Towards an Embodied History:
Metaphorical Models in Textbook Knowledge of the Controversial Polish-Lithuanian Past

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ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

To be publicly discussed, by due permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Helsinki, at the University Main Building Lecture Hall 5, on Friday, 18 May 2018 at 12 o’clock noon.

Finland 2018
Abstract

A complex shared Polish-Lithuanian past, subject to diverse interpretations, continues to raise historical as well as political controversy. The tensions manifest in the divergent narratives, maintained by the two nations, of their shared past, in school-history education. An incapacity to engage effectively with contradictory narratives obstructs the potential for mutual understanding and contributes to the ongoing state of latent resentment. Teaching about the controversial past begins from ontological and epistemological assumptions about what the past is and how it can be known – especially when there is more than one account of what happened. This research undertakes to examine the conceptual roots of the manner in which the past, that is shared, but remembered differently, has been taught in school-history education in Poland and Lithuania. This task is implemented by analyzing the metaphorical models that shape textbook presentation of the past.

The conceptual metaphor theory of cognitive linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson provides the framework within which to examine metaphors that shape an understanding of cognition and the past on a meta-theoretical level. Visual metaphors, which structure the textbook presentation of the past, receive a particular focus in this dissertation, because these metaphors participate in conceptualizing cognition as the making of representations by a disembodied mind, separate and distanced from the world; in other words, our own bodily perceptions intervene to map one mode of perception (seeing) as the metaphorical model for all cognition in a subtle form of deception. Visual metaphors have prevailed in the Western intellectual tradition since ancient Greek philosophy. The prevalence of the sense of sight in Greek art, philosophy, and religion permitted the Greeks to conceive of a distinction between an object and its representation, reality and knowledge, world and image, body and mind. The simultaneity, stasis, and distance evoked by the sense of sight afford a disembodied model of cognition, which implicitly continues to persist in Western thought.

In contrast to a disembodied and distancing model of cognition, I adopt a theoretical approach, which posits a radically different understanding of cognition – enactive embodiment. Through developments in neurobiology over the last decades, a new understanding of cognition has emerged. Knowledge in this model is conceived not as internal snapshots of a static, distanced, pre-given reality, but as a process of coming to know, which is inseparable from the lived, embodied experience of a dynamic being-in-the-world. This process of learning is coupled with and co-creates reality in a mutual interaction with the environment. Cognition is a self-modifying, self-organizing process, implying embeddedness in an environment, rather than a passive representation of a fixed, externalized world. Even though evidence for the embodiment of mind abounds, the implications of this research have not yet entered the public consciousness. There is a lack of understanding of the practical implications of research on embodied cognition, which this research aims to address. The research materials – Polish and Lithuanian school-history textbooks and interviews with their authors – serve as a “laboratory” for application and further development of these theoretical insights.
The disembodied model of cognition, which is at odds with the most recent findings of cognitive science and neurobiology, can be observed in the following features of textbooks: 1) the exclusive focus on veracity, accuracy, bias and subjectivity in discussion of truth and objectivity; 2) adjudication between competing accounts by separating pattern and process; 3) a sharp dichotomy between fact and fiction; 4) the focus on political and military history of the state/nation and an exclusion of lived, experiential past from the textbook narratives; 5) the arrangement of narrative as a linear sequence of static states.

It is argued that we need to move past the vocabulary of static, vision-based thinking about truth in terms of atomistic, subjective perspectives vis-à-vis the objective world of reality. Visual metaphorical models lead either to a static, relativist polarization of disparate perspectives or, alternatively, to attempts to transcend the lived dimension altogether, reducing truth to what can be claimed to be objectively shared facts. Neither of these options can offer effective tools for navigating the diversity of interpretations, because they fail to take into account the lived, ever-changing experience that is at the root of different perspectives.

When ways of thinking about knowledge and truth are framed by dualist metaphysics, divergent experiences of people, both individuals and groups, become a confounding problem. The metaphysical notion of truth does not accommodate varied and often conflicting narratives of experience. It fails to make sense of the truth in relation to the divergent lived past. The contribution of this dissertation is, therefore, to specifically show how the rethinking of the truth of the past in embodied terms opens up potential new avenues for conceiving of historical truth and for teaching it in school-history.
Acknowledgements

I thank Kone Foundation, Finnish Cultural Foundation and Research Foundation of the University of Helsinki for the financial support without which this research would not have been possible. The Center for Research on Ethnic Relations and Nationalism provided me with supportive work environment throughout my doctoral studies, for which I am most grateful.

The early seeds of the ideas I have developed in this dissertation stem from my Master’s Thesis, which was supervised by Professor Peter A. Kraus. Under his supervision, I began my doctoral studies at the University of Helsinki in 2012. I am grateful for his support, humor, and insightful comments on my various texts over the years.

I began working with my supervisor, Docent Emilia Palonen, in early 2015, at a point when I was at a stumbling block in the research process. Her course on Memory, Identity and Culture in Europe, together with a seminar in Theoretical Studies in Politics, have been a stimulating ground for exploring different theoretical paths and choosing my own. Emilia has continuously challenged me to improve my work, even when I was already quite tired of the project. Her encouragement as well as critique sharpened my arguments and kept me going. I am likewise indebted to my second advisor, Vice-dean Juri Mykkänen, who was always keen to read and comment on my work. I sincerely thank both of you.

Aside from my supervisors, I would like to express my profound gratitude to two fellow embodied thinkers, mentors, and friends, philosopher of historiography Dr Lisa Muszynski and economic historian Professor Christopher Lloyd. I could hardly imagine this book without our regular discussions in Helsinki. I cherish their company, which has been a supportive environment for me to explore various hunches and uncharted ideas. Lisa and Chris, your unwavering support is one of the pillars on which this book stands. I am also grateful to Lisa for her many hours spent on revising the language of my manuscript.

I would like to extend my gratitude to Professor Henri Vogt and Associate Professor Joanna Wojdon for reviewing this thesis and providing valuable suggestions for its improvement.

I would also like to register a huge debt of thanks to Docent Jan Löfström, Professor Emerita Sirkka Ahonen, and Dr Katrin Kello, who provided many useful comments on early drafts of this dissertation.

I am also grateful to many co-workers, colleagues, and friends for their support of my efforts and precious discussions on various aspects of this project, particularly to Anniina Hyttinen, Anne Epstein, Halil Gürhanli, Taavi Sundell, Vappu Helmisäari, Ave Ungro, Andrea Kanerva, I-An Gao, Laura Sibinescu, Pia Ranna, and Katia Shklyar.

Finally, this work would not have been possible without the love and support of my family, who have been there for me through the ups and downs of my PhD process. I thank my parents, Raimonda and Vylius, and sister Eglė for their trust in me to follow my path.
To all others, who have contributed to my dissertation in other numerous ways, thank you so much!

Helsinki, March 2018
## Contents

Abstract 3
Acknowledgements 5
Contents 7
List of Figures 11
Chapter 1. Introduction 12
  1.1 Synopsis of the thesis 16
Chapter 2. History education between history and memory 21
Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework 34
  3.1 Hans Jonas’ discussion of ocularcentrism 35
  3.2 Ocularcentric visual metaphors in models of cognition 39
  3.3 Objectivity and knowing selves in history 48
  3.4 Endurance of the (disembodied) mind-world gap after the linguistic turn 64
    3.4.1 Derridean poststructuralism and the Saussurean arbitrariness of the linguistic sign 64
    3.4.2 Disembodied dualism in postmodern philosophy of history 71
  3.5 Reconceiving the cognizing self in embodied terms 76
  3.6 Towards embodied ways of making sense of the past 90
    3.6.1 Disembodied and embodied senses of (historical) empathy 93
    3.6.2 Putting embodied ways of making sense of the past into practice 103
Chapter 4. Materials and Methods 116
  4.1 Materials 116
    4.1.1 Interviews 116
    4.1.2 Textbooks 117
  4.2 Method 118
    4.2.1 Metaphor analysis 118
4.2.2 Application of metaphor analysis to my materials 121

4.3 My role as an interviewer 125

Chapter 5. Context of Analysis 128

5.1 Lithuanian and Polish narratives of shared past 128

5.1.1 The Union of Krewo 128

5.1.2 The Battle of Grunwald 129

5.1.3 The Union of Lublin 131

5.1.4 The interwar conflict and the Question of Vilnius/Wilno 134

5.2 Lithuanian and Polish school-history curricula 138

5.2.1 Lithuanian school-history history curricula 138

5.2.2 Polish school-history curricula 144

Chapter 6. Metaphor analysis of the Lithuanian school-history textbooks and interview transcripts with the authors 151

6.1 Juozas Brazauskas 151

6.1.1 Juozas Brazauskas: LOOKING AT the past from the WINDOW of Lithuanian history 152

6.1.2 Juozas Brazauskas: Perceptions of the Polish-Lithuanian past 163

6.1.3 Juozas Brazauskas: Multiperspectivity and truth 165

6.1.5 Conclusion 169

6.2 Jūratė Litvinaitė 171

6.2.1 Jūratė Litvinaitė: History is no longer a reliable FOUNDATION to lean on 171

6.2.2 Jūratė Litvinaitė: Historians as FISHERMEN 173

6.2.3 Jūratė Litvinaitė: Multiperspectivity and truth 179

6.2.4 Conclusion 188

6.3 Ignas Kapleris 189

6.3.1 Ignas Kapleris: Historiographical influences 190

6.3.2 Ignas Kapleris: Limits of multiperspectivity: Textbook as a GUIDE-POST 200
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.3.3 Ignas Kapleris: SMOOTHING OVER sharp CORNERS?</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.4 Conclusion</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Mindaugas Tamošaitis and Deimantas Karvelis</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.1 Mindaugas Tamošaitis: Academic history vs. school history</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.2 Mindaugas Tamošaitis: A textbook cannot USURP A MONOPOLY</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.3 Mindaugas Tamošaitis: Objectivity</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.4 Mindaugas Tamošaitis: Polish-Lithuanian past</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.5 Deimantas Karvelis: A GIANT ABYSS between professional and school history</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.6 Deimantas Karvelis: Conflicting interpretations and objectivity in history</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.7 Conclusion</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7. Metaphor analysis of the Polish school-history textbooks and interview transcripts with the authors</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1 Halina Manikowska</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.1 Halina Manikowska: Historians’ BAGGAGE</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.2 Halina Manikowska: Avoidance of leaning to either SIDE</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.3 Halina Manikowska: Novelties in the depiction of the Polish-Lithuanian past</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.4 Halina Manikowska: Evaluation of the past</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.5 Conclusion</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2 Michał Tymowski</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.1 Michał Tymowski: Overwhelmed by individual facts</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.2 Michał Tymowski: Depiction of the Polish-Lithuanian past</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.3 Michał Tymowski: Pursuing truth</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.4 Michał Tymowski: Values in history writing</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.5. Conclusion</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 Robert Śniegocki</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.3.1 Robert Śniegocki: History education should enable one to understand the present 270

7.3.2 Robert Śniegocki: Objectivity in the midst of different interpretations of the past 271

7.3.3 Robert Śniegocki: The interwar conflict 282

7.3.4 Conclusion 284

7.4 Piotr Laskowski 284

7.4.1 Piotr Laskowski: Approach to history teaching 285

7.4.2 Piotr Laskowski: Multiple perspectives on the past 288

7.4.3 Piotr Laskowski: Theoretical discussion in history education 291

7.4.4 Piotr Laskowski: Ethics and evaluation 293

7.4.5 Piotr Laskowski: Depiction of the Polish-Lithuanian past 296

7.4.6 Conclusion 301

Chapter 8. Discussion 302

8.1 Truth and objectivity 302

8.2 Multiperspectivity 307

8.3 Narrative organization 311

8.4 The presentation of the Polish-Lithuanian past 313

8.5 Metaphorical themes 318

Chapter 9. Conclusion 323

References 327

Appendix 1 341
List of Figures

- **Figure 1**: Conceptual distinctions ................................................................. 27
- **Figure 2**: Seixas 2016 .................................................................................. 30
- **Figure 3**: Levesque 2016 ........................................................................... 31
- **Figure 4**: Sight in Greek thought ................................................................. 38
- **Figure 5**: Canaletto, Campo di SS. Giovanni e Paola, c. 1735. An example of a linear perspective .......................................................... 40
- **Figure 6**: Camera Obscura ......................................................................... 42
- **Figure 7**: Mimesis as Sameness (Optical Match) ....................................... 70
- **Figure 8**: Mimesis as Difference ................................................................. 70
- **Figure 9**: Ernst Mach, "The Inner Perspective." ......................................... 77
- **Figure 10**: Caricature ............................................................................... 227
Thinking about history begins from making sense of what past reality is. How do we imagine it? How do we conceptualize it? What models structure our idea of the past? Is past reality a separate plane detached from us, as observers, who inspect it at a distance? What metaphor would we use to make sense of it? Are we looking at the past? Can we touch it? Can we have a bodily connection to past reality? Does the past perhaps live through us in some ways? Can reality of the past be engaged, encountered or experienced in the present? Is it present or absent, static or dynamic? Epistemological choices inevitably follow from ontological assumptions about past reality, which are themselves shaped by implicit metaphorical models that reveal as much as they may hide with respect to certain important aspects of reality. These metaphorical models of cognition have concrete implications for how we deal with the controversial past, or the past, which is shared, but understood and remembered differently.

I demonstrate in my thesis that metaphors, which condition orientations towards the past, should not be taken for granted, because such metaphors lie at the root of conflicts about what happened in the past. This aim is carried out by examining meta-theoretical assumptions of school-history textbooks in Lithuania and Poland, which implicitly organize how textbooks introduce and make sense of the controversial Polish-Lithuanian past.

Metaphors, which we use to understand, make sense of and conceptualize our experience of reality, in turn shape our ways of thinking and being. They can highlight certain aspects of reality and of our experience, but also hide others. Metaphor is, however, not merely one way of seeing reality. Unconscious reliance on a certain metaphor has implications for what inferences we make about what kind of actions we can take on the grounds of our understanding of a given situation. The conceptual metaphor theory of cognitive linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson (1980, 1999), who were the first to propose that our thought is metaphorically structured, provides the framework within which to examine metaphors that shape an understanding of cognition and the past on a meta-theoretical level. In other words, I examine how metaphors serve as models or templates, which transfer attributes from a source domain that are imposed onto the target domain of theoretical concepts.

The Polish-Lithuanian dispute over shared history serves as a specific case meant to illustrate how metaphorical models of cognition shape the knowledge of the past in school history and can encourage or foreclose the possibility of mutual understanding between nations. Adam Michnik, a Polish historian, essayist, and editor-in-chief of Poland’s largest newspaper “Gazeta Wyborcza,” remarked that Polish-Lithuanian relations, despite the long-shared history of these two nations, are complicated. Lithuanians tend to view their Polish neighbors with distrust and suspicion, whereas the Poles, according to him, disregard the Lithuanians (Kępiński & Kunčius 2016, 7). The roots of the Polish-Lithuanian historical controversy stem from the 19th–early 20th century, when the Lithuanian national movement emerged from the intelligentsia of peasant origin. For the representatives of the Lithuanian national movement, the 1569 union of Poland and
Lithuania symbolized defeat of sovereignty and loss of political elites through Polonization (Milosz 2006). In Lithuanian historiographical accounts of the 19th and 20th centuries, the joint Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was primarily identified as an act of coercion, inaugurating a period of decline, which eventually led to the disintegration of the state at the end of the 18th century (Buchowski 2012). In Polish historiography, on the other hand, the 1569 Union of Lublin was perceived as a benevolent act on the part of Poland and a salvation for Lithuania, which could adopt Christianity, Western civilization, and a higher culture from Poland (Buchowski 2012).

Mutual antagonisms, which first emerged in the 19th century, reached their peak after World War I, when Poland took over the city of Vilnius and its surrounding region in 1920. Lithuania, for which Vilnius was a historical capital of the Lithuanian state, refused to acknowledge Poland’s annexation of the city. The two countries officially remained in a state of war until 1938. Soon afterwards, World War II began, bringing about the terrors of totalitarianism and the Soviet occupation in the case of Lithuania, while Poland became a Soviet Satellite state. The mutual dialogue on the shared historical past remained frozen for fifty years. The contestation of the two national narratives of the past, buried under the ideological dogmatism of the “friendship of the socialist nations” during the Soviet era, re-emerged to the surface of political discussions, once the processes of nation-state building had begun to gain momentum.

The tensions became likewise manifest in the divergent narratives, maintained by the two nations, of their shared past, in school-history education. A complex shared past, subject to diverse interpretations, raises an epistemological conundrum, if and when the truthfulness of competing narratives needs to be adjudicated. An incapacity to engage effectively and meaningfully with contradictory narratives obstructs the potential for mutual understanding and contributes to the ongoing state of latent resentment.

However, the implications of this project extend well beyond the cases of Poland and Lithuania by bringing attention to: 1) how metaphors shape human understanding of the past and lived experience; and 2) how metaphors can create or diminish a potential of openness to a different narrative of experience. Metaphor analysis of historical knowledge, thus, holds important insights for processes of conflict resolution and reconciliation.

Awareness of different interpretations does not readily offer clear guidelines for how to engage with multiple narratives and make sense of them. The scholarship, which engages with controversial past in history textbooks, focuses on representations as well as political and ideological debates that surround the treatment of contentious past in textbooks (e.g., Carretero, Jacott & López-Manjón 2002; Torsti 2003; Crawford & Foster 2008; Schneider 2008; Maoz, Freedman & Mccauley 2010; Repoussi & Tutiaux-Guillon 2010; Foster 2011; Romanowski & Alkhateeb 2011; Müller 2013). On the other hand, scholarship that reflects on the meta-theoretical orientations of school-history education in the way textbooks deal with the (controversial) past is relatively rare (e.g., Ahonen 1990; Seixas 2000; VanSledright 2008; Parkes 2011, 2013, 2014; Jonker 2012). This project aligns with the latter area of history textbook research by focusing on how school-history

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1 The shared history of Lithuania and Poland ensues from the unification process of the two states in the Middle Ages, which culminated in the establishment of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569.
textbooks instruct students to think about ontological and epistemological quandaries: what the past is and what it means to know the past – especially when there is more than one account of what happened.

Political scientists, who engage with the issues of history and memory, have studied how historical narratives and memories are deployed and function in forging collective identification, shaping political processes, policies, and legislation (e.g., Nyyssönen 1999; Berger 2002; Deighton 2002; Müller 2002; Neumann 2002; Lehti, Jutila & Jokisipilä 2008; Mälksoo 2009; Langenbacher 2010). In my own analysis, I diverge from these approaches by focusing, rather, on the meta-theoretical assumptions that shape the way the past and historical knowledge are conceived of and depicted, and that, in turn, hold implications for social integration and mutual understanding within and between diverse societies, which share a past. The question of how politics shape memory and vice versa inevitably enters my discussion. However, my primary concern is to comprehend the conceptual roots of a particular manner in which the past, that is shared, but remembered differently, has been taught in school-history education in Poland and Lithuania.

The key problem, which has preoccupied me ever since I started this project, was the question of how to think in a meaningful way about truth in school-history lessons, when we encounter different narratives of the shared past in those lessons. In the process of carrying out my research, I interviewed Polish minority members in Lithuania, whose narratives of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past fell beyond the official school-history curriculum. Polish minority members, whom I interviewed, often pointed out that the way they or their ancestors experienced the past did not match the textbook representation of the past, attesting to the idea that textbooks inevitably convey selective accounts of the past rather than any kind of “objective” knowledge.

Postmodern theory of historiography, which I was avidly reading at the time, suggested viewing all historical narratives as forms of literary artwork, whose truthfulness or falsity cannot be established, since narratives do not mirror the past reality. Herein was the source of my research problem. It seemed obvious to me that truthfulness of narratives could not be explained in terms of a static match between an image or representation and the past as a complex reality. In other words, there cannot be one truth that can be known as the static core of an event that historians can “objectively” extract. However, in the condition of postmodernity, truth was replaced by a conception of relative figural language, which appeared to me as “lifeless” as the objective static truth. I felt conflicted about giving up the notion of truth along the lines of the postmodern argument: The narratives of Polish minority members appeared in certain ways more truthful than, for example, the textbook representation. They were contingent on lived experiences that could not be reduced to mere subjective appearances expressed from relative, rhetorical points of view. As I struggled to make sense of these insights, I became painfully aware that the theories, which were available to me, failed to provide relevant concepts and models of thinking for addressing this problem.

A helpful hint as to where I should look for a solution to this quandary came from my engagement with the art of David Hockney, an English painter, printmaker, stage designer as well as a theoretician of art. Over the past few decades, one of Hockney’s passionate interests has been the different ways of seeing the world, which, in turn, translate into
different ways of depicting. The underlying purpose of depicting, according to Hockney, is that the act of depicting enables us to see “things we might not otherwise see” (Gayford 2011, 85). A picture entails a certain way of seeing and engaging with reality. What captured my attention was Hockney’s persistence in seeking after ways to depict the world that escape the way a camera lens sees it, because, as he argued, the photograph-like geometric representation of the world employs a single-point perspective, which leaves the viewer fixed outside the picture and distances him or her from what is depicted. Hockney’s analysis illuminated how a form of representation, modeled upon geometrical optics, entailed a way of seeing reality that is curiously disembodied – an immaterial and fixed point of vision hovering in detachment from the world.

Hockney’s insights were all the more relevant, taking into account that perspective and distance are deeply embedded cognitive metaphors in the Western intellectual tradition that have shaped how philosophers over the centuries made sense of cognition and knowledge (Ginzburg 2000, 29). The prevalence of vision-based metaphors in Western philosophy, beginning with ancient Greek philosophy, meant that attributes of visual experience had been metaphorically transposed to explain how we know the world in the abstract domain of conceptualization. Philosopher Hans Jonas (1982 [1966]) has notably demonstrated that ocularcentrism, or the prevalence of the sense of sight in Greek art, philosophy and religion, permitted the Greeks to conceive of a distinction between an object and its representation, reality and knowledge, world and image, body and mind. The simultaneity, stasis, and distance evoked by the sense of sight enabled Greeks to conceptualize cognition as making representations by a disembodied mind, distanced from the world. It allowed theorizing knowledge as a static image that is detached from the object of sight, a “form” that is abstracted from its “content,” or an “essence” that is isolated from its “existence.” The body, paradoxically, was hidden in this conceptualization: The metaphorical transfer of the experience of sight into abstract conceptualization hid the very bodily process, which gave rise to this concept (Johnson 2007). In other words, while visual metaphors derive from embodied experience, they hide the bodily source of metaphor and contribute to a disembodied understanding of reality. Metaphors highlight certain aspects of reality, but they can likewise hide other significant dimensions of experience.

My focus on metaphors, particularly visual metaphors, has meant that, in order to understand implicit metaphorical models that condition the notions of what the past, knowledge, objectivity, truth and multiperspectivity are, I needed to approach distinct theoretical approaches as metaphorical image-schemas to which they (unconsciously) adhere. In other words, I needed to figure out what image-schema shapes a particular way of seeing, knowing and depicting the past.

In contrast to a disembodied, distancing model of cognition, I have embraced a theoretical approach, which posits a radically different understanding of cognition – enactive embodiment. Through developments in neurobiology over the last decades (Maturana & Varela 1980, 1998 [1987]), a new understanding of cognition has emerged. Knowledge in this model is conceived not as internal snapshots of a static, distanced, pre-given reality, but as a process inseparable from lived, embodied experience of a dynamic being-in-the-world, which is coupled with and which co-creates reality in a mutual
interaction with environment (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1993 [1991]; Thompson 2007, 2015; Noë 2009; Di Paolo et al. 2010). Cognition is a self-modifying process implying embeddedness in an environment rather than a passive representation of a fixed, externalized world. Through this process of self-modifying cognition, or sense-making, the cognizing subject is enacting or bringing forth a world and itself simultaneously. Instead of dividing cognition into objective (static and distanced) and subjective (static and isolated), enactive embodiment highlights how cognition is contingent on a dynamic moving body and the context of lived experience in engagement with the world.

Even though evidence for the embodiment of mind abounds, the implications of this research have not entered the public consciousness. There is a lack of understanding of the practical implications of research on embodied cognition, which forms the gap this project aims to address. As I demonstrate in the analysis of textbooks, school historical knowledge still tends to be based on Greek metaphysics and its disembodied model of cognition, which are at odds with the most recent findings of embodied cognitive science and neurobiology. My analysis shows that the metaphorical models implicit in the epistemology of textbook authors lead them to a disembodied understanding of historical knowledge. On the other hand, enactive embodiment and its model of cognition, when applied to history and school-history education, open up new ways of thinking about historical knowledge. Lived experience becomes a crucial dimension of the past and history writing. My research materials – school-history textbooks and interviews with their authors – serve as a “laboratory” for application and further development of theoretical insights from cognitive science.

Eelco Runia (2014) proposed an idea of “proactive discontinuity,” which occurs when people, at the level of ideas, “flee forward” to insights, approaches and books and find themselves in situations they could not foresee when they had initially engaged in a particular undertaking. These sorts of situations, as Runia notes, “confront us with the task to ‘catch up’ with the history, or the view of history, we ourselves have somehow created” (Runia 2014, 56). It is precisely this work of catching up with an embodied approach to history that remains a task requiring further research and imagination.

1.1 Synopsis of the thesis

In Chapter 2, I explore connections of school-history education to two distinct ways of knowing the past: history and memory. The distinction between objective, critical history and subjective, affirmative memory leads to tensions between the universalizing commitment of historians to the historical truth and the particularizing identity claims (e.g., Halbwachs 1992; Nora 1989; Novick 1999; Megill 2007). The distinction raises a problem: What is, for example, the truth status of the narratives of experience of social or cultural groups? Since they are steeped in particularizing memory, does it follow that such narratives are inherently removed from truth?

Jan Assmann’s (2010, 2011) discussion of cultural and communicative memory is useful in this context, for it reveals that the distinction between cultural and communicative memory is linked to the difference between the eternal and the ephemeral,
the fixed and the changing, the sacred and the everyday. Rituals and textual canons (cultural memory), in this understanding, are expected to remain as fixed as they can possibly be and each consecutive ritual re-enactment or textual interpretation should not stray from the original meaning. Reproduction of meaning can then be ensured to be as accurate and, thus, as truthful as possible since the accuracy of the match ensures the continuity of identity.

Hence, stasis becomes linked to truthfulness at the expense of lived, changing, embodied experience, producing an epistemological tension between a universalizing, disembodied commitment to fixed, static truth and shifting embodied experience. Conceptualizing memory and historical knowledge, in metaphorical terms, as static, mental images of the past leads, in effect, to understanding the truth of the past as the ‘accuracy’ between a static image and a distanced, externalized reality. However, in conceptualizing the past in such a fixed, unmoving way, one overlooks relational and processual dimensions of the past. This tension between history and memory likewise unfolds in debates on school-history education (Levesque 2016; Seixas 2016). When school educators argue in favor of more disciplinary thinking in school history at the expense of memory, by “memory” they usually have in mind cultural memory, which is formalized, static, ritualized and externalized (Gardner & Boix-Mansilla 2006; Levesque 2009, 2016; Seixas 2000, 2016). What remains obscured in these debates is, however, memory of embodied and dynamic lived experience, memory as a potential source of lived knowledge, which can offer a significant contribution to understanding the past processes of life in different times and places.

In order to comprehend why embodied lived experience has been devalued in cognition (Jonas 1982 [1966]), it is necessary to discuss the role of vision-based metaphors in shaping the philosophical conceptualization of cognition. I take up this task in Chapter 3. In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, in particular, I trace the roots of dominant ways of seeing the past in the dualist Greek metaphysics and its vision-based omission of the body, which are embedded so firmly in the Western intellectual tradition. The ocularcentrism of Greek thought, or the prevalence of vision over the rest of the body, enabled the mimetic theory of truth and the disembodied distinction between a static image and the world, a representation and reality. The modern idea of objectivity can be derived from ocularcentrism, or the dominant position of sight in Greek thought, art, and religion.

I embrace the insight of philosopher Hans Jonas (1982 [1966]) that the effects of simultaneity, stasis, and distance elicited by the experience of sight enabled the Greeks to conceive of the distinction between the disinterested, objective knowledge of “the thing as it is in itself” and the subjective “thing as it affects me.” I trace several important visual metaphors, which are used to express what it means to know objectively and which also shape dominant epistemological models of cognition. In particular, I focus on the metaphors of perspective, the camera obscura, and the eye of the mind. These metaphors highlight the relation between the knower and knowledge, between the seer and the seen. Optics and the camera are powerful metaphorical models, which structure meta-theoretical assumptions of the Western tradition of philosophy.

In effect, it calls for an analysis of historians’ modes of seeing and cognizing the past, which I take up in Section 3.3. My analysis reveals that the self-effacing, disembodied,
detached historical gaze, modeled upon the metaphor of the camera, even though it has met serious challenges, especially in the second half of the 20th century, still retains influence in structuring notions of historical truth and knowledge. Historians are well aware that they can no longer unproblematically use notions of objectivity and truth (e.g., Braudel 1980, 1999; Fevrie 1973; Davis 2010; Pallares-Burke 2002), but the ingrained ocularcentric metaphorical models, as my analysis reveals, still exert an influence on how historians make sense of themselves, their practices, and ways of approaching the past. Inasmuch as disciplinary history and its “ways of seeing” are adopted as a cognitive model for school history, this is an important factor in shaping how pupils are taught “to see” the past.

In Section 3.4, I shift the discussion to show that, even in the wake of the linguistic turn, the characteristic disembodied distinction between image and reality, language and world, as well as between (static) pattern of perception and (dynamic) process of perception endured. Postmodern philosophers of history proposed to reverse the dominance of content (the past/world/reality) over form (historical narrative/language/word), but they retained the distinction itself between the content (past reality) and the form (language of historical narratives), between world and word (Munslow 2003, 2006a, 2006b; White 1974, 1978, 1999, 2005b, 2014 [1973]). Their claim is that past reality cannot be known or accessed other than through the historian’s textual rendition of the past and remnant textual traces of the past. Crucially, however, truth is still implicitly articulated by postmodernists in terms of an optical match between an externalized world and word, which implies disembodied metaphysics. The world does not shape the image in the mind; the disembodied mind shapes an image we impose onto the world that itself bears no non-arbitrary links to reality. In order to conceive of such an idea of knowledge as a mentalistic image, it is necessary to ignore the body and embodied experience and interaction with the world, out of which meaning emerges. Mimesis as sameness is replaced by mimesis as difference, but the crucial conceptual mimetic vocabulary, which posits a distinction between reality and representation, is retained.

In Section 3.5, I introduce the model of cognition of enactive embodiment (Maturana & Varela 1980, 1998 [1987]; Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1993 [1991]) which seeks to bypass the mimetic distinction and its two key features: internalism and static representationalism. The theory of enactive embodiment proposes to regard cognition as embodied action – “an enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs” (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1993 [1991], 9). The process, or history of (inter)action, shapes the cognizing self and is reflected in how the self makes sense of the world. Put differently, the process of cognition or interaction with the world is embodied in the pattern of perception. Enactive embodiment emphasizes that we are conscious through and in our living bodies and that perception and action are inseparable in lived cognition. Perception is not a passive internalization of information, but an active process – it implies a dynamic process of doing and acting. Embodied cognition depends on the experiences that arise from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, which are themselves embedded in a broader biological, psychological, and cultural context.
In Section 3.6, I discuss what an embodied approach to making sense of the past could mean in practice for the discipline of history and school-history education. Since the notion of lived experience is crucial in enactive embodiment, I begin by examining what it entails to know lived experience of other people in Section 3.6.1. Research on mirror neuron systems illuminates in what ways knowing other people’s mind is an embodied, rather than strictly mentalistic, process. These insights from research on embodied cognition and empathy provide clues as to why the notion of historical empathy, as R.G. Collingwood (1946) has formulated it, retains features of disembodied metaphysics. In Section 3.6.2, I attempt to provide the contours of a more encompassing approach to doing history in an embodied way. I suggest that the understanding of larger-scale processes and structures requires the additional contribution of experiential, relational, empathetic knowledge of lived experience of these processes. On the other hand, the past as lived experience needs to be complemented and juxtaposed with the knowledge of larger-scale processes and structures. The aim becomes to understand “how it is that humans are able at one and the same time to have a world in common and to live it as a function of their own particular histories” (Toren 1999, 16). I propose a metaphor of the weave to make sense of the complexity of past life.

In the empirical part of the thesis, I apply my theoretical insights to the study of the selected school-history textbooks and interviews with their authors. In Chapter 4, I describe my research materials and method of analysis. I introduce the conceptual metaphor theory of cognitive linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson (1980, 1999), which serves as the basis of my methodological approach, explicating how I applied it to my subject matter. I describe the different stages of analysis: identification of relevant metaphors; reflection on why they were used in terms of context and topic discussed; analysis of the entailments of metaphors; detection of patterns of metaphor use in and between textbooks and interviews; and identification of connections between metaphor use and inclination to empathically understand a different experience.

In Chapter 5, I provide a contextualization of the analysis. I outline an overview of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past, focusing on the main events that have provoked controversy in Polish and Lithuanian historiography, and provide an overview of the Polish and Lithuanian school history curricula from the 1990s onwards.

Chapters 6 and 7 comprise the analysis of, respectively, Lithuanian and Polish interview and textbook materials, followed by a discussion of the main findings in Chapter 8 and a conclusion in Chapter 9. The discussion of findings draws attention to enactive embodiment as a productive source of conceptual tools for history teachers and history textbook authors seeking new ways to handle the diversity of interpretations of the past in school narratives. As my analysis reveals, textbook authors are generally willing to include divergent accounts of the past into textbooks. However, an implicit adherence to a disembodied, vision-based and vision-generated metaphorical model of cognition as well as curricular restrictions limit their capacity to engage properly with different narratives of experience. The implicit adherence to a disembodied, oculareentric model of cognition in textbooks educates pupils how to perform a critical scrutiny of truth-claims in sources, but, on the other hand, leaves them incapable of making sense of divergent interpretations in relation to the lived process of experience. Pupils do not receive the tools for thinking
about the complexity of the past process of life, in which diverse lived experiences intermingle, intermesh, and constitute a crucial dimension of the past. By drawing attention to the underlying metaphorical models in textbooks and authors’ ways of thinking about the past, this thesis not only charts the multiplicity of ways of engaging with the past in Poland and Lithuania, but likewise opens up new paths for methodological innovation in history teaching.
Chapter 2. History education between history and memory

My choice to focus on school-history education offers a productive context for addressing an epistemological issue of how we can know the past. I will show in this chapter that history education, being situated between history and memory, is in a good position to reveal how problematic the extreme version of this dichotomy is. In fact, what appears to be a clash of opposites may, rather, turn out to be a fruitful coexistence of two ways of knowing the past, which are different, but not opposed. In this chapter, I argue that a sharp distinction between history and memory originates from conceptualizing these two ways of knowing the past in terms of reductive analysis. If memory and historical knowledge are metaphorically conceived of as static and mentalistic images of the past, this leads to a conception of truth that highlights the accuracy between such static images and a distanced, externalized reality. In other words, truth is here understood as a mimetic correspondence entailing a static conception of knowledge. On the other hand, such a conception neglects the relational and process dimensions of the past. That is, such a conception neglects how the parts relate to the whole at various levels of relational complexity in an ongoing process of dynamic interaction. Once we conceptually redefine this focus from static objects to dynamic processes and relations, the possibility opens toward thinking of memory and varied, even clashing memories, not as an impediment to truth, but as a productive challenge, inviting us to try to integrate those into a more encompassing explanation.

The past reveals its significance when people of different backgrounds, cultures, values, heritage, of different pasts live side by side (e.g., Kattago 2009, 2010, 2012a, 2012b). In these circumstances, a question can be raised: Whose history should be taught in school? (Levesque 2009). This is a universal problem, which manifests particularly acutely, if there is a legacy of social fragmentation and conflict. But even where there is a high degree of social integration, the issue of which narrative should be taught is bound to arise because of the heterogeneity of populations in terms of ethnicity, class, gender, etc. This question already bears a certain attitude to and a way of handling parallel narratives that coexist side by side: It suggests that we need to adjudicate and select a single narrative to be taught. In other words, it is reductive rather than synthetic. This question becomes ever more pertinent during transitional periods when borders shift, empires collapse, different beliefs and identities (re)emerge and are asserted. Conflicting memories and experiences in the case of a shared past elicit the urge to know “what actually happened” in the past. The lack of a memorial agreement over the past causes memory to be viewed with distrust, especially when one is faced with manipulation of the past in official accounts of the past and the use of the past for political purposes. This way of approaching the issue of a controversial past tends to translate into a dichotomy between history and memory (e.g., Halbwachs 1992; Nora 1989; Novick 1999; Megill 2007), where they are conceptualized as opposites of each other. But is this (metaphorical) conceptualization justified?

The relationship between history and memory is an old and controversial topic (e.g., Wertsch 2002, 18–20, 30–46; Misztal 2003, 99–108; Cubitt 2007; Assmann 2008;
Traditionally dismissed by historians, memory has risen over the last few decades to become a potent rival to history in approaching the past (e.g., Assmann 2006). However, although the boundary between history and memory may have become more permeable or blurry, the tendency to oppose memory and history as mutually exclusive has far from disappeared. Pierre Nora, for example, suggests a distinction between “memory-history” and “disciplinary-history”:

Memory and history, far from being synonymous, are thus in many respects opposed. Memory is life, always embodied in living societies and as such in permanent evolution, subject to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of the distortions to which it is subject, vulnerable in various ways to appropriation and manipulation, and capable of lying dormant for long periods only to be suddenly reawakened. History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer. Memory is always a phenomenon of the present, a bond tying us to the eternal present; history is a representation of the past. […] Memory is absolute, while history is always relative. (Nora 1996, 3)

However, Nora (1989, 10) acknowledges that “when history began to write its own history,” a growing realization occurred that history writing, in aiming to denounce mythologies of the past, is equally susceptible to alien impulses within itself, that is, history writing is not exempt from the possibility of being “the victim of memories which it has sought to master.”

Allan Megill (2007) adopts a sharper juxtaposition of history and memory. He is critical of the memory-oriented historiography and labels it as an affirmative historiography, which is essentially uncritical and has to accept the tradition of the group whose memories it is addressing:

But my argument here is that history ought rather to counter the harmful effects of an excessive preoccupation with memory. […] However we define memory […] it does seem to have, as Collingwood has suggested, the character of being “immediate”. In other words, if a person sincerely asserts “I remember that P”, we have no adequate grounds for challenging the assertion: we pretty much have to accept that this is indeed what the person remembers. History is different, for here we must bring evidence into play. […] Memory is an image of the past constructed by a subjectivity in the present. It is thus itself subjective; it may also be irrational, inconsistent, deceptive, and self-serving. It has long been clear that, without independent corroboration, memory cannot serve as a reliable marker of the historical past. […] In its demands for proof, history stands in sharp opposition to memory. History reminds memory of the need for evidence coming from eyewitnesses (autopsy) and from material remains. (Megill 2007, 22, 35)

Two assumptions are embedded in Megill’s understanding of the relationship between history and memory. Firstly, a historian who does memory-oriented history cannot be critical of it. Memory and critique are incompatible, for, in the case of memory research, there is a total identification between a historian and the person who remembers. Secondly, memory in Megill’s understanding is mentalistic and disembodied. It is conceived, metaphorically, as an “image” constructed in the mind, which is evaluated
according to how well it corresponds to past reality. The accuracy of a match between the remembered image and the past reality is the key criterion for the scholarly value of memory. The role of remembering is primarily evaluated in terms of repetition of the past or mimetic ability of memory (Keightley and Pickering 2012). The worth of a remembered image as an evidential source is assessed in isolation from the person remembering, to the extent that it can accurately depict the external events. Since memory can hardly give in to such separation from the lived experience of the person remembering (including the way in which this memory has been shaped in the aftermath of the remembered event), memory is problematized or even denied as being a reliable source due to its lack of objectivity. Memory is regarded as fabricated, ideologically framed, imagined rather than real. For Megill (2007, 27), history is and must be critical and objective, whereas the subjective and uncritical nature of memory is exemplified, to him, by memory conflicts between different ethnic groups, which share the past. He points out that the weakness of memory is that, being uncritical, it cannot adjudicate between different accounts in memory conflicts (Megill 2007, 28). This implies the role of critical historical science – to bypass the memory conflicts, to provide an account that rises above the subjective memorial perspectives and, thus, identity.

So even if Megill (2007, 24) claims that history should deal with “existents” in the past, rather than “essences” in the eternal present, the kind of objective evidence, which he takes to constitute the “existents,” is derived from the third-person, detached, static, external observation of actions of the people in the past. The spectator claims to seek after the past process of life, but instead adopts a “dead,” eternalized, objective vision. In light of my subsequent argument laid out in Chapter 3, it is noteworthy that Megill invokes the etymological connection between the historian’s procedure of gathering eyewitness evidence and *autopsy* – from Ancient Greek *αὐτόπσια*, *autopsia*, “seeing with one’s own eyes.” Evidential scrutiny is akin to the observation and dissection of a dead body. It implies a distanced spectator who views his or her object of study as a lifeless thing (a static object) rather than a living human being, whose memory reflects and is itself a record of history (process) of interaction with environment.

As the above examples illustrate, there are strong polarities that define the relationship between memory and history. Notable, here, is the emphasis on memory being subjective because it is prone to manipulation and distortion, whereas history is associated with a rational, third-person, detached, cool, circumscribed approach to reconstructing the past. This reflects, as Olick and Robbins (1998, 110) argue, the position held by “traditional” historians who would place history and memory in a clear-cut distinction, making a claim that only history is interested in the pursuit of truth. The distinction is far from being neat or unproblematical. Questioning the sharp delineation between history and memory, Burke (1989, 98) observes: “Neither memories nor histories seem objective any longer. In both cases we are learning to take account of conscious or unconscious selection, interpretation and distortion. In both cases this selection, interpretation and distortion is socially conditioned.” Megill (2007, 41) argues that the tension between affirmative, subjective memory and critical, objective history results from an unresolved “dialectic that characterizes all truthful history.” Kansteiner (2002, 184) also seems to uphold a similar position when he points out that the relation between history and memory remains one of
the interesting challenges in the field. In Megill’s words, there is not a way to square the circle: Historical research and writing are caught up between the critical commitment to the universals (objective) and the claims made by particular identities (subjective) (2007, 41).

The complexity of the epistemological distinction between memory and history increases even more when we take into account that memory can be conceptualized in a number of related ways (cf. Draaisma 2000). An important conceptualization has been offered by Jan Assmann (2010, 2011) who distinguishes between communicative and cultural memory and attempts, in this way, to get a grip on an extremely diverse vocabulary in the field of memory studies. Cultural memory is characterized by Assmann as fixed, exteriorized, objectified, static, institutionalized, and disembodied. It is formalized and requires institutions of mnemonic preservation, such as archives, monuments, libraries, museums. It encompasses both ritual and textual forms of preservation of the past. Cultural memory stores away information about the remote past, but it “reaches back into the past only so far as the past can be reclaimed as ‘ours’” (Assmann 2010, 113). Cultural memory has its experts, who serve the function of passing it on to the next generation. Ways of sharing and participating in cultural memory are ceremonial and hierarchically structured. Cultural memory requires commemorative practices, ceremonies, and rituals in order for it to be re-embodied, enacted, and experienced. Communicative memory, on the other hand, is not stable and formalized. It is not supported by any institutions caring for its preservation and transmission. As it lives in everyday verbal interaction, it is much more transient and diffuse. It has a limited temporal horizon of three interacting generations, or up to about eighty to one hundred years. Because participation in communicative memory is not formalized, it constitutes the unofficial memory of the group and consists of historical experiences in the framework of individual biographies (Assmann 2011, 41).

Assmann (2011, 43) takes notice of the fact that the distinction between cultural and communicative memory is linked to the difference between the eternal and the ephemeral, the fixed and the changing, the sacred and the everyday. Rituals and textual canons (cultural memory) are meant to remain as fixed as they can possibly be and each consecutive ritual re-enactment or textual interpretation should not stray away from the original meaning. Reproduction of meaning is expected to be as accurate and, thus, as truthful as possible since the accuracy of the match ensures the continuity of identity. Hence, stasis or fixity becomes metaphorically linked to truthfulness. The source domain of concrete experience of ritual re-enactment is metaphorically mapped onto the abstract epistemological concept of truth (See Chapter 4 on Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory). In Section 3.3, I will examine how this conceptual distinction between the eternal and the ephemeral, the fixed and the transient translated into a theory of knowledge in Platonic metaphysics, which distinguished between what lasts and, hence, what is real and what changes and, hence, is impermanent and not real. The latter – “the thing as it affects me” – was deemed partial and subjective, whereas “the thing as it really is” became viewed as objective knowledge. Truthfulness of knowledge as faithfulness to the original was metaphorically linked to the fixed and the eternal. The conceptual
distinction between objectivity and subjectivity was based on mind-body dualism. In other
words, knowledge of the thing could only be grasped by the mind detached from the body.

To the extent that historical knowledge and cultural memory are expected to rise above
the fleeting, impermanent apparitions and impressions, their understanding reveals shared
conceptual roots. In both cases, conceptualization preserves the focus on knowledge as a
static object rather than on the process of relations and interactions that are reflected in
such knowledge. History fulfills the functions of cultural memory in consolidating and
preserving the most important, foundational, knowledge about a group’s past (Tamm
2008, 2013, 463). History, like cultural memory, also has its special carriers and experts
who need to be initiated through special training, its institutions and formalized
procedures before they can be trusted in the task of reconstructing the past faithfully.

The faithful repetitive continuity is particularly emphasized in the ritual component of
cultural memory. Useful in making sense of Assmann’s conceptualization in this regard is
Connerton’s (1989) discussion of social memory. What interests Connerton (1989) is how
social memory is transmitted from one generation to the next and, in particular, how
(cultural) memory gets incorporated in the ritual performance. Rituals are characterized by
bodily performance of gestures, postures, dress codes, movements, which develop over
time into habitual bodily practices. The habitual aspect of bodily performance is what
sustains the group memory and its power to shape the ways of being of its members.
Commemorative ceremonies and celebrations stand out from other rituals because they
explicitly refer to a certain prototypical event or actions of a prototypical person, which
are then ritually re-enacted, relived in embodiment in the present (Connerton 1989, 61).
This kind of embodied memorial re-enactment in commemorative ceremonies implies a
static, fixed understanding of memory, which prioritizes enduring foundations, identifies
and establishes shared origins, collective beliefs and core values in the past. The
participants of commemorative ceremonies feel as if they are able to re-experience the
past through ritual re-enactment. Yet, what is embodied in a formalized and ritualized
commemorative practice is not so much the past as lived, continuously unfolding
experience, but an ideal, exemplary, eternalized, symbolic past of an event or person. The
ritual gives the body an appropriate pose, prescribed and determined movements, gestures
and actions (Connerton 1989, 59). It does not give space for an imaginative,
transformative engagement with the past. The symbolic “historical events transfigured by
mythification into unchanging and unchangeable substances” (Connerton 1989, 42) are
not open to or even resist change and recontextualization, for change indicates a danger of
losing a stable group identity. The utterances made in a commemorative re-enactment are
encoded in a canon, formalized and exactly repeatable (Connerton 1989, 58). To the extent
that the prototypical past resists reshaping of its meaning in light of changing
circumstances and experiences, it is formal, restrictive, and static. It is mimesis, or
representation as sameness.

2 Connerton (1989) distinguishes between myth and rituals by asserting that myths have much more potential for
variance, change, and interpretation. Myth constitutes more like a reservoir of meaning which is available for use and
subsequent modification. Rituals and rites, on the other hand, have a stronger tendency for invariance and stasis. The
fixity of rituals enables a group to prevent a too fast and potentially dangerous evolution of its identity.
In a textual form of cultural memory, the static past is fixed in a canon. Canonical texts must not be changed or modified in any way (Assmann 2011, 78–81). Assmann (2011) notes, however, that change in communication of textual cultural memory comes about through interpretation. As texts become increasingly temporally removed from the contemporary context, a class of experts specializing in interpreting the meanings of these texts is required. The interpreters need to actualize the meaning of the text, to bridge the gap between a fixed text and changing contexts while at the same time remaining faithful to the original text. So despite inescapable variation, an interpretation is meant to be faithful in word and meaning to the original text. It has to be a truthful reproduction of the original meaning.

Assmann’s (2010, 2011) communicative memory, on the other hand, is transient, impermanent and fluid, unless it becomes institutionalized or canonized. The sharing and communication of communicative memory is, however, limited to one’s own memory group(s). A typical instance of communicative memory for Assmann (2011) is generational memory, which accumulates and disappears together with its carriers. Communicative memory is by default assumed to be confined to one’s own memory community, partial, and subjective. It is the past “as it appears to me or as it affects me” and hence its truthfulness to reality is suspect. Assmann further maintains the difference between history and memory by asserting that historical knowledge “has a universalist perspective, a tendency towards generalization and standardization,” whereas “memory, even cultural memory, is local, egocentric, and specific to a group and its values” (2010, 113). Assmann’s conceptualization therefore espouses the same distinction between universalizing, objective history and particularizing, subjective memory. Memory is regarded as suspect in relation to its adherence to “the real.” My argument up to this point can be summarized in Figure 1 below. It reveals a curious connection between maintenance of ritualized continuity for preservation of group identity and notions of truth. Truth is associated with the faithful, accurate reproduction of meaning, whereas that which, by contrast, is transient and not static is deemed to be removed from the truth (or not real in the Platonic understanding, which will be discussed in Section 3.3). The threat of losing one’s identity is what motivates safeguarding of invariance, uniformity, precision, and truth-seeking preservation of the original meaning.
This extended attention to conceptual distinctions underlying Assmann’s (2010, 2011) and Connerton’s (1989) notions of memory serves to elucidate the meanings of “memory” in debates on school-history education. When a relationship between the past and a nation state is discussed, the meaning of memory as cultural memory – or formalized, static past – seems to prevail. Engagement with the past is conceived as an institutional instrument of states, communities, and schools, used for inculcating traditions, values and setting foundations (Levesque 2009). What is embodied is an institutionalized form of the past rather than shifting and varied lived experiences. Levesque, for instance, uses the term “memory” in this way, when he describes the activities of “memory fashioners,” who demand a nationalist curriculum, memorials and preservation of heritage, promote patriotic commemorations, and glorify national heroes:

This is no surprise, considering that public schooling has traditionally been justified for nation-building purposes. As people do not instinctively grow into fellow patriots, the task of creating citizens was too important to be left to private or religious organizations. So nationwide educational systems gradually became the norm, and soon governments regarded history as an important builder of national consciousness. (Levesque 2009, 9)

Such kind of conservative “memory fashioning” stands opposed to disciplinary historical thinking. Grounding his argument on Gardner and Boix-Mansilla’s (2006) appraisal of disciplinary historical thinking, Levesque states:

Disciplinary thinking, as Howard Gardner and Veronica Boix-Mansilla contend, constitutes the most advanced way of approaching and investigating issues within the various domains of knowledge. Although disciplines sometimes prove to be incomplete, […] they nonetheless represent the best scientific means available for answering ‘generative essential questions’ in human affairs. Disciplines such as history have their
own modes of inquiry, networks of concepts and principles, theoretical frameworks, symbolic systems, vocabularies, and modes of self-regulation. [...] Disciplines offer people formidable ‘ways of knowing’ about past or current issues of significance. ‘Shorn of disciplinary knowledge,’ as Gardner and Boix-Mansilla put it, ‘human beings are quickly reduced to the level of ignorant children, indeed to the ranks of barbarians.’ (Levesque 2009, 7)

The distinction between history and memory is replicated in debates on history education. Memory is reduced to re-enactment of the static past and associated with backward, immature, irresponsible, ill-informed “ways of knowing” the past by those who prioritize disciplinary thinking. Disciplinary thinking, on the other hand, is regarded as more intellectually demanding and refined: “Not only do people need to acquire established knowledge within their respective disciplines (e.g., facts and accounts), they must also (and perhaps above all) learn to employ their methods, procedures, and ways of thinking and inquiring” (Levesque 2009, 8).

As I will, for example, show in the analysis of textbooks, textbooks enact this distinction by stressing the scientific basis of history as a discipline. Disciplinary ways of knowing the past are, accordingly, opposed to assessment of the past that is guided by feelings. Scientific assessment is explained to depend on concrete data and source material, rather than feelings. Similarly, the reminiscences of contemporaries of certain historical events are identified as “subjective historical sources,” whereas original documents, especially legal documents, are identified as more important because they are not subjective (for example, Section 6.4.2.1). In other words, the subjective, affective, lived dimension is regarded as below the scientific standards both in relation to historians as cognizing selves and the past reality.

One challenge to teaching disciplinary historical thinking is the lack of agreement among professional historians and history educators as to what exactly constitutes or defines disciplinary thinking in the discipline of history, if one considers the diversity of approaches to studying the past in the discipline. Nevertheless, Levesque (2009) suggests that, despite these internal disciplinary differences, one can discern peculiar features of the disciplinary approach to the past. He contends that memory and history offer two different ways of knowing and approaching the past.

The memory-approach is about unconscious intuitive thinking, accumulation of information, memorization of facts and master narratives for the purpose of nation-building and identity orientation. By contrast, the disciplinary approach is about critical thinking and investigation, application of methods, practices and procedural concepts (such as evidence, continuity and change, significance, progress and decline, historical empathy) to the evidence of the past for the purpose of learning how to think as a historian, how to practice history as a craft (Levesque 2009). Levesque is convinced that teaching students the application of the above-mentioned procedural concepts, which are fundamental to the discipline of history, should be the goal of school-history education.

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3 These particular features of disciplinary thinking can even be regarded as cultural memory of the discipline of history that is passed on through formal university training where young students learn to embody the exemplary form of doing history.
because these concepts provide the structural basis for the disciplinary way of thinking. The substantive knowledge of history – the content of factual information – becomes valuable to learn only in relation to this more encompassing, structuring procedural knowledge.

With this distinction between history and memory in mind, a question may be raised as to the roles that history and memory play in school-history education. Peter Seixas (2016) and Stéphane Levesque (2016) propose two interrelated history/memory matrices for history education, which are loosely based on Jörn Rüsen’s disciplinary matrix, as re-interpreted by Allan Megill (1994). The conceptual scheme of Seixas (Figure 2) identifies “blue,” “red,” and “purple” forms of history education. According to him, the “blue” type of school-history education focuses on competencies in the disciplinary practices of history, such as source analysis and criticism, construction of historical accounts, and critical thinking. The disciplinary approach in history education, in effect, understates the importance of identity building or the use of history for the present (Seixas 2016). The “red” approach, by contrast, places the emphasis on a well-defined narrative, highlights events and important actors, and provides more or less unambiguous value orientations and meanings to be taken from the narrative. Such a form of history education outlines the origins, victories, defeats, enemies, core beliefs, values, and even important character traits which permitted the group to flourish or persist. The main purpose in this case is to strengthen a shared identity of the group, its sense of collective memory. What Seixas (2016) regards as the more sensible approach is the third possibility of “purple” history education, which integrates aspects of both “red” and “blue” forms of school-history. It blends both disciplinary practices and memorial beliefs, so that public memories are subjected to critical historical scrutiny, while the disciplinary approach is simultaneously accompanied by the memorial input.
Responding to Seixas’s scheme, Levesque (2016) proposes a revised history/memory matrix for history education (Figure 3), which places history education at the intersection of disciplinary history and culture and life practice, but also embeds these in the “white” zone of the wider historical culture, or the totality of historical discourses which operate in society and shape its self-understandings and interpretation of the past. The blue zone, for Levesque, is characterized by historical research, which raises research questions based on personal and cultural interests and theories, and uses different methods to produce evidence-based narrative interpretations. The red area defines experiences and memory practices by which stories are generated for orientation and identity formation, which, in turn, shape public memories and collective identity. Hence, history education needs to be contextualized in paying attention to all three influences shaping it and feeding into each other.
Both of these conceptual schemes aim to transcend the dichotomy between an exclusive focus in school history either on competencies or narrative, “telling the story” or “teaching historical thinking.” Levesque’s scheme is, however, more nuanced in at least two regards. Firstly, it emphasizes the interplay between historical culture, practice of disciplinary history, experiences, public memory, and school history. Secondly, it offers a broader understanding of “culture and life practice,” which not only includes collective identity and public commemorative practices (foundational and static cultural memory), but also experiences and memory practices of individual persons. Although Levesque himself never explicitly discusses it, this is an important shift. It allows for potentially overcoming the tendency to conceive of the relation to the past in fixed, static, and disembodied terms – either as a distanced, mentalistic, universalizing pursuit of knowledge (disciplinary history), or as public commemoration of the canonized past (cultural memory), and to broaden it to encompass engagement with embodied lived experience. It also potentially
allows questioning whether it is justifiable to regard memory as untruthful in principle, because it is changing and cannot be detached from the experiencing self.

What the above two schemes by Seixas and Levesque share, however, is the distinction between history and memory. The discipline of history is conceptualized as a third-person, objectifying, evidence-based narrative representation generated by applying historical method in pursuit of a theory- and interest-guided question. It is a scientific/scholarly pursuit of knowledge about the past. Memory, on the other hand, is relegated to a separate domain, characterized by a subjective relation to the past (in a static and mentalistic sense), and practical orientation and identity needs. History is supposed to rise above the fleeting personal impressions and this way come closer to the faithful reconstruction of what happened, whereas memory is an internal and hence likely distorted interpretation of the external reality rendered into a myth at the group level. The dualism between history and memory is a pervasive and deep-rooted distinction, which shapes discussions about how one should approach and “see” the past.

My understanding is that the sharp distinction between history and memory stems from an emphasis on reductive analysis of these two ways of engaging the past. If memory and historical knowledge are metaphorically conceived of as static and mentalistic images of the past, then this leads to a conception of truth that depends on accuracy between the static image and reality. On the other hand, the relational and process dimensions of this past are overlooked. Once we conceptually redefine our focus from static objects to dynamic processes and relations, we can begin to think of memory and varied, even clashing memories, not as an impediment to truth, but as a productive challenge, inviting us to try to integrate them into a more encompassing explanation. Such an explanation inevitably would have to preserve some of the critical methodology of historical research, in order to tackle omissions and identify distortions. Memory can and does distort, but the point, in terms of a dynamic and synthetic focus on processes and relations, is how memories and experiences may potentially convey a history of interactions with the environment (e.g., Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1993 [1991]; Capra 2003). In other words, memories and experiences can be valuable resources when comprehending past life. Therefore, the critical, reductive way of knowing would have to be integrated with a synthetic approach that emphasizes how lived experiences are interrelated and how a particular pattern of interpretation reflects a history of interactions with one’s social and material environment. Therefore, I believe that history education, being at the intersection of disciplinary history and memory, is a fertile ground for a more nuanced conception of truth of the past to emerge, if we pay closer attention to the role of metaphors in abstract theoretical conceptualization and redefine our focus to include not just an emphasis on static objects, but likewise relations and processes.

It is in a similar vein that David Middleton and Steven Brown elucidate the relation between memory and experience, when they describe memory as “the centre of lived experience – not as the storehouse of that experience, but, instead, as a relational process at the intersection of different durations of living” (2005, viii) and as “the site at which the singularity and collectivity of experience intersect” (2005, 15). The self, for Middleton and Brown, in this regard, is “a movement that is continuously refracted back through the stabilities it creates” and “the shifting intersection of experiences of which our present
consciousness is only the leading edge” (2005, viii). The self is thus a process; paraphrasing Thompson (2015), the self is continuously enacted in mutually co-arising circumstances in which the relation between the past and the present is negotiated and redefined as the self engages with others and the world. Edward Casey (1987), similarly, defines the memory of lived experience as something, which is enacted in our living, embodied engagement with other people, with objects and the places in which we dwell. Lived experience as embodied memory is inseparable from bodies, practices, and places as relational aspects of remembering. It is not just a mentalistic “fabrication,” a representation of the past willfully constructed in a permanent, static form. The past as lived experience is a “verb” rather than a “noun”: Lived experience is embodied in the ways of being, relating to others, world, and self. Reflective imaginative remembering, which seeks to make sense of past experience, is what enables one to arrive to a form of more general knowledge, and yet the latter needs to be constantly reconsidered in light of ongoing experience. Abstracted, generalized knowledge cannot be detached from the process of life and the change that the ongoing experience elicits. Knowing the past entails an amalgamation of critical, comparative analysis and empathic, imaginative engagement with a process of lived experience. These points might not seem clear or persuasive just yet, but I will elaborate on the embodied, experiential way of making sense of the past and how it can be combined with a critical, detached way of seeing in Sections 3.5 and 3.6.

I will show in Chapter 3 that the sharp distinction between history and memory rests on the ocularcentric metaphors at the root of the Western philosophical tradition. The impact of these metaphors is the ensuing disregard of embodied lived experience in epistemology, which means that knowledge of the past is understood as essences and/or images, contained in a disembodied mind and removed from past reality. In turn, these images can only be shown to be truthful by virtue of corresponding to the past reality “out there.” I will argue that ocularcentrism introduces into the Western philosophical tradition the mimetic distinction between an image and reality, language and the world, paving the way for an ocular theory of truth, which prioritizes reductive ways of knowing.
Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework

The distinction between memory and history highlights two ways of knowing and approaching the past, two ways of seeing the past and engaging with it. In this chapter, I seek to demonstrate how this differentiation of the ways of seeing the past has emerged and how it has shaped, via different metaphorical models of vision and of an observer, the ontological and epistemological orientations towards the past. KNOWING IS SEEING is a well-entrenched conceptual metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, Table 4.1, 53), so deeply embedded in our thought about knowledge that it is often invisible to ourselves. It is notable that commentators, such as Levesque (2009), appraise the disciplinary approach in teaching history at school, but do not consider the need to examine the ontological and epistemological assumptions implicit in the disciplinary historical thinking and its procedural concepts – the ways of seeing and knowing the past, and the metaphorical models which shape the latter.

It is useful to examine the underlying, implicit metaphors because they can reveal the ways in which our thinking and actions are organized. According to philosopher Alva Noë (2015), art and philosophy belong to the same genus of human activities, because both of them display, make manifest, the ways in which human beings are organized. Philosophy makes manifest the ways in which ideas organize us. Art makes manifest the ways in which engagement with the world organizes us: “They are practices – methods of research – aiming at illuminating the ways we find ourselves organized and so, also, the ways we might reorganize ourselves” (17). For example, picture making presupposes the use of certain crafts, tools, and technologies. A pattern in a picture can embody a process of human experience that is linked to these crafts, tools, and technologies, to particular ways of being, thinking, and feeling. The technologies may become so habitual that we do not notice them anymore. Yet, they guide and shape our approach to picture making; they organize our thinking and practices: “technologies are organized ways of doing things” (Noë 2015, 25). Art and philosophy can enable one to investigate these modes of our organization, of how we are embedded in different modes of organization, and, eventually, give us the opportunity to reorganize ourselves. Metaphors, or metaphorical models, in my view, are akin to organizing technologies: they shape our thinking and acting, our ways of seeing and making sense of the world and ourselves. When we examine a pattern of conceptualization, we can identify in it the use of particular organizing metaphors.

Metaphors, which people both unconsciously and consciously use to make sense of their experience, organize and shape what they are able to see. As a result, we should pay attention to, usually implicit, ways of seeing, knowing and the metaphorical models of vision that guide these. Seeing can be conceived of in many different ways. Important in this respect is how we form concepts, categories; how we understand and make sense is grounded in our seeing and being in the world and is shaped by bodily experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Nuñez 2000; Johnson 2007).

4 In this sense, painting, for example, displays what it means to see; picture makers put picture making and vision itself on display, and, by doing so, may enable us to become aware of the ways of seeing we have been taking for granted and reorganize those ways of seeing (Noë 2015, 45).
I will gradually elaborate my theoretical argument in subsequent sections of this chapter. I will show that, if one does not examine these metaphorical models of vision implicitly embedded in how we approach and make sense of the past, one cannot notice that the division between objectivity and subjectivity needs to be reconsidered. Indeed, such a division is based on a disembodied epistemology, at odds with the most recent findings of embodied cognitive science.

3.1 Hans Jonas’ discussion of ocularcentrism

Departing from the metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING, it is, firstly, necessary to reflect on the sense of sight itself. Before there are models of vision and of an observer, there is a particular experience of sight, which contributes to our ways of thinking about knowledge and cognition. In this section, I discuss the distancing and static effects of sight, as characterized in biologically inspired philosophy of Hans Jonas, and illustrate how particular ocular metaphors form the basis of the epistemic virtue of objectivity.

Hans Jonas (1982 [1966]) reflects on vision in his classic phenomenological study of mind by pointing out three aspects of the experience of sight: its simultaneity, stasis, and distancing effect. Sight, he asserts, is a sense of the simultaneous, enabling the comprehension of many things at the same time with just one glance (Jonas 1982, 136). When people open their eyes, they can see multiple co-existent things in an instant. Sight is therefore less temporal than touch or hearing, which tend to construct perception on the basis of a temporal sequence of sensations (Jonas 1982, 136–138, 140–141). Touch and hearing are experienced temporally, where succeeding data are bound together into one temporal unity of experience with the help of memory. Touch and hearing are dynamic events accentuating change and movement. By contrast, even just a glance allows us to collect manifold, co-existent data related in their mutual proportion, accentuating the present state as more than just the passing experience of now:

The present, instead of being a pointlike experience, becomes a dimension within which things can be beheld at once and can be related to each other by the wandering glance of attention. This scanning, though proceeding in time, articulates only what was present to the first glance and what stays unchanged while being scanned. The time taken in taking-in the view is not experienced as the passing away of contents before new ones in the flux of event, but as a lasting of the same, an identity which is the extension of the instantaneous now and therefore unmoved, continued present – so long as no change occurs in the objects themselves. (Jonas 1982, 144)

“The simultaneity of sight, with its extended ‘present’ of enduring objects, allows the distinction between change and the unchanging and therefore between becoming and being” (Jonas 1982, 144–145). Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) would point out in this regard that the source domain of a particular experience of sight is metaphorically transposed to form an abstract ontological concept of being and the eternal. Jonas argues that, because of the elevation of sight in Greek thought, Greek philosophy could conceive
of the distinction between dynamic becoming and static being, between the temporal and the eternal. “The very contrast between eternity and temporality rests upon an idealization of ‘present’ experienced visually as the holder of stable contents as against the fleeting succession of nonvisual sensation” (Jonas 1982, 145).

Moreover, sight does not require active engagement with the seen object, whereas in hearing and, in particular, touch there is a dynamic interaction (Jonas 1982, 145–146). The sense of sight neutralizes the dynamic content. It allows the capture of an image that is detached from the object of sight, the capture of a “form” that is detached, abstracted from its “matter,” or an “essence” that is isolated from its “existence.”5 To put it another way, ocularcentrism permits one to conceive of a distinction and a gap between an object and its representation, between reality and knowledge. Restating Jonas’ argument, it could be argued that ocularcentrism enables the principle of mimesis, understood as imitation or representation. The abstract concept of mimesis and representational theory of mind derive from a metaphorical conceptualization on the basis of a concrete bodily experience of sight. Paradoxically, the qualities of the experience of sight hide the very bodily process, which gives rise to this experience (Johnson 2007).

The notion of mimesis, originating in Greek antiquity, was primarily discussed by Plato in relation to art and aesthetics, since art was assumed to imitate or represent reality. The visual, ocularcentric significance of the mimetic principle is not accidental: Plato used the term “mimesis” primarily in the visual sense, invoking a visual image being imitated or represented (Melberg 1995, 10). Vernant contends that Plato’s theoretical knowledge of pure forms is “the elaboration of the category of the image in Western thinking” (Vernant in Melberg 1995, 23). Plato’s “way of seeing” rendered him critical of art: Because it imitated only the mundane, fleeting appearances, art, therefore, created mere imitations or copies of illusory sensations and could not offer any reliable knowledge. Artistic creation, for Plato, was completely removed from reality and cognition (Rockmore 2013, 21). In Plato’s theory of knowledge, only the ideal, eternal, unchanging forms were true by virtue of their correspondence to reality. They are true for Plato precisely because they are detached from any concrete experiential quality and corporeality, wherein the latter are regarded as changing and, thus, unreal. As Rockmore (2013) explains,

Plato is at pains to show that imitation always fails for three related reasons as concerns the perspectival nature of appearance, the fact that imitation imitates appearance only but not reality, and the further claim that imitation is deceptive in presenting mere appearance as reality. The claim that imitation is always perspectival suggests that the forms appear to one who imitates from different perspectives, as if there were different things when there is in fact only one. (30)

In other words, multiperspectivity equals falsehood. The artists only imitate because they cannot “see” the invisible, unchanging forms. To know the real means to grasp the fixed, stable essence and not merely to imitate appearances (Rockmore 2013). Hence, the

5 The form-matter distinction of Greek metaphysics serves as the basis for Saussurean linguistics, its first principle being the arbitrariness of the binary sign. This holds important implications considering that Saussure’s work influenced much of structuralist and post-structuralist thought. I am indebted to Lisa Muszynski for this insight.

36
particular metaphorical conceptual distinction between the eternal and the ephemeral leads to an array of logical inferences.

It needs to be emphasized that the mimetic distinction between reality and representation, world and image, on the one hand, forms the basis for the correspondence theory of truth, where truth is defined in terms of correspondence between an object and its representation, between a pre-given, fixed world and its image. On the other hand, as I argue in Section 3.4, even when the notion of mimesis as sameness or correspondence is criticized in the 20th century by deconstructionist and poststructuralist thinkers, the mimetic gap between a representation and reality remains in place. Whereas, in deconstruction and poststructuralism, mimesis as sameness and identity is merely replaced by mimesis as difference and alterity. The disembodied, static dualism between world and word, reality and representation endures after the linguistic turn.

According to Jonas (1982, 147), the simultaneity, stasis, and distancing evoked by the sense of sight permitted the Greeks to differentiate between disinterested, neutral contemplation of “the thing as it is in itself” (Being/eternal) and “the thing as it affects me” (Becoming/temporal). This distinction is illustrated in Figure 4. Contemplation with the “eye of the soul” provided the neutral knowledge of eternal, clear, ideal forms, i.e. the theoretical knowledge of pure forms underlying individual appearances. On the other hand, sensing with the eyes of the body offered merely fleeting temporal sensations, which needed to be contemplated, beheld, and looked at attentively in order to attain the eternal theoretical truth. Sensory experience provided merely individual, subjective “perspectives,” which were not real because they were multiple, changing and could not be conveyed in abstracted, pure form. The ultimate reality was only knowable in the intellectual realm, through the mind, distanced from the body, which only deceived the soul (Rockmore 2013, 41). Theoretical contemplation offered eternal, disinterested truth of the thing as it is. This distinction between knowledge of “the thing as it is in itself” and knowledge of “the thing as it affects me” paved the way for the development of the idea of objectivity (Jonas 1982, 147).
To conclude, Jonas presents an argument that the modern idea of objectivity can be derived from ocularcentrism, or the dominant position of sight in Greek thought, art, and religion. The simultaneity, stasis, and distancing effected by the experience of sight enabled the Greeks to conceive of the distinction between the disinterested, objective knowledge of “the thing as it is in itself” and the subjective “thing as it affects me.” Concrete bodily experience shaped abstract conceptualization. Contemplation with the eye of the soul gave access to the knowledge of the underlying pure, ideal forms that were real because they were unchanging, irreducible, and untainted by the impermanent sensations offered by the bodily eyes. Knowledge came to be conceived as essences detached from existence, forms detached from matter: as incorporeal, detemporalized, static essences. Embodied, dynamic, temporal, and interactive experience is excluded from this type of knowledge. Crucially, objective knowledge, conceived in ocularcentric terms, relies on the principle of mimesis as sameness. Truth is sameness between an object and its representation; it is representational verisimilitude between an ideal form and its thing-like copy.

As I will show in the following section, ocularcentric visual metaphors, invoking this principle of “mimesis as sameness” inform the notions of objectivity, truth, and knowledge in the Western tradition of philosophy. These visual metaphors shape not only the understanding of what it means to know, how one is to know or what knowledge is, but they likewise imply a certain model of the cognizing self.
3.2 Ocularcentric visual metaphors in models of cognition

In this section, I will examine several visual metaphors, which are used to express what it means to know objectively, or to see objectively. Objectivity, as an epistemic virtue, is particularly apt for shaping scholarly ways of seeing. The reason why it is necessary to examine the scholarly ways of seeing of historians is that professional historiography constitutes a significant source for school textbook authors. Textbook authors use historians’ conceptualizations, models and metaphors, making them part of textbook knowledge. In this sense, history textbooks implicitly or explicitly prescribe certain metaphorically structured ways of seeing the past. This is because historians not only shape the ways of seeing by which they are, in turn, themselves modified, but they also shape how the readers of their historiographical accounts see themselves and their pasts.

One of the key metaphors for reflecting on how we see the past is the visual concept of perspective, for it highlights the relation between the knower and knowledge, between the seer and the seen. Perspective, as a cognitive metaphor, is particularly deeply embedded in the Western intellectual tradition (Ginzburg 2000, 29; cf. Jay 1993). In fact, we certainly notice upon inspection that the vocabulary of cognition in English is saturated with visual and, in particular, perspectival metaphors. We “acquire insights,” “observe,” “reflect,” “inspect” (from Latin specere, to look at); we adopt “standpoints” and “points of view”; we “draw parallels”; we “approach,” “sketch,” and “project” (Elkins 1994, 29). Visual metaphors structure our thought about cognition and knowledge, the relation between the knower and the known, between reality and representation.

Perspective is a highly elusive concept. It encompasses a broad array of different fields and disciplines. As such, it is ridden with contradictions and discordant associations. It is not my intention to offer an overview of the long and multilayered history of perspective. I employ it, however, as a conceptual tool to help me think about ways of seeing in the discipline of history. Perspective is typically defined as the technical innovation in the Renaissance art that allowed the rendering of three-dimensional space onto the two dimensions of the flat canvas. Based on geometry and mathematical calculations, Renaissance perspective enabled artists to show depth by converging all lines on a central, fixed point in the distance. The Latin word perspective derives from perspicere, which means “to see clearly, to examine, to ascertain, to see through” (Jay 1993, 53).

There are two major contradictions inherent to the concept of perspective. Firstly, it bears an internal dissonance because it encompasses both geometric and literary discourses. As a branch of mathematics, Euclidean and Cartesian geometry, it is formal and precise. But it is also deeply prevalent in philosophical thought, literary, and political texts as a cognitive metaphor that describes the vantage point from which we see the world. In this metaphorical sense, the concept of perspective continues to shape ways of seeing and knowing. Elkins (1994, 19) contends that it was G. W. von Leibniz, who first...
used the concept of perspective in a metaphorical sense, referring to the imperfect points of view of the individual monads and metaphorically comparing them to the perspective views of a town. In this respect, perspective is a pervasive concept that highlights the subjectivity of our sight, of how we constitute ourselves as the viewing subject.

For example, Carlo Ginzburg (2000, 26–27) provides convincing evidence to assume that Machiavelli’s concern for “the truth of the thing as it is” was inspired, or at least reinforced, by Leonardo da Vinci’s use of perspective in his approach to depicting reality. Perspective employed by Leonardo in his landscape sketches taught Machiavelli that “different points of view lead to different representations of political reality,” that “none of these representations […] can be considered as more truthful than the other”; and, hence, “the only way to achieve objectivity is to be […] a distant observer: an outsider” (Ginzburg 2000, 27). This is a case of how a concrete metaphorical conceptualization, based on experience of engagement with art, led to specific philosophical conclusions.

Since Machiavelli’s model of reality was based on the idea of conflict and the assumption that human nature was inevitably conflictual, this implied that the representations of reality must also be necessarily conflictual. In order to acquire the knowledge of reality as it is, one needed to become a detached observer because individual points of view could not be reconciled into a single objective view of the world. Machiavelli’s metaphorical model taken from perspectival vision is based on the metaphysical juxtaposition of the objective truth, which is detached, fixed, singular, disembodied, and a multitude of subjective individual points of view, which do not rise above mere impure appearances.

The Leibnizian appropriation of perspectival metaphors, by contrast, permitted the reconciliation and harmonious coexistence of multiple viewpoints in the similarly
disembodied and detached idea of one Great World, or God (Ginzburg 2000, 29). The plurality of perspectives and their individual inadequacies were merely a faulty apparition rather than the ultimate reality, but they could be overcome when each was seen as part of one Great World. What is, however, shared by both Machiavelli and Leibniz is the distinction between “the thing as it is” and “the thing as it affects me,” between the disinterested and the subjective. This distinction being lodged at the core of their ontology leads to the assumption that individual points of view are irrelevant, faulty, and compels them to seek an objective view, which omits the role of embodiment in cognition.

On the other hand, the difference between Machiavelli and Leibniz consists in the difference between realism and idealism. Realism, predicated on Greek metaphysics, has been construed as a detached, static, disembodied vision that defies reciprocity and objectifies what is seen. In this understanding, it is based on the ocular correspondence theory of truth that assumes the truth to be dependent on the congruence between a mental image/representation and the world. Idealism, by contrast, claims a timeless, universal, spiritual truth that exists beyond human history as some kind of ideal essence. Both are founded on the idea of the disembodied viewing subject.

To return to the visual metaphor of perspective, the second discordance in the concept of perspective is that, whereas metaphorically it is frequently assumed to connote subjectivity of sight, the linear, single-point perspective in visual arts is thought to evoke a detached, remote, self-effaced, objective sight. The linear, single-point perspective with a vanishing point in the horizon enhances the effect of externality of sight. This technical development of the Renaissance art leaves the observer fixed, static at a distance from the object of her gaze. Reciprocity between the viewer and the viewed is eliminated. The observer does not need to directly engage with the object, which is viewed at a distance from a single vantage point.7

The viewpoint of perspectival vision implied “a monocular, unblinking fixed eye (or more precisely, abstract point), rather than the two active, stereoscopic eyes of embodied actual vision” (Jay 1993, 54–55). The vision of the living body was replaced by an eternal, static, disembodied eye that saw the object “as it really is.” It is not surprising then that the linear perspective was elevated by philosophies that valued rational thought, which exemplified this kind of detached contemplation.

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7 Picture making, thus, reveals the ways in which our vision is organized by implicit metaphorical conceptualization. The application of linear perspective signified a break with medieval representational practices. If in the medieval art, a scene could be portrayed from multiple vantage points, in the Renaissance it was meant to be painted from a single vantage point (Jay 1993, 54). “What had previously been a confusing jumble of receding lines fell into place and became fixed at one point on the horizon.[…] Linear perspective supplied a fixed relationship between viewer and world” (Modrak 2011, 18, 21). John Berger makes a pertinent point about the implications of this change in representational practices: “The convention of perspective, which is unique to European art and which was first established in the early Renaissance, centers everything on the eye of the beholder. It is like a beam from a lighthouse – only instead of light travelling outwards, appearances travel in. The conventions called those appearances reality. Perspective makes the single eye the centre of the visible world. Everything converges on to the eye as to the vanishing point of infinity. The visible world is arranged for the spectator as the universe was once thought to be arranged for God.” (Berger 1972, 16)
The new regime of relations between observer and the world was also made evident in the 15th-century Renaissance invention of the *camera obscura*, an optical device that consists of a dark room or a box with a hole on one side. When light passes through the hole into a dark, enclosed interior, an inverted image appears on the wall opposite the hole. Crary (1990, 38–40) provides two reasons why the appearance of the *camera obscura* indicated a new model of subjectivity, of the cognizing self. Firstly, it defined “an observer as isolated, enclosed, and autonomous within its dark confines.” It implied an observer’s withdrawal from the world in order to clarify one’s relation to the external world. Secondly, it separated the act of seeing from the physical body of the observed; it decorporealized vision. Additionally, unlike a perspectival construction, the *camera obscura* mechanism did not restrict the site or area from which the image is presented in a most coherent way and, thus, prevented “the observer from seeing his or her position as part of the representation” (Crary 1990, 41). It only amplified the effect of a disembodied, detached, objectively ordered representation enabled by the monocular, fixed eye of the mind.

The metaphor of the mind’s eye turned out to be persistent in the Western intellectual tradition. Richard Rorty (1979, 49–50) notes, for example, how both Descartes and Locke, each standing for epistemologies of rationalism and empiricism, conceived of “the human mind as an inner space in which both pains and clear and distinct ideas passed in review before an Inner Eye.” This was the novelty of Descartes, according to Rorty (1979, 50): “the notion of a single inner space in which bodily and perceptual sensations, mathematical truths, moral rules, the idea of God, moods of depression, and all the rest of what we now call “mental” were objects of quasi-observation.” Rorty (1979, 38) comments that the metaphor of the Eye of the Mind became the model for the better, higher kind of cognitive powers, which give access to the knowledge of the purest, universal things and which, thus, distinguish men from beasts. Mind, as an internalized essence of a human being, was the source of universal knowledge.
What this implied was that the description of the world could be objective, only if it was made from a point outside the world. The separation between an interiorized, disembodied subject and an external world became a precondition of objective knowledge about the world. The mind was conceived by the rationalist Descartes as an enclosed space, separate from the body and the external world, much like the camera obscura: “I will now shut my eyes, stop my ears, and withdraw my senses. I will eliminate from my thoughts all images of bodily things, or rather, since this is hardly possible, I will regard all such images as vacuous, false and worthless.” (Descartes [1641] 1984, 24).

For René Descartes, the eye of the intellect was prior to sense experience provided by the eyes of the body. It was the mind, not the eyes, that really sees. He alluded to the evidence of perspectival art to make his point: mind, like the perspectival construction of reality on the picture plane, “produces the experience of correct vision by devices that eschew perfect resemblance”; mind seeks after clear and distinct representations of the external world that are not perfect reproductions of this external reality, that are representations rather than perfect similitudes (Jay 1993, 76). The rationalized mental representations are the knowledge of true reality, while vision of the bodily eyes can be deceptive. Also, mind could be stimulated by words and signs that “do not in any way resemble the things which they signify” (Descartes 2001, 89–90).

Although Martin Jay considers this hint of a shift in Descartes from perfect similitudes to imperfect representations of the external world in the mind to be an early sign of an emerging non-visual, linguistically oriented epistemology, I tend to disagree with him. As indicated in section 3.1, Hans Jonas shows that the dichotomy between an image and the object of sight, between representation and reality arises from the ocularcentrism of ancient Greek philosophy. Neutralization of the dynamic content in sight enables one to conceive the possibility of capturing an image that is detached from the object of sight, a form detached from contents, essence from existence. Linguistically oriented epistemology, which refutes perfect resemblance, is therefore still dependent on the ocular metaphor and the distancing, static effect of sight, which neutralize the dynamic content in the act of seeing and allow for the separation between reality and its representations, world and a mental image of the world. There is a continuity of metaphorical conceptualization, based on visual-optical distinction between the world and the image, whether the image of the external world is a perfect resemblance or imperfect representation.

As opposed to Descartes’s deductive primacy of the mind, the empiricist advocates of the scientific method prized intersubjective visual witnessing as a source of knowledge and held faith in the primacy of sensory experience (Jay 1993, 64). However, as indicated above, Lockean empiricism and Cartesian rationalism shared the ocular metaphor of the Inner Eye, or the eye of the mind. For empiricists, such as Locke, real essences can be known only by close empirical observation. The deductive theoretical vision was held to be suspicious, prone to subjective speculation, unable to give access to the knowledge of

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8 Jay (1993, 80) adds that despite this allusion to signs and words, Descartes remained a firm ontological realist subscribing to a correspondence theory of truth; he also believed that the mind’s natural geometry corresponded to that of the natural world.
the thing as it is. All truth claims needed to be verified with empirical tests. The sense experience preceded any ideas in the mind. Yet, this empiricist inductive gaze was similarly decorporealized in that it was modeled upon the ocular-optic metaphors. For Locke, knowing was possible because the unblinking eye of the Mind observed the images of the external world imprinted on it (Rorty 1979, 143–144).

Metaphors play an important role in structuring Locke’s view of the mind. M.H. Abrams characterizes this view as follows:

The mind in Locke’s *Essay* is said to resemble a mirror which fixes the objects it reflects. Or […] it is a tabula rasa on which sensations write or paint themselves. Or (employing the analogy of the *camera obscura*, in which the light, entering through a small aperture, throws an image of the external scene on the wall) external and internal senses are said to be “the windows by which light is let into this *dark room*.” (Abrams 1953, 57)

Hence, the bodily eyes through which the impressions were acquired functioned like the aperture of the *camera obscura*, while the mind was understood as the mirror of the external world or a tablet on which imprints are made. In Locke’s own words:

For, methinks, the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little openings left, to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without: would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man, in reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas of them.” (Locke in Abrams 1953, 57)

The empiricist way of seeing placed the ocular apparatus outside the cognizing self, allowing for the detachment and noninvolvement of the observer with what is seen. Eyes registered images as purely passive sensation that mirrored the external world onto the mind as a white sheet of paper, void of any innate ideas. Mind, conceived as a mirror, cannot “refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas which the objects set before it do therein produce” (Locke in Abrams 1953, 345). Rorty is convinced that the metaphor of mind as mirror bears particular influence in the Western philosophical tradition:

It is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which determine most of our philosophical convictions. The picture which holds traditional philosophy captive is that of the mind as a great mirror, containing various representations — some accurate, some not — and capable of being studied by pure, nonempirical methods. Without the notion of the mind as mirror, the notion of knowledge as accuracy of representation would not have suggested itself. (Rorty 1979, 12)

I would add that both deductive rationalist and inductive empiricist models of vision and of the knowing self undermined the body and distanced the embodied knower from the world. Although they prioritized either the monocular eye of the mind or the eyes as an opening/lens through which the light passes in, they nevertheless both sought out the knowledge envisioned as a disembodied truth out there in the world or underlying the subjective appearances, separate from embodied, temporally extended experience of the subject. The disembodied eye only needed to replicate the world out there, not engage
with it. As Norman Bryson (1988, 11) notes, an image of the world, which departs from fidelity in replication of the world, is viewed exclusively negatively: “the painter has misperceived the optical truth, or has been unable, through lack of skill, or through excess of ‘style’, to match optical truth on canvas.” Personal style is a deviation:

The Essential Copy, if it were ever achieved, would possess no stylistic features [...].[...] Idiosyncrasies of the palette, habitual deformations of the figures, the characteristic signature brushwork, these reflexes that spring from the body and from the past history of the painter are therefore consigned to an underside of the official ideology. [...] Indifferent to the exalted mission with which the image has been entrusted, style emanates from the residue of the body which its optical theorization has thought to exclude. (Bryson 1988, 7)

The empiricist vision found its expression in the art movement of Impressionism. Impressionists replaced the Cartesian, idealized, geometricalized space seen from afar with the aim to capture the experience of light and color on the retinas of their eyes (Jay 1993, 154). Therefore, for example, Cézanne could proudly state that “being a painter I attach myself first of all to visual sensation” (Chipp 1968, 13). The subject of the painting was not very important for Impressionists. Instead, they sought to paint the experience of sight itself, the experience of stimulus on the retinas: pure sensation was their topic (Jay 1993, 154).

As indicated in Table 1 below, the visual modes of depiction in art are closely related to dominant epistemological models of the era (Abrams 1953, 69). It could be argued that painting, due to its embrace of optics and optical devices, served as a perceptual model for the knowledge of the world (Gregori in Hockney 2001, 222). As Lapucci takes note, the ambition to invent a means to achieve the perfect imitation of nature seems to have been a phenomenon that developed in Northern Italian culture during the late Renaissance, through the use of three different types of instruments: perspective instruments, optical systems (they formed reduced representations of the world in its form of light, chiaroscuro, and colour through the use of mirrors and lenses), and magic games. (Lapucci in Hockney 2001, 223–224)

Hockney (2001) provides ample evidence on how painters starting from the end of the 15th century were very likely using optical devices to aid in their work, most prominently the camera obscura. Pictures have ways of seeing and tools of craft built into them (Hockney 2001). The camera obscura offered a view of nature represented with complete truth, and it became a metaphorical model of cognition both in art and science. Therefore, it makes sense that the same metaphorical models inform the ways of seeing both in philosophy and art. Despite the differences between Cartesian rationalism, Lockean empiricism and poststructuralist linguistic epistemology, what these different ways of knowing share is the ocularcentric metaphors which inform their conceptualization of knowledge, truth, cognition. These visual metaphors enable a certain understanding of what a cognizing subject is, what constitutes knowing, and how the cognizing subject can know, by way of what dispositions, rules, attitudes towards the world and the self. In perspectival, geometricalized construction, rationalized mental representations, as pure essences, constitute the real, objective knowledge, echoing a Platonic distinction between
pure forms and impermanent sense experience (see the left-hand column of Table 1). Knowledge is a theoretically deduced mental abstraction achieved by taking distance from temporal, embodied experience of the cognizing self. This theoretical, abstract knowledge corresponds to the external world and is, hence, truthful.

Impressionism captures what amounts to an epistemological departure from the Cartesian theoretical deduction. The latter is mistrusted and instead pure sensation acquired by empirical observation is prized as the source of reliable knowledge. An inductive gaze reconceives the importance of bodily eyes, but in isolation from the rest of the body: empiricist eyes are like an opening or the lens of an optical device, through which images of the external world pass into the mind (see the middle column of Table 1). Lastly, the shift to 20th-century abstract art coincides with the emergence of linguistic theories, which refute an empiricist mimesis of the world (see the right-hand column of Table 1). It is argued that the correspondence truth of representations of the world cannot be ascertained and, therefore, all representations are arbitrary, subjective, fleeting appearances. Yet, in all these three broad epistemological inclinations, the argumentation relies on the ocularcentric tradition by way of static, disembodied metaphorical models and their neglect of the dynamic body of the viewer in the act of seeing.

Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectival construction</th>
<th>Impressionism</th>
<th>Abstractionism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perspective, camera obscura</td>
<td>Camera obscura, mirror</td>
<td>Structuralism and post-structuralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descartes, rationalism</td>
<td>Locke, Enlightenment, Empiricism</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rationalized mental representations as pure essences, pure forms</td>
<td>Mimetic images, imprints, reproductions, facts by way of pure sensation, pure data</td>
<td>Representations, images, and words are arbitrary, subjective appearances, not related to the external world; no underlying transcendental truth; abstract form appreciated by itself with no grounding in the viewing subject or environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive, detached reflection, theoretical deduction</td>
<td>Passive observation, registration Theoretical deduction mistrusted: a shift to empiricism</td>
<td>Return to the mind; empiricist mimesis mistrusted, a shift to linguistic theories; Still a disembodied ocularcentric framework</td>
</tr>
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Thus, ways of seeing the world matter, in that ways of seeing are closely linked to ways of knowing and depicting the world. This relation between ways of seeing, knowing and depicting produces a way to be in the world. It results in a particular concept of the self.
and its relation to the world, which, conversely, shapes our ways of seeing, knowing, and depicting. At first, this seems quite self-evident, yet the implication of this relationship is important. It means that the self cannot be metaphorically conceptualized as a thing; it is not something you can place in front of yourself, possess or own in the material sense. Nor is it some kind of spiritual essence existing beyond space and time. The self does not exist outside ourselves: it is necessarily embodied. Ways of seeing, knowing, and depicting shape the self. However, one can also choose to see, to know, and to depict the world in alternative ways, in effect changing the self. That is what artists seek after when they question the taken for granted ways to see and depict the world and strive to reconceive what it is to see or how one is to see. As Noë (2015) contends, art affords us opportunities to explore how we engage with the world: painters can put the activity of picture making, or vision itself, up for exploration. Paintings do not just represent the world; paintings put on display how and what we see, what it means to depict, what and how we seek to depict or express. Noë, thus, argues that “painting as an art, like poetry and fiction, is in the business of writing us, or writing us again or anew” (2015, 45).

As professional practitioners of their field, historians are also trained in particular ways of seeing, knowing and depicting, in particular modes of organization of their activities. This interplay of seeing, knowing and depicting the past implies a way of being a professional historian – a certain professional self as a regulative ideal for both aspiring trainees and experienced practitioners in the profession. Noë (2015, 8) argues, for example, that the critical level at which the emergent process of self is taking place is not the sub-personal level – the level of neural structures, for example – or the personal level – the level of deliberate, authoritative decisions and actions, but “the embodiment level.” In this understanding, historians co-evolve together with the environments in which they are embedded, and which are partially of their own making. It is an emergent, enactive process, meaning that the historian’s self and ways of seeing arise through a process of dynamic interaction between the historian and his or her lived environment (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1993 [1991]).

Not only do historians shape themselves and shape the practices by which they are, in turn, themselves modified; historians also shape how the readers of their accounts of the past come to view themselves and their respective individual and collective pasts. Academic historiography produced by historians is used by school textbook authors, rendering historians’ conceptualizations, models and metaphors part of textbook knowledge (cf. Repoussi & Tutiaux-Guillon 2010, 157; Jonker 2012). As a result, history textbooks offer not just facts about the past, but they enable pupils to view the past in certain ways, to make sense of it in certain ways rather than others; they highlight certain aspects and hide others. History textbooks may teach pupils to regard the past in an exclusively detached, fixed, and distancing way in order to render the past knowable in objective terms, or they may also teach them to make sense of the past as a process of life. Moreover, as the context in which historians and textbook authors write shifts and

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9 See, for example, Section 3.3, where I discuss how Leopold von Ranke and his generation, shaped the discipline of history and the historical seminar.
changes, so do the narratives and interpretations of the past. New experience elicits change in our relation to the past, as this applies equally to history and memory:

The redrafting of memories of our past experience is always in process, always a cumulative assemblage of what was recalled at different stages of our lives by successive versions of the person whose memory was thereby revised, but it is nevertheless around these relative consistencies, and what we try to hold onto in our ongoing revaluations of experience, that our sense of ourselves across the particular times in our lives hangs together and perdures. (Keithley and Pickering 2012, 16)

Hence, history textbooks not only elucidate the “what” and “why” of the past but, in equal measure, they expand or narrow down the possibilities of seeing the past in certain ways. History textbooks regulate vision by prescribing certain metaphorically structured ways of seeing the past without making pupils aware of alternative possibilities in how to attend to, conceptualize, and explain the past. The way textbooks depict the past can tell much about their authors and the cultural context in which they are written.

I understand cultural ways of doing things, routinized practices, prescriptive rules and styles as particular forms of “entanglement” (Hodder 2012) rather than as established, rigid “wholes” that completely determine what and how we do what we do. By entanglements, British archaeologist Ian Hodder (2012) means specific and non-arbitrary linkages between human experience, things, and abstract ideas. Following Hodder’s (2012) approach, one can comprehend and appreciate connections between ways of seeing in Western philosophy and visual art as cross-domain metaphorical associations that emerge between different fields and practices, as people are tangled up in specific ideas and build metaphors across domains. In this sense, a tradition can function not just by imposing homogeneous ways of seeing, but by affording or bestowing metaphorical associations for specific and varied entanglements of a human being. I believe this applies to historians, too, whose cognizing selves emerge and are enacted in relation to concrete entanglements in which they find themselves. Historians’ ways of seeing are the products of their particular entanglements of lived experience, things, and ideas they encountered, which leads to a question: What are these particular forms of entanglement? How do they teach the cognizing self – in this case, the historian – to see and relate to the past?

In what follows, I will examine how the abstract epistemic idea of objectivity as well as experience shaped the ways of seeing of concrete professional historians. I want to examine their understandings of what it means to be objective, how one is to approach and view the past in order to be objective, and what concept of the professional self this implies. Section 3.3 serves as an illustration of how metaphorical models of cognition can shape historians’ ways of seeing.

3.3 Objectivity and knowing selves in history

In this section, I explore how historians’ scholarly work might have been influenced by their personal experiences and life trajectories. Interaction with lived environment and the
specific “entanglements” that ensue from such interaction shape historians’ vision, highlighting the importance of lived experience to scholarly work. Lived experience becomes a source of metaphors, which organize historians’ ways of engaging with the past. The impact of lived experience on historians’ work can be regarded as one of the ways in which embodiment manifests in scholarly work, which I will elaborate more on in Section 3.6.2.

As indicated in the previous section, objective knowledge of the “thing as it is” in the modern scientific order implied an empiricist vision, where the embodied self of the knower is eliminated. Theoretical deduction was rendered suspect as a hindrance to the knowledge of the external world. As a solution to this problem, a detached, disembodied, self-effacing way of seeing was adopted as the role model of scholarly vision. An empiricist vision, although it seems to rely on the bodily eyes rather than the eye of the mind, is, in fact, similarly detached, disembodied, because the eyes that register images of the external world are metaphorically modeled on the “eyes” of optical devices rather than on those of living people. The body being excluded, the mechanical eyes can let in images of the world that both mirror it in the mind and have little to do with the lived experience of the person, who makes them and who interacts with the world. These images, following the mimetic principle of truth, are faithful reproductions of the distanced world out there. Examples of such an “objective” gaze can be found in the history of the natural and physical sciences, where objectivity has been equated with the perspective of mechanical photography (e.g., Daston & Galison 2010). The monocular, disincarnated eye of the camera seems to allow for a perfect reproduction of reality without any creative intervention of the person taking such a picture.

Photography came to be prized in the second half of the 19th century by many scientists coming from a wide range of disciplines as enabling the coveted “objective view” of reality, the representation of reality as it really is (e.g., Daston & Galison 2010; Tucker 1997, 2005). One could argue that it became the new metaphorical model for cognition in the long line of optical devices. Mechanical photography (to be distinguished from aesthetic photography, which was not considered objective in its representation) seemed to allow scientists to overcome their biggest challenge and fear – the intrusion of the willful self in the process of investigation (Daston & Galison 2010, 133–135), considered to be the main enemy of objectivity. The lure to aestheticize, schematize, simplify, and theorize was to be countered by any means: the aim was to scrupulously depict the surface of reality rather than deduce the characteristic, the general, the typical. The photographic image could offer a direct, faithful reproduction of the seen world.\(^\text{10}\)

\(^{10}\text{As Jay (1993, 128–130) notes, however, photography’s ability to offer verisimilitude and accurate reproduction of “the real” was not without its critics. By the late 20th century, the realist paradigm and its mimetic claims were mostly obliterated. But what needs to be highlighted here is that the critique of photography was still focused on the accuracy, on the resemblance between the image and the real world. The critics of the mimetic claims of photography denounced it by emphasizing why it was a subjective representation, intruded on by the willful self, rather than because a photographic image expressed the lived, embodied experience of the relation between self and world. What they sought to emphasize was how the photographic image only offered appearances, fleeting sensations that prevented access to the “really real,” the objective truth. They underlined how photographs could be retouched, doctored, altered – fictionalized.}\)
important feature of the camera was that it could “create a temporality of pure presentness in which the historical becoming of narrative time was stripped away” (Jay 1993, 134). A photographic image, as the truthful reproduction of reality, turned knowledge into a disembodied, eternalized essence, absolute Being, evoking the Greek metaphysics: “In the illustrated newspapers, the world is turned into a photographable present and the photographed present is completely eternalized. It seems to be snatched from death; in reality, it surrenders itself to it” (Kracauer 1993 [1927], 433). Although historical knowledge as disembodied, detemporalized reproductions of the past are seemingly set in time, their temporal and experiential quality is overshadowed.

Other techniques, besides photography, could also help the scientist in the quest for self-effacement, such as wood engravings and tracings, which were also considered appropriate for objective representation (Daston & Galison 2010, 138). The epistemic virtue of objectivity demanded that the projections of the self, its preconceptions, theories, interpretations be controlled and effaced. What must be underlined is that the epistemic virtue of objectivity simultaneously expressed an ethical norm. It not only guided the scientists by determining ways of knowing and securing knowledge, but likewise molded the self of the scientist. The conception of objectivity defined the right way to see and to depict reality as well as the right way to be a scientist. The new scientist self, compatible with the ethics of objectivity, had to practice self-restraint from temptations to intervene, to interpret, to theorize (Daston & Galison 2010, 122). The mechanical objectivity of a machine was held to be the metaphorical model of scientific virtue: it was patient, tireless, and selfless.

The discipline of history likewise did not escape the impact of scientific empiricism with its ethics of scholarly self-effacement and restraint. The first comprehensive manual of history on these new scientific principles, “Introduction aux Études Historiques,” by Charles-Victor Langlois and Charles Seignobos, published in 1898 in France, and later translated into English in 1909, aimed to render history as accurate and scientific as were the natural sciences. It turned out to be the most influential manual of its kind for aspiring historians in the decades to come, both in Europe and in the United States. It listed the following virtues, necessary for a proper scholar:

The true scholar is cool, reserved, circumspect. [H]e never hurries. [...] [H]e ought to be gifted with prudence, an exceptionally powerful attention and will, and, moreover, to combine a speculative turn of mind with complete disinterestedness and little taste for action [...]. (Langlois & Seignobos 1932, 126–127)

In the tasks of textual criticism, investigation of sources, description and compilation, a historian, above all, needed to practice reserve and perseverance and not permit involuntary imagination to intrude upon the intellectual work. Imagination needed to be mastered, conquered, overcome, in order to attain scrupulous evidentiary, factual accuracy. Langlois and Seignobos (1932, 125–126) refer to inaccuracy as a disease, the defeat of which requires historians to embrace and cultivate self-restraint at all times as part of their professional identity. The self itself becomes the object of mastery, control, and improvement.
The virtue of disinterestedness and cool, reserved, controlled pursuit of truth epitomized the qualities of the ideal historian, thus, imitating the mechanical objectivity of a tireless, patient, and selfless machine. Peter Novick (1988), depicting the development of the idea of objectivity among American professional historians, offers the following definition of historical objectivity as the *raison d’être* of the craft in the American context which is worthy of being quoted at length:

> The assumptions on which it rests include a commitment to the reality of the past, and to truth as correspondence to that reality; a sharp separation between knower and known, between fact and value, and, above all, between history and fiction. Historical facts are seen as prior to and independent of interpretation: the value of an interpretation is judged by how well it accounts for the facts; if contradicted by the facts, it must be abandoned. Truth is one, not perspectival. Whatever patterns exist in history are “found”, not “made”. [...] The objective historian’s role is that of a neutral, or disinterested, judge; it must never degenerate into that of advocate or, even worse, propagandist. The historian’s conclusions are expected to display the standard judicial qualities of balance and evenhandedness. As with the judiciary, these qualities are guarded by the insulation of the historical profession from social pressure or political influence, and by the individual historian avoiding partisanship or bias [...] [H]istorians, as historians, must purge themselves of external loyalties: the historian’s primary allegiance is to “the objective historical truth” and to professional colleagues who share a commitment to cooperative, cumulative efforts to advance toward that goal. (Novick 1988, 1–2)

It is notable how objectivity implied a sharp separation of the knower and the known as well as the externality of historical facts. Facts were as images let in through the aperture of the *camera obscura* and reflected in the mind as a mirror. Holding onto this idea of objectivity, American professional historians were convinced that they were following the path of their hero – the German historian Leopold von Ranke (Iggers 1962; Novick 1988).

Ironically, however, as Novick (1988, 26–31) duly explains, they failed to comprehend Ranke’s ideas and the ways in which these ideas fit into the German tradition of historiography. The discipline of history in Germany developed within the idealist tradition as part of the humanities. It was a gross misjudgment, therefore, to assume that, when Ranke spoke about the reconstruction of the past “as it really happened,” he intended to represent history as just another science operating on the basis of empiricism. To this day, Leopold von Ranke is considered to have fathered the “scientific,” professionalized discipline of history in the 19th century. The quest for the truth of the past by means of source criticism, archival research, and seminar training is attributed to him as his most important legacy in the discipline of history. Yet, Ranke’s conception of historical scholarship extends far beyond the well-known dictum to uncover the past “*wie es eigentlich gewesen.*” What tends to be overlooked is Ranke’s ties to German idealistic philosophy, which permeated his theoretical considerations of historical practice (Iggers 1962, 1988; Iggers & von Moltke 1973).

Ranke’s notion of objectivity cannot be appropriately grasped without placing it in the context of his religious views and an emphasis on the individuality of existence (Iggers & von Moltke 1973). For Ranke, every individual, every institution, or even a whole culture, possessed a certain unique individuality, a meaningful unity, and this is precisely what
constitutes, for him, the main object of historical investigation. The aim of the historical investigation is to apprehend the general truth through the unique, the individual, and the particular. He posits that “history recognizes something infinite in every existence: in every condition, in every being, something eternal, coming from God; and this is its vital principle. How could anything be without the divine basis of its existence?” (Ranke in Iggers & von Moltke 1973, 38). The approach of a historian is, then, to grasp the eternal dwelling in each individuality, to understand its uniqueness by a reconstruction of the past. The whole endeavor to unravel what happened in the past is dedicated to this higher purpose of recognizing the act of the human spirit in every existence: “By recognizing something sublime in the event, the condition, or the person we want to know about, we acquire a certain esteem for that which has transpired, passed or appeared.” (Ranke in Iggers & von Moltke 1973, 39). This essence and inner core of existence is the ultimate truth the historian is trying to attain. For Ranke, the focus on the empirical evidence, as important as it was, was only a means to cognize the atemporal, divine truth. Ranke evokes the distinction between the eternal and the temporal, the Platonic knowledge of pure, ideal forms and the knowledge of fleeting external manifestations of individuality.

Appreciation of the particular individuality also constitutes the leading idea of German historicism (Historismus) which advocates that each epoch, culture or generation should be viewed on their own terms, in their specific temporal and cultural context, as ends in themselves.11 Since there is an inherent positive value in all products of history, the people of the past and their actions should not be judged from a contemporary perspective. One finds this point of view strongly expressed by Ranke:

We judge the past too often by the present situation. [...] This may be the way of proceeding in politics, but it is not truly historical. We, who search for truth, even in error, who view every existence as permeated with original life, must above all avoid this error. Where there is any similar struggle, both parties must be viewed on their own ground, in their own environment, so to speak, in their own particular inner state. We must understand them before we judge them. (Ranke in Iggers & von Moltke 1973, 41–42)

Furthermore, Ranke argues that when a historian encounters competing perspectives or disputes, he must rise

to contemplate the essential character of opposing, conflicting elements, and see how complex and entangled they are. It is not up to us to judge error and truth as such. We merely observe one figure arising side by side with another figure; life, side by side with life; effect, side by side with counter effect. Our task is to penetrate them to the bottom of their existence and to portray them with complete objectivity. (Ranke in Iggers & von Moltke 1973, 42)

11 In line with this ethical reasoning, Ranke, for example, insisted that historians should refrain from passing moral judgment on Machiavelli and attempt to understand his writings from the point of view of Machiavelli’s specific historical situation (Iggers 1988, 66–68). As Iggers (1988, 67) points out, Ranke conceded that there was something “shocking” in Machiavelli’s “The Prince,” but he still insisted that his teachings should not be conceived as a general instructive guide for political action, since they were intended specifically for the corrupt condition of Italy at that time.
He affirms that “[i]t is not up to history even to pass judgment in theory on the struggle which the past teaches it. History knows very well that the struggle will be decided according to God’s will” (Ranke in Iggers and von Moltke 1973, 43). Objectivity is, thus, conceived more as an abstention from judgment rather than disinterested neutrality. The historian should give due attention to the unique existence, the meaningful unity of the individuality under research. The historian is not in a position to pass judgment, since the final judgment is, in all circumstances, the prerogative of God. The historian’s objective approach to the past could at most disclose the existing order of things as intended by God (Iggers 1997, 26).

Ranke also opposes the objection that the historian cannot separate himself from his opinions and will judge the past according to his political or religious views. He admits that the historian may obviously be too devoted to his opinions, but downplays the impact of such bias on the objectivity of historical knowledge by asserting that

this is not all that matters. We can see the error, but where is there no error? This will not lead us to deny the realities of the existence. Next to the good we recognize evil, but this is an evil which is inherent in the situation. (Ranke in Iggers & von Moltke 1973, 42)

The good and the evil are, then, qualities of the historical reality, of the individuality of existence itself rather than sense-making produced by the historian. The historian is not required to pass judgment. The historical reality readily possesses value quality, which can be objectively recognized by historians, if they immerse themselves in the external manifestations of the individuality. Even if historians happen to exhibit some present-minded partiality in their attitude, their judgment will be restricted by the value inherent in the subject matter.

However, this reveals ambivalence in Ranke’s concept of objectivity. On the one hand, he firmly asserts that

every epoch is immediate to God, and its worth is not at all based on what derives from it but rests in its own existence, in its own self. In this way the contemplation of history, that is to say of individual life in history, acquires its own particular attraction, since now every epoch must be seen as something valid in itself and appears highly worthy of consideration. (Ranke in Iggers & von Moltke, 53)

Yet, he also ambiguously qualifies that

although every epoch has its justification and its worth in and by itself, one still must not overlook what came forth from it. The historian must therefore, secondly, perceive the difference between the individual epochs, in order to observe the inner necessity of the sequence. (Ranke in Iggers and von Moltke 1973, 54)

For instance, Ranke observes that while the oldest epoch of “Asian culture” was the most flourishing, the consecutive epochs show a pattern of regression, and the invasion of the Mongols leads to the disappearance of culture in Asia altogether (Ranke in Iggers & von Moltke 1973, 52). This reveals that Ranke, in fact, does not consistently apply his own view that each epoch is equally worthy in its own self or is equally “immediate to God.”
The same inconsistency between Ranke’s philosophical considerations and historical practice is observed by Iggers (1983, 82–84), who notes that Ranke distinguishes between the healthy state and the sick state, wherein he, as the historian, is capable of determining which characteristics express the healthy developments in congruence with the inherent spiritual idea of the state, and which ought to be rejected or fought against as alien or foreign elements. Hence, Ranke’s way of seeing the past was refracted through the lens of his preference for states and orders, and their “natural” development over time, as opposed to the revolutionary upheavals, which were deviations from the “natural evolution.” Ranke’s way of approaching and viewing the past was, unsurprisingly, very much informed by his own values and beliefs, his own forms of “entanglement” (Hodder 2012).

This rather long recourse to Ranke’s idea of objectivity serves to highlight the misunderstandings surrounding the image of Ranke as a positivist. It shows that while Ranke advocated “extinguishing one’s personality” and advised self-restraint from passing judgment on the past, his idea of objectivity had more to do with a romantic conservative reaction against the critical philosophy of the Enlightenment than the positivist view from nowhere (Novick 1988, 26–27). He was primarily concerned to counter the scholars of the Enlightenment who, in his view, judged the past without paying enough attention to the unique individuality of the preceding epochs, which needed to be seen as worthy on their own terms (Novick 1988, 27).

Despite the ambivalences and the conservative leanings in the practical application of Rankean objectivity, the positivist objectivity is different from Ranke’s declared goal to see the essence at the core of external manifestations of individuality, to grasp the inner content of individuality on its own terms. Yet Rankean objectivity is still based on Platonic disembodied metaphysics, which distinguishes between the eternal and the changing, the essence and existence, the thing as it is and the thing as it appears. According to Ranke, historians should immerse themselves in the external manifestations of individuality, in the empirical evidence, in order to grasp the underlying essence by intuitive apperception. It is through this intuitive contemplation that historians acquire insight into the underlying forces or tendencies of spirit operating in history which is, ultimately, what they seek after by investigating the past.

Notwithstanding all the above qualifications of objectivity, it was common for the 19th century professional historians to conceive of their historical discourse as standing in sharp contrast to the preceding “unscientific” literary tradition. Although, as Iggers (1997, 3) points out, the split was not as wide as the proponents of the “scientific” history would have liked to assume. In fact, the older literary tradition of history shared certain foundational assumptions with the 19th century “scientific” orientation, which subsequently lasted well into the 20th century (Iggers 1997). The first of these assumptions was the correspondence theory of truth, according to which history conveys the truth of what happened as a mirrored reflection. Secondly, it was presumed that actions of people represent their intentions and historians are in a position to comprehend these intentions and build a narrative on their basis. Lastly, narrative, ordered in a chronological sequence, was privileged as the most proper form of historical writing (Iggers 1997).

Ranke’s heritage – critical source analysis, archival research and the historical seminar – was adopted by historians throughout Europe and the United States, who were
convinced that the new methods of historical study would not only render historical investigation more scientific, but also transform and perfect the character of aspiring students, or their scientific self (Smith 2000). Smith (2000, 110) illuminates how this new historian self, molded in the process of professionalization, was inseparable from the gender- and class-bound self. The historical seminar enabled the performance of masculine, middle-class values and allowed “the forthright (or “transparent”), autonomous, and middle-class self to come into being”, as opposed to the 18th century academies and social salons under the patronage of the aristocracy. The historical seminar transformed mere gentlemen into professionals: The old hierarchies of status and estate surrendered to the expertise in methods of inquiry, in turn, enabling the formation of fraternal brotherhood of professional practitioners (Smith 2000, 111). The seminar embodied “manly work”: It initiated trainees into a fraternal community of active, hard-working “men” endowed with specific attributes of professional expertise (Smith 2000, 114–115). Consequently, professional historians adopted a language of scholarly history, which took pride in its plain style and detailed factuality – as opposed to the amateur history with its use of rhetorical embellishment and philosophical deduction. Smith taps into an interesting parallel between the models of masculinity in the 19th century and the nature of disembodied scholarly vision.12

The gendering of scientific history in the 19th century had much in common with the approach of investigation in the natural and physical sciences. Science involved the active, inquiring mind of men observing and manipulating passive matter and it offered a model to emulate for historians, too. The operations of mind, importantly, were inseparable from the eyesight, which had to be specifically trained. Smith (2000, 141) notes how in the early 19th century the eye was considered by scientists to be distinct from all the other parts of the body. It was an instrument, a lens outside the realm of the physical body, outside the realm of the emotional body. The scientist, likewise, had to bypass the body, dissociate from the body, as “standing outside oneself” was the only way to reach the dispassionate truth (Smith 2000, 141). This logic of disembodied eyesight, a disembodied way of seeing and of being, likewise served as an ideal for professional historians. The scholarly mind was supposed to remain calm, lucid, disembodied, distant, in order to capture the truth, in effect, recapitulating the general ideal of the 19th-century manhood and repressing femininity in the name of truth (Smith 2000, 141–143).13

12 In the pursuit of rational knowledge of the past, one of the great fears of historians was to fall into obsession, to develop a fetishism for archival documents to such an extent that it might cloud their judgment in separating truth from falsehood, i.e. undermine their objectivity (Smith 2000, 121–124). Archival repositories of documents were often described by historians of the 19th century in sexual metaphors as princesses needing to be saved by chivalrous knights-historians or as untouched virgins (Smith 2000, 119–125). The disciplinary methods of historical inquiry served the function to prevent the dangers of delusion. They were the guarantors of truth and objectivity, making for a strange connection between the language of desire and fetishistic love and the language of objectivity (Smith 2000, 126–127).

13 I do not specifically focus on the gender factor when discussing the school history textbooks in Chapters 6 and 7. However, following Smith (2000), it is possible to argue that gendering of school historical knowledge is implicitly present in textbooks to the extent that the disciplinary approach to doing history is introduced in textbooks in accordance with the logic of disembodied eyesight.
What Smith’s discussion suggests is that the ideal way of seeing for professional historians was predicated on a conceptual split between mind and body and the rejection of an embodied self. This is well illustrated by the French historian Fustel de Coulanges, who famously stated, “It is not I who speak, Gentlemen, but History who speaks through me” (Monod 1897, 138). Or as Marc Bloch, one of the leaders of the Annales School\(^\text{14}\), put it: “[T]o plumb the consciousness of another person, separated from us by the interval of generations, we must virtually lay aside our own ego, whereas, to say what we think, we need only remain ourselves” (Bloch 1984, 140–141). Or again, as the British historian Geoffrey Elton felt the need to reinstate:

>[it] is knowledge of reality, of what did occur, not of something that the student or observer has put together for study. […] But that men cannot ever eliminate themselves from the search for truth is nonsense, and pernicious nonsense at that, because it once again favors the purely relativist concept of history, the opinion that it is all simply in the historian’s mind and becomes whatever he likes to make of it. (Elton 2002 [1967], 48, 51)

The ideal historians in pursuit of objectivity had to, therefore, lay aside their self and simply allow the images of that past reality to be reflected or mirrored in their writing. The historian’s self was imagined as absent, detached, disembodied.

The disembodied way of seeing recognized the value only in the “real” and the “factual,” which dictated a particular type of methodology. As Geoffrey Elton laid out in his instructive *The Practice of History*:

If [the historian] asserts a sovereignty over his facts he is a traitor to his calling. To say it once again: those things we discover, analyse, talk about, did actually once happen. The historian is entitled to think about his discoveries and to find a significance in them which may well have been invisible at the time. But his doing so does not affect the independent reality of the event; the historian is not entitled to suppose that he alone, by choosing this

\(^{14}\) The *Annales* School accounts for some of the most significant historical writing of the 20th century. It takes its name from the journal “Annales d’histoire économique et sociale,” later “Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations,” that was founded in 1929 in France by Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch. A group of historians that formed around the journal began its work with the aim to promote a new kind of history. While they started off being on the margins of the disciplinary community, after the World War II the Annales group with Lucien Febvre in charge was already firmly established as the dominant school of academic historians in France (Burke 1990, 31). Initially, the *Annales* School sought to replace the old traditional narrative of events with a problem-oriented analytical approach to writing history. Political, diplomatic and military history were significantly undermined in the research agenda of the *Annales* historians who instead were more interested in social history, economic history, and history of “mentality.” The second generation of the *Annales* School, led by Fernand Braudel, advocated the “total history” approach, which entailed focus on underlying deeper structures and trends as opposed to superficiality of individual events and persons. In line with the new approach of the *Annales* School, these historians actively encouraged and practiced research collaboration with other disciplines, particularly with geography, sociology, anthropology, psychology, economics, linguistics, demography, etc. They borrowed concepts and methodologies from other disciplines for the purposes of historical research. More recently, the last generation of the *Annales* School has been influenced by the cultural and linguistic turn and, as a result, turned its attention to the social history of cultural practices.
fact and ignoring that, creates history. […] If the independent reality of history is ever to be apprehended, the real meaning of the surviving material must be elicited from the surface appearance. (Elton 2002 [1967], 52, 66)

On the basis of this emphasis on the externality of factual truth, special methodological procedures were devised to allow historians to extricate the truth of what really happened from the surface apparitions. The importance of evidence stood above in the historian’s mind: the historian

opens his mind to the evidence both passively (listening) and actively (asking). The mind will indeed soon react with questions, but these are the questions suggested by the evidence, and though different men may find different questions arising from the same evidence the differences are only to a very limited extent dictated by themselves. (Elton 2002 [1967], 56–57)

According to Elton, the two main principles of method are: 1) a thorough knowledge of all (available) sources, and 2) the competent criticism of them. If these two principles are fulfilled, historians can expect to be able to extract the true facts of the past from the surviving evidence, and their true meaning in relation to other facts. Meaning is pre-given and only needs to be discovered as such by historians. In fact, Elton’s distinction between surface appearance and the underlying real meaning of the past echoes Ranke’s dichotomy between external manifestations of individuality and spiritual essences. Both Ranke and Elton, despite the former being an idealist and the latter a realist, rely on Greek metaphysics with the distinctions between “the thing as it is” and “the thing as it affects me,” between essence and existence, knowledge of pure forms and fleeting sensations. Their way of seeing is metaphorically structured by conceptual distinctions of Greek thought. There is a persistent continuity of metaphorical conceptualization of reality and knowledge.

In the name of the “real,” the language of history, too, had to be rendered free from metaphor and embellishment. Many historians were, however, troubled that language does not seem to allow the mirroring of a past reality in the way they intended it to; more to the point, they were troubled by the idea that a substantial contribution on the part of the historian is necessary, in order to construct a narrative or an explanation. In response to the anxiety about the intrusion of the subjective self upon the “real,” Elton’s writing advice to historians was the following: “Say exactly what you mean, no more and no less; prefer the concrete to the abstract, the active to the passive mood, directness to circumlocution; attend to the rules of grammar and syntax” (Elton 2002 [1967], 103). Elton (2002 [1967], 101) also spoke against the usage of metaphors in history as “class struggle,” “social mobility,” “demographic curve,” as well as the talk of “evolving institutions” or “maturing opinions.” He considered these terms and metaphors to be borrowed from other disciplines and, since they did not refer to a real content of the past, they introduced vagueness and obscurity into historical writing. They were faulty because they attributed agency to the entities that were not real. The language of history was supposed to mirror the past; it had to be free from metaphorical uncertainty. Metaphor, for
Elton, is opposed to truth, hence, the irony of implicit metaphorical concepts that are present in his own ontological and epistemological assumptions.\(^{15}\)

On the other hand, there were also those historians who were keenly aware that the historian is an integral part of the historical knowledge produced. In response to this epistemological problem, the historians of the *Annales* School protested against the hegemony of positivist history by rejecting the primacy the latter placed on pinning down facts, political events, and the great men in history.\(^{16}\) One of the founders of the *Annales* School Lucien Febvre, for example, was particularly outspoken on the matter of historical facts. Febvre was severely critical of introductory handbooks that placed primary emphasis on historical facts:

> Establish the *facts*; apply the established *facts*, but what are we to understand by *facts*? How do such handbooks conceive of the historical fact? We soon see that for most of those who talk in this way, historical facts are ‘given’ data. Very crude. Such people refuse to consider that in reality it is they themselves who construct facts without even realizing it. (Febvre 1973, 36)

Febvre (1973, 36) called grotesque an established image of the historian as a scientist who observes the facts that present themselves to him transparently. Instead, he was convinced that it was historians, who constructed facts, because the very nature of history demanded it. It was history’s social function to organize the past in terms of the needs of the present:

> For history does not present men with a collection of isolated facts. It organizes those facts. It explains them and so, in order to explain them, it arranges them in series to which it does not attach equal importance. For history has no choice in the matter, it systematically gathers in, classifies and assembles past facts in accordance with its present needs. (Febvre 1973, 41).

Fernand Braudel, another leader of the *Annales* School, had a similar take on the relevance of individual facts. Braudel argued that:

> [T]he mass of diverse daily facts “does not make up all of reality, all the depth of history on which scientific thought is free to work. […] Thus there is among some of us, as historians, a lively distrust of traditional history, the history of events – a label which tends to become confused, rather inexactly, with political history. Political history is not necessarily bound to events, nor is it forced to be. […] The momentous discovery of the document led historians to believe that documentary authenticity was the repository of the whole truth. […] Toward the end of the nineteenth century, this ideal of history “in the raw”, led to a new style of chronicle, which in its desire for exactitude followed the history

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\(^{15}\) Among other devises used in the written text in the name of truth, footnotes, appendixes and other similar paratextual referential devices were used to aid in amplifying the sense of the “real” (Carrard 1995). The use of personal pronouns in the text has been similarly adjusted to the realist effect: the self-disclosing personal pronoun “I” was to be avoided and instead replaced by the more universalizing and neutral “we” (Carrard 1995).

\(^{16}\) This, however, represents the “positivist history” as understood by the *Annales* historians: the empiricist history focused on individual events and people, usually political and military, and written in a narrative form.
of events step by step as it emerged from ambassadorial letters or parliamentary debates. (1980, 28–29)

Braudel distanced himself from traditional history, which put so much emphasis on the individual events arranged in a chronological narrative form. Braudel (1980, 11) was convinced that narrative history was incapable of giving access to the historical truth, for it was merely a one-sided interpretation that did not give equal weight to the different aspects of the complex reality of the past. It only focused on the short time span, the history of events and individuals. Illumination of the historical past, however, required that the historian also directed his attention to the longer cyclical changes, or conjunctures, particularly in social and economic history, as well as to the structures that persist even longer, such as geographical frameworks, biological realities, or mental frameworks. Only by combining the fast-moving history of events with the slow-moving history of socioeconomic cycles and even slower history of structures, can the historian expect to get a glimpse of the past, to attain an understanding of the complex past reality. The crucial point, for Braudel, is the “unity of history which is also the unity of life” (Braudel 1980, 16). The historian’s task, in this regard, is to try to capture this complex, “intermeshed” reality, in which different forces mingle, combine and conflict.

As to the self-image of the professional historian, Braudel criticized the requirement for the historian to purge himself from the work of history. Writing in 1950, he considered this kind of image of the historian’s work outdated:

Think of an artist, a landscape painter. Before him there are trees, houses, hills, road, an entire peaceful landscape. Such for the historian is the reality of the past – a reality which has been carefully verified, dusted off, and reconstructed. The landscape painter must leave nothing out, not a shrub, not a puff of smoke. Nothing must be left out except, of course, that the painter himself must be overlooked. For the ideal is to suppress the observer […], as if history somehow existed outside our reconstructions, in a raw state of pure fact. The observer is a source of error, and criticism must be on its guard against him. (Braudel 1980, 8, emphasis mine)

The significance of visual metaphors for shaping ways of seeing and knowing is made evident in this passage. Reality is metaphorically conceptualized as a landscape observed and the historian as a viewer at a distance. The relationship between the landscape and the spectator is not that of dynamic engagement, but of static detachment. Braudel captures the central feature of the kind of realistic painting he describes: it excludes the knowing self, the body of the observer. Like the monocular, static, fixed eye of the perspectival construction or the withdrawn, decorporealized observer of the camera obscura, the landscape painter must be suppressed because his presence in the picture is assumed to be a source of error, of subjective interference into reality “as it is.”

However, this did not prevent Braudel from cautioning historians to restrain their passions and emotions in scholarly investigation. If one were to open the pages of Braudel’s “Identity of France,” one would see how Braudel claims that although he loves his country, he pledges to keep his emotions and passions at bay in his investigation:
But that passion will rarely intrude upon the pages of this book. I shall keep it carefully to one side. [...] I shall keep it under close watch. [...] For I am determined to talk about France as if it were another country, another fatherland, another nation: ‘to observe France’ [...] ‘as if one were no part of it’. The historian’s craft, as it has developed, is in any case driving us towards ever greater restraint, towards the exclusion of feeling. Were it otherwise, history, which is only too fond of contact with the social sciences, would not have found itself becoming, like them, a very imperfect science perhaps, but a science all the same. [...] Our aim then should be to rid ourselves of our passions, whether they are dictated by our nature, our social position, our personal experience, our fits of rage or enthusiasm [...]. [...] I propose simply to carry out a reasonable investigation, exempt from any a priori judgments, by climbing in turn to several familiar vantage points and trying from there to understand how the long history of France has been constructed in its depths, how it has followed its own currents and those of the rest of the world. I shall try to keep my feelings out of it. (Braudel 1988, 15–16, 25, added emphasis)

Braudel is contradicting himself by claiming how he wants to “observe” France as a detached, disembodied knowing self, as if he were no part it. As a model scientific self, he intends to apply meticulous self-control and self-constraint, to rid himself of passions and feelings, which would endanger the scientific status of the historical discipline. This passage offers a better understanding of the type of objectivity that the Annales historians pursued. The historian should be an integral part of historical knowledge only at the level of questions, concepts, and methods used.

The rest of the historian’s subjectivity – feelings, emotions, experience and values – should be restrained and eliminated from the process of investigation. Emotions and experience are not part of cognition. What allows the historians to gain a measure of impartiality towards their own cultural and temporal context is that, by observing the distance that separates them from the past, they can become better aware of the particularity of their own time. So, as Philippe Carrard (1995, 111) duly notes, the Annales historians took objectivity to mean impartiality, restraint of judgment and emotions, but with the exclusion of “independence from a cognitive subject.” They did not seem to observe a contradiction in trying to take up a more analytical, problem-oriented approach to history writing and simultaneously aiming to withhold their embodied authorial presence in the text.

Yet, personal experience played a major role in the development of the Annales approach to the past. Reflecting on his choice of historical language, Braudel revealed that during his imprisonment in the special camp in Lübeck, he had the time to reflect on the triviality of daily occurrences pouring upon him from the radio. He denied, sought to distance himself from this fleeting daily news:

I had to believe that history, destiny, was written at a much more profound level. Choosing a long time scale to observe from was choosing the position of God the Father himself as a refuge. Far removed from our persons and our daily misery, history was being made, shifting slowly, as slowly as the ancient life of the Mediterranean, whose perdurability and majestic immobility had so often moved me. So it was that I consciously set forth in search of a historical language – the most profound I could grasp or invent – in order to present
unchanging (or at least very slowly changing) conditions which stubbornly assert themselves over and over again. (Braudel 1999, 496–497)

Even as Braudel encourages the abridgement of one’s passions and emotions for the sake of a more objective history, in his introduction to “The Identity of France,” in the latter passage he reveals that his personal experiences and emotions formed his model of reality and subsequently enriched his intellectual endeavors. His personal model of history and time, born out of life experiences, drove him to find a historical language suitable to express what this way of seeing helped him to recognize in the world. Braudel used the source domain of his experience of the perdurable, majestic, immobile Mediterranean in order to metaphorically convey his understanding of what history is and how it is made in the target domain. This metaphorical transposition allows one to better understand the roots of Braudel’s methodological approach. This illustrates well, I believe, the embodied nature of knowledge making: how knowledge is born out of the experiential engagement of the knowing self with the world.

The contradiction in Braudel’s reflections testifies to the pressure for historians to comply, at least in a declarative manner, with the rules of disembodied, detached, static objectivity. Even conceding that the historical investigation cannot proceed without the historian making choices in concepts and methodology to be applied to the traces of the past, it is still expected that emotions, feelings, and passions are kept securely at bay. Thus, it is perhaps also not surprising that Lucien Febvre (1953, 40) underlined that history should not recount the romances of Mary Queen of Scots or to “throw light on the Chevalier d’Eon and her petticoats.” Emotions, feelings, passions, subsumed under the sphere of the feminine, had to be left beyond the limits of objective, detached, universalizing gaze of the historian. And, as emotions were not to interfere with the process of historical investigation, the disembodied way of seeing and the historian’s disembodied self was maintained in scholarly practices.

A contrasting example of a knowing historian’s self is Natalie Zemon Davis. She is best known as an expert of 16th-century French history and as one of the most respected historians in the field of women’s history and the social and cultural history of the early modern period. Natalie Zemon Davis together with her colleague Jill Ker Conway were the first historians to develop a course on the history of women at the university of Toronto in 1971, which later became a model for analogous courses in other Western universities (Pallares-Burke 2002, 50). She has also been actively engaged in the civil rights movement in the US in the 1950s.

Davis’s main goal in writing history, as she herself states, has been “to insert a series of groups into history – workers, women, Jews, Native Americans and Africans – as though she were ‘engaged in some rescue mission over and over again,’” as if she sought “to bring people to life again as a mother would want to bear children” (Pallares-Burke 2002, 50). This is a striking metaphor in the way it reveals the embodied cognizing self, which is not detached and static, fixing its externalized gaze on “the thing as it is.” The metaphor of the historian as a mother evokes a very fleshly, embodied, and interactive way of engaging with one’s research topic. Her professional self is not only entangled
with the rest of her selfhood and experience, but also with the people whose past she wants to bring to life.

Her politics and her experience of motherhood – lived, embodied experience of active engagement with the world – infused and guided her history writing. Davis stated that “having children helped me as a historian. It humanized me; it taught me about psychology and personal relations and gave flesh to abstract words like ‘material needs’ and ‘the body’; it revealed the power of the family, rarely treated by historians in those days” (Pallares-Burke 2002, 52–53, emphasis mine). This quote is evocative because it shows the structuring influence of lived, embodied experience on how a historian approaches and makes sense of the past. It illustrates how Davis’s personal experience of living in the world enabled her to recognize important and neglected themes to pursue in her research. Long-despised facets of the embodied self were brought into awareness of the detached, universalizing gaze, forcing the displacement of the sharp boundary between mind and body. This shows how universalizing, objective reason, with its ocularcentric focus on the “thing as it is,” is predicated on the exclusion of bodily experience, the lived, dynamic experience of active engagement with the world.

However, distance is not altogether eliminated in Davis’s thinking about the knowledge of the past and her own role in creating that knowledge. In fact, the whole discussion of her work with Pallares-Burke focuses on demonstrating how her political engagement and her feelings do not upset the standards of a critical and objective study of the past. Pallares-Burke comments that Davis has a gift for revealing her feelings and emotions, but “without ever allowing this to compromise the highest academic standards of her important work” (2002, 50). Davis herself posits that she certainly wants to be an intellectual who is engagée, but then she continues to explain:

But I must add that if my work in the department is inspired by my political values, my work as a historian is not in the service of politics. In so far as my work has a critical edge – which I hope it always does – that seems to me to be a commitment. Because my first task as a historian is to understand the past, to do research about it in order to get as much evidence as I can, to check my evidence and do my best to interpret it in ways that do justice to the set of questions asked and to what the material shows. […] History serves through the perspective it gives you, through the vantage points from which you can begin to look at and understand the present, through the wisdom or the patience that it gives you and through a comforting hope in the possibility of change. (Pallares-Burke 2002, 55, emphasis mine)

The passage, to be sure, is the answer to the question posed by Pallares-Burke on whether the type of history Davis writes is at the service of her political commitments. So her response is already framed by the doubt as to the objectivity of her history writing implicit in the question. Even though she underlines that the contribution of history has mostly to do with the alternative vantage points it offers, the standard of objectivity demands her to emphasize the primacy of evidence, of the raw material of the past, which a historian is supposed to interrogate in a self-restraining manner. There is a tension in Davis’ thinking about her role as a historian which taps into the heart of a crucial problematic for
historians: how to understand the lived experience of people in the past and yet maintain some distance to it.

In an embodied vein, she posits how

The past can deepen our understanding of the present – our own personal present and our public and political life – by its very differences and by its approximate similarities. History offers us no well-defined or precise projects for improvement, but offers us many possibilities – fascinating for the play of our intellect, offering us irony, delight, indignation, but also helpful for our look at our own society. (Davis 2010, 172)

In this sense, history opens up new ways of looking at ourselves and our lives. Without being didactic, it can enrich our own selves by offering knowledge about how others lived, how they led their lives, in effect, enabling us to better understand our lives and our selves. Not the truth of the “really real,” but in terms of the lived experience of other people from other times and places is what becomes important in history reconceived this way. The meaning which is made by the historian is then as much about the past as it is about the present. The meaning is emergent in interaction between an embodied cognizing self and the past.

To conclude, not many historians are willing to share, or even deem relevant how their personal experiences and life trajectories might have influenced their scholarly work. Reading historians’ reflections on objectivity, truth, and their own approach to knowing the past, the first conclusion I draw is that the innovation that distinguishes the work of the historians that I have discussed is born out of their lived, embodied, personal experience. Their experiences allowed them to recognize something that others before them had not been able to take note of, to gain a different way of seeing. It offered them metaphors which structured their approach to making sense of the past in novel ways. Davis and Braudel seem to have profited most from relying on their fully embodied selves, rather than from merely seeking to ascertain the facts. The knowledge they have created is hence the result of an interaction of their embodied selves, the methodological rules of the craft at the time, and the past. Secondly, we could see the misconceptions to do with how Ranke’s contribution to the professional discipline of history is regarded and the influence of an empiricist, inductive gaze of the natural and physical sciences on historians and their ways of seeing the past. The self-effacing, disembodied, detached historical gaze had long been identified as the norm and as the structuring metaphorical model in the discipline. Even though it has met serious challenges, especially in the second half of the 20th century, it still retains its influence in structuring notions of historical truth and knowledge. In this regard, the ocularcentric Greek metaphysics and its conceptual metaphors are still influential in the discipline of history. Recognition of how our reasoning is partially metaphorically structured does not mean that we should do away with logic and reason. It only means that what we call reason is “embodied processes by which our experience is explored, criticized, and transformed” and which are influenced by the metaphors we adopt (Johnson 2007, 13). It also means that “a fundamental ontological divide between mind and body—along with the accompanying dichotomies of cognition/emotion, fact/value, knowledge/imagination, and thought/feeling” is flawed and needs to be reconsidered (Johnson 2007, 7).
In what follows, I discuss the critique of ocularcentric Greek metaphysics, which emerged in the 20th century. I problematize it by showing that this critique, while it aimed to subvert ocularcentrism, continued to maintain an optical, mimetic, and disembodied distinction between world and word, reality and language.

3.4 Endurance of the (disembodied) mind-world gap after the linguistic turn

In this section, I discuss the critique of the hegemony of vision in Western philosophical tradition in the wake of the linguistic turn. Decisive for the linguistic turn was the tradition of structuralism of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure as well as the subsequent movement of poststructuralism. The ideas, which emanate from structuralism and poststructuralism, found their expression in the narrativist philosophy of history. This section demonstrates the conceptual connections between the Saussurean arbitrariness of the linguistic sign, Derridean poststructuralism, and narrativist philosophy of history. Particularly, the endurance of the vision-based, disembodied mind-word gap after the linguistic turn is problematized.

3.4.1 Derridean poststructuralism and the Saussurean arbitrariness of the linguistic sign

One of the major figures, associated with poststructuralism and postmodern philosophy, who criticized the prevalence of vision, was Jacques Derrida. Derrida aimed to propose a new way of seeing that would displace the hegemony of vision. His deconstructive way of seeing suggests a subsersive vision, “a different visual Gestalt”: it implies a way of seeing that “simultaneously contests the absolute sovereignty of the center, the absolute authority of the frame, and the absolute grounding originality of the ground” (Levin 1999, 402). If the hegemonic vision aims to master and dominate the object of its gaze, the Derridean vision does not attempt to impose closure, to dictate the frame, to take control of the ground.

Derrida sought to displace the metaphysics of presence, or logocentrism, rooted in the Western philosophical tradition and argued that “the embeddedness of the act of perception in its situation, its context, its circumstantial field, will always deny perception its metaphysical claims” (Levin 1999, 409). Important in this regard is that, for Derrida, an act of perception is merely a conceptual construction (Derrida 1973, 103; Levin 1999, 409). Instead of the metaphysical eye of logocentrism, Derrida proposes a postmetaphysical vision, which is insightfully characterized by Levin:

[T]he gaze that Derrida’s writing seduces us into pursuing is a gaze that will have no center, no permanence, no stability, no determinacy, no predictability. […] Derrida demonstrates a postmetaphysical vision by inscribing and encrypting his glances and gazes within the movement of écriture, subverting the metaphysical eye in the articulations of his
texts. In effect, he articulates a “vision écriteur”: in a style of writing that insists on being strictly optical, he inscribes a vision, a gaze, that has no identity apart from the operations and effects of the text. [...] Vision écriteur, vision textualized in a Derridean style of writing, is de-centered and de-essentialized [...] and it loses not only its prized self-possession but also its power to possess what it perceives. (Levin 1999, 425, 427, 429)

“Vision écriteur” is a strategy for decentering the metaphysical eye and its absolute gaze. Derrida’s writing shifts attention to the margins, the invisible, the ambiguous and indistinct. His vision, by having “no identity apart from the operations and effects of the text” (Levin 1999, 427), embodies his philosophical theory. According to Derrida,

> [t]he play of differences supposes, in effect, syntheses and referrals which forbid at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple element be present in and of itself, referring only to itself. Whether in the order of spoken or written discourse, no element can function as a sign without referring to another element which itself is not simply present. This interweaving results in each “element”—phoneme or grapheme—being constituted on the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain or system. [...] Nothing, neither among the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces. (Derrida 1981, 26)

Difference is posited as the source of linguistic value: a sign derives its meaning from other signs in an endless process of signification.

Derrida’s theoretical attitude to embodiment is problematic, because, even if, as Reynolds (2004, Chapter 2) posits, Derrida’s position should not be reductionally interpreted as a version of linguistic idealism, he nevertheless concedes that Derrida’s comments on embodiment and the mind-body problem are extremely fragmentary. Derrida rarely mentioned this particular hierarchical opposition between mind and body and did not really engage with the issue of embodiment (Reynolds 2004).

Some commentators advanced an argument that, concerned to overcome the metaphysics of presence, Derrida proposed to understand the text as matter, whose endless movement of referral makes it more material than matter understood as presence or substance (Cheah 2010, 75). Matter, in this reading, constitutes “the absolute exterior of opposition” (Derrida 1981, 66), the relation to the other or alterity (Derrida 1981, 66; Cheah 2010, 75). The inscription of materiality as the relation to the other, in effect, desubstantializes matter (Cheah 2010, 76). Matter, as conceived by Derrida, does not invoke embodied experience.

However, what draws me to argue that Derridean vision still contains an implicit dualism of world and word is its dependence on the Saussurean principle of language: the arbitrariness of the sign. If difference is posited as the source of linguistic value, then the arbitrariness of the sign implicitly informs Derrida’s project. Crucially, Saussure’s sign is defined as a disembodied and disengaged relationship between a “signifier” (acoustic or visual form) and a “signified” (concept). In other words, the linguistic sign exists as a “two sided-psychological entity” in the human mind, completely dissociated from and unaffected by the external reality. Thus, material culture per se has no place in that system. This brings us to the second point, which is that this internal bond between the signifier
and the signified is postulated as “arbitrary.” The linguistic sign […] is entirely a product of human convention. (Malafouris 2013, 92)

In Saussure, meaning-making occurs on a completely separate linguistic plane, removed from material reality. An arbitrary percept (sound-image, the signifier) and an arbitrary concept (idea, the signified) are not connected in Saussurean linguistics to embodied perception and interaction with the world. Sound-images are attached to concepts rather than to anything in the world. There is no non-arbitrary relation between language and the body, which moves and interacts with the world.

This argument is substantiated by Lisa Muszynski (2017), who demonstrates that Saussure’s principle of the arbitrariness of the sign is informed by mind-body dualism. As she argues, “[t]o return to Saussure’s systemic value with enthusiasm is to fully (re)embrace Descartes’s mind-body dualism (Muszynski 2017, 174). Just like Saussure, “Descartes took for granted the arbitrariness of the connection between words and their meanings” (Joseph 2012, 81). Muszynski argues that

Saussure follows Aristotle, but Saussure’s purpose was to improve on and develop the ancient language philosophy that he inherited from Aristotle – and to make it uniquely his own, which is certainly what he did. What is new in Saussure’s arbitrariness is his specific way of formulating it: the linguistic sign is binary, that is, both material and immaterial. The sides are united in the (positive) linguistic sign by way of its arbitrary percept, or sound-image (the signifier), which is bound to an arbitrary (psychological) concept, or idea (the signified). This is a dualist principle, certainly, insofar as it separates body (the physical percept) and mind (the psychological concept, meaning), but this was a traditional philosophical argument that he accepted without a problem. (Muszynski 2017, 150)

The union of the arbitrary traits of percept and concept are entirely dependent on social rules or human convention. Language was assumed to be conventional (“historical”) rather than in any way dependent on the process of biological life, echoing the Aristotelian theory of language, which maintained that language is not the same for all because it is conventional, and different communities have different conventions (Harris & Taylor 1997, 33).

In order to comprehend the disembodied nature of language in Saussure’s system of linguistic value, it is crucial to take into consideration the metaphor of “coins as units of value in a currency system,” which informs his binary principle (Muszynski 2017, Chapter 5). Saussure borrowed this master metaphor from the field of political economy, which emerged in the 18th century. In fact, Saussure’s reliance on metaphors of political economy itself reveals the embodied and metaphorical nature of theorizing dependent on the process of lived experience: Saussure attended lectures on political economy at the University of Geneva, which inspired his philosophy of language (Joseph 2016). Saussure drew a similarity between the two “sciences” of economics and linguistics, arguing that,

in contrast to the other sciences, political economy and economic history constitute two clearly separated disciplines [i.e., a “duality”] within a single science […]. Proceeding as they have, economists are—without being well aware of it—obeying an inner necessity. A similar necessity obliges us to divide linguistics into two parts, each with its own principle.
Here as in political economy we are confronted with the notion of value; both sciences are concerned with a system for equating things of different orders—labor and wages in one[,] and a signified and signifier in the other. (Saussure 2011, 79, original emphasis)

Thus, the two binary orders of labor and wages are metaphorically transposed into the field of language and equated with the similarly binary orders of the signified and the signifier.

Like coins in a currency system, words have value, in Saussure’s linguistics, only differentially, through their static relative position. When applied as a model to understand language, this economic metaphor structures the concept of language as a structure of non-living units of value, in which differences carry signification: “[E]verything is only difference used as opposition, and opposition creates value” (Saussure in Joseph 2012, 545). The negative, differential system entails this principle of linguistic arbitrariness. In other words, it is not possible to selectively subscribe to the primacy of difference as the principle of signification without likewise adopting the disembodied Saussurean arbitrariness of the binary sign. If you adopt the idea that meaning is relative and differential, you likewise adopt the assumption that the sign is arbitrary and bears no necessary relation to the world or reality. The latter point substantializes my claim that Derridean approach, which subscribes to the idea of difference as the source of linguistic value, still implicitly upholds mind-body dualism, despite the claims against such semiological reductionism.

The pattern of Saussurean linguistics embodies the assumptions one needs to make, in order to arrive at this particular pattern. As Muszynski explains,

Saussure’s system of the arbitrariness of the binary sign is embodied in his system of linguistic value through the constituting metaphor he chose. There is therefore no escape from the ramifications and “veiled consequences” of this arbitrariness, even if you purport to set it aside and move on without it. […] This constituting metaphor thereby enables Saussure to embed the character of the arbitrary, binary sign (signified and signifier) in the system as a whole in terms of its negative, differential value – the very features that poststructuralism continued using in shifting from Saussure’s focus on speech to Derrida’s preferred focus on writing. (Muszynski 2017,157)

However, only when one artificially separates the pattern of organization from the process of its development, does it become possible to think of the relation between language and reality, word and world, mind and matter as arbitrary. More importantly, when one separates pattern and process, it follows that one can only conceptualize change as a linear sequence of static states, or perspectives, that are purely historically contingent and arbitrary, as if enclosed onto themselves. Since, in this case, we are not looking at the process, which has led to a particular pattern emerging, we are not able to understand change as a dynamic process of interrelations and entanglements, which involves embodied experience. Change is reduced to a linear sequence of static states, patterns, forms, and perspectives that are relative to each other. None of these patterns can be claimed to do a better job of making sense of reality – their value is equal, fixed, and specific to a particular language system, to a particular pattern. They are products of an
arbitrary social convention. Therefore, the researcher need not preoccupy herself with elucidating the process, which has led to this particular perspective or pattern emerging, and, in consequence, with evaluating whether this perspective is equipped to comprehend a particular aspect of reality.

What still needs to be clarified is how Saussure’s conceptualization of synchrony and diachrony relates to the notions of pattern and process in enactive embodiment theory, which will be introduced in more detail in the following section. For Saussure, what is diachronic in language is “the successive states of the language considered in contrast with one another,” whereas what is synchronic is “the linguistic facts as given when one confines oneself to a single state” (Saussure in Joseph 2012, 514). Saussure’s conceptualization of diachrony is very different from how temporal development is understood in the theory of enactive embodiment. Saussurean diachrony is a linear sequence of static snapshots or fixed states, of isolated patterns. In contrast to enactive embodiment, in which pattern and process are inseparable (i.e. pattern embodies the process), Saussurean diachrony does not mean a dynamic process of movement, a process of interactions and entanglements, which enact change and which are embodied in the pattern of organization. The disembodied nature of Saussurean linguistics – the separation between language and world and between pattern and process – entails that he can only conceive of change in static terms. Thus, according to Saussure, a diachronic study “should take the form of comparing two such states, two such ensembles [of sounds in a language at a particular state – R.K.], rather than looking at how a given sound is transformed across the centuries” (Joseph 2012, 320). Diachronic analysis entails the comparison of one static, synchronic “slice” of development with another. Each sequential state is new: “[W]hat determines its fundamental nature is not inherited” (Joseph 2012, 515). Thus, the process through which the state or the pattern emerges is irrelevant in Saussurean linguistics. Saussure insisted that the synchronic analysis and the diachronic analysis need to be kept strictly separate.

The repeatability of the sign – a Derridean version of Saussure’s arbitrariness of the linguistic sign (Melberg 1995, 172) – preserves the disembodied attributes of Saussurean structuralism. The Derridean repeatability of the sign evokes an idea of language that is disembodied – a language conceived of as a system of signs, in which difference produces meaning, but which remains detached from the process of an embodied and world-involving lived experience. Derridean language does not repeat or imitate, nor is it linked to lived reality in any way. It separates between language and life and between pattern and process in the same way that Saussure’s linguistics differentiates between the two. The body, if it appears at all in postmodern conceptualization, is made entirely of words (Hustvedt 2016, 349). In fact, the body disappears as a material, biological entity in the discursive condition (Birke 1999, 137). The focus in Derridean poststructuralism falls on the difference of meaning that is produced in iteration. Each time a textual iteration takes place, the meaning changes to the extent that it does not correspond to the previous meaning. In other words, each sequential state, each synchronic pattern is new: As for Saussure, what is fundamental to meaning in each iteration is not inherited. In Derrida’s own words, “iterability […] may be read as exploitation of the logic which links repetition with alterity” (Derrida 1982, 315); “iterability” does not signify simply […] repeatability.
of the same, but rather alterability of this same idealized in the singularity of the event” (Derrida 1988, 156). The repeatability of the sign introduces an element of fiction in language (Melberg 1995, 170). Derrida links the “originally repetitive structure” of signs to fiction: Reality derives from ever-changing fictional, mentalistic play of signification (Melberg 1995, 170). The form of meaning in the mind is separate from the matter of bodies and things. On such an understanding, the self is likewise a fiction spun out of iterated signs that bear no relation to the body, bodily movement, and engagement with the world. The Derridean vision produces reality-as-fiction.

Thus, Derrida transforms classical “mimesis as sameness” into the deconstructionist “mimesis as difference” (Heikkilä 2014). The idea that knowledge is truthful by being an accurate representation of a fixed world is here replaced by an emphasis on the constitutive process of meaning production that occurs in iteration. The world does not structure the image contained in the mind (Figure 7): The play of signification produces fictive images from which reality of the world is derived (Figure 8). However, and this is more important, the dualist premise, which posits a distinction between knowledge and reality, language and the world, form and content, concept and percept, mind and body is preserved in mimesis as difference. What this means is that the metaphorical, image-schematic distinction between an image and reality and between a mental concept and a bodily percept, rooted in the Western intellectual tradition since Greek metaphysics, still structures Derrida’s philosophy. Derrida’s rejection of correspondence and mimetic truth as sameness does not bypass the problem of metaphysical dualism, it merely goes in the opposite direction to posit a gap between reality and (disembodied) mind, life and language, process and pattern (See Figures 7 and 8).
Figure 7  Mimesis as Sameness (Optical Match)

Figure 8  Mimesis as Difference
By locking itself out from the bodily, experiential engagement with the environment, the Derridean vision dissolves the one who cognizes. Meaning is slippery, evasive, and infinitely susceptible to the play of signs in a chain of signification and difference. Therefore, it is not surprising that the dissolution of the cognizing subject and the slipperiness of meaning go hand in hand with the notion of the “Death of the Author,” since the author is just a representative of further texts and ideological positions. Roland Barthes announced the “Death of the Author” in 1968. The disappearance of the author, as Biriotti (1993, 3) explains, “was part of a broader project in the 1960s: structuralism. […] Structuralism, following the work of Saussure in the early part of the century, insisted that the linguistic sign was arbitrary and that therefore the link between language and the “real world” was not straightforward.” The abandonment of the traditional concept of the author was primarily a critique of the idea of the author as the single source of meaning and it resulted in the critical focus on the reader and the text (Biriotti 1993). However, by refuting the possibility of non-arbitrary links between language and the world, meaning and reality, “vision écriture” has likewise lost the capacity to make sense of an embodied, world-involving process of meaning making in an engagement between the cognizing self and the world.

3.4.2 Disembodied dualism in postmodern philosophy of history

The characteristic disembodied distinction between language and world and between pattern and process can be likewise observed in the work of postmodern philosophers of history, who, in the wake of the linguistic turn, proposed to reverse the dominance of content (the past/world/reality) over form (historical narrative/language/word). In other words, these bearers of the Saussurean inheritance challenged the claim that reality or the content of the past referentially determines the form history takes in a historical narrative. A crucial argument in these accounts is that there cannot be an unmediated correspondence between language and the world (e.g., Munslow 2006a). Nevertheless, what is retained in this argument is the distinction itself between the content (past reality) and the form (language of historical narratives), between world and word. Postmodernists posit a sharp separation between content (past reality) and form (language), and claim that “rather than the existence of a knowable past reality there is nothing but the-past-as-history” (Munslow 2006b, 11). The past does not exist and we do not have access to it, except for a few traces and the historian’s narrative.

Narrativist philosophers of history, because of their disembodied premises, make a mistaken assumption: They are convinced that our only relation to the past is strictly textual and that “the past exists for us only as it is written up by historians” (Munslow 2006a, 36). History is only accessible by way of language: it is a “relationship to the past mediated by a distinctive kind of written discourse” (White 1999, 1). The past is accessible solely as a textual representation, through “the prison house of language” (Munslow 2006a, 152). Thus, the deconstructive function of historians is to render one text (the past) into another text of the historians’ own invention (written history) (Munslow 2006a, 153). Revealing the influence of Derrida’s concept of différence, the
argument goes that “the historical text can be linked only to other historical texts and derive its meaning from those other texts” (Munslow 2006a, 153).

It is only possible, however, to arrive at this conclusion, if one ignores how the past process of lived experience is embodied in ourselves, in the way we engage with reality, past and present, and in things from the past that endure into the present. Postmodern philosophers of history likewise ignore the bodily sources of pre-linguistic meaning, which is accessible to us via empathic, bodily resonance (see Section 3.6.1). To put it differently, postmodern philosophers of history ignore that the patterns, in the present, embody the past process of life. For postmodernists, however, history becomes the past-as-history: an empty signifier, which “is filled with the meanings and definitions we want” (Munslow 2006b, 13). The effect of the arbitrariness of the sign on philosophy of history manifests in claims that the meaning of the past is entirely constructed through narrative impositionalism and social context in which the historian operates.

The pattern of a historical narrative is a perspectival, arbitrary state, enclosed onto itself and conventional (“historical”). Its meaning does not relate to or inherit anything from the past process of life. Whatever reality there is, it is always encountered as a socially constructed text: the world is known only through language. Thus, “history is the study not of change over time per se, but the study of the information produced by historians as they go about this task” (Munslow 2006a, 3). The past and written history are two completely different things. Historians, as they produce history as knowledge, create and impose a particular form onto the past: They produce history as text. As Hayden White insists,

We may […] arrange all artifacts known to us along a time line in such a way as to constitute a series, but any pattern that we may think we perceive as inhering in the series is actually a product of our own modalities of conceptualization, themselves given by rules of linguistic combination that are peculiar to Western linguistic systems and the myths which are formalizations of such combinatory strategies. (White 1974, 770)

The evidence of the past is itself meaningless and needs to be turned into “facts” through narrative organization and interpretation by historians in order to gain meaning (Munslow 2006a). Or, in other words, “meaning is generated by socially encoded and constructed discursive practices that mediate reality so much so that they effectively close off direct access to it” (Munslow 2006a, 11). Meaning is wholly self-referential. Saussurean influence is evident in how White, in the above quote, conceptualizes change in Saussure’s diachronic terms – as a linear narrative sequence of static states. This is an inheritance of a disembodied distinction of pattern and process as well as of language and world. If you posit change as a linear sequence of static snapshots (and if you, likewise, write history in such a way), this assumption prevents you from recognizing how the past process of lived experience is embodied in a pattern of past organization. Therefore, historiography, which ignores lived experience and which organizes the past as a sequence of static states, is actually susceptible to a postmodern critique. If history is reduced to a disembodied series of events, the meaning of the past will likely depend on the arrangement of these events in a narrative.
As characterized by Munslow, “deconstructionist” historians of the linguistic term conceive of history as a “literary performance”:

[History] is first and foremost a deliberate and calculated written act on the part of the historian, rather than a neutral reflection or correspondence. [...] History is an authored impression of pastness. [...] The historian brings his/her narrative, conceptual and ethical explanatory strategies to bear on the content of the past. (Munslow 2006b, 16, 17)

But the past itself bears no relation to the meanings that historians draw up. The past/content/matter is removed from the narrative/form/mind. Meaning is strictly a product of linguistic composition, social convention and the discursive structure of a given epoch. It is the use of language, which endows facts with value and meaning, “a specific posture before the world which is ethical, ideological, or more generally political” (White 1978, 129). By following the linguistic turn in epistemology, deconstructionist historians emphasize “the figurative basis for the emplotments, arguments and ideological modes of explanation upon which we are reliant for the meaning we ascribe to the past” (Munslow 2003, 146). Meaning is a conceptual, mentalistic and disembodied construction that is imposed on the content of the past, passively waiting to be emplotted in historians’ narrativizations. Historical narratives, as literary artifacts, “derive their chains of meaning(s) or significations from the nature of narrative structure (or forms of representation) as much as from other culturally provided ideological factors” (Munslow 2006a, 21). Thus, deconstructionists focus on how language constitutes the past.

Hayden White (1974), for example, argues that historians can interpret the culture of any historical period by exploring its tropic prefiguration, its structuring linguistic codes. For White, tropes are “a deep infrastructure of consciousness” that determines how historians interpret the past and that constitute history-as-fiction (Munslow 2006a, 77). Troping endows a chronicle of events with a kind of emplotment, which is provided by the cultural tradition of the historian (White 1999). White (2014[1973]) utilizes the theory of tropes to characterize “the deep structure of the historical imagination” (37). In other words, White conceives of tropes in a disembodied Saussurean sense – as an “internal” mental system of understanding:

White proposes that as the tropes organize the deep structures of human thought in de Saussure’s sense of constituting meaning through binary opposition – the idea of otherness, or difference in any historical period – tropes lie at the core of every society’s and every historian’s historical imagination. (Munslow 2006a, 78)

The inheritance of Saussurean structuralism shapes the Whitean conception of tropes in idealist, disembodied terms. Metaphors as well as other tropic devices are removed from reality: They are an internal deep structure of the human mind, separated from an externalized world or reality “out there,” and not shaped by it. World does not shape mind; the interior forms of disembodied mind constitute aperception of the world that bears an arbitrary relation to the world. This dimension of White’s thought reveals a Kantian idealist influence, which White himself acknowledges (Doran 2013, 108). Whitean tropes are dependent on an implicit image-schema that explains cognition in terms of a
disembodied mind producing images of the world/past, except that, in this case, images do not reproduce the world, but rather constitute it.

Thus, there are no “intrinsically tragic events”: There are only stories told or written depending on the perspective from which the events are viewed (White 1992, 1999, 9). White constructs the meaning of events in terms of subjective-objective dualism. The event is either objectively tragic (which is untenable) or it is subjectively and arbitrarily emplotted as a tragedy. Crucially, it is not lived as a tragic event: only literary figuration renders it tragic (White 1999, 9). White’s “perspective” is not a lived, experiential, embodied relationship to the past. The pattern of figuration is understood as an enclosed culturally-determined “perspective,” ignoring an embodied process of lived experience, out of which this pattern emerges. Only when one ignores the body and embodied experience and interaction with the world, out of which meaning emerges, can one conceive of knowledge as such a mentalistic image of the world. In contrast to, for example, the embodied metaphors of Lakoff and Johnson (1999), which link the tropic figuration of abstract concepts in the target domain with the embodied and world-involving lived experience in the source domain, Whitean tropes are still implicitly dependent on dualist Greek metaphysics.

Lastly, postmodern thinkers suggest viewing all historical narratives as forms of artwork, of literary work whose truthfulness or falsity cannot be determined once we reject the representationalist justifications of truth claims at the narrative level. What is crucial to note is that the latter claim still implies the dependence of the postmodernist argument on the separation between world and language. Thus, it relies on an assumption that narratives cannot be true or false because they do not mirror the world “out there.” What this means is that truth is still implicitly articulated in terms of an optical match between an externalized world and word, which implies disembodied metaphysics and dependence of the postmodern claims on the notion of correspondence. The argument is that, if the truth differs for Marxists, liberals, feminists and poststructuralists, then it is impossible to get at the truth (Munslow 2006a, 158). This formulation reveals that truth continues to be indirectly treated in the postmodern conceptualization in dualist, metaphysical terms. Postmodernists cannot conceive of a kind of truth that bypasses the optical dualism of (a disembodied) mind and world.

If all historical narratives are forms that bear no link to past life, but rather constitute it, the plurality of possible narrative figurations of the past is not in any way constrained or affected by the past itself. There is no way to adjudicate between these different narratives/forms, other than in terms of ethical consideration. In line with Saussure’s system of negative, differential linguistic value, historians’ narratives

occupy absolutely relative positions, vis-à-vis other narratives in the synchronic system of historical narratives, in terms of their relative interpretations of the events they discuss (where these narratives now function metaphorically on the model of (a) coins as units of value in a currency system, or the model of (b) different inertial systems of reference and their unique measurements). In such a synchronic system of exchange values, there are no referential anchors outside the system of signs that constitute their formal relationship, analyzed on the model of la langue. (Muszynski 2017, 176, original emphasis)
Thus, Hayden White, for example, can assert that the Holocaust is a synthetic concept or a figure of an event, the occurrence of which could hardly be doubted but the meaning or the significance of which, for European, American, Jewish, and Near Eastern history is an open question, begging to be treated under as many different modes of meaning-production as possible. (White 2005b, 337)

The discursive fact and the material event, or language and life, are radically separated. The event happens, whereas facts are constituted through language – they are not to be confused (White 1999). The meaning does not in any way depend on the actual event, because the meaning (pattern) is separated from the process through which this meaning emerged. In other words, it does not matter who and by what process of experience has come up with a particular meaning or a narrative. As a result, Munslow can argue that “we don’t look to the past, much less history, as a source for engaging with and understanding ‘the other’” (2006a, 171). The disembodied theoretical premises of postmodernists predispose them to exclusively focus on the pattern, while ignoring the lived process, and assume that the past process of life has nothing to offer for understanding “the other” (since the past is inaccessible other than through language). But if you do not look at the process through which a pattern has emerged, you cannot really understand the pattern, and in what ways it relates to the world (assuming that the relation is not one of simple correspondence between a static pattern and past reality). What remains for a deconstructionist historian, in the face of a plurality of narratives, is to compare one history against another history.

Seeking to overthrow the representationalist convictions of empiricist historians, who believe that content of the past dictates the form and meaning of the past, postmodern and narrativist thinkers reduce meaning to an arbitrary, mentalistic ascription grafted onto the passive content of the past. Either way, the dualisms of form and content, word and world, language and life, pattern and process remain firmly rooted in the theoretical premises of both modernist and postmodernist historians. The principal difference is that modernists claim to be able to bridge the gap and acquire truth, whereas, for postmodernists, the gap is unbridgeable, because the past and history are two ontologically different entities.

This disembodied, dualist premise of their theoretical position has, as a result, particular methodological implications, focusing their gaze exclusively on textual rendition of reality, culturally determined discursive practices, conceptual, ethical and ideological strategies and emplotments. Even though postmodernists manage convincingly to show that history is not merely a mimetic reproduction of past reality, they uphold a metaphysical differentiation between word and world, language and reality, mind and world, and, in this regard, deconstructionist history is not properly postmetaphysical. Having proved that the relation between word and world is not straightforward, deconstructionist thinkers do not concern themselves with the question of what the relation between word and world, reality and mind, mind and embodied experience is, if it is not explained by representationalism and referentialism.

I will elaborate on an alternative notion of an embodied cognizing subject and how it is crucially coupled and engaged in a dynamic interaction with the environment in the next two sections. I will argue that the meaning is neither strictly “in” the world, in need of
being discovered, nor is it solely determined and ascribed onto passive reality by the discursively produced self. Rather, it is emergent in engaged, dynamic interaction between the embodied self, conceived of as a process, and a changing environment.

3.5 Reconceiving the cognizing self in embodied terms

In this section, I explore the findings of research on embodied cognition and assess their implications for an alternative notion of a cognizing self. Replacing the default concept of the cognizing self as a disembodied entity with a notion of an embodied self, which is coupled to and interacts with the world, simultaneously transforms our conceptions of the past, knowledge, truth, and reality. This paves the way for a new understanding of making sense of the past, that is shared, but remembered differently, in the field of history and history education.

The disembodied model of vision is still prevalent today in the understanding of knowledge, truth, and reality, even though it has received extensive criticism from philosophers and social theorists. As Rebekah Modrak (2011, 18) notes, “[w]hat was a radical proposition in the 15th century has been so absorbed and internalized that linear perspective is now a given – easily legible and assumed to represent natural vision. This is one example of how individual systems can quickly become absorbed as common knowledge.” Yet, it is not how embodied, living human beings see. The eyes of human beings are not fixed, static. In fact, they are in constant motion as they scan the environment. Our entire body rotates and moves to assist the eyes in seeing the environment (Modrak 2011, 20). Our experience of seeing is mediated by the movement of our bodies. The philosopher of mind Alva Noë renders this point succinctly in a video interview:

Seeing is a temporally extended interaction with the environment. […] The skillful ability to move is at the very core of what it is to be a conscious perceiving agent. […] The capacity to move and the capacity to see are interwoven. […] It is not just the capacity to move. It is understanding and movement, understanding the sensory effects of movement. […] Using that kind of sensorimotor understanding is what brings the world into focus for consciousness. […] The world comes into focus as a kind of dynamic of trying to make sense of it. […] Consciousness is dance: dance is an enactment or modelling of this fundamental fact about our relationship with the world around us. […] The seeing, the perceiving is not something detached from that coupling, it is the dance. (2012, 2:20–3:41, 4:31–5:35)

17 Erwin Panofsky (1991, 34) writes about the pervasive endurance of linear perspectival construction by giving an example of the 17th century German astronomer Johannes Kepler who “had been led by the rules of painterly perspective to believe that straight is always seen as straight, without stopping to consider that the eye in fact projects not onto a planatabella [a flat surface] but onto the inner surface of a sphere [R.K. – the concave surface of eye’s retina]. And, if even today only a very few of us have perceived these curvatures, that too is in part due to our habituation – further reinforced by looking at photographs – to linear perspectival construction.”

76
In the enactive, interactionist understanding, perception is an active, embodied, experiential engagement with the world. Dance, as a metaphor, captures how cognition is embodied, emotive, and interactive (Maiese 2011, 164). Understanding results from this active and creative engagement. However, as philosopher and physicist Ernst Mach observed more than a century ago, “in ordinary visual experience, one is seldom conscious of the ways in which the body is continually present but effectively deleted out of one’s visual perceptions” (Crary 1999, 220). Figure 9, Mach’s self-portrait as seen from his left eye, evokes this curious experience of how vision distances the body and hides dynamic content in perception. This echoes Hans Jonas’s observation, stated in Section 3.1, how the primacy of sight led to the domination of abstract concepts which overlooked the embodied and dynamic nature of perception. Hence, we are faced with a paradox that our body-based experience reinforces the belief in disembodied thought: “We are aware of what we see, but not of our seeing. The bodily processes hide, in order to make possible our fluid, automatic experiencing of the world” (Johnson 2007, 5).

What I want to propose is that we need to rethink what it entails to see and to know, to be a cognizing subject, in the light of abounding evidence for the embodiment of mind. The habitual ideas we hold about history, the past, knowledge, truth, reality are still firmly

Figure 9  Ernst Mach, ”The Inner Perspective.” Image in the Public Domain.

77
embedded in disembodied Greek (Platonic) metaphysics and its dismissal of the bodily involvement in the process of thought, which we take for granted, so much so that our reliance on it is invisible to ourselves. This is why ontological and epistemological questions need to be preceded by the question: What is cognition? If we adopt a different understanding of what it entails to be a knowing self and how this self cognizes, then it also radically alters our ways of thinking about history, the past and how we can know them, or make sense of them.

The standard empiricist view in neuroscience on consciousness, as characterized by Noë (2009), is suggestive of a camera obscura model, according to which consciousness is something that happens inside our skulls. The brain, while being of the body, is at the same time detached from the rest of body. Alva Noë argues:

According to the now standard view, our conscious lives – the fact that we think and feel and that a world shows up for us – is achieved in us by the action of our brain. The brain produces images of the environment and manipulates those images in a process known as thought. The brain calculates and infers and eventually produces neural commands so that we act. We really are our brains, and our bodies are at most robotic tools at our brains’ disposal. The brain is sole author of what is in fact a grand illusion: that we inhabit a richly detailed and meaningful world, that we are the sorts of beings we think we are. (2009, 4)

This view posits that brain is sufficient for cognition, and that if we understand what is happening in the brain, we will be able to understand what mind or consciousness is. The “I” is reduced to the brain, which is separate from the rest of the body and is located in the skull. It thinks and feels, and inhabits the body. This understanding of subjectivity blends empiricism with the Cartesian model of an interiorized thinking subject. It implies the conception of the cognizing self as isolated, autonomous, enclosed within the confines of the head, withdrawn from the world. It is passive in that the world acts as a trigger on the nervous system and is then processed by the brain, rather than consciousness being born in a dynamic, interactive engagement of brain, body, and world, in which the embodied subject is making sense of her experience. This brain is envisioned as the disembodied “eye” that stands aside from the world, receives pictures or representations of the world, imprints of the external world, and then processes them as a computational machine. Noë argues that the representationalist internalism of neuroscience is the persisting vestige of Cartesian ideas about the mind:

The abiding idea here, then, is that our lived experience, our daily world, our everyday actions and reactions and feelings and concerns are events in the nervous system. The world itself is a domain of we know not what that acts on the nervous system and is

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18 In fact, the very notion of “ontology,” being at the core of Greek metaphysics, is rendered problematic by the idea of an embodied self because ontology implies static, fixed, eternal presence, or Being.

19 In this regard, the neuroscientific view of subjectivity shares a lot in common with the religious doctrine, in that both of these models conceive of a conscious self as something that happens or is inside of us (Noè 2009, 5-6). For Descartes, it was the decorporealized thinking and thus conscious subject; in religion, it is an immaterial, spiritual essence, the soul, the inner core.
screened off by its own effects. We find ourselves on this side of the wall of effects separating world and mind. We know things not as they are in themselves; we know only our brain’s internal fabrications of them. [...] We just assume that the membrane dividing brain and environment is somehow the causally critical division between self and world. (Noë 2015, 123, 125)

However, the representationalist internalism may not be so much the invention of Descartes as a legacy of Greek ocularcentrism, its mind-body dualism and a distinction between the world and its images, which shapes the conception of lived experience as merely a “fabrication” of the world, a subjective representation removed from the truth out there.

Recently, however, there has been a shift in cognitive science to conceive of consciousness not as something that happens in our brains, but as something we do or achieve by active bodily engagement with the world (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1993 [1991]; Thompson 2007, 2015; Noë 2009; Di Paolo et al. 2010). Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch (1993 [1991]) in their groundbreaking book “The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience” advanced a theory of cognition called “the enactive approach” (De Jesus 2016). Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (2002 [1945]) phenomenology of embodiment constitutes the philosophical basis for these explorations of the body and embodiment in cognitive processes. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1993[1991]) explicitly acknowledged the influence, which Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy has exerted on their research program in the context of contemporary cognitive science. It likewise needs to be added that the embodied approach to cognition likewise has its antecedents in the work that appeared in the 1970s by the Chilean neurobiologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco J. Varela (1980).

The field of enactivism has become more fragmented over the past decade as different theoretical accounts have emerged (De Jesus 2016). Nevertheless, all these different accounts endorse the original enactivist rejection of internal mental representations and propose that cognition entails “living organisms as active embodied subjects dynamically coupled to, and interacting with, their respective environments” (De Jesus 2016, 267). Since the latter shared principle of enactivism is the main point that concerns my further argument, I will not examine the differences and similarities between these different varieties of enactive accounts (on such distinctions, see, e.g., Muszynski 2017, 63–68). My further use of the notion of “enactive embodiment” is meant to indicate the broader paradigmatic shift in the field of the cognitive sciences, rather than any single and more specific account of the enactive approach.

Enactive embodiment challenges the assumption that cognition is an internal representation of the external, pre-given world. Varela, Thompson and Rosch proposed instead to regard cognition as embodied action – “an enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs” (1993 [1991], 9). The process or history of (inter)action shapes the cognizing self and is reflected

20 De Jesus (2016) identifies three of the most prominent accounts: the canonical autopoietic enactivism (AE), alternative accounts of sensorimotor enactivism (SE) of O’Reagan and Noë (2001) and the radical enactivism (REC) of Hutto and Myin (2013).
in how the self makes sense of the world. Enactive embodiment emphasizes that we are conscious through and in our living bodies and that perception and action are inseparable in lived cognition. Perception is not a passive internalization of information, but an active process – it implies a dynamic process of doing and acting.

Embodied cognition depends on the experiences that arise from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, which are themselves embedded in a broader biological, psychological, and cultural context (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1993 [1991], 173). They criticize the input-output representationalist model of cognition, where input as sensory stimuli or information is separated from output as behavior. Rather, by interacting and engaging with the environment, a cognizing subject is constantly transformed by its own process of cognition and interaction. Cognition is a self-modifying process implying embeddedness in an environment rather than a passive representation of a fixed, externalized world. In other words, Through this process of self-modifying cognition, or sense-making, the cognizing subject is enacting or bringing forth a world and itself. Cognition and life are processes that are bound up with one another. Living organisms are, therefore, undergoing a continuous process of change by way of cognition, movement, and interaction.

The interaction enables what is described as structural coupling between the cognizing self and its environment: Cognizing selves/systems influence the environment; the changes in the environment trigger changes in the selves/systems and if there are recurrent patterns of interaction between the cognizing self and environment/other selves, this recurrent interaction results in structural coupling (Maturana & Varela 1998 [1987]). The changes in the cognizing self are therefore partially produced by its own actions in and with the environment. The cognizing self never encounters the environment a-historically: “All acting and perceiving is done in a flow of activity that is continuous for living beings” and that is permeated and shaped by a dynamic cultural context (McGann 2014, 9).

The process of cognition or interaction with the world manifests in the pattern of self-organization and structural coupling with the environment. Over time, the cognizing self form its own way of structural coupling, which is “a record of previous structural changes and thus of previous interactions. In other words, all living beings have a history. Living structure is always a record of prior development.” (Capra 2003, 31).

Enactive embodiment overcomes the split between a subject and an object, the cognizing self and the world: The two are seen as interdependent and as emerging together. Proponents of this theory do not exclusively focus on the individual’s actions or the individual’s structural dynamics, but rather on the individual-in-her/his-environment. Their concern is with how the knower and the known co-evolve and are co-implicated (Davis, Sumara & Kieren 1996, 156). Context is introduced not merely as a place which contains the individual; rather, it is emphasized how the individual is part of the context and co-evolves with it (Davis, Sumara & Kieren 1996). That is, enactive embodiment does not support the notion of independent, bounded individuals plus contexts/rules or pre-given, independent organisms plus environments. The environment is not so much a pre-given container, but a part of one’s entangled process of co-emerging.

Alva Noë’s interactionist conception of consciousness likewise stresses the latter idea:
The locus of consciousness is the dynamic life of the whole, environmentally plugged-in person or animal. [...] To understand consciousness in humans and animals, we must look not inward, into the recesses of our insides; rather, we need to look to the ways in which each of us, as a whole animal, carries on the processes of living in and with and in response to the world around us. [...] Consciousness isn’t something that happens inside us: it is something we do, actively, in our dynamic interaction with the world around us. [...] I urge that it is a body- and world-involving conception of ourselves that the best new science as well as philosophy should lead us to endorse. (Noë 2009, xiii, 7, 24)

Consciousness conceived as a dynamic process of interaction between a living being and its environment extends the idea of the cognizing self. The knowing self is not isolated from the world, but actively participates, engages in knowing, in grasping. World comes into focus for consciousness as it actively seeks to understand, to know, to make sense. Consciousness is done or achieved in this process of engagement proximate to how dancing is done or enacted (Noë 2012). It is not an independent thing-like entity, whether conceived as a material brain or an immaterial spirit.

When the subject is understood this way, we may realize how making sense of the world cannot be separated from lived experience and interaction with the world, and what crucial role embodiment plays in this process. Knowledge and truth can no longer be conceived as internalized, mimetic essences or images that mirror the world inasmuch as these notions of knowledge are dependent on dualistic metaphysical views that mind is separate from body and that mind operates on “internal representations” that represent the external world (Johnson 2007). In the interactionist view of cognition, reality is not something completely external to us, but something we actively engage with. When we make sense of the world, or the past, our language communicates not by finding the “correct” words or statements (essence- or image-like) that correspond to the reality as it is or was, but by conveying the lived experience of interaction with others and environment with the help of embodied metaphor (Modell 2003). Cognition, in this sense, is not about “taking up a perspective on things” because “we do not perceive our surrounding from a series of fixed points” (Ingold 2015, 135); it is about moving along a non-linear path of cognition, engaging with and being attentive to one’s environment which is not pre-given, but in continual emergence.

The conscious “I,” rather like dancing, is a process:

Our ordinary or everyday concept of the self is the concept of a subject of experience and an agent of action, not of an inner and substantial essence of the person. Furthermore, when we look carefully at what we apply our ordinary concept of self to in the world of our individual and collective experience, we don’t find any inherently existent thing or independent entity; what we find is a collection of interrelated processes, some bodily or physical, some mental or psychological. These processes are all “dependently co-arisen”, that is, each one comes to be and ceases to be according to a multitude of interdependent causes and conditions. The proper conclusion to draw from this is not the nihilist one that there is no self whatsoever but rather that the self—the everyday subject of experience and agent of action—is a dependently arisen series of events. More simply stated, the self isn’t a thing or an entity; it’s a process. (Thompson 2015, 323)
Yet, as the philosopher of mind Thompson (2015, 324) notes, the habitual way to conceive of the self is to take it as a unified thing or entity, independently real with its inner essence. This conception is oblivious to how the self is “brought forth or enacted in the process of living” and how it is shaped by lived, embodied experience.

The essentialized view of the self as a fixed entity and the conception of the world/environment as pre-given and perceiver-independent reveal our everyday metaphysics. Metaphysics, whether in philosophy or in daily life, defines what is real, but, as Lakoff and Johnson argue (1999, 14), such a conception of the real depends upon unconscious metaphors. They propose that “our bodies, brains, and interactions with environment provide the mostly unconscious basis for our everyday metaphysics, that is, our sense of what is real” (1999, 17). They argue that the Western tradition of philosophy requires reconsideration in light of the three ground-breaking findings of cognitive science: that the mind is inherently embodied, thought is mostly unconscious, and abstract concepts are largely metaphorical. Lakoff and Johnson propose that reason and abstract thought use the sensorimotor system and that “reason is not disembodied, as the tradition has largely held, but arises from the nature of our brains, bodies, and bodily experience” (1999, 4). Categories and concepts that we form are, for the most part, based on how we are embodied and on the kind of experience we can have due to the bodies we have. The properties of the human body shape the peculiarities of our conceptual systems (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 18). A key point in their argument is that our conceptual system – the ways in which we think and act – is metaphorical in nature (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Embodied lived experience is an important source of metaphors for cognition. Meaning-making is accomplished through metaphorical and metonymical mapping between a concrete source domain onto an abstract target domain, which is shaped by bodily experience, sensorimotor activities and interactions. In Lakoff and Johnson’s experiential approach to meaning-making and cognition, the metaphorical projection extends from concrete bodily, sensorimotor and interactional experience to more abstract conceptual structures.

The embodied cognitive science of Lakoff and Johnson (1999) stands in opposition to the first-generation cognitive science of the 1950s and 1960s, which assumed that mind was disembodied and functioned as a computer program that could be run on any appropriate hardware. From this disembodied perspective, meanings were defined either in terms of the internal relationships between symbols or as inner representations of an external reality (Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 76). Accordingly, a mental representation was either a concept, whose meaning was defined only in terms of its relationship to other concepts in a formal system, or a symbolic representation of something outside the formal system (Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 76). In the former case, a representation bears no link to the world outside the formal system of symbols; in the latter, a representation is assumed to be a mentalistic mirror image of the external reality. In both cases, however, the conceptualization of meaning is metaphorically structured by the spectatorial imagistic model of cognition (the camera obscura represents this imagistic schema well), which determines the dualism between reality and representation, matter and mind, language and reality, subject and object.
The shared dualistic assumption leads to two concurrent epistemological solutions: to bridge the gap by means of optical mirroring or, if optical truth is not possible, to distance the world and define meaning within the boundaries of one’s mental construction. Both options share the metaphorical, image-schematic structuring premise of the mind-world gap, which shapes reasoning about meaning in disembodied terms. Meaning is conceived as mentalistic, contained in the head, detached from the world. The latter inferences are drawn from the imagistic conceptual structure of the source domain – spatial containment of mind, which is “inside,” as opposed to the body and the world which are “outside.” The ocularcentric division between mind and world can be said to structure an entire metaphorical conceptual system. Once the mind is assumed to be disembodied, the mind-world gap becomes unbridgeable (Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 95).

It is important to understand that representational theories of mind stem from mind-body dualism, according to which mind and body are not only separate, but ontologically different in kind. “Inner” mental space contains mental “representations” (ideas, concepts, images, propositions) that relate to the “external” material things in the world (Johnson 2007). Embodiment theory, as opposed to representationalist theories, treats concepts, percepts, propositions, and thoughts not as inner mental quasi-objects, but as patterns of experiential interaction, as “aspects or dimensions or structures of the patterns of organism-environment coupling (or integrated interaction) that constitute experience” (Johnson 2007, 117). Thoughts are not just about the world, but they are in and of the world as processes of experience (Johnson 2007, 117). They are patterns of experience and reality, not inner, abstract representations of reality.

Moreover, as an organism interacts with, relates to and couples with its environment, its continued functioning, growth and flourishing require emotions and value judgements, which is one of the ways in which organisms assess their situation and make adjustments to maintain a homeostasis within different kinds of environments. Emotions are necessary for our survival and harmonious interaction with our environments; “they provide a natural means for the brain and mind to evaluate the environment within and around the organism, and respond accordingly and adaptively (Damasio 2003, 54).” An organism’s

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21 As Hogan (2016) notes, emotion has become a focus of concern in literary studies, philosophy, psychology, and other fields. He differentiates between two broad strands in such studies: affective science and affect theory. Whereas affect theory has drawn on the tradition of psychoanalysis and postructuralism, affective science derives from the field of cognitive science. Although both of these two broad orientations in affect studies comprise a diverse array of approaches, there are some traits that are shared among the specific approaches of each of these strands of work, respectively. Affect theory, according to Hogan (2016), is very much influenced by the psychoanalytic thought of Jacques Lacan and Gilles Deleuze, defining affect in relation to a conception of fundamental drives. Even though Gilles Deleuze or Félix Guattari discuss affect by way of critique of the earlier psychoanalytic tradition, their discourse is “continuous with psychoanalysis in a way that affective science is not” (Hogan 2016). Importantly, affect theory also combines psychoanalytic thought with a critique of institutions and language, social and political structures, influenced by the poststructuralist ideas of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. It underlines how emotions are elicited and imagined in ideologically-motivated ways. Affective science, on the other hand, articulates an account of affect that is based on empirical study and analysis of cognitive and affective processes. I draw on this latter tradition and insights of affective science.
interaction and cognition of the world is therefore not neutral, but value-laden, as it seeks to sustain its identity and preferences, which means that emotions and feelings\(^{22}\) play an important role in cognition (Johnson 2007; Maiiese 2011). Emotions, as complex neural, chemical, behavioral responses to the environment, typically have a positive or negative value as they elicit changes in the body in response to perceived harm or benefit (Johnson 2007). Facts of cognition are thus not separate from emotions and values of cognition; they are intertwined. Most of these emotional processes, however, take place beneath the level of conscious awareness. Before we become consciously aware of our feelings, we have frequently already understood our situation in a certain value-laden way (Johnson 2007, 66). Even though emotion and feelings are at the heart of our capacity to experience meaning, most of the analytic philosophy of mind and language pays no attention to emotions and feelings because it considers them to be non-cognitive (Johnson 2007). Values, in the analytic philosophy of mind and language, are separate from propositional, factual content of meaning.

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) oppose both disembodied objective scientific realism and postmodern relativism. Instead, they defend embodied realism, which accepts that there is a world independent of our understanding of it, but denies that our “concepts and forms of reason are characterized not by our bodies and brains, but by the external world in itself” (Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 90). Embodied realism rejects a strict subject-object dichotomy, which posits an unbridgeable gap between the objective reality “out there” and the subjective representation “in here” (Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 93). If this dualism is accepted, as Lakoff and Johnson (1999, 93) explain, then there are only two conceptions of objectivity possible: either objectivity is given by the external reality itself (the object) or by the intersubjective, universal, transcendental structures of consciousness shared by all people (the subjects). Thus, objectivity is either derived from accurate mirroring of the external world or from universal, transcendental and disembodied reason. On the other hand, embodied realism, in accordance with enactive embodiment, posits that we are coupled to the world through our embodied interactions with our environment. Lakoff and Johnson (1999, 93) emphasize that disembodied realism mistakenly “takes two intertwined and inseparable dimensions of all experience—the awareness of the experiencing organism and the stable entities and structures it encounters—and erects them as separate and distinct entities called subjects and objects.” This explains why disembodied realism puts so much weight on theories of reference and truth because it needs to fill the gap between representation and the world.

Lakoff and Johnson’s approach corroborates my argument that metaphorical models of cognition are closely linked to models of the self:

What we now know about the mind is radically at odds with the major classical philosophical views of what a person is. For example, there is no Cartesian dualistic person, with a mind separate from and independent of the body, sharing exactly the same disembodied transcendental reason with everyone else, and capable of knowing everything about his or her mind simply by self-reflection. Rather, the mind is embodied, reason is

\(^{22}\) Emotional responses can operate without us being aware of them, whereas feelings are consciously experienced emotional states.
shaped by the body, and since most thought is unconscious, the mind cannot be known simply by self-reflection. Empirical study is necessary. There exists no Kantian radically autonomous person, with absolute freedom and a transcendent reason that correctly dictates what is and isn’t moral. […] There is no a priori, purely philosophical basis for a universal concept of morality and no transcendent, universal pure reason that could give rise to universal moral laws. What we can think is limited by the body. […] The phenomenological person, who through phenomenological introspection alone can discover everything there is to know about the mind and the nature of experience, is a fiction. […] There is no poststructuralist person – no completely decentered subject for whom all meaning is arbitrary, relative, and purely historically contingent. (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 5–6)

This passage captures how ways of knowing are interdependent with ways of being, how the ways in which we engage with the world link to our conceptions of the self or the cognizing subject. Crucially, if we examine these different models of the cognizing self and their respective ontology and epistemology, each is informed by a peculiar metaphorical model, which illustrates how the cognizing self relates to itself, others, and the world. The adopted model then shapes the kind of knowledge that is produced.

Movement, rather than making inner representations of a static, pre-given world, is then the principal way “by which we learn the meaning of things and acquire our ever-growing sense of what our world is like” (Johnson 2007, 21). Movement occurs within an environment and requires connection and interaction with aspects of this environment (Johnson 2007, 20). It is, as a result, not accurate to speak of subject and objects, because they are “abstractions from the interactive process of our experience of a meaningful self-in-a-world” (Johnson 2007, 20). Importantly, it is not just the structure and patterns of movements that matter in shaping meaning, but also the qualities of movement in corporeal encounter with our environment. These perceived qualities of movement and interaction are not subjective, inner, mental fabrications, located inside our skull, but they are “the qualities in the world as much as they are in us. They are the qualities of different experiences that involve both the structure of the organism and the structure of its environments inextricably woven together” (Johnson 2007, 25). Meaning has experiential, embodied rootedness.

It still needs to be underlined how the “concept empiricism” of Lakoff and Johnson, as it is sometimes referred to, differs from a standard empiricist view. For Lakoff and Johnson, bodies participate in the very concept formation and not just shape perception through the senses. Body, brain, and our active interaction with the world is what enables reason and abstract thought, rather than just informs it through sense perception that captures images of the external world. Reason is dependent not only on perception, but also movement, emotion, and other bodily capacities. Knowledge and truth are mediated by embodied understanding and imagination. In other words, Lakoff and Johnson’s theory rejects mind-body dualism. In an empiricist argument, on the other hand, the role of the body is reduced to sense perception, leaving the dualism in place. Movement is never taken into account in regular empiricist arguments, which perhaps accounts for their static, fixed, passive visual metaphorical models, which inform empiricist epistemology. For empiricists, sense perception precedes concept formation and the body is only involved in
forming percepts. What Lakoff and Johnson argue is that percept and concept converge, that the body is actively part of concept formation.

The argument on the convergence of concept and percept is taken further by Iain McGilchrist, who argues that we do not need words and language for abstract thought and concept formation. Concept formation precedes language: categorical perception is something human beings share with other animals (McGilchrist 2009). Therefore, it is wrong to assume that meaning depends on language: in fact, meaning antedates language. He provides examples of how different animals are able to categorize their environment as they come to engage with it.23 Making sense of the world by abstract conceptual thought and categorization is something we share with other animals. McGilchrist argues:

Language is necessary neither for categorization, nor for reasoning, nor for concept formation, nor perception: it does not itself bring the landscape of the world in which we live into being. What it does, rather, is shape that landscape by fixing the “counties” into which we divide it, defining which categories or types of entities we see there – how we carve it up. […] Language helps some things stand forward, but by the same token makes other recede. […] What language contributes is to firm up certain particular ways of seeing the world and give fixity to them. (McGilchrist 2009, 110)

We could extrapolate from this that the ways of seeing are a result of both the already established categorizations and our lived experiential engagement with the world by way of metaphor. McGilchrist makes a pertinent point:

The model we choose to use to understand something determines what we find. If it is the case that our understanding is an effect of the metaphors we choose, it is also true that it is a cause: our understanding itself guides the choice of metaphor by which we understand it. The chosen metaphor is both cause and effect of the relationship. Thus how we think about ourselves and our relationship to the world is already revealed in the metaphors we unconsciously choose to talk about it. That choice further entrenches our partial view of the subject. (McGilchrist 2009, 97)

Metaphorical models or visual metaphors, which guide thinkers in the Western intellectual tradition, shape their ways of engaging with the world, knowing the world and their own selves. The metaphors they unconsciously choose in trying to make sense reveals how they relate to themselves, their ways of being and engaging with the world. Therefore, it is crucial to pay attention to the kind of metaphorical models we apply in our thinking about ourselves as beings-in-the-world, because we shape ourselves and the world based on these metaphorical models.

The thought-shaping role of embodied metaphor is illustrated by the above-discussed example of Machiavelli, who looked at Leonardo da Vinci’s landscape sketches and made conclusions about objectivity using spatial schemas provided by the visual imagery (as discussed in Section 3.2). Perspective and distance are therefore conceptual metaphors that

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23 For example, pigeons not only can categorize different types of leaves, fish, or people, but also distinguish between different paintings by Monet and Picasso and generalize unfamiliar paintings from different styles (Hernstein, Loveland & Cable 1976; Cerella 1980; Watanabe, Sakamoto & Wakita 1995).
are based on the peculiar schematization of the knowing self and its interaction with the world. The same applies to the metaphor of the *camera obscura* (also discussed in Section 3.2), which entails an inside, outside, and a boundary, with the cognizing subject placed in the dark confined interior and reality being externalized. If you adopt this metaphor as your model of cognition, it has implications for how you reason, about how cognition proceeds, and what knowledge is. It means that cognition is the internalization of an external, pre-given, static reality and knowledge is an image, a mental representation of it. To say that we internalize images of the external world is to employ a metaphor. The problem with these metaphors, when they are made the exclusive basis of our epistemology, is that they disregard the body, its movement, its dynamic interaction with the world. Static visual metaphors are prioritized and associated with truth and knowledge because of the persisting prevalence of Greek ocularcentrism in the Western philosophical tradition (see Section 3.3). In other words, the intellectual tradition, which we inherit through implicit metaphors, shapes our ways of relating to ourselves and the world, our habitual ways of knowing, and is hence responsible for establishing certain neural structures that maintain these habits. Simultaneously, experience acquired from engagement with the world may alter these neural structures, allowing us to modify our ways of knowing and being.²⁴ Tradition shapes the body and the body shapes tradition: there is a constant interplay between them enacted in the process of life.

If we explore the conceptual metaphors of the ocularcentric tradition and the Platonic distinction between the pure, ideal forms and fleeting apparitions, they are based on two key conceptual metaphors, as characterized by Lakoff and Johnson (1999, 366–367): IDEAS ARE OBJECTS and KNOWING IS SEEING. Knowing is seeing an object, and one’s knowledge is dependent on how substantial an object is. Only what is, what exists (Being) can be known as solid knowledge, and can be clearly seen. What can be seen best by the mind are ideas, pure forms or essences. Plato upholds a theory of essences, which claims that there is a single essence shared by the multiplicity of instances of the same thing or phenomenon; it is the real thing, as opposed to multiple appearances. Only what is real can be seen, so ideas are objects that exist externally in the world. Subjective apparitions, on the other hand, belong to the realm of Becoming: they neither are nor are not, so they cannot be seen/known, and are therefore not real. Plato’s philosophy being at the root of the Western intellectual tradition results in how we are habituated to think of knowledge, truth, and reality.

In relation to the different ways of knowing, McGilchrist (2009) proposes a compelling argument about why philosophers have tended to prioritize certain metaphors in their thinking. He points out that while the left and right hemispheres of the brain cannot be divided in terms of “what” they do or what functions they perform, they can,

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²⁴ My own process of thinking about notions of truth, knowledge, reality has been affected by my experience of dance/movement. It showed that there was an altogether different way to think about what it means to know something and convey that knowledge by using the experience of bodily engagement through movement. I learned that movement, sense of connection, posture, tension of my own body and other people’s bodies was loaded with meaning.
however, differ in “how” they do it, in their manner of knowing, of seeing the world. The right hemisphere holds a way of knowing in the sense of experience or an encounter with something or someone. It is how we approach other living human beings and, crucially, art. We encounter art experientially in the same way we encounter a person. The meaning that we derive from this encounter is conveyed metaphorically; it is transmitted and received by our unconscious minds; it does not need to be translated into words, concepts, abstract ideas in order to be understood. This way of knowing has to do with living beings; it does not provide fixed certainties; it is focused on the whole rather than the parts and it depends on an encounter (McGilchrist 2009, 95).

The left hemisphere, by contrast, holds a way of knowing which has to do with approaching non-living, inert entities; discrete “pieces” of information, impersonal, general, fixed, certain, distanced knowledge. This knowledge does not vary from person to person or at one point in time from another; context is irrelevant to it (McGilchrist 2009, 95-96). The left hemispheric way of knowing is about “grasping,” “putting finger on it,” “getting a hold of it,” which allows seizing a thing in order to control or manipulate it for our purposes.

The right hemispheric way of knowing, on the other hand, is about exploring without necessarily seeking to grasp or get a hold of something. McGilchrist (2009) argues that these two different ways of knowing, of understanding offered by the two hemispheres, are synthesized in our experience of the world. However, the ways in which these two versions of knowledge are synthesized is not symmetrical, accounting for which kind of knowledge tends to dominate in our attempts to understand the world and ourselves. According to McGilchrist (2009), the left hemispheric way of knowing has gained dominance in the course of evolution. He hypothesizes that it was the drive to manipulate, to grasp the environment, which had propelled the expansion of the left hemisphere in our early ancestors before even language evolved for doing that more effectively. Language is then regarded by him as the extension of this capacity to grasp and manipulate:

Language enables the left hemisphere to represent the world “off-line,” a conceptual version, distinct from the world of experience, and shielded from the immediate environment, with its insistent impressions, feelings and demands, abstracted from the body, no longer dealing with what is concrete, specific, individual, unrepeatable, and constantly changing, but with a disembodied representation of the world, abstracted, central, not particularized in time and place, generally applicable, clear and fixed. Isolating things artificially from their context brings the advantage of enabling us to focus intently on a particular aspect of reality and how it can be modeled, so that it can be grasped and controlled. But the losses are in the picture as a whole. Whatever lies in the realm of the implicit, or depends on flexibility, whatever can’t be brought into focus and fixed, ceases to exist as far as the speaking hemisphere is concerned. (McGilchrist 2009, 115)

Language, however,

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25 McGilchrist’s theory should be differentiated from the “folk” psychology of left- and right-brain behaviors popular in the 1970s. He carefully distances himself from these theories.
begins in the world of experience” by way of metaphor, “which is a function of the right hemisphere, and is rooted in the body. […] Only the right hemisphere has the capacity to understand metaphor. […] Metaphoric thinking is fundamental to our understanding of the world, because it is the only way in which understanding can reach outside the system of signs to life itself. It is what links language to life. (McGilchrist 2009, 115)

It is relevant to keep in mind, in this regard, that when people come to encounter or experience something new, it engages their right hemisphere first. Only when the new thing or situation becomes routine, is its processing transferred to primarily the left hemisphere (McGilchrist 2009). The right hemisphere engages with the world by way of metaphor, which makes sense of what it encounters by way of connotations with the earlier experience of something else, something that relates to our previous embodied experience.

For instance, such an abstract word as “immaterial” is a Latin-origin term which relates to the feel of a piece of wood, or materia (McGilchrist 2009, 116). Denotative language (left hemisphere) is preceded by connotative language of metaphor (right hemisphere). Thinking, reasoning begins with metaphorizing when we experience or encounter something new and are making sense of it by relating it to something else we already have an experience of. The trajectory of previous experience is therefore crucial for the breadth and variety of our capacity to make sense of the world we come into contact with. The metaphors that guide our metaphysics reflect our previous experience: we can compare and relate the new only in terms of what we are already familiar with. Metaphors acquired from embodied, lived experience is what enables abstract thought.

For the left hemisphere, metaphor is suspicious. It is regarded as a lie or an unnecessary adornment, which intervenes with certainty and fixity of meaning: we need only to remember Elton’s advice to historians (Section 3.3) to avoid metaphor by all means, because it obscures the meaning and, according to him, does not refer to anything real in the world. Elton’s aforementioned cautioning to guard historical language against all sources of imprecision and vagueness is a good example of the left hemisphere’s dominant way of knowing, which ignores how language springs from metaphorical sense-making and which builds knowledge from observation of pieces of information or data isolated from their context.

McGilchrist’s (2009) argument suggests that the prevalence of ocularcentrism in Western philosophy could be a sign of the dominance of the left hemispheric model of knowing, which is taken as the standard of knowledge, according to which all knowledge is measured. Furthermore, McGilchrist’s (2009) argument is compelling in that it explains how visual metaphors – the linear perspective, a vantage point, the camera obscura, the monocular eye of the mind/soul, the mind as a mirror of nature and others – both reflect philosophers’ lived experience and guide their ways of knowing, being and engaging with the world. Just as in the case of historians, we have seen how Fernand Braudel’s approach to studying the past was profoundly shaped by his experience of imprisonment in Lübeck and how Davis’s experience of motherhood affected her way of writing history (Section 3.3). Their methodology, as their language and style, reflect their lived experience in engagement with others and the environment.
As a final point, my argument, supported by the research of Lakoff, Johnson, and McGilchrist, is that bodily experience and movement allow for abstract thought when we are making sense of ourselves, others, and the world. In the very way we use metaphorical models to structure our language and thought, it already illustrates the embodied nature of thought, of how percept and concept converge in cognition. Realizing how the body participates in the formation of concepts and abstract ideas bridges the gap between language and world, mind and world. The body can no longer be overlooked in discussions of knowledge-making and truth. In the following section, I will discuss what embodiment entails for historiography and history education.

3.6 Towards embodied ways of making sense of the past

Having posited the notion of history as the process of life and lived experience, the concept of experience needs to be explained in more detail. A peculiar feature of embodied experience is that it elides efforts to pin down its defining qualities: “Despite its continual relevance, even despite its sometimes grinding presence, embodied experience remains too slippery, fluid, mobile, and variable to be contained comfortably and completely within any symbolic form” (Brown et al. 2011, 496). Experience, as an ongoing, transient process, requires different methodological approaches.

LaCapra (2004, 4) asserts that “experience” is a frequently invoked but undertheorized concept both in history and in related disciplines.” He observes that in the past few decades there has been “an experiential turn,” which led some historians to turn to the issue of experience, particularly with regard to experience of different marginalized, subordinated groups (LaCapra 2004, 3). The experiential turn has similarly been visible in the approaches of microhistory and oral history as well as in the reevaluation of the status of testimony, which bears witness to lived experience, especially in the cases of traumatic experience (LaCapra 2004, 3). LaCapra’s particular interest in traumatic experience leads him to differentiate between the traumatic event and traumatic experience. According to him, the traumatic event is firmly situated in the past. The event is datable and punctual, but traumatic experience is not punctual and has an elusive aspect insofar as it relates to a past that has not passed away – a past that intrusively invades the present and may block or obviate possibilities in the future. So-called traumatic memory carries the experience into the present and future in that the events are compulsively relived or re-experienced as if there were no distance or difference between past and present. In traumatic memory the past is not simply history as over and done with. It lives on experientially and haunts or possesses the self or the community and must be worked through in order for it to be remembered with some degree of conscious control and critical perspective that enables survival and, in the best of circumstances, ethical and political agency in the present. (LaCapra 2004, 55)

LaCaprian experience can be conceived of as “the past in the present,” the past, which persists in the present in embodied memory. LaCapra has an expansive definition of experience:
LaCapra’s work aims at revealing how the past of lived experience is not something inaccessible and remote, but something that carries on and can be found in the present because of conscious or unconscious identification and/or empathizing with people who underwent the experience. His view is at odds with that of Peter Novick (1999) and Walter Benn Michaels (1999), for whom remembered lived experience is limited to those who personally and directly lived through the past experience in question. LaCapra (2004, 43) questions the latter view by arguing that Novick and Michaels are not able to explain the intergenerational transmission of trauma, where it is possible to observe posttraumatic symptoms of experiences in people who have not directly lived through these experiences.

Modell (2003, 40) addresses the persistence of the traumatic experience in the present by suggesting that traumatic experience remains intact, obliterating the distinction between the past and the present, when this experience has not been re-contextualized or transformed as a result of later experience. For a successful transformation, understood as re-categorization or re-contextualization of traumatic experience, to happen, a metaphoric process needs to be activated (Modell 1990, 2003). When the metaphoric process is successful, a metaphor not only transfers meaning, but “can transform meaning and generate new perceptions” (2003, 27), which means that imagination by way of metaphor is not a fantasy or fiction, but a re-combinatory metaphoric process, which is very much tied to lived experience. However, if the traumatic memory is unconscious, it exists as a latent potential awaiting reconstruction and is triggered later in life by similar circumstances, where it evokes a transfer of “meaning from the past to the present without transformation” (Modell 2003, 38). The metaphoric process is foreclosed. In effect, “the past becomes a template for the present, creating a loss of ambiguity in the experience of the here and now […] In experiential terms, this means that the present is conflated with the past” (Modell 2003, 38–39). The past persists in the present in the ways of relating to others, environment, and the self. Modell argues that “inasmuch as category formation is an aspect of memory, metaphor provides the link between emotional memory and current perceptions. […] Unconscious emotional memories exist as potential categories, which, in the process of retrieval, are associatively linked to events in the here and now by means of metaphor and metonymy” (Modell 2003, 42–43). For Modell, metaphors are multimodal and can engage visual, auditory, and kinesthetic inputs (2003, 32). The metaphor is embodied and does not necessitate language: it can be conveyed in gestures, movements, visual images, bodily sensations and feelings (Modell 2003, 27). Similar to the argument of Lakoff and Johnson (1999), Modell (2003) asserts that metaphors are not just figures of speech, but they are “a primary form of cognition and thought that becomes secondarily incorporated into language” (26–27). Metaphors, for Modell, are selective interpreters of embodied experience, of both conscious and unconscious memory (2003, xii, 26, 69).

Modell (2003, 171) points out that, since Descartes, some philosophers have been convinced that it is not possible to imaginatively know other minds and that only one’s own mind can be known with some certainty. Giambattista Vico, in contrast, asserted that
“our knowledge of other minds is privileged, in the sense that we can imaginatively enter into other minds and understand the works of human creation in a way that is not possible with regard to inanimate or other natural objects” (Modell 2003, 172). The difference between these two different ways of thinking about knowledge of other people’s experience is that Descartes and his followers do not permit for the “as if-ness” of metaphoric thought: a type of empathy which “involves a sense of similarity while maintaining a sense of difference. To experience the simultaneity of similarity and difference requires the acceptance of paradox, which in turn rests on the cognitive capacity for metaphor” (Modell 2003, 175). For Descartes, there seems to be only two options: total identification or total alterity, total correspondence or total difference. For Vico, empathic identification is only partial and does not deny alterity of the other: it only makes one feel “as if” they resemble the other person. So Modell goes on to argue that “our cognitive capacity to empathetically know other minds relies on an unimpaired faculty for metaphoric thought,” where a metaphoric process allows for the play of similarity and difference enabling a transitory, partial identification (Modell 2003, 175). Individuals, who have had traumatic experience, have their capacity for metaphoric thought degraded or impaired:

What I have observed as a clinician is that identification in such cases is not partial or transitory but absolute and total. There is no sense of the “as if.” In such cases, to feel identified with the other is viewed as hazardous, as one may fear the possibility of becoming swallowed up in the other and losing one’s sense of self. […] Identifying with the other rests on a paradox—that one is similar to the other and yet one remains oneself. One must be able to accept the paradox of something that both is and is not. […] When metaphors become foreclosed as a response to trauma, such impairments can be circumscribed and limited to metonymic associations to the original trauma. […] Those who survived the Holocaust, […] live in a world that is beyond metaphor. This loss of the metaphoric capacity may extend to children of survivors through a form of cultural transmission. This loss of the sense of safety appears to have been communicated from the inner world of the parent to the inner world of the child. How this process occurs is not at all clear. What characteristically develops can be described as a primary identification with the parent’s experience. Again, there is an inability to accept the paradox of similarity and difference. The parent’s memories and the parent’s guilt of surviving becomes the child’s own guilt and memories. Instead of the play of sameness and difference that is part of the empathic imagination, the child experiences a total identification with his parent. (Modell 2003, 175–177)

Modell’s characterization of how impaired metaphoric thought allows for traumatic experience to be passed on to the next generation fits well with LaCapra’s definition of lived experience, as transcending the individual who has personally undergone this experience, as something that carries on through conscious or unconscious identification in embodiment. In effect, Modell demonstrates how the past can manifest in the present, how the past can be engaged with and known in the present. He also shows direction for finding ways to tackle the presence of the past, especially the traumatic presence of the past, with the help of metaphoric thought. Art, for example, is considered by him as a tool enhancing metaphoric thought and therefore enabling people to re-contextualize or
transform the sense of their lived past experiences, asserting both similarity and difference between the present and the past.

Another important way in which Modell’s approach helps elaborate LaCapra’s insights is that Modell draws attention to the discovery of “mirror” neurons by two Italian neuroscientists, Vittorio Gallese and Giacomo Rizzolatti (Gallese, Fadiga, et al. 1996; Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998; Gallese 2000). Modell points out that the discovery of mirror neurons, firstly in monkeys and then in the human brain, shows how the brain is intrinsically relational. Mirror neurons fire when a person perceives an action performed by another individual: the same neural response is evoked as if the one who observes the action initiated and performed the action. Gallese (2001) believes that there may be more similar matching mechanisms in the brain, which permit this relational intersubjectivity. The discovery of mirror neurons, importantly, clashes with a representationalist theory of mind, which posits a distinction between the external world and its representations in the mind, which are truthful if they match the reality “out there.” In the case of mirror neurons, there is a neural link between self and other, which is immediate and which does not require an intervening symbolic code or a mental language (Modell 2003, 185). Modell argues that research on mirror neurons and other potential relational matching mechanisms “suggests that we use our bodies as a template that enables us to feel our way into the other’s experience. This supports the contention that the roots of empathy are in the body” (187).

### 3.6.1 Disembodied and embodied senses of (historical) empathy

So what does it mean to know another mind? And, crucially, which way of knowing – a first-person, second-person, or third-person approach – is most conducive to making sense of the experience of another person? If we recall the argument made by Levesque (2016) and Seixas (2016) in Chapter 2, the disciplinary way of knowing the past is a third-person, distanced approach aimed at a pursuit of scientific/scholarly knowledge about the past. It implies that a practicing historian seeks evidence about the behavior of people in the past and, on the basis of the evidence, makes inferences about what happened. Minds cannot be known, but behavior or activities of the people in the past can. The third-person way of seeing is tied in this approach to the neo-Cartesian dualism between mind and bodily behavior. Memory/experience, on the other hand, is characterized by Levesque (2016) and Seixas (2016) as a first-person, subjective relation to the past, implying that one can reliably know only one’s own mind, whereas the minds and experiences of others remain opaque. Both the third-person and the first-person conceptualization of empathy is bound to be disembodied, because it implicitly relies on dualistic Greek metaphysics and its separation between mental and bodily dimension of human experience. De Certeau (1998, 39, 46–47, 99–102) argues that this irreversible break between the historian writing in the present and the experience of the people in the past underpins modern Western historiography. The historian struggles to access the experience and minds of the people in the past, but the past is the dead and absent Other. In this understanding, history is incapable of bridging the experiential abyss between the past and the present.
As Reddy (2008) is able to clarify, there are two starting positions for the assumption that a gap exists between one mind and another. The first of these positions states that “I can know my own mind, but I cannot know your mind.” The second position asserts that “I can see your body and observe your behavior, but I cannot know whether you have a mind inside.” In both cases, the mind of another person is assumed to be opaque to perception. The first position illustrates Cartesian understanding. As Reddy (2008, 9), explains,

for Descartes, the mind was an isolated, unworldly, and disembodied thing, with no direct access to anything other than itself. As a consequence, individual minds (or people) were not only reaching across a profound gap for knowing or relating to other minds, but were also reaching across a gap in relation to knowing or relating to the world around them. Their relations were necessarily limited to their own—possibly hallucinatory—ideas about the world or other minds.” However, even if Descartes’ idea of a mind-body separation has been rejected in psychology and in cognitive sciences, a mind-behavior dualism is still alive and well. (Reddy 2008)

The mind-behavior dualism is one of the primary principles taught to students of psychology: It asserts that description of behavior must be clearly separated from interpretation of its meaning, because the behavior of the body is transparent to the observer, while the “mental” meaning is opaque and only accessible by interpretation and inference (Reddy 2008, 10). Behavior and the body, in other words, should by no means be confounded with meaning. The meaning is assumed to be disembodied, mentalistic, hidden in the mind, and impervious to perception. Behavior can be read, but not the minds and experienced meaning: “If we cannot know anything other than our experience, and if we cannot directly experience minds other than our own […], then it follows with an inevitable logic that we have absolutely no way of knowing the experience of others” (Reddy 2008, 12). Another sense in which mind has been understood as disembodied is by portraying it as a “mental representational” entity that exists in “representations” and can be known only by inference (Reddy 2008, 15).

The idea that other minds are opaque, unknowable, “hidden from view” is based on a faulty Cartesian assumption of an internalized cognizing self. If you assume that the mind is an isolated, disembodied entity, hidden in the confines of one’s head, then, you can at most be certain about your own mind, whereas the minds of others remain a mystery. In such case, all you can do is to observe the behavior of others and make inferences about their minds on the basis of the behavioral evidence. Yet, the Cartesian assumption rests on a misguided ocular-optic metaphor of a disembodied eye of the mind and the internal cognizing subject (for example, as in the camera obscura metaphor). If you adopt this assumption, knowing other minds would entail, quite impossibly, being the other person, implying total identification and discarding alterity of people in the past.

So how can other minds be known? One route to bridge the gap between minds, Reddy (2008, 19-21) posits, has been the first-person route, when the experience of another person is understood on the basis of one’s own experience. The modern version of this argument from analogy adopts the view that
perceiving the similarity of behavior between bodies, the individual has only to access her own mental experience usually accompanying that behavior and use this experience as an internal model for the other’s mind. Recognizing situations that the other is in, the individual can run “simulations” of the experiences she would have if she were in that situation, and through these “simulations” she can feel or think what the other feels or thinks. (Reddy 2008, 20)

The first-person route is, however, problematical in tying knowledge of other’s mind completely to one’s own experience (Reddy 2008, 19). The idea that, in order to understand another’s experience, one needs to extrapolate from one’s own personal experience is a neo-Cartesian notion, because it explains intersubjectivity as an ascription of one’s own subjectivity to others (because you can only know your own mind reliably) rather than seeing intersubjectivity as an engagement between subjectivities (Reddy 2008, 23). It implies that an empathic understanding of another’s experience is based on sameness between my experience and someone else’s experience.

Reddy (2008), on the other hand, proposes a second-person approach to knowing other minds. She argues that the first-person approach lacks a recognition of difference of the other and the ability to respond in the situation of embodied interaction. The second-person approach implies an alternation of engagement and disengagement, as opposed to the third-person detachment or the first-person ascription of one’s own introspected state (Reddy 2008, 35–36). Engagement implies encountering another as a separate person while simultaneously blurring the line between self and other. Others are experienced as others, but in direct emotional engagement (Reddy 2008, 26). Yet, engagement between subjectivities does not preclude disengagement, which is not the same as detachment. Disengagement happens within the frame of engagement, not outside of it; it is “a temporary stepping outside the frame to explore the frame better” (Reddy 2008, 36). One could say that disengagement, as characterized by Reddy (2008), is reminiscent of Alva Noë’s (2015) discussion of how art and philosophy both require some extent of disengagement in order to notice and to make manifest how we are organized by certain ideas. Knowing other minds and their experienced meaning, for Reddy (2008), happens in engagement with the other person and it does not necessarily require a mediating language, a symbolic code, or evidence-based inferences. Empathic knowledge of other minds means sharing in the experienced, embodied meaning of other persons.

Furthermore, the second-person approach illustrates the paradox of a metaphoric empathic relationship, where one can imaginatively experience an embodied felt sense of what it is like to be someone else, while at the same time maintaining a differentiation between self and other. This implies a combination of the so-called “cognitive” and “affective” aspects of empathy, when we are able to recognize both that other people have different experiences and beliefs than our own and, at the same time, we are capable of sharing another’s experience and emotions. In practice, these two elements of empathy are typically intertwined.

The possibility of such empathic knowledge is corroborated by studies on mirror neuron systems which show strong links between the mirror neuron systems and empathy, as, for example, in the case of observing facial emotional expressions (Carr et al. 2003; Leslie et al. 2004; Pfeifer et al. 2008) or grasping actions (Kaplan & Iacoboni 2006). In
fact, Gallese’s (2001) initial prediction that there may be multiple neural matching mechanisms in the brain has been proven correct, as different mirror neuron systems for emotion, action, touch, and pain have been discovered (Spaulding 2013, 234). In the case of facial expressions, for example, this means that the same neural circuits of the mirror neuron system for emotion are recruited when we observe facial expressions of other people and when we ourselves adopt these expressions. Neuroimaging studies of the neural mechanisms involved in the perception of pain, too, reveal that the affective states of others can be shared intersubjectively and intercorporeally (Morrison et al. 2004; Botvinick et al. 2005; Jackson et al. 2005). Other studies also demonstrate that the areas of the brain activated during a particular action are also activated not just by observation of this action being performed by another person, but likewise by imagination of the same action (Decety & Chaminade 2003; Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). The main insight coming from the growing literature on mirror neuron systems is that we have direct experiential knowledge of others, which is gained not purely cognitively, through linguistic representations, but by “simulating” the embodied minds of others (Gallese et al. 1996; Gallese et al. 2004; Wojciechowski & Gallese 2011; Gallese 2014). This corporeal imagination of what it is like to be the other person proceeds through preverbal, gestural, and tactile relations with others (Hustvedt 2016, 410). As Wojciechowski and Gallese elaborate,

[...]embodied simulation is a mandatory, pre-rational, non-introspective process – that is, a physical, and not simply ‘mental’ experience of the mind, emotions, lived experiences and motor intentions of other people. Embodied simulation challenges the notion that interpersonal understanding consists solely of our explicitly attributing to others propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires, which we map as symbolic representations within our own minds. (Wojciechowski & Gallese 2011, para. 39)

In a related vein of research, illuminating how mirror neuron matching mechanisms work in the absence of an actual bodily contact with another person, reading has been shown to be an embodied experiential activity, where reading about actions and bodily movements evokes a neural firing in the premotor and motor cortex as well as a motor potential in the limbs (Aziz-Zadeh et al 2006; Fischer & Zwaan 2008; Speer et al. 2005). Reading about affective states similarly leads to those feelings and emotions being felt in the body, resulting in the readers’ feeling of the affective states of characters (Oatley

26 The usage of the term “simulation” to describe intersubjective attunement has been contested by phenomenologist Shaun Gallagher (2007). His critique of simulation suggests that it is more appropriate to comprehend embodied attunement between persons as a direct intersubjective “perception” rather as a “simulation”. On the other hand, both Gallagher (2007) and the supporters of the implicit simulation theory (Gallese et. al 1996, Gallese et al. 2004; Wojciechowski & Gallese 2011; Gallese 2014) contest the disembodied explanation of interpersonal understanding, according to which understanding between persons proceeds by inferential attribution of mental states to others. In my own discussion of mirror neuron systems, I will keep using the term “simulation”. However, as I specify below, I do not take it to mean that we first make an offline model of the other person’s movements, actions or emotions and then internalize it. Rather, embodied “simulation” here implies a direct, bodily experience of the other person’s emotions, actions or movements.
Reading about people’s emotions, actions, and experiences stimulates the mirror neuron systems of readers in grasping what the characters are undergoing (Chersi et al. 2010). The same activation of mirror neurons seems to play out with “simulation” of embodied emotions, corporeal sensations, and actions when engaging with visual artwork (Freedberg & Gallese 2007). Spectators of artwork may undergo feelings of empathetic engagement with the depicted content or they may also, especially in the case of abstract art, experience empathetic engagement with bodily movements whose traces are implied in, for example, brush marks or paint drippings (Freedberg & Gallese 2007).

What this suggests is that emotions, actions, movements are not first copied and then internalized, but directly experienced; the reader/viewer does not firstly form an image of another’s emotions, actions, gestures and then “internalize” or introject them; she undergoes them in an embodied, engaged way by reading or looking at a painting, a sculpture, a video. It is not an image imitation, but an embodied intersubjective experience (Kuzmičová 2012b; 2014). An ocularcentric, mentalistic imitation, or mimesis, implies a gap between an image and the world, a representation and reality, self and other, the internal and the external. The embodied empathetic engagement is at odds with this ocular-mimetic theory of knowledge. Some scholars, for lack of a better term, propose to regard the embodied, empathetic, engaged way of knowing as “perceptual mimesis” (Scarry 1999; Kuzmičová 2012a) or, also, as a process of sensorimotor simulation/resonance (Kuzmičová 2012b). Gallese (Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011; Gallese 2014) uses the term “embodied simulation” to convey the idea of intersubjectivity as a second-person intercorporeal attunement between self and other.

Embodied resonance allows for the reader’s/viewer’s sense of presence in a story or an artwork, which is experiential and characterized by bodily interaction with environment. In fact, Kuzmičová’s (2012a) research shows that detailed visual descriptions (as opposed to simple remarks and other narrative instances of fiction) fail to elicit experiential imagination. Detailed visual descriptions, while they can be thought of as more faithful representations of reality (in terms of an ocular theory of truth), lack the experiential quality because “visual description construed as stasis and as subsequent temporary detachment from the object described has no purely experiential correlate in the actual world. For in visual description, interaction has come to a temporary halt” (Kuzmičová 2012a, 283). Lengthy visual descriptions, especially of inanimate objects, tend to evoke a sense of being informed of visual facts with no sense of direct perceptual, interactive experience, which goes hand in hand with their low memorability (Kuzmičová 2012a, 286). By contrast, what enhances the vivid sense of embodied resonance, or empathic capacity, is comments on bodily movement and motor interaction with the environment (Kuzmičová 2012b; Fischer and Zwaan 2008). So in the case of embodied resonance, reading or looking at art is not a passive, detached, externalized third-person activity, but

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27 See, for example, Julie Mehretu’s “Invisible Sun (algorithm 6, third letter form),” Jackson Pollock’s “Number 32” and Lucio Fontana’s “Concetto Spaziale ‘Atteza.’”

28 I choose to avoid the term “perceptual mimesis” in my work because of the connections of the notion of “mimesis” to Greek metaphysics.
more of an engaged, dynamic process by which meaning is achieved. This meaning, furthermore, is neither strictly “in” the words nor “in” the painting (whose meaning you decode and internalize), nor “in” the reader/viewer: the meaning is brought forth or achieved in the experience of engagement between the reader/viewer and the text/artwork; the meaning is emergent in engagement.

As Hustvedt (2016, 372) insightfully states, “the imagination itself, the ‘as if’ realm of human life, is not generated by purely mental activity, by conscious thinking processes, but originates in our fundamental intercorporeality.” Thus, imagination and empathy are interconnected. The connection that is activated and that offers insights into what the other person or even a character in a narrative is undergoing does not depend exclusively on a conscious mental process, but to a large extent derives from a bodily connection, likely mediated by mirror neuron systems and other bodily connection mechanisms, which neuroscientists are only beginning to understand. The kind of in-between space, between self and other, that is generated does not entail “a delusion of my actually being the other,” but serves rather as a “means of connecting with the other” (Hustvedt 2016, 380). Understanding of meaning that proceeds in this connection does not rely on inference or on identifying differential relationships of signs.

3.6.1.1 Empathy in history

Historians, who spend hours engaging with traces of past lives in sources, undoubtedly have a capacity to forge such an empathic connection with people in the past and partake in their lived meaning. Even if the histories they produce are not a mirror copy of the past and equally evoke the historians’ own lived experience, history writing does have a capacity to offer some non-arbitrary meaning of the past that does not depend on historians’ narrative organization of material and emplotment strategies. It is, rather, the bodily-rooted capacity for imagination and empathy that conveys the meaning of experience: “The imagination must be understood as a corporeal reality, one that can move from one person to another” (Hustvedt 2016, 407).

Although the topic of empathy is not new to the discipline of history, historical empathy remains a problematic and vague term, even for researchers who study empathy (e.g., Davis 2001). There also seems to be a lack of understanding and agreement on what empathy is and how it can be taught (Shemilt 1984). For example, Barton (1996, 4) proposes that historical empathy is the skill of recognizing how historical actors viewed their circumstances. Downey (1995) expresses his preference for the term “perspective taking” to historical empathy, because it implies an ability to understand the frames of reference of the people in the past without trying to identify with their feelings. The overall tendency is to define historical empathy as a disembodied mental act, aiming to know the thoughts of the people in the past. Empathy is reduced to cognitive empathy, excluding the affective and bodily aspect of empathic connection.

This is problematic for two main reasons. First of all, taking only a cognitive step to another person’s perspective, without an affective empathic identification, is how sociopaths empathize: This means that history education, which only teaches pupils to take
the perspective of another, without the affective component, is diminishing their capacity for empathy. Secondly, the mentalistic conception of historical empathy, as the above definitions demonstrate, is inseparable from ocularcentric, vision-oriented metaphors for making sense of what empathy is. Researchers speak of empathy as the ability to identify how historical actors viewed their circumstances and as perspective taking.

Perspective is, however, a fixed and static viewpoint. If our empathic goal is to understand where somebody “is coming from” rather than merely “where they stand,” the metaphor of “perspective taking” is insufficient to convey the meaning of empathic relation. The metaphor of perspective eludes the process of lived experience, which shapes perception. If, by contrast, we seek to know how the temporally extended process of lived experience shapes the worldviews of another person, we are trying to understand their non-linear process of life, their “path of life” and not just an isolated present context. Implicit in “perspective taking” is also an assumption that worldviews and values are fixed and rigid; “perspective taking” prevents us from recognizing change of experience over time. “Perspective taking” should not be taken as an exclusive metaphor for empathy because it obscures the process of lived experience.

Philosopher of history R. G. Collingwood, who has elaborated on the topic of historical empathy, conceived of it as historical imagination. He famously proposed that

[all] history is history of thought. But how does the historian discern the thoughts which he is trying to discover? There is only one way in which it can be done: by rethinking them in his own mind. […] The history of thought, and therefore all history, is the re-enactment of past thought in the historian’s own mind. (Collingwood 1946, 215)

According to him, historians should therefore inquire into the thinking of historical actors by re-thinking the thoughts of the past actors. It is an active endeavor on the part of the historian, who “not only reenacts past thought, he reenacts it in the context of his own knowledge and therefore, in reenacting it, criticizes it, forms his own judgment of its value, corrects whatever errors he can discern in it” (Collingwood 1946, 215).

Importantly, Collingwood (1946) consistently upholds a dichotomy between nature and history, where nature is associated with a process of events, whereas history – with a process of thought: “so far as man’s conduct is determined by what may be called his animal nature, […], it is non-historical” (216). Thought, on the other hand, is above nature and bodily life, and is a proper subject of interest for historians:

Thus a biography […] is constructed on principles that are not only non-historical but anti-historical. Its limits are biological events, the birth and death of a human organism: its framework is thus a framework not of thought but of natural process. […] The record of immediate experience with its flow of sensations and feelings, faithfully preserved in a diary or recalled in a memoir, is not history. (Collingwood 1946, 304)

Thought itself is characterized by Collingwood as the “inside” of a historical event and contrasted to the “outside” of an event, which is an event in terms of bodies and their movement (213). Mind and thought are located in the interior, evoking the ocularcentric metaphorical models of cognition. Therefore, although he criticizes the application of the scientific method to the discipline of history, he is embracing the Cartesian mind-body
dualism in his philosophy of history. The animal nature in man in no way affects the historical process of thought:

[S]ensation as distinct from thought, feelings as distinct from conceptions, appetite as distinct from will. Their importance to us consists in the fact that they form the proximate environment in which our reason lives [...]. They are the basis of our rational life, though no part of it”. (Collingwood 1946, 231, emphasis added)

This dualistic assertion stands in sharp contrast to the findings of cognitive linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson (1999), which show the embodied and, to a large extent, unconscious nature of thought.

In order to know other minds, to reenact another’s, Collingwood (1946, 291) believes, the historian should go beyond immediate bodily experience or feeling, and be aware of one’s act of thought cognitively, which renders the knowledge of another’s mind objective. Collingwood’s argument seems to be permeated by this recurrent contradiction. He elevates thought above the body, but simultaneously does not find it contradictory to criticize the “philiological way” of doing history, which only focuses on names, dates, ready-made descriptive phrases and which is only “dry bones,” as opposed to the re-enactment of past thought, which clothes these “dry bones” “with the flesh and blood of a thought” (1946, 305). His argument seems to oscillate between these two different ways of thinking about the “living past” and how it can be known. The conclusion seems to be that, for Collingwood, thoughts of people in the past can be reenacted in one’s disembodied mind because they are simply re-thinkable propositional contents, separate from bodily processes. Thoughts are disembodied: They are above the physiology, the corporeal, and the natural.29

Collingwood describes imagination as a mental operation, an activity which bridges the gaps between different sources of evidence and allows making inferences about what has happened. It has a structural function in the historian’s thinking process: without it, “we could never perceive the world around us […]: it is this which, operating not capriciously as fancy but in its a priori form, does the entire work of historical construction” (Collingwood 1946, 241). Collingwood sought to distance himself from the understanding of historical imagination as a flight of fantasy, and he did that by insisting that historical imagination needed to be tied to inferential judgments based on evidence. Inferential reasoning, however, is not a relational, second-person approach to knowing other minds – it is an objectifying, third-person approach of an external, detached spectator. Accordingly, Collingwood delineated between the task of the historian and that of the novelist.29

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29 One of the few instances, where I found Collingwood’s elaboration on knowing minds of people in the past to come somewhat closer to an embodied, relational understanding, was, when he argued that, “to the historian, the activities whose history he is studying are not spectacles to be watched, but experiences to be lived through in his own mind; they are objective, or known to him, only because they are also subjective, or activities of his own” (Collingwood 1946, 218). In this case, he makes a clear distinction between a detached, spectatorial way of knowing and a relational, experiential way of knowing, aligning the latter with the historian’s method. Yet, this does not translate into any kind of coherent thinking about historical empathy on Collingwood’s part.
As works of imagination, the historian’s work and the novelist’s do not differ. Where they do differ is that the historian’s picture is meant to be true. The novelist has a single task only: to construct a coherent picture, one that makes sense. The historian has a double task: he has both to do this, and to construct a picture of things as they really were and of events as they really happened. This further necessity imposes upon him obedience to three rules of method, from which the novelist or artist in general is free. First, his picture must be localized in space and time [...]. Secondly, all history must be consistent with itself. [...] Thirdly, and most important, the historian’s picture stands in a peculiar relation to something called evidence. (Collingwood 1946, 246, emphasis added)

Imagination, construed this way, is not much more than an inferential judgment: “The hero of a detective novel is thinking exactly like an historian when, from indications of the most varied kinds, he constructs an imaginary picture of how a crime was committed, and by whom” (Collingwood 1946, 243, emphasis added). This kind of historical imagination remains tied exclusively to “perspective taking” or cognitive imagination of a static picture of where a person “stands” without an effort to comprehend where they are “coming from.”

Levesque (2009), reflecting on historical empathy in educational contexts, suggests that historical empathy could be regarded as entailing three interrelated aspects: historical imagination, historical contextualization, and judgment of the past. Imagination here implies mental re-creation of what it was like to be in the context of the time. In the educational context, this means that students would be offered to engage with a wide range of multimodal sources and objects to facilitate the imagination of the past. Experiential learning activities could be used to induce imagination, such as dramatic re-enactment, role-play, field trips or virtual history. Contextualization, on the other hand, is conceived by him as a mental act primarily based on mental thinking processes (Levesque 2009, 150, 155). When contextualizing the past, three interrelated contexts need to be taken into account: the personal (inner), the sociocultural (outer), and contemporary (present-day) (Levesque 2009, 150).

Levesque explains that “the personal context refers to the inner beliefs, perspectives, and environment of the author of the source”; the sociocultural context implies the social, cultural, and economic context of the time and an author’s relation or participation in that context; lastly, the contemporary context denotes the historian’s own context which shapes the way he or she imagines and contextualizes the past (2009, 150–151). Finally, empathizing with the past is unavoidably linked to judging the past. Levesque (2009, 167) encourages teachers to help their students clarify their own sets of moralities and keep awareness of these when considering values and beliefs of historical actors.

I suggest that an exclusively mentalistic, cognitive, ocular notion of historical empathy should be combined with an embodied and relational understanding of empathy: empathy as metaphoric imagination where one aims not for a total (ocular) identification (knowledge as sameness), but for a metaphoric, partial, “as if” identification, where one can hold a paradox of both being and not being like the other person. Ultimately, this implies both respecting the alterity of the other person and imaginatively identifying with the person in the past, his or her embodied lived experience – it implies the practice of metaphoric thought (Modell 2003). It does not entail a first-person projective
identification of the sort one can sometimes find in history textbooks: for example, “Imagine you are a soldier in WWI. Write a letter home” (Kitson and Husbands 2011, 68–69). A relational, embodied, second-person empathetic engagement requires a lot of information and a variety of sources about the people in the past in order to enable an understanding of their experience. The kind of knowledge that it leads to is not merely spectatorial, detached, disembodied.

Moreover, when one adopts the understanding of empathy not as total identification, but as a transitory, partial, metaphoric identification, the problem of how to combine empathy and judgment/evaluation of the past can be transmuted. Indeed, one can both empathize with a person in the past and, recognizing them as a different human being, judge or evaluate their actions (such as, for example, actions of slave-traders, imperial colonizers, or the Nazis). This is particularly relevant in the case of violent, brutal, dehumanizing actions of people in the past, if there is an attempt to make sense of the lived experience of the perpetrators and not just of victims.

Empathizing does not mean you have to accept and agree (sympathize) with the actions of the perpetrators of violence: it can only mean that if the metaphoric thought is replaced by the (literal) total identification with the perpetrator. This is an important point to stress with regard to Megill’s (2007, Chapter 2) view that a focus on memory of lived experience undermines history’s critical function, that is, renders history incapable of delivering a sustained critical account. Megill (2007) seems to be convinced that the focus on memory can only be affirmative, while I would point out that this view stems from a misunderstanding of what empathic, second-person engagement with people in the past entails.

Crucially, this invites rethinking the historicist principle not to judge the past and regard it on its own terms. An embodied, relational understanding of empathic imagination allows regarding both the experience of people in the past on their own terms and acknowledging how the actions of these people may be unacceptable to the investigator, in the light of his or her experience and contemporary social and cultural environment. The two are not mutually exclusive. Some critics might also say that this implies that there are no absolute moral standards, and if there are no absolute moral standards, one does not have any foundation for non-arbitrary evaluation of the past. This assertion only holds if one assumes that, there being no absolute moral standards, his or her embodied, lived experience is rendered non-valid, not true. This logic only applies when one separates the notion of truth from embodied, lived experience.

The neuroscientific research on how empathy is enabled by mirror neuron systems in relation to other people as well as artwork and literature provides clues as to how empathy works and how it could be elicited. In an embodied approach, historical empathy is an experiential, dynamic, bodily engagement and not just “viewing the past through the eyes of the people in the past.” Embodied connection between self and other allows for understanding of meaning that is not dependent on inference, interpretation and analysis of relationships between signs. In the next section, I will elaborate further on how embodied ways of making sense of the past could be put into practice.
3.6.2 Putting embodied ways of making sense of the past into practice

Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980, 1999) conceptual metaphor theory has significant implications for the discipline of history. If we take seriously the claim that the way we think, reason and conceptualize is shaped by metaphor and image-schemas, rooted in bodily, sensorimotor experience, this holds several implications. It suggests that historians’ assumptions concerning what the past, events, causation, time, and the mind is; what relation between the past and the historian is; how historians can know the past and make sense of it; and historians’ theories of truth and reference, depend on their, mostly unconscious, choice of metaphors. However, Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980, 1999; Johnson 2007) metaphors are not conceived of as idealist, deep mental structures, as an “internal” mental system of understanding that is removed from the world “out there.” Their notion of metaphors is embodied: It links abstract conceptualization with a process of embodied, lived experience and interaction of the cognizing self and the world, to the extent that the boundary between the two is blurry, although not completely absent.

I agree with Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999; Johnson 2007) that metaphor use is inevitable and necessary in cognition and thought. Without metaphor and image-schemas our capacity to reason, understand and make sense of the world would be greatly impoverished. Yet metaphors, which structure philosophical concepts, often tend to be taken as literal and the only possible ways to make sense of reality and our relation to it. Metaphors highlight certain aspects of reality for us and hide others. Just as philosophers, historians, too, need to reconsider the taken-for-granted, implicit metaphors, which inform ontological and epistemological assumptions in the discipline of history and assess their aptness for purposes of understanding.30

In the light of the latest findings of cognitive neuroscience and embodied cognition, a disembodied idea of mind is no longer tenable. Mind and body are not separate, nor are they ontologically different in kind. Cognition does not entail detachment or separation from the world, but quite the opposite – engagement and interaction between the organism and its environment. This means that the dualist image-schema of representationalism and internalism no longer serves as an appropriate metaphor to explain our interaction with and cognition of the world. This is the beauty and the paradox of the insight of enactive embodiment: Elevation of an embodied experience of sight, to which Hans Jonas (1982 [1966]) insightfully drew attention, allowed for a disembodied theory of mind and cognition to emerge in Greek philosophy.

For the discipline of history, it means that sources are traces of an embodied life as lived and not merely subjective “perspectives.” Sources reveal something about how a shared world is lived in terms of individual histories. Sources are traces of past life, which can offer valuable insights, depending on historians’ questions and interests. Embodied engagement with sources implies that historians do not just infer and interpret meaning, but they can have a bodily and empathic connection with the lived past by way of sources.

30 The representational theory of mind, which informs the correspondence theory of truth and empiricist epistemology, as seen in Section 3.5, is shaped by mind-body dualism and an imagistic schema of the mind-world gap, where mind is located in the interior, detached from the externalized world.
Empathic engagement with the sources may offer historians an understanding of the meaning of lived experience that is based on bodily attunement rather than solely inferred (as discussed in Section 3.6.1).

Moreover, just as historians’ attempts to know and understand are metaphorically structured and shaped by unconscious emotional responses and previous experience, so too did people in the past make sense of their environment and circumstances in terms of embodied, lived experience. These people may not have had all the relevant information for making sense of their environment, but irrespective of such informational tools, their understanding of their environment was based on their embodied, lived experience of interaction with the world.

As such, lived experience cannot be reduced to a subjective, mental, disembodied image, which bears no link to reality, because it constitutes past reality. This is one of the implications of rejecting a sharp and disembodied subject-object dualism, where what is subjective is solely an internal arbitrary mentalistic construct, opposed to objective reality. Importantly, the way people experienced their situation shaped their actions and ways of being, irrespective of how accurate their judgment was, or what they invented to explain their sometimes inexplicable experience. It is worthwhile to remember that emotion is real, even when it is not based on an accurate assessment of a situation. Historians’ work then consists in combining critical analysis and comparison of various sources with an empathic engagement with lived experience and ways of being of the people in the past.

Since the metaphorical structuring of mind as an interior space “containing” quasi-objects or mental entities, such as propositions, ideas, concepts, and thoughts, is flawed, a methodology for knowing the lived past entails an embodied approach. This approach requires a reconsideration of how mind and thought relate to the world. For one, the thought of people in the past (as in the present) was not solely linguistic. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) demonstrate, thought does not necessarily require language. Thought is metaphorical, imagistic, and embodied. This position is opposed to a “spectatorial view of interpretation” of others’ minds (Hutto 2004, 549), which assumes that mental states of others (thoughts, feelings, intentions) are hidden inside people’s heads and, in order to perceive them, we need special cognitive processes (Maiese 2011). To perceive others’ mental states, according to this view, we need to adopt a third-person, distanced way of seeing, observe behavioral output and then make inferences based on gathered evidence. It is the work of a detached (fully objective) spectator.

What is overlooked in such accounts is that most of what amounts to understanding others’ (embodied) minds happens in emotive and embodied engagement and interaction. For example, Dominick LaCapra suggests that besides such experiential sources as diaries (LaCapra 2004), oral and video testimonies are also valuable to historians because of their distinctive relation to experience or the way events are lived; their role in the reconstruction of events, especially in the absence or paucity of other sources; the manner in which they enable one to hear the grain of the embodied voice in relation to facial expressions and bodily gestures, making “voice” more than a metaphor; and the way they bring up the issue of the “tricks” memory plays, at times related to post-traumatic effects.
and the interplay of conscious and unconscious forces involved in the movements and vagaries of memory. (LaCapra 2016, 382)

Oral and video testimonies enable one to understand embodied and emotive meanings of the lived past. It is not the case that we first form an image of others’ minds and then internalize it. Understanding happens through embodied and empathic resonance between bodies, as discussed in Section 3.6.1. If, however, sources, which could afford such embodied, emotive meaning, are lacking, then inference-making, theorizing and prediction become necessary. But this also means that understanding of others’ lived experience most likely remains quite opaque.

If thought is not exclusively linguistic and if it is not just a disembodied “text” to be “read,” it means that when we make sense of the lived past, a linguistic model of meaning is not suitable: “Meaning cannot be reduced to a sign which exists on a separate level outside the immediate sphere of the body’s acts” (Connerton 1989, 95). In a linguistic model of meaning, the prevailing conceptual metaphors are MEANINGS ARE OBJECTS, WORDS ARE CONTAINERS and COMMUNICATION IS SENDING (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). Meaning, according to this metaphorical understanding, is contained in the words themselves. To make sense of meanings, people only need to passively receive the carrier words, decode them, and then turn them into inner mental representations. Alternatively, meaning can likewise be conceived of in terms of a relationship of concepts in a formal system. Even if, in this understanding, meaning does not inhere in words as a thing-like entity, meaning remains “outside the sphere of the body’s acts.”

As Connerton (1989, 100–101) points out, textual sources have formed the privileged story in the history of hermeneutics, while the embodied practices have been neglected or ignored. This also explains why embodied practices continue to be approached by interpreters as “texts” that can be read and as metaphorical “carriers” or “containers” of meanings that can be “unpacked.” It reflects the history of humanist interpreters who sought after the original meaning of the text and who, therefore, developed a method and a theory of historical criticism, in order to assess the authenticity of documents, to discriminate between original and secondary sources, or to assess a bias of a source (Connerton 1989, 100).

This preoccupation with the original textual meaning and its faithful reproduction could be traced, in fact, to the tradition of accurate ritual repetition whose main purpose was to preserve the unchanging substance of the group identity (Assmann 2011). Enacting a disembodied subject-object dualism, textual sources can then be ranked according to how accurately they represent the objective past reality, ignoring how a given source, be it a diary or an autobiography, gives insight into how the past was lived and meaningful in its embodiment. Historical criticism alone, as such, is therefore inept in its efforts to make sense of the past in embodied terms: Its tools have been shaped by different goals and understandings of meaning-making processes. The dominance of the philological approach obscures the bodily sources of meaning and underscores strict subject-object and mind-body dualisms.

But embodied meaning cannot be examined independently of its being lived. If historians completely overlooked how the past was lived, experienced by, and was
meaningful to people, then history would only be a chronicle containing generalized propositions about states of the world. The depiction of the past in a chronicle could still be evaluated by historians in terms of their own conceptualizations, emotional responses and values, but it would lose touch with the lived past. When history is, however, written without attention to the lived, experiential past, I believe that it also loses the capacity to engage readers, to enable readers to find themselves moved by the past (cf. Runia 2014).

The issue of how mind and thought relates to the world has also recently become a topic of debate in archaeology. Archaeology is a disciplinary approach, which may be a rich source of theoretical and methodological insights into how we could reconceive the relation between knowledge and reality and pay attention to the ways of being and embodied practices implicit in things that endure in the present. As a field of study in which a focus on representations has been replaced by a “return to things,” materiality and the experiential (Hodder 2012), archaeology gives clues as to how the past process of life is embodied in the traces of the past that gives us access to a lived past. As Hodder explains, before a “return to things,” the application of structuralist and poststructuralist theories centered archaeologists’ gaze on symbols and signs, whose arbitrary nature was taken for granted: “Since the relationship between signifier and signified was seen as conventional and arbitrary, constructivist perspectives were foregrounded, and subject and object, mind and matter were thoroughly disconnected” (Hodder 2012, 16). In other words, mind was metaphorically structured as an interior container of arbitrary mental constructs disconnected from the world. What, however, soon became apparent is that there is some link between signifier, signified, and lived context, shifting the focus of archaeologists to interconnectedness of things and human experience (Hodder 2012, 16). Archaeologists began to problematize the treatment of material culture as a site of subjective “inscription” that always represents something else:

A subtext in most contemporary approaches is an implicit conception of culture as somehow “prior” to or detached from matter, with an assumption that cultures, “already different,” approach the material world in unique ways, causing a variety of material expressions and meanings. Thus, despite much talk about somatic experiencing and bodily practices, things and landscapes seem to have little to offer to this experience beyond being plastic, open ended, and receptive. (Olsen 2010, 3)

Thus, instead of reducing materiality to little more than discursive objects, the “phenomena” of subjective experience, to passive entities, which wait to be endowed with socially constituted meanings, archaeologists are increasingly paying attention to how things, materials, and landscapes shape and affect our perception and interaction with

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31 See, for example, A Desolate Place for a Defiant People: The Archaeology of Maroons, Indigenous Americans, and Enslaved Laborers in the Great Dismal Swamp, by Daniel O. Sayers (2014). The book tells the history of a community of fugitive slaves, maroons, living on an island in the middle of The Great Dismal Swamp. It is a history of slavery as it was lived rather than merely a history of the institution of slavery. It would remain untold had the archaeologist not ventured into the thick of the swamp, found the island on which the fugitive slave community was established and performed excavations on it.
them by way of their own unique qualities (Olsen 2010). This point can be illustrated by an earlier example from Section 3.3: Braudel’s understanding of what history is and by means of what methodology it should be studied was shaped by his experiences of the Mediterranean as well as the imprisonment in Lübeck. I believe these insights from the field of archaeology are similarly applicable in the discipline of history and social sciences, more generally. Similarly, Ewa Domanska has asserted that “the future of the ways of thinking about the past […] depends on and belongs to archaeologists” as well as other scholars interested in the past, who are reformulating their relation to the material remnants of the past (Domanska 2005, 393, 2006). The focus on materiality, relations, and interactions can potentially transform the subject matter of historians to encompass non-humans, such as things, plants, and nonhuman animals (Domanska 2010).

If we replace the linguistic model of meaning with an embodied and enactive model of meaning, this holds implications for the interpretation of sources, which need to be viewed as part of an embodied process of life. Sources can provide clues about a life history of an embodied and embedded cognizing self. The aim becomes not merely to judge the distortions or biases of a source, but to make sense of what the source can reveal about the way their authors experienced and engaged with their environment. Through people’s practices, actions, and habits in a lived context, we get to make sense of their lived experience, because action in and of itself is not only just an externally observable behavior but, rather, a constitutive part of cognition. Because of the prevalence of the representational theory of mind and the need to bridge the mind-world gap as its entailment, all too often the emphasis falls on the question: Does a representation in the source match past reality?

This question may still be relevant, but only at the level of general facts about states of the world (for example, when we seek to ascertain the amount of taxes collected, the outcome of a battle, the number of people attending an event, the number of victims). This does not preclude the fact that alterations and intentional distortions in the sources are possible and likely and that source criticism and comparative analysis could help identify forgeries and subsequent modifications. Source criticism and comparative source analysis are still relevant in this regard, but they are not sufficient. They need to be integrated into a model of cognition, which pays attention to the past as a complex process of lived, embodied interaction between people and their environment.

The past is then not a metaphorical static, fixed image that we should seek to mirror and reproduce as distanced spectators, but rather a past process of life, which can be approached at different levels of complexity. For historians, combining the empathic and

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32 This shift of focus to materiality in archaeology can be seen as a manifestation of the broader theoretical movement of the new materialisms (e.g., Frost & Coole 2010). New materialists adopt a new ontology of matter. They conceive of matter not as inert and passive, but as lively, indeterminate, constantly forming, and possessive of agential traits (Frost & Coole 2010).

33 Since my focus in this project is tied to the (human) relations and interactions between Poles and Lithuanians, I have not elaborated further on possible ways to include non-humans into an embodied history. However, the latter task, even though it would be an important contribution to the development of the humanities, would potentially require scholars to develop a different way of knowing, adjusted to non-human ways of being in the world.
analytical ways of knowing can enable them to understand the past as lived experiences that entangle and interweave to produce an overarching process of life, the junctions and patterns of which can be seen as something that is more complex than the individual lived experience, but still very much connected to it. I am convinced that history as a discipline needs to combine these two ways of knowing: the empathic, metaphorical second-person way of knowing (aimed at understanding the process of lived experience) and a critical, systematizing third-person way of seeing (aimed at comparing, identifying patterns and inconsistencies, making inferences). Knowledge of larger-scale processes of the physical and social environment require the contribution of experiential, relational, empathic knowledge of lived experience. The past as lived experience then needs to be complemented and juxtaposed with knowledge of larger-scale processes and structures. The advantages as well as challenges inherent to combining the micro-level lived experiences and the macro-level processes in historical understanding are, for example, illustrated in Henri Vogt’s (2005) study of political transformations in Eastern Europe in the post-communist era. Vogt (2005) examines the revolutions that took place in Estonia, East Germany and Czechoslovakia by carefully weaving together experiences and perceptions of ordinary people and contextualizing them in relation to broader social and political processes.

Past reality is therefore not an externalized static space “out there,” but, rather, a past process of life, the materiality of which is weaved into the present. This is what is meant by the notion that the present embodies the process of past life. If we are able to overcome the objectivity-subjectivity divide between “how it is that humans are able at one and the same time to have a world in common and to live it as a function of their own particular histories” (Toren 1999, 16), then we can also transcend the sharp distinctions between the real and the symbolic, the past and language, nature and culture, structure and process, stasis and change. If I were to use a particular metaphor, the process of life can be metaphorically understood as a woven fabric, which constitutes a material embodiment, an emergent product of the process of becoming or weaving. Threads (lived experience), through their particular entanglements, bring forth patterns, textures and shapes, which make up the materiality of the overall weave (past process of life) and which, in turn, shape the threads. You can both recognize the complex knots, textures and patterns in the weave, as if from outside, and follow the entanglements of individual threads (lived experience) that produce the patterns, but it is necessary to understand that they shape each other. Both the patterns and individual threads are part of the same weave and are interconnected. The past reality is, therefore, not a linear sequence of static states, but a process of interrelations, junctions, and entanglements that shape the patterns the weave takes. Larger-scale structures, in this understanding, come to be viewed as patterns that come into shape over time by human activity, although they are not reduced to that activity. Similarly to how Hodder (2012) speaks of cultural practices as “entanglements,” these structures can be conceived as systems of linkages between human experience, things and ideas rather than as rigid, static “wholes.” They are both created and transformed by human activity and interaction.

The cognizing self (historian), who makes sense of the weave, its patterns, entanglements and threads, engages with its shapes and textures and makes meaning that
is as much dependent on the weave as on the experience, categories, concepts, and metaphors of the cognizing self. The meaning emerges in the process of engagement between the weave and the embodied cognizing self. The meaning of the past is neither an arbitrary, subjective attribution, nor is it an objective representation of the pre-given, context-independent meaning of the weave. Historians bring their own embodied lived experience into the process of making sense of the past. Knowledge of the past requires an embodied engagement with that past on the part of the historian, for whom knowledge constitutes the activity of making sense of the sources. Historians’ practice, thus, requires self-reflective effort seeking to comprehend how their own process of embodied, situated, lived experience has shaped their ways of reasoning, thinking, making sense of and engaging with the past.

Making sense of the past is not just a matter of nailing down the externally, “objectively” seen generalized facts about states of the world. For example, if a historian faces several sources, which convey a very different account of what happened, the aim becomes not just one of identifying inaccuracies. Indeed, the aim also becomes one of understanding how the authors of these sources had come to experience the events in this particular way, through which kind of experiences of interaction with the world.

Lived, emotive, and embodied experience matters because it shapes meaning-making and interacting with the world; it shapes how people co-create the reality in which they are embedded, to which they are coupled. Emotional engagement with our environment plays a crucial role in cognition and sense-making, shaping the process of life. As enactive embodiment theory demonstrates, the way a living organism relates to, adapts to, and couples with its environment has implications for its continued existence, thus rendering the world into a place “that always means something to the organism” as it moves about (Maiese 2011, 160). A living organism’s value judgments are rooted in its bodily feelings of affective framing through which it makes sense of the world (Maiese 2011, 160). As a result, sharp differentiation between facts and values, cognition and emotion is deeply problematic. Emotional responses are part of cognition and dependent on embodied interaction with the environment. What we can do at most is to reflect on and seek to identify our unconscious emotional responses and conscious feelings in relation to the past. That is, we can assess to what extent these responses are justified or appropriate in particular, given circumstances. Finally, as meaning and value are not pre-given or static, the meaning of the past is continuously reconsidered, modified, and adjusted to new experiences of interaction with the environment in an ongoing process of life. This explains why each generation has the need to rewrite history; this is because experience, by changing the cognizing self, has likewise changed that experiential relation to the past. The way the past was experienced by people in the past is irreversible and stable, but our engagement with that lived past is constantly changing.

For example, one of my interviewees from a Polish minority in Lithuania explained to me that although the military takeover of the city of Vilnius by Poland in 1920 is regarded as an occupation in the official Lithuanian historical narrative, her grandfather, she emphasized, did not experience this as an occupation. Different historical

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34 This was an interviewee from an earlier Master’s Thesis project.
interpretations of this highly contested past raise a question: What is the truth? If I attempt to deal with the ensuing plurality of historical narratives about the take-over of Vilnius in 1920 by adopting a dualistic, disembodied representational theory of mind, I will look for the truth of the past, conceived of in terms of mimesis as sameness. The truth of a historical narrative will be defined in terms of a match between word and world, language of the narrative and past reality, form and substance, mind and matter. It will be a truth modeled upon the objective perspective of the camera obscura, which hides the embodied self of the viewer. This approach, however, will only permit me to determine certain very general factual truths about static states of the world. Like a distanced spectator, I will be able to determine: the Polish troops entered the city of Vilnius and took control of it.

If, rather, I adopt a deconstructionist approach to doing history of the interwar Polish-Lithuanian conflict, the truth of the past will not be a concern for me, since I would assume that I do not really have access to the past other than through textual representation and the narrative design we impose on it. I would preoccupy myself with discursive articulation of the past, the form, the pattern, the language of history without paying much attention to how it relates to the past process life. I would approach the plurality of contested narratives by exploring how ideologies, emplotments, rhetorical devices and explanatory strategies impose meaning onto past reality and shape social and cultural practices. I would approach different narratives a-historically, as culturally-determined “perspectives” of the situation. I may want to show how each group constructs their own definition that excludes and negates the perspective of the other group. The metaphor of “perspective,” in this case, will imply the relativist subjectivity of sight. On the basis of an implicit Saussurean legacy, I may focus on how each identity, each perspective is defined by what it negates. I would then study the articulations of perspectives, identities, and narratives in terms of the Saussurean understanding of meaning production as a chain of signification in the differential, negative system of values. I would focus specifically on the pattern, the form, the formal, discursive arrangement of signs. At the same time, I would regard these different perspectives as literary performances, as history-as-fiction, whose truth-status cannot be ascertained. My approach would likely enable me to successfully show how different groups use symbols from the past that take on meanings that have little to do with past life itself, especially in the case of analysis of national myths.

As a deconstructionist, however, I would preoccupy myself with the form, the pattern, but not the process that led to this pattern emerging. In other words, I would exclude the process from sight. As a result, I would not concern myself with the long-term, centuries-spanning political, cultural, social processes of the region’s very complex history, which led to this pattern arising in the first place. In other words, as a deconstructionist, I would not be interested in the past process of life. Neither would I be interested in the actual lived experience and past life that function as symbols in contemporary myths. Insofar as I would be dealing with the historical development in any way, I would be approaching history as a linear sequence of static states, each enclosed onto itself, in which meanings are not related to life/reality/world, but are rather defined by convention and social context (understood as a figural rhetorical form that is not based on physical nature and bodily
experience). Given that pattern would be my focus of analysis, as a deconstructionist, the primary question for me would be: “How are signs arranged in relation to each other?”

If I, on the other hand, adopt an embodied approach to making sense of the past, I will be interested in how a particular pattern relates to a process, which has led to this pattern emerging. I will be interested both in “how signs are arranged in relation to each other” and “how this pattern has come about.” The process, for me, will not merely be a disembodied sequence of static states that bears no link to lived reality, because the patterns will not be determined solely by social conventions of a given historical epoch. I will take into account how the world and embodied experience shape mind, and not just how mind shapes an understanding of the world. I will be eager to understand how emergence of specific patterns of social organization or values or material culture depends on a history of interaction of embodied and embedded cognizing selves and the world.

History, for me, will mean a process of interrelations, entanglements, junctions, which have shaped the pattern. I will want to know what process is embodied in a specific pattern, what experiences led to this kind of construal of the situation by Poles and Lithuanians. I will focus on the lived realities of different individuals or social groups. For example, to understand the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, I will need, among other things, to comprehend the relation between the experience of serfdom by the Lithuanians and their negative attitudes towards the Poles. In order to understand the Polish hostility or contempt for the Lithuanian national movement, I will need to understand the lived experience of the Polish landlords, their felt sense of superiority towards their subjects and their identification with the old tradition of the Polish-Lithuanian state. To understand the pattern, I will need to study the process of lived experience. In order to do that, I will not be able to treat emotions, feelings, experiences of the people in the past as just a subjective misconstrual of an external, objective reality. The experience of the people in the past will be significant to me, because it is lived and dependent on an embodied understanding of the situation. The experience may not be based on a fully informed position, but in order to understand the roots of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, empathetic, second-person engagement with lived experience of people will be necessary. I will need to understand the entire complicated past process of life. By looking at the process and not just the pattern, I will be able see where a particular perspective is coming from, even if I do not agree with it.

Thus, embodiment encompasses both the embodied and disembodied ways of knowing. I can explain, in an embodied way, why Saussure focuses on the formal arrangement of signs in a pattern and ignores process by looking at the experience/process that led Saussure to develop his theory (for example, his fascination with political economy and metaphors that he borrowed from this field, see, e.g., Joseph 2016; Muszynski 2017). I can also explain a disembodied, detached, objectifying way of observing and analyzing reality as one of the modes of knowing, because it has roots in embodied experience. As discussed in Section 3.1, the experience of sight neutralizes the dynamic content in cognition and, as shown by Jonas (1982 [1966]), enabled Greeks to come up with a distinction between mind and matter, essence and existence, being and
In other words, while “everything” has roots in embodiment, even the distancing effect of perspective, the metaphor of perspective may not suit the phenomenon one is trying to explain if the structural properties of the source domain, which are transferred to the target domain of the phenomenon, hide or misconstrue important aspects of this phenomenon. Embodiment itself affords disembodied thinking. Whether one adopts a focus only on the pattern, or on both a pattern and a process, whether one adopts a first, second or third-person way of knowing, they are different modes of engagement with the world, but not of equal, relative value. Our task, as cognizing selves, is to make sure we are applying the right mode of knowing to make sense of the aspect of reality that we are interested in. Likewise, we need to be aware of how changing the mode of knowing will affect what we know.

Polish forces took over and adjoined the region of Vilnius to Poland in the interwar period: This is something that can be ascertained without engaging with concrete lived experience, as if from outside. Once we engage with the lived experience of this event, we will discover that it was experienced differently by different groups of people. Looking at the process of experience of these people, we may come to comprehend how their distinct perspectives depend on divergent trajectories of life that permeate their understanding of the situation with very divergent meanings and values. To understand why Polish forces took over Vilnius requires an empathetic engagement with lived, embodied experience. The fact of the takeover is permeated by an embodied and value-laden understanding of the situation by people who implemented it. To understand the experience and judgment of these people does not require justifying what they did. The task for the historian is to both ascertain the particular details of the territorial takeover by examining and comparing sources, but, more importantly, to understand what process of experience led to different individuals and groups of people adopting a particular interpretation of events.

The truth of the past is, in other words, incomplete if we only focus on the factual details or try to determine the optical truth of the past, ignoring the value-laden meaning-making in lived experience. Because it deals with the human past, history cannot be detached from people, from living human beings who engage with the world and who are shaped throughout their life course by their particular experience. The terms “objective” and “subjective” become problematic in that they impose spectatorial, disembodied Greek metaphysics on our notions of truth. They presume the possibility of knowing pure essences or pure sensations detached from existence, which are considered objective, as opposed to impure, tainted, subjective “appearances.”

Differences in the interpretation of the past, in an embodied approach, result from differences in lived experience of interaction with others and the world. We regard the past in very different ways and cannot seem to comprehend how others can interpret it so differently, because we have not been able to relate to their experience. Others’ experience can seem alien, incomprehensible, and unrelatable. This “loss in translation” of embodied experience between individual people and groups is at the root of historical disagreements.

Humans, for example, can likewise experience what an extreme third-person mode “feels” like in a traumatic situation, which triggers dissociation and depersonalization, when all affectivity “switches off” and only “disembodied mind” remains – logical, rational, calculating.
Yet, unfortunately, this is completely overlooked in the “truth wars,” where each party seeks to prove their truth and where truth is conceived in disembodied Greek metaphysical terms, as the correspondence between a statement/image and the world.

This kind of essentialist, disembodied concept of truth ignores differences in lived experience and traditions of knowing. It completely misses the point of the embodied nature of knowledge making. Importantly, it is this kind of concept of truth that tends to be appropriated in the political use of history, when states, governments, or nations are ready to impose their “objectively valid truth” on others, when lived experiences are completely ignored or selectively chosen. “Truth wars” reveal a reductionist understanding of truth, knowledge, and reality. The same issue also applies to governments imposing a narrow, political history-oriented historical narrative on their populations, which is also built upon the disembodied Greek metaphysics and its reductionist concept of truth. This is eloquently illustrated in school-history education when it is tightly focused on the institutional narrative of the nation-state, where knowledge of history first and foremost means the knowledge of political history embedded in detailed and supposedly value-neutral factuality. This, however, imposes an injustice on people exposed to this kind of history education, because they lose the capacity to understand the complicated process of life, to engage with the plurality of lived experiences and to nurture the capacity to empathically relate to people different from themselves.

Understanding the metaphorical, embodied nature of language and thought also affects the long-standing debate on whether history is a science or an art. The form of presentation and language of history textbooks should be chosen not according to the imperatives of the disembodied notions of objectivity and factuality, but according to how well they can translate, convey the past process of life. The dichotomy between art and science that has animated so much of historiographical discussion over centuries loses its potency. Art, being the domain of embodied, metaphorical expression of experience, can teach historians a lot about truth-as-lived-experience, about how it can be understood and conveyed.

The unique quality of art to move us, to touch us derives from art’s access to embodied, metaphorical modes of expression. This is why sometimes a novel, a painting, a dance, a piece of music seems to access “truth,” explain, help us understand the past much better than an academic history book can. Art holds experiential knowledge which is primarily communicated by imagistic, linguistic, gestural metaphor and which is achieved by active engagement with the world. Art can give access to the past as embodied, lived experience in its “how-ness,” by displaying, revealing, making manifest the ways of being and relating to others, self, objects, and environment. In other words, the process of lived experience can be embodied in a work of art. The meaning is not something “in” the artwork as a pre-given thing which we only need to decode or extract; rather, artwork affords the emergence of a meaning in an encounter with it that is shaped both by the artwork and ourselves.

Put differently, the meaning is not in the artifact from the past as an object; rather, the meaning is achieved in a dynamic exchange between an intentional self and the artifact, it is in the experience of the artifact (Noë 2015). To extend the analogy, objects from the
past are not the past itself; rather, they invite you to engage in your imagination with the “how-ness” of the past, the ways in which these objects were used or experienced in the past by living human beings. The truth of the past is not in the authenticity of objects from the past; it is not in their “thing-ness” or “what-ness”; it is in the ways these objects were experienced by people in the past and shaped that experience. They afford access to the past as lived, embodied experience. In short, the embodied nature of art is what allows us to relate to it, and this is probably what distinguishes great art: it is able to move, to touch a lot of people, to relate to their experience. In this regard, an embodied approach embraces art-driven forms of engaging with the past: interactive, multi-modal museums and exhibits, novels, films and the experiential knowledge that they may give access to (as opposed to solely looking for factual mistakes or biases in art in terms of how it represents the past).

In the end, engagement with the past as a process of life of a being-in-the-world has significant implications for our relation to and expectations towards the past. The emphasis shifts away from trying to pin down the fixed, invariant, essentialized knowledge of the past, which, as a snapshot, refers to a pre-given reality. Similarly, the preoccupation with immobile, invariant, rigid foundations and original meanings diminishes, because identity is seen as a movement and a process, a way of being over time rather than a static thing-like substance, which requires continuous, repetitive, identical repetition. It is not a matter of replacing one way of thinking with another, but rather re-adjusting the weights on an imbalanced scale of Western tradition where the third-person, analytical, systematizing way of seeing has been considered weightier than the second-person, relational and empathetic attention to shifting lived experience.

36 For how this idea could be conveyed in artwork, see, for example, “Life Garage Sale” (2009) by Simon Evans. Exhibited at the Louisiana Museum of Modern Art, these everyday objects made from paper pulp, in white and black colours, remind one of old colorless photographs. They are not the past themselves. Their authenticity, their being the original and not a copy, is irrelevant. These paper pulp copies of objects from the past are not the past itself, but they invite you to re-experience in your imagination the “how-ness” of the past; they capture the ways in which these objects were used in the past by living human beings. The truth of the past is not in the authenticity of objects from the past; it is not in their “thing-ness”; it is in the ways these objects were used and experienced by people in the past.

37 Comics, or sequential art, might be a medium well-suited for combining the two ways of seeing the past – analytical and empathetic. Comics or graphic novels are both read sequentially and viewed, taken in, all at once (Sousanis 2015). Their constituent parts may be arranged in a linear, sequential manner, but each individual part is simultaneously a fragment of a larger cohesive whole, so that both the individual and the general, the sequential and the simultaneous, the hierarchical and the web-like have to be taken into consideration jointly when reading comics and graphic novels. Sousanis (2015, 63) argues that comics interweave two modes of knowing, of perceiving that are enacted by the two sides of the brain: the left side of the brain, which breaks down information and analyzes it in segmented, isolated parts, and the right side of the brain, which engages the whole in its context (McGilchrist 2009). In fact, such a historiographical approach has already been taken in some graphic novels dealing with historical topics (Heuvel et al. 2007; Spiegelman 2003).
The empirical part of the dissertation that follows is a terrain in which I apply and explore my theoretical insights. In particular, I seek to identify the embodied and disembodied aspects of the textbook presentation of shared past. Such analysis illuminates the role of meta-theoretical assumptions in disagreements about the past. The inquiry into the textbooks and interviews with their authors allows to discern which points of postmodern critique of history can be considered justified. However, the analysis likewise reveals the cases in which an embodied approach to making sense of the past can be more useful in disentangling controversies over the past. By bringing into attention the role of embodied, lived reality in making meaning, the embodied approach in certain ways extends and is able to encompass the postmodern critique of history. Thus, the empirical analysis that I take up in Chapters 6 and 7, in particular, offers a rich, example-driven assessment of theoretical points advanced in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4. Materials and Methods

4.1 Materials

The materials, used to examine how shared Polish-Lithuanian past is presented in school-history education in Poland and Lithuania, consist of school-history textbooks and interviews with their authors. I chose to combine the analysis of textbooks with the interviews, since the latter provided unique insights into why the past was presented in a particular way, what the reasoning of the author was, and whether it changed over time. Conducting interviews with the textbook authors enabled me to contextualize specific choices made by the authors in the presentation of the past. In Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, I describe the scope of my materials and how they were collected.

4.1.1 Interviews

Qualitative semi-structured interviews have been conducted with the authors of school-history textbooks in Poland and Lithuania in the summer of 2012 and later in 2013 and 2014. In selecting the interviewees, the priority was usually given to those authors whose textbooks I included in the analysis. Thirteen interviews have been collected in total with the Lithuanian textbook authors during the course of my research. Three of these were conducted in the summer of 2012, which I chose, however, not to include into my final analysis because the questionnaire I used in them differed from the later interviews. They served me mainly as exploratory interviews, providing me with information of a more general kind that later enabled me to select a more specific direction for my research. The other remaining ten interviews I conducted December 2013 – January 2014. Out of these ten interviews, I included five in the final analysis. The reasons for the elimination of the remaining interviews from the analysis are different in each case. For instance, one interviewee, who was supposed to co-author a textbook included in my analysis, later resigned from this task. Another interviewee was not essential for the analysis, because the main author of the textbook series in question was already included in the analysis. The textbook of another of the interviewees has not yet been published at the time of finishing this dissertation. Nevertheless, all of the interviews provided valuable insights and enabled me to have a broader understanding of the context of textbook authorship.

Seven interviews have been collected from Polish authors. Five of these interviews were conducted in person in the summer of 2014 and two interviews were conducted using Skype in the autumn of 2014. Out of these seven interviews, I included four into the analysis. I made a choice not to include one of the interview into the analysis, because the author in question did not write the parts of the textbook, which interested me specifically. In the case of the other two, I had to exclude them in order to limit the length of the chapter.

An important point regarding the collection of these interviews is that, at the time, my methodological approach was not yet informed by the enactive embodiment theory and the
conceptual metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999). Therefore, I did not specifically focus on metaphorical models of cognition, nor did I focus on how my interviewees metaphorized the past, history, time, or events of shared Polish-Lithuanian past. Irrespective of this, however, the people I interviewed utilized metaphors in explaining their ideas. My questionnaire consisted of six related themes, which remained important to me to the very end of my research process: objectivity and truth; multiperspectivity in representation of the past; the relation between facts and values; the presentation of the discipline of history in school textbooks; the purpose of history education, and the presentation of a shared Polish-Lithuanian past in textbooks. I did not follow the questionnaire strictly and sought to pay attention to and follow up the points, which the authors themselves wanted to stress, but simultaneously I tried to stay close to and bring discussion back to my own interests and questions. The general outline of the interview questionnaire can be consulted in Appendix 1. The questionnaire was typically modified with additional context- and author-specific questions in each interview.

The interviews were first transcribed and analyzed in the language in which they were conducted. I analyzed the transcriptions using Atlas.ti software in order to elucidate the authors’ ontological and epistemological orientations and to explore metaphors, which inform their thinking about and depicting of the past. In particular, I focused on how the authors articulated metaphors in their response to my questions, even though this was not planned at the time of collecting the interviews.

4.1.2 Textbooks

I apply my theoretical approach by analyzing a sample of the Lithuanian and Polish history textbooks, published after 1990. I have combined the analysis of textbooks with the analysis of interviews.

Before selecting which textbooks to include in my analysis, I read and executed a preliminary analysis of 37 Lithuanian and 26 Polish school-history textbooks for grades 5 to 12. I chose the majority of these textbooks during a research stay in the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Braunschweig, Germany, where I stayed March–April 2013. The library of Georg Eckert Institute has a wide-ranging collection of Lithuanian and Polish school-history textbooks, which was at my disposal during the fellowship. In this preliminary analysis, my aim was to note down in what ways textbooks introduce the discipline of history and its epistemology, the relation between the past and historical knowledge as well as how the shared Polish-Lithuanian past is presented, explained, and evaluated. In 2013 and 2014, when I began to analyze the textbooks, I was not yet focusing on the metaphor use and implicit models of cognition in the textbooks in a systematic way, even though in some cases I was paying attention to how textbooks employed metaphors to explain abstract concepts or past events.

I had several principles that underpinned which textbooks I chose to be included in the analysis. Firstly, I wanted to have a selection of textbooks, which would represent a diverse range in terms of publication date, so that the analysis would encompass textbooks published in the 1990s immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union as well as more
recent publications published in the 2000s–2010s. Secondly, I sought to include the most widely used textbooks series from the major publishing houses, which I expected had the biggest influence in shaping pupils’ historical consciousness. Lastly, I sought out the textbooks series, which would represent a diversity of interpretations of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past.

4.2 Method

The conceptual metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) serves as an inspiration in my project to examine metaphors that shape understanding of cognition and the past at a meta-theoretical level. These metaphorical models of cognition have concrete implications for how we deal with controversial past, or the past, which is shared, but understood and remembered very differently. In what follows, I describe the methodological approach of metaphor analysis and how I applied this method in the analysis of textbooks and interviews.

4.2.1 Metaphor analysis

Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) were the first to propose that metaphor is at the core of thought processes and that conceptual metaphors shape our human ways of thinking about the world. The work of Lakoff and Johnson has inspired successive generations of researchers working in the field of metaphor analysis in applied linguistics and social sciences. One of the central tenets of their theory states that metaphor is not limited to language, but permeates thought and action. On such an interpretation, metaphor is more than an isolated linguistic expression and a rhetoric device. Metaphorical expressions are tied to certain metaphorical concepts which shape thought and actions and which are emergent in concrete embodied, lived experience of interaction with the world. As such, metaphor use is dynamic. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) assert that our conceptual system, in terms of which we perceive, think, reason, and act, is metaphorical in nature.

As an illustration of how a conceptual metaphor can structure thought, Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1981) provide a conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. In terms of this metaphor, we can win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as our enemy or opponent. We can attack the position of our opponent or defend our own. We can gain and lose ground, strategize, adopt a new line of attack. What is crucial to emphasize is that conventional ways of talking about an argument presuppose a metaphor, which is not just in the words, but which is in the very concept of an argument (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1981). If, by contrast, we structured our understanding of an argument in terms of the concept of dance, it would result in a very different experience of what argument is and what it does. Our understanding and experience of an argument is therefore metaphorically structured. Conceptual metaphors and image-schemas shape how people, for example, reason about economics (Boers & Littlemore 2000), controversial debates (Read, Cesa, Jones & Collins 1990), philosophical concepts (Lakoff & Johnson...

Primary metaphors, like more is up or affection is warmth, result from a metaphorical correlation between the sensorimotor domain and the domain of subjective experience or judgment (Grady 1999). According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999), primary metaphors are embodied in three interrelated ways. First, metaphorical connections arise out of embodied functioning in and interaction with our environment, where we may regularly encounter correlation between two domains. Secondly, the source domain of the metaphor comes from the body’s sensorimotor operation. Lastly, this metaphorical correlation is instantiated in the body through neural connections. These primary metaphors, when they are put together in use and combined with certain cultural models or widely accepted beliefs, form more complex conceptual metaphors. For example, the conceptual metaphor a purposeful life is a journey arises out of two primary metaphors (purposes are destinations and actions are motions), which are combined with a prevailing belief that people are supposed to have a purpose in life (Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 60–63). Primary metaphors provide the experiential grounding for the more complex conceptual metaphor. Primary metaphors supply the logic, imagistic schemas, and the qualitative feel of sensorimotor experience to abstract concepts (Lakoff & Johnson 1999). Primary metaphors constrain inferences that can be drawn within a certain philosophical theory. They constrain how one can reason within a certain conceptual system of a philosophical framework.

The metaphorical mapping of aspects of a source domain onto a target domain is partial, which means that the source domain does not completely structure abstract concepts (Lakoff & Johnson 1981). Not all the features of the source domain map onto the target domain, which is why, for example, even if we understand theories in terms of buildings, it does not follow that theories have stairwells or elevators (Gibbs 2011). In light of a dynamic view of metaphor, a specific verbal metaphor may also arise from multiple “metaphorical contingencies” rather than a single conceptual metaphor (Gibbs 2011, 554). Moreover, even though two languages share a conceptual metaphor, specific cultural-ideological background has an effect on how this metaphor manifests in a concrete culture, resulting in subtle differences (Kovecses 2002; Yu 2003). Differences in the manner in which cultures speak of certain abstract topics reflect differences in how they think about these areas of experience (Gibbs 2011, 540). Metaphor use is, therefore, not caused by some innate single mental mechanism in the mind of people. It is highly dependent on the circumstances and history of an embodied, environmentally embedded individual in interaction with his or her changing environment. It is an emergent property of brains, bodies, and world (Gibbs 2013, 51). As a result, metaphor use is individual-specific, context-specific, language-specific, and task-specific (Gibbs 2013, 50), yet despite this people can communicate and understand each other’s use of metaphors, because people share certain embodied, sensorimotor experiences, can empathetically engage with another person’s experience, and because they may be embedded in a similar environment.
As Cameron (2010b) notes, metaphor is embodied, cognitive, affective, socio-cultural, and dynamic. Metaphors are embodied, which means that they are motivated by embodied experience, or by recurrent patterns of bodily activity and experience (Gibbs 2006, 2011; cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999). For example, the source domain of the classic conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY is an emergent pattern of bodily activities where people start from a point, move along a path and reach a destination (Gibbs 2013, 48). This recurrent bodily activity produces the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema that informs the metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 1999). The cognitive dimension of metaphor highlights how metaphors, by linking two domains in the conceptual system, structure the way people think and reason (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999).

Metaphors are also affective, which is revealed in the way they tend to express values, beliefs, and emotions. According to Cameron (2010b, 5–6), when people engage metaphors to explain something in terms of something else, they usually choose these metaphors which enable them to better express how they feel towards that phenomenon or thing. Moreover, metaphors are socio-cultural and inseparable from the social interaction, which enables the emergence of certain conventionalized metaphors over long periods of time or of certain more specific ways of metaphorizing bound with particular groups of people in a more specific place and time. Thus, analysis of metaphor use can reveal how people are tied to certain socio-cultural conventions or, alternatively, how they seek to reject certain conventionalized ways of thinking. Finally, metaphor is dynamic: it is constantly evolving and is transformed by social interaction and lived experience.

Cameron, who has done extensive research on metaphor use, characterizes metaphor as built into the very ordinary ways in which we use words to share our thinking with others. […] [M]etaphor does more than just saying; it connects into our thinking through the words used. By collecting the metaphors that people use, we can understand something of their thinking. We can catch glimpses of how their thinking has been shaped by the culture they grew up in, and by the people they live around; how thinking is shaped by participating in talk and by processing the ideas that others offer them in conversation. (Cameron 2011, 4)

Cameron (2011, 20) conceives of conversation in terms of complexity and dynamic systems theory, which means she treats a conversation as a process of activity of complex dynamic systems in interaction, shaped by their starting points as well as by the history of the interaction. In such a conversation, empathy, or the ability to understand the other’s experience, emerges “from the flow of talk, a complex dynamic system in its own right” (Cameron 2011, 20). Cameron proposes that:

A complex dynamic system is an evolving collection of heterogeneous elements or agents (people, language resources, ideas etc). These elements of the system are dynamic (always changing), and change also occurs in the connections, or relations, among components. As a result of these dynamics, the system develops as a whole that is more than, and cannot be reduced to, the combination of its component elements. A conversation is more than the sum of the words spoken. When two people come together to try to understand each other through talk, a complexity perspective sees a process of multiple interacting complex dynamic systems, where the component elements (which may themselves be systems) are
the individuals and their linguistic and cognitive resources. Each moment in the talk changes the participants’ understanding of the other and affects what is said next. […] [T]wo brains or minds engage in dynamically constructing understandings of the Other; two patterns of thinking and speaking built up over lifetimes are brought into use; two sets of memories and histories are called upon. (Cameron 2011, 20–21)

Even though metaphorical language is subject to the dynamics of self-organization and emergence just as any other language use, metaphor use is special in its role to supply emergent ways of talking and thinking (Cameron 2010a, 88). The emergent ways of talking and thinking may be more or less conventionalized and permanent or transient and temporary. Some enduring metaphorical conventions may become characteristic or even defining of groups, marking the identity of groups and revealing who belongs to a group, or is allowed to become part of it (Cooper 1986).

One of the main methodological issues to be cautious about in metaphor analysis is the danger of over-interpretation (Steen 2007). It is important not to overgeneralize on the basis of limited linguistic evidence when trying to identify a conceptual metaphor. As a possible solution to this problem, Steen (2007) highlights the need to choose representative texts and to have a reliable procedure for identifying metaphors. The researcher should also preferably carry out the procedure on large amounts of text and develop a reliable procedure for deciding which source and target domains metaphorical expressions realize.

4.2.2 Application of metaphor analysis to my materials

I investigated the use of metaphors in school-history textbooks and interview materials aiming to identify metaphorical models, which shape ways of thinking about and engagement with the past. I expected to find that metaphorical models, which inform the ontological and epistemological orientations, would have an impact on the ability to make sense of divergent or conflicting accounts of what happened. For example, if people metaphorically conceptualize truth in vision-based terms, as a static correspondence between language and past reality, it becomes difficult to integrate different narratives of experience into such a concept of truth. The entailment of the latter metaphorical model would be to think about divergences in terms of subjective bias, which needs to be eliminated, in order to arrive at truth. Alternatively, truth could be reduced to representation of general states of the world, which can be shown to accurately mirror the past. In both cases, however, the concept of truth underlies an image-schema, which derives from the experience of sight, disregards the role of embodiment in cognition and, therefore, cannot integrate embodied narratives of experience into knowledge of past reality.

I hypothesized that the metaphorical models, which invoke the ocularcentric, mentalistic, static, third-person, detached, self-effacing epistemological approach, prevent or are less successful at enabling one to view the past in terms of an embodied lived experience and empathically understand a different lived past. In the ocularcentric representational theory of mind and language, the truth of the past is regarded as an inner
mental construct, an entity that is detached from an embodied process of life. The entailment of the disembodied metaphor of mind is that the person who uses this metaphor has the need to advance a theory of truth, which can bridge the gap between “inner representations” and reality by means of empiricist correspondence that is devoid of values, emotions, context, and history of interaction with the world.

A relevant factor in metaphor analysis was that my materials emerged from two different contexts. Interviews, although guided by my questions and thematic interests, reveal a more spontaneous conversation, in which metaphors arose more contingently and depended on the interaction between the interviewee and the interviewer. Textbooks, on the other hand, were crafted much more carefully either by a single author or by a team of several authors and were arranged according to a deliberately designed structure. The differences in contexts out of which the analyzed materials emerged are reflected in metaphor use. As it will be revealed in the analysis, although the carefully crafted presentation of the textbooks disclosed fewer explicit metaphorical expressions than the partially spontaneous interview conversation, textbooks nevertheless contained implicit metaphorical ways of thinking that could be identified due to the interview analysis.

Throughout the analysis process, I was likewise interested in correlations or lack thereof between metaphorical ways of thinking in the interviews and the textbooks. The aim was to detect whether and in what ways the presentation of the past, pedagogic approaches, ontological and epistemological assumptions in the textbooks related to the views and ideas espoused by textbook authors in the interviews. The interviews proved to be a valuable source of information on how textbook authors reasoned about what they wrote and why they wrote it in a particular way. I was likewise focused on identifying any correspondences between the ontological and epistemological ideas and specific portrayals of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past. In other words, my interest was in whether it was possible to argue that certain ontological and epistemological ideas, shaped by implicit metaphors, affected how the past was depicted and how the authors made sense of controversial events or phenomena in the past. This proved to be a fruitful approach, revealing certain important patterns between ontological and epistemological assumptions and how a particular individual deemed it appropriate to handle disagreements about what happened in the past. The key point, in this context, is that meta-theoretical assumptions on what the past is, what history is, how we can know the past, what truth of the past and objectivity are, what the relation between facts and values is, were shaped to a great extent by implicit metaphors, which none of the respondents seemed to be aware of.

An important question was whether these implicit metaphors were appropriate and helpful in attempts to make sense of the past and whether they hid rather than revealed certain important aspects of cognition. In other cases, it was also made apparent in the analysis that a particular model of reasoning and justification in the textbook, while described without using any explicit metaphorical expressions, had an underlying structuring metaphor, which was revealed in an interview conversation. While the depiction in the textbook could appear as a regular historical explanation, based solely on logical arguments and free from metaphorical associations, the analysis revealed, in some instances, that the argument and justification depended heavily on metaphors as an
important part of the process of perception and understanding. Hence, my approach combining the analysis of textbooks and interviews proved to be useful.

The very first step in the analysis of interviews consisted of a general thematic coding of the transcripts using Atlas.ti software. This enabled me to identify certain topics, which overlapped to a great extent with the main themes of my interview questionnaire: objectivity and truth; multiperspectivity in representation of the past; relation between facts and values; presentation of the discipline of history in school textbooks; purpose of history education, and representation of a shared Polish-Lithuanian past in the author’s textbook(s). Throughout the coding process, I was alert to the metaphorical and idiomatic expressions, seeking to identify certain patterns emerging between thematic and metaphorical use.

The total of 749 codes were organized into 11 code families: Authorship, Epistemological Orientations, Multiperspectivity and Plural Interpretations, Optical-ocularcentric Metaphors, Perceptions of Lithuania and its History, Perceptions of Poland and its History, Perceptions of Polish-Lithuanian History, Perceptions of the Discipline of History and the Past, Purpose of and Approach to History Education, Relations between Facts and Values, Textbooks. There was a degree of overlap between some code families, such as, for example, between Epistemological Orientations and Relations between Facts and Values. However, keeping the code families distinct in this manner allowed for refining different analytical foci.

At this stage, I made a choice to organize the presentation of analysis by keeping the focus on particular authors and their textbooks, rather than on the themes of code families. The unique relation between an author’s reasoning and textbook contents as well as the richness of an author’s ideas, experiences, motivations would have been lost, had I arranged the presentation of analysis in Chapters 6 and 7 in terms of the thematic code families. In order to compensate for the lack of generalizability of my analysis in Chapters 6 and 7 due to the depth of engagement with each individual author, I present a more general thematic comparison of textbook authors and their textbooks in the final discussion in Chapter 8.

The second step in the interview analysis was to underline the metaphorical expressions in passages that were thematically relevant to me and then to interpret their meaning entailments with a view to the context of the interview, the topic discussed and other metaphors used in it. In some cases, the use of metaphors was consistent throughout the interview; in other cases, important tensions or discrepancies in ways of thinking appeared as revealed by metaphors. I have sought to indicate such tensions in the presentation of analysis.

By identifying metaphorical expressions, I mean identifying words or phrases that can be seen as somehow incongruent or mismatching in a given context in a literal sense, but which support a transfer of meaning, typically from the concrete to the abstract domain. Moreover, metaphorical words and expressions are best identified, when the researcher is familiar with the context in which they were produced (Cameron & Maslen 2010). Thus, it was useful to first familiarize myself with the interview transcripts by making a general thematic analysis and only then proceed to identifying and underlining concrete metaphorical expressions. While I sought to identify and underline all metaphorically used
words and phrases, not all were relevant to my research interests. Even though I included them in the identification stage, I was not always making use of them in further analysis.

In terms of translation from Lithuanian and Polish into English, the general rule I followed was to identify the metaphorical usage in the original language and then translate the passages that I chose to quote, seeking to convey the meaning as closely as possible to how the metaphor functioned in the original language. In many cases, due to the proximity of conceptual metaphors across Lithuanian, Polish and English (for example, when metaphorical usage concerned the metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING), translation was not particularly problematic. Concrete linguistic expressions could vary across languages, but the conceptual metaphor underlying these linguistic expressions was shared. However, there were also a number of instances, where a direct translation of the metaphorical concept or an idiom into English did not make sense. In these instances, I combined the translated metaphorical expression with a contextualized explanation of its meaning and entailments in the original language.

After analyzing each individual interview transcript, I turned to close-reading of the presentation in the textbooks. I had already done the preliminary analysis of the textbooks during 2013–2014, where I marked and made a list of significant passages with a short commentary of why they seemed important to me. In the later stage of textbook analysis, I re-read the relevant sections of the analyzed textbooks, marking the metaphors in them as well as taking note of evaluations, arguments, justifications, and explanations presented in them in depicting the past. The interview context, on this second reading, illuminated the meanings and ways of thinking implicit in the narrative of textbooks.

I chose to juxtapose the interview analysis with the textbook analysis of a particular author(s), in order to reveal how the metaphorical models and reasoning of the author corresponded to or differed from the textbook narrative. The aim was not so much to show the variety of representations of the same historical event or epistemological concept (which in any case becomes visible in the analysis), but rather to show the links between textbook contents and an authors’ reasoning.

In my analysis, I sought to identify not just the implicit metaphorical models of cognition, but paid equal attention to conventional metaphors and novel metaphors, the meaning of which depended a lot of on the context of the conversation. There were also metaphors, which appeared not as a linguistic expression, but, for example, as a form of presentation of material that carries implicit ontological assumptions. For example, a visual presentation of time and change on the textbook page as a uni-directional, left-to-right axis, which is divided into discrete segments and along which there are specific events, revealed the influence of the disembodied model of cognition. This model of cognition is supported by optics and the camera as metaphors of cognition, because optics spatializes time, rendering it to a succession of discrete, fixed snapshots, intervals, and states. Optics and camera, as an optical instrument, support the disembodied conception of cognition and change in history. Another visual presentation of time featured a box in which all time was contained, implying that time is a static, fixed, contained, structured substance. Neither of these metaphorical models of time, however, give any explicit acknowledgment to embodied human presence in time. They are both surprisingly de-
humanized metaphorical models of time, in which time is viewed as if from outside, by a spectator who is cut off from time.

I have adopted the convention for marking the metaphors in the empirical chapters 6 and 7 that consists of two basic principles. All the metaphors are underlined when they appear in quotations. However, when I discuss these metaphors in the main text, they are distinguished in small caps.

Thus, the main steps in metaphor analysis of my materials were to identify metaphors, consider why they were used in terms of context and topic discussed, reflect on the entailments of the used metaphors, seek out patterns of metaphor use in and between textbooks and interviews, and find connections between metaphor use and inclination to empathically understand a different experience.

4.3 My role as an interviewer

My presence in the interview setting shaped the flow of conversation not only because I arrived prepared with a set of questions and topics that I wanted my interviewees to talk about. Being there and engaging in a conversation also meant that I was participating in bringing forth the knowledge of the authors’ ways of thinking. My presence and participation in the interview are, in my understanding, not a source of bias, but rather a condition and a procedure of discovery (Ingold 2011). As I tried to understand how my interviewees think, I needed to engage them and reveal some of my own thinking and ideas to them. Together, the interviewee and I, were pro-duc-ing (bringing forth) (Ingold 2011) the knowledge and understanding of how each of us made sense of certain questions. The opinions and ideas that came out of this mutual encounter marked a point in an ongoing process of cognition.

My own thinking has developed significantly since 2014, when I conducted most of the interviews with the Lithuanian and Polish textbook authors. What manifested as a struggle with questions about truth and knowability of the past in 2014 led me eventually through various encounters, readings, and experiences to the theory of enactive embodiment. However, at the time of the interviews, I had positioned myself with the postmodern theory of history, as advanced by Hayden White (1978, 1992, 1999, 2005a, 2014 [1973]) and Alun Munslow (2003, 2006a, 2012). This is noticeable in some of the questions I pose in the interviews. However, my fascination with postmodern historical theory gradually faded. I found myself agreeing with only some of the points argued by White and Munslow, whereas certain other aspects of the postmodern theory of historiography did not seem convincing or sufficient to offer answers to the questions I was grappling with. Specifically, I agreed with the critique of objectivity and scientifcity in history advanced by Munslow and White, but was not as convinced that historiography is merely a fiction constructed out of historians’ figurative choices. I felt unease about this statement because it did not conform to my own experience of engaging with the past.

Still, the postmodern critique of objectivity and scientifcity exerted an important influence in the development of my thinking and the questions I posed to the textbook authors. I was interested in understanding: how they made sense of historical truth and
objectivity; what it meant for them to know the past; how they defined what the past and history were; and how textbooks should instruct pupils to respond to and adjudicate among competing accounts of what happened. In the end, I can only be grateful to the tension induced in me by the ideas of postmodern thinkers, because it kept me interested, vigilant, and reflective on the subject of the knowability of the past – to the extent that I have lived my questions and sought to apply them in different fields of my life. In a way, my process of research is itself an enactive process, as I found myself learning new things and developing new ideas, influenced by a changing context, which was partially of my own creation.

As to my interviewees, some of them were much more cautious in their responses and reactions than others, partly because they were reasonably fearful of revealing too much about their personal views and guarded their privacy and partly because they held assumptions about who I am and what opinions I held about a given subject. Many authors wanted to redirect the same questions that I posed back at me, which gave me an opportunity to learn about engaging the interviewee in a conversation. Observer independence, or taking up a role of a neutral interrogator, who only poses questions and actively excludes herself from the conversation, was not an option, inasmuch as the interviewees and I were co-creating knowledge. If they were willing to reveal their opinions to me, it was only fair to satisfy their curiosity and disclose at least some of my own thinking, too. I also noticed that if the authors expected me to be critical of certain values and ideas they likely subscribed to, they were carefully choosing words so as to maintain a more neutral image of themselves, which did not always coincide with the textbook contents. As a result, I sometimes needed to challenge them and point out the discrepancy between their response and the textbook contents.

However, when I sat down to transcribe and later immersed myself in analyzing the interview materials, a remarkable outcome was that I felt much less critical towards the authors than I had been initially. Seeing their ideas as emerging from their particular lived, embodied, longitudinal and ongoing experience enabled me to empathize with them, even when I questioned or disagreed with their ideas. Engagement with a person in a face-to-face conversation and, later, with their metaphorical ways of thinking about the past, history, and history education made me develop empathy and a deeper understanding of the experiential contexts out of which this person emerged and why they were holding onto these particular ideas.

I believe this would not have been possible had I merely analyzed the textbooks without talking to their authors. It was the interviews, rather than the textbook analysis, that enabled me to understand their ways of thinking through the metaphors they selected. The theoretical framework of enactive embodiment played an important role by focusing my attention on how ideas and meanings are not imposed on the thing-like, factual substance of the past, but how, rather, ideas and meanings arise and are emergent in the process of life and interaction with one’s environment. The former understanding – that meanings are ascribed and imposed onto the factuality of the past – is a legacy of ocularcentric epistemology, according to which we look at the past as if from “outside,” considering other people, things and events as a final, evolved, fixed form. The form is separate from matter; the deed is separate from the doer; the thought is separate from the
thinker (Ingold 2015). By contrast, considering other people and the meanings they express not as a final, static, idealized form, but as part of an ongoing, generative process of formation, of coming into being allows me as a researcher to approach my interviewees and their ideas as continuously in the making. Engaging with a person as a verb was a different experience from looking at a person as a noun or a pronoun: it enabled me to see a person more generously and to recognize how their past as lived experience shapes how they make sense of the world. As a researcher, it made me more attentive and open to an encounter with the interviewees.

Finally, my nationality (Lithuanian) and linguistic skills have also likely played a role in shaping the interview conversations. My national background has inevitably rendered me more sensitive to and perceptive of the ways in which the Lithuanian lived experiences might have been overlooked in the Polish accounts of the past. However, I strove to attend carefully to the Polish lived experiences and to be mindful of the diversity of these experiences. The proficiency of my linguistic skills in Polish might also have exerted an influence on the interview dynamic, as I am not bilingual in the two languages. I have started learning Polish during my master’s studies and acquired a level of linguistic proficiency sufficient enough for me to read and conduct interviews in Polish. Even though it did not constitute a major impediment to the conversation flow, I was not able to express myself as fully in Polish during the interviews as in my native tongue.

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38 When I refer to the Polish or Lithuanian lived experiences, I do not assume these to be in any way uniform or invariant.
Chapter 5. Context of Analysis

The purpose of this chapter is to contextualize the analysis that is carried out in Chapters 6 and 7. Firstly, I will acquaint the reader with the events of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past that have received different evaluations in Polish and Lithuanian historiography. Secondly, I will introduce the school-history curricula that have shaped history education in Poland and Lithuania since 1990.

5.1 Lithuanian and Polish narratives of shared past

In this section, I will provide a brief overview of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past, focusing on the main events that have raised controversy in Polish and Lithuanian historiography.

5.1.1 The Union of Krewo

The contention over the shared past begins with the very first step in rapprochement of Poland and Lithuania in the 14th century, when the Union of Krewo was concluded between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1385. Under the terms of the union treaty, the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jogaila (Polish: Jagiełło) was to be crowned the King of Poland and Christianize Lithuania. The treaty also stipulated that Jogaila was to help Poland regain lost territories, release Polish captives, and “attach” (the Latin term applicare) Lithuania to Poland. The proper translation and meaning of the Latin term applicare became an issue of debate among Polish and Lithuanian historians. Did the term suggest that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was annexed to the Kingdom of Poland? Did it imply incorporation of Lithuania into Poland or a union of the two states?

Historiographical narratives, which emerged in the first few decades of the 20th century in Lithuania and Poland, drew on very different meanings with regard to the Union of Krewo. Polish historians saw the Union as one of the most significant merits of Jagiełło, which permitted Polish culture and influence to spread in Lithuania (Jurkiewicz 1994). Polish historians also did not oppose Jagiełło to his cousin, the Lithuanian Grand Duke Vytautas, regarding the latter as Jagiełło’s closest ally (Nikžentaitis 2002). Nevertheless, Polish historians perceived Jagiełło as if separately from Lithuania and Lithuanian culture (Nikžentaitis 2002). He was fully integrated into a modern Polish national historical narrative and perceived as a representative of the Polish nation.

In the Lithuanian historiography of the interwar years, the narrative focused on the Lithuanian struggle for the preservation of statehood, labelling Jogaila as a traitor of national interests, as opposed to Vytautas, who was held in high esteem as a national hero. Lithuanian historian Alvydas Nikžentaitis (2002) argues that heroization of Vytautas in Lithuania had begun already in his own lifetime. According to him, the resistance of Vytautas to Jogaila’s rule was portrayed as a Lithuanian uprising against Polish attempts
to take control of Lithuania already in the end of the 14th century. Nikžentaitis (2002) refers to multiple sources, which show that, also during the 15th-16th centuries, commentators from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania praised the political merits, style of leadership, and personal characteristics of Vytautas, while downplaying or disregarding those of Jogaila. However, a concrete image of Jogaila as a traitor emerged only in the beginning of the 20th century in the context of the Lithuanian national revival. The emerging modern national Lithuanian identity required clear-cut differentiation between Poles and Lithuanians. Simultaneously, any traces of Vytautas’ anti-Polish, pro-Lithuanian policies and attitudes were given a renewed emphasis as his most celebrated merits in the emerging, national, historical narrative. Vytautas became a symbol of Lithuanian resistance against Poland.

Historiographical assessments exerted a considerable influence on political visions and policies. Lithuanian and Polish politicians, debating on future state models in the early 20th century, drew analogies and examples from the history of the Union of Krewo and relations of Jogaila and Vytautas (Nikžentaitis 2002). Hence, for Lithuanian politicians the Union of Krewo was a historical mistake, which they were determined not to repeat ever again, whereas Polish politicians perceived the union or federation of Poland and Lithuania as a consistent and even necessary outcome of a long-standing historical tradition. The Chief of State of Poland Józef Piłsudski imagined a federal Polish state, which comprised the territory of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, whereas Lithuanian politicians were unequivocally opposed to any binding ties between Poland and Lithuania.

In the Soviet period, despite the influence of Marxist ideology on the discipline of history, the historiographical depiction of the Union of Krewo as well as Jogaila and Vytautas did not change dramatically in terms of evaluative framework. In Poland, the history of Polish-Lithuanian relations became less topical (Nikžentaitis 2002). Finally, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Union of Krewo and the personalities of Jogaila and Vytautas have received a historiographical re-evaluation. As Nikžentaitis (2002) notes, Lithuanian and Polish historians agree today that the Union of Krewo did not signify the loss of statehood of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, nor was it a historic mistake. However, certain evaluative connotations and attitudes persist in the popular historical consciousness. Jogaila, for example, continues to be perceived in an unfavorable light in popular Lithuanian historical consciousness.

5.1.2 The Battle of Grunwald

Another event from the shared Polish-Lithuanian past, which has received controversial interpretations, is the 1410 Battle of Grunwald. Already in the 16th century, Poles and Lithuanians held divisive opinions about the course of the battle (Nikžentaitis 2002). Until the mid-16th century, there existed a separate Lithuanian historical narrative, developed in the Bychowiec Chronicle of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which credited Vytautas and the Lithuanians with victory and downplayed the contribution of the Poles (Nikžentaitis 2002; Mačiulis, Petrauskas & Staliūnas 2012). However, starting from the second half of
the 16th century, as a political and cultural rapprochement of two nations began to intensify, Lithuanian authors adopted a modified version of the Polish narrative, according to which the victory was credited to Polish troops (Nikžentaitis 2002). The basis of the Polish narrative was the “Annals or Chronicles of the famous Kingdom of Poland,” authored by the 15th century Polish priest and chronicler Jan Długosz, whose narrative became the main source of historical knowledge about the battle until the 20th century (Mačiulis, Petrauskas & Staliūnas 2012, 26). Długosz advanced an account of the battle, according to which the Lithuanian army escaped from the battlefield, portraying the victory against the Teutonic knights as a Polish victory. The Lithuanian narrative of the battle after the 1569 Union of Lublin with Poland was greatly shaped by the Stryjkowski Chronicle, written in 1582, which countered the claims that Lithuanian troops escaped from the battlefield and presented the victory as a shared Polish-Lithuanian achievement (Mačiulis, Petrauskas & Staliūnas 2012). In the 17th and 18th centuries, the significance of the Battle of Grunwald faded in the memory cultures of both Poland and Lithuania (Mačiulis, Petrauskas & Staliūnas 2012).

However, the event returned to its prominence in Poland at the end of the 19th century because of intensifying Polish-German tensions. The novel of Polish writer Henryk Sienkiewicz “The Teutonic Knights,” serialized by the magazine “Tygodnik Ilustrowany” between 1897 and 1899, depicted Germans as enemies of Poland, which were finally defeated in the Battle of Grunwald (Mačiulis, Petrauskas & Staliūnas 2012). The main winners, according to the novel’s narrative, were Poles and the King Jogaila, whereas the contribution of Lithuanians and the Grand Duke Vytautas was downplayed as of secondary importance. The Battle of Grunwald became one of the key Polish lieux de mémoire starting from 1910, when Poland celebrated the 500th anniversary of the battle (Mačiulis, Petrauskas & Staliūnas 2012, 44). Polish publications, dedicated to the celebration, emphasized the image of Germans as an eternal enemy of Poland and sought to unite the nation against the threat of Germanization (Sala 2010). Jogaila and Vytautas emerged in these representations as personifications of Polish and Lithuanian nations whose shared efforts to defeat the Teutonic Order were seen as the foundation for a shared life in the Polish-Lithuanian union. Poles presented themselves as “elder brothers” who, by gaining the victory in the battle, proved to the Lithuanians how useful it was to accept a closer union with Poland (Mačiulis, Petrauskas & Staliūnas 2012, 49).

In the 19th century, the memory of the Battle of Grunwald played only a marginal role in the Lithuanian national revival movement. As Nikžentaitis (2002) explains, modern Lithuanian nationalism sought to differentiate Lithuanian identity from Polishness, whereas the history of the Battle of Grunwald represented a joint struggle of Poland and Lithuania as allies. Nevertheless, the importance of the battle began to steadily increase at the beginning of the 20th century. Most Lithuanian literary accounts of the battle from the early 20th century accentuated the role of Vytautas and the Lithuanian army in defeating the Teutonic knights, and portrayed Jogaila as a coward who spent more time praying than leading the army (Mačiulis, Petrauskas & Staliūnas 2012, 58–61). However, contrary to Polish renditions, Lithuanian authors perceived rapprochement between Poland and Lithuania in the aftermath of the battle as the beginning of the decline of Lithuanian statehood and the nation. As a result, the Battle of Grunwald was not such a significant
historical event in the Lithuanian commemoration culture as it was in Poland at the beginning of the 20th century.

In the 1920s, Lithuanian historians renewed their interest in the debate about the tactical retreat of the Lithuanian army during the course of the Battle. Instead of a narrative about a joint Polish-Lithuanian victory against the Teutonic Order, the new interpretation foregrounded the disagreement between Poles and Lithuanians on the battlefield. Contradictions in the portrayal of the battle centered on the question of whether the true leader of the battle was Vytautas or Jogaila, and whether the Lithuanian retreat was a tactical maneuver, which determined the triumph of the Polish-Lithuanian forces, or a shameful escape (Nikžentaitis 2002). In Lithuania, however, the image of the battle was rather a background for the cult of the Grand Duke Vytautas and served as a constitutive part of mobilizing anti-Polish rhetoric in the interwar conflict with Poland (Mačiulis, Petrauskas & Staliūnas 2012). In Poland, on the other hand, the image of the battle was actualized in relation to the propaganda struggle against the German revanchism.

During the postwar period, the history of the Battle of Grunwald was ideologically re-interpreted as the fight of brotherly socialist nations against the Western powers and “German imperialism.” Soviet ideologues sought to present the image of the battle as a shared lieu de mémoire of the Soviet bloc (Mačiulis, Petrauskas & Staliūnas 2012). This ideological shift in interpretation was, however, unsuccessful in Lithuania due to the hold of memory of the interwar conflict with Poland (Nikžentaitis 2002). A latent strife for the legacy of the battle continued even under Soviet ideological constraints, where both Lithuanians and Poles sought to emphasize the achievements of their nation on the battleground. In Poland in particular, political elites systematically used nationalist ideas in relation to the battle in order to consolidate their power, whereas in Lithuania the Soviet commemoration was more modest and emphasized the battle as a symbol of “eternal friendship” of Lithuanian and Slavic nations and resistance to German militarism (Mačiulis, Petrauskas & Staliūnas 2012).

5.1.3 The Union of Lublin

The closer alliance of Poland and Lithuania eventually culminated in the establishment of a joint Polish-Lithuanian state in 1569. Contemporary commentators referred to the Union of Lublin by the metaphor of the “sacred marriage” (Bumblauskas 2009). It created conditions for major linguistic and identity transformations in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, especially with regard to the Lithuanian gentry, who, over the course of the existence of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, increasingly adopted Polish language and culture.

Lithuanian historiography and periodicals of the 19th and 20th century generally could be said to hold predominantly negative attitudes towards the Union of Lublin. In these accounts, the Union of Lublin denoted the end of the grandeur and authentic traditions of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Buchowski 2012). The Lithuanian gentry was said to resist the union, but finally had to succumb to pressure because of Polish blackmail and betrayal. For example, the 19th century Lithuanian historian Simonas Daukantas assessed
the Union of Lublin as a great misfortune, which opened the gate for the spread of the Polish language and ill customs in Lithuania. Only peasants, according to him, remained “unspoiled” by Polish influence. The Commonwealth was taken to signify the loss of independence, moral decline, weakening statehood and an increasing Polonization of political elites. In effect, these historiographical accounts tended to diminish the significance of the entire historical period of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, perceived as the period of gradual decline, which eventually led to the disintegration of the state in the 18th century.

However, in the end of the 20th century, alternative interpretations of the Union of Lublin and the Commonwealth emerged in Lithuanian historiography. Historian Edvardas Gudavičius introduced a new narrative by considering the gradual cultural Polonization of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania after its unification with Poland as the consequence of Lithuania’s Europeanization process and, thus, as an inevitable development, which brought Lithuania closer to the field of Western civilization. Gudavičius (2002, 203) claimed that Poland in the 14th century was to Lithuania what Germany was to Poland in the 10th century – the source of Western civilization. Rather than seeing the influence of Polish culture and language as solely a regrettable process of cultural colonization causing the loss of Lithuanian sovereignty and identity, he highlighted the role of Polish language as a medium through which the advancement of Western culture reached Lithuania, located far from the centers of Western culture. Nevertheless, he reaffirmed that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its society retained a sense of separate identity, distinct interests and traditions. In other words, the spread of Polish language and culture did not eradicate a separate political consciousness in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Lithuanian historian Alfredas Bumblauskas (2009) also highlighted that the Lithuanian nobility retained a sense of separate political identity, based on the traditions of the Grand Duchy, despite the gradual and overwhelming cultural Polonization.

However, despite these recent changes in historiographical accounts of the Union of Lublin, the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is not popular in Lithuanian society. A survey, conducted 2005–2006 on Lithuanian social memory, showed that, for Lithuanians, the least important historical period significant for their national identity is the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Šutinienė 2008). Only 4% of the respondents considered the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth meaningful to their national identity. Meanwhile, the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania before unionization with Poland was a much stronger and relevant element of national identity. A total of 25.6% of respondents considered the history of the Grand Duchy important to their national identity, and 14% identified the rule of the Grand Duke Vytautas and the subsequent period until the Union of Lublin (1392–1569) to be the most important (Šutinienė 2008, 109). This shows that the Union of Lublin and the ensuing history of a shared Polish-Lithuanian statehood is still regarded by many Lithuanians as “not their” history, but rather a regrettable “dark age” of Lithuanian history, overshadowed by Polish cultural domination.

Bumblauskas (2009) explains such generally negative attitudes by noting two key factors. First, the common Polish-Lithuanian history is traditionally judged through the prism of the Polish-Lithuanian interwar conflict. Secondly, unification with Poland is
perceived to be the causative factor for Polonization of Lithuanian culture. Bumblauskas (2009) also emphasizes that such negative assessments of the past partly stem from the fact that Polish historical tradition tended to portray Lithuania prior to the Union of Lublin as merely the “Poland of Jagiellons” and label the Commonwealth as “the Republic of Poland,” ignoring the dual character of the state. According to him, Polish historiography for a long time ignored the existence of a separate Lithuanian political consciousness in the Commonwealth (Bumblauskas 2009).

In Poland, a similar differentiation can be observed in historiographic accounts on the Union of Lublin. In the 19th century, Polish historians tended to ignore the dual character of the Commonwealth. For example, Józef Jaroszewicz (1844–1845) and Józef Szujski (1862–1866) overlooked the articles of the Union treaty, which implied that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania continued to exist as a separate political entity. As a result, the equal standing of Lithuania in the common state was largely ignored. A similar historical narrative was maintained by Oswald Balzer (1919) in the beginning of the 20th century, who argued that after the Union the Polish-Lithuanian state became one legally undifferentiated entity. In the 19th-century Polish literature, the Union was depicted as an amalgamation of a powerful and culturally advanced nation with a neighboring nation, which was brutal, pagan, and uneducated (Buchowski 2012, 49). The Union of Lublin was therefore a benevolent action on the part of Poland and a salvation to Lithuania, which could adopt Christianity, Western civilization, and a high culture from Poland. The Union of Lublin, rendered this way, was a symbol of success, power, and the brotherhood of two nations. The belief in the stability and eternal endurance of the Union was so strong in Poland that the modern Lithuanian national movement infuriated Polish society (Buchowski 2012, 50–51).

A new perspective on the nature of the Polish-Lithuanian state was introduced by the post-war generation of Polish historians. For example, Henryk Wisner (Visneris 1991, 7) acknowledged that the Union of Lublin did not mean the end of Lithuanian sovereignty and asserted that the newly formed Republic was comprised of a single nation of the lower gentry, but of two separate states, distrustful of each other. This distrust was maintained primarily by the families of the Lithuanian magnatry, who were against the union with Poland, seeing it as a danger to the sovereignty of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Wisner stressed that the establishment of the Commonwealth depended more on a lack of alternative options for the Lithuanian gentry than on mutual voluntary acceptance of the negotiated terms. Furthermore, he highlighted the fact that the gradual cultural Polonization of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania did not entail the takeover of the Polish identity and loss of a separate political consciousness (Visneris 1991, 24, 69). Despite the fact that Polish became the official state language and the language of communication and literature in the Republic, there remained two distinct states – the Polish Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania – each of them in possession of their own political identity and “native” citizenry, as opposed to the “foreigners” of the other confederate state.

Henryk Samsonowicz is yet another Polish historian who attempted to show the duality of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the equal standing of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in its union with Poland. He argued that despite the gradual Polonization of the Lithuanian gentry and its acceptance of Polish customs and offices
after 1569, it still retained a continuing consciousness of a separate identity (Samsonowicz 1982, 56). Samsonowicz highlighted cultural and linguistic differences as well as a long-standing tradition of mutual hostility, which hampered the realization of the Polish-Lithuanian union (Samsonowicz 1982, 55).

5.1.4 The interwar conflict and the Question of Vilnius/Wilno

After the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had been partitioned by Russia, Prussia, and Austria in the end of the 18th century, the memory of a joint Polish-Lithuanian state and union persisted in Polish society throughout the 19th century (Buchowski 2012). The heritage of the multicultural Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was, however, increasingly understood in Polish society as simply Polish heritage (Buchowski 2012). It needs to be pointed out here that, in the Commonwealth, being a Pole did not signify identity based on ethnic origin, but rather political identification with the multicultural Commonwealth, which is why, for example, a nobleman could perceive himself as a Lithuanian and a Pole simultaneously. Similarly, the label “Lithuanian” denoted political and administrative belonging to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, irrespective of ethnic or linguistic identification. However, in the 19th century, identity definitions were undergoing significant transformation. A split occurred in the understanding of what it meant to be a Lithuanian, where the gentry of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania began to increasingly identify themselves as Polish, as opposed to the “new” Lithuanian nation, originating from the peasantry.

Despite emerging national movements and changing identities, certain attitudes from the time of the Commonwealth tended to endure. Lithuanians peasants were patronizingly regarded by the Polish gentry and intelligentsia as “younger brothers,” who served the interests of the Polish nation and who needed to be educated and guided in the right direction, since they were not able to make their own national decisions (Buchowski 2012, 33–34). Lithuania was perceived as a territory integral to Poland’s “eastern borderlands.” Countryside life and culture were depicted as primitive and exotic, in seeking to emphasize the positive impact of Polish culture on peasants and idyllic, harmonious relations between the gentry and peasantry. A mythology of pagan Lithuanian history and folk customs emerged in Romantic Polish literature of the 19th century, which painted the image of Lithuania as a mysterious land, which was simultaneously very close to the Polish heart (Buchowski 2012, 39–53).

Familiar with this Romantic image of Lithuania, Polish society could not comprehend the aims and rhetoric of a rising modern Lithuanian national movement. Lithuanians, according to Polish imagination, were merely Poles, who spoke a different language; they were part of the same nation (Buchowski 2012). Lithuanians had to be grateful to Poland for Christianity and Western civilization. Hence, the only option for Poles and Lithuanians was to renew the union and establish a joint state when the circumstances would allow for that. Negative reactions of Lithuanians to such future visions of a shared statehood were surprising to Polish society. As antagonism was becoming fiercer, initial Polish indifference towards the Lithuanian national movement, mockingly labeled “Litwomania,”
was soon replaced by feelings of contempt and hostility. Lithuanian emancipatory aims were perceived to be an artificial initiative and a Russian intrigue, which did not match the spirit of history and the real interests of Poland and Lithuania (Buchowski 2012, 98–99). The Lithuanian republic, established in 1918, was similarly held to be a Russian or German sabotage directed against Poland (Buchowski 2012, 115).

“Litwomania” was metaphorically understood as a disease, which had to be controlled and treated in order to prevent its further spread (Buchowski 2012). Conservative landlords viewed claims of the Lithuanian intelligentsia contemptuously as a plebeian pathology. Supporters of Lithuanian national aspirations were also metaphorically portrayed in Polish periodicals as capricious children who play with dangerous toys and need supervision of an older sibling (Buchowski 2012, 106). Although older brother did his best to be patient with his inexperienced, ungrateful sibling, the child needed to understand that patience had limits and one day he might be punished for misbehavior.

The image of Poles among Lithuanian peasants in the 19th century was shaped by their experience of the local gentry, who were mocked for their vanity, laziness, gambling, and alcoholism. Serfdom and bondage to the lord of the manor, far from idyllic representations produced by the gentry, were experienced as painful injustice by peasants (Buchowski 2012, 37). Memories of abuse and violence under serfdom were later often used in anti-Polish articles in Lithuanian periodicals. The emerging Lithuanian intelligentsia of the 19th century used and adapted these anti-Polish attitudes and beliefs, in order to shape modern Lithuanian national identity. Literary and historiographical works, which portrayed Polish-Lithuanian antagonism in history and critically depicted Polish aspirations to annex Lithuania, were very successful.

Despite this, Polish language and culture were identified by Lithuanian peasants with a higher social status, which induced faster processes of Polonization among Lithuanian peasants in the 19th century. Certain leaders of the Lithuanian national movement, such as, for example, Vincas Kudirka, felt ashamed in their youth of their peasant origins, preferred to be seen as Poles, avoided speaking Lithuanian, and only later experienced a transformation of national identity. Polonization of the peasantry was metaphorically perceived by supporters of the Lithuanian national movement as a disease, which spread from the sin of the Polonized Lithuanian gentry and originated from the Polish-Lithuanian Union (Buchowski 2012). Poles and the Polish language were regarded as the biggest enemies of Lithuanian nation and culture, which was said to have implemented a systematic, intentional program of eradication of the Lithuanian nation since the 14th century. Fighting “Polonomania” meant bringing back the members of the Lithuanian nation to good health, lost under Polish influence during the course of history.

These ingrained mutual attitudes of Poles and Lithuanians played a major role in the interwar Polish-Lithuanian conflict. On 16 February 1918, when the Council of Lithuania signed the Act of Independence of Lithuania in Vilnius⁵⁹, the reaction of the local Polish population was unambiguously negative. Lithuanian Poles felt offended and excluded from the newly established Lithuanian state and perceived it merely as a German-backed intrigue of Lithuanian nationalists (Buchowski 2012). They questioned the legitimacy and

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⁵⁹ I will use the present-day Lithuanian version of the city name in what follows.
popular support enjoyed by the Council of Lithuania and argued that ethnic Lithuanians had no right to claim the city as the capital of the newly established Lithuanian state (Weeks 2012, 63). In 1918, Lithuanian-born Polish Chief of State Józef Piłsudski foresaw only two possibilities in this situation: either Lithuanians agreed to renew the union with Poland or they had to limit their territorial claims to only those regions which were ethno-linguistically Lithuanian, thus, excluding the city and region of Vilnius, whose population was predominantly Jewish and Polish (Buchowski 2012, 144). The Lithuanian authorities, on the other hand, argued that the local Polish-speaking population was not made up of Poles, but rather of Polonized Lithuanians who had lost their mother tongue over the centuries and needed to return to their ethnic Lithuanian roots.

In 1919, when, in the aftermath of World War I, the German troops retreated, the Bolsheviks attacked Lithuania and Poland from the east. On April 19, 1919, the Polish army captured the city of Vilnius, which soon led to clashes between Polish and Lithuanian soldiers. Immediately after the takeover of the city, Piłsudski issued a bilingual proclamation to the “inhabitants of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania,” in which he pledged to create an opportunity for settling nationality problems and religious affairs in a manner that inhabitants of the city would determine, without any kind of force or pressure from Poland. Piłsudski expected that the Lithuanian authorities would settle for a compromise in order to regain Vilnius and would accept the idea of a Polish-Lithuanian federation (Buchowski 2012).

However, neither Polish, nor Lithuanian nationalists supported Piłsudski’s vision. The disagreement was further negotiated in the Paris Peace Conference. Poland did not want to make any territorial concessions, basing its claims on the right of self-determination of the local Poles. The Lithuanians claimed Vilnius as their historical capital and refused any federation ties with Poland, desiring an independent Lithuanian state and perceiving Polish presence in the city as an occupation. The situation was further complicated by an attempted Polish coup organized in the city of Kaunas where the Lithuanian government resided at the time. The local Polish Military Organization was planning to take down the Lithuanian government and replace it with a pro-Polish cabinet, which would accept the idea of the Polish-Lithuanian Union (Buchowski 2012). Lithuanian intelligence discovered the secret plan and the coup failed. After this incident, the image of Poles as enemies of the Lithuanian nation and independence became even stronger.

Tensions between Lithuanian and Polish armies grew worse in 1920. In July 1920, westward advancing Bolshevik troops took control of Vilnius. Soviet Russia and Lithuania signed a peace treaty on July 12, according to which Russia recognized Lithuanian independence and an eastern border with the city of Vilnius on the Lithuanian side. The hostility felt towards Poland was so powerful that Lithuanian political elite was eager to sign an anti-Polish accord with Soviet Russia and did not consider the Bolsheviks as a serious threat to Lithuanian sovereignty (Kasperavičius 2001, 147–156; Laurinavičius 1997, 235). Although Lithuania declared neutrality in the Polish-Soviet war, the Lithuanian-Soviet peace treaty was interpreted by Poland as a violation of neutrality. When the Polish army crushed Soviet troops in the Battle of Warsaw in August, Polish troops started again to advance towards Lithuania. Only when the Polish army defeated the Bolsheviks at the Battle of Warsaw and started approaching the southern borders of
Lithuania, did the Soviet Army transfer Vilnius to the Lithuanian authorities. In September, fierce clashes began between Polish and Lithuanian forces in the region of Suwałki at the southwestern Lithuanian border. Polish and Lithuanian delegations opened negotiations over a demarcation line, but the most contentious point regarding Vilnius and to whom it belonged remained unresolved.

On October 7, both sides signed an agreement in Suwałki, according to which a demarcation line was drawn leaving the city of Vilnius on the Lithuanian side. In the Lithuanian narrative of the conflict, the Suwałki agreement has been traditionally given a lot of significance as a legal document proving Lithuania’s right to the city (Buchowski 2012). Polish accounts, on the other hand, downplay the importance of the agreement. Finally, in October 8, before the Suwałki agreement came into force, Piłsudski ordered General Lucjan Żeligowski to stage a mutiny with his 1st Lithuanian-Belarusian Division and capture the city of Vilnius. For Lithuanians, it meant that Poland broke the Suwałki agreement and became a symbol of Polish treachery. After taking control of Vilnius, Żeligowski’s troops continued marching further into Lithuanian territory, at which point their advancement was halted by the resistance of the Lithuanian army. On October 12, Żeligowski proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Central Lithuania, with Vilnius as its capital. The Polish-Lithuanian War continued until the intervention of the League of Nations, which demanded both parties to sign a ceasefire. Further negotiations, mediated by the League of Nations, were unsuccessful and did not change the status quo. The Republic of Central Lithuania was eventually incorporated into Poland as the Wilno Voivodeship in 1922. Lithuania broke off all diplomatic relations with Poland and refused any actions that would recognize Poland’s control of Vilnius. In 1939, however, the city and its surrounding areas were transferred to Lithuania according to the Soviet–Lithuanian Mutual Assistance Treaty. In exchange, Lithuania agreed to allow Soviet military bases to be established in strategic parts of the country. In 1940, the first Soviet occupation of Lithuania began.

The dramatic events of the interwar further consolidated hostile mutual attitudes. Poles were perceived in Lithuanian society as an eternal treacherous enemy, which sought to coerce Lithuania to submit to the imposed vision of the union. Lithuanian propaganda also widely employed the social antagonism by presenting Poles as rich landlords eager to oppress peasants and bring back serfdom (Buchowski 2012, 156–157). Piłsudski and Żeligowski were portrayed as greedy aggressors and criminals in periodicals and school-history textbooks throughout the interwar period (Buchowski 2012, 178–179). The Polish takeover and annexation of the Vilnius region was widely portrayed as an unjust occupation.

The negative image of Poland which reached its peak in the interwar Lithuanian republic persisted throughout the postwar period and can still be detected in Lithuanian society today, even if not in such acute terms. In Soviet Lithuania, the narrative of Polish-Lithuanian relations did not undergo drastic changes despite the pervading Marxist ideology. Polish landlords, according to the Soviet narrative, sought to oppress the peasant folk people throughout history and, in 1920, “Poland of bourgeois landlords” once again sought to take over Vilnius, which Soviet Russia had earlier rightfully given to Lithuania (Buchowski 2012, 501).
In communist Poland, the narrative about a shared Polish-Lithuanian past also did not undergo major changes, despite the fact that old antagonisms were downplayed. Until the end of the 1980s, Polish school-history textbooks depicted the glory and advantages of the Polish-Lithuanian union, described the Commonwealth as simply “Poland” and portrayed the interwar conflict as a minor border skirmish, among many other similar disagreements that sprang up after World War I (Buchowski 2012, 503). In bookshops, cinema and TV, the old romanticized vision of a historical Lithuania continued to prevail, based on the 19th century literary novels (Buchowski 2012, 504).

In the 1990s, tensions over the status of Vilnius reemerged once again. Poland strongly supported Lithuania’s independence in the turbulent years of the late 1980s-early 1990s. However, the common task to agree on the contents of a bilateral treaty in the early 1990s turned out to be a challenging endeavor, requiring extensive negotiations and compromises on both sides. What provoked most of the controversy during the negotiations on the bilateral Polish-Lithuanian treaty was, unsurprisingly, the question of the historical past and how it should be addressed in the text of the treaty. Prior to the signature of the 1994 Treaty, eleven deputies of the Lithuanian parliament urged the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Algirdas Sauðargas not to sign the declaration of January 1992, demanding that Poland condemn the act of aggression, led by General Żeligowski in 1920, and claiming that if this provision was not included in the bilateral treaty, the results of aggression would be legalized (Snyder 1995, 326). The Lithuanian side sought that Poland would officially acknowledge the fact of occupation and confirm that the annexation of Vilnius and its surrounding area was an illegal act, in breach of international law. The president of Poland Lech Wałęsa stated that Poland had no claims on Lithuanian territory (Snyder 1995, 327). However, the Lithuanians still insisted that the treaty could not be signed without an additional declaration on history, while Poland repeatedly responded that historical debates should proceed after the treaty had been signed. Ultimately, Lithuania agreed to exclude the historical issues from the treaty and the accompanying declaration. The treaty was signed on 22 February 1994. Lithuanians, initially determined to achieve Poland’s condemnation of the takeover of Vilnius in 1920, compromised and accepted a statement on the “possibility of different interpretations of a shared history.”

5.2 Lithuanian and Polish school-history curricula

In this section, I provide an overview of Lithuanian and Polish school-history curricula that were adopted after 1990.

5.2.1 Lithuanian school-history history curricula

the 5th to 12th grades. The 1996 curriculum provided guidelines for history education in the 10th-12th grades and the 1998 curriculum outlined history education for the 5th to 10th grades.\textsuperscript{40}

Starting from the 1992–1993 school year, the concentric curricular approach was introduced, according to which the teaching of history was divided into several consecutive phases that present the material at an increasingly advanced level (Bitautas 2015). In 1997, a new structure of history education in elementary (years 5 to 10) and secondary schools (years 11 to 12) was introduced (Bitautas 2015). In the 5th grade, pupils learned an episodic course of Lithuanian history. An episodic course of world history followed in the 6th grade. In the 7th to 10th grades, pupils learned an integrated Lithuanian and world history course, which encompassed the entire chronological expanse from pre-history to the end of the 20th century. In the 11–12th grades, pupils again repeated the entire Lithuanian and world history from pre-history to the end of the 20th century, at a basic or advanced level. In practice, this meant that pupils covered the same material three times during school education at an increasingly advanced level. This three-tier concentric approach to history education still endures in Lithuania today.

The 1999 history curriculum for the 5th to 12th grades specified that history lessons should help pupils form an image of the chronological sequence of the historical process; distinguish between facts and opinions; detect mistakes and biases; develop critical thinking; understand that a historical narrative is only a hypothetical approximation of the past, which depends on sources and research methodology (ŠMM 1999). It stated that the main aim of history education is to develop an understanding that “today's world is a result of a long-term and historically contingent development of humanity” (ŠMM 1999). The curriculum placed much emphasis on the development of historical thinking, critical evaluation, and understanding of the main methods of professional historical analysis. In terms of thematic focus, much of the curriculum, in particular starting from the 9th grade, focused on the political history of Lithuania and the world.

On the other hand, the curriculum likewise postulated that the ability to “feel into” a given historical epoch is no less important than the methods of historical reconstruction (ŠMM 1999). Moreover, the curriculum stated that pupils should learn that the same facts can be interpreted differently and should be able to compare and evaluate divergent interpretations (ŠMM 1999). Many of these postulates were retained, almost word for word, in later curricular documents. It is questionable, however, to what extent these didactic aims could be fulfilled in history lessons, because the curriculum encompassed an immense amount of factual information, which, undoubtedly, encouraged pupils to adopt rote memorization as a method of learning.

In 2002 and 2003, the Ministry of Education and Science released the new curricula for elementary and secondary education, which subsumed the subject of history under “Social education,” along with geography, philosophy, civic education, psychology, and religion studies. The new curriculum paid more attention to the development of pupils’ values, skills, knowledge, and understanding (ŠMM 2002, 2003). The curriculum for

\textsuperscript{40} Children start compulsory education at the calendar year when they turn 7 years of age. Education is compulsory until 16 years of age at which the learner has usually finished the basic education course.
elementary school education underlined that “school should not seek to convey as much knowledge as possible”; rather, knowledge acquired in school should be meaningful and should relate to pupils’ experience, interests and needs (ŠMM 2003, 10–11). It likewise postulated that pupils should learn to actively engage with and interpret knowledge rather than solely memorize and reproduce it (ŠMM 2003, 11).

According to the curriculum for elementary school education, pupils should acquire historical consciousness, or, in other words, an understanding that “today’s world, its order and values are historically contingent and changing” (ŠMM 2003, 365). It is emphasized that facts of past life unavoidably have an emotional, aesthetic, and ethical character; that “our relation to history is not only analytical, but likewise value-laden, dialogical” (ŠMM 2003, 366). As a result, history education should help pupils understand the concrete everyday life of people in the past, their ways of thinking, feeling, believing, acting, their values, and ideas (ŠMM 2003, 366). The curriculum emphasized the lived experience of people in the past and claimed that if “we do not get acquainted with everyday life of people, […] we cannot know the historical process thoroughly, because humanity is not divisible into those, who simply live, and those, who create history” (ŠMM 2003, 366).

The curriculum for elementary school education posited that pupils should learn to work with historical sources; analyze them; understand different interpretations of the same factual information and their causes; raise questions; explain historical phenomena and processes from different perspectives (social, political, cultural, economic, everyday life); reconstruct the past; “feel into” and even seek to experience a certain historical period (ŠMM 2003, 368). Thus, critical analysis was meant to be combined with historical empathy and perspective-taking.

After an episodic course of Lithuanian and world history in the 5th and 6th grades, pupils became acquainted with an integrated course of Lithuanian and world history from grades 7 to 10. The topics covered during these years were as follows:

- A human in history; the human of pre-history; ancient Eastern civilizations; civilizations of antiquity; the civilization of the Middle Ages; Early modern history; the World and Lithuania from the second half of the 18th century to the beginning of the 20th century; World Wars and the interwar period; the World and Lithuania from the second half of the 20th century to the beginning of the 21st century. (ŠMM 2003, 371–375)

Although the sub-topics of the curriculum are chronologically ordered in terms of the history of states and nations, the primary focus on political history is compensated by sub-topics dealing with social, economic, cultural history, and the history of daily life. Rather loosely defined descriptions of the contents of education likewise permitted textbook authors more interpretative freedom when writing textbooks (Bitautas 2015, 109).

In the 11th and 12th grades, pupils could then choose to follow one of four tracks: humanistic, “realistic” (exact and natural sciences), technological and art-oriented tracks (ŠMM 2002). Similar to the curriculum for elementary school education (ŠMM 2003), the curriculum for secondary education prescribed teaching methodology, based on interpretative analysis instead of merely reproducing factual information (ŠMM 2002, 16). It likewise underlined the need to relate acquired knowledge and skills to pupils’ experience, social and cultural context, and needs (ŠMM 2002, 16).
The description of the aims and methods of history education in secondary schools was more concise than in the curriculum for elementary school education. The curriculum reiterated some of the same ideas, adopted in elementary education, regarding the development of historical consciousness, analysis of sources and the interpretation of the past. The capacity to understand that the same facts can be interpreted differently and the capacity to compare and evaluate justifications for different interpretations were acknowledged as relevant only at an advanced level of history education (ŠMM 2002, 252).

However, the curriculum for secondary education failed, for example, to acknowledge the significance of daily life and lived experience of people in the past; the emotive and value-laden aspects of facts as well as the empathetic and dialogical engagement with the past. Rather, the emphasis fell strictly on the development of historical thinking, understood as critical evaluation of facts, opinions, events and processes; the ability to distinguish between facts and opinions; the ability to find and select information from sources and to assess their authenticity and veracity; the ability to explain historical events and processes, to raise and solve problems (ŠMM 2002, 248). This resulted in a strange incongruity between history education at the elementary and secondary levels. On the one hand, in elementary school education, pupils were learning to combine critical thinking with empathetic and dialogical engagement with past life; they were encouraged to understand that the relation to the past is not only analytical, but also value-laden; they sought to understand ways of thinking and feeling of people in the past. On the other hand, at the secondary level, pupils were suddenly required to adopt a distinctly critical-analytical approach, which echoed certain 19th-century disciplinary ideas of history (such as a sharp distinction between facts and values, facts and opinions; an exclusive emphasis on veracity and authenticity of sources). Principles of balanced historical understanding, given so much emphasis in the curriculum for elementary school education, were suddenly unimportant, or were then abandoned.

Moreover, the scope of the curriculum for secondary education remained vast and encompassed “all” history from pre-historical times to the present. Since all this material of both Lithuanian and world history had to be covered in two years, political and military history became the most prominent part of the curriculum.

In 2008 and 2011, the most recent history curricula for elementary and secondary education, respectively, were issued, which retained the focus on pupils’ skills and understanding of historical processes. History education remained part of social-studies education, which, apart from history, encompassed geography, civic education, economics and entrepreneurship, and psychology. The curriculum for elementary education prescribed the maintenance of close relations between these subjects in order to ensure that pupils build an integrated knowledge of the social world (ŠMM 2008).

The main aim of history education remained the same: pupils should acquire “an understanding that today’s world, its order and values are historically contingent and changing” (ŠMM 2008, 937). The curriculum for elementary education postulated that history enabled pupils to orient themselves in life and predict the development of social, economic, political and cultural processes (ŠMM 2008, 937). Likewise, the curriculum reiterated that pupils should get acquainted with concrete lifestyle of people in the past,
their ways of thinking, feeling, believing and acting, their values and ideas (ŠMM 2008, 937). Pupils should be able to connect facts into a meaningful whole; recognize different interpretations of the past and explain their causes; select, analyze and assess critically information from various sources; express and justify their understanding of the past (ŠMM 2008, 937).

The curriculum identified four main spheres of education: understanding of historical process; orientation in historical time and space; historical analysis and interpretation; and expression of one’s understanding of history (ŠMM 2008). It is notable that, in terms of historical analysis and interpretation, the curriculum placed emphasis on critical relation to the past. Accordingly, pupils were expected to learn to evaluate authorship and reliability of sources, critically assess historical facts, opinions and interpretations (ŠMM 2008).

After an episodic course of Lithuanian history in the 5th grade, pupils continued to learn the history of Europe in the 6th grade. Thus, the scope of the 6th-grade curriculum was reduced to encompass only the history of Europe (in the previous curriculum, 6th-graders learned world history). In the 7th to 10th grades, the focus on political history is counterbalanced by topics dealing with social, cultural, and economic history and the history of daily life. In particular, social, economic, and cultural history prevails in the parts of the curriculum dealing with prehistory and ancient history. Political history, however, dominates the presentation of modern history. However, the chronological scope of the curriculum for elementary education remained vast and encompassed the period from prehistory to the 21st century of both Lithuanian and world history. The description of thematic contents in the curriculum is quite general, permitting considerable freedom for textbook authors in interpreting and evaluating the past.

The 2011 curriculum for secondary education (11–12th grades) adopted a focus on the “history of society.” The choice of society as the primary emphasis was justified in the curriculum by noting that everybody is a member of society and that the history of society integrates politics, culture, and economics more than any other area of history (ŠMM 2011, 2). In practice, political history prevailed in the curriculum, primarily organized as the history of states and nations, accompanied by sub-topics devoted to social, cultural, and economic aspects of development. Chronologically, the curriculum still encompassed “all” world and Lithuanian history from antiquity to the 21st century. The history of Lithuanian society was given more attention in the curriculum. At both the basic and advanced levels of education, the curriculum encompassed the following main themes:

- Europe and the formation of society of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL), until the end of the 15th century; the change of European and GDL society, 16th to mid-17th century;
- Enlightenment in Europe and changes in the life of the GDL society; Lithuanian society in the environment of European and global changes from the 19th to the beginning of the 20th centuries; society from the beginning of the interwar through the WWII period (1919–1945); society in the period of the Cold War and the fall of communism in Europe; life of contemporary society and the change of Lithuanian society in an independent state. (ŠMM 2011, 5)

The curriculum underlined that “the 19th-century aim ‘to show how it really was’ has already become obsolete. For a 21st century person, important, memorable and valuable
information explains ‘what our relation is to what happened in the past’” (ŠMM 2011, 5). Pupils should learn to read and understand historical sources, critically assess historical information, reflect on solutions of currently significant problems in the past (ŠMM 2011, 6). The curriculum stated that education should include activities that would be related to pupils’ experience and context of daily life, because they enable pupils to learn better than standard tasks of source analysis (ŠMM 2011, 6).

A glance through concrete descriptions of knowledge and skills pupils should acquire from each subtopic reveals, however, that memorization and reproduction of information still plays a prominent part in history lessons. For example, the skill defined as the ability “to compare the features of governance of Lithuania in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth” requires the following knowledge:

To explain the causes and essence of the Union of Lublin;

To describe the functions of the most important officials of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the Commonwealth;

To explain the main characteristics of the governance of the Commonwealth in the 16–17th centuries. (ŠMM 2011, 9, 21)

Thus, pupils need to memorize detailed information about systems of government and functions of officials in Lithuania before and after the union with Poland.

Oddly, such descriptions of pupils’ knowledge and skills, based on factual information, belong exclusively to the competency of “understanding of the historical process.” On the other hand, the competency of “historical analysis and interpretation” is operationalized separately from the concrete factual information. The curriculum abstractly defines that pupils, for example, should identify factors, which generate different interpretations of the same event, phenomenon, or process (ŠMM 2011, 16, 29), but this requirement is not tied to any concrete historical topic. In other words, the curriculum does not suggest which historical topics should be depicted in textbooks by presenting different interpretations of the past and their causes.

To sum up, despite reforms of school-history education in Lithuania, the curriculum continues to encompass a very vast chronological stretch of the past, filled with factual information. It is, therefore, questionable to what extent history educators can manage to find time for more nuanced tasks and projects, aimed at the development of historical thinking, analysis, and interpretation. Although the most recent curricula place emphasis on interpretative, skill- and problem-oriented methodologies of teaching, memorization and reproduction of factual information occupies a significant part in history education.

The latter point is revealed by the way aims of education are operationalized in the curriculum into concrete skills and knowledge of pupils. Moreover, political history retains its prevalence in the curriculum, even though it is combined with topics of social, economic, and cultural history. However, as the descriptions of contents of education are rather general, textbook authors exercise a considerable measure of freedom in choosing how to depict and frame the narrative of the past. Lastly, a discrepancy between the aims of elementary and secondary level history education can be observed. Whereas in
elementary school education the curriculum underlines the significance of historical knowledge about daily life, people’s ways of thinking and feeling in the past, the curriculum for secondary education ignores these issues and focuses exclusively on political, social, and economic issues, failing to integrate the former into the latter issues. As a result, such curricular choices disrupt the continuity and coherence between elementary and secondary levels of history education.

5.2.2 Polish school-history curricula

The emergence of the Solidarity trade union in Poland ushered in an alternative educational discourse already in the 1980s that challenged the governmental monopoly over education. In the aftermath of the fall of the communist regime, Polish history educators and historians expected that loosened government control of school history would result in new textbooks, more representative of contemporary historical scholarship and democratic pedagogical principles (Parker 2003, 151). However, the end of the communist period in Poland in 1989 did not bring immediate changes to school-history education. As Maternicki (1998) observed, history educators were still complaining in 1998 about many of the same problems textbooks had in the 1980s. Throughout the 1990s, history textbooks were dominated by chronologically ordered narrative focused on political and military history (Parker 2003).

Even though older publishing houses, such as, for example, WSiP (School and Pedagogical Publishers), retained a majority control of the textbook market and transitioned successfully into a free-market economy, they did not develop new textbooks (Parker 2003, 163). Established publishers continued to produce the same old textbooks with only minor changes (Parker 2003, 163). Paradoxically, as discussed by Christine S. Parker (2003), the free-market economy impeded development of new, innovative teaching materials, because Polish publishers, seeking to reduce financial costs and increase profit, avoided investing in expensive changes in textbooks. Older textbooks were still selling and were cheaper to produce.

The Ministry of National Education (MEN) issued the new Basic Curriculum in 1999, which was introduced into the fourth grade of elementary school and the first grade (year 7) of middle school (gymnasium) in the 1999–2000 school year for all state-run public schools. The old system, consisting of an 8-year primary school and either a 2-year vocational, or a 4-year secondary school, was replaced by a 6-year elementary school, a 3-year middle school (gymnasium) and a 3-year vocational or upper secondary school (lyceum).41

41 In Poland, children are admitted to primary schools at the age of 6 or 7 (they must reach the age of 6 or 7 during the calendar year in which they start compulsory education). Before 2014, admission of 6-year-olds to grade 1 of primary school was left to the parents’ discretion. In 2014, education in primary schools became compulsory for 6-year-old children born in the first half of 2008, i.e. children born before the end of June 2008. Starting from the academic year 2015/2016, all 6-year-olds had to commence compulsory schooling. However, starting from the academic year 2016/2017, the obligatory age to start school returned to seven years old, leaving the discretion to parents to decide if
According to the 1999 Basic Curriculum, the subject of history was integrated with civic education in grades 4 to 6 of elementary school. The contents of historical knowledge, which pupils were expected to acquire, continued to focus exclusively on the traditional narrative of political and military history, history of kings, battles, and wars:

The Christianization of Poland; the Congress of Gniezno and the coronation of the Polish Duke Bolesław I Chrobry; Władysław Lokietek and Casimir the Great; the Battle of Grunwald; the Polish-Lithuanian Union; the Queen Jadwiga and Jagiello; Stefan Batory; the Swedish Deluge; Jan Sobieski; the Constitution of May 3; partitions of the Commonwealth; forms of conflict for the independence of Poland; WWI; retrieval of independence; the Polish-Soviet war; Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski; WWII; occupation and the struggle for independence. (MEN 1999)

In the gymnasium (years 7 to 9), the curriculum integrated Polish history with the history of Europe and the world. Among important educational aims, the curriculum, for example, listed the development of historical thinking and criticism as well as a deepening of the patriotic mindset. The curriculum indicated that pupils should learn about the basics of source analysis as well as become aware of possible different interpretations of the past:

Transmission of knowledge about the most important periods of the history of Poland, Europe and the world;

Teaching of skills of analysis and synthesis of historical material; teaching of principles of reading and interpreting a historical source;

Disclosing the possibility of varied interpretations of sources, events and historical figures; teaching of honesty in research;

Improvement of various forms of oral and written communication; development of skills of searching, organization, utilization and maintenance of different kinds of information. (MEN 1999)

The curriculum for gymnasium provided detailed content for the teaching of Polish history, with an enduring focus on political and military history. Some themes of social and cultural history were introduced, but they remained subjected to the overall politically oriented narrative. Below, I list topics of the curriculum dealing with Polish history, excluding European and world history. The definitions of topics are quite general, allowing for a wide-ranging interpretation by school textbook authors.

6. Poland and the first Piasts, the stature of Bolesław Krzywousty and the period of fragmentation of Poland, the unification of the Polish state, the reign of Casimir the Great.

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they prefer their children to begin school at six years old. Compulsory full-time education, currently, ends in grade 9, until the pupil is 16 years old (the age of the completion of gymnasium). Part-time compulsory education, however, lasts until 18 years of age.
7. The first members of the Jagiellonian dynasty on the throne of Poland, economy and culture of Poland in the Middle Ages – phenomena and processes, specifics of the culture of the Polish Middle Ages.

9. The Nobles’ Republic of the 16th and 17th centuries – a nation of many cultures and religions.

10. The Enlightenment era in Europe and in Poland – structural, economic and cultural transformations, Poland in decline in the 18th century (cultural rebirth, attempts to save the Republic, partitions, the Kosciuszko uprising).

12. The fate and attitudes of Poles during the period of the lack of sovereignty, national uprisings, the conception of organic work, the fate of Poles in emigration.

15. The rebirth of the Polish state, the building of the state, battles over borders, structural evolution, the major economic and social problems, international politics and the place of Poland in interwar Europe.

17. Poland 1939–1945, dual occupation, Katyn, forms and locations of battles for independence, the Polish underground movement, the Warsaw uprising, the fate of Poles in the country and abroad.

19. Poland after 1945, struggle for the shape of the state, Polish Stalinism, socio-economic transformations in the People’s Poland, political crises of 1956, 1968, 1970, the election of a Pole as pope, 1980 and the rise of Solidarity, martial law and the 1980s, the events of 1989, the process of building the Third Republic. (MEN 1999)

In 2001, the Ministry of National Education adopted consequent regulations for history teaching in upper secondary schools. The curriculum postulated that pupils repeated the entire chronological material from ancient history to the 20th century during the 3-year upper secondary education. In practice, this meant that pupils, for example, learned about the Polish-Lithuanian union in three consecutive rounds: in primary school, gymnasium, and lyceum. The curriculum defined the topics to be covered in upper secondary education more loosely, but retained a focus on chronologically ordered political history (MEN 2001). Pupils, according to the curriculum, had to become acquainted with the scientific methodology of cognition and description of the past, learn to interpret and verify different types of sources and be able to use historical knowledge for building their own picture of the past (MEN 2001).

In 2009, the Ministry of National Education introduced a new core curriculum for general education in Poland. The curricular reform began in 2007 with consultations and further shifted the emphasis from knowledge acquisition to critical and analytical thinking. The main educational aims, common for primary, middle and upper secondary education, were focused on knowledge of historical chronology, historical analysis and interpretation and creation of a historical narrative (MEN 2008).

In primary education (grades 4 to 6), history remained integrated with civic education. The overall number of topics devoted to history increased and encompassed not only themes of Polish history, but also more general historical subjects, such as, for instance,
“monks,” “knights,” “peasants,” and the “industrial city” (MEN 2008). The usual chronological overview of the history of Poland remained in place and was expanded to encompass the period from the rule of the first Piast dynasty in the 10th century to the establishment of the Third Polish Republic in 1989. The curriculum described in detail the knowledge pupils needed to acquire from each topic. For example, in the case of the curricular topic “Jadwiga and Jagiello,” pupils had to identify the Grand Duchy of Lithuania on the map, explain the causes of the Polish-Lithuanian union, characterize the person of Jadwiga and enumerate her merits to Polish culture, describe the causes and consequences of the Battle of Grunwald (MEN 2008). Since the amount of information pupils were expected to assimilate increased after the curricular reform, it is, therefore, highly questionable to what extent the new curriculum enabled teachers to focus more on development of analytical skills and critical thinking.

The curriculum for gymnasium (years 7 to 9) was also defined in more detail, specifying concrete knowledge and skills, which pupils had to acquire or practice in each thematic unit. Chronologically, the curriculum encompassed the period from prehistory to World War I. From a total of 39 thematic units, 13 units (a third of the curriculum) were specifically devoted to the history of Poland. The themes of Polish history included in the curriculum focused on a chronologically ordered political and military history.

The 2009 curriculum introduced more novelty in the upper secondary level of education. Pupils could choose between a 3-year history curriculum at an advanced level, or a 1-year history curriculum at a basic level, combined with a 2-year curriculum of a supplementary subject “History and Society.” The changes in curriculum at an upper secondary level were introduced in schools during 2012. According to the new requirements, middle school (gymnasium) students and first-year high school (lyceum) students would follow a unified World and Polish history curriculum, after which they would choose their track. The science-track students would then be able to build upon the history knowledge they acquired in earlier grades and deepen their understanding of history in the “History and Society” subject.

At an advanced level, the curriculum demanded that pupils, among other things, would learn to notice the multiplicity of scientific perspectives and historical interpretations as well as their reasons (MEN 2008). Pupils were likewise required to learn: to identify a problem and build argumentation, taking into consideration different aspects of the historical process; to analyze historical events, phenomena, and processes in the epochal context; to evaluate the usefulness of a source for explaining a historical problem; to create a historical narration in a problem-oriented or cross-sectional approach (MEN 2008). Chronologically, the curriculum encompassed the period from the history of ancient civilizations to the end of the 20th century, with an enduring focus on political history, the history of the state and nation. Although the curriculum incorporated topics of social, cultural, and economic history, these functioned rather as themes supplementary to the main politically-oriented narrative.

When, on the other hand, pupils chose the science track, the curriculum consisted of one year of “History” and two years of the “History and Society” subject. Pupils spent the first year learning the history of the 20th century (after World War I). In this course, 7 out of 12 thematic units were dedicated to Polish history, focused primarily on political
Similar to the advanced level, there was an emphasis on analytical skills. Pupils, among other things, needed to learn to notice the multiplicity of scientific perspectives, diverse historical interpretations and their reasons, analyze historical events, phenomena and processes in an epochal context, build an argument, taking into consideration different aspects of the historical process (MEN 2008).

The new “History and Society” course encompassed overarching topics that the teacher would be able to develop together with students. The recommended topics provided by the Ministry of National Education are the following: “Europe and the world,” “Language, communication and the media,” “Science,” “Familiarity and strangeness,” “Economy,” “The rulers and the ruled,” “War and military affairs,” “Woman and man, family,” and “The pantheon of the Fatherland and Fatherland’s disputes.” Each of these nine topics was, moreover, divided into five historical periods: ancient history, the Middle Ages, Modern history (15th–18th c.), the 19th century, and the 20th century. The teacher could then choose to deal with either four thematic units in their chronological entirety or two thematic and two epochal units.

The reform of history education, particularly in the science track, resulted in considerable protest in Polish society. Critics pointed out that pupils would not be exposed to enough history and might not learn about Polish history at all, which could hinder the formation of a Polish identity (Bakalarz 2012). The opponents also feared that there was no control over teachers’ choices of thematic units, permitting them to de-emphasize Polish history in the “History and Society” classes (Bakalarz 2012). Public protests against the reform initially started with hunger strikes initiated by groups of parents in eight Polish cities in February and March 2012 (Bakalarz 2012). The protests were eventually embraced and ignited by the right-wing “Law and Justice” and “United Poland” parties, which demanded “to bring history lessons back” to high school (Bakalarz 2012). As a response to the demands of protesters, the Ministry of National Education eventually announced that the topic “The pantheon of the Fatherland and Fatherland’s disputes” would be a mandatory thematic unit for all pupils studying the “History and Society” subject.

However, the reforms of the Polish core curriculum do not end here. In 2017, a new core curriculum reform for primary schools was introduced by the ruling “Law and Justice” party. The reform changed the structure of the system of education, replacing the previous 6-year elementary school with an 8-year elementary school. The new curriculum presents a significant conceptual shift, defining history as “the storehouse of collective memory” and as a fundamental instrument of patriotic national education (MEN 2017). It states that “the history of the fatherland is permeated by heroism and the daily toil of ancestors, is full of heroism and praise, but also of tragedy, doubt and even villainy” (MEN 2017). One of the key aims of history education is to learn about “values,” such as of the fatherland, nation, state, national and state symbols, patriotism, historical memory, truth, justice, goodness, beauty, freedom, solidarity, responsibility, courage, criticism, tolerance, identity, and culture (MEN 2017). In history lessons, pupils are supposed “to feel love for the fatherland,” respect for and adherence to tradition and history of the nation, its culture, and native language (MEN 2017). Pupils need “to learn important moments from the history of the Polish nation, particularly through the acts of
great historical figures; to become familiar with national state and religious symbols; to be able to explain their meaning, and to develop respect for them” (MEN 2017).

In the 4th grade, pupils are familiarized with the main elements of Polish cultural heritage, historical figures and events of great meaning for shaping Polish cultural identity (MEN 2017). The government provided a complete list of such historical figures and events, which need to be presented in history classes. In grades 5 to 8, pupils cover the entire chronologically ordered swath of history from the ancient civilizations to the accession of Poland to the EU in 2004, with a continuous focus on political history of states and nations. It is noted that “in every phase of elementary school education, the shaping and development of a patriotic attitude, while simultaneously respecting the achievements of other nations, should be brought into the foreground” (MEN 2017).

However, the curriculum, for example, barely even mentions other national or religious groups and their contribution in the history of Poland. The amount of information that pupils need to cover in history classes remains extremely large, inducing rote memorization and hindering the development of analytical and critical thinking skills.

The historians of the University of Warsaw issued a statement about the new curriculum, in which they declared that:

With regret we state that the new programmatic principles have abandoned concern for such vital attitudes for contemporary society as civic engagement, social sensitivity, tolerance for differences in opinion, behavior, customs and convictions, opposition to manifestations of discrimination, maintenance of bonds not only in local and national communities, but also European and global communities. […] History is neither a collection of patriotic episodes nor a gallery of heroes. Passing over controversial figures and negative interpretations distorts our image of the past. (Rada Naukowa Instytutu Historycznego UW 2017)

However, the criticisms of the new curriculum by academics and teachers were largely ignored by the government. The new curriculum will come into effect in primary schools in September 2017.

To sum up, despite gradual shifts in the Polish history curriculum, one of the main issues has been and remains that the curriculum encompasses an extremely vast amount of information. It leaves little time for development of analytical and critical-thinking skills, in-depth analysis of different types of sources, consideration of different historiographical approaches and interpretations because teachers are forced to rush through, in seeking to cover all the curricular topics. Although themes of social, cultural, and economic history have been increasingly inserted into the curriculum, political and military history retains the primary emphasis in the chronological narrative. History is, first and foremost, presented as the history of the state and nation. The curriculum largely represents a 19th century understanding of history as a discipline, ignoring the thematic and methodological shifts that transformed the discipline in the 20th century. However, it needs to be added that the curriculum, at least until the 2017 reform, left considerable freedom for textbook authors on how to depict and evaluate the past in the textbooks.

An innovation in the history curriculum was the “History and Society” subject for science-track pupils at the upper secondary level, which permitted customizing history
education toward a thematic rather than chronological orientation. However, in light of impending education reforms introduced by the ruling “Law and Justice” party, the fate of this subject in the future is not clear. The most recent curriculum for elementary schools reveals that the current Polish government seeks to turn history education into an instrument for inculcation of nationalist values.
Chapter 6. Metaphor analysis of the Lithuanian school-history textbooks and interview transcripts with the authors

In this chapter, I will analyze the Lithuanian school-history textbooks and the interviews I have made with their authors. I engage with five textbooks authors and their textbooks: Juozas Brazauskas, Jūratė Litvinaitė, Ignas Kapleris, Mindaugas Tamošaitis, and Deimantas Karvelis. This selection of textbook authors does not exhaust the list of school-history textbook authors in Lithuania. However, it covers the main publishing houses, some of the most popular textbook series on the market, and textbooks published in different time periods. Each section merges an analysis of an interview and textbooks written by the author discussed.

In the sections on Juozas Brazauskas and Jūratė Litvinaitė, I introduce two authors, who have worked with the publishing house “Šviesa.” “Šviesa” is the largest national publisher of textbooks and educational literature in Lithuania. It was founded in 1945 as a publishing house of educational literature and has not changed its purpose since. In 1995, “Šviesa” was privatized. Brazauskas’s textbooks from the 1990s together with Litvinaitė’s textbooks from the 2000s reveal an evolution of pedagogical approaches and narratives in the textbooks of the publishing house “Šviesa.”

Ignas Kapleris represents the publishing house “Briedis,” where he works currently as a project manager. He is the main author of the textbook series “Laikas.” Initially, the publishing house “Briedis” was founded in 1989 as a publisher of cartographic materials. In 1994, “Briedis” began to publish educational materials and, eventually, textbooks. The history textbook series “Laikas” has been particularly successful on the Lithuanian textbook market.

Finally, Mindaugas Tamošaitis and Deimantas Karvelis represent the publishing house “Baltos lankos”. Established in 1992 as an editorial office of a magazine “Baltos lankos”, the publishing house was later changed—increasing staff and the number of publications. “Baltos lankos” publishes fiction by Lithuanian and foreign authors, academic books on humanities, textbooks for secondary schools, illustrated children books, etc. The history textbook series “Raktas” is among the most popular history textbook series currently available on the Lithuanian market.

6.1 Juozas Brazauskas

Juozas Brazauskas is a well-known history teacher and history textbook author in Lithuania. He is a graduate of Vilnius University with a degree in history. He is the author of the first school-history textbooks published in Lithuania after the fall of the Soviet Union. These first textbooks were intended for the 6–7th and 7–8th grades, focused entirely on Lithuanian history and were published by the publishing house “Šviesa.” I will be focusing on these two textbooks in the subsequent analysis. In 2014, when I
interviewed Juozas Brazauskas, he was about to retire (in 2015) from the Catholic Kazimieras Baltarokas gymnasium in the city of Panevėžys.

Analyzed textbooks by Juozas Brazauskas:


**6.1.1 Juozas Brazauskas: LOOKING AT the past from the WINDOW of Lithuanian history**

Textbooks authored and co-authored by Juozas Brazauskas stand out in their national-patriotic orientation. As he explains, the main conceptual idea behind the very first textbooks he wrote was to offer a narrative that reflected the political changes that were taking place in the late 1980s–early 1990s in Lithuania. It was inspired by the historiography of the interwar Lithuanian historian Adolfas Šapoka. Šapoka was a prominent Lithuanian historian of the interwar period, who was the editor of an extremely popular “History of Lithuania,” published in 1936. Throughout the Soviet occupation period in Lithuania (1940–1990), Šapoka’s “History of Lithuania” was forbidden and held in the so-called spetsfonds. For many Lithuanians, the book represented the “true history of Lithuania” (Senn 2002, 44), as opposed to the forfeited history written by the Soviet historians. This is probably why many Lithuanian families found it necessary to own a copy of the book, when it was published for the second time after the reestablishment of Lithuanian independence in 1990. Despite its historical research being outdated, Šapoka’s work became “the embodiment of popular discontent” with the official Soviet historiography (Senn 2002, 43). Thus, by its perceived opposition to the corrupted Lithuanian history of the Soviet era, Šapoka’s book, presenting strong anti-Polish sentiments and an explicitly Lithuanocentric narrative, became the “idolized true history of Lithuania,” which portrayed Poles as treacherous enemies of Lithuanian statehood. In the interview he accounts:

> The main intention was to present the Lithuanian history in a new way. It is the history, which was concealed, which was cherished by the older generation, the history written by Šapoka, read and cherished. When I was working in Panevėžys, I dictated a lot from this book to children. (P 3: 3:14)

Brazauskas’s main concern with history education, as he reiterates multiple times throughout the interview, is to lay a strong FOUNDATION for the Lithuanian identity, based on respect for one’s culture and tradition. This orientation appears to be informed by several interrelated metaphors about history and the past. Brazauskas primarily likens the

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42 Special collections of the USSR libraries.
global history to a WIDE OCEAN, in which the Lithuanian history may MELT AWAY and
dissolve like MILK DILUTED IN WATER. The same metaphor is used in two different
passages. It evokes a sense of danger of losing oneself and disappearing into something
much larger; being unable to specify a boundary anymore and losing one’s identity in the
process of mixing with what you are not. The Lithuanian history, on the other hand, is
metaphorized repeatedly as a FOUNDATION, something necessary, solid, and tangible to
HAVE and to LEAN ON in order to be able to create the future.

In the excerpt 3:41 below, Brazauskas attributes the source of his ideas to Vincas
Kudirka, a 19th century Lithuanian poet, who is the author of the Lithuanian national
anthem and one of the most active participants of the national revival movement. The
emphasis on the past as the FOUNDATION for national consciousness and national pride
stem from Kudirka’s POINT OF VIEW.43 By identifying with Kudirka and his ideas,
Brazauskas becomes a living link between a 19th century Romantic conception of
nationhood and the 21st century school context. Kudirka’s ideas live on through the
person of Brazauskas, who passes them on to his pupils.

Either the Lithuanian school has Lithuanian history as the foundation, or this cosmopolitan
history, so the Lithuanian history is melting and melts away into this wide ocean of history,
and I don’t know what will happen to it in the future. (P 3: 3:13)

But just this wide ocean and the Lithuanian history in it...As I say, pour some milk into
water and it will dilute. I wanted to have a stronger foundation. That’s why children do not
cherish, appreciate it or radical nationalism is appearing, which turns into certain
phenomena, which I also do not want to understand and agree with. (P 3: 3:45)

We have the past and, by looking at the past/taking the past into consideration, we are
creating the future. This is the emphasis, from the point of view of Kudirka. We lean
against the past, and it is, was the foundation to be proud of, to recover one’s self-esteem,
to feel worthy, and then the freedom appeared, and this shared understanding of nation and
of our community, what we can be proud of. (P 3: 3:41)

A related metaphor, which further specifies how Brazauskas conceives of “seeing history”
evokes a perspectival metaphor of looking at history from a WINDOW. The perspectival,
optical nature of this metaphor may not be obvious at first, but perspectival construction in
painting since the Renaissance was typically likened to viewing something through a
window. Elkins (1994, 49), for example, explains how the Renaissance painters were
using tools, called “perspective windows” or “perspective frames,” to help them produce
perspective views. In the extract, Brazauskas identifies two “perspective windows” from
which one could look at the Lithuanian history: the WINDOW of the national, Lithuanian,
history and the WINDOW of the world or what he also sometimes refers to as the
cosmopolitan history. The two WINDOWS seem to be mutually exclusive: either you look

43 The lyrics of the national anthem, for example, urge “the sons of Lithuania” to draw inspiration and spiritual strength
from the past. Lithuanians are called to work for their homeland’s good and for the good of humanity. The Romantic
obligation of Kudirka to devote himself fully to fostering the Lithuanian language, culture, and national consciousness is
embodied in Brazauskas’s thinking.
from one or the other. It illustrates well how the optical metaphors lead to “ways of seeing” that isolate different perspectives from each other and suggest that they are incompatible. The relation between the two perspectives is negative and differential. To focus on Lithuanian history is to exclude European history, and vice versa.

That is to look at the Lithuanian history from the window of Lithuanian history. If we looked at it from the window of world history, so perhaps we would only have the Battle of Grunwald, maybe also the Union of Lublin. So this is the principle: how to look at this history? At the moment this history is being looked at not from the window of Lithuanian history. (P 3: 3:16)

Brazauskas underlines that the principle and choice of “how to LOOK AT history” is crucial for one’s sense of the past and for what one can find and notice in it. LOOKING from the WINDOW of world history implies that one almost loses Lithuanian history from sight, because there are so few events in Lithuanian history that can be merited as important on the global scale. In this sense, the WINDOW metaphor reflects the same way of thinking as the OCEAN metaphor, for in both cases what is implied is the threat of being lost, of disappearing into the big picture, the big frame. It reflects uncertainty and anxiety about the future of Lithuanian national identity, which should “lean against” the Lithuanian history as its FOUNDATION, and point of stability, but that FOUNDATION is in danger of being dissolved, of MELTING AWAY, of DILUTING.

Brazauskas perceives his textbooks as vehicles of RESISTANCE to the SPIRIT of cosmopolitanism, which, in his opinion, is MARCHING FAST into Lithuania, to his great regret. Several times throughout the interview, he articulates his disappointment that his views and principles are not appreciated anymore and that he feels excluded by those who have a different vision for history education today. He feels THROWN OUT, left behind. Thus, his metaphors bear a relation to a contemporary Lithuanian context – rapid changes of Lithuanian society which have been taking place since the accession of Lithuania to the European Union in 2004. Brazauskas perceives the influence of pro-European, pro-Western values and ideas as threatening the stability of the traditional Romantic vision of the nation, which he seeks to preserve in his pupils. The act of teaching history acquires a new meaning: It is an instrument of rebellion against the perceived onslaught of European-cosmopolitan values and attitudes.

The sense of threat re-emerges again in relation to the change of times and prevalent political views, as he conceptualizes the relation between his national-patriotism and the cosmopolitan ideas in combat metaphors of RESISTANCE and MARCHING FAST. The metaphors imply his beliefs and value judgments: RESISTANCE suggests the righteous, honorable defense of one’s land against the enemy MARCHING in. The enemy is threatening to invade the national territory and undermine the foundations.

So I say: the kind of order there was at the time, the kind of conception that was given, so accordingly the kind of textbooks there are. I am somewhat happy that they have not been burned yet and they are as if a certain resistance to the spirit of cosmopolitanism, which is fast marching into Lithuania. (P 3: 3:43)
These first textbooks are very nationalistic. They clash with the contemporary times, because they are cosmopolitan, and when Lithuania turned to this cosmopolitan spirit, I was practically thrown out from the vortex of textbook writing. (P 3: 3:4)

Resistance is strongly linked to setting and maintaining strong foundations for the national identity, which stands out as the main purpose of history education. However, in the extract below, the metaphor Resistance is a different Lithuanian word, which relates more to bodily health and immunity. He makes sense of the metaphor of Foundation by associating it with the organic metaphor of the Tree, which can only be resistant to outside influences if it has a firm, solid trunk. If the trunk or Foundation is strong, then the branches can twist and turn in any direction without the danger of being uprooted. It implies that what is healthy and strong is firmly rooted in the soil. Resistance as combat against the enemy marching in and as protective immune resistance to disease coincide in Brazauskas’s metaphorical usage. The overarching belief is that the basis for a strong national identity can act as a protective measure against the intrusive, uprooting, and disorienting influence of cosmopolitanism.

Resistance, if it is, if this foundation is firm, you can then, like the branches of the tree, you can rotate them. (P 3: 3:117)

There is a curious contradiction, however, that when he talks about the Lithuanian accomplishments throughout history, in which they should take pride and which should form the Foundation for the national identity, he consistently discusses and evaluates these achievements in the wider European context. Simultaneously, however, Europe is characterized by the metaphor of washed out Foundation.

I would think that when we are raising historical consciousness, we really need this national foundation, the civic pride in, let’s say, the nation and to emphasize what Lithuania has given to Europe, that Lithuania is not a secluded corner. Of course, it was lagging behind in the process of historical development, but we certainly have unique achievements, which are indisputable in European history. For example, Lithuania achieved the first European Constitution in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The French declared later. Our civic consciousness, in 1918, is another example; Lithuanian women were among the first, 10 years earlier than the English and French women, to receive their civic rights. We can behave with our history in a very civic way and properly, and to raise pride, to eliminate the sense of worthlessness, the complaint that we are worthless, that we don’t have anything, except for basketball. It seems as if we do not have scientists...Then Simonavicius stands in his right place, the rocket engineer, and Freitag appears from the 17th century, and other scientists, who in Europe were creating a European-level science. Now Europe is disputing: nation, state – are they of value? If this unitary Europe is what will be, then these things will certainly be washed out. (P 3: 3:34)

The above passage makes for incongruity between thinking of global/European history and political unification of Europe as threats to the Foundation of the Lithuanian identity and identification of the Lithuanian achievements that are worthy of pride using “Europe” or the “European level” as the measuring stick. Temporal and spatial metaphors are
combined when he acknowledges the temporal disadvantage of Lithuania in historical development (LAGGING BEHIND), but at the same time, he contests the spatial positioning of it as a SECLUDED CORNER, where there is not much movement or activity. It also needs to be mentioned how he talks about the period of shared Polish-Lithuanian statehood and personalities from that period by including them in “Lithuanian history.” The famous scientists from the period of shared statehood with Poland all have their RIGHT PLACE TO STAND IN among the merited national heroes. This renders his understanding of the national identity and national values somewhat more nuanced, in that the label “Lithuanian” is not limited to just strictly ethnic Lithuanian statehood and identity.

The following three subsections illustrate how the metaphors used by Brazauskas in the interview manifest in the textbook contents.

6.1.1.1 Textbook I: The story of defense and resistance


In the textbook from the 1990s, the overarching frame used for telling history is the “nation.” History is told primarily as the story of the Lithuanian nation. The main elements on the basis of which the story is structured are periods of rule by different political and military leaders, battles, political treaties, and unions. The textbook encompasses the period from prehistory to the 1569 Union of Lublin between Poland and Lithuania.

The relations with the Poles are introduced in an ambiguous manner. On the one hand, it is underlined that the Poles and the Lithuanians grew closer in the 14th century due to the common enemy – the Teutonic Order. On the other hand, the two sides were involved in a continuous military conflict over what the textbook calls “the Ukrainian territories.” The textbook mentions that the Poles, seeing that they are unable to take over the disputed territories by military actions, hoped to acquire them via a dynastic union with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (106). The decision of the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jogaila to adopt Christianity from the Kingdom of Poland rather than from the Teutonic Order or the Duchy of Moscow is explained as an outcome of Jogaila’s desire for the Polish crown, which had been offered to him in exchange for baptism. Moreover, adoption of Eastern Orthodox Christianity would not have prevented the attacks by the Teutonic Order.

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44 Jogaila, known in Poland as Władysław II Jagiełło, was the Grand Duke of Lithuania and the King of Poland. Born a pagan, he made a union with the Kingdom of Poland in 1385, converted to Christianity and became the King of Poland in 1386. The union was a decisive moment in the histories of Poland and Lithuania: it marked a beginning of the four centuries of shared history between the two nations. Jogaila has been assessed negatively in the nationally-oriented Lithuanian historiography. He was the founder of the Jagiellonian dynasty in Poland.
The textbook gives the following reasons for the Polish-Lithuanian Krewo Union in 1385: pagan Lithuania needed to adopt Catholic Christianity in order to remove the pretext for the Teutonic Order’s attacks on Lithuania; unification could aid in resisting the attacks of both the Teutonic Order and the Tatars; Poland sought to gain influence in the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL); and the merchants of both states sought union (109-110). The enduring separateness and independence of the GDL after the Krewo Union are strongly underlined: “the Lithuanian nobility understood the Krewo agreement as a union of two equal states, based on shared military goals. Under no circumstances did they agree to abolish their state and be ruled by strangers” (110). However, the downsides of the union, according to the textbook, are that Lithuania became a vassal country to Poland and, secondly, the fact that the union did not guarantee the survival of “the Lithuanian nation,” even if Jogaila’s decision prevented the “physical annihilation” of the Lithuanians by the Order (114). The “Lithuanian nation” emerges as a continuous, stable entity, in possession of a fixed, clearly delineated identity throughout history. The textbook narrative presents a history of stable continuity and of the will to survive rather than, for example, a history of changes, entanglements, and influences.

The textbook considers how to evaluate the person of the Grand Duke Jogaila and his role in Lithuanian history. The value judgments are exclusively framed in terms of national interests, which, however, reflect a modern notion of nationhood and national identity of the 19th century rather than the lived context of the grand duke. As a result, Brazauskas is able to reproach Jogaila for “selfishly wanting to keep Lithuania to himself and his dynasty,” although the Grand Duchy of Lithuania constituted his patrimonial inheritance. Thus, it is possible to argue that, rather than engaging with past life, textbook projects the contemporary values and beliefs onto the past.

“What good or bad had he done to Lithuania?

- With the help of Poland, Lithuania had defended itself against the Teutonic Order (without the Union of Krewo the victory in the Battle of Grunwald would have been impossible);

- After having adopted Christianity, our land took a decisive step in the direction of Western culture, without undergoing any territorial losses;

- Jogaila loved Lithuania, but selfishly. He desperately wanted to keep it to himself and his dynasty. Without Lithuania, Jogaila would not have been the king of Poland for one day. (114)

And yet later in the textbook, the meaning of the Union of Krewo is evaluated as essentially negative, because it subjected Lithuania to Poland’s dominance.

Remember that the Krewo Union (1385) was essentially unfavourable to Lithuania – even though the Lithuanian state remained, it was bound to Poland through the vassal relations. (203)
Although positive effects of Christianization are acknowledged (the spread of Western civilization and culture; increased contacts with Western countries; the Order lost the reason to attack Lithuania), the main negative outcome of adopting the Catholic faith from Poland is identified as the start of the Polonization process in Lithuania, carried out initially by the Polish priests, who looked down on the Lithuanian language as a remnant of the pagan culture and, hence, forced the Lithuanians to use Polish (113).

The aspirations of the Grand Duke Vytautas (Jogaila’s cousin) to increase the autonomy of the GDL in relation to Poland are strongly emphasized. Jogaila, we are told, was mainly occupied with his duties as the king of Poland, which created favorable conditions for Vytautas to centralize his power and influence in the GDL. The efforts of Vytautas to increase his power and become the sole sovereign of the GDL, weakening the union ties with Poland, are presented in a section, titled “The fight of Vytautas and the Lithuanian gentry over the independence of the Lithuanian state.” The Poles are described as trying to prevent the strengthening of the Lithuanian statehood and autonomy. On the other hand, it is acknowledged that Vytautas himself eagerly invited the Polish knights to the Duchy, which stands in contradiction with the aim to present Vytautas as the defender of Lithuanian independence. In spite of this, Vytautas is justified by claiming that he invited the Polish knights only to ensure a better defense of the Duchy as the Polish military garrisons had better military equipment (121).

The role of the Polish gentry is introduced in negative terms: still unable to annex the Duchy to Poland, “they decided to destroy the Lithuanian state in another way – by making uniform the interior life in both countries” (134). The tension between the Duchy’s aim to increase its independence and sovereignty, and Poland’s intention to subordinate the GDL constitutes the overall background frame for the outline of the Polish-Lithuanian relations. The GDL, throughout the narrative, is on the defense, under siege, being attacked by adverse forces.

The textbook describes how the Lithuanian Grand Duke Vytautas, after the coronation and, along with it, sought the further loosening of the union ties with Poland. The Polish gentry are depicted as seeking to create different obstacles attempting to block Vytautas’ goal. The increased sovereignty of the Duchy was not in their interests and, thus, the textbook outlines how the Poles prevented the coronation of Vytautas by attacking the envoys and taking away the crowns, which were being transported to the coronation ceremony in Vilnius. The textbook presents the actions and aims of the Polish gentry as insidious and adverse, hostile to the idea of “independent Lithuania.” Vytautas dies soon after the failed coronation and his death marks the “end of the most glorious period of Lithuanian history”45 (138). The Duchy’s unification with Poland is gradually intensifying and Polish political and cultural influences in the GDL become increasingly prominent.46

45 Importantly, that the latter interpretation strongly echoes in the popular historical memory has been revealed by a survey, conducted during 2005–2006, which showed that, for the Lithuanians, the least important historical period to their national identity is the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Šutinienė 2008, 109). Only 4% of the respondents considered the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth meaningful to their national identity.

46 When different treaties between Poland and GDL are discussed in the textbook, the emphasis is usually placed on the relation of sovereignty and subordination between the countries. For instance, a lot of attention is typically paid to the
The construction of the narrative by emphasizing that the death of Vytautas equals the end of the glory of the Lithuanian history further reveals the connections of this narrative to the interwar Lithuanian historiography, in which Vytautas was traditionally idealized and presented as a symbol of the struggle and resistance to Polish influence.

The negative image of the Kingdom of Poland is rendered even stronger when the reasons for the Union of Lublin are discussed. Essentially, the textbook portrays how the GDL was pressured into the union by Poland, which made use of Lithuania’s destabilized situation during the War of Livonia with the Duchy of Moscow. It is stressed that, until the power balance between the GDL and Moscow was stable, Poland raised no further demands on the GDL. But when the GDL became increasingly unable to effectively defend the territory of Livonia from Russian attacks, Poland started demanding the annexation of the GDL to the Kingdom of Poland as an integral part of its territory. During the negotiation process for the union, when the Lithuanian delegation refused to accept the Polish terms, the King Sigmund August annexed the southern territories of the GDL to Poland. This further weakened the situation of the GDL in the negotiations as well as its position in the war with Moscow. Taking this point into consideration, the approval of the treaty by the Lithuanian delegation is characterized as being forced onto the Lithuanians by the Poles. This textbook, thus, participates in the maintenance of the traditional 19th century Lithuanian narrative about the Union of Lublin.

The textbook shows in what ways the GDL remained autonomous, even after agreeing to the union with Poland (208–209). It is strongly emphasized how the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was not annexed to Poland, despite the immense pressure that Poland exerted. Rather, the GDL is said to maintain its autonomy and statehood in the common Polish-Lithuanian state. The two members of the union still had an internal border and separate territories, armies, legal and court systems, and treasuries.

The textbook narrative of the Polish-Lithuanian relations is representative of the metaphors of RESISTANCE and strong FOUNDATIONS that prevent one from disappearing, MELTING AWAY. A lot of emphasis is laid on the Lithuanian plight to preserve a separate identity and state sovereignty in opposition to the Polish influences and pressures of unification. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania is portrayed as a subject that continuously fights for its survival, whereas Poland emerges as an actor, which seeks to subordinate the Lithuanian state. Thus, the relation between the two countries is depicted in terms of defense and attack.

6.1.1.2 Textbook II: The story of struggle and resurrection


question of the inheritance of the GDL throne. Poland sought to acquire the throne of the GDL so that the Polish king would simultaneously be the grand duke of Lithuania. The Duchy, on the other hand, aimed to break free from this subordination and sought after the right to elect its own independent grand duke.
In the following textbook, Brazaukas engages with the period of Lithuanian history, which begins after the 1569 Polish-Lithuanian Union of Lublin and is primarily characterized by struggle and misfortune. One of the forms of this misfortune is the intensifying Polonization of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The textbook explains that the main centers of Polonization were the Catholic Church, the courts of the grand duke and of the nobility, and public institutions of the shared state. The gentry is criticized for losing its Lithuanian roots and joining the “Polish nation,” whereas the aristocracy is appraised for seeking to defend the autonomy of the GDL and fighting for equal rights in the union with Poland (58).

The overall negative assessment is particularly discernible in the section of the textbook that offers an overview of Lithuanian history from 1569 (the Polish-Lithuanian union) to 1795 (the last partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by the neighboring powers). Brazauskas concludes the assessment of the period with the following points.

The previously independent and powerful Grand Duchy of Lithuania became a part of the Polish-Lithuanian state in the 16th century.

The political sovereignty of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was continually diminishing in the joint state.

The Polish-Lithuanian state was partitioned by the neighboring monarchies in 1795, and Lithuania […] fell to the Russian Empire.

The weakening of statehood and its loss was harming the national interests. […]

The majority of the denationalized gentry became distant to the Lithuanian nation. This encumbered the Lithuanian national emancipation movement but did not halt it. (155)

Starting from the Union of Lublin, the Lithuanian political and economic sovereignty gradually diminished until, exhausted by the wars, internal strife with the Polish ally, it weakened completely and became a victim of Russian imperial aggression. (158)

The main conclusion appears to be that the union with Poland was destructive to the GDL in the long run and caused the loss of sovereignty and previously held power. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania is described as an ailing state, whose resistance had been compromised by the negative consequences of unification with Poland. Existence in a shared state compromised the ability to resist, to withstand the encroaching ailment. It evokes a sense of disease taking over a weak body (or a tree?) after its immune system has been severely damaged.

The 19th century marks the rebirth of the nation, yet even then the Polish culture still posed a severe threat to the health of the nation, according to the textbook.

The beginning of the 19th century was a very important and fatal period in the Lithuanian national history, marked by its resurrection. Weighed down by double Slavic – Polish and Russian – oppression, the Lithuanian nation was on the verge of extinction. It seemed like
there was no power capable of resurrecting it. Polonization was far more dangerous to the Lithuanian nationhood than Russification. Why? In the first half of the 19th century Polonization already had had several centuries of tradition. Since Polonomania (sic!) spread through churches, schools, manors, government institutions, its effects on the Lithuanian language and culture were catastrophic. (182)

Samogitia was resisting Polonization more firmly. The Lithuanian national revival in the beginning of the 19th century is associated with exactly this part of Lithuania. Patriotically minded Samogitian gentry understood that that the source of all the misfortunes of the nation was the Russian occupation and the spread of Slavic culture. [...] Many Samogitian manors became hotbeds of the Lithuanian culture. Their reserved character helped Samogitians not to lose the spirit of their forefathers, which at all times have resisted the influence of foreigners. (183)

The metaphor of RESISTANCE strongly reverberates throughout these excerpts in relation to the Polish language and culture that SPREADS like a virus or disease. Gentry from the region of Samogitia are praised for their withdrawn character, which acted as a defensive mechanism against losing one’s identity. Resisting the foreign influence becomes a character trait to be emulated in order to prevent the nation from MELTING AWAY. The withdrawn character became part of the fixed canon or cultural memory of the Lithuanian identity. The textbook allocates the blame decisively to the outsider, neighboring nations, which WEIGHED DOWN the Lithuanian nation and interrupted its healthy development. The narrative of the Lithuanian history, as Brazauskas presents it, follows the pattern in which the strong and powerful Grand Duchy of Lithuania is WEAKENED in the union with Poland, to the point of being threatened by EXTINCTION, followed by oppression and, finally, RESURRECTION. 47

In the context of the 19th century national revival, the textbook describes how the issue of “purity” of the nation emerged: the BRIGHTER Lithuanian people started “to look for a “PURE” Lithuanian, “PURE” Lithuanian language, the “PURE” truth about the past of Lithuania, because history had MUDDLED everything UP too much” (197). These BRIGHTER people “decided to DEFEAT their weakness, feelings of inferiority, start interacting with foreigners on equal terms, not to YIELD to their influence” (197). Initially, the terms “pure” and “purity” are used in quotation marks, suggesting some critical distance to the term on the part of the author. However, the metaphorical term “pure” is used without the quotation marks when referring to PURE history in the same section. The author regretfully mentions that until the 19th century the Lithuanian history was written only by the clergy, which were, moreover, foreigners (198). Brazauskas claims that only a Lithuanian, secular historian could tell the PURE truth about the past of Lithuania (198). As history messes up the sharp boundaries of the Lithuanian identity, brings in foreign influences, MUDDLES everything UP, diminishes RESISTANCE to the threat of disease, BRIGHT people are expected to cleanse it of impurities, to DIG UP the ROOTS, to tell the PURE truth of the past. Brazauskas suggests that only the Lithuanian people themselves can distinguish what the

47 This kind of narrative is likewise suggestive of a secularized version of the Christian narrative, which begins with pristine origins, through struggle, to an ultimate salvation (Megill 2007, 31).
PURE truth is. Within the same context of PURE culture, the people and the gentry are juxtaposed. The people are uneducated peasants, who have almost no rights, speak Lithuanian, sing Lithuanian songs, and live in wooden huts. The gentry, on the other hand, are “rich landlords, educated, reside in palaces, in possession of all the rights and all the opportunities to make use of the world’s cultural wealth, speak and write in Polish, German” (198).

In textbook II, Brazauskas outlines a coherent continuation of the narrative of struggle for survival. RESISTANCE to harmful outside influence is compromised in the aftermath of the Union of Lublin, but eventually the RESURRECTION of vitality returns once again in the 19th century as BRIGHT Lithuanians begin looking for and uncovering the PURE history of the nation.

6.1.1.3 Textbook II: LEANING ON the FOUNDATION of the past


This part of the Textbook II conceptualizes history and the past. The author addresses the pupils in a short preface as “daughters and sons of the Fatherland” (3).

“The history of Lithuania,” which you have been studying in the 6th and 7th grades, gave you a response to the question, where we came from. Knowing this, you will walk forward – you will try to comprehend who we are and where we should go, what we should seek after. This will be the learning aim in the 8th and 9th grade course of “The history of Lithuania.” As sons and daughters of your Fatherland, seek to know the past of the nation and learn from it. (3)

The preface reveals a linear understanding of temporality, history, and the past. Time is conceived of as a line along which you can WALK. If you know history, you know where you COME FROM and where to go FORWARD, which direction to follow. If you know history, you know your way, you are not lost. Temporal development is a spatial linear trajectory, where the past constitutes the source and the future is a goal. Knowing history implies not digressing from the path which is predetermined by the past. Knowing history means staying on the path and not wandering about. The relation between the past, the present, and the future is further elaborated in the passage below.

So the past, the present, and the future are time segments which supplement each other. The present leans on the past and rushes into the future. Memory and dream flow together/join in the present, reality and the ideal fuse. All of it together blossoms and ripens the fruit.

In the first half of the 19th century, the road taken was reflected on and assessed for the first time; the roots of the Lithuanian national culture were dug up; ways and possibilities
to further create and foster it were found. The tree of the Lithuanian culture, which was about to wither, was restored, began to grow, to branch out:

Centuries ago my roots grew into this land

And the black storm of centuries will not uproot them. (An excerpt from a poem by Bernardas Brazdžionis48). (202)

In the above passage, the author employs multiple metaphors to make sense of the temporal dimension. The past, the present and the future are defined as separate segments that can be distinguished on the shared temporal line or path to walk along. The past is behind you as the road taken. The metaphor of foundation re-emerges when the author describes the present as leaning on the past. The present is more dynamic than the fixed, solid, stable foundation of the past. Memory and dream, reality and the ideal flow together, fuse in the present. There is movement and a margin of unpredictability in the present, as the past (what has been) meets the future (what could be). The three time segments taken together combine into a recurrent organic metaphor of the tree. Brazauskas used this metaphor in the interview to suggest that the tree needs a solid foundation if it is to resist foreign influences and uprooting. Only if it has a firm trunk and strong roots, can its branches rotate in any direction without the threat of them breaking or being uprooted. The tree of the Lithuanian national identity and culture had almost withered, dried up before the 19th century, according to the textbook, when historians reflected on the road taken for the first time. What helped to restore the vitality and growth of the tree was reflection on the past, digging up the roots, writing the history of the nation. So, history writing is associated with rebirth, growth, revitalization of the nation after centuries of struggle and suffering, or a centuries-long black storm. Writing history is digging up the roots.

6.1.2 Juozas Brazauskas: Perceptions of the Polish-Lithuanian past

In the interview, I inquired more into his understanding and evaluation of the shared Polish-Lithuanian state. In the extract below, he speaks about the impact of the 1791 Constitution of 3 May, which abolished the dual monarchical union of Poland and Lithuania into one unitary state of Poland.

Unified state. One state – Poland. So if we look at this, there is one disadvantage in that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania does not exist. But if one looks at the development of civic consciousness...There was a shared state, then it was fused into one Poland, but the nation remained. The Lithuanians remained. Another question: what language did they speak? They spoke Polish. What was the culture? So wait then: what about Mickevičius? How to assess him? Are we going to continue tearing him asunder: whether he is ours, or Poles’, or Belarusians’, or is he a citizen of the Grand Duchy? Therefore I sometimes say: what is the

48 A Lithuanian poet (1907–2002), known for patriotic poetry as well as poetry for children.
difference, what language does he speak – what is important is that you feel yourself as a citizen. (P 3: 3:39)

He attempts to see two sides – positive and negative outcomes – of the 1791 Constitution and is willing to regard the Polish-speaking nobility from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as Lithuanian. In this context, he exhibits a civic, political understanding of the Lithuanian identity rather than one strictly based on ethnic Lithuanian language and culture. Since this positive treatment of a shared past with Poland was so much at odds with the textbook contents, I pointed out the contrast. However, Brazauskas defensively renounced his authorial responsibility and deflected responsibility to the political demands made by the government.

When writing a textbook there is the so-called conception, the program, according to which you need to write. You cannot clash, because you will not pass through the commission of reviewers. They reject the manuscript. You have to, as they say: Sing the song of the man whose cart you sit on. It is a state order. You cannot do anything here. If there were an alternative… (P 3: 3:95)

R.K: You speak quite sharply about the Poles in your textbooks, especially in the 8–9th grade textbook. I had at least this impression.

Maybe, maybe this was the order… Maybe this was the program. Maybe it was such an order. (P 3: 3:101)

I say: this is an order, the programs, perhaps the confirmed conceptions. Perhaps it was the reviewers. If they let it through, they let it through. Perhaps it had to be that way. Of course, you live and learn. I think that from the conversation it is visible that something has changed, hasn’t it? (P 3: 3:119)

He sought to convey how his ideas about the shared Polish-Lithuanian history have evolved since the early 1990s, when he first engaged in writing textbooks. Despite this, his pupils seem to have a straightforwardly negative idea of the role of Poland in the Lithuanian history.

Yes, my kids [pupils – R.K.], when we speak: who is the most vicious enemy of our nation? A Pole! […] Then I tell them: why are you thinking like this? Where is this hatred from? For the Vilnius region? For the Union of Lublin? But if there had been no Union of Lublin, there would be no Lithuania. It would be Russia. So what was one to choose? From two evils one had to choose the smaller evil. (P 3: 3:53-54)

The passage above is a telling example of the prevalent stereotypes associated with the Poles in Lithuania, which have a strong basis in the perception of the shared Polish-Lithuanian history. This perception likely results not just from school-history education, but is also influenced by the media and discussion of the past with family members.

When I asked whether Piłsudski, who initiated the take-over/occupation of the Vilnius region by Poland in 1920, was, according to him, a Pole or a Lithuanian, he responded by identifying him as a Lithuanian, but as someone who went to serve another country
This taps into a more general trend in thinking about the relations between Poland and Lithuania in the past (e.g., Snyder 2003, 32–35, 68–70; Buchowski 2012). The metaphors of BLOOD FLOWING DOWN and small Lithuania FEEDING big Poland with the supply of state leaders conjure the idea of the uneven balance of power and, at the same time, of a dependent bond where one side is weakened and loses vitality — BLOOD — because of the bond. This metaphorical image supplies the reasoning about Polish-Lithuanian relations in the past with a negative evaluation, implying that Lithuania was depleted and weakened by its relation to Poland.

Our blood flowed down to Poland. And they say: Jogaila, Jagiello is ours, but he is ours. Our dukes had become the kings of Poland, and not vice versa. Our small state, small territory was feeding big Poland. (P 3: 3:58)

6.1.3 Juozas Brazauskas: Multiperspectivity and truth

In the case of different interpretations of the past, Brazauskas does not have faith that pupils can make right choices and adjudicate among them. His thinking seems to be guided by the idea that pupils need to evaluate and choose a certain interpretation, and he is not convinced that they will be able to select the one which merits this choice. He thinks that pupils are not yet cognitively and intellectually able to accomplish this and, hence, the teacher should play an active role in guiding the students as to how they should judge the divergent interpretations. The underlying idea, possibly prompted by my own formulation of the question, is that there is only one preferred interpretation that pupils need to adopt, to the exclusion of the rest. The aim of history education is to convey the “correct” narrative rather than to teach pupils how to engage, make sense of and adjudicate among different narratives.

R.K. So how should one pick what goes into the textbook, which version of the events?

I don’t believe that kids will pick. It is often told: there needs to be different opinions offered. We tried to offer some questions, but I don’t believe that the kids will pick. Their age is still such that… (P 3: 3:76)

Pupils’ own requests need to be taken into consideration as well. Brazauskas reveals that students sometimes ask the teacher to give them information in a short and clear manner, that is, without different interpretations being discussed. In this particular context, he uses a gestural metaphor to express how exam questions require from pupils very concrete, factual, brief answers. He knocks several times on the table, evoking the Lithuanian idiom “to hammer information,” which means to learn information, especially factual details, by heart, without reflection, interpretation, or critical engagement.

Yes, because during the exam, it comes, straight to the point — is there the date of the Union of Lublin or not? — tasks. We can talk a lot and explain that there should be the development of personality, critical thinking. The exam task comes — (knocks several times on the table: a gestural metaphor) everything is set, put straight. (P 3: 3:81)
Multiperspectivity is not demanded, in his opinion, in the exams, which shapes how students approach the information studying the past. The goal becomes to cram the student’s head full of detailed information, which might be required in the state exam. Several times during the interview Brazauskas expresses his critique of the currently existing system of examination and the way in which textbooks are written, calling it superficial and even primitive. However, this claim is not without contradiction, for in another segment of the interview he also proudly mentions that he has received feedback from some students, who say they still use his textbooks when preparing for exams, since they provide information in a clear, abridged, summarized manner.

The theme of multiperspectivity in the history classroom brought up an uneasy juxtaposition between truth and personal memory of the past, which is made most acute in the context of exams. If you subscribe to the optical notion of truth as a mimetic representation, an image that mirrors the past reality “out there,” there is little room left for divergent, lived experiences and memory. Experience and memory may be treated as personal, subjective interpretations of the externally existing objective reality that only take place “inside one’s head” and, hence, are irrelevant. They are like subjective internal fabrications of the externally incoming sensory stimuli, according to the optical-ocularcentric epistemology.

But I say, I feel as if, as if this generation is imbalanced. Imbalanced and it is not easy to understand. While it is good to have different points of view, when the hour of exam comes and he needs to tell one truth – which one is the truth? Is it the one which grandmother told him, the way you said it? Or is it the one which is written in Brazauskas’ or Bumblauskas’ book? (P 3: 3:114)

The discordance between the memories of lived experience and factual truth becomes particularly severe in the context of exams, where pupils may find it problematic to decide what the truth is, if truth is a singular copy of past reality. The ocularcentric binary opposition between subjective memory and objective history does not accommodate the idea that truth cannot be separated from an embodied process of life or experience.

I also have mournful experience – personal. From my family, from my mother’s side, when my R.I.P. mother-in-law was telling what the Poles were doing along the demarcation line, how girls and men were defiled, and these “feats” of the Home Army…So it was implanted a little, since (a pause), but, but… But now already it is different, these things appear differently. But the memory of people is alive. And it bears witness. You cannot write everything in the textbook. (P 3: 3:102)

In the passage above, he reflects on how his own lived experience and memories of his family might have affected his way of conceiving the past and writing textbooks. He speaks of the negative connotations of the Polish role in Lithuanian history, which he has acquired from the memory of his family as something that was implanted in him, almost as if against his will, as something done to him without his consent. This process of personal experience has very likely affected the form, in which he presents the Polish-Lithuanian past. This influence means for him what he elsewhere described as “subjectivism.” Lived experience and memory are therefore something one should get rid
of in order to be more objective because personal, embodied “vision” departs from the optical truth and its mimetic representation. It is a deviation from the “Essential Copy,” to use Bryson’s terms (1988), which should exclude all residue of the body and the lived experience of the painter/scholar. To be objective, one’s relation to the past should be strictly optical. A painter/historian should only transmit the image passively, as if she is not there.

It also constitutes a good example of the intergenerational transmission of traumatic memory, where painful events experienced by a distant relative can be remembered as ALIVE and almost one’s own. At the same time, the memories can be passed on without awareness of the one who inherits them. They are ALIVE and can be re-experienced, bearing witness to that lived experience. Perhaps, in such cases of traumatic experience, the memory of it, when not resolved or re-contextualized for long periods of time, becomes static, formalized and preserved as if in an “archive” of memory. It becomes part of a cultural memory (Assmann 2010; see Chapter 2) of the group. However, Brazauskas mentions that his way of thinking about the Polish-Lithuanian conflict has changed over time.

The intergenerational transmission of traumatic memory is important to understand also because school-history teaching includes meetings with people from the older generation, who had lived through important events and want to share their experiences.

Although there are events: the exile to Siberia, and Vorkuta, the Christian Democrat youth that returned from Vorkuta, there was an event at school about the exile locations, the preservation of memory, how they were tidying the graves, they were speaking, with music, with songs. There are very sensitive things. […] So from time to time we are organizing such meetings, where kids listen to people who have suffered. (P 3: 3:107)

This demonstrates how textbooks, even if they are a significant factor shaping one’s sense of the past, are not the only or exclusive source of information about the past. Meetings with people, who personally experienced important events in the past, or who strive to preserve the memory of the past, incorporate embodied forms of shared knowledge. The lived past is passed on through storytelling and songs.

In the case of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past, the negative evaluation by pupils prevails, which may point to the buildup and gradual reinforcement of such beliefs by different sources and environments over time. The prevailing negative assessments of the Polish role in Lithuanian history seems to be the result of a drawn out process, where negative experience and memory, instead of being gradually resolved and re-contextualized, are used and reinforced by the state for identity building purposes. Communicative memory is preserved and institutionalized as cultural memory, suitable for maintaining clear group boundaries and a sense of identity based on the memories of injustice.
6.1.3.1 Textbook II: Truth and lived experience


Polonization as a subject emerges when the textbook outlines the situation of the Lithuanians who lived in Užnemunė (beyond the river Nemunas), a part of Lithuania that was incorporated to the Duchy of Warsaw after the 1815 Congress of Vienna. The author notes that the process of Polonization was particularly fast in this region, schools being the main instruments of spreading Polonization. The textbook offers an excerpt from Vincas Kudirka’s memoirs, who was the author of the Lithuanian national anthem and who went to one of these Polish-language schools in Užnemunė. Kudirka’s case is special because he was transformed from a person who identified with the Polish culture in his youth to one of the leading figures of the Lithuanian national movement. As a young man, he was ashamed of his Lithuanian peasant family background and considered himself a Pole. Later in life, upon reading the first Lithuanian national newspaper “Aušra” [orig. “Auszra”], he experienced a transformation of identity.

V. Kudirka wrote in his memoirs: “Pupils were forbidden to speak in Lithuanian not only in the progymnasium, but also at home, not only with other pupils, but even with parents when they would bring the son home after the holidays or when they would come to visit in the boarding school. Speaking in Lithuanian was punishable by hanging a trinket around the neck of the one who spoke […] – a sign of humiliation and contempt. (246)

Since lived experience of Vincas Kudirka constitutes the foundation of modern Lithuanian nationalism and finds expression in the 19th century Lithuanian historiography, it is not surprising that Brazauskas is eager to include it in the textbook. It conforms with Brazauskas’ reasoning about the past and gives a basis for his metaphors. The process of the 19th century Lithuanian experience shapes and is embodied in the nation-centered textbook narrative. On the other hand, this kind of narrative ignores the experiences, voices, and testimonies of the Polish-speaking Lithuanians, the Lithuanians who were willingly adopting the Polish language and culture, those Lithuanians who supported the idea of a Polish-Lithuanian statehood and of members of ethnic minority groups. Only the lived experience that agrees with the author’s own experiential meaning framework gets to be included in the textbook narrative.

In the end, it leads to the question of whose experience pupils learn about from this textbook, which eventually affects the present by shaping their ways of thinking about the Poles and Poland. It could explain why so many pupils, although having no personal contact with the Polish people and having never visited Poland, hold negative views on this country and its people. Is the textbook capable of conveying the lived experience of people in the past? Or does it convey the lived experience of only certain limited groups of people and individuals taking it for the history of an entire nation? To take it even further, does it express the traumatic lived experience of certain historians who were among the first ones to produce the narration, such as the interwar historian Adolfas Šapoka, whose
influence Brazauskas admits? While this traumatic experience should be acknowledged, the question is whether it should be passed on as the exclusive truth of what happened, where the textbook acts as an instrument of transmission of traumatic experience across generations of people. This emphasizes the role of historians, who make sense of past lived experiences and build narratives on such a basis. History writing allows them to convey an experiential meaning framework that consists of an amalgamation of the ways of being in the past and the historian’s own lived experiential environment. Historians’ own lived experience, engagement with their environment throughout their lifetime, the ways in which they learn to make sense, to understand, affects how they respond to the traces of people in the past.

The recurrent metaphors of RESISTANCE to foreign influence, strong FOUNDATIONS and ROOTS, danger of MELTING AWAY, threat of EXTINCTION and RESURRECTION after years of misfortune and oppression shapes into a narrative that may have less to do with the actual experience of people who, for example, lived in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, than with the efforts to make sense of the past by the generation who lived in the late 19th – early 20th centuries and the interwar period. This is the period of fierce antagonism between the Polonized Lithuanian gentry and the Lithuanian intelligentsia of peasant origin. This is also the period in which the 19th century nationalist historiography first emerged and was later continued by the Adolfas Šapoka School, emphasizing the continuity of the Lithuanian nation throughout history. Therefore, the two textbooks, written by Brazauskas, reflect an understanding of the past that stems from this period of the Lithuanian national rebirth. The process of experience of the generation involved in the national revival movement and the establishment of the Lithuanian state became embodied in the historiography of this period.

When Brazauskas was writing the textbooks in the 1990s, the old interwar historiography was his primary source, since new narratives, presenting an alternative vision to the Marxist interpretation of history, were not yet available at the time. This situation of a “narrative vacuum” in the early 1990s was conducive to the return of the Romantic, idealized narrative of the Lithuanian nation as a stable, fixed entity, which persisted throughout history, despite struggle and adversity. Brazauskas’s textbooks are, therefore, a good example of the embodied nature of history writing. His (unconscious) choice of metaphors reveals an influence of lived experience of the 19th–20th century historians and activists of Lithuanian national revival. On the other hand, the narrative, being focused strictly on political and military history, not only fails to pay attention to non-political aspects of past life, but likewise projects contemporary values and ideas onto the life of political elites in the past. In this regard, the textbooks fail to engage with past lived experience.

6.1.5 Conclusion

There are several main points to draw from the textbook analysis, when we assess it jointly with the interview commentary. First, the narrative of textbooks strongly accentuates the themes of threat, resistance, and defense of sovereignty/independence.
These themes match the thinking captured by the interview metaphors of RESISTANCE to invasion and defense of one’s territory and culture against the external influences MARCHING IN. In the textbook, the central question that is raised to assess the role of Poland in the Lithuanian history is whether it strengthened or diminished the FOUNDATION of the Lithuanian state and separate identity. The onset of Polonization after the adoption of Christianity is evaluated in negative terms, evoking once again the threat of MELTING AWAY, disappearing, losing oneself in something larger and being unable to specify a clear boundary. This explains the strong emphasis on the endurance of the boundary between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the shared state, which constitutes perhaps the key thematic aspect of the textbook narrative. If there is no clear boundary, the FOUNDATION may be WASHED OUT and the identity can become DILUTED. In effect, dissolving and losing the boundary could be interpreted as implying death, the non-being, which renders the historical narrative so important and so laden with emotional value, even if the count of explicit metaphors is low throughout the textbook.

This leads me to the second point: The textbook bears many fewer metaphors than the spoken interaction during the interview. On the one hand, this may not seem surprising as spoken language is, in general, more interspersed with metaphors, whereas the textbook language adopts a fact-driven narrative with mostly straightforward layout of significant information, offering explanations, causes and consequences of events and actions of its historical agents. And yet, what the analysis reveals is that even though the textbook language does not employ many metaphors, the historical narrative presented therein is congruent with the metaphorical ways of thinking disclosed in the interview, thereby demonstrating how metaphors shape thought and historical thinking, even if they are not present in the text itself. I find this significant in that it shows that historical reasoning in the textbook and in the historiography, on which it is based, is influenced by metaphorical concepts which play a significant role in shaping thought, but which are rarely, if ever, explicitly revealed. Furthermore, because metaphors are affective (Cameron 2010b) – people use metaphors to convey how they feel towards something – the values are already inbuilt in the forms of reasoning and justification presented in the textbook, even though the language used in the textbook is itself almost free of metaphor.

The metaphors that inform the thought of people can vary greatly from person to person, particularly if the metaphors are taken from one’s individual experience, but they are also and predominantly shared by groups of people (cultural and social). Meaning is shared when it is enacted together in a shared context. Metaphorical meanings are acquired in social engagement, part of which is constituted by institutionalized exchange of information. Historiography and textbooks are one such source of institutionalized metaphorical models, thereby shaping not only how one is to understand the past, but also how one is to approach and make sense of new information and experience in the present. Hence, the negative attitudes towards the Poles persist among the Lithuanians. The particular choice of metaphors by Brazauskas, as the interview reveals, was influenced by the preserved/inherited memory of his extended family, swift political changes in the aftermath of the reestablishment of Lithuanian independence, as well as the Lithuanian historiography of the interwar period. The process, which has led Brazauskas to this kind
of understanding of the past, demonstrates that modern sensitivities and values deeply affect the way he makes sense of past life.

6.2 Jūratė Litvinaitė

Jūratė Litvinaitė is a well-known history teacher and history textbook author in Lithuania. She is a graduate of the Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences. She is an author and a co-author of the history textbook series “Šok” for the 5–8th grades. She has also co-authored one textbook for the 8th grade from the series “Lithuania in the World.” Her latest project is a textbook for the 5th grade published in 2015. She works with the publishing house “Šviesa.” I interviewed Litvinaitė in January 2014 at Vilnius Vytautas Magnus Gymnasium, where she works as a history teacher.

Analyzed textbooks by Jūratė Litvinaitė (authored and co-authored):


6.2.1 Jūratė Litvinaitė: History is no longer a reliable FOUNDATION to lean on

In the beginning of 2014, when I interviewed Litvinaitė, she was engaged in writing a new history textbook for the 5th grade. Our conversation reflected her preoccupations and conceptions of history teaching at the time. As a history teacher, she was cognizant of the fact that pupils could no longer identify why learning about the past would be relevant or how the knowledge of history could be applicable in their everyday life. The textbook project was therefore informed by the motivation to convey to pupils why and how history could be useful and what could be learned from it that would aid in facing modern-day challenges. One of the great concerns for Litvinaitė is the widening gap between different generations, which results from the acceleration of change in the present. The world is changing so fast that the experience of the older generation bears little relevance for young people. History and the past, during such accelerating change, lose their importance as sources of knowledge and experience. They can no longer be deemed reliable FOUNDATIONS for a young person to LEAN ON. History, especially if it is taught as stories about the deeds of brave heroes, does not equip pupils to live in the present.

Assmann’s (2010, 2011; see Chapter 2) insights into cultural memory are relevant in this context, because the stories about brave heroes are a part of the static, state-sanctioned historical canon, which loses its pertinence if it is not re-interpreted in the face of changing, ongoing experience in the present. The past as an abstracted substance
consisting of role models, foundational events and values is locked into a pattern of invariant reproduction, expecting it would strengthen the group identity, but it appears that an emphasis on fixity and rigid repetition only widens the gap between the present and the past, endangering the group identity, as a result. More importantly, the new state of experience in a high-paced world disrupts the linear conception of time, where a person could lean on the past and look to the future. Incommensurability of experience between generations unsettles the sense of continuity across a broad span of time. Pupils cannot relate to the past, because they cannot relate to it as it is depicted in history lessons. Litvinaitė is convinced that her pupils have a different sense of time, where they mostly look to the future and ignore the past. However, I would argue that this phenomenon of being unable to relate, to empathize, to partially identify with the past can be explained to a great extent by the static, detached, invariant – canonical and ritualistic – nature of historical knowledge, as it is presented to pupils. Hence, the paradox occurs that efforts to preserve the group identity lead to reverse effects of disengagement, where past experience is diminished as irrelevant to one’s sense of self and of group identity.

Kids live today in a very fast-changing world [...] and history becomes irrelevant to them. [...] The fairy tales, narratives about the brave Vytautas or the victory in Grunwald are lovely, interesting, but not practical. A child cannot comprehend why he needs it, what the use of it is. He is unable to place history in the system of his values, way of thinking and experience. (P 4: 4:2)

From Herodotus until, let’s say, 1990, perhaps it was possible to expect that your experience, your knowledge will come from the past. You look to the past and by modelling it you carefully go to the future. Not anymore. I very often think that our kids, this generation, they don’t look to the past, they only look to the future. [...] And this is a general, total social shift, if we hold onto this linear [model – R.K.], agreeable with Western historiography. So if we stood in time and leaned on the past as our most important baggage, so this generation is certainly “presentist,” because the past is a half year and after the half year he must change his phone, because a new one arrived. And when he goes to his grandmother, you know, twenty years ago I could tell: “Go to the grandmother, ask her and come to recount.” And he comes with glittering eyes and recounts. Nowadays they do not believe that the grandmother and even the parents can help them with anything. (P 4: 4:16)

Two crucial observations differentiate Litvinaitė from the position of Brazauskas on history teaching and the importance of the past. Firstly, Litvinaitė approaches the past not so much as a foundation for one’s present identity and orientation needs, but rather as a practical tool, an instrument that can offer a tangible skill or practical application. Since pupils cannot relate to the past, she seeks to resurrect it by rendering history practical. History teaching is instrumentalized, placing more emphasis on disciplinary literacy and analytical skills. Secondly, Litvinaitė indicates that the intergenerational transmission of memory and lived experience is losing its impact, that pupils are no longer interested in speaking to their elders and hear their stories. She perceives a more general departure from the past as a source of valuable and much needed knowledge, which requires that history teaching and our engagement with the past be reconceived.
6.2.2 Jūratė Litvinaitė: Historians as FISHERMEN

The passage below contains several key metaphors, which aid Litvinaitė in accomplishing the reconceptualization of school history education. The latter arose from Litvinaitė’s classroom experience as well as from her extensive reading on the subject.

Is it still worth teaching history in schools? Does history, as a discipline, have a prospect? After I had raised this question, I read a lot of specific literature, which examines the philosophy of history, the purpose of history teaching [...]. I really sought to understand what the meaning is, and from this the new conception of textbooks emerged, and after all it responds to the current needs, not to teach history in a history lesson, but to teach “taking” history, when you need it, the way you need it and for the purpose you need it. Because I really like this metaphor that history is a boundless ocean and the historian is a fisherman, who catches the fact he needs. And then the question: the historian catches the fact which he needs for his experience, in order to model his future, in general, he is catching, he knows where he is going to put it, how he is going to eat it and use it. And the kid does not need that because the kid is different, with different experience, with different needs, and then I think that perhaps we should also teach the kid to fish. (P 4: 4:5)

Her metaphors reveal how she comprehends the nature of historian’s work. As FISHERMEN, historians are motivated by their concrete needs and previous experience. They are FISHING for facts with a clear intention, and therefore not for its own sake. As professional historians, they are equipped with a skill of “TAKING” from the OCEAN what they need, of identifying the relevant FISH within this BOUNDLESS myriad of floating facts and CATCHING them for dinner. They know how to prepare and EAT the FISH, what method to apply to make the most of it. And it is precisely this mastery of FISHING skills that Litvinaitė wants to impart to pupils in school-history education. She is aware that pupils’ experience is different from that of professional historians, and she wants to accommodate history teaching to pupils’ experiences and needs.

The metaphors might also suggest the idea that facts, as FISH, are whole and ready-made, waiting to be pulled out of the OCEAN by the FISHERMAN. They come into being in the vast space of the OCEAN without the efforts of the fisherman; historians only require the expertise in retrieving the facts with their rod and then using the FISH for their needs. Litvinaitė concedes though that a pupil cannot become an accomplished historian, but the skills of a professional historian – the mastery of fishery – is held as a model of practical applicability of the knowledge of the past. Learning how to work as a historian responds to demands in rendering history more useful and relevant to modern-day life.

Firstly, the very first step is to show, what history is and what one can catch in this ocean. To become acquainted with a few facts, which prove that the past was successfully used in the present, that problems were solved on the basis of past experience, that certain political, economic or social constructs were assembled on the basis of these past happenings. So that a kid, after having seen that there really are some examples, that history has been usefully applied and that these people who understood history, which had a grasp of it, acted very successfully and won. Then the child naturally believes: If I too understand history, I will also be able to apply it. But in this place the kid has to have a
real, strong, steadfast certitude that historical information, which is in a textbook, or that, which is in a film, or that, which is in a novel or even a game is not necessarily indispensable for me. Perhaps history textbooks do not even depict that, which is important for me, as a child, as a person, as a Lithuanian, as a... citizen. Therefore, I have to go to the history ocean, sit down myself, fish, pull out, fry and use. (P 4: 4:6)

The author supports the idea that students themselves should not be satisfied with the information offered in a textbook and dare to raise their own questions, which reflect their own experience and interests. The textbook may not be up to date or relevant for pupils’ needs, which is why they need to learn how to become FISHERMEN themselves. The encouragement to examine the past on your own could possibly present a way to counter the invariance of cultural memory. The goal of history teaching shifts to providing pupils with the most important skills and techniques of historical literacy, so that they would be able to find their way in the OCEAN of history independently. The past in this regard emerges as something that can offer a BASIS or a FOUNDATION of useful knowledge, but not in the sense of giving a solid ground for an identity, of finding oneself firmly rooted in the past, but as practical knowledge which could inform and guide people’s actions. She lays out a step-by-step approach of how such skills could be conveyed and taught.

The first step is to convince a child by examples, stories, situations, that history is really practical and useful, that one can accomplish a lot with it. That is why, when writing the textbook, we have put advice in the first lessons, which is useful not just in history, but also in learning other subjects, for example: how to write down a fact, how to collect information, how to construct a narrative. Elementary things which, of course, will help first of all in history, but they are easily applied in daily life, too. Then the child knows that history lessons give a practical use. Then the second step goes: he is taught how to investigate the past and know it. Professional historians are given as an example, of course; it is briefly described what they do, and the child is allowed to do it himself in one small step at a time. (P 4: 4:7)

When professional historians and their ways of thinking, knowing, seeing are provided as a model, as a disciplinary standard, it is quite evident that the teaching approach and the textbook aspire to emulate the disciplinary thinking, as it is understood by the textbook author. The basic level of the scholarly investigation, as it is introduced, consists of learning how to write down a factual statement, to collect information and construct a narrative. Pupils are taught to conceive of historical knowledge as language, which refers to the past and which needs to be carefully selected, verified, and organized. In this process, pupils become apprentices in learning how to work as professional historians. What this amounts to in the context of the 5th grade is basic historical literacy rather than any kind of more advanced methodological approach to the study of the past.

On the other hand, the pedagogical approach becomes more nuanced in upper secondary education when pupils are already more capable of engaging in critical thinking and analysis. The 12th-graders whom she teaches frequently become frustrated, as she describes in the excerpt below, by not being able to pin down what actually happened in the past.
Let’s say, we discuss about this a lot with the 12th graders. Each of our lessons ends with their despair that they do not know how it is. Perpetual discussions.

R.K. Why do they want to know how it is? Where does this strong need come from?

Because the main load comes from intrigues, which I constantly pour on them. For example, I say: you imagine, write in a controversial way, for example, that Vilnius belongs to the Belarusians or Poles. One option for and one option against. All sorts of facts. As you say, to draw out varied opinions and show that there can be different and varied assessments. And when they come to some kind of conclusion, to give one more, which would deny their conclusion. So they say: Where is the end? These are my happiest moments when children do not ask anymore: “So what do these historians do? Everything has been written already. All the past has been written about. What are they still doing there?” (P 4: 4:22)

If you have described, written down, written a book, what else can you do? And when they say that history is really a boundless [ocean – R.K.], and the further, the worse it gets. The 12th graders often ask me: So what should we do, how can we know? I tell them: You need to read. And they really start to read more. It’s interesting to them and they dispute, but it is only a 12th-grader when he already senses that, when reading, he no longer needs to believe the author, but can question the author. (P 4: 4:23)

It is a telling illustration, which reveals the epistemological understanding of upper secondary school pupils. Before their teacher’s intervention, they are convinced that a historical monograph lays out an exhaustive depiction that mirrors past reality. Once the image of the past has been captured in an optical truth, there is no need for further research. Pupils are prone to believe that the knowledge of the past in historians’ monographs is an accurate representation of the past reality in an optical sense of truthfulness. These pupils hold an optical theory of truth, which permits them to take for granted an externalized past reality and its faithful mimetic representation as historical knowledge. The teacher then adopts a pedagogical approach seeking to intentionally disrupt the certainty and bring in doubts about whether such truth of the past can be attained.

On the other hand, Litvinaitė does not really provide clear advice to pupils on how to deal with multiperspectivity. She proposes to them that they read more, but this does not amount to any clear suggestions on how to make sense of a plurality of different narratives. In the excerpt, she associates the epistemological anxiety that stems from this plurality with the boundlessness of the ocean, which further explains how she conceives of the historian’s method. Historians’ mastery of method, their skill at casting nets and cooking a meal out of a catch is what ensures they can face the vast ocean of history. It is a tool which prevents historians from getting lost in or being overwhelmed by the ocean.
6.2.2.1 Textbook II: Finding one’s way in the BOUNDLESS KINGDOM of time


Pupils begin a history course as a separate school subject in the 5th grade. As a result, the author dedicated the introduction of the textbook to elucidation of history as a discipline: what it is; how historians do research on history; how it relates to the present. She cautions the students that since

We have already decided to set out into the world of the past, hence we should agree about certain things in order not to get lost in the boundless kingdom of time. (12)

The past is characterized in spatial terms: as a separate WORLD and a BOUNDLESS KINGDOM. SETTING OUT into the past evokes a sense of mystery and adventure. The past is vast and BOUNDLESS, suggesting a connection to the metaphor of the past as a BOUNDLESS OCEAN, which Litvinaitė had used in the interview. The spatial metaphors to express the notion of the past should be the focus of our attention, because they put forward a static configuration of time, which contrasts, with an understanding of time as a temporal process of change. The temporal change is obscured by the ontological idea of time as a spatially laid out geographical terrain. In this sense, the past is already, from the very beginning, introduced as located outside of and independent of a human life, with its particular boundaries and needs: it is a pre-given, pre-existing WORLD, external to the knowing self. Pupils are, as a result, left with a narrative, which can either be read naïvely, as an objective account of the past, or in a postmodernist fashion, as an imposed form on the content of the past. The spatial ontology of the past suits the ocular-optic epistemology well. However, this produces an inherent tension between the aim of history to simultaneously convey dynamic, embodied change, on the one hand, and the static, disembodied, mimetic ontology and epistemology, on the other. The “kingdom of time” stands outside of or distant to the time of one’s life, or time that is embodied in this life through lived experience(s).

In order to find one’s way around the vast terrain of spatially constructed time, pupils need to acquire specific skills and knowledge, which historians apply in their research on the past. History is described as “a science about people’s activities in the past” (12). Historians, the textbook explains, are interested in people’s activities in the past, because “history is the TEACHER of life. If people in the past did something wrong, don’t do it. That which they did not know – you learn. That at which they succeeded and which was useful – you adopt.” (12) Two contradictory senses of history are combined together, when, on the one hand, the textbook underlines Cicero’s formula “historia magistra vitae” and simultaneously conjoins it with the idea of history as a scientific discipline. The classical notion of history as a source of authoritative ethical-practical examples from the past for the present suggests that historians inquire into the actions of people in the past not for its own sake, but in order to learn from and evaluate people’s behavior in the past. This

49 I am grateful to Lisa Muszynski for helping me elaborate this point.
conforms to the way Litvinaitė emphasized the practical purpose of history and its useful applicability. Simultaneously, however, the historian who draws lessons from the past should be circumspect and balanced, avoid judgment and strive for empirical veracity. The following extracts illustrate the methodology and dispositions towards the past, which, according to the textbook, distinguish the historian’s work.

The most important thing is that the conclusions of the historian’s investigation would be proved by evidence – by the sources of historical cognition. [...] A real historian is very distrustful. [...] He verifies several or even more sources, finds out who their authors are, under what circumstances they appeared, compares them and only then makes conclusions – writes an article or a book about the past. (14)

As in every scientific work, only these data are presented in the historian’s article or book which can be verified. A historian avoids words, such as long ago, much, small, beautiful, good, expensive. He refers to dates, amounts, sizes in digits, to qualities in clearly visible characteristics; he mentions the nationality, name, surname of the described human being. (14–15)

These excerpts reveal that the historical discipline is introduced as an exclusively ocularcentric and positivist undertaking, emphasizing its scientificity and referential verifiability. “Real historians” should avoid any value judgments and seek precision in their utterances about the past. Historical knowledge is conceived as propositional, factual statements that are truthful by virtue of optical correspondence to past reality. Historians should sift through multiple sources and seek to disentangle the mimetic, factual knowledge from subjective opinion and evaluation. The striving to separate between facts and opinion and to eliminate any traces of subjectivism – anything that cannot be verified – is a distinguishing mark of 19th-century positivist history.

Once again, we can see that historical truth is presented as an accurate reproduction of the past reality, which primarily aims at descriptive verity rather than value-laden meaning-making. If past reality is metaphorically understood in spatial terms, as a fixed terrain, then historical knowledge can be grasped as a snapshot of this spatially imagined past, which is a faithful reproduction to the extent that it is captured by a cognitive apparatus located outside the embodied viewing self. So it becomes important to show how the description of the past is purged from subjective bias and personal, experiential attributes. In this case, we again have to do with optics and the camera as the metaphorical models structuring metatheoretical assumptions about what knowledge is and how it relates to reality (see Section 3.2).

Historians’ methodology is portrayed as focused on the separation of mimetically accurate, factual knowledge from subjective opinion and evaluation. The truth is presented as an accurate reproduction of past reality, where the latter is metaphorically structured in spatial terms, as a geographical terrain. Historical knowledge is a faithful, accurate depiction, a snapshot of this spatially organized past, captured by a disembodied eye. The optical apparatus of the camera thus serves as an overarching metaphorical model for textbook’s meta-theoretical assumptions. This shows again how metaphors inform and shape historical thought and its forms of reasoning about the past. The underlying
metaphorical models may not be explicitly spelled out, but they do seem to influence how historians, textbook authors, and eventually pupils come to explain and view the events in the past and approach the task of historical understanding, despite the absence of any explicit metaphors in the outlined justification.

6.2.2.2 Textbook III: Knowledge about ESSENCES and OBSERVED reality


In Textbook III, the main contribution of Jūratė Litvinaitė is the introductory, first chapter, which explains what history is, why history is important, and how history can be researched. In fact, the overall conception of the history textbook series “Discover” is that pupils should learn about the past by carrying out their own investigations of the past. Each of the eight chapters begins with an outline of a historical investigation, which pupils need to implement throughout their engagement with a given chapter. An investigation is defined as “an activity which is planned and implemented during a predetermined period and which is carried out seeking to gain new knowledge about the essence of phenomena and/or observed reality” (6). The two key ideas, which emerge from the above statement, is that history has access to the ESSENCES of phenomena and an investigator OBSERVES the past reality. The meta-theoretical assumption that the phenomena have an underlying essence disclose an ocularcentric, Platonic distinction between essence and existence, between the underlying pure, ideal forms that are real because they are unchanging and the fleeting impressions, which are not real because they are transient, changing. Ocularcentrism at the root of this conception of historical investigation is also discernible in the idea that a historian OBSERVES the past. In other words, the historian is understood as a detached spectator who is not part of the reality or world that he or she observes. Historians are not coupled or engaged with the past reality, nor do they co-create the understanding of the past: they are positioned outside the past reality, conceived of as externalized and pre-given. What historians do is to accurately represent the externalized past, to produce faithful depictions of the past, thereby evoking the metaphor of the camera obscura as the model of cognition.

The purpose of history, according to the textbook, is to investigate the past of humanity and to explain the present on the basis of the past (12). “History,” the readers are told, “can advise, help find solutions. The examples of the past can inspire, teach. We learn from the mistakes of the past” (12). There is a perceptible continuity between Litvinaitė’s textbook “Heritage” for the 5th grade (Textbook II) and this textbook in how both place a lot of emphasis on Cicero’s dictum “historia magistra vitae,” or the idea of history as the teacher of life. History is an authoritative source of ethical-practical examples, which implies that history is entangled with value judgments and normative principles. History, understood in Cicero’s terms, is not just a source of neutral
information about what happened, but it necessarily invites assessing the deeds of people in the past and learning from their success or failure.

This value-laden aspect of historical investigation, however, is grafted onto an understanding of history as a scientific pursuit, in which facts and values are defined as pertaining to different and sequentially distinguished procedures of a historical investigation. A scientific history work is said to be written following specific requirements, which are listed in four sequential steps. Firstly, the historian writes an introduction in which he describes the topic of research, which can be a certain region, a sphere of human activity, or a historical period. Secondly, the historian identifies and writes down the most important factual data, which are clear, precise and have been verified. The following procedure is perhaps the most telling in terms of how a historical investigation is introduced to pupils. The textbook explains that

3. After the historian has written down the most important data of the event or phenomenon, he begins to analyze them: a) he specifies the causes of the event or phenomenon, explains why it happened; b) he reveals the course of the event or phenomenon, explains how it began, continued and ended; c) he specifies the consequences of the event or phenomenon, explains its impact on the subsequent history.

4. After the historian has analyzed the topic specified in the introduction, he summarizes, provides conclusions and his opinion, identifies the sources on the basis of which he prepared the work. (14)

A historical investigation is presented as a clearly sequentially distributed set of procedures. The textbook suggests that the historian, first, writes down the facts, only then analyzes them and, lastly, can reach an opinion on or evaluation of the findings. Identification of facts is separate from their analysis. Analysis is separate from evaluative and meaning-making aspect of the historian’s work.

This explanation of how an investigative work proceeds is completely at odds with Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) cognitive metaphor theory, according to which percept and concept converge in cognition. In other words, metaphors (concept) shape the process of knowing and reasoning about the past (percept), and because metaphors are affective (Cameron 2010b, 5–6), that is, people engage metaphors to explain how they feel towards something, metaphors import values, beliefs and attitudes into the very fabric of reasoning about the past. Facts and values cannot be separated so neatly in the process of knowing, as the textbook suggests. If cognition (meaning-making process), on an embodied-enactivist account, is dependent on the history of lived experience and interaction with the world, then metaphor is the link between the previous experience and cognition in the present.

6.2.3 Jūratė Litvinaitė: Multiperspectivity and truth

The use of multiperspectivity in school-history teaching is not without obstacles or risks, according to Litvinaitė. In the interview, I mention an example from an 8th-grade textbook, co-authored by Litvinaitė, where pupils are asked to assess the “accuracy of
information” based on two sources. The sources in question present two radically different evaluations of the 1569 Polish-Lithuanian Union of Lublin. The first source, an excerpt from the speech by the leader of the Lithuanian delegation in Lublin, Jan Chodkiewicz, a fierce opponent of the union with Poland, expresses the view that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was forced into unification with Poland against its free will. The second source, an excerpt from a 1613 map of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania by the Polish-Lithuanian cartographer Tomasz Makowski, offers a very different opinion arguing that the unification was equally desired by both parties, eager to join forces against shared enemies. The pupils are expected to compare the two sources and discuss the accuracy and reliability of the information. Litvinaitė admits that since pupils are not equipped or able to make a competent, nuanced judgment solely on the basis of these two sources, they will be steered to view one of the sources as biased and inaccurate. This reveals the responsibility, which falls on the textbooks authors and teachers in shaping students’ beliefs about the past.

R.K. I remember there was this one task about the Union of Lublin. I think it was authored by your colleague Salomėja. One source was the famous speech by Chodkiewicz, the lamentation about the defense of the Fatherland, and the other source was a commentary by Makowski that the Union of Lublin was made and very much desired by both parties and that those, who claim there was a resistance from either side, speak untruth. A pupil is then asked to compare these evaluations…

…and which one of them is correct? (laughter)

R.K. “…and to make conclusions about the accuracy of information.” My question would be: What is really expected here from the pupil? What conclusions does he need to make?

You see what happens, what gigantic risk, when you decide to teach children by giving them sources, isn’t it? You see, then, when you give children two alternative things – good and bad – and some sources for proofs, you take a gigantic responsibility, because you, as a teacher, direct them to the truth you prefer. And you know what the postmodernists say: There is no objectively existing truth. What is truth? Truth is what you believe. But really, I increasingly start to think that this saying is inspiring, that the truth is what you believe. If you believe it, you can convince another, too. (P 4: 4:18)

Litvinaitė is tempted to adopt the postmodernist rejection of an objectively existing truth when faced with multiperspectivity towards the past. The truth, according to her understanding of the postmodernist argument, is that which you believe about the past. Truth can be whatever you shape it to be and are able to persuasively present to others. The relation to the past life of a historical narrative becomes secondary in this understanding, because the emphasis falls on history-as-fiction, the form, subjective meaning that we ascribe to the past. Not only the relation between the past and language of historical narratives is not straightforward; the relation is likely unattainable at all.

However, since the truth of the past cannot be known, she suggests that the relativity of truth of the past exposes an urgent need for firmly grounding certain value orientations in school-history teaching. The emphasis shifts away from seeking after truth to making
value-informed choices. In other words, when faced with a plurality of narratives, we should select the one that best fits our values and beliefs because truth, as a referential match between narratives and the past, cannot be known. Since uncertainty about the past evokes the desire for setting some kind of foundations or criteria of adjudication, we leap back to the issue of canonization of the past – this time in terms of value preferences. The past is once again rendered static, fixed, and disengaged from lived experience. Past life and lived experience are treated as merely content that passively awaits to be given some meaning and which does not at all influence the meaning-making process. This is a concrete example of how the postmodern arbitrariness of truth, because it remains attached to the disembodied metaphorical models, does not circumvent the mimetic distinction between reality and language and reconcile multiperspectivity with lived and dynamic embodied experience. By contrast, if we propose a different notion of truth, which treats “multiperspectivity” not as isolated, static snapshots of external, pre-given reality, but as inseparable from the process of lived, embodied experience of a dynamic being-in-the-world, where an embodied self is coupled with its environment and co-creates its reality, then the truthfulness of the past acquires a very different character. Multiplicity of experiences is no longer a challenge to truth. Instead, the inability to engage with the process of lived experience becomes the challenge to truth.

It is here that the main problem emerges. Imagine that I leave the child with this open-ended answer, hoping that our society will become more tolerant and more forbearing, since they will know that there are multiple perspectives and that it is possible to handle the same issue in different ways, without hurting anybody. They leave the lesson without having fought over the issue of whether the Constitution of May 3 is good or evil, right? They leave smiling. And then the society becomes more positive, right? Everyone will be tolerant knowing this. But then the question emerges: Which facts can we leave to hang freely like this, if these facts speak about more serious issues, let’s say, about victims, casualties, unresolved problems in politics? Let’s say, today some politicians say: Should we demand one Litas from Russia or not? Should we forgive and be friends with Russia or should we remain loyal to our principles? To allow the Lithuanian Poles to write their names in Polish orthography or not? And you see, the question is: To what extent can we trust the child’s ability to understand these things? After all, we will not offer them as many sources as a professional receives in order to define one’s truth, one’s position. Due to the scope of a textbook, I will give him two, three sources. Imagine, everything depends on what I give him. And what if I am different? What if I give him what I personally like? Do you understand? It is inevitable – I have written twenty of these textbooks and in each one of them I can tell my own, […] even though I try to escape this, I try to be as objective and fair, but…. (P 4: 4:19)

Thus, even if she is open to introducing different interpretations of the past in history teaching, she insists that there are certain limits to the extent that doubt and uncertainty about the past are acceptable in the classroom. There are questions, which should be decided and established as foundations or pillars of society: These should not be left to

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50 She refers here to the discussions whether Lithuania should demand symbolic reparation from Russia for the damage and casualties inflicted during the Soviet occupation.
HANG FREELY. Leaving them not pinned down, open to free interpretation elicits a sense of danger for Litvinaitė, because not all textbook authors or teachers seek to be fair and objective and can misrepresent the past. This is where her position comes closer to that of Brazauskas in highlighting the need to guide pupils' understanding of the past. The latter point demonstrates that even though she is tempted to embrace the idea of truth as that which you believe, she is convinced that fair and balanced judgment of the past constrains the kinds of narratives that can be told. Fair judgment implies defense of certain evaluations or assessments of the past, especially in relation to traumatic experiences. Her insistence that textbooks should contain some value orientations for pupils could be understood as reappraisal of the belief that different interpretations or perspectives on the past are not all equal. Certain experiences afford meanings, which are not arbitrary and which need to be recognized.

As a solution to the predicament of uncertainty, Litvinaitė deems national politics of history necessary to establish certain core collective values and beliefs. She is convinced it cannot be left to the teachers or to textbook authors to decide in order to prevent tendentious, biased representation of the past. She conceives of a state as a FAMILY UNIT, WHICH deliberates and agrees on certain key rules, values and beliefs which express the national VISION.

But, you see, I believe that if there is a state, then there is a state school. What is a state? I strongly believe that a state is an organization. For me, that is a sacred vision. I want to believe this. I want it to be like that. And if this is our, your, my organization, we sat down, huddled together into a state, sat down, agreed that this will be our state. And we say: These are our kids. We have to raise them. The same way that a father and a mother deliberated, a child was born to them, they deliberated how they were going to raise him, what they were going to implant in him. They do not say: Whichever way it goes, it will be fine. There are visions. I believe we need these visions. (P 4: 4:28)

6.2.3.1 Textbook I: RESISTANCE and decline


The textbook is a joint project of two authors, Salomėja Bitlieriūtė and Jūratė Litvinaitė, each of whom wrote four chapters of the textbook. It is important to note that out of the sections that deal with the shared Polish-Lithuanian past, Litvinaitė only authored the parts leading up to the 1569 Union of Lublin, whereas the subsequent chapters are attributed to Bitlieriūtė. In spite of this, I discuss the textbook portrayal of the Polish-Lithuanian history encompassing the work of both authors, since the collaborative nature of the project implies coordination of the overall conceptual and thematic integrity of the textbook. I did not, however, have an opportunity to interview Bitlieriūtė as well.

The depiction of the Polish-Lithuanian past in the textbook maintains a traditional emphasis on political history. The Polish-Lithuanian relations are mentioned for the first
time in the textbook in the context of the 1385 Union of Krewo and the Christianization of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL). The textbook explains that the Union of Krewo “guaranteed the cooperation of Lithuanians and Poles in various areas. It was particularly important in the fight against the shared enemy – the Teutonic Order” (117). The author does not delve into the question as to whether the Union meant a merger or just a rapprochement of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland, which constitutes one of the contentious points in historiography. Christianization, as a consequence of unification with Poland, is also assessed positively, stating that “even though the baptism did not solve all the problems at once, it opened up many great opportunities for Lithuania” (118). Pupils are asked to organize a classroom discussion on whether the Union of Krewo was useful for Lithuania and whether Jogaila, the grand duke of Lithuania and the king of Poland, made a good decision in choosing to adopt the Catholic faith.

The role of Poland in Lithuanian history, as described in the textbook, began to shift, however, when Vytautas became the grand duke of Lithuania in 1401 (vice-regent of the king in the GDL from 1392). Tensions are said to surface as Vytautas sought to strengthen the sovereignty of the GDL from Poland. The textbook states that, when Vytautas finally arranged his coronation in 1430, the Polish nobility prevented the envoys of the Emperor Sigismund from reaching Lithuania and captured the crown. The arrangements for coronation and Vytautas’ plan to establish the Kingdom of Lithuania failed. This constitutes a turn in the narrative when the negative influences of Poland’s involvement in Lithuanian history begin to outweigh the positive ones. Pupils are prompted to reflect on why the Poles were against Vytautas’ coronation. An image of Poland as an adversary neighbor of Lithuania begins to emerge.

The successive rapprochement of Lithuania and Poland is presented by showing how Lithuania was in dire need of military support in the Livonian war with Russia. Poland accepted to join forces with Lithuania against Russia, but only in exchange for closer political ties. The Lithuanian aristocracy is introduced as standing strongly against the increasing unification with Poland, yet the nobility was eager to acquire more rights and privileges comparable to those of the Polish nobility. The negotiations that took place in 1569 in Lublin, therefore, amount to the defense of the national sovereignty by the Lithuanian delegation. The textbook concludes that

But with regard to the GDL, the Union of Lublin was partly an act of coercion. It had to make concessions to Poles, which restricted the independence and statehood of the GDL. Even though the Lithuanian political sovereignty diminished after the signature of the Union of Lublin, it nevertheless retained the most important institutions of local government and the monetary system. Thus, it could continue resisting the rise of Poland’s influence, while simultaneously being sure that it would support it in the fight with Russia for Livonia. (196)

The metaphor of RESISTANCE to the outside influence in relation to Poland crops up, revealing how the unification with Poland is perceived as threatening to the Lithuanian identity and statehood. In this regard, the textbook carries on the narrative tradition of Lithuanian historiography. The emphasis is placed on the efforts of the GDL to maintain
its sovereignty and statehood in the joint Polish-Lithuanian state. It is stressed which institutions remained separate in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland after the unification, which is supposed to support the claim that the union did not merge the two states completely into “one indivisible body” (196). The pupils are asked to “prove that the GDL maintained autonomy in the joint state” (197).

There is one task in relation to the Union of Lublin, which attempts to introduce the notion of multiperspectivity by asking pupils to compare two sources, which assess the Union of Lublin from very different perspectives. The first source is an excerpt from the speech by Jan Chodkiewicz, the head of the Lithuanian delegation in the Lublin negotiations, who is against the union with Poland. The source suggests that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was coerced into the union against its free will and that the Lithuanian delegation was deeply distressed by the outcomes of the negotiation. The second source, an excerpt from a 1613 map of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania by the Polish-Lithuanian cartographer Tomasz Makowski, states, in conflict with the first source, that the unification was sought by both parties equally, eager to join forces against shared enemies. The pupils need to identify the differences between the two sources and “discuss in the classroom about the reliability and accuracy of information” (195). They also need to consider whether this issue is relevant in contemporary times. Since the main authorial text rather supports the opinion expressed in the first source, students are already steered to regard the second source as biased and inaccurate. A task of this kind could engage students to consider the lived experience of the authors of these two sources and how it shaped their perception of events, but instead the ocularcentric-optical pursuit of unbiased truth dominates the comparison of sources. The task emulates the approach of historical criticism, which primarily aims to untangle bias and distortion from the authentic, original truth, and sidesteps the issue of what experience had led to these two different opinions about the significance of the Union of Lublin.

The task thus implicitly teaches the students that the truth is a faithful reproduction, an accurate repetition of the original past in a source. Truthful knowledge is dependent on mimesis as sameness. A truthful source maintains repetitive accuracy of the original meaning. In order to understand this, it could be helpful to recall the image of the camera obscura and how it models human cognition of an external, pre-given reality. The textbook task instructs students to “see” the past as a thing-like substance, which can be represented truthfully and known through that optical rendering. In order for it to be knowable or duplicated as an image in one’s mind, the thing-like, factual past needs to be separated from opinion. Opinion or assessment is conceived as an added, ancillary element, which at best is not necessary for truth and in the worst case is an impediment to truth. Opinion is an adornment to cognition rather than a constitutive aspect of interaction with the environment, which explains why the 19th century principles of historical criticism require a strict separation of facts from opinion. The sharp separation of facts and opinions is an inheritance from the 19th century positivist historians who were particularly concerned to distinguish between the two (Howell and Prevenier 2001, 87). As a result, the dominant conception of truth is disembodied and detached from the experiential process. The camera obscura serves as an implicit metaphorical model for cognition,
structuring the understanding of reality as external, pre-given, static, and the understanding of knowledge as a snapshot, an optical duplicate of that external reality.

In describing the centuries following the Union of Lublin, the textbook accentuates themes of decline, disorder and the gradual fading of Lithuanian statehood, thereby further fortifying the negative assessment of the Union of Lublin.

Historians call the 17th–18th centuries a period of the greatest decline, because the nobility were making use of their “golden freedoms” which no other single nobleman had in Europe. Such freedoms of nobility eventually had led to lawlessness, because it became impossible to adopt any laws and maintain a basic order in the state. (207)

Anxiously, we have been watching the rapprochement of the GDL with the Kingdom of Poland and the legal establishment of this rapprochement by the Union of Lublin, and then the weakening statehood of the GDL and disorder as well as continuous wars in the nobiliary Commonwealth. (223)

The excerpt above constructs the process of learning about the past as WATCHING the development of historical events, as if on a movie screen. This curious ocularcentric metaphor brings forth the distance of the past events in relation to the spectator, which nevertheless are being observed with emotional investment, or anxiously. KNOWING IS SEEING, but it is a particular kind of seeing dependent on the camera as a metaphorical model for cognition. It implies that temporal change is understood as a sequence of static snapshots, static, fixed states of the external world: first, the rapprochement of the two states; then, the Union of Lublin, followed by weakening statehood, disorder, and wars. The cognizing self stands aside from it as a distanced spectator. What remains unclear in this narration is the non-linear process of interrelations and entanglements, of lived experience that leads to these events.

To sum up, the textbook remains within close proximity of the traditional historiographical narrative, according to which the Union of Lublin marks the beginning of the decline in Lithuanian history. The main emphasis falls on political history of political elites. Attempts to introduce multiperspectivity fail inasmuch as they are employed for detection of bias rather than enable students to assess the conflicting accounts in terms of life trajectories of their authors. The particular example of the task with a comparison of diverging opinions is a useful illustration of how school-history education, without any explicit clarification of ontological or epistemological issues, instructs students in particular ways of “seeing” and knowing the past. Camera and optics serve as the metaphorical models structuring metatheoretical assumptions about the past and history.

6.2.3.2 Textbook II: Decline and resurrection

The shared Polish-Lithuanian history is touched upon only very briefly and in passing in this textbook, yet certain themes stand out in the depiction. It mentions that some Lithuanians lost their national identity, mother tongue and customs, and began to identify themselves as Polish as a consequence of the Polish-Lithuanian unification. The 1385 Union of Krewo is causally connected to the Polonization of the Lithuanian nobility. Since the issue is discussed in a chapter dedicated to the topic of the formation of the Lithuanian nation, it further contributes to a negative assessment of the implications of the union with Poland.

It happens that people adopt customs of other tribes. That is what happened to some Lithuanians. In the 14th century, the grand duke of Lithuania Jogaila married the Polish princess Jadwiga. The court of the monarch was established in Krakow. Polish fashions, language, customs began to spread among the Lithuanian nobility. They started to Polonize. (24)

The outcomes of the 1569 Union of Lublin are assessed negatively, emphasizing that the abuse of privileges and rights by the gentry led to an increasing chaos and weakening of the shared Polish-Lithuanian state. A causal connection is established by the textbook between the rapprochement with Poland and the eventual disintegration of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1795, when the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was taken over by the Russian Empire.

In the context of the 19th century insurrections against Russian rule, the Polish-speaking Lithuanian nobility is juxtaposed with the Lithuanian-speaking nobility.

The noblemen were resisting, establishing secret societies, organizing insurrections. But they were defending the Polish language, culture. In Samogitia it was otherwise. Here, the Lithuanian language, customs have survived among both peasants and the majority of noblemen. The well-educated Samogitian people started the movement for fostering the Lithuanian language, history, customs – for the revival of Lithuanianness. (24)

The textbook also briefly comments on the interwar conflict between Poland and Lithuania over the city of Vilnius. Poland and Lithuania are personified as two people fighting as TO WHOM the city should rightfully belong and who struggle to take it over or RECEIVE it BACK. The relations between the two countries before the interwar conflict are characterized as friendly. The conflict is presented in terms of two static divergent “perspectives”: Lithuanians called Vilnius their capital, whereas Poles likewise thought of Vilnius as their city. Pupils learn nothing about the process of lived experience out of which these two different views or perspectives arose (see Section 3.6.2). Such an approach to multiperspectivity does not provide the means to understand the complicated past or the reasoning of the other side to the conflict.

The friendship with Poland broke due to an argument as to whom Vilnius should belong. Lithuanians called Vilnius their capital; Poles – their city. In 1919, the Polish army took over Vilnius and its region. An argument flared up which cost more than one life to each

51 An ethnographic region in northwestern Lithuania.
side. In 1939, Lithuania received Vilnius back, but soon afterwards lost its independence.

Friendship between Lithuania and Poland is said to have been restored after the re-establishment of the Lithuanian independence in 1990. The textbook states that both countries recognized each other’s rights and territories, thus, including the city of Vilnius within the territory of the Lithuanian state. Poland is once again personified, noting how it “helped the young Lithuanian state to stand on its feet, aided in its preparations for joining NATO” (45). Pupils are asked to explain why it was and remains important for Lithuania to closely cooperate with Latvia and Poland (45). Cooperation in friendly, peaceful terms with neighboring states is highlighted as a goal in the arena of international relations.

Even though the textbook presents a very condensed overview of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past, which mostly includes only basic factual information, the narrative of the past steers towards a negative evaluation of Poland’s influence in Lithuanian history. Value judgment is conveyed through a linear narrative sequence of events, by implying causal connections between the Polish-Lithuanian unification and consecutive decline of statehood or Polonization of the Lithuanian nobility. Analyzing such a narrative creates the impression that values in a historical narrative are a sole product of linguistic organization by the author, because we learn nothing from it about how the past was lived and experienced in embodiment. What strikes me in this narrative is how the factual information that is provided offers very little understanding of the lived experience of the events in question. Thus, the only values present in the narrative are the ones built into the very fabric of reasoning and justification, despite an absence of any explicit words marking value ascriptions. Pupils learn about a sequence of events that took place in an externalized past and are implicitly taught to draw causal connections between them, but they understand little about how people lived and experienced the past.

The negative implications of the political and cultural rapprochement with Poland are counterbalanced in the overall narrative by stressing the friendship and good terms between the two states in contemporary times and, particularly, after the re-establishment of the Lithuanian state. This shows, however, that Poland’s role in Lithuanian history is assessed exclusively in terms of its impact on the Lithuanian statehood and independence, which is not surprising considering that the textbook is shaped overall by themes of patriotism, national belonging, national consciousness, and independence. In this regard, Litvinaitė’s textbook replicates Brazauskas’ textbooks, where the role of Poland in Lithuanian history was also assessed primarily according to whether it strengthened or diminished the foundation of the Lithuanian state and identity. Thus, the shared Polish-Lithuanian past is narrated in accordance with the Lithuanian historiographical tradition, which is reflective of the concerns and lived experience of the historians of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The idea that pupils should learn from the past (and thus the metaphor of history as a teacher), especially from the struggle for the Lithuanian independence, is instantiated in the textbook narrative. When drawing lessons from the past, pupils could, for example, learn to regard Poland as predominantly adverse and unfriendly to Lithuania. And, since, according to the textbook, history is a scientific pursuit whose claims are based on
verifiable evidence, they might also conclude that such a negative assessment derives solely from the facts and has nothing to do with affective, experiential factors when making sense of the past. That affective, experiential factors do, however, play a role in shaping historical understanding is revealed by the personification of Poland and Lithuania when describing the changes, which took place in their mutual relations over time. Lithuania can be metaphorically conceived as a human being, a person whose identity has been under threat and damaged by the influence of Poland.

6.2.4 Conclusion

The interview with Litvinaitė reveals broader trends in the development of historical consciousness in Lithuania: the “loss in translation” between experiences of different generations, the widening gap between the past and the present born out of the acceleration of change in contemporary life, the future-oriented identity of pupils, and the diminishing role of the past. School-history education in this context becomes a TOOL in making the past relevant again and the precise way in which Litvinaitė seeks to achieve this goal is by rendering the past practical and teaching pupils basic skills of historical literacy. History emerges as a FOUNDATION of useful knowledge and skills. Historians, in this context, serve as a model of how to face the BOUNDLESS OCEAN of history. They act as FISHERMEN, whose tools and skills permit them not to get overwhelmed by the OCEAN and CATCH THE FISH they need.

Moreover, multiperspectivity is permissible, for Litvinaitė, in school-history education only to the extent that it does not endanger certain core values and beliefs, which make up the group identity. These core values and beliefs, according to Litvinaitė, cannot be left to the teachers, textbook authors or pupils to decide, but need to emerge from a purposeful and systematic politics of history at the national level. The state should function, in this regard, as a FAMILY UNIT, which deliberates and decides which values should be passed on to the children. In effect, since the relation between language and the past is assumed to be arbitrary, unwanted interpretations are displaced not because they fail to engage with past life, for example, but because they do not correspond to the values espoused by the state and society. Thus, the contents of history education can become entirely dependent on the value preferences of those, who are in power to make such choices. Furthermore, although she is convinced that the meaning of certain past events and experiences is not arbitrary, she is not able to explain why it is so or what the relation between meaning and the past is. Thus, when faced with a lack of clear principles for adjudication among different narratives, she prefers to entrench certain meanings by means of the politics of history.

The narrative of the Polish-Lithuanian past in the textbooks closely follows that established historiographical tradition, evaluating the role of Poland according to whether it strengthened or diminished Lithuanian sovereignty. Attempts to introduce multiperspectivity in relation to the Polish-Lithuanian past remain focused on the identification of bias and accuracy. Pupils need to ascertain the truth rather than synthesize several divergent accounts into a more encompassing and complex understanding.
The issues which emerge in the interview – in particular, the problems of historical truth and multiperspectivity – are particularly discernible in “transitional” societies which are going through identity transformations. A conception of multiperspectivity as a collection of arbitrary and relative stances, detached from the process of embodied experience, elicits renewed interest in setting and re-enacting foundational memory. These diverse perspectives are understood as isolated, static, mutually exclusive; they are also equivalent to each other so that a meaningful comparison between them is complicated, if attainable at all. Different narratives, when they become disembodied through implicit metaphorical models that shape ordinary reasoning, are reduced to subjective, static mental snapshots, or perspectives. Perspective, as a powerful and deeply entrenched visual metaphor, structures our epistemological assumptions about knowability of the past. It forecloses our capacity to take into consideration that our perception, reasoning and action are shaped by our history of dynamic interaction with the world. Thinking about divergent interpretations in terms of the metaphor of perspective hides the significance of the process in relation to the pattern of perspective.

6.3 Ignas Kapleris

Ignas Kapleris is a project manager in the publishing house “Briedis.” He has done his Master’s degree in history at Vilnius University and has also completed his doctoral studies at Vilnius University in 2014 in the discipline of media and communication studies. He is the main author of the textbook series “Laikas” [Time]. I interviewed him in December 2013 in the premises of the publishing house “Briedis.”

Analyzed textbooks by Ignas Kapleris:

- **Textbook V.** Ignas Kapleris, Antanas Meištas, Karolis Mickevičius, Andželika Laužikienė, Robertas Ramanauskas, Živilė Tamkutonytė-Mikalienė. Laikas, Istorijos
6.3.1 Ignas Kapleris: Historiographical influences

My conversation with Kapleris began from discussing the conception of the textbook series “Laikas.” I was interested in finding out what kind of ideas shaped the methodological and didactic approach of the publishing house and its authorial team and whether there was a clear intention to introduce some changes in relation to what was available in the school textbook market at the time.

In the interview, Ignas Kapleris made clear that the historiographical school of Vilnius University and, in particular, the ideas of the contemporary Lithuanian historian Alfredas Bumblauskas,52 exerted an important influence on his way of thinking about the past. Several times throughout the interview, Kapleris stressed his wish to overcome the authority of the Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences (previously known and still commonly referred to as Vilnius Pedagogical University) in the field of history education. Kapleris’s intention was to compete against what he perceived as the dominant position of the pedagogical approach of the Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences. Kapleris explains the concept of the textbook series and the historiographical influences that informed it in the following way:

We did not have any specific strategy, as it is sometimes laid out in educational documents. We acted according to intuition. And there was one thing that the society itself was changing, we were ourselves such that...Because in school-history teaching the historicist narrative was ruling, the 19th century Rankean approach, where there is a lot of “factology” [sic! – R.K.], political history, guys, dukes, kings, and we saw and...I have myself graduated from a slightly different school, Vilnius University, which perhaps I have not encountered too extensively, that is the school of Bumblauskas, which offers a slightly different conception. And in the Lithuanian school-history education these two narratives are competing: the one of the pedagogical university, in which “factology” rules and, let’s say, strictly speaking, “Šapokism”, this national, national conception of the Lithuanian

52 Alfredas Bumblauskas is a historian from Vilnius University and a well-known intellectual figure in Lithuania. Bumblauskas received his doctoral degree in 1987, and was mentored by Edvardas Gudavičius. He was formerly a Dean of the Faculty of History and is now head of the Department of Theory of History and Cultural History at Vilnius University. The field of his influence is not limited to the academic field, as he is also a famous TV personality and has hosted multiple TV programs over the last two decades. It could be argued that he has exerted a considerable influence on the national historical consciousness via his strong media presence. This is particularly important considering that, together with his mentor and predecessor, the Lithuanian historian Edvardas Gudavičius, he criticizes the Romantic patriotic historical narrative of the Lithuanian history that first appeared in the 19th century and proposes a conception of an integrated Lithuanian history in a European context.
history, and a different conception, which comes from Vilnius University. Now, until then, until our “Briedis” [the name of the publishing house – R.K.], there had been exclusively the dominance of the Pedagogical University. We brought a new trend, we see it from other textbooks that have been published after ours that we have attained our goals in certain issues and that teachers have accepted our textbooks, because today we are leaders.

(P 2: 2:5)

He describes his textbook and the pedagogical approach in general as being driven by the goal to stir students’ interest in and curiosity in relation to the past, to reduce the amount of factual information and to eliminate the academically inclined presentation of the past. Later in the interview (2:32), however, Kapleris points out that it is impossible to leave all the “factology” out of the textbook, since teachers, who make the decision about which textbooks to use in classroom, would not choose their textbooks for schools. The majority of secondary school-history teachers in Lithuania, according to Kapleris, have been educated according to the historicist school of the Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences. The publishing house has to adjust to their theoretical and pedagogical ideas about what history is and how it should be taught.

Kapleris noted that rote memorization of factual details and dates did not disappear from school-history education, because the average age of a history teacher in Lithuania is above fifty years old. In other words, even if current teacher training programs might provide new methodologies of teaching, the majority of teachers had received their pedagogical training, which followed an older model of pedagogical instruction. He regards this as the reason why history is understood in Lithuanian schools “separately from the everyday life” (2:32). The latter comment points to a conception of historical knowledge as a disembodied, static substance, which is disconnected from the past as lived experience. The “factological” approach to teaching history, with its emphasis on distanced “states” of political and military history, renders knowledge as a disembodied content that can be known because of and in its factuality.

The same could be said about the source analysis as it is presented and taught in school-history education. I mentioned how a typical task of source analysis in “Laikas” textbooks focused on attentive reading and identification of specific factual information in the text. Kapleris commented that this approach stems from the established tradition of methodology in the Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences. It does not require contextualizing the source and mostly asks pupils to “EXTRACT information” out of it (2:44). He regards this as part of a larger phenomenon, namely, taking the natural sciences as the model for the discipline of history, with an emphasis on observation, empirical evidence, and description, whereas the “the narrativist history and narration are neglected in school” (2:44). He perceives this as a problematic trend, because history is “a narration, a story of a human being” (2:44).

It is crucial to observe the dichotomy that is identified in the interview between the nationalist master narrative based on the historiography of Adolfas Šapoka and the alternative narrative of the Lithuanian history proposed by Alfredas Bumblauskas and his mentor Edvardas Gudavičius. The tradition of the Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences is aligned with the interwar historiography of Šapoka, whereas the tradition of Vilnius University is aligned with the contemporary historiography of Gudavičius and
Bumblauskas. Hence, the textbook series “Laikas” attempts to perform a paradigmatic narrative change in school-history education.

This serves as an example of how historiographical narratives shape school-history education and how the changes taking place at the academic level of history writing eventually, with a certain period of delay, find their way into school textbooks. Even without any explicit, well-defined strategy or concept, the authorial team, particularly its leader Kapleris, builds the textbook narrative to accommodate the narrative of Bumblauskas. This illustrates my point that history as a discipline and school-history education cannot be sharply separated as two distinct fields of knowledge (see Section 3.2). Academic, professional historians bear a significant, even if indirect and sometimes imperceptible, influence on the presentation of the past in school-history. The narratives and underlying meta-theoretical assumptions of professional historians are transposed into school textbooks, even if this process extends up to several decades in order to be noticeable. It is exactly in this sense that historians shape the ways of seeing and knowing the past. The way historians make sense of the past – assumptions, values, beliefs, attitudes, experiences that guide their process of meaning-making – comes to shape how a community of people learns to make sense, know, and assess the past via, among other things, school-history education. School-history education has a wide reach across the young generation of the national population and this aids it in building shared ways of seeing the past.

6.3.1.1 Textbook II: Source criticism


The introduction notes that the textbook devotes more attention to the development of a student’s abilities to think historically. Three of the textbook’s chapters are followed by a new segment, called “Method,” which aims at instructing pupils on how to analyze and work with various historical sources (visual and written historical sources as well as maps) (4).

One of the sections on method offers advice on how to analyze written historical sources. It is noted that historical events or persons may often receive different evaluations in the sources and it is therefore important to learn to compare them (69). Three steps define the analysis of a written source. First, pupils should gather the information about a source: when it was written; who the author is; whether the author is a contemporary of the events described in the source; the purpose for which the source could have been written; whether the source represents a perspective contemporary to the author’s own period. Secondly, pupils should analyze how the text is formulated; whether it is possible to detect certain statements or opinions in it; what the main idea of the text is; whether statements are contradictory among themselves and whether they are objective. Lastly,
pupils should search for additional information that either confirms or contradicts the statements of the text (69).

The authors sought to convey a basic sense of source criticism in a way comprehensible to the 8th-graders. However, the outlined sequential steps of source analysis do not enable pupils to raise questions about how a particular source and a perspective represented in it link to certain ways of being, thinking and feeling, certain social, cultural or political processes and phenomena. The provided questions guide pupils only to analyze the contents of a source as a static snapshot without much regard for lived experience, part of which it is. The examination of the authorship of a source is mostly aimed at evaluating the potential truthfulness of claims made in the source, or, in other words, assessing to what extent the representation in a source can match external past reality. Thus, the dualist, ocularcentric model of cognition is preserved and implicitly conveyed to pupils.

6.3.1.2 Textbook III: A moderate take on the Polish-Lithuanian unification


The 1385 Union of Krewo is introduced by stressing that both Poland and Lithuania had their own interests in concluding an agreement. Both are said to seek military cooperation in the joint war against the Teutonic Order. The textbook explains that the Polish nobility expected, by arranging a marriage of the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jogaila and the Polish Princess Jadwiga, to acquire the territories of Volhynia and Podolia which belonged to Lithuania at the time. Jogaila thought that, with the help of the Poles, he could maintain the Lithuanian sovereignty in the Slavic territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Although it is mentioned that the text of the unification treaty included a statement about the annexation of the GDL to Poland, the importance of this statement is downplayed. The textbook claims that, according to historians, the Krewo Union was merely a collection of Jogaila’s marital pledges to Jadwiga and that the statement about Lithuania’s annexation remained just a promise, but was never actually implemented in practice (185). The Union of Krewo and the ensuing Christianization of the GDL are presented as positive developments, which brought about the spread of Western culture and civilization and which eliminated the moral basis for crusades organized by the Teutonic Order into the Baltic region (186).

Rapprochement of Poland and Lithuania after the 1385 Union of Krewo eventually led the two countries to challenge their common enemy – the Teutonic Order – in the 1410 Battle of Grunwald. The interpretation of the event, which is advanced in the main text,
identifies the maneuver of the multi-ethnic Lithuanian army as a feigned retreat and as the determining factor in the defeat of the Teutonic knights.\textsuperscript{53}

Pupils are introduced to these two different interpretations of the battle via historical sources, which they are asked to compare and then identify key differences in their statements (191–192). One source is an excerpt from Jan Długosz’s chronicle in which he describes how the Lithuanian army started running away in panic. The second source is an excerpt from the actual letter found by Ekdahl. It is interesting that the textbook does not instruct pupils to reflect on this contradiction and its meaning further, to consider why Długosz’s interpretation prevailed or why Długosz chose to describe the battle as he did.

After the Battle of Grunwald, the narrative of shared Polish-Lithuanian history continues by describing intensifying bilateral tensions. The textbook provides a detailed description of how the Polish nobility resisted and tried to actively prevent the coronation of Vytautas, for this would have meant the loss of Polish influence over Lithuania. A letter of Vytautas is quoted where he states this explicitly, that Poles were not willing to allow the coronation to happen and sought to make Lithuania dependent, “to govern it as their own” (194).

The textbook finally introduces the 1569 Union of Lublin by stating that both states had their own interests in closer unification (222). The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was in dire need of the Polish military support in the Livonian war with Moscow. The Polish nobility, on the other hand, was anxious about the possibility that the GDL might elect its own separate grand duke, since the King and Grand Duke Sigismund August was childless, hence, ending the Jagiellonian dynasty. The Polish nobility is also said to have expected to acquire territorial property and offices in the GDL, which, until then, were prohibited from obtaining by the Lithuanian Statute, and to have annexed the southern territories of the GDL. After having stated these primary reasons for the union, the textbook concludes that “the Poles sought to annex and make Lithuania part of Poland. The Lithuanians were afraid to lose sovereignty, wanted to arrange an equal union” (222). The latter statement succinctly sums up the Lithuanian narrative of the Union of Lublin.

The difficult negotiations between Poland and the GDL are described by stressing how the two sides could not agree on the model of the new state: Poland sought to annex the GDL to Poland, whereas the GDL resisted this project and sought to conclude a union of two equal states. The Polish nobility together with the King and Grand Duke Sigismund August are said to put pressure on the Lithuanians by breaking the pledge of the grand duke and annexing the southern territories of the GDL to Poland. The textbook explains

\textsuperscript{53} It needs to be pointed out that the question whether the retreat of the Lithuanian troops was a pre-planned simulated strategy or an actual withdrawal has been a point of contention between Polish and Lithuanian historiography for centuries. In the Polish historiography, the Lithuanian tactical maneuver has been interpreted as an actual withdrawal from the battlefield, yielding to the advance of the Teutonic army. This interpretation originates from the chronicle written by the Polish historian Jan Długosz (1415–1480), who provided a vivid description of how the Lithuanian troops fled from the battlefield after one hour of fighting (Ekdahl 2010). The long-standing disagreement between Polish and Lithuanian historians came to a turning point when, in 1962, Sven Ekdahl, a Swedish historian, found a letter in archives in Germany, disproving the claims of Długosz that Lithuanians fled the battlefield of Grunwald, succumbing to the Teutonic Knights’ pressure. According to Ekdahl, the letter, addressed to the Great Master of the Teutonic Order, was written by a high ranking military officer several years after the battle. It warns the Great Master about the tactics of a feigned retreat of the Lithuanian army and reminds that the Lithuanians had used the very same tactics in the Battle of Grunwald (Ekdahl 2010).
that the Lithuanians considered starting a war against Poland, but in the end had to conclude that the country was unable to wage two wars simultaneously (223).

A commentary of the Lithuanian historian Zigmantas Kiaupa is inserted as a supplementary source in which he states that

> [t]he events of 1569 did not cause unrest, serious resistance. Societies, which lived side by side and were governed by one sovereign got considerably acquainted with each other, had things to adopt from each other. Lithuania was worn out by the difficult war with Russia. Therefore, after the experience of more than one hundred years of close relations with Poland, the union did not frighten the Lithuanian politicians and the nobility. What was argued persistently concerned its character; the Lithuanian’s own conception of the union was defended. (224)

This passage reveals a moderate view of the union where it is stressed that the GDL was itself interested in concluding the union and that the disagreement was mainly about the type of the union to be implemented. The overall conclusion that the textbook draws is that the union made both Lithuania and Poland stronger and enabled both countries to resist Muscovy more effectively (224). The Union of Lublin put constraints on the sovereignty of the GDL, but did not abolish its statehood, since the Grand Duchy of Lithuania continued to preserve its own autonomous territory, borders, laws, judiciary system, army and treasury (224).

The textbook touches on the topic of Polonization of the Lithuanian gentry by pointing out that

> a person of each epoch has his/her own sense of history. The gentry of the GDL were thinking in a different way than us. People now understand the Lithuanian nation as speaking Lithuanian. The gentry of the GDL grounded their Lithuanianness and Lithuanian patriotism not on language, but on citizenship. (228)

In the 16th century, the gentry of the GDL, who had their origins in different Lithuanian or Belarusian regions, spoke diverse languages, and had different religions, all identified themselves as Lithuanian. Even though the gentry largely adopted Polish language, they made a clear distinction between themselves as Lithuanian citizens and Polish gentry. But already in the 17th century, as the textbook explains, the Lithuanian gentry nation began to lose its separate political consciousness. The Commonwealth, and not the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, was increasingly conceived of as the fatherland of the gentry (241). The Lithuanian gentry no longer resisted their fellow Polish gentrymen, who sought to hold political office in the Grand Duchy (241).

The rule of gentry in the 17th and 18th centuries is strongly criticized in the textbook. The gentry is said to be only concerned with maintaining and defending their rights and freedoms. However, the gentry ignored the interests of the Commonwealth, which eventually plunged into complete anarchy and political paralysis (242).

The textbook assessment of the Polish role in Lithuanian history acknowledges explicitly in what ways Lithuania benefited from rapprochement with Poland and the ensuing Europeanization, but it does not shy away from identifying less desirable
developments and influences after the 1569 Union of Lublin. There is a distinct attempt to SMOOTH OVER THE CORNERS in the portrayal of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past.

6.3.1.3 Textbook IV: SMOOTHING OVER THE CORNERS of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past


The 9th-grade course focuses on Lithuanian and world history during the period from the end of the 18th century to 1918.

The adoption of the Constitution of May 3 in 1791, the first written constitution in Europe, is considered as a remarkable achievement, which was significant not only for Poland, but also for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (40). The textbook explains that even though the Constitution abolished the dualism of Poland and Lithuania, and referred to the shared state as the Republic of Poland, the representatives of the GDL protested against this formulation. Furthermore, they achieved that an addendum be added to the Constitution, the Mutual Pledge of the Two Nations, which would be adopted shortly thereafter. The Mutual Pledge reaffirmed the unity and indivisibility of the state, while consisting of its two united members – the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The textbook, thus, underlines that “the Constitution of May 3 is also the Constitution of the GDL” and since it was translated into the Lithuanian language, it was the first political document written in Lithuanian (40). This straightforward affirmation of the Constitution as equally significant to Lithuania is a departure from the traditional romantic historiographical narrative, according to which the Constitution, which spoke only of the Republic of Poland, signified the loss of the official state dualism and thus contributed to the dissipation of separate Lithuanian political consciousness.

Although it is acknowledged that University of Vilnius functioned in the Polish language in the first half of the 19th century, it is described as “the centre of Lithuanian culture” (78). The textbook gives a detailed description of Romanticism in Lithuania, how it encouraged historians, writers, and painters to become interested in the Lithuanian past and to start collecting folk tales and songs, write works of literature devoted to the Lithuanian past. The fact that historical and literary works were created in Polish is not made problematic. The textbook explains that the educated people typically used Polish (78) and mentions historical and literary works of Teodor Narbutt, Ignacy Kraszewski, and Adam Mickiewicz.

Subsequently, the textbook clarifies that the Polish-speaking Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Słowacki, Władysław Syrokomla, perceived themselves as the successors of the
former GDL tradition, as citizens and patriots of the GDL (83). The textbooks authors try to reconcile the old and new forms of the Lithuanian national consciousness by showing how both of these contributed to the Lithuanian national revival. This is clearly seen in a table, which identifies the “awakeners of the Lithuanian national consciousness in the first half of the 19th century.” In the table, next to representatives of the ethnolinguistic Lithuanian nationalism, such as Simonas Daukantas and Motiejus Valančius, we find the names of Polish-speaking Mickiewicz, Słowacki, Syrokomla, Narbutt, or the representatives of the old Lithuanian patriotism who identified with the tradition of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (83). Pupils are asked to consider why people, who originated from diverse places and wrote in different languages (the table provides information about each “awakener’s” territorial origins and language), all identified themselves as Lithuanian. They have to indicate how the contemporary conception of the Lithuanian nationality differs from the conception of the first half of the 19th century (86). In the section designated to an overview of the most important information of the larger chapter, pupils are again asked to list the activists of Lithuania, who wrote in Polish, but celebrated Lithuania (98). This means that the personalities of Mickiewicz, Słowacki, and Narbutt become important to remember as part of Lithuanian history. I would argue that this constitutes a concrete example of how the textbook attempts to SMOOTH OVER THE CORNERS (more on this metaphor in Section 6.3.2) of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past and, more importantly, how it seeks to convey to pupils the idea of identity as dynamic movement along a PATH. The paradigmatic narrative change in the textbook seems to hinge on these two metaphors.

Considering the re-evaluation of the Constitution of May 3 and the Polish-speaking “Old Lithuanians,” the portrayal of 19th-century Lithuanian history in this textbook is aligned with the historiography of Alfredas Bumblauskas.

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54 For example, Adam Mickiewicz, although often identified as a symbol of Polish nationalism, cannot be neatly categorized as an adherent to any of the modern nationalisms. Born in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the present-day Belarus, he was a citizen of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and thus espoused a different identity constellation. He saw no contradiction in the fact that he was a patriot of Lithuania, which he considered to be his homeland, but at the same time expressed his love for Lithuania in Polish, typically exemplified by the following famous passage from “Pan Tadeusz”: “Litwo! Ojczyzno moja! ty jesteś jak zdrowie; ile cię trzeba cenić, ten tylko się dowie, kto cię stracił. (“Lithuania, my fatherland! You are like health; How much you must be valued, will only be discovered, By the one who has lost you.” The textbook “Laikas” for the 9th grade contains a whole separate section about the life of Mickiewicz and acknowledges the multidimensional nature of his identity.

55 It was Bumblauskas, who first proposed the distinction between the “Old Lithuanians” (senalietuviai) and the “Young Lithuanians” (jaunalietuviai). “Old Lithuanians” denote the Polish-speaking gentry, loyal to the tradition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, either in the form of a federation or a unitary state, nevertheless, considering themselves to be Lithuanian. “Young Lithuanians,” by contrast, based their identity on language and ethnic identity, thus, challenging the “Old Lithuanians” and their conception of Lithuanianness. The textbook series “Laikas” acknowledges these differences, yet does not exclude the Polish-speaking gentry from the narration of Lithuanian history.
6.3.1.4 Textbook V: The SPLIT of the nation


A novelty in this textbook is a separate chapter on the formation of modern Lithuanian, Polish, and Belarusian nations. The chapter is metaphorically titled “The split nation” (192–195). It is rich in ideas, arguments, and written and oral sources that reveal identity transformations of concrete people. The textbook initially describes how the eastern parts of Lithuania underwent intensive processes of Slavicization. Eastern Lithuanian villages came under the influence of the Belarusian language due to the territorial proximity of Belarusian settlements (192). Over time, villagers of Eastern Lithuania developed the so-called “simple language,” or “po prostu,” which was a form of the Belarusian language with a strong admixture of Polish and Lithuanian words (192). According to the textbook, the Polish language took hold of the urban areas at first, but later spread to countryside villages through the manors of Polonized nobility and churches. It is claimed that, in the second half of the 19th century, the Slavicization of villages of Eastern Lithuania increased twofold (193). It is explained that “peasants could not comprehend that the change of language changes nationality. They continued to hold themselves as Lithuanian, former inhabitants of the GDL, hence, “locals” – tutejsi [R.K. – from Polish “locals”]. Only later, convinced by priests and landlords, did they become “simple language”-speaking Poles” (193).

Written sources, which are inserted in this chapter, reflect different ideas as to what comprises the Lithuanian identity. One source, dating from 1863, refers to a Lithuanian as somebody who believes in freedom, follows the rules of the Third Lithuanian Statute, and lives in harmony with the Poles (193). Another account from the memoirs of Vincas Kudirka from the end of the 19th century already presents an ethnolinguistic conception of identity (193). Students are asked to compare them and detect differences. Yet another excerpt from an ethnographic interview conducted in 1885 reveals how the identity of an interviewed shoemaker does not correspond to modern “singular” conceptions of identity (219). When asked by the interviewer about his “breed,” the shoemaker responds that he is Catholic. Religion is the primary defining feature of his identity rather than ethnic belonging. Then the ethnographer specifies that what he wishes to know is whether the shoemaker is Lithuanian or Polish. The latter replies that he is both. The ethnographer’s response is “That does not happen. You can either be one or the other,” to which the shoemaker responds that he speaks both Polish and Lithuanian (219). These sources are valuable, even if fragmentary, testimonies of the lived dimension of identity and nationality. They reveal the complexity of identity transformations as experienced by different people and as shaped by the imperatives of modern national movements. They also give a sense of how identity is a dynamic movement contingent upon interaction with one’s environment rather than a reductive, fixed essence.
The main axis of the chapter is the relation between the Polish-speaking “Old Lithuanians” and the Lithuanian-speaking “Young Lithuanians.” It is acknowledged that, under the influence of Romantic ideas, the activists of the Lithuanian national movement began to idealize the history of Lithuania before the Union of Lublin and rejected the rich cultural heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: “The activists of the Lithuanian national revival rescued the Lithuanian nation from extinction, but, by rejecting everything that was Polish, they consciously declined the rich heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth” (195). The conflict between Polish-speaking “Old Lithuanians” and the modern Lithuanian national movement is presented by trying to convey how each of these internally diverse groups perceived their situation. There is an attempt to avoid a BLACK AND WHITE rendering of historical processes and to SMOOTH OVER THE CORNERS between conflicting accounts of the past. Since part of the Polish press and Polish-speaking nobility reacted negatively to the national aspirations of Lithuanians and pejoratively referred to them as “Litvomaniacs,” the Lithuanians reacted defensively and refused to accept, as Lithuanian, those who did not speak the language (194). “The Polish-speaking residents of Lithuania” are said to find themselves at “a crossroads of a painful choice” (194). The textbook, however, clearly aims to shift the uniformly negative image of the Polish-speaking Lithuanian nobility and instead provide a more nuanced explanation of their lifeworld:

The majority of the Lithuanian noblemen were sincere patriots of their country: They grieved over the destiny of Lithuania; if called a Pole, many got offended. However, it was difficult for them to disavow the Polish language, to forget the past of the noble Commonwealth. The noblemen were convinced that only they were capable of governing their future’s destiny. Many could not even imagine that they should share this duty with the Lithuanian intelligentsia originating from the countryside. (194)

The textbook asserts that a multinational state can endure only under the condition that its constituent nations trust each other and do not despise each other’s rights (195). The Poles, however, “did not recognize the right of Lithuanians to decide their own destiny” (195). The metaphor of PATH emerges in the following passage, which describes how the Lithuanian nation, as a result, SPLIT into two BRANCHES:

Not being able to decide which path to follow, the nation split. A part of it decisively chose Lithuanianness and flowed into the Lithuanian national revival and modern Lithuanian nation. The destiny of those residents, who no longer felt themselves as being a branch of the same nation, became distant to their people, set differently. They unconditionally flowed into the modern Polish nation. The reviving nation experienced huge losses because of this Slavicization; it lost a big part of its society, the intelligentsia. (194–195)

Polish-speaking Lithuanians, which merged into the modern Polish nation, are introduced as people who were forced to make a choice under unfavorable circumstances, who were at a CROSSROADS of a PAINFUL choice. They envisioned a different PATH for the Lithuanian nation. Kapleris also used the metaphor of PATH in the interview in a very similar sense, when talking about value choices in the textbook. Decisions on how to make sense of past experience also implies a choice of the PATH to be followed. The “Old”
and the “Young Lithuanians” came to a crossroads where they had to make a choice, causing the paths to branch out in different directions.

The textbook presentation aligns with the intention of Kapleris, as stated in the interview, to reframe the conception of Lithuanian history, especially in relation to the shared Polish-Lithuanian past. There seems to be a conscious effort to shift away from the exclusively negative, accusatory portrayal of the Polish-speaking “Old Lithuanians” and to empathize (not sympathize!) with their trajectory of experience, to understand how this experience subsequently shaped their reaction to the rise of the modern Lithuanian nation. In other words, the textbook combines, in an embodied way, the presentation of divergent perspectives with a discussion of a process of lived experience out of which it emerges. The same empathetic attitude applies to the “Young Lithuanians” whose disavowal of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is regarded critically, but introduced as understandable under the adverse conditions at the time. In fact, the main text and the chosen excerpts from written and oral sources allow interpreting the 19th century split between Lithuanians and Poles as to a great extent caused by the inability and unwillingness to relate to each other’s lifeworlds and lived experience. This lack of metaphorical, partial, empathetic identification led to a splitting of the nation, transforming the two branches of the same nation into two different kinds of nations. Following alternate paths transformed a difference of degree into a difference of kinds. The textbook authors regret the splitting as a tremendous loss of rich cultural heritage as well as of an important part of society, thus embracing the Polish-Lithuanian shared past as part of the Lithuanian past.

6.3.2 Ignas Kapleris: Limits of multiperspectivity: Textbook as a guide-post

Even if Kapleris is generally supportive of multiperspectivity in school-history education, he is, however, cautious about how far the multiperspectivity can go in the presentation of the past. In this sense, his understanding comes very close to the views of Litvinaitė and, to some extent, to those of Brazauskas, too, who also believed that pupils do not have the resources and cognitive capabilities to adjudicate among different evaluations or narratives. According to this view, textbooks, together with guidance provided by teachers, should lead pupils in the right direction. The main point is that there are certain events in the past whose evaluation cannot be left to “hang freely” in the textbook. The textbook should serve the function of a guide-post in terms of how certain events should be assessed or evaluated. Values, in these cases, are not a matter of arbitrary choice because it has to do with painful or tragic experience.

R.K. It is written in the textbook that we always write history from the present perspective, that every generation re-writes history and that views on the past change. An observation was associated with it that “there are things which historians evaluate differently and therefore one needs to not only learn during lessons why, what, where and when something happened, but also to critically reason whether the events of history are explained convincingly.” So if there are different interpretations, how should pupils select among them?
Of course, they should look at justification, but still, you see, in the lesson, even when a pupil chooses, there should be a guide-post for him. A textbook should still say something: which interpretation? […] Which one is closer to the view of our state? There needs to be a prompt. Also, from the stance of the teacher, we also think that we leave a space for the teacher. Still, the child will not make conclusions on his own, well, maybe he will make, but there needs to be some sort of direction. Let’s imagine a situation that, for example, there is a speech about the events of January 13th\textsuperscript{56} and we put two interpretations. We put the reminiscences of the people who stood by the TV tower and we put the rubbish of Paleckis. A child might not distinguish where the truth is. You see. He was not on the January 13th by the tower. He did not see all those emotions and how it was. He will read two analogous texts and he, only unless he asks the parents, can tell what the truth is. (P 2: 2:14)

The example of the events in January 1991 is one of these historical events, which brings up the question of historical truth particularly forcefully. On the one hand, the meaning and truth of these events are inseparable from the lived experience of thousands of people who took part in them.\textsuperscript{57} On the other hand, the most well-known case in Lithuania of opposition to the widely accepted evaluation of the January events in 1991 is Algirdas Paleckis, the leader of the Socialist People’s Front. He claimed that he had found witnesses and evidence, which indicated that it was not the Soviet troops, who were shooting at the people by the TV tower. Rather, he argued that there had been secret snipers on the rooftop of the TV center shooting at the people, drawing a conclusion that “our own people were shooting at their natives.”\textsuperscript{58}

If you offer these two interpretations in the textbook as equally plausible perspectives, according to Kapleris, a pupil may not be able to figure out what the truth is. A pupil did not experience the events in question, participate in and feel the atmosphere of the events. A pupil does not have access to many different sources and testimonies to make up his or her mind. This passage reveals that the process of lived experience, in fact, is seen as the source of truth by Kapleris. The perspective of Paleckis is, on the other hand, based on a very different source of evidence. Paleckis relies on ballistic expertise to argue that the bullets could not have been fired by the Soviet troops on the ground, but Paleckis’ evidence-based justification is completely at odds with the lived experience of the

\textsuperscript{56} On January 13th, 1991, in the aftermath of the Act of the Re-Establishment of the State of Lithuania, pro-Kremlin forces, backed by the Soviet military, tried to take power in Lithuania. Lithuanian protesters formed a human shield to protect a radio and television center from Soviet forces in the capital Vilnius. More than a dozen people were crushed by Soviet tanks or shot to death, around seven hundred people were injured. Following these attacks, large crowds of people also formed a shield around the Supreme Council building. Despite columns of military trucks and tanks moving into the vicinity of the Supreme Council, the Soviet military forces retreated.

\textsuperscript{57} My understanding is that when Lithuanians speak about the truth of the January events, they usually have in mind the highly emotionally charged lived truth, the experience which they had undergone by either taking part in the events directly or closely following the events in the media and feeling distressed.

\textsuperscript{58} In 2011, Lithuanian authorities had initiated prosecution against Paleckis for his alleged denial of Soviet aggression against Lithuania. In January 2012, a Vilnius court vindicated Paleckis, but the prosecutor appealed and Paleckis was sentenced to pay a fine for denying the Soviet aggression of 1991.
Lithuanian participants. Nor is Paleckis concerned with the lived experience of the events, when he articulates his narrative. Disembodied evidence stands against the embodied lived experience in this illuminating controversy over historical truth, which can be compared to many similar and much more tragic cases of aggression.\[^{59}\]

Kapleris continues to elaborate on his notion of historical truth by providing a concrete example from a history exercise book for 12th-grade pupils (2:15). Pupils are asked to compare and assess the truthfulness of two texts. The first text is written by a retired KGB colonel, Michail Golovatov, who was in charge of the Russian Special Forces squad during the January events in Vilnius and who advances the same version of the events as Algirdas Paleckis. The second text is an account of the events as experienced by a Lithuanian participant who was shot by the TV tower and remained permanently crippled due to injuries done to his legs. Historical truth acquires a literally embodied, fleshly nature in this enlightening example where a physical injury serves as a tangible, real link between the past reality and its narrated meaning. Embodiment in this case attests against the arbitrariness of interpretation of the past and links memory to life, to lived experience. Truth is not something that is limited to the capacity of words and sentences, or propositional statements, to mirror the reality “out there,” but extends to corporeal experience in which the past is presently felt.

We put a task in the exercise book of “Laikas 12” where they had to distinguish between a lie and the truth. A text is given of Golovatov that snipers were shooting from the rooftops of Karoliniškės\[^{60}\] and there is a recollection of ours, of our Lithuanian, with legs shot through who became a cripple for an entire life. There he writes concretely, who beat him and from whom he received a bullet. (P 2: 2:15)

The latter passage in the interview also highlights how problematic the distinction between facts and values is in our attempts to make sense of the past. The truth of the January events in 1991 brings up the question whether it is possible to neatly distinguish between reason and emotion, or thought and feeling, as the entrenched dichotomies of Western ways of thinking would suggest.\[^{61}\]

In the following passage, I further inquire into how the relation between facts and values in history is understood by the textbook author. The way in which I formulate my question, below, betrays how difficult it is to avoid ocularcentric vocabulary. My metaphor of LOOKING AT the past is quickly picked up and used by Kapleris in his

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\[^{59}\] In this regard, I find that the methodology of the Holocaust studies can be illuminating in the pursuit of truth, with the emphasis on the experience and testimony of individuals as a significant source of truth about the past, as opposed to exclusive reliance on disembodied factual information to be assembled into a historical narration.

\[^{60}\] A district in Vilnius in which the TV tower is located.

\[^{61}\] These dichotomies stem from a metaphysical dualism between mind and body and they have a profound impact on how we regard knowledge of the past (Johnson 2007). On an embodied account of knowledge, affective patterns of our encounter and engagement with the environment become inseparable from knowledge and underlie the processes of reason and thought.
response, which confirms the pervasiveness of the vision-based metaphorical model of cognition in our everyday metaphysics. In the way I frame the question, we look at the past as distanced spectators, but at the same time our glance is not neutral. We look at the past normatively, as if through a lens of values we hold to be important. Kapleris notes that immediately after the re-establishment of Lithuanian independence a vacuum formed: Nobody, not even historians, knew how to evaluate the past.

R.K. There are often such narratives which match in terms of facts, but the evaluations are very different. Are these differences a consequence of a certain kind of wrong, mistaken interpretation or do they follow from the way in which we look at the past in terms of values?

Of course, there is one thing how we look at the past in terms of values and how we evaluate certain periods, certain events of ours. […] A vacuum formed after the recovery of independence at our place [in Lithuania]. The historians were lost and we did not know how to evaluate our history. The partisans were bandits in the Soviet period, then they suddenly became heroes. Which path to choose and how to present this to a pupil? I can give a concrete example. We presented that the armed resistance to the occupant is a positive thing, but certainly there occurred, as we know, the murders of families. Pupils have a personal experience having talked to the parents, grandparents, learning that there were also negative aspects, but these negative aspects do not grow over/Hide the phenomenon itself – the armed resistance toward the occupant. And exactly in such places we try to find a certain relation to the Soviet reality. Now many say: “It was better to live in Russian times,” but we try to show, because children did not experience the Soviet period, that it was after all not better. (P 2: 2:16)

The metaphor of a vacuum implies a void, a space devoid of matter, an emptiness, absence, groundlessness. Before new interpretations and assessments emerged, there was a temporary transitional period of emptiness, without a clear grounding effect of values, evoking a feeling of being lost. Values provide grounding and orientation for group identity and as long as values were not elucidated historians and society were lost. I find that Kapleris’s metaphors of vacuum and being lost bear a relation to the metaphors of foundations, roots (Brazauskas) and the boundless ocean of history (Litvinaitė) in terms of how they highlight the spatial organization of time and the position of the self in relation to that spatial time. Values serve as foundations and as roots which fasten a person’s identity onto a firm ground, prevent him or her from getting lost in an empty void, from disappearing into nothingness, from perishing in the boundless ocean. Values establish a sense of self, persisting through time, and help cope with change. When previously officially recognized values are abruptly dismantled, as in the aftermath of the re-establishment of Lithuanian statehood, it creates a sense of groundlessness and the need to reconsider what it means to be a Lithuanian. A necessity emerges to make sense of the trajectory of lived experience in light of the most recent transformation of transaction between self and environment. Values play a key role in this process of meaning-making and self-understanding.

Choosing values also means choosing a path to follow. If you convey certain values in the textbook, you also guide pupils onto a particular path. A textbook is a guide-post.
along a journey of life and cognition. Whereas the metaphors of FOUNDATIONS and ROOTS imply an association between values and fixation, stasis, or grounding, the metaphor of a PATH implies dynamic movement. It brings to mind Tim Ingold’s metaphorical association between a life and a line, along which it is lived:

Life on the spot surely cannot yield an experience of place, of being somewhere. To be a place, every somewhere must lie on one or several paths of movement to and from places elsewhere. Life is lived, I reasoned, along paths, not just in places, and paths are lines of a sort. It is along paths, too, that people grow into a knowledge of the world around them, and describe this world in the stories they tell. (Ingold 2007, 2)

Lives are lived along paths and so the choice of values does not have to indicate a static attachment or fixed grounding. Values put you onto a path, but the path is that of growth and movement: “It is rather a line that grows, issuing forth from its advancing tip rather like a root or creeper probes the earth” (Ingold 2007, 118). There is a path dependency, but it does not rigidly pre-determine where you will find yourself along the journey. The past guides the movement, but the future is open for the process of life. In this understanding, identity is always in the making: it does not exist as a thing-like substance, in a fixed and final form. Identity is a verb (Ingold 2015).

The passage above (2:16) also demonstrates that Kapleris reinstates the importance of the truth of the past as lived experience, but contests the weight or accuracy of certain memories. As children who go to school today have not personally experienced what it was like to live in the Soviet period, Kapleris fears that they might be influenced by those who claim that it was better to live back then than in independent Lithuania. The goal of his textbook is therefore to convey that life in the Soviet regime was worse than life in contemporary Lithuania. Later in the interview, Kapleris also comments that, in this regard, he is fully aware how textbook writing is not just a commercial activity, but also a political activity (2:21). By authoring a textbook, Kapleris engages in “information warfare” (2:21). A textbook is a RETORT to the Russian propaganda, which is widely disseminated through different media channels (2:21). It is an instrument of “information warfare,” where the war itself is characterized by Kapleris as a CARD GAME. Since the other player is not playing by the rules, the reasoning goes, then Lithuania has to adjust and react accordingly, otherwise it will lose the GAME (2:21).

Mälksoo (2015) characterizes this connection between public remembrance and state security as “mnemonic security” – the idea that distinct understandings of the past should be fixed in public remembrance and consciousness in order to buttress an actor’s stable sense of self as the basis of its political agency” (222). Mälksoo (2015) argues that securitization and legal juridification of historical memory by means of “memory laws” only lead to new security dilemmas and reinforce historical animosities. The use of metaphors, such as “information warfare,” organizes the conflict of historical narratives as a mutually exclusive, zero-sum game, in which securitization of one narrative is automatically assumed to negate the security of the other narrative. It enhances attachment to a rigid, static conception of identity.

In relation to the memory of lived experience, Kapleris acknowledges that, despite the official praise and “heroization” of the post-war guerilla war against the Soviet regime in
contemporary Lithuania, some partisans executed brutal actions towards civilians. The case of armed resistance to the Soviet regime serves as a good example to illustrate how an embodied account of cognition may serve in handling plurality of evaluations. The complexity of past reality requires that cognition proceeds in comprehensive terms and gives emphasis to how individual lived experience(s) relate to larger-scale phenomena or processes. Rather than having to select one viewpoint, from which to evaluate armed resistance to the Soviet regime, teachers and pupils would need to comprehend past reality as a complex system, with multiple diverse experiences interconnecting with each other and with multiple layers of complexity at which the phenomenon can be examined. Understanding a plurality of interpretations requires comprehensive thinking skills (being able to relate parts to wholes, understanding relations and interconnections between them, identifying different levels of complexity) as opposed to solely differentiative thinking skills (reduction, specialized focus on isolated parts).

The way in which mimesis as difference, or the arbitrariness of the meaning of the past, is further dismantled, when one engages the past as lived experience, is discussed in the following excerpt. The meaning of certain events of the past is not arbitrary, especially when it has to do with a painful and tragic past.

*R.K. This textbook often speaks about objectivity, truth, falsification of facts, but don’t you think that we should also direct the critical view towards ourselves in terms of how we evaluate the past? How would you describe the truth?*

You see, the objective truth does not exist. That’s one thing. […] You see, what confusion we would cause. Imagine: a text in a textbook, in which we write in the end: “You know, dear reader, dear pupils, that which is written here can be interpreted in different ways and perhaps that which is written here in the textbook is not the truth.” We would cause a light storm in his mind. So what then is the truth? If he raises some kind of philosophical questions, he can do very well without the help of textbook authors. He can look critically at the text and that’s great. But we cannot, let’s say… doubt certain things. About the 13th of January or other painful moments of Lithuanian history and convey them as a row of interpretations. Or the Holocaust. In our textbook everything is very well thought out and given from a certain self-critical Lithuanian perspective. We have a completely new treatment of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, compared to what there had been in the previous textbook, purely according to the Sapokian version, that Piłsudski is equal to Hitler and Stalin. We presented this, we tried to smooth certain corners out. (P 2: 2:23)

Kapleris is in agreement with both Brazauskas and Litvinaitė arguing that painful past cannot be interpreted in just any way one wishes to make sense of it. The experience of the Holocaust or January the 13th, 1991, is too tragic to relativize it by arguing that it can be emplotted in a number of different ways. I would argue that the limits of interpretation derive from the concrete embodied experience of these events, which is not just a fabricated internalized mental image, which is separate from the reality out there and, therefore, treated as subjective, unreliable, and relative. Meaning-making which derives from the body and which is lived in the flesh illuminates the limitations of the postmodern and disembodied truth as difference. The meaning of the painful past is a bodily-lived meaning. The past, which is painful cannot be understood as an externalized,
disembodied spatial terrain which has nothing to do with the cognizing self. The PAINFUL past is part of the self as a process. Although pain can sometimes be seen as a purely bodily phenomenon and, hence, as pre-linguistic and without any meaning, the fact that we make sense of the past using the metaphor of pain shows that sensation and emotion, percept and concept combine in the experience of pain. Pain is a physiological and an emotional experience. Pain is permeated by meaning and pain can be shared: “Although everyday-world language has trouble describing the lived experience encountered […], if it is allowed to metaphorize pain, then it becomes adequate to the task” (Jackson 1994, 214; cf. Bourke 2014). Metaphor does not provide a description of pain, but rather permits an embodied, affective, experiential understanding of what it feels like – as in, for example, the metaphor of “seeing stars” to express a sharp, intense pain (Scarry 1985, 30). Even if pain can obliterate everyday-language and present obstacles to communication in non-metaphorical ways, pain always has meaning (Jackson 1994, 214).

A defensive, aggravated reaction elicited by contestation or denial of a group’s PAINFUL past is exacerbated by a commonplace misconception that pain is an essentially private, subjective experience and, as a result of these qualities, is not real. Defensive behavior, seeking to acquire formal recognition of particular painful experience on the part of the sufferer, is then a way of acquiring an intersubjective validation of one’s experience. It is not a coincidence that Kapleris juxtaposes the January events in 1991 in Lithuania with the experience of the Holocaust. He uses the Holocaust as a supporting analogy to convey the normative idea that the painful experience of the January events cannot be questioned or doubted.62

6.3.2.1 Textbook I: The changing GAZE at the past


The 7th grade history course focuses on ancient history, which is not specifically at the focus of my analysis. What interests me, rather, is the introductory chapter, which describes what history is, what purposes history serves and how historians work.

62 It is as if painful experience lacks reality until it is formally recognized or seen. But as the interview with Jūratė Litvinaitė already revealed, the past, when it is immortalized as an abstracted substance and cemented into a pattern of invariant reproduction, hoping it would strengthen the group identity, loses its relevance to pupils if it is not re-interpreted in the face of changing, ongoing experience in the present. The paradoxical effect of rigid fixation of the truth of the past endangers identity rather than strengthens it; it induces disaffection. At the same time, there remains a concrete need to make sense of the past as lived experience and to provide a textbook narrative, which would be inclusive to different (shifting) experiences and memories of the past, but would nevertheless set limits to hate speech and historical negation. The decision about the limits of inclusiveness cannot be made on the basis of general rules or standards; it requires that each case be assessed in its particular complexity.
The very first thing, which the textbook mentions about historians’ interests, is that “it is very important for history specialists to lay out all events and phenomena in a row, determine relations, links and follow the development” (6). The metaphors of this statement reveal a linear conception of temporal change, where all events and phenomena can be located on a straight line of time. History is a row of events. The relations and links between different events and phenomena can then be mapped in terms of linear causality.

The textbook seeks to elucidate why history matters and what it can teach, echoing the pedagogical concerns and aims of Litvinaitė, who also stressed how important it is to explain to pupils how they can benefit from learning history.

A glance/gaze at the past allows one to better comprehend our present. We can evaluate the present-day life conditions only if we know why they have formed this way and not in some other way. If we want to explain the origin of current conflicts and offer ways to peacefully regulate them, we need to inquire into the causes of such disagreements, which often hide in the past. By the way, we ourselves, our reasoning and behavior, language and lifestyle are also an outcome of the long development of humanity. (7)

The first thing that bears attending in this passage is that historians’ efforts to understand the past are achieved through a glance/gaze at the past. The Lithuanian word “žvilgsnis” does not make a clear differentiation between a glance and a gaze. A gaze is more intense, purposeful and inquiring than a brief, passing glance. Since the excerpt describes an active, investigative attitude towards the past, I am inclined to interpret the metaphor as gazing at the past. What this ocularcentric metaphor implies is that the past is distanced from the self of the spectator.

On the other hand, the textbook also emphasizes connections between the past and the present: how the present is shaped by the past and how human beings themselves are an outcome of a long process of development that unraveled in the past. This immediately brings the past closer to the cognizing self and its ways of life. It renders the past present in a person’s ways of thinking, behaving, and living. The past, then, is not distinctly separate from the present; it carries on and persists in the present. A tension emerges between these two different ways of seeing the past in the textbook explanation, which distances the past from the cognizing self and, at the same time, weaves the past into the fabric of the present.

Another instance of how the textbook contests an ocularcentric, spatial, mimetic understanding of historical knowledge appears in the following passage. Historical knowledge is compared in a simile to a human being who gets old as time flows. As the process of life proceeds, knowledge is continuously reshaped. New aspects and layers of the past become relevant. The same way a human being keeps changing in the process of life and cognition, so, too, what is considered as valuable knowledge of the past changes. Knowledge emerges out of the process of human development.

The textbook provides a concrete example of how historical knowledge is changing over time by highlighting that, in the past, the discipline of history mainly focused on political and military history, or the deeds of “great men,” whereas today historians, it is underlined, also “see” the history of children, women, and the daily life. The latter aspects
of the past, however, appear as somewhat secondary or auxiliary to the political and military history of men: women, children, and the daily life are said to have existed and lived next to the important historical events. Heroic deeds are still regarded as the most important; only now they are supplemented with the "other side" of history.

The textbook encourages pupils to direct a critical gaze at the historically changing conception of what constitutes important historical knowledge and shifting forms of pedagogy. Whereas previously the standard learning approach was to hammer the dates of battles or years of rule of kings and emperors, today this kind of knowledge is not valued as much. The textbook mentions that "if you glanced at a history textbook of your parents or even an older one, you would be convinced that history was taught differently earlier" (7). Below the main text, an illustration shows three different history textbooks, which were and are used in Lithuanian schools from the years 1923, 1972, and 2004, respectively. Pupils are given a task to talk to their family members and ask them about how they were taught history.

Historians’ efforts are compared to detective work in a simile: "archaeologists and historians like detectives search for footprints of the past, examine, assess them and make conclusions on the basis of accumulated evidence" (8). The past itself is gone, but it leaves footprints or trails which historians seek to understand and make sense of. It implies that the past is gone and what is left is its traces. The passages below specify how exactly historians pursue their detective work.

Historical work is said to be unimaginable without historical sources and source criticism. In Lithuanian, a historian leans on the sources when she refers to them. Sources provide solid ground to hold onto, to lean on; they serve as a foundation or a basis for further work and interpretation. Source criticism is followed by comparative analysis of sources seeking to determine what happened. When the information is lacking from historical sources, historians-scientists request the help of other related fields, like ethnography or archaeology. Emphasis is given to primarily textual sources.

Often historians write differently about the same events: Some explain in one way, others – in another way. Everyone can have their own opinion in a free society, which they try to prove. Such different explanations are called “interpretations.” Scientists discuss debatable issues in conferences, seminars, or write about them in the scientific press.

In this textbook, there, too, are issues, which historians evaluate differently. Thus one needs to learn in history lessons not only why, what, when and where something happened. It is especially important to raise questions, think critically about whether certain historical
events are explained convincingly, what consequences they had for the next generations, what their meaning is to us. (9)

Crucially, the textbook points out that historians interpret the past in different ways. Historians have a right to stand by their own opinion just like everyone else in a free society.

The textbook shows a perceivable critical attempt to move away from a form of pedagogical instruction, exclusively focused on “factology,” rote memorization of factual details, and the political history of “great men.” Despite this, certain epistemological and ethical tensions, which will show markedly in the textbooks for more advanced grades, is already apparent here in this early introductory chapter of the 7th grade textbook. One of these tensions has to do with contradictory ways of seeing the past. The metaphors which are employed in the text either distance the past from the spectator or permit the knower to engage with the past, to recognize how the past is present. The metaphors conceptualize the past either as spatially organized, linear, and sequentially segmented change, or as a complex process of life, which weaves into the present.

6.3.3 Ignas Kapleris: SMOOTHING OVER sharp CORNERS?

Kapleris argued that his textbooks adopt a self-critical attitude towards the past, especially in relation to the treatment of the Polish-Lithuanian shared history. He sought to SMOOTH OVER sharp CORNERS and re-assess the role of Poland in Lithuanian history. Countering the patriotic historiographical narrative of Šapoka means that he needed to re-evaluate the person of Pilsudski and question the widespread belief that the meaning of Pilsudski’s actions is tantamount to that of Hitler’s or Stalin’s actions. In the interview, I sought to get insight into what motivated Kapleris to present the 1920 Polish-Lithuanian conflict over the city of Vilnius in a particular way. One noticeable feature of the textbook representation of this conflict was that the Polish Chief of State Józef Piłsudski was explicitly identified as a Polish-speaking Lithuanian nobleman rather than a Pole. In other words, he was identified as a member of the Lithuanian nation, who, however, envisioned the future of Lithuania in a different manner and who eventually became a leader of the independent Polish state. Moreover, one of the exercises in the section of the 10th grade textbook “Laikas” points out that Piłsudski is assessed differently in Poland and in Lithuania and further asks students to speak to their family members about how they perceive Piłsudski. When I asked Kapleris what the intention or the didactic aim of this exercise was, he offered the following explanation:

So that they develop their critical thinking, that for Poles Piłsudski is of one kind and for Lithuanians – of another kind. [...] On the other hand, in the concrete case of Jogaila, by means of this question we wanted to force them to reflect, because in the Šapoka’s paradigm Jogaila was a bad guy, black, and now we see that he brought Christianity to Lithuania, brought the European civilization, and so we want by means of this question that children would reflect a little, on the change of the image, that they would assess his role in Lithuanian history more pragmatically. One thing with such questions is that the
children of Eastern Lithuania learn from our textbooks, too. For them, Piłsudski if one kind and in Samogitia he is of another kind. But in principle we want to tell children that he was not Hitler, nor Stalin, that he is of our own kind, only that he had imagined a different kind of Lithuania. We wrote about this in the 9th grade that he held himself to be a Lithuanian, but in a different sense than it is understood now, not as a speaker of the Lithuanian language, but as a Lithuanian in a civic sense. (P 2: 2:36)

His approach to the Polish-Lithuanian history is a concrete manifestation of the influence of the historiography of Bumblauskas. The aim becomes to rehabilitate the role of Jogaila and Piłsudski in Lithuanian history and to replace the historiographical paradigm of Šapoka with the paradigm of Bumblauskas. The effort to reconceive the person of Piłsudski as not equal to Hitler or Stalin, but as a Polish-speaking Lithuanian who had a different vision for Lithuanian statehood is perhaps the first step in the paradigmatic change of the prevalent narrative. However, it does not in itself guarantee that the narrative is engaged with the lived experience of Piłsudski.

However, in the context of the interwar Polish-Lithuanian conflict, I pointed out that the same textbook failed to mention certain aspects of the conflict that may change how the conflict is perceived by the textbook readers. Namely, I mentioned a secret appendix to the 1920 Lithuanian-Soviet Russian treaty, which permitted Soviet Russian troops to freely move across the Lithuanian territory in the simultaneously ongoing Soviet Russian-Polish war. I found it odd that the textbook failed to mention this secret protocol, since the historian Bumblauskas, to whom Kapleris refers as the main historiographical influence, typically puts forward the significance of the protocol in the context of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict and presents it as a shameful act on the part of Lithuania. In response, Kapleris proposes his own understanding of the situation.

R.K. I wanted to ask, in the context of this conflict, about the 1920 Lithuanian-Soviet Russian treaty. The textbook does not mention the secret protocol by which Lithuania permitted Russia to use its territory during the Polish-Soviet Russian war. This is pointed out by some historians, including Bumblauskas, as a shameful thing, as something for which we should be feeling shame in this conflict.

Well, you see, again…Now imagine, […] who ignited this whole conflict? Was it so that the Lithuanians got together with Russia from the beginning and then signed this secret protocol? Or was it after all that something had happened already before that? How would you act if a neighbor came and told: “You know, this is your plot of land, but I think that it should belong to me.” You would resist him in an armed way, fighting would occur, but you would see that the forces of the neighbor are much stronger. He is much physically stronger than you. Nearby there would be one more neighbor, who would say: “Well, you know, allow me to walk through your plot of land – I will help you to deal with that neighbor.” […] You see, it is not black and white in history. Never have been and never will be. (P 2: 2:38)
authored by Jūratė Litvinaitytė (Section 6.2.3). Personification of countries shows that affective, experiential factors shape historical understanding and reasoning. The narrator/author makes sense of the past – who is guilty and who is a victim – by metaphorizing countries as human beings and, specifically in this case, as neighbors. Lithuania is a victim because it was a weaker neighbor and because it did not start the conflict – Poland did. Soviet Russia is, on the other hand, a neighbor who observes the conflict and uses it to his advantage by offering help to Lithuania in exchange for the right to walk across its plot of land, or national territory. The assumption behind this metaphorical explanation is that countries and their societies are undivided units: Their individual members are unanimous in their perceptions and judgments. The region of Vilnius is defined as a plot of land, which frames the conflict as being about property of a territory rather than, for example, about the people who lived on this plot of land, their wishes, experiences and concerns. By emphasizing that history is never black and white, that past events cannot be assessed in terms of straightforward value judgments, Kapleris acknowledges the complexity of the past, yet his own metaphorical explanation seems to lack nuanced complexity.

In reaction to Kapleris’s comment, I restated my view that I believe that the choice of whether or not to insert or to omit the fact of the secret protocol of the Lithuanian-Soviet Russian treaty changes the meaning of the narrative and that it may affect what conclusion pupils may arrive at after having read the passage, to which Kapleris responded:

You see, and what conclusion will the student draw, if we insert a sentence in the 10th grade textbook saying that the Lithuanians, while negotiating with the Soviets, adopted a protocol, kept in secret from the Poles, which permitted the Red Army to march through the Lithuanian territory? It still does not change the essence in the presentation of the topic, where one needs to talk to a tenth-grader about it in accessible, clear... In academic circles – great. That should be written. In an academic book, where that questions is analyzed. But we are talking about entirely different things. I know what you want to say: that often in Lithuanian textbooks it has been written about this in a biased way, that Poles are bad, Poles are bad, while Lithuanians did not assume certain faults of their own. In our textbooks it is written about the Polish schools in Lithuania and the like. It is written, but nevertheless, well, it was not Lithuania which ignited this conflict. It was not Lithuania which came carrying weapons and so on. (P 2: 2:38)

His insistence on the fact that it was not Lithuania which started the conflict and CAME CARRYING WEAPONS reveals that he puts the blame for the conflict on Poland. He draws a straightforward dichotomous conclusion about who is the perpetrator and who is a victim. In other words, whatever mistakes Lithuania had done in the conflict, such as signing the secret appendix to the treaty with Soviet Russia, it was, according to him, inevitable under the difficult circumstances in which Lithuania found itself and it did not justify the actions of Poland at the time. He adds later that “it seems that small nations have to take the blame, but the large ones never want to take it” (2:40).

In Poland, on the other hand, he points out, the Polish-Lithuanian conflict is taught in schools by “giving an ethnic 19th-century map of Lithuania, which indicates that Poles were living all the way up to Samogitia and that there are no Lithuanians living at all here.
It is happening in Poland. Should we then beat our chest and say that yes, we are guilty?”

(2:39) The attitude of Kapleris was markedly defensive and annoyed about the injustice done by Poland as well as about how modern Lithuanian history is being taught in Poland. It was undoubtedly provoked in part by my own insistence on the topic and his perception of my views as overly critical and pro-Polish. It was also clear that he felt it was unfair to demand from Lithuanians that they would feel apologetic or adopt a very self-critical attitude, when it was clearly not Lithuania, which stirred up the conflict in the first place.

If we reflect on the reasoning of Kapleris, we can see once again how cognition and reason are not separate from emotion and values. Historical reasoning is shaped by feelings of victimization, unfairness, and injustice. These feelings are present in the reasoning even if they may be hidden under the externally neutral language of evidence and logical justification. I would even raise the question whether the complexity of the past can really be faced unless we openly acknowledge these underlying feelings that influence the explanations of the past. Identification of history with a neutral, objective, logical, purely rational and evidence-based discourse on the past, however, constitutes a real challenge to coming to terms with the emotional, affective aspect of making sense of the past and cognition, more generally.

6.3.3.1 Textbook VI: NEIGHBORS fighting over a PLOT OF LAND


The 10th grade history textbook tackles the 20th century history, in which the main controversial event in the shared Polish-Lithuanian history is the interwar conflict between Poland and Lithuania over the city of Vilnius and its surrounding region in Eastern Lithuania. In the interview with Ignas Kapleris, the discussion of the interwar conflict seemed to provoke strong metaphorical associations and feelings about the process, outcomes, and interpretations of the conflict, despite the overall attempt to SMOOTH OVER THE CORNERS and avoid an overly negative evaluation of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past (Section 6.3.2). Poland, Lithuania, and Soviet Russia were metaphorically personified as NEIGHBORS, who have a disagreement about the ownership of a PLOT OF LAND. Lithuania appeared to be a victim, because it was a weaker NEIGHBOR and because it did not start the conflict – Poland did.

The Polish-Lithuanian interwar conflict over Eastern Lithuania is described in the textbook within the context of Poland’s refusal to recognize the right of the Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians to have their own states as well as Poland’s exclusive claims to the heritage of the Commonwealth (48). Whereas the Lithuanians sought to establish their own national state, the Poles are said to believe that they were the sole inheritors of the Commonwealth tradition (48). Two Polish visions of the future of Lithuania are mentioned: the aim of the National Democrats to annex Lithuania to “Greater Poland” and the aim of Piłsudski to create a federation led by Poland on the basis of the former
Commonwealth. The textbook quotes Piłsudski as stating, “Lithuania must be joined to Poland in accordance with the historical community, religious tradition, and remembrance of the union” (48). Against this background, it is claimed that “Lithuanians understood that any kind of merger with Poland would be disastrous. Due to Polonization, the extinction of the state was impending” (48).

The Polish army first entered Vilnius in 1919, after having expelled the Red Army troops from the city during the simultaneously ongoing Soviet-Polish war (1919–1921). Upon entering the city, Piłsudski declared a bilingual proclamation “To the Inhabitants of the Former Grand Duchy of Lithuania,” which promised to “create an opportunity for settling your nationality problems and religious affairs in a manner that you yourself will determine, without any kind of force or pressure from Poland” (48–49). The proclamation is evaluated in the textbook as ambiguous because it invited the Lithuanians to refuse the idea of an independent state. Sharply criticized by the Lithuanian (and Polish) nationalists, the proclamation did not achieve its aims. The Western European members of Entente interfered, in order to halt the military clashes of the Lithuanian and Polish armies, setting a demarcation line between the two countries with Vilnius being assigned to Lithuania.

The commentary of the textbook is that Poland “declared that it only had territorial disputes with Lithuania, but was not adverse to its independence. However, it continued to refuse to recognize Lithuania as an independent state and secretly planned to annex it. J. Piłsudski decided to organize a coup d’état in Kaunas, seize power and annex Lithuania to Poland” (49). The textbook provides a brief description of the failed coup d’état attempt in the city of Kaunas, where the Lithuanian government took up its residence at the time. According to the textbook, after the failed coup it became a firmly established opinion that Poland was its biggest enemy regarding independence (49).

In July 1920, Vilnius again fell into the hands of the Red Army marching westwards in the ongoing Soviet-Polish war. Since the Polish army crushed the Soviet troops in the Battle of Warsaw, Soviet Russia assigned Vilnius to Lithuanian control. The textbook acknowledges the merit of Piłsudski for winning the war against Soviet Russia and, as a result, contributing to the rescue of Lithuania from impending sovietization already in 1920 (49).

The Polish-Lithuanian conflict, however, continued as the Polish army again is said to “intrude into our country” (49). The League of Nations interfered in the conflict, halted the warfare, and forced Poland and Lithuania to sign a peace treaty in Suwałki in October 1920. The Suwałki peace treaty is usually highlighted in the Lithuanian accounts of the conflict, because, according to it, Vilnius was supposed to remain in the territory of Lithuania. Poland signed the treaty, but, as the textbook explains, “Piłsudski was a hypocrite; he knew he would break the agreement” (49).

The textbook goes on to explain the actions of Piłsudski as hypocritical. The day after signing the peace treaty, a part of the Polish army declared themselves mutineers and marched to Vilnius led by General Lucjan Żeligowski. Since Piłsudski “foresaw that an
international scandal would arise, he sought to pretend that Vilnius was taken back by local residents” (50).63

The parliamentary elections of Middle Lithuania are also introduced as a hypocrisy of the Polish government (52). As diplomatic negotiations between Poland and Lithuania over the status of the Vilnius region faltered, the parliament of Middle Lithuania had to decide to which country Middle Lithuania should belong. The textbook insists that free, democratic elections were impossible with the presence of Želigowski’s troops in the country, which is why the majority of Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Jews boycotted the 1922 elections (52). It is explained that “the elected Polish deputies spoke in the name of all residents of Eastern Lithuania without any authorization and declared that the Vilnius region was being annexed to Poland” (52). Lithuania protested, but “Western countries made concessions to the more powerful Poland. The Vilnius region fell under the Polish state for the first time in history” (52).

What is important in the portrayal of the conflict is that the textbook shows how, after having had seized Vilnius, Želigowski’s army did not halt its march and continued to advance to Kaunas. The Lithuanian army, however, stopped their advance. This contributes to the overall negative portrayal of Poland in the conflict.

An interesting source is provided in an excerpt from Piłsudski’s and Želigowski’s conversation as described in Želigowski’s memoirs, wherein Piłsudski said that “if we don’t rescue Vilnius now, then history won’t forgive us for it. Even more so, we have to fight in order to restore the historical Lithuania. Only the people themselves, with the help of the Lithuanian-Belarusian Division, can do it. We must organize an uprising” (50). No questions accompany this source, but it stands as an important text, in that it allows pupils to come closer to the reasoning and motivations of Piłsudski, as it was lived. It reveals how Piłsudski actually understood the military operation for the takeover of Vilnius as a rescue mission, as a way to salvage Vilnius by annexing it to Poland. It contrasts with the presentation of the main text, which only refers to Piłsudski as a hypocrite who ignored the wishes of the Lithuanians and who singlehandedly forced the idea of the federative union onto Lithuania.

On the other hand, Józef Piłsudski is portrayed by clearly stating that he “originated from Lithuania” and by pointing out, by means of an additional source, that he was able to speak Lithuanian (48). The same goes for Želigowski who is said to have originated from the Vilnius region. However, it is also stated that “L. Želigowski, who originated from the Vilnius region, thought that he was implementing the will of the region’s people, although, as a matter of fact, he represented only the Polish-speaking residents of Vilnius. The majority of the local Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Jews did not support the march of the general” (49).

63 This is one of the key disagreements between the Polish and Lithuanian accounts of the interwar conflict. The Lithuanian account typically emphasizes that Vilnius was seized primarily by the Polish army with only a small share of Želigowski’s troops coming from the local Vilnius region. The Polish narrative, by contrast, highlights that Želigowski’s troops mainly consisted of the local residents. After the takeover of the city, the so-called “Middle Lithuania” was established in Eastern Lithuania, which the textbook clearly identifies as a marionette state, dependent on Poland.
Pupils are also asked to look for information on how Piłsudski is perceived in Lithuania and in Poland (50). This could potentially provoke discussions on why there exist such stark differences in evaluation. Pupils are likewise asked to consider and suggest what could have been done in order to avoid the military conflict of Poland and Lithuania (50).

The 10th-grade textbook “Laikas” not only provides information on the military and political aspects of the interwar Polish-Lithuanian conflict over Vilnius, but also includes a separate chapter, titled “Vilnius – the drama of Lithuania,” which is exclusively dedicated to discussing the conflict and the ensuing diplomatic war between Poland and Lithuania. The first thing that stands out while reading this chapter is that already in the very beginning, in a subtitle, it poses the question “Whose is Vilnius?” (51). The paragraph dealing with this straightforward question opens up by mentioning the long-standing multicultural and multinational heritage of Vilnius. It makes mention of the fact that in the early 20th century the city was predominantly populated by Jews, Poles or Polonized Lithuanians, a few Belarusians, and Russians, whereas the entire region of Eastern Lithuania is said to have been also affected by strong tendencies of Slavicization of mostly Belarusian and, less rarely, those of Polish origin. However, immediately after having stated these facts about the multicultural and multilingual situation of the larger Vilnius region, the textbook continues to lay out a determined position that, in terms of historical and legal points of view, Vilnius entirely pertains to Lithuania:

Vilnius has been a multinational and multicultural city, the hearth of tolerance for centuries. In the beginning of the 20th century, in Vilnius there lived mostly Jews, Poles or Polonized Lithuanians, fewer Belarusians and Russians. The Lithuanians made up the minority. […] But only for the Lithuanians Vilnius was a historical capital. When the national revival commenced, the Lithuanianness returned to the city. […] Vilnius was a part of the Lithuanian national consciousness. The reestablishment of the Lithuanian state was unimaginable without it.

Until the 20th century, the attachment of Vilnius to Lithuania raised no doubts for anyone. Changes followed after World War I. Poland, which had never owned/had Vilnius, declared its claims on the city. Neither in Vilnius, nor in Eastern Lithuania did the Poles comprise the majority. Poland also did not have any well-grounded legal or historical justifications to tear Vilnius away from Lithuania. It was argued that the Vilnius region belonged to Poland because of the supposedly dominant Polish language in this territory. But in accordance with international law, the language of the residents of a territory was not and is not a legitimate basis for resolving territorial disputes. In the conflict over Vilnius, Lithuanians were the weaker, though legally and historically, the legitimate party. (51)

What is striking about this excerpt, first, is that it exposes a high degree of certainty in the form of assertion or denial. Hence, it is “only” for the Lithuanians that Vilnius was a historical capital. The reestablishment of the Lithuanian state was “unimaginable” without Vilnius. Poland “never” owned Vilnius. The belonging of Vilnius to Lithuania did not raise doubts “for anyone.” The language of the residents “was not and is not” a basis for the resolution of territorial disputes. Moreover, the passage employs justifications from
international law to make its point even more authoritatively, using the sanctioning power of the legal argument. 

The only instance of uncertainty in this passage is the word “supposedly,” but it is used only to diminish the claim of the opposing – Polish – perspective that appears in the text. It is supposed to instill doubts as to the truthfulness of the Polish claims about the dominance of the Polish language in the region. The level of assertiveness reveals how historical reasoning is shaped by feelings of victimization, unfairness, injustice, anger, and hurt. These feelings are present in the reasoning, even if they may be hidden under the externally neutral language of evidence and logical justification.

The passage further engages the sense of unfairness done to the Lithuanians by using the metaphorical expression of “TEARING AWAY” in order to convey that Poland tore Vilnius away by force, unjustifiably. The metaphorical personification of Poland and Lithuania as two neighbors of unequal power, who have a disagreement over a plot of land, as invoked by Kapleris in the interview, provides insight into the potential reasons for assertiveness and a sense of injustice which emanates from the textbook. With Poland unquestionably standing out as a unilateral perpetrator and Lithuania as a victim of injustice, these clearly defined labels convey a rather BLACK AND WHITE sense of the conflict.

The textbook takes note of the repression perpetrated against Lithuanian associations, schools, and the press in the Vilnius region after the annexation, but also acknowledges that the Lithuanian government adopted similar actions towards the Polish minority of Lithuania (53). It is also stated that one hundred thousand “Polish colonists” came from Poland to the Vilnius region as part of the measures undertaken by the Polish government after the annexation to prove that there were no Lithuanians living in the region, only Poles who had lived there for centuries (53).

During the interwar period, the loss of Vilnius is said to have been strongly mourned, causing strong anti-Polish sentiments (53). The textbook stresses that the loss of Vilnius united the nation, strengthened the idea of statehood, and encouraged patriotism (53).

The evaluation of the conflict and the way in which it affected the relations of two historically close nations presents the events as a regrettable incident, which sowed hatred and fear among Poles and Lithuanians. “Even more painful lessons were needed in order for friendship to be restored,” according to the textbook (53). The chapter finishes with a remark explaining that today Poland acknowledges that the decision of Piłsudski to take over Vilnius was a historical mistake. The Polish historian Piotr Łossowski is quoted to have said that

Żeligowski’s action was implemented at the time when, as can be seen from many facts, a willingness emerged in Lithuania to seek an understanding with the Poles, to make concessions out of good will, so that Vilnius would remain the capital of an independent Lithuania. It could very reasonably be said that it was exactly then that the possibilities to regulate the Polish-Lithuanian question opened up. But the leaders of Poland at the time did not show even the slightest good will. (53)

However, it is not obvious that there is a unanimous position among Polish historians on the “Questions of Vilnius.” Whereas pupils are asked to discuss why the takeover of

216
Vilnius is today understood as a historical mistake of Poland (53), the questions remain as to what extent Łossowski’s stance is representative of Polish historiography in general.

In the overall context of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past, the interwar conflict stood out as the most value-laden, emotionally charged presentation of events in the textbook series “Laikas.” The fact that I conducted an interview with Kapleris and was able to identify metaphors, which manifested in his discussion of the interwar Polish-Lithuanian conflict, enabled me to recognize the affective, emotional aspects of the historical narration. The metaphor of two neighbors fighting over the ownership of a plot of land, which informs Kapleris’s understanding of the conflict, serves as a model to make sense of and evaluate the conflict. A deep sense of injustice and victimization can be perceived in the way the conflict is introduced. Instead of encouraging engagement with the complexity of the conflict, the metaphorization of Poland and Lithuania as NEIGHBORS place the two countries under unambiguous categories of victim and perpetrator.

It matters what metaphors we use to think about the past. In this particular case, the metaphor of NEIGHBORS guides one into conceiving Poland and Lithuania as two unitary, single-minded actors; it sidelines internal diversity and the complexity of views and opinions. Moreover, since the focus of the metaphor is on the plot of land, or Vilnius and its surrounding region, it creates an impression that the conflict was purely territorial, that it could have been resolved as a territorial dispute. The logical reasoning, shaped by the metaphor, implies that Lithuania had all rights to Vilnius because, territorially, the city of Vilnius has always been the capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; it has always been within the territory of Lithuania. Metaphor is implicit in the very fabric of reasoning and justification. However, the metaphor of the plot of land overshadows the complex and diverse identities of the people who lived in this territory. It obfuscates the ways in which the local inhabitants perceived and experienced the annexation of the Vilnius region to Poland. The metaphor enacts a separation between the human inhabitants and the territorial space, between lived, personal space and territorial, externalized space.

The Polish narrative of the conflict, as will be seen in the discussion of the Polish textbooks, puts much more emphasis on the people who inhabited the territory and downplays the territorial factor. Yet, even with this emphasis on the people, the Polish narrative tends to overlook the non-Polish residents of the Vilnius region, their experience, and the impact of the long-term process of Polish-Lithuanian relations on the conflict. In other words, Polish textbook narratives similarly fail to combine a pattern with its process in their explanations and show the complexity of the conflict. On the other hand, the Lithuanian narrative acknowledges the multicultural make-up of the region, but foregrounds the territorial idea of Vilnius as Lithuania’s historical capital. This disparity is the crux of historical hostility between Poland and Lithuania over the ownership of Vilnius. The differences in metaphorical models had an impact on mutual incomprehension, leaving the conflict at a deadlock. The two sides could not come to an agreement, because they approached the issue in terms of different metaphorical models framing their reasoning. Poland and Lithuania remained in an official state of war until 1938.
6.3.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, several points need to be highlighted. Firstly, the conception of the textbook series “Laikas” is informed by an effort to implement a paradigmatic change of historiographical narratives, to replace the older patriotic narrative of Šapoka with the more recent narrative of Bumblauskas/Gudavičius. In this regard, the educational background of Ignas Kapleris manifests in the textbook contents. This demonstrates that the discipline of history and the work of professional historians have an influence on the textbook contents, the narratives and value orientations presented in them. Professional history and school-history education are not mutually exclusive fields. Rather, professional, disciplinary history plays a crucial role in shaping how pupils come to learn about the past, make sense of it, and assess it. Secondly, there were several indications in the interview, which revealed that metatheoretical assumptions of Kapleris lean towards an embodied understanding of what the past and history are. Historical knowledge should not be understood, according to him, separately from the life lived because history is a story of a human being. The truth as lived experience plays an important role in the pedagogical approach adopted in the textbooks, especially when it is related to the tragic events in modern Lithuanian history. The meaning of a PAINFUL, tragic past is not arbitrary since it bears its presence in the bodily experience. Even though he admits that there is no objective truth, the meaning of a tragic past is not relative or random. Thirdly, textbooks should function as a clear GUIDE-POST, according to Kapleris, which provide indications to pupils which PATH to choose, which values and narratives to follow. A textbook is a signpost which guides pupils, provides orientation, directs them onto a certain course. The metaphor of PATH implies dynamic movement along the PATH rather than a fixed, static attachment to a place. It implies movement from one place to another in the process of life, cognition, and meaning-making. Identity is lived in movement rather than limited to a concrete spatially circumscribed place.

Even though the textbook series is said to seek to shift away from the political and military history of the “great men” and their heroic deeds, it remains a challenging task. State treaties, unions, wars, and other political developments dominate the main focus of the narrative, whereas culture, daily life, and mentality are at best a secondary supplement to the main plot. Simultaneously, I think that the political and military history could also be introduced by paying attention to how these events were experienced and lived not just by the gentry, but also by the peasants or burghers. Pupils could familiarize themselves not just with depersonalized facts about the functioning of state institutions, but learn something about how these institutions were experienced by different groups of people. There are some references to and excerpts from the sources inserted into the textbook, which address exactly these issues, but they do not amount to a coherent and systematic approach.

Finally, the analysis revealed that affective, emotional factors shape the historical reasoning of Kapleris that are manifest in the metaphors he employs to convey meaning. In particular, the interwar Polish-Lithuanian conflict (NEIGHBORS FIGHTING OVER A PLOT OF LAND) seemed to provoke strong metaphorical associations and intense feelings about the process, outcomes, and interpretations of the conflict. This was the case despite the
overall attempt to smooth over the corners and avoid an overly negative evaluation of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past.

6.4 Mindaugas Tamošaitis and Deimantas Karvelis

Mindaugas Tamošaitis is a historian and a history teacher. He has completed his studies of history in the Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences. In 2011, he defended his PhD, completed externally in Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas. Currently, he is a lecturer at the Department of Lithuanian history of the Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences. He also works as a history teacher in a gymnasium in Vilnius. He has been working as a history teacher since 1998. Mindaugas Tamošaitis is an author and a co-author of a textbook series “Raktas” [A Key] for 7–12th grades which is widely used in Lithuanian schools. The series is published by the publishing house “Baltos Lankos.” I interviewed Tamošaitis in January 2014 at Vilnius Simonas Daukantas gymnasium, where he works as a history teacher.

Deimantas Karvelis is a history teacher and an adjunct professor at the Department of Lithuanian history of the Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences. In 2009, he defended his PhD, completed externally in Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas. He works as a history teacher in Vilnius Simonas Daukantas Gymnasium. Karvelis is the main author of chapters on Lithuanian history in the 8th grade (Part 2) and the 9th grade (Part 1) textbooks from the series “Raktas.” I interviewed him in December 2013 at the Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences.

Analyzed textbooks by the two authors are:

6.4.1 Mindaugas Tamošaitis: Academic history vs. school history

Several times throughout the interview, Mindaugas Tamošaitis juxtaposed academic history and school history as two separate fields guided by different aims, approaches, and needs. He expressed criticism with regard to school textbook texts written by scholars from Vilnius University as too academic and often not suited to practical pedagogical needs (5:4). Reaffirming the opposition between Vilnius University and the Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences, he explicated that Vilnius University was representative of “theory”, whereas the University of Educational Sciences stood for “practice” (5:11). On the other hand, he considers himself both a “theoretician” and a “practitioner,” which permits him to be more nuanced in writing textbooks (5:11).

Nevertheless, as Tamošaitis explains in the passage below (5:5), the authorship of a textbook does not require “deep knowledge”; rather, textbook authors need a capacity to synthesize material. Opposing academically inclined historiography to school-history education, Tamošaitis made a statement that “there should not be science in textbooks.”

When writing textbooks, one does not need to be… […] It does not require people, who go very much into depth. When writing a textbook, one needs to see, to have an ability to synthesize material, of course, to know the historiography, but one need not go into depth. […] There should not be science in the textbooks. There should be solely the basis of science outlined and that is all. Science belongs to higher education. (P 5: 5:5)

His sharp differentiation between history education in secondary schools and academic history in higher education suggests an idea that school-history education should remain simple enough in order for pupils to be able to comprehend the material. School history should not be overloaded by complicated historiographical details or theoretical reflection. On the other hand, the juxtaposition of “theory” and “practice” reveals an assumption that if school history remains “simple” enough, it can elude “theory,” as if “simplified” school history does not underpin certain ontological and epistemological positions or theoretical approaches. The distinction between theory and practice obscures how “practice” inescapably involves a certain “theory,” a certain way of thinking about and engaging with the past.

6.4.2 Mindaugas Tamošaitis: A textbook cannot usurp a monopoly

A major theme discussed in the interview was truth in history. I asked him to elaborate on these issues, in relation to the introductory chapters in textbooks for the 7th and 11th grades, which introduce history as a discipline and present how historians approach and analyze their materials.

I can say that when I am teaching I tell students that usually there is no one single truth, but there are facts. If there is a fact, a date, it does not change. If we know that the Battle of Grunwald happened, I say, but there are various interpretations [of those facts]. (P 5: 5:6)
Therefore, while there are diverse narratives and interpretations, which cannot be reduced to a single truth, facts are truthful because they do not change. The Platonic distinction between what is real, because it is fixed, unchanging, essential, and what is not real, because it is shifting and transient, can be recognized in this statement. Truthfulness is linked to stasis. Facts are separate from interpretations: Facts are solid entities onto which interpretations are imposed or assigned. Cognition of the past is modeled in disembodied terms, distinguishing between the language of facts, which does mirror the past, and the language of narratives, which does not directly correspond to the past. Truth is reduced to disembodied propositional statements about general, static states of the world.

According to Tamošaitis, if there are three different opinions about the same event in a textbook, the teacher should not tell which one of them is correct (5:7). The pedagogical aim should be to make pupils comprehend that there is not a single opinion or evaluation of the event. Subsequently, when pupils recognize the existing diversity of opinions, they may choose one of them, which they find more agreeable, and should provide justifications for their choice (5:7). To be unbiased in this context, according to Tamošaitis, means to approach different opinions about the event without prejudgments (5:8). What remains unclear, however, is the principle of adjudication that school history should instill in pupils as they encounter diverse narratives. On what basis should pupils select a preferred interpretation, especially if a teacher abstains from providing guidance to pupils? Moreover, this kind of approach of handling multiperspectivity does not enable pupils to comprehend the relations and interconnections between divergent narratives at a more systemic level. Pupils are not encouraged to conceive of multiple perspectives as part of a larger, complex process of life. Rather, they need to select a single interpretation at the exclusion of others.

When choosing how to assess the past in the textbooks, Tamošaitis claimed that textbook authors needed to take into consideration the diversity of views on the past among one’s readership. A textbook cannot usurp a monopoly, to impose a single interpretation of the past (5:15). In his opinion, therefore, the textbook should try to avoid very assertive and definitive value judgments of the past; the textbook should remain quite neutral when it comes to judgments and evaluations of the past (5:13, 5:14). He understands this as the “rules of the game” – an expectation that textbooks should try to stay moderate in their assessments, or remain “diplomatic” (5:35). Too explicit judgment should thus be avoided. I challenged him by pointing out that the textbook series “Raktas” reflects a value stance on the Lithuanian-Polish political and cultural rapprochement, aiming to displace the predominantly negative image of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and that, as a result, the meaning and evaluation of the Union of Lublin is introduced by stressing the benefits for Lithuania in making the union with Poland. Tamošaitis responds by arguing that he does not have a straightforward opinion about the Union of Lublin.

These sort of events, like the Union of Lublin, to be honest, I would not be able to state my single opinion about it. I would say, there is not one opinion. But there are things like, for example, the loss of independence in 1940, so there it is like that… […] Who will read the textbook? Many will read it – so you need to a little…Of course, there needs to be an assessment – all right. But I would say…Because you might condemn yourself in a certain
sense. You can write a scientific article, everyone has a lot of opinions, many have written about it, but for the most part nobody reads it. Whereas here we have slightly different rules of the game.

R.K. So do you say that textbooks should offer a somewhat polished, toned-down version of the past?

There is a need for diplomacy. Diplomacy. There is a need for diplomacy. (P 5: 5:35)

Hence, not every past event is assessed in textbooks applying the same moderate perspective. The loss of the Lithuanian independence in 1940, for example, bears a straightforward negative assessment. This shows that not every opinion is of the same merit, even if there is a diversity of opinions available. It matters how an opinion is linked to lived experience of interaction and engagement with others and the world. When I pointed out my perception that textbooks in the series “Raktas” mostly tend to avoid stating a clear value judgment or evaluation of the past, Tamošaitis responded that since there is no single definite and clear assessment of the past, the textbooks should then also abstain from espousing a certain concrete assessment of the past. According to him, textbook author is not a know-all. Moreover, the authors who express a straightforward opinion in the textbooks risk receiving harsh critique.

According to Tamošaitis, another important reason, why textbooks should avoid explicitly stating value judgments, is the lack of agreement among professional historians. Tamošaitis insists that if academic historians cannot arrive at a shared evaluation, then textbooks should avoid putting forward any single interpretation. Tamošaitis juxtaposed the caution, which informs his attitude on expressing value judgments in the textbooks, with a straightforward value indoctrination employed in the Soviet textbooks. Soviet textbooks serve a model of a single-truth approach to writing history. As part of his pedagogical approach, pupils sometimes receive a task to find and correct mistakes in the Soviet textbooks in history lessons.

Tamošaitis’ reflection suggests that the stakes involved in choosing to state a clear value judgment or to express one’s authorial stance on the past are high. The load of authorial responsibility entails a high risk of fierce criticism, especially if the textbook aims to break with certain traditions of evaluation of the past.

6.4.2.1 Textbook I: The dichotomy between truth and values


The introductory chapter, which is authored by Mindaugas Tamošaitis, explains the purpose of learning about history. The author asserts that “only the person, who knows the past well, especially the history of one’s own family and nation, can comprehend his roots, be a patriot of his country. It is especially important to hold onto traditions, pay regard to
the past and learn from it” (7). History is therefore primarily introduced as national history, which should underpin pupils’ identity and value orientations. History provides knowledge of one’s roots, initiates a pupil as a bearer of a concrete national tradition. Knowledge of the past establishes a firmament of identity; provides a solid base for further development. In this sense, history has a protective function, echoing the metaphorical associations to history of Juozas Brazauskas.

Appraising Cicero’s dictum, the textbook suggests that pupils can learn from the past. The terms “past” and “history” are used interchangeably in this context. The textbook compares history to the life of a single person who is learning continuously in order to understand how to act (7). In other words, history is metaphorically understood as the life of humanity, which uses the experience of the past to orient its activities in the present. The main actor of history is humanity, in parallel to a human being who is the main actor of his/her life (7).

The essence of historians’ work is described by stressing that

> Generally history is identified with the past and it is often claimed that history is a story about the past of a human being. However, for historians, unlike for literary scholars, it is very important not only to describe the events, but also to determine their causes, to ascertain the consequences, generalize and make conclusions. Hence, historians are concerned with what, how and, most importantly, why things happened in the past. (8)

The textbook asserts the scientific basis of history as a discipline. History aims to know the past, which means to analytically comprehend the linear, causal processes of history and to arrive at generalized conclusions. It is not sufficient to memorize dates and facts – pupils should seek to understand the past, which is explicated as a capacity to link important phenomena, explain their causal connections, influence and consequences to society (10). The textbook further elaborates that pupils should analyze sources, that is, explain the meaning of a source and justify their opinion about what the sources have to say (19). When examining the sources, pupils are expected to determine whether knowledge in a source is reliable. Hence, a critical perspective is deemed necessary, if pupils want to ascertain whether the author of a source or the witness of an event is not biased or provides just a partial truth (19–20).

The textbook blends two meanings of history – historical memory and the scientific discipline of history – without identifying the potential tensions between these two ways of engaging with the past. On the one hand, the author puts a lot of emphasis on how important it is to know your country’s past and history; how, in order to develop national consciousness and understand “the essence of one’s nation,” its features and its role, a person has to take over historical memory and historical experience of previous generations (9). Historical memory and experience are introduced as possessing a fixed core, a static essence that is carried on from one generation to another. The textbook reasserts that “every nation must know its history,” that “the present is enriched by a well understood past” (10).

On the other hand, it is stressed that while learning history, “it is very important not to stumble ‘on the slippery path of patriotism’” (11). According to the textbook, this can happen if we assess the past by glorifying only our own nation and at the same time regard
other nations only negatively (11). Thus, pupils are told that “while assessing the events one should not be guided by feelings (I like or do not like); the assessment should depend on concrete data and source material. It is necessary to look at events without bias – one ought not to sacrifice truth for the love of one’s nation and Fatherland or for any other reason” (11).

The ocularcentric metaphor constructs a scientific, disciplinary engagement with the past as looking at the past without bias, objectively. To be unbiased, to adopt an unbiased historical gaze means to exclude feelings, to suppress “the reflexes that spring from the body and from the past history” (Bryson 1988, 7) of the viewer. As feelings are the source of bias, true knowledge – the truth of the past – should be purged from the bodily feelings.

This positivist, optical dichotomy between truth and feelings, cognition and evaluation is at odds with the emphasis of the textbook on the value of historical memory for one’s identity and value orientations. Pupils are both instructed to nurture their attachment to the national experience of the Lithuanian nation and to adopt a distanced, analytical historical gaze. What the textbook lacks is therefore an awareness that it promotes two different ways of seeing the past. It lacks a reflection of how these two different ways of seeing the past can be combined.

It remains unclear why some feelings towards the past are deemed acceptable, while in other cases feelings have to be purged from the pursuit of truth, or why some opinions about the past are more merited than others. While trying to offer and describe a more nuanced approach to historical understanding that surpasses a simplistic “I like/I do not like” attitude, the textbook enacts an outdated “truth-value,” “knowledge-feelings” distinction which stems from disembodied Greek metaphysics. The “I like/I do not like” attitude is problematic to the extent that it stands for an unwillingness to engage with and pay attention to past lived experience, and not because feelings are in principle opposed to the pursuit of truth.

The textbook identifies the reminiscences of contemporaries of certain historical events as “subjective historical sources” (18). It is explained that such reminiscences often contain inaccuracies; their authors often exaggerate their own role in the events or inadequately criticize other personalities. Therefore, original documents, especially legal documents, government documents are more important because they are not subjective, according to the textbook (18). On the other hand, echoing the interview statements, the author asserts that “when learning history one ought to understand that, for the most part, there is no single truth, that an absolutely objective assessment of examined events is not possible. It often occurs that the same event is explained differently” (19). Absolute objectivity is understood as a completely disembodied state of mind, a way of knowing which is purged clean from bodily experience, feelings, and emotions. Absolute objectivity is associated with pure truth – the kind of knowledge, which is an “essential copy” of the world “out there,” a perfectly mirrored, optical inner representation of a static, pre-given world.
The chapter depicting the period of rule by two grand dukes, and cousins, Vytautas and Jogaila begins with an introductory question: “Why does the majority of Lithuanians still today negatively view the Grand Duke of Lithuania and the King of Poland Jogaila?” (72). The nature of this question shows that the textbook attempts to reframe a long-standing negative historical evaluation of Jogaila’s role in Lithuanian history. It aims to question whether this evaluation is justified and whether it needs to be reconsidered.

When Jogaila was offered the crown of the Kingdom of Poland, the textbook explains that Poland had its own interests in this offer: “Jogaila, as a sovereign of Lithuania and Rus’, would bring the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a dowry’ and would thereby expand the territory of the Crown – the Kingdom of Poland” (72). The 1385 Union of Krewo between Lithuania and Poland is introduced very briefly by pointing out that it entailed Jogaila’s duty to Christianize Lithuania, defend the interests of Poland and “to annex the territory of Lithuania to Poland for the ages” (72). The latter controversial promise, the textbook indicates, is a point of contention among Polish and Lithuanian historians, who continue to debate what the term “annex” (Latin term applicare) meant; whether actual annexation or merely a close rapprochement between the two countries (72). However, the textbook then elaborates that the Union of Krewo did not establish a shared Polish-Lithuanian state; it was, rather, a personal or dynastical union, which permitted Poland and Lithuania to coordinate and implement foreign policy together, but did not entail a complete merger (73). The textbook specifies that the Lithuanian Gediminiid dynasty ruled Poland starting from Jogaila to the second half of the 16th century (73).

The 1410 Battle of Grunwald of the joint Polish-Lithuanian army against the Teutonic Order received a lot of attention in the textbook. It is described how for a long time, historians, on the basis of the statements of the Polish chronicler Jan Długosz, argued that the Lithuanians escaped from the battlefield and that the victory was only a merit of the Poles. However, the Swedish historian Sven Erik Ekdahl proved that the Lithuanian escape was a great feigned maneuver which dismantled the chasing German wing and, in this way, determined the end of the battle. (75)

The merits for the victory are attributed to the Lithuanian maneuver, but it is likewise additionally explained what historical evidence there is for this claim. This shows the significance of this issue to the textbook authors, who seek to prove the Lithuanian interpretation of the battle. It reveals how important it is for the Lithuanians to disprove the claims of Polish historiography, but also gives insight into the process of historical research, when newly discovered sources can significantly alter the narrative. The textbook introduces pupils to an excerpt from Długosz’s “History of Poland,” who need to assess to what extent the information provided in the source can be trusted (77).
In a chapter on multinationalism and multiculturalism of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, it is, first of all, explained that the conception of Lithuanian identity changed over time (112). A difference between a civic and a modern ethnic sense of Lithuanian identity is conveyed by explaining that in the GDL “a Ruthenian nobleman, a Jewish artisan, a Tatar soldier” – all could identify themselves as Lithuanian, since ethnic affiliation was not important to one’s national belonging (112). In the same chapter, the influence of Polonization in the GDL is discussed by stressing that the Polish language spread mostly through the court of the grand duke, educational institutions and the church (114). Eventually, the textbook explains, “an interesting consciousness of the Polonized Lithuanian noblemen formed, who identified themselves as “gente Lituanus, natione Polonus,” or of “Lithuanian origin, Polish nationality” (114). It is mentioned that Polonization left “A DEEP MARK” in southeastern Lithuania, where the majority of residents is Polish (114). However, the textbook specifies that most of them are not Poles, who arrived from Poland, but the offspring of the Polonized local Lithuanians (114).

6.4.3 Mindaugas Tamošaitis: Objectivity

A related issue discussed in the interview was objectivity in history. I indicated that a specific type of exercise caught my attention in the textbooks, where students were asked to analyze caricatures depicting a certain event of the past by answering the question as to whether these caricatures represented the event objectively. I asked Tamošaitis to elaborate on the intention of this exercise, namely, on the expected answer from pupils. The specific caricature that he speaks about in the passage below can be seen in Figure 17.

It depicts Mikhail Muravyov, a Russian imperial statesman who was appointed as a Governor General of the Northwestern Krai (former Grand Duchy of Lithuania) in 1863 and was in charge of putting down the Polish-Lithuanian uprisings of 1863–1864. Due to brutal measures he undertook in order to subdue the rebellion, he became known among the Poles and Lithuanians as “the hangman of Vilnius.” In the caricature, Muravyov is represented as the sculpture of an angry dog, a loyal implementer of the tsarist policy. The caption on the structure beneath the statue reads: “To the degenerate of the human race, hangman Muravyov – a grateful Lithuania.” Tamošaitis explains how students are expected to handle the question whether the caricature represents the past objectively.

Whether objectively? The point is that Muravyov is shown – as whom? A hangman. So a student – recently there was a similar question in an exam – needs to tell what shows what. [...] The idea goes like this: how much does it have to do with objectivity? The Lithuanians make a monument, they have made such a caricature, built for him. The point is that it is enough that a student realizes that he sees a caricature, that Muravyov was a hangman. Did the Lithuanian nation depict such an event about Muravyov well, correctly, objectively? Essentially – yes. And practically there is not much more here...In other words, if it were a university, we can go further. But for a student, especially keeping in mind that this is a B-level task… (P 5: 5:38)
Tamošaitis does not find the rationale of the question about the objectivity of a caricature debatable. By objectivity, he means accuracy of a representation in the caricature in relation to the actual events. An objective caricature does not employ deception and manipulation in his understanding. Accordingly, a caricature depicting Muravyov as a hangman is objective, because Muravyov implemented a vast scale of repressive measures against the participants of the 1863–1864 insurrection, many of whom were hanged. The idea of objectivity could be said to be confounded with truthfulness in this case. What Tamošaitis seems to have in mind is truthfulness, connected to lived experience, as opposed to manipulation, which ignores the latter. The term “objectivity” is not suitable, however, in this context, to the extent that the caricature does not denote a value-free “view from nowhere.” A perhaps better way to formulate this issue would be to explore the relation between the caricature, as a pattern of interpretation of events, and the process of lived experience.

In the following example of an “objective” caricature, objectivity comes to mean an ocularcentric correspondence between past reality and an image, which is said to be an identical reflection of the events. Objectivity comes to mean a mimetic correspondence between a representation and external reality. However, Tamošaitis does not see it as problematic to claim that a caricature is objective. The vision-based image-schematic model of cognition shapes the reasoning of Tamošaitis about objectivity without him, however, realizing the full import of this notion.
I do not have now, but there is a good example. Stalin cuts people. Completely correctly in the caricature, no question marks. The majority of the Soviet ones [caricatures – R.K.] lie. For example, [leafs through book and shows the caricature] what is happening? The red terror is happening; the great purge is happening; Stalin organizes everything. In Lithuania, a caricature appears which completely identically reflects the events. (P 5: 5:21)

The purpose of caricature analysis, as he explains, is to develop critical thinking skills (5:20, 5:25), so that when pupils engage with information beyond the history classroom, they would be able to critically assess the accuracy of information. Verification of accuracy, identification of bias and deception constitutes a significant aspect of source analysis in the textbook approach. It is questionable, however, to what extent such analysis of caricatures prepares pupils to deal with bias and deception, since caricatures can be very easily shown to bear a subjective imprint of their author. Analysis of a caricature’s objectivity does not provide a better understanding for pupils about what truth is or how one should distinguish between truth and lies.

6.4.3.1 Textbook V: Objectivity


A curious example of how the author of the textbook chapter conveys the idea of objectivity is brought forward in a task, which asks pupils to evaluate an excerpt from a poem, whether it objectively describes the events of the past (39). As was discussed above in Section 6.4.3, Tamošaitis does not see it as problematic to pose a question about an objective representation of the past in a poem or a caricature. He seems to equate objectivity with factual accuracy. Thus, if the poem mentions that there was a group of Samogitian students in Vilnius University, who promoted Lithuanian national revival, and this was indeed the case, the poem depicts the events objectively. In formulating the question this way, he, however, ignores the tension between objectivity in the sense of an objective “view from nowhere” and a personal, embodied voice of the poem’s author. The same understanding once again emerges in another task, which asks pupils to evaluate whether a sculpture, which commemorates the period of the smuggling and distribution of the illegal Lithuanian press during 1864–1904, objectively represents a historical event (51). Tamošaitis’ didactic approach is in accord with opinions that he expressed in the interview, but I would question to what extent it is appropriate to speak of “objectivity” in relation to works of art that inescapably convey a metaphorical, experiential, and embodied knowledge of the past and not merely a mimetic, ocular-optic image of the past. A metaphorical, experiential, embodied knowledge of the past can be factually accurate, but it does not follow from this that it is “objective.”
6.4.4 Mindaugas Tamošaitis: Polish-Lithuanian past

The conversation eventually moved from the topic of truth and objectivity to the presentation of the Polish-Lithuanian past in textbooks.

If you opened the curriculum and looked, for example, at the Polish-Lithuanian relations in the 20th century: are they identified separately or not? Piłsudski is not even mentioned. I can skip him altogether. I have a right not to mention him at all. […]

R.K. But you choose to mention him.

Why? It is an intention to lift the Poles above, to lift Piłsudski above. In the sense that he rescued, he fought against the Bolsheviks, he won. Lithuanians could have had a lot of problems here. […] In the exam program, for example, Piłsudski is not even mentioned. So he [R.K. – a student] does not need to know anything about Poles. I mean, in contemporary history. He will know about the uprisings in the 19th century, then the national revival takes place and the topic of Poles goes to the side. When does the conflict resume? It resumes during the First World War, then the Paris Peace Conference follows, then the War of Independence follows, and then the conflict over Vilnius. That is all. And later in 1939. Afterwards, in the second half of the 20th century the Poles do not appear at all. There is nothing about it in the curriculum. (P 5: 5:37)

The above excerpt illustrates well how shared Polish-Lithuanian past is introduced in the curriculum as well as in the textbook as a linear sequence of static states. Thus, the conflict over Vilnius between Poland and Lithuania can be depicted in textbooks without explaining how different perspectives of Poles and Lithuanians related to the long process of lived experience. Pattern can be separated from process: the 19th century history of the Lithuanian national revival and the interwar conflict over the city of Vilnius become chapters that are too distinct in the textbook outline of the past. Historical development is introduced as a sequence of patterns, of synchronic “slices” of development rather than as a process of interrelations, junctions, and entanglements. The complexity of the event is lost and, simultaneously, the ability to comprehend how different perspectives relate to each other and to the process of lived experience and interaction.

During the interview, I mentioned that his 10th-grade textbook mentions the secret protocol accompanying the Lithuanian-Soviet Russian treaty in 1920, whereas in the 12th-grade textbook this is not mentioned anymore. I ask him to comment on this change. My question leads him to briefly state his assessment of the interwar conflict between Poland and Lithuania.

You see, I can say that sometimes it happens like this, it is a matter of editing, a matter of layout. Sometimes you need to shorten, to delete some things. […] I always mention the 1920 treaty. I mention the 1926 September Moscow non-aggression pact and I write what the Lithuanians do. It is written in the textbook that the Lithuanians are the same. They are the same, only the point is that it is a weak state, it got it in the neck. It suffered and so it gives an impression that we are victims, whereas they are like that. But if we had been a powerful, strong state, we might have inflicted suffering on others. It is difficult to say. In other words, both states made the same move, and we were not saints either. (P 5: 5:31)
Tamošaitis perceives both sides of the conflict as equivalent to each other, despite the fact that Poland was a more powerful state. Lithuania is personified in a metaphorical idiom, recognizing the loss of Vilnius as getting it in the neck. He refuses to see the Lithuanians as victims or saints in the conflict, implying that the conflict does not give in to simple value dichotomy between a victim and a perpetrator. There seems to be, once again, the avoidance of straightforward value judgments, which informs his overall stated approach to textbook authorship.

6.4.4.1 Textbook VI: The interwar conflict


The interwar Polish-Lithuanian conflict over the city of Vilnius is tackled in a chapter focused on the Lithuanian Wars of Independence. The conflict is contextualized by explaining that at the end of the 19th century Lithuanians and Poles developed different visions of future statehood.

The Polish and Lithuanian gentry attempted for the last time to restore a shared Polish-Lithuanian state during the 1863–1864 Uprising. In the 8th-9th decades of the 19th century, the heralds of the Lithuanian national revival Jonas Basanavičius, Jonas Šliūpas, Vincas Kudirkas did not accept the idea of a shared Commonwealth and began declaring that Lithuanians and Poles “are not on the same path.” The majority of Polish politicians could not imagine the reestablished Poland without Lithuania, and therefore they did not want to hear anything about the 1918 Act of Independence of Lithuania; when the opportunity arose, they planned to annex Lithuanian territory to Poland. The vision of Piłsudski was that of a federative state, consisting of Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, and maybe Belarus. (89)

In this brief passage, we learn that there were two main sides to the conflict – the Lithuanians and the Poles – who disagreed about the future of the Lithuanian state. Development of a separate national consciousness meant a forking of paths, when the Lithuanians proclaimed that they were not on the same path as the Poles anymore. They sought an independent national existence without federative ties to Poland. The Poles, on the other hand, ignored the will of the Lithuanians to change the direction of movement. The Poles remained on the old path and remained attached to the idea of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The conflict of Lithuanians and Poles is then a conflict of diverging paths as different ways of being. Identity appears not to be fixed or static, but as a dynamic movement along a line (Ingold 2007). A positive influence of this paragraph is that it connects the interwar Polish-Lithuanian disagreement with the process of developments in the 19th century. It enables an understanding of history as a process of interconnections, entanglements, as well as divergence.
In terms of factual description, the textbook does not fail to mention the secret appendix to the 1920 Lithuanian-Soviet Russian peace treaty. By the peace treaty, Soviet Russia recognized the right of Lithuania to the city of Vilnius, but the secret appendix permitted Russian troops to use Lithuanian territory during the simultaneously ongoing Polish-Soviet Russian War (89). The textbook explains that recognition of Vilnius to Lithuania was not a friendly gesture of Soviet Russia. Bolsheviks expected to win the war with Poland and take control of Lithuania.

As Soviet Russia lost the war to Poland, the Polish troops once again started advancing on Lithuania. With the interference of the League of Nations, the textbook emphasizes, Poland and Lithuania finally signed a treaty in Suwałki in October 1920, according to which Vilnius remained with Lithuania (89). It is stressed that Poles broke the agreement while the participants of negotiations were still in Suwałki. The Polish government pretended that it had nothing to do with the Polish army, led by General Żeligowski, but “it was not true” (89). The Polish army seized Vilnius and “began breaking deep into Lithuanian territory,” but its advance was halted by the resistance of the Lithuanian troops (89).

The textbook avoids any explicit evaluation of Polish actions during the conflict. As Tamošaitis pointed out in the interview (Section 6.4.2), he does not want to usurp a monopoly, to impose a single interpretation of the past. Instead, he seeks a “diplomatic way” to present the events, to tone down sharp value judgments. This rather neutral presentation may also have to do with his refusal to perceive Poland and Lithuania as, respectively, an evil perpetrator and a saintly victim (Section 6.4.4). Both sides of the conflict are equivalent to each other for him, despite the fact that Poland was a more powerful state.

Despite an attempt to link the interwar conflict with the 19th-century development, the focus is on the factual details of the military conflict. Little attention is devoted to an explanation of how Poles and Lithuanians perceived and experienced the conflict, acknowledging also the internal diversity of views on both sides of the conflict. Emphasis on the concise, fact-oriented information does not allow for an understanding of why the conflict broke out.

6.4.5 Deimantas Karvelis: A GIANT ABYSS between professional and school history

One of the first issues to be discussed in the interview was changes in the presentation of Lithuanian history, introduced in the textbooks, as compared to earlier textbook series. I wanted to know if Karvelis sought actively to introduce some modifications in the chapters that he authored.

R.K. Did you want to purposefully change something in the presentation of these topics, which you wrote yourself?

Yes. Firstly, one should not hurry to make revolutionary changes. The first thing from which one needed to start, it is clear, that is, to scrupulously take into consideration the
current history curriculum in Lithuania. Obviously, one should not digress from it, even though I am of an extremely critical opinion about it, but because it is a normative act, on the basis of which the textbooks should be constructed, so whether you want it or not – you need to lean on it. But when you take concrete historical topics, periods, undoubtedly, then there is a lot of change, as compared with earlier textbooks, because it is not a secret – those, who write history textbooks in Lithuania, they do not follow the most recent historiography, the most recent scientific achievements. The problem identified by Alfredas Bumblauskas twenty years ago – a giant gap between historical science and history didactics – this abyss is still here. Those, who create textbooks, should solve this, because neither scientists, nor teachers can solve it themselves. A textbook can be an intersection, as one German historian put it, that a history textbook can become either a creator of new myths, or it can become an autobiography of national history. (P12: 12:3)

Karvelis emphasized that the GIANT ABYSS between professional, disciplinary history and school-history education can only be overcome by textbook authors, who are responsible for following the most recent historiography and translating the findings of historians into textbook contents. A textbook, ideally, for him, is an INTERSECTION between professional history and national memory. Just like Seixas (2016) and Levesque (2016), he envisions history education as being located in between disciplinary history and memory. If it is well connected to both of these fields of knowledge, it can become an AUTOBIOGRAPHY of national history. The nation is personified by Karvelis, in this regard, as a unitary subject whose past experience can be rendered into an autobiography.

Karvelis pointed out many problems in the current history curriculum. Firstly, he believed that the ratio between Lithuanian and world history in the curriculum was inadequate, placing too much emphasis on world/European history. He expressed this as a phenomenon born out of “going down on bended knees to the European Union, not even comprehending what this European identity is” (12:5). Inclusion of a broad scope of topics on European history into the curriculum, according to Karvelis, is an expression of obsequiousness or servility to foreign culture, of lacking a strong identity of one’s own. Lithuanian and world/European history are perceived as mutually exclusive rather than as interrelated.

Another problem in the curriculum, according to Karvelis, is too much of a focus on political history, at the expense of cultural, social history, history of everyday life, “which are very relevant in the West” (12:5). This shows that the West is not only despised for its overwhelming influence, but also serves as a measure and a model of historiographical developments. Emphasis on the cultural, social, everyday aspects of the past should be an example to be emulated for the officials responsible for a national history curriculum. By contrast, the history of everyday life currently “falls into some textbooks merely as an exotic episode” (12:5) without a systemic approach at the level of national educational policy development.

Although the curriculum stands as an IMMOVABLE normative basis (12:5) for instruction, Karvelis encourages his pupils to engage with the textbooks critically. Pupils are given tasks to find factual historical mistakes in the text and need to correct them. Karvelis uses several religious metaphors to convey that a textbook is not immune to criticism, that it is not the Bible.
But when I read and myself work at school with this textbooks, I find also things which can be improved, changed in other colleagues’ texts. There are even factual mistakes. Sometimes, one task I like to give to pupils is: Find two historical mistakes, two nonsenses on this page, and everybody searches for them. A textbook is not a biblical text, which should not be read critically. It is the main text – a catechism for a pupil, but not the Bible.

(P12: 12:16)

6.4.6 Deimantas Karvelis: Conflicting interpretations and objectivity in history

The passage below contains several religion-based metaphors and examples, specifically centered on the conflict between catholic and protestant faiths in the Middle Ages. This subject arose in our conversation when I asked Karvelis how he deems it appropriate to present controversial historical topics in textbooks, which receive different evaluations in historiography.

R.K. In your chapters, out of these two textbooks, there are topics, which receive controversial evaluations. How, in your opinion, should such value conflicts be presented to pupils?

They should be presented by introducing all conceptions. For example, if early history is narrated, it is always written that there is Darwinism, but creationism, the theory of creation is further related as a legend. If the 19th century emergence of political ideologies is written up, irrespective of political conjecture in Lithuania, all ideologies should be presented with their values, without any axiological meaning making, what is good, what is bad. […] Or when you write about the conflict between Reformation and Counter-Reformation, you will not find it in any other textbooks, but mine that, as also Gudavičius points out, Vilnius University was created as the headquarters of the Counter-Reformation – to annihilate the Reformation. If you write about the Renaissance, so write not only about Da Vinci, but also about the Medici and the Borgias’ crooked Florence, write about the dark and the light sides, write about both sides of history. I think that both sides should be presented, avoiding axiological evaluation, because the historian should not take up prophesying and offering the final judgment. They should simply show, as Ranke says in the 19th century, “the way it was.” […] I am a supporter of showing history the way it was. […] If you write about Mindaugas, write about everything, how he created the state through the corpses. If you write about Vytautas, write not only about Grunwald, but also about how he shamefully escaped from the Battle of the Vorskla River. To show that history is not black and white, day and night, that it is colorful. (P12: 12:18)

The above passage shows a conflation of two different contexts to convey a point about multiperspectivity. The issue of competition between religious Creationism and the secular theory of evolution has to do with two models of explanation, in which both aim to explain the same phenomenon of life. On the other hand, the issue of presenting BOTH SIDES – THE DARK AND THE LIGHT – of history has to do with including different lived experiences as part of the more complex process of life into a historical narrative.

233
Since all interpretations should be presented as equivalent to each other, avoiding value judgments, Karvelis argues that Creationism should be introduced on a par with Darwin’s theory of evolution. Creationism and Darwinism are, for him, two conceptions that should be equally represented in the textbooks, without an axiological judgment, which he sees as implicit in treating Creationism as a legend. In his view, Creationism is treated as a legend not because it fails to explain the process of life adequately, but because of implicit, subjective value judgments. The textbook, according to him, should not show preference for either of these theories. This is a concrete example that it is problematic to handle diversity of interpretations as a collection of distinct subjective patterns or perspectives, without evaluating the process out of which these perspectives emerged. As a result, Karvelis views different interpretations as equivalent to each other in a relativist manner, which implies that neither of them can be deemed more adequate to understand the phenomenon of life. For him, they are merely two absolutely relative points of view.

If we are trying to understand the phenomenon of life, evaluation of different perspectives – according to how well they can fulfill this task – becomes crucial. However, an attempt to understand the complexity of past reality is quite another issue, where varied lived experiences are what this past reality is woven of. Thus, in an embodied sense, if we wrote a history of beliefs about the origins of life, in such a narrative we could include both creationist and evolutionary ideas. This, however, still does not mean that we would have to, as historians, regard both of these strands of ideas as equally merited. In an embodied sense, history is inclusive of divergent experiences in the past, but, since history is still always written in the context of our present-day knowledge and accumulated experience, understanding of past ways of life does not preclude their evaluation. Thus, just as Karvelis himself argues, history should not only praise the Lithuanian King Mindaugas for establishing the state, but likewise acknowledge the violence, which this act required. A historian can understand this violent practice of state-creation in its own historical context and, simultaneously, evaluate it in terms of present-day customs and experience.

Karvelis assumes that portraying THE DARK AND THE LIGHT SIDES of history equals historical objectivity. This kind of approach is certainly inclusive, but it does not imply an objective POINT OF VIEW. An objective POINT OF VIEW “from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) cannot be attained to the extent that it implies a disembodied viewer, uninfluenced by her own embodied, lived experience. The very idea of identifying THE DARK AND THE LIGHT SIDES of history already implies a value-laden engagement of the historian with complex past reality.

Karvelis is a Rankean in the sense that he understands objectivity as an abstention from judgment rather than disinterested neutrality. As it was discussed in Section 3.3, for Ranke, the historian is not in a position to pass judgment, since the final judgment is the prerogative of God. The historian’s objective approach to the past therefore needs to disclose the existing order of things as intended by God. However, Ranke differentiated between good and bad developments in the past on the basis of his own conservative political preference for states and national order, which enabled him to judge which were healthy, good developments and which were to be rejected as harmful and negative. His
own contemporary context and lived experience shaped the way he engaged with and evaluated the past. Even though Karvelis may not want to make final judgments, he is likewise making judgments about the dark and the light sides of history.

In the interview, I inquired to what extent Karvelis believed it was possible to eliminate all the traces of one’s own value preferences from the text.

*R.K.* I understand that one needs to introduce all sides – positive and negative, different historical perspectives – but is it possible to not reveal, express your own perspective at all through your text? You still identify more with one value position rather than another. Do you think it is possible to avoid this?

If you write a scientific text, you need to avoid that, but it is very difficult to do that, because you are presenting your own position as a historian. You belong to a certain historiographical school, a movement. Your worldview is sooner or later seen by everybody, but if you cannot solve this question, this challenge, which you mention, when you write a textbook, then you should better not touch the writing of textbook. Because you write a text, in which there should be as little as possible of the human factor, because this text will be read by a person, whose historical memory is only under formation, and if you hammer your own things there, you will hammer new historical myths and stereotypes into his head, and this is at best unforgivable, at worst a criminal action [...]. (P12: 12:19)

In the passage above, Karvelis again seems to have in mind abstention from judgment rather than disinterested neutrality when he speaks of preventing the human factor from appearing in the textbook. He is, however, aware that it is difficult, if not unattainable to ensure complete objectivity, to completely eliminate the human factor. The fact that the embodied presence of the author/historian in the text is identified as the human factor reveals that objectivity is understood as a disembodied way of seeing, a way of seeing without a spectator. The human factor is a source of error, which must be put under control, if not completely removed.

Karvelis believes that in cases where a textbook depicts events, which receive controversial historiographical interpretation, it should show the variety of different opinions (12:19). On the other hand, matters, which are already settled among historians, can be explained in a straightforward way. As an example of a controversial event, I brought up the topic of the Constitution of May 3, which was adopted in 1791 in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Lithuanian historians do not agree whether May 3 deserves to be commemorated as a day important to the Lithuanian nation.64

*R.K.* As an example, there is the Constitution of May 3. You ask in the textbook why, since 2007, the evaluation of this event has changed in Lithuania. It is an event, which is really

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64 Traditionally, the Constitution of May 3 was regarded negatively since it eliminated the dual character of the Commonwealth and did not mention the name of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania anymore. Recently, however, some historians, such as, for example, Eligijus Raila, have argued that the Constitution deserves to be commemorated in Lithuania not only because it did not eliminate the autonomy of the GDL, but also because its adoption proved a high degree of civic consciousness in Poland and Lithuania.
evaluated controversially by Lithuanian historians, and there is no consensus. So how should this event be introduced in the text?

[...] Well, the question about the Constitution of May 3 – it is not a question for discussion; it is clear. I can even explain why these discussions take place. We restored our independence a long time ago. The science of history had already experienced its Renaissance a long time ago, but for many years, nobody even thought about May 3. Poles celebrated for three days. We never even mention it. But when our historians started going to Poland, to receive funding from different foundations, when the historians of the old Vilnius University began to receive orders from Poland and go down on bended knees, to write pro-Polish texts, and so the Constitution of May 3 came back, that it is also our Constitution. Even though it is not our Constitution. It was the constitution of the Commonwealth, in which the name of Lithuania disappeared and if it had finished this way, the statehood of the GDL would have been completely annihilated. And the Mutual Pledge of the Two Nations, which was signed in October, Poles attached it because of screaming and opposition of the Lithuanian gentry, but it does not really mean anything.

There are other aspects. Why did the famous Lithuanian historians of the interwar, which did research on the GDL – Ivinskis, Šapoka – were they fools? The masters of the Soviet era – Tyla, Jurginis, Lukšaitė – they never raised this question, because this question was clear to them. (P12: 12:20)

For Karvelis, the evaluation of the Constitution of May 3 is not a matter of discussion. He asserts the traditional view that the Constitution was not “ours,” because it did not mention the name of Lithuania and weakened the statehood of the GDL. In the passage below, he also emphasizes that the Poles “sought in all times to ABSORB US, SUCK US IN.” This metaphorical expression constructs the narrative of shared Polish-Lithuanian history by underscoring the threat of being engulfed and swallowed. Lithuanian historical narrative becomes a story of a fight for survival and resilience. The values, which inform this interpretation, are the preservation of the Lithuanian language, culture, and national continuity.

So, the Constitution is written in Polish. Looking from different sides, there is no Lithuanianness in it. There is no talk about civic rights in it. There is talk only about the expansion of the rights of the townspeople in it, but there were not many cities in the GDL. [...] I am neither for nor against the celebration of May 3. [...] But keeping in mind the Polish aspirations of statehood in the beginning of the 20th century, how they wanted the restoration of a federative state and in all times wanted to absorb us, suck us in, and the statehood of the GDL never equaled the Polish one in its weight... So to have a perspectival, not retrospective, dream that the Constitution of May 3 could have led to a salvation of the Titanic, which is the Commonwealth, is empty illusions. Mečislovas Jučas has said it beautifully: It was the testament of a perishing state. A state, which is already in a coffin; those, who wrote it, covered themselves with it. (P12: 12:21)

The Commonwealth was a perishing TITANIC, which could not have been rescued by the Constitution, according to Karvelis. It was written in Polish and did not contain any “Lithuanianness” in it. As a result, he does not see why it should be commemorated or celebrated by the Lithuanians. On the other hand, he also adds that when the topic of the
Constitution is presented in history lessons, its positive side, namely the spread of the ideas of Enlightenment in the Polish-Lithuanian sphere, needs to be acknowledged (12:22).

When I probed further to understand how he understood objectivity in history, he referred to the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga’s saying that “physics is the most precise science, while history is the least precise one” (12:28). In the passage below, he explains that the textbook is a “FIFTH MIRROR IN THE KINGDOM OF DISTORTING MIRRORS,” which implies that it is very far removed from past reality and does not offer a faithful reproduction of what happened. Truth is defined on the basis of a correspondence theory of truth, using an optic metaphor of an accurate, mimetic reflection in a mirror. Perfectly accurate and objective historical knowledge would ideally exclude any presence of an embodied knowing subject, leaving the reflection undisturbed. Historians’ work necessarily distorts past reality because they need to FILTER it THROUGH themselves.

Objectivity, Karvelis asserts, is only possible in facts, which are free of value judgment. As a result, caricatures, for example, are subjective in principle, rendering the question about the objectivity of caricatures impossible (12:25). On this point, he seems to disagree with his colleague Tamošaitis. When I pointed out that there may be different kinds of facts, some facts being very concrete and others based on generalization, he elucidated his opinion by quoting the historian E. H. Carr, who has said that “not every fact of the past is a historical fact, but only that which is SEEN BY the historian’s EYE” (12:29). Thus, he is willing to acknowledge the influence of the knower on the historical knowledge.

6.4.6.1 Textbook III: The controversy of the union


The chapters of the textbook which I discuss in this section are authored by Deimantas Karvelis.
A chapter on the 1569 Union of Lublin begins with an introductory question asking pupils to reflect on why, even today, the majority of Lithuanians assess negatively the Union of Lublin (68). The textbook describes the interests held by each side in seeking closer unification. The Lithuanian gentry is said to urgently require military support from Poland in the Livonian war with Russia. They also sought to acquire the same rights and privileges as the ones possessed by Polish nobility (68). The Polish nobility, on the other hand, leaned towards the idea of closer union with Lithuania, because they “fostered a hope to annex the Slavic territories of the GDL” (68). They likewise needed an ally in the war with the Ottoman Empire and, since King Sigismund August was still childless, it posed a threat that after his death the Polish-Lithuanian union would disintegrate (68–69).

The opposition between Poles and Lithuanians in relation to the terms of the union is described by stressing that Lithuanians feared that the union would undermine the sovereignty and separate status of the GDL (69). In this context, the textbook expresses a strong value judgment of the decision of Sigismund August to annex the southern territories of the GDL to Poland: “Sigismund August resolved to take an unpredictable step by which he showed that after all he tended to support the Polish terms. According to his decisions, several Slavic GDL territories […] were annexed to the Kingdom of Poland. What was achieved by heroic fight and diplomacy of Algirdas, Kęstutis and Vytautas was given to the Poles by a single stroke of a pen by the last Gediminid” (69). The hard work and effort of the Lithuanian grand dukes at taking hold of the southern territories is juxtaposed to the negligent act of Sigismund August. Since it is stressed that he was the last member of the Lithuanian Gediminid dynasty, it adds more weight to the disloyal, irresponsible nature of his decision.

As in most other textbooks, the author lists which institutions were merged and what remained separate after the Union of Lublin in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It is pointed out that the Lithuanian state continued to exist after the Union, but its independence was significantly limited (72). The negative evaluation of the Union and its consequences prevails in the textbook. The author claims that “doors were opened up widely for the Polonization of the Lithuanian nobility which started in 1385” (72). Polonization is metaphorically imagined as an external threat, an unwanted visitor, to whom the DOORS WERE OPENED WIDELY by the Union. It implies that if until the Union the Polish cultural impact could still be controlled, the Union broke down the defensive shield. The use of metaphors suggest a sense of vulnerability of Lithuania against imminent Polonization. The meaning of the Union is explicitly associated with a loss of protective, defensive shield and a weakened, vulnerable state of being. It suggests that had Lithuania not concluded the Union with Poland, it could have remained strong and resilient.

The textbook refers to the opinion of the fiercest opponents of the Union of Lublin – the noble magnate family Radvila – who held the Union to be a “funeral and annihilation of the free and independent state” (72). The textbook further explains that “the goal of Poland to completely annex the GDL to the Kingdom and eliminate the historical name of the Lithuanian state became a threshold which was difficult to overcome in all the subsequent history of mutual relations of both states” (72). This commentary portrays Poland as an adversary state continually seeking to annex and culturally assimilate
Lithuania. The entire shared history of Poland and Lithuania is reduced to Poland’s relentless aim to overcome and annihilate Lithuania. Pupils are asked to identify positive and negative consequences of the Union to Lithuania (73), but there is not a single positive outcome for Lithuania of the Union mentioned in the main text of this chapter. The Union of Lublin is presented as a turning point, a threshold in Lithuanian history, which opened the doors for an eventual decline of Lithuanian statehood and sovereignty. These features of presentation of the Union render a continuation of an old historiographic narrative tradition, stemming largely from the 19th century and the interwar period, according to which the Union of Lublin is “the beginning of the end.”

In a subsequent chapter, however, the unilaterally negative evaluation of the Union of Lublin is somewhat countered. The textbook explains that “some historians of Poland and Lithuania hold the opinion that the nobility democracy was merely ostensible and spread chaos in the state” (76). The latter view is challenged by referring to the opinion of the Lithuanian historian Jučas, who argues that such critical views of the noble democracy are ungrounded and “based on emotions and thickened dark colors” (76). The noble democracy is said to be an advantageous phenomenon for Lithuania after the Union of Lublin, for it provided opportunities for preservation of independence of the GDL (76). A lot of space is allocated to showing how the GDL managed to preserve its separateness and partial independence in the Commonwealth, both in the main text and through the chosen additional sources (77–79). The textbook comments that “there is no evidence that the Lithuanian gentry would have opposed the union with Poles – they held it to be a sacred thing. But there is also no evidence that the Lithuanians would have renounced the matters of their state. It was continuously underlined that Vilnius is the capital of Lithuania – Metropolis Lituaniae” (77). The textbook thereby comes to the conclusion that “the nobility democracy was the best thing which could have happened in the political life of Lithuanians before the separatism of individual magnate families […] and an aggressive policy of foreign states began to erode the political system of the state. Thus, it is not in vain that the primary period of the noble democracy is called by historians the golden age” (78).

6.4.6.2 Textbook IV: The Constitution of May 3


The chapters of the textbook, which I discuss in this section, are authored by Deimantas Karvelis.

The introductory question to a chapter on the decline of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth starting from the second half of the 17th through the 18th century asks pupils to consider “why the Polish culture increasingly overpowered the Lithuanian magnates” (72). As an important factor in Polonization of the Lithuanian magnates and
gentry, the textbook indicates the 1697 decision to adopt the Polish language as an official legal language throughout the entire Commonwealth and, hence, in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as well.

In the main text, the Constitution of May 3 is introduced by pointing out that Lithuania was mentioned in the text of the Constitution not as a federative member of the Commonwealth, but merely as one of the provinces of the state (111). Yet, it is equally stressed that all social strata of the Lithuanian society supported the Constitution and that it was translated into Lithuanian, thus, becoming the first official state document in the Lithuanian language (111). An additional source (a contemporary historian’s commentary) included at the end of the main text further entrenches the claim that the Lithuanian society positively viewed and supported the Constitution of May 3 (115). The Lithuanian gentry is said to support the Constitution even more than their Polish “brothers” (115). Lastly, pupils need to consider why in Lithuania until 2007, unlike in Poland, the day celebrating the Constitution of May 3 had not been commemorated (116). They are told to inquire why the situation changed in 2007 (116).

6.4.7 Conclusion

There is a perceptible contrast between the textbooks in the series that were co-authored by Mindaugas Tamošaitis and Deimantas Karvelis in terms of how they handle the Polish-Lithuanian past. Tamošaitis adopts a more moderate tone and avoids usurping a monopoly with explicit value judgments, whereas Karvelis is more outspoken on, for example, the negative influences brought on by the Union of Lublin, which opened the doors widely for Polonization. In the case of Tamošaitis, the moderate attitude propels him to personify Poland and Lithuania as two individuals, neither of whom is a complete saint or perpetrator. In the interwar conflict, both sides are equivalent to each other in their mindset and actions.

While other Lithuanian authors maintained that textbook should provide certain guidelines on how the past should be evaluated and direct pupils towards a preferred interpretation, Tamošaitis is more cautious about this issue. In his opinion, a single interpretation can only be applied to such events as the loss of national independence or the struggle for freedom. In other cases, textbooks and teachers should avoid explicit judgment on the past and seek to look at the past without bias. Moreover, even though Tamošaitis was averse to delving more deeply into “theoretical” issues in school education, the discussion above, nevertheless, reveals that the textbook outline of contents and exercises implies an unconscious choice of epistemological assumptions, which are not well understood by the textbook author. In particular, confusion pertains to the use of the term “objectivity,” which Tamošaitis unproblematically employs in relation to the depiction of the past in caricatures.

Likewise, Tamošaitis separates between facts, which are truthful, because they are stable and fixed, and interpretations, which cannot be shown to be truthful, because they are changing. This Platonic distinction implies that he upholds a disembodied model of cognition, with its characteristic conceptualization of truth as a match between a static
image and the world. This reliance on Greek metaphysics cannot offer any conceptual tools for dealing meaningfully with multiperspectivity and diverse interpretations of the past. Tamošaitis expects his pupils to adjudicate among divergent interpretations, select one of them and offer justifications for their choice. However, he is not able to clearly articulate the principles on which this choice should be made. This kind of approach, where pupils need to select only one interpretation, likewise does not encourage them to comprehend how different interpretations relate to each other and out of what process of lived experience they emerge.

Karvelis’s thinking about the past and history seems to be informed by an ocularcentric, optical model of cognition and its respective metaphors. In this understanding, historical truth and objectivity depend on suppression of the HUMAN FACTOR to the extent that it is possible. A historian should abstain from judgment and instead convey the past as it really happened, namely, by showing THE GOOD AND THE BAD, THE DARK AND THE LIGHT SIDES of history. By reporting BOTH of these SIDES of history, a historian can expect to remain objective. A textbook, in this context, is the FIFTH MIRROR IN THE KINGDOM OF DISTORTING MIRRORS, which explains why pupils should learn to question the contents of the textbook.

On the other hand, Karvelis is selective about which events of the past should be regarded as controversial and requiring the acknowledgment of multiple interpretations. Thus, according to him, the Constitution of May 3 should not cause contention, because it was a TESTAMENT TO THE PERISHING TITANIC, or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
Chapter 7. Metaphor analysis of the Polish school-history textbooks and interview transcripts with the authors

In this chapter, I will present the analysis of the Polish school-history textbooks and interview transcripts with their authors. Five textbooks authors and their textbooks will be introduced in consecutive sections of the chapter: Halina Manikowska, Michał Tymowski, Jolanta Choińska-Mika, Robert Śniegocki, and Piotr Laskowski. This list of textbook authors and their respective textbooks does not constitute an exhaustive selection of textbook narratives and publishing houses in Poland. However, this group of authors illustrates the variety of presentation of the past and encompasses some of the most popular textbook series on the market. Each section merges the analysis of an interview and textbooks (co-)written by the author.

The chapter begins with a section dedicated to historian Halina Manikowska, who co-authored one of the first history textbooks after the fall of the communist regime in Poland. She has collaborated with two publishing houses: WSiP and “Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN.” WSiP is the largest Polish educational publisher producing textbooks, supplementary books, methodical materials, and multimedia. WSiP was established in 1945 as the state publishing company of Poland. It has been a privately held company since 2004. “Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN,” on the other hand, was founded in 1997 and specializes in publication of school textbooks for learning of foreign languages. The two textbooks, discussed below, both focus on the history of the Middle Ages.

Historian Michał Tymowski has worked exclusively with the publishing house WSiP. Three of his textbooks, examined below, focus on the history of the Middle Ages.

Historian Jolanta Choińska-Mika was in charge of the group that prepared a new history curriculum during 2007–2008. All three textbooks, co-authored by her, have been published by the publishing house WSiP. Their chronological scope ranges from the 16th to the 20th century.

Historian and history teacher Robert Śniegocki is an author and a co-author of the textbook series for upper secondary schools, published by the publishing house “Nowa Era.” “Nowa Era” was established in 1992 and is one of the largest publishers in Poland, producing textbooks and other educational materials.

Historian and history teacher Piotr Laskowski is one of the authors of an original textbook series, which combines the subject of history with the study of Polish language and literature, cultural studies, civic education, philosophy, and ethics. The series has been published by “Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN.”

7.1 Halina Manikowska

Halina Manikowska (b. 1950) is a Polish historian, specializing in the Middle Ages. She is a professor at the Tadeusz Manteuffel Institute of History of Polish Academy of Sciences. One of her co-authored textbooks “Historia 1 Średniowiecze,” first published in 1989 by

Analyzed textbooks co-authored by Halina Manikowska:


### 7.1.1 Halina Manikowska: Historians’ BAGGAGE

In the beginning of the interview, Halina Manikowska pointed out two main reasons, which, according to her, play the main role in shaping textbook writing practices. The first of these has to do with endurance of certain schematic, established ways of depicting the past, which textbook authors maintain. The very fact that ways of presenting and organizing the knowledge of the past persist reveals the continuity of certain attitudes and conceptualizations of past reality and the cognizing self. Persistence of ways of depicting betray a continuity of ways of seeing the past, or, as Manikowska identifies it, a continuity of VISION. Manikowska observed that even when alterations in the curriculum occur, they do not displace the settled patterns and formulations. Authors use earlier textbooks as an example and reproduce the narrative with minor revisions or modifications. Importantly, professional historians (as opposed to history teachers) constitute the majority of school-history textbook authors in Poland.

Firstly, a characteristic phenomenon for textbooks is conservatism, the endurance of a certain scheme. It results from this that, apart from exceptions, textbooks are written by, well, especially now, professional historians, because they do not have money not to throw themselves at textbooks, but sometime ago they were written rather by teachers or people who had behind them experience in school. In relation to this, there is in textbooks, this is not a flaw of textbooks, there is something like continuity of culture, of vision. A significant part of textbooks is dependent on earlier textbooks. It means that one looks at what was and even when there is a curricular change, certain things endure; in short, they are almost plagiarized. (P13: 13:1)

The lack of innovation in history textbook writing is tightly connected to continuity of certain established models of shaping the narrative which, when reproduced in consecutive textbook projects, amount to a distinctive way of seeing, or a VISION. A VISION could be interpreted in this context as a convention that sediments over time through repeated re-
enactment into forms of cultural memory (Assmann 2010), or fixed, static ways of relating to the past. It implies that professional historians embody a particular vision of textbook writing, which delivers a narrative focused on political history and facts about states of the world in the past. History education becomes a means to maintain cultural continuity, a ritualized re-production of a cultural canon, a function of preserving fixed national identity.65

This brings us to the second feature of textbooks, which, according to Manikowska, concerns the influence of nation-oriented, patriotic education on textbook authors, most of whom are professional historians. She underlined that until very recently, the nation-focused, patriotic approach was the mainstream form of school-history education in Poland. History as a discipline had traditionally been an integral element in nation-state and identity building processes. Hence, historians, having being shaped by nation-oriented school education as well as professional education, come to textbook writing with a certain baggage, which impacts the way they conceive of the task of textbook writing. Baggage here denotes a similar idea to what I mean by the influence of lived experience on the ways of seeing, knowing, and depicting the past. Lived experience shapes the cognizing self of history-textbook authors and affects how they see the past.

And the second phenomenon is a generational phenomenon, which sometimes endures for two or even three generations, especially in relations with neighbors, which are important for national identity, and are an important element in building national identity. So, until the revolution, let us call it like that, or the turn in humanities towards minorities... That is to say, fetishization of national minorities and the turn, multiculturalism, that is one turn, and the second turn is appraisal of minorities. But until that moment, or until very recently, this identity was being built, it was shaped at school in whole Europe. History was an important element in building state and national identity. In relation to this, a professional historian entered research with this baggage. He was already shaped. (P13: 13:3)

Manikowska identified two possible ways to be released from the baggage, or ways to achieve a shift in the accustomed nation-oriented focus in history. A historian may commit to a conscious ideological choice or embrace a certain scientific turn. The danger, as she explains, in choosing one of these paths is, however, to lose any possibility of the objectivity in one’s relation to the past. Seeking to escape one extreme side of the spectrum, a historian may tilt to an opposite side. This implies her conviction that historians should stick with the middle ground and avoid leaning to either extreme side. Historians should be balanced and fair, which can be achieved only if they equally avoid nationalist pathos and resignation from truth and reality.

65 In contrast, I view cultural continuities and routinized practices as forms of “entanglement” rather than as rigid, imposed models that completely determine historians-authors’ practices (Hodder 2012). Historians’ ways of writing textbooks can be regarded as a result of their particular entanglements of lived experience and ideas they have encountered.
And release from it [the baggage – R.K.] is related to some, I do not know, either an ideological choice or espousal of some scientific turn, and then it happens that one tilts to another side, or, in other words, is not able to in general, if objectivity exists in historical research, in which I do not believe, I do not believe, I do not believe. There is nothing like objectivity in humanities because it is impossible to reduce it to “two and two is four,” even though some say that “two and two is five.” (P13: 13:4)

Even though historians should strive for a balanced attitude towards the past, Manikowska firmly objected that there could be objectivity in history. Objectivity, which she likened to a reductionist, simple, measurable, mathematical formula, does not apply to the field of humanities. Historians should steer away and hold on to the middle road between demands for detached objectivity and outright manipulation or distortion of those who would claim that “TWO AND TWO IS FIVE.”

### 7.1.2 Halina Manikowska: Avoidance of leaning to either SIDE

Her response spurred my interest to comprehend how she conceived of truth in history. Manikowska showed her awareness of the arguments of postmodern theory in historiography, which, as she underlined, disengaged from past reality and posited a gap between the historian and the past. The past, in this argument, is gone and all we have are representations of the past whose truthfulness or capacity to match the past accurately cannot be known. Historical knowledge bears no link to past reality. According to Manikowska, to verify the truth of historical knowledge, in a postmodern argument, means to verify the truth of the text. Historical knowledge is reduced to linguistic content, a disembodied representation. A recurrent trope in Manikowska’s position is the need to keep to the middle path or middle ground, avoidance of leaning to either of the TWO extreme SIDES. Hence, her epistemological orientation reasserts the need to maintain a “central” predisposition.

\[ R.K. \text{ But how then can we talk in this case about truth? How do you understand it?} \]

If you please, you know that in postmodernism one verifies texts, but not the truth of reality. Hence, a historian does not at all reach something, which could be called…

\[ R.K. \text{ And do you believe in this?} \]

I believe that we are able to reconstruct reality, but we do that using an entire modern apparatus of our possibilities and, let us say, central predisposition. That is to say, I do not want to [lean – R.K.] to this or that side. We do it constantly in a sense like chroniclers (simile) of earlier epochs. That is to say, we are reconstructing it, this reality for our purposes. (P13: 13:5)

Implicitly, Manikowska upholds optic metaphors in her assertion that historians can reconstruct past reality. Reconstruction of the past implies a process of reproduction of a faithful, accurate duplicate image of past reality, of what once was. A representationalist
theory of mind informs epistemology of reconstruction and assumes a stable, fixed, pre-given world, which can be known by means of the sameness between our depiction and the past. A simile used by Manikowska to compare historians to CHRONICLERS, who reconstruct the past for present-day purposes, however, indicates that she does not espouse an objectivist stance and admits that contemporary interests and values shape history. She referred to contemporary purposes as present-day realities or issues, which can only be explained by tracing their origins and development in the past (13:6). Manikowska, however, cautioned against using history for purposes, which were too closely connected to concrete ideological beliefs. She conceded that contemporary needs and historians’ backgrounds played a significant role in shaping historical knowledge, but reasserted the epistemic value of balance and a middle ground.

Reality, for Manikowska, is something that HIDES BEHIND sources and can be UNCOVERED by a skillful historian. Following the logic of these metaphors, past reality and sources are distinct from each other. The past is not present in the sources themselves, but rather is concealed BEHIND them. World and word, past reality and language are distinct. In the excerpt below, she underlines once again that there cannot be an objective truth of the past because past reality is too complex and our access to it too imperfect in order to be able to encompass it all in a historical representation.

I am not a postmodernist. In relation to this, I think that reality hides behind sources and that we uncover this reality. Every generation does it a little differently and a little more widely. But there is not something like objective truth or material truth because, if we are not able to encompass contemporaneity, because there are too complex processes and our knowledge is too imperfect in relation to this, thus, this concerns the past even more. (P13: 13:7)

I inquired whether she deemed it appropriate that epistemology of historical knowledge would be made part of school-history education. Manikowska enthusiastically supported this idea, but insisted that questions of historical truth need to be addressed by teachers rather than textbooks. Textbooks, in her opinion, can provide materials for a classroom discussion about historical truth and different ways of understanding the past, but the main responsibility falls on the teacher to engage pupils with such meta-theoretical questions. Textbooks, in order to be effective and comprehensible to pupils, need to be as simple as possible and free from what she calls “manipulation” (13:9). Manipulation, in this context, means certain evaluative framework or model of explanation, which is underpinned by distinct values. However, as she herself notes, textbooks cannot avoid laying out some “manipulations” because authors need to make certain choices about how to synthesize, make sense of and present the past. The presence of the author in the text muddles up the objective representation of the past; it is a source of error and potential deception. Some of these manipulations are an outcome of a national curriculum and others are dictated by authors’ personal views, beliefs, and predispositions (13:9).

Manikowska’s conviction is that the past needs to be studied in order to comprehend the present. In the excerpt below, she makes a statement that the past is present in contemporaneity. Hence, it is not something completely detached from the present, but rather interwoven into contemporary times. This is an element of an embodied way of
thinking in Manikowska: Pattern in the present embodies the past process of life. Simultaneously, she notes that the past can be used to legitimize the present, which both enables us to understand how the present is shaped by the past and how the past may be abused for present day purposes, or manipulated.

R.K. Should we talk to pupils about this at school, about the epistemology of history?

Obviously. Obviously, because, for me, this is in general one of the basic didactic tools. That is, discussing about what practicing history is. Because it allows understanding more easily, what overview of contemporaneity is. [...] This is an extremely essential field and it has always been regarded this way, because the past is present in the present. It is an element of the present. Even more, since a very long time ago, since the moment when it was born, history is an element, which legitimizes the present. Hence, there is no way to resign from it, one only needs to know what tools there are of this legitimation. It allows us to understand the present, what manipulations there are, we could put emphasis on that. (P13: 13:8)

I pointed out, however, that perhaps very few teachers make an effort or are capable of bringing epistemological issues to their pupils’ attention. Manikowska identifies the prevalence of male students studying history in universities as the root cause of this situation. The discipline of history is, in her opinion, too much constrained by interests and preferences of men who are only passionate about traditional political and military history and place too much emphasis on factual details (“factography”) (13:10). Other areas of past life and different approaches to doing history are, on the other hand, marginalized. Traditional masculinity shapes the discipline of history along these lines, which, in turn, affects the kind of history that is taught in secondary schools.

7.1.2.1 Textbook II: The disciplinary approach


The textbook series “Historia dla maturzysty” is intended for years 1 to 3 of lyceum (upper secondary level of education). The textbook on the Middle Ages is used by pupils in the first year of lyceum. The structure of the textbook differs from many other analogous textbook options in that it consists of six large thematic parts, each dedicated to a different area of human activity and presenting an integrated course of European and Polish history. After the introductory part dealing with sources from the medieval period, other chapters examine the Middle Ages in European history, power, politics, and development of states, economy and society, culture and spirituality and, finally, Latin Europe and other civilizations. The textbook is not focused on political and military history, but rather seeks to introduce different facets of social life in the Middle Ages.
Sections on Polish-Lithuanian history, however, appear mostly in the largest of the six textbook chapters on power and politics.

The narration of the past is interspersed with the author’s commentary on those aspects of the past, which continue to raise historical debate. The author explicitly indicates to pupils when knowledge of a certain event or phenomenon is only hypothetical and when there is enough historical knowledge based on sources to make certain claims or generalizations. The author adopts a disciplinary approach to history teaching and uses conditional language that marks to what extent given knowledge can be considered reliable. Instead of simply stating the facts, she attempts to demonstrate to pupils how historians assess evidence and engage in historical reasoning.

7.1.3 Halina Manikowska: Novelties in the depiction of the Polish-Lithuanian past

The second half of the interview focused on the textbooks authored by Manikowska and the particular depiction of the past, especially of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past, found in them. I was interested to find out whether she sought to introduce certain concrete modifications in the established textbook narrative, in order to present a new interpretation or new factual information. This question is particularly relevant knowing that she was preparing the first textbook in the late 1980s, which had to present an alternative vision to the communist interpretation of the past. The first objective, which Manikowska set for herself, was to include more non-political history into the narrative and counter the imbalance of an overly male-oriented historical focus. The second aim had to do with her identification with and belonging to the Warsaw Historical School, as opposed to the Cracow School. In practice, this meant a shift in emphasis from nationally-oriented historiography to an interpretation of Polish history as part of the broader scope of universal history.

The alterations in the depiction of a shared Polish-Lithuanian past stemmed from Manikowska’s research on the subject. As she explained in the extract below, she sought to show that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland were two separate states before the Union of Lublin. As a result, the earlier 1385 Union of Krewo cannot be interpreted as implying a merger of two states or annexation of Lithuania to Poland. Claims about the meaning of the Latin term “applicare,” used in the treaty of Krewo, arguing that it legitimized Lithuania’s incorporation into Poland as one of its provinces only show aggressive Polish pretensions, which are, however, not based on past realities. As she explained later in the interview, she sought to demonstrate in the textbook what a huge country the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was territorially and how complex it was

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66 For example, one of such controversial topics concerns the implications of the Gniezno convention that took place in the year 1000 in Poland. Some historians maintain that the convention signified a de facto coronation of the Duke of Poland Boleslaw the Brave, whereas other historians argue that the elevation of Boleslaw to the “family of kings” in the convention only meant that he received the right to nominate bishops (101). Two different interpretations are presented, pointing out that the second argument is more dominant among historians.
administratively prior to the Union of Krewo, as compared to Poland. As a result, Poland did not have any capacity to incorporate or annex Lithuania.

Above all, I want to put a markedly bigger emphasis on non-political history, to lighten the burden from what was a nightmare of textbooks, from factual details. From factual details which are, in addition, conceived in the way that we do mostly battles. Hence, to show women at least a little bit, I am not a genderist, I am not interested in it, but this did not exist at all. […] Because I come from, I am a grandchild of the Warsaw School, not the Cracow School. […] It means that the history of Poland is only a part of universal history. And also certain corrections in the case of Polish-Lithuanian relations, this ensued from my research experiences. […] I wanted to underline that until the Union of Lublin we are dealing with two separate states, not to move the reality of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the Middle Ages […]. I meant to show that there were two separate states and that the whole problem of “applicare” is a problem of pretense, aspirations, and in a sense an aggression of the Polish side. (P13: 13:12)

Another novelty in the narrative was to stress that Poland concluded the Union of Krewo with its biggest enemy at the time (13:16) and to show that the Union demonstrated the diplomatic and political skills of Jogaila who managed to redirect the anti-Lithuanian attitude of Poland towards a joint anti-Teutonic Polish-Lithuanian military policy. Jogaila was, in this interpretation, not a traitor of the Lithuanian nation, but rather worked in Lithuania’s interests (13:17).

During the communist period in Poland, school-history textbooks barely mentioned Lithuania or any disagreements about the past between Poland and Lithuania, especially in relation to the interwar conflict and the infamous “Question of Vilnius.” As Manikowska explained, it was not permitted to touch the topic of Vilnius and the territorial disagreement in the textbooks in the postwar period (13:19). This made her textbook narrative of a shared Polish-Lithuanian past even more original.

In the excerpt below, Manikowska counters the historiographical depiction that Polish gentry introduced slavery and practiced a colonialist policy towards local peasants of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Her argument is based on a claim that serfdom was equally established in Poland and imposed on Polish peasants as well. Moreover, she underlined that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was governed by Lithuanian, not Polish, gentry who, however, adopted the Polish language and customs over time. When discussing this issue, she, for the first time, refers to Poland and Poles using the first person plural pronoun “we.”

However, the problem of Polish-Lithuanian relations was covered over completely, covered for the simple reason that the Soviet Lithuanian Republic with Vilnius came into being and any questions were not allowed at all – Vilnius, what the demography of Vilnius was before the war: Poles, Jews, and only in the third place – Lithuanians. It was not allowed to touch this at all. One needs to remember that there was no Lithuania in the textbooks. Later, there is the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. […] Lithuania was in the hands of the Lithuanian gentry, Lithuanian gentry. Of course, they Polonized but they were Lithuanian gentry, they behaved like Poles, everything nice. However, even today there appears in the consciousness something that Daniel Beauvois wrote twenty or twenty-five
years ago, that we practiced a colonialist policy and introduced slavery. Only that slavery was also in Poland, that is, peasants were subjected or in slavery. And one more thing. It mattered for me to put into thought what an enormous country Lithuania was territorially and how complex. Nobody wrote about this, for example. […] (P13: 13:19)

7.1.3.1 Textbook I: CONTACT of the West and the East


The narrative of the textbook is chronological, descriptive, and fact-oriented. The emphasis mostly falls on the large-scale processes and development of political, social, economic, and cultural structures in Poland and Europe in the Middle Ages. Social, economic and cultural history receive as much attention as political and military history. Each chapter ends with a segment “Have you remembered?” which lists questions indicating the most important information to be remembered by pupils. For each chapter, there are also special questions and exercises for the analysis of maps, illustrations, and written sources.

A part of the chapter on the 1387 Union of Krewo is dedicated to a brief description of Lithuanian history until the Polish-Lithuanian Union. The section describes the establishment and territorial development of the Lithuanian state in the 13th century. Just as Manikowska indicated in the interview, the textbook emphasizes that the Lithuanian state was territorially very large as well as ethnically diverse (175). It is noted that Lithuanians were a minority in their state, thus, underlining an ethno-linguistic understanding of identity (175). The textbook comments that in terms of the level of civilization, the Ruthenian inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were more advanced than the Lithuanians (175).

It is indicated that both Poland and Lithuania had a shared interest in making the union, namely, they both sought to unite against the threat of the Teutonic Order (176). Another reason for Lithuania to seek closer cooperation with Poland was Christianization, which Lithuania was more willing to receive from Poland than the Teutonic Order (176). The Union of Krewo is introduced by pointing out that the terms of agreement mentioned the adjoining of Lithuania to Poland. However, the textbook explains that the latter promise was interpreted differently by Jogaila and the Polish nobility. The Latin term “applicare” was understood by Jogaila as a merger of two states under his rule, whereas the Polish nobility interpreted it as an incorporation of Lithuania to Poland (176). Different interpretations of the union terms are introduced.

Following the union, Poles are said to demand that Lithuania would be annexed to Poland, but “this had never been achieved due to resistance of the Lithuanians, who interpreted the Krewo agreement differently and underlined the separateness of Lithuania. […] The Lithuanian state was too powerful to be completely subordinated by Poland”
The Lithuanian Grand Duke Vytautas is briefly mentioned in one sentence as a cousin of Jogaila who became Jogaila’s deputy in Lithuania and ruled the country until his death (177), but nothing is said about Vytautas’ separatist policy or his aims of coronation as the King of Lithuania.

The Polish-Lithuanian Union is assessed in the textbook very positively as an event which permitted Poles and Lithuanians to jointly eliminate the danger of the Teutonic Order and which led to an emergence of the powerful and territorially largest state in Europe (178–179). The union is said to contribute to the cultural development in the vast territory of the state and allow for Western Christian culture to spread in Lithuania (179). The Union of Krewo is metaphorized as a “CONTACT of the West and the East,” which gave a specific character to Polish culture, RADIATING to neighboring countries (179).

The description of the 1410 Battle of Grunwald points out that the Lithuanian and Russian troops, led by Vytautas, started the assault, defeated the Teutonic infantry, but then “had to shift back from the counterattack of the Teutonic heavy cavalry” (184). Polish troops, on the other hand, clashed with the Teutonic army on the left flank and withstood the attack (179). The Polish attack and the return of the Lithuanian army to the battlefield are said to have led to the victory. The Lithuanian retreat is not discussed in a more detailed way, nor is it identified as a special maneuver aimed at confusing the army of the Teutonic Order. However, the contribution of both Lithuanians and Poles to the victory in the battle is clearly acknowledged.

The textbook does not engage issues of memory and interpretation of the discussed Polish-Lithuanian past in either country, or enter into a discussion of how the events were perceived or experienced by their contemporaries. It presents the main facts in a predominantly descriptive and concise manner, avoiding the expression of opinion, judgment or polemics, at least in the chapters dealing with the Polish-Lithuanian past. In this sense, the style of the textbook can be said to represent an avoidance of “manipulation,” or of the presence of the subjectivity of the author, against which Manikowska cautioned in the interview. Even though she criticized the fact-driven approach to history teaching, based on memorization of factual details, the main text of the textbook is still dominated by a “dry” fact-oriented depiction, which may limit a pupils’ capacity to understand and make sense of the past. It could be said to follow the tradition of writing history as a national narrative of political history. The aim of the textbook seems to be to provide a generalized, “objective” depiction of “what happened,” of states of the world in the past, employing the third-person way of seeing the past as if “from the outside” and without introducing the lived dimension of the past.

7.1.3.2 Textbook II: Polish-Lithuanian unification

An innovation of this textbook in its depiction of the Polish-Lithuanian past is that the author introduces clashes between Poland and Lithuania in the 14th century, before the union, over the territories of Rus’ which both Poland and Lithuania sought to annex (136). It is pointed out that Poland’s relations with Lithuania became a problem of great importance for the Polish King Kazimierz Wielki, who expected to Christianize and subordinate pagan Lithuania to the archbishopry in Gniezno (136). The section presents a brief overview of the development of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 13th and 14th centuries (135–136). Lithuania is introduced as a strong, ethnically and confessionally diverse state created by pagan Lithuanians.

The textbook tackles the topic of the Union of Krewo in a novel way by pointing out that, for Poland, the Union meant, among other things, a reorientation in foreign policy and a rapprochement with, until then, hostile Lithuania (142). The Union resolved the problem of military conflicts with Lithuania over the Ruthenian territories. For Lithuania, the Union signified “opening to the influence of the West” (142). It is mentioned that Jogaila’s pledge to incorporate the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to Poland was to become a quarrelsome issue between the two states (141). The separatist attitudes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are emphasized. The textbook explains that the unions of Poland and Lithuania during the 15th century “had the nature of a rather loose connection between two separate states” (143).

Lithuania is said to play a major role in the Polish-Teutonic relations after the Union of Krewo. The interests of the Grand Duke Vytautas and the King Jogaila matched in this regard as both of them sought to fight the Teutonic Order in an armed attack on the Order (143). The Battle of Grunwald is depicted extremely briefly, avoiding more detailed descriptions of its process and involvement of Polish and Lithuanian troops. However, Jogaila emerges as the main leader of the Polish-Lithuanian army, whereas the name of Vytautas is mentioned only in relation to the peace agreement signed with the Teutonic Order.

The military success of Poland was not, however, fully exploited. […] The peace agreement which was sworn in 1411 in Torun provided the return of Samogitia to Vytautas (after his death, it was meant to return to the Teutonic knights), to Poland – the return of the Dobrin Land, arbitration in a dispute over border territories, and payment of a very high compensation. (144)

Hence, Lithuania is not even mentioned as one of the victorious parties to the conflict. The defeat of the Teutonic Order is presented as a military success of Poland, rather than as a joint victory of both Poland and Lithuania.

The attention that is paid to different interpretations and debates of historians in the textbook in relation to some other events or phenomena of Polish and European medieval history does not extend to the depiction of a shared Polish-Lithuanian past. The textbook does not delve into explaining in more detail the different interpretations of the Union of Krewo and the Battle of Grunwald. Especially in the case of the Battle of Grunwald, the role of the Lithuanian army is downplayed. The implication can be drawn that these issues are considered, perhaps unsurprisingly, much less relevant in the overall context of Polish history by the textbook author. They are perceived as not requiring further elaboration and
discussion. Simultaneously, authorial intentions to modify the description of the Union of Krewo by inserting new factual information are clearly discernible. The authorial impact is likewise visible in the disciplinary approach throughout the textbook, based on the methodology of the Annales School, with its emphasis on social, economic, and cultural history.

7.1.4 Halina Manikowska: Evaluation of the past

Our conversation took a turn when I asked Manikowska whether she sought to consciously emphasize certain values in her textbooks. In other words, my intention was to understand how she deals with the evaluation of the past and her own values when trying to stay balanced and fair. Her response revealed a very specific definition of empathy, which, for example, does not match my own understanding of empathy as resting on a cognitive capacity for “as if-ness” of metaphoric thought (Modell 2003; Section 3.6.1). Defined this way, empathy requires the acceptance of a paradox, where a person is capable of imaginatively identifying with people in the past and their worldview and simultaneously recognizing difference and alterity of the past. For Manikowska, on the other hand, empathy is synonymous with total identification and sameness, which is why she regards empathy as unsuitable in the discipline of history. Empathic identification leads to anachronistic relation to the past. Empathy, according to her, prevents historians from seeing the past as it was lived and experienced, because we judge the past on the basis of our contemporary moral standards. However, I would argue that this is not empathy but, rather, first-person projection on the past, which, I agree with her, does not permit us to understand the past.67

For Manikowska, empathy is not a second-person, partial identification, which leaves room for a sense of alterity. She perceives empathy as a first-person projection of the researcher’s own values. To do that is unfair to the past, because people in the past cannot speak back and defend themselves. Although she identified empathy with philosophical posthumanism, it remains unclear what she meant by this connection, because sometimes she critically referred to humanism and other times to posthumanism. She firmly underlined her strong adverse relation to humanism, which she regarded as totalitarian and “overflowing with pride.”

For Manikowska, values express subjectivity of a knowing self which should be kept under control to prevent it from intervening too much in the process of cognition.

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67 As I argued in Section 3.6.1, when one adopts the understanding of empathy not as total identification, but as a partial, metaphoric identification, the problem of how to combine empathy and judgment/evaluation of the past shifts. One can both empathize with a person in the past and, recognizing them as a human being of a different context and experience, judge or evaluate their actions as based on their own moral system. Empathy does not necessarily undermine the sense of difference, alterity, and critical detachment; rather, empathy needs to be carefully combined with them. An embodied, relational understanding of an empathic imagination allows one to both regard the experience of people in the past on their own terms and acknowledge how the actions of these people may be unacceptable to the investigator in light of his or her experience and contemporary social and cultural environment.
That is, what values? [...] I have a certain moral vision, let us say, of history. Because I come from the school… My master was Benedykt Zientara. That is important, because that was one of the most objective, if in quotation marks “objective,” historians. In the sense that he warned against anachronism. In other words, I cannot write that wife beating was a moral wrong, if it was not a moral wrong.

R.K. In those times?

Yes. I can write that they beat their wives and that there was no sympathy and that was natural, but I cannot condemn them for beating their wives.

R.K. Even if we always write history from a contemporary point of view?

In this moment, we are in posthumanism and posthumanism promotes empathy. I reject it because it is such a manipulation of the past. Because how can they defend themselves? It is unfair towards the past. How should the past defend itself? [...] I cannot impose on the past my moral system. My obligation is to recreate this moral system and show what ends it served. It happens that it was criminal, it served crime. That was the Third Reich. [...] (P13: 13:20)

Her duty as a historian is to show whether a certain custom, a behavior pattern was a typical element of that culture, in which case it cannot be condemned as a moral ill. If, on the other hand, it was a deviation at the time, then it can be judged negatively (13:22). The past needs to be evaluated strictly on its own terms. This is how she conceives of “objectivity” in the practice of history.

As a concrete example of how the judgment of the past works in the case of modern Polish-Lithuanian history, she commented on the interwar conflict between Poland and Lithuania. Her emphasis falls on the need to understand (and I would interpret this as empathizing with) the reasoning of the people who lived at the time, their worldviews and experience which shaped how they perceived the situation. Hence, she underlines that Polish society could not imagine a separate Lithuania, due to hundreds of years of a shared past. Only when you comprehend their reasoning, can you begin to point out how these people did not take certain things into account or were mistaken in their judgments. There is a hint of embodied reasoning in her reflection, when she asserts that a judgment must pursue close familiarity with lived reality, a lived context, and reasoning of the people involved in the interwar Polish-Lithuanian conflict. She is convinced that if the reasoning of the Polish people is properly understood, Polish military intervention could be seen, not as an attack against Lithuania or the Kaunas government, but as dictated by attachment to a certain vision of the shared past.

What is the situation in Lithuania at the beginning of the 20th century? It is not so obvious that a Lithuanian nation exists. It is obvious that a Lithuanian fatherland exists, but it is not obvious that there exists… The same will be with Belarusians, which were created by the Radziwill family. Lithuanians had a better past, they had an elite and had history, also had Dlugosz from whom they could find support that they were descended from the Romans. They had all those things. But that is not obvious. Hence, one would need to show that this was not an attack on Lithuania, on Kaunas, that it was not an attack on Lithuania, [...] and
it is not an outcome of some extreme Polish nationalism or chauvinism. One only needs to remember that we have behind us 400 or 300 years of shared history and, for these people, a separate Lithuania was unfathomable. Because, of course, there are extreme nationalists, that is another issue. On the other hand, what is important is to show real reasoning of those people and then we can discuss – they were mistaken, or they did not take that into account. But if I evaluate this, I make a mistake by not showing the reasoning. But such reasoning does not appear either in Lithuania, or in Poland. (P13: 13:23)

What is important, according to Manikowska, is that this reasoning of people in the past would be shown on both sides of the conflict (13:24). Metaphorically structuring the conflict as split into two sides can possibly conceal positions and opinions, which do not neatly fit into two opposed categories, thus, preventing compromise and aggravating conflict. However, she also added that internal diversity of views and opinions among Lithuanians and Poles needs to be demonstrated by, for example, showing how the ideas of Polish nationalists differed from those of Piłsudski, who did not uphold nationalist beliefs (13:24). When I pointed out that Polish school-history textbooks addressed this issue in a very brief, schematic, fact-oriented explication of the disagreement, Manikowska responded by underlining that this stems from a certain mythology and a lack of knowledge about Polish-Lithuanian relations in the past (13:25). In addition, if one looks at joint Polish-Lithuanian historiographic accounts, there is not a shared position on the past (13:25). I would raise a question whether there can be and whether there needs to be a shared, stable position on the past. Perhaps it would be more important to encourage mutual understanding and acceptance of different lived experiences, comprehend the reasons why people experienced the past in very different ways rather than seek a single account of the past. More importantly, Manikowska attributes blame to the Lithuanians for this lack of agreement about the past. Lithuanians are, in her view, not yet ready to talk about the past.

It follows from this mythology, lack of education. That is, one needs to remember that these are not specialists. It is a difficult problem which requires familiarity with the Lithuanian side as well. If you look at these joint works, certain Polish-Lithuanian syntheses, there is not a shared position. And I would say that the blame lays in this moment more on the Lithuanian side. I am not talking about school textbooks, only works. Lithuanians are not yet ready to be able to say… (P13: 13:25)

As she further explains, “We had already mourned over Lithuania a long time ago and there is nothing more to discuss. Lithuanians do not realize that nobody wants to integrate them, to take them. (Laughter)” (13:26). The problem with Polish historiography on the interwar conflict, according to her, is that from a complete condemnation of Piłsudski and the Polish military intervention during the communist period, Polish historians tilted to the completely opposite side, portraying him as a hero, whose actions are unequivocally glorified. The trope of a balanced middle ground as a desirable quality and epistemic virtue for historians is repeated in the metaphor of a pendulum, which she employs to express the fluctuations of evaluations in Polish historiography from one extreme side to another.
Throughout the entire communist period, we had to spit on the Second Polish Republic in the textbooks. In relation to this, “Chief, lead to Kaunas!” was presented exceptionally as a crime. Piłsudski was a criminal. There are these pendulums. It will return sometime later to the middle, soon, I hope. […] That is, that is also a reaction of the latest historians to the fact that it was needed to change the perspective and show that it was not like that. But instead of showing how it was, this pendulum went to the other side. (P13: 13:29)

7.1.5 Conclusion

Even though the use of metaphors throughout the interview was low, the trope of the middle ground or MIDDLE PATH was repeatedly evoked during the conversation, which shows that it had a structuring effect on her way of thinking about the practice of history. Historians, according to Manikowska, should not TILT TO EITHER SIDE. In order to access the truth, according to her, the past should be seen on its own terms. Manikowska accepted that the historian’s background, experience, beliefs, and values (BAGGAGE) play a role in history writing to some extent, but cautioned against anachronistic judgment of the past on the basis of present-day moral values. Although Manikowska described the latter phenomenon as a consequence of empathy, I sought to show that what she means by empathy is a first-person projection of personal ideas and values on the past rather than empathic imagination.

According to Manikowska, history textbooks should avoid “manipulations” as far as it is possible, although she readily admitted that it is impossible to completely avoid some “manipulation” because textbook authors need to produce a synthesis, make sense of the past and, therefore, make some choices about how they should depict the past. Describing the personal input of authors, seeking to make sense of the past, as “manipulations” reveals a negative evaluative judgment of an author’s “subjective” presence in the narrative. The subjectivity of the author is perceived in opposition to the reality of the past, which is externalized and objective. The knowing self should preferably be kept under control, if it cannot be completely detached when it engages in the reconstruction of the past reality that HIDES BEHIND SOURCES. The analysis reveals a hold of implicit metaphors and image schemas underlying the subjective-objective dualism and the mind-world gap, which inform her meta-theoretical assumptions, even if the overall use of metaphors is low.

On the other hand, there is a hint of embodied reasoning in Manikowska responses, particularly when she argues that an understanding of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict requires understanding the reasoning of people in the past and what experience has shaped their perception and behavior. She insists that a textbook should present BOTH SIDES of the conflict.
7.2 Michał Tymowski

Michał Tymowski is a Polish historian and a professor of the University of Warsaw. His areas of specialization encompass history of Africa, history of the Middle Ages and political anthropology. In 2005, Tymowski was awarded the Commander’s Cross of Polonia Restituta, conferred for outstanding achievements in the field of science. I interviewed Tymowski at the Institute of History of the University of Warsaw in June 2014.

Analyzed textbooks co-authored by Michał Tymowski:

7.2.1 Michał Tymowski: Overwhelmed by individual facts

The conversation with Michał Tymowski delved straightaway into the question of different interpretations of the past in school-history education. Tymowski emphasized that there is a certain misalignment between professional history and school history in this respect. It is likely that some pupils may struggle to understand diverse narratives about past events. He perceives this situation as one of the biggest challenges facing school-history education. School history, on the one hand, should draw pupils’ attention to differences in interpretation of the past, but simultaneously needs to provide basic factual knowledge. According to him, school history needs to find an approach which would permit expanding pupils’ knowledge, including diverse evaluations and narratives, without burdening them with too much factual material. The possibilities for dealing with different narratives in school history are also narrowed down by the curriculum and the limited time that is allocated to a concrete topic. All these factors add up to a complex dilemma of how to adjust the curriculum and history-teaching approach in order to achieve different goals.

Later in the interview, Tymowski pointed out that, due to the limitations of the curriculum, he was forced to diminish the chapters on culture in one of his textbooks (15:21). Similarly, the scope of the curriculum makes the introduction of diverse interpretations problematic. As Tymowski explains in the excerpt below, Polish school-history curriculum encompasses both Polish and world history from the ancient history to the 20th century. In practice, this means that time devoted to a single topic is very small, leaving little or no possibility to discuss how this topic is perceived and interpreted by different communities. By contrast, the history curriculum in England or France is themo- or problem-oriented, which is more conducive to bringing up and discussing controversial
issues. Even though there was an attempt in Poland to change the curriculum into a more problem-oriented format, the proposal was met with resistance from proponents of the existing curriculum model, according to which the entire history of Poland is taught in schools (15:30).

He further elaborated his position on the history curriculum by employing the metaphor of a GRAIN ELEVATOR. History teaching, according to the existing curriculum, is like a GRAIN ELEVATOR, which POURS facts on pupils and overwhelms them by the multitude of individual facts. There is no possibility to raise a discussion, because pupils DROWN under the weight of factual information. Simultaneously, he acknowledges that, in order for a discussion to succeed, pupils do need to possess basic factual knowledge. But Tymowski was not optimistic about the likelihood of different interpretations being taught in school history. In addition to political resistance to changes in history teaching, he pointed out that it was questionable to what extent teachers were prepared to navigate different interpretations of the past and encourage nuanced discussions on such issues.

[...] There is no way to obtain this teaching about everything. Because the facts overwhelm. It is as if someone got to a grain elevator and grains were poured on him, he will not come out anymore, no one will do anything, because they will drown in these specks, which are so many. Therefore, it is a great problem as to how to teach history in order to get to the skill of discussion. The discussion must be based on some facts, because otherwise, when one doesn’t know anything, it’s very easy to discuss. Then there’s no problem. Hence, one should learn something. On the other hand, it’s even a political problem, not only an educational-cultural or psychological one. [...] It will not be an easy process. Not easy with respect to political resistance, with respect to the quality of teacher personnel, which carries out such debatable problems not everywhere. [...] (P15: 15:31)

7.2.2 Michał Tymowski: Depiction of the Polish-Lithuanian past

Tymowski underlined that the Lithuanian narrative of a shared Polish-Lithuanian past springs from the 19th century, from the context in which the modern Lithuanian nation was emerging. A negative evaluation of the union with Poland is an outcome of the 19th century Lithuanian way of looking at the past, shaped by values, needs, and interests which prevailed at the time. He stressed that the perception of the union in the Middle Ages by the politically defined Lithuanian nation was not the same as in the 19th century. Evaluations depend on the lived context and experience. The Polish POINT OF VIEW of the union is, on the other hand, positive and based on a certain sense of nostalgia for the greatness of statehood in the past. As Tymowski explained, he put a lot of emphasis on the Polish-Lithuanian Union in his textbooks, considering it to be an event of extraordinary WEIGHT, since Polish-Lithuanian unification and the establishment of a shared state is a precursor to the attempts to BUILD the European Union.

It is at any rate varied and surely not medieval or modern factors that determine it, but such an evaluation, let us say, from the point of view of the 19th and 20th centuries. That is, from the point of view of the formation of modern nations and that, which the union meant
from the point of view of formation of, for example, the Lithuanian nation in the long scale, over a long time period. [...] Poles maintained a positive evaluation and a certain longing for the greatness of the state, which was a state, something we today call “The Republic of many nations.” [...] On the other hand, it raises a certain nostalgia, hence, it is also a contemporary point of reference, from the point of view of Polish evaluations. How interesting… It was an extraordinarily interesting political, social, and cultural experiment, interesting in every way, even from the contemporary point of view again. [...] It is an event of extraordinary weight. [...] (P:15: 15:2)

I drew Tymowski’s attention to the fact that Polish textbooks, especially those published in the 1990s, tended to refer to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth simply as “Poland.” He explained this phenomenon as stemming from Polish identification with the Commonwealth. However, according to him, it is increasingly understood in Poland that the “Republic” was a much more complex state and should not be equaled to Poland (15:17).

I mentioned that Tymowski’s textbooks stood out in the way they explicitly sought to underline the separateness of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the union with Poland. Tymowski explained that it was necessary to show to pupils that even though the Union of Krewo was an attempt of incorporation of Lithuania into Poland, it was impossible to implement. Political elites of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania preserved their sense of a separate identity even after they had become linguistically Polonized. On the other hand, Tymowski’s main approach to portraying the Polish-Lithuanian union was to compare it to other analogous dynastic unions in the context of Europe. A comparative approach allowed him to identify the unique stability and continuity of the Polish-Lithuanian union. When considering the Polish evaluation of the union, he pointed out that despite the overwhelmingly positive general assessment, he likewise wanted to point out some negative or risky consequences of the union for Poland, such as becoming involved in the wars with Moscow (15:4).

[...] I posit a question – what was it that the union of Poland with Lithuania, or of the Crown, the Kingdom, with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania turned out to be so stable? It could not be merely a dynastic phenomenon. There should have been some kind of deep processes which entailed the stability of such a union. I discuss different unions, not only the unions of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. [...] But in each case I posit this problem against the general background of unions in Europe and the particularity of this union against this background. [...] Later we contemplate, posit an issue to pupils that the first union – Krewo – was, as a matter of fact, an incorporation. It was “applicare.” But it turned out to be impossible in general and that is an emphasis of separateness of Lithuanian state. It could not be incorporated. It was another organism, organized in another way, socially different, and other most different traits. [...] (P15: 15:4)

Tymowski’s consistently comparative approach enabled him to illustrate the positive aspects of the union with Poland for Lithuania. As he explains in the excerpt below, the union created favorable circumstances for stability and continuity of Lithuanian statehood. The adoption of Catholic Christianity, as one of the conditions of the union, distinguished Lithuanians from the Orthodox population and safeguarded it against the attacks of
Christian knights. A comparison of Lithuanians with other Baltic tribes, which did not adopt Christianity and perished, permits one to argue that, according to Tymowski, the Polish-Lithuanian union had a positive influence on Lithuanian sovereignty and statehood. Tymowski argued that a significant aspect of the pedagogical approach should, therefore, be to show the consequences of the past in contemporary times – to make history relevant to pupils who live today and may find it difficult to comprehend how the past is linked to the present. This is what makes history ALIVE, as opposed to DEAD history, which only outlines factual information for memorization and recollection, but does not explain how the past manifests in the present. Revealing hints of embodied thinking, Tymowski explained that what makes history ALIVE is to show how the past is present in contemporary life, how its consequences are woven into the fabric of the present.

If it has to do with the beginning of the union, but also with its consequences until today, I wrote about the problem of Catholicism. Hence, from the point of view of Polish evaluations, adoption of Catholicism by the still pagan Lithuanian elite was an important factor in the long scale for the formation of the Lithuanian nation. That is how we imagine it and these are two points of reference. Firstly, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had huge areas with an Orthodox population [...] They could Ruthenize Lithuanians. Catholicism created a possibility of distinction. [...] Among the Balts, those who didn’t Christianize, perished. In other words, the baptism of Lithuania, and the union was one of the conditions of baptism of Lithuania, is to a certain degree a possibility of its continuity. [...] I show these differences, but I show them not just against the background of mutual relations, but in terms of what happened in Europe. [...] I think it’s best and it can make contemporary pupils interested, because it needs to have some… Otherwise it’s dead for pupils. What can it mean for a young person in Poland, if he is not especially interested in history? It seems to them that the union didn’t leave any traces in this moment. We are a completely differently shaped state in terms of ethnic, territorial, and any other aspects. [...] (P15: 15:6)

7.2.2.1 Textbook I: Maintaining separateness in the union


The textbook conforms to the basic level history curriculum of the first year of upper secondary school. It encompasses ancient history and history of the Middle Ages and presents a unified course of Polish and world history. Michał Tymowski authored three chapters of this textbook, which depict the Early, High, and Late Middle Ages.

The Lithuanian state is first introduced in a section on states of East and Central Europe in the 14–15th centuries. The textbook explains that Lithuanians established their state in the 13th century with a capital in Vilnius (300). As the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was increasingly threatened by attacks of the Teutonic Order, the Lithuanian Grand Duke
Jogaila is said to have decided to Christianize Lithuania and make a union with the Kingdom of Poland in 1385 (301). Christianity, adopted from Poland, incorporated Lithuania into the field of Western culture and distinguished the Lithuanian elites from the Ruthenian Orthodox population of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (301, 314). Catholic Christianity “restrained the influences of eastern culture in Lithuania” (314).

The textbook, first, shows that both sides had their own weighty interests in establishing the union. Apart from the shared threat of the Teutonic Order, the Lithuanian gentry are said to seek to acquire the same rights and privileges possessed by their Polish counterparts (314). The union also strengthened the position of Jogaila, whose rule was contested in dynastic conflicts in Lithuania (314). The Polish Church likewise held an interest in the union, which led to new administrative positions in Lithuania (314).

Although, as the textbook explains, the Union of Krewo stipulated the incorporation of Lithuania into Poland, it soon became obvious that merger of two such different states and societies was not possible (315). Lithuanians are said to strive toward maintaining their separateness from Poland. The textbook also mentions Vytautas as the person who best expressed the Lithuanian desire for sovereignty by his eventually successful attempts to become the Grand Duke of Lithuania (315).

The textbook’s attention to the separateness and sovereignty of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is further exemplified by a relatively lengthy depiction of the rule of Casimir Jagiellon. The Lithuanian gentry broke off the union with Poland when they independently elected Casimir Jagiellon as the grand duke of Lithuania in 1440 (322). Casimir Jagiellon wanted to strengthen the separate status of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. When the Polish gentry, seeking to renew the union with Lithuania, proposed Casimir Jagiellon as King of Poland, he accepted the throne, but guaranteed the Lithuanian gentry that offices in Lithuania could only be taken by the Lithuanians and that the territory of the Grand Duchy could not be modified (315).

Hence, the textbook depicts the union of Poland and Lithuania as a bond between two separate states, which nevertheless were becoming increasingly similar in terms of administrative and institutional arrangements. The textbook pays attention to the Lithuanian view of the union with Poland and describes the efforts of Lithuanians to preserve the sovereignty of their state. The presentation of a shared Polish-Lithuanian past, however, remains limited in scope to fact-driven political and military history of medieval states. This perhaps can be explained as an outcome of the wide-ranging scope of the curriculum, which means that the textbook authors do not have enough room to delve beyond a brief, generalized description of the most important facts of political Polish-Lithuanian history. This mode of presentation, however, creates an effect, where the past appears distanced and abstract, detached from the people who took part and experienced the events in question. Far from bringing the past into “life,” the mode of the textbook presentation increases the distance between the past and pupils.
7.2.2.2 Textbook II: The union in the wider European context


Michal Tymowski’s sections on the history of the Middle Ages consistently contextualize the presentation of Polish history against the wider European background. Medieval realities of Central and Eastern Europe, whether political, economic or cultural, are compared to those of Western Europe. Introducing the union, Tymowski points out that the Polish-Lithuanian union can be evaluated not only from the point of view of Poland and Lithuania, but also by comparison to other similar unions of medieval states in Europe (325–327). The textbook provides a definition of a dynastic personal union in the Middle Ages and then offers different examples of such unions in medieval Europe, ranging from the Kalmar Union of Sweden, Norway and Denmark to the Castile-Aragon Union. In each case, the aim is to demonstrate how a particular union functioned in practice and what its main features were. The center of attention is not so much on the factual details, but the phenomenon of medieval dynastic unions as such.

Importantly, the textbook describes the changing nature of the Union after 1385 enacted by the 1401 Union of Radom and Vilnius and the 1413 Union of Horodło, which increased Lithuania’s autonomy (328–329). It is noted that the separateness of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was increasingly emphasized in the subsequently signed documents of the union (328). On the other hand, the cultural ties between Poland and Lithuania grew stronger, as Lithuania adopted the Polish system of political and administrative institutions (329). The growing similarity between the two states is said to have been a slow process, which nevertheless “created a more solid and durable basis for the union of both states than merely a personal union” (329). The textbook emphasizes that the Polish-Lithuanian Union was one of the most long-lasting unions in Europe.

Tymowski underlines that Polish-Lithuanian unification and the adoption of Catholic Christianity by Lithuania enabled Lithuanians to differentiate their identity from the Orthodox Ruthenian population of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, whose size exceeded the ethnically Lithuanian population (333). The influence of Polish political, cultural, religious norms and practices on Lithuania is acknowledged, but the textbook also does not fail to mention the cultural influences reaching Poland from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (334), which distinguishes this textbook from its counterparts.

Lastly, textbook discusses positive and negative consequences of the Union for Poland and Lithuania. Some of these consequences of the union are said to reach the modern history of Poland and Lithuania, illustrating how the past is present, how it is woven into the fabric of contemporary times. Importantly, the textbook mentions that the 19th century brought about negative evaluations of the union by the modern Lithuanian nation (337), which perceived the union as the main cause of the Polonization of Lithuanian political
elites. The difference between the Lithuanian and Polish evaluation of the union is indicated.

To conclude, this textbook stands out both in terms of its meta-theoretical assumptions and its concrete presentation of the Polish-Lithuanian past. It metaphorically conceptualizes the past as a process of change and continuity rather than as a static space to be reconstructed. The authors sought to go beyond the usual presentation of historical methodology focused exclusively on source criticism (identification of bias, assessment of veracity, and the authenticity of sources) and extended it with examples of practical application of other methodological approaches that contemporary historians use.

Presentation of the Polish-Lithuanian Union in this textbook unequivocally departs from an established fact-oriented narrative tradition. The factual information is included in the depiction, but the author clearly sought to focus pupils’ attention on the phenomenon of medieval unions as such and show how the Polish-Lithuanian union figures in the European context. Lithuania’s interests in the union receive as much attention as those of Poland. Lastly, the textbook acknowledges diverse and changing evaluations of the union in Poland and Lithuania. Pupils are made aware of the fact that evaluations of the Lithuanian gentry, who were contemporaries of the union, differed from the evaluations, which emerged in the 19th and 20th centuries together with modern nationalist movements.

7.2.3 Michał Tymowski: Pursuing truth

I asked Tymowski to elaborate on what ideas he sought to convey in the introductory textbook chapters, which depict history as a disciplinary, scientific pursuit. His response puts a lot of emphasis on the fact that historians study reality, which does not exist anymore. This is what, according to Tymowski, defines the peculiarity of history as a discipline. Hence, the past is woven into the present, but simultaneously it is absent. However, the examples of sources, which he employed to ground his argument, suggests that his way of thinking about the past is nevertheless shaped more by the idea of the past as woven into the present. For example, he spoke about language as a historical source, which can provide historians information about life in the past and which, likewise, through linguistic continuity, connects the present to the past. Lastly, Tymowski sought to emphasize that historians attempt to reconstruct the past, but knowledge of the past is always conditional and open to debate, modification, questioning. The past cannot be known completely, totally.

I wanted to show pupils that, if I offer them different knowledge about history, it derives from the reconstruction of history through historical sources. History is a very peculiar science because, on the one hand, we relate to reality, but this reality does not exist. […] when it comes to history, it’s reality which does not exist, and I wanted to put this into thought to the pupils, that we investigate it only through what remained. And I write that sources remained, these sources are typically considered as written sources, but there are different ones, there are archaeological and linguistic sources alike. Many persisted in
language. One can investigate language; one can investigate its chronology, formation, different influences and so on. [...] (P15: 15:7)

Although pursuing truth is important to him, no historian can claim that he or she has achieved the final, ultimate truth (15:8). As a result, it is important to show that there are different POINTS OF VIEW on the past. Crucially, recognition of differences in interpretation “builds a possibility of rapprochement. We will not come to the truth” (15:8). Getting to know different interpretations of the past creates a potential for mutual understanding. A distinct (embodied) POINT OF VIEW is, therefore, not an obstacle to understanding, but a prerequisite for knowledge. It is impossible to achieve a single, final truth, a faithful mimetic copy of past reality. Rather, historical knowledge depends on an embodied relation to past reality.

Tymowski distinguished between the truth of factual propositions and the truth of assemblages of facts. A propositional statement can be true or false. It is relatively easy to establish whether a propositional claim is truthful, i.e. matches the reality of the past. However, Tymowski explained that since most historians go beyond individual facts and pursue the truth of large-scale processes and conjectures, which Tymowski equated to assemblages of facts, truth, understood as a single image of the past, becomes impossible to attain.

We investigate facts and it is relatively easy to [establish – R.K.] truth in reference to facts. Something either happened or did not happen. On the other hand, a historian is not content with this. There is a neopositivist stance in historiography, but it doesn’t suffice for historians. Hence, they try to investigate processes, conjectures, that, which Braudel called longue durée, or some phenomenon which goes throughout centuries. The Polish-Lithuanian union was just such a phenomenon over the longue durée. It changed its character and so on, but it persisted through centuries. But accumulation of facts, these assemblages, which are processes, phenomena, conjectures or even the longue durée, this is a controversial thing. When it comes to facts, we need not discuss – whether the Battle of Grunwald was or wasn’t. But its evaluation can be varied, its influence on the following events. When it comes to the longue durée, there is much material for varied views. (P15:15:9)

7.2.3.1 Textbook II: The past in the present


The textbook is intended for the first year of upper secondary schools. It combines Polish and world history and encompasses ancient and medieval history. Michał Tymowski is the author of the fourth part of the textbook on the Middle Ages.
The authors emphasized in the preface that their aim was not only to deliver knowledge defined in the curriculum, but also to teach pupils how to independently shape an image of the past and formulate value judgments (8). According to them, history is not “a collection of ready-made formulas,” which need to be memorized. Rather, history is a “creative area, open to the intellectual needs of a contemporary person” (8). The textbook states that “a picture of the past,” which is shaped by historiography, changes with time, since the questions we pose to the past change (8). Hence, historiography is presented as closely linked to present-day interests, views, challenges and position of the historian in his or her society. The present-day context and experience shape history writing through the questions we pose to the past. Historical knowledge emerges in the textbook depiction as open-ended, constantly evolving, and open to discussion.

Moreover, the contents of the textbook are not explicitly focused on political history, but rather, as the textbook title already suggests, on people, societies, and civilizations. A lot of attention is paid to economic, cultural history, history of religion, which are not treated separately from each other or from political history, but are combined in the textbook chapters. The authors justified this arrangement of the textbook materials by arguing that politics, economics, and culture did not function as distinct and isolated areas in the past, just as they are interwoven in the life of contemporary societies (9). Polish history is presented as part of the history of European civilization, which illustrates how Tymowski put into practice his approach of contextualization, which he inherited from his master, Polish historian Marian Malowist.

The introductory chapter on history as a discipline, authored by Tadeusz Cegielski, a colleague of Michał Tymowski, stands out from other analogous textbooks in that it tries to bring history closer to pupils, to show its relevance in terms comprehensible to pupils. The textbook raises the point that by investigating the past, we can pose questions to the present (14). For example, history can explain why they, pupils, speak Polish and not Latin or German, or why they wear jeans and sweaters and not, like the Greeks in antiquity, woolen tunics. By posing such questions, the author seeks to show how the past can explain and manifest in the present. The past is depicted not as a pre-given, static space to be reconstructed, but as a process of change and continuity. To illustrate this point, the textbook reveals connections between the popularity of jeans today and various aspects of cultural, political, and social history, which contributed to jeans becoming such a widely used item of clothing. Moreover, the textbook explains how jeans could be used as a historical source in the fields of cultural anthropology and semiotics (14). The example of jeans demonstrates the interconnectedness of different spheres of life in the past and present. It also reveals how an object can serve as a rich source of information about the past, how the past is present in ordinary things of everyday use. Jeans, as an item of clothing, can connect pupils to the past.

Furthermore, the textbook discusses cyclical and linear conceptions of time (17–19). It is illustrated how the widely accepted conception of time in a given society is closely connected to its lifestyle and culture. Pupils need to reflect on why, for example, mechanical clocks did not have a minute hand for a long time after their invention (20). Engagement with things from the past can reveal something about the life of people in the past, their ways of thinking and being. The past is, in other words, embodied in things
from the past. Pupils are also asked to reflect on their own conception of time, their
relation to the past and the future, to consider when and why the second hand of clocks
became necessary (23). The main text, sources, and exercises contribute to the idea that
the conception of time is not given or static and that it is very much dependent on lived
experience, contemporary needs and interests of people, and the societies of which they
are a part.

In terms of an evaluation of the past, the textbook cautions pupils against committing
an anachronism, when, for example, an 11th-century event is evaluated in terms of values
and beliefs of the 19th or 20th centuries (22). Hence, as the textbook explains, the wars
waged against Czechs in the 12th century by the Duke of Poland Bolesław the Brave can
be anachronistically regarded by a contemporary Polish historian as a positive
phenomenon from a nationalist POINT OF VIEW, whereas a Czech historian sees the same
events negatively (22). The author notes that an event should be assessed from a POINT OF
VIEW contemporary to that event. Consequently, the territorial annexations implemented
by Bolesław the Brave appear as a mistake, since they received a reprisal of the Emperor
of the Holy Roman Empire, but the textbook also draws attention to the fact that territorial
annexations and plundering need to be understood as a typical state practice in early
feudalism (22). The textbook emphasizes that the task of historians is not so much that of
evaluation, but of an explanation of facts and phenomena (23). On the other hand, it is the
reader, who is supposed to assess the knowledge provided by historians in terms of his or
her personal values (23). The manifestation of historian’s own values in assessment of the
past is treated as an instance of subjectivity, which should be kept under control, but
which is nevertheless inevitable to a certain extent because “history is a FUNDAMENTAL
part of our culture. Culture is BUILT on the BASIS of values. The problem is, however, what
values we choose. Our evaluation will depend on this choice” (22). The textbook, thus,
suggests that it is crucial to be aware of our own values and beliefs in our investigation of
the past, but simultaneously encourages pupils to comprehend the value system of the
people in the past rather than project contemporary values onto the past, anachronistically.

In terms of a methodology of historical research, the textbook introduces comparative,
philological and statistical methods used by historians (26–27). Emphasis is placed on
specific rules of historical methodology, which enable historians to make sources “SPEAK”
(26). Instead of merely describing the procedures of source criticism and analysis, the
textbook provides concrete examples of what source analysis would mean in the case of a
medieval chronicle as well as in the case of a history of jeans, where researchers face a
challenge of great multitude of diverse sources (27–30). The textbook draws attention to
practices of falsification of sources by noting that this constitutes an especially acute
methodological problem for the historians of the 20th century (30). Examples of
falsification of “the IMAGE of the past” are provided from the history of the Soviet Union
as well as Nazi Germany, such as the retouching of photographs or the distortion of past
reality in propaganda materials (30).

The last phase of historical research, or historical synthesis, is said to be the most
complicated with regard to various theoretical problems, which may arise at this stage
(35). The textbook cautions that each historical hypothesis needs to be formulated in a
way, which would allow verifying its truthfulness (35). Hypotheses should avoid
ambiguity and should be articulated in simple and precise language (35). On the other hand, the textbook also acknowledges that:

Formulating final conclusions, or synthesis, a historian must also remember that they depend on methods adopted by him. Investigating some problem by means of two methods, we obtain two different conclusions. There is nothing wrong in this, if we posit that a single simple truth about our world does not exist. Reality created by a human being is always complex, therefore, individual research methods unveil only some elements and aspects of life. History needs to be understood, not swotted up. (35)

The textbook authors acknowledge that there is not a single truth and explain that different conclusions of historians are an outcome of different methodology and models of explanation. A chosen model can only provide knowledge about a particular aspect of a complex past reality.

7.2.4 Michał Tymowski: Values in history writing

Tymowski’s own way of seeing and relating to the past has been shaped by his background, education, lived experience. In the passage below, he described his two major intellectual influences – the Polish historian Marian Malowist and the French historian Jacques Le Goff, to whom he refers as his MASTERS. Drawing parallels to the organization of medieval craftsmanship, he perceived himself as an apprentice of his masters, whose scholarly attitudes, methods, practices, and values he acquired during his education. This ensures that a certain continuity of scholarly behavior and ideas persists through time. For example, Tymowski remarked that he inherited his attention to the comparative method from his Polish master who always deemed it necessary to investigate Polish history by contextualizing it within the European history. Like Manikowska, he was shaped by the methodology, attitudes, and dispositions of the Warsaw School. Tymowski sought to pass on this comparative method both to his university students and school pupils by devoting a lot of attention to comparison and contextualization in school-history textbooks. This shows how academic history bears an influence, via the embodied presence of the author, on textbook contents and a manner of presentation of the past.

Yes, I am a historian of Africa. I have been educated in seminars on the Middle Ages in Poland and France. In Poland, my master was, over here I have his portrait, that is Marian Malowist.[…] Hence, my history of Africa is entangled in universal history. It is not only investigations of Africa itself, but comparative, different processes and so on. […] Later I studied with Le Goff, Jacques Le Goff died now, I was in his seminar in Paris. […] Later I switched over to political anthropology, to types of states, types of pre-state organizations. […] I have very often, and you saw this in the case of the union with Lithuania, a comparative gaze. I showed other European unions, I showed it in a comparative way. I inherited this comparative method from my master, he taught me that. To examine each phenomenon in the context of similar phenomena. He investigated the history of Poland but he never distinguished it from European history. He considered that the history of Poland does not exist by itself.[…] (P15: 15:20)
In the passage below, Tymowski articulates the idea that values, which stem from lived experience of the historian or author, inevitably enter historical knowledge. Historians cannot break away from values, because it would mean breaking away from their own person. Certain values had persisted in him through the years, while others changed, because he changed as a historian. Hence, values are not static, relative, and isolated from lived experience. His values are very much connected to his lived environment and academic background. The changes in the discipline of history effected changes in him as a historian and his point of view. He underlined that history was interesting only to the extent that it is connected to contemporaneity, himself, and his recipients, which implies that history should not be regarded in isolation from embodied lived experience, whether of the author or the readers. Simultaneously, however, a historian can and should be aware of the otherness of the past, of how the values of the people in the past differed from contemporary values. The historian’s ability to recognize the alterity of the past need not be compromised by his or her embodied presence in historical knowledge. He distinguished the influence of anthropology as particularly conducive to the work of historians seeking to understand the life of people in the past and its alterity.

You know, there is no way to set us free from this. That is, we are people of the 20th, I am more of the 20th, but likewise of 21st century and certain values, which are in me, are valuable for me, are important for me, and there is no way to set us free from this. It’s a great dilemma for a historian concerning evaluation, which inevitably results from his formation. [...] As I look at the beginnings of my work, there are certain things which I have kept, which persist in me. But I learned many new things, something, which I did not know. Or I bump into some discussions, which change my point of view. Hence, it is not so that a man is unchanging. I think that these changes, which arose in me, are visible even in the books I wrote. Hence, there is no way to break away from myself. It is a great dilemma if history is an art or science. [...] A lot has changed in historical science and, hence, in me. But there is a certain set of values, which we value. It is an extremely difficult thing. Perhaps it is even impossible to break away from it. When I write, I am as I am. The only thing which I can understand and try to understand is that, for example, the values of people in the Middle Ages were other. To penetrate them is very difficult. But here anthropology helps, because anthropology, or science about the culture of man, shows its changeability. [...] (P15: 15:26)

Tymowski drew attention to differences in how historians related to Africa in the 19th century and today. These divergences show very clearly how the background and lived context of the cognizing self affects the nature of historical knowledge that is produced. The questions historians pose reveal values, attitudes, and practices they bring to the research process. Values are inevitably part of the research process because they are tied to the lived experience of the inquirer. In this regard, Tymowski maintains an embodied understanding of historical practice.

[...] The point is that the way we are entails the kind of questions we pose to the past. If we see the importance of the role of women, not only the role in the family, but also social, political, every kind, today, so we ask what it was like in the past. We can respond differently, but this question occurs to us. Hence, we will not break away from our time.
We can say that we cannot at all know what questions historians will pose in one hundred years, because we do not live in one hundred years. They have, will have some ideas, which the same way as we ask about certain things, whereas a 19th century historian has a conception of civilizing of backward people. And they look at Africa from the point of view of civilizing. […] Hence, if you ask me about a system of values, it is built in me through the social, national, ethnic, European groups to which [I belong – R.K.]. It depends on the feelings which are in me and which indicate circles with which I identify. […] (P15: 15:27)

Amidst the multitude of values and different interpretations of the past, the role of the ministry, according to Tymowski, is to provide a certain direction, a framework for history education, which would take into account different views. It should not outline a single, narrowly conceived interpretation, but it should nevertheless indicate a direction on what kind of values are important to encourage through school history (15:23).

Tymowski’s concluding remark perhaps best summarizes his idea of the purpose of history. History, for him, is a FOUNDATION for getting to know and understand the otherness of people. History provides resources for mutual understanding and empathy to the extent that it is OPEN to diversity.

[…] History is a foundation in relation to other people, to other different cultures. It seems to me that this is the most important aim for the future – to open history to diversity. (P15: 15:37)

7.2.5. Conclusion

Tymowski stood out in his embodied understanding of the historian’s relation to historical knowledge and past reality. What makes historical knowledge ALIVE, according to him, is its ability to reveal how the past is present, how the past is woven in contemporary life. Historical knowledge should bear a link to life, both past and present. It should not DROWN pupils in innumerable, static, DEAD facts.

Tymowski underlined that history writing is inevitably shaped by present-day values, which enter historical knowledge through an author’s background and lived experience. Values are not static or relative; rather, they change together with the cognizing self. They are a reflection of changes taking place in the life of the cognizing self. To try to eliminate values from historical knowledge would equal an attempt to BREAK AWAY from one’s self. Objectivity, as a completely detached, disembodied relation to the past, is not possible. This does not mean, however, that truth is irrelevant to historians or that each narrative is as good as any other narrative. It only suggests, for Tymowski, that one single, final truth is not attainable. As long as history prepares pupils to be open to different narratives of experience, it can provide resources for mutual understanding and empathy. In this sense, history emerges as a FOUNDATION for encountering the otherness of people in the past.

His engagement with the Polish-Lithuanian past is shaped by his comparative approach, which propels him to compare the Polish-Lithuanian union to other analogous medieval unions in Europe. Instead of focusing on national PERSPECTIVES, his scholarly
approach, inherited from the university training, focuses his attention on the meaning of the Polish-Lithuanian union in the wider European context.

7.3 Robert Śniegocki

Robert Śniegocki is a Polish historian and a history teacher in the Zamoyska and Modrzejewska Lyceum in Poznan. He is a graduate of the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan. Śniegocki is an author and a co-author of the textbook series for upper secondary schools, published by the publishing house “Nowa Era.” The textbook series has been very successful. According to Śniegocki, approximately a quarter of Polish high-school pupils were studying from this textbook series during its years of publication. The first edition of the series, published 2002–2004, went through ten impressions by 2013. I interviewed Śniegocki in September 2014 via Skype.

Analyzed textbooks authored and co-authored by Robert Śniegocki:


7.3.1 Robert Śniegocki: History education should enable one to understand the present

Śniegocki described his conception of history teaching as focused on the development of pupils’ skills and the capacity to understand the contemporary world. Instead of overwhelming pupils with innumerable factual details and dates, it is more important, for Śniegocki, that pupils are able to understand historical processes and how the past relates to the present.

The point is perhaps to understand the contemporary world. Today. What is happening here? This is perhaps the most important, because going into excessive historical details is not always readable to a pupil. […] Understanding, understanding certain processes – how it looked back in the day, how it once functioned and whether it may be eventually useful today. But that is very disguised, that is, I do not communicate that directly, but try to disguise it in certain information. (P17: 17:2)
When, later in the interview, I asked him how he would teach history if he had complete freedom to adopt a preferred approach, Śniegocki reiterated the emphasis on the purpose of history teaching in enabling one to understand the present. History teaching should not be an end in itself, but rather a means to better comprehend the contemporary world. In consequence, he would shift the thematic weight of the curriculum from the ancient history and history of the Middle Ages to the history of the 19th and 20th centuries, which offer, according to him, more insights into contemporary times.

I would partially reduce the materials which concern very old history, or ancient history, the Middle Ages. I would leave only that which is indispensable for understanding the present, because, for me, the most important aim of teaching history is not to solely teach about history, but to teach in such a way that we could understand the current time. Hence, some materials are, in general, unnecessary for me of this kind about the Middle Ages. I would focus on the 19th, 20th century and would compel pupils as much as possible to independent thinking. To reduce the factual material in favor of thinking, understanding certain phenomena. (P17: 17:23)

In terms of the pedagogical approach that seeks to develop historical thinking and understanding, I asked Śniegocki how he presented history as a discipline and its most important features to pupils. In the excerpt below, Śniegocki explains that pupils need to realize that historical knowledge should be based on a variety of sources. An epistemological dimension is important in this explanation. Pupils need to differentiate subjective and objective information in a source, which means that they are required to identify bias and subjectivity in a source. Śniegocki, thus, reiterates the standard historicist emphasis on the “historical-critical method” – verification of sources, issues of authenticity and veracity. Pupils become acquainted with a mode of the discipline of history as it functioned in the 19th century.

From the very beginning, I try to indicate that history must really be based on sources, on different type of sources, that history cannot be based on a single formulation, because it may not be authentic or it may be unreliable, because it is subjective. From the very beginning, I try to show that it is important that they would understand that there can be different points of view. Sometimes, the matriculation exam looks as though here, for example, there are questions added as to whether a source is objective and then a pupil must ascertain on the basis of who wrote it, when it was written, whether it is objective or not. (P17: 17:4)

7.3.2 Robert Śniegocki: Objectivity in the midst of different interpretations of the past

I asked Śniegocki to elaborate on how he understands what objectivity in history is. He lists questions that pupils should apply in a standard source analysis that are meant to help assess the authenticity and veracity of a source. Objectivity is a lack of bias, prejudice, propagandistic manipulation. The aim of source analysis is to discover bias-free, truthful, objective information about the past. Śniegocki employs an ocular-optic metaphor to
convey the subjectivity of sources, which deal with national histories. As he points out, nation-based prejudices are the most fixed, static form of subjective GAZE on the past. The structuring implication of this metaphor is that there exists an objective past, which is detached from the viewer/knower and his or her subjective understanding of it. The objective past is the only past that concerns historians and that constitutes the goal of their research. The purpose of source analysis is to overcome the subjectivity of sources that prevents the knower from getting at the objective past.

We look at the date of publication of a given source. Theoretically, the closer to a given event, the more objective a source is. Furthermore, could the author write the truth? Was he not under some pressure? Further, did he want to write the truth? Is what he wrote not by any chance some propagandistic work? And on the basis of all of this a pupil is capable of answering questions more or less independently. Then there are analyses of texts: Which prejudices does a person get rid of with most difficulty? It results from this that, for example, it is most difficult to get rid of prejudices towards nations. That is, if we like some nation, then we like it. If we do not like it, we do not like it. It is even easier to get rid of bias towards ideology, towards historical figures. A subjective gaze on the history of nation – it is quite strongly fixed. (P17: 17:5)

However, reviews of his textbooks made Ŝniegocki realize that objectivity is very hard, even impossible, to achieve. As he explains in the passage below, the reviewers disclosed that he had noticeable political views, which manifested in the textbooks through the choice of facts, textual and visual materials, as well as their arrangement. Implicitly, Ŝniegocki’s political sympathies surfaced in the textbook contents through, for example, the number of pictures of the Chief of State, Józez Piłsudski, as compared to those of the leader of the National Democrats Roman Dmowski. But, should textbooks actually aim to efface any traces of value judgment and preference? What kind of message would such a textbook convey to pupils?

I would argue that a textbook author, who purports to treat each ideological position or opinion completely equally, evades the very cognitive task of historical thinking, which is expected from pupils. Textbook authors should set an example of how to evaluate the past adequately: to pay due regard to different ways of being, thinking, and acting in the past in its own context; but, such authors should likewise acknowledge the ways certain positions may be more justified than others. Criteria and reasons for evaluation need to be spelled out. Textbooks should teach historical thinking by concrete examples in the depiction of the past.

It seemed to me, I used to think in my naiveté that I am very objective. On the other hand, there were reviews which suggested that I have very pronounced political views, which surprised me a little, but after their analysis I arrived at a conclusion that, indeed, something like that came about perhaps. The choice of facts itself, of texts already immediately suggests that I have certain political views. And only then I found out that it suffices to look through my book and it is known that I have such and such views. For example, that I like Piłsudski, but I do not like the nationalists, Dmowski, for example. And I say: OK, it makes sense, it is visible. And I was surprised, because, for example,
there were more pictures of Piłsudski than of Dmowski. To be honest, it made me realize that it is difficult to practice objectivity. I wanted to, but it didn’t come out. (P17: 17:8)

In circumstances when we are faced with different narratives about the past, an important issue becomes how to decide which interpretations or narratives should be included into textbooks. By posing this question to Śniegocki, I managed to get a better grasp of his idea of objectivity. In order to practice objectivity, the aim for him as an author is to escape evaluation of the past and to show, where it applies, different points of view. He admits that it is, however, difficult to step out of one’s self and assess one’s own bias or prejudice. To be objective, to him, does not mean that one completely eradicates the presence of the subjective viewer/knower in historical knowledge. Rather, the viewer/knower presents his or her vision, which he tries to explain and justify. As Śniegocki admits, objectivity, as such, does not exist. In practice, such strict objectivity, cleansed from any traces of subjectivity, would amount to not more than a calendar, a collection of dates. Objective knowledge only provides information about static states of the world, disembodied factual information, which, however, does not enable historical thinking and understanding. Moreover, even history written as a calendar filled with dates, through its particular selection of dates, can express a specific and, thus, not an objective point of view.

This is problematic. (Laughter). That is, it would be best if it was my version, no, but it will not work out. I hope that I escaped this – not to evaluate. I tried to, where there were doubts, I tried to show different points of view, but I don’t know if I succeeded. Someone else should assess it, as if from outside. I already said: the cat is out of the bag. I have more views, more arguments in favor of Piłsudski than against. I was convinced that I was objective, it seemed that… They detected that it wasn’t so.

R.K. By the word “objective,” do you mean that there is a balance?

I tried, yes, because objectivity as such in general does not exist. That is, if we did that, it would be a collection, a calendar with dates and nothing more, and even the choice of dates itself would be subjective. On the other hand, I tried to show such a version, such a vision and attempted to sort it out. (P17: 17:11)

Śniegocki supported the idea that pupils should learn about the nature of historical knowledge, but pointed out that the chronological scope of the Polish history curriculum is an obstacle to teaching history in a more reflexive way. This issue was likewise identified by other textbook authors. The main problem is that pupils need to learn about the past “from beginning to end.” They are expected to assimilate a lot of factual information from both Polish and European/world history, which means that little time and capacity are left to engage in discussion of different interpretations. What he consistently attempts to do in history lessons is to note to pupils how historical knowledge may be shaped by contemporary political interests.

But, first of all, there’s a problem, because there’s typically little time in school. History teaching is very extensive. From the beginning to contemporaneity. We teach about the
U.S. and Poland. Time may be lacking for a proper analysis. But here it’s sometimes called the politics of history. I try to attract attention to the fact that, sometimes we are speaking about history, when really, we are speaking about the present. (P17: 17:6)

Śniegocki is aware of contemporary interests and values in historical knowledge as a more general phenomenon. He likens it metaphorically to an ideological war, where history is used as an instrument of warfare. For example, the choice of topics in an annual History Olympiad in Poland, a national history competition for pupils, reflects well the current political preoccupations and interests. The ongoing war in Ukraine informs the thematic focus of questions in the Olympiad. This can also be observed in history textbooks, which devote increasingly more attention to the history of China, in relation to the growing global influence of China (17:7).

Śniegocki noted that he sees how confused pupils become when they are faced with several different interpretations of the same event. Nevertheless, he sees it as an important task of history education to make pupils aware that historical knowledge is not, metaphorically speaking, sacred words or the Bible. Pupils can and should learn to question the historical knowledge that they receive. They should realize that historical interpretations are not static, that they keep changing and that historical optics change from generation to generation. He uses the latter powerful optical metaphor to convey the idea of the subjectivity of vision. In other words, historical interpretation and meaning of the past depend to a great extent on the position of the viewer, on the angle at which he or she observes the past.

Below, Śniegocki explains how he discusses divergent interpretations with pupils. The main idea is to demonstrate that there are different ways to make sense of the same event. In a standard exercise, pupils are required to assess an event or phenomenon by finding arguments in favor of and against that event/phenomenon. On the basis of these, pupils then need to formulate their own opinion on the matter. This exercise, however, is focused not so much on considering how and why people interpreted the past differently, but on arriving at a judgment of a particular event/phenomenon. In other words, if pupils analyze divergent interpretations of the American Civil War, they do not necessarily engage with the question of why and how people on both sides of the conflict came to uphold such views and values.

I see in pupils of lyceum that when they realize it is possible to look at one thing from four points of view, they already get into a fit, do not know what to do. On the other hand, I think that at the level of lyceum we ought to explain to pupils that there are problems with sources and that there may be different evaluations of the same event. I think it’s very necessary. That they would not treat a historical text, which they sometimes received, as a religious Bible, that those are sacred words. They must see that even optics change sometimes from generation to generation. We see certain things completely differently. […]

*R.K. How do you do this in practice during a lesson?*

Sources. Sometimes on the basis of sources, exercises. It is possible to do this obviously by telling normally. But I try, for example, to do it with sources, I show different sources on
the same [event – R.K.] from different points of view. […] Most frequently from our Polish history really. For example, it concerns the Warsaw Uprising and the evaluation of the Warsaw Uprising, of the communist government. For example, why did the Poles support some communists and not others? The problem of collaboration during World War II in some societies, how it looked, how it is evaluated from the point of view of Frenchmen. […] The American Civil War, the problem of slavery in the US is shown differently in historical sources. It seemed to be unambiguous – slavery in the US – but it could also be evaluated differently. The 19th century colonialism. And then we have such a nice question, which appears somewhere there – “consider.” And then pupils need to find arguments for, arguments against, and then still to express their own opinion. […] (P17: 17:10)

I noted, however, that there were instances in his textbook, where an event or behavior of a person raises controversies and had been interpreted differently in Polish and Lithuanian historiographies, but this diversity is not represented in the textbook. The concrete case concerns the person of Janusz Radziwiłł, a powerful 17th century Lithuanian magnate who, in 1655, amidst the wars with Moscow and Sweden, took the decision to break the Polish-Lithuanian Union and signed a treaty with Sweden, thereby establishing the Swedish-Lithuanian Union. In the textbook, pupils are given a task to write a formal accusation of Janusz Radziwiłł as a traitor of the Republic: “Using freely chosen publications or the Internet, find examples of anti-state activities of some magnates and write a speech, in which you accuse […] Janusz Radziwiłł of betrayal.” I quoted this task to Śniegocki as an example of a very clear value judgment of a historical figure, whose deeds otherwise cannot be assessed univocally. Śniegocki argued that the textbook permitted a pupil to form a different opinion, but, as further analysis shows, this is not really the case. Thus, the textbook teaches pupils to judge him as a traitor, but does not guide them to understand the lived experience of Radziwiłł.

The discussion of this controversy, however, brought up another issue concerning presentation of the past in fictional literary accounts. Śniegocki noted that the Polish opinion of Janusz Radziwiłł had been traditionally shaped by the historical novel The Deluge by Nobel Prize winner Henryk Sienkiewicz, in which the Lithuanian nobleman is portrayed particularly negatively because of his supposed treason and alliance with the Swedes. The novel was also later made into a film under the same name by Jerzy Hoffman. Śniegocki explained how he attempted to show that a literary depiction of the past by Sienkiewicz does not correspond to the actual past – that Sienkiewicz’s vision was shaped by his creative ideas more than by a concern for accuracy. However, I would add that a one-sided emphasis on the fictionalization of the past in artistic works, while it is necessary for the development of critical thinking, omits an important aspect of historical thinking. Namely, pupils need to realize that a biased presentation of the past in Sienkiewicz’s novel can also constitute a valuable historical source for different kinds of enquiries about 19th century Romanticism in Poland, the ideas, values, and influence on historical memory of this movement.

R.K. I know that Janusz Radziwiłł….
…is taken from the point of view of Poles as a traitor. I sought to write there somewhere that his point of view could be different. On the other hand, there is an additional problem here that sometimes we give out exam questions also on the basis of literature. That is, such tasks are awarded many points, where a pupil is able to use knowledge of history, but also knowledge of literature. And we have The Deluge, where this Janusz Radziwiłł is shown in an almost singularly negative way, almost. On the other hand, here, from this angle, it was about examining these figures. Use the knowledge, which you can search for in sources.

R.K. Yes, there was a task to compare a fragment of The Deluge and then a description of the historian Adam Hirsten.

How it seemed according to his opinion.

R.K. So I understand that the aim was to show how a literary description may not correspond to the truth.

Precisely. Completely different or partially different than a literary description. Sienkiewicz had, firstly, different sources. Secondly, he had some kind of a vision, which he wanted to show and this real description would be completely different. Then we have the same in a film of Hoffman, where this feast is charged very patriotically. In reality, it looked a little differently. And we try to attract attention to this, so that pupils would not take The Deluge of Sienkiewicz as a historical source, because it is only an artistic vision. It would be good if they noticed it, learned it. (P17: 17:9)

I posed a question to Śniegocki regarding the names used in textbooks when referring to the Polish-Lithuanian state, which, as I pointed out, is often called “Poland” or the “Polish Republic” in Polish textbooks. Śniegocki considered this practice as unequivocally faulty in that it obscures the multicultural nature of the Polish-Lithuanian state. As he explains below, such usage often results not from the intentions of textbook authors and historians, but from the decisions of language editors, who, not knowing the difference of meaning between “Poland” and “the Republic of the Two Nations,” replace the terms in order to avoid the repetition of the word “Republic.” They follow a tradition of using these two terms interchangeably, which Śniegocki likens to a CARBON PAPER producing copies IN THE BRAIN. Such usage is habitual, automatic, and does not provoke major hesitation.

It’s not so much historians, but experts of Polish language who corrected the word “Republic” to “Poland.” Because this word was repeated. What kind of word should I have used, right? I couldn’t use the word “Poland,” if it was the Republic of the Two Nations. And I suspect that sometimes there might be a carbon paper in the brain that it had to be “Poland” simply. […] From a grammatical point of view, I had to use the word “Poland.” I said, sorry, but from a historical point of view it is garbage. […] It is such a tradition, which, sorry, is perhaps better to dispose of, isn’t it? (Laughter). I heard myself that, for example, the Hetman Chodkiewicz occurs as a Polish hetman at this moment. That’s one thing, sorry, but not really, no. There were such ideas for the purity of language, in order not to repeat the word “Republic.” There is some kind of battle and the “Polish army” won,
but I say, sorry, there were Poles and Lithuanians, and Curonians, and surely a few other nations were found there, so it is does not fit. (P17: 17:13)

7.3.2.1 Textbook I: The Polish-Lithuanian union from different POINTS OF VIEW


The textbook is intended for the first year of upper secondary school, both at a basic and advanced level of teaching. It encompasses the history of the Middle Ages in Poland and Europe.

The topic of the 1385 Union of Krewo in the textbook is preceded by a brief section on the history of Lithuania in the 13th–14th century. Pupils learn that “Lithuanian pagans comprised a minority in their state, stood on a lower level of civilization than the conquered Christian population of Ruthenia” (156). However, the increasingly threatening presence of the Teutonic Order in the shared neighborhood of Lithuania and Poland is said to have given a spur to the personal union of the two states. The textbook explains that Jogaila, both of whose Lithuanian and Polish names are introduced, agreed to the union terms and promised to baptize Lithuania, adjoin Lithuania to Poland and retrieve lost Polish territories (157). The resistance of the Lithuanian Grand Duke Vytautas to unification with Poland is extensively described. The textbook notes consecutive treaties between Poland and Lithuania signed in Vilnius, Radom and, finally, Horodlo, in 1413, which established the separateness of the Lithuanian state, governed by Vytautas, who remained, nevertheless, subject to the King and the Grand Duke Jogaila (157).

Moreover, pupils are provided with a commentary of the Polish historian Jerzy Ochmański (1933-1996) on the meaning of the Polish-Lithuanian Union in Krewo (160). Upon reading the excerpt, pupils need to explain the meaning of the Latin term “applicare,” used in the text of the Krewo agreements, and find fragments in the historian’s commentary, which confirm that it was originally planned to incorporate Lithuania into the territory of Poland (158). It is notable that Ochmański counters in his commentary Polish historians who “are generally inclined to consider that Lithuania, by force of the Krewo agreement, lost not only its sovereignty, but also its separate statehood, that it became a province of Poland” (160). He provides arguments why it is incorrect to interpret the Union of Krewo in this way and underlines that the word “applicare,” which historians tend to regard as suggesting incorporation, remained “a dead sign on the pergament, while the actual mutual relation of the two states was decided by life” (160). Hence, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, even in the union with Poland, remained a state governed by Lithuanian themselves (160).

This is a telling example of how a specific interpretation of a professional historian becomes the basis for a school-textbook narrative. Through this example, textbook authors want to explicitly show pupils the divergencies of interpretation of the past among
historians in Poland, namely, that the past can be viewed differently and that some of these narratives are more justified than others. It is a practical example of how historical knowledge is open to discussion and does not constitute SACRED WORDS, to use Śniegocki’s metaphor. Pupils are made to realize that historical interpretations can be questioned.

Moreover, one of the questions after the main text asks pupils to evaluate the position of Vytautas towards the Polish-Lithuanian union from the POINT OF VIEW of Poles and Lithuanians and to find positive and negative effects of his politics (158). This is also an interesting task from a methodological point of view. Pupils are required to take different perspectives and apply skills of cognitive empathy, aiming to see the same situation from the point of view of Poles and Lithuanians. Pupils can learn that the same event can elicit very different meanings and assessments, depending on the position of a person. On the other hand, the task does not push further and does not encourage pupils to think why Lithuanians and Poles perceived the situation in such different terms, what experience led to these divergences. In addition, a question could be raised about how the perception of people in the past differed from contemporary assessments of the union in Poland and Lithuania.

The textbook devoted considerably much space to discussing the Polish-Lithuanian conflict with the Teutonic Order, which culminated in the 1410 Battle of Grunwald (161–164, 167–168). Pupils are given an additional source – a description of the course of the battle by the 15th century Polish chronicler Jan Długosz, which depicts how Lithuanian troops, unable to resist the attack of the Teutonic knights, escaped from the battlefield (167). Hence, the victory is presented as the sole accomplishment of the Polish army and the leadership skills of Jogaila. The textbook does not explicitly counter this interpretation of the battle by Długosz, nor does it mention anything about the maneuver of the Lithuanian army. The only allusion to the fact that the Lithuanian army returned to the field appears in an illustration, which depicts the movement of the Lithuanian army during the two phases of the battle; but in no way does it elaborate or explain this issue to the pupils (164).

The failed attempt of Vytautas’ coronation is described and contextualized completely differently from the Lithuanian accounts. In the textbook, it is presented as a political maneuver of the King of Hungary and a candidate to the throne of the Holy Roman Empire Sigismund, who sought to divide Jogaila and Vytautas by proposing to the latter the crown of Lithuania (166). The motivation of Sigismund is explained as that of revenge for Jogaila’s support shown to the Husites. Hence, the coronation is framed primarily as a plan of Sigismund rather than as an independent goal of the separatist politics of Vytautas.

Lastly, a striking feature of the narrative is that the authors identify Jogaila as primarily a Lithuanian, who, as a result, “put the interests of Lithuania in the first place” (166). That is, the textbook considers Jogaila’s politics, even after he had become the King of Poland, to express loyalty to the interests of the Grand Duchy. This strongly contrasts with the Lithuanian portrayal of Jogaila as a traitor, who prioritized his dynastic interests over the interests of Lithuanian statehood. Polonization of political elites and the gradual weakening of Lithuanian sovereignty are typically blamed on Jogaila’s decision in the established Lithuanian narrative. In this Polish textbook, however, Jogaila’s decision to
agree to the union with Poland is regarded as a choice beneficial to Lithuanian statehood and sovereignty.

The textbook contains multiple exercises (throughout and not merely in chapters on the Polish-Lithuanian past), which engage pupils with divergent historical interpretations as well as perceptions of a certain event by its contemporaries. In this regard, pupils are acquainted with the idea that the past (reality) can be interpreted and assessed in many different ways and that historical knowledge can be questioned. This coincides with Śniegocki’s opinions expressed in the interview. However, as the above analysis demonstrates, certain omissions, arrangement and the particular framing of facts alters the meaning considerably and changes the narrative. There are significant disparities between the portrayal of the past in this textbook and Lithuanian textbooks. On the other hand, the depiction of the Union of Krewo is very promixate to the Lithuanian narrative.

7.3.2.2 Textbook II: The evaluation of the past is constantly changing


The textbook is intended for the second year of upper secondary level. It encompasses the period of modern history starting from the geographical explorations of the 15th century until the beginning of the 19th century.

The textbook upholds its approach to introduce pupils to divergent interpretations of the past by historians. Pupils are offered two opinions of Polish historians on the same aspect of foreign policy of the King and the Grand Duke Sigismund I the Old (76–77). Upon reading the commentaries of the two historians, pupils learn that one of them strongly criticizes the political priorities of Sigismund I, whereas the other historian, belonging to a younger generation, curbs those criticisms and explains how difficult it is to pass a singular, unambiguous value judgment. He notes that “a judgment is, hence, difficult and fluid, because the issue, which is discussed, is continuously alive in its effects” (77). Pupils are acquainted with the idea that since the effects of the past in the present are constantly changing, so are the meanings and judgments of the past not fixed and singular. Meaning and assessment of the past changes over time, depending on the experience of its consequences. The past emerges not as a distant and externalized space, but as a process, the influences of which can be felt and experienced in the present; the past is thus interwoven into the present. Since the main text that precedes historians’commentaries does not outline any clear-cut value judgments on this matter either, the opinions of historians can actually prompt a more nuanced analysis and discussion among pupils.

The 1569 Union of Lublin is introduced in the context of the Executionist movement in the Kingdom of Poland, which demanded the complete unification of Poland and Lithuania (78). Simultaneously, Lithuania found itself in a difficult geopolitical situation
at the time. It is explained that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania needed Polish military support in an ongoing war with Moscow and, thus, had to take into consideration the possibility of a closer union (78). The textbook vividly depicts the dissonance in attitudes towards the union in Lithuania. Whereas the magnates were firmly against the closer union ties with the Kingdom of Poland, it was in the interests of the Lithuanian middle gentry, who, by way of the union, could acquire more rights and emancipate themselves from subordination to the magnates (78). The textbook author acknowledges that the negotiation process between Polish and Lithuanian delegations over the terms of the union was particularly difficult (79). The decision of Sigismund August to exert pressure and break the resistance of the Lithuanian magnates by annexing a part of the territory of the Grand Duchy to Poland is, however, identified as a legal right of Sigismund as a patrimonial ruler of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (79). One of the tasks, addressed to pupils, asks them to explain why Lithuanian magnates were against the union (80).

The most interesting aspect of the presentation of the Union of Lublin is the accompanying source, which follows the main text. It is an excerpt from a commentary of the Polish historian Juliusz Bardach on the historical consequences of the Polish-Lithuanian union (81–82). Importantly, some sentences from Bardach’s opinion are transposed into the main text of the textbook almost word for word. Bardach’s evaluation of the union outlines positive and negative effects of the union on Poles, Lithuanians and Ruthenians (later Belorussians and Ukrainians), stressing that each of these national groups experienced certain advantages and drawbacks of the union. Bardach notes that even though Lithuanian political elites became linguistically and culturally Polonized, they did not lose a sense of separate political consciousness and defended the political and legal subjectivity of the Grand Duchy in the union with Poland (82). Pupils are asked to identify all positive and negative nuances of the union and provide their own evaluation (80).

Overall, the evaluation of the Union of Lublin in the textbook is quite nuanced. It conveys the same idea, which we have seen in the above case of the foreign policy of the Sigismund I the Old, that it is impossible to pass a singular, decisive and static judgment on the past. Pupils can learn to appreciate the complexity of divergent assessments, which vary depending on the point of view taken. Bardach likewise reflects on divergent meanings and assessments of the union in terms of what processes it brought forward immediately afterwards as well as looking from a contemporary point of view. By way of Bardach’s opinion, pupils are given a concrete example of historical thinking and interpretation.

The main text of the textbook mentions very briefly that, in 1655, during the Swedish occupation of the Commonwealth, the Hetman of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania Janusz Radziwiłł signed an agreement of the union with Sweden, thereby, abolishing the union with Poland (155). It is explained in a caption containing biographical information on Radziwiłł that he is seen as a traitor in Poland, whereas in Lithuania he is held in high esteem as a hero (157). Moreover, pupils are given the task to write an accusatory speech directed at Radziwiłł and his anti-state activities (162). Hence, a negative evaluation of Radziwiłł prevails in the textbook. Pupils are not confronted with different perceptions and experiences of the same situation by Radziwiłł and his Polish contemporaries, which would perhaps enable them to understand the roots of the conflict more easily. The same
applies to the contemporary judgments of Radziwill: Pupils learn that evaluations in Poland and Lithuania are polarized, but not the reasons for such divergences.

In addition, an interesting task, which relates to Radziwill and the Swedish-Lithuanian union in 1655, asks pupils to reflect on a fragment from the historical novel *The Deluge* by Henryk Sienkiewicz. The novel is well-known for its negative portrayal of Radziwill as a traitor of the Republic and its ideals. Pupils, however, are provided with a commentary of the Polish historian Adam Kersten, who points out that the novel is a “weave of truth and fabrication,” in which fabrication comes to the fore (163). Kersten explains that past reality was much less dramatic than how it is presented in the novel. On the other hand, he does not suggest that the evaluation of Radziwill is too one-sided or exaggerated. The point of this exercise is to convey the idea that literary accounts of the past should not be trusted as a reliable source of historical knowledge, that literature is fiction, whereas historical accounts provide verified facts. This sharp distinction between fact and fiction, history and literature has its roots in a positivist approach to history. It would be useful to show pupils how the historical novel, even if it does fail to provide accurate historical information, may serve as a valuable source of insights into the values and ideas that prevailed in 19th-century Polish Romanticism. This would allow for a more nuanced understanding of how fiction relates to past reality, of how the past is embodied in works of fiction.

The chapters depicting the history after the Polish-Lithuanian union consistently use the terms “Republic” and “Polish-Lithuanian state” to refer to the Commonwealth. Even when the 18th century is described all the way to the partitions of the Commonwealth at the end of the century, the textbook adheres to these terms and avoids referring to the state as “Poland,” which distinguishes it from other analogous textbooks.

The textbook mentions that the Constitution of May 3 abolished the division of the Commonwealth into the Crown and Lithuania and introduced a shared title of the state – Poland (274). However, the author clarifies that the Constitution was soon followed by the adoption of the Mutual Pledge of the Two Nations, which guaranteed half the seats in institutions of central government for the Lithuanians. Importantly, the textbook underlines that “in practice, the previously existing federative union was maintained” (275). In contrast to many other Polish textbooks, the continuing duality of the state is acknowledged and emphasized.

Overall, the textbook contains numerous tasks, where pupils are required to engage with different evaluations and interpretations of the past, compare divergent opinions of historians, discuss about the past with others, and adjudicate among different accounts. A strong didactic idea, upheld throughout the textbook, is that the past can be evaluated differently and that, furthermore, evaluation is not static or fixed and tends to change with time. The textbook includes excerpts from texts of professional historians, which are selected in a way so as to convey the idea that historical knowledge is open to debate and can be contested. Opposing views on the same matter of two historians are frequently introduced. Nevertheless, presentation of certain historical events points to different interpretations, but does not encourage pupils to reflect on why people perceived the events in different ways. The authors clearly sought, however, to integrate the Lithuanian interpretation of the past in most topics related to shared Polish-Lithuanian past.
7.3.3 Robert Śniegocki: The interwar conflict

Although Polish pupils are aware that there was a conflict between Poland and Lithuania in the interwar years, very few know more about the reasons, course, and perception of the conflict by Lithuanians and Poles (17:17). Only about two persons from a class may know something about General Żeligowski and his fake mutiny (17:17). Pupils are generally aware that there was a conflict, but not how it “looked concretely” (17:17). Śniegocki pointed out that Polish textbooks typically present the Polish-Lithuanian conflict as part of the Polish-Bolshevik war, where the Lithuanians are identified as adversaries of the Polish state. However, Polish aggression towards Lithuania, such as a failed coup d’état in Kaunas, organized by the Polish Military Organization, is very seldom, if at all, mentioned. He is cognizant that a particular choice of facts alters the meaning of a narrative. Śniegocki explains such omissions are partially determined by the technical limits of textbooks and the obligation to keep textbooks relatively thin and light.

We most frequently attach this to the Polish-Bolshevik war, the formation of the eastern border. Practically in all textbooks it is shown as an element of the Polish-Bolshevik war. Then it is picked up that the Lithuanian side is written into the list of adversaries of Poland, which were situated there somewhere. But I tried to show it more or less, I hope, moderately objectively in terms of facts. [...] There is always the problem of which facts to select, in order not to dim the picture, and then I considered whether to remember, for example, the attempts to overthrow the Lithuanian government by Poles in 1918, which inflamed relations very strongly. Even if it’s three additional sentences, five sentences, an entire thicker book is made, which may not be functional for pupils. We always must choose some fragments, unfortunately, and this impedes understanding sometimes, it impedes, it is a fact, but technical possibilities are quite limited. (P17: 17:18)

7.3.3.1 Textbook III: The Polish-Lithuanian interwar conflict


The textbook is intended for the third year of upper secondary schools. It resumes the chronological narrative from 1918, or the end of World War I, and presents the history of the 20th century.

The Polish-Lithuanian interwar conflict is introduced in a chapter, entitled “The fight for the eastern border” (30–38). Firstly, the textbook introduces two divergent conceptions of Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski on how the issue of Poland’s eastern borders should be resolved (30–31). Pupils learn that the federative conception of Piłsudski envisaged Poland in its ethnic borders, in the neighborhood of independent Lithuania and Ukraine, which would nevertheless be connected to Poland in federative ties. He is said to
anticipate an establishment of a federation “under Polish dominations, on the model of the Union of Lublin” (30).

Roman Dmowski, on the other hand, was in favor of an incorporationist conception, according to which, the eastern territories, which were inhabited by a large population of Poles, had to be directly incorporated into Poland, for they could easily be Polonized (30). Pupils are given a task to organize a debate between supporters of these two conceptions, in which they evaluate their main features (36).

The Polish-Lithuanian conflict is primarily contextualized in relation to the simultaneously ongoing Polish-Bolshevik war. The textbook draws attention to the fact that, in the beginning of 1919, Bolsheviks entered Lithuanian and Ukrainian territories (31). Polish troops, however, gradually ousted the Bolsheviks from Lithuania in spring of 1919 and took over the city of Vilnius, where Piłsudski is said to announce his Manifesto to the Inhabitants of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania (31). In the Manifesto, he promoted the idea of an independent Lithuania, linked to Poland in federative ties, but Lithuanians “did not agree to these plans, fearing another attempt of Polonization and imposition of political and economic superiority” (31).

The actual conflict between Poland and Lithuania is described in a single paragraph, which relates that when the Bolsheviks took control of Vilnius again in July 1920, they assigned the city to Lithuania (36). However, “when Lithuanians took an adverse position towards the Poles, Piłsudski decided to adjoin Vilnius, which lay in his native region, to Poland” (36). However, since the Polish minister of foreign affairs already acknowledged that Vilnius belonged to Lithuania in the Spa conference, Piłsudski “could not take over the city by force in order not to complicate relations with the states of the Entente” (36). Consequently, he is said to have organized a fake mutiny, led by General Żeligowski, whose troops pretended to revolt against the Polish government and took control of Vilnius in October 1920. The general announced the establishment of a new state, called Central Lithuania, which was annexed to Poland in 1922.

Pupils are provided a very brief, fact-oriented description of the conflict, which, however, does not explain at all why the conflict emerged in the first place. The narrative gives an impression that the conflict arose simply because “Lithuanians took an adverse position towards the Poles,” ignoring the long and complicated history of mutual relations. Because of the predominantly chronological narrative arrangement, the textbook fails to contextualize the conflict by discussing the long-term processes of identity transformation in the 19th century and the rise of modern national movements in the territory of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Whether it is intentionally or unconsciously omitted, it diminishes the role of the Lithuanian nation and state as an independent, autonomous agent, which likewise had its own interests and took an active part in the unfolding events. The textbook focuses on the Polish-Bolshevik war, but “forgets” to clearly differentiate Bolshevik interests from Lithuanian interests.

One task in the textbook asks pupils to evaluate the conduct of Poles from the POINT OF VIEW of Poles, Lithuanians, and the states of the Entente (37). It is questionable, however, to what extent this exercise really permits pupils to understand the Lithuanian POINT OF VIEW, since there is very little information provided about that. An excerpt from the memoirs of General Żeligowski in the textbook, however, provides a rich source for
understanding how the general experienced the events, of how he perceived himself as a Lithuanian, ready to fight the Bolsheviks and liberate Vilnius. It would be a great source for a Lithuanian history textbook. It certainly gives access to the lived past, but only partially, since the past as lived and experienced by the Lithuanians is largely omitted from the textbook.

7.3.4 Conclusion

The interview reveals one clear discrepancy between the aims of history education and practical approaches adopted to attain these aims. Pupils are expected to develop skills of historical thinking and to be able to deal with and adjudicate among different interpretations of the same event. In order to cultivate these skills, however, they are primarily familiarized with the 19th-century historicist methodology of verification of source authenticity and veracity, identification of bias and prejudice, differentiation between objective and subjective sources. Textbook exercises, which engage pupils with different interpretations, require them to formulate an evaluation of a particular event/phenomenon rather than comprehend why and how people made sense of the events differently.

The “historical-critical” method, with its sharp separation between objectivity and subjectivity, facts and values, fact and fiction, reveals its limitations, however, when Śniegocki admits that “objectivity, as such, does not really exist.” If it did, it would amount to a calendar of dates at most, but even then the choice of dates already indicates the presence of the cognizing self in historical knowledge. The term “objectivity” is habitually used, although it is acknowledged that an actual disembodied, detached “view from nowhere” is not possible. Nevertheless, Śniegocki used multiple optical metaphors when talking about truth and subjectivity: He spoke of changing historical optics, different points of view, and the hold of the subjective gaze on the past.

Śniegocki supported the idea that pupils should be introduced to different interpretation of the past, but, like other authors, he reiterated the limitations of time and space dictated by the curriculum. Importantly, textbooks, authored by Śniegocki, demonstrate that the past can be evaluated differently and that, furthermore, evaluation changes with time. Contrasting opinions on the same matter of two historians are frequently introduced. Nevertheless, in some cases, the presentation of divergent interpretations does not encourage pupils to reflect on why people perceived the events in different ways. The author clearly sought, however, to integrate the Lithuanian interpretation of the past in most topics related to shared Polish-Lithuanian past.

7.4 Piotr Laskowski

Piotr Laskowski is a historian, an archaeology graduate of the University of Warsaw, a lecturer at the University of Warsaw, a history teacher and a co-founder of the Jacek

Analyzed textbooks co-authored by Piotr Laskowski:


### 7.4.1 Piotr Laskowski: Approach to history teaching

The textbook series, co-authored by Piotr Laskowski, stands out in the Polish history-textbook market by its innovative pedagogical approach. The subject of history is combined in the textbook with the study of Polish language and literature, cultural studies, civic education, philosophy and ethics. Hence, the textbook is not strictly limited to the field of history. Topics of history are introduced not solely in a traditional chronological narrative, but are likewise integrated with the study of, for example, literary and philosophical texts or works of art from the same historical period. The study of the past is not separated from the totality of cultural and social phenomena of a given historical epoch. In the excerpt below, Laskowski explains the source of this textbook conception, which has been strongly influenced by his own experience as a pupil in the First Communal High School “Bednarska” in Warsaw, where education was guided by the idea of coordination of all humanistic subjects.

Similarly, Laskowski wanted to dissolve sharp divisions between humanistic disciplines in the textbook. It was important, for him, to convey the idea that certain processes and ideas manifest simultaneously in different fields of life. In the textbook, this idea is communicated by dividing the materials into different but overlapping “WORLDS”: 285
“WORLD of facts,” “WORLD of ideas,” “WORLD of emotions,” “WORLD of imagination,” “WORLD of creation.” An additional philosophical and ethical commentary on a given historical period is inserted in chapters “In Search of Truth” and “How to Live?” Nevertheless, the “WORLD of facts” remains the main part of the textbook, intended specifically for the study of history.

The idea is from practice. In general, the idea was born in the head of Krystyna Starczewska, or the organizer, in 1989, of the first school in Poland that was not state-run, the First Communal High School “Bednarska.” From the beginning, one of important ideas was the idea of the coordination of all humanistic subjects. That is, what was very faulty in the earlier instruction was that literature went separately, history separately, there was no philosophy at all, one thing did not go with another, did not suit each other […]. Hence, such an idea so that the humanities would be a totality, so that the specificity of different disciplines could be shown, but simultaneously knowing that if something is happening in history, then something is happening in literature, something in art, something in philosophy. This was a basic idea of the “Bednarska” school, from which I graduated as a pupil. When verified in practice, it functioned very well. […] Here, characteristically, there is not a part “history,” “literature,” “philosophy,” but there are only different worlds. And, obviously, “the world of facts” is rather a world for a historian, but “the world of ideas” is already a little for a historian, a little for a philosopher, and also a little for a teacher of literature. […] (P16: 16:1)

This kind of pedagogical approach requires teachers to coordinate their progress along the chronological axis of the curriculum, in order to make sure that more or less the same historical period is being studied in lessons of different subjects. This enables teachers to indicate connections between different areas of human activity. As a consequence, the aim of education is not memorization and reproduction of facts, but an ability to see connections between, for example, the philosophy of Hegel, Romantic literature, and the uprisings of the 19th century. Pupils need to recognize the interconnections between different fields and the manifestation of certain ideas in concurrent areas of human activity. This kind of pedagogical approach counterbalances the mental procedure of analytical differentiation with comprehensive thinking in terms of how each fragment is part of a larger cohesive whole.

That is, that when I do Romanticism, the 19th century, Romantic uprisings in history, I show how it is in literature, that there was Byron, that Byron had written “The Giaour,” that this Byron died in Greece. And now we have here history of the revolution in Greece, uprisings in Greece and so on, and soon you will read this Byron or you have already read Byron, it is this Byron, the same one. This is the context of these actions. It is doable. It really requires from teachers two things: agreement on how we do it and awareness of what others are doing in order to be capable of pointing out to pupils these points where there will be a connection. […] (P16: 16:2)

Laskowski’s conception of history as a discipline, which he would likewise want to convey to his pupils, is that history is continuously in the process of making and change. The focus, interests and methods of history are not fixed, nor are they isolated from
broader developments taking place in society. It is particularly crucial, for Laskowski, to show pupils that history is a form of speaking about the past, which is politically entangled or engaged. In this sense, history manifests as language, as a particular discourse, which functions on the basis of certain rhetorical devices and is ideologically motivated. Pupils are expected to identify political aims, which hide behind different ways of speaking about the past.

To my comment that modern professional history itself arose as a discipline, which assisted nation-state building, Laskowski responded by drawing attention to the transformations of the discipline in the 20th century and its shift away from the political past. By contrast, school-history education has not undergone the same shifts and maintains its focus primarily on political and military pasts. For Laskowski, this constitutes an unforgivable abuse of history and an injustice towards past life. His emphasis that history should provide knowledge about how people felt and thought in the past reveals the importance of the lived past and experience in his approach to doing history. Depersonalized, abstracted facts about events and processes in the past do not take priority over what people thought and how they felt about these events and processes.

However, it realized this, went through important transformations in the 20th century in order not to be this, but textbook history remained this. It, in general, does not realize that there was the Annales School in France, that there was microhistory. That it has simply changed in the 1950s–1960s, that already nobody really writes history in such an archaic way, nobody writes history like this. It is like from the 19th century. And such history is not good. Dangerous, criminal in principle, it is an abuse of history, and that is also not true about history. Simply, if we understand history as a science about how the people in the past felt and thought, the people of the past who are not politicians of the past, then we must pose research questions in a completely different way. We have to search for completely something else. (P16: 16:21)

Laskowski wishes that school-history education would correspond to the history of the discipline as it is practiced today. Pupils would need to engage with at least fragments of certain of the most important theoretical texts and would become acquainted with contemporary historical methods and disciplinary attitudes. Moreover, history education needs to be in touch with contemporary life, reveal how studying the past can help pupils understand certain mechanisms that occur in their own lives. History education likewise needs to nurture the capacity for empathy and dialogue with people different from ourselves, a capacity, which Laskowski describes as “stepping into someone else’s shoes.”

I would really wish that history corresponded to what historical sciences are today. It means, in this sense, that there would perhaps not be textbooks, that at least fragments of historical works would be read, especially of those which are groundbreaking, revolutionary, that they would be explained, why they look like that, a piece of Braudel, a piece of Emmanuel Le Roy Laudyrie about Montaillou, a piece of Ginzburg, a piece… I can name many here. Hence, that it would all the time consist in informed workshops, informed methods, that this science has its own method, that is, self-reflexive, that it reflects what it tells, about whom it tells and why it tells in such and not another way. This is perhaps the most important thing. And, secondly, what you called ethics of
communication, that it would be in touch with contemporary people and lives, that they could feel that this is important for them, that it would give something to them in their life, that it would give them something on an existential plane, that it would be a dialogue with people who are different from us, that is, an effort to understand them in good will, that it is an effort to enter into somebody else’s shoes, but also that it is a recognition of certain social mechanisms. [...] (P16: 16:25)

7.4.2 Piotr Laskowski: Multiple PERSPECTIVES on the past

Laskowski does not subscribe to the idea of an unbridgeable categorical gap between history as a linguistic representation and past life. He does not isolate history as language in his thinking from history as lived experience. History should seek to recover the voices of people in the past who were silenced, ignored, excluded from the mainstream narrative, in congruence with the project of Walter Benjamin, to whom Laskowski refers as one of his main theoretical influences. Laskowski foregrounds the ethical task of history as a discipline – to give voice to those who have been left out of the mainstream narrative, which has been typically focused on the deeds of the winners of history. Hence, Laskowski does not posit a sharp distinction between language and the past, representation and reality. History does have access to past life, if it delves beyond the narrative of state and nation and recognizes a diverse array of perspectives available for looking at the past.

In this sense, this textbook is already a little outdated. We wrote it quite a long time ago and it has already changed for me a little. If we wrote it today, it would be more radical. It’s polite and I have such an impression that it’s rather, rather, from my current point of view, already too conservative and too subordinated to the curricular and state pressure. I would want that they knew that history is continuously in a process of making. I mean that it is a certain form of speaking about the past and that it is politically entangled form of speaking about the past. It means that we always speak about the past today and we usually speak with some aim. So that they simply knew what aims hide behind different ways of speaking about the past. Moreover, I would want to induce them to a realization of some such historical project of Walter Benjamin, or of such a project, in which we are obligated to, speaking pompously, fulfill the expectations of those whose voice was taken away in the past. It means to pay attention in general and to search for the voice of these people, who were the losers of history, not winners. In this sense, there are too many narratives of winners and too few narratives of losers. Certainly, we would include today much more feminist perspectives, postcolonial perspectives and perspectives which are much more sensitive to political entanglement. (P16: 16:4)

For an illustration of his argument, Laskowski picked up one of his textbooks and opened a chapter on the so-called GOLDEN Age of Poland, or the 16th century. During the Golden Age, Poland became one of the largest and most powerful states in Europe. The prosperity of the state and cultural advancement were unmatched in later national history. However, the focus on the state and its elites effectively hides the history of peasants, whose situation worsened during the GOLDEN Age (16:5). The textbook narrative is, therefore,
not an objective account of what really happened, but a partial and value-laden perspective on the past, which foregrounds the history of political elites at the expense of the voice of peasants, who were forced into serfdom and lived in poverty (16:5). Laskowski is critical of his own textbooks in this respect as too moderate, conservative, and too subjected to the narrative of the state.

He would, therefore, like to modify his textbooks by showing more clearly that the state-oriented narrative is only one of the perspectives on the past, one way of looking at the past, which foregrounds certain elements and neglects others. Pupils need to comprehend that there can be multiple perspectives on the past and that the default state-oriented narrative currently exists at the expense of a more inclusive perspective that takes into consideration the lives of ordinary people in the past.

Here, there are almost no peasants at all. That is, there is no story about who pays for this Golden Age, what their situation is, what changes for them. It changes to their disadvantage. It is a paradox that the narrative from the perspective of authority and nobility is a narrative about how this time is the most beautiful. From the perspective of the peasants it was much more beautiful in the 14th century. They lost so much freedom and so many liberties. (P16: 16:6)

Ocular metaphors likewise enable Laskowski to argue against the possibility of objective history, which, for him, meant a history free from political entanglement. As he explains, what is seen in history is always seen for a reason. The vision of the historian is always limited by his or her perspective, which determines the nature of historical representation. A historian can never see everything. The metaphor of perspective foregrounds the subjectivity of vision. The supposedly objective historical depiction is, therefore, only one of the perspectives. The critique of objective history reveals that shifting the glass lens simultaneously transforms the narrative about the past. The effect of the optical metaphors on reasoning about cognition is that they circumscribe epistemological reflection within the limits of the subject-object dualism and the mind-world gap. The historian, imprisoned within her subjective perspectival angle, is distanced from the objective world. The optical metaphors, if they serve as the sole imagistic basis for reasoning, prevent one from conceptualizing cognition as a process in which a dynamic cognizing self is coupled, interacts, and co-creates reality with one’s environment.

It is simply about constricting attention instead to the fact that what we see in history, we see for some reason. We never see everything, right? Hence, it is not about evaluation in the sense that somebody was good, somebody was bad, acted well, acted wrongly. It is rather about saying, showing how glasses shift. I would rather contest a thesis that we can have objective knowledge about facts, free from entanglement, as in “it was like that.” Because this “it was like that” is always seen from some perspective. I do not want to say that there are no facts, but that they yield to being laid into different stories, into different narratives. And such a narrative that there was such and such king and he concluded such and such truce, such and such union, won such and such war, it is a very specific way of seeing and a very specific story. And likewise history is a representative science. Such a
history represents a very limited social group, a very limited point of view and very many people are simply not to be found in such history. (P16: 16:7)

7.4.2.1 Textbook I: The Polish-Lithuanian Union


The textbook series combines the subjects of history, Polish language and literature, philosophy, and civic education. The contents consist of several WORLDS: the WORLD of facts, which provides the basis for history education; the WORLD of ideas, which allows the organization of historical facts, and connects them to the culture of a given epoch; the WORLDS of imagination, emotion, and creation offer fragments of literary texts and reproductions of works of art, which support the teaching of Polish language and literature. The WORLD of facts covers the largest part of this particular textbook, focused on the period of the Middle Ages. The textbook is intended for the first year of gymnasium, or grade 7.

The textbook introduces the 1385 Union of Krewo as advantageous to both Poland and Lithuania (154). In particular, it is stressed that the union strengthened both states against the threat of the Teutonic Order, which sought to dismantle the union by any means (154). The textbook notes that Jogaila committed himself to incorporating Lithuania into Poland, among other things, and that all these obligations were fulfilled within a year of signing the union treaty (153). Explanation, thus, suggests that Jogaila did, in fact, annex Lithuania to Poland, which is not accurate, but the textbook authors chose not to discuss the nuances of the particular status of Lithuania in the union with Poland. On the other hand, as the narrative proceeds, pupils learn that consecutive treaties, signed by Poland and Lithuania, established the sovereignty of Lithuania and Vytautas as the Grand Duke of Lithuania (155). Jogaila, despite his superior status to Vytautas, only held a formal title as the ruler of both states (155).

Apart from a descriptive narrative of the main text, the authors inserted an excerpt from the chronicle of Jan Długosz, in which he describes Jogaila’s appearance, personality, attitudes and daily lifestyle (153–154). The questions, which follow the source, do not require pupils to engage critically with the source or reflect on the veracity of the provided information. Pupils are rather asked to consider what information about the culture and customs of the period this fragment of the chronicle can provide (154). The focus on Jogaila’s experience and daily life counterbalances the fact-oriented description of political history.

The contestation of narratives in relation to the Polish-Lithuanian union emerges in the textbook only in relation to the Grand Duke Vytautas. Pupils learn that it is difficult to find a street named after Jogaila in Lithuania today (155). By contrast, Vytautas is widely celebrated as a national hero (155). The textbook explains that, looking from the
Lithuanian POINT OF VIEW, it is not surprising, as Vytautas sought to dissolve the union with Poland and strengthen Lithuanian sovereignty (155).

The authors visibly sought to enliven the text by, for example, paying attention to the age difference between the Polish princess Jadwiga and Jogaila or by remarking how food was prepared for the Polish and Lithuanian armies in anticipation of war with the Teutonic Order. Nevertheless, the textbook does not digress from the PERSPECTIVE of political elites and focuses exclusively on the political and military history of the Polish state.

7.4.3 Piotr Laskowski: Theoretical discussion in history education

Discussion about historical truth occupies an important part of history education in Laskowski’s pedagogical approach. Pupils get acquainted in lessons with certain theoretical texts on historiography, such as, for example, fragments from the work of Hayden White and Carlo Ginzburg. In the context of Poland, his approach to teaching history constitutes a big exception. The effect of this approach, as Laskowski explains, is that pupils once again begin to enjoy learning history because they rediscover historical knowledge as a LIVING, ongoing discussion rather than DEAD information, which one must memorize. Theoretical discussion emphasizes the open-endedness of historical knowledge. By contrast, knowledge of the past presented as a given, fixed narrative does not encourage curiosity in pupils. If everything that can be known about the past has been already researched, discovered, and described in a history textbook, what is the point of continuing the inquiry? Pupils lose motivation to engage with history. The idea of a textbook as a medium of historical knowledge conveys the impression that historical knowledge is fixed, DEAD information. It creates an impression that information presented in a textbook is objective, safe, universal, authorless knowledge, which does not require further questioning, reflection, consideration.

R.K. Do you speak with pupils in history lessons about historical truth?

Yes, yes. Above all.

R.K. In what sense? How do you explain it to pupils and how do they take it?

They take it well. At last they can like history, because it is alive then. The problem with school history is that the way it is presented in school, it is dead. It means that it is not known what to learn it for. Everything is known. Everything has been told and one needs to learn it by heart. Only the insane would want to do something like this, and here it turns out that there is a discussion and that it is alive. We read a lot with them new theoretical texts – Hayden White, in general, such texts, which try to set…

R.K. In history lessons?

Yes, yes. Fragments of White, “Microhistory” of Carlo Ginzburg, because I love it very much. Today I am after a lesson on postcolonial theoretical text in historiography. They see how it works and then they can take it away, take a textbook and look what is
happening here, what is played out here, why something is written in one way and not
another, what it results from. It is important that they would know that a textbook is not
authorized knowledge, because a textbook is a beastly thing. I do not know if in general
they should be written, because a textbook simulates that it is the truth which needs to be
assimilated and then enunciated. And meanwhile a textbook is always from a certain
position and this textbook is only a section, a conceptualization. But it is the worst possible
formula, because the idea of a textbook is an idea where there is no person of an author,
which pretends that it is some indisputable standard for all.

R.K. The omniscient voice.

But we know that it is not like that. In this sense, in general textbooks do not need to be
written, one only needs to read historical books. Perhaps it is like that. I am inclined
towards the latter. (P16: 16:8)

I asked Laskowski how his pupils, having this broader awareness of contemporary
theoretical debates and divergent historical perspectives, handle history exams, where their
knowledge may not accommodate the nature of exam questions focused on retrieval of
factual information and single correct answers. Writing an exam is much like WRITING A
SONNET, Laskowski explained. The analogy conveys the idea that pupils approach the
exam and its rules as a certain literary genre, to which they need to accommodate in order
to pass it. Laskowski’s teaching approach determines that they no longer take the official
narrative for granted. Passing the exam, hence, does not mean that you know history well.
It solely means that you have mastered the rules of a peculiar literary genre, although you
do not really identify with the way this genre frames reality. Theoretical reflection
enhances a capacity for critical thinking.

It is simply a certain practical exercise. They must now determine what narrative state
demands from them and do the exercise as if they wrote a sonnet. There are certain frames
and one needs to fit into these frames with full awareness that this is a certain literary
genre. When a sonnet is written, there must be rhymes. When a history exam is written
(laughter), there must be certain words, terms and an outlook on history. But they don’t
already consider that they know history when they have written the matriculation exam.
They have a feeling that one thing has nothing in common with the other. Writing of an
exam does not mean that I know history and I understand it. And knowing something like
this is a success. (P16: 16:9)

Laskowski spoke particularly critically about the system of history exams in the Polish
education system, which, according to him, has little in common with humanistic thinking.
Tests, which require a standard answer, are seemingly a more objective way to measure
the knowledge of pupils. The problem with tests is, however, that they do not measure the
skills that humanistic disciplines, such as history, impart. Reduction of historical thinking
to memorization and reproduction of factual information misconstrues the purpose of
history learning. The current system of examination, Laskowski underlined, reveals a
symptomatic avoidance of the question: Why do we learn history? In his view, a much
more suitable form of examination would be a historical essay, which pupils could even
write at home, but in the supervision of teachers, with whom they would need to discuss
the topic during the writing process (16:11). They would need to reflect on a chosen historical topic and later publicly defend their work at school.

He contested the potential accusations that pupils from the provincial schools would be incapable of handling such a form of teaching and examination. In his opinion, mass education should be maintained at a high level in order to prevent it from reproducing and deepening the inequalities between the schools at the center and periphery of the country. The point is that if the average level of education is of low quality, good education becomes a privilege, accessible only to pupils that come from families of a higher socio-economic status. Laskowski expressed a strong regret that Poland adopted an Anglo-Saxon model of history education, which is, in principle, competitive, individualistic, test-oriented, and does not incline pupils toward cooperation (16:14).

7.4.4 Piotr Laskowski: Ethics and evaluation

I noted, during the interview, that Laskowski’s textbooks stood out by their strongly ethical character. The presentation of historical knowledge openly included discussion of morality, ethical issues, and values. The authors did not hide, but rather openly acknowledged their value preferences in relation to the past. For example, I pointed out that his textbook constitutes a great exception in the way it takes a critical stance towards the National Democrats and their leader Roman Dmowski, their ideas and actions. Contrary to the widely established belief that a textbook should seek to stay objective and eradicate any traces of an author’s personal attitudes and values, the textbook clearly voices the authorial understanding and judgment of the past. Laskowski underlined that there is no history that would be free of values and ethical issues. There is no objective history as such, including his own narrative.

However, the purpose of speaking critically and problematizing the xenophobic ideas of the National Democrats, for Laskowski, was not so much to condemn Roman Dmowski and his supporters, but to reveal to students the mechanism of xenophobia as such, which is what links the past to the present. In other words, the aim of talking about xenophobia is sociological rather than ethical, even if the latter is present in the textbook, too. Laskowski wants his pupils to understand the mechanism of xenophobia so that they would be able to recognize the workings of this mechanism not only in the past, but in their daily life, too. This is what constitutes the continuity between the past and the present and the relevance of learning history. Understanding the past can simultaneously equip pupils to understand themselves and their environment better. History provides tools for making sense of contemporary life. For Laskowski, understanding and analysis of these social processes cannot be sharply separated from values and moral education. Teaching history cannot be reduced to strictly value-free scientific pursuit; understanding, analysis, and moral sensitivity are integral parts of the process of education.

[...] It seems to me that there is no history free from some kind of ethics [...]. And in this sense, I rather believe in honesty, that is, in telling what I say quite clearly, that is, defining “yes, this is my outlook on these issues.” And it also seems to me that history, especially on the gymnasium level, must have formative dimensions really. It means that it must
explain certain social mechanisms. As, for example, the mechanism of xenophobia. And it unfolds like this exactly that the National Democrats and Roman Dmowski in Poland understood this mechanism superbly, used it, politicized it. And now it isn’t possible to talk about it in some other way than by simply exposing this structure. It means that some kind of a pattern functions here. In this sense, it perhaps came out more ethically, but it had to be more sociological. It had to show, there is obviously some evaluation, but it generally had to show what group dynamics there are, how this happens in general. That there is some “other,” that somebody establishes, constructs this “other,” then does something with him, so that they would understand that there are certain processes to which they submit themselves, not only on the country level, but in the school classroom. It is a micro-community, there is everything here, all social processes are found in the classroom: rich, poor, others, misfits. So that they would understand, that they would read history as a certain tool for understanding what is happening with them as individuals, as social beings, what this society is. Ultimately, that the ideal would be that they read history in order to understand why it is so that when they go on a trip and sit on a bus, the cool ones always sit in the back, the nerds always sit in the front, and the quiet ones always sit in the middle. That these are some kind of social structures and history permits us to study them, it is an empirical science for studying this, how this is happening. And in this sense, it is upbringing. […] There is no upbringing separate from teaching. (P16: 16:15)

7.4.4.1 Textbook II: Beyond the history of political elites


The textbook is intended for the second year of gymnasium and encompasses the period of modern history from the end of the 15th until the 17th century.

The textbook reflects Laskowski’s sensibility towards the peasant issues in the Middle Ages. For example, the chapter on the system of government during the 15th–16th centuries does not fail to mention that the gentry, which ruled the country together with the king, profited from the free work of peasants (64). In the late medieval period, the situation of peasants significantly worsened in Poland, as they lost their freedom and became a property of the gentry, forced to work in their land (64). Not having to pay peasants for their labor, the landowners could produce cheap grain, which was highly in demand in Western Europe (64). The textbook, thus, provides a more nuanced description of life in the Middle Ages, which is not limited to the history of political elites. Pupils are asked at the end of the chapter to reflect whether the term “Republic,” which means “a common thing,” characterizes well the political arrangement of Poland (69). The textbook encourages pupils to think critically about the exclusion of and limitations imposed on the peasantry and the burghers by the gentry.

The textbook contains multiple instances, where decisions, values and attitudes of the people in the past are reflected from a contemporary point of view of civic values. The
The author invites pupils to evaluate the rationale of the people of the past. This textbook approach consistently combines history education with ethical reflection, demonstrating that a sharp division between facts and values is not sensible. For example, it depicts the love of King Sigismund August for Barbara Radziwiłł and their secret marriage, which was vehemently opposed by the Polish gentry. Pupils, then, need to consider whether the choice of the king to prioritize his right to love and happiness over responsibility for the state was a correct decision (76).

The textbook does not dwell in too much detail on the 1569 Union of Lublin. It is briefly mentioned that King Sigismund August decided to introduce changes in the union terms between Poland and Lithuania, against the wishes of the Lithuanian magnates (83). Until then, as the textbook explains, the union between the two countries was quite loose and dependent on the person of the monarch (83). In light of the fact that Sigismund August did not have offspring, the union was bound to break away after his death (83). Therefore, with support of the gentry, he implemented the necessary political and administrative arrangements for a closer union of Poland and Lithuania. The textbook explains which institutions became shared and which remained separate in the Republic of the Two Nations after the union (85). At the end of the text, the author asks pupils to consider why the Lithuanian magnates were against the union and the politics of the king (85).

The textbook brings to attention that, not only Poles and Lithuanians lived in the Republic, but also Ruthenians (Ukrainians), Cossacks, Jews, Dutch, and Scots (86–89). Pupils learn, for example, that Ruthenians, who were mostly peasants andburghers subjected to the control of the Polish magnates, sought, unsuccessfully, to attain certain rights and freedoms, which made the region of Ukraine and Ruthenians increasingly grow apart from Poland (87). Ruthenians could not perceive the Republic as “their own state” (87). The depiction imparts criticism of the Polish gentry, its unwillingness to come to terms with and dismissive attitudes towards other religious and ethnic groups in the country as a factor which, over time, contributed to the weakening of the state due to internal conflicts.

The family of Lithuanian magnates, the Radziwiłł, appears in a negative light in the textbook, as traitors of the Commonwealth (148). The textbook foregrounds the misdeeds of Janusz Radziwiłł and his supporters, who broke off the Polish-Lithuanian union, concluded a union with Sweden instead and, finally, signed an agreement with other enemies of the Commonwealth, by which they agreed to divide its territory (148, 158–159). It is introduced as an example of private interests of the magnatry winning over the shared interests of the Commonwealth.

In the context of the 17th century, the textbook increasingly begins to refer to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as “Poland.” The two terms “Republic” and “Poland” are used interchangeably without making the meaning of the term “Poland” explicit. Laskowski agreed in the interview (Section 7.5.5) that this usage is incorrect, but results mostly from a wish to simplify the text and avoid repetition of the same term.

To sum up, the textbook follows the curricular focus on political and military history of Poland. Nevertheless, the authorial presence and influence on the narrative can be detected through the emphasis on the lives of marginalized groups of society, engagement
with ethical issues, emphasis on multiculturalism, tolerance, civic engagement and patriotism. A distinguishing feature of this textbook is the stress on the ethical reflection on the deeds of the people in the past, which most other textbooks typically tend to avoid. In this regard, these textbook authors do not subscribe to a sharp differentiation between facts and values. They perceive the teaching of history as a means for development of civic responsibility and moral sensitivity in pupils. However, the ethical reflection on the past is not always accompanied by a dialogue with the past. In other words, evaluation of the past in terms of civic values is not counterbalanced by an attempt to understand the rationale of the people in the past as resulting from their own lived experience and context of the times. Identification with the past tends to prevail over the sense of alterity. The Polish-Lithuanian differences in interpreting the past, on the other hand, are touched upon minimally and do not attract too much attention from the authors.

7.4.5 Piotr Laskowski: Depiction of the Polish-Lithuanian past

I brought attention to the fact that, in relation to the Polish-Lithuanian interwar conflict, Laskowski’s textbook barely mentions it. The issue of the sham mutiny organized by General Ẓeligowski appears only in the margin of the textbook page. Pupils do not learn about how differently Lithuanians and Poles perceived the conflict at the time and why. As Laskowski explained, a particular portrayal of Piłsudski in the textbook resulted from the organizing opposition of the narrative, where Dmowski and Piłsudski are contrasted to each other as polar opposites. Laskowski acknowledged that it was a conscious rhetorical strategy to introduce Piłsudski as a hero and, thus, other sides of his ideas and actions, which would evoke a more critical reception, were not included. Since the textbook series was intended for gymnasium, the guiding assumption prevailed that the representation of Piłsudski could be made more nuanced and ambiguous in textbooks intended for upper secondary level. Laskowski agreed, however, that a textbook should introduce different perspectives on the interwar conflict and encourage pupils to understand where such divergent interpretations stem from, in particular how they are affected by the political ideologization of the past. What this demonstrates, however, is the influence of the author in shaping the textbook narrative.

If a textbook as a form, because as I say, it is perhaps in general a redundant form, but if it needs to be, it would be nice that there would show up in Polish textbooks a selection of how it was once written about it in Polish textbooks and how it is written in Lithuanian textbooks. And then these young people can reflect on why it is like that, on what this difference of perspectives depends, whether we can determine and what we would have to determine; if it is only about facts, or if it also serves something. […] But different ordinary sides of Piłsudski had been annulled on this level of gymnasium. In agreement with a thought that he can be made more complicated on the level of lyceum, that on this level of gymnasium it is perhaps worthwhile to sharpen the opposition Piłsudski-Dmowski. […] But undoubtedly it would also be worthwhile to show it already here, how it is told differently and for what reasons it is told differently. In order to disclose these positions even more. […] And then it would be much more critical towards Piłsudski. There is no
point in establishing one narrative, because there is never one narrative and there, where it is, it is encumbered by authority. (P16: 16:16)

It also interested me how Laskowski perceived the commonplace references to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the textbook as “Poland.” His own textbook identifies the state as “Poland” starting already from the 17th century. While Laskowski admitted that this usage is undoubtedly incorrect, he noted that it had more to do with finding a more elegant linguistic arrangement than with a conscious historical judgment. The names “Republic” and “Republic of the Two Nations” are too long to be used repetitively in the text. Thus, various authors face a common challenge of finding other, more succinct terms to replace them with. Laskowski agreed though that attention to Lithuanian sensitivities required authors to avoid using the term “Poland.” He added that, for example, attention to the Polish-Ukrainian contestation of the past was stronger in the textbook than towards the Polish-Lithuanian disagreements. The authors were more sensitized to the Ukrainian PERSPECTIVES and sought to present them in a nuanced way. The representation of the Polish-Lithuanian relations in the past, on the other hand, remained subject to the traditional narrative.

It seems to me that it is not a tradition, but a certain type of simplification which depends on the fact that the name “the Republic” is already long, whereas “the Republic of the Two Nations” – even longer. From what I remember, it did not work out for us. However, we attempted, tried to use the term “Republic” as the correct one.

R.K. But it is usually used interchangeably.

It is obviously incorrect. It was not Poland, it was the Republic and it was of the Two Nations. It seems to me that here it is rather about a certain simplification. It means that it is difficult to write, all the time to introduce the “Republic.” Honestly (pause), well, yes, it would be better to write the “Republic,” it is clear. (P16: 16:17)

The crucial thing about the Polish-Lithuanian past is, however, that the majority of ordinary people, who were peasants and who were not part of the political elites, felt neither as Poles, nor as Lithuanians. Laskowski underlines in the excerpt below that the preoccupation with Polishness or Lithuanianness is determined by the nation- and state-oriented tradition of history writing. This approach to the past ignores that peasants, who were not given a VOICE and whose experience is not included into the narratives of the political elites, preoccupied themselves with very different issues. The dominance of political history in the school curriculum equals, for Laskowski, a MURDER of history as a discipline and of moral sensitivity in pupils. They receive a very limited understanding of what history is about and how it can be written. They do not learn about the life of ordinary people in the past. Aware that history education remains a tool of the state, he nevertheless envisions a kind of school-history education, which would expose political manipulation and abuse of history.

I will say it radically. It seems to me that in general we should depart from the state key. It means that, in my understanding, such a confrontation would serve to show that history
organized by the state is always a false history. It means that it serves circumstantial political goals. What I said about Benjamin and the history of subjected classes, of the subaltern, which did not have a voice, they didn’t feel to be either Poles, or Lithuanians. Their problems were completely other problems. I would like to have a history of peasants, a history of Jews in Central Europe, whereas histories of how one elite did not like another elite (laughter) interest me less. [...] But I think it is difficult to accept and quite radical. But I simply consider that such circumstantial politality of history, politics of history, the use of history through school as an instrument of civic formation is murdering history, is destroying moral sensitivity. It has always been exchanged for the idea that this is “us,” “ours,” and so on. Hence, I would want a kind of history, it’s difficult to conceive of it in school, which is obviously an apparatus of the state and has to conform to the needs of the state, but I would wish for a history exposing that. It means, a history which shows that these historical pretensions, historical rights, historical invoices, faults and injustices, in some cases it needs to be told that they are a real suffering of concrete people and in some cases they serve mean political aims. [...] (P16: 16:20)

7.5.5.1 Textbook III: Giving VOICE to marginalized groups


The textbook is a continuation of the curriculum for the second year of gymnasium. It encompasses a period from the beginning of the 18th century to the middle of the 19th century.

In congruence with the narrative of the preceding textbook, the terms “Poland” and “Republic” are used interchangeably, when the textbook describes the 18th century. The narrative tells of the history of political elites from a visibly contemporary point of view. The Polish gentry and magnates are condemned for their narrow-mindedness, corruption, irresponsible behavior, ignorance of state interests, and lack of religious tolerance. The attitudes of the gentry are repeatedly used as a counterexample for an indirect ethical commentary on the importance of civic values and duties.

The authors likewise took the initiative to problematize the concept of the “Polish nation” and its meaning in the 18th century. The textbook elucidates that, until the mid-18th century, the citizenry of the “Polish nation” was limited only to the gentry who had the right to participate in state governance (95). An excerpt from the text of a Polish social and political activist, belonging to the Enlightenment movement, shows, however, that already at the end of the 18th century a new conception of the Polish nation was emerging (95). The Polish nation, according to the Enlightenment thinkers, had to encompass all of society, including the burgthers and peasants. The quoted passage likewise expresses the critique of the gentry and its control of power. Pupils need to reflect why “those, who live without privileges, […] will be indifferent to the fate of the nation and to its name” (95).
Thus, the textbook attempts to include the perspective of marginalized groups in society. By bringing to attention the disenfranchisement of the majority of the population, the textbook authors try to consistently combine historical knowledge with civic education.

The description of the Constitution of May 3 receives a lot of attention in the textbook. However, the nuances regarding Lithuanian sensitivities and the territorial-administrative arrangement of the state do not enter the focus. The textbook puts more emphasis, for example, on the fact that peasants did not benefit much from the Constitution, despite the fact that they constituted 90% of the population (107). The majority of the gentry could not conceive of peasants as equal citizens of the state, which is metaphorically identified as the “Achilles’ heel of the Polish revolution” (106). In opposition to these conservative views of the gentry, the textbook praises the ideas of Tadeusz Kościuszko, who is said to firmly support the idea of the revolution of all the strata of the Polish nation, including people of other religious and ethnic groups (107).

The textbook thereby merges historical knowledge with civic education. Various events and historical figures are employed in the text for an ethical commentary seeking to set certain behaviors and attitudes as an example of responsible and sensible civic conduct. The textbook sets an aim to shed light on the situation of marginalized groups in society. To the extent that it is permitted by the curriculum, the textbook authors clearly strove to enlarge the scope of the narrative of political elites by including some information about the status of peasants, religious and ethnic minorities. This is consistent with Laskowski’s emphasis on the need to give voice to groups whose experience has been traditionally neglected in history.

7.5.5.2 Textbook IV: Giving voice to the marginalized groups


The textbook encompasses the period from the second half of the 19th century to 1939. It is intended for the third year of gymnasium.

A novelty in this textbook is consideration of other nations, which lived alongside Poles, in the so-called “Polish lands” of the former Commonwealth. It constitutes an exception among the totality of Polish history textbooks. Although the authors do not discuss the national movement of Lithuanians and Lithuanian-Polish relations, they, for example, problematize the Ukrainian-Polish relations and refer critically to the sense of superiority and contempt of Polish landlords towards the Ukrainian peasants (70). Ukrainian adversity towards Poles is, therefore, explained as resulting from the unwillingness of Polish landlords to acknowledge Ukrainians as a separate nation and to provide them with basic freedoms and rights (70–71). Instead of schematically introducing the Ukrainian-Polish conflict as a clash of two nationalisms, the textbook engages the
deeper social issues and attempts to reveal the rationale of Ukrainians. In this regard, the
textbook once again takes an ethical stance to show the point of view of marginalized
groups in history.

The two leading figures of modern Poland, Roman Dmowski and Józef Piłsudski,
receive a very different evaluation in the textbook. Roman Dmowski, the ideologue and
leader of the right-wing party of National Democrats, is presented as a controversial
figure, who justified brutality and violence for the sake of national interests and who
perceived relations between nations in terms of a fight for survival (73). The claims about
Dmowski’s views are supported by quotations from his books. It is noted, however, that
for many Poles, Dmowski became the highest and most respected authority at the
beginning of the 20th century (72). The textbook claims that Dmowski’s ideas undermined
the best traditions of Polish patriotism: “To the extent that the earlier fighters for Polish
freedom wanted cooperation with Jews, Ruthenians, or Lithuanians, dreamed about a
revived, tolerant Republic of many nations, Dmowski considered these traditions to be an
expression of weakness” (73).

The socialist Piłsudski, by contrast, appears in an extremely positive light and is
presented as a national hero, whose understanding of patriotism differed tremendously
from that of Dmowski’s. Piłsudski based his vision of an independent Poland on the
tradition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, supported the idea of a federation of
the former nations of the Commonwealth, and stood in favor of democratic principles,
universal voting rights, equal rights for all citizens, free compulsory public education, a
minimum wage, and social insurance (76).

The portrayal of Piłsudski as a national hero, who maintained the best traditions of
Polish patriotism and upheld progressive values, takes special importance, keeping in
mind that it was Piłsudski, who was responsible for shaping Poland’s eastern border,
including the border with Lithuania. The textbook claims that Piłsudski wished that
independent Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine would come into existence to the east of
Poland (136). In other words, he expected that these countries would enter a federation
with Poland. The textbook quotes Piłsudski arguing that “one cannot think about the
independence of Poland without the independence of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland,
Ukraine, and Belarus” (136).

The fight for Poland’s eastern borders is framed in the textbook as the fight between
Poland and Soviet Russia. In this vein, the textbook explains that when, in 1919, the Red
Army took control of Vilnius and Kiev, Piłsudski “decided that it is time to act – only the
containment of the Bolshevik offensive could save independent Lithuania and Ukraine”
(137). When the Polish army pushed the Bolsheviks out of the city of Vilnius, “Lithuanians
were afraid that Piłsudski wanted to incorporate Vilnius into Poland. They demanded a
clear affirmation that Vilnius will be the capital of an independent Lithuania. But
Piłsudski – a native-born Vilniusian – did not want to give such an affirmation” (137).

What is striking is that the final military take-over of the city of Vilnius and its region
by Polish troops in 1920 is not even mentioned in the main text. Pupils learn that the
troops of General Żeligowski staged a fake mutiny, under Piłsudski’s command, and that
the region was soon after incorporated into Poland – in six sentences inserted on the
margin of the page as supplementary information (139). The ethical reflection, which is
emphasized throughout the textbook, does not accompany the presentation of the interwar Polish-Lithuanian conflict. The description focuses only on the Polish point of view and presents the events in a fact-oriented, descriptive manner. Since the emphasis falls on the Polish-Soviet war, it is difficult to comprehend the roots of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict in the interwar period. The attitudes and rationale of the Lithuanians in the conflict are not introduced in the textbook.

The textbook combines historical knowledge with social critique and civic education. In agreement with Laskowski’s conception of history education, the textbook seeks to include the experience of peasants, of ethnic and religious minorities, into the overall narrative of national history. While the authors brought the Polish-Ukrainian relations into focus, the Polish-Lithuanian relations in the aftermath of the demise of the Commonwealth, however, do not receive much attention in the textbook.

7.4.6 Conclusion

Laskowski’s vision of school-history education is radical in the Polish context. The driving idea of his pedagogical approach is to enable pupils to recognize the limitations of the traditional state-oriented historical narrative, which effectively ignores and silences the voice of ordinary people in the past. Giving voice to the losers of history, attention to their experience is as much an ethical task as it is a task of understanding the past. Thus, history education becomes a means to step into someone else’s shoes.

History as embodied life and history as disembodied language intermingle in Laskowski’s reasoning. Pupils need to learn to recognize political manipulation and ideologization of the past – the way history is rendered into a form of speaking about the past, a discourse, a disembodied form. Nevertheless, history also has access to past life, if and when it delves beyond the history of political elites.

A key feature of Laskowski’s approach to teaching history underscores the open-ended character of historical knowledge. Engagement with theoretical debates reveals to pupils historical knowledge as part of a living process of debate and reflection, as opposed to dead, fixed information designed for memorization. Pupils come to appreciate the ongoing transformation of the discipline of history itself, its methods, attitudes and dispositions of historians towards the past.

Attention to theoretical reflection on history enables Laskowski as well as his pupils to recognize the perspectival nature of historical representation. What is seen in history is always seen at a certain static angle of view.
Chapter 8. Discussion

Implicit metaphorical models of cognition that are embodied in the way textbooks present the past have been examined in Chapters 6 and 7. I was particularly interested in the implicit image-schematic models of cognition that authors and textbooks employ as they conceptualize what the past, history, truth, objectivity, and knowledge is. Crucially, the models of cognition are not solely manifest in explicitly stated metaphors, but reveal themselves indirectly – in the default ways the information is organized, in the methodological and epistemological emphases. What became evident is that the disembodied model of cognition prevails in

- the way textbooks make sense of truth and objectivity (focus on veracity, accuracy, bias and subjectivity; a dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity);
- the way textbooks instruct pupils to deal with divergent interpretations of the past (reductive separation of pattern and process; seeking to determine which interpretation of the available ones is correct in order to reject the others, rather than seeking to integrate conflicting accounts into a more encompassing explanation; focus on the facts and lack of engagement with divergent lived experiences);
- a sharp dichotomy between fact and fiction;
- the focus on political and military history of the state/nation and an exclusion of lived, experiential past from the textbook narratives;
- the arrangement of narrative as a linear sequence of static states.

I will survey the findings of the analysis in four consecutive sections, which, respectively, focus on the conceptualization of truth and objectivity, the use of multiperspectivity, organization of a narrative, the presentation of the Polish-Lithuanian past in textbooks, and the main metaphorical themes that emerged in the analysis.

8.1 Truth and objectivity

Engagement with diverse perspectives puts the questions of truth and objectivity at the forefront of historical analysis. However, as the analysis demonstrated, a comparison of and reflection on diverse narratives lacks nuance, if it is practiced by placing an emphasis exclusively on identification of bias and subjectivity, verification of truth claims, assessment of accuracy of information, differentiation between facts and opinions. In Table 2 below, I offer an overview of the ideas expressed by the Lithuanian textbook authors on truth and objectivity.

Table 2. Truth and objectivity: Lithuanian authors

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<th>Juozas Brazauskas</th>
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<td>To be objective means to acknowledge the obvious facts. These facts are clearly seen, known, and constitute the truth, which is opposed to myth. The discordance between the memories of lived</td>
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experience and factual truth is a confounding problem, if truth is a singular copy of past reality.

| Jūratė Litvinaitė | Truth is that which you believe about the past. However, the relativity of truth of the past elicits a need for firmly grounding certain value orientations. The emphasis shifts away from seeking truth to making value-informed choices. A fair judgment of the past constrains the kinds of narratives that can be told. Fair judgment implies defense of certain assessments of the past, especially in relation to traumatic experiences. |
| Ignas Kapleris | The objective truth does not exist, but the meaning of a painful past is not arbitrary. Acknowledging the importance of the truth of the past as lived experience is important, but this still leaves room for doubt on the weight or accuracy of some memories. Textbooks should guide pupils towards the truth, if several interpretations are presented. |
| Mindaugas Tamošaitis | There is not a single truth, but there are facts, which do not change. Truthfulness is linked to stasis. If there is no single definite and clear assessment of the past, the textbooks should also abstain from espousing a particular assessment of the past. It is important to look at the past without bias. An objective caricature represents the events in the past truthfully. Verification of accuracy and identification of bias are crucial for determining truthfulness. |
| Deimantas Karvelis | THE DARK AND THE LIGHT – both SIDES – should be presented in textbooks without an evaluative judgment in order to ensure objectivity. Objectivity entails preventing the HUMAN FACTOR from appearing in the textbook. Objectivity is only possible in facts, which are free of value judgment. For him, objectivity entails presenting THE DARK AND THE LIGHT SIDES of an event or a phenomenon. In order to be objective, the historian should abstain from judgment and show the good and the bad aspects of the past. |

The majority of the interviewed Lithuanian textbook authors underscores the importance of historical truth and objectivity (Table 2). Juozas Brazauskas, Mindaugas Tamošaitis, and Deimantas Karvelis, in particular, associate truthfulness and objectivity with the historical facts, which are fixed, stable, free from the HUMAN FACTOR and, as a result, objectively true. In other words, they separate facts from interpretation, where the latter is more conducive to divergent views and, consequently, less capable of being truthful. Truthfulness is linked to stasis – to what is unchanging and supposedly exists independently of human perception (see Chapter 2).

Tamošaitis underlines that there is not a single truth, but there are stable facts, which are truthful and which can be verified. Therefore, verification of accuracy, identification of bias and deception constitutes a significant aspect of source analysis in his textbooks. Karvelis emphasizes that objectivity is only possible in facts, which are free of value judgment. For him, objectivity entails presenting THE DARK AND THE LIGHT SIDES of an event or a phenomenon. In order to be objective, the historian should abstain from judgment and show the good and the bad aspects of the past. Brazauskas emphasizes the
weight of facts, but is nevertheless aware of the difficulties in establishing what is true,
when objective history is juxtaposed with memories of lived experience, which
contaminate a distanced, objective view of the past.

Ignas Kapleris and Jūratė Litvinaitė, on the other hand, speak about truth and
objectivity in relation to multiple interpretations. Both of them find it important to
highlight that even though absolute objectivity or the single truth does not exist, fair and
balanced judgment of the past can nevertheless bring one closer to truthful knowledge of
the past. Textbooks, authored by Kapleris, particularly underscore the ongoing
significance of critical and comparative source analysis. Both Kapleris and Litvinaitė
stress that the truth of certain painful or traumatic experiences of the past cannot be
doubted or made arbitrary.

The views on historical truth and objectivity of the Lithuanian authors and their Polish
colleagues overlap to a great extent. Table 3 below offers a summary of the ideas held by
the Polish authors on this topic. Halina Manikowska, Michał Tymowski, Robert
Śniegocki, and Piotr Laskowski all underline that absolute, self-effacing objectivity and
the single historical truth do not exist or are impossible to attain in the discipline of
history. Nevertheless, Manikowska and Śniegocki, in particular, note that balanced, fair
judgement of the sources and scientific procedures of investigation ensure that historical
knowledge produced by historians is verifiable. Manikowska reiterated several times
throughout the interview the need for historians to stick with the middle ground and avoid
TILTING TO any extreme SIDE in the evaluation of the past. She associates truthfulness and
objectivity with what she described as central predisposition. She likewise emphasizes that
historians should aim to evaluate the past on its own terms and avoid judgment on the
basis of contemporary values and beliefs.

Piotr Laskowski, on the other hand, stands out from the group in his emphasis on the
subjectivity of the historian’s GAZE and its impact on the narrative. He does not contest the
existence of facts, but, for him, it was more important to stress the open-endedness and
partiality of historical knowledge. Laskowski explained that theoretical discussion about
historical truth, as opposed to a static, fact-oriented narrative, facilitated pupils’ interest in
the past, brought historical knowledge TO LIFE.

Just as their Lithuanian peers, Polish authors, such as Tymowski, Śniegocki, and, to
some extent, Laskowski differentiated between the absolute, distanced, objective
truthfulness of static individual facts and the subjectivity of more encompassing, complex
interpretations or conjectures. Above the level of individual facts, historians’ subjectivity
inevitably enters the knowledge produced, because historians highlight only certain
aspects of the past, while ignoring others. They arrange the factual information and insert
a particular kind of narrative that depends on their PERSPECTIVE on the past and imbues the
facts with meaning. For example, Tymowski stressed that one should distinguish between
the truth of factual propositions and the truth of assemblages of facts. While it is relatively
easy to establish the truthfulness of the former (whether a statement matches the
exteriorized past), the truth status of larger-scale conjectures is more complicated to
ascertain.

Table 3. Truth and objectivity: Polish authors
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<tr>
<th><strong>Halina Manikowska</strong></th>
<th>Absolute objectivity does not exist in humanities. There cannot be an objective truth of the past because the past reality is too complex and our access to it too imperfect. However, historians should stick with the middle ground and avoid leaning to either extreme side. Historians should be balanced and fair. Reality hides behind sources and can be uncovered by a skillful historian. The past needs to be evaluated strictly on its own terms.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Michał Tymowski</strong></td>
<td>The pursuit of truth is important, but no historian can claim that s/he has achieved the ultimate truth. There are different points of view on the past. A distinct point of view is not an obstacle to understanding, but a prerequisite for knowledge. One should distinguish between the truth of factual propositions and the truth of assemblages of facts. A propositional statement can be true or false. But most historians go beyond individual facts and pursue the truth of large-scale processes and conjectures, in which it is impossible to attain a single image of the past.</td>
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<td><strong>Robert Śniegocki</strong></td>
<td>In order to practice objectivity, the aim is to avoid evaluation of the past and to show different points of view. It is difficult to step out of one’s self and assess one’s own bias. The viewer/knower presents his or her vision, which s/he tries to explain and justify. Absolute objectivity does not exist. In practice, it would amount to not more than a calendar, a collection of dates. Objectivity is a lack of bias, prejudice, propagandistic manipulation. The aim of source analysis is to discover bias-free, truthful, objective information about the past.</td>
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<td><strong>Piotr Laskowski</strong></td>
<td>The vision of historians is always limited by their perspective, which determines the nature of historical representation. The supposedly objective historical depiction is, therefore, only one of the perspectives. The critique of objective history reveals that shifting the glass lens simultaneously transforms the narrative. We cannot have objective knowledge, completely free from entanglement. Theoretical discussion emphasizes the open-endedness of historical knowledge. Discussions about historical truth bring historical knowledge to life.</td>
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An aforementioned emphasis on verification of truthfulness and accuracy in textbooks can be observed in tasks, which present pupils with two contrasting sources, asking them to evaluate whether the claims made in the sources are accurate and reliable. The emphasis on verification is detectable in tasks which require pupils to consider, for instance, whether a poem and a caricature “represent past events objectively” (e.g., the Lithuanian textbook series “Raktas,” Section 6.4), or whether a film or a painting depicts the past accurately (e.g., the Polish textbook “History from the Renaissance to the Napoleonic times,” 7.3.2.2). This approach can be useful in certain cases, in particular, when pupils learn to critically assess propaganda materials and identify manipulations, omissions and selectively presented facts, but it is not sufficient for teaching pupils how to make sense of diverse interpretations of the past.
However, the application of the latter method of adjudication reveals that the metaphorical model of cognition based on the distinction of world and (disembodied) mind still implicitly prevails in school-history education. Pupils are taught to focus on those aspects of representation that can be reliably shown to match or falsify past reality. A problem occurs when this model of truth as a static optical match between distanced world and contents of the mind is assumed to express a universal epistemological standard. An exclusive emphasis on veracity and factual accuracy fails to address differences of interpretations and meanings that depend not on factual inaccuracy, but on a complex process of lived experience out of which these particular patterns of interpretation emerge.

Identification of inaccuracies and bias in sources may be useful in cases of forgery and falsification, but it does not prepare pupils to comprehend subtler differences of interpretation, which extend beyond issues of a straightforward, optical match between language and the past. Crucially, it does not assist pupils in making sense of why one interpretation may be more truthful than another and/or how they relate to each other, in cases when both interpretations rely on the same factual information. Importantly, pupils are not taught to consider how the past is present, how it is embodied in sources, even those that are not factually accurate, and what these sources can reveal about past life. For this reason, the lack of conceptual tools for handling and making sense of plural perspectives in school history remains a significant issue.

Extending Seixas’s (2016) and Levesque’s (2016) conceptual schemes (see Chapter 2) in an embodied approach, it could be argued that disciplinary critical scrutiny of evidence and memory are two complementary ways of knowing, which are embedded within a larger systemic feedback loop between embodied lived experience and social and material environment. The feedback loop describes the relation of structural coupling (see Section 3.5) between embodied individuals and the environment, within which people move and act, to which they respond, and which shapes them (see, for example, Muszynsni 2017, Chapter 2). In a static sense of (optical) accuracy, the disciplinary approach can correct certain distortions of memory. When we complement the static accuracy with a dynamic aspect of complex processes and relations, memory and lived experience can serve as a record of prior developments and interactions with the environment.

When faced with more nuanced divergences of narratives, textbook authors and teachers are deprived of conceptual means or resources to explain to pupils how one is to assess such divergences in relation to each other, or why one narrative may be deemed more truthful than another. The shortcomings of the dualistic, disembodied model of cognition come into full view once, in the wake of the linguistic turn, the realization arises that the relation between language and life, word and world, knowledge and reality is not that of straightforward optical sameness. However, since the dualism between world and (disembodied) mind, past reality and language of historical narratives continues to be assumed in postmodern philosophy of history at a meta-theoretical level (Section 3.4), an epistemological argument collapses into a relativist position. Postmodern philosophy of history seems to suggest that, in attempts to adjudicate among narratives, the emphasis on truth should be replaced by an emphasis on value-based deliberation and ethical choice.
This shift, for example, finds its concrete manifestation in Lithuania in calls for a systematic, organized national politics of history, which would determine core state values and beliefs for shaping textbook representation and interpretation of the past. The latter position was adopted by Jūratė Litvinaitė, who was acutely aware of how her own authorial judgment and interpretation weighed in heavily on textbook representation of the past. In effect, this may lead to a situation, where, since the relation between language and the past is assumed to be arbitrary, unwanted interpretations are displaced not because, for example, they fail to engage with past life, but because they do not correspond to the values espoused by the state and society. Thus, the contents of history education can become entirely dependent on the value preferences of those, who are in power to make such choices. The postmodernist fixation on the form of language and imposition of meaning on the passive content of the past, paradoxically, may materialize into practices, which are contrary to the aims of postmodern thinkers, keen to displace objectivized accounts of the past.

8.2 Multiperspectivity

The analysis has demonstrated that a plurality of historical narratives constitutes an important challenge to school-history education, which is expected to provide truthful knowledge about the past. Even though the interviewed school-history textbook authors and teachers in both Lithuania and Poland are generally willing to insert different interpretations of a shared Polish-Lithuanian past into textbooks, significant obstacles remain to such a textbook approach.

An extremely broad thematic and chronological scope of the curriculum severely limits the possibilities of textbook authors and teachers to examine any single topic in a more complex way. The curriculum imposes a format of narration, which introduces the past as a linear sequence of distanced events rather than as a complex process of life. Moreover, since political history of states and nations still prevails in the curriculum, the lived, experiential past is largely excluded from the textbook contents. This significantly diminishes possibilities to include accounts of different experiences of the past, however.

The prevalence of political and military history also demonstrates that school-history continues to be taught in the tradition of cultural memory (Chapter 2; Assmann 2010, 2011). School-history is expected to consolidate and preserve the foundational knowledge about the group’s past and to rise above the impermanent, subjective apparitions and impressions (Tamm 2008, 2013). The ways in which pupils are trained to cope with multiperspectivity reveal that the focus is on knowledge understood as a static object rather than on the process of relations and interactions that are reflected in such knowledge (Chapter 2). The entanglement (Hodder 2012) in static, visual modes of conceptualization is thereby extended and bestowed by shaping pupils’ ways of thinking about the past.

In teaching about conflicts and disagreements in the past, a particularly problematic approach is to introduce distinct perspectives (patterns) without explaining the processes of lived experience, out of which these perspectives arose. One of the entailments of disembodied meta-theoretical premises, which assumes a separation between language and
world and between pattern and process, is that an engagement with divergent narratives can be reduced to a “I have my history, you have yours” approach. This approach reduces different interpretations to subjective “appearances,” which are relative, isolated, static and figuratively framed. The analysis may be focused on identifying similarities and differences between divergent interpretations, but does not link these patterns to a process of lived experience. However, if pupils do not come to understand a particular pattern of viewing the past in terms of the process of its instantiation and organization over time, other people’s experience in the past may remain opaque and unrelatable. In order to make sense of multiple divergent perspectives, pupils need to learn to recognize how they have emerged over time and how they are entangled in a complex process of past life.

An exception among the analyzed Lithuanian textbooks was the 9th grade textbook “Laikas,” which attempted to explain the 19th century conflict between the “Young Lithuanians” of the national revival movement and the Polish-speaking “Old Lithuanians” by connecting this conflict to the process of lived experience of both groups. Pupils could learn to empathize with the trajectory of experience of both groups and to understand how this experience subsequently shaped their reactions to each other. In other words, the textbook combined, in an embodied way, the presentation of divergent perspectives with a discussion of a process of lived experience out of which the perspectives emerge. The main text and the accompanying excerpts from sources allowed interpreting the 19th century split between Lithuanians and Poles, to a great extent, as being caused by the inability and unwillingness to relate to each other’s process of lived experience. In Table 4 below, an overview of the Lithuanian authors’ understanding of the use of multiperspectivity in school-history education is provided.

Table 4. Multiperspectivity: Lithuanian authors

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<th>Author</th>
<th>Multiperspectivity</th>
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<tr>
<td>Juozas Brazauskas</td>
<td>The teacher should introduce different interpretations and steer pupils towards a preferred interpretation. Multiperspectivity, however, is not demanded in the exams. Two perspective windows from which to look at the Lithuanian history: the window of the national, Lithuanian, history and the window of the world. The two windows are mutually exclusive. Looking at the past from the window of the world poses the threat of disappearing in the big frame.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jūratė Litvinaitė</td>
<td>Multiperspectivity can be incorporated at an upper secondary level of education. Authors bear a huge responsibility in shaping pupils’ ideas about the past by the way they introduce multiple narratives. When faced with a plurality of narratives, pupils should select the one that best fits their values and beliefs. There are limits to the extent that uncertainty about the past is acceptable in the classroom. A national politics of history is necessary in order to establish core collective values and beliefs that shape society’s future.</td>
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| Ignas Kapleris           | Multiperspectivity in school-history is welcome, but one should remain cautious about its use in the classroom. Textbooks and teachers
should serve the function of a GUIDE-POST in terms of how certain events should be assessed, especially when the past events in question have to do with painful or tragic experience.

| Mindaugas Tamošaitis | Pupils should be made aware that there could be multiple interpretations of the past. The teacher or a textbook should not usurp a monopoly and impose a single narrative. Pupils need to compare different interpretations, choose one of them and provide justifications for their choice. The textbook should avoid very assertive judgments. |
| Deimantas Karvelis | The textbook should introduce all interpretations and avoid passing judgment. In cases where a textbook depicts events which receive a controversial historiographic interpretation, it should show the variety of different opinions. However, matters, which are already settled among historians, can be explained in a straightforward way. |

All the interviewed Lithuanian authors agreed that multiperspectivity – introducing different interpretations of the same events – should be incorporated in school-history education, particularly when the interpretation is contested among professional historians (Table 4). However, all authors underlined that there are limits to the use of multiperspectivity in the classroom. For example, as the interview with Ignas Kapleris illustrated (Section 6.3.2), the lived experience of tragic or painful events, does not lend itself to being emplotted in a number of different ways. The limits of interpretation derive from embodied experience of these events, which, if it is included into a narrative, illuminates how meaning is lived and afforded by embodiment rather than solely determined by narrative impositionalism. The textbooks should, according to Kapleris, guide pupils towards a particular preferred interpretation.

Jūratė Litvinaitė upheld a slightly different position that multiperspectivity is permissible in school history to the extent that it does not endanger certain core values and beliefs, which make up the group identity. These core values and beliefs, according to Litvinaitė, cannot be left to the teachers, textbook authors, or pupils to decide, but need to emerge from a purposeful and systematic politics of history at the national level. Juozas Brazauskas, likewise, expressed his opinion that the teacher should steer pupils and help them identify the interpretation, which is more justified. He was not convinced that pupils would be able to adjudicate among various interpretations on their own. The interview with Brazauskas, however, also revealed how thinking of different interpretations in terms of static perspective “windows” may prevent pupils from conceiving the complexity of the past life. The relation between different perspectives may be perceived as mutually exclusive and negative.

Mindaugas Tamošaitis emphasized that the textbook and the teacher should strictly avoid imposing a single narrative or interpretations on pupils. Textbooks, in his view, should avoid explicit value judgments and assertive opinions about the past. Pupils should become acquainted with multiple interpretations, compare them and make a justified choice among them. Deimantas Karvelis, on the other hand, acknowledged that all interpretations should be introduced in the case of controversial issues, but the interview
with him likewise revealed that he refused to identify certain events of the past, which presently raise debates among professional historians, as controversial.

The interviewed Polish authors (Table 5) were unanimously supportive of including diverse interpretations of the past into textbooks, particularly if they are introduced at an upper secondary level, when pupils are mature enough to engage with and make sense of competing accounts. Halina Manikowska underscored the idea that engagement with different narratives should entail an understanding of the reasoning of people in the past, which acknowledges their experiences and lived context. She maintained the idea that textbooks should explain the Polish-Lithuanian conflict by familiarizing pupils with lived experience and perceptions of past peoples. However, Manikowska admitted that such an approach to explanation of the conflict is not implemented in Poland, where the shared Polish-Lithuanian past is mostly presented in a very concise, fact-oriented, and descriptive manner.

Michał Tymowski welcomed the introduction of multiple perspectives into school-history education, but admitted that an extremely broad scope of the curriculum limits the possibility of such a pedagogical approach. He pointed out that history, to the extent that it is open to different narratives of experience, can provide resources for mutual understanding and empathy.

Robert Śniegocki and Piotr Laskowski both stressed the obligation to introduce pupils to multiple points of view on the past and demonstrate to pupils that a textbook narrative does not offer an exhaustive knowledge of the past. In this regard, they reiterate the views of the Lithuanian authors Deimantas Karvelis and Jūratė Litvinaitė, who similarly emphasized that pupils should realize that a textbook does not constitute a sacred and indispensable source of historical knowledge. Laskowski laid emphasis on the need to show pupils that the default state-oriented textbook narrative excludes the lives and experiences of ordinary people. Śniegocki argued that pupils should learn to question the knowledge presented in the textbook and realize that historical interpretations are constantly shifting in accordance with the change of OPTICS from one generation to the next. On the other hand, concrete examples of how multiperspectivity is practiced in Śniegocki’s textbooks reveal that they rather concern judgment of particular events in the past (for or against) than understanding of different lived experiences, reasoning and perceptions of people in the past.

Tymowski’s position was likewise reminiscent of Litvinaitė’s belief that the role of the government in history education is to provide a particular direction with regard to value orientations. He emphasized that such official guidelines should provide a vision or a framework for history education, but simultaneously encompass multiple points of view.

**Table 5. Multiperspectivity: Polish authors**

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<tr>
<td>Halina Manikowska</td>
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<td>Historians need to examine and portray the reasoning of people on both SIDES of the conflict. Historians need to understand the reasoning of the people who lived in the past, their worldviews and experience which shaped how they perceived the situation.</td>
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</table>
Michał Tymowski  
School-history should draw pupils’ attention to differences in interpretation of the past, but simultaneously needs to provide basic factual knowledge. Getting to know different interpretations of the past creates a potential for mutual understanding. It is important to show that there are different points of view on the past. The role of the ministry is to provide a certain direction for history education, which would take into account different points of view. It should not outline a single interpretation, but indicate a direction on what kind of values need to be encouraged through school-history.

Robert Śniegocki  
It is important that pupils would understand that there can be different points of view. An author is obliged to avoid evaluation of the past and to show, where it applies, different points of view. History education should make pupils aware that historical knowledge is not sacred words. Pupils should learn to question the historical knowledge and realize that historical optics change from generation to generation.

Piotr Laskowski  
Pupils need to comprehend that there can be multiple perspectives on the past and that the default state-oriented narrative currently exists at the expense of a more inclusive perspective that takes into consideration the lives of ordinary people in the past. History education should teach dialogue with people different from ourselves and resurrect the voices of the silenced.

### 8.3 Narrative organization

The presentation of history as a linear sequence of static states, that is devoid of a lived, experiential past, does create the impression of a narrative, in which values and meanings are solely a product of narrative organization of factual material. When history writing attempts to present objective knowledge about the past or ignores the past that is lived in embodiment, it has few means to counter the postmodern critique that meaning is made in history solely through narrative impositionalism (e.g., White 1974, 1999; Munslow 2003, 2006a, 2006b; Section 3.4.2). This is evidenced in historical narratives that are principally organized in terms of the developments of the nation and state and that ignore diverse lived experiences of its population.

In such cases, the postmodern critique of history writing is justified to the extent that such disembodied historical narratives have little to offer to prove otherwise. The problem, however, is that the postmodern philosophy of history, because of its own implicit reliance on a disembodied model of cognition, assumes all history writing, in principle, to be removed from past reality (as discussed in Section 3.4). It scales up a partial textual phenomenon to be representative of the whole field of history writing. An embodied approach to history writing can encompass and extend the postmodern philosophy of history by revealing the effects of embodiment on the way historians make sense of the
past, but likewise by showing that the meaning of the lived, experiential past does not have to depend completely on historians’ emplotment and narrativization.

The effects of textbook narratives that downplay or ignore the lived, experiential past demonstrate why a sharp opposition between history and memory, as discussed in Chapter 2, is counterproductive. That is, why such a sharp opposition between history and memory is unhelpful, if the aim is to understand, in contrast to an optical sense of static correspondence, how a past reality can relate to a historical text. History, on the one hand, requires an experiential, embodied memory of lived experience; memory of lived experience, on the other hand, can benefit from a disciplinary emphasis of history on critical engagement with diverse sources. In other words, history and memory are interdependent and mutually supportive, rather than antithetical to one another as is sometimes assumed. What is meant here by the notion of memory, moreover, is not the essentialized, static, foundational and canonical memory that is often employed by state apparatuses and which imposes its own fixed image on the body (Assmann 2011). Rather, dynamic and embodied memory of lived experience is diverse and fluid, not uniform and fixed. Taking into account the past as lived in a narrative may reveal the ways in which the meaning of the past is not an arbitrary product of narrative organization.

The focus on divergent interpretations illustrates well how an embodied approach to making sense of the past may serve in handling a plurality of evaluations. The complexity of past reality requires that cognition proceeds in comprehensive terms and emphasizes how divergent lived experiences relate and contribute to larger-scale phenomena or processes. That is, how individual threads of lived experience interconnect to produce the patterns, shapes and textures that themselves form the overall weave, or the process of life, and which, in multiple ongoing feedback loops, shape those individual threads (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1993 [1991]; Capra 2003). A plurality of interpretations demands that we recognize the multilayered complexity of past reality and link patterns (perspectives) to processes (lived experience) in our analysis.

Comprehensive thinking skills are those that enable identifying relations between individual parts as well as between these parts and the wholes they form, understanding relations and interconnections, and identifying different levels of complexity. Such skills are opposed to merely reductive analysis and permit the comprehension of a plurality of interpretations. This is no impediment to truth, understood in terms of such complexity. On the other hand, when we rely exclusively on a linear, static, reductionist way of thinking that is intrinsic to a disembodied model of cognition, we think about knowledge in terms of static entities, isolated parts, enclosed, “inner” mental images or snapshots. Accordingly, we are led to scrutinize perspectives as the focus of our specialized analytical attention. But we struggle to see such perspectives as part of the multilayered process of life.

In an embodied approach, instead of having to select one viewpoint from which to evaluate an event, teachers and pupils would need to comprehend past reality as a complex system, with multiple diverse experiences interconnecting with each other and bringing forth larger-scale processes and phenomena, whose effects loop back to shape individual lives. School history needs to encourage mutual understanding and acceptance of different lived experiences and help pupils comprehend why people experienced the past in very
different ways rather than necessarily seeking a single account of the past. Thus, a
correction of the past as a process of life forces the narrator to engage with a multilayered
complexity of the past – multiple patterns and their respective processes. In order to
handle successfully the plurality of interpretations, the concept of complexity is of
paramount importance.

A striking, though not an unexpected, finding of the analysis was that textbook
narratives, both in Lithuania and Poland, largely omit the lived, experiential past from
textbook narratives of a shared Polish-Lithuanian past. This could partially be explained
by the nature of the history curriculum in both countries, which encompasses an extremely
large amount of information. The scope of the curricula is very wide and encompasses
“all” history from pre-historic times to the 21st century, which prevents any kind of more
meaningful engagement with the past beyond a brief, fact-oriented and superficial
depiction of the most important, typically political, history.

Political and military history still prevails in the depiction of the Polish-Lithuanian
history, in both Poland and Lithuania. In this regard, I agree with Piotr Laskowski’s
critique of school-history education, which, unlike professional history, has not yet
transcended its 19th-century inherited fixation on political history. The linearity of a
narrative sequence of static states of the world, combined with an enduring overall
emphasis on political history, renders the complexity of the past process of life invisible.
Moreover, if history is modeled as a collection of disembodied facts about generalized
states of the world, it likely leaves pupils indifferent to the past, since there is little in such
a history that could engage pupils with an experiential, embodied, lived dimension of that
past.

As long as school-history textbooks depict the shared past in terms of a linear,
disembodied narrative and a strictly nation-oriented perspective, integration of multiple
narratives of experience will remain a challenge. What Polish and Lithuanian textbooks
share is the disembodied, linear, reductive model of the past. Where they differ is in the
perspective they prioritize at the expense of other perspectives. Complexity does not enter
the picture of the past, because the very structure of the textbook narrative prevents pupils
from thinking about the past in terms of a complex process of life that accommodates
different narratives of experience.

8.4 The presentation of the Polish-Lithuanian past

In the analyzed Lithuanian textbooks, it is possible to observe a slight shift towards a more
balanced portrayal of the shared Polish-Lithuanian past and Poland’s role in Lithuanian
history. The textbooks of Juozas Brazauskas illustrate the narrative of the early 1990s,
where the themes of threat, resistance, and defense of sovereignty predominate. Poland
and Poland’s role in Lithuanian history are assessed in these textbooks primarily
according to whether they strengthened or diminished the FOUNDATION of the Lithuanian
state and identity. Polonization of the Lithuanian political elites is depicted as evoking the
threat of MELTING AWAY, whereas the Union of Lublin is said to contribute to the gradual
decline of Lithuanian statehood.
Compared to the textbooks from the 1990s, textbooks published after 2000 reevaluated the impact of Polish-Lithuanian unification and shared statehood in less negative terms. The history textbook for the 9th grade “Laikas” of the publishing house “Briedis” (Sections 6.3.1.2 and 6.3.1.3) stand out in this regard by a more nuanced evaluation of the Polish-Lithuanian unification. This reveals an influence, even if delayed, of shifts in historiographical debates on the contents of history textbooks.

The negative evaluation of Poland’s role in Lithuanian history, however, still figures in Lithuanian textbooks, even though authors avoid asserting explicit judgments. In particular, the Union of Lublin and the interwar conflict remain contentious topics. For example, two textbooks, (co-)authored by Jūratė Litvinaitė (6.2.3.1 and 6.2.3.2), exclusively characterize Lithuania’s unification with Poland after the 15th century as threatening the Lithuanian identity and statehood. Textbooks underline that the Union of Lublin was partially an act of coercion. One of Litvinaitė’s textbooks (6.2.3.1) accentuates themes of decline, disorder and the gradual fading of Lithuanian statehood in the centuries following the Union, thereby further fortifying a unilaterally negative assessment of the Union of Lublin. On the other hand, FRIENDSHIP between Lithuania and Poland is said to have been restored after the re-establishment of Lithuanian independence in 1990. The textbook (6.2.3.2) states that both countries recognized each other’s rights and territories, thus, including the city of Vilnius within the territory of the Lithuanian state. Poland is personified, noting how it “HELPED the YOUNG Lithuanian state to STAND ON ITS FEET.”

In the textbook series “Laikas” (6.3), co-authored by Ignas Kapleris, an attempt can be observed to SMOOTH OVER sharp CORNERS and re-assess the role of Poland in Lithuanian history. The textbook assessment of the Polish role in the Lithuanian history acknowledges explicitly in what ways Lithuania benefited from the rapprochement with Poland and the ensuing Europeanization, but less desirable developments and influences after the 1569 Union of Lublin are also mentioned. The adoption of the Constitution of May 3 in 1791 is presented as a remarkable achievement, which was significant not only for Poland, but also for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Importantly, the conflict between Polish-speaking “Old Lithuanians” and the modern Lithuanian national movement in the 19th century is presented by seeking to explain how each of these internally diverse groups perceived their situation. Polish-speaking Lithuanians, who merged into the modern Polish nation, are introduced as people who were forced to make a choice under unfavorable circumstances, who were at a CROSSROADS of a PAINFUL choice. The textbook combines, in an embodied way, the presentation of divergent perspectives with a discussion of a process of lived experience out of which these perspectives emerged.

On the other hand, the interwar conflict elicited strong emotions both during the interview with Kapleris and in the textbook presentation of the series “Laikas.” The textbook narrative asserts that Lithuanians were the weaker, but legally and historically the legitimate side of the conflict, whereas in the interview, Kapleris made sense of the interwar conflict over Vilnius by personifying the two countries as NEIGHBORS who fight over a PLOT OF LAND.

Lastly, the textbook series “Raktas” (6.4), co-authored by, among others, Mindaugas Tamošaitis and Deimantas Karvelis, encompasses a diverse jumble of assessments of the Polish-Lithuanian past. The depiction of some events of the past, such as the 1385 Union
of Krewo or the interwar conflict, avoid any explicit positive or negative evaluation. Just as Tamošaitis explained in the interview, he avoided asserting a strong judgment and sought neutrality in the textbook narrative. Despite an attempt to link the interwar conflict with the 19th-century developments of national consciousness, the focus is on the factual details of the military conflict. In the case of the Union of Krewo, the textbook (6.4.2.2) suggests to pupils, however, that Jogaila’s promise “to annex the territory of Lithuania to Poland for the ages” has been a matter of discord among Polish and Lithuanian historians, who debate what the term “annex,” or “applicare,” meant. Unlike in Polish textbooks, the textbook (6.4.2.2) from this series also attributes the merits for the victory in the Battle of Grunwald to the Lithuanian maneuver.

The sections of the series “Raktas,” written by Karvelis, on the other hand, espouse stronger value judgments of the past. The negative evaluation of the Union of Lublin and its consequences prevails in the textbook. The author claims that “DOORS WERE OPENED UP WIDELY for the Polonization of the Lithuanian nobility which started in 1385” (6.4.6.1). The Union of Lublin is presented as a turning point, a THRESHOLD in Lithuanian history, which OPENED THE DOORS for an eventual decline of Lithuanian statehood and sovereignty. On the other hand, the noble democracy is said to be an advantageous phenomenon for Lithuania after the Union of Lublin.

A general tendency that can be observed in the analyzed Lithuanian textbooks, with the exception of the textbook series “Laikas,” is that the Union of Lublin stands out as the point in history, marking the beginning of the decline of Lithuanian statehood. In the narrative sequence, the medieval glory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is gradually diminished by closer rapprochement with the Kingdom of Poland, which ultimately leads to the loss of sovereignty. The nation is, however, redeemed from extinction in the 19th century with the emergence of the national revival movement.

In the analyzed Polish textbooks, there is a shift toward showing more explicitly that different ethnic and religious groups inhabited the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The textbooks of Halina Manikowska interpret the Union of Krewo as a reorientation in Polish foreign policy and a rapprochement with, until then, hostile Lithuania. The Polish-Lithuanian Union is assessed in the textbook (7.1.3.1) very positively as an event which permitted Poles and Lithuanians to jointly eliminate the danger of the Teutonic Order, and which led to an emergence of the powerful and territorially largest state in Europe. Jogaila’s pledge to incorporate the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to Poland is said to have become a quarrelsome issue between the two states (7.1.3.2). However, the textbook explains that the unions of Poland and Lithuania up until the 1569 Union of Lublin were based on a loose connection between two separate states (7.1.3). Moreover, the textbook (7.1.3.1) acknowledges the contribution of both states to the victory won in the Battle of Grunwald against the Teutonic Order.
Michał Tymowski’s textbooks stood out in the way they explicitly sought to underline the separateness of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the union with Poland. As an author, he aimed to show pupils that the political elites of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania preserved their sense of a separate identity even after they had become linguistically Polonized. The textbooks (7.2.2.1 and 7.2.2.2) explain that Polish-Lithuanian unification and the adoption of Catholic Christianity by Lithuania enabled Lithuanians to differentiate their identity from the Orthodox Ruthenian population of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

In this sense, the union with Poland is presented as a favorable development which guaranteed stability and continuity of Lithuanian statehood. The presentation of the Polish-Lithuanian Union in the textbooks (7.2.2.1 and 7.2.2.2) unequivocally departs from an established fact-oriented narrative tradition. The factual information is included in the depiction, but Tymowski clearly sought to focus pupils’ attention on the phenomenon of medieval unions as such and show how the Polish-Lithuanian union figures in the European context. Nevertheless, the textbook (7.2.2.2) acknowledges diverse and changing evaluations of the union in Poland and Lithuania. Pupils are made aware of the fact that evaluations of the Lithuanian gentry, who were contemporaries of the union, differed from the evaluations, which emerged in the 19th and 20th centuries together with modern nationalist movements.

The textbooks of Robert Śniegocki encourage pupils to consider different interpretations of the same events. For example, the Union of Krewo is introduced by familiarizing pupils with the historians’ debate about the meaning of the term “applicare” (7.3.2.1). Pupils likewise need to evaluate the position of Vytautas towards the Polish-Lithuanian union from the point of view of Poles and Lithuanians and to find positive and negative effects of his politics. The textbook (7.3.2.1) devoted considerably much space to discussing the Polish-Lithuanian conflict with the Teutonic Order, which culminated in the 1410 Battle of Grunwald. Pupils are given an additional source – a description of the course of the battle by the 15th century Polish chronicler Jan Długosz, which depicts how Lithuanian troops, unable to resist the attack of the Teutonic knights, escaped from the battlefield. Hence, the victory is presented as the sole accomplishment of the Polish army and the leadership skills of Jogaila. The textbook does not problematize this interpretation of the battle in light of the latest historical findings, nor does it mention anything about the maneuver of the Lithuanian army (7.3.2.1).

Śniegocki presents the 1569 Union of Lublin in the context of the Executionist movement in the Kingdom of Poland, which demanded the complete unification of Poland and Lithuania (7.3.2.2). The textbook vividly depicts the dissonance in attitudes towards the union in Lithuania. The textbook author acknowledges that the negotiation process between Polish and Lithuanian delegations over the terms of the union was particularly difficult. Pupils are familiarized with the commentary of the Polish historian Juliusz Bardach on the positive and negative effects of the union on Poles, Lithuanians and Ruthenians (7.3.2.2). Bardach notes that even though Lithuanian political elites became linguistically and culturally Polonized, they did not lose a sense of separate political consciousness and defended the political and legal subjectivity of the Grand Duchy in the union with Poland.
Another distinct feature of Śniegocki’s textbook series is that the chapters depicting the history after the Polish-Lithuanian union consistently use the terms “Republic” and “Polish-Lithuanian state” to refer to the Commonwealth. Even when the 18th century is described all the way to the partitions of the Commonwealth at the end of the century, the textbook adheres to these terms and avoids referring to the state as “Poland.” Furthermore, even when the Constitution of May 3 is depicted, the author clarifies that the Constitution was soon followed by the adoption of the Mutual Pledge of the Two Nations, which guaranteed half the seats in institutions of central government for the Lithuanians. Importantly, the textbook underlines that “in practice, the previously existing federative union was maintained” (7.3.2.2). In contrast to other Polish textbooks, the continuing duality of the state is acknowledged and emphasized.

Lastly, the textbook (7.3.3.1) contextualizes the interwar conflict between Poland and Lithuania in relation to the simultaneously ongoing Polish-Bolshevik war. The actual conflict between Poland and Lithuania is described in a single paragraph, which relates that when the Bolsheviks took control of Vilnius again in July 1920, they assigned the city to Lithuania. Pupils are provided a very brief, fact-oriented description of the conflict, which, however, does not explain at all why the conflict emerged in the first place. Because of the predominantly chronological narrative arrangement, the textbook fails to contextualize the conflict by discussing the long-term processes of identity transformation in the 19th century and the rise of modern national movements in the territory of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

The textbooks co-authored by Piotr Laskowski adopt a novel and more inclusive perspective on the history of peasants, religious and ethnic minorities, whose voice he is eager to insert into the textbook narrative. As he argued in the interview, the majority of ordinary people, who were peasants and who were not part of the political elites, felt themselves neither as Poles, nor as Lithuanians. Laskowski underlined that the preoccupation with Polishness or Lithuanianness is determined by the nation- and state-oriented tradition of history writing. However, in terms of the narrative of the Polish-Lithuanian past, the textbook does not depart much from an established narrative focused on the history of political elites. The textbook (7.4.2.1) introduces the 1385 Union of Krewo as advantageous to both Poland and Lithuania. In particular, it is stressed that the union strengthened both states against the threat of the Teutonic Order, which sought to dismantle the union by any means. The 1569 Union of Lublin is introduced rather briefly, laying emphasis on the fact that it constituted a closer political and administrative rapprochement of the two states (7.4.4.1). In the context of the 17th century, the textbook increasingly begins to refer to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as “Poland.”

The description of the Constitution of May 3 receives a lot of attention in the textbook (7.5.5.1). However, the nuances regarding Lithuanian sensitivities and the territorial-administrative arrangement of the state do not enter the focus. Keeping to its thematic focus, the textbook puts emphasis, rather, on the fact that peasants did not benefit from the Constitution, despite the fact that they constituted 90% of the population.

A distinctive feature of the presentation of the 19th century in the textbook (7.5.5.2) is that it takes into consideration other nations, which lived alongside the Poles, in the so-called “Polish lands” of the former Commonwealth. Although the authors do not discuss
the national movement of Lithuanians and Lithuanian-Polish relations, they, for example, problematize the Ukrainian-Polish relations and refer critically to the sense of superiority of Polish landlords towards the Ukrainian peasants. On the other hand, what is striking is that the final military take-over of the city of Vilnius and its region by Polish troops in 1920 is not even mentioned in the main text (7.5.5.2). Pupils learn that the troops of General Żeligowski staged a fake mutiny, under Piłsudski’s command, and that the region was, soon after, incorporated into Poland – in six sentences inserted on the margin of the page as supplementary information. The description focuses only on the Polish point of view and presents the events in a fact-oriented, descriptive manner. Since the emphasis in the narrative falls on the Polish-Soviet war, it is difficult to comprehend the roots of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict in the interwar period. The attitudes and rationale of the Lithuanians in the conflict are not introduced in the textbook.

In the analyzed Polish textbooks, the authors sought to depict the shared Polish-Lithuanian past not just from the nation-oriented perspective, but also from the European and social class perspectives. Nevertheless, the nation-focused political history prevails in the textbook narratives. The sovereignty and separateness of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the union with Poland are widely acknowledged. However, since the emphasis is primarily concentrated on the political and military past, textbooks devote little to no attention to the lived, experiential past, or to how people in the past experienced and perceived their situation. Attention to how the past was lived would inevitably require authors to show different perspectives and experiences of Poles and Lithuanians of the shared past. This is a particularly acute problem in depictions of the Polish-Lithuanian interwar conflict. The textbook presentation of the conflict in Poland is concise, fact-oriented, and descriptive. Textbooks do not engage the questions of how and why Lithuanians and Poles perceived the situation in such divergent terms, out of what process of experience these differences emerged.

This overview reveals the differences and consistencies in the interpretation of the past both between and among Lithuanian and Polish history textbooks. Despite certain similarities and encompassing patterns, there exist important in-group divergences in the presentation of the past among the analyzed Lithuanian as well as Polish textbooks.

8.5 Metaphorical themes

In addition to the ocularcentric metaphorical model of cognition, which implicitly shaped the presentation of historical knowledge, there were other metaphor, which played a role in influencing the authors’ reasoning about and portrayal of the past. The source of these metaphors was the authors’ personal and family memory, the social environment with which they engaged, the historiography they read, university studies, the influence of specific teachers or mentors. A particular textbook rendition of the past inevitably carries a
stamp of these authors’ lived experiences, all of which shape their individual ways of interpreting and presenting the past. Even though the curriculum structures the contents of a textbook, it leaves a lot of room for these authors’ personal choices as to how the past should be introduced and which aspects of it should be highlighted. Table 6 below lists the main metaphors of each textbook author.

**Table 6. Metaphors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Metaphors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Juozas Brazauskas</td>
<td><strong>RESISTANCE, HISTORY AS FOUNDATION FOR IDENTITY, TREE, ROOTS, MELTING AWAY, MARCHING, EXTINCTION, RESURRECTION, LOOKING FROM THE WINDOW</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jūratė Litvinaitė</td>
<td><strong>BOUNDLESS OCEAN, FISHERMEN, BOUNDLESS KINGDOM, WORLD OF THE PAST, HISTORY AS FOUNDATION OF USEFUL KNOWLEDGE, OBSERVING THE PAST, STATE AS A FAMILY UNIT, PERSPECTIVE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignas Kapleris</td>
<td><strong>TO SMOOTH OVER THE CORNERS, BLACK AND WHITE IN HISTORY, TEXTBOOK AS A GUIDE-POST, A VACUUM, INFORMATION WARFARE, A CARD GAME, PERSPECTIVE, THE SPLIT NATION, TWO BRANCHES OF THE NATION, TWO PATHS, NEIGHBORS FIGHTING OVER A PLOT OF LAND, PAINFUL PAST</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindaugas Tamošaitis</td>
<td><strong>USURP A MONOPOLY, RULES OF THE GAME, TO LOOK AT EVENTS WITHOUT BIAS, ROOTS, DIFFERENT PATHS, POLAND AND LITHUANIA AS PERSONS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halina Manikowska</td>
<td><strong>A CONTINUITY OF VISION, A BAGGAGE, PENDULUM, TILT TO AN OPPOSITE SIDE, HISTORIANS AS CHRONICLERS, REALITY HIDES BEHIND SOURCES, BOTH SIDES OF THE CONFLICT TO BE SHOWN</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michał Tymowski</td>
<td><strong>CURRICULUM AS A GRAIN ELEVATOR, DROWNING IN FACTS, ALIVE AND DEAD HISTORY, POINT OF VIEW, AN IMAGE OF THE PAST, HISTORIANS CANNOT BREAK AWAY FROM THEMSELVES, FOUNDATION FOR UNDERSTANDING THE OTHERNESS OF PEOPLE OF THE PAST</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Śniegocki</td>
<td><strong>POINTS OF VIEW, A GAZE ON HISTORY, ASSESS AS IF FROM OUTSIDE, A VISION, HISTORICAL OPTICS, TEXTBOOK IS NOT A CALENDAR OF DATES, SACRED WORDS, A CARBON PAPER IN THE BRAIN</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piotr Laskowski</td>
<td><strong>OVERLAPPING WORLDS, HISTORY EDUCATION AS A DIALOGUE WITH PEOPLE DIFFERENT FROM US, STEPPING INTO SOMEONE ELSE’S SHOES, VOICES OF THE SILENCED, PERSPECTIVES, SHIFTING THE GLASS LENS, WAYS OF SEEING THE PAST, LIVING AND DEAD KNOWLEDGE</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Several key thematic groups of metaphors emerge from the above list: organic, ground/groundlessness, spatial, ocular-optic metaphors, and metaphors that are based on senses other than that of sight.

**Organic**: TREE, ROOTS, RESISTANCE, EXTINCTION, MELTING AWAY, TWO BRANCHES OF THE NATION, POLAND WANTED TO ABSORB US, TO SUCK US IN, ALIVE AND DEAD HISTORY, LIVING AND DEAD KNOWLEDGE.

Organic metaphors were particularly dominant in the interview and textbooks of Brazauskas. However, they likewise emerged in the textbooks of Kapleris and the interviews with Karvelis, Tymowski, and Laskowski. In both Brazauskas and Karvelis, the organic metaphors are used in relation to the theme of national vitality that is in danger of being annihilated or overwhelmed. The perception of menace of disappearing, melting away, diluting, dissolving is at the same time associated with the need for strong FOUNDATIONS, which would ground the identity, ensure the resistance to upROOTing influences, and maintain the boundary between self and other. Accordingly, the endurance of the boundary between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the shared state features prominently in the textbook narrative of Brazauskas. If the boundary is blurry or permeable, the FOUNDATION may be WASHED OUT and the identity can become DILUTED. MELTING AWAY becomes synonymous with death, non-being, which explains why the textbook narrative is laden with strong emotional value, even if the count of explicit metaphors is low throughout the textbook. In the case of Karvelis, the metaphor of ABSORPTION likewise indicates the perception of threat associated with the fragility and permeability of the boundary between self and other. The organic metaphors of Brazauskas and Karvelis further correlate with a shared trait of reasoning in that both authors expressed their reservation towards European-cosmopolitan identity and values. Particularly for Brazauskas, European values threaten the stability of the traditional Romantic vision of the nation, which he seeks to preserve in his pupils.

In the case of the Polish authors, organic metaphors were rare and manifested solely in the context of making sense of the liveliness of historical knowledge. Both Tymowski and Laskowski associated DEAD knowledge with detached, objective factual information that needs to be memorized, whereas LIVING knowledge reveals how the past is present in its consequences. DEAD knowledge is fixed and static (ocularcentric) (see Section 3.2), whereas LIVING knowledge is continuously in the process of making.

**Ground/groundlessness**: HISTORY AS FOUNDATION for identity, MELTING AWAY, HISTORY AS FOUNDATION of useful knowledge, BOUNDLESS OCEAN, BOUNDLESS KINGDOM, A VACUUM, USURP A MONOPOLY, DROWNING IN FACTS, HISTORY AS FOUNDATION for understanding the otherness of people of the past.

The metaphor of FOUNDATION was used in several meanings that highlighted divergent priorities and interests of textbook authors and history teachers. Thus, while, for Brazauskas, history exerts its grounding effect as a FOUNDATION for identity, Litvinaitė rather underlines the instrumental value of history as a foundation of useful, practical knowledge. The grounding effect of the metaphor of FOUNDATION contrasts in Brazauskas with his perception of the threat of disappearance or EXTINCTION. Laskowski, on the other hand, places the metaphor of FOUNDATION in a completely different context that seeks to engage with rather than to isolate oneself from otherness. The interrelated themes of
grounding and groundlessness also manifested in relation to assessing and making sense of the past, when Kapleris uttered the metaphor of a VACUUM to convey the absence of clear value stances in relation to the past in the beginning of the 1990s. Identifying values, thus, allows facing the disorienting, groundless state of VACUUM in the aftermath of ideological shifts. The overwhelming groundlessness likewise strongly reverberated in Litvinaitė, who proposed that the BOUNDLESS OCEAN of the past can only be faced by skilled historians as FISHERMEN.

**Spatial:** BOUNDLESS OCEAN, BOUNDLESS KINGDOM, WORLD of the past, OVERLAPPING WORLDS.

Metaphorically structuring history, the past, time as a BOUNDLESS OCEAN of facts, a BOUNDLESS KINGDOM or a WORLD spatializes the temporal dimension. The processual and embodied character of temporal change is obscured. The past is then located outside of a human life: it is distanced from the time of one’s life, or time embodied through lived experience. Spatializing of time or the past may reflect a deeper underlying ocularcentric image-schema, where an observer is watching the past laid out spatially at a distance (Section 3.2). However, when time or the past is a place, the temporality and embodiment of lived experience are concealed. In turn, historical knowledge can then be conceptualized as an IMAGE of the past, a flattened snapshot of the geographically laid out past, a copy of a distanced WORLD. Time turns into a chronological succession of snapshots (Sections 3.2 and 3.4).

**Ocular-Optic:** LOOKING FROM THE WINDOW, OBSERVING THE PAST, PERSPECTIVE, TO LOOK AT events without bias, FIFTH MIRROR IN THE KINGDOM OF DISTORTING MIRRORS, showing BOTH SIDES – THE DARK AND THE LIGHT – of history, BLACK AND WHITE IN HISTORY, COLORFUL HISTORY, VISION, POINT OF VIEW, AN IMAGE OF THE PAST, A GAZE ON HISTORY, HISTORICAL OPTICS, assess AS IF FROM OUTSIDE, SHIFTING THE GLASS LENS, WAYS OF SEEING THE PAST.

The most abundant group of metaphors was ocular-optic metaphors, which surfaced in every interview and/or textbook. These metaphors are the tip of an iceberg – the underlying, implicit ocularcentric metaphorical model of cognition (Sections 3.1 and 3.2), on which the conceptualization of truth, objectivity, multiperspectivity as well as organization of the narrative content rest, as discussed in Sections 8.1–8.3. Ocular-optic metaphors are based on a particular schematization of the knowing self and its (dis)engagement with the environment. They conjure an idea of the knowing self as a static observer, who is imprisoned within the subjective-objective dualism (Crary 1990; Sections 3.1 and 3.2). Hence, the knowing self is a distanced objective spectator who observes the world as if from outside or a subjective viewer, who cannot really know the world and who solely imbues what she or he sees by way of a relative, figuratively framed meaning. The ocularcentrism invokes the epistemological quest for bridging the gap between the “inside” and the “outside” of cognition.

**Other senses:** TO SMOOTH OVER THE CORNERS, PAINFUL PAST, VOICES OF THE SILENCED.

In contrast to sight, other senses served as a metaphorical source domain only very rarely. However, it is exactly those metaphors, based on senses other than sight, that turn the readers’ attention to the lived dimension of the past. For example, the readers are encouraged to recognize the sense of the past, whose pain can be presently felt and
inhabits one’s body (Section 6.3.2). The past cannot be PAINFUL outside of a body, however, which feels it (e.g., Jackson 1994). Alternatively, the readers may be encouraged to engage with the sound of the VOICES OF THE SILENCED. Among similar metaphors, based on other sensory domain sources, is the touch metaphor. Used to convey the idea of avoiding “sharp,” antagonizing depictions of the past, in order TO SMOOTH OVER THE CORNERS, this metaphor evokes the sense of touch. However, in this case, what is being SMOOTHED OVER is not the past, but rather narratives told in the textbooks.
Chapter 9. Conclusion

The main goal of this work has been to demonstrate how vision-based, implicit metaphorical models continue to shape default assumptions in school history about what it means to know the past. The effect of the endurance of the disembodied, static, ocularcentric model of cognition is that the act of knowing the world continues to be conceived in terms of mimesis – making of (re)presentations as mental images, which are detached from the world/reality/past. The principle of mimesis obscures the role played by the body in cognition.

A disembodied, metaphysical distinction between mind and world entails that narratives can be conceptualized either as “inner” representations of external reality or as presentations, whose meaning is defined in terms of internal relationships between symbols within a formal system. In the former case, a representation is assumed to be a mentalistic mirror image of the externalized reality; in the latter case, a presentation bears no link to the world outside the formal system of symbols. In both cases, the conceptualization of meaning is metaphorically structured by the spectatorial image-schema of cognition, which implies the distinction between reality and representation, matter and mind, language and reality, subject and object, “inside” and “outside” of cognition. The dualistic assumption leads to two concurrent epistemological solutions: one can either seek to bridge the gap by means of optical mirroring or, if optical truth is not attainable, to distance the world and define meaning within the confines of disembodied mental construction.

As I sought to demonstrate, in order to conceive of knowledge as inner mental snapshots that are distanced from the world, one needs to ignore the role played by the body in cognitive experience. Sight, the sense that is most capable of detachment, has come to dominate philosophical conceptualizations, effectively hiding the dynamic and embodied experience in cognition. What has escaped our awareness is how visual metaphors, at an implicit meta-theoretical level, has exerted a tremendous influence on what questions, theories and methodologies we build and what kind of knowledge these, in turn, lead us to. I have argued that a reevaluation of an entrenched metaphysical assumption of a divide between world and word is urgently needed. This model of cognition, dominant as it has been in Western philosophy, has marginalized the embodied and world-involving nature of mind and cognition.

The theory of enactive embodiment challenges the assumption that cognition is an internal representation of an external, pre-given world and opposes the dualism of mind and world. Enactive embodiment offers a radically altered, more broadly defined conception of cognition, which maps the relation between the cognizing self and world in terms of a process of dynamic interaction. Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1993 [1991]) propose to regard cognition as embodied action – “an enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs” (9). In this understanding, perception is not a passive internalization of information, but an active process – it implies a dynamic process of doing and acting in the world. The process or history of embodied (inter)action shapes the cognizing self and its ways of making sense
of the world. The process of cognition or interaction with the world is embodied in the pattern of perception.

When applied to the discipline of history, enactive embodiment holds important theoretical and methodological implications. Past reality becomes conceived not as an externalized static space “out there,” but rather, as a past process of life, the materiality of which is weaved into the present. The process of past life is embodied in the present and can be encountered as such in the present – in ways of being, living, seeing, in subtle and often unnoticeable manifestations of the persistence of the past.

I have proposed the metaphor of the weave to make sense of the complexity of the process of life. The weave constitutes a material embodiment, an emergent product of the process of becoming or weaving. Threads (lived experience), through their particular entanglements, bring forth patterns, textures and shapes, which make up the materiality of the overall weave (past process of life). Examining the complexity of the weave, one can both identify the knots, textures and patterns in the weave, as if from outside, and follow the entanglements of individual threads (lived experience) that both produce the patterns and are organized by them.

Both the patterns and individual threads are part of the same complex weave, intermeshed and interconnected. The past reality is, accordingly, not a linear sequence of static states along a chronological axis, but a process of interrelations, junctions and entanglements that shape the patterns the weave takes. Larger-scale structures of social life, in this understanding, come to be viewed as patterns that come into shape over time by way of human activity and that simultaneously organize the environment of embodied interaction. Such interaction, moreover, affects the dynamic trajectory of individual threads.

These structures can be conceived as dynamic systems of linkages between human experience, things and ideas rather than as rigid, static “wholes.” An embodied approach to history, therefore, requires that inquiry into larger-scale processes and phenomena of the shared past would be combined with an engagement of processes of diverse lived experiences on a smaller scale. Appreciation of the complexity of the past process of life entails due recognition of the ways in which the past can both be shared and lived in terms of individual experiential trajectories.

The cognizing self (historian), who makes sense of the weave, its patterns, entanglements and threads, engages with its shapes and textures and makes meaning that is as much dependent on the weave as on the experiences, categories, concepts and metaphors of the cognizing self. The meaning is brought forth in the process of engagement between the weave (or its particular dimension) and the embodied cognizing self. The meaning of the past, then, is neither a completely arbitrary, subjective, “inner” figuration, nor is it an objective representation of the pre-given, context-independent meaning of reality. In this regard, we can speak of two levels of embodiment in history writing: the embodiment of the historian who makes sense of the past and the embodied nature of past life, with which the historian engages.

The complexity of the past process of life encompasses divergent lived experiences that dualist metaphysics fails to take into account. As I demonstrate in my analysis, when ways of thinking about knowledge and truth are framed by dualist metaphysics, divergent
experiences of people, both individuals and groups, become a confounding problem. The metaphysical notion of truth does not accommodate varied and often conflicting narratives of experience. It fails to make sense of the truth in relation to the divergent lived past. The contribution of this dissertation is, therefore, to specifically show how the rethinking of the truth of the past in embodied terms opens up potential new avenues for conceiving of historical truth and for teaching it in school-history textbooks. Further research is required to propose concrete ways in which enactive embodiment could be applied in history writing and history teaching. However, this dissertation can be considered as a first step in seeking to propose new ways of engaging with the past and making sense of it.

An embodied approach to history, I am convinced, can be of particular merit in processes of post-conflict reconciliation, where opposing parties typically fail to engage with divergent narratives of experience of a shared past. My project shows that in order to be able to achieve reconciliation, a larger emphasis should be placed not on attempts to nail down the truthful facts, but on efforts to understand and relate to different processes of lived experiences that have generated the conflict. Attention to metaphor can be of particular help in this context, as research on metaphor use offers ample evidence that a crucial factor in reconciliation is readiness to engage with a different experiential framework by partaking in other people’s metaphors. Metaphorical identification does not entail that people need to agree with or justify a different lived past; it only implies a capacity to empathically engage with and understand a divergent narrative of experience and how it forms a part of an encompassing weave of past life.

My research on school-history textbooks and their authors has shown that attention to the lived, experiential past in school history in Poland and Lithuania remains very scarce, if acknowledged at all. Priority continues to be assigned to the political and military past of states and nations and to the factual information about general states of the world in the past. The analysis has revealed that when the lived dimension of the past is obscured in textbook narratives, it becomes, in fact, possible to argue that the meaning of textbook narratives is primarily, if not exclusively, dependent on the historians’ emplotment and narrative organization of factual content. Thus, an unexpected finding of my examination of textbooks is that attention to the lived, experiential past is what can expose the non-arbitrary and non-mimetic connections between past life and history.

I have argued that attention to embodiment can provide conceptual tools for history teachers and history textbook authors for how to handle the diversity of interpretations of the past in school narratives. As the analysis has shown, textbook authors are generally willing to include divergent accounts of the past into textbooks. However, they face significant challenges to achieving this task effectively due to curricular restrictions, but likewise due to an implicit adherence to a disembodied, vision-based and vision-generated metaphorical model of cognition.

The latter manifests in textbooks by an exclusive priority given to: evaluation of accuracy; identification of bias and subjectivity in sources; reduction-driven analysis of diverse interpretations through adjudication of which one is correct and which one is false (while simultaneously ignoring the question of how these conflicting accounts could be synthesized into a more encompassing account); chronological arrangement of history as a linear sequence of static and depersonalized states (events); and the exclusion of a lived,
experiential past from textbook narratives. The unconscious adherence to a disembodied, ocularcentric model of cognition in textbooks prepares one for a critical scrutiny of truth-claims in sources, but leaves pupils completely unprepared to make sense of divergent interpretations in relation to the lived process of experience out of which they emerged. Authors of textbooks fail to equip pupils with the tools and ways of thinking about the complexity of the past process of life, in which diverse lived experiences intermingle, intermesh, and constitute a crucial dimension of the past.

I am convinced that the post-truth world that we are told to be living in requires a closer look at embodied lived experience because hearing and reading someone talk about their lived experience, seeing their facial expressions and bodily gestures reveals something crucial about the lived dimension of truth, whose meaning can be perceived even if one does not agree with the expressed ideas and opinions. To ignore the lived, experiential past is to lose the potential for understanding another person and where they are coming from. That understanding is the beginning of a realization about the complexity of the process of life and of how we are all shaped by our own histories of interaction with our respective environments.

In short, we need to move past the static, vision-based thinking about truth in terms of atomistic, subjective perspectives vis-à-vis the objective world of reality. This kind of reasoning, based on visual metaphorical models, inevitably leads either to a static relativist polarization of the “you have your narrative, I have mine” kind or, alternatively, to attempts to transcend the lived dimension altogether, reducing truth to what can be claimed to be objectively shared facts. Neither of these options can offer effective tools for navigating the diversity of interpretations, because they inherently fail to take into account the lived experience that is at the root of different perspectives.

In conclusion, what we need to strive for is an understanding of how humans can have a world in common and simultaneously live it in terms of their own particular histories. It is in this sense that an understanding of truth requires an understanding of complexity. Until such a time when truth can be understood in all its complexity, various conflicts and tensions that divide us rather than unite us will continue to gnaw away at the edges of our societies, if not at their cores. Feeding such conflicts in the name of reductive, relativistic truths, however, denies the conciliatory potential that understanding such complexity offers.
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339


Appendix 1

The Outline of the Interview Questionnaire

- Should different historical interpretations of the same event or phenomenon be introduced in school textbooks and if so, in what manner? According to what principles should it be decided which interpretations/narratives to include in school textbooks? What should the relation be between school history and different historical narratives?
- How do you understand the concept of historical truth? How could the truthfulness of competing claims and/or narratives be measured? Should pupils be acquainted in school-history lessons with the epistemology of history? If so, in what manner? Is such knowledge relevant and accessible to pupils?
- How do you understand the concept of objectivity in the discipline of history? What constitutes an objective historical depiction? What role does objectivity play in school history, if any?
- Should school-history textbooks promote certain values? If so, which values have you sought to emphasize in your textbook(s)? What is the relation between values and factual information in school history?
- What is the key purpose of school-history education? What skills and knowledge are the most important for pupils to acquire from school-history education? What kind of understanding of history as a discipline should pupils receive from school-history lessons?
- How free were you in constructing the textbook narrative? Did you seek to modify a certain existing interpretation, to present a counter-narrative, or to make the account more complex with new facts? What historiographical references did you rely on? What challenges and experiences have you encountered in the process of writing a textbook?
- If you had an opportunity, would you revise anything in your textbook(s)? If so, what?
- Do you perceive the presentation of certain topics in Lithuanian/Polish school-history textbooks problematic (conceptually or methodologically)? What would you change in the presentation?
- Do you have an ideal model of a school-history textbook? If so, what features distinguish it? If you had complete freedom in authoring a textbook, what would it look like?
- What feedback have you received about your textbook(s), including reviewers and schoolteachers? How do you assess the textbook review practices in your country? How much did you have to change, modify your text, if at all, for the text to be accepted?