ibid.: 271) talks about the diction of language.

Largely, in geno-singing, Barthes is looking for something as “uncoded” as possible, the coup d’état of the surplus of signification that appears in excess. Barthes thinks of it as a divisive remainder that gushes out of (or over) the function of cleaning the fleshliness of language, and plunging it into abstraction. Simultaneously, it also marks the combustibility of a language. It is a kind of perversion of language: language as a space of pleasure and jouissance, “a site where the language works upon itself for nothing”, by which he means, for no other reason. (Barthes 1985: 275.) Geno-singing somehow mines out the “music” embedded in the language (prosodic and metrical features of speech) into the actual condition of real (sounding) music.

Barthes emphasizes the throat in his description of geno-singing, as “a site where the phonic metal hardens and takes shape” (1985: 255). According to Barthes, the materiality of the body arises from the throat rather than from the lungs (ibid.). Rather than breathing, which most often is highlighted in discussion and teaching of singing, Barthes focuses on “the tongue, the glottis, the teeth, the sinuses, the nose” (ibid.: 271). In them, Barthes hears the sound produced by the rub (grain of the voice) between music and language, the friction that he also calls signification (ibid.: 273).

From a drive-psychoanalytic point of view, the voice is always an object of desire (cf. Barthes 1985: 279–280). At that level, the subject’s relation to the voice is necessarily erotic (for Barthes the notion of the erotic is a much broader...
concept than the way it is understood in psychoanalysis). This erotic relation is related to the “voice in itself” (the very thing chased after by Barthes), and not to the information that the voice transmits (it is thus not a question of an erotic subject matter in speech or song; the symbolic subject matter has nothing to do with this). According to Barthes, semiotics and psychoanalysis must examine what the voice can mean independently from what it says; that is to say, in paradox, the meaning of all that in the voice which transcends meaning.\footnote{Barthes notes the special fascination with speech at the core of psychoanalysis, the project of which is “to reconstruct the subject’s history in his [her] speech” (1985: 256).} To hear the nonlinguistic text of the voice, the \textit{mise-en-scène} of language – the materiality of language that the touch of the (social) signified has not yet “purified” (castrated) and censored – is to hear an erotic relationship between the voice and the listener. (Barthes 1985: 280–285; 1991: 183–185.) The grain of the voice is the body in the singing voice: the listener in relation to a singing body. This is why listening to a voice involves an erotic relationship (Barthes 1985: 276; 1991: 184). Barthes’s ideas are similar to Poizat’s (1992; see also, Chap. 5.3), who focuses on opera as an adornment of the (lost, absent) object voice, cast in a void, beyond the linguistic function: “The voice as object is … constructed both as lost object and as first object of jouissance” – it manifests as an object \textit{a} (Poizat 1992: 103).

As Barthes explains, the relationship between the singing voice and the listening ear is a quasi-physical relationship between two subjects. To listen for me means: touch me, verify my existence. The other (the singer) gathers her whole body into her voice and, I as the listener gather all of myself into my ears. (Barthes 1985: 251–252.) It can be said that music succeeds in producing an acoustic picture of the body (ibid.: 277, 255). It functions as a reverberator for the developing subjectivity, that is to say, as an acoustic mirror.

\subsection*{10.4 Acoustic mirrors and lustful glissandi: The rhetoric of desire}

As touched upon in Chapters 5.2.2 and 8, the concept of the acoustic mirror is related to that part of psychoanalytic theory which ponders the significance and role of voice in the formation of subjectivity, as well as the sensuous and infantile sources of auditory pleasure. The concept was inaugurated by Guy Rosolato (e.g., 1978: 35) who, like Barthes, wrote roughly at the same time about the bodily aspects in the voice and discussed the voice as the \textit{conjunctio} of body and language.\footnote{Barthes and Rosolato both published essays on the corporeal aspects of the voice and singing starting at the turn of the 1970s. In his article, “La voix: Entre corps et langage”,} As Poizat (1992) did later, Rosolato discusses the powerful effect of
the voice as a derivative and manifestation of the body. Similarly, he mentions opera as an exceptional site for the passionate explosion of the voice as an object voice and as detached from the body. The notion of the acoustic mirror describes the subject’s fantastic relation to the voice: the acoustic mirror offers an acoustic image of the body. (Rosolato 1978: 32–35.)

The early, maternal acoustic space, built from the interaction of mother and child, is what Rosolato (1978: 37) also refers to as the “sonorous womb” (*matrice sonore*); he refers to a “music of the spheres” that envelopes, holds, and nurses the child. In the maternal voice the child perceives signs of closeness, care, satisfaction, and affection. This acoustic space is the proto-model for auditory pleasure, the place where music receives its nostalgic meanings. Rosolato emphasizes that this “origin” of the voice is not to be taken too simplistically: this voice manifests irrevocably as a lost object, and it is graspable only as a lost object. The voice is also an agent of separation, which introduces the name of the father. (Ibid.)

Didier Anzieu (1979; 1995: 184, 193), referring to object-relation theories and to Lacan and Rosolato, talks about the “sonorous envelope”, “sonorous mirror”, and “acoustic-phonic skin” (see also, Silverman 1988: 72, 84–85). This overwhelming, acoustical, experiential realm prior to entry into language and, thus, (divided) subjectivity, belongs to that state of maternal fusion where the small child is not yet differentiated from the mother, and where this differentiation gradually begins to receive more and more dominance as momentary experiences. It is a disposition that is characterized by oceanic feelings (Freud 1961b [1929/30]: 64), experiences of sameness, unity and fusion before the differentiation of self and world (m/other) and subjectivity properly formed. In the voice, the subject/child does not differentiate between the production and reception of the voice, not between the voice of herself and that of the mother. It is a space of unison, which later serves as a musical image of fusion: separate bodies join in harmony (Rosolato 1978: 38). Rosolato also suggests (ibid.: 39, 50), when considering the voice in terms of Freudian drive, that the voice and music can be considered in general as a cultural metaphor for drive: drive without any other representatives than “the music itself”.

The concept of the acoustic mirror refers to the very threshold crossing between registers of subjectivity and listening (cf. Schwarz 1997a). It denotes the border zone between the nonlinguistic and linguistic, semiotic and symbolic (Kristeva 1984 [1974]), real, imaginary and symbolic (Lacan 1977 [1966]), conesthetic and diacritic organization (Spitz 1965), symmetrical (anaclitic) and asymmetrical (differentiating) logic (Matte Blanco 1998 [1975]), fantasy thing...
and space (Schwarz 1997a), the body and strains of discourse, union (fusion) and separation, sameness and difference, self and other, full and empty, presence and absence, geno-singing and pheno-singing (Barthes 1985). This is what connects the concept of the acoustic mirror to Winnicott’s (1971) notion of transitional space and Barthes’s (1985) concept of the grain of the voice: they refer to the area between the registers of subjectivity, between definable categories. Musical constructions of the acoustic mirror are characterized by various kinds of threshold crossing, boundary negotiation, transitivity, and different kinds of transitions. It exposes the questioning dialogue of the imaginary and the symbolic, the threshold crossing between language and nonlinguistic voice material (as discussed in Chaps. 8.2–8.3).

In the following passage, I trace musical figurations of the acoustic mirror in lang’s music. I analyze aspects of lang’s vocal performance that evoke in the listening subject a state recalling that of the acoustic mirror, by enveloping her with the sonic fantasy of echoing the other. These aspects are also examples of music’s amorous features, and can be regarded as musical channelings of desire. Silverman emphasizes the space of the maternal voice as a powerful cultural fantasy. As discussed in Chapter 8, the reconstruction of this irrevocably infantile state happens in two kind of fantasies about the maternal voice: as a positive bliss of unity and a negative horror of getting trapped. (Silverman 1988: 72–73; see also, Dunn & Jones 1994: 11–13.) When interpreting acoustic mirrors in lang’s music, it is always a question of positive fantasy.

In lang’s music, desire-bearing and acoustically mirroring features include various kinds of vibratos and glissandos, 23 used, for example, as ornament or expressive coloring. lang’s repertoire of vibratos is wide, from blues-inflected to operatic, from slowly to quickly reverberating, from subtle to strong, quiet to loud, light to deep, from slight to tremolo-waver, minimal to maximal, from ornamental to continuous. Sometimes it almost subsides into a plain, un-pitched, vibrating breath, quivering at the end of a phrase, and thus experienced even more so as the “corporeal” (perhaps resembling the young Elvis).

lang’s glissandos, as ways of moving from one pitch to another, seem to be infinitely numberless. lang uses both portamento and stepwise glissando. In portamento the pitches are connected without steps (intervals), resulting in a completely smooth and plain glide across the pitch-continuum; individual pitches are indiscernible and the transition points are not heard. Conversely, gradual or stepwise glissando slides from pitch to pitch in a way that articulates (i.e., differentiates) pitches one from the other, and the transition points are audible (the

---

23 I purposely use the term glissando here, instead of the ordinary vocal term of portamento, because the former includes stepwise sliding from pitch to pitch, which is central to lang’s singing.
Subject Strategies in Music

Articulation may be more or less marked. An example is the chromatic glissando, each half step of which is audibly salient. Moreover, lang’s glissandos vary, for example, from small to wide ambitus, slow to fast (one trademark of lang is the art of slow glissandos), from one produced with vibrato to one of pure voice, from strong to light pressure – not to mention different colors, nuances, dynamics, and the like.

The combinations of glissandos and vibratos produce a broad and colorful palette of vocal imagery, making her music slide, float, slippery, and enticing. All these contribute the listener’s visceral experience, easily seizing the stomach, vibrating the skin, and kneading the “spinal cord”. The floating character of music is effectively enhanced by the plentiful use of the steel guitar. The imitative antiphons between lang’s voice and steel guitar form the space for an acoustic mirror and are a central characteristic of lang’s music.25

Glissando can generally be interpreted as a manifestation of the acoustic mirror: a tone aspires to the condition of the other, as if having “the desire of the other”, and also reaches the other, accommodating and transforming itself to suit that alterity. The transformation happens in such a way that, in the continuous sliding, one cannot pinpoint where the change from the starting tone to ending tone specifically takes place. This obeys the logic of the imaginary: a linear fusion of one tone to another, one becoming an acoustic image of the other. Actually glissando means both “dissolving” and expressively bringing forth the differences between the two pitches. Tones are brought closer together by contractions of the distance between them, by a closing of the gap. On the other hand, as a technique of expression, the glissando itself precisely underlines difference. In the acoustic mirror stage, this is comparable to the fact that the infant both recognizes and differentiates herself in the vocal mirror of the (m)other.26

A type of glissando in lang’s repertoire that evokes a powerful visceral experience in the listener is a descending, vibrating, stepwise slide, which is like a Freudian condensation of torch-blues and bel canto, sharing the common affect of lamentation (pianto topic characterizes both).27 Affective nostalgia runs high in this elegant vocal figure referring to two “lost musical traditions”, the torch singers of the 1920s–40s and bel canto. Moreover, it recalls the lost paradise of the acoustic mirror stage. This vocal figure emphasizes both the beauty and

24 Steel guitar refers here both to the pedal steel guitar (developed from Hawaiian guitar), belonging to the most marked genre characteristics of country music, and to the slide play technique of guitar used in blues and rock, too.
25 The centrality of this device has been noted by Williams 2001: 96.
26 G. Flesch, in his Die Kunst des Violinspiels, aptly depicts the portamento as “an emotional bonding between two tones” (in Stowell 2003).
27 This is titillatingly parodied in Johnny get angry, at the end of the performance (Harvest) (see Välimäki 2003).
embellishment of the voice (lightness, flexibility) as well as its pathos (weight, heaviness). Classical and jazz singing are often to be considered far apart in technique (though exceptions, such as Sarah Vaughan, can be found); and this is one example of the mixed figures typical of lang, which mix together surprising, even conflicting elements.\textsuperscript{28} It is also mixed in the sense of both the powerful and fragile; the French term\textit{ farouche} – meaning both wild and shy at the same time – perhaps captures the sense here.\textsuperscript{29} In singing this mixed figure, the vocal color changes from intense (closed) to more open.\textsuperscript{30} In its visceral affect – its injection of dramatic alarum, if you will – the vibrato feels like a vibrating body. As Barthes (1985: 270) writes: it is “as if a single skin lined the performer’s inner flesh and the music [s]he sings”. These kinds of slides indelibly color lang’s performances. To cite instances: the Patsy Cline classic, “Three Cigarettes”; Cole Porter’s “So in Love”; her solo version of Roy Orbison’s “Crying” (all in\textit{ Harvest}); and at the end of “Three days” (\textit{Torch & Twang}).

In “I wish I didn’t love you so”\textsuperscript{31} (\textit{Shadowland}) lang builds effective slides, the ambitus of which is – strangely enough in regard to its power – but a half step. Actually, it is a figure that shares characteristics of both slide (glissando) and terminal vibrato. The starting and title phrase begins with a long $a^b$ (in the word “I” [$!]$), which lasts the whole measure through. lang sings it with a growing terminal vibrato and crescendo that increases towards the end of the tone. The pitch range in this jazzy vibrato expands, and when lang ends up after the long-standing tone “down” to $g^1$ (to the word “wish”), it feels as if both glissando and vibrato grow into a tremolo that finally stays put at its lowest pole ($g^1$). Vocal space gradually widens, from one pitch, and eventually thickens into an interval

\begin{center}
\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{example10a.png}
\caption{Example 10a. Terminal vibrato and half-step drop in lang’s interpretation of “I Wish I Didn’t Love You So” (\textit{Shadowland}).}
\end{figure}
\end{center}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{28} Cf. mixed figures as carnivalistic condensations obeying the symmetrical logic of the Freudian unconscious (discussed in Chap. 9.4).
\item \textsuperscript{29} I am grateful for Richard Littlefield for suggesting this term.
\item \textsuperscript{30} The transformation of the vibrato into a powerful tremulousness à la Roy Orbison starts to sound fragile, as if holes were being poked in the vocal lace.
\item \textsuperscript{31} This country standard was composed by Don Goodman, Sara Johns, and Jack Rowland.
\end{itemize}
of a minor second (see Example 10a).

lang’s Ingénue album is full of imagery of the acoustic mirror, such as slides and echo effects.\(^{32}\) The whole album seems to be a maternal envelope with oceanic echoes. The slow and easy swing “Save me”\(^{33}\) (Ingénue) is tinged with tender portamentos, a minor-third in range (alternating with major seconds in the refrain). The song begins instantly with this distinctive mark of the song, repeats it throughout, and ends with reiterations of the same figure, its “unending” sense prolonged by the fade-out. In the key G major at the beginning, the slide takes place in the first title phrase, starting on the word “save” (d\(^1\)) ending on the word “me” (b). The reiteration of this element constitutes an acoustically floating, sonorous envelope. The abundance of slides turns them into pleasingly enjoyable descents, pleasurable plummets, acoustic mirrors, on the surface of which the listener easily slides along. In the refrain, the sinusoidal (oceanic), swinging guitar figurations alternate between G and Fmaj\(^{13}\) chords, the bass undulating up and down between G and F. The lyrics, too, describe the blissful fantasy of maternal care and fullness of the acoustic mirror (for example, “watch over me with mother’s eyes”). The careful rhymes in the slides, in turn, form phonetic mirrors as the music of words (see Examples 10b–c).

“Constant craving”, on the same album, is tinged with mournful portamento that falls to a minor sixth (a\(^b\)–c\(^1\)). It takes place inside one word, which means that the slide happens between two syllables (and once between two words). (See Examples 10d–e.)

The refrain of “Constant craving” constructs an acoustic mirror of musical echoes and repetitions. This overwhelming sound space acts as a sonorous envelope, inside of which the listener/subject remains in its (acoustical) care. Each phoneme or syllable is repeated as a multi-voiced (part-song) echo that also contains octave doublings. The result is a “house of mirrors” effect of endless reflections (see Example 10f).\(^{34}\) In the repeated refrain at the end of the piece (the song ends with a fade-out), the echo effects are varied in many ways. This can be considered an example of a parallel world occupied by doubles constituted by the logic of the imaginary. “Constant craving” – actually the whole Ingénue album – serves as a good example of the “mesmerizing” sweetness (Dunn & Jones 1994: 45–46) of the acoustic mirror of music. The sonorous envelope works as a

---

32 For a discussion of the album in terms of its musical style and lesbian appeal, see Whiteley 2000: 159–164; in terms of postmodern style, see McClary 2000: 157–159.
33 “Save me”, as are all songs from Ingénue, was co-written by k.d. lang and Ben Mink.
34 Interestingly, Whiteley notes in the refrain “the heightened tension of the polychordal Eb/Db which aurally encodes a need” (2000: 163). According to Whiteley (ibid.: 169 n. 42) this twitch between two harmonic centres word-paints the inner conflicts of the lyrics.
mythical construction of pre-Oedipal “sound-wrappers”, maternal care, full presence, and an immanence outside of language (ibid.: 12).

Music resembling the acoustic mirror stage creates a transitional space where the threshold between language and the nonlinguistic realm of being seems to
As Silverman (1988: 44) writes, the voice is the site of perhaps the most radical of all subjective splits and divisions, such as the one between the meaning and material (body).

10.5 Lawless voice, liberation from language, union in sound

Following suit, lang’s music is centrally characterized by manifold transitions that may take place inside one phrase (breath) or even one word or syllable. It may be, for example, a Protean transition from one vocal style, color, shade, register, or mode of voice formation to another. These constant transformations often act as hooks that allure the listener. Often they contain characteristics that can be interpreted as constituting an acoustic mirror. All kinds of slides (glissandos) from one tone to another, described above, can be interpreted to denote one type of transformation and transition. A similar case occurs in the mirroring

35 The idea of interpreting these transitions as imaginary mirroring mechanisms derives from Schwarz (1997a). My use of transition as a music-analytical category is influenced
relation between an instrument (for example, steel guitar) and the voice, that is, the vocal imitation of an instrument.

lang’s performance of the ballad “Pine and Stew” (Harvest video)\(^{36}\) includes intense, even overwrought, singing with pure voice, vibrato that moves at the limits of exaggeration, delicate falsetto tricks, speech, and portamentos up and down. lang presents the song as seriously as possible, maximizing the “camping” aesthetic characterized by exaggerated usage of it. She sings country-torch “straight from the heart from an ironic distance”: the impression is simultaneously – and paradoxically – both “true” (authentic) and ironic. This is another example of lang singing between the categories and thus exposing camp aesthetics.

lang not only sings but also dresses for and makes gestures between the categories. lang’s visual performance, dress, moves and gestures obey the same

---

Example 10f. k. d. lang, “Constant craving” (Ingénue), refrain. Above: melody and basic idea of the background vocals echo a quarter-note value behind the solo voice; various blurring echoes are constructed by the background vocals and echo effects (transcription approximate). Below: multi-voiced echoing envelop illustrated graphically with lyrics. Gray = echo effect; vertical brackets = “echoing” background vocals extremely delayed; no brackets = short delay of background vocals overlaps with solo voice.

---

by Anne Sivuoja-Gunaratnam’s studies of Kaija Saariaho’s music. Sivuoja-Gunaratnam has approached transitions in Saariaho’s music from a Kristevan perspective as a negotiation between the semiotic and symbolic and by applying Luce Irigaray’s ideas about “feminine style” (2003a). Irigaray’s (1993) views about the feminine style that is located at the edge of meaning and non-meaning, sense and non-sense, well describes lang’s “sliding” music. This would offer another interesting perspective for theorizing the musical manifestations of gender, sexuality, and lesbian desire in lang’s music.

36 “Pine and Stew” is also on the album *a truly western experience*, but the live version on *Harvest* is, in many senses, much richer. It presents a recording from CFRN-TV’s *Sun Country* program from the year 1984.
rhetoric of parody and camp that draws on excessive exaggeration with a "serious" attitude (see Välimäki 2003). In the performance of "Pine and Stew" lang has close-cropped hair, no make-up, wears old-fashioned eye glasses, a corny and gilded Country&Western shirt, shoestring tie, a black and shabby cowgirl skirt with tiny appliqués, thick woolen socks and worn-out cowboy boots cut from the ankle. lang sings staring closely into the camera and making gestures with her hands as if depicting the lyrics, such as pointing a finger to her head on the word "mental". lang exaggerates the "ballad" performance to the limit where the effect of subversion is grasped. It may be difficult for the listener to make up her mind whether to take the performance seriously (as balladic truthfulness and authenticity) or as a parody (mockery) of ballad.

In the final phrase ("think I’m mental"), lang sings “mental” with an ascending portamento that spans an octave, during which she changes the register first to falsetto and then to operatic singing. In turn, the operatic vocalization imitates the sound of the steel guitar by a glissando and forms an acoustic mirror by amalgamating – identifying and fusing – with the glissando of that instrument. This could be described as operating with the (dream) logic of analogies and correlations. Because of the vocal imitation of the steel guitar, the last word ("mental") sounds a lot like “metal”, as if she were saying, “Do you think I’m metal?” – an apt description of steel guitar imitations: the voice transforms itself into a metallic guitar string. The voice escapes the jail of language (linguistic content) and flees to the refuge of pure sound (such as that which a musical instrument signifies). The voice liberates itself from the word, revealing the voice behind the logos: the lawless voice that spurns the symbolic (cf. Dolar 1996: 18). Noteworthy also, is that the piece starts as a slow country waltz, but in the middle of the word “men-tally” (first stanza) changes to a ballad in simple meter.

lang’s vocal imitation of steel guitar can be related to a kind of scat singing. In jazz scat (Ella Fitzgerald’s, most famously) the singer imitates the sound, articulation, melodic structure and gestures of an instrument as an improvisatory solo. Scat technique involves the use of nonsense syllables set to improvised melodies. I define it more generally, as singing that imitates the sounds of instruments and that includes “non-musical” sounds such as cries, screams, sobs, and laughter (cf. Robinson 2003). Schwarz argues that, in the blues and rock tradition, scat singing is simultaneous with the imitated instrument and usually happens at the unison or the octave. Blues and rock scat is characteristically less “precise” than in jazz, and the singer also emphasizes differences between the voice and the instrument it imitates. (Schwarz 1997a: 27–29.)

Schwarz questions what it is that separates the imitating voice from the sound

37 In the live performance that is my source, echo might have been added to lang’s voice to emphasize this vocal gesture. I thank Hannu Välimäki for this observation.
of the imitated instrument. He draws on Barthes and answers that it is the “grain of the voice”. He also discusses scat singing as a representation of desire and a fantasy of the acoustic mirror. The relation between scatting voice and imitated instrument recalls the bond between mother and child. The instrument represents pure sound, and the voice represents sound loaded with language (the symbolic). This division becomes subverted in the acoustic mirror of scat singing. The threshold between language and nonlinguistic space of the subject is continuously transgressed in scat. (Schwarz 1997a: 27–29.)

The symbiotic mirror relationship between the steel guitar and lang’s voice characterizes lang’s music overall. In “Pine and Stew” this dialogue is going on even before the “metal” climax (discussed above).38 At the end of the fifth phrase of the first verse (“Wait and see is that what you’ll do”; see Example 10g), lang sings the last word “do” as a descending portamento spanning a major third at the same time as the steel guitar plays a corresponding upward glissando, forming a mirror inversion of the vocal gesture. lang’s voice and the steel guitar criss-cross each other and construct an inversely reflecting acoustic mirror. The boundaries between lang and steel guitar, human and instrument, language and music, are transcended and blurred; the boundary becomes fluid, like the sound of an Hawaiian guitar. The border crossing in question takes place even at the level of lyrics. The phrase border is subverted by lang’s portamento, which melds the word “do” with the following “you” (the word that ends the portamento). The border of the phrase cannot be accurately drawn, because the word “do” seems to belong to the preceding line (as the last word of the phrase) and to start the next one. And yet, the word is sung only once.

“Pine and Stew” also contain “ooh’s” sung between the verses. As in the piece’s climax, here too the figure recalls both opera singing and steel guitar. lang’s echoing and metallic vocalization can also be considered as scatting here, as well as a construction of the acoustic mirror that “reflects”, by imitation, the steel guitar. At the same time, the “ooh” is also a sign or topic of opera. The jarring juxtaposition of opera and steel guitar is one example of the hybrid (inter-textual) and unexpected elements so typical of lang’s music. The opera topic functions as a sign of ironic distance, having a queer (anomaly) and an alienating effect in regard to the archetypal signifier of country music: the steel guitar.39 Therefore, lang actually ironizes, in real time and while singing, her own “scatting” and celebration of the imaginary (illusory) self-image, the ego-ideal that

38 Lang’s vocal climaxes usually take place at the very end of the pieces as codas. Her habit resembles that of Roy Orbison, who also used an operatic singing style (though in a different way and sense) and also located his falsetto climaxes at the very end of the piece.
39 Cf. also the humorous dimension of the uncanny (see Chap 9.4).
Subject Strategies in Music

Let’s se[E]Tle down
The wo[o]rd won’t stop spINNin’ round
WE’LL GET OUT OF THIS MESS
Wait and see
Wait and see is that what you’ll do—
you think I’m mental in anguish over you?

Example 10g. k.d. lang, “Pine and Stew” (Harvest). Above: the beginning of verse 1, lyrics. Boldface and long line = acoustic mirror and transitional space reversing the phrase border; italics = especially emphasized (shaky, “slow”) vibrato; small capitals = parlando; large capitals = passing falsetto (“kick”). Below: transcription of the last three lines; the transgressive slide in mm. 6–7.

the steel guitar here represents. lang also ironizes genre (ballad) and affect. The “pine & stew” – the psychic state of nervous longing and worrying – has burst into the choric gesture, stripped of the symbolic.

Perhaps the most turgid point of camping parody in the performance is the almost unrecognizable “wow”, which lang utters half-carelessly but in a most careful way, shaking her head simultaneously, which acts as if it were both a resolution of the affect and a sign of ironic distance. It comes in the middle of the second verse, after the lines that represent pathetic suffering: “Does the fact that we may die urge you to pine and stew / Do you think I’m mentally anguished over you?” It is a (self-)reflecting and ironic comment by which to take one’s distance from pain’s “pine and stew”.

The ascending and descending chromatic lines, on “Tell me that your tan is via the sun / Tell me that the plan won’t hurt anymore”, construct mirroring relationships between the voice and instrument and contain melodic and rhythmic unisons (cf. drums). The last syllable in the last word, “anymore”, lang sings as a gradual descending glissando spanning a perfect fifth in the “visceral”, torch-bel canto way described above (pp. 314–315).

Transitions (displacements, condensations, and transpositions), and mirroring relations between voice and instrument (especially steel guitar) are examples of lang’s protean use of voice and of the centrality of vocal transformations
in her vocal aesthetics. Alastair Williams (2001: 96) has paid attention to the dialogue between lang’s vocal slides and lead twang-guitar in “Pullin’ back the reins” (Torch & Twang). By using certain techniques, the voice is able to obtain the sound and quality of a certain instrument. Moments in which lang’s voice fuses with an instrument, may in the listening experience construct a continuity wherein the listener is no longer sure what the source of the sound is, if it is an instrument or a human voice (this effect can be manipulated with electronic recording techniques as well). At the beginning of “The air that I breath” (Drag), for a blink of the eye it is difficult to say if the sound comes from a wind instrument or if it is a voice humming “mm”. In this sense, the beginning of the piece also iconically depicts the title and lyrics of the piece. In “Western stars” (Shadowland) lang imitates the steel guitar by singing with a pure voice, shaky and echoing vibrato, and falsetto. lang also joins in the upwards glissandos of steel guitar. In “[Waltz] me once again around the dance floor” (Shadowland), lang’s scatting seems to aspire to the timbre and gestures of country fiddling too.

Imitation of instruments is a central characteristic of lang’s vocal significance. Because of its “slippery” sound, steel guitar is an excellent acoustic image, a representative and arouser of desire. But steel guitar is also one of the most clichéd of country music instruments, the signified of which is “this is country music” (level of communication). At the level of symbolic signification, the dialogue between lang’s voice and steel guitar is also a matter of scat symbolism. lang’s slides, which imitate the steel guitar, also have the power of a significance transcending the communicative and symbolic levels. It is the dimension of the acoustic mirror stage, the choratic register of bodily merger and differentiation. As such, it refers to the corporeality of singing. It refers to the body as instrument. It turns the lyrics upside down, turns the listener’s attention from the linguistic content of the lyrics, to the polyvalence of the text and the bodily dimension of voice.

In a mirror relation, the matter always has to be examined the other way round also. The instruments are likewise imitators of the human voice, which is also why they are able to offer acoustic images of a subject’s self so powerfully. Do not instruments reflect the human voice as liberated from linguistic content? The imitation of instrument by human voice and the imitation of human voice by instrument, as well as the imitation of instrument by another instrument with structural topics and Spielfiguren – all these devices, and more, have been used in the western art music tradition since the Renaissance. Barthes (1985: 287) in his essay “The Romantic song”, ponders upon the instrument as an imitator of the human voice, in reference to the opening phrase of the Andante of Schubert’s String Trio No. 1 in B♭ Major:
Subject Strategies in Music

[The human voice is here all the more present in that it has delegated itself to other instruments, the strings: the substitute becomes more real than the original, the violin and the cello “sing” better – or, to be more exact, sing more [plus] – than the soprano or the baritone, because, if there is a signification of sensuous phenomena, it is always in displacement, in substitution, i.e., ultimately, in absence, that it is most brilliantly manifest.

10.6 Theoretical reverberations

lang’s vocal aesthetics contains many elements that make it function powerfully at the level of significance, geno-singing, and grain of voice. It produces spaces (fantasies) that resemble the acoustic mirror stage, where the subject is in a state of imaginary formation. This denotes the dimension of textual jousissance that beckons an erotic listening to a “lawless” voice and momentary disappearances of subjectivity (cf. Barthes 1991: 206–207). We are asked to hear the “surplus” of signification, to listen awry (Žižek 1991; Schwarz 1997a: 58–59). In “corporeal” or “bodily” singing, the referent is the body, which gives infinite polyvalence to the sung text.

The concept of the acoustic mirror refers to the double organization of the vocal/auditory system. The producer of sound/voice always functions simultaneously as its listener, too, because the sound (utterance) coming from inside the body always returns, in its uttering process, back to its utterer (enunciator) as a sound that is exterior to the body and that the ear receives and incorporates (takes in). Because of the simultaneity of these events, it is difficult to define the location (place) of the sound. It is difficult to know if a sound is exterior or interior, if it exists “outside” or “inside” of the self. For these reasons, in the auditory sphere, the boundary between inner and outer world is blurred (Silverman 1988: 79–80). The acoustic mirror offers a space (fantasy) of full presence, free of separations (differentiation) and splits (divisions).

This kind of listening is encouraged by those factors in lang’s singing that emphasize corporeality: amorous, extra-linguistic sound repertoire; the Protean character of voice; an aesthetics of transitions and transformations; and abundant imagery of acoustic mirrors consisting of echo effects, imitations, sliding sounds, and reflective relations. The excessive amount of these factors suggests that listening to lang’s music ought to transcend the levels of communication and symbolic signification, in order to hear significance.

And yet, we can never find the “genuine” boundary separating signification and significance when analyzing lang’s (or anyone’s) singing, because as analyzing subjects we are always prisoners of the symbolic. When studying a certain feature in lang’s vocal signifying, such as vibrato, for instance, it is simultane-
ousely a question of both geno- and pheno-singing. Important also is what level of geno-singing one examines. Is it possible to say, for example, whether a certain vocal aspect actually is in fact geno-singing or if it is a representation of geno-singing in pheno-singing? In such a case, geno-singing is the subject matter or a “theme” in the singing. For reasons such as the former case; that is to say, because of the possible multi-layered differentiation of geno/pheno-singing, I do not agree with the sharp distinction between geno- and pheno-singing based on the kinds of mutually exclusive oppositions adduced by Barthes in this regard.\(^{40}\) Is not it through the thetic of pheno-singing that geno-singing must work? (If so, then there is no pure geno-singing.) The grain hangs in the fissure between pheno- and geno-singing, but also paradoxically to the rope that binds them. The grain of the voice is both geno- and pheno-singing simultaneously (cf. Barthes 1985: 269, 273). This double bind is manifested in the motto at the beginning of the chapter: the materiality of the body (geno) bound with the mother tongue (pheno).

The notion of object voice (voice as object of drive) refers to a moment of vocal transcendence in which the listening subject attends to the body’s libidinal drives in the voice *qua* voice “unmediated” by language. This autonimization of the voice destroys signification and differentiation, alienation (castration) and subjectivity are overruled. (Poizat 1992: 31–33, 93–106; Dunn & Jones 1994: 9.) The protean quality is one feature of lang’s voice that appeals to the listening subject’s experience of music as an imaginary space before the “castration” that arrives with language. It functions as an acoustic mirror that answers to every act of desire, to the listening subject’s beckoning of the other to respond “in the real of his or her being” (Žižek 1997: 192). Yet, the linguistic message is not destroyed in lang’s singing; rather, it is invested with new meaning: it is re-semantized. This also points out the fact that lang sings – queers – songs _between_ the categories, in the grain of the voice, between geno- and pheno-singing. lang’s vocal style is bound to the phenotext in a way that makes her voice function as a drive-loaded, object voice of desire in a different way and sense than the voice that Poizat describes, in reference to opera (the voice liberated from the symbolic order; 1992: ix, 37–45, 93–106). In the operatic object voice, the symbolic is no longer audible; communication and signification have vanished. In lang’s music, such extreme pheno-subversion happens very seldom. lang _subverts_ meaning, rather than destroying it. This takes place in relation to lang’s central style of critical parody, as well as her penchant for singing between the cracks. Also in this perspective, lang sings between categories.

\(^{40}\) Barthes sets them as opposites in order to categorize singers into two classes, and to draw a difference between (his much-admired teacher) Panzéra’s geno-singing, and Fischer-Dieskau’s pheno-singing.
If we go beyond music analysis and its methods, and take Barthes’s concepts also as a philosophical system, it is difficult to say which features of lang’s voice are geno- and which pheno-features. There are two basic reasons for this difficulty: (1) no feature is purely pheno or geno. (2) Any element interpreted as geno-singing is, by that very act of attribution, destined for the level of pheno-singing: it becomes defined and coded (although it by its definition precisely escapes all definitions, as goes a central cliché of early poststructuralism). Here, we again confront the paradox inscribed in all poststructural-psychoanalytic criticism: geno becomes pheno when it is under analysis. Research cannot escape defining things, even if provisionally, despite the claims that certain poststructural (non-)concepts “evade all definitions”. We may truly be looking for something as uncoded as possible (the signification evading the tyranny of communication and signification), but the moment we find it, it becomes coded. We can neither conceptualize nor communicate to the scholarly community the “uncoded” that we have found, save through the stuff of the coded. This central methodological problem comes to the fore most strongly when one is considering manifestations, representations, or constructions of the Lacanian real in music (coming in Chap. 11).

Figures of the unconscious in certain music under discussion, which derive from desire and permeate the symbolic (though invisibly so), can be captured only by compromise, because our research tames and washes them up, for a proper night’s lodging in the symbolic. For example, to hunt the grain of voice in lang’s music transforms our quarry into a code.\(^\text{41}\) Research cannot be done without a system and an explicated research setting. This is a problem that Barthes did not bother to address. Silverman would ask us to speak of a powerful cultural fantasy constructed retrospectively (we cannot “directly” grasp the acoustic mirror, geno-singing, and so forth). Barthes, however, wants to track real geno-singing, and not its representation. For our part, we can always ask: What is the source of such and such fantasy? Where did it originate? What is the reason for the fantasy? – We have much knowledge about the pre-linguistic mode of being in subjectivity, obtained by psychoanalytic developmental theory, baby observation, and empirical psychology.

Even Silverman remarks:

The sounds the voice makes always exceed signification to some degree, both before the entry into language and after. The voice is never completely standardized, forever

\(^{41}\) As Anne Sivuoja-Gunaratnam put it (private communication), in the conceptual and music-analytical use of the concept of the grain, its (mythic) immunity is lost, the rejection or mourning of which characterizes the discussion of the autonomy aesthetics (this denotes a scholarly subject strategy). In this way, even musicology is constructed around the lost object.
retaining an individual flavor or texture – [this is] what Barthes’s calls its “grain”. (1988: 44.)

What, then, is the relationship between Barthes’s concepts of geno-singing and the grain of the voice? Geno-singing is about the grain of voice; it is born in the grain of voice and from there springs forth. The grain of the voice is not restricted to just vocal music; it obtains as well in speech in general. Perhaps we could say that geno-singing fetishizes the grain of the voice and makes it audible through song.

According to Barthes, the voice is situated in the confrontation of body and discourse, in the corporeality of speech. Here, in this intermediate space between the body and the discourse, listening takes place. This kind of listening allows us to hear precisely what the speaking subject does not say: the texture of the unconscious that joins her “body as a place” with her discourse. It re-actualizes the subject’s own history in her speech. (Barthes 1985: 255–256.)

The grain of the voice in a sense comes close to Freud’s concept of drive. As drive is for Freud, so the grain of the voice is to Barthes: a borderline concept that charts the no-woman’s-land between the body and psyche (Freud) or between the body and language/culture (Lacan, Barthes). It is the zone and material link that leads to subjectivity – or to its (momentary) disappearance.
Chapter 11
Between being and meaning: 
Music of alienation, emptiness, and death in P. H. Nordgren’s TV-opera Alex

*From the moment when she crosses the entrance to the zone between life and death, that is to say, when what she has already affirmed herself to be takes on an outward form... Although she is not yet dead, she is eliminated from the world of the living. And it is from that moment on that her complaint begins, her lamentation on life.*


11.1 Genre on trial: TV-Zeitoper in the age of media
– Contemporary relevance and a depth-psychological view

This is the last analytic chapter examining musical subject strategies, and the focus now turns to an amalgam of music theatre, opera, and TV. The object of study is the TV-opera *Alex*, composed by a Finnish contemporary composer Pehr Henrik Nordgren (b. 1944) to a libretto written by Finnish poet Pentti Saaritsa (b. 1941). Directed by Hannu Heikinheimo, it was first performed in FBC TV1 (Finnish Broadcasting Company / Suomen Yleisradio, YLE) in 1986 with a simultaneous radio broadcast (FBC/YLE Radio 1).

---

1 This title is in debt to Jelena Novak’s (2002) paper on “Opera in the age of media”.
2 Nordgren is one of the most widely known Finnish contemporary composers, along with Kaija Saariaho, Magnus Lindberg, Einojuhani Rautavaara, and Kalevi Aho, among others. Nordgren’s wide and multifarious oeuvre consists of symphonies, concertos, and other orchestral works, chamber music, choral works, and solo works for various instruments. See Heinö 1994 and 1995: 258–266, 368–371; Kaipainen 1986; and Korhonen 1995: 39–43, 141–143; see also, http://www.fimic.fi.
My discussion of *Alex* as a story of subjectivity centers on how the music contributes to the existential thematics of the story. *Alex* is interpreted as a (re)presentation of the subject’s hopeless and paradoxical “either–or” position between Being and Meaning, as theorized by Jacques Lacan (1998 [1973]), and as a condition “between two deaths” (Lacan 1992 [1986]). Musical symbolism is studied in the light of Lacan’s registers of the psychic constitution of the subject, by paying main attention to the register of the real and how it intertwines with the imaginary and symbolic³ (Lacan 1998 [1973] and 1977 [1966]). Special attention is given to the musical representation of alienation and death pervading the work.

*Alex* tells the story of a man (Alex) in his thirties to whom the world makes no sense; life has no meaning, and he finds no place in society nor any reason for his existence at all. He feels that the life he is living is not his own. He is out of touch with how he is defined by people around him. He does not want to follow in his father’s footsteps as the director of a metal factory that manufactures armaments, and he is not able to make up his mind about the woman (Maria) he is supposed to love. Then, Alex falls in love with a woman he sees by chance on the street (Miriam). The woman is Alex’s distant childhood object of fascination, whom he has not seen since his school days. Miriam belongs to an international terrorist organization composed of young people fighting against international trade in arms and militarism. Because of her, Alex drifts into terrorist activity, thus fighting not only against a “bad” world but against his father’s world, too. In one operation, Alex accidentally blows up a bus full of school children. The terrorist organization is destroyed in the aftermath; all terrorists are killed except Alex. He survives but wishes to die, since he has irrevocably lost himself, his humanity and subjectivity. His life is gone – if he ever even had one – for everything was empty and insignificant already before he met Miriam and took part in terrorism. After becoming “inhuman”, a murderer, Alex ultimately loses even his former emptiness, exchanging it for an even more absolute nothingness and non-being. The opera ends with a scene in which Death comes to take him.

This is the story, briefly told, of *Alex*, as it was commissioned in 1983 by the Finnish Broadcasting Company. The term “TV-opera” is to be understood here as follows: an opera made particularly for television, which takes advantage of the specific capacities and resources of that medium (Barnes 2003: 2). Thus it can be differentiated from other types of opera presentations via television, such as opera relays (live or recorded from opera houses and festivals), films about opera, and opera films (in most cases this means cinematic versions of stage operas); also not at issue here are studio production versions of stage operas...

---

³ Exceptionally, in this chapter, the symbolic is to be understood primarily in its Lacanian sense.
filmed for television as a kind of combination of film and relay (Barnes 2003: 1–2; Salter 2001: 1; Large 2001; Citron 2000: 41). In this sense, the television opera represents only a minute fraction of TV operatic output, where the most popular case is the relay (Salter 2001: 1). The possibility of transposing a TV-opera to stage and vice versa makes porous the boundaries between the various genres. Also the boundary between television and cinema can be blurred, and an operatic-filmic work can belong to more than one category (Citron 2000: 41). Still, Alex fills clearly the criterion for television opera as an art form of its own amongst the more familiar types of music drama, such as stage opera, film and stage musical, music theatre, or music video. It represents a marginal and odd form of opera, the reception of which has often been one of negative bewilderment, ever since its inception, as if it were especially difficult to accept this kind of hybrid medium that amalgamates different media as well as types of music drama. The same can be observed in the reception of Alex. There is something uncanny – ghostly – about TV-opera, as a form of art that has “mortified” the spectacle of stage opera into a television production wherein the voice is not “alive”, as it is in opera and in relay: perhaps this revenant voice is trapped into the uncanny condition between death and life (cf. Freud 1955a [1919]).

Alex is a peculiar type of TV-opera genre especially able to create a depth-psychological – one could even say, psychoanalytic – musico-dramatic work, one which focuses on the subject’s inner (unconscious) drama. Television is an intimate medium, with specific capacities and techniques such as instant scene changes, intensity of close up shots, and montage, just to name a few. TV has particular idiomatic potentialities for representing the surrealistic logic of the unconscious dynamics of desire, dream, and phantasm. Typical of the genre of depth-psychological TV-opera is that it explores the extreme emotional territory of subjectivity via ordinary people, in our own time, in ordinary circumstances (unlike opera that presents mythical and historical figures at a distance). Psychological probes are injected into a narrative that is related to actual social and political problems of today’s world. Elements of drama and tragedy consist of the uncanny, which can enter the most commonplace things.

4 Jack Bornoff (see Barnes 2003: 2) suggests an even narrower definition for TV-opera as an opera which can never be adapted to stage production and which thus should be differentiated from a broader category of “opera for television”. This definition is shaky, however, since anything can be transformed into whatever medium in some way (though one may debate the results and degree of distortion).
5 The reception of Alex and of Finnish TV-opera in general are not discussed here. We can note, however, that the famous “Finnish opera boom” has not extended to the genre of TV-operas.
6 On the history and techniques of television opera, see above all Barnes 2003; cf. also, 2001; about on-screen opera in general, see, e.g., Citron 2000 and Tambling 1987.
Chapter 11. Between being and meaning: P. H. Nordgren’s Alex

This type of TV-opera is a relative of Expressionist music drama (e.g., Berg’s Wozzeck) in its focus on the subject’s unconscious inner life and extreme affective registers, such as grief, obsessions, insanity, and tragic consequences. The Expressionist atmosphere is further emphasized in Alex at the visual level, in its symbolism and allusions to German Expressionism of 1920s. Mikko Heiniö (1994: 348–349) describes Alex as combining slightly melodramatically the atmosphere of the factory squires of the 1920s and 1930s, the guerrilla romanticism of the 1960s and 1970s, and the alienation of the 1980s. The Expressionist ambiance of the psychic forum is intensified with excessive close-ups, signifying that what really takes place in the work is all in a person’s (Alex’s) head, that the true stage is his mind. This mental insularity is also suggested by the absence of outdoor scenes and shots. The drama takes place mostly in dimly lit, in unidentified and undefined (non-)places, such as a train corridor (the train is not shown) and a street with no name or other attributes of locale, but only rain-slicked paving stones à la film noir and masses of people’s unidentified backs and feet coming and going in cross-fading. An essential site in this comfortless scene is a bridge, symbolizing the subject’s being “on the edge”, in transition, in an unsettled condition of “in-between-ness”. Alex’s object of affection, Miriam, is first seen on the bridge, and Alex also meets his own death there (see Figure 11a).

This type of TV-opera is also related to the paradigm of opera in our media-glutted day: the topic is of contemporary relevance and connected to extensive social and political problematics of today’s world, and to the age of mass media. Hence, the (mass) media society of spectacle is an essential part of the subject matter and theastics of the work (Novak 2002). The excitement over the possibility of opera being about something of contemporary relevance dominates television operas, where, given the medium involved, it is often handled differently than it is on stage. In view of the media opera paradigm and that of TV-opera, the story of Alex is exemplary in focusing on terrorist acts committed by young people (students, for instance) in west European cities and directed against an international armament business. Librettist Pentti Saaritsa has said that, when writing the text, he had in mind the wave of terrorism in Germany in the 1970s–1980s, and that he was obsessed with the question of why these terrorists were so often children from so-called “normal” families.

7 Erik Wahlström (1986) mentions the symbolic function of the bridge in Alex.
8 The images in the present chapter were not directly shot from a TV-screen, but are production photographs for promotion and press purposes. They are, however, fully representative.
10 Private communication with Saaritsa, April 2002.
Alex can also be categorized as a Zeitoper. In Alex, the presence of media and technology, tragic relationship, contemporary relevance, everyday happenings, transportation motives (train, airport), factory, armament technology, technical innovations, cinematic progress of events, recitative and discussion-like style and avoidance of arias – all are elements of Zeitoper. Certainly the paradigm of opera in the age of media, including such works as John Adams’s political operas, can be considered a return of the Zeitoper of 1920s–30s. But in Alex the sense of Zeitoper is present not only as a predecessor of media opera but also in the sense of historical (postmodern) references. (Cf. Figures 11a and 11c.)
Chapter 11. Between being and meaning: P. H. Nordgren’s Alex

The dialogue of media opera with mass media society is complex and multi-layered. In TV-opera, the relation between the art form, media, and (TV-)technology is even more fundamental and fixed. The performers have to sing their message through many layers of media. These are related to the various audio techniques and production methods that may result in “deathly”, uncanny effects. For example, in Alex, singers lip-sync to a pre-recorded sound track, i.e., to a mechanical reproduction of their own voices. If in “normal” stage opera there are already lots of uncanny features (Abbate 2001), the latter are perhaps heightened to a second degree when brought from the live situation to “dead” reproduction in which actors/singers often mime singing (their own or someone else’s).

11.2 Music as the protagonist’s psychical mise-en-scène

But who, who is that impatient one that assails me inside myself? Why, for what reason two times pulsate inside me?
(Alex, Scene 7; Saaritsa 1986: 9)

Alex is composed for grand orchestra, 15-voice male choir, and boys’ choir. Its duration is about 1 hour and 40 minutes (97’43’’), which is rather long for a television opera. The characters are shown in Figure 11b.

The terrorism in Alex functions as an extreme symbol of existential suffering and the Weltschmerz of an alienated subject in the west. In Lacanian (1998 [1973]) terms, we can say that the subject (Alex) is not able to deal with the fundamental void in his subjectivity and his “thrownness” (cf. Heideggerian Geworfenheit) into the world, with the fundamental alienation inscribed necessarily (structurally, constitutively) to – and thus actually also produced by – subjectivity. Impossible for the subject to understand are the constant confrontations with the real as it manifests in the world, in the ruptures of the symbolic, and in the subject himself. Moreover, the trauma is not only structural but also socio-

11 I am grateful to Altti Kuusamo for this comment.
12 TV media operas often contain interesting self-reflexive tones in posing questions, such as, what kind of dynamics is concealed in the subject’s relation to television (media)? In what way and to what extent do we live in and through visual and audial media? These may, however, be only pseudo-questions: if one takes poststructuralist semiotics seriously, nothing is unmediated in our lives, for sign systems can exist only in (or through) some medium.
13 The lines from Alex are quoted in the study as they are in Saaritsa 1986.
14 The orchestral instrumentation is: 3333/4331/16, piano, strings. The orchestra is The Finnish Radio Symphony Orchestra, conducted by Atso Almila.
15 For the present chapter I have exchanged “her” for “his” when the subjectivity discussed is that of Alex.
Subject Strategies in Music

historical: terrorism and armament dealing.

The opera consists of four periods (spring, summer, autumn, and winter), which symbolize the life cycle, from birth to death. But the protagonist is not a hero whose subjectivity is established and secured in the journey by his overcoming of obstacles (cf. the mythical-textual mechanism as discussed by de Lauretis 1984 and 1987). For this Ulysses achieves nothing in his Odyssey, only horror and death, and more fundamental emptiness and nothingness. The negativity of his being, the lack and longing, is not filled, but only intensified by the illusion of the paradise lost as an end to suffering and a site of freedom, fullness of being, and consistent self, all of which are projected most importantly onto Miriam. As one of Alex’s various others, Miriam does not represent the object a (Lacan 1998 [1973]) only in the sense of the impossible object of desire, but also in the sense of the real and the presence of death.

There is no meaning and no solution to the fundamental existential problematics in the story of Alex. Nothing develops, not even in the music. The static hopelessness of a man thrown into the meaningless, violent, and merciless world is emphasized by Nordgren’s music. The music works as a psychological and philosophical counterpart of the text, as if it were extracting basic ideas and

16 See pp. 211–212 (Chap. 7.2).
Chapter 11. Between being and meaning: P. H. Nordgren’s Alex

themes from the story to use as musical symbols representing the conflicting elements in the psychical constitution of the subject. The music in Alex can be read as the protagonist’s psychical structure. The musical text is the psychic reality of Alex, the site for subjectivity to make its own stories.

Nordgren’s musical style is postmodern, pluralistic, and collage-like. Elements are drawn from twelve-tone music, Ligetian field techniques, the pathos of Shostakovich, western tonal tradition, minimalism, folk music, and choral pieces steeped in melancholy, and more; musical material and stylistic devices are taken from here and there (cf. Kaipainen 1986: 10, 13–14; Heiniö 1994: 345–346). The composer has said that, because Alex was meant for a medium watched by almost everyone, he tried “for a certain clear expression, though not to anything folkish or populist, but to an opera, which contents are in a concrete way conceivable also from the music and possible to comprehend on a single hearing” (in FBC 1986b: 2). In Barthes’s terms (1985: 41–43), the music aims to serve the meaning levels of communication and signification (symbolisms) rather than that of signification. Indeed, this is not an opera wherein the voice denotes liberation from the tyranny of linguistic representation – and this musical solution is paradigmatic.
For music-theatrical reasons, the musical texture is simpler in Alex than in other of Nordgren’s orchestral works. As a background for speech-like singing, the orchestral texture often lessens to a partial orchestra, producing fragile yet dissonant spaces of few lines, with minimal pitch variations dominated by minor seconds, giving the impression of a laconic, dampened anguish. From time to time this changes to a tutti orchestral outburst (in $fff$ or even $ffff$) with aggressive rhythmic patterns and lots of percussion. Such stark contrasts dominate the music, and the dark undercurrents are all-pervasive.

The vocal style is speech-like, dominated by simple recitative declamation in the middle register where the words can be understood clearly. The singing displays tradition kinds of text-underlay and unfolds in speech rhythms. Long notes and vocal embellishments are rare and peripheral. There are no arias, not many characteristic melodic turns, and no vocal acrobatics. Instead there is much repetition of the same pitch, along with speech-like curves composed mainly of the smallest intervals and often beginning or ending with a tritone. The seconds, tritones, and whole-tone scales are quite salient, and transitional vocal techniques between speech and singing are used. From time to time the music becomes pure speech, and opera turns into melodrama or spoken theatre (Heiniö 1994: 349).

As already said, this is not “an object voice opera”, which aims at transgressive ecstatic pleasure and bliss beyond language, allowing the listening subject to forget her fundamental attachment to the symbolic order (cf. Poizat 1992: ix, 37–45, 93–106). On the contrary, it emphasizes the symbolic order at many levels. It is an anti-opera in the sense that singing does not destroy speech to allow for a purely musical melody that moves toward higher and higher pitches for the sake of an ecstatic cry that would detach the voice from speech and the subject from its necessarily alienated condition (cf. ibid.). This music offers no transgression or jouissance. Arias and vocal athleticism are avoided: the voice is not worked up into a drive-loaded voice of desire. Expressive extremes can be seen only in the anti-ecstatic recitation and suppression of vocal, operatic cries. This aesthetics emphasizes the subject’s entrapment and angst: not even the music in the opera frees the subject from the prison of the symbolic order and emptiness of being. Thus the subject’s entrapment in language is also represented by (meta)musical means in the work.

The music of Alex can be said to be non-, a-, or even anti-thematic. The musical materials remain static; nothing happens to them; they are not developed by means of conventional techniques (such as motivic variation); rather, they just come and go. Instead of motivic or thematic development, the music constructs symbols, certain characteristic gestures, types of texture, and patterns of musical

17 I refer here to Poizat’s (1992) and others’ psychoanalytic understanding of voice in opera.
material that plunge in to the total texture of aggressive sound masses and meditative pauses, based on the repetition of concise musical materials. The music proceeds by abrupt contrasts and segmentations, by sudden transitions from one dimension to another by the juxtaposition of alien materials (Heiniö 1994: 346). This creates an impression of overpowering irresistibility, a divided subject being thrown about on the musical screen of his psyche. The music – as opposed to the verbal level of the opera libretto – serves as the primary language of the speech of Alex’s unconscious, which uses a different language from that of the consciousness (the pheno-verbal level). For its protagonist (Alex), the music in the opera acts as the stage and the discourse of the other, by whom one is (supposed to be) recognized in order to achieve the security of existence (cf. Lacan 1998 [1973]: 131). But here this psychic stage is stripped of the capacity to enjoy any bliss, any echoes of presence, any unity and security. The other is not responding as object of desire but rather as a void of annihilation, emptiness of the symbolic, and as a grimace of the real.

Before proceeding, we should note the special problems of applying Lacan’s (1998 [1973]) concept of the real to music analysis. The central question is, how is it possible to read something as a representation of the real, which by definition is beyond representation and thus eludes all conceptualizations?

Important is to emphasize that, in my subject-strategical analyses, psychoanalytic concepts are not taken primarily as a philosophical system but as methodological tools for analyzing and interpreting particular pieces of music. Therefore the following methodical clarification can be made. Firstly, there is Lacan’s theoretical supposition of the actual order of the “real” as a dimension in (non-)subjectivity experience, which cannot be described or symbolized (for example one’s own death or birth). This real is total psychotic plenitude, which supports while evading signification. It is “an inscrutable force or thing beyond the limits of sensory or linguistic representation” (Schwarz 1997a: 32). Certainly it is there in all symbolic systems, but by definition the real works as a kind of anti-material to the symbolic and cannot be approached discursively. This real cannot be examined “directly” in a work of art. Secondly, we can read in a work of art a representation of the subject’s encounter with the real. It can be represented in the textual mechanics and thematics of a work as such, for example in the “fractures” or “noise” in a musical text. Also, it can be represented as a musical gesture, character, or other element in the work, as I shall later suggest in listening the protagonist’s psychic constitution in Alex.

It is furthermore possible to differentiate theoretically between primal and secondary representations of the real. (1) Primal representations of the real are musical elements that are easily connected or associated with that concept, because of their sound qualities and properties as such. This category may include noise,
Subject Strategies in Music

loudness, and other such things often considered as “non-symbolic”. The listener cannot “escape” them, they cannot be “controlled” by signification, and they may evoke nausea or ecstatic pleasure. (2) The secondary representation of the real is even more crucially related to musical genres, styles, and other specific discursive codes and contexts, where something in the text (an element, gesture, or other rhetorical or formal device) may, in its structural context, stand for the real. In these cases, we are talking about analogies between textual and psychical mechanisms at the representational level, although the two categories overlap and the difference between them may not always be clear.

The same kind of methodical clarification was outlined in relation to notions of the abject and the semiotic in Chapter 5.2.1 (pp. 139–141). This very abstruse notion of the real presents even greater philosophico-methodological problems, which seem both paradoxical and insolvable. These are related to the fundamental question of all psychoanalytic art criticism: if the unconscious cannot be studied as such but only through its actions and what Freud described as drive derivatives or “vicissitudes”, then, in what way and on what level can we suppose the unconscious to unfold (for us) in the work of art?

11.3 Representation of the lack

What I seek in speech is the response of the other.
What constitutes me as subject is my question.
(Lacan 1977 [1966]: 86)

The opera begins by repetitions of an inversely syncopated, full orchestral tet- rachord: B♭–C–E♭–G♭ played fortissimo (half diminished seventh chord with the seventh in bass) (see Example 11d). This tense, rhythmically obsessive and harmonically ambiguous symbol of Alex’s “crisis” keeps appearing constantly in the work. It functions as the very symbol of the whole story, the lack and alienation in the subject and Alex’s existential question. It appears persistently in the same monotonous pattern of half note + quarter note + half note in 5/4 meter, with slight harmonic variations – as a kind of exercise in tritone-rich tetrachords – which seems to over-determine the symbol’s identity.

In addition to the chordal outbursts by the orchestra, when the symbolic chord occupies the whole texture, it also dominates the music in other ways. Materials related to the symbol-chord are used here and there in the collage-texture as a background to vocal sections. This symbol-chord is present almost always throughout the work, sometimes hidden in the harmony, sometimes as an obsessive rhythmic pattern played on this or that instrument. Often it fades away into the distance, to pianissimo.
Chapter 11. Between being and meaning: P. H. Nordgren’s Alex

The symbol-chord drives the story, as the musical signifier of Alex’s lack, obsession, desire, and wound. It can be thought to represent and condense all the conflicts and splits in Alex, with the fundamental lack resonating in each of them. These conflicts in Alex’s subjectivity can be described as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>demands made by others</th>
<th>vs. Alex’s own will</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– family, work in arms factory, established social-symbolic</td>
<td>– felt only negatively as revolt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>order</td>
<td>against the established social-symbolic order (against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>others)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and as a longing for impossible, imaginary fullness and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>freedom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>consciousness</th>
<th>vs. unconscious</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>repression as knowledge, power, and law</td>
<td>repression as denial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meaning (Other)</th>
<th>vs. Being (subject)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Name of the father”</td>
<td>vs. bodily desire, drive, sexuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>life (society, subjectivity)</td>
<td>vs. death (freedom, psychosis)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In accordance with Lacan, we can opine that the existential wound (lack) in Alex (of the subject) is enveloped by a fantasy of a full presence that is presented by images of the lost paradise experienced (or fantasized as experienced) in childhood and belonging to the order of the imaginary. Alex projects onto Miriam this longing for unity and fullness of being – and for a better world. The imaginary register is represented musically by various devices. Most importantly it is presented by the music of the forest sung by a boy choir. The use of boy choir in itself refers to childhood, and the forest (nature) refers to the opposite of city/street, society, culture, and the negative real. Also it forms an opposite to the factory music which represents the emotional territory of the social-symbolic order, as well as the horror of the real that inhabits inside the symbolic. The forest (boy choir) is the imaginary but also the “positive” real. At the visual level, the imaginary is presented, for example, by cross fading of a close up of Alex with an image of Alex as a child (in a boy’s sailor suit, symbolizing freedom).

The imaginary register is also constructed by a magical whole tone passage played by piano, heard distantly, as if a flicker of an object a (e.g., scene 3, mm. 170, 173, and 198). The music of the imaginary in Miriam’s first appearance (scene 3, mm. 248–257) is constructed by a dreamlike, visionary soundscape painted by the marimba. The marimba plays alone and in piano pianissimo tremolos that produce tetrachords, one of which is characterized by a “magical”

---

18 Wahlström (1986) also notices the function of this chord as a kind of motto of conflicting impulses in Alex.
Example 11d. P. H. Nordgren, *Alex*, mm. 1–4, winds and percussion (reduced score): symbol of Alex’s lack; construction of psychical crisis.
Chapter 11. Between being and meaning: P. H. Nordgren’s Alex

whole tone scale (e–f♯–bb–c¹), one is a half diminished seventh chord, and one is a diminished seventh chord. The fact that Miriam does not sing (i.e., is not presented in the symbolic) on her first appearance, emphasizes her function as an inner object of Alex’s projection, the imaginary other, whose response would make Alex whole. It represents the illusory response that Alex is looking for to answer his fundamental existential question. Thus, Miriam is Alex’s internal object-relation rather than a person. In this way, the symbol-chord and the music of imaginary represent the self/other dialectics in Alex’s subjectivity.

Viewed from a Lacanian perspective, Alex’s search is doomed to fail, for language irrevocably severs the subject from any experience of unmediated reality (cf. Scherzinger 2001: 98). It is thus not possible to return to imaginary fullness or to the unmediated real. As the forest sings by the voices of young boys: “He has returned to that place to which there is no return: He could be the same, but not himself.” (Scene 6, mm. 492–504; Saaritsa 1986: 8.) The boy choir sings these lines in high register and the passage is dominated by “cold” and irrational major thirds that contrast with the previous dominance of tritones. It is further accompanied by a humming male choir and an electronic echo (tape), which, according to my interpretation, represent the real (“street”). The last words of the phrase, “but not himself” (as if saying “there is no subjectivity”), is also sung by the male choir – as if telling about the relatedness of the imaginary and the real: “the real supports the phantasy, the phantasy protects the real” (Lacan 1998 [1973]: 41). At the same time, Alex (qua his consciousness) says parlando: “This place reminds me of something. I can’t remember what.” The forest (boy voices) continues to sing, accompanied by the males’ humming and tape echoes: “You can’t remember, but someday you will remember everything in a single moment: you’ll remember how as a child the light shone through the leaves and the grass swayed at a level with your eyes: then you will shout and I will no longer answer” (scene 5; Saaritsa 1986: 8).

The musical representation of the subject’s confrontation with the real, sensed as anxiety and horror, is presented in Alex by music of the street (with male choir as an important element) and by music of the factory. The street music consists of mechanical repetitions of very short, fast, and rhythmically bumpy patterns recycled from one instrumental section to another. Harmonically, this music is characterized by the tritone, and its orchestration by timpani, xylophone, snare drum, and piano. To this mechanical mix are added the grotesque thrusts of piccolos and trumpets, all playing fortissimo (see Example 11e).

The factory music is in many ways similar to the music of street and also to the music that describes terrorists in action, but it is even more machine-like in an iconic sense of factory-likeness. In the factory scenes, the vocal parts are often accompanied with a percussion section that stands almost alone against the voice
Subject Strategies in Music

(timpani, tom toms, castanets, finger cymbals, break drums, anvil). The music of the real sounds aggressive, chaotic, hard, metallic, mechanical, inhuman, as “the nightmarish nothingness within [Alex’s] male desire” (cf. Schwarz’s 1997a: 35). The real is that which lies outside of the imaginary and in the fissures of the symbolic; it is a psychotic fullness that lies beyond the subject’s experience and representation. It “emerges in a kind of mismatch between the symbolic and the imaginary orders” (Scherzinger 2001: 98–99). In its mechanicalness, the factory music is also interpretable in terms of the uncanny (Freud 1955a [1919]) related to the death drive, as the horror and blurring between human and machine – a depersonalized aspect of the self (cf. Cumming 1997a: 131). As Naomi Cumming (ibid.: 130) writes, “[t]he experience of obsessive, mechanical motion can involve the listener in such a way as to suggest a more primitive ‘drive’ – an involuntary motion, a compulsive participation in something beyond his or her own control”. Also, it may be experienced as incorporating or mirroring bodily motion (ibid.: 136).

11.4 Between two deaths

The film mustn’t be shown in public in any country.
The sight of death can be faked
and the faking even slowed up.
It’s only real death from really close up
that is forbidden.
(Alex, Scene 18; Saaritsa 1986: 23)

Death is interestingly evoked in the uncanny factory music, for it is an arms factory. Inside its products lay death: the factory produces death. Indeed, the whole opera in its entirety revolves around death taking various forms, and death may be said to be present in the work on all its discursive and symbolizing levels.

The story is about Alex’s tragedy in having no hold on life, and it ends with his death (a kind of suicide is suggested). Other characters die too (terrorists, school children, Alex father’s business colleague), and they die violently, killed by other human beings. Further, almost all characters seem to be somehow half dead, the “living dead”, in the sense that they are psychically broken. Alex’s mother (who is a mute) manifests in the psychoanalytic light as a deadly mother, “a living corpse”, and is thus a sign of Alex’s psychic necrosis. Dumbness may be a sign of death/castration but here it also signifies a mother who is not able to respond to her son’s pleas and who is left out of the symbolic. The wordless and voiceless mother in a wheel chair and black dress, without symbolic communication of any kind, suggests that something is fatally wrong in Alex’s imaginary, which should keep him (psychically) alive. Miriam’s path to terrorism, as fight-
Example 11e. P. H. Nordgren, Alex, Part I, Scene 3, mm. 136–140, winds, percussion, and piano (reduced score); street music; grotesque melody in trumpets and piccolo begins (m. 139; see p. 344).
Example 11e (continued).
ing against the “bearers of the briefcase of death” (as the arms business men are described in scene 12; Saaritsa 1986: 17), is determined by her earlier mortification caused by trauma of her witnessing torture and death (this is suggested, but not stated outright in the opera; hence it is something unnamable). Further, issues concerning the armament business and terrorism signify in themselves the extremes of a culture of death.

Death is also personified, as a character in the opera (bass). In the libretto (Saaritsa 1986) it is described with the epithet “very common”, in some bro- chures “man on the last platform”, and in the program note ”the man on the final shore, he who awaits us all” (FBC 1986a). The personification of death shows up at the very beginning of the opera (scene 2) and keeps manifesting as a silent character during the work. Death sings only at the end, when coming to take Alex (scene 22).

It can be said that death is present in the work as a philosophical topic, the most ultimate real, the totally unknown other of the subject, the shadow always there. It encompasses the subject’s consciousness of his own mortality, her unconscious denial of death, and the death drive (thanatos). It marks the limit of reason and knowledge, and the end of subjectivity. “The relationship to death supports or subtends, as the string does the bow, the curve of the rise and fall of life” (Lacan 1992 [1986]: 194).

The musical symbol of death in Alex appears as an icy minor triad or a pro- gression of minor triads in non-functional succession, as if castrated (decapitated) from the vital fluid of functional tonality. The gesture is effective when appearing suddenly after a texture dominated by non-triadic and non-tonal, cluster-seeking elements. The death symbol appears, for example, when Miriam is referring to the horrors of her past (about which Alex does not know but would like to know) (scene 12). Most importantly it appears in the last scene (scene 22), when coming to take Alex. The death chords in Example 11f (mm. 215–218) take place in scene 18, when the terrorists are in their hideout, waiting for information about their actions. To pass time, one terrorist is talking about death, and singing, for instance, the lines quoted at the start of this sub-chapter (11.4). The successive trichords, without tonal function, act here as a representation of “non-meaning”, for they are irrational triads, without (tonal) sense. They also construct a sense of abstractness and distance.

This symbol of death appears in the work when the death is present as a shadow of subjectivity. It is not used to tone-paint an actual death as an event in the narrative (e.g., when the terrorists are slaughtered), but rather when death signifies the ultimate real as a philosophical category and existential condition of

---

19 I have discussed this rhetorical device of successive irrational triads in Nordgren’s piano ballad Earless Hoichi (1972) in Välimäki 2000: 162–164.
Example 11f. P. H. Nordgren, *Alex*, Part III, Scene 18, mm. 213–218, piano, terrorists, strings (reduced score). Terrorist I sings, “death from really close up” (mm. 213–214); “irrational” minor triads follow in piano (mm. 215–218).
the subject, who is doomed to fundamental alienation and mortality, to a condition of “between two deaths” (Lacan 1992 [1986]). In Lacan’s theory, the first death is the symbolic castration at the language acquisition. It denotes the separation from direct connection to things, [m]other and world, which in turn allows for the birth of subjectivity. The second death is the actual (historical) death of an individual. (Ibid.) Between these two deaths Alex’s existential condition is suspended and pulled. The symbolic (language) brings the first death to the subject’s life, as the unavoidable alienating structure of subjectivity, dividing words from things and subject from the fullness of the real and bliss of the imaginary, and moreover, as the realization of one’s own mortality.

The symbolic order as law and castration is condensed in Alex in the profession of Alex’s father as an arms manufacturer. “The name of the father”, the big Other as language, symbolic, and social order (Lacan 1977 [1966]: 67, 199, 217) is presented as a factory producing super-efficient mortars. The symbolic, as the law and as the name of the father, is raised exponentially by the character of the lawyer working in the factory. It is this lawyer’s daughter (Maria) whom Alex is “supposed” to love. Moreover, this aspect of the symbolic order is mediated by the piercing tenor voices for both father and lawyer.

The factory operates in the manner in which symbolic signification works in the subject, as agreed practice that makes the subject’s life possible and profitable (“business”). The involuntary, mechanistic movements of the factory laborer are also a Marxist symbol for the alienated condition of the subject (cf. Cumming 1997a: 132). It is the real as the support of and fissure in the symbolic order, which Alex is approaching in his concern about what is really hidden in the manufacturing business and inside its products (the mortars). The deadly potential of arms (such as grenades, for instance) parallels the real as absolute psychotic fullness that is repressed for the sake of representation and subjectivity; here is the psychic site of the ultimate horror and unknown (the death) in the subject’s existential screen of anxiety. Alex’s striving for knowledge, “truth”, “just” action, and a righteous life is as hopeless and fatal as trying to see the void inside the subject. The effort is necessarily doomed and tragic.

Alex’s condition of hopelessness, as it relates to alienation and lack, can also be described by Lacan’s concept of vel (1998 [1973]: 210–213; see also, p. 136, Chap. 5.1.2). According to Lacan, when one chooses Meaning (social-symbolic order), then Being (real/imaginary fullness) is lost. Alienation, or vel, the either/or of the subject, is a bizarre thing: given two alternatives, of Being (subject) and Meaning (Other), neither remains as such. If choosing Being (freedom), the subject will vanish into non-meaning, into psychosis: it is to choose death. If

20 For Lacan (1992 [1986]), the exemplary model for this condition is provided by Antigone’s story. See the motto at the beginning of this Chapter 11.
Subject Strategies in Music

choosing the Meaning, the subject remains (she chooses life) but only as an otherness, as alienated. The subject chooses life, but it is life without freedom, i.e., life in the prison of the symbolic. (Lacan 1998 [1973]: 210–213; Ihanus 1995: 28–29.) As the street sings (scene 3; Saaritsa 1986: 4): “I don’t mean anything, I am street. I am everything that is possible. You may live, you may choose.” Alex’s intent to choose freedom (of being), by joining Miriam’s organization, which operates outside the law, is in fact a choice of death.

The problem of vel is projected also in the double thematics in Alex. The characters of Axel, whose epithet is “who could have been the same man”, and Maria, whose epithet is “a woman who should have been Alex’s”, represent the life which could have been Alex’s but is not. It also means the life Alex’s father wanted his son to live. Axel is the mirror of that part of Alex which could have adapted himself to society and to the symbolic order. I interpret a two-part melodic theme with a lamenting curve, partly in unison (cf. mirror) and partly dissonant (cf. distorted mirror), as signifying this double thematics of Axel and Alex (see Example 11g).

This symbol of the mirror and double thematics could be further interpreted as representing the problematics of the Lacanian (1953, 1977 [1966], and 1998 [1973]) vague and alienated (“fictive”) ego. Also it could be interpreted as a musical image of the failure of the symbolic to represent adequately. Furthermore, it can be thought to represent Alex’s abject “no” (negation) to the social pressure and will of the father, and maybe also to annihilation by the real. And further, it forms a condensation of Alex’s Antigonean lamentations about the life he never lived, stated from the position between the two deaths (Lacan 1992 [1986]). His father’s arms factory reveals that Alex already inhabits the kingdom of death. Alex is acting out this symbolic, first death by going into terrorism, and especially by “accidentally” murdering children. After that, Alex is doomed to death, although he is not yet dead – he is excluded from the realm of society and of the living, exiled to the zone between life and death, which comes before the (relief of the) second death. As Lacan (1992 [1986]: 280) describes Antigone’s condition: “Although she is not yet dead, she is eliminated from the world of the living”. At the end of the opera, just before Death comes to take him, Alex writes a letter to Axel (scene 21), in the passage where the musical symbol for the double thematics also appears. Alex writes: “You continue, my friend, your name

21 As one detail about the pessimistic, depressing social philosophy that the work as a whole seems to present, it could be remarked that both Alex and Axel suffer as individuals, and both are responsible for potentially massive damage to the world. Axel is a nuclear physicist in a power plant and is presented in the work as ethically suffering because of his work. Interesting, too, is that the nuclear power plant disaster of Chernobyl (26 April 1986) happened just a few months before the broadcast of Alex.
Example 11g. P. H. Nordgren, Alex, Part I, Scene 2, mm. 80–85: double thematics in violins; “crisis” symbol in other strings. Axel [parlando]: “You’ll soon been thirty. Your father was hoping [double thematics in violins begins] you knew what he had hoped.” Alex [parlando]: “The head of a factory, I am not going to be. [singing] I shouldn’t have been born into a rich family.” (Saaritsa 1986: 2.)
passes over the cross upon which my name ends” (Saaritsa 1986: 27).

11.5 Death and sexuality – and some questions of interpretation

This lack is real because it relates to something real, namely, that the living being, by being subject to sex, has fallen under the blow of individual death.


The scenes portraying terrorists waiting for the next move (especially scene 16, see Figure 11h) are exorbitantly loaded with sexual symbols and connotations. Women terrorists look like stereotypical seductresses, with their heavy-make up, costumes, and stereotypically provocative gestures, for example, in how they caress the guns. Signs of power hierarchy among the terrorists are given in the form of sexual gestures and relations. For example, Miriam, who in scene 16 reminds one of a kind of queen bee, slaps one terrorist on the cheek. (Also, a kind of love-triangle drama is suggested in the visual representation.) All this seems to propose that, ultimately, the terrorists’ motives were in fact sexual, and that the women characters were sexual predators rather than terrorists fighting against the military.

Though Miriam (female terrorist) resides atop the power hierarchy of terrorists, suggesting a matriarchal order, the gender ideology appears stereotypically patriarchal, as if to suggest that female sexuality is the root cause of all worldly problems. The scene is highly ambiguous and open to opposite readings. For example, it is not clear if the scene is patriarchal or a presentation of such an ideology. Maybe the female imagery of seducer is to be understood as describing the unconscious mechanisms of the hegemonic (male) masculinity. Perhaps it underlines the inseparability of death and sexuality in the subject’s unconscious. A psychoanalytic reading is suggested also by the fact that the place of the terrorists is an underground cellar, a space in which eros and thanatos flow freely. Or is this, too, a male fantasy?

Moving from feminism to psychoanalysis, we can note that the female imagery resembles here that of the twofold imagery reserved for the primal mother (proto-woman) in the unconscious, according to which a (sexual) woman is the deliverer of life, but because of that, also the taker of life, the destructor, the annihilator. According to the psychoanalytic conception of the subject, the reality

22 A stereotype of women as seducers is present in the work also in the form of the visually implied debauchery of Alex’s father. This, as well as the sexes of the terrorists, is not indicated in the libretto.
of the unconscious is markedly a sexual reality, which, as Lacan (1998 [1973]): 150) cogently puts it, “is an untenable truth”. Death and sexuality are intertwined in the Freudian conception of the libidinal life drive and destructive death drive, just as they join together in Lacan’s conception of the real.

This scene (16) drew the sharpest criticism in newspapers when the work was broadcast in 1986 (it has not been aired since). It was not always the (self-)conscious way in which sexuality was presented that annoyed critics, but rather the female terrorists’ clothes, “terrorist chic” (Wahlström 1986). Such vestments were considered too fashionable, superficial, inappropriate, and highly in conflict with a story dealing with terrorism. (Is not this discussion about clothes a displacement for the issue of female sexuality?) Also the fingering of guns and grenades were pointed out as “questionably equating love for women [sic] and love for arms” (Lampila 1986). I wonder why the critic did not put it as “questionably equating love for men and love for arms”? For in the given sexual symbolism, the female terrorists seem to be more active than the men. Of course, in feminist
Subject Strategies in Music

perspective, it manifests as a “natural” result of the ancient process of constructing the gender difference (man as the subject, woman as object and threat; e.g., de Lauretis 1984 and 1987). Perhaps the scene irritated critics in the same way as dreams do, by their surrealistic and detestable pictography of odd sexual associations (uncanny reception effects?).

To finish: My analysis of Alex has been restricted to interpretation of the work as the protagonist’s psychic constitution in a Lacanian scheme. Other possible interpretative paths have been left undeveloped, such as Kleinian interpretations, for instance. Also, the political and social issues in the work, related to its pessimistic view of the world and the philosophical existentialist questions of choice, act, and responsibility as definers of an individual, could also be interpreted from perspectives other than those offered here.

To close, I would like to return to the issue of TV-opera as a genre. In general, TV-opera has never had much success in establishing its own identity as an art form. This helps explain the lack of (musical) studies of TV-opera. If discussed at all, the latter is still compared with “less mediated” stage opera and seen as having “all the lifeblood leached from it” (the expression is Higgins’s 2002). It may be that, in its absolute lack of any kind of live performance effect, the TV-opera constitutes an anti-opera (a- or de-opera), as a dead discourse in all its textual levels (relay, for instance, still is a document of a live performance). Though this situation is irritating, in the case of Alex, it happens to be paradigmatic of the depressive and existential subject matter of the work, saturated in manifold death thematics and presenting the subject as a kind of psychic zombie. TV-opera is able to thematize death, absence, and emptiness by its very medium (genre) alone. Maybe Alex’s uniqueness lies in precisely in its identity as an art form stretched between two deaths.23 In its very uncanniness, Alex seems to show that TV-opera can be an analysis of death at many levels of broadcast media: from the genres themselves and their peculiar characteristics to the textual levels of the story.

23 Cf. Žižek & Dolar 2002.
Chapter 12
Conclusions and after-images

The foregoing chapters constitute my attempt to explore music from a psychoanalytic point of view as a site for unsettled subjectivity. Music as a signifying practice and representative system was subjected to procedures of psychoanalytic criticism in order to illuminate musical subjectivity, signification, and experience at the psychoanalytic level of primal subjectivity formation. Elements of the musico-textual mechanism of subjectivity formation were outlined through a variety of psychoanalytic angles and musical texts. This exposed music as a psychical and musico-textual landscape of object losses, melancholy, abjection, de-subjectivization, uncanny, transitional space, imaginary identification, mirroring, and the infinite search for sameness (symmetrical logic). It was suggested that the processes of identification, projection, primary process operations and other psychoanalytic mechanisms function especially effectively in musical experience because of its nonlinguistic and temporal appeal to the listening subject by enacting pre-subjective experiences. The workings of music as disclosing and displaying psychical/textual mechanisms were theoretically gathered under the umbrella concept of subject strategies, which formed the main operative category for analyzing works of music, as employed in the presented case studies.

The examination has been based on a semiotico-psychoanalytic framework according to which subjectivity and meaning are effects of the same process of signification. Meaning is used to mark out, maintain, and endow subjectivity with sense. In this perspective, musical signification unfolds as discursive meaning/subjectivity work. Unsettled subject(ivity) has been conceived as a signifying process that developmentally operates both before and after language acquisition: the subject continuously negotiates her subjectivity in a complex dialectic between the demands of the outer world (the social realm of signification) and those of the inner world (the unconscious, body, and desire). Music was theorized and analyzed in this perspective as “playing” a fundamental stage of development, as well as the threshold connecting the body and social demands, the semiotic and the symbolic, the nonlinguistic and linguistic. In this way, the study aimed to underline and somewhat follow Julia Kristeva’s theory of the subject and the sensuous body as important elements in experiences of musical subjectivity and musical signification in general. I chose Kristeva’s model, instead of grounding the source of subjectivity in accordance with Jacques Lacan’s theory,
in which the subject is but the abstracted reflection of the body. In Kristeva’s perspective, experiencing a flexible sense of self,¹ which includes momentarily losses of subjectivity, is related to sensuous, bodily enjoyment and jouissance.

In each chapter of this study I have examined the production of subjectivity through music, by focusing on subject-strategical articulations of unsettled subjectivity. Instead of as breaks or ruptures in discourse, I have rather interpreted the constructions of “the semiotic” on all possible articulative levels in the music analyzed, at the points of excess in their signification. However, the differentiation between the two (poles of) understandings of the semiotic is fluid. The starting point of the present research was that there is no “direct semiotic” level in music to be studied; from the point of view of semiotics, every cultural text is symbolically articulated and mediated, and thus a representational system of signs. In other words, here I have studied the semiotic in the realm of signification and as reflected in music as part of that realm: the semiotic can be studied only by studying it in the Symbolic, i.e., by studying the text as the dialectics of the semiotic and the symbolic in the Symbolic order that is the total social realm of signification.

Basic claims presented in the theoretical chapters were put to the test in the music-analytic part of the study. The analytical discussions have confirmed that (1) psychoanalysis has much to offer music analysis; (2) that music can be analyzed from a psychoanalytic perspective in terms of its operations in the Symbolic (as a socio-cultural system of representation); (3) that music constitutes the subject and can be “about” unsettled subjectivity.

In the music-analytical parts of this study, I have focused on musical signification and subjectivity formation in the works under consideration. I have moreover aimed to demonstrate semiotico-psychoanalytic theorizations of music and subjectivity in the music analyses. Departing from the theoretical chapters, I have aimed to develop a psychoanalytic approach to music analysis. This means that the analyses have not only demonstrated how subject strategies are present in music and how they can be analyzed, but also the relevance of psychoanalytic theory to musicology and music analysis. Although the study is in many respects theoretically oriented, and my concerns have been largely intratheoretical, having ample methodological considerations, my main motivation was to engage with music analysis that deals with semantics. That is to say, the analyzability of music as a system of representation has been my primary concern, with music-psychological and philosophical considerations of secondary importance. The extensive theoretical and methodological considerations in Part I and II derived from the fact that psychoanalytic music research is still not settled in its paradigms, and it remains under-theorized in musicology. Basic surveys,

such as those in Part I, are quite scarce, and much remains to be done in that area. Also, I have attempted to bridge the gap between the traditions of applied psychoanalysis and those musicological psychoanalytic research, by bringing the traditions more closely together in the discussions in Part I, by an integrated theoretical approach developed in the Part II, and by putting the two traditions into dialogue in the music-analytical case studies in Part III.

My objects of analysis were taken from different kinds of music, instead of, say, from one style or composer. Different musics call for different ways to analyze their processes of representation. This valorizes the flexibility of taking a psychoanalytic approach to analysis. On the other hand, psychoanalytic concepts might have appeared to be too flexible. Still, that is not a problem typical just of psychoanalytic music research, but of music analysis and psychoanalytic criticism in general. It has seemed most evident that psychoanalytic theories offer relevant and fruitful perspectives on music analysis, as they do when one is analyzing films, literature, pictures, and other forms cultural imagery. In the end, it is how the concepts and theories are used that determines whether an analysis is successful. Most importantly, psychoanalytic interpretations of musical works should add layers of meaning and ways of experiencing (listening) music. Future research will sort out what kind of psychoanalytic registers of subjectivity would come forth when one analyze music other than the kinds engaged in the present study.

Because of my psychoanalytic orientation, an “extra” theme has appeared from time to time in this study, as a kind of reflexive sub-theme. By this I refer to the question of scholarly subject strategies. Music research is also a site for primary subject formation. Music and music research can serve the researching subject as a continuum of self, a mirror of self, a sign of identity. Or musicology can be constructed around melancholy. In that case, we might reflect on questions such as, why is music comprehended as it is on the academic scene? Why do scholars want to think about music in such and such way? What (unconscious) purposes could this thinking serve in the psychoanalytic economy of subjectivity? Research and writing about music serve as a subjectivity practice and a site of outlining self against the other, the not-me. Music research is always also a mode of subjectivity construction (Williams 2001: 29). On this view, musicology is a language, which creates secondary level subject strategies, i.e., the (musicological) subject strategies of a researching subject. For example, the researching subject, in her melancholic scholarly longing, may spend her entire life reconstructing a past musical tradition as a lost object. Or she may shape her subjectivity and identity by fighting against other trends, paradigms, or schools of thought. With these questions we move into the realm of the socio-political and research-political ideologies of music research (and of music), an area of
Psychoanalysis aims to enlarge our understanding of ourselves from the angle of the unconscious subject, and by this to understand social phenomena and cultural activities. In the present research, this project has been carried out as it relates to musical representation in certain Romantic and contemporary music. I have inquired as to what kind of (cultural) trope of self that music is, from the point of view of primal subjectivity formation. It is my hope that musical meaning has been illuminated in the service of primal subjectivity-work – by which the subject (re)finds her constitution in and through music.
Bibliography

1 Music research
2 Other theoretical literature
3 Newspaper articles and press releases
4 Music-analytical source material

1 Music research


Chijs, A. van der (1923). An attempt to apply objective psychoanalysis to musical


Subject Strategies in Music

Bibliography

_Explorations in Music._ Madison, CT: International Universities Press.


Jackson, Timothy L. (1999). *Tchaikovsky: Symphony No. 6 (Pathétique)*. Cambridge,
Bibliography

UK: Cambridge University Press.
Koestenbaum, Wayne (1993). The Queen’s Throat: Opera, Homosexuality, and the
Subject Strategies in Music


Bibliography


Subject Strategies in Music

the Tonal Tradition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bibliography

23–45.


Subject Strategies in Music


2. Other theoretical literature

Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press.


Freud, Sigmund (1953 [1900]). *The Interpretation of Dreams*. SE 4–5. [Orig. Die Traumdeutung.]

Subject Strategies in Music


— (1955e [1920]). Beyond the Pleasure Principle. SE 18. 7–64. [Orig. Jenseits des Lustprinzips.]

— (1955f [1922/1940]). Medusa’s Head. SE 18. 273–274. [Orig. Das Medusenhaupt.]


— (1957b [1915]). The Unconscious. SE 14. 166–204. [Orig. Das Unbewusste.]


376
Bibliography

Bloomington & Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.
Subject Strategies in Music


Bibliography


3. Newspaper articles and press releases

Subject Strategies in Music


4. Music-analytical source material


Nordgren, Pehr Henrik (1986). *Alex, op. 56* [the full score]. Finnish Music Information Center, Helsinki.


# Index

## A

Abrams, David M. 35–37, 39  
Abrams, M. H. 16  
Adams, John 62, 332  
*I Was Looking at the Ceiling and Then I Saw the Sky* 331  
*Nixon in China* 331  
The Death of Klinghoffer 331  
Adorno, Theodor W. 16, 56  
Agamben, Giorgio 12, 224, 232, 238  
Agawu, Kofi 26, 33, 102, 115, 120  
Aho, Kalevi 328  
Ahumada, Jorge L. 189  
Akhmatova, Anna 287  
Aksnes, Hallgjerd 60, 183, 184  
Alesaro, Juhani 235  
Allanbrook, Wye Jamison 114, 120–121  
Almila, Atso 333  
anaclitic 31, 171, 179–180, 312  
anti-subjectivity 16, 137  
Antigone 38, 328, 347–348  
Anzieu, Didier 43, 51, 59, 155, 198, 312  
applied psychoanalysis 25–29, 34, 38, 47, 51, 54–55, 83, 85, 87, 91–92, 144  
Attali, Jacques 82  
Austin, John L. 129–130  

## B

Bach, David Josef 35  
Bach, Johann Sebastian 51, 56, 76, 82  
Bal, Mieke 118  
Balint, Michael 91  
Ballantine, Christopher 60  
Barnes, Jennifer 329–330  
Battersby, Christine 150, 217  
Beardsley, Monroe C. 84
Beatles  51, 57, 62
Beethoven, Ludwig van  14, 32, 36, 56–57, 105, 222
   Piano Sonata in C Minor (“Pathétique”) (Op. 13) 297
   Piano Sonata in E flat Major (“Les Adieux”) (Op. 81a) 122–123, 221, 246
   Piano Sonata in F minor (“Appassionata”) (Op. 57) 220
Benois, Alexandre  289
Bent, Ian  104
Benveniste, Emile  3, 135–136, 155
Berg, Alban  56, 270
   Wozzeck  331
Bergeron, Katherine  50
Berio, Luciano
   Sequenzia III  62
Berlioz, Hector  288
Bernstein, Elmer
   The Magnificent Seven  224
between being and meaning  142, 328–329, 348
between two deaths  328–329, 342, 347, 352
Bion, Wilfred  78, 189
Björk  305
Blass, Rachel B.  268
Blom, Eric  208, 227, 234
Bloom, Harold  63–64, 76, 119
Bohlman, Philip  50, 108
Bonaparte, Marie  81
Borch-Jacobsen, Mikkel  144
Borodin, Alexander
   Prince Igor  227
Bradley, Owen  306
Brahms, Johannes  63
   Symphony No. 1 in C Minor  62, 68
Braidotti, Rosi  52
Brémond, Claude  123
Brett, Philip  33–34, 149, 233, 267
Britten, Benjamin  270
Brooks, Peter  107
Brown, Malcolm Hamrick  267
Brown, Marshall  297
Bruzzi, Stella  301–303, 308
Burrows, David  97
Bush, Kate  305
Butler, Judith  113, 130, 144, 149, 151, 153–154, 165, 229, 305, 307

C

Cage, John  68, 176
Caïn, Anne  39, 51
Caïn, Jacques  39, 51
Campion, Jane  52
Cantor, Georg  194
Capell, Richard  246
Caravaggio
   Medusa’s Head  273
carnivalistic discourse  135, 162, 188, 194, 196, 272, 287, 288–291, 305, 308, 315
Carollo, Rosalba  51
Castrarède, Marie-France  51, 63
castration  5, 31, 142, 174, 224, 272–274, 290–291, 325, 342, 347
Cellini, Benvenuto  32
Cherlin, Michael  49, 147
Cheshire, Neil M.  39
Chijs, van der A.  31
Chion, Michel  155, 312
Chodorow, Nancy  93, 149
Chopin, Frédéric  12, 63, 82, 121, 125, 227, 263
   Etude in F Major (Op. 10, No. 8)  230
   Nocturne in C minor (Op. 48, No. 1)
Bibliography

11, 135, 236, 238, 258–264
Chumaceiro, Cora L. Díaz de 35–36, 39, 48
Citron, Marcia J. 17, 102, 148, 208, 211–213, 217, 232–233, 330
Cixous, Hélène 149, 151, 230
Clayton, Martin 26
Clément, Catherine 18, 45, 64, 124, 151, 218, 233
Cline, Patsy 303, 306
“Three cigarettes” 315
Coeuroy, André 76
Cohn, Richard L. 41, 146–147, 255, 278
Coker, Wilson 114
Colette
The Bewitched Child 94
Collis, Rose 305
Cone, Edward T. 125–126
Connelly, Bridget 63
Cook, Deryl 114
Cook, Nicholas 26, 60, 102
Cook, Susan C. 233
Copland, Aaron 122
Rodeo 224
The Red Pony 224
Courtivron, Isabelle de 231
Crumb, George
Ancient Voices of Children 63
Cubitt, Sean 64, 151
Cumming, Naomi 2, 11, 17, 49, 62, 114, 116, 125, 133, 139, 144, 281, 342, 347
Curtius, Ernst 122
Cusick, Suzanne 45, 102

D
Dali, Salvador 65
Dame, Joke 62, 139, 301, 304, 309
Darwin, Charles 31
Davis, Madeleine 241–242
Debussy, Claude 82
Dedekind, Richard 193
de Lauretis, Teresa 12, 18, 124, 149, 151, 154, 209, 211–212, 215, 217, 334, 352
Deleuze, Gilles 62, 64, 74
De Man, Paul 160, 199, 265
Derrida, Jacques 3, 78, 104–105, 144, 154, 160, 168, 189, 194, 199
Descartes, René 68
Didier-Weill, Alain 51
Disney, Walt 291
Doane, Mary Ann 59, 63
Dolar, Mladen 59, 63, 93, 238, 306, 320, 352
Dor, Joël 137, 144
Dostoyevsky, Fyodor 38, 287
Douglas, Mary 141
Downes, Olin 235
Drinker, Henry S. 243, 249
Dunn, Leslie C. 49, 59, 63, 151, 301–302, 313, 316, 325
During, Jean 63

E
Ehrenzweig, Anton 27, 47, 93, 95–96
Eisenstein, Sergei 308
Ellis, Havelock 85, 268
Ellis, John 301
Engh, Barbara 301
Subject Strategies in Music

Epstein, David 48
Erkkilä, Jaakko 51, 60–61, 184–185
Etchegoyen, R. Horacio 189
Everist, Mark 26, 102
Expressionism 13, 16, 65, 331

F

Fairbairn, W. R. D. 91
Falck, Daniel 51, 64, 144–145, 241
fantasy thing and fantasy space
(Schwarz) 85, 154–159, 312
Feder, Stuart 35, 37, 39–40, 48, 57, 83, 86–87, 144
Felman, Shoshana 55, 89
feminine in music 34, 64, 150–151, 155, 200, 207, 211–220, 228–235, 247, 290, 304, 319
Ferenczi, Sandor 73
Fink, Robert 42–43, 45, 62, 66–67, 149, 159, 171
Fischer-Dieskau, Dietrich 325
Flesch, G. 314
Flinn, Carol Ann 18, 49, 59, 64, 139, 155, 301
Flodin, Karl 207
Fornari, Franco 51
Foucault, Michel 3, 110, 133, 137, 154
Franklin, Peter 231
Frege, Gottlob 194
Freud, Anna 59, 86, 91
Friedman, Stanley M. 60, 79
Frith, Simon 301
Fuller, Peter 181

G

Gabriel, Peter 62
Galás, Diamanda 48, 62, 141
Gallop, Jane 149
Garnett, Liz 106
Gasset, Ortega y 232
Gay, Peter 27
gay criticism. See lesbian, gay and queer studies
gender studies. See feminist theory
Genette, Gérard 123
geno-singing (Barthes) 301, 307–310, 313, 324–327
Gibbs, Christopher H. 49, 147, 241, 289–290, 300
Glass, Philip 52
Akhnaten 62, 66
Einstein on the Beach 331
Goodman, Don 315
Gora, Thomas 1
Goss, Glenda Dawn 216, 220
Gould, Glenn 220, 235
Grabócz, Mártan 116, 120, 123, 258
Graf, Herbert 36
Graf, Max 35–37, 56, 81
grain of voice (Barthes) 67, 301, 308–311, 313, 321, 324–327
Gramit, David 33
Gräsbeck, Folke 232, 235
Greer, David 26
Greimas, Algirdas Julius 109, 116, 123–124, 136, 149, 220, 230, 276
Gribenberg, Bertel 225
Groddeck, Georg 47
Grünthal, Satu 216–217
Guattari, Félix 64, 74

H
Hall, Stuart 107, 109–110, 132–134
Hallstein, D. Lynn O’Brien 151
Hartmann, Heinz 71, 86
Hatten, Robert S. 41, 104–105, 113–116, 120–121, 123–124, 127, 130, 183, 244, 258, 270, 275, 295
Haverinen, Margareta 334
Haydn, Franz Joseph 120, 147
The Seasons 246
Hedges, Warren 160
Heidegger, Martin 125, 333
Heinheinimo, Hannu 328
Heiniö, Mikko 328, 331, 335–337
Heinonen, Eero 220, 227, 235
Heinonen, Yrjö 51, 57, 60, 79
Hepokoski, James 234
hermeneutic window (Kramer) 118, 128–131, 207, 221, 360
Hicks, Scott 52
Higgins, Charlotte 352
Hilbert, David 194
Hildegard of Bingen 68
Hintsa, Merja 187, 189, 197, 264
Hitschmann, E. 34, 62

Hoffmann, E. T. A. 38, 273, 275, 289
Sandman 146
Holiday, Billie 303
Holly, Buddy 303
Holmqvist, Christian 281, 288
See also lesbian, gay and queer studies
Horney, Karen 96
Hutcheon, Linda 303
Huyssen, Andreas 12

I
Ignatius-Fleet, Heli 208–209, 235
Ihanus, Juhani 86, 187, 196–198, 348
Imberty, Michel 51, 60, 184
See also transposition (Kristeva)
Irigaray, Luce 144, 149, 151, 154, 319
Isakower, Otto 43
Ives, Charles 57

J
Jackson, Leonard 107
Subject Strategies in Music

Jacono, Jean Marie 113
James, Burnett 234
Jardine, Alice 1
Jean Paul 275
Jensen, Wilhelm
Gradiva 38
Jentsch, Ernst 146–148
Johns, Sara 315
Jones, Ernst 81, 217
Jones, Nancy A. 49, 59, 63, 151, 302, 313, 316, 325
Jordanaires 306
Jung, Carl Gustav 47

K
Kagel, Mauricio 176
Kaipainen, Mauri 328, 335
Käkelä-Puumala, Tiina 272, 289
Kalevala 207–209, 215, 224–225, 231
Kallberg, Jeffrey 121, 220, 233, 258
Kassabian, Anahid 18, 49, 64, 275
Keinonen, Heikki 332, 334
Keller, Hans 46, 60–61, 63, 66, 283
Kerman, Joseph 103–104
Kieslowski, Krzysztof 52
Kilpeläinen, Kari 234–235
Kinderman, William 249
Kirby, W. F. 210
Klein, Melanie 13, 40, 59, 78, 80, 90–97, 118, 138–140, 163, 219, 283, 300, 352
Klempe, Hroar 39, 60, 79
Klumperhouver, Henry 60, 79
Knapp, Raymond 42, 126, 277
Knuttila, Tarja 50, 110
Koestenbaum, Wayne 302
Köhler, Wolfgang 185
Kohut, Heinz 43, 47–48, 54, 59–60, 64, 70, 75–78, 81–82, 87–89, 91, 95, 97
Kon, Joseph 235
König-Graf, Olga 36
Korhonen, Kimmo 328
Korsyn, Kevin 63
Kortekangas, Jaakko 334
Koskinen, Kalevi 334
Kotilainen, Juha 334
Kramer, Richard 239
Kretzschmar, Hermann 104
Krims, Adam 49, 67, 104
Kris, Ernst 27, 71, 87
Kuoppa, Kari 334
Kurkela, Kari 51, 64, 76, 97, 181
Kurth, Ernst 118
Kuusamo, Altti 41–42, 44, 65–66, 69,
Index


L


LaCapra, Dominick 265

Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe 201–203

Lampila, Hannu-Ilari 351

lang, k.d. 9, 11–13, 64, 69, 122, 152, 301–325

Absolute torch & twang 302

“Big bone girl” 306

“Three days” 306, 315

Angel with a Lariat 306

Drag

“The air that I breath” 323

Even Cowgirls Get the Blues 302, 306

Ingénue 15, 68, 302, 303

“Constant craving” 316–318

“Save me” 316–317

Shadowland 302, 306, 323

“(Waltz) me once again around the dance floor” 306

“I Wish I Didn’t Love You So” 315

“Western stars” 323

The Harvest of Seven Years 302

“Crying” 315

“Don’t be a lemin polka” (Harvest) 306

“Johnny get angry” (Harvest) 122, 307

“Pay dirt” (Harvest) 306

“Pine and Stew” (Harvest) 307, 319–322

“Polly Ann” (Harvest) 306, 307

“So in love” 315

“Three cigarettes” 315

Lång, Markus 36, 48, 51, 60, 79, 88–90, 97, 243, 257, 268, 289, 291

Langer, Susanne 40, 114, 184, 265

Laplanche, Jean 71–72, 74, 133, 171, 240, 250

Large, Brian 330

Laukka, Inga-Liisa 334

Layton, Robert 234

Lecourt, Édith 39, 51, 59

Lee, Brenda 306

Lee, Peggy 303

Leher 35

Lehtonen, Kimmo 51, 60, 61, 97, 181, 184

Lennox, Annie 305

Leonardo 38

Leppert, Richard 102, 233


Levarie, Sigmund 43, 47–48, 54, 59, 75, 81, 87–88

Lévi-Strauss, Claude 82, 114–115,
Subject Strategies in Music

Levy-Dhurmer, Lucien
Medusa 274
Lewin, David 60
Ligeti, György 335
Lima, Paulo Costa 48, 60
Lindberg, Magnus 328
Liszt, Franz 258, 259
Littlefield, Richard 41, 104, 224, 291, 315
Loesti, Friedhelm 235
Loewenstein, Rudolph 71, 86
Lönnrot, Elias 207
loss. See object loss
Lotman, Juri 109
Lynn, Loretta 303, 306
Lyotard, Jean-François 60, 79, 201

M

Maasalo, Kai 288
Macey, David 28, 93
Madonna 151, 304
Mahler, Gustav 42, 56–57, 65, 126–127, 142, 246, 270
Symphony No. 6 121
Mahler, Margaret S. 59, 142
Mandelshtam, Osip 287
Mann, Thomas 65
Marshall, Robert L. 48
Marston, Nicholas 147
Marttinen, Tauno
Burnt Orange 66
Marxist theory 16, 28, 32
Massie, Henry 63
Matte Blanco, Ignacio 78–79, 90, 163–165, 188–197, 197–198, 312
Maus, Everett 123
McClary, Susan 14, 17–18, 33–34, 45, 102, 104, 106, 124, 148,
150–151, 202, 208, 211–213, 215–216, 218, 229, 233, 235,
267–269, 276–277, 301, 303, 316, 354
McCreless, Patrick 301
McDonald, Marjorie 97
McDougall, Joyce 59, 242
Medusa 151, 212, 218, 230, 272–275, 290
melancholy 6–7, 12–15, 68, 96–97, 138, 141–142, 152–153,
158, 161, 220–232, 236–238, 240–241, 257–266, 296, 298,
335. See also object loss
Mendelssohn, Felix
Midsummer Night’s Dream 288
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 182
Metz, Christian 123, 133
Meyer, Leonard B. 106, 114
Michel, André 37, 47, 51, 76, 81–83
Michelangelo 38
Middleton, Richard 304–305
Miller, Bonny L. 137, 233
Mink, Ben 316
Minsky, Rosalind 80, 94, 95–96
mirror stage 5, 60, 78, 96, 143–145, 156, 167–168, 170, 176–179,
See also acoustic mirror
Mitchell, Julliet 149
Mockus, Martha 301–303, 306, 308
modernist ideology 16, 39–41, 43–44, 64, 66, 90, 106, 110, 112, 150, 199–201, 304
Moi, Toril 149, 165
Molino, Jean 114
Monelle, Raymond 14, 18, 41, 62, 102, 104–105, 111, 113–114,
119–122, 124–125, 160, 166, 201–202, 237, 246–247, 253,
Index

264, 270, 278, 287, 297
Monteverdi, Claudio 122
Mooney, W. E. 57
Moore, Burness E. 71, 72, 92–93, 133, 224, 298–299
Morricone, Ennio 122
Mosonyi, Desiderius 54
mourning 37, 57, 94, 141–142, 227, 237–238, 278, 281, 326
Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus 32, 38, 57, 105, 120, 246
Don Giovanni 23, 68
The Magic Flute 290
The Marriage of Figaro 23
Muller, John P. 242
Müller, Wilhelm 239, 246–247
music analysis. See postmodern music analysis

N

narcissism 6, 37, 50, 73, 77, 81, 105, 127–128, 151, 179, 236, 260, 263, 298
Nashville String Machine 306
Nass, Martin L. 48, 53–54, 59, 65, 75, 84–85, 87–89, 142, 183
Nattiez, Jean-Jacques 28, 47, 114
Negus, Keith 301
Nelson, Willie
“Three days” 306
Niederland, William G. 43
Niekerk, Margaretha Johanna van 64
Niskanen, Jyrki 334
Nordgren, Pehr Henrik 15, 69, 328
Alex (Op. 56) 11–13, 64, 67, 328–351
Earless Hoichi 345
Noske, Frits 120
Nöth, Winfried 50, 113
Novak, Jelena 328, 331

O

O’Neill, Eugen 65
The Emperor Jones 76
object voice 63, 93, 306, 311–312, 325, 336
oceanic experience 5–6, 81, 155, 198, 312, 316
Oliver, Kelly 4, 165, 167–170, 175
Orbison, Roy 315, 321
“Crying” 315
Ostrovsky, Ruwim 235
Ostwald, Peter 57–58, 61, 63, 90, 97
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oudart, Jean-Pierre</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padilla, Alfonso</td>
<td>103, 108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panofsky, Erwin</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panzéra, Charles</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parton, Dolly</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peirce, Charles Sanders</td>
<td>109, 112–113, 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pfeifer, Sigmund</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plato</td>
<td>65, 178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>played subjectivity</td>
<td>128, 132, 135–136, 138, 208, 239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plon, Michel</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poe, Edgar Allan</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poizat, Michel</td>
<td>47, 51, 59, 63, 82, 93, 132, 143, 156, 158, 198, 237, 241, 302, 304, 306, 311–312, 312, 325, 336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pollock, George H.</td>
<td>57, 63, 142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand</td>
<td>71, 72, 74, 133, 171, 240, 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter, Cole</td>
<td>“So in love” 315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post, Jennifer C.</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postacchini, Pier Luigi</td>
<td>60, 184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>postmodern music analysis</td>
<td>9–10, 16–17, 20, 101–109, 115, 117, 123, 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potter, John</td>
<td>301–302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poznansky, Alexander</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pratt, Carroll</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presley, Elvis</td>
<td>122, 303, 306, 313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propp, Vladimir</td>
<td>123, 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protean voice</td>
<td>303, 305–306, 318, 322, 324–325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proust, Marcel</td>
<td>225, 253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulkkinen, Tuija</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>queer studies. See</td>
<td>lesbian, gay and queer studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racker, Heinrich</td>
<td>40, 43, 47, 81, 93–95, 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rainio, Riitta</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajamäki, Erkki</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randel, Don Michael</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank, Otto</td>
<td>81, 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapaport, David</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratner, Leonard G.</td>
<td>114, 120–121, 246–247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rautavaara, Einojuhani</td>
<td>127, 328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabescata</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canto I</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canto II</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ravel, Maurice</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolero</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bewitched Child</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rayner, Eric</td>
<td>188–190, 192, 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reflexivity</td>
<td>21, 49–51, 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reich, Steve</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Trains</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Tales</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reik, Theodor</td>
<td>47, 54, 73, 81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Index

Richardson, John 18, 49, 52, 62–63, 66, 123, 139, 144, 147, 287, 301
Rickards, Guy 233, 235
Ricoeur, Paul 31, 34, 123, 159
Ringbom, Nils-Erik 208
Rizzo, Francis 36
Rolland, Romain 81
Roos, Esa 190, 196
Rose, Gilbert J. 181
Rose, Gillian 50
Rose, Jacqueline 137
Rosen, Helen 27
Rosolato, Guy 13, 39, 43, 51, 60, 144, 155, 164, 191, 241, 247, 301, 306, 311–312
Rossini, Gioachino 57
Roudiez, Leon S. 1, 171, 175, 178
Roudinesco, Élisabeth 36
Rowland, Jack 315
Royle, Nicholas 147, 271, 281, 290, 296
Russell, Bertrand 194
Ruwet, Nicholas 114
Rycroft, Charles 93, 134, 224
Rytkölä, Kalevi 332
Saariaho, Kaija 151, 319, 328
Saarinen, Eeva-Liisa 334
Saaritsa, Pentti 328, 331–335, 341–342, 345, 348
Sabbeth, Daniel 60, 79
Sachs, Hans 32
Said, Edward 201, 233
Salmenhaara, Erkki 232
Salminen, Matti 332, 334
Salomon, Gavriel 47
Salomonsson, Björn 182
Salter, Lionel 330
Samson, Jim 121, 258
Samuels, Robert 67, 104, 113, 121–122, 124–125, 199, 201
Sand, George 151, 253
Sandler, Joseph 70
Schenker, Heinrich 17, 60–61, 85–86, 120, 269
Scherzinger, Martin 67, 159, 202, 341–342
Schiesari, Juliana 229
Schoenberg, Arnold 16
Erwartung 62, 65–66
Schor, Naomi 118
Schubert, Franz 9, 14–15, 25, 32–34, 57, 62, 105, 267
Die Schöne Müllerin (D.795) 247
Erlkönig (D.328) 241, 289
String Trio No. in 1 B flat Major 323
Winterreise (D.911) 68, 238, 239, 240, 257
“Der Leiermann” 240, 241, 255
“Der Lindenbaum” 11–12, 64, 97, 239–257, 302
“Die Nebensonnen” 246
“Die Post” 246
“Die Wetterfähne” 240, 248
“Erstarrung” 240
“Frühlingstraum” 246
“Gefrorne Tränen” 240
“Gute Nacht” 239, 255, 263
“Mut” 246
Schumann, Robert 76
_Dichterliebe_ (Op. 48) 238
“Ich hab’ im Traum geweinet” 57, 90
_Frauenliebe und Leben_ (Op. 42) 220, 238
Schwartz, Daniel W. 57
Scott, Derek 26, 102
Searle, John 130
Segal, Hanna 93, 94, 95
semiotic/symbolic, differentiation of (Kristeva) 1–2, 4, 6–7, 138–140, 163–178
semiotics. See musical semiotics;
Shakespeare, William
_Hamlet_ 153
Shearman, Cindy 140
Sheinberg, Esti 122
Shostakovich, Dmitri 36, 276, 287, 289, 335
Symphony No. 4 277
Symphony No. 5 277
Symphony No. 8 277, 289
Sibelius, Jean 12, 270
_Captive Queen_ (Op. 48) 231
**Dryad** (Op. 45 No. 1) 231
_Ferryman’s Brides_ (Op. 33) 231
_Kullervo Symphony_ (Op. 7) 216
_Kyllikki_ (Op. 41) 11–12, 207–232, 238, 246, 259, 296
_Lemminkäinen, Four Legends_ (Op. 22) 235
_Lemminkäinen’s Return_ 225
_Lemminkäinen goes to war_ 225
_Luonnotar_ (Op. 70) 231
_Oceanides_ (Op. 73) 231
_Pohjola’s Daughter_ (Op. 49) 231
_Symphony No. 1 in E Minor_ (Op. 39) 225
_Symphony No. 2 in D Major_ (Op. 43) 227
_The Lover_ (Op. 14) 208
_Valse Triste_ (Op. 44 No. 1) 226
_Wood Nymph_ (Skogsrået) 231
Silverman, Kaja 1, 5, 12–13, 18–19, 21, 39, 59–60, 63, 79, 132, 143–144, 149, 151, 155, 164–165, 211, 236, 241–242, 252, 301, 313, 318, 324, 326–327
Sklovski, Victor 123
Solie, Ruth 150, 233
Soller, Philippe
_H_ 176
Solomon, Maynard 32–34, 48, 56–57
Spitz, Ellen Handler 63, 97
Spitz, Rene A. 59, 91–92, 163–165, 167, 198, 241, 312
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty 150, 217
splitting 94, 219, 250, 255
Steblin, Rita 33
Index

Stefani, Gino 114, 140, 184, 198
Stein, Alexander 39
Stein, Seymour 303
Sterba, Edith 47, 57
Sterba, Richard 37, 39, 47–48, 57, 81
Stern, Daniel N. 59–60, 163–164, 198, 241–242
Stock, Jonathan 26, 102
Stockhausen, Karlheinz 176
Stoianova, Ivanka 62, 139
Stowell 314
Straus, Joseph N. 63
Strauss, Richard 147

Salome 67
Stravinsky, Igor 82
subject-in-process/on-trial 1–5, 7–8, 30, 72, 135, 139, 144, 157, 160, 164, 168, 173, 179
Subotnik, Rose Rosengard 102
Suchet, Melanie 151
suture 132, 135–137
symbolic. See semiotic/symbolic, differentiation of (Kristeva)
Symbolic (the total realm of signification), definition of 4
symbolic order (Lacan) 4, 142–145, 262, 329, 339, 347
symmetrical logic 164–165, 185, 187–193, 195–198, 288, 312, 315
Székely, Lajos 5, 182, 186

T
Tagg, Philip 120
Tähkä, Veikko 71–72, 188, 250
Tambling, Jeremy 330
Taruskin, Richard 276
Tawaststjerna, E. T. 235
Tawaststjerna, Erik 207–209, 216, 224–225, 227–230
Tchaikovsky, Pyotr II’yich 15, 85, 227
Symphony No. 4 268
Symphony No. 6 (“Pathétique”) (Op. 74) 11–13, 69, 85, 218, 267–300
The Nutcracker (Op. 71) 289
The Sleeping Beauty (Op. 66) 289
thetic (Kristeva) 169, 172–176, 193, 204, 230, 263, 308
Tick, Judith 233
Tiilikainen, Sauli 334
Todorov, Tzvetan 123
tombeau 276, 278, 281–282, 287, 296
Törne, Bengt de 234
Tovey, Donald Francis 278, 281, 297
transitional object and space  6–7,  
59–60, 63, 96–97, 145, 161,  
164–165, 179, 242–243,  
247–249, 251, 255, 313, 317  
transposition (Kristeva)  79, 135,  
160, 166, 173, 175, 186, 191,  
194–195, 203, 224, 322. See  
also intertextuality  
trauma  16, 67, 75, 77, 94, 143,  
161–162, 215–216, 220–221,  
224, 236, 238–241, 250, 253,  
259, 263, 265, 281, 283, 298,  
333, 345  
Treatler, Leo  26, 48, 65, 69, 102–104  
Trevarthen, Colwyn  60  
Tsou, Judy S.  233  
Tuckett, David  188–189, 192, 195  
Tuominen, Juhani  334  
Turner, William B.  153  
TV-opera  11, 329–333. See also Nord- 
gren, Alex  
Tyrväinen, Helena  12  
Tyson, Phyllis  78, 93  
Tyson, Robert L.  78, 93  
U  
uncanny  6, 13, 63, 132, 145–148,  
161, 218, 223, 241, 255, 267,  
270–300, 321, 330, 333, 342,  
352  
V  
Välimäki, Jukka  31, 71–72  
Vaughan, Sarah  315  
vitality affect  164, 183–187, 198, 241  
Volgsten, Ulrik  60, 184  
Volkov, Solomon  276, 287, 289, 298  
Volterra, Vittorio  51  
W  
Wachowski, Larry and Andy  
The Matrix  275  
Wagner, Richard  37–38, 47, 56–57,  
67, 219  
Der Fliegende Holländer  36  
Wahlström, Erik  331, 339, 351  
Walker, Allan  66  
Wallbridge, David  241, 242  
Waller, Margaret  1  
Wallgren, Thomas  69  
Walser, Robert  119, 301, 303  
Walter, Bruno  65  
Wang, Richard  77  
Warburg, Aby  122  
Weill, Kurt  
Lady in the Dark  66  
Wells, Kitty  306  
Whitehead, Alfred  194  
Whiteley, Sheila  18, 301, 302, 316  
Williams, Alastair  15–16, 26, 49, 55,  
102, 104, 144, 302, 314, 323,  
355  
Wimsatt, William K.  84  
Winnicott, Donald W.  1, 13, 59, 63,  
78, 80, 92–93, 96–97, 138–  
140, 145, 163–164, 167, 179,  
241–242, 247–248, 257, 313  
Wintle, Christopher  31  
Wittgenstein, Ludvig  107  
Wollheim, Richard  49  
Wood, Elizabeth  149, 267, 302, 304  
Wooster, Gerald  190, 192  
Wright, Elizabeth  19, 29–30, 46–47,  
65, 71–72, 80, 94–95, 131,  
137, 143–145, 197, 202, 270,  
296, 298–299  
Wynette, Tammy  
“Stand by your man”  304
Y
Youens, Susan 239, 240, 243–244, 249, 253, 255, 257
Young, La Monte 176

Z
Zajaczkowski, Henry 270, 275–277, 288, 295–297
Zakim, Eric 64
Zegans, Leonard S. 57, 63
Zeitoper 328, 332
Zickler, Elaine 27
Subject Strategies in Music
Index