The Nordic Self and the Russian Other

- Russia in Nordic Security Discourses after 2014

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Master’s Thesis
August 2017
“The Nordic Model is dead” the Finnish Prime Minister Esko Aho said in 1997. The Nordic identity which originated during the Cold War experienced an ontological crisis with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar world order. In the 1990’s discourses of Europeanisation emerged and the Nordic identity was by many deemed a Cold War construct. Since the middle of the 2000s Nordic cooperation gained a stronghold where it previously had not existed: within security cooperation. The overall re-emergence of Nordic cooperation took place in parallel with the growing Russian superpower ambitions. Since 2009 there have been more notable advances in Nordic security cooperation through the establishment of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) and the signing of the Nordic Declaration of Solidarity. These advances are remarkable because security has previously been a non-issue in the construction of the Nordic identity. The inclusion of security and defence cooperation in the Nordic identity can be labelled paradigmatic.

The theoretical approach is one of poststructuralist discourse analysis, which advocates a reality completely constructed in discourse and rejects any pre-existent identities. The premise is that the self is constructed in discourse through the articulation of a number of others. This Thesis is concerned with how Russia is constructed in Nordic security discourses and how it contributes to a Nordic identity. The inclusion of security and defence cooperation in the Nordic identity can be labelled paradigmatic.

The study shows that Russia has replaced economic benefits as the primary incentive for Nordic cooperation. The focus of Nordic cooperation has shifted its focus from the global to the regional and the Baltic Sea Region is increasingly important. The discourses clearly reject the Cold War identity of the “Third Way” between the two poles of the bipolar system. Rather the Nordic identity is integrated in the Western security and value community. It is also notable that despite this, the Nordic countries’ views on Russia, the world and the near vicinity differ. History, geopolitics and membership in NATO and/or EU play a big role in shaping the respective national understanding of security. The differing understandings of security represent the biggest obstacle for Nordic security and defence cooperation. The Thesis also discusses the role of hybrid warfare, NATO and norms and values in the othering of Russia in Nordic identity construction.

Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords
Nordic countries, Russia, identity, othering, poststructuralism, discourse, Cold War
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“Is it the case that Nordic identity has been chipped away too much by European Union membership, globalisation and by new consumerist politics within states? Or is there a new area - security and defence - to plant the Nordic flags where they have rarely been seen before?”

- Clive Archer, 2009

1. Introduction

After the collapse of the Cold War, the question of Russian identity on the international arena was to intrigue many. Would such a country be able to refrain from superpower ambitions, for a place as an equal among many sovereign states? By the end of the 2010’s it was clear that Russia had superpower ambitions and was also prepared to flex its military muscle. What can be seen as the most recent culmination of these ambitions is the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and its action in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. It is by many considered a severe blow to the European post-Cold War security order. The European Union responded to the Russian action through the implementation of economic sanctions on Russia with the claim that the European security order had been challenged, bringing security back into the public and political discourse.

Norden; Europe’s most Nordic region, has historically always been affected by Russian action. This was also the case after the Russian annexation of Crimea. A region, traditionally defined by its peaceful character, social-democratic welfare model and respect for human rights, had suffered a loss of identity in the post-Cold War era. There was a notable decline in discourses about Nordic cooperation, along with the rise of Europeanisation policies. Coinciding with Russia’s growing superpower ambitions, a revival of Nordic cooperation could be perceived.

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Causes for this increase in Nordic cooperation are considered to be the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008 on the European Union, the decrease of US interests in Europe and the polarisation of societies. Russian foreign policy can also be interpreted as central to this shift. This is where the nexus of this Thesis’ research lies.

The recent shift in Nordic identity, through the inclusion of security and defence cooperation, can be understood as paradigmatic. Military and security cooperation have for national security reasons, remained outside Nordic cooperation. Nordic security and peace has been ensured through processes of asecuritisation. Rather than security being intentionally left off the agenda, asecuritisation denotes a process where security is understood as a non-issue completely. Unlike the European Union, the Nordics have never justified Nordic cooperation as a peace project, where deeper integration secures a more stable peace. Instead, the peace has been established through the non-existence of security in discourses of Nordic cooperation. Now, security as both a concern and possibility has entered the discourse regarding Nordic cooperation, for the first time in modern history.

Herein lays the foundation of the research question for this Thesis, which is concerned with Nordic identities and how the portrayal of Russia contributes to a shift in the understanding of Nordic identity. The particular focus is how the enemy image of Russia is constructed in security discourses, through processes of othering, and its impact on the understanding of the Nordic identity.

1.1. The Research Question

How does the othering of Russia in Nordic security discourses contribute to the social construction of Nordic identity after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014?

1.2. Theory & Data

The theoretical premises for this research question and this Thesis as a whole is the poststructuralist understanding of identity. Identity is constructed in discourse and the Self is

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created through the construction of multiple selves. Identity is always understood as fluid. Poststructuralist theory states that all reality is discursive. Foreign policy is understood as a “boundary-producing practice(s) central to the production and reproduction of identity in whose name it operates.”3 Through the thorough study of discourse, the aim is to discover the extent to which Russia after 2014 has been portrayed in Nordic security discourse and how it contributes towards the construction of a Nordic identity.

The conditions in the choice of data were that they had to touch upon security, defence and foreign policy, published after 2014. The characteristics of the Nordic identity; as transnational rather than supranational led to the choice of four national discourses rather than one single Nordic one (e.g. statements from the Nordic Council of Ministers). The Nordic identity is the sum of the countries it constitutes and it is the by-product of this data.

The primary data consists of four reports, from Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark respectively. The reports have been published after 2014 and they are either published by the national governments or commissioned by them. Finland has a tradition of publishing a government report (white paper) every four years. Denmark’s, Sweden’s and Norway’s governments have specifically commissioned reports regarding their security and defence policies. References to changes in the security environment are many.

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### Table 1: The primary data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name of report</th>
<th>Date published</th>
<th>Commissioned by/author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Government report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy</td>
<td>June 2016</td>
<td>Finnish government /Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>“Säkerhet i ny tid” - Security in a New Era</td>
<td>August 2016</td>
<td>Swedish government/ Ambassador Krister Bringéus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>“Ett felles løft” - A United Effort</td>
<td>April 2015</td>
<td>Minister of Defence Ine Eriksen Soreide/ External expert group on defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>“Dansk diplomati og forsvar i en brydningstid” - Danish diplomacy and defence in times of upheaval</td>
<td>May 2016</td>
<td>Danish government/ Ambassador Peter Taksoe-Jensen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.3. Aims and Objectives

The aim and objective of this Thesis, is to gain a deeper understanding of Nordic identity in the thorough reading of the primary data and application of poststructuralist analysis. The Thesis aims to provide a review of the construction of Nordic cooperation, and how it has been shaped through a number of constitutional others. The aim is to gain an overview of the national differences in their approach to Russia, and yet also see the similarities. An understanding about how the barriers between “us “and “them” are formed in the Nordic context, in relation to Russia is also an objective, and how an inkling of how Nordic cooperation may take form in the future.
1.4. Relevance of the Research Question

Russia and the Russian threat in the Baltic Sea Region are often covered by respective Nordic national media sources. The Nordic region is increasingly being discussed along with the importance of the collective defence of the Baltic countries, precisely because Finland and Sweden are not NATO members. This coincides with the application of identity studies and regional studies to the Nordic region, through the recognition of a Nordic renaissance. This Thesis combines two topical issues; the re-emergence of Nordic cooperation and the return of Russia superpower ambitions. The Thesis maintains its relevance through the focus on these two after the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and the Russia aggression in Eastern Ukraine. The purpose is to see how one of these trends affects the other.

1.5. Key Concepts

1.5.1. What is Norden? Kärt barn har många namn

*Norden*, Scandinavia the North or the Nordic countries - the region goes under many names. Norden, which literally means the North in the Scandinavian languages, consists today of Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden as well as three autonomous areas; Greenland and the Faroe Islands (Denmark) and the Åland Islands (Finland). The region started to be referred as Norden more commonly only after World War One. Joint Nordic cooperation increased in international forums like the League of Nations during the Interwar Years as Finland also became more active. From then on, the Nordic countries were increasingly seen and treated as an entity by others. During the Cold War, a number Nordic institutions and forms of cooperation emerged. Norden gained an identity as peaceful and democratic, with societies defined by the emerging welfare state, later to be called the Nordic model.

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4 Swedish proverb meaning: A beloved child has many names
The Nordic countries have not always been peaceful. In the five centuries prior to the 19th century the Nordic countries engaged in over 60 wars with each other. Since then, all Nordic disputes have been solved peacefully. The progression to the so called Nordic Peace, has led to the region in many respects being treated as an exception in the discipline of International Relations (IR). It is seen as a region where traditional notions of power politics cannot be applied. A pluralistic security community, that is, a region where war has become completely unthinkable, developed in Norden without a common enemy, neither spatial nor temporal.

1.5.2. Poststructuralist Identity Construction & Othering

Poststructuralist theory first emerged as an alternative to constructivist thought and in particular to the concept of pre-determined identities. Poststructuralism questions the dichotomous nature of constructivist identity construction. Poststructuralist identity construction originates in discourse and exists only within discourse. All identities - both the self and the other are seen as complex. Poststructionalists advocate identity as defined by multiple others and otherness can be defined by a variety of means such as difference or enmity.

There are a number of different definitions of othering, in different schools of thought. In sociology, anthropology and cultural geography it is usually understood as a “a process (…) through which identities are set up in an unequal relationship”\(^6\). Other scholars see othering as strictly dichotomous – the self is to the other what friend is to enemy\(^7\) or alternatively where a group of people is described as fundamentally different from group.\(^8\) Othering in this Thesis can be understood as: a discursive practice of identity construction where the self is divided from the other through varying degree of difference.

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1.6. Structure of the Thesis

The Thesis is divided into five chapters, following the introduction. The second chapter outlines the theoretical framework. The reason for starting with the theoretical framework, rather than the historical context is that the theoretical premises permeate the understanding of Nordic identity – also historically. The first chapter also provides an overview of the methodology.

The third chapter provides the historical context. Using the theoretical framework, a historical overview of Nordic identity construction is outlined. There is particular focus the Cold War period, also known as the golden era of Nordic cooperation, as well as the end of the Cold War. The chapter finishes with an overview of the discourses regarding Nordic cooperation, in particular within security and defence policies prior to the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea.

The fourth chapter focuses on the primary data and the results of the analysis. There is an overview of each primary source and each respective discourse relating to Russia. This chapter follows a more comparative approach, in regard to how each source of primary data defines security and engages in discourses of othering. This allows for a summary of all the discourses the Nordic countries resort to in their discussions about Russia.

The fifth chapter represents the discussions and the application of the results of the research. The chapter focuses on the analysis of how Russia is portrayed in discourse to contribute to a changing Nordic identity. The chapter places Nordic identity within a global context, amongst other organizations. The discussion ranges from a critique of the Nordic cooperation to contemplations of the potential forms of Nordic cooperation.

The closing chapter concludes the Thesis. Global developments otherwise not included in this Thesis, and their impact on Nordic identity is discussed. Finally, the potential and future prospects of Nordic cooperation are considered.
2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Discourse à la Mode

Since the “linguistic turn” in social sciences, discourse has been increasingly scrutinised by a growing number of scholars. The study and analysis of discourse reached the discipline of International Relations (IR) in the 1990s, with scholars such as Iver B Neumann, Andrew Linklater and David Campbell. The focus on discourse coincided with the end of the Cold War, and the failure of rationalist theories to predict the collapse of the bipolar system. The reactions to the new world system and the failure of the rationalist theories were varied. Some claimed, like Francis Fukuyama (1989) in *The End of History*\(^\text{10}\) that it was the end of mankind’s socio-cultural development and evolution. Other scholars, like the widely read Samuel Huntington (1993) advocated for a more regional approach in his essay *Clash of Civilisations*\(^\text{11}\). Alex Wendt, brought the constructivist approach into the discipline around the same time, claiming that “anarchy is what states makes of it”\(^\text{12}\). These have become classics in IR. A reaction to constructivists stating that constructivism is a compromise between rationalist and post-modernist accounts\(^\text{13}\), was born in poststructuralism. Poststructuralism took the focus on discourse a step further than the constructivists, stating that it is where reality originates. The following section will outline the theoretical premises of poststructuralism before delving into the application of the theory.

2.2. Poststructuralist discourse theory

Poststructuralist theory is a discourse theory, drawing on Michel Foucault’s discourse analysis of the link between discourse and knowledge. Derrida’s deconstruction, the intertextuality of Kristeva and Laclau’s and Mouffe’s writing on discourse and hegemony constitute the building blocks of poststructuralist discourse theory. The poststructuralist view is that language is ontologically productive (reality is constructed there), epistemologically discursive (language is

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\(^{11}\) Huntington, Samuel (1993): *The Clash of Civilizations?* Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993


\(^{13}\) Adler, Emmanuel (1997): *Seizing the middle ground*. European Journal of International Relations, Vol 3: 319
a way of knowing), and relationally structured\textsuperscript{14}. Language is seen as a network or a system of signs where meaning is understood by what it is not, through a pattern of juxtapositions. Language is \textit{social} because people are socialised to understanding meaning and \textit{political} because all meaning can be contested. Full stability or \textit{fixity} of meaning is not possible, but neither is absolute non-fixity\textsuperscript{15}. This Thesis draws its theoretical premises from Hansen’s understanding of poststructuralist discourse theory as introduced in her work; \textit{Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War}.

\subsection*{2.2.1. Ontology, epistemology and structure}

Poststructuralism sees discourse as ontologically productive. This means that all meaning, including identities is constructed in discourse and indeed no identity exists prior to discourse. This is unlike constructivist theory, which sees some identities as pre-existent to language. The most well-renown constructivist Wendt argues that states have corporate identities that are defined prior to discourse; a pre-social identity. He for example claims that “democracy” is such an identity.\textsuperscript{16} Wendt’s idea that two states, when they interact for the first time, already have predetermined identities is strongly rejected by the poststructuralist school of thought. Rather, an identity may seem very \textit{fixed} because the discourse has been dominant for so long, however it is always generated in discourse.

For all meaning to be generated in discourse, it also hence means that in the search for meaning (i.e. identity) one must study language. In turn, this means that there is no objective truth in discourse. For poststructuralists, the epistemology is hence both discursive and relativist\textsuperscript{17}. This does not provide an obstacle in the study of meaning in discourse; meaning can be evaluated.

\begin{itemize}
\item Laclau, Ernesto & Mouffe, Chantal (2014, 2nd ed.): \textit{Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics}. Verso, New York; London: 111
\item Shapiro, Michael J. (1981): \textit{Language and political understanding: the politics of discursive practices}. New Haven, Yale University Press: 218
\end{itemize}
against other criteria than truthfulness, such as for example clarity, usefulness and applicability.\textsuperscript{18} Poststructuralists reject constructivism’s identities based on binary opposition\textsuperscript{19}. Wendt described it in the following way; identity formation and change is a process through which the ego (self) presents the alter (other) with a new identity, which the alter can accept or refuse, and that the contestation over the identity remains between the two, the alter and the ego\textsuperscript{20}. Rather, poststructuralists like Campbell, Connolly and Hansen, advocate that the self can be constructed through a variety of non-Selves.\textsuperscript{21} Each non-self is defined by varying degree of difference rather than \textit{radical Otherness} (enmity). Postructuralism, unlike constructivism adopts a \textit{differential} and \textit{referential} view of language.\textsuperscript{22} Meanings are seen to exist within a system of meanings. In this system, meanings, and hence also identities are connected to each other through two processes; linking and differentiation. Linking allows for the creation of “us” while differentiation creates “them”. They occur simultaneously and together they constitute identity construction.\textsuperscript{23} They cannot exist independently.

\textbf{2.2.2. Foreign Policy, National Identity and Security}

When identity is conceptualised as political, social and relational, foreign policy can be understood as an articulation of other(s) in opposition to a self. The self is constantly redefined in relation to others through processes of securitisation and desecuritisation.\textsuperscript{24} Foreign policy constitutes the official state discourse, articulated by the government, and hence where the


\textsuperscript{19} Jensen, Sune Qvotrup (2011): \textit{Othering, identity formation and agency}. Qualitative Studies; 2(2): 63-78: 66


\textsuperscript{21} Hansen, 2006: 37


\textsuperscript{23} Hansen, 2006: 18

official national identity is constructed. The government discourse can to a greater or lesser extent be challenged by opposition parties, the media, public opinion and popular culture.

In the construction of national identity, security is an essential component. Security, like all other concepts in poststructuralist theory, is seen as socially constructed in discourse. In security discourses, the self is identified and a threat is securitised, from which the self needs to be secured.\textsuperscript{25} This allows for the differentiation between the (national) self and the other and in international relations. It is facilitated by the Westphalian international order, where sovereign, equal states exist in an anarchic space, where the “inside”, i.e. the domestic is juxtaposed with the “outside.”\textsuperscript{26} For a long time the idea existed within IR, that an enemy was needed to secure the existence of a state. Enemies had to be constructed, if none emerged naturally. The end of the Cold War proved that the construction of a national identity was not dependent on a radical enemy. Rather, the understanding grew, along with the increased focus in discourse studies, that the ontological identity depends on the exterior is in some way or other being different from the interior.

There are a number of strategies employed within discourse to secure this ontological identity, through constructing difference. Browning and Joenniemi identify the following ontological security-seeking strategies\textsuperscript{27} which are securitisation, desecuritisation and asecuritisation. Securitisation, first coined by Ole Waever, challenges the traditional realist understanding of security as either objective (a real threat to security) and subjective (perceived as a threat).\textsuperscript{28} Waever sees security as speech act, where a certain issue (such as climate change, violations of air space or militarization) are portrayed as a threat. Difference is often instrumental in processes of securitising another country or group of people. Desecuritisation is essentially the opposite – it is a speech act where certain issues are purposely not portrayed as a threat. The European Union

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{25} Bellamy, Alex (2004): Security Communities and Their neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators Palgrave Macmillan, United Kingdom: 57
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{26} Hansen, 2006: 30
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{27} Browning, Christopher S. & Joenniemi, Pertti (2012): From fratricide to security community: re-theorising difference in the constitution of Nordic peace. Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 16, no.4 pages 483 – 513: 494
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{28} Van Munster, Rens (2012): Securitisation in Oxford Bibliographies, 26 June 2012
and European integration overall is often considered a prime example of desecuritization. Differences and perceptions of threats were purposely set aside. Difference also ceases to be a radical constitutive of identity\textsuperscript{29}. Finally, asecuritisation, which also covers Hansen’s notion of fading, means deleting notions of security from discourses upholding ontological security\textsuperscript{30} by abandoning difference as a constitutive of identity\textsuperscript{31}. It means adopting an ontological identity where the one accepts the “given ambiguity, difference and inherently fragmentary nature of identity”\textsuperscript{32}. This definition can be understood as poststructuralist view on identity.

In discussions about national identity and national security, the critics of poststructuralism tend to argue about the material factors – if a state decides to move troops to the border or shoot down a plane this is not a discourse but an action. Lene Hansen draws on Critical Discourse Analyst Norman Fairclough in discussing this\textsuperscript{33}; not all language needs to be verbal\textsuperscript{34}. An action can also be understood as a type of discourse. The manner in which these actions are portrayed in speech is the focus of poststructuralism; material things like say an airplane, made of steel and weighing several tons can either be a war machine or a tool of humanitarian assistance for performing airdrops. It is the discourse that defines the airplane.

2.3. The Region in a Theoretical Perspective

The region has only emerged as an area of study in International Relations at a later stage. The regional identity is less fixed than a national one and can be reconstructed in multiple ways. The region is often denoted within discourses of national identity, but can also be constructed in discourses of regional authorities or institutions, in popular culture and media. The more established the institutions are the less there is fluidity to what constitutes the region. It is constructed in the same manner, through the identification of others – defined by difference, alterity and enmity. The choice of primary data for this Thesis; the national governmental reports

\textsuperscript{29} Browning, Joenniemi, 2012: 12
\textsuperscript{30} Browning, Joenniemi 2012: 12
\textsuperscript{31} Prozorov, Sergei (2011): The Other as Past and Present: Beyond the Logic of Temporal Othering in IR Theory. Review of International Studies 37 no.3: 1273-94.
\textsuperscript{32} Browning,Joenniemi, 2012: 12
\textsuperscript{33} Hansen, 2006: 21
means that the regional identity under scrutiny; the Nordic identity is a by-product in the
construction of the national one.

Regional security has been theorised in different manners – Adler and Barnett built on the
Deutschian concept of a security community, which is understood as community where the use
of violence has been virtually excluded and the possibility of war becomes unthinkable. Adler
and Barnett claimed that a security community is defined by shared identities, values and
meanings, direct interactions and reciprocal long-term interests. They represent the traditional
understanding of difference: the more shared values, norms and culture, the more stable the
security community. This leads to the understanding that similarity creates stability while
difference represents conflict. Bellamy has further discussed in detail the relations between
security communities and their neighbours, through a constructivist IR lens. All these
approaches share the notion that a shared idea of an external threat or perceived threat is needed
for the existence of a security community. Poststructuralists oppose this binary view of
difference, but rather advocated for a varying degrees of difference that co-exist.

Rather, in the poststructuralist approach, one can apply Waever and Buzan’s regional security
complex theory (RSCT). RSCT slots well into poststructuralist thought, allowing for a
multitude of others, defined by varying degrees of difference. States within a security complex
can have different relations to those inside and to those outside. According to Waever and
Buzan, security complexes are shaped by patterns of amity and enmity as well as power
relations, yet these are not necessarily the same as outside the regional security complex. It
became more relevant with the collapse of the bipolar Cold War system, where the focus on
different regions increased, when the bipolarity did not permeate every single security discourse.

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International Political Science Review. 28 (4): 425–449 – use this at some other point
Cambridge: 33
38 Bellamy, Alex (2004): Security Communities and Their neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global
Integrators Palgrave Macmillan, United Kingdom
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
40 Buzan, Waever, 2003: 88
RSCT is particularly applicable to *Norden* as its identity has often been defined, in relation to the larger world order, yet difference exists within the region.

2.4. **Othering as a Theoretical Concept – a Historical Overview**

Poststructuralism as a theory is today still very new, however the Other in academia has prevailed since the Ancient Greek philosophers. Aristotle wrote “the self-sufficing man will require friendship in order to know himself”\(^{41}\) this is because he saw a friend as another self, through which one could gain self-knowledge\(^{42}\). In Ancient Greek the Other we by the Barbarian or the Savage during the 17\(^{th}\) century. In the 21\(^{st}\) century it has been translated to “(radical) alterity”\(^{43}\). Othering has been covered in multiple disciplines, including, but not limited to sociology, anthropology and critical theory.\(^{44}\)

In modern times, scholars have drawn on Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. An example is Simone de Beauvoir in her defining work *The Second Sex* (1949), where the male is defined as privileged, who systematically oppresses women by defining them as the Other\(^{45}\). She presents how the dominant part (the men) defines meaning through discourse, which in turn allows for the repression of the marginalised. Another classical example is Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1978), where the Orient is defined as irrational, psychologically weak, feminine and non-European as opposed to the rational, psychologically strong and masculine Britain or West\(^{46}\). Spivak was the first person to apply Othering systematically to her research, in her study of third world women in India in 1985\(^{47}\). What made her study particularly significant is the existence of layered

\(^{41}\) Aristotle, Magna Moralia Book II 15 12i3 a, [https://archive.org/stream/magnamoralia00arisuoft/magnamoralia00arisuoft_djvu.txt](https://archive.org/stream/magnamoralia00arisuoft/magnamoralia00arisuoft_djvu.txt), (accessed 20.4.2017)
\(^{44}\) *Ibid.*
\(^{47}\) Spivak recognises three dimensions of othering, utilising Derridean deconstruction and drawing on Marxist understanding of exploitation (Jensen, 2011: 63) The first dimension is represented as who
Othering, or its intersectionality and multidimensionality. She understood Othering as classed, raced and gendered, creating a system of interlocked webs of oppression.

Drawing on Said’s example, one can visualise the system of meanings created through othering like this. This also shows how the processes of linking and differentiation take place. The same form of visualisation will be used to exemplify the Nordic identity.

**Figure 1:** Identity construction – Britain and the Orient

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“women are subject to”, the second dimension is about plotting the women as inferior, both pathologically and morally and finally the third dimension is “the master of science or knowledge”, in essence that the powerful self also possesses the knowledge. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1985): *Three Women’s Text and a Critique of Imperialism* Critical inquiry, vol. 12, no. 1, (Autumn 1985) pp. 243-261

Jensen, 2011: 64
The figure\textsuperscript{49} above provides an example of how identity is constructed through the relational character of language. This is to be understood as a fractional segment of the entire system that constitutes language.

2.4.1. Conceptualising Difference

Difference is usually intrinsically tied to the understanding of othering. In her introduction to her book \textit{Portraying the other in IR} Sybille Reinke de Buitrago writes “I see representations of difference inseparably linked with othering, both being a regular part of interaction between states, groups and individuals”\textsuperscript{50}. Postructuralism sees a more complex representation of the self, where the self is defined by multiple Others, with varying levels of difference.

The constructivist notion that difference represents threat, like in the Deustchian security community is rejected by poststructuralist scholars. If one looks at past conflicts, it is usually the most similar neighbours that engage in conflict, in particular in ethnic conflicts, where identity politics play an important role. Drawing on psychology and psychoanalysis, one can see that this it does not make sense to approach difference as an inevitable threat, \textsuperscript{51} since it is not always difference that leads to enmity. It is groups that struggle in their understanding of self (i.e. ontological security), that will strengthen their identities through emphasising difference.\textsuperscript{52} This is what Freud calls the ‘narcissism of minor differences’, that is to say that identity is “based on subtle distinctions that are emphasised, defended and reinforced against what is closest because that is what poses the greatest threat.\textsuperscript{53} Hence, seeing difference as inevitably leading to enmity provides for only a shallow understanding of identity.

Strategies of othering include previously mentioned ontology-seeking strategies. Some

\textsuperscript{49} The structure of this graph is taken from Lene Hansen’s work \textit{Security as a Practice}, however the examples used, I have chosen and made myself.
\textsuperscript{50} Reinke de Buitrago, Sibyll (2012): \textit{Portraying the Other in International Relations: Cases of Othering, Their Dynamics and the Potential for Transformation} Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle -Upon-Tyne: xii
\textsuperscript{51} Browing, Joenniemi, 2012: 8
\textsuperscript{53} Mitchell & Black 1995: 48
poststructuralist scholars, like Thomas Diez, in his analysis of Europe as a normative power, denotes in more details the strategies. He identifies four strategies of othering:

1) The representation of the other as an *existential threat*. This is the same as securitisation. These forms of discourses allow for the legitimisation of extraordinary measures.

2) The representation of the other as *inferior*. This form of othering, has more similarities with Orientalism. Difference does not have the same radicalism to it as securitisation. It is only when the inferior starts to endanger the identity of the self that it surpasses into the aforementioned category.

3) The representation of the other as *violating universal principles*. Diez sees this form of othering as stronger (i.e. difference is underlined more) than the second strategy, because not not only is the other seen as inferior, but the self’s superiority is based on universal validity, which the other should attain or achieve, meanwhile the “universal” values remain unquestioned. Hansen calls this *ethical othering*.

4) The representation of the other as *different*. This remains the most ‘innocent’ strategy, even though, one must not forget, it still imposes identities upon others.

Diez calls this a typology for othering. It provides the basis for the analysis of the primary data.

**2.4.2. The Role of the Past: Temporal Othering**

Waever’s concept of temporal othering was a turning point in the literature on othering in IR. Waever wrote that the EU had been constructed in discourse through temporal othering of its own past. In other words, there was no enemy image in the construction of Europe. The enemy

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55 The classic example is provided by Said, Edward (1979) *Orientalism*. Random House, New York
56 This strategy is discussed in connection with the global governance debate by Richard K. Ashley. See Ashley, ‘Imposing International Purpose: Notes on a Problematic of Governance’, in Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s, eds. Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 251-290
57 Hansen, 2006: 45
58 Diez, 2005: 629
image was the European war-torn past, which at all costs was to be avoided.\textsuperscript{59} The purpose for European integration is to avoid the former conflict-ridden Europe. It is important to note, that the temporal other is not the only other, and it co-exists with alternative spatial others. In particular democratic identities are often defined through spatial difference as well as temporal difference\textsuperscript{60}. Despite the democratic states today being mostly peaceful, a majority of them have a conflict-ridden past. They use this past to project a peaceful identity, because it is what they are not anymore.

The past is not only important as an other, but also because of the role history plays in shaping discourse. Foreign policy is always drawing on both contemporary discourses as well as historical ones\textsuperscript{61} – foreign policy discourses are indeed placed within a historical one, through references to development, progress, backwardness. \textsuperscript{62} Official foreign policy discourses are framed as progression from one temporal identity to another. Past identities of other entities are also often referred.

\textbf{2.5. Methodology: Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis}

The purpose of the poststructuralist discourse analysis is to discern and distinguish certain strands, which lead to discoveries of several discourses. These discourses, when perceived through the poststructuralist lens, provide an understanding of the self through the identification of the numbers of others constructed within and through the discourse. Poststructuralist discourse theory, like other discourse theories, is neither qualitative nor quantitative – rather it questions the assumptions of qualitative and quantitative methods completely. Discourse analysis is a deconstructive reading or interpretation of a speech act. The goal is to distinguish more subtle nuances and identities through the meticulous study of the setting and the process where meaning is created. In the case of this Thesis, the data is where the national identity is constructed, and the regional Nordic identity emerges as a by-product. The methodology draws on the theoretical framework and Hansen’s methodology in \textit{Security as a Practice}.

\textsuperscript{60} Hansen, 2006: 22
\textsuperscript{61} Hansen, 2006: xv
\textsuperscript{62} Hansen, 2006: 6
The methodology consists of first identifying the central themes of the text. Once, the themes have been coded different strands can be distinguished. The following step is the identification of articulations of meaning or identity. These are significantly shorter statements, which can consist from everything from a word to longer sentences, within the strands. These are often shorter sentences or depictions of the self or the other which contribute to a discourse strand. Articulations of identity are not always blatantly clear. Rather, the use of literary devices is often employed, ranging from similes and metaphors to patterns of transitivity, the use of active or passive voices and cohesion devices. The structure of the text itself can also be seen as a part of the articulation of identity. Kristeva’s notion of intertextuality, for example through the use of direct quotations, can be used to articulate identity. Each articulation exists within a web, or a system of signs, when several articulations and hence processes of linking and differentiation have been identified, one can discern the strategies of othering. Processes of linking and differentiation can be studied separately; they together constitute the process of identity construction. The final step is gaining deeper understanding of the system of signs and where a meaning places itself in regard to other meanings.

The goal of the poststructuralist discourse analysis is hence the identification discursive articulations of self or other through processes of linking and differentiation, and how they constitute the discourse that solidifies certain identities. It includes the identification of spatial, temporal and ethical constructions of identity.

2.5.1 Limitations of the poststructuralist discourse analysis methodology

63 Norman Fairclough makes use of Halliday’s list of linguistic devices used in text, stemming from 1985. It provides the researcher with a tick-off list of literary devices one should consider when analysing text. For reference, 3rd edition: Halliday Michael, Matthiessen, Christian Introduction to Functional Grammar (2004), Oxford University Press, New York
65 Hansen, 2006: 39
66 Hansen, 2006: 17
Advocates of rational theories will criticise the non-causal epistemology of poststructuralist discourse analysis. Constructivists even, tend to accept to some extent a causal relationship between identity and policy. Poststructuralism on the other hand, acquiesces that identity and policy are mutually constitutive. Drawing on Hansen; the non-causal epistemology indeed doesn’t exclude “empirical analyses of ‘real world relevance,’ or systematic assessments of data and methodology.”

A thorough analysis is hence possible, despite the non-causal epistemology, in particular because the aim of the research question is a deeper understanding of identity and not how identity informs certain actions.

If identity is understood as constructed through processes of linking and differentiating, the reliability of one reader’s judgement may differ from another reader’s. Would another researcher come to a different result? The methodology, of critically identifying how signs are linked and juxtaposed should take place in an as empirical manner as possible. It is worth noting that poststructuralist discourse analysis allows for a multiple readability of texts.

Limitations tied to the researcher are more specific. The most prominent challenge is the fact that the data is in four different languages. The Finnish report is the only one which is also published in English; others only include summaries in English. The other texts are in Swedish, Norwegian and Danish respectively. As a native Swedish speaker, I have no trouble understanding and processing Danish and Norwegian text, however to distinguish smaller nuances may prove to be more challenging. The second challenge is the personal convictions of the researcher and how they affect the research. It is worth noting that the researcher is of Finnish nationality, and has Western convictions.

67 Hansen, 2006: 4
68 Hansen, 2006: 41
3. Historical Context

This chapter aims to provide a historical context of the Nordic region, with particular focus on identity creation and othering. Focus is placed on the Cold War period and the construction of Nordic identity during that period. The chapter ends with the early developments of Nordic security and defence cooperation and the Nordic identity discourses employed prior to the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea.

3.1. Vikings of Norden and so on

The Scandinavian Peninsula was first inhabited around 10 000 years ago after the first Ice Age. Christianity reached the region of Northern Europe around 500 AD. The Viking era took place in the late Iron Age from 700 A.D. to 1100. The Vikings put the region on the European map, as Scandinavians gained a reputation as vicious, barbaric and conflict-prone.\textsuperscript{69} After the separation of the church, there was an increased interest in Northern Europe, which was still considered a heathen part of Europe. The region generally remained excluded from the religion wars that shook the continent.\textsuperscript{70}

The reputation of a warring region of barbarians was maintained throughout the middle Ages. In the five centuries preceding 1814, the Nordic states engaged in around 60 wars with each other. The region was defined by conflict, both intra-Nordic and with their neighbours.\textsuperscript{71} Browning and Joenniemi referred to the region as a \textit{fratricide} prior to 1815 in their influential article on Nordic Peace.\textsuperscript{72} Discourses on Nordic identity would often recall on a brutal and sometimes even primal identity of a Gothic Scandinavian warrior society.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{69} Lindholm, Sture (2011): \textit{Nordens Historia från Forntid till nu}. Pohjola Norden RF, Helsinki: 5
\textsuperscript{70} With the notable exception of Thirty Years’ War, Denmark was the only country to witness violence and conflict related to religion wars.
\textsuperscript{71} Wiberg, 2000: 291
\textsuperscript{72} Browning, Joenniemi, 2012
From its modern genesis, the Nordic region has been defined and portrayed in contrast to its neighbours. Geopolitically, the region has been defined by two securitised borders – the Eastern one and the Southern one. The Nordic countries engaged in wars with the neighbours, but equally often the neighbours engaged in other conflicts. There were multiple wars between Sweden and Tsarist Russia with two periods when Finland (belonging to Sweden) was occupied by Russia. Both times the Swedes abandoned the Finns to defend mainland Sweden. These events contributed to the cementation of Norden’s Eastern border. Furthermore, the Nordic Germanic languages were contrasted against the Slavic one, free peasantry was opposed to serfdom and the constitutional monarchies as opposed to tsarist regimes. Already in the 18th century, Norden was seen as fundamentally different from its European neighbours in the South, since it non-Catholic, non-colonial and non-imperial. The Slavic East and the Prussian South were non-democratic states, under authoritarian rule, which was contrasted with the Nordic countries. The narratives were not always such that Norden was explicitly seen as non-Russian or non-German/Prussian. Nevertheless, the region was portrayed as different. The anti-Russian rhetoric has been particularly common in Finland and Sweden, which anti-Europe has been more significant in Denmark and Norway. Prior to the 20th century the region was defined by shifting borders and defined by traditional security concerns with the kingdoms of Sweden and Denmark engaging in balance of power practices.

The exception to this warring identity was the Kalmar Union, which united Sweden, Norway and Denmark between 1397 and 1521. Due to the focus on national accounts of history, in particular among historians from Nordic countries, the Kalmar Union time has been profiled as an exception or anomaly. Further on, it however provided a base to build more pan-Scandinavian discourses, both during the 19th century but also in more recent times.

76 Hilson, 2008: 16
78 Hilson, 2008: 14
79 Hilson, 2008: 14
indeed an exception in terms of security cooperation. The Union was based on the Letter of the Union, which consisted of the five defining principles\textsuperscript{80} for the Union. One of them approached security and stated. “If one of the kingdoms is threatened by war, the remaining kingdoms shall provide assistance.”\textsuperscript{81} This remains the single most comprehensive form of security cooperation ever agreed upon between the Nordic countries.

3.2. From Battlefield to Negative Peace

Despite the balance of power and rather tense relations, the region was defined by similarity in its transition to modernity. The region consisted of two early modern states: Denmark (which included Norway) and Sweden (which included Finland), in which the Reformation had a very similar hold, the role of the Lutheran Church was significant, and their progression into modern states happened at approximately the same time. Furthermore, it is notable that this took place in a rather peaceful manner\textsuperscript{82}, in particular in comparison to central Europe. After 1815, a negative peace emerged through the establishment of a no-war community.\textsuperscript{83} Due to the region’s conflict-ridden past the peace was negative one. Johan Galtung first defined negative peace as the “absence of war” and positive peace as the “integration of human society”\textsuperscript{84}. Their further development into security communities has then been addressed by Deutsch, Adler and Barnett. Norden developed gradually into a security community.

3.3. Security Community

The Kalmar Union agreement’s reference to collective security remains an exception and an

\textsuperscript{80} The five principles were: 1) One single king shall reign over the three kingdoms. The union shall be an elective monarchy. 2) The king shall govern over each kingdom according to its respective laws. 3) If one of the kingdoms are threatened by war, the remaining kingdoms shall provide assistance. 4) An outlaw shall be treated as such in all kingdoms. 5) In negotiations with other countries, the king has the power, with his advisers, to make decisions for the entire Union’s best (own translation from Lindholm, 2011).

\textsuperscript{81} Lindholm, 2011: 12


\textsuperscript{83} Browning, Joenniemi 2012: 13

anomaly, because collective security has never since occurred between the Nordic countries. This became clear, in 1864, when the dream of a Scandinavian security alliance died. The Swedish King Karl XV failed to meet his promise of providing assistance to the Danes against the Prussians. King Karl XV had made a promise to send 20 000 troops to help Denmark defend itself against the Prussian invasion. In not coming to the Danes’ assistance a clear message was sent that the Nordic neighbours could not be relied on in security matters. The security dimension was hereby excluded from Nordic cooperation. Nordic cooperation and the Nordic identity were hence permitted to progress without a security dimension. The Kalmar Union and the Scandinavism that it entailed did contributed to the construction of a security community without the security dimension. Indeed many scholars claim that 1864 signified the end of the pan-Scandinavian dream, however it was only the death of it with the security dimension. Nordic cooperation continued to develop, and as Hemstad writes in her book *Fra Indian Summer till nordisk vinter*, there was a peak in voluntary Nordic cooperation around the turn of the century. The dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden in 1905 was a proof of a dispute being solved peacefully, despite forcing much of Nordic cooperation on hold.

Nordic cooperation truly took shape in the 20th century, through cooperation in international organisations. The joint neutrality policy during World War One is an example of joint Nordic foreign policy. Nordic cooperation existed prior to the First World War, but it was during the Interwar Period that cooperation grew, in the League of Nations and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) just to mention a few. This cooperation contributed to a shared Nordic identity, as the Nordic countries acted like a bloc within these organisations and were often treated as a unit. In the League of Nations this has sometimes been referred to as the Genevese construction of Norden. Götz uses as an example the following citation: “You from the Scandinavian countries seem [like] blue-eyed angels to us” to exemplify how foreign discourses about the Nordic countries shaped the Nordic identity. Even though the Nordic countries have always emphasised their differences in the cooperation in international

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organisations, their similarities were more often than not contrasted against more radical
difference, such as mainland Europe. Their awareness of their shared heritage increased in these
international conferences. At the same time when Finland engaged in cooperation with its
neighbours the region was increasingly called Norden, as opposed to Scandinavia. Prior to the
outbreak of World War Two, there were a number of disputes about borders, the most significant
of them about the Åland Islands, between Finland and Sweden. More notable is the fact however,
that it was dealt with in a peaceful manner (actually one of the few successes of the League of
Nations). This dispute further confirmed the idea that intra-Nordic relations were no longer
viewed as anarchic, and borders were no longer a source of military dispute.

The outbreak of World War Two proved the extent to which the security dimension was absent
from Nordic cooperation. At a certain point during World War Two, Finland was allied with the
power that occupied both Denmark and Norway. Due to the absence of the security dimension,
the Nordic cooperation remained sustainable. This opposes the view of Adler and Barnett that a
shared enemy is necessary for the development of a security community. Nordic cooperation was
despite the different experiences during the war, able to reach new heights after the end of it.
This reflects a defining characteristic of Nordic cooperation. Norden has remained intrinsically
different from Europe, because there has never been a shared threat to the region, (or the
region’s identity) from the outside and neither have the countries themselves engaged in intra-
Nordic warfare (in modern times). Instead, each state has had separate threats to national
security.

3.4. The Cold War: the Golden Years of Nordic Cooperation

The different experiences during World War Two led the Nordic countries to seek different
security arrangements. There were some attempts to establish a Scandinavian Defence Union at
the end of World War Two. Due to the countries separate security concerns, the plans fell

88 Götz, 2009: 36
89 Hilson, 2008: 16
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91 Joenniemi, 1992: 45
through and they all sought separate guarantees for their national securities, strongly based on their experiences during the war and neo-realist policies. Norway and Denmark, who had been invaded by Nazi Germany, decided to become founding NATO members in 1949, along with Iceland. In doing so, they bandwagoned with the USA. Similarly, Finland bandwagoned with the USSR, mainly for purposes of pure self-preservation. Meanwhile, heated debate was undertaken in Sweden regarding NATO membership, but the country chose to maintain its neutrality policy. In doing so they created a balance in the region, between the two superpowers of the Cold War.

During these early post-war years, the seeds for Cold War Nordic cooperation were planted. Nordic cooperation was to bloom over the coming decades. The manners in which the Nordic countries sought security guarantees also encouraged an interest in Nordic cooperation. For Finland, Norden became its gateway to the West, in its attempt to not succumb completely to the Soviet sphere of influence. Denmark, Norway, and to a lesser extent Iceland, used Nordic cooperation as way to balance their own interests and NATO memberships. Finally, Sweden turned to Nordic cooperation, seeking to justify its neutrality policy and to find support for it. Norden was defined by its exceptional character during the Cold War – it was a low-tension area and highly progressive, depicted as mediators between East and West\(^\text{92}\). This exceptionalism lasted the length of the Cold War, and was strengthened by the Nordic countries themselves using this brand of Nordic exceptionalism as a foreign policy instrument.\(^\text{93}\) Cold War cooperation was also pragmatic, developed as a way to make life simpler for the Nordic people. Cooperation between the organised labour movements, consisting of both trade unions and the social democratic parties, contributed to the cooperation. The developments, such as the Passport Union, the Nordic Council and the Council of Ministers put the Norden at the forefront of regional development.

3.4.1. The Nordic model – a social model and a foreign policy tool

The Nordic welfare model was seen as a defining factor of Nordic identity during the Cold War.


It was represented as a *third way*, placed between communism and capitalism. Even though the region was understood as a “Third Way” it was never understood as a fully-established *third point*\(^{94}\) – it did not represent a third pole, but rather it existed within the dualism of the Cold War system. It did not exist in complete juxtaposition to either opposing system. The Cold War not only shaped Nordic identity, but it also influenced Nordic cooperation itself. Cooperation was defined according to the lowest common denominator\(^{95}\) and remained limited due to the bipolar character of the Cold War. There were many “Grand Designs” for Nordic cooperation which fell through. However, the so called Nordic phoenix effect ensured that there was always progress made – the failure of a Grand Design, for example NordSat, led to deepened cooperation nevertheless. The Cold War allowed the Nordic cooperation to develop in “soft” areas, such as social policy, care and education, in which they often applied very similar national policies. This exceptional character of the region allowed for an identity which was depicted as superior and the Nordic model was considered a goal for other countries. *Norden* was in the most general terms, regularly portrayed as *better*.\(^{96}\)

The Nordic model was not only a social model; it was also a foreign policy model, where the Nordic countries took on the role as bridge-builders and peacemakers.\(^{97}\) They took on the role as mediators between East and West, but they also used this identity to promote consensual democratic values in the organisations in which they were members, to promote anti-militarism and nuclear disarmament\(^{98}\). Furthermore, this peaceful characteristic was strengthened through their international solidarity, where the Nordic countries as a bloc championed for the rights of all countries to develop without external interference. Similarly, the region was the first to reach the UN Official Development Assistance target of 0.7% of GDP.\(^{99}\) This foreign policy tool was of course one of necessity as well, due to the size of the Nordic countries.

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\(^{96}\) Browning, 2007: 18
\(^{97}\) Browning, 2007: 3
\(^{98}\) Browning, 2007: 14
\(^{99}\) Browning, 2007: 16
3.4.2. The Cold War Others

During the Cold War, the region was able to construct an identity for itself through multiple others. The backwardness of the Soviet Union was used to propel *Norden* to become an epitome of advancement (through the Nordic Model)\(^{100}\) while simultaneously the ontological security of the region was consolidated through its difference to Europe. Europe was during the Cold War defined by high-tensions and an area of friction between the two superpowers. Indeed; “the very existence of the Cold War was among the preconditions for upholding the [Nordic] self-image because it was defined … by contrast.”\(^{101}\) Waever and Wiberg argue that during the Cold War, *Norden* was a sub-regional security community, within a larger security complex (Europe), which in turn was defined by a bipolar superpower security complex. Rather than constructing an identity in opposition to either communism or capitalism, the identity was constructed within the Cold War bipolar global system.

The Cold War bipolar system also created the so called Nordic balance. This meant that the Nordic countries maintained the region as a low-tension one. It consisted of mutual restraint and the idea of keeping their “own” superpower out, to avoid the escalation of tensions in the region between the superpowers.\(^{102}\) It required the Nordic states to work in tandem, essentially taking into consideration, also their neighbours’ security, in their own security policies\(^{103}\). Further it allowed the region to develop an identity through its alterity to Europe, an area of high-tension (see figure 2). *Norden* has often been described as an anomaly; a region where traditional power politics cannot be applied\(^{104}\). The Cold War allowed for a Nordic identity, as exceptional, peaceful and advanced.

**Figure 2:** Nordic identity and its alterity to Europe during the Cold War

\(^{100}\) Joenniemi, 1992: 49


\(^{102}\) Wiberg, Waever, 1992: 25


3.5. “The Nordic Model is dead”

The end of the Cold War signified an end to the structure within which Norden had been allowed to flourish. It also signified the time of a united Europe and deeper European integration. Esko Aho claimed in 1997 that “The Nordic Model is dead”\(^\text{105}\) while the Swedish Prime Minister accurately put into words, why the *third way* was seen as redundant: “No one wants to be a compromise between a system which has turned out to be a success and another that has turned out to be a historic catastrophe.”\(^\text{106}\) The Nordic identity was shunned as a Cold War construct, Norden “lost its nature as a borderline case and its character as an entity out of the ordinary.”\(^\text{107}\) The economic depression that hit the Nordic countries and Finland in particular highlighted the

\(^\text{107}\) Joenniemi, 1992: 77
notion that the Nordic model was not the solution anymore. Nordic cooperation was considered pointless to the extent that the Nordic Council itself published a book about the death of Norden.\footnote{Karlsson, Sven-Olof (1994), ed., \textit{Norden är död—längle leve Norden. En debattbok om de nordiska länderna som en ”megaregion” i Europa}. Stockholm: Nordic Council}

When seen through the poststructuralist lens where identity is relational, it becomes evident that Norden experienced a significant ontological crisis at the end of the Cold War. Already in the peaceful revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe challenged the Nordic identity, simply because they were peaceful.\footnote{Waever, Ole (1992): \textit{Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War} International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944 -), Vol 68, No 1: 77} The European project grew into one of history’s greatest peace projects and the Nordic peace ceased to be exceptional. Europe ceased to be the meeting point between East and West, and \textit{Norden} lost its identity as a low-tension area. Many European countries adopted system of social welfare and the Nordic Model as a “third way” ceased to exist. \textit{Norden}, as a discursive practice, was at the mercy of new discourses, which provided less stability than the former East-West ones.\footnote{Joenniemi, 1992: 77}

In the post-Cold War order, the NATO-Russia Council was founded and the identity as a bridge-builders and mediators between East and West became insignificant.\footnote{Browning, 2007: 19} After 9/11 the focus of the world turned to the Middle-East and the geopolitical significance for their role as mediators, decreased further. Solidarity for other countries became from Gdansk’s shipyard onwards, became a European characteristic, rather than a Nordic one.

During the post-Cold War era, the borders of the region became porous as the discourses that gave the region its identity had ceased to exist. Baltic became the new Nordic, as cooperation became over the Baltic Sea was preferable to the traditional state-to-state form of cooperation in the Nordic Council.\footnote{Waever, 1992: 101} Region building approaches were popular and some attempts were even made to rename the entire region as Northern Europe, some discourses even including Russia in
it, and the Baltic Sea Region was referred to as a mega-region, by Joenniemi. Another poignant example is The Northern Dimension, as introduced by Paavo Lipponen at the Barents region international conference in 1997, which called for cooperation between EU and Russia in the North. There was a form of identity fluidity that reigned over Europe as new states were born, and a reshuffling of former identities took place. This was also the case with Russia at this time period. Russia gained the identity as a learner or apprentice that wanted to enter into the community of democratic states. This led to a hierarchical relationship, were liberal democratic norms were considered a goal. Russia was often treated as a country in the process of developing into a democracy, which was dependent on the aid, assistance and guidance of the already established democracies.

3.6. Europeanisation

The end of the Cold War also signified the rise of Europe, along with American power hegemony. Realists in IR say that the world established after the Cold War is a unipolar one based on American hegemony. Postructuralists reject unipolarity, as there are always processes of differentiation due to the referential nature of language. After the Cold War, globalisation allowed for the birth of a new system, which was also differential. The new camps were developed, peaceful and democratic states and through processes of differentiation, the other became the non-developed, conflict-ridden undemocratic states. The new threat was exclusion and states were expected to adopt certain “standards of civilisation” to stay close to the core of democratic states and not be shunned to the periphery. The world became increasingly defined

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Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki: 9
117 Gerner, 2002: 64
118 Buzan & Waever, 2003: 25
by centrality versus periphery as opposed to East versus West. The fear of exclusion and periphery also led to an increased number of multilateral engagements and cooperation, seeing as non-participation was not an answer anymore,\textsuperscript{119} not even to neutral countries like Sweden. In the Nordic region, \textit{Norden} was seen as less of a possibility and more as the threat of being of periphery.\textsuperscript{120} This proves that an existential external threat is not needed for ontological security. The threat can take another form, such as fear of exclusion. The fear of exclusion was tightly associated with discourses of Europeanisation.

Discourses of Europeanisation became the dominant in the Nordic discourses and big public debates and referenda were held regarding EU membership in Finland, Sweden and Norway. Finland and Sweden joined Denmark in the EU; meanwhile Norway remained outside the Union. The debates regarding Europeanisation, were constructed in such a manner that Nordic cooperation was portrayed in opposition to European integration,\textsuperscript{121} Norden represented exclusion and isolation. Ontology-seeking strategies were employed in the discourse of Europeanisation. The Nordic countries had for a long time seen themselves as “better” and Sweden and Finland applied this approach to their EU memberships. Finland did its best to become a first-rang EU member states, while Sweden attempted to make EU more Nordic (read more Swedish). Meanwhile Denmark took on the role as a teacher from Finland and Sweden.\textsuperscript{122} Directives were implemented immediately, often with no coordination on the Nordic level.

For Finland the EU membership signified finally shaking off the shackles of the Cold War and significant effort was devoted, to prove that Finland belonged there. Through Finland and Sweden joining the EU, Denmark lost its Cold War identity as the EU-Nordic link, which also lessened the Danish interest in Nordic cooperation. In essence, European integration had replaced the USSR as the biggest factor in foreign policy, in particular in Finland and Sweden. EU continued to grow in importance with the expansion of the EU. When Finland and Sweden joined the EU was still a rather small club of countries. This shift from USSR to EU as focus in

\textsuperscript{120} Waever, 1992: 77
\textsuperscript{121} Hansen, Buzan, 2002: 13
\textsuperscript{122} Rieker, 2006
foreign policy is evidence of poststructuralist view on IR – the main factor in foreign policy does not necessarily have to be an enemy. Nevertheless, the EU did not represent enough difference for Nordic cooperation to exist simultaneously, which allowed the Nordic cooperation to lay dormant for some time.

3.6.1. The Baltic countries

The independence of the Baltic countries led to significant changes to the Baltic Sea. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had represented half of the Baltic Sea. Now there was a plethora of countries. They were slowly integrated into the Nordic sphere and Nordic-Baltic Ministerial (NB8) meetings were established. The cooperation is less formalised than the Nordic one, however the Baltic countries play a crucial role in the development of the Baltic Sea Region’s identity and stability, as well as the Nordic identity and how Russia is portrayed in discourse.

3.7. The Nordic Phoenix Rises Again

It is difficult to pinpoint a time, when the discourse of renewed Nordic cooperation occurred. Well into the 21st century, Nordic cooperation remained out of fashion, as other discourses regarding the region were deemed more relevant. Clive Archer, one of the academics concerned with Nordic cooperation, wrote in 2009 that there was simply no ethos left to feed the Nordic phoenix. In retrospect, scholars tend to say that it is around 2007–2008 that Nordic cooperation re-entered discourse in a positive light. Strang and Olesen, saw it as a turning point because of the global financial crisis, led to the return of international attention on the Nordic model. The European framework, to which the Nordic EU members had committed themselves to, became weaker and failed to live up to its promises when the unemployment rates rose in Finland in particular. The countries felt a strong call to safeguard national interests, when the EU failed to do so, and hence they turned to each other. The period coincided with a rise in immigration, which was also depicted as a challenge. The US and NATO military commitments

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123 Archer, 2009: 149
124 Olesen, Strang, 2015: 36
125 Olesen, Strang, 2015: 37
in Iraq and Afghanistan did not seem to progress as the Taliban executed several successful offensives in 2008 in Afghanistan. Furthermore, these global changes coincided with a significant increase in Russian military and defence spending. Putin had already for some time challenged the established geopolitical security in public speeches, in 2007 calling the unipolar system of American hegemony that was established after the Cold War unacceptable. The Russo-Georgian War clearly displayed that Putin’s geopolitical ambitions were more than words. This was also strengthened by the symbolic planting of a Russian flag on the North Pole in August 2007.

Calls were made for a new kind of Nordic cooperation. In 2009, the Stoltenberg report was published, which would come to serve as the basis for future Nordic cooperation within security and defence policy. Other calls for Nordic cooperation were also made. A Swedish historian, by the name Gunnar Wetterberg published a work in 2010, called The United Nordic Federation, which gained attention and raised public discussions. He called on a federal union, built on the pan-Scandinavian dream. Furthermore, within academia there was a move towards more cooperation. In 2012, Johan Strang wrote a report titled Nordic Communities, which called for deeper foreign and defence policies, without a federal union. Wetterberg’s and Strang’s works were very different from the Stoltenberg report, in many ways, however they all shared a form of scepticism for the established institutions of Nordic cooperation; the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers. The institutions were seen as limiting to Nordic cooperation, in their consensual nature, with no possibility of opting out. Nordic cooperation has always been identifiable through its flexibility, ad hoc character and bottom-up approach. The institutions did not allow for the rise of new Nordic cooperation, but rather worked to maintain


\[130\] Strang, Johan (2012) Nordiska Gemenskaper - en vision för samarbetet Helsinki Centrum för Nordenstudier, University of Helsinki

\[131\] Olesen, Strang, 2015: 37

\[132\] Strang, 2015: 15
the already existent. The assumption was that Nordic cooperation would continue, after the Cold War, in areas such as social policy and the promotion of certain norms despite the loss of many Cold War identity characteristics. The rise of cooperation in the policy area of security and defence, was however something that few, if any have envisioned.

3.8. Defence Cooperation

Thorvald Stoltenberg, the former foreign minister of Norway, handed his report to the Nordic foreign ministers in February 2009. The purpose of the report was to evaluate the potential for Nordic defence cooperation. The Report contained 13 points where the Nordic countries could cooperate within defence. The Stoltenberg Report did not come out of the blue and it did not fill a vacuum. Small advances within security cooperation had already been made prior to it. As the Cold War ended, there was a normalisation of defence cooperation as well as a liberalisation of it what it entailed. In the 1990’s small advancements included the Nordic Armaments Cooperation (NORDAC) and Cooperation Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS). There were, however, also failures, such as the Nordic Standard Helicopter Project, where the Nordic countries decided, despite joint discussions, to buy helicopters separately, from different providers and with different standards. The Stoltenberg Report and the establishment of NORDEFCO represented a big step forward in the consolidation of security and defence cooperation as part of Nordic cooperation.

The main reasons the Stoltenberg report was commissioned were the decreasing defence budgets. Other concerns included the Arctic and Russia. Previously the Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish chiefs of defence had made shared calls for increased cooperation, where the main

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134 Forsberg, Tuomas (2013): The rise of Nordic defence cooperation: a return to regionalism?. International affairs, 89(5), pp 1161-1181: 1165
135 Stoltenberg, 2009
136 Forsberg, 2013: 1163
reason was the increasingly small defence budgets. The economic crisis hit hard and the need to renew much of the defence equipment was seen as the principal motivator for cooperation. Furthermore, the Nordic countries were stretched in terms of their contributions to UN peace operation, in for example the Darfur region in Sudan. Through pooling resources, cooperation was seen as beneficial. Additionally, United States had deported from their Keflavik military base in 2006, which had led to a number of Russian intrusions into Icelandic airspace. Finally, the Arctic was a growing area of concern with the melting of the ice cap, opening up options for tourism but also as a source of dispute. Nordic cooperation allowed Finland and Sweden to come closer to NATO, without the necessity to have public discussion of potential NATO membership. It was however difficult to pinpoint the significance of the Stoltenberg Report and it is only in retrospect that it becomes evident. Its value in discourses pertaining to security and defence has increased significantly due to the changes in the geopolitical scene that have taken place after the Report being published.

The Stoltenberg Report contained 13 points, of which six received immediate attention: the stabilisation task force, air surveillance, satellite system, resource network against cyber-attacks, cooperation between foreign services and military cooperation. The 13th point was a mutual declaration of solidarity. In 2011, all Nordic countries signed the Nordic Declaration of Solidarity. This was considered a controversial suggestion by Stoltenberg, and was put in motion by Sweden in 2009, when Sweden stated that it would not stand passive, if a neighbour was threatened, or subject to military aggression. The initial goal of the Declaration was something similar to NATO’s Article V; however this was deemed too ambitious, and would step on the toes of both NATO and the EU. To avoid this, the focus of the Declaration became new challenges, such as the climate, terrorism and cyber security. The Declaration was not a one-off; a further declaration included the one from the Nordic Defence Ministers meeting in Helsinki 2013, which confirmed “an enhanced political and military dialogue on security and defence issues” which the countries would have by 2020.¹³⁹

The history of Nordic cooperation facilitated the establishment of defence cooperation between the Nordic countries. Trust is a characteristic valued highly in the Nordic countries. This transnational and informal characteristic of Nordic cooperation allowed Nordic defence cooperation to take place also on a more informal level. An example is exchanges between military personnel on different levels and good chemistry between ministers of defence. Secondly, the discourses about Nordic identity which already existed, allowed for easier defence and security cooperation because the “Nordic” label makes it first of all easy as a concept to sell to domestic audiences\textsuperscript{140}, in particular in Finland and Sweden.\textsuperscript{141} Furthermore, this brand, which admittedly is seen as more united from the outside than from the inside,\textsuperscript{142} allows for Nordic defence and security cooperation to be taken seriously internationally.

3.9.1. Finnish and Swedish Defence Cooperation with NATO

The cooperation between Finland and Sweden has increased significantly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The two countries have acted in unison, in particular in their relations to NATO. They have progressed from NATO’s Partnership for Peace to Enhanced Opportunities and now have a right to attend many NATO meetings. The two countries have been present in nearly all NATO missions; Sweden first began its co-operation in NATO’s missions in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{143} In their cooperation with each other, they have also facilitated closer cooperation with NATO. There seems to be a general consensus that a Swedish or Finnish NATO membership would be difficult now, because of the Russia reaction. Russian officials have made it clear to both countries that their membership would lead to precautions on the Russian side as well.\textsuperscript{144}

3.9. Nordic Security Discourses before Crimea

\textsuperscript{140} Forsberg, 2013: 1163
\textsuperscript{141} Forsberg, 2013: 1177
\textsuperscript{144} Savel, 2016: 6
The Russian annexation of Crimea proved to be a turning point for the Western discourses regarding Russia and how Russia was seen. Prior to the annexation of Crimea, there are many Russian actions which were regarded as antagonistic, in particular the Russo-Georgian War. For the Nordic countries, there had been sightings of Russian submarines in the Swedish waters and violations of Finnish airspace by the Russian air force. However, the discourses about Russia allowed room for cooperation and development in the region – an aspect which was completely discarded after 2014.

In the Finnish Government Report on Foreign and Defence Policy of 2012, the importance of cooperation with Russia and its commitment to European development is underlined. Russia is seen as an important player on the international scene, engaged in the global community to promote shared values. “Russia keeps promoting a multilateral world order and it wants to be duly recognised as a key actor in global policy. Russia underscores the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference.” is an example of how Russia is portrayed through processes of linking as a democratic state with similar values as Finland in the Finnish report from 2012. China and Russia are depicted as rivals to each other. Indeed, there is a clear desecuritisation of Russia’s military modernisation and it is clear that Russian integration into the European security order remained one of the Finnish priorities. Furthermore, it is clearly underlined: “Finland’s present security environment is stable.”

In the Swedish report Vägval i en globaliserad värld from 2013, the tone is similar. The tensions between China and Russia are referred to as tense. China is considered the main opponent of Western values, such as democracy and human rights. The relationship between NATO and Russia is described as tense, however not antagonistic and based on dialogue. The biggest

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146 Finnish Government, 2012: 32
149 Swedish Government, 2013: 22
150 Ibid. 16
151 Ibid. 88
threats to European security are considered the frozen conflicts, such as Nagorno-Karabach, international crime, epidemics, the relations between Turkey and Cyprus as well as Turkey and Russia. EUs enlargement process is seen as a challenge.\textsuperscript{152} Russia is considered a source of instability in certain situations in its superpower ambitions, which are based on their nuclear arsenal. The situation in the Baltic Sea is described as stable.\textsuperscript{153}

The Danish report from the Foreign Minister to the Danish Parliament from 2013 – 2014 mentioned the many activities that Denmark had engaged in abroad. The biggest concerns were the Middle East and Northern Africa. The approach is global and the goal for Danish foreign policy is to “take joint responsibility for the management of global challenges to security.”\textsuperscript{154} The Russian foreign policy is noted, in particular its confrontational approach towards NATO. Denmark’s priorities included supporting NATO’s general secretary in his work to strengthen the NATO-Russian cooperation.\textsuperscript{155} The Danish interest is clearly that Russia continues to contribute constructively to the global approaches to dealing with regional and global security challenges. The global approach of the report means that the regional aspects for example the Baltic Sea Region are not addressed at all. The Danish foreign policy had a very global approach and Denmark’s own vicinity was not seen as a source of concern or of importance to the extent that it is not mentioned at all.

The Norwegian Foreign Minister’s Report to the Norwegian Parliament had a more regional approach, when he states that Norway’s foreign policy is based on Norway promoting stability in its near vicinity and to promote Norway’s interests abroad.\textsuperscript{156} The areas of Russo-Norwegian cooperation are many and are underlined. These include fisheries, visas and various industries and commerce in northern Norway. Certain developments in Russia are seen as worrying, such

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid. 120
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid. 219
\textsuperscript{155} Nielsen, 2014: 7
as the disrespect for certain human rights. Engaging Russia bilaterally and internationally is seen as important. The relationship between USA and China is judged to be the most important bilateral relation globally and the relationship between Norway and China is seen as precarious. The Baltic Sea Region and near vicinity is not mentioned.

Prior to the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea, the discourses relating to Russia within the Nordic countries were not particularly antagonistic. There was some apprehension due to the domestic developments in Russia, the Russo-Georgian War and the inability to predict the direction that Russian foreign policy would take. However, bigger threats were generally the situation in the Middle East and Northern Africa with the Arab Spring, as well as Mali. Furthermore, China’s growth was seen as a factor that could shift the international balance. Nordic cooperation was a factor in each report, except Denmark (which can be attributed to the Danish global foreign policy approach). Incentives for deeper Nordic cooperation within security policy stemmed from shrinking budgets and the possibility of improved cost efficiency in supply of material. The economic benefits of deeper security cooperation are stressed in all reports (except Denmark) prior to 2012. The area where there is the most potential is seen within digital security, material, and air surveillance.

3.10. Russia’s Annexation of Crimea

Russia annexed the Ukrainian territory of Crimea in March 2014. At the time Crimea was going through a political crisis due to the revolution of February 2014. Kremlin denied the presence of Russian troops in Crimea until the middle of April. Only four months after the annexation, in July, Prime Minister Medvedev stated that Crimea had been completely integrated into the Russian Federation. The majority of the Western world condemned the Russia actions as a military intervention and many other stated their support for Ukrainian territorial integrity. Sanctions were implemented and are still maintained today.

157 Barth Eide, 2013: 2175
158 Barth Eide, 2013: 2176
159 Barth Eide, 2013: 2177
160 Finnish Government, 2012: 12
The Russian annexation of Crimea can be understood as the culmination of a number of Russian actions; however it proved to be the turning point in the European discourses pertaining to Russia. This includes the Nordic discourses. This will be demonstrated in the following chapter, which is concerned with the primary data of this Thesis, presented before delving into the analysis.

4. Data and Results

The following section will present the data. Below is the same summary of the primary data as it was presented in the introduction. It is often said regarding the Nordic model, that there is one model and five exceptions. Precisely for this reason, this chapter focuses on each report separately in a comparative approach. Each subsection will focus on the understanding of national security, bilateral relations with Russia, the role of international organisation and
multilateral relations. The chapter concludes with a summary of the discourses relating to Russia distinguished in the reports.

Table 2: Summary of the primary data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name of report</th>
<th>Date published</th>
<th>Commissioned by/author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Government report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy</td>
<td>June 2016</td>
<td>Finnish government / Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>“Säkerhet i ny tid” – Security in a New Era</td>
<td>August 2016</td>
<td>Swedish government/ Ambassador Krister Bringéus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>“Ett felles løft” – A United Effort</td>
<td>April 2015</td>
<td>Minister of Defence Ine Eriksen Soreide/ External expert group on defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>“Dansk diplomati og forsvar i en brydningstid” – Danish diplomacy and defence in times of upheaval</td>
<td>May 2016</td>
<td>Danish government/ Ambassador Peter Taksoe-Jensen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1. Primary Data

The data consists of four different government reports, published in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark respectively. The exclusion of Iceland is intentional. All primary data has been published after 2014 and the Russian annexation of Crimea. The reports are also the first of their sorts in each respective country to be published after the Russian annexation. The role of Russia and its actions in Crimea cannot be undermined – the Swedish government has commissioned and independent investigation of Swedish international security cooperation with references to
the changing security environment.\textsuperscript{162} Norway and Denmark have also commissioned reports. In Finland, there is a tradition of publishing a report every four years. The changes in the near vicinity and security environment are a strong justification for publishing of these reports. This can be seen already in the titles, which refer to change and a need to act in unison. In the Danish report itself, \textit{brydningstid} is defined as “a time of worry and transitions”. Similarly, the “new era” in the Swedish Report is defined by an “unpredictable character that has crept into the Sweden security environment.”\textsuperscript{163}

The timeframe poses a challenge to the research enquiry since it is a highly relevant to current affairs, and recent developments affect how security is understood for these four countries. To limit the timeframe, I have chosen the years 2014–2016 to avoid taking into consideration any further implications that current affairs can have had on the perceptions and representations of Nordic identity.

There are multiple reasons for excluding Iceland from my primary data. First of all, Iceland has released no report equivalent to the other Nordic countries. Iceland released its first ever National Security Policy in 2016.\textsuperscript{164} However, the policy document lacks depth and is only two pages long. It remains noteworthy that Iceland indeed has released this document after the annexation of Crimea. Iceland has never had a standing army and has hence not had a national security policy either. Iceland, a founding member of NATO, joined NATO on the premise that it would never be asked to establish one. The lack of standing army has in the past created different security concerns for Iceland, which represents the second reason. Finally, Iceland remains geographically distant from the increasingly securitised Baltic Sea Region, which also means it has less interest in the geopolitically tense relations there. Within security studies on the Nordic region scholars tend to focus on the four largest ones.\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{162} Bringéus, 2016: 25
\textsuperscript{165} An example is Rieker, Pernille (2006) \textit{Europeanization of national security identity: The EU and the changing security identities of the Nordic states} Routledge, New York: 2
4.1.1. Finland

The Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy was published in September 2016, by the Prime Minister’s Office. As previously mentioned, there is a tradition in Finland to publish similar reports every four years. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland is in charge of writing it. The purpose is to shape Finnish foreign and security policy until 2020. In media the report lost limelight because of Brexit, which happened only a week later. The report’s irrelevance, because of its timing – it does not include Brexit or the election of Trump, is covered in Finnish media. The report states that the main objective of the Finnish foreign and security policy is “to avoid becoming a party to a military conflict” and that “The goal of Finland’s foreign and security policy is to strengthen Finland’s international position, to secure independence and territorial integrity, to improve the security and wellbeing of Finns and to ensure that the society functions efficiently”. The balance between the traditional views on security; independence and territorial integrity, and more contemporary notions of security that includes society and the wellbeing of citizens, is clearly visible. Finland has one of the most traditional notions of security compared to its fellow Nordic countries. This is reflected in its discourses about Russia. The relations between Finland and Russia have, out of the Nordic countries, been the most complex.

Finnish relations to Russia must a large extent shape the Finnish foreign policy towards Russia. Finland remained a part of Sweden until 1809 when the territory of Finland was lost to Russia. Finland gained its independence from Russia in 1917. During the era when Finland was a Grand Duchy of Russia, Finland experienced rather severe oppression of Finnish separatism, which was called Russification. Finland’s security policy was based on the League of Nations and it was only when its failures became clear that the Finnish Parliament voted for a Scandinavian security

168 Finnish Government, 2016: 7
policy in 1935. Finland engaged during World War II in two wars with the Soviet Union, but succeeded in staying independent. The Cold War period was informative in shaping the relations towards Russia seen in the Government Report. Finland managed to stay outside the Warsaw Pact, however the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed between Finland and the Soviet Union. The Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine was applied to Finnish foreign policy throughout the length of the Cold War. Good relations with Russia were a precondition for Finnish survival, with the simultaneous advocacy of Finnish neutrality. During the Cold War, the Finns went to great lengths to maintain these relations, which can be seen through the Notecrisis in 1961 and Urho Kekkonen’s long presidency. However military preparedness was maintained at all times. Russia was the epitome of existential threat to Finland. When the Soviet Union dissolved, the YYA Agreement from 1948 was replaced with agreements on trade and cooperation in a number of fields.

In the Government Report, the importance of bilateral relations between Finland and Russia are underlined. Out of the four reports, the Finnish one is the sole to include a separate section on the “importance of relations with Russia”. It is also the only report to support direct contact between citizens and support for the civil society. Finland maintains some of the discourse from before Crimea in promoting cooperation and dialogue and the purpose of Finnish policy remains to maintain “stable and well-functioning relations”. There is a visible prudence in the Report’s approach to Russia, however the threat that Russia poses is not ignored.

The report refrains from painting an extensive enemy image of Russia, yet it is clear that Russia presents a threat to Finland. The report employs a more moderate, indirect form of existential othering. The report states early on that “The use of threat or military force against Finland cannot be excluded” due to the increasingly tense security environment, but Russia is not mentioned. However, in other parts of the report, Russia’s return to power politics is described as the source of new insecurity in Finland’s vicinity. This is one of many examples, where the

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170 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
172 Finnish Government, 2016: 22
173 Finnish Government, 2016: 22
174 Finnish Government, 2016: 11
Report avoids referring directly to Russia, and rather denotes “tense security situation”\textsuperscript{175} or “unpredictability in the security policy environment”\textsuperscript{176}. This kind of indirect othering echoes Finnish foreign policy from the Cold War.

The focus on national security in the Finnish report is the most distinctive of all four reports. This in itself is also a flashback to Cold War discourses. While the other reports see a Russian invasion of the Baltics as a threat with catastrophic consequences\textsuperscript{177}, the Finnish report places very little focus on the Baltic States’ security. The Report states that “The security and prosperity of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are important to Finland”\textsuperscript{178}. In doing so, the Report chooses to prioritise Finnish national security, and the othering remains indirect.

A significant difference is that the Finnish neutrality, which was a cornerstone of Finnish Cold War policy, is no more. The report portrays a Finland that is defined by its multilateral relations and its membership in international organisations. The Finnish identity is deeply embedded in the Western value community through its EU membership, which in turn allows for more radical othering of Russia. In stating that; “The EU’s common positions on Russia form the basis for Finland’s actions”\textsuperscript{179}, Finland can also create distance from Russia, without risking direct deterioration of bilateral relations. Russia is portrayed as a threat to the European security community: “Russia has mostly abandoned the cooperation-based security thinking. Rather, now it challenges the European security system”\textsuperscript{180}. Russia is depicted as having a different understanding of international relations, of challenging the established order and bringing uncertainty to the entire region, but also Europe. The securitisation is more direct, when the discourse is concerned with the European security and value community than with the Finnish national security. The Russian employment of hybrid warfare and methods is seen as a threat to the rules-based international order, because the hybrid methods cause instability. This is juxtaposed against the Western democracies, which represent stability.

\textsuperscript{175} Finnish Government, 2016:11
\textsuperscript{176} Finnish Government, 2016: 11
\textsuperscript{177} Bringéus, 2016: 43
\textsuperscript{178} Finnish Government, 2016: 12
\textsuperscript{179} Finnish Government, 2016: 22
\textsuperscript{180} Finnish Government, 2016:14
The relations between Finland and the USA, as well as Finland and NATO, are seen as important to Finnish foreign policy, and there is a call for deeper cooperation on both fronts. Russia is depicted as polar to both the US and NATO. NATO, when it comes to security is seen as central to the Western value and security community, even though Finland is not a member of NATO. While Russia is seen as the source of insecurity in the region (as mentioned above), “The presence and action of NATO brings security to the region”\textsuperscript{181}. Furthermore, NATO’s presence in Europe is seen as integral to the Finnish national defence\textsuperscript{182}. Finland has clearly departed from its Cold War neutrality policy, but also its policy of non-alignment can be questioned through these statements.

The most poignant discourses regarding the Russia in the Finnish Government Report can be distinguished through how the Report defines the Finnish identity and self. When the self is understood as Finnish national identity, the discourses of differentiation are significantly less radical than when the Finnish national identity is denoted through its EU membership and belonging to the Western value and security community. Russia is an existential threat to Finland in the sense that it is indirectly stated that a military threat from Russia cannot be excluded. However, the indirect differentiation allows for the simultaneous existence of bilateral relations based on dialogue.\textsuperscript{183}

### 4.1.2. Sweden

The Swedish Report “Security in a New Era” (Säkerhet i ny tid) was published in September 2016. Krister Bringéus was in charge of writing the report. Bringéus is a Swedish diplomat who has been posted in Moscow, Washington D.C., a number of European countries as well as OSCE. The report was covered in a number of daily newspapers and seen as controversial by some.\textsuperscript{184} The report is broad and covers a number of formats of Swedish international cooperation in the foreign and security policy spheres ranging from membership in international

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\textsuperscript{181} Finnish Government, 2016: 12 
\textsuperscript{182} Finnish Government, 2016: 24 
\textsuperscript{183} Finnish government, 2016: 22 
organisations to bilateral relations. The Swedish understanding of national security is significantly broader than the traditional territorial interpretations of national security. The three goals of Swedish security policy are to defend the people’s lives and wellbeing, to defend the functioning of society and to defend Swedish values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Hence, the joint priority of the Swedish foreign, security and defence policies, is “to secure the value which constitute the Swedish society, the belief in democracy and the equal value of all people”. Essentially elements that pose a threat to these said values also threaten Swedish security.

The Swedish neutrality and the military nonalignment is integrated deep into the Swedish identity to the extent that the authors of the Swedish Government, when they commissioned the report, specifically asked for the exclusion of Sweden’s military nonalignment policy from the Report. Sweden has not engaged in a war since 1814. The Swedish foreign policy’s cornerstone has been one of non-alignment during peacetime and neutrality during wartime. It was tested several times, for example during the dispute with Finland over the Åland Islands in 1921 and during World War II. Sweden did not engage with armed forces during WWII, but did give material support to Finland during the Winter War. Sweden did accept assistance through the Marshall Aid Plan, but did not join NATO. The relations between Russia and Sweden were formal. They became tense after an incident when a Russian submarine emerged in Swedish waters in the 1980’s, and the Swedish defence forces were mobilised. Sweden maintained large armed forces, as a guarantee for its neutrality policy. In the 1960’s Sweden still pursued an independent nuclear weapon programme. By 1960, the US provided a military security guarantee to Sweden. This was kept from the public until 1994. With the end of the Cold War, Sweden commenced a significant reduction of its armed forces. By joining the EU, Sweden also resigned from its policy of neutrality and adopted one of non-alignment. In doing so, the values and norms gained significant leverage in Swedish foreign policy.

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185 Bringéus, 2016: 32
186 Bringéus, 2016:33
The Swedish report clearly states, that an isolated attack on Sweden can be excluded. Russia remains the only country in Sweden’s near vicinity “who could within a certain time make use of military aggression against its neighbours,” However, even that is unlikely. Despite the lack of direct threat, Russia is in discourse differentiated radically and portrayed as a threat. The Report manages to portray Russia as a threat since it threatens the norms and values that constitute the base of the Swedish national identity.

The report acknowledges the impact of Russian aggression in Sweden’s near vicinity. First of all, it is acknowledged that if there were a conflict or some form of escalation, Sweden would be drawn into it an early stage. The fact that NATO would ask for permission to use Swedish territory at in an early stage is acknowledged in the report. The security of the Baltic States remains of vital importance since; “Sweden would not alone be able to organise the reception of the flows of refugees, which a military attack would lead to.” This reflects the Swedish broad and cross-sector understanding of security. In terms of the impact Russian action could have on the Swedish understanding of security, Russia already poses a significant threat. There is no reference to bilateral relations between Russia and Sweden, nor the promotion of a relations based on dialogue or cooperation.

The importance of values like democracy and rule of law for the Swedish understanding of security means that membership in international organisations that promote these values is crucial. Sweden places a significant amount of weight on the UN, because of its promotion of human rights and cooperation-based international relations. Indeed, membership in the UN is covered prior membership in the EU or the OSCE, in the report. The importance of various memberships becomes particularly visible when the authors of the report claim that, for the Baltic states, more than NATO membership being a security guarantee, it is “the inclusion in NATO – and the European integration – have an existential psychological value for the societies of the Baltic people...it is ultimately about the social cohesion and endurance, about the faith in

190 Bringéus, 2016: 13
191 Bringéus, 2016: 13
192 Bringéus, 2016: 13
193 Bringéus, 2016: 87
oneself\textsuperscript{194}. The defence minister of e.g. Latvia would hardly claim that NATO is about faith in oneself, but about Article V of NATO.

Russian actions in Crimea are seen as the greatest threat to the European security order, which was established after the Cold War\textsuperscript{195}. Russia is depicted through radical forms of differentiation, in many cases portrayed as the alter to the Swedish ego. References to Cold War identities are made in the Report, such as the Russian “return” to power politics and the Russian interest in building spheres of influence and buffer zones\textsuperscript{196}. The Baltic Sea is depicted as the new point of friction between the West and Russia, just like Eastern Europe was during the Cold War\textsuperscript{197}. The blame is completely on Russia, who has “chosen to develop an antagonistic relationship to the West”\textsuperscript{198}. Russia’s employment of hybrid warfare methods is seen as one of the largest and most significant threats to Western democracies. Western democracies are seen as synonymous with stability, while hybrid warfare methods specifically seek to destabilise the functioning of society, through non-linear methods, with no clear defining line between war and peace.\textsuperscript{199} It allows for radical differentiation of states employing such methods, of which Russia is the principal one.

The Russian non-adherence to the norms that the Report sets out creates hierarchical discourses, where the Western democracies are defined as superior to the Russian ones. The Russian political system is described as “fundamentally flawed”\textsuperscript{200}. Furthermore, “democracy and social market economy represent through their inherent attractiveness… a threat to the current Russian political system.”\textsuperscript{201} Constructing a Russia that is inferior through the non-respect for values, constructed by the West, create an uneven relationship.

In the Swedish Report, Russia is portrayed as the greatest threat to European security and the established cooperation-based world order. The focus on values and norms can also be justified by the awareness that Sweden is incapable of defending itself from foreign military aggression

\textsuperscript{194} Bringéus, 2016: 50
\textsuperscript{195} Bringéus, 2016: 37
\textsuperscript{196} Bringéus, 2016: 39
\textsuperscript{197} Bringéus, 2016: 42
\textsuperscript{198} Bringéus, 2016: 40
\textsuperscript{199} Bringéus, 2016: 48
\textsuperscript{200} Bringéus, 2016: 45
\textsuperscript{201} Bringéus, 2016: 40
and is reliant on other countries aid. Cold War discourses are employed to portray Russia as the radical other, contrasted against Europe, through different values, norms, perspectives and domestic policies. Sweden, has historically not had close ties with Russia, and has not had a need for such; hence such discourses are not employed. Ironically, maybe the Report calls for the promotion of a cooperation-based regime, however not for cooperation specifically with Russia.

4.1.3. Norway

Norway’s report “Ett felles løft” (A Unified Effort), published 28 April 2015, is the first time that an independent expert group has been appointed to analyse and produce a report on the Norwegian defence’s options and capabilities in solving its most demanding challenges. The expert group consisted of seven individuals from academia, the armed forces and foreign policy representatives. The expert group also had a secretariat of six people. The media and experts received the report in a positive manner. The report is concerned with security and defence and the Norwegian Armed Forces. National security is defined as “preserving the existence, sovereignty, sovereign rights and integrity…[it] may be challenged through armed attack, political and military pressure, and serious strikes against Norwegian interests by state and non-state actors”205. However, the notion of security is not limited to that; societal security, which includes the “preservation of the lives, health and safety of the population” as well as other functions such as infrastructure in the society, is also brought up. The link between the two is clearly illustrated in an image in the Report, which shows that when national security is threatened, societal security is challenged as well.

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202 Bringéus, 2016: 54
205 Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy (2015): Et felles løft- Ekspertgruppen for forsvaret av Norge. Ministry of Defence 05/2015, Department for security and service organisation, Oslo:
206 Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 8
207 Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 9
Norway’s relations with Russia have been shaped by its border, which was defined in 1826, and the conditions in the far North where oil plays a central role. Norway joined NATO as a founding member after World War Two and hence the border became one of two land borders between NATO and the USSR. The Soviet Union was portrayed in Norway as Norway’s principal enemy and the border always had a heavy Norwegian military presence. However, Norway implemented a self-imposed restraint on the amount of NATO activity in the Northern Finnmark region and a number of other restrictions, for the purpose of not being portrayed in Russian eyes as too aggressive. Simultaneously, very successful bilateral relations emerged through the mutual restraints imposed. One of the successes was the 1975 Agreement on Cooperation in the Fishing Industry. It included fishing quotas, coastal state jurisdiction and importantly, it allowed access of Russian vessels in Norwegian Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZ) and vice versa. During the Cold War this was known as the Norwegian dual policy towards the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union dissolved, an era of deeper cooperation ensued, mainly through common interests such as the Barents Sea, the Arctic and the environment.

For Norway, “the relations to Russia are the most important single factor in Norwegian defence planning.” The references to the border between Norway and Russia are numerous and Russia is portrayed as a very serious threat to Norwegian national security. The report depicts three possible scenarios where Norwegian national security; an escalation of a bilateral crisis (most probably in the North), collective defence in the Baltic countries and a terrorist attack. The two former ones include Russia as the main perpetrator. The language is one of securitisation; “probability of a military invasion seems small today, one cannot ignore such a risk in the long-term.”

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208 The second land border between NATO and the USSR was Turkey
212 Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 62
213 Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 62
However, on a national level the report also calls for a dual policy towards Russia, similar to that during the Cold War. The goal of the dual policy is to maintain functioning bilateral relations with Russia, in particular in policies relating to the Arctic. Shared interests constitute the basis for this form of cooperation. A reason for this approach is also what is called an “asymmetrical neighbourhood”\textsuperscript{214}, where Norway is recognised as a small country with a big neighbour. This is present and repeated multiple times in the report. This awareness of size provides Norway with incentives to draw on the transatlantic identity.

Proactive NATO membership is in a key position in the report, because NATO’s collective defence also signifies Norway’s ultimate security guarantee. Hence relations with the USA are also deemed vital, which is called an “alliance within an Alliance.”\textsuperscript{215} The awareness that the geopolitical situation combined with NATO membership poses a threat is also clear in the Report; “an attack on Norway would not be limited to a fight against Norway, but a fight over Norway”\textsuperscript{216}. NATO membership is completely integrated in the Norwegian national identity.

The report makes it clear that that Norway and NATO are inseparable. In this report, references to other international organisations are few and far between. NATO is the symbol for the Western security community. Norway’s non-membership in the EU also explains the focus placed on the Western security community and the lack of reference to a European security community. The focus on the Western identity leads to a strong differentiation between Russia and the West. “Norway is part of the Western security community” while “Russia stands on the outside of the Western security community.”\textsuperscript{217} Overall, emotive language is used; through the annexation of Crimea Russia has broken the “deep peace”\textsuperscript{218}, which reigned in Europe. The term “West” is used 92 times (89 in juxtaposition to Russia) in the Norwegian Report. In comparison, the word “West” is only used four times in the Finnish one. Russia is portrayed in stark opposition to the West, as something that the West is not. Russia is constructed as the constitutive other of the West, rather than a geographical area.

\textsuperscript{214} Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 15
\textsuperscript{215} Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 73
\textsuperscript{216} Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 65
\textsuperscript{217} Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 15
\textsuperscript{218} Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 13
The hybrid warfare methods used by Russia are also used to construct an enemy image, but also to create an image of inferiority. Western superiority is described through technological developments, however in adopting hybrid warfare methods; Russia, China and a number of other countries have “implemented measures which have compensated for Western conventional dominance.”

Within the sphere of hybrid trends, the West remains inferior and vulnerable, according to the Report. Hybrid warfare is tied strongly to the enemy image of Russia and its antagonistic views on the West. Hybrid tools are pitted against NATO. One of the main conclusions of the report is the need for a “unified effort” with multiple societal actors, to be capable to act simultaneously and seamlessly, in response to new threats such as the hybrid ones.

The Norwegian Report depicts an enemy image of Russia, both in the Arctic and in the Baltic Sea, as well as on a global level. The Russian dual policy however, simultaneously allows for cooperation in certain spheres of shared interest. The enemy image does not exclude cooperation in other areas. This allows for Russia to have multiple identities, depending on the region or level in question.

4.1.4. Denmark

The Danish report Dansk diplomati og forsvar i brydningstid (Danish diplomacy and defence in times of change) is an investigation of Danish foreign and security policy, published in May 2016 it has a broad approach to how Danish interests should be pursued up to 2030. The report was written by Peter Taksøe-Jensen, who was at the time the Danish Ambassador to India. He has previously been the Ambassador to the USA as well as the Assistant Secretary-General of Legal Affairs at the UN. The report was covered in the media quite neutrally.

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219 Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 32  
220 Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 32  
221 Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 59  
222 Klarskov, Kristian Det giver da ikke mening at begynde at lave ny strategi, hvor USA fylder så lidt” Politiken.dk http://politiken.dk/indland/politik/art5986880/%C2%BBDet-giver-da-ikke-mening-at-begynde-at-lave-ny-strategi-hvor-USA-fylder-s%C3%A5-lidt%C2%AB (accessed 2.3.2017)
Denmark’s foreign policy is to “understand, influence and adjust to international developments with the primary aim of maintaining and continuously shaping a safe, free and prosperous Denmark, based on a set of values to benefit its people” 223. In the report, foreign policy is understood as the ensemble of defence, security, development and trade policy. Denmark has in essence discarded traditional security, such as territorial integrity. Rather, Danish security encompasses all Danish interests, and Danish security policy consists of “contributions to international operations, through which Denmark can impact the international environment...and promote Danish interests.”224

Diplomatic relations between Russia and Denmark were established relatively late; in 1924, when Denmark recognised the Soviet Union. Denmark attempted to stay neutral in both World Wars, without avail. Through its occupation by Nazi Germany, Denmark had little choice but to join the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1941, however insisting on its neutrality towards Russia. As a country in the middle of Europe when Europe was divided in the middle, Denmark attempted to keep a relatively neutral stance. Like Norway, the other Nordic founding NATO member, Denmark attempted to restrict NATO, to keep the area low tension. This was also in the Soviet’s interest. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, more cooperation ensued, in particular in the Arctic and the Baltic Sea. Cooperation with the US became of utmost importance because of the fear that the USA would forget Denmark/Europe without the Soviet Union threat. As a consequence Denmark (and Norway) adopted pro-American policies. Being anti-American, for example during the Iraq War, could come at a high strategic cost. The Danish geopolitical significance decreased as Denmark found itself in the middle of Europe after EU and NATO enlargements.

Denmark has since the collapse of the Soviet Union, renounced itself of traditional security concerns and the armed forces were decreased significantly. Through the expansion of the European Union and NATO, Denmark has ceased to be a “be a frontline state” in relation to the

223 Peter Taksøe-Jensen on behalf of the Danish government (2016): Dansk diplomati og forsvar i en brydningstid: vejen frem for Danmarks interesser og værdier mod 2030 Review of Denmark’s foreign and security policy, Copenhagen: Exec summary, p 4
224 Taksøe-Jensen, 2016: 75
East. In the Report, there are no references to changes in Denmark’s near vicinity, rather the changes are seen as European or global. Correspondingly, the report judges that “an increased military threat to Danish territory is still not likely.” Denmark is the only Nordic country, which has not increased its military expenditure to due to the situation in the Baltic Sea. Furthermore, the report evaluates that the choice to eliminate full conscription remains justified (unlike the Swedish Report). Denmark sees the threat that Russia poses as level to that of uncontrolled migration and climate change.

The European Union is important because of the value community it is. Seeing as Denmark has opted out of the EU Common Security and Defence Cooperation, Denmark also has no say in its developments, and hence places even greater worth on the EU as an advocate of norms and values. Denmark still gives its support; “Denmark should, in relation to Russia, support EU’s joint, robust and principled policy outward and its policy of unity and endurance inwards.” When it comes to national defence, Denmark lays all its faith in NATO, and Denmark’s goal becomes ensuring the credibility of NATO’s deterrence capacity.

Western democratic values are strongly linked with stability in the Report. “Denmark is a country that thrives in a regular and predictable international order.” This is due to the characteristics that Denmark as a country possesses: democratic, open and abiding to the rule of law. Predictability in turn is provided by NATO’s deterrence credibility. These form the premises for Danish security policy: stability through democracy and Western values and predictability through NATO deterrence. In the report, Russia presents a threat to the democratic values and, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, there are discussions about NATO’s collective defence. Hybrid methods in particular are seen as a source of instability and a threat to predictability, since they are inherently made to destabilise the target society from a variety of directions simultaneously.

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225 Taksøe-Jensen 2016: 71
226 Taksøe-Jensen, 2016: 74
227 Taksøe-Jensen, 2016: VII
228 Taksøe-Jensen, 2016: V
229 Taksøe-Jensen, 2016: 74
230 Taksøe-Jensen, 2016: 2
Denmark has a very global approach to security. Rather than adopting Cold War dichotomies, the Report advocates for a multipolar world: “Despite the Russian regime challenging Western values, it does not represent a global ideological confrontation”\textsuperscript{231}. Rather than pitting Russia against NATO or the West, the Report argues that in a multipolar world Russian inferiority is demonstrated: “The global balance of power is today more expanded… globally, Russia is far from matching USA’s the EU’s military and economic power”\textsuperscript{232}. This is a more moderate approach to Russia, than direct securitisation. However, it does provide Russia with an inferior identity.

The Report does not do much to promote good bilateral relations between Denmark and Russia. The argument used many times is that the general international trust in Russia has been reduced significantly, which hinders cooperation\textsuperscript{233}, particularly in the Arctic. Seeing as trust is defined as key component to Danish society and values, this is more notable othering.

The discourse allows for securitisation and more radical forms of othering, through values and NATO membership, which are fundamental to Danish identity. The Russian use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine allows for the construction of a enemy image of Russia; juxtaposed with Western, open democracies. However, NATO-Russia dichotomies are avoided, and rather discourses of multipolar worlds are evoked. The multipolar world order constructs hierarchical identities, which are further maintained by emphasis on values, which Russia does not meet.

4.2. Results

Based on the application of the poststructuralist discourse analysis and the identification of different discourses in the primary data, it is clear that there are very differing views on Russia on the national level. The following figure summarises these differences.

\textbf{Figure 3:} Results of the primary data

\textsuperscript{231} Taksøe-Jensen, 2016: 71
\textsuperscript{232} Taksøe-Jensen, 2016: 72
\textsuperscript{233} Taksøe-Jensen, 2016: 71
This figure is based on qualitative methods. Drawing on the figure above, the following conclusions can be made regarding perceptions of national security and othering of Russia:

1) All Nordic countries engage in active othering and differentiation of Russia, however to different extents.
2) Neither EU nor NATO membership have a decisive effect on the respective national discourses and level of othering of Russia.
3) A border with Russia coincides with a more traditional understanding of security (Finland and Norway).
4) A more traditional understanding of security (focus on territorial integrity) converges with the promotion of cooperation with Russia.
5) Differentiation and securitisation are not the same thing. Finland and Norway engage in securitisation but significantly less differentiation.

6) The broader the definition of security and understanding of self (including values and norms, usually through international organisations) the broader the enemy image of Russia is constructed.

7) Values can be overlooked for cooperation when the security only encompasses national territorial security.

4.3. **Discourses in Data**

Based on the poststructuralist discourse analysis of the primary data, six discourses about Russia can be distinguished. The three first ones engage in more radical differentiation and securitisation of Russia, while two are less radical. The final discourse is the least radical, where cooperation is promoted in certain areas.

Russia is securitised through statements that Russia is a direct threat; the language is easily distinguished, through language that depicts an enemy. This strongest form of securitisation occurs on the national level (in the Norwegian and Finnish reports) and on a regional or global scale in the Swedish and Danish reports. It is slightly less radical when the securitisation is done indirectly through referring to new threats in the security environment. This is most common in the Finnish report. Another manner, in which Russia is radically othered, is in the return of Cold War discourses. When discourses are about bipolarity, balance of power and spheres of influence, it portrays a very radical othering of Russia, simply because the Cold War represented in many ways the ultimate othering of Russia/Soviet Union.

Norms and values are a manner in which to differentiate in a less radical manner. Certain norms and values are depicted as “universal”, and central to the Western value community. To be part of the community, a country has to adhere to the norms. It creates a hierarchical relation, which is often constructed through choice of diction, for example the use of the word “promote”. Promote suggests that one country is always in the receiving end which creates a hierarchical
relationship, for example through the promotion of democracy or cooperation.\textsuperscript{234} In general, the domestic developments in Russia are described in a negative and reprehensive tone.\textsuperscript{235}

Hybrid warfare and methods is a common theme in all reports. It is used to portray difference to Russia in all reports. Hybrid warfare is considered in opposition to democratic open states, and is portrayed as a threat to the Western states. Discourses on hybrid methods work to differentiate Russia and construct the idea that Western states are stable while hybrid warfare is tied to instability.

The final discourse recognised is one that entails the least amount of differentiation. Rather than stressing the differences similarities are underlined to facilitate cooperation in certain areas, such as the Arctic, economic cooperation or other shared interests.\textsuperscript{236} Finland and Norway promote the most bilateral cooperation with Russia. Another way of diminishing the differences is portraying Russia as a rational actor. In the traditional (dominant) understanding of IR, states are described as rational. This is done through explaining why Russia might be acting in a certain manner; such explanation to why NATO’s advancements are seen as a threat by Russia (lack of consideration for Russian interests),\textsuperscript{237} rather than simply portraying Russian actions as antagonistic. The absence of rational actor characteristics allows for more radical othering.

5. **Discussion: Nordic Identity**

The previous chapter has provided an overview of each state’s respective take on Russia and the main discourses identified in the primary data. The discussion will build on these discourses and focus on the role of values, incentives for Nordic cooperation as well as the role of international

\textsuperscript{234} Finnish Government, 2016: 22
\textsuperscript{235} Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 73
\textsuperscript{236} Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 69
\textsuperscript{237} Finnish Government, 2016: 13-14
organisations such as NATO. For this purpose, repeating the research question may be useful:

**How does the othering of Russia in Nordic security discourses contribute to the social construction of Nordic identity after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014?**

### 5.1. Norden in the Primary Data

Nordic cooperation and references to Nordic values are present in all four reports. The manner in which Norden is present in each report reflects their understanding of security overall. For Denmark, Norden is first and foremost a value community, which is seen as the vantage point for the Danish identity, along with the European identity and the Danish bilateral relations to the USA. As a NATO country, Nordic defence cooperation remains low on the list of priorities. Sweden highlights the value community, the complementary character of Nordic defence cooperation and the importance of cooperation with Finland. Norway has little focus on Nordic cooperation, because of its focus on defence and sees the Finnish and Swedish decision to stay outside of NATO as an obstacle to further cooperation. The Finnish report underlines the value community and its importance to Finnish security. The structure of the discussion will be as following: first of all a section on values, secondly on defence cooperation and Russia’s influence on it, a critique of the Nordic defence cooperation and a section on where the Nordic identity places itself globally.

### 5.2. Norden as a Value Community

In the primary data, Nordic cooperation and the Nordic countries is first and foremost understood as a value community. However, the manner in which it is expressed in the primary data varies greatly; the Swedish and Danish reports are more “Norden-friendly”, in particular when it comes to highlighting the value community that Norden represents. For Denmark, Norden is seen as natural: “Denmark shares a natural interest and value community in particular with the other

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238 Taksøe-Jensen, 2016: Introduction IX
Nordic countries”\textsuperscript{239}. The Swedish report is also rather vocal in the role of Norden as a value community, where there is an “inherited Nordic feeling of belonging and of a value community”\textsuperscript{240}. Meanwhile, the Norwegian and Finnish reports focus less on the Norden as a value community. This can be explained by their more national discourses – as opposed to international. While the Finnish report expresses the importance of Nordic cooperation, it claims that “Finland and Sweden, sharing a value basis and the same security environment”\textsuperscript{241}. Due to the Norwegian report, being a report on defence policy, there are significantly fewer references to value communities overall.

The Nordic values and their value communities also allow, through processes of linking, becoming closer to NATO and the EU. The Nordic countries security guarantees have previously been seen as the principal obstacle to deeper Nordic defence and security cooperation. However, now the different security choices play a smaller role and values are underlined. Norway depicts the relationship between NATO and Sweden and Finland as a “semi alliance”\textsuperscript{242} in the sense that it is a functional defence community; however the guarantee of Article 5 is missing. Indeed, for Denmark and Norway, the Finnish and Swedish adhesion to NATO would bring increased security to the region\textsuperscript{243}. One of the most poignant processes of linking is the ease at which a Finnish and Swedish adhesion would supposedly take place\textsuperscript{244}, indeed no strong obstacle to Finnish and Swedish membership exists. Even Finland and Sweden, the non-members, make use of discourses where NATO is strongly contrasted against Russia, as it is seen as a source of stability to the region\textsuperscript{245}. The fact that two of the Nordic countries are not NATO members was previously seen as an ultimate obstacle and difference between the Nordic countries. This is now disregarded and it allows for values to be the vessel that pushes Nordic cooperation into the security sphere. Despite values being the basis for this process of linking, it serves purpose within the security dimension as well.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{239} Taksøe-Jensen, 2016: 32
  \item\textsuperscript{240} Swedish government, 2016: 61
  \item\textsuperscript{241} Finnish government, 2016: 12
  \item\textsuperscript{242} Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 43
  \item\textsuperscript{243} Taksøe-Jensen, 2016: 29
  \item\textsuperscript{244} Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 44
  \item\textsuperscript{245} Finnish government, 2016: 12
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
As opposed to the Cold War identities of neutrality, low-tension and peaceful, there are clear statements of “which side” the Nordic countries take. In the Norwegian and Danish reports, there is very clear support for Finnish and Swedish NATO membership. This is remarkable as a shift away from all that is Nordic Balance and “keeping respective superpowers out”. NATO constantly portrayed as the radical other to Russia, and in taking the Western side, there is a clear bandwagoning with NATO by the Nordic countries as an entity. Simultaneously, in doing so the Nordic countries contribute to the polarisation, between the USA and Russia as well as increasing the importance of the Baltic Sea Region.

5.3. From Global to Regional: the Baltic Sea’s Growing Importance

During the Cold War, the Nordic countries were defenders of sovereignty, speaking up for countries far beyond the Nordic sphere of interest. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Nordic countries horizons broadened. At the same time, military conscription in Denmark and Sweden was completely abolished and military and defence spending decreased significantly. The Nordic countries were active players in the era of humanitarian interventions. Along with discourses of Europeanisation, the outlook for the Nordic countries was increasingly global at that time, which also reflected the Nordic cooperation. The Nordic countries acted together in international peacekeeping missions. An example of this is the Nordic Battle Group, an EU battle group. With increasingly antagonistic Russian actions, culminating in Crimea in 2014, the focus of the Nordic countries changed, from a global one to a regional one. Europe ceased to be the main factor in the countries’ foreign policy and Russia took centre stage.

The Baltic Sea Region emerged in discourse as increasingly securitised. The increasing Russian military presence in Kaliningrad and along the borders to the Baltic States, Russian aircraft in Finnish and Norwegian airspace and Russian submarines in Swedish waters have all contributed to the securitisation of the region. In the primary data, it is in particular in discourses about Russia that the Baltic Sea Region is described as a region of instability and increasingly tense relations. This signifies a clear shift from the identity of the region, only 10 years prior to the illegal annexation of Crimea. The Baltic Sea Region, along with the Arctic, was considered
regions for deeper cooperation, which involved Russia.246 Discourses of shared heritage or a revival of the Hanseatic Sea Basin have since been discarded. Indeed, the Nordic countries have been thrown into the spotlight after over a century of being seen as the “quiet corner of Europe.”247 This fundamental shift in identity of the Baltic Sea Region, due to Russian action, represents a change in the Nordic cooperation as well. Nordic cooperation has lost, to a great extent its global dimension. The Swedish Report states it clearly: “The challenges of the Baltic Sea Region have come to replace the peacekeeping mission as the common [Nordic] purpose.”248 Nordic cooperation, in particular within defence and security has shifted its focus from the global to the regional, which in turn allows for development of Nordic cooperation in areas where it has previously not taken place, such as security and defence.

5.4. Nordic Cooperation as a Stabilising Factor in the Baltic Sea Region

Nordic cooperation has adopted a stabilising identity in an increasingly unstable Baltic Sea Region. Russia is without exception described as the destabilising force in the region. Nordic cooperation is depicted in discourse as a counterweight to the Russian instability in the region. In the Swedish report, Nordic cooperation is seen as a source of regional security249, while the Finnish report states that “Nordic cooperation as... central importance to Finland and its security.”250 Furthermore, the Danish report seen the Nordic defence cooperation in the light the “heightened tensions in the security policy environment around the Baltic Sea Region”,251 while Norway sees the cooperation as important for joint action in emergency preparedness in crises of the highest level.”252 Russia as a source of instability provides the Nordic foreign policy dialogues the opportunity to depict themselves as the source of stability. The juxtaposition allows the Nordic countries to be portrayed as stable in contrast to Russia, and as a stabilising force in contrast to the unstable region.

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246 An example is the Northern Dimension.
247 Archer, 2003: 10
248 Bringéus, 2016: 14
249 Bringéus, , 2016: 66
250 Finnish Government, 2016: 12
251 Taksøe-Jensen, 2016: 75
252 Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 43
5.5. **Russia Replaces Economic Benefits as Key Incentive**

One of the principal reasons the Stoltenberg report was commissioned in 2008 were the economic benefits that would arise from Nordic cooperation. After the economic crisis in 2008 and the falling defence budgets, the Nordic ministers of defence and defence chiefs saw a significant incentive in Nordic cooperation. Their call for cooperation to ensure cost effectiveness in defence budgets is mentioned already in the introduction of the Stoltenberg Report.²⁵³ Discourses about Nordic cooperation in security and defence were for a long time defined by these potential benefits. In the Finnish Government Report on Security and Defence from 2012, the conclusion regarding Nordic cooperation is that the cooperation “improves cost-effectiveness and interoperability.”²⁵⁴ Likewise, in a Swedish government’s communication on Nordic cooperation from 2013, states that a closer cooperation between the Nordic defence forces is “deemed to lead to a more efficient use of resources.”²⁵⁵ Nordic defence cooperation had a multi-partisan support. In times of tight state budgets, it is easy to support cooperation that is economically beneficial.

In the primary data of this Thesis, the economic benefits of Nordic cooperation are mostly absent. Only exception is the Norwegian report, where there is a section committed to budgets and arms procurement. The need for Nordic cooperation is very strongly tied to promotion of regional stability. The Russian annexation of Crimea has led to a fundamental shift in the incentive and motivation behind Nordic defence cooperation in the Nordic security discourses. Russia is one of the principal factors in the countries’ respective foreign and security policies. This suggests a shift, and for perhaps the first time ever, the Nordic countries are coordinating in a certain area because a common perceived threat.

During the Cold War, the Nordic identity was allowed to develop in juxtaposition to the Soviet

²⁵³ Stoltenberg, 2009: 6
²⁵⁴ Finnish Government, 2012: 72
Union and gain the identity as forward and progressive compared to the Soviet backwardness. However, Nordic identity never took form through the securitisation of Russia during the Cold War. The extent, to which the securitisation of Russia has taken place all over the world, is unprecedented since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is not at all only the Nordic countries that engage in securitisation – all Western countries do. In particular, Russia’s use of hybrid methods can be seen as a recurring theme in the securitisation discourses.

5.6. Hybrid Threats Create Nordic Forerunners

The Nordic countries have no doubt always enjoyed the status of being forerunners, stemming from the Cold War and the Nordic Model. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Nordic countries experienced a decreasing significance and loss of geostrategic importance. Stoltenberg would have liked to see a significantly more ambitious Nordic Declaration of Solidarity than it de facto ended up being. The main obstacle for a more profound declaration, were the familiar obstacles of differing security guarantees. This meant that traditional “hard” security was excluded. Instead, “new” challenges and threats were included, such as terrorism, climate change, cyber challenges and other non-manmade threats. NORDEFCO focuses on threats such as cyber threats because it is an area outside national structures and hence easier to build joint cooperation on. This allowed the Nordic countries to regain their status and discourse as both forerunners, an identity that had been lost in the midst of the Europeanisation discourses. With the rise of unconventional threats Norden saw some return to relevancy through the declaration.

In the primary data, hybrid threats from Russia are a common theme. The enemy image is conveyed through its adoption of unconventional methods. This is turns raises the significance of the ability to fight unconventional methods and hence the importance of the Nordic Declaration of Solidarity. In essence, the declaration could have become insignificant, but because global development, and Russia pursuing its superpower ambitions, the declaration gained worth. Russian is increasingly seen as the possessor and user of unconventional warfare. Nordic cooperation, seeing as it still remains outside the sphere of hard security, becomes better

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256 Archer, Joenniemi, 2015: 174
prepared for precisely the unconventional kind of threats. The rise of the use of hybrid methods, terrorism and other irregular warfare allows for the Nordic countries to adopt a position as forerunners again, after years of decline. It seems that Nordic cooperation thrives when the Nordic countries are described as forerunners. It allows for international relevance and expertise that can be shared and importantly incentive to keep developing it.

NATO’s Article 5 only refers to traditional security threats. Some scholars even claim that Russia’s development of hybrid warfare is specifically meant to challenge NATO’s Article 5, because it uses a combination of conventional and unconventional methods\(^{257}\). The structure of NORDEFCO is built to better meet unconventional threats. The opt-out, informal and pragmatic character of the defence cooperation allows it to meet these threats, unlike the rather rigid structure of the Alliance’s Article 5. Specifically for this reason, it is considered beneficial for NATO to turn to NORDEFCO as a partner, because of NORDEFCO’s expertise in the area and its promotion of regional stability\(^{258}\). The common understanding is that NATO obligations trump the Nordic declaration of Solidarity on all fronts\(^{259}\).

5.7. Where is the Nordic Defence and Security Cooperation Situated?

It is clear that Nordic cooperation and in particular Nordic defence cooperation does not exist in isolation. As mentioned previously, the Nordic countries are not the only ones that engage in some form of securitisation of Russia. As can be seen in the primary data, the securitisation of Russia often takes place within the juxtaposition between Russia and NATO, EU or universal values. Russia is portrayed as the other to them. Nordic defence and security cooperation exists within a wider framework of securitisation of Russia in a global world order. This brings forth the question of where exactly the Nordic cooperation is placed within this order.

In the early years of NORDEFCO, there was some opposition from both American and Russian


\(^{258}\) Dahl (2014): 12

\(^{259}\) Strang, 2016: 12
sides to it. The USA saw NORDEFCO as an attempt to break up NATO through its potential challenge to Article 5. Meanwhile, Russia saw it as an extension of NATO. Still today, some see NORDEFCO as a preparation of the Finnish and Swedish NATO membership. Both the Russian and American positions warmed to NORDEFCO as NATO saw it as a source or regional stability, and Russia saw it as a way to keep Finland and Sweden out of NATO. However, Nordic cooperation is never understood outside the larger framework of NATO. In the primary data, NATO is far from a competitor to NORDEFCO, which can be seen through the values discussed earlier. Nordic security and defence cooperation gains a complementary character.

NORDEFCO as well as Nordic cooperation complements various other international engagements differently in each Nordic country. The different security policy choices of each country also mean that NORDEFCO has a different function in respective national discourses. In Finland and Sweden, Nordic cooperation is often used to come closer to NATO without full membership. NORDEFCO is popular both among those who support and oppose NATO – it is either portrayed as a tool to get closer to NATO (supporters) or a way to stay outside of NATO (opposition). For Norway, it is a manner in which to balance non-EU membership. Denmark has been the most inactive NORDEFCO member, yet has participated on an ad hoc basis. Saxi calls NORDEFCO a balance between efficiency and sovereignty, between NATO and non-alignment. In this sense, NORDEFCO also contributes to each respective country’s national identity. The complementary character of Nordic defence and security cooperation is enhanced by the ad hoc and flexible nature of the cooperation in question.

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260 Dahl, 2014: 3
262 Saxi, Håkan Lunde (2011): Nordic defence cooperation after the Cold War. Norwegian Insitute for Defence Studies, Oslo: 29
5.8. A Critique of Nordic Security and Defence Cooperation

There has recently been more talk about Nordic cooperation, a Nordic renaissance. The defence cooperation within NORDEFCO and outside it has been praised by many as the within the defence industry, as well as academics of international security policy. However, despite all the good publicity and positive press, it has been more talk and less progress. The references to the mosaic of memberships in international organisations and the challenges they pose are well known. Five countries, three EU members, one of which with the euro currency, and one has opted out of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. There are three NATO members. Three autonomous areas to two EU member states, yet only one of the three is an EU member (Åland). One autonomous area has not even engaged in the sanctions imposed on Russia (Faroe Islands). Based on this starting point, Nordic cooperation seems challenging. The differing traditional security guarantees apart, some other points of criticism will be discussed below.

5.8.1. US dependence

What is often not addressed, even in Nordic forums, is each respective Nordic state’s dependence on USA. The US remains essential for their critical defence. This is addressed strongly in the primary data; relations with the USA are seen as crucial to each nation’s defence. There has been some joint action through the US-Nordic Security Dialogue, established in 2013 with President Obama and the Nordic heads of state, yet there seems to be a lack of initiatives to engage on the Nordic level with the USA. It is understood that the US administration (Obama administration) viewed the Nordic heads of state as a team in place of representatives of separate states. However, in terms of security and defence, Norden is still far from being a team.

5.8.2. Lack of political will

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265 Čižik, 2017: 191
During the Cold War, the Nordic countries took each other’s security into consideration, in their foreign policies. It is not because of a deeper sense of Nordic identity, rather conditions of necessity. In establishing and maintaining the Nordic Peace, the Nordic countries considered their neighbours’ security simply because it was a matter of national security. A fundamental obstacle to Nordic defence and security cooperation is the lack of legitimate political will that translates into actions.

Nordic politicians have expressed their interest in Nordic cooperation and in deepening defence cooperation. The Nordic defence ministers issued a statement in 2015, calling Russia the largest threat to European security and called for deeper cooperation to face the challenges caused by the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and the Russian aggression in Ukraine. Indeed, there seems to be solidarity – on paper. Finland is going to buy new military aircraft by 2021, choosing between French, American and Swedish aircraft. However, the arguments for choosing a Swedish one have been few, despite the fact that if Finland and Sweden shared an air force, it would significantly improve cooperation. The complex character of modern war and indeed hybrid and asymmetrical warfare means that the most significant advances in defence cooperation is the joint procurement of weapons, same systems and information sharing. The Nordic countries have expressed their will to share information and cyber yet there is little cooperation with e.g. Estonia, a country that excels in cyber issues.

5.8.3. Different understandings of security

NORDEFCO was established, when national territorial defence was deemed irrelevant. The only possible exception is Finland, which has maintained a more traditional view of security, despite the end of the Cold War. The discourses about security, Russia and the world have shifted significantly, since the establishment of NORDEFCO. This means that the Nordic

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268 Forss, Holopainen, 2015: 29
countries and their defence cooperation have to shift as well, to not become irrelevant. With the return of geopolitics and regional security, will the Nordic states rise to face the challenge? Nordic cooperation during the Cold War worked on the basis of the lowest common denominator and indeed did not include cooperation in defence.

This links in with the modern age understanding of what security means, which links in to understanding of dependence and military autonomy. Finland has a very different view on the necessity for military autonomy, which is based on its long history and border with Russia and the USSR. This has also defined the Finnish armed forces today. The Finnish understanding of security differs from the say Danish understanding of security, as can be seen in the reading of the primary data. This means Finland would be reluctant to enter any form of Nordic military agreement, since the Finns want guarantees that can contribute to territorial integrity, with the Danes cannot provide (due to their broad understanding of security). Hence, the national understanding of security plays a defining role in making the limits of Nordic defence and security cooperation. In the primary data and overall, the Nordic countries have failed to take a common stance on Russia. Rather, Sweden and Denmark refer to values, Norway to NATO and Finland bases its take on Russia through the EU.

Does this boil down to the real problem of Nordic cooperation? That there is perhaps a lack of Nordic identity per se and that Nordic identity is simply an umbrella term for all that is Nordic cooperation; however, it does not translate to an encompassing Nordic identity – at least not within security policy. It is commonly said that there is one Nordic model with five exceptions. Is it an illusion that Norway or Denmark or even Sweden would come to the aid of Finland? Sweden failed to do so for Denmark in 1864 and for Finland during World War II. Even their military capacity to do so may be questioned. For the Nordic countries, the national security remains first priority. Without calling the Nordic security and defence cooperation void, there is also an opportunity to acknowledge that it may be in a formative phase.

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5.9. **Nordic Cooperation in a Formative Phase**

In the primary data, despite Nordic cooperation taking a secondary place of importance, it deemed to be an area of further cooperation. The obstacles for deeper integration of security and defence policies are in no way seen as insurmountable. In all primary data, this formative phase is emphasised. Nordic defence cooperation is seen to be on the road to “further strengths”\(^{270}\) (Denmark), while Finland takes on the responsibility of “further intensification of Nordic cooperation”\(^{271}\) during their NORDEFCO presidency. Indeed, the Nordic “defence cooperation is in a “formative phase”\(^{272}\) (Norway). Out of all the primary data, Sweden places the most weight on Nordic cooperation, and sees itself as the informal leader within the *Norden*\(^{273}\). Nordefco and Nordic security cooperation can be developed and there is potential, however only as complementary to bilateral and multilateral forums\(^{274}\).

It is over 20 years since Finland and Sweden abandoned their policy of neutrality. The fact that the Nordic countries have different security guarantees is a well-known fact. Despite this, NORDEFCO was established. Despite the security guarantees, there has been unprecedented advancement in a sphere of cooperation previously absent. NORDEFCO has advanced because of its flexible character, in times otherwise defined by rigidity – the Nordic Council, Article 5 of NATO or the EU bureaucracy. There is development, which cannot be denied. Russia was not a crucial factor in the start of Nordic security and defence cooperation. The initiatives for NORDEFCO were made before the Russo-Georgian War. However, after the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and its aggressions in Eastern Ukraine, there was a shift in the Nordic identity and Russian role in shaping it. Drawing on the conclusions made from the primary data and this discussion, the Nordic identity can be portrayed in juxtaposition to Russia like this:

![Figure 4: Russia and the Nordic identity construction](image-url)

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\(^{270}\) Peter Taksøe-Jensen on behalf of the Danish government, 2016: 75  
\(^{271}\) Finnish Government, 2016: 21  
\(^{272}\) Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 68  
\(^{273}\) Bringéus, 2016: 65  
\(^{274}\) *Ibid.* 67
Russia was previously not a factor in the security dimension of the Nordic identity construction. Now, through discourses of othering, Russia has become the main factor in this construction, based on the poststructuralist reading of the primary data. Rather, than economic benefits being the incentive and global security through the participation in different peacekeeping missions being the purpose, Russia is now the main motivator and reason for Nordic cooperation and
regional stability is the objective of it. This is the ultimate answer that this Thesis can provide to the research question.

6. Conclusion

The Nordic identity has shifted through the increasingly hostile Russian behaviour. It has allowed for the already existing security cooperation through NORDEFCO and elsewhere to take
on a more defined security dimension, where Russia plays a central role. Russia now plays a contributing role in the motivation for further cooperation and how Nordic cooperation is justified in security discourses. The economic benefits are no longer referred to when justifying Nordic cooperation. The different respective understandings of security are the primary obstacle for deeper cooperation.

6.1. Nordic-Russian relations in the long run

The primary data of this Thesis place themselves at the end of a long line of different Nordic discourses pertaining to Russia. Russia has always been of central importance to the Nordic countries – as a neighbour, friend or enemy. The Nordic discourses pertaining to Russia have previously not left any space for the construction of a Nordic identity with security cooperation through processes of linking. Rather, the traditional security guarantees were referred to. This Thesis shows how there has indeed been a paradigm shift in the Nordic identity – for the first time in modern history there is a security dimension to it. In doing so, the Nordic countries have abandoned the identity construction through asecuritisation and new ontology-seeking methods are employed. This represents ultimate change in Nordic identity brought about through the Russian actions, culminating in the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Despite the different security guarantees, Nordic security and defence cooperation have been permitted to make small advancements. This rejects the idea that the national security priorities and choices are the main obstacle for Nordic security cooperation. Rather, based on the analysis and outcomes of this Thesis, it is the understanding of the notion “security” itself that provides the most fundamental obstacle. To truly deepen Nordic cooperation a more stream-lined understanding of security would be needed. It is the understanding of security, coupled with the historical views on Russia that represent the most striking differences between the Nordic countries.

The primary data is situated in time of global uncertainty. As was seen with the Finnish report, it was quickly criticised for its timing because it was published a week prior to the Brexit referendum and was hence not included in the report. Other important developments not included
in the reports are the election of President Trump and the development of the EU. It seems the Franco-German alliance has been rekindled with the election of President Emmanuel Macron, however not all EU member states seem to be on the same page with France and Germany regarding the development of the EU. There has been an increase in terrorism, also in the Nordic countries. The reports prove how the Nordic identity with its security dimension is in a potential phase, which proves the relevance of the Reports, despite not including more recent development. Russian actions, global developments and how these are portrayed in Nordic discourse will be decisive for the development of the Nordic identity.

6.2. Other others

Nordic identity is of course not only constructed through the othering of Russia or in juxtaposition to Russia. Rather, as the poststructuralist discourse theory emphasises, identity is constructed through multiple others and different degrees of differentiation. The Nordic identity is complex – like all identities. In primary data, there are certain notable others, other than Russia, that emerge. The most common, shared in all reports, is the migration and refugee crisis in Europe. In the Danish report, flows of immigrants are described as equally threatening to Danish security as Russia is. It has the potential to perturb the stability that Danish report advocates for clearly. Migrants, the polarisation of societies are all seen as threatening. It is also used as an identity construction device as it leads to strong discourses of differentiation between the country in question and the migrants, which are portrayed as a threat to national security. Within Nordic identity construction, not all others are concerned with security. The Nordic identity is constructed through a variety of non-selves.

6.2.1. The Arctic as a new low-tension area

The Nordic identity of a region of low-tension in opposition to Europe was lost at the collapse of the Cold War. However there seems to have emerged a new area of low-tension that is of great importance to the Nordic countries: the Arctic. Despite global tensions, cooperation has pursued on certain themes within the Arctic Council. Despite most of the countries in the Arctic Council
have taken part in the sanctions on Russia after the illegal annexation of Crimea, security has remained off the Arctic agenda. The Arctic is gaining importance with the melting icecap and it may be of geostrategic importance in the future and the Nordic countries may utilise the events and actions there to construct the Nordic identity.

6.3. Final Remarks

There are multiple factors to take into consideration when studying identity. The self, the other the manner in which they are constructed. This Thesis has focused specifically on how the portrayal of Russia in Nordic discourse contributes towards the construction of the Nordic identity with a security dimension. To gain further depth into the Nordic identity and Russia, a similar research could be undertaken, however looking at the Nordic Council’s and Nordic Council of Minister’s statements after 2014. The role of the Baltic States for the Nordic countries in relation to Russia would also provide a deeper understanding of Nordic identity. The Baltic countries play a crucial role in the developments of the Baltic Sea Region.

Responding to Archer’s quote from 2009, with which the Thesis commenced: “…Or is there a new area - security and defence - to plant the Nordic flags where they have rarely been seen before?”, one can conclude that the flags have been planted. Global developments, Russian actions and the Baltic Sea Region are three important factors, among many that are used to construct a Nordic identity. After 2014, the Nordic countries have constructed this identity through the othering of Russia. The security dimension of the Nordic cooperation seems to be here to stay.

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