Emissions trading, non-compliance and bankable permits

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dc.contributor.author Lappi, Pauli
dc.date.accessioned 2019-01-23T22:38:49Z
dc.date.available 2021-12-17T22:02:41Z
dc.date.issued 2017-12
dc.identifier.citation Lappi , P 2017 , ' Emissions trading, non-compliance and bankable permits ' , International Tax and Public Finance , vol. 24 , no. 6 , pp. 1081-1099 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-017-9439-2
dc.identifier.other PURE: 94105017
dc.identifier.other PURE UUID: 9bffda01-1e12-4d1e-a518-0f918762f9ee
dc.identifier.other WOS: 000414966800006
dc.identifier.other Scopus: 85010778017
dc.identifier.other ORCID: /0000-0002-9531-5384/work/40636095
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10138/298116
dc.description.abstract We study non-compliance in an emissions trading system in which firms may bank and borrow permits. We find a condition involving auditing probability that characterizes compliance and allows us to analyze the time paths of actual emissions, reported emissions and violations. We find two interesting time instants. At the first time instant, reported emissions begin to be lower than the actual emissions, and at the second time instant, the reported emissions become zero and the actual emissions become constant. The results indicate, among other things, that a given penalty scheme may fail to induce compliance over the whole planning interval, even though it achieves compliance over the initial stage. en
dc.format.extent 19
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartof International Tax and Public Finance
dc.rights.uri info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject Banking
dc.subject Compliance
dc.subject Emissions trading
dc.subject Enforcement
dc.subject Monitoring
dc.subject MARKET POWER
dc.subject POLLUTION
dc.subject ENFORCEMENT
dc.subject BANKING
dc.subject POLICY
dc.subject FIRMS
dc.subject QUANTITIES
dc.subject PRICES
dc.subject CHOICE
dc.subject 511 Economics
dc.title Emissions trading, non-compliance and bankable permits en
dc.type Article
dc.contributor.organization Department of Economics and Management
dc.description.reviewstatus Peer reviewed
dc.relation.doi https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-017-9439-2
dc.relation.issn 0927-5940
dc.rights.accesslevel openAccess
dc.type.version acceptedVersion

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