Oligarchs, political regime changes, and firm valuation

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Economics of Transition, 2009, Vol 17 (3), pp. 411-438

Title: Oligarchs, political regime changes, and firm valuation
Author: Maury, Benjamin; Liljeblom, Eva
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Date: 2010-12-31
Language: en
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2009.00359.x
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10227/777
Abstract: This paper examines the impact of a regime shift on the valuation of politically powerful oligarch firms. Focusing on the Yeltsin-Putin regime shift in Russia, we find that the valuations of outside shareholders claims are significantly higher under the Putin regime than under the Yeltsin regime after controlling for industry and time effects. The findings suggest that the increasing cost of extracting private benefits outweigh the reduction in the value of political connections following the political regime change. The results are also consistent with changes in the risk of state expropriation. Our results show that effects driven by the political regime change complement the traditional view stating that increased ownership concentration improved the performance of Russian oligarch firms.
Subject: oligarchs
regime shift
subversion of institutions
political connections
ownership structure

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